The Short-term Prospect for Cambodia

Central Intelligence Agency · 1973

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Introduction

The short term prospect for Cambodia is assessed in a CIA paper dated in 1973. Cambodia's republic was then fighting a losing war against the Khmer Rouge. Short term papers judged the next months, not the far future, and those months were dark. Within two years Phnom Penh fell, which gives this forecast a somber place in the record.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1973
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE24252
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000024836

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Full text

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fAL.TIZED COPY, SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 3 , ESTIMATE — : | | The Short-Term Prospect for Cambodia 7 a 57-73 24 Moy 1979 Se ug KT 2. 289 er es ee he ee ee ie Be ee i Pare Tere “at bag eB ‘rate : zee Bp val THi; ESTIMATE 1§ SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR. ' The following inte “yence orgonizotions participated in the preparation of the esfimcte: . The Centrof Intelligence Agency ond the intelligence organizations of the Deport- ments of Stote and Defense, tha NSA, and the Treasury. Concurring: The Deputy Director of Centrat b-tefligence The Director of Intelligence ond Research, Department of Stole The Director, Defanse Intelligence Agency The Director, Notional Security Agency The Director, Division of Internotiong: Security Affain, Atomic Enargy Commission . The Speciol Assistont to the Secretory of the Treasury Abstaining: The Assito-t Director, Federot Bureou of Investigation, the subject being ovtide of his jurisdiction. WARNING ; This moterio! contains information offectiag the Nationol Oeferse of the United Stotes within the meoning of the erpionoge fows, Title 16, USC, Secs. 793 ond 794, the trons- mission or revelation of which in eay monner fo on unauthorised person bb prohibaed. - oa eee i we Pe ee i tod ee ge . eee a Raa | Pe ad eh rented ere eee, aay sepa so ee ee ee . sesmenntnrneneaeacemaiame sammie Dan nenmein tee menientaie hnineetietia Lt ee a, tT a Pee) + 4 7 A : i * a rome en - Pa a + SNIE 57-73 FOR CAMBODIA - me. eee * THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT td ee Le ed . ee a oo * = + Pete eee eg et / TRE SHORT-TERM PROSPECT | a FOR CAMBODIA NOTE , é This Estima‘c considers the outlook for survival of a non-xommunist government in Cambodia though the end of 1973. The problem Is addressed under two opposing ¢ sumptions regarding US bombing in Cambodia; (1) the bombing (3-52 and tactical air suppcrt) con- tinues more or less ut present levels; or, (2) the bombing :s ended within the next few weeks as 2 result of Congressional action Sn ET ee re ie re mr 6 rie eC me Ce ees wat abet TPAEETENY oe Bar ye age n arigts 5 Mos. nt roy, AP paRee- eth gy CRB aR arate yee ror el ty bey veh Uy eee oa eel “8. fait’, same PRECIS The Khmer insurgents, with many communist leaders responsive to Hanoi's direction and contol, have the military {nitiative fn Cam- boalia; the government's military and political position has steadily eroded over the past year. US alr support has been the mufor prop of the Cambodian Government. Hf US bombing continues, the chances are better than even that a non-communist government in Phnom ~ Penh will be able io last out the ycar. Obviously, if the government demonstrated an abliity to come to grips with the military and political problems facing Cambodia, the odds would improve somewhat. But there is little basis Icr expecting any substantial improveinent in the performance of FAN < or the gov- emment over the next six months. Meanwhile, the Insurgents will be hard at work consolidating and expanding their contre? throughout ; the countryside. Thus, even if the present government survived the vad year, it would probably have suffered a net decline in strength relative . : to the insurgents. But if US support were to cease in the near term, the Lan Nit regime could not survive for long, perhaps no more than a month or two. Most Cambodians would believe that it was only a matter of time before _the conimanists in one way or another gained control of the country. Pressures for a deal with tie communists would Increase. ; ny) tal 4 vaste: 204 ° sme . astepneRnnatiarenelecial aa ATS A SOS AC ee wT aOR Pa LEP a Lael a a roe apne ees ee : * + eb em he The communists might decide to press for a complete military take- over of Cambodia. Their chances of accumplishing this would be good, But Hanoi at least would probably want to test other alternatives before taunching an all-out military effort, in part because such an effort would not be without some risks and costs and would not avto- matically improve the communist position in South Vietr 4m—-still the number one objective. ot : _ Thus, unless there were a total collapse of organized resistonce, the communists would be more likely to try to arrange a coalition govern- ment, holding in reserve the ction of setzicg control by direct military ection, Under the circunstarices, they could more or less dictate the terms and get what they felt necessary. However the successor regime came to power and whether or no? it was headed by Sihanouk, the Khmer communists would be the pre- dominant force, and Hanol would be calling most of the shots. Such a regime would Le hostile to the interests of Wishington, Saigon, end Bangkok. The non-communist aspect of such a government would be Bittle more than a fucade. ; Over time, “he deep Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese might " generate some resistance to Hanoi’s dictates. Sihanouk would also almost certainly attempt to maneuver to undercut the communist role in the government. The odds, however, would be against him. A communist takeover in Cumbodia would be fn political and psy- chological terms extremely unscttling In both Saigon and Bangkok Both capitals would be acutely concerned as to what it meant for them, particularly conceming the prospect of continued US support. Both would seek new assurances from the US and would feel increas- ingly [sofated and beleaguered if none, or not enough, were forth- coming from Washington. . By itself, the enhanced communist position in Cambodia would not bring about a major shift In the present balance of military power in South Vietnam (a view the South Vietnamese leaders would prob- ably share); it would, however, ease communist logistic. burdens and give them greater flexibility in developing their streagth and future strategies. The South Vietnamese would fear that the communists would use Cernliocdlia as a base for organizational efforts against South Virtram as well as a springboard for a major military offensive in South Vietnam. In terms of overall implications for the future of South Vietnam, Laos, or even Thailand, the tnstallation of a communtist-leaning regime in Phaom Penh could be of less significance than the efrcumstances which brought this about. Uf the Prestdent were forced for the jirst time hy the US Congress to halt military action in Indochina, this would be seen as a vital turning point, forecasting the end of eny siguificant CS military role in this arca. 2 + ' . i re ee oe ean ee be Es I Ha EE be EGE _ . + AN Pat iss is $Me y rr ceaatay L eS Lee cat SMe fT al wy tee a SREB | ay 1 rx Sealed ie ft 4 te ita"s3. i.e THE ESTIMATE I. THE FORCES AT WORK IN CAMBC'D!A AT PRESENT 1. The Communist Position. The Cambo dian fnsurgents

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