The Outlook for Iraq
Central Intelligence Agency · 1957
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Introduction
The outlook for Iraq is forecast in a CIA paper dated in 1957. Iraq was then a kingdom allied with Britain, ruled in the name of a young king. Within a year the monarchy was destroyed in a bloody coup. Read with that knowledge, a calm outlook paper from 1957 shows how fast the ground of the Middle East could shift under careful men.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1957 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 22948 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000026758
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Full text
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The foncowe intelligence organteattons participated preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency” and the intelligence ae oy the Departments = ws " erELLagence’ ADVISORY ‘COMMIT TE or en pokes "om @ June 1957. Concurring were the Special ’ Intelligence, Department of State; fhe Assistant Chlef of - “Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of * “ : Waval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and : pat - the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Jotnt Staff. ‘The “. Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the - _ Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, adstained, en ee ee ee His 1. Iraq has emerged from the Suez crisis with its internal stability unimpaired and its policy of cooperation with the West unchanged. Use of reserves and borrow- ings from the Iraq Petroleum Company have enabled it to continue its economic development program despite the shut- down of the pipelines through Syria (now operating at about 50 percent of capac- ity). Recent developments have lessened Iraq’s isolation from the other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Jor- dan. (Paras. 6-9) 2. Iraq will probably retain its present political stability so long as Nuri Said remains active, either as premier or as the power behind the scene. However, undercurrents of opposition to the regime will probably require continuing reliance on authoritarian methods and, over the Jonger run, demands for broader par- ticipation in governmental affairs will probably become increasingly forceful. (Paras. 10-11, 13) 3. Political stability would probably de- cline if the 69-year-old Nuri were to dis- THE OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ THE PROBLEM To assess Iraq’s prospects for stability and economic progress and its probable role in Arab and Middle East affairs over the next few years, CONCLUSIONS appear from the scene. Although con- Servative elements are likely to retain control at least initially, the ruling group would probably be weakened by internal rivalries, and would probably face in- creased demands for reform and ultra- nationalist pressures both from within Iraq and from abroad. A successor regime might not be able to retain the present tight controls. (Para. 12) 4. Iraq’s development program is just beginning to show tangible results, and future economic prospects remain bright. Although Iraq’s economy could at present be endangered by new Syrian interference with the oil pipelines, this vulnerability could be reduced within the next few years by development of new pipelines and other alternate means of delivery. (Paras, 14-16) 5. Over the next few years Iraq will prob- ably continue to consider its interests best served by maintaining close political, economic, and military relations with the West, even though its ties with Britain have been weakened and its reliance on US support correspondingly increased. However, Iraq’s willingness to support Western policies and objectives in the Middle East will continue to be tempered by its sharing of general Arab aspirations and its desire to avoid becoming com- pletely isolated from its fellow Arab states. On the central issue of Palestine, the Iraqis share the general Arab hos- tility toward Israel and will continue to demonstrate their loyalty to the Arab cause by anti-Israeli pronouncements or gestures. (Paras, 17-23) DISCUSSION IRAQ AND THE SUEZ CRISIS 6. Iraq continues to occupy a special position in the Arab world, Among the principal Arab states, Iraq alone has both extensive economic assets and a sound development program well underway. It has resisted the temptation to adopt an extreme nationalist Policy and has retained close connections with the West. Iraq is the only major Arab state still having close ties with the UK and the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact. Furthermore, its government has refused to accept Egypt’s claim to leadership in the Arab world. Polit- ical contro] in Iraq remains in the hands of an established oligarchy of professional poli- ticians, wealthy landlords, businessmen, and tribal leaders. The dominant political figure is the veteran prime minister, Nuri Said, who has the important backing of the Palace. Iraq’s relatively high level of political and economic stability and its prospects for eco- nomic growth give it a potential importance out of proportion to its present five million population. 7. The Israel-French-UK invasion of Egypt imposed a severe strain on Iraq’s foreign policy orientation. The success which Nasser had had in his political efforts to establish a militant nationalistic anti-Western bloc with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia had already isolated Iraq in the Arab world. Relations with Saudi Arabia were also affected by longstanding dynastic differences. With the outbreak of the hostilities against Egypt, the Nuri Said government came under violent attack for its continued association with the UK in the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian and Syrian pres- Sures against the Nuri regime increased, Ultranationalist and leftist demonstrations broke out after the invasion and contin- ued intermittently until late December 1956. Syria’s sabotaze of the Iraq Petroleum Com- pany (IPC) ripelines in November forced a virtual shutdown of most oil activities and cut off the source of about 68 percent of the Government’s revenues. Grumbling in Iraq over Nuri’s suppression of opposition activ- ities and his personal dominance over the gov- ernment increased. In these cir: umstances, many moderate elements, including some army officers and even some of the prime minister’s erstwhile supporters, felt that Nuri’s long identification with the British and his sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact mude him a liability. 8. Nuri felt compelled to make some gestures to offset the charges of treason to the Arab Cause and the demands for withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi government supported Egypt’s case in the Suez controver- sy and emphasized its solidarity with the other Arabs in opposition to Israel. For a period of time Iraq took the initiative in excluding the British from Baghdad Pact meetings, and other aspects of Iraq’s British connections were de- emphasized. However, Nuri made no real con- cessions and succeeded in riding out the storm by taking advantage of his firm hold on the army and on tne machinery of government, his mastery of political maneuver, and the support of the Falace. Serious economic con- Sequences from the virtual stoppage of oil revenues were avoided by utilizing reserves Cay 3 and by borrowing from IPC, thus allowing the development program to continue. ? 9. US condemnation of the attack on Egypt, the promulgation of the American Doctrine, and thé US decision to join the military com- mittee of the Baghdad Pact strengthened Nuri’s foreign policy position both within Iraq and in area affairs. Day-to-day relations with the UK, including Baghdad Pact cooperation, are back to normal. For the moment the Brit- ish tie has become B less sensitive issue, though British prestige and influence have suffered @ net decline. Meanwhile, recent develop- ments have decreased Iraq's isolation In the Arab world. The forces now in control in Jordan under King Hussein include those Jor- danian elements most friendly to Iraq. The recent visit of King Saud to Baghdad appears to show at least a temporary submergence of the dynastic problem between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and a recognition of common interests. ' Relations with the controlling elements in Lebanon are friendly.’ More importantly, these countries appear to share a common ap-