The Outlook for East Germany
Central Intelligence Agency · 1966
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Introduction
Five years after the Berlin Wall split Germany, a CIA paper from January 1966 takes stock of East Germany's outlook. Walter Ulbricht's communist regime ruled the smaller German state under Soviet protection. The Wall had stopped the flood of refugees westward, and with it the regime's worst crisis.
The paper weighs the regime's stability and finds it resting on concrete and Soviet backing. It also looks at the economy and at East Berlin's drive to be treated as a real state. The study captures a workers' state that endured by force, judged coolly by the other side.
Catalog record
| CREATOR | Central Intelligence Agency |
|---|---|
| YEAR | 1966 |
| COLLECTION | DECLASSIFIED |
| FORMAT | TXT |
| FILE SIZE | 29923 |
| VERSION | 1.0 |
| LICENSE | Public Domain |
| RIGHTS | PUBLIC DOMAIN |
| SOURCE | Internet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror |
Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000012249
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Full text
The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:
el Pp ts i I Lo by Junbary lao we ane Cy W ? Le Js +t wl PINE Lp ay 29 ‘ / i ewpenninerne s NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE \ , NUMBLR 124-66 Pine LIU EOGK ay kes, ee FMCat ys ‘ulanitted by ADR Me oS veka ne phys annem edlcse een mee 4 , Wage a Hos awe . oh he a foo - DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred In boy the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD o baucated overlaaf A 1S IAINMUARY 1966 ann re . ' on = i “ a . is 7 an “ a ’ h a. ¢ 7" em moot, ! ‘5 ‘ : . was at PN ean “ts fre | kee Attica ca te wie a P.M | . : r, ' 4t ; ey en : t . eee be a . Hostage bey ‘ voy a oy “ ‘inn . | Approve FOR nF FASE JULY > aan The following intelligence organizations participated in the Preparation of | this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelli gence organizations of the Depart- ments of State, Defense, and the NSA. Concurring: Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Thomas {. Hughes, T State he Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of Hiewth nant Gon. Gf Josear fy F, Coarvall USA). Ditector, Gefense [ite {i ch ite PAP RE A carter UP Lined ef theft Dr. Charles ii. Reichardt for the Assist ant General Manager for Administration, , Atomic Liergy Commission and Mr. William ©, Cregar for the As:istont 4. the Dire.ior, Federal Burequ af Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction, 1 “We . WARNING...’ This material contains Information affecting the within the ‘meaning of the etplanage mission or revelation of which In an PE cate Cee oe. National Defense, of the United States a nt ‘laws, Title ‘18; USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-. ae y manner to an unauthorlizdd person Is prohibited. ' . GhouP 1 Excluded from automatle \ dawngrading and -___declassification a fe ane Vatvngapee f % ctell ‘ ye eee eet telah bathed ond dea, THE OUTLOOK FOR EAST GERMANY THE PROBLEM To estimate the long-term outlook for Kast Germany and to examine major trends in internal and external policies over the next several years, CONCLUSIONS A. The East German regime is more stable. and the leadership more confident, than at any other time in its history. Popular support is still minimal, hut a resigned wecephance of the regime has become general, Improvement in the economy will be slow and uneven, but major reversals are unlikely, B. The regine will remain heavily dependent upon Soviet support. and the Soviet voice will remain decisive in foreign affairs. Within a framework of close cooperation with the USSR, the Kast German leadership may inake limited moves toward greater independence from Moscow and a less repressive internal order. ‘The departure of Ulbricht could lead to crises within the party, but is unlikely to en- danger the survival of Communist authority. C. The regime's slow. eradual accretion of acceptance al home and abroad will probably continue, This will make it increasingly clifli- cult for the West, and particularly for West Germany, to deny the existence of the Mast German regime as a fact of life. Seri DISCUSSION I dn Angust L961. betore the Wall was erected aerass Berlin, the East German regime was in deep trouble. The cnermous mumber of people Heeing to the West was symptomatic of the regimes economic and political crisis. The situ- ation was in great part the result al overcoufidence. Ulbricht bad fully expected that Khenshehes’s Berlin campaign would Tead toa decisive political hreak- throneh in favor of Bast Germany. [fis overconfidence had also bern reflected in ambitions and totally aoreatistic economic plans: ta overtake \West Germany, and in his willingness to mim the risks of forced-dratt collectisization al awri- aultire. By the summer af 16. the Bast German government faced a@ near panic among the people, au economic crisis. it decline in morale and in ils awn authority, and arise in passive resistance in the countryside. The situation demanded drastic measures. 2. The Wall was. in effect. the prerequisite for dealing with the crisis. The East German regime then began, with Soviet encouragement, fa mave gradu- ally in a new direction. ‘The abortive Seven Year Plan was quietly buried, and in 1963 the “new economic system” was adopted in an effort to revitalize and rationalize the economy. Simultaneously, the Olbricht: regime began to take some carefully controlled measures to case internal tension. Crucial to these developments was the fact that Khrushchev's challenge to West Berlin had heen decisively defeated asa result of the Cuban missile crisis in 162. l. THE INTERNAL SITUATION 3. In the past four vears there has heen an obvious inerease in the stability of the regime and the self-confidence of its leadership. Por the first time since the war. the labor force is not being drawn off by flights of refugees, and the economic planners can assume that it will remain stable An ecanamic recovery has been evident since 1963. ‘The population, though basically anti-Cammunist, has had to come to terms with the regime, And in its relations with the USSR, especially since the overthrow of Khrushchev, the Ulbricht leadership has skill- fully exploited East Germany's position in Central Kurepe to enhance the USSH’s interest in the regime’s long-term survival, 4. The Party and the Leadership. Vhe Socialist. Unity Party (SED) has evolved into a surprisingly disciplined political instrument, Under Ulbricht’s leadership it has proved capable of surviving repeated political and economic crises. The party now minnbers LS million members and candidates—about 10 The population of about (7 uillion inehules a lubor fores of over 4 willion. From 1950 unti) August 1961. the net Joss ef population by emigration was iMore than 2,100,000, in- cluding a great many metibers af the moat productive elements of the population. ‘The excess ot live births aver deaths has cansistently averaged Tess than one-halk of ene percent, lowest in Eastern Europe. [pn 1063, the population incrensed for the first time since LOAK, It has very slowly begin to approach a nennal distribution by age and ses. but a consider- able gabalance will remain tor at least a weneration, of old aver ound and of females aver males. For about the nest 10 sears the niuher ef workers will change litle, while the umber of dependents toa voung ar too ahd to work will dierease slowly. : SEORET pr percent of the population and the highest number since 1950. It continues to he a mass rather than an elite party. The fact that membership has risen by 130.000 since the Wall suggests that many East Germans are resigned to making their careers in the German Democratic Republic and believe that party membership will help. 3. Perhaps the mast important challenge to the party and to internal stability will he the question of the succession to Ulbricht. Far 20 years he has domi- nated East German polities. {fe has been skillful and resourceful. not only in coping with internal problems but in adjusting to the modulations in Soviet policy, But he is