Communist Capabilities in Indochina

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954

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Introduction

Communist capabilities in Indochina are weighed in a CIA paper dated in 1954. That year France's war in Indochina ended at Dien Bien Phu and in Geneva talks. Judging what communist forces could do next shaped every plan for the region. The paper dates from the moment Vietnam was split and America's own long role there began.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1954
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE20604
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000022775

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

~POP-GEGHET TIT. STUDY RY THR CENTRAL UNTOMLTSESCK AGENCY. COMMURIST CAPABILU?IE. Ti LNDOCHINA (NIB LO-3-049 Table of Contents EULE Trangmittal Memorandum The Problems cesaeesasaancesnseeseraeeverer sand narsesaang 1 ASSUMPCIONS aascaeer ne nonnaneesenesenesnnsenneensecnas 4 I. Capabilities of Viet Minh Forces Supported In- directv by the Chinese Commuinists.curcresesnee 2 A. Viet Minn Ground Force Capabilities..... 2 B. Viet Minh Air Cupabilities, .essassssenes 3 C. Viet Minh Naval Capabilities..ssecssseee 1 D. Commmist Political Warfare Capabilities 4+ Il. Capabilities of Chinese Communist and Viet Minh Fore Ss sea wah a ee nw ee ear ee eee eR OE 6 ‘A. Chinese Ground Force Capabilities in : Tndochind sweseervasenvesenecentneeraee b B. Chinese Communist Air Capabilities in THOIG CHINA s.6 shah as i aie eek See RS 8 C. Communist Chinese Naval Capabilities.... 9 D. Commmist Political Warfare Capabilities 11 Table I - Viet Minh Troop Strengths and Dispositions Table II =- Troops Strengths and Dispositions Chinese Communist Ground Forces Table Ii] - Air Order of Battle in Communist China - Table IV ~ Chinese Communist Naval Forces «BGR SECNRSY CENTRAL INTELLI GERACE MENGRANDIM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SFORETARY THE WATIONAL SexCuRITY COUNCIL TRU 8 AGENCE 25 Fey 1954 SUMTECT: TIE 10.3-54, "Commmiss Capabilitice in Indochina 1, Tho sttashed optimate of Camuist Copobilitisa in Indoshins is subaittied in response to your nemorendcua of 18 Mey. 2, Tota echimeto vas ecraucred in by dhe members of ths TAC on 25 lMerr, fef RQERT ANGI, JR. Uoputy Direstor/Intalligsnes Declassifiod by OPP DA i date Ao? Cr F&A. WATIOWAL IN@GELLIGEUCE BBTTINATE CONMUGIST CAPABILITIES IN ..vOCHLR (Mveace . Copy) Big 10-3-54 Approved 25 May 1954 fhe Intelligesce Advisory Comittee concurred in this entinete on 25 Mey 1954. The ASC acd FEL ebotainsd, the pubjact bring outeide of thair juriedietion. Whe following meaker organizations of the Intelligenca Advisovy Comltice participe ted with the Central Intel- ligense Agency in the preperation of this cetimata: {he dotelligencs orgimizations of the Doportscute of State, tha Army, the Ravy, the Atv Foree, eni The Joint Stat. CENPRAL LETBSLLIGERCE AGERCY OR al mit oe 25 = as mR GL SE ee CRAYVRAL INWNTELLIGRUACEHR AGEUCY kK on BIE 16-3-54; COMMUNIST CAPABILITIBS DY YEDOCHINA TE PACoLEN e r es Ho estimate Communist eapsbilities to oppose an intervention . of US eruad forees in Indochina employing either: 3. Viet Minh militery foreeo supported infiireetly by : Communist China; or "s >. Chinage Comnmiat and Viet Minh forces. ASSUSPPTICHR 1. he US hes intervene’ during 1954 with grows, sea, end sir forees in Indochina, -, 2, US forcen ora opposed by either (a) Viet Fish forcaa alone, receiving indixreet Chinese Commnist ald; or (t) Chinese Carzmmniat nna Viet Minh foresa, receiving Soviet support gmorally along the liner of suth support in Korsa. we wae Teer VS oata OT) G2my a Po epeongy ctticn uve dircescd Mi OF BPEL TY foreaz Tad Law yckue of anvatetuin,; guersiile ra re con Yic eooowe vheovciows Indechius ead of mivating cShoeks or Gauntcr- aes ulem ao epee ere \ 7 Bae pte ln re ‘ ada eae 7 - Ten: artneke by foqiules forge: wp te ef: dicistens ta otreusta in Korba ira tin mike en initial Teiashios;. It, om tha sae " ee iets ale “ra St. ae ra mapyit Bel ns 3 Lee Pon se na 5 a Bee fectoton te cyolé Lax meenenla poettionol Warvaion, saa we ak be Gonne hee 4 mtn map ype te ep eed 7 sfobyr tpn Pa paby es tas seg? Bie of pranwbly masest.d ep wed lin oivitir. Such a cave ponld geechly dmerance he clbeiticrel enpeeta of tha war oi @ Liza Gorecn. eapcbility of tuo Viet lint vonda Pen sarogs re. ar PTancene pend aot aaa ee on Chinese Cormavhet villipcnese af eepae hive Go LY. Ydoan of ecuromifecbion Terisac fyoa Gitns dato the Balt. cae. of Trios CLM Ie} OOO Go oo POO QO0 coach ae we dm affiition se the prcaanl 209 M0 ouvhin forws. Poudre, I4 Be ye DE ” vote, “TE eat fe velikely cuby Yioo t. uh cewbeh tosgan would emprud Doswin an LAG par oun L8G, 00) over prawn) otreogsh. on Laeger 3. Tnobrotuction of “voluntecs” Cainonc Cotmiaibt Torccu Ca gusyrlllos oy a3 ccapoments of Viet tinh units conldé iosrense Viet Tinh canzkilities up to the limit of loglutic gupport, bus it is mitikely that the pretense ¢f now: “nterrestion could be mrinteined ir sigemble punbers of Chinnce Comavulct pertenagi vers ceniltied. B. Viet llinh Air Capcbiiiices ada oe bh. ‘be Viet Minh do not now porueas on ais yorce. 5. a the Viet Mink-hel’ svees thar ore onprosins aly nins cirflelds with 4,000 to 5,000 feo minveys prescutly unacevieceble - bus hich, within « perto& of a work to ten dsys, could ts @svclopcl So take MEG-15 cpesctiony. Thara can 20 cirviolés vith eniviye rerming fron 2,699 to 3,000 fect waica, with varying desr3ac of dmorevowent, voald be owiteble for liatiscu aohreroty anf posetoly lijyscs trainposs erhivity. Many of than: cirflelis would ta severally ra- eorteted in ube during wet waathos due to Tlocéing. In oldition, nowy ais@ielés aviteblo fer HIG-15 operations might ta canveructe within 30 dsya. Axedisbtiiny of sivflelés would mot pose a lint- teaion to bin oprretion of cm adv fovea of consider gle site within “SAagpina after e uoelk to ton daya of biga pricrity contincticn activity, tha Viet Mink co not mow ponsess the capinllity to oparet: cueh co Teves. Eowever, the Chirsia Commminte hove the erpsbility of $rcinirg Vist Mink pilots ead vepport poracanel end of providing ay = BORE SeHe thom vith clrevaft and equipment. Ve heve no firm evidence thet this eopebility in now being oworcined. Ci Sol atte cal Sia 6. Viet Minh hove the follovwlog nmeval cepatilities: #eiver mining, river ambush, end gebotaca im porta and naval fecilities- They also have eo coneldersble ourber of native Jjunks vbhich could be ‘preared into service to moet logistic demands or to take edvantage of wilitery onjortunities. ve Tie Colnese Comuumiste exye copsble of training Viet Minh foreng in nevel warfare, ent providing then with vivar erd conatal nfipes end nineloyoers. RB. Ceossunist Political Worfare Canshilities 8. The Commmists would have the cepebility of opposing US intervention by eppenis to pationzlism among the Indochirere popuia- tion ead by Genouneing VS intervention ar an operation decsisned to perpetuate colonialian. These cepebllitica would wary not only in reelection to tha military prograss of tha war but ole. to the extent thot the US ection appearcé ta the Indothinese to gusrante) their inécpsricnea. DE Cdatett 9. Vvor wlthoub apocivice political susurnnces, Ime eGiate and lorge-teele puctennes by WS area would almost cartcinly reduce Coia- muniat political enxpabilltien to cuvvert em intintéasts the Trriochiseas poeple end to use them for in vtalliganc? end logletic purposes. In eidition, sigus of Viet Minh deYecs would probobly tmerarsingly en- courage defecticns from the Vist Mink. IF US cived succesces vere acenmnenied by political morsnres vbich puerantced Inficehinsse inie- panéence, Viet Minh political warfare espebilities would be further wedcede Viet Mink metiegsiist enpaad youll be diminisheé, aml there world prohubly be concidersble and dnerearing Gefecbions fron the Viet Monn. ne devclopmoetn vould aleo reduce Vist Hink capabilities to aondeet poevrilla end terveric “4 activities. 10. Coumenict political wurtere capzbilities to

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