The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Pe Acetim

Central Intelligence Agency · 1951

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Introduction

Iranian and Middle East oil, and its importance to Western Europe in peacetime and beyond, fill a January 1951 CIA paper. The heading's final words are cut short, but the subject is clear: oil as the West's lifeline. Europe's recovery ran on Middle Eastern crude moved through few chokepoints.

The paper weighs how much Europe depended on that oil and what interruption would do. Months later, Iran's oil nationalization turned the study into front-page crisis. Analysts had stated the stakes in advance, in writing. This file preserves that warning, a resource study that reads like a forecast of the decade.

Catalog record

CREATORCentral Intelligence Agency
YEAR1951
COLLECTIONDECLASSIFIED
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE21350
VERSION1.0
LICENSEPublic Domain
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCEInternet Archive — CIA Reading Room mirror

Source: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0000010474

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

298" BOR TRE LEE DEAT oes. aioe 20F THE. ‘UNITED, 87 TATES : ‘ setts ma ‘3 @ a sen eee ie PE tara DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This copy of this publication is for the information arid use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the reciplent’s . office who require the information for the performance of their offictal duties. Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa- _ tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: - a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart- ment of State , b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force _ é. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission jf. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff > 7g, Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other _. Tae : Department or Agency __ @. ‘This copy may be elther retained or destroyed by burning fn accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar- rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. m4 . Seer ane tem Antica Smee A ht oe ns Meme © ote an © ne 4 vif am, : fiat ep a # ia eee DISTRIBUTION (NITE Beriea): Office of the President ~~~ Rational Security Council National Security Resources Board ; wd Department of State ~ Office of Secretary of Defense ~ Department of the Army - +> Bepartment of the Navy. Department of the Air Force _ Alomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefe of Giafh Feder] Bureau of Investigation Research and Development Board Muniliona Board — NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ‘THE IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN AND MIDDLE EAST OIL TO WESTERN EUROPE ~ UNDER PEACETIME CONDITIONS NIE-14 This estimate has been prepared in response to a request . from the Senior Staff of the National Security Council. The ---.-. basic data were supplied by an interdepartmental ud hoc committee of technical representatives of ECA, the Petroleum Committee of the Munitions Board, the Departments of the . Treasury, Commerce, and State, and CIA. The intelligence aia te oe organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the ..- -- ~~ , Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the ecie preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper eee is based on information available on 50 December 1950. © THE IMPORTANCE OF IRANI TO WESTERN EUROPE UNDE THE PR ‘To estimate the importance of (a) Iranian oll production and (b) total Middle East oll _... production to Western Europe in time of peace. Gees a ASSUMPTIONS That access to (a) Iranian oli production, and (b) total denied to the Western Powers by means other 1. The amount of crude oll and refined prod-_ ucts now exported from Iran could be derived from other areas by small increases in crude production and by fuller use of available re- fining capacity. At the rates of consumption and levels of prices prevailing at the end of 1950, the extra annual dollar charge to Europe © of procuring would be about $700,000,000.° 2. Loss of Iranian oil production and of the refinery at Abadan would temporarily have an adverse effect upon Westera European eco- nomic activity, and would impose severe finan- etal losses particularly upon the British, who control all the oll production of the country. Aithough th volume of petroleum which could be made available to Western Europe might be over- * Figures In this paper representing estimates af- extra annual dollar costs and of the extent of ou shortages which would result from a loss of Iranian . or Middle Eastern oll sre indicative rather than exact. They will hold true as given only as long as cil prices stay at the levels of late 1850, _. production and consumption continue at the rates , currently estimated for the fiscal year 1950-51, The — effect of the rearmament programs in the Western Europe will presumably be to — yatsa the consumption of oll, and probably also to raise its price. These factors would tend to make the ofl of the Middle East more important to the western economies, and to cause its Joss to be even more severely felt than is indicated by the Agures etted In this paper. general Us and in CONCLUSIONS | ~ “reserves and building refineries elsewhere, the this amount of of] elsewhere - e effect of the loss of Iran on the —- and oll — AN AND MIDDLE EAST OIL R PEACETIME CONDITIONS OBLEM Middle East ofl production is than war. : come in & relatively short time by developing - Bnancial effects would be overcome slowly, if at all. 3. If all Middle East ol] production were to °- be lost, a cutback of about 10 percent inthe — total oll consumption of the non-Sovict world = would have to be imposed, even after a maxt- |. mum practicable increase of production from other sources. This would call for substantial | —~ rationing in the United States as well as else- | where. International allocation would be re- ]: quired. At the price level of late 19508 net |] > ¢nerease in dollar requirements of from $1 to - $1.2 billion would occur if Western Europe, after-a cutback of 10 percent in its consump- tion, were to procure from alternative sources - an amount of oll sufficient to make up for ‘ne loss of Middle East imports. 4. It is estimated that if a cutback of 10 per- cent from present levels of of! consumption ~~ were imposed on Western Europe, it would. - | permit maintenance of industrial production ~at approximately the levels of late 1050, and = of transportation at the extreme minimum necessary for that purpose. No appreciable expansion of industry, whether for normal . economic development or for rearmament, _ would be possible, unless economies were ef- fected, expansion of industry and transporta- we tion facilities were accomplished only with iB solid fuel-utilizing equipmeat, and possibly —'- | ‘3 some conversion of existing petroleum-using of time, could be made to the total loss of equipment were made. Rationing even tore Middle East oll, unless new reserves are proved duce consuraption by 10 percent would pre- elsewhere, Or new sources of energy developed. —- -- sent great difficulties in thme of peace. Western Europe therefore would not be able to compensate for the loss of Middle East ol - §. No way can be foreseen at present by which save by profound changes in Its currently __.. a satisfactory adjustment, over a longer period planned economic structure. : DISCUSSION : 1. Total petroleum requirements of Western could be more than made up by increasing the Europe (including the UK) for the fiscal year output of British companies operating else- ---~ 4950-51 are estimated at 66 million metric where in the workd. Indeed it could all be tons, of which 42.5 million will be imported

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