Faith (Catholic Encyclopedia article)

Hugh Pope · 1913

Read Faith (Catholic Encyclopedia article) by Hugh Pope (1913) in the Tower of Babel, a free online library of public-domain works preserved in clean, searchable text. No sign-up. The full text is served as a plain-text file at a predictable URL, where text is present: https://antarctic-labs.com/tower-of-babel/catholic-encyclopedia-1913-faith.txt.

Introduction

Faith, in this article, means trust in God and assent to revealed truth. The Old Testament stresses steadfast trust in God's promises and covenant. The New Testament adds belief in Christ as Saviour and Lord. Faith thus joins personal trust with acceptance of what God reveals.

The article separates objective faith, the truths believed, from subjective faith, the act of believing. It also sets out two orders of knowledge, reason and revelation. Reason can know some truths about God on its own. Revelation adds truths reason alone could not reach.

Catalog record

CREATORHugh Pope
YEAR1913
COLLECTIONREFERENCE
FORMATTXT
FILE SIZE59 KB
LICENSEPUBLIC_DOMAIN
RIGHTSPUBLIC DOMAIN
SOURCENew Advent — Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)

Source: https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05752c.htm

Browse the full library · About the Tower of Babel

Full text

The opening of the work, from the library's hosted text:

The meaning of the word ( Pistis , fides). In the Old Testament , the Hebrew means essentially steadfastness , cf. Exodus 17:12 , where it is used to describe the strengthening of Moses' hands; hence it comes to mean faithfulness , whether of God towards man ( Deuteronomy 32:4 ) or of man towards God ( Psalm 118:30 ). As signifying man's attitude towards God it means trustfulness or fiducia . It would, however, be illogical to conclude that the word cannot, and does not, mean belief or faith in the Old Testament for it is clear that we cannot put trust in a person's promises without previously assenting to or believing in that person's claim to such confidence. Hence even if it could be proved that the Hebrew does not in itself contain the notion of belief , it must necessarily presuppose it. But that the word does itself contain the notion of belief is clear from the use of the radical, which in the causative conjugation, or Hiph'il , means "to believe", e.g. Genesis 15:6 , and Deuteronomy 1:32 , in which latter passage the two meanings — viz. of believing and of trusting — are combined. That the noun itself often means faith or belief , is clear from Habakkuk 2:4 , where the context demands it. The witness of the Septuagint is decisive; they render the verb by pisteuo , and the noun by pistis ; and here again the two factors, faith and trust, are connoted by the same term. But that even in classical Greek pisteuo was used to signify believe , is clear from Euripides (Helene, 710), logois d'emoisi pisteuson tade , and that pistis could mean "belief" is shown by the same dramatist's theon d'ouketi pistis arage (Medea, 414; cf. Hipp., 1007). In the New Testament the meanings "to believe" and "belief", for pisteon and pistis , come to the fore; in Christ's speech, pistis frequently means "trust", but also "belief" (cf. Matthew 8:10 ). In Acts it is used objectively of the tenets of the Christians , but is often to be rendered "belief" (cf. 17:31 ; 20:21 ; 26:8 ). In Romans 14:23 , it has the meaning of "conscience" — "all that is not of faith is sin " — but the Apostle repeatedly uses it in the sense of "belief" (cf. Romans 4 and Galatians 3 ). How necessary it is to point this out will be evident to all who are familiar with modern theological literature; thus, when a writer in the "Hibbert Journal", Oct., 1907, says, "From one end of the Scripture to the other, faith is trust and only trust", it is hard to see how he would explain 1 Corinthians 13:13 , and Hebrews 11:1 . The truth is that many theological writers of the present day are given to very loose thinking, and in nothing is this so evident as in their treatment of faith. In the article just referred to we read: "Trust in God is faith, faith is belief , belief may mean creed, but creed is not equivalent to trust in God ." A similar vagueness was especially noticeable in the "Do we believe?" controversy—one correspondent says—"We unbelievers, if we have lost faith, cling more closely to hope and — the greatest of these — charity" ("Do we believe?", p. 180, ed. W. L. Courtney, 1905). Non-Catholic writers have repudiated all idea of faith as an intellectual assent, and consequently they fail to realize that faith must necessarily result in a body of dogmatic beliefs . "How and by what influence", asks Harnack, "was the living faith transformed into the creed to be believed, the surrender to Christ into a philosophical Christology ?" (quoted in Hibbert Journal, loc. cit.). Faith may be considered both objectively and subjectively Objectively, it stands for the sum of truths revealed by God in Scripture and tradition and which the Church (see RULE OF FAITH ) presents to us in a brief form in her creeds, subjectively, faith stands for the habit or virtue by which we assent to those truths . It is with this subjective aspect of faith that we are here primarily concerned. Before we proceed to analyze the term faith, certain preliminary notions must be made clear. (a) The twofold order of knowledge . — "The Catholic Church", says the Vatican Council , III, iv, "has always held that there is a twofold order of knowledge , and that these two orders are distinguished from one another not only in their principle but in their object; in one we know by natural reason, in the other by Divine faith; the object of the one is truth attainable by natural reason, the object of the other is mysteries hidden in God , but which we have to believe and which can only be known to us by Divine revelation ." (b) Now intellectual knowledge may be defined in a general way as the union between the intellect and an intelligible object. But a truth is intelligible to us only in so far as it is evident to us, and evidence is of different kinds; hence, according to the varying character of the evidence, we shall have varying kinds of knowledge . Thus a truth may be self-evident — e.g. the whole is greater than its part — in which case we are said to have intuitive knowledge of it; or the truth may not be self-evident, but deducible from premises in which it is contained — such knowledge is termed reasoned knowledge ; or again a truth may be neither self-evident nor deducible from premises in which it is contained, yet the intellect may be obliged to assent to it because It would else have to reject some other universally accepted truth ; lastly, the intellect may be induced to assent to a truth for none of the foregoing reasons, but solely because, though not evident in itself, this truth rests on grave authority — for example, we accept the statement that the sun is 90,000,000 miles distant from the earth because competent, veracious authorities vouch for the fact. This last kind of knowledge is termed faith, and is clearly necessary in daily life. If the authority upon which we base our assent is human and therefore fallible, we have human and fallible faith; if the authority is Divine, we have Divine and infallible faith. If to this be added the medium by which the Divine authority for certain statements is put before us, viz. the Catholic Church , we have Divine-Catholic Faith (see RULE OF FAITH ). (c) Again, evidence, whatever its source, may be of various degrees and so cause greater or less firmness of adhesion on the part of the mind which assents to a truth . Thus arguments or authorities for and against a truth may be either wanting or evenly balanced, in this case the intellect does not give in its adherence to the truth , but remains in a state of doubt or absolute suspension of judgment; or the arguments on one side may predominate; though not to the exclusion of those on the other

Read the complete text