Vc Policy Toward Treatment of Allied Pow's in Vc Military Region Iv
Central Intelligence Agency · 1967
Read Vc Policy Toward Treatment of Allied Pow's in Vc Military Region Iv by Central Intelligence Agency (1967) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/cia-0000013243.txt.
Introduction
Rules for allied prisoners in Viet Cong Military Region IV are set out in a CIA item from September 1967. Region IV covered the Mekong Delta, the war's watery south. The item shows how the rules changed from place to place. Each zone's chief ran his camps in his own way, under the same flag but with different habits, rations, and degrees of mercy.
The zone-by-zone view is the item's value to the accounting. The same war produced different rules for the jailed in different country. For readers, the page shows a system that was one system on paper only.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1967 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 9671 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000013243
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
perctparnmnnngcres ares apht ndaiediiag sng oe Mg n° eos 7 OME wd Cag Ye a» ee : 7.3, = ae ie ‘ Ny ; : ~ Sout VIETNAM + (su) | aol a “ SUBJECT : VC Policy Toward Treatment of | ag _ Allied POW's in VC Military Be te Re * -. * “Region IV DATE OF REPORT : 28/10/67 re < DATE OF INFO : 1965 - 28 February 1967 © NO. OF PACES : 3 “DATE AND PLAGE + | a pEF:| = “OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam ga as a ca a ede aE a a " souRee source: L__ i a ae Le ei. sel . ; a tik TTHKERES : i ‘2, In VC Military Region! (MR): IV ‘Prom October. Les +t] $s 28 depmuay 1967, the h VC .dug trenches before a battle . for Altsed et poigras of war (POW's) that they _. anticipated capturing. These were used for protedtion: “against bombing and “i were only prepared for engagemeitts, expected)td last; more than’ -one~haif hour, * Upon capture, the POW's.were evatuated“to/e- médical’ camp near the batvleground; From there, Vietnamese prisoners, wore. ‘sont tovaistrict-dnd higher levels; U.S. POW's were taken through district knid Province to The Céntral Office For SVN . (COSVN). Wounded prisoners ware Taft. at the site of the conflict warn the fighting -.Was near a road or an Allied ‘post; wien there was_Jittle change of their beliig - resoued, the wounded were taken $o~the_VC. 3. base-Comp. VC had to treat POW's J. wells; if a soldier violated this rule, he was criticised Ly his: supervisor, and ee he continued the mistreatment,:he was criticised again and ra~educatecd, .-Cadres were criticised and subsequently, Bont to a Rear Services er if they " gontinued violation of the rules. © eaten pee eo eae sh eeten WERE S ,PETemenNeE Der aetta Mages Rene alee, DISTRIBUTION: ATTACHMENTS 1 YS MACY : i ‘ ‘ 97 : US EMBASSY (054) Yey, a on Y None TSE bone ween Serge tWet sean teeenet amnast J panmetie tri nocnaaweeiny atienste meta Tete uammrmee sme jemi sen et ty om mi siete manmite fe Gener eines eo ts oe spe perertetergent 7: tore sera errs semanprrerr eras wepenemne ae x epee . soa ead ied ii Meine thee aeoly * Boner Aare a ¥ | | | Peee 2 ye y a ae a og Moe ed aren pres ee ef Liat. HO. Province from Cob.ber 13960 tha Suse (Ys February 1967, ihe ve dug trenches in their camps near the command post : “prior to a bacste vis veenches were wed for Allied POW!'s whom the vC “expected to Cupeure dusting the battle. The trenches were to protect the prisoners from artitle ry fire and bombings. POW's sat in group of three , vs near the holes, and when the sneLling began they were told to jump into them Tho priconats were not tied, but one VC was assigned to watch all of thei. A trench wae Cesignad for only one to three men to attenuate . the effecte of the sonting. The number cf trenches dug depended on an estimate eB int the battalioa cumnander as to _how many would be taken; however, _ ‘there was no diveetive to capture a certain number. The commander based “his guess on the sine of the unit to be attacked. Trenches were only dug . when the aenevandss: cicided that, the battle would last more than one-half hour, after considering the size of the opponent, the type of unit, the - terrain. (Qik woo ther or not piety reinforcements: or air Support wers } expecteds, ese wanes d ARVN soldiers “under ‘the. rank _of ere were given a firs 66 LO minute niet on the policies of the National 7ront For The Lilora+ion _Of SVN (NFLSYN), since the cadres realined that these men had beon fa-ced by the GVH to fight. A squad was assigned to take ell other POW's fic a “medical evacuation point about 1000 meters from ths battieficlds itt 1 enbion _for each oattlic was detormined by the battalion commanders 15 Wau senbially ~:s located among all perticipating vnits for easy evacuation and observation JN of ‘the battle, and yot far enovgh away to evoid arti llery fire. Jt was = -. usually Lenated in tha forest to prevent detection by aircraft, tut if this 7 Was not practicable, ths crtire » meaical ocmplex moved to a safor anea ag 7 “goon as ths wounded wer? evacuated from the battlefield. Dnring 25 phases or evacuation, ee POW's were not tied, but assigned one to a Vo es ia) permit both uCE uate ene seiareins. ard rapid movement. Sa ie er —— “te the unit fought a battle in en area near a road or an Allied post, wounded ' POWs were Civ ratlncan ant thgn abandoned. It was felt that the Allies “.wovld rescus them within one-he. if hour, ana. thet if the VC hed to evacuate them tarough morn then five to seven kilometers of denss forest, they would die enroute snd ie onih would be alowed dom unnecer sarily, However, if . the battle ware feugis Pe aE PSeY ted arza where there was little ekance of the priscnzvs bisug rese.ed, the: yc bad no choise but to carry than to the VG base camp, ALL aaa: Ailiad prisoners and VO were treatod alike; the most sericus 82.608 "ere treated firat, Injured pvisonar trizé_to escape, VO seme wond?_ze1 after bin aed could not catch him, one warning ez "shot was Lired. if thie wea nch heeded soldiers shot ants Seu th > POW es y ' ‘ “+ Eyacuation fron the medical station was effected diniadeaeelas: after the battle. Pig we:o ssot to district or province first, deperding on which Was nearer, Ther x.eco Kuph at dietrics for one to two dazs it this losation -was safe, i cooniinate with cormo-Liaiscn agent, and then sent to previncea, If the aie ag aoe curve they were evdcuated to province immediately; theet pavers weve. proceasad for those Roing to higher echsions. U.S. POW's3 Fae Myo ae Oe wa penb ca Afelabe as nocsible through district, province, and hicadwarters ae se ae te COSW, nine thet: safety could net be guaranted, Vistnamese Non--Commissioned o yt et aficave iG 5? aud big! ranking enlisted men were re-educated at pas Pot, ge Desel and th. vallonced So gc cither to GYN or VC controlled‘areas, Viet ’ cs OS" Hagiene officers hrpough the rank of scnior Lieuwsenand were sent to M&@ he Has Quarters re -nterropaticn and re-etucation; higher ranicing Vietnamese PL ee a ORES eee taken throught MR headquarters to COSVN. Gne comms-liaiso : Cote 7 on eta Re oo. BOWts fer cniy aacn portion of the journey: from district to ge ee a a DOTY, Jeuald 'y three wat a one to two wait at each level while coordination oe ee We efCerted with comno- liaison agents; fOUONSE, an Smergency means was £ound_ NND 5a7680-15p ‘ 3 waht ree sies Se ARSE TART ORA ES. Mada Oo BERN ee RR EM DINER STRATEN A FO ee tip aa Mace pa a ee ls ER ee area a ee