Prospects for North and South Vietnam
Central Intelligence Agency · 1961
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Introduction
Prospects for North and South Vietnam are weighed in a CIA paper dated in 1961. Vietnam had been split since 1954 into a communist north and an American backed south. In 1961 the southern war was growing and drawing in more American advisers. A two state forecast that year faced the hard question of whether the south could stand.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1961 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 69045 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000024387
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
twa NATIONAL PROSPECTS FOR NORT!- NUMBER 14.3/53-61 (Supersedes SNIE 63.1-60 ond NIE 63-59) SOUTH VIETNAM * a * : ! Sw milled by fAc DRECTOR OF CENTHAL INTEC LICENCE Jae toheing enreluigeh ¢ pregmicsthers parte psfed im the preparation ef th evi Te The Central fatlelige a7e Iver cy and fhe entedig ICe OF CEN alin of the Depertirenls af stgie Pre Ac y De Nore the Av Force, and The font Staff ven nered am by the EAELED STATES ENTELEAGE ACF bor ade dog 196F Con rring bere Tie Brereton ot Int he gee atthe oA, Depo rimepn tot Store, (he As fant Cae? et SS? ft por Pneetiges. @, ie patter. af the Acmy. fae Asecre- eat Ce epul Na at pete feo spateiiewe = Depertine fet the Nuie, the daada OG epoap sear fateigouce USAF, TAe€ ines tor foo Estettigense font Stuf the Agstiant ft whe Secetar, of inten. 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TORT. - aris i ll ie lS lal ry ’ ‘+ = of Ta a0 “ants A means ov a; te you” a “e “ ear, — > Se tad aes CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE ; Lod’ ete tute was die ated by the Central Intellicence Apency “Tats copy Soba theangemanon and ose et the recisert and of per ans wider Nia purisdic th OR ace fb te Ghote basi Ad ioctl eaocntial cisemination Mer te gatherized by the oh Wen, Oi cals win ther rospective departments a Dir-rtor of Inteligesce .nd Reorat ‘fh. for the Department of State b Asst tant Chief of S'o1. su Inteltige ace, Department ef Une Army Asitant Chicf at Navel Operators Untelbgencer, for tie Da puriment 03 fe 4 oe toe Navy Ou od. Director of Inte Higence, USAF. for ‘he Dep.rime at of the Aur Force © Des tor for dete Prgence Jumnt Stath for Tov Joust Stat of L Dineetat of Intelsgeice, AEC, te ne Atemic Fnergy Commission , KE A sistant Director, FGL tor t..e Fd oral Burress of Investazction + h. Asal fant to the Sevictary oi Dern ¢, Special Operations, for tne Departm ni 3 t of D: fense . oa) Director of NSA for '6 4 National fecunmtly Arency ‘ } A-stetanh Pieeeter for Central Pefrenes, CHA for any other Di purtment oF : (Oo Agency 2 This copy may be retain oan destrove!l by burning in accondance with appheable se curity regu anions, Ar Peburns dito the Central Intellyence Agency by arrangemont _ wih the Oltne of Central Reference, CIA - aa 3. When af estimate is disseminated overseas. the overseas racipients may -¢7ain ot for a peried not in excess of ome year AY the eod ef this period, the cotimate sheuld F rithes be destroyed, relurn: d to the forxarding ageacy. or permin-ien heuld be requested ef the fovaarding #,enes to retain it in accordance with [AC-D-69 2. 22 June 1933. : § The the oibhsebmae wien usd wparately from the test sioukld be clas -lfied: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ae os WARNINO : : ae The mates. contains infermaton afechag zi : the Natoma Gefeme of the Usted Starter : aiey Be j ian (he neanuns of Ue espionace bas. tot, - | Me 1B USE, Sees Ty3 and “54 the trans: ge re ‘ : m ‘lon op ney Laer. af cchieh In aay manner “oy ae Lo bn urautheneet pow as prohtited by haw ats Bi ae ; . . = * eee - + ria Ota ae BE cree | Cea ty ap eatin Or ae - foam oof Bae ! ce rr ne es a Ae er) Le - 8 eee thea of fe cestivattes in! Oe : . aca gts pal ‘a! - ? TABLE OF CONTENTS T4E PROBLEM . eS ea ce le Bie ib* Gi ee bye Me ie we te Bose S Pare CONCLUSIONS: = 44 Go d.08 Go Ree ee me Se ea ee ee ES DISCUSSION. 6 SiS ble Oe pri Oe S Src Sd Bee Ds I INTRODUCTION . . Be tS aay Ue ese font See fi THE SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN NORTH VIETNAM A Introduction. .. «2. wa te. eee eke eal te a ie B. Politwal Situation und Qutlook . 2... . 2... +--+ © Economic Situation 2... 2 1 we ee ee HI S.fUATION AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. . . A. Political. tes te AS ee ce B Economic... . fe ie eek rath teh tern = on # 8 # 8 wn we IV THE COMMUNIST THRE.T TO SOUTH VIFTNAM. . . . A The Military Threat. 2... a. B. The Guerrilla Threat. . 2... . c. Pohtkal and Psychological Warfare | " W¥. OUTLOOK FOR THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . ‘ & Fy WANE 1 ggg? Peta Me ech stg sh tore A Democratic Republi of Vietnam... i The Government of Vietnam... t r a 3 ~ F ’ _ Intraparty strife. _. active there will probably be a struggse “ for power between the Moscow-onented . and the Peiping-oriented elements of the _ party. (Paras. 13, 15, 21, 23- ~25% g THE PROBLEM ee - ae To assess the situations in North and South Vietnam, to ce the nature ‘and ; scope of the Communist threat to South Vietnam, and to estimate the Prospects ‘for _ the next year or so. % CONCLUSIONS 2 0. 1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) has thoroughly conslidated its political control in North Vietnam and, with extensive Bloc assistanci, will prob- ‘ably continue to make rapic economic progress. Regimentation and food short- ages have increased public unrest and ' dissutisfaction and resultec in some slackening of discipline among ‘ocal ~ffi- cials. However, there is no sizificant organized opposition. The mo fterating inftuence of the aged Ho Chi Minh has - prevented policy differences ameny: top DRV leaders from erupting into serious Whea Ho is no longe: 2. There is surne dissatisfaction in South Vietnain with Diem’s leadership armor g members uf the cabinet, the bureaucauy, and the militag,, ari: ing out of the serbous internal security situation and itritation with Diem’s systen of family rule. Diem tate 8 EB 7 . oe Nae cate SEC T o rc ae ns i ai Cr . ou ee te . . m * - 3 a es . * . ba fe = ro has Initia'ed a number of pol'tical reform measures, but probably will not relinquish his hiphly centralized method of govern- rient control The c-gree of dissatisfac- tion will probably be directly related to - the success