Injustice (Catholic Encyclopedia article)

Joseph Delany · 1913

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Introduction

Moral theology gives injustice a narrow sense here, apart from its broad use for any breach of the virtue of justice. In this narrower sense it means breaking another person's strict right against that person's reasonable will. A right, the entry explains, is the moral power to hold, do, or claim something that serves one's own good.

Goods tied to the person stand apart from goods outside the person. The first kind includes life, limb, liberty, and good name. The second kind includes property of any kind. Harm to the first kind counts as personal injury, harm to the second as real injury. The entry sorts those cases and the forms of wrongdoing that follow, giving readers a working map of how moralists graded offenses against what others are owed.

Catalog record

CREATORJoseph Delany
YEAR1913
COLLECTIONREFERENCE
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE3 KB
LICENSEPUBLIC_DOMAIN
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCENew Advent — Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)

Source: https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08010c.htm

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Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

( Latin in, privative, and jus, right).

Injustice, in the large sense, is a contradiction in any way of the virtue of justice . Here, however, it is taken to mean the violation of another's strict right against his reasonable will, and the value of the word right is determined to be the moral power of having or doing or exacting something in support or furtherance of one's own advantage.

The goods whose acquisition or preservation is contemplated as the object of right belong to different categories. There are those which are bound up with the person , whether there is question of body or soul , such as life and limb, liberty, etc., as likewise that which is the product of one's deserts , such as good name; and there are those things which are extrinsic to the individual, such as property of whatever sort. The injury perpetrated by a trespass on a man's right in the first instance is said to be personal, in the second real. All injury, like every kind of moral delinquency, is either formal or material according as it is culpable or not. It is customary also to distinguish between that species of injurious action or attitude which involves loss to the one whose right is outraged, such as theft, and another which carries with it no such damage, such as an insult which has had no witnesses. The important thing is that in every kind of injury such as we are considering, the offense is against commutative justice . That is, it is against the virtue which, taking for granted the clear distinction of rights as between man and man, demands that those rights be conserved and respected even to the point of arithmetical equality. Consequently, whenever the equilibrium has been wrongfully upset, it is not enough to atone for the misdeed by repentance or interior change of heart. There is an unabatable claim of justice that the wronged one be put back in possession of his own. Otherwise the injury, despite all protestations of sorrow on the part of the offender, continues. Hence, for example, there must be apology for contumely, retraction for calumny , compensation for hurt to life and limb, restitution for theft, etc. No one therefore can receive absolution for the sin of injustice except in so far as he has a serious resolution to rehabilitate as soon as he can and in such measure as is possible the one whose right he has contemned.

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