Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle E

Central Intelligence Agency · 1965

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Introduction

Soviet and Chinese strategy across North Africa, the Middle East, and nearby regions fills a CIA paper dated June 4, 1965. The paper tracks the tactics both powers used far from home. By 1965 Moscow and Beijing were rivals as much as partners. Reading their moves side by side helped Washington plan its own Cold War steps.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1965
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE97943
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000014188

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

SEP St thee Ea bes SRE. : SNIE 10-2-65 f CONTROLLED DISSEM 15 July 1965 , : I “LBY LIBRARY ae Mandatory Review Case # NLJ 22-4) Document #13 SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 10-2-65 Soviet al Chinese Communist Strategy — and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD ‘As indicated overleaf 15 JULY 1965 APPROVED FOR RELEASE — AUGUST 1994 0 CONTROLLED DISSEM N? 1 The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments of State, Defense, and NSA. Concurring: Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Director of the National Security Agency Abstaining: The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification oS SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 10-2-65 Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia = THE PROBLEM TABLE OF CONTENTS CONCLUSIONS .... wu eee ee eee TISCUSSION. srdentitac Senses nett. oe an oar pp ceca ecpteg emia Ss ts aly MA bs as J. THE SETTING ...... She ane, Nene tina nae gtd sey Atced cao ona ieee ate tA: oe, Il. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES ............----4--- +++ Aer ee ee 6 Ill. MEANS AND METHODS ..0.. 0). ce ec ees ioe Military Assistance ...... nfl stat a Be Baaih kare sae errr Pensa dalesuel. eh —68 Economic Aid ............ Sd es eat La Ot ae Rope hs Ss a ty ited elect, street, 2) Paley «cious otto eet ORM ceili Gl a athe antennae aia arene Ah Cultural Relations 0... 000. cece ce ee eter eee 13 Communist Movements ........0....0 02 eee ee eee eee te ee eee 13 The Covert Mechanism ..........-.- 0. cee cee ee ee ne eens 19 | IV. COMMUNIST PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS ..............---..-5: 21° South Asia ............. ee Coa och btext ade Snes See a Perrier: 21 The Arab World ............- wae bali A onctth Bete eniuat pashacett hy iene Lenctnst tte wet ib ss 24 Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus ........-.. old Ave Rete een SSO 28 VAISUMMING:! URS 23.335 208 badils wld pe Bode Sede ew tees a Ra ed 29° ANNEX: THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (RIS) ........... 33 geet SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST STRAT- EGY AND TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA THE PROBLEM To assess the nature, extent, and present effectiveness of Soviet and Chinese Communist overt and covert efforts in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, and to estimate the outlook for such efforts over the next several years. CONCLUSIONS A. Most of the countries in this area have been opened up to Soviet and other Communist penetration by the liquidation of Euro- pean colonial empires and by the widespread emergence of movements of protest against the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small ruling class. Over the past decade or so, the USSR has injected itself dynamically into the whole area. ‘China plays a significant role mainly in South Asia. With the exception of Yugo- slavia, whose progress while maintaining a balance between the USSR and the West has greatly impressed certain leaders in the area, the East European countries have ridden into the area on Soviet coat- tails. (Paras. 1-4) B. Soviet influence in the area has been achieved principally through the customary instruments of contemporary statecraft. With a considerable degree of success, Moscow has exploited nationalist and anti-colonial resentments, encouraged neutralist sentiment, and taken sides in local disputes. The USSR, and to a lesser extent China, have mounted cultural and student exchange programs and expanded their trade relationships. The Soviets have extended economic aid to 16 of the 23 countries in the area, and six of them have armies that are largely equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods. * The following countries are included in this estimate: all the Arab states {including those in northern Africa, ie, UAR, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Israel, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Ceylon. The economic and military aid programs have not only contributed to the Soviet image in the area, but also provide Moscow with some potential for leverage by slowing down projects, failing to deliver spares, and the like, though this leverage could not be exerted without some political cost. (Paras. 9-20, 33) C. The overt Soviet presence—for example, diplomatic, trade, mili- tary missions—provides cover for an extensive clandestine apparatus. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) play a wide role in carrying out foreign policy. Aside from the classic intelligence collection functions, these services conduct operations to denigrate the US and other Western powers, to capture and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and to place individuals in positions in local governments, political parties, etc., where they can influence policy in Moscow’s favor. The Soviets have recruited local officials at various levels, including some holding senior government positions. In general, the Soviet covert operations have been fairly successful. (Paras. 26-32) D. The Communist nations also strive to develop and use local Communist movements and international front organizations. The former include a few sizable legal or quasi-legal organizations, as in India, Greece, and Cyprus, and a dozen or so small, mostly illegal, but fairly well organized parties. Their organizational strength has en- abled them to survive repression and, on occasion, to make significant but temporary gains in the wake of political upheaval. On the whole, the Communist parties have made little progress as mass movements; they have done best in attracting discontented intellectuals, while making little headway among the peasants who comprise the bulk of the population, and only somewhat more among workers. This has led the Soviets, in some countries at least, to slacken their efforts to develop a mass organization and turn instead to a tactic of infiltrating ongoing nationalist or revolutionary movements. (Paras. 21-25) E. In both overt and covert operations, the Soviets probably con- sider that they have met with a fair degree of success in establishing their presence and influence in the area. They have, broadly speak- ing, been most successful in the Arab world and least successful where fear of Slavic domination remains strong—in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. They will probably continue their efforts to establish an identity of feeling and interest with the modernizing forces in the “Third World,” though tailoring their approach for individual countries. Some of the countries we are dealing with have adequately functioning political systems, sufficiently coherent societies, or strong enough leadership to be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies, barring a major upheaval. A number of others lack most or all

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