Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action in Southeast Asia
Central Intelligence Agency · 1965
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Introduction
How others would react to a certain U.S. course of action in Southeast Asia is weighed in a CIA paper dated August 5, 1965. The title keeps the action itself vague, as such papers often did. Judging foreign reaction was the core task of estimate work. The paper belongs to the months when the American war in Vietnam was fast growing.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1965 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 17634 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000014185
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
a . g p f SNIE 10-10-65 CONTROLLED Sse SENSITIVE 10 September 1965 TS 0038806 14 LE} LIERARY i Mandatory Review Case # NY] (mbavael Document # } : 4 weenga rp Steg ete be Bled 7 SPECIAL nw NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 10-10-65 - Reactions to a Certain US Course of | Action in Southeast Asia | Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf N 10 SEPTEMBER 1965 ; APPROVED FOR RELEASE AUGUST 1994 CONTROLLED Bice SENSHIVE N° 1 wo SECREL/SENSITIVE The following intelligence organizations Participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments of State, Defense, and NSA. Concurring: Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Director of the National Security Agency Abstaining: The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction, WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification /SENSITIVE E AMEE Oy a Te ne SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 10-10-65 ~ Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action in Southeast Asia REACTIONS TO A CERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THE PROBLEM To estimate Communist and other reactions to the use of US forces to establish a barrier across Communist supply lines in the Lao pan- handle. ASSUMPTION A US force of three divisions moves into Laos along Route 9 from Thailand and South Vietnam to seize and hold terrain along the Route with the purpose of blocking Communist troop and supply movements. DISCUSSION 1. The international reaction to the US action would be generally unfavorable, particularly if the action were not undertaken at the request of Premier Souvanna Phouma. We believe, however, that the chances are less than even that Sou- vanna could be persuaded to make such a request. He would recognize that the US action would be a clear and conspicuous violation of the 1962 Geneva accords upon which the legitimacy of his government rests. He would see few advantages to Laos and many dangers in such a deployment. He would fear that Laos would become a major battleground for the powers involved in Vietnam, that the Communists would retaliate against his forces in other parts of Laos, and that the Chinese Communists might occupy the northern provinces. Souvanna has approved of US escalation of air activity, and he would probably prefer to see this course fully exploited, including the destruction of Hanoi, before considering involvement of Laos in a US-Communist ground war. 2. If the US pressed for a Lao Government request in the face of Souvanna’s opposition, he might be led to resign and return to France, as he has so often threatened to do. While most other Lao leaders, including the King, would be likely to share Souvanna’s misgivings, Souvanna could probably be removed by a coalition of conservative forces. Under such circumstances, however, any successor government would be seen by most of the world as a US puppet. 3. If Souvanna could be persuaded to call for the US divisions, his assent would almost certainly be conditioned on explicit US guarantees of protection against DRV and Chinese counteraction in northern and central Laos. He might not request immediate deployment of US forces into these areas, lest this precipitate the very attacks he wished to prevent, but he would almost certainly demand some tangible evidence that substantial US forces would indeed be available quickly if needed. This would be equally true of any successor government. 4, The Thai would be concerned about having such a large foreign presence in their country as the assumed action implies, but their major concern would be that the action might bring Communist, particularly Chinese, attacks against Thailand.We believe that the Thai would cooperate with the US plan if given specific commitments on defense measures to protect Thailand in such a con- tingency. The Thai leaders would also almost certainly seek a substantial increase in US aid. At least sporadic sabotage efforts against the lines of com- munication across Thailand to the Route 9 region of Laos would be likely, and their protection would require a fairly large-scale Thai or US effort. In short, the US would almost certainly be called on to provide substantial forces, in Thailand as in Laos, over and above those which would be required to seal off the Communist supply route through Laos. 5. In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk’s fear of US-supported attacks from South Vietnam or Laos would probably be increased. He would vociferously con- demn the US action and would probably reiterate in some form his demands for international guarantees of his borders. At the same time, however, he would probably be impressed with this new evidence of US determination not to be driven out of Southeast Asia. Until he had some clearer view of the outcome of the US effort, he would probably be reluctant to see any @x- pansion in the use of Cambodia as a supply route and safe-haven for Communist forces in Vietnam. 6. The North Vietnamese would almost certainly learn that a major US opera- tion was being planned; they already seem to suspect that something of the sort may be under consideration. As US intentions became clearer, Hanoi and the Pathet Lao would seek to discourage Souvanna’s concurrence and to deter the US action by propaganda and by actions designed to demonstrate their ability to threaten areas about which the Lao and Thai governments are sensitive, e.g., by troop movements in the north and central areas. At the same time they would send some reinforcements into southern Laos and attempt to stockpile supplies. As the dimensions of the US build-up in northeast Thailand became more apparent, Hanoi might undertake limited offensives to bring PL/PAVN forces close to the Mekong along the Thai frontier. All this would be accom- panied by a vigorous propaganda campaign designed to heighten fears in Laos and abroad of an ever-expanding conflict. SENSITIVE 7. Once the US operation was under way, the North Vietnamese might choose to engage US forces at specific points where the PL/PAVN units would have local advantage, but the normal pattern probably would be vigorous harassment and ambush. Though the PL/PAVN would probably exert strong pressures in north and central Laos, we believe the chances are less than even that they would launch a major counter-offensive against the US forces in the south. For at least some time, the Communists would be likely to feel that they could maintain the insurrection in South Vietnam, even if the US interdiction reduced the levels of activity. Hanoi and the Pathet Lao would call for condemnation of the US action under the Geneva agreement. The North Vietnamese might set up a rival Lao “government of National Union,” particularly if Souvanna were no longer in power. They would at least