Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Association with the United States

Central Intelligence Agency · 1951

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Introduction

Six years after Japan's defeat, CIA analysts asked a hard question in March 1951: could Japan rebuild armed forces while working with the United States? Japan was still under American occupation, and its new constitution barred it from keeping an army. The Korean War, raging next door, made the question urgent for planners in Washington.

The study weighs what rearmament would take in men, money, and public support. It also considers how Japan's neighbors would react to a rearmed former enemy. The paper came months before the peace treaty was signed, and it foreshadows the Self-Defense Forces Japan created soon after.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1951
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE23038
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000010668

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Full text

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LIBRARY AP eaeeveres RES ECRETARY FIL ee Y_S,. IR PARR Papers of HARRY S, TRUMAN FPRESIDENT'S § ee Sea oe 4 Gti a 42ST ne cede et, eo + ae . - at, . . “ Appr Date _~s Bre Bf. . ‘ ; if “oe, 1 an On ae it iva “yl @ fy ‘Pe oh. zs oN soe 2 5, . - ‘ ‘ re i rg i Lot NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FEASIBILITY OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES NIE-19 Published 20 April 195) Tne intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par- ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 17 April. oe wee FEASIBILITY OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES THE PROBLEM hu assess the feasibility of rearming Japan in association with the US and its allies, the capability of Japan for effecting such rearmament, and the Soviet reaction thereto. CONCLUSIONS 1. Japan’s value to the Eastern or West- ern bloc rests on its industrial potential, its trained manpower, and its strategic _ Jocation with respect to the Asiatic main- land and to US defense outposts in the -... western Pacific. 2. Japan has sufficient manpower and in- dustrial facilities to enable it, within a few years, to assume a large and growing impeded by widespread war-weariness, fears of a resurgence of militarism, and concern over economic hardships. A le- gal obstacle, the importance of which cannot be accurately estimated at this time, is the constitutional prohibition against the maintenance of armed forces (see Appendix A). The Japanese Gov- ernment would undoubtedly use popular reluctance to rearm, as well as the consti- share cf its own military defense pro-~ vided: (a) enough raw materials includ- ing those in scarce supply were made available; and (b) the US furnished in- terim military assistance and training. . Japan also has the economic capability to assume a major share of the costs of re- armament, and, if Japan were to do 0, the coller costs to the US would probably not exceed current levels of US support to the Japanese economy. 3. We believe that if Japan were accorded sovereignty under a treaty of peace, and if the US provided military protection and economic support, the Japanese Govern- ment would move toward reconstituting its armed forces in strength sufficient to defend Japan and could gain adequate popular support for this program. For some time however, progress would be tutional difficulty, as bargaining points in negotiations for US military and eco- nomic aid. — 4. Although the non-Communist coun- tries with major interests in the Far East have varying degrees of apprehension about the remilitarization of Japan, the present governments in these countries are reconciled to the necessity of Japanese defensive rearmament. Australia and New Zealand, however, would press for the simultaneous development of mutual se- curity arrangements with the US par- ticipating. 5. The Kremlin and the Chinese Commu- nist regime will continue to try to pre- vent the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty to which they are not a party and will try to frustrate, or at least to delay Pe a, ee eed sae . and limit Japanese rearmament by bringing propaganda and diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan, the US, and other non-Communist countries . 6. The USSR would refuse to recognize the validity of a US-sponsored treaty be- tween Japan and the non-Communist powers but would not consider it to be suf- ficiently important in itself to justify di- rect military action. Soviet concern over Japan centers not in the treaty issue as such, but in Japanese rearmament. 7. We do not believe that Japanese re- armament in itself would set off a general war between the USSR and the US. UW, however, the Kremlin were to conclude, in the light of the world power situation, that the rearmament of Japan and its alignment with the US constituted a threat to the security of the Soviet bloc, the USSR would probably resort to mili- tary action at the time and place most ad- vantageous to itself. DISCUSSION 1. Because of the strategic location of Japan, its industrial capacity, and its large pool of trained civilian and military manpower, Japan’s ultimate political alignment will be @ decisive factor in the balance of power in the Far East. If the Communists controlled Japan, they could: a. Safeguard the Communist controlled ter- ritory in Northeast Asia, >. Breach the US defense line in the west- ern Pacific; c. Strengthen the industrial and military power of the Soviet bloc, particularly in re- spect to shipping and sea power-with the Far East; = 9 d. Facilitate Communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia, and e. Free Communist forces for deployment elsewhere. If, on the other hand, Japan were to be rearmed and aligned with the West: a. The West would benefit from the fact that the industrial and military resources of -the nation were retained in friendly hands, b. Japan would provide a ; otential base for Western military power in Northeast Asia, c. The US would be able to protect its de- fense outposts in the western Pacific, and d. Other non-Communist countries would be encouraged in their fight apainst the spread of Communism.” Japan's Military Potential 2. Because of its present military impotence, Japan is vulnerable to military attack by the USSR, which alone, or together, with Com- munist China, could initiate & large-scale in- vasion with no further warning than we now have. Japan has, however, the potential for creating forces sufficient to defend itself against such an invasion or to build up & large military establishment. $. Japan has sufficient manpower to create large ground, naval, and air forces. a.A Japanese Army of Up to 500,000 men theoretically could be created within six months or a year after Japan had agreed to rearmament, equipment and supplies had be- come available, and a training program had begun. Its nucleus would be the 75,000 men now in the National Police Reserve, who are receiving US training and equipment. The remainder of such an army and the further in- crements would be drawn from & manpower pool of 15 million men, including approxi- mately 8 million veterans, theoretically fit for military service. The basic machinery re- quired for mobilization still exists, and there are enough veteran officers of the Imperial Army at all command and steff levels for virtually any size of army required. b. Similarly, there are enough naval and air force personnel, including technicians, to man large naval and air establishments. 3 { BS z ae cone poten AMIN TOP & 4. There are enough trained workers in Japan to operate an industrial yuant as large and productive as that maintained during World War Il. A large part of this industrial plant, despite war damage and some removals for reparations, is intact or usable, or could be re- stored after relatively minor repairs. Japan still has facilities for the manufacture of such ground force munitions as edged weapons, small arms, mortars, rocket guns, artillery, light tanks, self-propelled guns,

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