The Institutes of Justinian (Justinian I (Thomas Collett Sandars, trans.), 1874) ========================================================== T. C. S. INTEODTJCTION. ]. The legislation of Justinian belongs to the latest period of the history of Roman law. During the long space object of the of preceding centuries the law had undergone as many ^''^^'^oduction. changes as the State itself. The Institutes of Justinian embody principles and ideas of law which had been the slow growth of ages, and which, dating their origin back to the first begin- ning of the Koman people, had been only gradually unfolded, modified, and matured. It is as impossible to understand the Institutes, without having a slight knowledge of the position the work occupies in the history of Roman law, as it is to understand the history of the Eastern Empire without having studied that of the Western Empire and of the Republic. Many, also, of the leading principles of Roman law contained in the Institutes are unfamiliar to the English reader, and though they may be learnt by a perusal of the work itself, the reader, to whom the subject is new, may be glad to anticipate the study of details by having placed before him a general sketch of the part of law on which he is about to enter. It is proposed, therefore, in this Introduction, to give first an outline of the history of Roman law, and then an outline of Roman private law. Each, however, will only be given with the very moderate degree of fulness proper to a sketch intended to be merely a preliminary to the study of the Institutes. HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW. 2. However obscure may be the history of early Rome, we cannot doubt that Roman citizens were, from a very ^. , ^ ^ ^ J History oj early period, composed of two distinct bodies, the early Rome, populus and the plebs, of which the first alone origi- ^^ ^^" "*' nally possessed all political power, and the members of which vm INTKODUCTION. were bound together by peculiar religious ties. Nor can we have any reasonable doubt about the general features of the constitu- tion of the populus. Whatever may have been their origin, it consisted of three tribes. Each tribe was divided into ten curiosy and each curia into ten decuricE ; another name for a decuria was a gens, and it included a great number of distinct families, united by having common sacred rites, and bearing a common name. It was not necessary that there should be any tie of blood between these different families, in order that they should form part of the same gens ; but a pure unspotted pedigree, ancient enough to have no known beginning, was claimed by every member of a gens,^ and there was a theoretical equality among all the members of the whole tribe. The heads of the different families in these hundred gentes met together in a great council, called the council of the curies (^comifki cnriata), A smaller body of one hundred, answer- ing in number to the gentes, and called the Senate, was charged with the office of initiating the more important questions sub- mitted to the great council ; and a king, nominated by the senate, but chosen by the curies,! presided over the whole body, and was charged with the functions of executive government. 3. The populus was also bound together by strong religious Beligious ^^^^' ^^^bat was most peculiar in the religion of Rome system. ^vas its intimate connection with the civil polity. The heads of religion were not a priestly caste, but were citizens, in all other respects like their fellows, except that they were in- vested with peculiar sacred offices. The king was at the head of the religious body ; and beneath him were augurs and other functionaries of the ceremonies of religion. The whole body of the populus had a place in the religious system of the State. The mere fact of birth in one of the familicB forming part of a gens gave admittance to a sacred circle which was closed to all besides. Those in this circle were surrounded by religious ceremonies from their cradle to their grave. Every important act of their life was sanctioned by solemn rites. Every division and subdivision of the State to which they belonged had its own peculiar sacred ceremonies. The individual, the family, the gens, were all under ■^ Gentiles sunt, qui inter se eodem nomine sunt ; non est satis : qui ah ingenuis oriundi sunt; ne id quidem satis est : quorum majorum nemo servitutem. servivit : ahest etlam nunc qui capite non sunt deminuti. — Cicero, Topic. 6. f Quirites, regem create ; ita Patrihus visum est. — Liv. i. 17. INTEODUCTION. IX the guardianship of their respective tutelary deities. Every locality with which they were familiar was sacred to some patron god. The calendar was marked out by the services of religion : the pleasure of the gods arranged the times of business and leisure ; and a constantly-superintending Providence watched over the councils of the State, and showed, by signs which the wise could understand, approval or displeasure at all that was under- taken. 4. By the side of this associated body there was another element of the State, occupying a position very dif- ferent from that which was occupied by this privi- leged community. The p^ehs was probably formed by the inhabi- tants of conquered towns being brought to Rome ; perhaps also by the influx of voluntary settlers. These new-comers, or, if we are to suppose that the plehs was coeval with the populus, these strangers, remained without the political circle which included the populus. They belonged to no gens* had no place in the comitia, no share in the legislative or executive government ; as little had they any share in the jus sacrum. They were as much excluded from the pale of the peculiar divine law as from that of the pecu- liar public law of the ruling body. Even the Servian constitu- tion, and the formation of the thirty tribes, laid the foundation of future change, rather than altered in early times the basis on which existing institutions were founded. The centuries opened to the plehs a door to political power by making the two orders meet on the common ground of a graduated scale of property ; and the constitution of the thirty tribes marked off the inhabi- tants of the town and country into small local divisions, in the comitia of which the plehs had of course the preponderance, if it is to be supposed that the tribes had any recognised comitia before the institution of tribunes at the beginning of the Kepublican period. But though the comitia centuriata took away ultimately almost all political power from the comitia curiata, still the old relations of the different members of the body politic remained, in theory at least, long unimpaired. The curies alone could give the religious sanction which was indispensable to the validity of the resolutions of the centuries, and the plehs was as much as * The position of the plebeian families included in the gentes was so exceptional, and is so obscure, that we need not qualify the general state- ment that the jjlehs did not belong to a gens, especially if the expression in the text is considered as referring to the early times of Rome. X INTKODUCTION. ever excluded from admission into the body of tlie populus, fenced round with its impassable wall of religious privileges, although the plebs and the populus were governed for the most part by the same rules of private law. 5. There could be very little direct law-making, except to Legislation ioi i^eet temporary emergencies, in such a community as early Borne. early Eome. What laws were made, were first pro- posed, arranged, and determined on by the Senate^ under the guidance of its chief magistrate, the king, and then submitted to the highest source of power, the comitia curlata. After the in- stitution of the centuries, the comitia centuriata gradually suc- ceeded to the political power of the mriata, and the curies only met to give a formal religious sanction to the resolutions of the centuries. The king published regulations on matters that fell exclusively within his province as pontifex maximus, and a collec- tion of these leges regicB, which were probably nothing more than by-laws for the conduct of religious ceremonies, was made, or said to be made, by Papirius, who lived in the time of Tarquinius Superbus.^ 6. The king was the supreme judge in all causes. But if, in a criminal trial, the accused was a member of the populus, he could appeal from the king to the comitia curiata. If the accused was a plebeian, he had no tribunal to which he could appeal, until, shortly after the expulsion of the kings, the Valerian laws transferred appeals to the comitia centuriata , of which the plebs formed a part. Civil causes were decided by the king in his quality oi pontifex maximus, or by the subordinate pontijices acting under him, as all the private law of the populus was so mixed up with the sacred law, that it was part of the duty of a pontifex to know and guard its provisions, f 7. After the expulsion of the kings, the struggle between the plebs and the populus became gradually more and Tositmi of the -^ . \/ _ , . .^ _ -^ i . xi, Flehs after the more scrious. iicsidcs the right ot appeal to tne exindsion oj centuries secured by the lex Valeria in every case the Kings. ^ «^ *' . when a citizen Avas condemned to death, the secession to the Aventine in 260 A.u.C wrung from the patres a cancel- * There is no reason to doubt that Papirius was a real person (Dionys. iii. 36). But when Pomponius speaks of his collection as the jus civile papirianuni (D. i. 2. 2. 2), he probably uses the term not with reference to the real work of Papirius, but to a work composed towards the end of the republic by Granius Flaccus, De Jure Papiriano (D. 1. 10. 144). t D. i. 2. 2. 6. INTEODUCTIOK XI ment of existing debts, and the creation of tribunes, at first two in number, then five, and afterwards ten, to defend the plehs. These champions of the lower order of the State gave great additional importance and a new character, or perhaps a beginning, to the cornitic tributa, which now had to elect magistrates, who were protected themselves by a sacred character, and were specially commissioned to maintain the interest of their fellow-tribesmen. But the j)l^^s li^^ to struggle with an evil which no partial remedies could meet. There was no body of laws to which they could appeal in case they were "wronged. The whole administration of the laws was in the hands of the patricians, and there was no ap- peal from the decision of the magistrate except in cases where life was at stake, or unless the injury, inflicted by -wilful perversion of the law, was great enough, as in the memorable instance of Virginia, to rouse the wronged to the redress of physical force. Many of the rights which theoretically belonged to the plebeians as having the same private law with the populus, were practically denied them. At last, a successful revolution enabled the plebs to insist on a changed form of political government, which might open the door of power and oflfice to the members of their own body, and supply a machinery for the preparation of a fixed and permanent body of law. The Decemvirate, superseding and in- corporating into itself every other magistracy, and composed of an equal number of patricians and plebeians, was formed 303 A.u.c, for the purpose of collecting and embodying in the shape of written law all those portions of the customary law which it was most essential for the due administration of justice to place on an in disputable footing, and publish for the benefit of the whole body of citizens. 8. The lavish praises bestowed on the laws of the Twelve Tables by the later writers of Rome, and the story of j-^^^ Twelve the deputation sent to learn the laws of Greece, would Tables. give us an idea of a very difierent body of laws from that which these Tables actually presented. We should expect to find a systematic exposition of Roman public and private law as it existed in the times previous to the Gallic invasion ; and to find, also, that the whole body of law was at least coloured by the infusion of a foreign element. We should naturally think that there was somethino; new and ori^rinal in a leo:islation which Cicero considers as almost the perfection of human wisdom."^ The frag- * See esj)ecially De Orat. i. 43, 44. Xll INTRODUCTION. ments of the Twelve Tables which remam to us show how erro- neous are these conceptions of their contents. There is nothing whatsoever which we can decidedly pronounce to be borrowed from a foreign origin, except possibly some provisions respecting the law of funerals, taken from the laws of Solon. These Tables contained, for the most part, short enunciations of those points of law which the conduct of the affairs of daily life required to be settled and publicly announced. The law had existed before, but in a floating, vague, traditionary shape, only some very few laws having been engraved on tablets and publicly displaj^ed. The Twelve Tables left to the decision of the magistrate, and the interpretation of those skilled in law, the application and exposi- tion of these principles ; they also left many parts of the custo- mary law wholly untouched on. But what the exigencies of the time required deciding, they decided ; and they laid a firm foun- dation on which the structure of private law would rest for the future. It is not difficult to understand how this was esteemed so great a gain to the large body of the citizens, that these laws were spoken of by the ancients as the creations of a new legislation. The following are the chief provisions of the Twelve Tables, so far as they are known.* — 1. The First Table related to the pro- ceedings in a civil suit. If the person summoned before the magistrate would not come, he "s\^as to be forced to go, but for an old or sick man a beast of burden was to be provided. If the adversaries could agree on the way, they were to be allowed to do so. If not, the statements of both were to be heard before midday in the Comitium or the Forum, and then, after midday, the magis- trate was to adjudge the thing, but every process was to be stopped at sunset. 2. The Second Table fixed the amount to be depo- sited in the action by wager, and provided that the affair might be put off if necessary, as if, among other things, the judge or arbiter appointed by the magistrate was ill; and pointed out how witnesses might be summoned. 3. The Third Table vras apparently made in favour of debtors, for though it left them ultimately at the mercy of the creditor, it gave them new means of averting their fate. They were to have thirty days before any steps could be taken against them on a debt confessed or decided to be due. They might then be brought before a magistrate, and unless pay- * This summary is taken from the arrangement of the supposed con- tents of the Twelve Tables adopted by Ortolan ; but in manj'- points, and especially in the assignment to a particular Table of a fragment, this arrange- ment is necessarily conjectural. INTKODUCTION. Xlll ment was made or a surety {yindex) found, the creditor mlglit put them in irons, but not of more than fifteen pounds weight, and must give them a pound of flour a day. This could last for sixty days only, and the debtor had meanwhile to be produced before the magistrate to show he was alive ; and notice of the amount of the debt must be given on three market-days by the creditor, so that an opportunity of ransoming the debtor might be given. Then, but not till then, the debtor was at the mercy of the creditor, who could sell him as a slave or kill him, and if there were several creditors, they might hew him in pieces, and although any of them took a part of his body larger in proportion than his claim, he was not to be punished. 4. The Fourth Table referred to the father of the family, who was bidden to destroy deformed children, and whose absolute power over the life and liberty oJt his children was established, while it was provided that if he sold his son three times, the son should be freed from his power. 5. The Fifth Table related to inheritances and tutorships. Wo- men were to be in perpetual^ tutorship, except the vestal virgins. As a man disposed by testament, so was the law to be ; but if he died intestate, and without a suus heres, his nearest agnati, or, in default of agnati, the gentiles, were to take. The agaati were to be tutors, and have the custody of madmen who had no curators. 6. The Sixth Table referred to ownership, and pro- vided that the words spoken in the solemn forms of transfer, a nexum or mancipium, should be held binding ; that he who denied them should pay double ; that ten years' possession for immoveables, and one for moveables, should be the time necessary for usucapion, and that a year should suffice for the usucapion of a wife by her husband, unless she absented herself for three nights in the time ; that no one not a Roman citizen should acquire by usucapion ; and that materials built into a house should not be reclaimed by their owner, at least until the building was taken or fell down. The property in a thing sold was not to pass to the purchaser until the vendor was satisfied. The "fictitious suit for the transfer of property called in jure cessio, and mancipation, were confirmed. 7. The Seventh Table contained provisions as to buildings and to plots of land, as to the width of way to, be left, as to overhanging trees, and so forth ; and in case of disputes as to boundaries, the magistrate was to appoint arbitrators. 8. The Eighth Table dealt with delicts. It prescribed capital punish- ment for libellous sono-s and outrages. A limb was to be given for a limb, three hundred asses for the tooth of a free man, and XIV INTRODUCTION. one hundred and fifty for the tooth of a slave ; for an injury or minor outrage, twenty-five asses ; a four-footed beast doing injury might be given up to whomsoever it injured, in lieu of compensation. The nocturnal devastation of crops or the incendiarism of a build- ing was punished with death. Theft, if the thief was caught red- handed, was to be punished by the thief, if a freeman, being given over to the person robbed, and, if a slave, by his being beaten and thrown from the Tarpeian Rock ; while various other provisions are made as to theft, fixing minor penalties, where the circumstances were not so grave. The rate of interest was fixed at 8J per cent, per annum {centesimcB usurce), and the usurer who exceeded this was to be fined quadruple. The false witness was to be thrown from the Kock, and the witness, in a solemn form, who refused his testimony was to be infamous ; and the enchanter and poisoner were to be punished. 9. The Ninth Table related to public j law, and provided that there were to be no privilegia, or laws affect- ing individuals only ; that the centuries alone could pronounce capital sentence ; that the judge or arbiter taking a bribe should be punishable capitally ; that there should be an appeal to the people from every penal sentence ; and that death should be the punish- ment of leaguing with or handing over a citizen to the enemy. 10. The Tenth Table related to funerals, limiting the ceremonies and display attending them. 11. The Eleventh Table prohibited the marriage of patricians and plebeians; and 12. The Twelfth Table had reference to some miscellaneous matters ; as that a slave who had done an injury might be abandoned to the person injured, in lieu of compensation. The seizure of anything belonging to the debtor {pignoris capio) was permitted when the debt had been contracted, or the sum due was to be expended, for sacrificial purposes. It will be observed that the Twelve Tables recognise four of the actions of law, the nature of which will be noticed in a later part of the Introduction, viz., sacramentum, judiciis postulatio, (in the shape of the arbitration to be given to settle boundaries), maniis injectio, and pignoris capio. They further recognise the distinction between the magistrate and the Jz^c/e^, w^hich was the characteristic feature of Roman procedure ; and probably these actions of law and this distinction between the judge and the magistrate date from a time much earlier than the Twelve Tables. Most, too, of the characteristic points of Roman civil law are to be found in the TavcIvc Tables. The patria potestas, usucapion. INTKODUCTION. XV tutelao-e, testamentary and intestate succession, the nexuin, man- cipatio, all are enforced, and evidently formed part of the ancient customary law of Rome. 9. The Decemvirate was nominally intended to be a means of removinof, as far as was then thouo;ht possible, the The attain- political distinction between the orders. How little mcnt of poU- the object was really accomplished is notorious. Al- t^c^^'^n'^'^^^y though half the decemvirs were plebeians, the suppres- sion of the meetings of the comitia tributa, and the loss of tribunes, was poorly compensated by the presence of magistrates who acted in conjunction with patricians, and readily yielded deference to their colleagues. Besides, the Two Tables added in the year of the second Decemvirate contained provisions which later writers considered manifestly unjust;^ and we have seen that, among other things, they expressly refused the connuhlum to the plehs. The Twelve Tables, as fixing and proclaiming the law, were un- doubtedly a source of great strength to the plebeians, and enabled them to maintain a much more secure position in their future struggles ; but the Decemvirate, regarded as a crisis in their political history, was certainly unfavourable to them. Nothing shows more completely that this was so than the progress they made immediately after the downfall of Appius Claudius and his colleagues. The laws of Horatius and Valerius not only forbad the constitution of any magistracy from which there should be no appeal, but provided that the ordinances of the comitia trihuta should, if sanctioned by the senate and the curies, be binding on all Roman citizens ; and in 309, only four years after the aboli- tion of the Decemvirate, the Canuleian law gave the connuhivm to the plebs, and the marriage of a patrician with a plebeian was no longer forbidden by law. This change was important, not only as removing a distinction mortifying to many individuals and em- barrassing many of the relations of private life, but as breaking through one of the barriers which the jus sacrum had hitherto interposed in the way of the plebs.'f The obstacle of a religious disqualification was the reason generally assigned by the populus for the exclusion of plebeians from public offices ; J and it was a ^ Cic. De Rep. ii. 37. t Ideoque decewmros connubium ' diremlssey ne incertd prole auspicia turharentur. — Liv. iv. 6. X Interroganti tribimo, curplebeium considem Jieri non oporteret ? respondit, qudd nemo plebeius auspicia haheret. — Liv. iv. 6. a XVI INTEODUCTION. great step towards political equality that the objection urged to marriages between the two orders — that it would disturb the sacra of the cjentes — should be overcome. The advance of the plehs to political equality was, however, very slow ; and it was not until a century and a half had elapsed from the passing of the Canuleian law that the two orders were placed on an equal footing. We may take the year 467 ,a.u.c., the date of the lex Hortensia, as the period when we can first pronounce that the distinction of the two orders was really done away. When that law had been passed, the plebeian had a full share in the jus publicum and the jus sacrum. The ordinances of the comitia tributa required no confirmation of the curies, no sanction of the Senate ; they were binding on the whole Koman people directly they were passed. The equality between the two orders was so complete that the plebeian could become consul, censor, praetor, curule gedile ; he could enter the Senate, he could administer justice ; he was excluded from none of the privileges of ih^jus sacrum ; he could become pontifex and augur ; and though he could not of course take part in any of the sacra belonging to particular gentes, go through certain religious ceremonies, or be engaged in the service of particular gods, these exceptions did not lower his political position. As far as the history of law is concerned, we may henceforv/ard lose sight of the distinction between plebeian and patrician. 10. From the writings of the later jurists, and especially from those of Gains and Cicero, and from the frag- ments of the TavcIvc Tables that have come down to us, we can collect the essential features of the private law of Some in its earliest period, before a general advance in civilisa- tion had modified it. This early law, which rested on custom as its foundation, and the elements of which, except so far as appeared in the laws of the Twelve Tables, were only known by tradition, was called in subsequent times \hQJus civile, the pecu- liar law of the Koman State. The history of Koman law is the history of the changes introduced into this law, of the additions made to it, and of the method adopted in the process. The notion of a body of customary law, in part unwritten, which was not abrogated, but was evaded or amplified by persons acting under the ideas of later times, is the notion which, above all others, must be embraced clearly by any one who wishes to under- stand Roman law. The jus civile must always be taken as the INTRODUCTION. XVll standino- point, and in tracing the history of the later law we have always to trace how, while the jus civile still remained in force, the law was made to suit the requirements of diiFerent periods by evading or adding to \h.QJus civile. It was only in the later days of the Empire that ihejus civile began to be swept away. When we come to speak of the contents of Koman private law, we shall have occasion to notice what were the leading features of i\\QJus civile. We need not at present do more than say that, when a student of Koman law has made himself acquainted with the elementary doctrines, he will find that the chief of these peculiar principles, dating from an unknown antiquity, and affecting the whole body of later jurisprudence, are those which determine the position of a father of a family, the succession to his estate, and the contracts and actions relating to the chief possessions of an agricultural proprietor. 11. The conquest of Italy and the gradual spread of Roman conquest materially altered the character of the legal Conquest of system. A branch of law almost entirely new sprang I^^^y- up, which determined the different relations in which the con- quered cities and nations were to stand with reference to Rome itself. As a general rule, and as compared with other nations of antiquity, Rome governed those whom she had vanquished with wisdom and moderation. Particular governors, indeed, abused their power ; but the policy of the State was not a severe one, and Rome connected herself with her subject allies by conceding them privileges proportionate to their importance, or their ser- vices. The jus Latinum and the Jm^ Italicum are terms familiar to all readers of Roman history ; the first expressed that, with) various degrees of completeness, the rights of Roman citizenship) were accorded to the inhabitants of different towns, some having^' the commercium only, some also the co7inubium. Towards the end of the republic, after the Social War (a.u.c. 663), the dis- / tinction of the Latinitas, as a partial right of citizenship attached to the inhabitants of particular places, disappeared among the*" people of Italy. The lex Junia (a.u.C. 664) and the lex Plautia (a.u.c. 663) gave the full rights of citizenship to almost the whole , of Italy, and the Italians were distributed among the thirty-five tribes. T\iQJus Italicum expressed a certain amount of municipal independence and exemption from taxation, attached to the dif- ferent places on which the right was bestowed. The citizens of some particular places in the provinces possessed the jus Latinum^ a 2 XVlil INTRODUCTION. and the jus Italicum was attached to certain privileged cities ; but the provinces generally had no participation in either right. They were subject to a proconsul or propraetor, paid taxes to the trea- sury of Rome, and had as much of the law of Rome imposed upon them, and were made to conform as nearly to Roman political notions, as their conquerors considered expedient."^ 12. But the contact of Rome with foreign nations produced a much more remarkable effect on Roman law than the introduction of a new branch of law regulating the position of subject nations. It wrought, or at least contributed largely to work, a Change in ■ i • • i i i • p i -r> t Boman law revolution ni the legal notions oi the Roman people. zmdcr the j^ forced them to compare other systems with their FrcBiors. , . . . ^ own. In the language of the jurists, it brought the Qjis^^iientium, that is, the law ascertained to obtain generally in I other nations, side by side with the jm5 civile, the old law of Rome. The prcBtor peregrinus, who was appointed (a.u.C. 507) to ad- judge suits in which persons who were not citizens were parties, could not bind strangers within the narrow and technical limits in which Romans were accustomed to move. Many of the most important parts of Roman law were such that their provisions .could not be extended to any but citizens. No one, for instance, except a citizen, could have the peculiar ownership termed domi- nium ex jure Quiritiiim. But when justice and reason pronounced a stranger to be an owner, it was impossible for a prcBtor not to recognise an ownership different from that which a citizen would claim ; and what magistrates were obliged to do in the case of strangers, the requirements of advancing civilisation soon induced them to do in the case of citizens. They recognised and gave effect to principles different from those of the municipal law of Rome. This municipal law remained in force wherever its pro- visions could give all that was required to do substantial justice ; but when they could not, the praetor appealed to a wider law, and sought in the principles of equity a remedy for the deficiencies of ihejus civile. He pronounced decrees (^edicta), laying down the law as he conceived it ought to be, if it was to reo-ulate aris^ht i the case before him. In process of time it became the custom for I the praetor to collect into one edictum the rules on which he in- tended to act during his tenure of office, and to publish them on a tablet {in alio) at the commencement of his official year. The * See Warnkcenig, Hist, du droit romain externe, p. 70. Savigny, Geschicht. Rom. Beclits, vol. i. ch. 2. INTEODUCTION. XlX edict, put forward at the beginning of the year of office, and running on from one praetor to another, was termed the edictum perpetuiim. How much the praetor was aided in the formation of a broader and more comprehensive system of law by a change in the form of actions, will appear when we come to speak of the system of civil process. By degrees such a system w^as intro- luced and fully established, and the jus honorarium, the law of :he 23ra3tors* {qui honor es gerebant), was spoken of as having a listinct place by the side, and as the complement, of i\\QJus civile. The praetors gave the formula of an action to the judge. For nany centuries senators alone were indoles until the i. / X 1 1 . 1 p The judges. ex Semproma (A.u.C. 632) tooK away the right oi )eing judges from the senators, and ga,ve it to the knights. Ifter a series of contests, the right was shared by the two orders, Lud extended even to persons of inferior rank, so that the 300 ►f the senatorial times had become 4,000 by the time of Augustus. Besides the judges placed on the annual list {in albo relati) there v^ere the recziperatores, who were appointed to determine causes o which peregrini were parties, and who were taken from every ank for the special occasion, who sat three or more together, and vho were used in cases requiring despatch. And there were lIso the centumviri, taken so many from each tribe, and who udged of cases of status, Quiritary property, and testamentary .nd intestate succession. 13. The progress of law was also much facilitated by the growth of a body of men termed juris consulti or The juris ^nu- uris pru denies, men who studied the forms, and, in denies. ime, the principles of law, and expounded them for the benefit f their friends and dependents. They were generally among he first men of the State, and the employment was considered one f the most dignified that could occupy the evening of a life of lublic service and magisterial honours. In the earlier times of he republic the patricians alone knew the days on which it was r was not lawful to transact legal business, and the forms in ^hich actions were to be brought. The story of the publishing f a collection of these forms, and of a list of the days on which usiness could be transacted, by Caius Flavins, is familiar to all eaders of Livy.f But although to a certain extent the study of * The term also included the edicts of the sediles who issued decrees in latters that came specially within their province, t Liv. ix. 46. XX INTEODUCTION. the law became open to all, whether patricians or plebeians, yet it does not seem to have been ever undertaken except by men of eminence. Such men used to instruct and protect the persons who sought their advice, explain the steps necessary for the suc- cessful conduct of an action, and write out the necessary forms."^ They gave answers when asked as to the law on a particular point ; and though they professed only to interpret the Twelve Tables, not to make laws, their notion of interpretation was so wide that it included whatever could be brought within the spirit of anything which the Twelve Tables enacted. Such answers (responsa) were of course of no legal authority ; but as the sage would frequently accompany his client f (as the questioner was called) before the magistrate, and announce his opinion, it had frequently all the effect upon the magistrate which a positive enactment would have had, and thus the responsa prudentum came to be enumerated among the direct sources of law. The names of some of these sages have been handed down to us. Cato the censor, and Severus Sulpicius, the cotemporary of Cicero, are those otherwise best known to us.| In the latter days of the republic the juris prudeiites were men acquainted with some por- tion at least of Greek philosophy, men of learning and general cultivation ; and it is not difficult to understand how powerfully their authority, acting almost directly on judicial decisions, must have contributed to the change which the law underwent towards the end of the republic. 14. By far the most important addition to the system of The law of I^oman law which the jurists introduced from Greek nature. philosophy, was the conception of the lex natures. We learn from the writings of Cicero whence this conception came, and what was understood by it.§ It came from Che Stoics^ and especially from Chrysippus. By natura, for which Cicero sometimes substitutes mundus, was meant the universe of things, and this universe the Stoics declared to be guided by reason. But as reason is thus a directive power, forbidding and enjoining, it is called law {lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quce juhet ea * The duty of a jurisprudent was respondere, cavere, agere, scrihere. — Cic. De Orat. i. 48. -'^—■'-^' f Clienti j^t'omere jura. — Hon. Epist. ii. 104. J Gibbon, viii. 31. § The most important passages in Cicero, with reference to the lex naturse, are De Leg. i. 6-12 ; Be Nat. Deor. i. 14, ii. 14. 31 ; De Fin. iv. 7. The expressions used in the text are from De Leg. i. 6. INTRODUCTION. XXl qucB facienda sunt, prohihetque contraria). But nature is with the Stoics both an active and a passive principle, and there is no source of the law of nature beyond nature itself. By lex natures, there- fore, was meant primarily the determining force of the universe, a force inherent in the universe by its constitution, (Z^^ est naturce vis). But man has reason, and as reason cannot be twofold, the ratio of the universe must be the same as the ratio of man, and the lex naturcB will be the law by which the actions of man are to be guided, as well as the law directing the universe. Virtue, or moral excellence, may be described as living in accordance with reason, or with the law of the universe. These notions worked themselves into Koman law, and the practical shape they took \ was that morality, so flir as it could come within the scope of I judges, was regarded as enjoined by law. The jurists did not j draw any sharp line between law and morality. As the lex natures I was a lex, it must have a place in the law of Rome. The prsetor considered himself bound to arrano;e his decisions so that no strons: moral claims should be disreo-arded. He had to o;ive effect to the lex natiircB, not only because it was morally right to do so, but also because the lex natures, was a lex. When a rij^id adher- ence to the doctrines of the jus civile threatened to do a moral/ wrong, and produce a result that was not equitable, there the lex\ naturcB was supposed to operate, and the praitor, in accordance • with its dictates, provided a remedy by means of the pliant forms of the praetorian actions. Gradually the cases, as well as the modes in which he would thus interfere, grew more and more cer- tain and recognised, and thus a body of equitable principles was introduced into Roman law. The two great agents in modifying and extending the old, rigid, narrow system of the jm5 civile were thus the jus gentium and the lex naturcB ; that is, generalisations from the legal systems of other nations, and morality looked on according to the philosophy of the Stoics as sanctioned by a law. But as, on the one hand, the generalisations from experience had in themselves no binding force, and as, on the other, the best index to ascertain what morality commanded was to examine the contents of other legal systems, the jus gentium and the lex natures, were each the complement of the other, and were often looked on by the jurists as making one whole, to which the term jus gentium was generally applied.* * See Austin", Province of Jurisprudence determined. Appendix, page xii. xxii INTKODUCTION. • 15. The centuries met to decide questions of war and peace, and to choose the higher magistrates ; but the laws which, after Sources of the lex Hortensia, were j)assed to effect any real legislation. change in the body of Roman law, were almost all plehhcita. The comitia tributa were recognised as almost the \ . . . \exclusive centre of legislative power: but in the later times of the republic a continually-increasins: importance was JPIebiscita. J g r ^ attached to the ordinances of the senate. Gains says that it had been questioned whether the senatus-consulta had the force of law.^ Perhaps they had not exactly the force of law at any time under the republic, excepting when they related to matters which it was the peculiar province of the senate to regulate ; but they were probably of little less weight than enactments recognized as constitutionally bind- The Senate. . „ on • • t i • , j_ mg. Ihe senate successiuUy mamtamed a clamif to exercise a dispensing power, and to release individuals from obedience to particular laws. It was generally able to reject a law, either wholly or partly, by calling in the aid of religious scruples ; and if it added a clause to a law, the new portion of the law was as binding as the old. J In the shape of directions to particular magistrates, it issued injunctions, of which the force was felt by all those who were subject to the magistrate's power; and it made, we have reason to think, independent enactments in matters belonging to religion, police, and civil administration, and perhaps even in matters of private law.§ The senate com- prised the richest and most influential men in the State ; the disruption of society attending the civil wars strengthened their influence ; and the Komans of the days of Cicero were quite prepared for the place which the senate held, as a legislative body, under the early C^sars. The growth of law during the time that elapsed between the : promulgation of the Twelve Tables and the commencement of the empire is marked not only by the abolition of the actions of law and the institution of praetorian actions, but by the ^development of the law of obligations, the old conveyance of nexum having expanded into verbal and literal contracts, and real contracts being recognised where no form but the delivery of the * Cicero mentions them among the sources of law. — Tojjic. 5. f AscoN. Argum. in Cornel. (Orell. p. 57). % AscoN. Argum. in Cornel. (Orell. p. 67). § PucHTA, Inst it. i. 298. INTEODUCTION. xxm thing was required; and four forms of purely consensual con- tracts being admitted as part of the civil law ; to all which the prgetor constantly added cases in which he announced that he would recognise and enforce an obligation. The pra3tor, too, pro- tected and regulated possession as apart from ownership ; and his attention w^as bestowed on the ties of blood, the father being restrained from disinheriting his children, and cognati taking the place oi gentiles in intestate succession. ^^ 16. The first emperors were only the chief magistrates of the republic. Auo;ustus and his immediate successors united m their own persons all the highest omces ot the State. The imperhtm, or supreme command, was conferred on them by the lex regia passed as a matter of form at the be- ginning of their reign, and by which the later jurists suj^posed that the people devolved on the emperor all their own right to govern and to legislate.* The assumption of -despotism was veiled under an adherence to republican forms ; and, at any rate during the first century of our era, the emperor always affected to con- sider himself as nothing more than the princeps reipuhlicce. Although we have instances, even in the time of Augustus, of edicts intended to be binding by the mere authority of the emperor, yet the people at first, and the senate afterwards, was recognised as the j)rimary source of law. By degrees the emperor usurped the sole legislative authority, either dictating to the senate what it was to enact, or, in later times, enacting it himself. The will of the prince came to have the force of law.f Sometimes this will decided what the law should be by the pub- lication of edicta pronounced by the emperor in his magisterial capacity, or mandata, orders directed to particular officers ; some- times by decreta, or judicial sentences given by the emperor, which served as precedents ; at other times by rescripta, that is, answers given by the emperor to magistrates who requested his assistance in the decision of doubtful points. 17. The people did not cease to make laws for a considerable time after the commencement of the empire.! These laws n n 1 «PI ) Laws. were ol course really the creations ot the emperor s will. Augustus, for instance, procured the sanction of legislation * D. i. 4. 1. t Inst. i. 2. 6 : Quod principi placuit, legis hahet vigorem. X Gaius mentions a lex Claudia. — Gaius, i. 157. XXIV INTEODUCTION. to a series of measures which made a considerable innovation in private law. These measures were designed to repress and dis- courage the excesses and corruption of a demoralised society. The lex Julia et Papia PoppcEa, and others of a similar character, attempted to restore virtue to private life by a system of rewards and penalties, attached to the fulfilment or neglect of family duties, and consisting chiefly in the taking away of testamentary benefits from the unmarried and childless, and giving them to those married with children, and, in default, to the treasury. They failed in their object; but the portion of law to which they belonged, and especially that of testaments and legacies, was con- siderably modified by their provisions. To the time of Augustus also belongs the introduction oi Jideicommissa and codicils. 18. After the middle of the first century of our era, all legis- ^, „ lative enactments of which we know are senatus-con~ The Senate. mi i • sulta. The election of maecistrates was transferred to the senate from the comitia^ and the senate was intrusted with the cognisance of offences against the emperor and the State, and the decision of appeals from inferior tribunals. f The later jurists said that the senate was made to represent the whole people, because the number of the citizens became too great to permit of their acting as a political body. J However historically false this may be, it yet is so far true that the senate was, in the earlier times of the empire, a body distinct from, and, in a certain very limited degree, opposed to, the emperor. We have some few memorable instances in Tacitus of senators who dared to speak what they thought,§ and who showed that the senate was, in more than name, a remnant of the republic. Gradually the very notion of independent action died away, and the senate met merely to adopt the will of its master. 19. The edictum perpetuum, the annual edict of the praetor, as being the written exposition of the jus honorarium, edict ''^^^^^ was the subject of many of the treatises of the Roman jurists. In the time of Hadrian, a jurist of great eminence, Salvius Julianus, was appointed by the emperor to draw up an edict, partly from existing edicts, partly according to his own opinion of what was necessary, which should serve as ■^ Tacit. Annal. i. 15. t Suet. Calig. 2 ; Nero, 17. Tacit. Annal. xiii. 44. :i: Inst. i. 2. 5 . PoMPONius in Dig. i. 2. 9. § Tacit. Hist. iv. 8, Puchta, Inst. i. 512. INTKODUCTION. XXV the guide and rule of all succeeding praetors. The edict which he drew up, and to which the sanction of Hadrian gave the force of law, was itself termed the edictum perpetuum, the word -per- petuum, instead of meaning, as before, that the edict ran on from year to year, being used to express that the edict was permanent and unchangeable. The different magistrates, who had to apply the edict, would thencsforw^ard use their own discretion only when the edict drawn up by Julianus did not serve as an express authority. 20. The writings of the jurists, the authority attached to their decisions, and the admirable manner in which they developed and arranged the law, formed the most marked feature of the legal history of this period. Augustus found the position which the great sages of the law held in public opinion too important a one to be overlooked in his scheme of government. He formally gave to their decisions the weight which usage had in many instances given them already ; and it was enacted that their answers should be solicited and announced in a formal manner, and given under the sanction of the emperor. Hadrian decided that they should have the force of law, provided the respondents all agreed in their answer ; but, if they differed, the judge Avas at liberty to adhere to whichever 023inion he preferred."^ Among the eminent jurists of the days of Augustus was Trebatius, whose opinion, as the Institutes tell us, was specially asked by Augustus as to the propriety of admitting codicils. Two others, of even higher authority, Antistius Labeo and Ateius Capito, represented in the same period two opposite modes of regarding law, Labeo and and were the founders of schools which maintained ^^^^ °' and handed down their respective opinions. Labeo, in whom a wider culture had instilled a love of general principles, did not hesitate to make such innovations as he conceived reason and philosophy to require : Capito was distinguished by the fidelity with which he adhered to the law as he had himself received itf A succession of jurists of greater or less renown divided them- selves under the banners of these rival authorities. But the schools of which Labeo and Capito were the first authors did not derive their names from their founders. The one school was * Gaius, i. 7. t Labeo ingenii qualitate et Jlducia doctringe, qui et in cseteris sapientigs partibus operam dederat, plurima innovare statuit. Ateius Capito, i)i> his qux ei tradita erant, perseverabat. — Dig. i. 2. 2. 47. XXVI INTEODUCTION. termed Proculians, after Proculus, a distinguished follower of Labeo ; the other Sabinians, after Sabinus, a follower of Capito. Gaius, who informs us that he was a Sabinian^ gives the differing opinions of the two schools on many subtle questions of law. By the labours of this succession of jurists, the law was moulded and prepared until it came into the hands of the five great luminaries of Roman jurisprudence — Gains, Papinian, Paul, Ulpian, and Modestinus, whose writings, as we shall see, were subsequently made a distinct and special source of law. 21. Gains, or Caius, as the name is sometimes written, was probably born in the time of Hadrian, and wrote Gains. . r^n ^ ' 11« under the Antomnes. Oi his personal history nothino; is known. He himself tells us that he was an adherent of the school of Sabinus. Besides other works which he is known or supposed to have written, he composed a treatise on the edictum -promnciale (the edict of the proconsul in the pro- vinces) and a commentary on the Twelve Tables. But the work by which he is best known to us is his Institutes. The discovery of the manuscript of this work by Niebuhr in 1816 has contributed greatly to the modern knowledge of Koman law. The manuscript had been written over with the letters of St. Jerome, and its existence was almost entirely unknown until Niebuhr brought it to light while examining the contents of the library of the Chapter at Verona. The Institutes of Gains formed the basis of those of Justinian, who has followed the order in which Gains treats his subject, and adopted his exposition of law, so far as it was applicable to the times in which the Institutes of Justinian were composed. The work of Gains, therefore, showing us what was common to the two periods, and also where the law had changed, enables us to understand what the change was, and what the law had really been at the time when its system was most perfect. 22. ^milianus Papinianus was the intimate friend of the Emperor Septimius Severus, and held under him the office of praetorian prajfect, which had now become equivalent to that of supreme judge. He probably accompanied Severus into Britain, and was present at the emperor's death at York in a.d. 211. Severus commended his two sons, Geta and Caracalla, to his care. Caracalla dismissed Papinian from his office ; and, after his murder of Geta, is said to have required Papinian to compose his vindication. Papinian refused, and was INTEODUCTION. XXVU executed by the orders of Caracalla. He was considered the first and greatest of juristS;, and every epithet which succeeding writers could devise to express wisdom, learning, and eloquence was heaped on him in profusion. We know, from the Digest, of his Books of Questions, Books of Answers, and Books of Definitions. The fragments of his works which we possess amply justify his eminent reputation. 23. Paul, UlpiaUj and Modestinus are all said to have been pupils of Papinian. Julius Paulus was a member of the imperial council and praatorian praefect under Alexander Severus (a.d. 222). Besides numerous fragments in the Digest, we possess his ReceptcB Sententice, which was long the chief source of law among the Visigoths in Spain. The most celebrated of his works, which were very numerous,"^ was that Ad Edictum in 80 books. 24. Domitius Ulpianus derived his origin, as he himself tells us, from Tyre in Phoenicia.f He wrote several works during the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, and perished (a.d. 228) by the hands of the soldiers, who killed him in the presence of the emperor, Alexander Severus. He was praetorian praifect at the time of his death, but the exact time when he was first appointed to the office is unknown. The Digest contains a greater number of extracts from his writings than from those of any jurist. Besides these extracts, we also possess fragments of his composition in twenty- nine titles, known by the name of the Fragmenta Vlpiani. 25. Herennius Modestinus was the pupil of Ulpian as well as of Papinian. He was a member of the imperial T^od&stiiTi Its council in the time of Alexander Severus, but hardly anything is known of his history. One of the best known of his writino;s is the Excusationum Lihri. We have nothino^ remainino- of his composition except the extracts from his works given in the Digests. 26. The influence of Christianity on Roman law was partly direct, partly indirect. The establishment of a hier- jnfluence of archical rank, the power granted to religious corpora- Christianity. ations to hold property, the distinction between Christians and heretics, affecting the civil position of the latter, the creation of * We know the names of more than 70, embracing an extraordinary variety of subjects. xxviii INTEODUCTION. episcopal courts, and many other similar innovations, gave rise to direct specific changes in the law. But its influence is even more remarkable in the changes which were suggested by its spirit, rather than introduced as a necessary part of its system. To the community which citizenship had bound together"^ succeeded another bound by the ties of a common religion. The tendency of the change Avas to remove the barriers which had formed a part of the older condition of society. If Ave compare the Insti- tutes of Justinian with those of Gains, we find changes in the law of marriage, in that of succession, and in many other branches of law, in which it is not difficult to recognise the spirit of humanity and reverence for natural ties, Avhich Christianity had inspired. The disposition to get rid of many of the more peculiar features of the old Roman law, observable in the later legislation, was partly indeed the fruit of secular causes ; but it was also in a o^reat measure due to the alteration of thouo;ht and feelino; to Avhich the new religion had given birth. But it Avas not only the substance of the laAv that Avas changed under the emperor. The forms of procedure became different. Even under the formulary system the magistrate had occasionally, instead of sending the trial of an action to the judex, disposed of it himself {cognitio ex- traor dinar id). The practice grew more frequent as the empire Avent on, and in a.d. 296 Diocletian ordered the presidents of the provinces themselves to try all cases. The formulary system and the exposition of the laAv by the praitors became a thing of the past, and the law Avas altered by the enactments of the emperor, and administered directly by the magistrates. 27. Before Ave pass to the legislation of Justinian, we must bestow a cursory notice on the efforts made by Theodosius II. . ^^ , . ., Ineodosms 11. to determme and arrange the law, and to promote its study. With a vicAv to keep alive and increase the knoAvledge of law, he founded (in a.d. 425) a school of juris- prudence at Constantinople. He also constituted the works of the five great Avriters, Gains, Papinian, Ulpian, Paul, and Modestinus, into a source of laAv of the highest authority, enact- ing by a constitution, published A.D. 426, that the judge should * The value of citizenship was greatly lessened by the recklessness with which it was extended. Caracalla (a.d. 212) gave the citizenship to all persons not slaves, who were then subjects of the empire, leaving it, how- ever, possible, that slaves imperfectly manumitted after this date should hold the place of Latini, not of cives. INTRODUCTION. xxix always be bound by the opinion expressed by the majority of these writers ; if those among them who expressed an opinion on the point were equally divided, the opinion of Papinian was to prevail : if he was silent, the judge could use his own discretion. In A.D. 438, Theodosius published his Code, containing a collec- tion of the constitutions of the emperors from the time of Con- stantine. It was made on the model of two earlier collections compiled by the jurists Gregorianus (a.d. 306) and Hermogenianus (A.D. 365). 28- The Emperor Justinian was of Sclavonic origin. His native name was IJprauda, a word said to mean . - T , , ft • 1 • Justinian. upright, and thus to nave lound an equivalent m the Latin Justinianus. He was born at Taurisium in Bulgaria, about the year a.d. 482, and having been adopted by his uncle, the Emperor Justin, succeeded him as sole emperor in the year A.D. 527. He died in a.d. 6Q5, after an eventful reign of thirty- eight years. Procopius, the secretary of his general Belisarius, has left us a secret memoir of the times, which, if we may rely upon his accuracy, would make us believe Justinian to have been a Aveak, avaricious, rapacious tyrant. His court, wholly under the influence of his wife Theodora, a degraded woman, whom he had raised from the theatre to share his throne, was as corrupt as was customary in the empire of the East. Justinian would never have been distinguished from among the long list of eastern emperors had it not been for the victories of his generals and the legislation to which he gave his name. The successes of Belisarius and Narses have shed the splendour of military glory over his reign. But his principal claim to be remembered by posterity i& his havinoj directed the execution of an undertakino; which crave to Boman law a form that fitted it to descend to the modern world. 29. In the year A.D. 528, Justinian issued instructions for the compilation of a new code, which, founded on that of Theodosius, and on the earlier codes on which that code was based,* should embrace the imperial constitutions down * Shortly before the time of Justinian, three attempts had been made to- draw up a body of law for the use of the western barbarians and their Roman subjects. These were — the edict of Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths (a.d. 500) ; the Lex Romana Burgundiorum (a.d. 500) ; and the Lex Romancd Visigothorum (a.d. 506). These names are so well known that it is perhaps hardly proper to pass them over altogether ; but, as their assistance was not employed in the construction of Justinian's legislation, a detailed account of them is unnecessary here. XXX INTRODUCTION. to the date of its promulgation. The task was entrusted to a body of ten commissioners, who completed their labours in the following year, and in the month of April, a.d. 529, the emperor gave it his sanction, and abolished all preceding collections. 30. In the December of the following year, Tribonian, who _^ ^ had been one of the commission appointed to draw up The Digest. iiii iii* i^ , the code, and who had recommended himself to the emperor by the energy and ability he had shown, was instructed, in conjunction with a body of coadjutors whom he selected to the number of sixteen, to make a selection from the writings of the elder jurists, which should comprehend all that was most valuable in them, and should form a compendious exposition of the law. In spite of the foundation of schools of jurisprudence, of which those of Rome, Constantinople, and Berytus were the most famous, the knowledge which the lawyers of the time had of the writings of the old jurists was exceedingly limited. Justinian wished not only to promulgate a body of law which should not be too bulky and voluminous for general use, but also to provide a work, the study of which should form a necessary part of legal education. The commissioners performed their task in the short space of three years, and on the 30th of December, a.d. 533, the emperor gave to the result of their labours the force of law. The com- pilation, termed Digesta, or Pandectae, from its comprehensive character, was divided into fifty books., and was arranged on the model of the perpetual edict. Ulpian's work on the edict had been a text-book in the schools of jurisprudence, and probably it Vv^as this that determined the commissioners to adopt a model,* which has prevented their work having anything like a scientific arrangement. There are thirty-nine jurists from whose writings the Digest contains literal extracts, those from Ulpian and Paul constituting about one-half of the Avhole work. 31. The Digest was too vast a work, and also required for its comprehension too great a previous knowledo-e of law, The Institutes. ox q y to admit of its being made the opening of a course of legal study. Justinian, therefore, determined to have an elemen- tary work composed. He had declared his intention in the consti- tution of December a.d. 530, in which he directed the compilation of the Digest ; and Tribonian, in conjunction with Theophilus and Dorotheus, respectively professors in the schools of Constan- * WARNKCENia, Hist, du droit romain^ j). 182. INTRODUCTION. xxxi tinople and Beiytus, were appointed to draw it np. This ele- mentary work is tlie Institutes. It was formed on the basis of the Institutes of Gains, alterations being made to bring it into har- mony with the Digest and Code. 32. There were still some points which had been debated by the old jurists, and to which the legislation of Justinian The Fifty De- did not as yet furnish any answer. To determine these, ^'^^'^^"*- Justinian published a book of Fifty Decisions ; and as the Code of the year a.d. 529 was a very imperfect work, it was deter- mined to revise that Code, and to incorporate the The second Fifty Decisions in the revised edition. Tribonian ^^^^* was appointed to superintend the undertaking, and in November, A.D. 534, the ncAv code, called the code repetitce prcelectionis received the force of law. This is the code we now have ; the former code, that of a.d. 529, having been carefully suppressed, and no trace of it remaining. The Code, which is divided into twelve books, is arranged nearly in the same manner as the Digest. 33. But Justinian could not endure that his having systema- tised the law should exclude him from law-making. He announced in the Code * that any legislative reforms he might at any future time see fit to make should bo published in the form of Novellm Constitutiones, Many such NovellcB were afterwards published ; the first in January, a.d. 535, the last in November, a.d. 564. Altogether they amount to 165 ; but no collection of them seems to have been made in the lifetime of Justinian. Few of them bear a later date than a.d. 545, the year of Tribonian 's death. 34. The Institutes of Justinian, after a few g-eneral observa- tions on the nature, the divisions, and the sources of > , ^ ' ^ Arrangement laAv, proceed to treat, first of persons, then of things, of the Insti- then of successions to deceased persons, then of obli- gations, and lastly of actions. An arrangement as nearly similar as possible will be observed in the following outline of Roman private law. * Const, de Emend. Cod. 4. XXXU INTKODUCTION. ROMAN PRIVATE LAW. The reader of Mr. Austin's Treatise on the Province of Juris- prudence will remember that he proposes, in the outline given in the Appendix, to treat the subject of Law by examining, first, the science of General Jurisprudence, that is, of the legal notions and principles which enter into every system of law ; and secondly, the science of Particular Law, that is, as he explains it, ' The science of any such system of Positive Law as now actually ob- tains, or once actually obtained in a specifically determined nation;' and he carefully distinguishes between the sciences of general and particular jurisprudence and the science or sciences which would tell us, not what law is, but what law ought to be. The Roman jurists made no approach to a division of the sub- ject so accurate and so exhaustive. It is their great merit, the real source of their value to modern Europe, that they apprehended and elucidated the great leading principles and notions of general jurisprudence ; but they did not clearly distinguish between general jurisprudence and the municipal law of Rome, or between law and morality. As we have said before, they assumed, on the authority of Greek philosophy, that there was a lex naturae binding on them because it was a lex^ and they endeavoured to work up the dictates of this law and of the jus gentium together with the provisions of the old jus civile into a whole. The Institutes of Gains open with a declaration that every system of law must contain the two elements of general and municipal law ; but in the Institutes of -r, r ;■ n Justimau there are prefixed two definitions taken from Bejimtions of ^ ^ / justice and the writings of Ulpian ; and, while the definitions them- jurisjpru ence. g^jy^g illustrate the inexactness with which the jurists determined the province of jurisprudence, the place assigned to them in this compilation shows the utter want of anything like philosophy in the age when the Institutes were written. The first definition defines the moral virtue of justice by reference to a legal term {jus), which it leaves unexplained : the second pro- nounces jurisprudence to be the ' science of things human and divine,' a phrase which, originally referring, perhaps, to the dis- tinction between pontifical and secular law, has no general mean- ing, except as a summary of the philosophy Avhich thought that law was the expression of a reason common to the universe and to man. We can only treat the Roman notions of law and juris- INTRODUCTION. XXXlil prudence historically, and ascertain what they were and whence tliey came : we cannot make them fit into the more accurate shapes assigned to these general terms by the modern philosophy of law. 35. The preceding historical sketch will have sufficed to show what were the sources of Koman law: (1) There was SozcTCcs Or icvuj the old jus civile^ which mainly depended on custom as its basis. (2) There were the judicial decisions of the prcBtors^ and the opinion of the juris prudentes, supplementing the jus civile from the dictates of the lex naturce and the jus gentium ; and (3) There were positive enactments, which may be divided into leges, plehiscita, senatus-consulta, and announcements of the vpAX of the emperor. 36. The main leo:al term with which we have to start in approachino; E-oman law is jus. The word is used to . . . Jus jura. signify both the sum of rights and their corresponding duties sanctioned by law, and also any single one of these rights. The law prescribes different relations in which the members of a State are to stand to things and to each other. The claim, pro- tected by legal remedies, which each man has to have any of these relations observed in his own case is a right ; and as the right must be conceived to belong to or reside in, a person, we speak of a right being the right of a person, e.g. my fight to have that book, your right to have that house (^jus meum, jus tuum). When we examine the different rights established by law in a State, we find some of a public character, affecting in- :lividuals as members of a body politic ; others of a private cha- racter, affecting individuals directly. It is only of the private rights established by Roman law that we now propose to speak ; and as rights are either rights which persons have over things, or fights which persons have against some other person j)iyision of [)r persons, we shall treat, first, of the mode in which ^^^^ subject. the Roman law regarded persons ; then of the mode in which it regarded things ; then of the rights it gave to persons against persons ; and, lastly, of the method by which the State enforced private rights when disputed or disregarded, that is, the system of civil process. b2 xxxiv INTRODUCTION. I. PERSONS. 37. The word jjersoiia had, in the usage of Koman law, a ... n different meanino; from that which we ordinarily at- Mcamng of ^ •' the ivord ])er- tach to the word person. Whoever or whatever was ^^'^^'* capable of having, and being subject to, rights was a persona. All men possessing a reasonable will would naturally be personce ; but not all those who were, physically speaking, men, were personce. Slaves, for instance, were, not in a position to exercise their reason and will, and the law, therefore, refused to treat them as personae. On the other hand, many personce had no physical existence. The law clothed certain abstract conceptions with an existence, and attached to them the capability of having, and being subject to, rights. The law, for instance, spoke of the State as 2i persona. It was treated as being capable of having rights, and of being subject to them. These rights really belonged to the men who composed the State, and they flowed from the constitution and position of associated individuals. But, in the theory and language of law, the rights of the whole community were referred to the State, to an abstract conception interposed between these rights and the individual members of the society. So, a corporation, or an ecclesiastical institution, was a persona, quite apart from the individual personce who formed the one and administered the other. Even thejiscus, or imperial treasury, as being the symbol of the abstract conception of the emperor's claims, was spoken of as a persona, 38. The technical term for the position of an individual re- garded as a legal person was status, and the constitu- tive elements of his status were liberty, citizenship, and membership in a family. First, he must be free. A slave had no rights. In the earlier days of Koman law, no one would have conceived this to be unnatural. But philosophy, and the study of morality, taught the later jurists that the condition of a slave was a violation of natural law. It was not, however, necessary that the person should have been born free {ingenuus)\ for the process of manumission placed the slave in some degree on a level Avith the freedman {lihertinus, or, if spoken of with reference to his master, liber tus *). It de- * The Latin for a freedman was lihertinus ; but libertus Titii is the Latin for the freedman of Titius. INTKODUCTION. XXXV pended on the mode and circumstance of his manumission whether he became at once a Roman citizen ; but in whatever way he was enfranchised he still owed certain duties to his patron, and in certain cases his patron was his heir. 39. The second element of the status was citizenship. The Roman notion of the State was that of a compact privileged body separated off from the rest of the world by the exclusive possession of certain public and private rights. In the early times of Rome the cives, or members of the State, were divided into two bodies of patres and plebeians, the former of whom had a public and sacred law peculiar to them- selves, while they shared with the latter the system of private law. Beyond the State all were hostes and harbari. But as civilisation progressed, the number of foreigners who resorted to Rome for trade, or were otherwise brought into friendly relations with citi- zens, was so great that they were looked upon as a distinct class, that of peregrini. To be a citizen was thenceforward not to be a peregrinus, the force of the one idea being brought out by the prominence of its opxDosite. A peregrinus was subject only to the jits gentium ; citizens alone could claim the privileges of the jus Quiritium. But when her conquests placed Rome in new and varying relations with the nations of Italy, an intermediate posi- tion between the citizen and the peregrinus was accorded to the more privileged of the vanquished. Some of the rights of the citizen were given to them, and some were withheld. These peculiar rights of the citizen were summed up in the familiar term suffragium et honores, the right of voting and the capacity of holding magisterial offices, and in the terms connuhium and commercium, Connuhium is a term which explains itself. The foundation of the Roman family was a marriage according to the jus Quiritium, and not to have the connuhium was to be incapable of entering into the Roman family system. In the word commer- cium were included the power of holding property and making contracts according to the Roman law, and also the testamenti f actio, or power to make a will, and to accept property under one. By the jus Latinum and the jus Italicum various modifications of the different rights implied in the civitas were granted. The jus Latinum gave private rights to individuals, the jus Italicum gave public rights to towns. In some cases \hQJus Latinum gave the connuhium and commercium ; in some only the latter, in many only a portion of the latter ; the testamenti f actio, the power of XXXVi INTRODUCTION. making, or taking under, a testament being withheld. The jus Italicum gave certain favoured towns a free municipal constitu- tion, an immunity from direct taxation, and made the soil subject to Quiritarian ownership (see sec. 58). In the course of time other shades between the civis and the peregrinus were introduced, but all distinction between them was gradually swept away, by the increasing recklessness with which the rights of citizenship were bestowed. At last Caracalla made all the free subjects of the empire citizens ; and thenceforward the class of peregrini, pro- perly speaking, ceased to exist. All the free inhabitants of the civilised world were cives, and beyond were nothing but barbari and Jiostes. 40. The Roman family, in the peculiar shape it assumed under the jus Quiritium, was modelled on a civil rather than on a natural basis. The tie which bound members of the same family was not that of blood ; it was their commort position in the midst of an artificial system. For the formation of such a family, a legal marriage was an indispensable prelimi- nary ; but it was only a preliminary, and the peculiar character of the family did not in any way flow from the tie. The head of the family was all in all. He did not so much represent as absorb in himself the subordinate members. He alone was sui juris, i.e. had an independent will ; all the other members were alieni juris their wills were not independent, but were only expressed through their chief. The paterfamilias, the head of the family, was said to have all the other members of his family in his power ; and this power (^patria potestas) was the foundation of all that peculiarly characterised the Roman family. At the head of the family stood the paterfamilias alone. Beneath him came his children, sons and daughters, and his wife, who, in order to preserve the symmetry of the system, was treated by law as a daughter.* If a daughter married, she left this family, and passed into the family of her husband ; but if a son married, all his children were as much in the power of the paterfamilias as the son himself. Thus all the descendants through the male line were in the power of the same person. And it was this that constituted the link of family rela- tionship between them, not the natural tie of blood. When the paterfamilias died, each of the sons became in his turn a pater- * She was technically said to be in the manus of her husband ; and per- haps manns is the old word signifying the power of the paterfamilias, and potestas is only an expression of later Latin. INTRODUCTION. XXXVll familias ; he was now sui juris, and all his own descendants through the male line were in his power. Each of the daughters, as long as she remained unmarried, was also sui juris ; but directly she formed a legal marriage, and thereby entered into her husband's family, she passed into the power of another. Hence it was said that a woman was at once the beginning and end of her family, caput et finis families, sucb, for directly she attempted to continue it, she passed into another family. 41. Persons who were under the power of another could not hold or acquire any property of their own. All belonged to the jpater familias ; and whatever the son acquired was p^^^-^ww of acquired for the father. In matters of public law i^ersons in the filiusfamilias laboured under no incapacities ; he "^ could vote or hold a magistracy, but in all the relations of pri- vate law he was absolutely in his father's power. He could not make a will, for he had no property to dispose of; nor bring an action, for nothing was owing to him. But in all public relations, whenever this incapability of possessing property was not in question, the filiusfamilias had all the privileges of a citizen ; he had, for instance, the connuhium, aud could contract a legal mar- riage ; and the commercium, and could, therefore, be a witness ill sale by mancipation, to which none except citizens could be witnesses. The indulgence of later times permitted the filius- familias to hold certain property apart from the paterfamilias, an indulgence first accorded as an encouragement to military service. But even over a portion of this property the head of the family possessed certain rights ; and, so far as it went, it was a departure from the strict theory of law. 42. The distinction between the legal and the natural family is illustrated by its being possible for a member p,,,^., ."~. ,, . Emancipation. 01 the legal family to quit it and become an entire stranger to it, and for an entire stranger to be admitted to it, and be as completely a member as if he were a son of the pater- familias. The mode by which the change in either case was accomplished was by a fictitious sale. Every Roman citizen could sell himself to another by the peculiar form of sale called man- cipatio ; and as the father possessed over the son the rights which a person sui juris possessed over himself, he sold the filiusfamilias to a nominal purchaser, who was supposed to buy the son. It was declared by the law of the Twelve Tables, that a son thrice sold by his father should be free from his power, and the cere- XXXVlll INTKODUCTION. mony was therefore repeated three times, and the son was then emancipatus, or sold out of the family. When a stranger, being himself alieni juris, wished or was compelled to enter a family, the process was effected by adoption. Here again, then, was another sale, the paterfamilias of the family he quitted being the seller, and the paterfamilias of that he entered being the purchaser. If the stranger was sui juris, he entered his new family by arroga- tion, which in ancient times could only be effected by a vote in the comitia curiata, it being considered a matter of public policy to keep a watch over such a proceeding, lest the last of his gens should arrogate himself, and its sacra be lost. Much simpler modes for effecting arrogation, as well as for effecting emancipa- tion and adoption, were employed in later times. 43. A person might be sui juris, and be in possession of every Tutors and I'ight, and yet be unable, through some imperfection. Curators. to exercisc the rights he possessed. A child, for in- stance, Avas not only not able to conduct his affairs with discretion, but he was unable to understand, perhaps to speak, the forms necessary to be expressly pronounced in almost every legal trans- action. A tutor was therefore appointed, who, until the child attained the age of puberty, suj3plied this defect of his ward, or, as he was called, his pupil. And this is the Roman notion of a tutor : he was a person who supplied something tliat was wanting, who filled up the measure of his pupil's persona. He of course took care of the person and property of the child ; but this was only an accessory of his position ; his primary office was to supply by his auctoritas '^ what the pupil fell short of. So, too, in the old law, unmarried women, of whatever age, remained in the tutelage of their relations. Further, a person might be sui juris, and be of an age to exercise his rights, and yet it might be neces- sary to ensure that he did not hurt himself and his family by the mode in which he exercised them. In such cases, a curator was appointed, whose duty it was to look after his property. This curator had a perfectly different office from a tutor ; in technical language, the tutor was said to be appointed to the person, the curator to the property. The curator was only appointed as a check to prevent pecuniary loss. Curators were also appointed to watch over the interests of insane persons, and of persons * The derivation of auctoritas slioiild never be lost sight of. When one person increased, augebat, what another had, so as to fill iij) a deficiency, this increasing or filling np was called auctoritas. INTRODUCTION. xxxix notoriously prodigal, as well as of those who had attained the age of puberty, but were under the age of twenty-five. 44. While the head of a family lived, all those who were in his i3ower were connected together by the tie of Aanciti. subjection to the power of the same person. The tie was called agnatio, and the persons so mutually connected were agnati to each other. When the paterfamilias died, the tie of agnatio still subsisted. Each of those who, by his death, be- came sui juris, became the head of a new family ; but still they and their descendants were agnati to each other so long as they did not by emancipation or by adoption, or, in the case of women, by marriage, leave their original flimily. All those, in short, who would have been agnati to each other if the life of the original paterfamilias had been prolonged were agnati at any distance of time, however great, after his death. A number of distinct families might thus, when looked on as connected by agnatio, be spoken of as one family ; for they were all portions of the family of a deceased paterfamilias, 45. Beyond the circle of the agnati, the ancient patrician had that of the qens. They were nearer to him than those . Gentiles. who were only related to him by blood. If a patri- cian died intestate, in default of agnati, his gentiles, the men of his gens, were his heirs. He was placed in the midst of two artificial circles, shutting out the natural circle of blood relations ; while the plebeian, unless he happened to belong to one of the few ple- beian gentes, and when the system of gentes had faded away, the patrician also, acknowledged the ties of blood as next to that of agnatio. All those who were connected too;ether by , . 11 Cognati. the ties 01 blood were cognati. It was the tendency of the later Koman legislation to give greater and greater weight to the ties of blood, and to substitute a natural, for an artificial, system of family relationship. Lastly, the cognati of each of the parties to a marriage were said to be affines to the other party. 46. We have spoken as if the wife had been always in the manus, or power, of her husband. And this was so, j>osition of probably, in the strict theory of the Koman family, ^^^^^ '^'-'^fi- and in the practice of early times. The tie of marriage was formed among the patricians by the ceremony of confarreatio, in which none could partake except those who had the privileges of ihQjus sacrum ; and apparently the mere fact of going through the xl INTRODUCTION. ceremony placed a wife in the manus of her husband. The ple- beians had no corresponding ceremony ; and in order that, when two persons came together in marriage, the wife should be in the power of the husband, she Avas sold to the husband by the father, a process which was termed coemptio, or if she remained with her husband a year, then the power over her was acquired by usus, that is, by the uninterrupted lapse of time. If, however, she absented herself for three nights in the year, this prevented her falling into the husband's power. Perhaps, at all times, at least in plebeian families, a woman could so marry as not to fall 'into the maniis of her husband ; and in later times such marriages formed the rule. It made no difference in other relations of the family whether the wife was in the power of the husband or not. Sup- posing she and her husband had the connuhium, that is, were capable of intermarrying, all the usual incidents of a marriage, such as the pafria potestas, attached to the connection. If a man and a ivoman entered into a permanent connection Concubinage. .. . xi'i-it Without marriage {concubinatus), their children were naturales liheri, and were so far favoured by the later law as to be capable of being placed in the position of children sprung from a legal marriage, by the process of legitimatio. After the time of Constantine they might be made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents. In all unions of the sexes, other than a legal marriage, the children followed the condition of their mother: being free, for instance, if she was free, and slaves if she was a slave. The union of slaves was called contuhernium ; but however solemnly entered into, and however faithfully its natural tie acknowledged, it was never in the eye of the law regarded as anything better than promiscuous intercourse. 47. It was possible that any one who possessed a complete Beoninutio status should undergo a change of status, and this capitis. change might happen in any one of the three com- ponent parts of the status. The capability of exercising all those rights implied in a perfect status was frequently spoken of as a man's caput, and the change in each of these component parts was said to be a cleminutio capitis, a lessening or impairing of the caput. First, a man might lose his freedom ; he might be taken prisoner by an enemy, or undergo a very severe criminal sentence. The loss of this element of the status, called capitis deminutio maxima, involved the loss of the remaining two, the person who ceased to be free ceasing also to have the rights of citizenship or INTRODUCTION. xli family rights. Secondly, he might lose his rights of citizenship, and this loss, called the capitis deminutio media, involved the loss of family rights, but still left him free. Thirdly, by what was called the capitis deminutio minima, he might lose his position in his family, by emancipation, adoption, or arrogation. In early times there were rights, principally those forming part of the jus sacrum, which a person who passed out of his family really lost ; but in later times, as in every case the person who underwent this capitis deminutio either entered another family, or became the head of his own family, his status was really not made at all less perfect by the change. Of course this capitis deminutio involved the loss of neither of the two other component parts of the status. 48. When a person was possessed of a perfect status, he was considered to enjoy a high dignity and reputation in the eyes oi others. Ihis reputation [existimatw) the Komans considered as one of the chief possessions of a person. It was even to a certain extent regulated by law. If a person ceased to be free, his existimatio was gone. Certain offences were treated by law as impairing it. If the offence was so grave as to impair the existimatio very seriously, its diminution was said to amount to infamia. For example, a partner, or a mandatary, condemned in an action pro socio or mandato, was stamped with infamy. The consequences of infamy were, that the guilty per- son could not be a Avitness, could not receive public honours, and could not bring a public prosecution. If the offence was rather less grave, the consequence was turpitudo ; and if the person was in some inferior position, as, for instance, an actor, he was said to be marked with a levis nota, a slight brand of disgrace. 49. It only remains to be observed that, although persons that were the mere creations of law, as corporations, ^ , ,. , ceased to exist when the law in any Avay put an end existence of to their existence, as by the dissolution of the corpo- -2^^^^^^^^- ration, yet the person of individuals, that is, their legal, as opposed to their natural being, did not become extinct by their death. At the moment of death it was shifted to those who represented them. The son was clothed with the person of the father, the heir with that of the testator. What we mean by saying that the deceased is represented, that is, again made present and brought before us, the Koman jurists expressed by saying that his person had been shifted to those who succeeded in his place. xlii INTEODUCTION. IT. THINGS. 50 The word thing (res) has, in Roman law, a sense as arti- Use of the ficial and as wide as the word person. As person com- word res. prehends every being who has rights and is subject to them, so thing comprehends all that can be considered as the object of a right. The object of a right may be incorporeal, or the pure creation of law, and need not be limited to things cor- poreal and visible. The law can separate the right to possess a field and the right to walk in it, and the object of each right is called indifferently a thing. When we attempt to classify these objects of rights, we are unable to select any one principle of division according to which we may distribute them. The aspects in which we may view them are too various to admit of a simple arrangement ; Ave may, however, make a division approximately accurate by considering, first, those heads of things which we arrive at by examining the nature of the things themselves ; and secondly, those gained by inquiring into the interest which persons have in them. 51. First, then, things may be corporeal or incorporeal ; or, as the jurists expressed it, tangi possunt or tangi noii Division of __^ ^ *^ , things. possunt. VY e see a house or a Held ; we do not see Corporeal and ^ j^ig-ht to inhabit the One or reap the fruits of the incorporeal. *=* •■• other. The physical tangible object of sense is a corporeal thing ; the intangible abstraction of the mind is an in- corporeal thing. Incorporeal things always consist in a right; if we see a stream flowing, or a path winding through a field, the mind sees, as something distinct from the object of sense, the power of using the water or of following the path. This power is, in the language of the law, an incorporeal thing ; and a person may have a right to possess it just as he may have a right to pos- sess a house or field. Strictly speaking, the right to own a field, and not the field itself, is what the law takes cognisance of, and this is as much incorporeal as the right to walk over it. But Koman law has adopted or introduced the popular way of speak- ing, according to which we say, ' I have a field ; ' ' I have a right of way over a field.' 52. We may again speak of corporeal things as moveable and rry. immoveable (res mobiles ^ se moventes, and res soli, res Ihings move- ... . able and im- immohiles), a distinction so obvious that it needs no other remark than that some moveable things are so incorporated with immoveables, or so constantly associated with . INTKODUCTION. xliii their use, that the law treats them as immoveables ; as for instance a house, each brick of which is a moveable, is itself an immove- able, because attached to the soil. 53. Thino^s are also either divisible or indivisible. We cannot di\ide a slave or a horse so that the several parts ^,. .. . ^ 1 kings dim- have the same value which they had when they were sihU and in- parts of a whole ; but if we divide a field into four, we have four small fields. 54. They are also principal or accessory ; that is, they are the direct obiect of ris^hts, or are only so as forminoj m.- "^ , ^ , '' , " 1 flings imn- portion of, or being intimately connected Avith, some- cival and ac- thing that is ; thus a tree is a principal thing, its ^^^^^^y- fruit an accessory. 65. Another distinction relating to things familiar to the Koman jurists was that between the genus and the Q(,nus and species. By the genus was meant a whole class of Specks. objects, such as horses, or the general name for an object, such as wine, oil, wheat. Species was the particular member of the class, or particular portion of the object comprehended under the genus, as this horse, or the wine in this bottle. If a purchaser bought a horse or a certain quantity of oil, the thing bought was said to be determined genere ; if he bought a particular horse or the oil in a certain vase, the thing bought was said to be deter- mined specie. All things which are included under a general name, such as oil or wheat, are commonly divided by being weighed, numbered, or measured, and were therefore spoken of by the jurists as being those things quce pondere, numero, mensu- rave constant. 6Q. We may, lastly, regard things as particular, or as col- lected under some head, when the whole collection is a thing in law. Thus a sheep is a particular thing i^res and (res singularis) a flock, composed ex distantibus uni ^'^''^^^ univer- . . 11 . r> ^ ' sitaies. nomini subjectis, is a collection of things, or, as the jurists expressed it, is a rerum universitas (or simply universitas). As also, of course, are such comprehensive things as an inherit- ance, a dowry, the peculium of a slave. 57. In proceeding to the second division of things according to the persons who have rights over them, and to the extent of those rights, we must first notice the distinction in things caused by certain things having a sacred character {res divini juris). inese Avere res sacrcB^ consecrated to the superior gods ; or res religioscBy such as tombs or burial-grounds, xliv INTEODUCTION. consecrated to the infernal gods ; or, lastly, res sanctcs, things human, but having a sort of sacredness attaching to them, such as the walls and gates of cities. 58. The State, again, impressed on some things a peculiar character. All things which were held by peregrini and not by citizens were peregrina. The soil which was included in the terri- Ager torics of the early State, the ager Romanus, was dis- tinguished from all other land by being alone capable of being the subject of a sale by mancipation, and being alone held by the especial tenure oiihQJus Quiritium.^ In later times, a greater portion of the soil of Italy was placed on the same footing with the soil of the ager Romanus, and solum Italicum came to be the name of all soil wherever situated to which the privileges of the old ager Romanus were accorded as opposed to solum provinciale, which always remained, at least in theory, the property of the State, and of which a perfect ownership could not be acquired, t Justinian abolished this difference in the tenure of the soil. 59. In the older law there also prevailed a distinction, abolished by Justinian, between res mancipi and res es onancij^i. ^^^^ mancipi. We know from a fragment of Ulpian,J what thino'S were res mancipi. They were prcedia in Italico solo, whether in the country or the city, servitudes (a term to be explained presently) over these prcEdia when in the country, slaves, and four-footed animals, as oxen and horses, tamed for the service of man. All other things were nee mancipi. We also know that property in res mancipi could only be transferred by mancipatio, that is, by a form of sale, in which the purchaser took hold with his hand of the thing purchased, and claiming it to be his tendered a piece of copper to the seller. § The list of res mancipi is evidently a list of the possessions of an early agri- cultural community, and there can be scarcely any doubt that the form of sale required to transfer the property in them was the ordinary form of sale in such a community. At some period, and in some manner of which we have no knowledge, these possessions of an early agricultural community were contrasted with other * Dion. Halicarn. iv. 13. t Ulpian, xix. 1 ; Cicero, Pro Flacco, i. 32 ; Gaius, i. 20. X Ulp. Beg. xix. § The form of mancipatio will be more fully noticed in sec. 81 of the Introduction. INTRODUCTION. xlv forms of wealth, and the mode of transfer customary in the one case was found not to be customary in the other. The law, sanc- tioning and embodying the custom, made the form of mancipatio necessary to pass res mancipi, and declared it not to be necessary to pass other things. Manus, as signifying ' power,'* is, pro- bably, the root of the phrases mancipi and mancipatio. Thus res mancipi meant originally things in the hand, or taken by the hand, of the owner, and the taking by the hand in the form of transfer w^as symbolic of the purchaser holding or acquiring the thing in the way in which the seller had held or acquired it. 60. If we look at things according to the persons by whom they are owned, we have a division into res communes^ jRcS CO^)Z77ZZ('}Z€S as the sea and the air, which cannot be appropriated by any particular individuals ; res puhlicce, things which belong to the State, as the State land (ager puhlicus\ navi- gable rivers, roads, &c. ; res universitatis, things which belong to aggregate bodies, as to corporations ; and res privatcB, things which belong to individuals ; and wnicn were saicl to be in nostra patrimomo, i. e. we could, in one way or another, have a property in them : whereas things common, or public, or dedicated to the gods, r . were extra patrimonium, i. e. could not become the patrimonio. subject of private property. Lastly, there were res nuUius, things of which no one has acquired the ownership, as wild animals, or unoccupied islands in the sea. 61. Having thus given a sketch of the position of persons in Roman law, as also of the divisions of things, we now proceed to speak of that connection between persons ^^^^^* and things which what are termed rights express. The necessities of his physical position oblige man to exert his power over the world of things ; his special interests prompt each man to claim, as against his fellows, an exclusive ^^^ ^^^'^^^^* interest in particular things. Sometimes such a claim sanctioned by law is urged directly : the owner, as he is said to be, of the thing publishes this claim against all other men, and asserts an indisputable title himself to enjoy all tlie advantao-es which the- * How manus signifies power is a further question; it may be that the hand is merely a metaphor, as we say ^in the hands' for 'in the power ' of a person ; or it may mean the hand of a conqueror or pkm- derer, and thus originally things 7nanu capta would be the booty of plunderers. xlvi INTRODUCTION. possession of the thing can confer. Sometimes the claim is more indirect ; the claimant insists that there are one or more parti- cular individuals who ought to put him in possession of something he wishes to obtain, or do something for him, or fulfil some promise, or repair some damage they have made or caused. Such a claim is primarily urged against particular persons, and not against the world at large. On this distinction between claims to things advanced against all men, and those advanced primarily against particular men, is based the division of rights into real and personal expressed by writers of the middle ages,"^ on the analogy of terms found in the writings of the Roman jurists, by the jyhrases jura in re tmdjura ad rem. A. real right, a jus in re, or, to use the equivalent phrase preferred by some later commen- tators, ^z^^ 191 rem, is a right to have a thing to the exclusion of all other men.f A personal right, jus ad rem, or, to use a much more correct expression, jics in personam, is a right in which there is a person who is the subject of the right, as well as a thing as its object, a right which gives its possessor a power to oblige another person to give or procure, or do or not do some- thing. It is true that in a real right the notion of persons is involved, for no one could claim a thing if there were no other persons against whom to claim it ; and that in a personal right is involved the notion of a thing, for the object of the right is a thing which the possessor wishes to have given, procured, done, or not done. But the leading principle of the distinction is simple and intelligible ; and though it has not been formally adopted in the system of the Institutes or of the leading jurists, yet the classifications of the different relations of persons and things which they actually employed, are so capable of being assimilated to that which this distinction susfS^ests that we need not hesitate to adopt it. o& * The term jus in re appears in the summary of law bearing the name of the Brachylogus, which belongs to the twelfth century ; both phrases occur in the pontifical constitutions of the thirteenth century. (See Sexti Decret. iii. 7, 8, in quihus jus non esset qucesitum in re, licet ad re'm. ) t The objection to using the term jus in re is that the expression occurs in the classical jurists as meaning an interest in a thing short of ownership, as the interest of a mortgagee in the thing pledged, and on this ground the term jus in rem, which is not found in the classical jurists, but is supported by the analogy of the familiar term actio in rem, seems preferable. INTEODUC'TION. jl^JJ III. RIGHTS OVER THINGS. 62. The most complete real right is of course that possessed by the absolute owner of the thing, the person who has power to dispose of it as he likes, and who holds '°'""""«'"- it by a title recognised as valid by law. This ownership was in Koman law expressed by the word dominium, sometimes by pro- prietas. The dominus was entitled to the use of the thino- (usus) to the perception of all its products {fructus), or to consume the thing entirely if it were capable of consumption (abusns) He could also dispose of, or alienate it at will. In the ancient system t ^Ti^ ^^' f"" '''''"^'' ^''^ '''''' *° ^' °^"^'' ^^■>'-^ Quiritium. JNor did the old law recognise any dominium other than that which was enjoyed ex jure Quiritium. But the prietors found occasions when they wished to give all the advantages of owner- ship, but were prevented by the civil law from givino- the leo-al dommium.. Another kind of dominium came therefore to le spoken of: and the term in bonis habere was used to express an ownership which was practically absolute because it was protected by the praetor's authority, but which was not technically the same as ownership ex jure Quiritium. Commentators have called this ownership the dominium bonitarium, a term not, however, used by the jurists. The distinction between the dominium bonitarium and that ex jure Quiritium entirely disappeared under Justinian. 63. To the notion of dominium was opposed that of possesno A person might be owner of a thing and yet not pos- sess it, or possess it without being the owner. Pos- ■''''«*«««''■ session implied actual physical occupation, or 'detention, to use the technical term, of the thing; but it also implied somethinc. more in the sense in which it was used by the Eoman lawyers It implied not only a fact, but an intention; not only the fact of the thing being under the control of the possessor, but also the intention on the part of the possessor to hold it so as to reap exactly the same benefit from it as the real owner would and to exercise the same rights over it, even though he mio-ht be well aware that he was not the real owner, and had no claim to be so The possessor was entitled to have his possession protected a<.ainst every one but the true owner, and length of possession would Linder certain conditions fixed by law, make the possessor really become the owner of the thing possessed. xlviii INTKODUCTION. 64. As the real rights over a thing may be very numerous, ii is perfectly possible to separate them, and to give some to on( person and some to another. We can, for instance, separate the right of walking in a field from the right of digging under the surface, and give the right of doing the one to this person and o1 doing the other to that. In this way each right that is separatee off may be considered as a fragment of the whole dominium. capable of being given away from the proprietor. These frag- mentary rights, these portions of the whole right comprised in the absolute ownership, were termed servitutesy because SsTvitutcs the thing was under a kind of slavery for the benefit of the person entitled to exercise over it this separate right. In some servitudes, the right over the thing subject to the servitude. res serviensy was attached to the ownership of another thing (res dominans) : the servitudes were then spoken of as servitutes rerum or prcEdiorum, and a distinction was made in these servi- tudes according as the right given by them referred to the soil itself, as the right to go or to drive over it, when the servitutes were said to be rusticorum prcBdioriim, or to the soil as supporting some superstructure, as a house, when the servitudes were said to be urhanorum prcedioi'um. In other servitudes, the right was given to particular persons ; and the servitudes were then termed servitutes personarum. The most important of these latter servi- tudes were ususfructus and usus. Ususfructus was the right to enjoy a thing belonging to another person so as to reap all the produce derivable from it, as, for instance, all the fruits of the soil ; usus was the right to use and enjoy a thing belonging to another person, only without reaping any, or only a small portion, of its produce. Only immoveable property was subject to the servitutes prcediorum ; both moveable and immoveable to the servitutes personarum, ^5. There were two other real rights which had something of ^ , . the nature of servitudes, but which received a par- and sufpcr- ticular name. These were emphyteusis and super- ^*^*' Jicies, The former was an alienation of all rights except that of the bare ownership for a long term, in considera- tion of the proprietor receiving a yearly rent (pensio) ; the latter was the alienation by the owner of the surface of the soil of all rights necessary for building on the surface, a yearly rent being generally reserved. ^Q, Lastly, there was the real right given over a thing by INTRODUCTION. xlix ledge or mortgage, piptus, h?/potheca; the former term being sed to express the case of the thinfy, over which the ^ . 1 1 • 1 • /» 1 Jus ptgnoris. [crht was given, being placed m the possession oi the reditor, the latter to express the case of it being left in the ossession of the debtor. The right was given to secure a reditor the payment of his debt ; and he ultimately had power 3 sell the thing, and to satisfy his claim out of the proceeds, or, ■ he could find no purchaser, to have himself made owner of the liino;. 67. We may now proceed to speak of the mode in which real ights are acquired. We find at the outset an obvious diiference etvveen acquiring rights over a particular thing, and acquiring ights over the entirety of a number of things comprised in such term as an inheritance, which includes the entirety . ^ «^ Acquisition f the rights belonging to a deceased person, both of rights over eal and personal. We may thus divide the subject "^^^^" f the acquisition of rights into two parts : the first comprising he modes in which real rights are acquired over particular hings ; the second comprising the modes in which an entirety universitas) of rights, both real and personal, passed from one lerson to another. 68. We may mention, as the first of the modes of acquiring )articular things, occupation, i.e. the seizing on a thing which is L res nuUius, i.e. without an owner : land in an un- . , ^ . jj. •! 1 • 1 Acquisition of ►ccupied country is a res nulLius, so are wild animals; riqhtsomrpar- f we seize on, or, as we should say, occupy the land, ^^^ular things. -, 11 -n -1 • -1 Occupatio. md catch the wild animal, we gam our right over he soil and the animal by having been the first to seize it. 69. Accession is the general term for the acquisition of rights iither over things which are added by the forces of j4.CC€SSZ0 lature to, and become an inseparable part of, another :hing regarded as the principal thing, or over things which by ^he operation of man are united with other things so as to form m indivisible product. The owner of the principal thing, by drtue of his being owner, is the owner also of the accessory thing. 70. A contract or gift, by which one person promised to give a thing to another, did not make that other the owner 3f the thing. A further step was necessary. The thing must be handed over to the person who was, under the terms of the contract, to become the owner of it. This handing c2 1 INTKODUCTION. over was called traditio ; and a perfect traditio implied, first that it was a real absolute owner, capable of alienating the thing who transferred it, and secondly, that he placed the new pro prietor in actual possession of the thing. 71. The above are termed natural modes of acquisition; bu there are some which are said to derive their force brljts. only from the civil law. One is acquisition by gift Strictly speaking, gift is not a peculiar mode of acquisition, bui an acquisition by delivery with a particular motive for th( transfer. Probably it was on account of the solemnities witl which under Justinian sifts had to be made that ffifts are treatec in the Institutes as a special mode of acquisition. One special kind of gift was a donatio mortis causa, a gift to take effect in case of the death of the donor in the lifetime of the recipient. 72. The law also gave the ownership of a thing by usucapio, that is, by quiet possession, bona fide, and founded on a good title, which sufficed, under the civil law, to transfer the dominium, or legal ownership, if maintained during one year over moveable things, or during two years over im- moveable. The operation of usucapio Avas of great importance in Roman law ; for by it the interest of a person to whom a res mancipi was transferred otherwise than by mancipation and the interests of all persons who held things in bonis (see sec. 62) were, after a short lapse of time, converted into full Prescription. _... ,. -p» .,. ,« , Quiritarian ownership. prescription, before the time of Justinian, was not a means of acquiring rights : it merely gave a means of repelling actions brought to regain rights which had long been held by another than the absolute owner. It was applicable to immoveables in the provinces, they being not affected by usucapio, which regarded all moveables, but only such immoveables as were in Italy. Justinian made considerable alterations in the law with respect to acquisition of ownership by length of possession. The same law was made to prevail through- out the empire, and possession during three years gave the ownership of moveables, and possession during ten years, if the parties had inhabited the same province during the time, or possession during twenty years if they had not, gave the owner- ship of immoveables. 73. The ownership was also transferred when things were surrendered by the fictitious process of injure cessio. In jure cessio. . . «i • i • i j_i i /> i ^ , -i that is, a suit m which the deienaant gave up to the I INTKODUCTION. li plaintiff all he claimed, or when things were adjudged {adjudicatio) in certain actions, such as those for assigning boundaries, and dividing a family estate, when the judge had a power to assign the respective portions to the different parties. 74. The entirety of rights was acquired when one person succeeded to the -persona, or les^al existence, of . . .,• ^ ^ ' o ' Acquisition oj another, and thereby succeeded to all his rights, an entirety of whether over things or against persons. The cases ^^^ in which this most naturally occurred were that of arrogation (for when a person was arrogated, he, of course, transferred all that he had to the person whose family he entered), and that of succession to the inheritance of testators and intestates. 75. Testaments were originally made by being proclaimed in the comitla curiata, or by a fictitious sale, in which testators transferred their property to a purchaser {familice emptor) who was himself heir, or who was, after their death, to distribute it according to their wishes. In later times a testament was made in the presence of seven witnesses, who affixed their seals to it, and the witnesses and the testator sub- scribed the testament. In order to make a testament, it was necessary to have the testamenti f actio, a term implying such a participation in the law of private Roman citizens as to make a person considered capable of making, taking under, or beino- witness to, a testament. 76. The testator was obliged to disinherit by name every one who, being among those in his own power, had a natural claim on his property ; and if he failed to do ^^^^' so, the whole testament was set aside. The great peculiarity of a Koman testament was the institution of the heir, that is, of the person who was to succeed to the persona of the j ft f f testator. Unless there was such a person, no other ^^^^ ^^&^'^- disposition of the testament could take effect, for there was no con- tinuation of the testator's legal existence. The heir was, therefore properly appointed at the beginning of the testament ; in case of the heir accepting, he placed himself exactly in the position of the testator, received all his property, and was answerable for all his iebts ; in receiving his property he was, however, bound to o-ive 3ffect to the subsequent dispositions of the testament. Various provisions were made at different times to protect the heir, and especially he was secured by the Lex Falcidia in a clear fourth, Hi INTEODUCTION. as the inheritance ; and under the later empire, he could sepa- rate the property of the testator from his own. In order that the testament miorht not fail because the heir was not wdllino; to enter on the inheritance, it was customary to name one or more persons to "whom in succession it might be open to take upon them the office of heir {suhstitutio). And a testator could always secure an heir by naming, as the last of the list, one of his own slaves, whom the law did not permit to refuse the office (Jieres necessarius). When some of the conditions necessary to create an heir, or give a legacy, were wanting in a will, still the expressions of the testator's wall were binding as trusts upon the heir under Fideicom- ^^® ^^^^^^ ^^' ^^^^' ^^ intestato. Such trusts {Jidei- missa. commisso) w^ere first made obligatory by Augustus, who also first gave effect to codicils, that is, writings purporting to ^ , , deal with property in the manner of a testamentary Codicils. . . , n . 1 1 • . disposition, but not executed with the solemnities which were required to make a testament valid. 77. If there was no testament to determine the succession to the particular property, the law prescribed the order inustaiel' ^^" ^^^ which it was to devolve. The first claimants were the sui lieredes, that is, all persons in the power of the deceased, and who, on his death, became themselves sui juris. Thus, a son in potestate was a suus heres of the deceased, but not a grandson until the son was dead. These persons were termed sui heredes as having an interest of their own in the family pro- perty. If there were no sui heredes, the next heirs were the agnati, i.e. all members of the same civil family; and then, in default of agnatic the law of the Twelve Tables gave the in- heritance to the members of the same gens, an enactment which could of course only take effect when the deceased was a member of a gens. What was the course of devolution beyond the agnati under the old civil law, when the deceased was not a member of a gens, w^e do not know ; but probably the blood-relations suc- ceeded. In default of ognati, under the praetorian legislation, the claims of the natural family were attended to, and the cognati, or blood-relations, succeeded to the inheritance. In the later times of the Roman law the claims of blood-relations were more and more favoured, and in many important points w^ere gradually preferred to those of merely civil kinsmanship. The Institutes also notice three other modes of minor impor- tance by which universitates rerum were acquired. (1) Bonorum INTEODUCTION. liii addictio, the giving over of the property of a deceased person to a slave to whom the deceased had given his freedom, other modes (2) Bonorum venditio, the sale by order of the whole ^/«^^^«^^y ^ / ^ «^ universitates property of an insolvent to a person who would under- rerum. take to pay most to the creditors. (3) Ex seriatus-coiisulto Clau- dlano, which gave over a woman with all her property, who had cohabited with a slave, to the slave's master. IV. EIGHTS AGAINST PERSONS. 78. A personal right is, as w^e have said before, a right which one person has against another ; a right to constrain that other to give something to, or do something for, ^jj^^^^^^"^*^ or make something good to, the possessor of the right. The person to whom the right belonged, and the person against whom it existed, were said in Roman law to be bound by an oblio-ation, the notion of an oblio-ation beinfT that of a tie between two parties of such a nature as to confer on the one a power of compelling by action the other to give, do, or make good some- thing. The obligation did not give any interest in a thing, to get which might be the ultimate object of the proceeding, but only gave a means of acquiring it, or, under the praetorian system, its value. 79. The three words, dare, facere, prmstare, were used to embrace all the possible duties an obligation could create. Either the person bound by the obligation r>rLstarr^^' w^as obliged dare, i.e. to give the absolute ownership of a thing ; or facere, that is, to do or not to do some act ; or prcsstare, that is, to make good something, as to make good a loss, or to furnish any advantage or thing, the yielding of which could not be included in the limited sense of the word ^ dare!' Every person who possessed a personal right against another was termed a creditor, and every one who owed the satisfaction of a claim, or was the subject of a personal right, was a debitor. The word creditor, of course, points to those transactions in w^hich the possessor of the right trusted the person w^ho was the subject of it; but the application of the terms was perfectly general, and must not be confounded with the English usage of the words creditor and debtor. 80. According to the theory of Roman law, all obligations llV INTEODUCTION. owed their origin either to the consent of the parties (^contractus). Division of ^^ ^^ injuries (^delicto) done by one person to another, obligations, which gave the injured party a right to recom- pense. Contracts did not, however, include all cases when an obligation arose from the mutual consent of the parties. The general name for such an obligation was conventio, pactum con- ventum, A contract was properly an obligation arising by mutual consent, and made in one of the forms recognised by the civil law ; but all oblio:ations arisino^ from mutual consent are spoken of as arising from contracts, because in the old law no other mode of expressing mutual consent was recognised, and mere agreements were not binding. 81. The mode of transferring res mancipi was, as we have said in sec. 59, called mancipatio. Gains (i. 119) thus describes the form of transfer : ' Mancipation is effected in the presence of not less than five witnesses, who must be Roman citizens of the age of puberty, and also in the presence of another person of the same condition, who holds a pair of scales, and hence is called libripens. The purchaser, taking hold of the thing, says and affirms that this thing is mine, ex jure Quiritium, and it is purchased by me with this piece of copper and these scales. He then strikes the scales with the piece of money, and gives it to the seller as a symbol of the price.' But the generic term for this mode of sale was not mancipatio, but nexum* for this form was used not only when a sale was its real object, but when under the form of a sale the parties intended to effect a contract of deposit or pledge. The purchaser took the thing handed over to him upon the condition of restoring it under certain specified circumstances, and thus a form of transfer came to be a form of contract where part of the contract was still to be executed. 82. In the time when the civil law had assumed its full Contracts shape, and apart from the alterations it received from made re. the pr^torian system, the nexum was used chiefly as the mode of transferring res mancipi, for contracts of deposit and pledge were ordinarily made, as it was termed, re. That is, by the mere delivery of the thing, the person to whom it was delivered, and who accepted it, was bound by an obligation to hold it for the purposes for which it had been delivered. There * Nexum est, quodcumque per ces et libram geritur, idque necti dicitur. — Festus. INTRODUCTION. Iv were four heads of contracts recognised by the civil law, and this of contracts made re is the first noticed in the Institutes, although historically the recognition of such contracts was probably pos- terior to that of the more formal contracts, verbis and Uteris. Under contracts re were classed four kinds of contract, namely, the contracts of mutuum when the receiver had to return as much of the same kind of the thing he received, commodatum when he had to return the specific thing itself, depositum when the receiver was bound to keep safe a thing committed to his charge, and pignus when the receiver took a thing in pledge. 83. The second head of contract under the civil law was that of contracts made verbis, of executory contracts, that Contracts is, made in a prescribed form of solemn words. One "''^"^^^ vtrbis. of the parties put to the other a formal (question {stipulatio) , to which the other gave a formal answer {responsio, promissio). To the validity of the contract it was necessary that the question should be couched in the form * spondes ? ' and the answer in that of ' spondeo.'' Do you engage ? I do engage. It was long before equivalent words, such as promitto or dabo, were admitted as sub- stitutes. A contract made by the pronunciation of these solemn words was said to be made verbis, 84. A third head of contract under the civil law was that of contracts made Uteris. An engagement having been Contracts made to give a definite amount, the parties agreed to ^'^^'^^^ Uteris. make a memorandum of the terms of the contract. The creditor placed in his book of domestic accounts [tabulce, or codex) the name of the debtor, and the sum as pecunia expensa lata, weighed out and given to the debtor ; and the debtor entered in his tabulcE the same sum as pecania accepta relata. Either party could call on the other to produce his tabulcB, which it Avas considered so incumbent on a Roman citizen to keep carefully and accurately, that any wilful error was discoverable without much difficulty. The debtor, in fact, furnished the creditor with a means of proving that the debtor had on a certain day received the money, and even if the debtor had not set the sum down in his tabulca, the creditor could show his own tabulcE as a proof of the contract. These contracts were peculiar to Roman citizens. Peregrini had as a substitute syngraphce, signed by both parties, or chiro- graplia, signed only by the debtor ; and on these documents an action could be brought. 85. There were, also, four particular contracts, for the forma- Ivi INTRODUCTION. tion of which the civil law required no formalities whatever, ^ ^ , but which were made merely consensu, by the con- Contracts _ ^ «^ 'J made con- sent of the parties. These four contracts Avere — sale (^emptio-veaditio), hiring (locatio-conductio), partner- ship [societas), and bailment [mandatum). The four modes, then, in which contracts mionht be entered into under the civil law were — re, verhis, Uteris, and consensu. 86. When, however, the old law of contracts fell under the manipulation of the prastors, many changes were introduced. The Prcstorian ^^^ forms of Contract recognised by the civil law, innovations, that is, the four heads of contract made re, the four heads of contract made consensu, and contracts made verbis and Uteris still remained the basis of the whole law of contracts ; but the prastors, while nominally adhering to the civil law, introduced changes that had a great practical effect. The nature of this change can only be understood by studying the details of theRoman law of contracts, and it would be out of place in a general intro- duction to attempt to notice them. But there are three ways in which the praitors wrought a change, which were so important that they may be briefly stated here. By an extension of the theory of the civil law contract re, the pra3tors permitted an action to be brought to enforce every contract that was in part executed ; secondly, agreements (pacta) that would not furnish a cause of action were permitted to be set up by way of defence to an action with which they were inconsistent ; and thirdly, there were a few specified particular cases in which the praetor permitted pacts to be enforced by action. 87. Obligations might, however, very well arise, without any . fault on the part of any one, and yet without having \yOtl(JCLLt\/ ito quasi ex con- their Origin in mutual consent. The mere fact of occupymg a certain position will sometimes involve duties, the performance of which may be enforced by an action, and which give rise to a personal right which the person interested in their performance has against the person bound to perform them. An heir, for instance, was, by the mere fact of accepting the inheritance, bound to pay the legacies given by the testament. Such obligations were said to be quasi ex contractu, not that they really rested on any contract, but there was an analogy between the obligation thus arising, and that arising from the formation of a contract.* * See Austin, Province of Jurisprudence determined. Appendix, page xl. INTKODUCTION. Ivii 88. It was not every wrong deed for which compensation could be obtained that gave rise to an obligation ex delicto ; obligations there were certain particular wrong deeds, such as ^^ delicto. theft and robbery with violence, which the law expressly charac- terised as delicta, and to procure reparation for which the law pro\ided a special action. It was only when a person suffered by one of these wrono; deeds that an oblio-ation ex delicto arose. When any wrong deed was done not thus expressly designated by law as a delictum, and when no particular and appropriate form of action was provided, the obligation was said to arise quasi ex delicto ; among the instances given in the Institutes is that of dangerous things being placed so as to fall into a public Avay. If any one were hurt by the fall, the author of the injury would be bound to make reparation by an obligation quasi ex Qf^ij^y^fi^^^g delicto, there being this point of analogy between this ?«««* e^ de- obligation, and that in the case of a delict, that the person liable to be sued had done harm to the person or property of another. The division of obligations adopted in the Institutes is therefore into those ex contractu, those quasi ex contractu, those ex delicto, and those quasi ex delicto. 89. The ancient law considered an oblis^ation as existins; until the tie of law, the vinculum juris, was loosed by the Dissolution of thing being given, furnished, or done, or by a new obligations. tie being formed in place of the old ; this loosening of the tie was termed solutio. If payment was made, i.e. if the contract was carried out, this at once put an end to the contract. But it might happen that the parties wished to put an end to the contract before it was carried out. Each mode of forming a contract by the civil law was accompanied by a corresponding mode of dis- solving it. When the contract had been formed re, it was enousfh that the thing should be restored ; when it had been formed verbis, a question and ansAver again furnished the means of accomplishino; the desired object. Habesne acceptum ? Habeo, sufficed to put an end to the contract. The parties made an entry of payment in their codices, if the contract had been Uteris ; and mutual con- sent dissolved those contracts Avhich it had sufficed to form. The solutio verbis was most frequently employed, and it was easy to employ it on every occasion : for in whatever way the contract might originally have been entered into, its terms could be repeated in the form of a stipulation, and then this stipulation could be dissolved by a solutio verbis. The stipulation extinguished the Iviii INTRODUCTION. original contract. For contracts were extinguished not only by payment, but by what was called novatio ; that is, by makmo; a new contract, and substitutmo; it m the place of the original one. The law required that the new contract should be always made verbis or Uteris. When strict adherence to the rule of law, requiring a particular mode of payment, would work injustice, the praetor would always provide a remedy by means of his equitable jurisdiction. V. SYSTEM OF CIVIL PROCESS. 90. An action is the process by which a right is enforced. Meaninq of Unless a means of enforcing it was provided, the right the word ac- would be a mere inoperative abstraction. Directly it was disputed, it would cease to have any real exist- ence ; but in order that it may have a real existence, the State uses its powers to ensure a free exercise of it, as soon as it is made certain to the magistrate, who is entrusted with the authority of the State, that the right claimed does really belong to the claimant. The proceeding by which this is made evident to the magistrate, and the machinery set in motion by which the State exerts its power of compulsion, is called an action. The word ' action ' is not, however, always used exactly in this sense ; for it is also employed to mean sometimes the right to institute such a proceeding, and sometimes the form which the proceeding takes. 91. There are three great epochs in the history of the Koman system of civil process. First, that of the system of history of Bo- ^^^ ^^9^^ actiones, certain hard, sharply-defined forms man system of which a rude civilisation prescribed for all proceed- ed i;i? process. . ^ Ti 1 PI n ^ 7 1 mgs. secondly, that ot the system ot jormuics, by which the praetor, adopting a most flexible form of organising the proceedings, was enabled to give a means of enforcing every right which the more enlarged vicAvs of an advancing civilisation pro- nounced to be founded on equity ; and thirdly, that of the extra- or dinar ia judicia, by which, under the later emperors, the supreme authority took the whole conduct of the proceeding into its ov/n hands, and arrived at what seemed to it to be just in as direct and speedy a manner as it found possible. 92. In enforcing rights two very different functions have to be exercised by those to whom the powers of the State are dele- INTKODUCTION. lix gated. First, there must be some one invested with magis- terial authority, o^ivino^ the sanction and solemnity of ^,, ^_. his position to the whole proceeding, who shall re- trate and the present the law and say what the law is, and who shall -^ ' ^ " have power to employ the force which the State places at the dis- posal of those it selects to administer justice. Secondly, an inquiry has to be made into particular facts, evidence has to be received and weighed, and an opinion formed and pronounced as to the real merits of the case. The person who exercised the one function was spoken of by the Romans as magistratus ; the person who exercised the other as judex. To the law, represented, pro- nounced, vindicated, by the magistrate, they applied the term jus: to the examination of contested facts by the judge, the term judicium. It is perfectly possible that the same person should act as magistrate and judge ; but it is also possible that the two provinces should be separated and placed in the hands of different persons. Among the Romans the magistratus was a different person from the judex, until the introduction of the system of extraor dinar ia judicia. The two functions were kept almost entirely apart under the system o^ formulce, and, from a compara- tively early period of Roman history, the notion of a judge distinct from the magistrate was familiar to the national mind. After the expulsion of the kings, and during the time of the first period of the system of civil process, first the consuls, then the prcEtor urbanus, and in some cases the CBdiles, acted as the magistrate, and the magistrate was said to have two functions, (1) Jurisdiction the elements of which were summed up into three words : do, I give an action or possession of goods ; dico, I express the law, issue edicts or interdicts ; addico, I give ownership as a judge ; and (2) Imperium, the power of using the public forces to ensure obe- dience to his orders. As judex, any member of the senatorial body, so long as senators alone were qualified to act as judges, could act who was chosen by the mutual consent of the parties : if they could not agree, the choice was determined by lot. There was also a standing body of plebeian judges dating from ancient antiquity, the centumvirs, elected annually by the comitia, three from each local tribe, and constituting a collegium divided into sections. They had special jurisdiction over questions of status, of dominium ex jure Quiritium, and of successions, and a spear (hasta), the special symbol of Quiritian ownership, was set up in front of the place where they met. In cases involving any question Ix INTRODUCTION. into which the centumolrs were the proper persons to inquire, it was not open to the parties to ask for a judge, and the whole proceed- ings were carried on before the centuntvirs. Lastly, in cases where the interests of peregrvni were involved, recuperatores, i.e. persons not on any list, were invited to act, and, so acting, furnished the body who were to act the part of the judex. It may be added that where the circumstances of the case demanded that the judge, in pronouncing his opinion on the facts, should exercise a wider discretion than was ordinarily open to him, or decide from special knowledge, he was spoken of as an arbiter, and although there were never more than one judex, there were sometimes several arhitri, but the arbiter was chosen from the same class as \h.Q judex. 93. All judicial proceedings, whether before a magistrate or a Character of j^^o^» ^cre Conducted publicly at Rome. The pro- judicialjpro- cccdings began with the in jus vocatio, or summons to ^Eomc in early comc before the magistrate. If the adversary would times. ^f^^^ come the summoner called, by touching them on the ear, bystanders to witness that he had made the summons ; but ascendants and patrons could not be summoned except by pre- vious authorisation of the magistrate. When before the magis- trate the parties had to give security for their further appearance (vadimonium), and called witnesses to testify that the litigation had duly begun (litis contestatio). In early times, the magistrate sat in the forum, and openly dispensed justice to all comers. Nothing, perhaps, conveys a more correct picture of the ideas and feelings that lay at the bottom of the public life of a Roman citizen, while Rome was still the rival of the Volscians or the ^quians, than the mode in which the actions of law were con- ducted. The magistrate and the judge of the patrician order, the distinction of days fasti and nefasti, the key to which only those who knew the jw5 sacrum possessed, the solemn and indispensable form of words by which every stage of the proceeding must be accompanied, would throw over the conduct of the action much of the same character which the existence of a privileged and partly sacerdotal order impressed on the whole body politic. 94. The most ancient and most important of the actions of law, the actio sacramenti,* brings before us, in the most marked manner, the delight in appeals to the external senses, and the * Gaius, iv. 13. INTRODUCTION. Ixi use of symbolical acts, sanctioned by long usage and expressive in themselves, which belongs to the early times of so many nations. It was originally the only form ^ZtLTslflaw, of action ; and every species of right could be en- —actio sacra- forced by it. When it was employed to enforce a right over things, the proceedings opened by the thing being brought before the magistrate (in jure) ; the claimants appeared, each touched it with a rod [vindicta or festucd), and said, ^ Hunc ego hominem (the instance given in Gains is that of a claim to a slave) ex jure Quiritium meum esse aio secundum suam causam, sicut dixi. Ecce tibi vindictam imposui.^ His adversary repeated the same words. At the same time that the words were spoken each party seized hold of the thing claimed ; this was termed the manuum consertio, representing a combat which was supposed to take place in the presence of the magistrate before he would interpose, and the imposing the rod was termed vindicatio. If the thing was one that could not be brought into court, a portion of it was brought to represent the whole. A piece of turf, a twig, a brick, or one sheep, stood in place of a field, a house, or a flock."^ When the vindicatio and manuum consertio were over, the magistrate said to the parties, mittite ambo hominem ; both were to place their claims in his hands. Then came the wager, the sacramentum, each party challenging his adversary to deposit a certain sum, which the loser of the cause was to forfeit to the treasury of the people {cBrarium) , to be applied to the expenses of sacrifices. The law of the Twelve Tables fixed the amount of the wager at 500 or 50 asses, according as the value of the thing contested fell above or below 1,000 asses. The formal words by which this was done are thus given by Gains. He who had first gone through the vindicatio asked his adversary why he claimed it. Postulo anne dicas, qua ex causa vindicaveris. The other replied that it was in conformity with right and law that he had made his claim. Jus peregri sicut vindictam imposui : the first answered, Quando tu injuria vindicasti, D. L. ceris Sacra- mento te provoco ; ' I challenge you to a deposit of 500 pounds of copper ; ' and the other accepted the challenge by saying. Simili- ter ego te. The magistrate then awarded the possession of the * If the thing was an immoveable, there appears to have been an old ceremony of the parties going to the land or other immoveable thing, and one expelling the other from it, and leading him before a magistrate (deduc- tio). See Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. xx. 10 ; Cicero, Pro Murxna, c. 6. Ixii INTRODUCTION. thing contested until a decision was pronounced to the party that appeared to have the best right to it, requiring him to furnish security that it would be forthcoming at the proper time. These sureties were called pr cedes litis et vindiciarum — Us signifying the thing contested itself, and vindicice the fruits or profits which might arise from it before the final sentence was given. After a certain delay, a judge was appointed to examine the facts ; he in- formed the magistrate what his decision was, and the magistrate gave effect to this decision by using the force placed at his dis- ])0sal. When the right to be tried was a personal one, there was of course nothing that could be claimed by vindication and the action bes^an at once with the wao-er. 95. The details of the actio sacramenti furnish so lively a picture of the actual working of early Roman law. Actio per ju- ^ ^ ^ ^ r> j ^ dicis postula- that it is worth while to set them fully before us ; but i07iem. ^^^ other actions of law may be passed over with a much more cursory notice ; "^ indeed, our knowledge of them is very deficient, as the portion of the manuscript of Gains which contained a sketch of the proceedings is imperfect. We know that the action called judicis jiostulatio was employed with regard to obligations, the machinery of the actio sacramenti being ob- viously but very ill adapted for enforcing rights against persons. We know little more than that the magistrate was asked to allow the appointment of a judge, or arbiter, to decide the matter iu question ; and that the form of action was probably adopted, not where some certain thin»; was asked for as the fulfilment of the engagement, but where a greater uncertainty in the circumstances of the case allowed a greater latitude of opinion, and where an appearance of good or bad faith would naturally colour the whole cause.f In the year A.u.C 510 (as it is conjectured) the lex Silia instituted a new form of action where the obligation was for the giving a definite sum of money, and a lex Calpurnia (a.u.C. 520) extended the scope of the action to all obligations for any certain definite thing. J This action was called condictio, because the plaintiff gave notice (^con- dicere) to the defendant that he must appear before the magistrate, at an interval of thirty days, to receive a judge. Probably its * Gaius, iv. 12. t Prmdarum a majoribus accepimus morem rogandi judicis, si ea rogare- mus qu3e salva fide facere possit. — Cicero, De Off, iii. 10. X Gaius, iv. 19. INTEODUCTION. Ixiii institution completed the withdrawal of the enforcement of obli- gations from the scope of the actio sacramenti. The judicis postu- latio may have left to the sphere of the actio sacramenti the de- mand for things certi, and then the condictio took that also away. 96. There were two other actions of law,^ that per manus ijijectionem, and that per pignoris capionem. These . .. were, however, not really actions so much as methods onanus injec- of obtainins; execution. If it was a rio^ht over a thino^ that was claimed, then, if the sentence was in favour of the claimant, the magistrate at once put the claimant in possession of the thing, having recourse to force, manus militaris, if necessary. But when a right against a person had to be enforced, there was nothing which could be thus handed over ; the remedy was against the person, the liberty of the defeated adversary, and the action p)er manus injectionem was the means by which the successful litigant exerted his power. He laid hands on him, manus ijijecit, and brought him before a magistrate, stating that he had been cast in the previous suit ; if this was denied, ii judex was ap- pointed, and inquiry made whether judgment had really been given against him as alleged. If this was found to be the case, he was adjudicatus to the claimant who, kept him prisoner, and then being brought, after sixty days, before the magistrate, was addictus, or assigned over, and became the slave of his creditor. To the principle that the person, and not the property, of the debtor was bound, an exception was made when the debt was due to a soldier for military service, to the fund for sacrifices, or the public treasury.f The creditor, in such cases, might seize on anythino- belonginoj to the debtor, and take it as a , ,. •^ ° ° ^ ^ ^ Actio per pledge for the payment of a debt. This pignoris pignoris capio was only spoken of as an actio because it was ^"^^^^'^^^^^* conducted with certain solemnities, and accompanied by the re- petition of a peculiar form of words. The following are some of marked features of actions of law, in respect of which great differences were gradually introduced under the later systems. (1) The procedure in the actions of law was one open only to Koman citizens. (2) The parties were almost always obliged to appear personally, but an assertor lihertatis could appear to claim the freedom of a person w^rongly treated as a slave. (3) So rigid was the necessity of adherence ^ Gaius, iv. 21. t Gaius, iv. 26. (See also ante, sec. 8.) d Ixiv INTKODUCTION. to the prescribed forms, as Gains informs us (iv. 11), that if, in an action for damage to a vineyard, the plaintiff used the word vites instead of the general word arhores, employed in the law of the Twelve Tables, he lost his action. (4) If the action was once brought, it was exhausted, or if it failed, even on the most technical ground, the plaintiff had no further remedy. (5) The sentence was ordinarily to give the thing demanded, not a pecuniary equivalent. 97. The leg is actiones were necessarily replaced by other forms of actions more convenient as Home advanced in civilization. They were in a great measure suppressed by the lex j^hutia cy . r (about A.u.c. 573), and afterwards, in the time of iSupjpression of ^ ^^ ^ the actions of Augustus, by the leges JiflicB. They were, however, lono; retained in cases where the centumviri were the proper Jw^/ces, that is, in questions of status, Quiritian owner- ship, and disputed succession, the prcetor presiding personally over the deliberations of the centumviri, and not instructing them by a formula ; and a fictitious process, termed in jure cessio, which was nothing else than an undefended action at law, in wdiich a disputant gave u'p{cessit) before the magistrate {injure) the thing in dispute, was retained as a ready means of many legal changes, such as manumission or adoption, long after the actions of law had fallen into disuse. Before the actions of law were suppressed, the prcBtor peregrinns had for years been administering justice through forms of action devised by him where peregrini were concerned. 98. The changes wrought by intercourse with foreign nations, , , the new duties of extended dominion, and the stimulus Second ejpoch ; ^ the system of given to the national mind by the long internal jormucB. struggles which had now subsided, produced by degrees a general change in the mode in which justice was ^ , . administered. A new system succeeded the old leqis Judges tn ^ '' «^ the second actiones ; the magistrate was more strongly marked jpeno . ^^ from the judex, and it was the directions which the former gave the latter that constituted the important feature of the new system of procedure. At home the praetors, of whom there were eighteen in the days of Pomponius,* and one or two other magistrates ; and in the provinces the prcesides or pra3fects, vfho held cvnventus or assizes in the principal towns at stated intervals, sat as magistrates. At Rome the long struggle between * Dig. i. 2. 34. INTRODUCTION. 1; XV the senate and the equites for the exclusive right to farnish the judges ended, as has been ah^eady said (sec. 12), in the judges ceasing to be taken entirely either from the senate or the equites ; and two, at least, out of the five decurles of judges appearing in the album were taken from a comparatively humble class. The recuperatores and centumviri still continued to act in the cases which properly fell within their province. 99. The directions which the magistrate sent .to the judge were always conveyed in a formal shape, and the ^w^ord formulcB was used to express the diiferent forms in which dii^^ctions w^ere given. These formulcB were preserved and collected. . . FormulcB. and it became the great object of the contending parties ih^t the right formula should be used in their case, the judge not being allowed to depart from the instructions he received. As there was no legal form to bind the magistrate, he could easily vary the formula so as to render substantial justice, and had thus a ready means of availing himself of any equitable doctrine, which a more refined jurisprudence or his own sense of wdiat was right suggested to him. These formulcB, so flexible in their general character, yet couched in terms always precise and simple, furnish one of the many admirable instances of the pa^er of the Romans to express correctly the subtlest legal ideas ; and it w^as by this machinery that the prastors principally introduced their great legal changes. But it may be observed that, although the old actions of law became obsolete, traces of them are to be found in the praetorian system. Thus, in certain actions the parties entered into a v/ager sponsio pcenalis, evidently a relic of the old actio sacramenti^ by which each stipulated with the other for a sum of money to be paid as a penalty by the loser in-, the action to the successful party. 100. To show what these formulcB were, it wdll perhaps be best to give at length one of those we find in Gains, Exa7n,vle of and then to. explain .its difierent parts. One which a formula. we may collect from difierent sections of the Fourth Book runs thus : — Judex esto : Quod Aulus Agerius Numerio Negidio homiuem vendidit ; si paret Numeriam Negidium Aulo Agerio sestertiuni X. millia dare oportere, judex Numerium Negidium Aulo Agerio sestertium X. jnillia condemnato, si nor^/paret'; absolvito.^ * Gaius, iv. 40-43. d2 Ixvi INTKODUCTION. Judex esto is merely the order for the appointment of the judge, and is not, strictly speaking, a part of ihe formula. From * quod'' to ^ vendidW is what is called the demonstration from ^ si paret'' to ^ dare ojjortere'' is the intention and from ^ judex"* to the end is the condemnatio. 11\\q formula ordinarily consisted of these three parts — the demonstration the intentio, and the condemnatio. 101. The demonstratio is the statement of the fact or facts which the plaintiff alleges as the ground of his case."^ D6')110')lStTCLt'io . Aulus Agerius, the plaintiff, says that he has sold a slave to Numerius Negidius. The demonstratio varied, of course, Avith each particular case. 102. The intentio was the really important part of the formula. It was a precise statement of the demand which the plaintiff made against {tendebat in) f his adversary. It was necessary that it should exactly meet the law which would govern the facts alleged by the plaintiff, if true. Whether Aulus Agerius has sold this slave to Numerius Negidius at the -price he alleges, and whether the debt is still owing, this is what the judex has to determine; if the judge thinks he has {si paret), then the judge is instructed to pronounce his judgment against him ; if he thinks he has not {si non paret), he is to be absolved. 103. The condemnatio is the direction to condemn or absolve according to the true circumstances of the case.J The judex was only a private citizen, and, unless specially authorized by a magistrate, could have no power to pronounce a judicial sentence. It is to be observed that the condemnatio was under the formulary system always pecuniary; the judge was always directed to condemn to a payment of money, never to do or crive a particular thing. In three particular actions, however, and perhaps in more, the judge was directed to 'adjudicate' a thino', in the sense of dividing it out among several litigants. These three actions were those brought to divide a flmiily inherit- ance, to divide the property of partners, and to settle boundaries. In these actions there was an additional part of the formula run- nino* thus : quantum adjudicari oportet, judex Titio adjudicato. This was called the adjudicatio ; so that in these actions the parts of the formulce were four — demonstratio, intentio, adjudicatio, and condemnatio. Of course when a thing, and not a sum of money. •^ Gaius, iv. 40. t Gaius, iv, 41. t Gaius, iv. 42. INTRODUCTION. 1 xvii was claimed, it was not possible for the magistrate always to fix a precise sum iu which the defendant was to be condemned. Some- times, therefore, the condemnatio merely fixed the maximum as the sum, and ran duntaxat X. millia condemnato. Sometimes the direction was still more indefinite, and the sum was left to the discretion of the judge. Quanti ea res erit, tantum j^ecuniam, &^c., condemnato. Sometimes, too, as when the action was real, i.e. brought to claim a thing, the actio was arbitraria, and the words nisi restituat were inserted in the condemnatio. The de- fendant was ordered to give up the thing, and then was condemned to pay the money if he refused to restore the thing, in accordance with the order {arhitrium) of the judge. 104. The intentio sometimes stood quite alone, and was then called a ipr(2judicialis formula \^ when this w^as the Prcejudldalis case^ the object of the action was merely to establish formula. a point which it was necessary to have settled with a view to a future action. The decision of such a preliminary point was called a proijudicium. Of course the intentio took any form that best suited the case ; and accordingly it was the intentiones that were so carefully preserved as precedents, and so keenly debated by the contending parties. Sometimes the grounds of the defence made part of the intentio. The defendant might admit the plaintiff's statement, but say that there were special circumstances to take this particular case out of the general rule of law under which it would naturally fall. He might own, for instance, that he had bought a slave at the price alleged, but say that he had been induced to do so by fraud. This plea was called an . /. 1 . XT -\ r Exceptio. exceptio (i.e. a taking out), and was made to lorm part of the intentio, some such words as these being added : si in ea re nihil dolo malo Auli A(jerii factum sit neque Jiat. The plaintiff, again , mio;ht have somethino; to uro:e as an exception m reply to this plea : ms answer was called repLicatio ; if the defendant had a further answer, it was called a duplication the plaintiff's further reply a triplication and so on. There was also sometimes an accessory part of the formula called the 'prcE- scriptio, placed, as its name denotes, at the beginning of the whole formula for the purpose of limiting the enquiry. As employed by the defendant, it answered the purpose of the exceptio, and belongs, probably, to a time before the exceptio had its regular ^ Gaius, iv. 44. 133. Ixviii INTRODUCTION. place in \h.Q formula. A well-known example of its use is that by which the defendant sto])ped an action for the possession of pro- vincial lands, by raising the question whether he had not been in possession for a particular period, which is the origin of the familiar term * prescription.' (See sec. 72.) But the plaintiff also might, in the early days of the formulary system, hav^ occasion to resort to a pr(Escriptio. He might, for instance, wish that, in enforcing a security on which payments were due from time to time, the action brought to try whether this security was valid should only affect his claim to payments already due, so that if hefailed he might have a further action for future payments. In such a case some such words as ea res agatur cujus re dies fuit (let the enquiry only be made as to the sum for the payment of which the time has arrived) were prefixed to \hQ formula. Gradually, however, the prcEscriptio fell into disuse, and the intentio and esoceptio were so constructed as to serve every purpose for Avhich it had been employed. 105. In the Roman system of civil process the time when a Litis contcs- conte&ted right was to be considered as really made ^«'^^^- the subject of litigation, was very carefully marked. It was very necessary that this should be very clearly ascer- tained. The claimant in whose favour the ultimate decision was aiven was entitled to all that accrued to the thino- claimed from this moment; and when once a point had been submitted to litigation, it could not be again litigated, both parties surrender- in o^ all their interest into the hands of the court, which assigned to the successful claimant such a fresh interest in the thing claimed as might appear to be due to him. This time was marked by each party, at the end of the proceedings before the magistrate, calling bystanders to witness, that they submitted the matter to the decision of the judge."^ This was called the litis contestatio, as has been said (see sec. 93). In process of time the ceremony might be omitted, or at any rate become a mere form, but the conclusion of the proceedings before the magistrate {in jure), i.e. in the formnlary system, the time when the praetor delivered the formula, still formed the crisis at which the claims of the different parties were considered to be finally submitted to the decision of the law. Under the judicia extraor dinar ia, when the magistrate and the judex were no longer different * Festus, stib voce Contest ari. — Dig. xxviii. 1. 20. INTKODUCTION. Ixix persons, the litis contestatio was fixed by the commencement of the trial."^ 106. Actio meant, under the system of the actions of law, a particular form of procedure ; under that of the Memmiq of formulae, it meant the rio-ht crranted to a plaintiff by ^^^^ ^^^^ «^- r Hon tinder the magistrate to seek what was due to him before a the system of judge. Sometimes, however, the formula by which J^'^^'^'^^- the judge was to determine the right, and sometimes i\iQ judicium, the proceedings by which the judge determined the right, were spoken of as '\i formulcR, judicium^ and actio were synonymous terms. Of the divisions under which the formulary actions may be grouped, the following were the most important. 1. The first division turns on the difference in the nature of Divisions of the thing claimed, and, according to this division, actions. actions were in rem and in personam. If the object of the pro- ceedings was to enforce a right to a thing, then the formula ran si paret hominem AuH Agerii esse ; if to enforce an obligation, then the formula ran si paret Numerium Negidium Auli Agerii dare, facere, prcestare, oportere-, and it was according to this difference in the intentio that actions were said to be in rem or in persojiam, Vindicatio came to be used as a generic term for actions in rem., and condictio for actions in personam. 2. Another division of actions refers to the modes in which the prtetor extended or modified the law by the shape he gave to the for- mula. In shaping actions, the praetor introduced changes of two kinds : First, he gave actions for the enforcement of actions outside the old civil law, and this he principally effected by giving an actio in factum concepta^ in which the demonstratio and intentio were blended, and the praetor directed that, if a given state of facts was found to be true, the defendant was to be con- demned, the action being thus contrasted with one in jus con- cepta, i.e. given to try an issue by the rules of law. Secondly, the praitor extended existing actions {actiones directcB) by giving actions {actiones utiles) to suit cases and persons outside the limits of the direct actions ; and this he did either by means of actionss in factum, which could be used for these purposes "^ It had, however, much less importance, as fixing an epoch, under the judicia extraordinaria (see page 144, where this sense must be given to the statement that the litis contestatio had no place in the ci^dl process of Jus- tinian's time). Ixx INTRODUCTION. equally well as to give new remedies, or by giving a fictitious action, i.e. an action in which the plaintiff was allowed to feign that he was within the scope of the unextended action. When there was a contract not falling under the old heads, but executed on one side, the prajtor enforced it by an action in factum prce- scriptis verbis, an action to meet the case with the circumstances set forth at the beginning ; but such an action, as it was to try an issue according to known rules of law, was in jvs concepta. 3. A further division depended on the varying amount of latitude given to the judge. The actions depending on the old civil law were stricti juris, and the judge had merely to decide the question submitted to him, without taking into account considera- tions of equity. Other actions were boncB Jidei, i.e. the judges were allowed to take such considerations into account. In real actions, and in some few special actions, the judge had always a particular kind of latitude given him, as the action was arhitraria (see sec. 103), i.e. he could order the thing claimed to be given up, and, if it was not, could condemn the defendant in as much as he thought equitable. Among personal actions which were arhitraria was one termed ad exJiibendum, which was used in order to make a person in possession of a thing produce it, so that its existence in his hands and the state in which it was might be ascertained, or pay damages for not so producing it. 107. In speaking of actions under the system oi formulcE, it is impossible to pass over without notice the interdicts of the prsetor,"^" though they were only incidentally connected with actions. An interdict was an order issued by the praetor, and was in fact an edict addressed to some person or per- sons with reference to a particular thing. Vim fieri veto, exhibeas, restituas, ' I forbid you to have recourse to violence ; you are to produce, you are to restore ; ' such were the forms in which these commands were couched. Interdicts were granted where some danger was apprehended, or some injury was being done to some- thing to which a public character attached ; as, for instance, if a road was stopped up ; but they were also granted to protect private interests, and especially to protect or regulate possession. If the person to whom the interdict was addressed acquiesced and obeyed the pra3tor's injunction, nothing remained to be done; but if he refused to obey, the magistrate then referred to the * Gaius, iv. 138. INTRODUCTION. Ixxi decision of a judge, whether the terms of the interdict ought to be complied with. For instance, an interdict ordering a thing to be restored might have been issued ; but the person to whom it was directed might deny that by law he was bound to restore the thino'. On his statino; this to the mas^istrate, the mao;istrate would give an action to try the question, shaping the terms of the interdict into the intentio of the formula, si paret A. A. rem restituere, oportere, 8fc. And it is thus that interdicts are con- nected with actions, as their validity depended on no action being brought to contest them, or the result of an action belno^ to support them. Gradually the action superseded the interdict, which was no longer used as a preliminary step, and, by the time of Justinian, they had become obsolete. 108. There were under the system of f annul (B certain cases which the magistrate decided without sending to a Extraordina- judge. In these cases the magistrate Avas said extra ''^^f^J^'-^^^cia. ordincm cognoscere^ and the proceedings were termed extra ordlnem cognitiones, judicia, or actiones. Among the cases in which the magistrate proceeded in a summary way, were restitu- tiones in integrum (that is, certain cases in which he restored a person suffering from something from which he ought not by law to suffer, to the same position as he had occupied before the injury was sustained), and cases relating to fideicommissa. But he was called upon most frequently to proceed in this way in order to give execution to the sentence of a judge. rj^, 1 1 1 p • 1 . T Execution. Ine old modes ot execution, the manus injectio and pignoris capio, remained, though under a mitigated form ; but a new method of execution was also permitted by the praetor, and was much more generally adopted. The creditors were placed in full possession of all that the debtor had belonging to him ; his persona was, in fact, transferred to them. This was termed the missio in honor um possessionem. After a certain delay, the creditors sold their interest in the debtor's property to the person who Avould offer to pay the largest proportion of the sums they claimed. He became the purchaser, and this emptio honorum transferred to him the persona, or legal existence of the debtor, who thereby suffered a capitis deminutio, and became, in the language of the law, ' infamous.' It was in the exercise of his ' extraordinary ' jurisdiction that the magistrate gave this mode of execution. 109. In the third period of the Eoman system of civil pro- ixxil INTRODUCTION. cess, the period of extraordinaria judicia^ this summary jurisdiction Third period was the Only jurisdiction the magistrate exercised. tJtemorcMl ^here was no longer any distinction between J7/S and process. judicium ; the magistrate and the judge were the dinariajudi- Same person. By a constitution published a.d. 294, ^^^'- Diocletian directed all magistrates in the provinces to decide causes themselves. The practice was, in courseof time, extended throughout the whole of the empire ; and in the days of Justinian, it was possible to speak of the or dinar ia judicia as quite past.^ 110. In the days of the later emperors, the provinces were classed together into praefectures. Over each pro- Judqes. . i i i • • • • vmce was a presses, who had a vicarius, or vice-presi- dent under him, and who, either himself or by his vicarius, tried all cases above a certain amount, fixed by »Tustinian at 300 solidi ; cases below that amount were tried by inferior judges, called judices ijedanei. The great cities, such as Constantinople and Alexandria, were under a separate jurisdiction. The preetorian prEefect was the head judge of appeal ; but a final appeal lay to the emperor himself. 111. In the time of Justinian, an action was begun by the Mode of pro- p^^i^tiff announcing to a magistrate that he wished to ccdure. bring an action, a proceeding which was termed the denuntiatio actionis, and furnishing a short statement of his case ; this statement, called the libellus conventionis, the magistrate sent by a bailiff of the court {executor) to the defendant. The parties or their procurators appeared before the magistrate, and the magistrate decided the case. JExceptio was still used as the term to express the plea of the defendant, which he generally, of course, reduced to writing, but apparently not only was he not obliged to do so, but it was not even necessary in all cases for the plaintiff to put his plaint into writing ; if he did not, the executor would merely tell the defendant, by word of mouth, that an action had been brought against him, perhaps adding a general statement of the object for which it was brought. The litis con- testatio took place directly the magistrate began to hear the cause. The condemnation was no longer merely a pecuniary one, but the system of execution was not materially different from what it had been under the praetorian system. * Inst. iv. 15, INTEODUCTION. Ixxiii 112. Although the subject of crimes and criminal procedure does not fall properly within the scope of the Insti- . . T-» • r Crimes. tutes, which is a treatise on Jrrivate i>aw, yet as the subject is slightly noticed at the end of the Institutes, and is connected with the general history of Roman Law, it may be convenient to give some slight account of it here. Criminal jurisdiction was under the kings an attribute of the king him- self, but there was an appeal in capital cases to the comitia curiata. After the establishment of the republic the comitia centuriata alone could judge capital cases. The comitia trihuta exercised a criminal jurisdiction (but without the power of in- flicting death) for political offences, such as those committed by a magistrate during his year of office. Before both these comitia the accusation had to be made by the presiding magistrate. The senate also exercised a special power of judging offenders in times of public danger, and sometimes under such circumstances inflicted death as punishment, but it did not properly belong to the senate to deal with capital cases, and the senate also exercised an ordi- nary jurisdiction and dealt with such crimes as it thought proper to notice. But all these authorities, the king, the comitia and the senate, while they sometimes discharged themselves the func- tions of the judge, were in the habit of delegating their powers to others charged to make an investigation (^qucEstio) of the crime. At first each delegatio was made to try one particular offence, and when the case had been tried the qucBstio was at an end. These qucestiones, the term being transferred from the inquiry to the persons making it, were subsequently appointed to try all offences of a particular kind that it might be necessary to in- quire into, while the delegated persons held their authority. Lastly, the qucestioiies began to be made perpetuce (a.u.c. 605), and this change was accompanied by the introduction of some- thing like a body of criminal law. When a qucBstio was made perpetua, the delicts it was to try were in some degree defined, and the punishment prescribed ; whereas previously, the body exercising criminal jurisdiction or its delegates had been bound by no rules of law as to the nature of the delict or its punish- ment, except that the comitia centuriata could alone inflict death. Each qucestio consisted of a number of judges varying according to the regulations laid down in the law creating it ; sometimes of thirty-two, or of fifty, or of a hundred — the judges being appointed for a year and taken from the same list as Ixxlv INTRODUCTION. that from which judges in civil suits were selected, so that the history of the contests between the senatorial and equestrian orders for the right of being judges already referred to (see sec. 12), applies to criminal and civil judges equally. Before the qucEstlones jjerpetucB any citizen might be an accuser. He had to swear that his charge was not false, and he had to prove the guilt of the accused — ^so that the system under which a criminal trial is regarded as a suit between parties was thus introduced into Roman law. Private persons had from an early time of Koman law recovered penalties in a civil action for delicts committed to their injury, and now the criminal proceeding took the form of an action between the private person accusing and the accused. The judges were under the guidance of a president (^prcEses), and each judge pronounced that he condemned, absolved, or that there was not proof either way, by dropping into an urn one of three tablets, bearing respectively the v^^ords condemno, ahsolvo, non liquet. If the accused was condemned he received the precise punishment provided by the law creating the qucBstio perpetua. During the last century of the republic, and in the early days of the empire, a great number of laws, each handing over a special head of offence to a qumstio perpetua were passed, and thus something like a system of criminal law and criminal procedure was esta- blished. Under the empire, as time went on, exactly what hap- pened in civil suits happened in criminal proceedings. ■ The magistrates had exercised a power of dealing with some offences in a summary manner (e.r^r<7 ordinem),and the sphere of their autho- rity was gradually enlarged until it superseded the qucestiones perpetucB altogether, as the formulary system of actions was super- seded by the extraordinary jurisdiction of the magistrate in civil suits. INSTITUTIONUM JUSTINIAN! PEOCEMIUM. IX NOMINE lyO^nXI NOSTKI jesxj christi. Impekator Cesar Flavius Justi- NiANus, Alamanicus, Gothicus, Francicus, Germanicus, Anticus, Alaxicus, Vandalicus, Africanus, pius, felix, inclytus, victor ac triumphator, semper augustus, cupids legum juventuti. Imperatoriam majestatem non solum armis decoratam, sed etiam legibus oportet esse armatam, ut utriimque tempiis et bellorum et pacis recte possit gubernari ; et princeps Romaniis victor existat non solum in liostilibus prpeliis, sed etiam per legitimos tramites calum- niantium iniquitates expellens, et fiat tam juris religiosissimus, quam victis kostibtis triiimpliator. 1. Quorum utramqne viam cum summis vigiliis siimmaque provi- dentia, annuente Deo, perfecimus. Et bellicos quidem sudores nostros barbaricse gentes sub jnga nostra deductfe cognoscunt, et tam Africa quam alife numerosge provincioe post tanta temporum spatia, nostris vic- toriis a coslesti Numine prsestitis, iterum ditioni Romanfe nostroque additae imperio protestantur ; omnes vero populi legibus jam a nobis promulgatis vel compositis regun- tur. 2. Et cum sacratissimas constitu- tiones antea confusas in luculentam ereximus consonantiam, time nos- tram extendimns curam ad immensa in the name op cue lord jesus christ. The Emperor C^sar Flavius Jus- TINIANUS, vanquisher OF THE AlA- MANi, GoTHS, Francs, Germans, Antes, Alani, Yandals, Africans, PIOUS, HAPPY, glorious, TRIUMPHANT CONQUEROR, EVER AUGUST, TO THE YOUTH DESIROUS OF STUDYING THE LAW, GREETING. Tlie imperial majesty should be not only made glorious by arms, but also strengthened by laws, that, alike in time of peace and in time of war, the state may be well governed, and that the emperor may not only be victorious in the field of battle, but also may by every legal means repel the iniquities of men who abuse the laws, and may at once religiously uphold justice and triumph over his conquered enemies. 1. By our incessant labours and great care, with the blessing of God, we have attained this double end. The barbarian nations reduced under our yoke know our efforts in war ; to which also Africa and very many other provinces bear witness, which, after so long an interval, have been restored to the dominion of Rome and our empire, by our victories gained through the favour of heaven. All nations moreover are governed by laws which we have either promul- gated or arranged. 2. When we had arranged and brought into perfect harmony the hitherto confused mass of imperial constitutions, we then extended our B PEOCEMIUM. veteris prudentioe voliimina ; et opus desperatiim, quasi per medium pro- fundum euntes, ccelesti favore jam adimplevimus. 3. Cumque hoc Deo propitio peractum est, Triboniano viro mag- uiiico, magistro et exqupestore sacri palatii nostri, r.ec non Theophilo et Dorotheo viris illustribus, anteces- soribus nostris (quorum omnium solertiam et legum scientiam et circa nostras jussiones fidem jam ex multis rerum argumentis acceijimus) con- vocatis, mandavimus specialiter ut nostra auctoritate nostrisque suasio- nibus Institutiones componerent, ut liceat vobis prima legum cunabula non ab antiquis fabulis discere, sed ab imperiali splendore appetere ; et tam aures quam animse vestrse nihil inutile nihilque perperam positum, sed quod in ipsis rerum obtinet ar- gumentis, accij)iant. Et quod priore tempore vix post quadriennium prioribus contingebat, ut tunc con- stitutiones imperatorias legerent, hoc vos a primordio ingrediamini : digni tanto honore tantaque reperti felicitate, ut et initium vobis et finis legum eruditionis a voce prin- cipali procedat. 4. Igitur post libros quinquaginta Digestorum seu Pandectarum, in quibus omne jus antiquum collatum est, quos per eumdem virum excel- sum Tribonianum nee non ceteros viros illustres et facundissimos con- fecimus, in hos quatuor libros eas- dem Institutiones partiri jussimus, ut sint totius legitimse scientise prima elementa. 5. In quibus breviter expositum est et quod antea obtinebat, et quod postea desuetudine inumbratum im- periali remedio illuminatum est. 6. Quas ex omnibus antiquorum Institution ibus, et praecipue ex commentariis Gaii nostri tim Insti- tutionum quam rerum cotidianorum, aliisque multis commentariis com- positas cum tres prsedicti viri pru- dentes nobis obtulerunt, et legimus et cognovimus et plenissimum nos- trarum constitutionum robur eis accommodavimus. care to the endless volumes of ancient law ; and, sailing as it were across the mid ocean, have now completed, through the favour of heaven, a work we once despaired of. 3. When by the blessing of God this task was accomplished, we sum- moned the most eminent Tribonian, master and ex-qusestor of our palace, together with the illustrious Theo- philus and Dorotheus, professors of law, all of whom have on many occa- sions proved to us their ability, legal knowledge, and obedience to our orders ; and we specially charged them to compose, under our authority and advice. Institutes, so that you may no more learn the first elements of law from old and erroneous sources, but apprehend them by the clear light of imperial wisdom ; and that your minds and ears may receive nothing that is useless or misplaced, but only what obtains in actual practice. So that, whereas, formerly, the foremost among you could scarcely, after four years' study, read the imperial constitutions, you may now commence your studies by reading them, you who have been thought worthy of an honour and a haj^piness so great as that the first and last lessons in the knowledge of the law should issue for you from the mouth of the emperor. 4. When therefore, by the assist- ance of the same eminent person Tribonian and that of other illustrious and learned men, we had compiled the fifty books, called Digests or Pandects, in which is collected the whole ancient law, we directed that these Institutes should be divided into four books, which might serve as the first elements of the whole science of law. 5. In these books a brief exposi- tion is given of the ancient laws, and of those also, which, overshadowed by disuse, have been again brought to light by our imperial authority. 6. These four books of Institutes thus compiled, from all the Institutes left us by the ancients, and chiefly from the commentaries of our Gaius, both from his Institutes and his Journal, and also from many other commentaries, were presented to us by the three learned men we have above named. We read and examined them, and have accorded to them all the force of our constitutions. PROCEMIUM. 3 7. Summa itaque ope et alacri 7. Receive, therefore, with eager- studio has leges nostras accipite ; ness, and study with cheerful dili- et Tosmetipsos sic eruditos ostendite, gence, these our laws, and show your- ut spes vos pulcherrima foveat, toto selves persons of such learning that legitimo opere perfecto, posse etiam you may conceive the flattering hope nostram rempublicam in partibus of yourselves being able, when your ejus vobis credendis gubernari. course of legal study is completed, to govern our empire in the different por- tions that may be entrusted to your care. D. CP. XI. calend. decembris, D. Given at Constantinople on the JusTiNiAXO PP. A. III. cons. eleventh day of the calends of De- cember, in the third consulate of the Emperor Justinian, ever August. LIBEE PEIMUS Tit. I. DE JUSTITIA ET JUKE. JusTiTiA est constans et per- Justice is the constant and per- petiia voluntas jus suum cuique petual wish to render every one his tribuendi. due. D. i. 1. 10. The term jus, in its most extended sense, was taken by the Roman jurists to include all the commands laid upon men that they are bound to fulfil, both the commands of morality and of law. The distinction between commands which are only enforced by the sanction of public or private opinion, and those enforced by positive legal sanctions, may seem clear to us ; but the Roman jurists, in speaking of the elementary principles and divisions of jurisprudence, did not keep law and morality distinct. Celsus defines Jw5, as ars honi et cequi. (D. i. I. 1.) This extension of the term would sink positive law in morality ; that only would be supposed to be commanded which ought to be commanded. The confusion arose principally from the view of the law of nature, borrowed from Greek philosophy by the jurists. (See Introd. sec. 14.) Jus, used in its strictly legal sense, has two principal meanings. It either signifies law, that is, the whole mass of rights and duties protected and enforced by legal remedies, or it means any single right, that is, any faculty or privilege accorded by law to one man accompanied by a correlative duty imposed on another man. Jus itineris, for instance, is the right given to one man of going through the land of another who is placed under a duty to let him pass. Neither a right nor a duty, at any rate in the sphere of private law with which alone the Institutes deal, can exist without the other. (See Introd. sec. 36.) 1. Jurisprudentia est divinarum 1. Jurisprudence is the knowledge atque humanarum rerum notitia, of things divine and human ; the sci- justi atque injusti scientia. ence of the just and the unjust. D. i. 1. 10. 2. Jurisprudentia is the knowledge of what is jus, and jus, accord- ing to the theory of the law of nature, laid down what is com- 6 LIB. I. TIT. I. manded by right reason, this right reason being common to nature, or, as the Romans more often said, to the Gods, and to man. On this ground, and also because public law has to deal with religious worship, the knowledge of divine things was therefore necessary, as well as the knowledge of human things, to say what were the contents of jus. Both this and the preceding definition are taken at random out of the writings of Ulpian, are unintelligible unless taken in connection with a philosophical theory from which they are here dissevered, and are quite out of place at the beginning of an elementary treatise on law. (See Introd. sec. 34.) 2. His igitur generaliter cogni- tis et incipientibu.s nobis exponere jura populi Romani, ita videntur posse tradi commodissime, si primo levi ac simplici via, post deinde diligentissima atqiie exactissima interpretatione singula tradantur. Alioquin, si statim ab initio rudem adliuc et infirmum animum studiosi multitudine aut varietate rerum oneraverimus, duorum alterum, aut desertorem studiorum efficiemus, aut cum magno labore, seepe etiam cum diffidentia quse plerumque juvenes avertit, serius ad id perducemus, ad quod leviore via ductus sine magno labore et sine ulla diffidentia matu- rius perduci potuisset. 3. Juris preecepta sunt li?ec : honeste vivere, alterum non Icedere, suum cuique tribuere. 4. Hujus studii duse sunt po- sitiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum jus est, quod ad statum rei Romanse spectat ; privatum, quod ad singulorum utilitatem. Dicendum est igitur de jure pri- vate, quod tripertitum est ; col- lectum est enim ex naturalibus prpeceptis aut gentium aut civi- libus. 2. Having explained these general terms, we think we shall commence our exposition of the law of the Ro- man people most advantageously, if we pursue at first a plain and easy path, and then proceed to explain particular details with the utmost care and exactness. For, if at the outset we overload the mind of the student, while yet new to the subject and unable to bear much, with a mul- titude and variety of topics, one of two things will happen — we shall either cause him wholly to abandon his studies, or, after great toil, and often after great distrust of himself (the most frequent stumbling-block in the way of youth), we shall at last conduct him to the point, to which, if he had been led by an easier road, he might, without great labour, and without any distrust of his own powers, have been sooner conducted. 3. The maxims of law are these : to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give every one his due. 4. The study of law is divided into two branches ; that of public and that of private law. Public law regards the government of the Roman Em- pire ; private law, the interest of in- dividuals. We are now to treat of the latter, which is composed of three elements, and consists of precepts belonging to natural law, to the law of nations, and to the civil law. B. i. 1. 1. 2. Both the jus publicum and the jus privatum fall under municipal law, that is, the law of a particular state. Publicum jus in sacris, in sacerdotibus^inmagistratibus consistit, (D. i. 1. 2.) Public law regu- lates religious worship and civil administration ; private law deter- mines the rights and duties of individuals. The threefold division of private law given in the text is discussed in the next section. LIB. L TIT. II. 7 Tjt. II. DE JURE NATURALI, GENTIUM ET CIVILE Jus naturale est, quod natura The law of nature is that law which omnia animalia docuit : nam jus nature teaches to all animals. For istud non humani generis proprium this law does not belong exclusively est, sed omnium animalium qufe in to the human race, but belongs to all coelo, qua3 in terra, qute in mari animals, whether of the earth, the nascuntur. Hinc descendit maris air, or the water. Hence comes the atque feminse conjunctio, quam union of male and female, which we nos matrimonium appellamus ; hinc term matrimony ; hence the procrea- liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio. tion and bringing up of children. We Videmus etenim cetera quoque ani- see, indeed, that all the other animals malia istius juris perita censeri. besides man are considered as having knowledge of this law. D. i. 1. 1. 3. In the Introduction (sec. 14) a sketch has been given of what the jurists meant by the lex naturcB. It was the expression of right reason inherent in nature and man, and having a binding force as a law. It was contrasted with \\\&jns civile, the old strict law of Kome (Introd. sec. 10), and also Avith \\\q jus gentium, the sum, that is, of the law found to obtain in other nations besides the Komans, as well as in Roman law. (Introd. sec. 12.) There thus arose the threefold division of law adopted in the last para- graph of the last title ; but the jus gentium and the Jw5 naturale were often placed in the same head of division, for the law com- mon to all nations was but the embodiment and indication of what right reason was supposed to command to all men. Thus while the threefold division of law was adopted by some jurists, a two- fold division was adopted by others, and is adopted in the next and the last paragraphs of this title, Justinian first borrowing from Ulpian, who adopted the threefold division, and then from Gains, who adopted the twofold. Unfortunately, in order to give a notion of jus naturale, Jus- tinian has borrowed a passage from Ulpian, in which that jurist runs off into a subsidiary and divergent line of thought. It is easy to see that if we begin to make inherent reason the foundation of law, we may find it necessary to take into account the commu- nity of actions which, in some of the primary features of physical life, reason or instinct suggests to man and animals. Vljns is that which nature commands, nature may be said to command the propagation of the species in animals as much as in man, and thus there would be a jus common to animals and to men. A jurist, to whom the theory of the lex naturcB was familiar, might easily pursue the subject to a point in which men and animals seemed to meet. But the main theory had nothing to do with animals, as it looked only to the reason inherent in the universe and in man, and in considering what the Roman jurists meant by jus naturale this fragment of Ulpian may be dismissed almost entirely from our notice. 8 LIB. I. TIT. II. 1. Jus auten civile vel gentium ita dividitur, Omnes populi qui legibus at moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi om- nium hominum jure utuntur ; nam quod quisque popukis ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius civitatis pro- prium est, vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes perseque custoflitur, voca- turque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur. Et populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, l^artim communi omnium hominum jure utitur : qua3 singula qualia sint, suis locis proponemus. 2. Sed jus quidem civile ex una- quaque civitate appellatur, veluti Atheniensium : nam si quis velit Solonis vel Draconis leges ajDpellare jus civile Atheniensium, non erra- verit. Sic enim et jus quo populus Homanus utitur, jus civile Roma- norum appellamus, vel jus Quiri- tium quo Quirites utuntur ; Romani enim a Quirino Quirites appellan- tur. Sed quotiens non addimus pomen cujus sit civitatis, nostrum jus significamus : sicuti cum poe- tam dicimus nee addimus nomen, subauditur apud Grascos egregius Homerus, apud nos Virgilius. Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est : nam usu exigente et humanis necessitatibus, gentes hu- man?e qu?edam sibi constituerunt. — Bella etenim orta sunt et cap- tivitates secutse, et servitutes quoe sunt naturali juri contraripe ; jure enim naturali ab initio omnes homi- nes liberi nascebantur. Et ex hoc jure gentium, omnes pene contractus introducti sunt, ut emptio, venditio, Jocatio, conductio, societas, deposi- tum, mutuum., et alii innumerabiles. 1. Civil law is thus distinguished from the law of nations. Every com- munity governed by laws and customs, uses partly its own law, partly laws common to all mankind. The law which a people makes for its own government belongs exclusively to that state and is called the civil law, as being the law of the particular state. But the law which natural reason appoints for all mankind ob- tains equally among all nations, and is called the law of nations, because all nations make use of it. The people of Rome, then, are governed p>artly by their own laws, and partly by the laws which are common to all mankind. We will take notice of this distinction as occasion may arise. 2. Civil law takes its name from the state which it governs, as, for in- stance, from Athens ; for it would be very proper to speak of the laws of Solon or Draco as the civil law of Athens. And thus the law which tliQ Roman people make use of is called the civil law of the R-omans, or that of the Quirites, as being used by the Quirites ; for the Romans are called Quirites from Quirinus. But when- ever we speak of civil law, without adding the name of any state, we mean our own law ; just as the Greeks, when ' the poet ' is spoken of without any name being expressed, mean the great Homer, and we Romans mean Virgil. The law of nations is common to all mankind, for nations have established certain laws, as occasion and the ne- cessities of human life required. Wars arose, and in their train followed cap- tivity and then slavery, which is con- trary to the law of nature ; for by that law all men are originally born free. Further, by the law of nations almost all contracts were at first introduced, as, for instance, buying and selling, letting and hiring, partnership, de- posits, loans returnable in kind, and ver)^ many others. D. i. 4. 5. The term jus civile, as used here, entirely depends for its meaning on the contrast betvs^een it and the J7is gentium. When the jurists came to examine different systems of laws, they found much in each that was common to all. This common part they termed the jus gentium ; and the residue, the part peculiar to each state, they called jus civile. The contracts of sale, hiring, and the others mentioned in the text, were, they found, carried LIB. I. TIT. II. 9 on much in the same way in every country, and they therefore assigned them to the head of jus gentium, and contrasted them with forms of contract which were peculiar to the old Roman law, and were therefore considered part of the/«.^as not so complete in the former, it was probably limited more by natural feeling than by law. The father could, sell, expose, or put to death his children. Time, however, ameliorated, the position of the child, and all that was left was a power to inflict moderate chastisement (C. viii. 47. 31), and to sell at the time of birth in cases of extreme necessity. (C. iv. 43. I.) Constantine condemned the father who killed his child to the punishment of a parricide. (C. ix. 17. 1.) The sale of a child was in general fictitious, and only formed the mode by Avhich the child was released from the father's power. Like that of the slave, the child's property was only a pecu- litim, belonging strictly to the father ; and whatever the son in j)otestate acquired was acquired for the father, although the son could not make his father's position worse, and the father was not liable for the debts and engagements of the son. But under the early emperors a change was made, and the son had complete ownership in property acquired in war {castre?ise peciilium); Con- stantine made a further exception of property acquired in employ- ments about the court (^quasl-castrense peculium) (^see Bk. ii. 9, and Introd. sec. 41); and Justinian only permitted the father to have the usufruct during his Hfe of everything coming to the son in any way except from the father himself. (^Bk. ii. 9.) The meaning ofjustce nuptice will appear in the next Title. Neither age nor marriage, nor anything except emancipation, terminated the power of a father over his son. As we learn from Tit. 12. 4, the Jiliusfamilias might rise to the highest public dignities, even that of consul, and yet he would remain in the power of his father. If a daughter married in manu, she passed from her father's power into that of her husband. 1, Nuptios autem sive matrimo- 1. Marriage, or matrimony, is a nium est viri et mulieris conjunctio, binding together of a man and woman individuam vitse consuetudinem con- to live in an indivisible union, tinens. D. xxiii. 2. 1. Nupii(B is properly the ceremonies attending the formation of the legal tie, and matrimonium is the tie itself; but the jurists use LIB. I. TIT. X. 29 the two terms quite indifferently, as, for instance, Moclestinus says, ' nupticB sunt conjunctio maris et femincB.^ (D. xxiii. 2. 1.) The individua vitce consuetudo implied a community of rank and position, and of sacred and human law, divini et humam juris communicatio (D. xxiii. 2. 1), but not necessarily of property. Marriage gave neither party any right oyer the property of the other, except w^hen the wife passed in manum, and then all that she had belonged to the husband. 2. The power which we have over our children is peculiar to the citizens of Rome ; for no other people have a power over their children, such as we have over ours. 2. Jus autem potestatis quod in liberos habemus, proprium est ci- vium Romanorum ; nulli enim alii sunt homines, qui talem in liberos habeant potestatem, qualem nos habemus. Gai. i. 55. Gains mentions the Galatae as being reported to have had a similar institution. 3. Qui igitur ex te et uxore tua nascitur, in tua potestate est. Item qui ex filio tuo et uxore ejus nas- citur, id est, nepos tuus et neptis, peque in tua sunt potestate, et pro- nepos et proneptis, et deinceps ce- teri. Qui tamen ex filia tua nascitur, in tua potestate non est, sed in patris ejus. 3. The child born to you and your wife is in your power. And so is the child born to your son of his wife, that is, your grandson or granddaugh- ter ; so are your great grandchildren, and all your other descendants. But a child born of your daughter is not in your power, but in the power of its own father. If a woman, although she was not in the power of her hus- band, had children, they were not in her power; and hence, as she could have no descendants in her power, it was said, mulier familicE suce et caput et finis est, i.e. her family ended with her- 'self (D. 1. 16. 195. 5.) Tit. X. DE NUPTIIS. Justas autem nuptias inter se ci- ves Romani contrahunt, qui secun- dum praecepta legum coeunt, mas- culi quidem puberes, femina3 autem viripotentes, sive patresfamilias sint sive filiifamilias : dum tamen, si filiifamilias sint, consensum ha- beant parentum quorum in potes- tate sunt. Nam hoc iieri debere et civilis et naturalis ratio suadet, in tantum ut jussum parentis pr?ece- dere debeat. Unde qusesitum est an furiosi filia nubere aut furiosi filius uxorem ducere possit ? Cumque super filio variabatur, nostra pro- cessit decisio, qua permissum est, ad exemplum filise furiosi, filium quoque posse et sine patris inter- ventu matrimonium sibi copulare, Roman citizens are bound together in lawful matrimony, when they are united according to law, the males having attained the age of puberty, and the females a marriageable age, whether they are fathers or sons of a family ; but, if the latter, they must first obtain the consent of their parents, in whose power they are. For both natural reason and the law require this consent ; so much so, indeed, that it ought to precede the marriage. Hence the question has arisen, whether the daughter of a madman could be mar- ried, or his son marry ? And as opinions were divided as to the son, we decided that as the daughter of a madman might, so may the son of a madman marry without the intervention of the 30 LIB. I. TIT. X. secundum datum ex nostra consti- father, according to the mode esta- tutione modum. blished by our constitution. C. V. 4. 25. In the earliest times of Roman law there were three modes of forming the tie of marriage ; first, confarreatio, a religious cere- mony, in which none but those to whom the jus sacrum was open could take part ; secondly, coemptio, a fictitious sale, in which the wife was sold to the husband; and lastly, usus, i.e. cohabita- tion with the intention of forming a marriage. All three modes had the same effect on the position of the wife. She always passed in manum viri. (See Introd. sec. 46.) This incident of marriage was attached to the marriage by mere cohabitation and lapse of time, on the analogy of the ownership which was acquired in a thing by uninterrupted possession. It was, however, open to the wife to * break the use ; ' to prevent, that is, her husband gaining complete power over her by lapse of time : the law of the Twelve Tables declared that, if the wife absented herself from her husband for three nights in the year, the usus should be interrupted, and she should remain in her own familia, and not pass into that of her husband. This was considered so much more advantageous to the wife that, even in the latter days of the republic, almost all marriages were formed without the wife passing into the manus of her husband. In the time of Justinian she never did so, and the whole distinction of the effect of different modes of marriage had been long obsolete. The nuptim were equally Jz^.s^^ whether the wife passed in manum or not. At no time did these different modes of beings married form part of the real tie of marriage ; they only decided, when the tie of marriage was formed, what should be the position of the wife. Neither were the religious ceremonies nor the nuptial rites any- thing more than accessories of that which created the binding rela- tion between the parties. The tie itself was constituted by the consent of the parties — by their intention to become man and wife — being expressed and manifested ; and the mode in which it was necessary the manifestation should take place was that the woman should pass into her husband's possession. A man and woman were not married because they lived together, unless they had the intention to be married. Nuptias non concubitus sed con- sensus facit. (D. XXXV. 1. 15.) Neither was the mere expression of a consent sufficient to constitute a marriage. There must be an actual or constructive passing of the woman into the posses- sion of the man. The ordinary sign of this was that she was re- ceived into the husband's house, in domum deduci\ but this was only the usual and most patent sign, and any other clear indica- tion was accepted. If, for example, the parties were both per- sonally present and formally consented, the woman was taken to have placed herself, or been ])laced if she were in manu, in the possession of the man (C. v. 17. 11), and the marriage tie was formed ; while, on the other hand, a marriage could not be effected LIB. I. TIT. X. 31 by a mere written consent between persons not present together, as by letter (D. xxiii. 2. 5), without the woman passing into the man's possession by some separate distinct act, such as being received into his house. In order that the marriao^e mio^ht have the effect of just(E nuptice, it was necessary that three conditions should be fulfilled. 1. There must be the consent of the parties duly manifested ; 2. The parties must be piiberes, i.e. the man must be fourteen and the woman twelve years of age ; and 3. They must have the connubium, or legal power of contracting marriage, which may be regarded under three heads: — 1. Under the old law both parties were required to be citizens, or to have had so much of citizenship given them as w^ould enable them to iorm. justcB nupticB. Various changes were made on this head, which will be noticed under sec- tion 11 of this Title. 2. They must not stand within the prohi- bited degrees of relationship ; what these were is discussed in the following paragraphs of this Title. 3. If under the power of any one, they must have obtained that person's consent. The hus- band was obliged, even though in his grandfather's power, to obtain his father's consent ; otherwise the grandfather could have eventually increased the number of the father's family without consulting him (D. i. 7. 7), which it was against the spirit of the law to allow, as no one could have a new suus heres forced on him by agnation against his will. (See Tit. 11. 7.) The same reason had caused the doubt adverted to in the text, whether, even if the father were incapable of giving his consent, the son could introduce new members into his father's family. This did not apply to the daughter, who could not intro- duce new members into her father's family. Justinian, in the Code, prescribed the mode in which marriage might be validly made either by the son or daughter of a madman. The son or daughter of the madman was to submit the proposed marriage to be approved, and the gift to the wife, or dowry, to be fixed, by the prcEfectus urbi at Constantinople, by the presses or bishop of the city in the provinces, in the presence of the curator of the madman and his principal relations. Marcus Aurelius had pre- viously provided for the case of children of imbecile persons, dementcs, (C. v. 4. 25.) Where the rights of the paterfamilias were not in question, as when the son was emancipated, it was not necessary to have the father's consent. (D. xxiii. 2. 25.) If the persons, whose consent was necessary, did not give it, the marriage was absolutely void, and therefore no subsequent consent could ratify it. Thus Justinian says here that the con- sent^jussus (a word denoting the authority of the paterfamilias) must precede the marriage. It was not, however, necessary that the consent should be expressly given. If the paterfamilias knew of the marriage and did not oppose it, his assent was presumed (C. V. 4. 5); and if he were absent or a captive for three years, his children might form a marriage which he could not afterwards 32 LIB. I. TIT. X. disapprove of. (D. xxiii. 2. 9. 10.) If both or either of the parties were impuheres at the time of the marriao^e, the marriage, thouoii then invalid, became valid by their living together with the intention of being married after puberty was attained. (D. xxiii. 2. 4. ) 1. Ergo non omnes nobis iixores ducere licet ; nam quaramclam nup- tiis abstinendum est. Inter eas enim personas qu£e parentum liberorum- ve locum inter se obtinent, contrahi nuptise non possiint : veluti inter patrem et filiam, vel avum et nep- tem, vel matrem et filium, vel aviam et nepotem, et usque ad infinitum ; et si tales personae inter se coierint, nefarias atque incestas nuptias con- traxisse dicuntur. Et lipec adeo ita sunt, ut quamvis per adoptionem parentum liberorumve loco sibi esse coeperint, non possint inter se matri- monio jungi, in tantum ut etiam dissoluta adoptione idem juris maneat. Itaque eam quse tibi per adoptionem filia vel neptis esse coeperit, non poteris uxorem ducere, quamvis eam emancipaveris. 1. We may not marry every woman without distinction ; for with some, marriage is forbidden. Marriage can- not be contracted between persons standing to each other in the relation of ascendant and descendant, as be- tween a father and daughter, a grand- father and his granddaughter, a mother and her son, a grandmother and her grandson ; and so on, ad infinitum. And., if such persons unite together, they only contract a criminal and in- cestuous marriage ; so much so, that ascendants and descendants, who are only so by adoption, cannot inter- marry; and even after the adoption is dissolved, the prohibition remains. You cannot, therefore, marry a woman who has been either your daughter or granddaughter by adoption, although you may have emancipated her. Gai. i. 58, 59. When two persons were related by being agnati to each other, tliey were exactly in the same relative position, so far as regarded the power of marrying, as if they had been related in the same degree by blood. If the tie of agnatio was dissolved by emanci- pation, the tie of blood, if any, would of course remain, and be a bar to marriage ; but if there were no tie of blood, that is, if one of the parties had entered the family by adoption, then, if the emancipated person had, while the agnatio subsisted, occupied the position of ascendant or descendant to the other person, mar- riage was forbidden, but if of a collateral, it was allowed. 2. Inter eas quoque personas quae ex trans verso gradu cognationis jun- guntur, est qusedam similis observa- tio, sed non tanta. Sane enim inter fratrem sororemque nuptic^e prohi- bitse sunt, sive ab eodem patre ea- demque matre nati fuerint, sive ex alterutro eorum ; sed si qua per adop- tionem soror tibi esse coeperit, quam- diu quidem constat adoptio, sane inter te et eam nuptiae consistere non possunt ; cum vero per emanci- pationem adoptio sit dissoluta, po- teris eam uxorem ducere. Sed et si tu emancipatus fueris, nihil est im- pedimento nuptiis. Et ideo constat, 2. There are also restrictions, though not so extensive, on marriage between collateral relations. A bro- ther and sister are forbidden to marry, whether they are the children of the same father and mother, or of one of the two only. And, if a woman be- comes your sister by adoption, so long as the adoption subsists, you certainly cannot marry ; but, if the adoption is destroyed by emancipation, you may marry her ; as you may also, if you yourself lu'e emancipated. Hence it follows, that if a man would adopt his son-in-law, he ought first to emancipate his daughter ; and if he v/ould adopt LIB. I. TIT. X. 33 si quis genenim adoptare velit, de- his daughter-in-law, he ought pre- bere eum ante filiam emancipare ; et viously to emancipate his son. si quis velit nurum adoptare, debere eum ante filium emancipare. Gai. i. 60, 61 ; D. xxiii. 2. 17. 1. To adopt a son-in-laAV would be to make him brother by agnation of his own wife. The bar did not invalidate the pre- vious marriage, but operated to restrain the adoption, until the daughter had been emancipated. 3. Fratris vero vel sororis filiam 3. A man may not marry the uxorem ducere non licet. Sed nee daughter of a brother, or a sister, nor neptem fratris vel sororis quis ux- the granddaughter, although she is in orem ducere potest, quamvis quarto the foiu'th degree. For when we may gradu sint ; cujus enim filiam ux- not marry the daughter of any person, orem ducere non licet, neque ejus neither may we marry the grand- neptem permittitur. Ejus vero mu- daughter. But there does not appear lieris quam pater tuus adoptavit, to be any impediment to marrying the filiam non videris impediri uxorem daughter of a woman whom your ducere, quia neque natiu-ali neque father has adopted ; for she is no rela- civili jure tibi conjungitur. tion to you, either by natural or civil law. Gai. i. 62 ; D. xxiii. 2. 12. 4. In the direct line every degree represents a generation. The son is in the first degree with respect to his father ; the grandson in the second with respect to his grandfather. In the collateral line the generations are taken first up to and then down from the common ancestors. For instance, first-cousins are in the fourth degree. From either cousin to his father is one degree, from the father to the grandfather is another, from the grandfather to the father of the other cousin is a third, and from that father to that cousin is a fourth. The marriaoje of an uncle with a niece had been legialised in favour of Claudius and Agrippina (Suet, in Claud. 26); but prohibited by Constantine. (Cod. Theod. i.) The children never followed the family of the mother, and therefore, though she was adopted, remained as they were be- fore. But of course a daughter could not have married an adopted son's son. 4. Duorum autem fratrum vel 4. The children of two brothers or sororum liberi, vel fratris et sororis, two sisters, or of a brother and sister, jungi possunt. may marry together. D. xxiii. 2. 3. The marriage of first-cousins, forbidden by preceding em- perors, had again been legalised by Arcadius and Honorius. (C. V. 4. 19.) 5. Item amitam, licet adoptivam, 5. So, too, a man may not marry ducere uxorem non licet ; item nee his paternal aunt, even though she be materteram, quia parentum loco so only by adoption ; nor his maternal habentur. Qua ratione verum est, aunt ; because they are regarded in D 34 LIB. I. TIT. X. magnam qiioque amitam et mater- the light of ascendants. For the same teram magnam prohiberi uxorem reason, no person may marry his great ducere. aunt, either paternal or maternal. Gai. i. 62 ; D. xxiii. 2. 17. 2. It was of course only possible to be in the same family with an adopted aunt on the father's side. A mother's sister by adop- tion would be in the family to which the mother belonged by birth, whereas the nephew would be in the family of the father, and therefore adoptivam is added to amitam only, not to mater- teram.. Every person in the first degree from a common ancestor was considered, so far as regarded marriage, in the position of that ancestor. Thus an aunt, being in the first degree from the grand- father, the common ancestor, was looked upon as standing in the place of that grandfather (jparentis loco liahetur), and could not therefore marry her nephew. A cousin would be in the second degree from the common ancestor, and therefore proximity would not be a bar to the union. 6. Adfinitatis quoque venera- tione qiiarumdam nuptiis absti- nendum est, nt ecce : privignam aut nurum iixorem ducere non licet, quia utreeque filise loco sunt. Quod ita scilicet accipi debet, si fuit nurus aut privigna tua : nam si adhuc nurus tua est, id est, si adhuc nupta est filio tuo, alia ratione uxorem eam ducere non possis, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest. Item si adhuc privigna tua est, id est, si mater ejus tibi nupta est, ideo eam uxorem ducere non poteris, quia duas uxores eodem tempore habere non licet. 6. There are, too, other marriages from which we must abstain, from regard to the ties created by marriage ; for example, a man may not marry his wife's daughter, or his son's wife, for they are both in the place of daughters to him ; and this must be understood to mean those who have been our step- daughters or daughters-in-law : for if a woman is still your daughter-in-law, that is, if she is still married to your son, you cannot marry her for another reason, as she cannot be the wife of two persons at once. And if your step- daughter is still your stepdaughter, that is, if her mother is still married to you, you cannot marry her, because a person cannot have two wives at the same time. Gai. i. 63. Affinitas is the tie created by marriage between each person of the married pair and the kindred of the other. 7. Socrum quoque et novercam prohibitum est uxorem ducere, quia matris loco sunt. Quod et ipsuni dissoluta demum adfinitate procedit ; alioquin, si adhuc noverca est, id est, si adhuc patri tuo nupta est, communi jure impeditur tibi nubere, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest. Item si adhuc socrus est, id est, si adhuc filia ejus tibi nupta est, ideo impediuntur nuptife, quia duas uxores habere non possis. 7. Again, a man is forbidden to marry his wife's mother, and his father's wife, because they hold the place of mothers to him ; a prohibition which can only operate when the affinity is dissolved ; for if your stepmother is still your stepmother, that is, if she is still married to your father, she would be prohibited from marrying you by the common rule of law, which forbids a woman to have two husbands at the same time. So if your wife's mother is still your wife's mother, that is, if LIB. I. TIT. X. 35 her daughter is still married to you, you cannot marry her, because you cannot have two wives at the same time. Gai. i. 63. The Institutes do not notice the marriage of a brother and sister-in-law. It was permitted up to the time of Constantine, who forbad it. (Cod. Theod. i. 2.) The prohibition was renewed bj Yalentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius. (C. v. 5. 5.)' 8. Mariti tamen filius ex alia 8. The son of a husband by a former uxore, et uxoris filia ex alio marito, wife, and the daughter of a wife by a vel contra, matrimonium recte con- former husband, or the daughter of a trahunt, licet habeant fratrem so- husband by a former wife, and the son roremve ex matrimonio postea con- of a wife by a former husband, may tracto natos. lawfully contract marriage, even though they have a brother or sister born of the second marriage. 9. Si uxor tua post divortium ex 9. The daughter of a divorced wife aho filiam procreaverit, hsec non est by a second husband, is not your step- quidem privigna tua, sed Julianus daughter ; and yet Julian says we hujusmodi nuptiis abstineri debere ought to abstain from such a marriage, ait : nam nee sponsam filii nurum For the betrothed wife of a son is not esse, nee patris sponsam novercam your daughter-in-law ; nor your be- esse, rectius tamen et jure facturos trothed wife your son's stepmother ; eos qui hujusmodi nuptiis abstinue- and yet it is more decent and more in rint. . accordance with law to abstain from such marriages. D. xxiii. 2. 12. 1, and foil. The sponsalia constituted in no Avay a binding tie. They were, as far as law went, mutual promises to contract a tie. Spon- salia sunt sponsio et repromissio nuptiarum futurarum. (D. xxiii. 1. 1.) All that was necessary was, that the parties, and their respective patresfamilias, should consent, and that the betrothed should have attained the age of seven years. Either party wish- ing to renounce the engagement, which by law was always per- missible, could do so by announcing the wish in these w^ords — conditione tua non utor. Hence it could only be custom founded on a respect for boni mores that prevented a father marrying his son's betrothed, or a son his father's. 10. lUud certum est, serviles 10. It is certain that the relation- quoque cognationes impedimento ship of slaves is an impediment to mar- nuptiis esse,, si forte pater et filia aut riage, even if the father and daughter, frater et soror manumissi fuerint. or brother and sister, as the case may be, have been enfranchised. D. xxiii. 2. 14. 2. The union of slaves, contuhernium, was not recognised in law as a marriage, but still the law did not permit natural ties to be violated in the case of slaves, any more than in the case of the issue of concubinage, or that of illicit commerce. (C. v. 4. 4.) Of course a manumission must have taken place, or there could be no question of nuptm ; but if slaves were freed, then, although D 2 36 LIB. I. TIT. X. competent to contract a marriage, they were bound by the ties of blood, and could not marry any one connected with them by close natural relationship. 1]. Sunt et alise personse quae 11. There are other j)ersons also, propter diversas rationes nuptias between whom marriage is prohibited contrahere prohibentiir, quas in libris for different reasons, which we have Digestorum sen Pandectamm ex permitted to be enumerated in the veteri jure collectarum enumerari books of the Digests or Pandects, jDermisimus. collected from the old law. D. xxiii. 2. 44, jDr. and 1. The reasons alluded to are not, like the preceding, founded on nearness of relationship or other tie, but on public or political grounds. The patres and plels could not intermarry till the lex Canuleia. Nor the freeborn and freedmen till the lex Julia and Papia Poppcea. (D. xxiii. 2. 23.) These laws prohibited the marriage of senators with liberti, but allowed that of other free- born, forbidding at the same time all freeborn to marry actresses or women of openly bad character. (D. xxiii. 2. 41.) Constan- tino extended the prohibition to marrying women of the lowest class, humiles ahjectcEve personcE. (C. v. 27. 1.) This was re- pealed by Justinian. (Nov. 117. 6.) The guardian could not marry his ward before she was twenty-six years of age, unless betrothed or given to him by her father. (D. xxiii. 2. %Q.) The governor of a province could not, while he held his office, marry a native of that province (D. xxiii. 2. 38. 57), lest he should abuse his authority. The ravisher could not marry the woman he vio- lated. (C. ix. 13. 2.) Nor the adulterer his accomplice. (Nov. 134.) Nor a Jew a Christian. (C. i. 9. 6.) While the distinction between Latini and cives remained in force, a citizen could not marry a Latina (excepting ^!v\\QreLatmitas carried with it the connuhiwn), nor could he marry a peregrina, without the permission of the emperor. But the unauthorised union of a citizen with a Latina or peregrina was recognised as matrimoiiium, though not as justm nuptice. The wife was termed in such a case injusta uxor. None of the rules of law as to patria potestas and dos applied to such a union, but the breach of the tie would be looked on as adultery. (D. xlviii. 5. 13. pr. 1.) 12. Si adversus ea quse diximus, 12. If persons unite themselves in aliqui coierint, nee vir, nee uxor, contravention of the rules thus laid nee nuptise, nee matrimonium, nee down, there is no husband or wife, no dos intelligitur. Itaque ii qui ex nuptials, no marriage, nor marriage 60 coitu nascuntur, in potestate portion, and the children born in such patris non sunt, sed tales sunt a connection are not in the power of (quantum ad patriam potestatem the father. For, with regard to the pertinet) quales sunt ii quos mater power of a father, they are in the vulgo concepit : nam nee hi patrem position of children conceived in j)ro- habere intelliguntur, cum his etiam stitution, who are looked upon as having pater incertus est. XJnde solent no father, because it is uncertain who spurii appellari, vel a Grseca voce he is ; and are therefore called spurii, quasi cTropddrjv concepti ; vel quasi either from a Greek word airopddrjv, LIB. I. TIT. X. 37 siiie patre fiUi. Seqiiitur ergo, ut meaning ' at hazard,' or as being sine dissoluto tali coitii nee dotis ex- patre, without a father. On the disso- actioni locus sit. Qui autem pro- lution of such a connection there can hibitas nuptias contrahunt, et alias be no claim made for the demand of a po3nas patiuntur, quae sacris con- marriage portion. Persons who con- stitutionibus continentur. tract prohibited marriages are liable also to further penalties set forth in our imperial constitutions. Gai. i. 64 ; D. i. 5. 23 ; D. xxiii. 2. 52. Under the head of stuprum the Komans included every union of the sexes forbidden by morality. Different punishments awaited the guilty according to the degree of crime implied in the union. (Cod. v. 5. 4.) But the law recognised and regulated in concubinage {concuhinatus) a permanent cohabitation, though ■vvithout the sanction of marriage, between parties to whose mar- riage there was no legal obstacle. In every case where such an obstacle existed, unless the obstacle was one merely founded on public policy^ such as that of being governor of a province, who was not permitted to marry a native of that province, the law inflicted a punishment on parties cohabiting in defiance of law. The chief incident of the Koman concuhinatus^ which was so far restricted that a man could not have two concubines at once, or a wife and a concubine, was, that the children could be legitimatised, and so placed on a footing with the offspring of a legal marriage. Between the formation of such a union, and the contracting: a legal marriage, there seems to have been no diflPerence except what rested in the intention of the parties. If two persons lived together, it was the intention with which they did so which decided whether the union was concubinasce or marriao;e. Concu- hinam ex sola animi destinatione (Bstimari oportet. (D. xxv. 7. 4.) If there was no affectio maritalis, no intention to treat the woman as a wife, she was not a wife. Of course, practically, the question of consent was seldom, if ever^ left doubtful. Generally speaking, an instrument fixing the amount settled respectively by the busband and wife, was drawn up, and the consent was publicly ^iven in the presence of friends. And as concubinage was a dis- honourable state, the presumption in favour of marriage, when the woman was of honest parentage, and of good character, was v^ery strong. To the union of concubinage none of the incidents 3f marriage attached. No dowry could be asked for, no settle- ment was made by the man: the children were not in the power of the father. But the connection was separated from that of a temporary intercourse by no man being allowed to have two con- cubines, or a wife and a concubine at the same time, and by the power which was given to legitimatise the children, and place bhem in the position of the offspring of a legal marriage. (See aext paragraph.) In a legal marriage, without convejitio in manum, the marriage portion of the wife {dos) belonged to the husband during the continuance of the marriage. In early times his power over the 38 LIB. I. TIT. X. dos was unrestricted, but afterwards successive limitations of this power were introduced. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 7. 3 ; Tit. 8. introd. paragr.) The settlement on the wife by the husband (^donatio propter nuptias) belonged, during the marriage, to the wife, but was managed by the husband. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 7. 3.) When the marriage was dissolved, which it might be by death, loss of liberty, captivity, or divorce (D. xxiv. 2. 1), the dos was returned to the wife or her father. Divorce was always permitted if either party ceased to wish to preserve the tie of marriage, which was only looked on as a contract resting on mutual consent. But, unless both parties consented to a divorce, heavy penalties were attached to its being insisted on by one alone {repudmm\ unless any of the grounds for divorce established by law, such as adultery or criminal conduct (Cod. v. 17. 8), could be shown to exist; and the fact of repudiation had to be established by the presence of seven citizens as witnesses, and a libelliis repudii. After the divorce either party might, after a fixed interval, marry again. 13. Aliquando autem evenit iit 13. It sometimes happens, that liberi qui, statim ut nati sunt, in children who at their birth were not in potestate parentum non fiant, postea the power of their father, are brought autem redigantur in potestatem under it afterwards. Such is the case parentum. Qualis est is qui, dum of a natural son, who is given to the naturalis fuerat, postea curiae datus curia, and then becomes subject to his potestati patris subjicitur : nee non father's power. Again, a child born of is qui a muliere libera x^rocreatus, a free woman, with whom marriage cujus matrimonium minime legi- was not prohibited by any law, but bus interdictum fuerat, sed ad with whom the father only cohabited, quam pater consuetudinem habu- will likewise become subject to the erat, postea ex nostra constitutione power of his father if at any time after- dotalibus instrumentis compositis in wards instruments of dowry are drawn potestate patris efficitur. Quod si up according to the provisions of our alii liberi ex eodem matrimonio constitution. And this constitution fuerint procreati, similiter nostra confers the same benefits on any constitutio prsebuit. children who may be subsequently born of the same marriage. Gai. i. 65 ; C. v. 27. 10. By legitimation the offspring of concubinage were placed in the position of liberi legitimi, and this was effected in three ways : 1. By oblation to the curia-, 2. By the subsequent marriage of the parents ; and 3. By a rescript of the emperor, a mode intro- duced by Justinian in the 74th Novel. The curia was the class from which, in provincial towns, the magistrates were eligible. To be a member was a distinction, but an onerous one, from the expenses and burdens attached to the position. In order to prevent the order decaying through unwillingness to incur the expenses attending it, Theodosius and Yalentinian permitted citizens, whether themselves members of the curia or not, to present their children born in concubinage to, and make them members of, the order (Cod, v. 27. 3), by which they became legitimate, and the heirs of their father. This mode of legiti- mation, which could, of course, only be adopted when the parents LIB. I. TIT. XI. 39 were rich, did not, however, make the children complete members of the father's family. They became his legitimate children, but gained no new relationship or right of succession to any other member of his family. (C. v. 27. 9.) Constantine first established that natural children should be made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The law required that at the moment of conception the parents should have been capable of a legal marriage ; that an instrument settling the dowry [instrumentum dotale\ or, at least, attesting the marriage (instrumentum nuptiale), should be drawn up, and that the children should ratify the legitimation, for no one was made legitimate against his will. (Nov. 89. 11.) If the mother Avere dead or had disappeared, and the marriage was thus impossible, the emperor would by a rescript allow the natural children (if there was no legitimate one) to be placed in the position they would have held if the marriage had taken place, as he would also if a father by his testament expressed his wish to that effect. Tit. XI. DE ADOPTIONIBUS. Non solum autem natnrales li- Not only are our natural cliildren, beri, secundum ea qupe diximus, in as we have said, in our power, but potestate nostra sunt, verum etiam those also whom we adopt, ii quos adoptamus. ■ Gai. i. 97. Before the time of Justinian, the effect of adoption (see Introd. sec. 42) was to place the person adopted exactly in the position he Avould have held had he been born a son of the person adopting him. All the property of the adoptive son belonged to his adop- tive father. The adoptive son Avas heir to his adoptive father, if intestate, bore his name (retaining, however, the name of his own gens with the change of -us into -anus, as Octavius, Octavianus), and shared the sacred rites of the family he entered. Natnrales liberi is here opposed to adoptivi, not, as in the last Title, to legitimi, 1. Adoptio autem duobus modis 1. Adoption takes place in two fit, aut principali rescripto, aut im- ways, either by imperial rescript, or perio magistratus. Imperatoris auc- by the authority of the magistrate. toritate adoptare quis potest eos The imperial rescript gives power to easve qui quseve sui juris sunt : adopt i)ersons of either sex who are qure species adoptionis dicitur ad- sui juris ; and this species of adoption rogatio. Imperio magistratus adop- is called arrogation. By the authority tare licet eos easve qui quseve in of the magistrate we adopt persons potestate parentum sunt, sive pri- in the power of an ascendant, whether mum gradum liberorum obtineant, in the first degree, as sons and daugh- qualis fllius, fili^,, sive inferiorem, ters, or in an inferior degree, as grand- qualis est nepos neptis, i)ronepos children or great-grandchildren. proneptis. Gai. X. 98, 99. 40 LIB. I. TIT. XL A public character was always attached in ancient Koman law to so important an alteration in families as adoption. (See Introd. sec. 42.) The sanction of the curice was probably necessary to its validity, when the family of a member of the curicB was affected. If the person adopted was sui juris, his entry into a new family (arrogatio) was jealously watched, as the jjontifices would never allow it where there was any likelihood of the sacred rites of the family he quitted becoming extinct by his departure from it. The form of gaining the consent of the curice was even continued when the curice were only represented by thirty lictors, until the rescript of the emperor was substituted as a means of effecting arrogations. What were the forms of arrogation, when neither the person arrogated nor the person arrogating belonged to the body of the curicE, we have no certain knowledge ; but we may guess arro- gation was effected by a fictitious suit, in which the person arro- gated was claimed as the child of the arrogator, and let judgment go by default. If the person adopted were under the power of another, the person under whose power he was had to release him from that j^ower, Avhich he did by selling him (^maiicipatio) three several times, which destroyed his own patria potestas (see Introd. sec. 42), and then giving him up to the adopting parent by a fictitious process of law, called ' injure ceasio,^ in which he was claimed and acknowledged as the child of the person who adopted him, and pronounced to be so by the magistrate before whom the proceeding was held {imperio magistratus). The word adojjtio was common to both jorocesses, both to arrogatio, said by Gains to be derived from rogo, because the person arrogated was asked before the curice whether he consented (Gai. i. 99), and to adoptio in its more limited sense of the adoption of a person not sui juris. For the ceremonies previously required for the adoption of a j^erson alieni juris, Justinian substituted the simple proceeding of executing, in presence of a magistrate, a deed, declaring the fact of the adoption — the parties to the adoption, that is, the person giving, the person given, and the person receiving, being personally present to give their consent. But it was sufficient if the consent of the party adopted were expressed by his not declaring his dissent — non contradicente. (C. viii. 48. 11. Tit. 12. 10.) 2. Sed hodie, ex nostra consti- 2. But now, by our constitution, tutione, cum filiusfamilias a patre when a filiusfamilias is given in adop- naturali extranese person?e in adop- tion by his natural father to a stranger, tionem datur, jura potestatis patris the power of the natural father is not naturalis minime dissolvuntur, nee dissolved ; no right passes to the adop- quicquam ad patrem adoptivum tive father, nor is the adopted son in transit, nee in potestate ejus est, his power, although we allow such son licet ab intestato jura successionis the right of succession to his adoptive ei a nobis tributa sint. Si vero father dying intestate. But if a natu- pater naturalis non extraneo, sed ral father should give his son in adop- avo filii sui materno, vel si ipse tion, not to a stranger, but to the son's LIB. I. TIT. XI. 41 pater naturalis fuerit emancipatus, maternal grandfather ; or, supposing etiani avo paterno vel proavo simili the natural father has been emanci- niodo paterno vel materno filium i)ated, if he gives the son in adoption suum dederit in adoptionem : in hoc to the son's paternal grandfather, or casu, quia concurrent in unani per- to the son's paternal or maternal great- sonam et naturalia et adoptionis grandfather, in this case, as the rights jura, manet stabile jus patris adop- of nature and adoption concur in the tivi, et naturali vinculo copulatum, same person, the power of the adop- et legitimo adoptionis nodo constric- tive father, knit by natural ties and turn, ut et in familia et in potestate strengthened by the legal bond of hujusmodi patris adoptivi sit. adoption, is preserved undiminished, so that the adopted son is not only in the family, but in the power, of his adoptive father. C. viii. 48. 10. The change made by Justinian in the law of adoption (C viii. 48. 10) completely altered its character. It used sometimes to happen under the old law, that a son lost the succession to his own father by being adopted, and to his adoptive father by a subsequent emancipation. Justinian Avished to remedy this effec- tually. He therefore provided that the son given in adoption to a stranger, that is, any one not an ascendant, should be in the same position to his own father as before, but gain by adoption the succession to his adoptive father, if the adoptive father died intestate. The adoptive father was not, however, bound, like the natural father (Bk. ii. Tit. 18), to leave him a share of his property, if he made a will. In this kind of adoption, which commentators have termed the adoptio minus plena, the adoptive son still remained in the family of his natural father ; and the only change which adoption caused, was, that he acquired a right of succession to his adoptive father, if intestate. (Bk. ili. Tit. 1. 14.) When the person to whom the adoptive son was given, was one of his own ascendants, then the old law was permitted to regulate the effects of the adoption, and the adoption in this case was what the commentators term adoptio plena. The adoptive son entered the family of the ascendant, who became his adoptive father. A grandson was not naturally in the same family with his maternal grandfather, and could only enter the family of his maternal grandfather by being adopted. If he had been born after his father had been emancipated, he would not be in the same family with his paternal grandfather, who might therefore kvish to adopt him. It was even possible that he might be adopted by his own father ; for if born before his father was emancipated, lis grandfather might have emancipated his father without eman- iipating him, and then might afterwards have given him in idoption to his father. 3. Cum autem impubes per prin- 3. When any one, under the age of iipale rescriptum adrogatur, causa puberty, is arrogated by the imperial lognita adrogatio permittitur, et rescript, the arrogation is only allowed ixquiritur causa adrogationis an Avhen inquiry has been made into the lonesta sit expediatque pupillo, et circumstances of the case. It is asked, 42 LIB. I. TIT. XI. cum quibusdam conditionibus ad- rogatio fit : id est, ut caveat adro- gator personse publico, hoc est tabiilario, si intra pubertatem pti- pilhis decesserit, restitutnrum se bona illis qui, si adoptio facta non esset, ad siiccessionem ejus venturi essent. Item non alias emancipare eum potest adrogator, nisi causa cognita dignus emancipatione fuerit, et tunc sua bona ei reddat. Sed etsi decedens pater eum exhereda- verit, vel vivus sine justa causa eum emancipaverit, jubetur quartam par- tem ei bonorum suorum relinquere, videlicet prseter bona qu?e ad patrem adoptivum transtulit et quorum com- modum ei postea adquisivit. what is the motive leading to the arro- gation, and whether the arrogation is honourable and expedient for the pupil. And the arrogation is always made under certain conditions ; the arrogator is obliged to give security before a public person, that is, before a notary, that if the pupil should die within the age of puberty, he will restore all the jDroperty to those who would have succeeded him if no adop- tion had been made. Nor, again, can the arrogator emancipate the person arrogated, unless, on examination into the case, it appears that the latter is worthy of emancipation ; and, even then, the arrogator must restore the property belonging to the person he emancipates. Also, even if the arroga- tor, on his death-bed, has disinherited his arrogated son, or, during his life, has emancipated him without just cause, he is obliged to leave him the fourth part of all his goods, besides what the son brought to him at the time of arrogation, or acquired for him afterwards. Gal i. 102 ; D. i. 7. 18 ; D. xxxviii. 5. 13. Neither women nor children under the age of puberty could be arrogated. Arrogation was first permitted in the case of the latter by Antoninus Pius (Ulp. Reg. viii. 5; D. i. 7. 21), but only after strict inquiry had been made into the circumstances of the case. Besides the general inquiry which took place in evety case of adoption, as to the ages of the parties, and the possible injustice to other members of the family, which the introduction of a new member might give rise to, in this case inquiry was made whether the character and circumstances of the proposed arrogator were such, as to make it probable that the arrogation would be beneficial to the person arrogated. Further, certain regulations were made, designed to protect the property of the imjnihes, which were briefly as follows: — 1. If the arrogated son died before puberty, the arrogator had to restore the property of the son to that son's natural heirs. 2. If the arrog-ated son was disinherited or was emancipated without good reason before pu- berty, the arrogated son received back all his own property, and also received one-fourth of the property of the arrogator, called the quarta D. Pii, or quarta Ant.nina, as having been first required by that emperor. 3. If the son were emancipated before puberty for a good reason, the son received his own property from the arrogator, but nothing more. 4. Lastly, if the arrogated son, on attaining puberty, wished to rescind the arrogation, he was at liberty to do so, if he could show it was prejudicial to him. Under Justinian arrogated persons and persons adopted by ascendants were treated as cognati in the succession to the natural LIB. I. TIT. XI. 43 father (Bk. iii. 6. 3) ; and, in the intestate succession to the arro- gated son, the arrogator was postponed to the children and brothers and sisters of the arrogated son (Bk. iii. 10. 2), and the arrogator had only the usufruct of the property of the arrogated son while the arrogated son was living. There is some little doubt when arrogation was first made 'per rescriptum principis. However, Ulpian {Reg, viii. 5) expresses himself too plainly to admit of a doubt that in his time arroga- tion was made per popidum (i.e. by the curies represented by lictors), and not by imperial licence. He further adds, that arro- gation was only made at Rome {JReg. viii. 4), and, of course, when the system of permitting it by imperial rescript was adopted, place could have nothing to do with arrogation. The tahularii here spoken of were public notaries, who kept public registers {tabulce), on which formal acts were recorded. 4. Minorem natu majorem non 4. A younger person cannot adopt posse adoptare placet. Adoptio enim an older ; for adoption imitates na- naturam imitatur, et pro monstro ture ; and it seems unnatural, that a est ut major sit filius quam pater, son should be older than his father. Debet itaque is qui sibi filium per Any one, therefore, who wishes either adoptionem vel adrogationem facit, to adopt or arrogate a son should be plena pubertate, id est, decem et the elder by the term of complete octo annis praecedere. puberty, that is, by eighteen years. D. i. 7. 15. 3 ; D. i. 7. IG ; D. i. 7. 40. 1. As long as the required number of years intervened, there was no further positive rule as to age ; but it being in the discre- tion of the emperor to allow ado2:)tion or not, there was generally a disposition to refuse it unless the person who wished to adopt was of such an age as to make it improbable he should have children of his own. (D. i. 7. 15.) The legal age of puberty in males was fourteen ; but eighteen was the age at which the body was considered to be fully deve- loped in all cases, plena puhertas. 5. Licet autem et in locum ne- 5. A person may adopt another as potis vel pronepotis, vel in locum grandson or granddaughter, great- neptis "vel proneptis, vel deinceps grandson or great-granddaughter, or adoptare, quamvis filium quis non any other descendant, although he has habeat. no son. It would have seemed, without express enactment, that a person, to have a grandson in his power, must have or have had a son, as the sons of his daughter Avould not be in his power. But, as we know, the maternal grandfather might adopt. ; With re- spect to the degrees of marriage, it sometimes made an important difference whether a person was adopted as a son or grandson. The natural (i. e. non-adoptive) granddaughter, for instance, of the person adopting would be cousin or niece of the person adopted, according as he was adopted as a grandson or son, and might marry him in the one case, and not in the other. 6. Et tarn filium alienum quis 6. A man may adopt the son of in locum nepotis adoptare potest, another as his grandson, and the quam nepotem in locum filii. grandson of another as his son. 44 LIB. I. TIT. XI. 7. Sed si quis nepotis loco adop- 7. If a man adojDts a grandson to tet, vel quasi ex eo filio quern liabet be the son of a son already adopted, jam adoptatum, vel quasi ex illo or of a natural son in his power, the quern naturalem in sua potestate consent of this son ought first to be habet, in eo casu et filius consen- obtained, that he may not have a tire debet, ne ei invito suus heres s^tns heres given him against his will, adgnascatur. Sed ex contrario, si But, on the contrary, if a grandfather aviis ex filio nepotem det in ad- gives his grandson by a son in adop- optionem, non est necesse filium tion, the consent of the son is not consentire. necessary. D. i. 7. 6. 10, 11 ; D. xxiii. 1. 16. 1. A grandson could be adopted either generally, when he was supposed to be the issue of a deceased son, and so was sui juris at the death of the grandfather ; or, specially as the son of a parti- cular son, in which case he came under that son's power when the grandfather died. The grandfather could at his pleasure dimi- nish, but could not add to the number of his son's family : because otherwise the son would have had a suus heres (see Introd. sec. 77) forced on him against his will, to take a share of his pro- perty. 8. In plurimis autem causis ad- 8. He who is either adopted or ar- similatur is qui adoptatus vel adro- rogated is assimilated, in many points, gatus est ei qui ex legitimo matri- to a son born in lawful matrimony ; monio natus est. Et ideo si quis per and therefore, if any one adopts a per- imperatorem, sive apud pr?etorem, son who is not a stranger by imperial vel apud prsesidem provincise non rescript, or before the praetor, or the extraneum adoptaverit, potest eum- prxses of a province, he can afterwards dem alii in adoptionem dare. give in adoption to another the person whom he has adopjted. Gai. i. 105. The text says that the adoptive son is assimilated to the na- tural in plurimis causis, and not altogether; because, among other differences, if the adoptive son left his adoptive family, he ceased to have any relationship whatever to its members ; but the natural son was always cognatus to his own blood relations, although, by emancipation or adoption, he might cease to be agnatus to them. Of course, under Justinian's legislation, the adoptive father, if a stranger, had no patria potestas at all, and therefore could not exercise such a power as that of giving his adoptive son in adoption to another person. When once the tie of adoption w^as dissolved, all the relations created by it were entirely at an end, except that marriage was forbidden between the person adopting and the person adopted. (See Tit. 10. 1.) In omni fere jure, finita patris adoptivi potes- tate, nullum ex pristino retinetur vestigium, (D. i. 7. 13.) But the tie could never again be renewed between the same persons. (D. i. 7. 37. 1.) 9. Sed et illud utriusque adop- 9. It is a rule common to both tionis commune est, quod et ii qui kinds of adoption, that persons, al- LIB. I. TIT. XI. ' 45 renerare non possunt, quales sunt though incapable of procreating, as, j'padones, adoptare possunt ; castrati for instance, impotent persons, may, lutem non possunt. hut those who are castrated, cannot, adopt. Gai. i. 103. The distinction was drawn because it was considered as never perfectly certain that the former {spadones) would not at some time or other have children of their own. 10. Feminse quoque adoptare 10. Women, also, cannot adopt ; Qon possunt, quia nee naturales li- for they have not even their own chil- beros in sua potestate habent. Sed dren in their power ; but, by the in- sx indulgentia principis ad solatium diligence of the emperor, as a comfort liberorum amissorum adoptare pos- for the loss of their own children, they sunt. are allowed to adopt. Gai. i. 104 ; C. viii. 48. 5. Women could not adopt, because the meaning of adoption was that the person adopted passed into the patria potestas of the person adopting. The adoption mentioned in the text (which was permitted by a constitution of Diocletian and Maximian, C. viii. 48. 5), only placed the adopted children in the same relation, to the woman as her own children would have held. She gained, nothing like patria potestas over them. 11. lUud proprium est adoptionis 11. Adoption by the rescript of the illjus quae per sacrum oraculum fit, emperor has this peculiarity. If a per- quod is qui liberos in potestate son, having children under his power, habet, si se adrogandum dederit, should give himself in arrogation, not non solum ipse potestati adroga- only does he submit himself to the toris subjicitur, sed etiam liberi power of the arrogator, but his chil- ejus in ejusdem fiunt potestate, dren are also in the arrogator's power, tamquam nepotes. Sic enim et being considered his grandchildren, divus Augustus non ante Tiberium It was for this reason that Augustus adoptavit, quam is Germanicum did not adopt Tiberius until Tiberius adoptavit, ut protinus adoptione had adopted Germanicus ; so that facta incipiat Germanicus Augusti directly the adoption was made, Ger- nepos esse. manicus became the grandson of Augustus. Gai. i. 107. This is said to be an incident of arrogation only, because when a person not sui juris was adopted, his children were not in his power, and so he could not transfer them to the power of his adoptive father; into which they only came after the death of the person in whose power their own natural father was. All the property of the person arrogated became, before Justinian's time, the property of the arrogator. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 10.) The adoptive son, as he was previously in the power of his natural father, had no property to pass. 12. Apud Catonem bene scrip- 12. Cato, as we learn from the turn refert antiquitas, servos, si a ancients, has with good reason writ- domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso ten, that slaves, when adopted by posse liberari. Unde et nos eruditi their masters, are thereby made free. 46 LIB. I. TIT. XII. in nostra constitutione, etiam eum serviim quern dominus actis inter- venientibus filium suiim nomina- verit, liberum esse constituimus, licet hoc ad jus filii accipiendum non sufficiat. In accordance with which opinion, we have decided by one of our constitu- tions, that a slave to whom his master by a solemn deed gives the title of son is thereby made free, although he does not acquire thereby the rights of a son. C. vii. 6. 10. It is doubtful whether slaves could be adopted, so as to be- come members of the family of the person adopting them. Aulus Gellius (Noct. Attic, v. 9) says that the majority of the ancient jurists, including Sabinus, held that they could. Theophilus says Cato was of the contrary opinion. They certainly became freed- men, and never ingenui by adoption ; even a freedman never be- came ingenuus by adoption (D. i. 7. 26), and he could only be adopted by his j)atron (D. i. 7. 15), and on a good ground, such as the patron having no children. (C. viii. 48.) Tit. XII. QUIBUS MODIS JUS POTESTATIS SOLYITUR. Videamus nunc quibus modis ii qui alieno juri sunt subjecti, eo jure liberantur. Et quidem servi quem- admodum potestate liberantur, ex iis intelligere possumus qiise de servis manumittendis superius exposuimus. Hi vero qui in potestate parentis sunt, mortuo eo sui juris fiunt ; sed hoc distinctionem recipit. Nam mor- tuo patre, sane omnimodo filii fili?eve sui juris efficiuntur ; mortuo vero avo, non omnimodo nepotes neptes- que sui juris fiunt, sed ita si post mortem avi in potestatem patris sui recasuri non sunt. Itaque, si mori- ente avo pater eorum vivit et in potestate patris sui est, tunc post obitum avi in potestate patris sui fiunt. Si vero is quo tempore avus moritur, aut etiam mortuus est aut exiit de potestate patris, tunc ii, quia in potestatem ejus cadere non j)ossunt, sui juris fiunt. Let us now inquire into the dif- ferent ways in which persons in the power of others are freed from it. How slaves are freed from the power of their masters may be learnt from what we have already said with regard to manumission. Those who are in the power of a j)arent become indepen- dent at his death ; a rule, however, which admits of a distinction. For when a father dies, his sons and daughters become undoubtedly inde- pendent ; but when a grandfather dies, his grandchildren do not necessarilj'- become independent, but only if on the grandfather's death they do not fall under the power of their father. Therefore, if their father is alive at the death of their grandfather, and was in his power, then, on the grand- father's death, they become subject to the power of their father. But, if at the time of the grandfather's death their father is either dead, or has al- ready passed out of the grandfather's power by emancipation, as they do not fall under the x^ower of their father, they become independent. Gal i. 124. 126, 127. The modes in which the patria potestas was ended were — 1. The death of the parent; 2. The parent or son suffering loss of freedom or of citizenship ; 3. The son attaining certain dignities; 4. Emancipation. All these modes are treated of in this Title. LIB. I. TIT. XII. 47 1. Cum aiitem is qui ob aUquocl 1. If a man, convicted of some maleficium in insulam deportatur, crime, is deported to an island, he civitatem amittit, sequitur ut, qui loses the rights of a Roman citizen ; eo modo ex numero civium Roma- whence it follows, that the children norum toUitur, perinde ac eo mor- of a person thus banished cease to be tuo desinant liberi in potestate ejus under his power, exactly as if he were esse. Pari ratione, et si is qui in dead. Equally, if a son is deported, potestate parentis sit, in insulam does he cease to be under the power of deportatus fuerit, desinit in potes- his father. But, if by the favour of tate parentis esse. Sed si ex indul- the emperor any one is restored, he gentia principal! restituti fuerint, per regains his former position in every omnia pristinum statum recipiunt. respect. Gai. i. 128. The i^atria jiotestas belonging exclusively to citizens, and being necessarily exercised over citizens, when a parent or son lost the rights of citizenship, or, as it was termed, underwent a media capitis chminutio (see Tit. 16. 2), the patria potestas was necessarily at an end. (Ulp. Reg. x. 3.) The punishment of deportatio in insulam consisted in the condemned being confined within certain local bounds, whether really those of an island, or of some prescribed space of the mainland, and being considered as civilly dead, deportatus pro mortuo liahctur (D. xxxvii. 4. 10. 8), and looked on as peregrinus, not as a civis. (Ulp. Reg. x. 3.) It the condemned was recalled, and by the pardon of the emperor all the effects of his punishment were done away, he was said to be restitutus in integrum : he then resumed all his civil rights, and was placed as exactly as possible in the position which he would have held, had he never been deportatus. (Cod. ix. 51. 1.) Many texts, instead of reading in this section restituti fuerint, per omnia . . . recipiunt, read restituti fuerint per omnia, making restitutio per omnia equivalent to restitutio in integrum. The reading adopted in the text supposes that a restitutio in in- tegrum is spoken of in the word restituti. 2. Relegati autem patres in in- 2. A father who is merely banished sulam in potestate sua liberos reti- by relegation, still retains his children nent. Et ex contrario liberi relegati in his power ; and a child who is re- in potestate parentum remanent. legated still remains in the power of his father. D. xlviii. 22. 4. The relegatus was merely forbidden to leave a certain spot, and his civil status was in no way altered. (See Ovid, Trist. V. 11.) 3. Poenae servus effectus filios 3. When a man becomes a ^ slave in potestate habere desinit. Servi of punishment ' he ceases to have his autem pcense efficiuntur, qui in sons in his jpower. Persons become metallimi damnantur, et qui bestiis ^ slaves of punishment ' who are con- subjiciuntur. demned to the mines, or exposed to wild beasts. D. xlviii. 19. 17. 19. A slave had no legal power over his children ; in whatever way, therefore, a father became a slave, he lost his power over 48 LIB. I. TIT. XII. Ills cliildreii. When a person was sentenced to work in the mines, or to contend with wild beasts in the arena, punishments only inflicted for very great crimes, he became, by the mere operation of his sentence, a slave. But as there was no master whose slave he could be considered, it was said that he became the slave of the punislnnent i^servus 'pmncB). 4. Filiusfamilias, si militaverit vel si senator vel consul fiierit factus, manet in potestate patris ; militia enim vel consiilaris dignitas potestate patris filium non liberat. Sed ex constitutione nostra, summa patriciatus dignitas, illico imperiali- bns codicillis prsestitis, filium a patria potestate liberat. Quis enini patiatur, patrem quidem posse per emancipationis niodum su?e potes- tatis nexibus filium relaxare, im- peratoriam autem celsitudinem non valere eum quern sibi patrem elegit, ab aliena eximere potestate ? 4. A son, though he becomes a soldier, a senator, or a consul, still remains in the power of his father, from which neither military service nor consular dignity can free him. But by our constitution the supreme dignity of the patriciate frees the son from the power of his father imme- diately on the grant of the imperial patent. It is obviously absurd that a parent could emancipate his son from the tie of his power, and that the majesty of the emperor should not be able to release from the power of another, one whom he had chosen to be a father of the state. D. i. 7. 3; C. xii. 3. 5. Under the old Koman law no child was released from a father's power, by having any dignity or office, except that of ^ jiamen dialis, or a vestal virgin. Persons holding either of these offices, without undergoing any capitis deminutio, or ceasing to be mem- bers of their father's family, became sui juris. Justinian con- ferred the privilege on those enjoying the dignity of the patriciate, and at a later period of his legislation enlarged the number of dignities to which this incident was attached ; and the child was freed from the power of his father by being made a bishop, a consul, qujestor of the palace, proetorian prefect, or master of infantry or cavalry ; and, in general, all those whose dignity exempted them from the burdens of the curia were freed from the power of their father. (Nov. 31 ; C. x. 31. QtQ.) When under Justinian^s legislation a child was released by attaining a dignity, he still, as in the older law, remained a member of his father's family, and enjoyed all his rights of succession and agnation. (Nov. 81. 2.) Constantine changed the meaning of patricius, by making it a title of the highest honour conferred on persons who enjoyed the chief place in the emperor's esteem. The power of making -patricii was, in general, used very sparingly by the emperors, and hence the title became an object of ambition even to foreign princes. 5. Si ab hostibus captus fuerit parens, quamvis hostium fiat, tamen pendet jus liberorum propter jus postliminii ; quia hi qui ab hostibus capti sunt, si reversi fuerint, omnia 5. If a parent is taken prisoner, although he becomes the slave of the enemy, yet his paternal power is only suspended, owing to the jits postli- 7ninii ; for captives, when they return, LIB. I. TIT. XII. 49 pristina jura recipiunt. Idcirco reversus etiam liberos habebit in potestate ; quia postliminium fingit eum qui captus est, semper in civi- tate fuisse. Si vero ibi decesserit, exinde ex quo captus est pater, filius sui juris fuisse videtur. Ipse quoque filius neposve si a.b liosti- bus captus fuerit, similiter dicimus propter jus postliminii, jus quoque potestatis parentis in suspenso esse. Dictum est autem postliminium a LIMINE et POST. Unde eum qui ab hostibus captus in fines nostros postea pervenit, postliminio rever- sum recte dicimus ; nam limina sicut in domibus finem quemdam faciunt, sic et imperii finem limen esse veteres voluerunt. Hinc et limes dictus est, quasi finis quidam et terminus ; ab eo postliminium dic- tum, quia eodem limine reverte- batur, quo amissus fuerat, Sed et qui captus victis hostibus recupera- tur, postliminio rediisse existimatur. are restored to all their former rights. Thus, on his return, the father will have his children in his power : for the postlwiinium supposes that the captive has never been absent. If, however, a prisoner dies in captivity, the son is considered to have been independent from the time when his father was taken prisoner. So, too, if a son, or grandson, is taken pri- soner, the power of the parent, by- means of the jus postliminii, is only in suspense. The term postlimi7iium is derived from post and limen. We therefore say of a person taken by the enemy, and then returning into our territory, that he is come back by postliminium. For, just as the threshold forms the boundary of a house, so the ancients have termed the boundary of the empire a thres- hold. Wlience limes, also, is derived, and is used to signify a boundary and limit. Thence comes the word postli- minium, because the prisoner returned to the same limits whence he had been lost. The prisoner, also, who is re- taken on the defeat of the enemy, is considered to have come back hj post- liminium. Gai. i. 129; D. xlix. 15. 29. 3; D. xlix. 15. 26. By the jus postliminii , property taken in war, and retaken from the enemy, was restored to the original owners (see Bk. ii. Tit. 1. 17); and captives, on their return to their own country, were re-established in all their former rights. When the captive returned, all the time of his captivity was, in the eye of the law, blotted out, and he was exactly in the position he would have held if he had not been taken captive. (D. xlix. 15. 21. 6.) The manner of his return was quite immaterial. Nihil interest quomodo captivus reversus est, (D. xlix. 15. 26.) When the father returned, he resumed all his rights over his property, and his patria potestas over his children ; when a child returned, he regained his rights of succession and agnation, and at the same time he fell again under the patria potestas of his father. (D. xlix. 15. 14.) If the captive did not return from captivity, the law considered him to have died at the moment of his captivity commencing, a point important with regard to testaments (see Bk. ii. Tit. 12. 5); and also as making children sui juris, and giving them all property acquired by them, from the time of the parent's captivity. Gains says that in his time this point in favour of the children was not established (Gai. i. 129); but, at any rate, it was so when Ulpian wrote. (D. xlix. 15. 18.) 6. Prseterea emancipatione quo- 6. Children, also, cease to be under que desinunt liberi in potestate the power of their parents by eman- 50 LIB. I. TIT. XII. parentum esse. Sed emancipatio cipation. Formerly emancipation was antea qiiidem vel per antiquam legis effected, either by adopting the pro- observationem procedebat, quae per cess of the ancient law, consisting of imaginarias venditiones et interce- imaginary sales, each followed by a dentes maimmissiones celebrabatur, manumission, or by imperial rescript ; vel ex imperiali rescripto. Nostra but we, in our wisdom, have intro- autem providentia et hoc in melius duced a reform on this point by one of per constitutionem reformavit, ut our constitutions. The old fictitious tictione pristina explosa, recta via process is now done away with, and ad competentes judices vel magis- parents may now appear directly be- tratus parentes intrent, et sic filios fore a proper judge or magistrate, and suos vel filias, vel nepotes, vel nep- free from their power their children, tes ac deinceps sua, manu demit- or grandchildren, or other descendants, terent. Et tunc ex edicto prastoris And then, according to the praetorian in hujus filii vel filiae vel nepotis vel edict, the parent has the same rights neptis bonis, qui vel quae a parente over the goods of those whom he manumissiTS vel manumissa fuerit, emancipates, as the patron has over the eadem jura praestantur parenti, qua3 goods of his freedman. And further, tribuuntur patrono in bonis liberti ; if the child or children emancipated et praeterea, si impubes sit filius vel are within the age of puberty, the filia vel ceteri, ipse parens ex manu- parent, by the emancipation, becomes missione tiitelam ejus nanciscitur. their tutor. Gai. i. 132. 134; D. xxxvii. 12. 1; D. xxvi. 4. 3. 10; C. viii. 49. 5. 6. We have no trace of any other form of giving freedom, in early times, than that of emancipation. In the law of the Twelve Tables we find it laid down, ^ Si pater filium ter venumduit (sells) liber esto.^ The father might sell his son, and he would then be in the mancipium of the purchaser; but when the purchaser freed him, the son would fall again under his father's power. This might happen over and over again ; but the Twelve Tables, whe- ther making a new enactment, or sanctioning an old custom, declared that after a third sale the father's power was extinguished for ever. This may perhaps have been originally intended as a kind of check on the father abusing his power of selling his son, and have been afterwards used as a means of giving freedom by a fictitious sale ; or it may have been expressly enacted in the Twelve Tables to extinguish all doubts whether the custom of freeing from a father's power by three sales was valid. In the form the fictitious sale took in the times of historical certainty, the father three times sold his son to a fictitious purchaser, who, between the first and the second sale, and also between the second and the third, manumitted the son, i.e. discharged him from his i power as a master which he had acquired by the sale. After the third sale, the son was in the mancipium of the fictitious purchaser, and if this purchaser had manumitted him, he would have been the son's patron. But as the father generally wished to be the patron of his son, the relation giving him, among other things, the right of succeeding to the son if intestate and childless, the ; purchaser, instead of manumitting him, resold (remancipavii) him to the father, who then himself manumitted him, and became his patron. In cases where the fictitious purchaser manumitted the third time, he was considered as a trustee for the father of all the . LIB. I. TIT. XII. 51 rio-hts of patronage. Originally, an express contract was made, contracta Jiducia, to bind the purchaser to remancipate or to manumit, reserving the rights of patronage to the father, as the case mio*ht be ; but in later times the purchaser was considered bound by an implied contract, and the prastorian edict, as we learn from the text, secured to the father in all cases the rights of patronage. As the law of the Twelve Tables spoke only of a son, it was considered by a strict interpretation of the term ' son/ that one sale instead of three was sufficient in the case of a daughter or grandchild. (G. i. 132.) Anastasius introduced a new mode of freeing the child from the power of the father. The emperor issued, in cases where he thought it proper, a rescript authorising the emancipation ; and this rescript being registered by a magistrate, the process was complete. (C. viii. 49. 5.) Justinian, in giving the greatest possible facility to emancipa- tion, preserved all the effects which the process had had under the old system of fictitious sales. Both under his system and that of Anastasius, a child could be emancipated in his absence, which was not possible in the times when the old forms of manumission were strictly observed. 7. Admonendi autem sumtis, li- berum arbitrium esse ei qui filmm et ex eo nepotem vel neptem in potestate habebit, filium quidem potestate diinittere, nepotem vero vel neptem retinere ; et ex diverse filium quidem in potestate retinere, nepotem vero vel neptem manu- mittere, vel omnes sui juris eificere. Eadem et de pronepote et pronepte dicta esse intelligantur. 8. Sed et si pater filium quern in potestate habet, avo vel proavo naturali, secundum nostras consti- tutiones super his habitas, in adop- tionem dederit : id est, si hoc ipsum actis intervenientibus apud com- petentem judicem manifestaverit, prsesente eo qui adoptatur et non contradicente, nee non eo prsesente qui adoptat, solvitur jus potestatis patris naturalis ; transit autem in hujusmodi parentem adoptivum, in cujus persona et adoptionem esse plenissimam antea diximus. 7. It is also to be observed, that a parent having in his power a son, and by that son a grandson or grand- daughter, may emancipate his son, and retain in his power his grandson or granddaughter; or, conversely, he may emancipate his grandson or granddaughter, and retain his son in his power ; or, he may make them all independent. And it is the same in the case of a great-grandson, or a great-granddaughter. 8. If a father has a son in his power, and gives him in adoption to the son's natural grandfather or great- grandfather, in conformity with our constitutions enacted on this subject, that is, if he declares his intention in a formal act before a competent judge, in the presence and without the dis- sent of the person adopted, and also in the presence of the person who adopts, then the right of paternal power is extinguished as to the natural father, and passes from him to the adoptive father ; with regard to whom, as we have before observed, adoption preserves all its effects. C. viii. 47. 11. The adoptive father could not acquire any patria potestas by fictitious sales; he could only extinguish that of the natural E 2 52 LIB. I. TIT. XIII. father. In order to gain it himself, he had recourse to another fictitious process, called in jure cessio. He claimed the child as his before a magistrate, and the natural father not withstanding the claim, the child was given into the patria potestas of the adoptive father. For the change made by Justinian in the law of adoption, see Tit. 11. 1. 9. lUud autem scire oportet, quod si nuriis tua ex filio tuo conceperit, et filium postea emancipaveris vel in adoptionem dederis prsegnante iiurii tua, nihilominus quod ex ea nascitur, in potestate tua nascitur; quod si post emancipationem vel adoptionem conceptus fuerit, patris sui emancipati vel avi adoptivi potestati subjicitur ; et quod neque naturales liberi neque adoptivi uUo pene modo possunt cogere parentes de potestate sua eos dimittere. 9. It must be observed, that, if your daughter-in-law becomes preg- nant, and if during her pregnancy you emancipate your son, or give him in adoption, the child will be born in your power; but if the child is con- ceived subsequently to the emanci- pation or adoption, he is born in the power of his emancipated father, or his adoptive grandfather. Children, natural or adoptive, have almost no means of compelling their parents to free them from their power. Gai. i. 135. 137; D. i. 7. 31.33. The rights of a child were always determined by reference to the moment of conception, not of birth, when he was born injusto mairimonio, because he then followed the condition of his father. But when he followed the condition of his mother, as he did when he was born out ofjustum matrimonium, reference was had to the time of his birth (G. i. 89), or, in the later law, to the time of his conception, of his birth, or to any intermediate time, as might be most favourable to him. (See Tit. 4. pr.) The exceptional cases alluded to in the words neque ullo pene modo only occurred where the father attempted to make a base use of his power over his children, or abandoned them ( C. xi. 40. 6 ; viii. 52. 2) ; or when a person, adopted under the age of puberty, on attaining that age, compelled his adoptive father to emancipate him. (D. i. 7. 33.) Tit. XIII. DE TUTELIS. Transeamus nunc ad aliam divi- sionem personarum; nam ex his personis quse in potestate non sunt, quaedam vel in tutela sunt vel in curatione, quaedam neutro jure tenentur. Videamus ergo de his qui in tutela vel curatione sunt : ita enim intelligemus ceteras personas quae neutro jure tenentur. Ac prius dispiciamus de his quae in tutela sunt. Let us now proceed to another^ division of persons. Of those who are not in the power of a parent, some are under a tutor, some under a curator, some under neither. Let us treat, then, of those persons who are under a tutor or curator ; for we shall thus ascertain who are they who are not subject to either. And first of persons under a tutor. Gai. i. 142, 143. This is rather a subdivision of persons sui juris than another division of persons generally. There were some persons who LIB. I. TIT. XIII. 53 ■yvere exempt from the patria potestas, and yet required constant protection and assistance. When this arose from youth, or, in the old law of Rome, from the incapacity supposed always to attach to females (^propter animi levitatem, Gx\i. i. 144), the protector was called a tutor \ when it arose from mental incapacity, he was called a curator. The two offices greatly resembled each other ; but there was one leading distinction between them. The tutor was said to be given to the person ; he not only administered the property of the pupil, but he also supplied what was wanting to complete the pupil's legal character. The curator was said to be given to the property : his duty was exclusively to see that the person under his care did not waste his goods. (See Introd. sec. 43.) 1. Est autem tiitela (ut Servius definivit) vis ac potestas in capite libero, ad tuendum eum qui propter setatem se defendere nequit, jure civili data ac permissa. 1. Tutelage, as Servius lias defined it, is an authority and power over a free person, given and permitted by the civil law, in order to protect one whose tender years prevent him de- fending himself. D. xxvi. 1. 1. By a free person is meant here one sui juris. The power of a tutor {^vis ac potestas being merely a redundant expression) was either given [data) by the civil law, when it devolved on the next of kin, or allowed (^permissa) by that law, when it was conferred by testament. 2, Tutores autem sunt, qui earn vim ac potestatem habent, exque ipsa re nomen ceperunt. Itaque appellantur tutores, quasi tuitores atque defensores, sicut seditui di- cuntur qui sedes tuentur. 3. Permissum est itaque parenti- bus, liberis impuberibus quos in potestate habent, testamento tutores dare, et hoc in filios filiasque pro- cedit omnimodo. Nepotibus tamen neptibusque ita demum parentes possunt testamento tutores dare, si post mortem eorum in patris sui potestatem non sunt recasuri. Ita- que si filius tuus mortis tufe tem- pore in potestate tua sit, nepotes ex eo non poterunt testamento tuo tutorem habere, quamvis in potes- tate tua fuerint : scilicet, quia mor- tuo te in potestatem patris sui re- casuri sunt. 2. Tutors are those who have this authority and power, and they take their name from the nature of their office ; for they are called tutors, as being protectors (tuitores) and de- fenders ; just as those who have the care of the sacred edifices, are called geditui. 3. Parents may give tutors by tes- tament to such of their children as have not attained the age of puberty, and are under their power. And this, without any distinction, in the case of all sons and daughters. But grand- fathers can only give tutors to their grandchildren when these will not fall under the power of their father on the death of the grandfather. Hence, if your son is in your power at the time of your death, your grandchildren by that son cannot have a tutor appointed them by your testament, although they were in your power ; because, at your decease, they will fall under the power of their father. Gai. i. 144. 146. The law of the Twelve Tables said, ' Uti legassit super pecu- nia tutelave su(b rei, ita jus esto.^ None but the head of the family 54 LIB. I. TIT. XIII. could appoint a tutor by testament, and for none but children, or descendants in his power, who were included in the term sua res. Further, he could only appoint a tutor for those who, on his death, became sui juris, and were under age. 4. Cum autem in compluribus 4. Posthumous children, as in many aliis causis postumi pro jam natis other respects, so also in this respect, liabentur, et in hac causa placuit are considered as already born before non minus postumis quam natis tes- the death of their fathers ; and tutors tamento tutores dari posse : si modo may be given by testament to posthu- in ea causa sint ut, si vivis parenti- mous children, as well as to children bus nascerentur, sui et in potestate already born, provided that the post- eorum fierent. humous children, had they been born in the lifetime of their father, would have been sui heredes, and in their father's power. Gai. i. 147. It was a maxim of Koman law that nothing could be given by testament to an uncertain person, and a posthumous child was looked on in this light, so much so that he could not be heir, nor take a legacy, nor have a tutor appointed, by will ; after- Avards this was so far modified that, as regarded the chief of his family, he was looked on as if born in the father's lifetime (pro jam Jiato hahebatur) ; that is, the ascendant might make him heir, disinherit him, give him a legacy, or appoint a tutor for him. It was not until the time of Justinian that the posthumous child of a stranger was capable of taking under a testament. (See note on Bk. ii. 20. 28.) The words compluribus in causis are extracted from Gains ; Justinian left no point of difference between the posthumous child and the child born in its father's lifetime. (C. vi. 48.) The proper meaning of posthumus is ' born after the death of a person.' Under special legislation it received the artificial sense of * born after the date of a testament.' (Bk. ii. 13, 2.) By the term sui heredes were meant those persons who, on the death of the head of the family, having no one above them in the line of ascent, became sui juris, and were the necessary heirs of the deceased, if intestate. (See Introd. sec. 77.) 5. Sed si emancipato filio tutor 5. But, if a father gives a tutor a patre testamento datus fuerit, by testament to his emancipated son, confirmandus est ex sententia pras- the apx3ointment must be confirmed sidis omnimodo, id est, sine inqui- by the sentence of the preeses in all sitione. cases, that is, without inquiry. D. xxvi. 3. 1. The emancipated child not being in the power of his father, could not, strictly speaking, be subject to the father's directions as to his tutor ; but a magistrate had power to carry out an ap- pointment of a tutor in a testament if there was only this tech- nical objection to be surmounted. The wishes of a father were considered so sure an indication to the magistrate of the fittest i LIB. I. TIT. XIV. 55 person to be tutor^ that they were always carried out without examining into the suitability of the appointment (si?ie inguisi- tione). unless some change in the position of the tutor since the making of the testament made him obviously unfit for the office. (D. xivi. 111. 8. 9.) A father could appoint by testament a tutor for his natural children if he left them property ; and the mother, the patron, and indeed any one who left property to infants sui juris, might appoint a tutor by testament, and the magistrate carried out the appointment, but in these cases not until he had examined all the circumstances of the case. (D. xxvi. 111. 2. 4.) The husband might also by testament appoint a tutor to his wife in manu, or give her the option of fixing on a tutor. (Gai. i. 148- 154.) Tit. XIV. QUI TESTAMENTO TUTORES DARI POSSUNT. Dari autem potest tutor non Not only a father of a family may solum paterfamilias, sed etiam be appointed tutor, but also a son of filiusfamilias. a family. The office of tutor was looked on as in some respects a public one, as the tutor supplied what was wanting to the per- sona of a citizen ; and a filiusfamilias was always capable of holding any public office. (D. i. 6. 9.) Any one could be made a tutor with whom there was the testamenti f actio (D. xxvi. 2. 21), or, in other words, any one who had the rights of citizenship sufficiently to enable him to go through the peculiar forms of Koman law. Women could not be appointed tutors according to the old law, but the emperors would confirm the power of a mother named by testament tutor of her children. (D. xxvi. 1. 18.) 1. Sed et servus proprius testa- 1. A man may also by testament mento cum libertate recte tutor appoint as a tutor his own slave, at dari potest. Sed sciendum est eum, the same time giving him his liberty, et sine libertate tutorem datum, But it must be observed, that if a tacite libertatem directam accej^isse slave be appointed tutor without an videri, et per hoc recte tutorem express gift of liberty, he is still held esse. Plane si per errorem quasi to receive by implication a direct free- liber tutor datus sit, aliud dicen- dom, and thus can legally accept the dum est. Servus autem alienus office of tutor. If, however, it is by pure inutiliter testamento datur mistake, and from the testator sup- tutor ; sed ita cum liber erit, utiliter posing him to be free, that he is ap- datur. Proprius autem servus in- pointed tutor, the decision would be utiliter eo modo tutor datur. different. The appointment of a slave belonging to another person as tutor is ineffectual, if unconditional; but is valid when made with this condi- tion, 'when he shall be free.' If, however, any one appoints his own slave with such a condition, the ap- pointment is void. D. xxvi. 2. 32. 2. 56 LIB. I. TIT, XIV. A slave was incapable of holding any legal office. It was therefore necessary to enfranchise him in order that he might become a tutor. If the appointment were made without express enfranchisement, it was the opinion of Paul (D. xxvi. 2. 32) that the appointment implied enfranchisement, and this as if given by the testator himself {direcfa), and not entrusted to his heir to give {Jideicnmmissaria). Valerian and Gallian, however, decided subsequently by a rescript (C. vii. 4. 9), that it was only a libertas Jideicommissaria which such an appointment carried with it. Justinian here restores the authority of the former opinion. The appointment of the slave of another carried with it the libertas Jideicommissaria^ that is, it was incumbent on the heir to j^urchase and emancipate the slave, who could then discharge the office of tutor. (D. xxvi. 2. 10. 4.) If the heir was not able to purchase the slave, then the slave could not act as tutor until he gained his freedom in some other way. Even if the testator had not used the words cum liber erit, or some corresponding expression, he was presumed to have intended to use them, unless a contrary intention appeared. (D. xxvi. 2. 10. 4 ; Cod. vii. 4. 9.) If a testator said of his own slave that he was to be tutor when free, this showed that the testator, who had the power to en- franchise him, did not choose to exercise it ; and as he thus volun- tarily made his own appointment void, the law would not help him. 2. Furiosiis vel minor viginti 2. If a madman or a person under quinque aimis tutor testamento the age of twenty-five years is by tes- datus tutor erit, cum compos mentis tament appointed tutor, the one is to aut major viginti quinque annis begin to act when he becomes of factus fuerit. sound mind, and the other when he has completed his twenty-fifth year. D. xxvi. 1. 11 ; xxvi. 2. 32. 2. Meanwhile the magistrate would appoint another tutor. (See Tit. 20.) 3. Ad certum tempus, seu ex 3. There is no doubt that a tutor certo tempore, vel sub conditione, may be appointed either until a cer- vel ante heredis institutionem posse tain time, or from a certain time, or dari tutorem non dubitatur. conditionally, or before the institution of an heir. The old law regarded the naming the persons designed to take as heirs under the testament as the base of the testament, and passed over every declaration of the testator's wishes placed before this as out of due order and entirely void. The Proculians (Gai. ii. 231) thought this ought not to be extended to the ap- pointment of a tutor, and Justinian did away with the doctrine altogether. 4. Certae autem rei vel causae 4. A tutor cannot be appointed for tutor dari non potest, quia person^e a particular thing or business, as it is non causae vel rei datur. to a person, and not for a business or a thing, that a tutor is appointed. D. xxvi. 2. 12. 14. LIB. I. TIT. XV. r)7 The tutor had to take charo^e of the whole interests of the pupil, and complete his pei'sona, and therefore to appoint him to take charge of his interest in any one matter only was incon- sistent with the nature of his office, and such an appointment was Toid. (D. xxvi. 2. 13.) If, however, the property of the pupil was situated in provinces far apart from each other, a separate tutor might be appointed to take care of his interests in each province. (D. xxvi. 2. 15.) 5. Si quis filiabiis snis vel filiis tntores dederit, etiam postumae vel postumo dedisse videtur ; quia filii vel filige appellatione postmmis vel postnma continetur. Quod si ne- potes sint, an appellatione filiorum et ipsis tutores dati sunt ? Dicen- dum est ut ipsis quoque dati vide- antur, si modo liberos dixit: ceterum si filios, non continebuntur ; aliter enim filii, aliter nepotes appellan- tur. Plane si postumis dederit, tarn filii postumi quam ceteri liberi continebuntur. 5. If any one appoint a tutor to his sons or daughters, lie is held also to appoint him as tutor to his post- humous children ; because, under the appellation of son or daughter, a post- humous son or daughter is included. But if there are grandchildren, are they included in the appointment of a tutor to sons? We answer, that under an appointment to children, grand- children are included, but not under an appointment to sons ; for son and grandson are quite distinct words. But, if a testator appoints a tutor to his posthumous descendants, the term obviously includes all posthumous children, whether sons or grandsons. Tit. XY. DE LEGITIMA ADGNATOEUM TUTELA. Quibus autem testamento tutor datus non sit, his ex lege duodecim tabularum adgnati sunt tutores, qui vocantur lesritimi. They to whom no tutor has been appointed by testament, have their agnati as tutors, by the law of the Twelve Tables, and such tutors are called ' legal tutors.' D. xxvi. 4. 1 : Gai. i. 155. Tutores legitimi was a general term applied to all tutors appointed by law, and especially by the law of the Twelve Tables, or according to some inference from its provisions, as in the case of patrons. We do not know the exact terms of the law of the Twelve Tables on this subject. 1. Sunt autem adgnati, cognati per virilis sexus cognationem con- junct!, quasi a patre cognati : veluti frater eodem patre natus, patris filius neposve ex eo ; item patruus et patrui filius, neposve ex eo. At qui per feminini sexus personas cognatione junguntur, non sunt adgnati, sed alias naturali jure co- gnati. Itaque amitse tuse filius non est tibi agnatus, sed cognatus, et invicem scilicet tu illi eodem jure conjungeris ; quia qui nascuntur. 1. Agnati are those who are related to each other through males, that is, are related through the father, as, for instance, a brother by the same father, or the son of a brother, or the son of such a son ; or, again, a father's brother, or a father's brother's son, or the son of such a son. But those who are related to us through females are not agnati, but merely cognati by their natural relationship. Thus the son of a father's sister is related to you not by agnation, but by cognation, and 58 LIB. I. TIT. XV. j)atris non qimntur. matris familiam se- you are also related to him by cogna- tion ; as children belong to the family of their father, and not to that of their mother. Gai. i. ]56. The law gave the rights of relationship, such as inheritance and appointment as tutors, to the agnati only. All persons, related by ties of blood, were cognati to each other. Within this larger circle the members of any one family were agnati to each other. A family, in this sense, consisted of all persons related to each other, by having a common ancestor, in whose power, if he were alive, they would all be. A brother and sister, for instance, were agnati, and a nephew and aunt, by the father's side. For if the grandfather were alive all would be in his power. But the tie was dissolved by the sister or aunt marrying in manum (see Introd. sec. 46); and as the children of females would be in the power of the husband, they could never be agnati to their mother's agnati, except by adoption ; and hence it is here said that agnati are related through males only. By the 118th Novel Justinian abolished the distinction between agnati and cognati, and the nearest in blood was thenceforth the tutor legitimus. 2. Quod autem lex ab intestato vocat ad tutelam adgnatos, non hanc habet significationem, si omnino non fecerit testamentiim is qui po- terat tutores dare ; sed si, quantum ad tutelam pertinet, intestatus de- cesserit ; quod tunc quoque accidere intelligitur, cum is qui datus est tutor, vivo testatore decesserit. 2. The law of the Twelve Tables, calling the agnati to be tutors in case of intestacy, does not refer merely to the case of a person who might have appointed a tutor, dying without having made any testament at all, but also to that of a person dying intestate only so far as regards the appointment of a tutor, and this includes the case of a tutor nominated by testament dying in the lifetime of the testator. D. xxvi. 4. 6. It was necessary to state expressly that the testament was good, as far as it went, and that the law remedied its deficiency by making the agnati tutors, because it was a maxim of Roman law that a man could not die partly testate and partly intestate. 3. The right of agnation is ordi- narily taken away by every capitis deminutio, or change of status, for ag- nation is a civil right : but the right of cognation is not lost by every kind of capitis deminutio, for although civil law may destroy civil rights, it cannot de- stroy natural rights. I 158. 3. Sed adgnationis quidem jus omnibus modis capitis deminutione plerumque perimitur, nam adgnatio juris est nomen. Cognationis vero jus non omnibus modis commutatur ; quia civilis ratio civilia quidem jura corrumpere potest, naturalia vero non utique. Gai. The tie of agnation being created by law, could also be dis- solved by it : not so that of cognation, which was a tie of nature. But the law could take away the legal rights attaching to the natural tie ; and this it did in the case of the maxima capitis de- minutio, (See next Title, 6.) A constitution of Theodosius and Arcadius provided that the LIB. I. TIT. XVI. 59 mother, if she has not remarried, and undertakes not to remarry, may have the tutela of her children given her. (C. v. 35. 2.) And Justinian, by the 118th Novel, extended this to the grandmother, as well as the mother, if there was no testamentary tutor. Tit. XYI. DE CAPITIS DEMINUTIONE. Est autem capitis deminutio prio- The capitis deminutio is a change ris status commutatio, eaque tribus of status, which may happen in three modis accidit : nam aut maxima est ways : for it may be the greatest capitis cajDitis deminutio, aut minor quam deminutio, or the less, also called the quidam mediam vocant, aut minima, middle, or the least. Gai. i. 159. The status of a Roman citizen was composed of three elements : Tria sunt qucB habernus : libertatem, civitatem, familiam (D. iv. 5. 11.) The citizen was free, he had his position as a civis, he had his position in a family. Caput, originally, perhaps, signifying the mention made of the citizen in the registers of the census, was used as synonymous with persona ; and if a citizen ceased, lost his liberty or his civic rights, or changed his family position by adoption or emancipation, he underwent what was termed a capitis deminutio, this capitis deminutio being termed maxima, media, or minima, according to which of the three elements of status it was that was primarily affected. 1. Maxima capitis deminutio est, 1. The greater capitis dendnutio is, cum aliquis simul et civitatem et when a man loses both his citizen- libertatem amittit : quod accidit in ship and his liberty ; as they do who his qui servi poenae efficiuntur atro- by a terrible sentence are made ' the citate sententise, vel libertis ut in- slaves of punishment ;' and freedmen, gratis erga patronos condemnatis, condemned to slavery for ingratitude vel qui se ad pretium participandum towards their patrons ; and all those venumdari passi sunt. who suffer themselves to be sold in order to share the price obtained. Gai. i. 160 ; D. xxviii. 3. 6. 6 ; xxv. 3. 7. 1. See Tit. 12. 3 ; Tit. 3. 4 note. 2. Minor sive media capitis demi- 2. The less or middle capitis c^e^ni- nutio est, cum civitas quidem amitti- nutio is, when a man loses his citizen- tur, libertas vero retinetur : quod ship, but retains his liberty ; as is the accidit ei cui aqua et igni inter- case when any one is forbidden the use dictum fuerit, vel ei qui in insulam of fire and water, or is deported to an deportatus est. . island. Gai. i. 161. In this kind of capitis deminutio, as well as in the preceding, the position in the familia was lost, its rights belonging only to citizens. In this lesser kind, freedom is preserved ; but the person who undergoes the change of status becomes a stranger, peret/rinus Jit. (Ulp. Beff. 10. 3.) It was a maxim of Roman law, that no one could cease to be a citizen against his will. Civitatem nemo unquam ullo populi jussu amittit invitus. (CiC. pro Dom, 29.) 60 LIB, I. TIT. XVI. The condemned was therefore denied the necessaries of life, until he was driven to withdraw himself from the city. Id autem vt esset faciendum, non ademptione civitatis, sed tecti, et aqucB et ignis inter d ictione facieb ant, (CiC. pro Dom. 30.) The aqiicR et ignis interdictio thus became a form by which a sentence of perpetual banishment was inflicted. The deportatio in insulam superseded this form. (D. xlviii. 29. 2.) The person who was banished was confined to certain limits, out of which he could not stir without rendering himself punishable with death. This must be kept distinct from simple relegatio, which was also an exile within prescribed limits, but did not in any way affect the status, (D. xlviii. 22. 7. See Tit. 12. 1 and 2.) 3. Minima capitis deminutio est 3. The least capitis deminutio is, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, when a person's status is changed with- Sed status hominis commutatur ; out forfeiture either of citizenship or quod accidit in his qui, cum sui liberty ; as when a person sid juris be- juris fuerint, cceperunt alieno juri comes subject to the power of another, subjecti esse, vel contra. or a person alieni juris becomes inde- pendent. Gai. i. 162. The status was changed (commutatur) by the change of family position ; but the person who underwent this form of capitis demi- nutio had still after it all the three elements of status. Whether the minima capitis deminutio involved a degradation or merely a change has been much debated by commentators. Savigny (see Posters Gai^is, p. 108) was of opinion that capitis deminutio always involved a degradation. The French commentators take the other view, that there was merely a change implied, and they have, perhaps, if not the better arguments, the clearer authorities on their side. Therefore Ulpian says the minima capitis deminutio takes place salvo statu. (D. xxxviii. 17. 1.) What is said here of change of family by arrogation and emancipation must be extended to adoption. (D. iv. 5. 3.) In old times, the wife who passed iii manum viri, or the freeman who was given in mancipio, underwent this minima capitis deminutio, (Gai. i. 162.) After the words vel contra, at the end of this paragraph, some texts have the following words : veluti si filiusfamilias a patre emancipatus fuerit, est capite deminutus. The addition is probably owing to some writer having perceived that it was only in the case of emancipation that it was true that when a person became sui juris he was capite minutus. There was no change of family when a son became sui juris on the death of his father. The person who underwent the minima capitis deminutio was, in the eyes of the law, a new person. He could not, therefore, until the praetor permitted an action against him, be sued for debts previously contracted. (D. iv. 5. 21.) And we shall see, in the Second Book, that in the old law a usufruct was extin- guished by the minima capitis deminutio of the usufructuary. (Bk. ii. Tit. 4. 3.) The capite minutus also, as we shall see in the LIB. I. TIT. XVI. 61 Third Book (Tit. 1. 9 and 10. 1), forfeited his place in intestate succession, except so far as he was helped by the praetor^, or by lesrislation. o 4. Servns autem manmnissus capite non minuitiir, quia nuUiim caput liabuit. D IV. 5. Quibus autem dignitas magis quam status permutatur, capite non minuuntur ; et icleo senatu motum capite non minui constat. 4. A slave who is manumitted is not said to be capite minutus, as he has no ' caput, ^ or civil existence. 5. 3. 1. 6. Those whose dignity rather than their status is changed, do not sufter a capitis demmutio, as those, for instance, who are removed from the senatorial dignity. D. i. 9. 3. Even infamia did not produce a capitis deminutio (D. ii. 16. 103.) 6. Quod autem dictum est manere cognationis jus et post capitis demi- nutionem, hoc ita est, si minima capitis deminutio interveniat ; ma- net enim cognatio. Nam si maxi- ma capitis deminutio currat, jus quoque cognationis perit, ut puta servitute alicujus cognati ; et ne qui- dem si manumissus fuerit^ recipit cognationem. Sed et si in insulam quis deportatus sit, cognatio solvitur. 6. In saying that the right of cog- nation remains in spite of a ca2ntis deminutio, we were speaking only of the least deminutio, after which the cognation subsists. For, by the greater deminutio, as, for example, if one of the cognati becomes a slave, the right of cognation is wholly destroyed, so as not to be recovered even by manumis- sion. So, too, the right of cognation is lost by the less or middle deminutio^ as, for example, by deportation to an island. D. xxxviii. 8. 5. 7. A change of the civil family by adoption or arrogation never dissolved the natural tie of cognatio, or destroyed its attendant civil rights ; but these were destroyed by a sentence which in- volved the loss of the civitas. And if the civitas were once lost and then regained, the restored, or rather new, civis was in all respects the founder of a new family, excepting when he was restitutus in integrum, that is, restored by the emperor to the same position that he had formerly held. (See Tit. 12. 1.) 7. Cum autem ad adgnatos tutela pertineat, non simul ad omnes per- tinet, sed ad eos tantum qui proxi- miore gradu sunt, vel si plures ejus- dem gradus sunt ad omnes : veluti si plures f ratres sunt qui unum gradum obtinent, ideoque pariter ad tutelam vocantur. 7. The right to be tutor, which be- longs to the agnati, does not belong to all at the same time, but to the nearest in degree only; or, if there are many in the same degree, then to all in that degree. Several brothers, for instance, in the same degree, are aU equally called to be tutor. Gal i. 164. The principle of the law was, that those persons should have the burden of the tutelage who had the hope of the succession. (Tit. 17. pr.) The nearest in degree of the agnati were therefore the tutors in case of intestacy. The nearest in degree might. 62 LIB. I. TIT. XVII. however, happen to be a woman or an infant, and then, althouo-h this person was the next in succession to the inheritance, it was necessary to go a step further off to find the tutor. (D. xxvi. 4. 1. 1.) Tit. XVII. DE LEGITIMA PATRONORUM TUTELA. By the same law of the Twelve Tables, the tutelage of freedmen and freedwomen belongs to their patrons, and to the children of their patrons ; and this tutelage is called legal tute- lage, not that the law contains any- express provision on the subject, but because it has been as firmly esta- blished by interpretation, as if it had been introduced by the express words of the law. For, as the law had ordered that patrons and their children should succeed to the inheritance of their freedmen or freedwomen who should die intestate, the ancients were of opinion that the intent of the law was that the tutelage also belonged to them ; since the law, which calls agnati to the inheritance, also appoints them to be tutors, because, in most cases, where the advantage of the succession is, there also ought to be the burden of the tutelage. We say ' in most cases,' because, if a person below the age of puberty is manumitted by a female, she is called to the inheritance, although another person is tutor. Gai. i. 165 ; D. xxvi. 4. 1. 1. 3. The law gave the patron the right of succession to the inhe- ritance of the freedman ; and as the right of succession was con- nected with the tutelage in the case of the agnati, it seemed natural to connect the two in the case of the patron. Ex eadem lege duodecim tabula- rum, libertorum et libertarum tu- tela ad patronos liberosque eorum pertinet. Quae et ipsa legitima tutela vocatur, non quia nominatim in ea lege de hac tutela caveatur, sed quia perinde accepta est per in- terpretationem, atque si verbis legis introducta esset. Eo enim ipso quod hereditates libertorum liber- tarumque, si intestati decessissent, jusserat lex ad patronos liberosve eorum pertinere, crediderunt veteres voluisse legem etiam tutelas ad eos pertinere : cum et adgnatos quos ad hereditatem lex vocat, eosdem et tutores esse jussit ; quia plerumque ubi successionis est emolumentum, ibi et tutela? onus esse debet. Ideo autem diximus plerumque, quia si a femina impubes manumittatur, ipsa ad hereditatem vocatur, cum alius sit tutor. Tit. XYIII. DE LEGITIMA PARENTUM TUTELA. Exemplo patronorum recepta est et alia tutela, quae et ipsa legitima vocatur ; nam si quis filium aut filiam, nepotem aut neptem ex filio et deinceps impuberes emancipaverit, legitimus eorum tutor erit. In imitation of the tutelage of patrons, there is, too, another kind which also is said to be legal ; for if a parent emancipate, below the age of puberty," a son, a daughter, a grandson, or a granddaughter, who is the issue of that son, or any other descendant, he is their legal tutor. Gai. i. 175. It was not the sales by the father which emancipated the son, but the subsequent enfranchisement after these sales had LIB. I. TIT. XIX. 63 destroyed the father's power, and made the son a mancipium of the fictitious purchaser. Sometimes, probably generally, the purchaser resold (remancipavit) the son thus in mancipio to the father, who freed him, and thus became his patromis and his tutor legitimus. If the purchaser did not resell him, but himself emancipated him, he became the patromis^ and so the tutor ; but as the whole proceeding was but a form, he became only a tutor fiduciarius, (Gai. i. 166. 172. 175; Ulp. Reg. xi. 5; D. xxvi. 4. 3. I.) Tit. XIX. DE FIDUCIARIA TUTELA. Est et alia tutela quse fiduciaria There is another kind of tutelage appellatnr ; nam si parens liliiun vel called fiduciary ; for, if a parent eman- filiam, nepotem vel neptem vel cipate, below the age of puberty, a son deinceps impuberes manumiserit, or a daughter, a grandson or a grand- legitimam nanciscitur eorum tute- daughter, or any other descendant, he lam : quo defuncto, si liberi virilis is their legal tutor ; but if, at his death, sexus ei extant, fiduciarii tutores he leave male children, they become filiorum suorum, vel fratris vel so- the fiduciary tutors of their own sons, roris et ceterorum efiiciuntur. At- or brother, or sister, or other descend- qui patrono legitimo tutore mortuo, ants of the deceased. But when a liberi quoque ejus legitimi sunt patron, who is a legal tutor, dies, his tutores. Quoniam filius quidem children also become legal tutors, the defuncti, si non esset a vivo patre reason being that a son, who has not emancipatus, post obitum ejus sui been emancipated in his father's life- juris efficeretur, nee in fratrum po- time, becomes independent at the death testatem recideret, ideoque nee in of his father, and does not fall under tutelam ; libertus autem, si servus powerof his brothers, nor, therefore, un- mansisset, utique eodem jure apud der their tutelage ; while the freedman, liberos domini post mortem ejus had he remained a slave, would also futurus esset. Ita tamen hi ad have been, after the death of his master, tutelam vocantur, si perfectse setatis the slave of his master's children, sunt. Quod nostra constitutio gene- These persons, however, are not called raliter in omnibus tutelis et cura- to be tutors unless of full age, a rule tionibus observari pra3cepit. which by our constitution applies gene- rally to all tutors and curators. D. xxvi. 4. 3, 4 ; C. v. 30. 5. When it is said that the sons become the fiduciary tutors of their own sons, reference is made to the case of the grandsons having been emancipated by the grandfather. The person who emancipated the child succeeded to all the rights of a patron over the child ; if it was the father, then, as being a patron, he was included in the terms of the law of the Twelve Tables, and was a tutor legitimus (Gai. i. 172 ; D. xxvi. 4. 3-10) ; if it was not, he was a tutor fiduciarius (Gai. i. 166), a tutor bound to the father by a trust. In the case of a slave, the children of a patron succeeded to the rights of patronage ; but this did not extend to the case of emancipated children : the children not emancipated were not the patrons of those who were. They were not tutors, therefore, by the law of the Twelve Tables, and the word fiduciarii is borrowed from its more proper usage to express their position, and is in this case merely opposed 64 LIB. I. TIT. XX. to legitimi. (D. xxvi. 4. 4.) The reason given in the text for their being only tutores Jlduciarii, viz. that the emancipated in- fant would have been sui juris if he had not been emancipated, is manifestly an imperfect one. For it would not be necessarily true when a grandfather emancipated his grandson, who, if his father were living, would not on the grandfather's death become S211 juris. If the father of the emancipated child left no other children above the age of puberty, the nearest agnatus, as, for instance, the father's brother, was the tutor, and he, too, was called the tutor Jiduciarius. (Theoph. Paraph.) The perfecta (Bias was the age of twenty-five years. Tit. XX. DE ATILIANO TUTORE ET EO QUI EX LEGE JULIA ET TITIA DABITUR. Si cui nullus omnino tutor f uerat, If any one had no tutor at all, one ei dabatur, in urbe quidem Roma a was given him, in the city of Rome prsetore urbano et ma j ore parte tri- by the prsetor urhanus, and a majority bunorum plebis, tutor ex lege Atilia ; of the tribunes of the plebs, under the in provinciis vero, a prsesidibus pro- lex Atilia ; in the provinces, by the vinciarum ex lege Julia et Titia. presides under the lex Julia et Titia. Gai. i. 185. The date of the lex Atilia is unknown, but it must have been in existence in the year of the city 557, when Livy (xxxix. 9) says of a liherta, ^ Post patroni mortem, quia nullius in manu esset, tutors a tribunis et prcRtore petito.^ And as the necessity for some means of appointing a tutor, where one was not appointed by testament or law, must have been early felt, the lex Atilia, or one similar to it, must probably have existed long before the time of which Livy speaks. The date of the lex Julia et Titia was probably 723 a.u.C As there were ten tribunes, the majority would be at least six. The term tutor dativus is used by commentators to express a tutor given by the magistrate ; this term being used by Gaius (i. 154) to express tutors given by testament. 1. Sed et si testamento tutor sub 1. Again, if a testamentary tutor conditione aut die certo datus f uerat, had been appointed conditionally, or quamdiu conditio aut dies pendebat, from a certain time, until the com- ex iisdem legibus tutor dari poterat. pletion of the condition or arrival of Item si pure datus fuerat, quamdiu the time fixed, another tutor might ex testamento nemo heres existebat, be appointed under the same laws, tamdiu ex iisdem legibus tutor pe- Also, if a tutor had been given un- tendus erat : qui desinebat esse tutor, conditionally, yet, as long as no one si conditio existeret, aut dies veniret, had accepted the inheritance, as heir aut heres existeret. by the testament, another tutor might be appointed for the interval. But his office ceased when the condition was accomplished, when the time arrived, or the inheritance was entered upon. Gai. i. 186; D. xxvi. 2. 11. LIB. I. TIT. XX. 65 If the wishes of the testator were declared to any extent re- specting the appointment of a tutor, this entirely excluded the tutores legitimi, and every deficiency in the declaration was reme- died by the interposition of the magistrate. (D. xxvi. 2. 11.) No testament took effect until an heir entered on the inhe- ritance. If it was known that a testament existed appointing a tutor, this excluded the aynatl from being tutors ; but the tutor under the testament did not commence his tutela until the testa- ment took effect. Meantime a tutor appointed by the magistrate took care of the pupil. 2. Ab hostibiis qnoque tiitore capto, ex his legibus tutor peteba- tur: qui clesinebat esse tutor, si is qui captus erat, in civitatem rever- sus fuerat ; nam reversus recipiebat tutelam jure postliminii. 2. If, again, a tutor was taken pri- soner by the enemy, appHcation could be made, under the same laws, for another tutor, whose office ceased when the first tutor returned from captivity ; for on his return he re- sumed the tutelage by the jus post" liminii. Gai. i. 187. For an account of the jus -postliminii, see Title 12. 5. 3. Sed ex his legibus tutores pupillis desierunt dari, posteaquam primo consules pupillis utriusque sexus tutores ex inquisitione dare coeperunt, deinde prsetores ex con- stitutionibus ; nam supradictis legi- bus, neque de cautione a tutoribus exigenda rem salvam pupillis fore, neque de compellendis tutoribus ad tutelse administrationem quicquam cavebatur. 3. But tutors have ceased to be appointed under these laws, since they have been appointed to pupils of either sex, first by the consuls, after inquiry into the case, and afterwards by the praetors under imperial con- stitutions. For the above-mentioned laws required no security from the tutors for the safety of the pupils' property, nor did they contain any provisions to com^Del them to accept the office. The power to appoint tutors was given by Claudius to the consuls (Suet, in Claud. 23), and transferred by Antoninus Pius (Jul. Capit. in Vit M, Anton, 10) to the praetors. 4. Sed hoc jure utimur, ut Romee quidem preefectus urbi vel pr£etor secundum suam jiu-isdictionem, in provinciis autem prsesides ex inqiu- sitione tutores crearent ; vel magis- tratus jussu prsesidum, si non sint magn?e pupilli facultates. 4. Under our present system tutors are appointed at Rome by the prsefect of the city, or the prsetor, according to his jurisdiction, and, in the pro- vinces, by the prxsides after inquiry ; or by an inferior magistrate, at the command of the prseses, if the pro- perty of the pupil is only small. D. xxvi. 5. 1. The prcBfectus urhi was, from the time of Augustus, an officer who had the superintendence of the city and its police, with juris- diction extending one hundred miles from the city, and power to decide on both civil and criminal cases As he was considered the direct representative of the emperor, much that previously belonged to the prcetor urhanus fell gradually into his hands. F 66 LIB. I. TIT. XX. The prcefectus urhi appointed tutors in cases where pupils of higher rank and larger fortune were concerned ; the prcetor, when the pupils were of humbler station and smaller fortune ; and this it is which is referred to in the words secundum suam juris- dictionem.. In the provinces the prceses appointed ; but until Justinian altered the law (see next paragraph), not only could not muni- cipal magistrates appoint without the authority of the presses, but no one could be authorised by the presses unless he Avere a ma- gistrate. (D. xxvi. 5. 8.) 5. Nos aiitem per constitutionem 5. But by one of our constitutions, nostram, et hujusmodi difficultates to do away with these distinctions of hominum resecantes, nee expectata different persons, and to avoid the jussione preesidum, disposuimus, si necessity of waiting for the order of facultas pupilli vel adulti usque ad the prmses, we have enacted, that if quingentos soUdos valeat, defensores the property of the pupil or adult does civitatum una cum ejusdem civitatis not exceed five hundred solidi, tutors religiosissimo antistite, vel alias or curators shall be appointed by the publicas personas, id est, magistra- defensores of the city acting in con- tus vel juridicum Alexandrince - ci- junction with the holy bishop, or by vitatis, tutores vel curatores creare, other public persons, that is, by the legitima cautela secundum ejusdem magistrates, or, in the city of Alex- constitutionis normam prasstanda, andria, by the judge ; and legal se- videlicet eorum periculo qui eam curity must be given according to the accipiunt. terms of the same constitution, that is to say, at the risk of those who re- ceive it. Cod. i. 4. 30. The constitution of Justinian provided that, where the fortune of the person requiring a tutor or curator did not amount to more than 500 solidi (the aureus, 11. Is. Id. of English money, after the time of Alexander Severus, was called a solidus), a local magistrate, without the authorisation of the prceses, could appoint, not making a formal examination into the position and character of the tutor or curator {inquisitio\ but merely taking a money security for his faithful performance of his duties. The defensor was a magistrate appointed for two years out of the decuriones of a city. His principal business was to act as a check on the presses, and he had besides a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. 6. Impuberes autem in tutela esse 6. It is agreeable to the law of naturali juri conveniens est, ut is nature, that persons under the age of qui perfectse setatis non sit, alterius puberty should be under tutelage, so tutela regatur. that persons of tender years may be under the government of another. Gai. i. 189. Gains, in his Institutes, after the words extracted from him in the text, proceeds to contrast "with the tutelage of minors, which is an institution natural and necessary in all communities, the tutelage of women, which he considers founded on no reasonable basis. The original reason of this tutelage was probably the inca- LIB. I. TIT. XXI. 67 pability of women to share in the proceedings of the curia, and their being supposed unfit to go through solemn forms. In default of a testamentary tutor — and it may be mentioned that the husband could by testament either appoint a tutor to his wife in manu, or give her the option of choosing one (Gai. i. 148 et seq.) — the nearest agnatus was the tutor, women being either alieni juris, or else under a tutor all their lives ; the tutor being allowed in cer- tain cases to surrender his office (Gai. i. 168), and the woman being allowed to demand a substituted tutor in place of one absent. (Gai. i. 173.) The lex Papia Poppcea exempted from tutelage women who had three children, and a lex Claudia (a.d. 45) sup- pressed the tutelage of the agnati altogether in the case of women of free birth, leaving only the tutelage of ascendants and patrons. (Gai. i. 157.) This modified tutelage of women existed in the time of Ulpian {Reg. 11. 8), but had fallen into desuetude in the time of Justinian. While the tutelage of women lasted, the woman above puberty (see Gai. i. 180 et seq.) managed her own affairs, and the tutor was only called in to give his auctoritas on occasions of moment, the praetor interposing to force a tutor to give his authority when necessary, but the praetor would not adopt this course where the tutor was an ascendant or patron, unless some very strong reason existed. 7. Cum igitur pupillorum pupilla- 7. As tutors administer the affairs rumque tutores negotia gerunt, post of their pupils, they may be com- pubertatem tutelse judicio rationes pelled to account, by the actio tutel. xxvi. 2. Ostendimus, qui possint de suspecto cognoscere ; nunc videamus qui suspecti fieri possint. Et quidem omnes tutores possunt, sive testa- mentarii sint sive non, sed alterius generis tutores ; quare et si legiti- mus sit tutor, accusari poterit . Quid si patronus ? Adhiic idem erit di- cendum : dummodo meminerimus famse patroni parcendum, licet lit suspectus remotus fuerit. 1. The power of removing suspected tutors belongs at Rome to the praetor ; in the provinces to the praesides, or to the legate of the proconsul. 10. 1. 3, 4. 2. We have shown what magis- trates may take cognisance of sus- pected j)ei'sons : let us now inquire, Avhat persons may become suspected. All tutors may iDecome so, whether testamentary, or others ; thus even a legal tutor may be accused. But what is the case with a patron ? He, too, may be accused ; but we must remember, that his reputation must be spared, although he be removed as suspected. The descendants could not bring an action to which infamy attached against an ascendant. They and the libertus could only call for the interference of the law to protect their property, not to punish the tutor with infamy. (D. xxxvii. 15. 5.) And in the case of all legal tutors it was customary, except in very bad cases, not to remove them, but to join a curator with them. (D. xxvi. 10. 9.) By famcR parcendum is meant that the grounds of the decision for their removal were not to be expressed. 2>. Consequens est ut videamus, qui possunt suspectos postulare. Et sciendum est quasi publicam esse hanc actionem, hoc est, omnibus patere. Quinimo et mulieres admit- timtur ex rescripto divorum Severi et Antonini, sed ese solas quae pie- 3. Let us now inquire, by whom suspected persons may be accused. Now an accusation of this sort is in a measure public, that is, it is open to all. Nay, by a rescript of the Em- perors Severus and Antoninus, even women are admitted to be accusers : G 2 84 LIB. I. TIT. XXVI. tatis necessitudine ductse ad hoc procedunt, ut puta mater ; nutrix quoque et avia possunt, potest et soror. Sed et si qua alia mulier fnerit, cujus prsetor perpensam pie- tatem intellexerit non sexus vere- cimdiam egredientem, sed pietate productam non continere injuriam pupillorum, admittet earn ad accu- sationem. D. xxvi. but only those who are induced to do so through feelings of affection, as a mother, a nurse, or a grandmother, or a sister, who may all become ac- cusers. But the praetor will admit any other woman to make the accu- sation, in whom he recognises a real affection, and who, without overstep- ping the modesty of her sex, is im- j)elled by this affection not to endure the pupil suffering harm. 10. 1. 6, 7. The action is called quasi puhJica, because on tlie one hand it had the private object of securing the pupil's interests, and on the other had, like public actions, criminal consequences, and^ might be brought by a person not interested in the private result. Women, as a general rule, could not institute public actions. (D. xlviii. 2. 1.) 4. Impuberes non possunt tutores suos suspectos postulare ; puberes autem curatores suos ex consilio ne- cessariorurn suspectos possunt argu- ere, et ita divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt. 4. No person below the age of pur berty can bring an accusation against his tutor as suspected : but those who have attained that age may, under thi advice of their near relations, accusi their curators. Such is the decisioi given in a rescript of the Emperori Severus and Antoninus. D. xxvi. 10. 7. 5. Suspectus autem est, qui non ex fide tutelam gerit, Ucet solvendo sit, ut Julianus quoque rescripsit. Sed et antequam incipiat tutelam gerere tutor, posse eum quasi sus- pectum removeri idem Julianus rescripsit, et secundum eum con- stitutum est. 5. A tutor is suspected who doeg not faithfully execute his trust, al- though perfectly solvent, as Julian writes, who also thinks that even \ fore he enters on his office, a tui may be removed, as suspected ; and a constitution has been made in acr cordance with this opinion. D. xxvi. 10. 8. Ulpian says that a tutor could not be suspectus before he en- tered on his office, and that if there were any reason to think him an improper person beforehand, the magistrate would forbid him to assume the administration. (D. xxvi. 10. 3. 5 and 12.) Jus- tinian decides in opposition to this. 6. Suspectus autem remotus, si 6. A suspected j:>erson, if removed quidem ob dolum, famosus est ; si on account of fraud, is infamous, but ob culpam, non seque. not if for neglect only. C. v. 40. 9. For the meaning of the word infamia see Introd. sec. 48. 7. Si quis autem suspectus postu- latur, quoad cognitio finiatur, inter- dicitur ei administratio, ut Papiniano visum est. 7. If an action is brought against any one as suspected, his administra- tion, according to Papinian, is sus- pended while the accusation is pend- ing. D. xlvi. 3. 14. 1. LIB. I. TIT. XXVI. S5 8. Sed si snspecti cognitio sus- 8. If a process is commenced against cepta fuerit, posteaque tutor vel a tutor or curator, as suspected, and curator decesserit, extinguitur sus- he dies while it is going on, the process jjecti cognitio. is at an end. D. xxvi. 10. 11. The action to force the tutor or curator to give in his accounts would be brought against the heirs of the tutor or curator. But the suspecti cognitio could not, as its object was to remove the tutor or curator, not to recover money from him. The crimen suspecti could only be brought against a person actually tutor or curator, and was at an end if the office came to an end, not only by death, but in any way. (D. xxvi. 10. 11.) 9. Si quis tutor copiam sui non 9. If a tutor fails to appear, that faciat ut alimenta pupillo decernan- a certain amount of maintenance may tur, cavetur epistola divorum Severi be fixed on for his pupil, it is provided et Antonini, ut in possessionem bono- by a rescript of the Emperors Severus rum ejus pupillus mittatur ; et quae and Antoninus, that the pupil shall mora deteriora futura sunt, dato be put into the possession of the effects curatore distrahi jubentiu*. Ergo of the tutor, and that after a curator ut suspectus removeri poterit, qui has been appointed, those things, which non prsestat alimenta. are perishable, may be sold. There- fore a tutor who does not afford main- tenance to his pupil may be removed, as suspected. D, xxvi. 10. 7. 2. The prastor generally determined the amount to be annually expended on the maintenance and education of the pupil (the word alimenta must be taken very widely), when it was not de- termined by the testament of the father. The tutor had therefore to attend before the magistrate to state Avhat amount the fortune of the pupil would bear. Dato curatore^ i.e. a curator appointed for this particular purpose only. 10. Sed si quis prsesens negat 10. But if the tutor appears, and propter inopiam alimenta non posse denies that maintenance can be allowed decerni, si hoc per mendacium dicat, in consequence of the smallness of the remittendum eum esse ad prsef ectum pupil's estate ; if he says this falsely, urbi puniendum placuit ; sicut ille he shall be handed over to the prsefect remittitur, qui data pecunia ministe- of the city, to be punished, just as a rium tutelae redemit. person is handed over who has pur- chased a tutelage by bribery. D. xxvi. 10. 3. 15. The praetor had no criminal jurisdiction, and therefore persons were sent for punishment to the prcefectus urhi, (D. i. 12. 1.) In the provinces the prcBses could punish, as well as remove, the tutor. 11. Libertus quoque, si fraudu- 11. Also a freedman, who is proved lenter tutelam filiorum vel nepotum to have been guilty of fraud, when 86 LIB. I. TIT. XXVI. patroni gessisse probetur, ad praefec- acting as tutor to the son or grandson turn urbi remittitur puniendus. of liis patron, is handed over to the prsefect of the city to be punished. D. xxvi. 10. 2. 12. Novissime sciendum est, eos 12. Lastly, it must be known that qui fraiidulenter tutelam vel curam they who are guilty of fraud in their administrant, etiamsi satis offerant, administration, must be removed, al- removendos a tutela ; quia satisdatio though they offer sufficient security, tutoris propositum malevolum non For giving security makes no change mutat, sed diutius grassandi in re in the malevolent purpose of the tutor, familiari facultatem prsestat. but only procures him a longer oppor- tunity of injuring the estate. D. xxvi. 10. 5. 6. A person is considered thus open to suspicion whose general character and conduct warrant the suspicion. But a zealous and honest man, as we learn in the next paragraph, is not to be re- moved on suspicion, because he is poor. 13. Suspectum enim eum puta- 13. "We also deem every man sus- mus, qui moribus talis est ut sus- pected, whose conduct is such that we pectus sit. Enimvero tutor vel cannot but suspect him. A tutor or curator, quamvis pauper est, fidelis curator who is faithful and diligent, is tamen et diligens, removendus non not to be removed, as a suspected per- est quasi suspectus. son, merely because he is poor. D. xxvi. 10. 8. I LIBEE SECUNDUS Tit. I. DE DIVISIONS KEEUM ET QUALITATE. Having treated in the first book of the law of persons, the Insti- tutes now proceed to treat of the law of things — that is, they pass from persons who exercise rights to things over which rights are exercised. Rights may be divided into those which we have in or over things as against all the world, and those which we have against particular persons. (See Introd. sec. 61.) The second book of the Institutes, and the first portion of the third, treat of the former class, and of the mode in which they are acquired. The most proper mode of treating the law of things would be, perhaps, first to inquire of what divisions things themselves are susceptible ; next, to divide rights over things (Jura in rem) according to the extent of the right ; and lastly, to treat of the mode in which those rights are acquired. To a certain extent this mode of dividing the subject is adopted in the Institutes, but not very distinctly or expressly. Things themselves may be divided, generally, by making the basis of division either the re- lation in which they stand to persons, or something inherent in the nature of the things. Things divided in the first way may be divided according as they are the subject of the rights of all men or no men on the one hand, and of particular men on the other, the latter class receiving modifications according to the character in which particular men hold them. This division of things is treated of in the first sections of this Title. The most promi- nent distinction inherent in things is that of things corporeal and things incorporeal, and this is treated of in the second Title. There are other divisions of things (see Introd. sees. 52-60) which are alluded to in the Institutes, but not expressly noticed. A person may have the whole sum of all rights over a thing when in Roman law he was said to have the dominium. These rights of the dominus were summed up in the jus utendi, that is, making use of the thing ; the jus fruendi, that is, reaping the fruits and profits ; and the jus abutendi, that is, consuming the 88 LIB. II. TIT. I. thing, if capable of consumption. Or any one of the jura in rem may be separated from the rest and enjoyed by different persons. (See Introd. sec. 64.) These fragments of the dominium, called ser- vitudes, are treated of in the third and three following Titles. Or a person may have a right over a thing in the ownership of another, limited by the extent to which he has a claim against the owner, as a creditor has over the thing given him in pledge as a security for the debt. This right, generally termed in Roman law ihe jus pignoris, is not spoken of expressly in the Institutes, but a brief sketch of the law on the subject will be found in the conclusion of the notes to the fifth Title. The Institutes then recur to the modes by which the owner- ship in things is acquired, and the subject is divided according as ownership is acquired in a particular thing, or in a universitas rerum, that is, the aggregate of rights possessed by a particular person. Two of the principal modes of acquiring particular things, occu- pation, that is, being the first person to appropriate an unappro- priated thing, and tradition, that is, the OAvner handing over the thing to another person with the intention of transferring the owner- ship, and the transferee receiving the thing with the intention of becoming owner of it, have been treated of in the first Title, as also have the subordinate modes of accession, when an owner ac- quires by the natural increment of the thing owned, or when, the property of two owners being somehow mixed up, the law gives the result to one only, and specification, when a new thing is created, and belongs to the creator. All these are said to be modes of acquiring things jure naturali. Two modes of acquiring particular things jure civili are then noticed. (1.) The sixth Title treats of usu- capion, the process by which the law attached the legal ownership after a certain length of possession. (2.) The seventh Title treats of certain cases in which gift might be looked on as a different mode of conferring ownership from tradition. This ends the discussion of the modes of acquiring the ownership in particular things. The eighth and ninth Titles speak of certain restrictions on alienation, and of one person acquiring ownership through other persons. In the tenth Title the Institutes proceed to discuss the modes of acquiring a universitas rerum. The two chief modes are, the gift of an hereditas by testament, and the succession to an liereditas in case of intestacy. The subject of testaments occupies the re- mainder of the second book, and that of succession to an intestate occupies the first nine Titles of the third book. Some minor modes of acquiring a universitas rerum, of which arrogation is the most important, are then noticed ; and with the twelfth Title of the third book the treatment of jura in rem, and of the modes of acquiring ownership in them, is brought to a conclusion. This treatment of the modes of acquisition is subject to the inconve- nience noticed by Gains (ii. 191), that legacies which are a mode of acquiring specific things, are treated of as coming under the acquisition of a universitas rerum by testament. LIB. 11. TIT. I. 89 Previously to the legislation of Justinian, there had been two other modes of acquisition J?/?'e civili, applicable both in the case of particular things and in that of a universitas rerum, which are treated of by Gains at considerable length. (GrAi. ii. 18-37. See also Ulpian, Reg. 19. 2.) These were mancipation, the process by which res mancipi were conveyed from one Roman citizen to another (see Introd. sec. 59), and in jure cessio. The cessio injure was a fictitious suit, in which the person who was to acquire the thing claimed (vindicahat) the thing as his own, the person who was to transfer it acknowledged the justice of the claim, and the magistrate pronounced it to be the property {addicehat) of the claimant. Mancipation and cessiones injure were both abolished by Justinian. Ulpian {Reg. 19. 2) also notices two others, adjudi- catione, i. e. by property held in common being judicially marked out, so that the separate portions were owned, and lege, by some special statute, as when legacies devolved under the lex Papia Poppcea, (Bk. ii. 20.) The explanation of the term possession, which occurs fre- quently in this Title, may be conveniently deferred until we reach the sixth Title. Superiore libro de jure persona- In the preceding book we have rum exposiiimus : modo videamus treated of the law of persons. Let de rebus, qua? vel in nostro patri- us now speak of things, which either monio vel extra patrimoniuin nos- are in ovir patrimony, or not in our trum habentur. Qusedam enim na- patrimony. For some things by the turali jure communia sunt omnium, law of nature are common to all ; qusedam publica, quaedam univer- some are public ; some belong to cor- sitatis, qusedam nulHus, pleraque porate bodies, and some belong to no singulorum, quae ex variis causis one. Most things are the property cuique adquiruntur, sicut ex sub- of individuals, who acquire them in jectis apparebit. diJElerent ways, as will appear here- -^ after. Gal ii. 1 ; D. i. 8. 2. Under the word res, thing, is included whatever is capable of being the subject of a right. The principal division of Grains is into things divini juris and liumani juris. Here the principal division is according as things are in nostro patrimonio, that is, belong to individuals ; or extra nostrum patrimonium , that is, belong to all men {communes), to the state {publiccB), to no xnQn {nullius), or to bodies of men {univer sitatis). The words bona smd pecunia, it may be observed, are only used of things i?t Jiostro patinmonio, 1. Et quidem naturali jure com- 1. By the law of nature these munia sunt omnium hsec : aer, aqua things are common to mankind — the profluens, et mare et per hoc litora air, running water, the sea, and con- maris. Nemo igitur ad litus maris sequently the shores of the sea. No accedere prohibetur, dum tamen one, therefore, is forbidden to ap- villis et monumentis et aedificiis abs- proach the sea-shore, provided that tineat : quia non sunt juris gentium, he respects habitations, monuments, sicut et mare. and buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations. D. i. 8. 2. 1 ; D. i. 8. 4. 90 LIB. II. TIT. I. Of things that are common to all any one may take such a portion as he pleases. Thus a man may inhale the air, or float his ship on any part of the sea. As long as he occupies any por- tion, his occupation is respected ; but directly his occupation ceases, the thing occupied again becomes common to all. The sea-shore, that is, the shore as far as the waves go at furthest, was considered to belong to all men. For the purposes of self- defence any nation had a right to occupy the shore and to repel strangers. Individuals, if they built on it, by means of piles or otherwise, were secured in exclusive enjoyment of the portion occupied ; but if the building was taken away, their occupancy was at an end, and the spot on which the building stood again became common. (D. i. 8. 6.) 2. Flumina autem omnia et por- 2. All rivers and ports are public ; tns pnblica sunt. Ideoque jus pis- hence the right of fiishing in a port, or candi omnibus commune est in portu in rivers, is common to all men. fluminibusque. D. i. 8. 4. 1 ; D. xlvii. 10. 13. 7. The word puhlicus is sometimes used as equivalent to com-' munis, but is properly used, as here, for what belongs to the people. Things public belong to a particular people, but may be used and enjoyed by all men. Roads, public places and build- ings might be added to those mentioned in the text. The parti- cular people or nation in whose territory public things lie may permit all the world to make use of them, but exercise a special jurisdiction to prevent any one injuring them. In this light even the shore of the sea was said, though not very strictly, to be a res puhlica : it is not the property of the particular people whose territory is adjacent to the shore, but it belongs to them to see that none of the uses of the shore are lost by the act of indivi- duals. Celsus says, Litora in qucB populus Romanus im-perium hahet populi JRomani esse arbitror (D, xliii. 8. 3), where, if we are to bring this opinion of Celsus into harmony with the opinions of other jurists, we must understand ^populi Romani esse ' to mean ^ are subject to the guardianship of the Roman people.' 3. Est autem litus maris, quatenus 3. The sea-shore extends as far as hybernus fluctus maximus excurrit. the greatest winter flood runs up. D. 1. 16. 96. Celsus ascribes this definition to Cicero, who apparently bor- rowed it from Aquilius. (CiC Top, 7.) 4. Riparum quoque usus publicus 4. The public use of the banks of est juris gentium, sicut ipsius flu- a river is i^art of the law of nations, minis. Itaque navem ad eas adpli- just as is that of the river itself. All care, funes arboribus ibi natis reli- persons therefore are as much at liberty gare, onus aliquod in his reponere to bring their vessels to the bank, to cuilibet liberum est, sicut per ipsum fasten ropes to the trees growing there, ' flumen navigare ; sed proprietas and to place any part of their cargo earum illorum est quorum preediis there, as to navigate the river itself. LIB. II. TIT. I. 91 hserent: qua de causa arbores quoque But the banks of a river are the pro- iii iisdem natse eorumdem sunt. perty of those whose land they adjoin ; and consequently the trees growing on them are also the property of the same persons. D. i. 8. 5. The banks of rivers belonged to the proprietors of the adja- cent lands ; but the use of them, for the purposes of navigation or otherwise, was open to all. The proprietors, therefore, could alone reap the profits of the soil ; but if they attempted to exer- cise their rights so as to hinder the public use of the bank, they would be restrained by an interdict of the prsetor. (See Introd. sec. 107.) 5. Litorum quoque usus publicus 5. The public use of the sea-shore, juris gentium est, sicut ipsius maris ; too, is part of the law of nations, as is et ob id quibuslibet Uberum est that of the sea itself ; and therefore casam ibi ponere in quam se reci- any person is at liberty to place on it plant, sicut retia siccare et ex mari a cottage, to which he may retreat, or reducere. Proprietas autem eorum to dry his nets there, and haul them potest intelligi nullius esse, sed ejus- from the sea ; for the shores may be dem juris esse cujus et mare, et quse said to be the property of no man, subjacet mari terra vel arena. but are subject to the same law as the sea itself, and the sand or ground beneath it. D. i. 8. 5. pr. and 1. The shores over which the Koman people had power were not the property of the Roman people, although it belonged specially to the Roman people to see that the free use of them was not hindered. (See note to paragraph 2.) 6. Universitatis sunt, non singu- 6. Among things belonging to a cor- lorum, veluti quse in civitatibus sunt porate body, not to individuals, are, for theatra, stadia et similia, et si quae instance, buildings in cities, theatres, alia sunt communia civitatum. race-courses, and other similar places belonging in common to a whole city. D. i. 8. 6. 1. Universitas is a corporate body, such as the guilds (^collegia) of different trades ; for instance, the collegium pistorum. Res universitatis are things which can be used by the members of the universitas. Both the state and corporate bodies had property which they held exactly like individuals ; as, for instance, the agri vectigales, or slaves and lands belonging to a collegium. Such things were not 'puhliccB or universitatis in the sense in which the words are used here ; for every member of the state or corporation could not use and enjoy such things, although the proceeds went to the general purposes of the state or corporation. They were, like the property of individuals, in nostro patrimonio, the state or corpo- ration being looked on as any other owner. 7. Nullius autem sunt res sacrse 7. Things sacred, religious, and et religiosse et sanctse ; quod enim holy, belong to no one ; for that which 92 .LIB. II. TIT. I. divini juris est, id nullius in bonis is siibject to divine law is not the pro- Gai. ii. 9. Res nullius are either things unappropriated by any one, in Avhich sense things common, or unoccupied lands, or wild animals, are res nullius ; or they are things to which a religious character prevents any human right of property attaching. 8. Sacrse res sunt, quae rite et per jDontifices Deo consecrata3 sunt, veluti sedes sacra? et donaria qua3 rite ad ministerium Dei dedicata sunt. Quse etiam per nostram constitutio- nem alienari et obligari prohibuimus, excepta causa redemptionis capti- yorum. Si qiiis vero auctoritate sua quasi sacrum sibi constituent, sacrum non est sed prof anum. Locus autem in quo cedes sacra? sunt sedificata?, etiam diruto sedificio sacer adhuc manet, ut et Papinianus rescripit. D. i. 8. G. 8. Tilings are sacred which have been duly consecrated by the pontiffs, as sacred buildings and offerings, pro- perly dedicated to the service of God, which we have forbidden by our con- stitution to be sold or mortgaged, except for the purpose of purchasing the freedom of captives. But, if any one consecrates a building by his own authority, it is not sacred, but profane. But ground on which a sacred edifice has once been erected, even after the building has been destroyed, continues to be sacred, as Papinian also writes. ; ; C. i. 2. 21. The distinction between res sacrce and religiosce, in the older pagan law, was that the former were things dedicated to the celes- tial gods, the latter were things abandoned to the infernal — relictce, diis manibus. (Gai. ii. 4.) In order that a thing should be sacra, it was necessary that it should be dedicated by a pontiff and with the authority of the people, afterwards of the senate, finally of the emperor. (D. i. 8. 9. 1.) Things consecrated were by law inalienable. The support of the poor in a time of famine (C. i. 2. 21), and afterwards the payment of the debts of the church (Nov. 120. 10), sufficed, as well as the release of captives, as reasons for the sale of consecrated moveables ; but immoveables were always inalienable. 9. Religiosum locum unusquis- que sua voluntate facit, dum mor- tuum infert in locum suum. In communem autem locum purum invito socio inferre non licet ; in commune vero sepulcrum etiam in- vitis ceteris licet inferre. Item si alienus ususfructus est, proprieta- rium placet, nisi consentiente usu- frvictuario, locum religiosum non facere. In alienum locum concedente domino licet inferre ; et licet i)ostea ratum habuerit quam illatus est mor- tuus, tamen religiosus fit locus. D. i. 8. 6. 4 ; 9. Any man at his pleasure makes a place religious by burying a dead body in his own ground ; but it is not permitted to bury a dead body in land hitherto pure, which is held in common, against the wishes of a coproprietor. But when a sepulchre is held in com- mon, any one coproprietor may bury in it, even against the wishes of the rest. So, too, if another person has the usufruct, the proprietor may not, with- out the consent of the usufructuary, render the place religious. But a dead body may be laid in a place belonging to another person, with the consent of the owner ; and even if the owner only ratifies the act after the dead body has been buried, yet the place is religious. D. xi. 7. 2. 7. LIB. II. TIT. I. 93 Directly the body or bones of a dead person, whether slave or free, were buried, the ground in which they were buried became religiosus, although previously pure, that is, neither sacer, reli- giosus, nor sanctus (D. xi. 7. 2. 4), provided that the person burying the body was the owner of the soil or had the consent of the owner. Although the place was a res nullius, yet there could be a special kind of property in it. There were tombs and burial- places in which none but certain persons, as, for instance, members of the same family, could be buried ; and this kind of interest in a locus religiosus was transmissible to heirs, or even to purchasers of a property, if the right of burying in a particular place was attached, as it might be, to the ownership of that property. (D. xviii. 1. 24.) 10. Sanctse quoque res, veluti inuri et portfe, quodammodo divini jiiris sunt, et ideo nullius in bonis sunt. Ideo autem muros sanctos dicimus, quia poena capitis consti- tuta sit in eos qui aliquid in muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum eas partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fece- rint, sanctiones vocamus. Gai. ii. 8. 9 ; D. i. J 10. Holy things also, as the walls and gates of a city, are to a certain degree subject to divine law, and therefore are not part of the property of any one. The walls of a city are said to be holy, inasmuch as any ofience against them is punished capitally ; so too those parts of laws by which punishments are established against transgressors, we term sanctions. ; D. i. 8. 9. 3 ; D. i. 8. 11. Res sanct(B are those things which, without being sacred, are protected against the injuries of men (^sanctum est quod ah injuria hominum defensum atgue munitum est (D. i. 8. 8.)) by having a severe penalty attached to the violation of their security. 11. Singulorum autem hominum multis modis res fiunt ; quarumdam enim rerum dominium nanciscimur jure naturali, quod, sicut diximus, appellatur jus gentium ; quarumdam jure civili. Commodius est itaque a vetustiore jure incipere ; palam est autem vetustius esse jus naturale, quod cum ipso genere humano rerum natura prodidit. Civilia enim jura tunc esse coeperunt, cum et civitates condi et magistratus creari et leges scribi coeperunt. 11. Things become the property of individuals in various ways ; of some we acquire the ownership by natural law, which, as we have observed, is. also termed the law of nations ; of others by the civil law. It will be most convenient to begin with the more ancient law ; and it is very evi- dent that the law of nature, established by nature at the first origin of man- kind, is the more ancient, for civil laws- could then only begin to exist, whent states began to be founded, magis- trates to be created, and laws to be written. D. xli. 1. 1. We now proceed to inquire how property is acquired in par- ticular things. It is acquired either by natural or civil modes. The natural mode first treated of is occupation, of which there are two essential elements ; that the thing, the property in which is acquired, should be a res nullius, and that the person acquiring it should bring the thing into his possession, that is, into his power> 94 LIB. II. TIT. I. and do so with the intention of holding it as his property (joro suo hahendi). 12. Wild beasts, birds, fish, and all animals, which live either in the sea, the air, or on the earth, so soon as they are taken by any one, immedi- ately become by the law of nations the property of the captor ; for natural reason gives to the first occupant that which had no previous owner. And it is immaterial whether a man takes wild beasts or birds upon his oami ground, or on that of another. Of course any one who enters the ground of another for the sake of hunting or fowling, may be prohibited by the pro- prietor, if he perceives his intention of entering. Whatever of this kind you take is regarded as your property, so long as it remains in your power, but when it has escaped and recovered its natural liberty, it ceases to be yours, and again becomes the property of him who captures it. It is considered to have recovered its natural liberty, if it has either escaped out of your sight, or if, although not out of sight, it yet could not be pursued without great difficulty. Gai. ii. 67 ; D. xli. 1. 1. 1 ; D. xli. 1. 3 pr. and 1 ; D. xli. 1. 3. 2 ; D. xli. 1. 5. Directly the thing ceases to be in the power of the occupant, the property in it is lost, and it is exactly as if it had never been seized or occupied. What is meant by being in the power of the occupant must vary according to the nature of the thing occu- pied. Several examples are given in this and the following paragraphs. 12. Ferae igitur bestice et volucres et pisces, id est, omnia animalia qu?e mari, coelo et terra nascuntur, simul atque ab aliquo capta fuerint, jure gentium statim illius esse incipiunt ; quod enim ante nuUius est, id natu- rali ratione occupanti conceditur. Nee interest, feras bestias et volu- cres utrum in suo fundo quisque capiat, an in alieno. Plane qui in alienum fundum ingreditur venandi aut aucupandi gratia, potest a do- mino, si is providerit, prohiberi ne ingrediatur. Quidquid autem eorum ceperis, eo usque tuum esse intelli- gitur, donee tua custodia coercetur ; cum vero evaserit custodiam tuam, et in naturalem libertatem se rece- perit, tuum esse desinit, et rursus occupantis fit. Naturalem autem libertatem recipere intelligitur, cum vel oculos tuos ejffugerit, vel ita sit in conspectu tuo, ut difficilis sit ejus j)ersecutio. 13. It has been asked, whether, if you have wounded a wild beast, so that it could be easily taken, it imme- diately becomes your property. Some have thought that it does become yours directly you wound it, and that it con- tinues to be yours while you continue to pursue it, but that if you cease to pursue it, it then ceases to be yours, and again becomes the property of the first person who captures it. Others have thought that it does not become your property until you have captured it. We confirm this latter opinion, because many accidents may happen to prevent your capturing it. D. xli. 1. 5. 1. ^■- Gains, in this passage of the Digest, informs us that the former opinion was that of Trebatius. 13. Illud qu8esitum est, an si fera bestia ita vulnerata sit ut capi possit, statim tua esse intelligatur. ^uibusdam placuit statim esse tuam, et eousque tuam videri donee earn persequaris ; quod si desieris perse- qui, desinere tuam esse, et rursus fieri occupantis. Alii non aliter puta- verunt tuam esse, quam si eam ceperis. Sed posteriorem sententiam nos confirmamus, quia multa accidere possunt ut eam non capias. LIB. II. TIT. I. 95 14. Apiiim quoque natura fera est. Itaque qii?e in arbore tiia con- sederint, antequam a te alveo inclii- dantiir, non magis tuae intelligimtur esse, quam volucres quae in arbore tua nidum fecerint ; ideoque si alius eas incluserit, is earum dominus erit. Favos quoque si quos efFece- rint, quilibet eximere potest. Plane integra re, si provideris ingredien- tem fundum tuum, poteris eum jure prohibere ne ingrediatur. Exanien quoque quod ex alveo tuo evolave- rit, eousque intelligitur esse tuum, donee in conspectu tuo est, nee dif- ficilis ejus est persecutio : alioquin occupantis fit. 14. Bees also are wild by nature. Therefore, bees that swarm upon your tree, until you have hived them, are no more considered to be your pro- perty than the birds which build their nests on your tree ; so, if any one else hive them, he becomes their owner. Any one, too, is at liberty to take the honeycombs the bees may have made. But of course, if, before anything has been taken, you see any one entering on your land, you have a right to prevent his entering. A swarm which has flown from your hive is still considered yours as long as it is in your sight and may easily be x^ursued ; otherwise it becomes the property of the first per- son that takes it. D. xli. 1. 5. 2-4. It is said tliat the owner of the land, if he wished to secure the bees for himself, must prevent any one entering integra re ; because, if the bees are once taken, they belong to the person who takes them, although the owner of the land may have an action against the person entering against his will. 15. Pavonumet columbarumfera natura est : nee ad rem pertinet, quod ex consuetudine avolare et revolare solent ; nam et apes idem faciunt, quarum constat feram esse naturam. Cervos quoque ita qui- dam mansuetos habent, ut in silvas ire et redire soleant, quorum et ipso- rum feram esse naturam nemo negat. In iis autem animalibus quse ex consuetudine abire et redire solent, talis regula comprobata est, ut eousque tua esse intelligantur, donee animum revertendi habeant ; nam si revertendi animum habere desierint, etiam tua esse desinunt, et fiunt occupantium. Revertendi autem animum videntur desinere habere, cum revertendi consuetudi- nem deseruerint. 15. Peacocks, too, and pigeons are naturally wild, nor does it make any difference that they are in the habit of flying out and then returning again, for bees, which without doubt are natu- rally wild, do so too. Some persons have deer so tame, that they will go into the woods, and regularly return again ; yet no one denies that deer are naturally wild. But, with respect to animals which are in the habit of going and returning, the rule has been adopted, that they are considered yours as long as they have the intention of returning, but if they cease to have this intention, they cease to be yours, and become the property of the first person that takes them. These animals are supposed to have lost the intention, when they have lost the habit, of returning. Gal ii. 68 ; D. xli. 1. 55. 16. Gallinarum autem et anserum non est fera natura ; idque ex eo possumus intelligere, quod aliae sunt gallinse quas feras vocamus, item alii anseres quos feros appellamus. Ideoque si anseres tui aut gallince tuse aliquo casu turbati turbatseve evolaverint, licet conspectum tuum effugerint, quocumque tamen loco 16. But fowls and geese are not naturally wild, which we may learn from there being particular kinds of fowls and geese which we term Avild. And, therefore, if your geese or fowls should be frightened, and take flight, they are still regarded as yours wher- ever they may be, although you may have lost sight of them ; and whoever 96 LIB. II. TIT. I. sint, tui tiireve esse intelliguntur ; et detains such animals with a view to his qui lucrandi animo ea animalia re- own profit, commits a theft, tinet, furtum committere intelligitur. D. xli. 1. 5. 6. 17. Item ea quee ex hostibus capi- 17. The things we take from onr mus, jnre gentium statim nostra enemies become immediately ours by fiunt, adeo quidem ut et liberi the law of nations, so that even free- homines in servitutem nostrum de- men thus become our slaves ; but if ducantur. Qui tamen, si evaserint they afterwards escape from us, and nostram 'potestatem et ad suos re- return to their own people, they regain versi fuerint, pristinum statum re- their former condition. cipiunt. Gai. ii. 69 ; D. xli. 1. 5. 7 ; D. xli. 1. 7. The possessions of an enemy were always looked on as res mdlius ; the first person who took them became the owner. Practically, of course, things taken in war did not belong to the particular soldier who took them, unless in very exceptional cases, because he took them as one of a large body, whose exertions all contributed, directly or indirectly, to the capture. The army, again, did but represent the state ; and though moveables were generally given up to the soldiers and divided among them, land taken in Avar was claimed by the state, whose servants the soldiers were and in whose behalf they fought. Just as the freeman, who had been made a prisoner and a slave, regained his status when he returned to his own country by the jus postliminii (see Bk. i. Tit. 12. 5), so everything that returned to its former state of being free from any owner, was said to do so by a process analogous to the jus postliminii, Marcian, for example, speaks in the Digest (i. 8. 6) of a person building on a shore, and after having said that the soil is only his while the building remains, goes on, alioquin, mdijicio dilapso, quasi jure postliminii revertitur locus in pristinam causam. We have no mention here, which we might expect to have, of the mode by which things retaken in war returned to their owners, nor what things did so return. We know that the things that did return were said to do so by postliminium : Pomponius says, dticB species postliminii sunt, aut ut ipsi revertamur aut aliquid recipiamus, (D. xlix. 15. 14.) Generally speaking, if the property of individuals was captured by an enemy and retaken, it was prceda, that is, was part of the spoil of war, and belonged to the state, not to its former owner. But there were certain things to which a jus postliminii attached, and which, if retaken, reverted to their original owner, and did not form part of the prceda. These things, so far as we know them, were land, slaves, horses, mules, and ships used in war. (CiC. Top. 8 ; D. xlix. 15. 2.) 18. Item lapiUi et gemmse et 18. Precious stones, gems, and cetera quae in litore inveniuntur, other things, found upon the sea- jure naturali statim inventoris fiunt. shore, become immediately by natural law the property of the finder. D. i. 8. 3. LIB. II. TIT. I. 97 In the next section Justinian leaves the subject of acquisition by occupation, but afterwards speaks of matters that properly belong to it, of islands rising in the sea (paragr. 22), and things found which have been intentionally abandoned by their owners (paragr. 47, 48). 19. Item ea quae ex animalibns 19. AU that is born of animals of dominio tuo siibjectis nata sunt, which you are the owner, becomes by eodem jure tibi aclquiruntur. the same law your property. D. xli. 1. 6. From the 19th to the 35th paragraph inclusive, may be taken together as bearing more or less on the subject of accession. The Latin word accessio always means an increase or addition to some- thing previously belonging to us, but commentators have used the word accession not only for the increase itself, but also for the mode in which the increase becomes our property. First, there is the instance given in this section and in the 35th section of the produce of animals, and the fruits of lands belonging to us. They are really part of that which originally belonged to us. The owner of the wheat-seed is potentially the owner of the blade and the ear ; the owner of the animal is potentially the owner of its young. Again, a thing may be an accessio ^ an actual gain or increase to our property, which was in theory of law, but not in fact, ours already. This is the case with an island in a river, an instance given in sec. 22. The bed of the river becomes publicus by the mere fact of the river flowing over it ; if any portion of the bed is dried so as to form an island, it ceases to be public, and, becoming private, is presumed to be a part of the adjacent land. It is something not newly acquired, but restored to us by nature ; we have been temporarily deprived of it, and again resume our rights over it. Again, a person who uses materials sometimes only gives them a new form, sometimes makes with them a new thing, different from the materials themselves. When he does the latter, the thing he makes, the nova species, as the jurists termed it, becomes his by the fact of his making it. The thing did not exist, and he has made it to exist, and it belongs to him by a title not dissimilar to that of occupation : it is a new thing, which he is the first to get into his power. To take an instance given in paragraph 25, a man who makes wine out of another's grapes has made something new of a kind distinct from the grapes themselves, and the wine belongs to him. This specification may be, perhaps, regarded as a distinct mode of acquisition. Again, when two thinocs belonorino; to different owners are united so as to become integral portions of a common whole, but one portion is subordinate and inferior to the other, we have to ask whether the owner of the greater became the owner of the less. The Roman jurists answered this by asking whether the H 98 LIB. II. TIT. I. two things could after their union be separated from each other. If this was physically possible, each owner of the respective por- tions continued to be owner ; but if not, the owner of the more important or principal thing became the owner of the less im- portant or accessory thing. 20. Prseterea quod per alliivio- 20. Moreover, the alluvial soil nem agro tuo Humeri adjecit, jure added by a river to your land becomes gentium tibi adquiritur. Est autem yours by the law of nations. Allu- alluvio incrementum latens ; per vion is an imperceptible increase ; alluvionem autem id videtur adjici, and that is added by alluvion, which quod ita paulatim adjicitur ut Intel- is added so gradually that no one can ligere non possis quantum quoquo perceive how much is added at any memento temporis adjiciatur. one moment of time. D. xli. 1. 7. 1. The deposit of earth gradually formed by alluvion upon the bank of a river is inseparable from the native soil of the bank ; and the owner of the latter acquires the former by right of ac- cession. An exception was made in the case of agri limitati, that is, lands belonging to the state by right of conquest, and granted or sold in plots. If these plots were enlarged by alluvion, the in- crease did not become the proyjerty of the owner of the plot. (D. xli. 1. 16.) The reason seems to be that the particles deposited by alluvion were considered public as forming portion of the cur- rent of the stream, the waters of which were public, and when these particles were deposited by the side of a plot granted or sold by the state, they were not allowed to enlarge the plot of which the state had already determined the proper size. 21. Quod si vis fluminis partem 21. But if the violence of a river aliquam ex tuo prredio detraxerit, et should bear away a portion of your vicini prsedio attulerit, palam est land, and unite it to that of your earn tuam permanere. Plane, si neighbour, it undoubtedly still con- longiore tempore fundo vicini tui tinues yours. If, however, it remains hseserit, arboresque quas secum for a long time united to your neigh- traxerit in eum fundum radices hour's land, and the trees, which it egerint, ex eo tempore videntur vi- swept away with it, take root in his cini fundo adquisitse esse. ground, these trees from that time be- come part of your neighbour's estate. D. xli. 1. 7. 2. When a large mass of earth is carried to the side of a river bank, it is quite possible to detach it, and consequently the mass remains the property of its former owner ; but if it becomes in- separable in the manner described in the text, then the property, in it is chano-ed. Videntur acquisitcB is substituted here for videtur acquisita in the Digest, to include the trees themselves as well as the soil of the fragment. (See paragr. 31.) 22. Insula quse in mari nata est, 22, When an island is formed in quod raro accidit, occupantis fit ; the sea, which rarely happens, it is nullius enim esse creditur. In flu- the property of the first occupant ; LIB. 11. TIT. I. 99 mine nata, quod frequenter accidit, si quidem mediam partem fiuminis tenet, communis est eorum qui ab utraque parte fluminis prope ripam prsedia possident, pro modo latitu- dinis cuj usque fundi, qu?e latitudo prope ripam sit. Quod si alteri parti proximior sit, eorum est tantum qui ab ea parte prope ripam prsedia pos- sident. Quod si aliqua parte divi- sum sit flumen, deinde infra unitum, agrum alicujus in formam insulse redegerit, ejusdem permanet is ager cujus et fuerat. for before occupation, it belongs to no one. But when an island is formed in a river, which frequently happens, if it is placed in the middle of it, it belongs in common to those who possess the lands near the banks on each side of the river, in proportion to the extent of each man's estate adjoining the banks. But, if the island is nearer to one side than the other, it belongs to those persons only who possess lands contiguous to the bank on that side. If a river divides itself and afterwards unites again, thus giving to any one's land the form of an island, the land still continues to belong to the person to whom it belonged before. D. xli. 1. 7. 3, 4. An island formed by a stream cutting off a portion of land could not be supposed to belong to any one but its former owner. But if the island was formed by the bed of the river becoming dry in any part, it might be doubtful to whom it belonged. The bed of the river, as long as the river flowed over it, was public, Ille alveus quern sihi flumen fecit, et si privatus antea fuit, incipit tamen esse publicus (D. xliii. 12. 1. 7) ; or rather the use of it was public, while the soil itself was the property of the private indivi- duals to whom the soil of the banks belonged, and therefore when the bed was dried, w^hen it had ceased to be subject to public use, the private owners resumed the rights of ownership over it. Quum exsiccatus esset alveus, proximorurn fit, quia jam populus eo noii ulitur, (D. Ixi. 1. 30. 1.) If the bed was not wholly but par- tially dried, the island formed would belong to the owner of the nearest bank, if it lay entirely on one side of the stream ; or if it lay partly on one side and partly on the other, it would belong to the owners of both banks in such proportion as a line drawn along the middle of the stream would divide it. 23 . Quod si natural! alveo in uni- versum derelicto, alia parte fluere coeperit, prior quidem alveus eorum est qui prope ripam ejus prsedia pos- sident, pro modo scilicet latitudinis cujusque agri, quse latitudo prope ripam sit. Novus autem alveus ejus juris esse incipit, cujus et ip- sum flumen, id est publicus. Quod si post aliquod tempus ad priorem alveum reversum fuerit flumen, rur- sus novus alveus eorum esse incipit qui prope ripam ejus prsedia pos- sident. 23. If a river, entirely forsaking its natural channel, begins to flow in another direction, the old bed of the river belongs to those who possess the lands adjoining its banks, in propor- tion to the extent that their respective estates adjoin the banks. The new bed follows the condition of the river, that is, it becomes public. And, if after some time the river returns to its former channel, the new bed again becomes the property of those who possess the lands contiguous to its banks. D. xli. 1. 7. 5. It might happen that the soil over which the river flowed was known to have belonged to a different person, and not to the H 2 100 LIB. II. TIT. I. owners of the adjacent banks. If the river changed its channel and left the soil dry, to whom was the recovered land to belong ? Could its original owner claim it, or was the presumption of law so fixed in favour of the owners of the adjacent banks that no- thing was admitted to rebut it ? Gains says that strict law was against the original owner, but adds, vix est ut id obtineat (D. xli. 1. 7. 5); equity would hardly allow such strictness to prevail in all cases. 24. Alia sane cansa est, si ciijus totus ager inundatus fuerit : neque enim inundatio fundi speciem com- mntat, et ob id si recesserit aqua, palam est eum fundum ejus manere cujus et fuit. 24. The case is quite different if any one's land is completely inun- dated ; for the inundation does not alter the nature of the land, and therefore, when the waters have re- ceded, the land is indisputably the property of its former owner. D. xli. 1. T. 6. An inundation is here contrasted with a change in the course of a river. A field overflowed with water is still a field, and as much belongs to its owner as if it were dry. 25. Cum ex aliena materia spe- cies aliqua facta sit ab aliquo, quseri Rolet quis eorum naturali ratione dominus sit, utrum is qui fecerit, an ille potius qui materia3 dominus fuerit. Ut ecce, si quis ex alienis uvis aut olivis aut spicis vinum aut oleum aut frumentum fecerit, aut ex alieno auro vel argento vel sere vas aliquod fecerit, vel ex alieno vino et melle mulsum miscuerit, vel ex medicamentis alienis emplastrum aut collyrium composuerit, vel ex aliena lana vestimentum fecerit, vel ex alienis tabulis navem vel arma- rium vel subsellium fabricaverit. Et post multas Sabinianorum et Proculianorum ambiguitates placuit media sententia existimantium, si ea species ad materiam reduci pos- sit, eum videri dominum esse, qui materise dominus fuerit ; si non pos- sit reduci, eum potius intelligi domi- num, qui fecerit : ut ecce, vas con- flatum potest ad rudem massam asris vel argenti vel auri reduci ; \'inimi autem aut oleum aut frumentum ad uvas et olivas et spicas reverti non potest, ac ne mulsum quidem ad vinum et mel resolvi potest. Quod si partim ex sua materia partim ex aliena speciem aliquam fecerit quis, veluti ex suo vino et alieno melle mulsum miscuerit, aut ex suis et alienis medicamentis emplastrum aut collyrium, aut ex sua lana et aliena 25. When one man has made any- thing with materials belonging to another, it is often asked which, ac- cording to natural reason, ought to be considered the proprietor, whether he who gave the form, or he rather who owned the materials. For instance, suppose a person has made wine, oil, or wheat, from the graj)es, olives, or .ears of corn belonging to another ; has cast a vessel out of gold, silver, or brass, belonging to another ; has made mead with another man's wine and honey ; has composed a plaster, or eye-salve, with another man's medica- ments ; has made a garment with another's wool ; or a ship, a chest, or a bench, with another man's timber. After long controversy between the Sabinians and Proculians, a middle opinion has been adopted, based on the following distinction. If the thing made can be reduced to its former rude materials, then the owner of the ma- terials is also considered the owner of the thing made ; but, if the thing can- not be so reduced, then he who made it is the owner of it. For example, a vessel when cast, can easily be reduced to its rude materials of brass, silver, or gold ; but wine, oil, or wheat, can- not be reconverted into grapes, olives, or ears of corn ; nor can mead be re- solved into wine and honey. But, if a man has made anything, partly with his own materials and partly with tha LIB. II. TIT. I. 101 vestimentnm fecerit, dubitandum materials of another, as if he has made non est hoc casu eum esse dominum mead Mdth his own wine and another qui fecerit, cum non sohim operam man's honey, or a plaster or eye-salve, snam dedit, sed et partem ejusdem partly with his own, and partly with materise prsestavit. another man's medicaments, or a gar- ment with his own and also with another man's wool, then in such cases, he who made the thing is un- doubtedly the proprietor ; since he not only gave his labour, but fur- nished also a part of the materials. Gal ii. 79 ; D. xli. 1. 7. 7 ; D. vi. 1. 5. 1 ; D. xH. 1. 27. 1. When materials belonging to different persons were mixed to- getiier, or one person bestowed his labour on the materials of another, although one person only might be the owner of the product, yet he did not become so at the expense of others. He was obliged to pay those whose materials or labour had been em- ployed the value of their respective materials or labour, and was liable to a condictio or personal action (see Introd. sec. 95) for the enforcement of the payment. He himself could claim the product itself by vindication or real action, given only to the owner of a thing. The jurists very commonly speak of a person being able to vindicate a thing as a mode of saying that he is the owner, the test of ownership being whether the supposed owner could or could not claim the thing by vindicatio. If he could bring a vindicatio, he could also bring a preliminary action called the actio ad, exldbendum, the object of which was to have the thing claimed produced to the tribunal, or to get damages if it was not produced. Supposing a person formed a thing with materials belonging to another, which was the one that could claim it by a real action, the maker of the thing or the owner of the materials ? The Pro- culians said, the thing is a new thing and its maker is the owner ; the Sabinians said, the materials remain, althcJugh their form is changed, and their proprietor is the owner of the thing made. The distinction sanctioned by Justinian decided the question ac- cording to the fact of there being or not being a really new thing made. If there was, then the reasoning of the Proculians held good, and the maker becomes the owner by a species of occupa- tion, quia quod factum est, ante nullius fuerat. If the thing made was only the old materials in a new form, then it belonged to the owner of the materials in accordance with the opinions of the Sabinians. The opinion of each school, therefore, was admitted w^here the facts were in accordance with it. In the latter part of the section Justinian says that if the materials were partly the property of the maker, the thing made certainly belonged to him. This must be understood strictly with reference to the case spoken of in the text, that, namely, of ma- terials, none being merely accessory, i. e. subordinate, to the others, being inseparably mixed together. If some of the materials were 102 LIB. II. TIT. I. only accessory, and the thing made was not a new thing, it would not necessarily belong to the maker, but would only belong to him if he were the owner of the principal materials ; and if the different materials were separable from each other, they would still belong to their respective owners. 26. Si tamen alienam purpuram 26. If, however, any one has woven vestimento suo quis intexuit, licet purple belonging to another into his pretiosior est purpura, accessionis own vestment, the purple, although vice cedit vestimento. Et qui domi- the more valuable, attaches to the nus fuit purpurse, adversus eum qui vestment as an accession, and its for- subripuit, habet furti actionem et mer owner has an action of theft and condictionem, sive ipse sit qui vesti- a condiction against the person who mentum fecit, sive alius ; nam ex- stole it from him, whether it was he tinctae res, licet vindicari non pos- or some one else who made the vest- sint, condici tamen a furibus et ment. For although things which quibusdam aliis possessoribus pos- have perished cannot be reclaimed by sunt. vindication, yet this gives ground for a condiction against the thief, and against many other possessors. D. X. 4. 7. 2 ; Gai. ii. 79. This is an instance of what is termed by commentators ad- junctio. Ulpian says, in the Digest (x. 4. 7. 2), that a person whose purple was woven in could bring an action ad exhihendum against the owner of the vestment. This, which is as much as to say that the owner of the purple is still its owner, seems at variance with what Justinian says here of the purple acceding to the vest- ment, and of the person, qiii dominus fuit pur puree, having only a personal action. Their respective decisions would, however, be right, according as the purple was not or was an inseparable part of the vestment. Supposing the purple was so woven in that it could be again separated, then its owner, remaining its owner, could bring an action ad exhibendum. If it were made an inse- parable part of the vestment, if it were an extincta res, i.e. could no more have a separate, distinct existence, then, being by its nature accessory to the vestment, it would become the property of the owner of the vestment, and its former owner would only have a personal action to recover its value. Quibusdam possessoribus. The word quibusdam is used to exclude bona fide possessors of the res extincta, who had not done anything to cause it to perish. Against an actual thief an actio furti and a condictio might be brought, against others only a con- dictio. (Theophil. Paraphr.) 27. Si duorum materise ex vo- 27. If materials belonging to two luntate dominorum confusse sint, persons are mixed together by their totum id corpus quod ex confusione mutual consent, whatever is thence fit utriusque commune est ; veluti si produced is common to both, as if, qui vina sua confuderint, aut massas for instance, they have intermixed argenti vel auri conflaverint. Sed their wines, or melted together their etsi diverse© materiee sint, et ob id gold or silver. And although the ma- propria species facta sit, forte ex terials are different which are employed vino et melle mulsum, aut ex auro in the admixture, and thus a new sub- et argento electrum. idem juris est : stance is formed, as when mead is LIB. II. TIT. I. 103 nam et eo casu commiinem esse spe- ciem noil dubitatur. Quod si for- tuitu et non voluntate dominorum confuste fuerint vel diversiTe materise, vel quse ejusdem generis sunt, idem juris esse placuit. made with wine and honey, or elec- trum by fusing together gold and silver, the rule is the same ; for in this case the new substance is un- doubtedly common. And if it is by chance, and not by the intention of the proprietors, that materials, whether similar or different, are mixed together, the rule is still the same. D. xli. 1. 7-9. This union of liquids is termed by commentators confusio. Wlien the product became common property, then any of the joint proprietors could procure their own share to be given up to them by bringing an action called communi dividundo. 28, Quod si frumentum Titii fru- mento tuo mixtum f uerit, si quidem ex voluntate vestra, commune erit ; quia singula corpora, id est, singula grana quj3e cuj usque propria fuerunt, ex consensu vestro communicata sunt. Quod si casu id mixtum fuerit, vel Titius id miscuerit sine tua voluntate, non videtur commune esse, quia singula corpora in sua substantia durant ; nee magis istis casibus commune fit frumentum, quam grex intelligitur esse com- munis, si pecora Titii tuis pecoribus mixta fuerint. Sed si ab alterutro vestrum totum id frumentum re- tineatur, in rem quidem actio pro modo frumenti cujusque competit ; arbitrio autem judicis continetur, ut ipse SBstimet quale cujusque fru- mentum fuerit. 28. If the wheat of Titius is mixed with yours, when this takes place by your mutual consent, the mixed heap belongs to you in common ; because each body, that is, each grain, which before was the property of one or other of you, has by your mutual consent been made your common pro- perty ; but, if the intermixture were accidental, or made by Titius without your consent, the mixed wheat does not then belong to you both in com- mon ; because the grains still remain distinct, and retain their proj^er sub- stance. The wheat in such a case no more becomes common to you both, than a flock would be, if the sheep of Titius were mixed with yours ; but, if either one of you keep the whole quan- tity of mixed wheat, the other has a real action for the amount of wheat belonging to him, but it is in the pro- vince of the judge to estimate the quality of the wheat belonging to each. D. vi. 1. 4. 5. This mixing together of things not liquid is termed by com- mentators commixtio. If the things mixed, still remaining the property of their former owners, were easy to separate again, as for instance, sheep united in one flock, when one owner brought his claim by vindication his property was restored to him without difficulty ; but if there was difficulty in separating the materials from each other, as in dividing the grains of wheat in a heap, the obvious mode would be to distribute the whole heap in shares proportionate to the quantity of wheat belonging to the respective owners. But it might happen that the wheat mixed together was not all of the same quality, and therefore the owner of the better kind of wheat would lose by having a share determined in amount only by the quantity of his wheat; and the judge therefore was 104 LIB. II. TIT. I. permitted to exercise his judgment {arhitrio continetur — see Introd. sec. 106) how great an addition ought to be made to his share to compensate for the superior quality of the wheat originally belouo^ins^ to him. 29. Cum in suo solo aliquis ex aliena materia osdificaverit, ipse in- telligitur dominus sedificii ; quia omne quod ineedificatur solo cedit. Nee tamen ideo is qui materi^e dominus fuerat, desinit dominus ejus esse ; sed tantisper neque vin- dicare earn potest, neque ad ex- hibendum de ea re agere, propter legem duodecim tabularum, qua cavetur ne quis tignum alienum iedibus suis junctum eximere co- gatur, sed duplum pro eo prsestet per actionem qufe vocatur de tigno injuncto. Appellatione autem tigni omnis materia significatur, ex qua jedificia iiunt. Quod ideo pro visum est, ne sedificia rescindi necesse sit ; sed si aliqua ex causa dirutum sit jiedificium, poterit materise dominus, si non fuerit duplum jam persecutus, tunc earn vindicare et ad exliibendum de ea re agere. 29. If a man builds upon his own ground with the materials of another, he is considered the proprietor of the building, because everything built on the soil accedes to it. The owner of the materials does not, however, cease to be owner, only while the building stands he cannot claim the materials, or demand to have them exhibited, on account of the law of the Twelve Tables, providing that no one is to be compelled to take away the tignum of another which has been made part of his own building, but that he may be made, by the action de tigno injuncto, to pay double the value ; and under the term tignum all materials for build- ing are comprehended. The object of this provision was to prevent the ne- cessity of buildings being pulled down. But if the building is destroyed from any cause, then the owner of the ma- terials, if he has not already obtained the double value, may reclaim the materials, and demand to have them exhibited. Gai. ii. 73 ; D. xli. 1. 7. 10. Materials, although forming part of a building belonging to the owner of the ground, were not considered themselves as necessarily belonging to the owner of the building. They were istill the property of the person to whom they had belonged before being employed in the building. They were separable from the soil, and, if a special law had not prevented it, could have been claimed by their owner, and their production enforced by an action ad exliibendum. The Twelve Tables forbad, however, the needless destruction of buildings, ne cedificia rescindi necesse sit. They suspended the right of claiming the materials, or bringing an action ad exliibendum, until the building was destroyed. When it was destroyed in any way {aliqua ex causa) the materials might be reclaimed, or an action ad exliibendum brought. Mean- while, by an action termed de tigno injuncto, their owner might, if he preferred, recover double their value, forfeiting, however, thereby all right of eventually reclaiming them, unless the builder had acted mala fide, and then the ov\^ner of the materials had both remedies. (D. xlvii. 3. 2.) Such was the law when the builder employed the materials of another quite innocently. If his conduct was tainted with mala fides , as it would be if he knew that the materials did not LIB. II. TIT. I. 105 belong to him, the law of the Twelve Tables still prevented the materials being at once reclaimed by the compulsory destruction of the building ; but an action ad exldhendum was permitted to be brought as a means of punishing the builder. (D. vi. 1. 23. 6.) The effect of this action in such a case was that the defendant, not producing the thing demanded, was condemned in such a sum as the judge thought right as a punishment for his having put it out of his power to produce it — quasi dolo fecerit quominus possi- deat, (D. xlvii. 3. 1. 2.) 30. Ex diverse, si qiiis in alieno 30. On the contrary, if any one solo sua materia domiim asdificaverit, builds with his own materials on the illius fit domus cujus et solum est. ground of another, the building be- Sed hoc casu materise dominus pro- comes the property of him to whom prietatem ejus amittit, quia volun- the ground belongs. But in this case tate ejus intelligitur alienata, utique the owner of the materials loses his si non ignorabat se in alieno solo property, because he is j^resumed to a^dificare ; et ideo licet diruta sit have voluntarily parted with them, domus, materiam tamen vindicare that is, if he knew he was building non potest. Certe iliud constat, si upon another's land ; and, therefore, in possessione constitute sedificatore, if the building should be destroyed, soli dominus petat domum suam esse, he cannot, even then, reclaim the ma- nec solvat pretium materise et mer- terials. Of course, if the person who cedes fabrorum, posse eum per ex- builds is in possession of the soil, and ceptionem doli mali repelli, utique si the owner of the soil claims the build- bonse fidei possessor fuerit, qui «idi- ing, but refuses to pay the price of tlie ficavit ; nam scienti alienum solum materials and the wages of the work- esse potest objici culpa, quod asdijS- men, the owner may be repelled by an caverit temere in eo solo quod intel- exception of dolus malus, provided the ligeret alienum esse. builder was in possession bona fide. For if he knew that he was not the owner of the soil, it may be said against him that he was wrong to build on ground which he knew to be the property of another. D. xli. 1. 7. 12. If a person used his own materials in building on the land of another, we have to consider his position, according as he was or was not still in possession, and according as, in building, he had acted boriajide or mala fide. If he was in possession of the soil, then, if he was acting bona fide, he could not be turned out without the owner paying him for the additional value he had by the building given to the soil, this rather than the price of the materials and wages of workmen, as stated in the text, being the measure of compensation. If he was acting mala fide, that is, if he knew the soil was not his, he could not claim the additional value, but he might take away the materials he had used, if he could separate them without doing damage. (D. vi. 1. 37.) There is, however, a passage of Paulus (D. v. 3. 38) which would seem to show that, in the opinion of that jurist, the mala fide pos- sessor could claim the additional value. If he was not in possession of the soil, he might, whether having acted in good or bad faith (D. xl. 1. 7. 12 ; C. iii. 32. 2), reclaim the materials if the building 106 LIB. II. TIT. I. was destroyed ; and, wlietlier he had acted in good faith or bad, he could not bring any action for compensation for the additional value. This statement of the law is, it will be seen, at variance, in one point, with the language of the text, which says that if the owner of the materials knew he was building on another man's land he could not reclaim the materials, because the fact that he knew this was taken to show that he meant to alienate the materials. The passage in the Code above referred to is inconsistent with this. If the owner of the materials meant to give them to the owner of the soil, no question could arise ; but the fact that he used his materials, knowing the soil was not his, Avas declared by the constitution referred to (being a constitution of Antoninus Caracalla), not to imply, as the text takes for granted that it does imply, the intention to alienate the materials ; and if there was no such intention, then the materials could be reclaimed even by the mala fide possessor. The words of the constitution are — Materia ad pristinum dominum redit, sive bona fide sive mala (Edficium exstructum sit, si non donandi animo cBdificia alieno solo imposita sint. The date of this constitution is a.d. 213, which is posterior to the time of Gains, from whom the text is taken. Dolus malus (opposed to dolus bonus, artifice which the law considers honestly employed) means nearly what we mean by fraud. When a plaintiff was repelled by an exception of fraud, such words as these were introduced in the intentio of the action : si in ea re nihil dolo malo Auli Agerii factum sit, neque fiat, (See Introd. sec. 104.) 31. Si Titius alienam plantam 31. If Titius places another man's in solo suo posuerit, ipsius erit, et plant in ground belonging to himself, ex diverso si Titius suam plantam the plant will belong to Titius ; on in Maevii solo posuerit, Maevii the contrary, if Titius places his own planta erit : si modo utroque casu plant in the ground of Maevius, the radices egerit ; ante enim quam plant will belong to Msevius — that is, radices egerit, ejus permanet cujus if, in either case, the plant has taken et fuerat. Adeo autem ex eo tern- root ; for, before it has taken root, it pore quo radices agit planta, pro- remains the property of its former prietas ejus commutatur, ut si vicini owner. But from the time it has arbor ita terram Titii presserit ut taken root, the property in it is in ejus fundum radices egerit, Titii changed ; so much so, that if the tree effici arborem dicamus ; rationem. of a neighbour presses so closely on enim non permittere ut alterius the ground of Titius as to take root arbor esse intelligatur, quam cujus in it, we pronounce that the tree be- in fundum radices egisset. Et ideo comes the property of Titius. For prope conlinium arbor posita, si reason does not permit, that a tree etiam in vicini fundum radices ege- should be considered the property of rit, communis fit. any one else than of him in whose ground it has taken root ; and there- fore, if a tree, planted near a boun- dary, extends its roots into the lands of a neighbour, it becomes common. Gai. ii. 74 ; D. xli. 1. 7. 13. The tree, after it had once taken root, did not belong to its] former owner, although it was afterwards severed from the soil. LIB. II. TIT. I. 107 It would seem natural that it should belong to him, because it was separable from the soil, and did not become a part of it more than the materials of a building became part of the soil ; but the jurist considered that the nourishment it had drawn from the soil had made it a new tree, alia facta est (D. xli. 1. 26. 2), and thus the owner of the soil claimed it by occupation. When the text says that the tree which strikes root into the soil of Titius belongs to Titius, this is only to be understood of a tree of which all the roots are in the soil of Titius. If only some of the roots were in the soil of Titius, the tree would belong partly to Titius, partly to its former owner. 32. Qua ratione autem plantse quae terra coalescunt, solo cedunt, eadem ratione frumenta quoque qua3 sata sunt, solo cedere intel- liguntur. Ceterum sicut is qui in alieno solo sedificaverit, si ab eo dominus petat aidificium, defendi potest per exceptionem doli mali secundum ea quae diximus, ita ejus- dem exceptionis auxilio tutus esse potest is qui alienum fundum sua impensa bona fide conseruit. 32. As plants rooted in the earth accede to the soil, so, in the same way, grains of wheat which have been sown are considered to accede to the soil. But as he who has built on the groiind of another may, ac- cording to what we have said, defend himself by an exception of dolus malus, if the proprietor of the ground claims the building, so also he may protect himself by the aid of the same exception, who, at his own expense and acting honajide, has sown another man's land. Gai. ii. 75, 76; D. xli. 1. 9. 33. Literse quoque, licet aureae sint, perinde chartis ^membranisqxie cedunt, ac solo cedere solent ea quse in?edificantur aut inseruntur : ideoque si in chartis membranisve tuis carmen vel historian! vel ora- tionem Titius scripserit, hujus cor- poris non Titius sed tu dominus esse videris. Sed si a Titio petas tuos libros tuasve membranas, nee im- pensas scripturse solvere paratus sis, poterit se Titius defendere per ex- ceptionem doli mali, utique si earum chartarum membranarumve possessionem bona fide nactus est. 33. Written characters, although of gold, accede to the paper or parch- ment on which they are written, just as whatever is built on, or sown in, the soil, accedes to the soil. And therefore if Titius has written a poem, a history, or an oration, on your paper or parchment, you, and not Titius, are the owner of the writ- ten paper. But if you claim your books or parchments from Titius, but refuse to defray the cost of the writing, then Titius can defend himself by an exception of dolus malus ; that is, if it was bona fide that he obtained posses- sion of the papers or parchments. Gai. ii. 77; D. xli. 1. 9. 1. In this case the letters are inseparable from, and subordinate to, the substance on which they are written, and become at once the property of the owner of that substance. 34. Si quis in aliena tabula pinx- erit, quidam putant tabulam pic- turse cedere ; aliis videtur picturam, qualiscumque sit, tabulas cedere. Sed nobis videtur melius esse tabu- lam picturse cedere; ridiculum est enini picturam Apellis vel Parrhasii 34. If a person has painted on the tablet of another, some think that the tablet accedes to the picture, others, that the picture, of whatever quality it may be, accedes to the tablet. It seems to us the better opinion, that the tablet should accede 108 LIB. 11. TIT. I. M in accessionem vilissimse tabulae to the picture ; for it is ridiculous cedere. Unde si a domino tabulae that a painting of Apelles or Parrha- imaginem possidente, is qui pinxit sius should be but the accessory of earn petat, nee sol vat pretium ta- a thoroughly worthless tablet. But buiae, poterit per exceptionem doli if the owner of the tablet is in pos- mali submoveri. At si is qui pinxit session of the picture, the painter, possideat, consequens est ut utilis should he claim it from him, but re- actio domino tabulae adversus eum fuse to pay the value of the tablet, detur : quo casu, si non solvat im- may be repelled by an exception of pensam picturae, poterit per excep- dolus mains. If the painter is in tionem doli mail repelli, utique si possession of the picture, the law per- bona lide possessor fuerit ille qui mits the owner of the tablet to bring picturam imposuit. Illud enim a utilis actio against him ; and in this palam est, quod, sive is qui pinxit case, if the owner of the tablet does subripuit tabulas, sive alius, com- not pay the cost of the picture, he petit domino tabularum furti actio. may also be repelled by an exception of dolus malus ; that is, if the painter obtained possession hona fide. If the tablet has been stolen, Avhether b}' the painter or any one else, the owner of the tablet may bring an action of theft. Gai. ii. 78 ; D. xli. 1. 9. 2. As written characters belonof to the owner of the substance on which they are written, it would seem to follow that a paint- ing also would belong to the owner of the substance on which it was painted; and Paul (D. vi. 1. 23. 3) decides that it does, say- ing that the painting could not exist without the substance on which it was painted, and therefore acceded to it. Gains, whose opinion is adopted in the text, makes the great value of the paint- ing the reason for an exception to the rule. But the owner of the tablet or substance, on which the painting was painted, had in one way something of the rights of an owner ; for if the painter was in possession of the painting, the owner of the tablet was not left only to a personal action for the value of the board, but could claim the board itself. The action by which he did so was termedl utilis, because it was only an equitable method of protecting him, the prjetor allowing him to assert fictitiously that he was the owner. The direct legal power of claiming the tablet {vindicati6\ recta) was in the ])ainter whose property the tablet had become ; but the former owner of the tablet was allowed still to treat it as his, in order to compel the painter to pay its value. If, when the actio utilis was brought, the painter paid the value of the tablet, the right of action was at an end, and the owner of the tablet could not get possession of the picture by offering to pay its cost. Consequens est ut utilis actio, &c. It would not follow from the painter possessing that the owner of the tablet should have a real action of any kind. On the contrary, it was an exception that then he sliould have one. Therefore consequens must be taken as meaning ' in accordance with the principles of law ; ' or the sentence must be taken as meaning, ^ If the painter is in posses LIB. II. TIT. I. 109 sion/ this circumstance places the owner of the tablet in such a iiard position that it is thought right he should have a utilis actio. 35. Si quis a non domino quern dominum esse crediderit, bona fide fundum einerit, vel ex donatione aliave qualibet justa causa aeque bona fide acceperit, naturali ratione placuit fructiis quos percepit, ejus esse pro cultura et cura ; et ideo si postea dominus supervenerit, et fundum vindicet, de fructibus ab eo consumptis agere non potest. Ei vero qui alienum fundum sciens possederit, non idem concessum est : itaque cum fundo etiam fructus, licet consumpti sint, cogitur resti- tuere. 35. If any one has bona fide pur- chased land from another, v/houi he believed to be the true owner, when in fact he was not, or has bona fide acquired it from such a person by gift or by any other good title, natural reason demands that the fruits which he has gathered shall be his in return for his care and culture. And therefore, if the real owner after- wards appears and claims his land, he can have no action for fruits which the possessor has consumed. But the same allowance is not made to him who has knowingly been in possession of another's estate ; and therefore, he is compelled to restore, together with the lands, all the fruits, although they may have been consumed. D. xli. 1. 48 ; D. xxii. 1. 15. Justinian now passes to the interest of a bona fide possessor and a usufructuary in the fruits of land, a subject to which he is led by having spoken of other ways in which the interest of the owner of the soil w^as limited. A person would be said to possess bona fide and ex justa causa who had received a thing from a person he believed to be the owner in any method by which ownership could legally pass. As long as the fruits still adhered to the soil, that is, were still ungathered, they belonged to the owner of the soil. If gathered, but not consumed, they belonged to the bona fide pos- sessor as against every one except the owner of the soil. When the owner of the soil claimed them, they became his, for they had only been the property of the bona fide possessor interim (D. xli. 1. 48), that is, provisionally; but if they had been consumed, the owner of the soil could not recover their value from the bona fide possessor. The mala fide possessor, on the contrary, was obliged to give the value even of those that were consumed {restituere fructus consumptos). There seems little doubt that the interest of the bona fide pos- sessor extended over all the fruits of the land, and not only over those produced by his cultivation and care (see D. xli. 1. 48), although Pomponius (D. xxii. 1. 15) seems to limit it to the latter. 36. Is ad quern ususfructus fundi 36. The usufructuary of land is pertinet, non aliter fructuum do- not owner of the fruits until he has minus efficitur, quam si ipse eos himself gathered them ; and, there- perceperit ; et ideo, licet maturis fore, if he should die while the fructibus nondum tamen perceptis fruits, although ripe, are yet un- 110 LIB. II. TIT. I. decesserit, ad heredem ejus non gathered, they do not belong to his pertinent, sed domino proprietatis heirs, but are the property of the adquirimtur. Eadem fere et de owner of the soil. And nearly the colono dicuntur. same may be said of the colonus. The interest of the usufructuary has a special Title (Tit. 4) devoted to it, and all remarks upon it may be reserved till we arrive at that Title. Eadem fere. The heirs of the colonus could gather fruits not gathered by him, for his rights did not perish with him ; but the heirs of the usufructuary had no rights transmitted to them, and could not therefore gather fruits which he had not gathered. 37. In pecudum frnctu etiam foetns est, sicnt lac, pili et lana. Itaque agni, hsedi et vitidi et equuli et suculi statim natural! jure do- minii fructuarii sunt. Partus vero ancillse in fructu non est, itaque ad dominum proprietatis pertinet ; ab- surdum enim videbatur hominem in fructu esse, cum omnes fructus rerum natura gratia hominis com- paraverit. 37. In the fruits of animals are included their young, as well as their milk, hair, and wool ; and therefore lambs, kids, calves, colts, and young pigs, immediately on their birth be- come, by the law of nature, the pro- perty of the usufructuary; but the offspring of a female slave is not con- sidered a fruit, but belongs to the owner of the property. For it seemed absurd that man should be reckoned a fruit, when it is for man's benefit that all fruits are provided by nature. D. xxii. 1. 28. pr. and 1. Ulpian gives, as a reason for the children of slaves not being in fructu, that non temere ancillcs, ejus rei causa comparantur ut pariant. (D. v. 3. 27.) There were, however, many animals, cows or mares for instance, used for draught, that could not be said to be expressly destined to bear offspring, and yet their off- spring was in fructu. 38. Sed si gregis usumfructum quis habeat, in locum demortuorum capitum ex foetu fructuarius sum- mittere debet, ut Juliano visum est ; et in vinearum demortuarum vel arborum locum alias debet substi- tuere : recte enim colere debet et quasi bonus paterfamilias. 38. The usufructuary of a flock ought to replace any of the flock that may happen to die, by supplying the deficiency out of the young, as also Julian was of opinion. So, too, the usufructuary ought to supply the place of dead vines or trees. For he ought to cultivate with care, and to use everything as a good father of a family would use it. This paragraph relates entirely to the subject of Title 4. 39. Thesauros quos quis in loco suo invenerit, divus Hadrianus na- turalem sequitatem secutus ei con- cessit qui invenerit ; idemque sta- tuit, si quis in sacro aut religioso loco fortuito casu invenerit. At si quis in alieno loco, non data ad hoc opera, sed fortuito invenerit, dimi- dium inventori, dimidium domino soli concessit ; et convenienter, si 39. The Emperor Hadrian, in accordance with natural equity, al- lowed any treasure found by a man in his own land to belong to the finder, as also any treasure found by chance in a sacred or reUgious place. But treasure found without any ex- press search, but by mere chance, in a place belonging to another, he granted half to the finder, and half to the LIB. II. TIT. I. Ill quis in Cfesaris loco invenerit, di- proprietor of the soil. Consequently, miciium inventoris, dimidium Cve- if anything is found in a place be- saris esse statnit. Cui conveniens longing to the emperor, half belongs est, ut si quis in fiscaH loco vel x^ub- to the finder, and half to the emperor, lico invenerit, dimidium ipsius esse, And hence it follows, that if a man dimidium fisci vel civitatis. finds anything in a place belonging to the fiscus, the public, or a city, half ought to belong to the finder, and half to the fiscus or the city. D. xli. 1. 63 ; D. xlix. 14. 3. 10. Thesaurus, says Paul (D. xli. 1. 31. 1), est vetus qucBdam de- positio pecunice (that is, of anything valuable), cujus iion extat me- moria, ut jam dominum non haheat. Of course if it was known who placed it there, it was known to whom it belonged. But a treasure, though its depositor was unknown, was not considered exactly as a res nuUius. The owner of the land in which it was found had always some interest in it. If he found it himself, it all belonged to him ; if another person found it, the finder and the owner of the land divided it equally. When there was no owner of the land, as when the place was sacred or religious, the finder took it all ; but no one was allowed to make the search for treasures an excuse for digging up tombs and sacred places, or for digging up other men's ground ; and therefore it was only when the discovery was quite accidental, and the finder had made no search for it, that the treasure, or the half of it, as the case might be, was permitted to belong to him. 40. Per traditionem quoque jure naturali res nobis adquiruntur : nihil enim tarn conveniens est naturali a3quitati, quam voluntatem domini volentis rem suam in alium trans- ferre, ratam haberi. Et ideo cujus- cumque generis sit corporalis res, tradi potest et a domino tradita alie- natur. Itaque stipendiaria quoque et tributaria pr?edia eodem modo alie- nantur : vocantur autem stipendiaria et tributaria preedia, quae in pro- vinciis sunt : inter quse nee non et Italica prsedia ex nostra constitutione nulla est differentia ; sed si quidem ex causa donationis aut dotis aut qualibet alia ex causa tradantur, ' sine dubio transf eruntur. 40. Another mode of acquiring things according to natural law is tradition; for nothing is more con- formable to natural equity than that the wishes of a person, who is de- sirous to transfer his property to another, should be confirmed ; and therefore corporeal things, of what- ever kind, may be passed by tradi- tion, and when so passed by their owner, are made the property of another. In this way are alienated stipendiary and tributary lands, that is, lands in the provinces, between which and Italian lands there is now, by our constitution, no difference, so that when tradition is made of them for purpose of a gift, a marriage portion, or any other object, the property in them is undoubtedly transferred. D. xli. 1. 9. 3 ; C. vii. 25. When the property in a thing was to be transferred from one person to another, it was necessary that the process should be I complete in four points : — 1. The person who transferred it must be the owner; 2. He must place the person to whom he trans- 112 LIB. IT. TIT. I. ferred it in legal possession of the thing ; 3. He must transfer the thing with intention to pass the property in it ; 4. The person to whom it was transferred must receive it with intention to become the owner. The placing another in legal possession of a thing was termed the traditio of that thing. In the simplest case, that of a por- table moveable, the owner might really hand over the thing to the person who was to become its possessor ; but in no case was it necessary that this should be done ; what was necessary was that the party who was to receive it should have the thing in his power, and that the two parties should express, in any way what- ever, the wish of the one to transfer, of the other to accept, the possession. The thing need not be touched ; land, for instance, need not be entered on ; but the person who was to be placed in possession must have the thing before him, so as to be able, by a physical act, to exercise power oyer it. (See Savigny on Pos- session, Bk. ii. sees. 16 and 17.) Property could not be transferred by mere agreement. ( Tra- ditionibus et usucapionihus, non nudis pactis dominia transferun- tur. C. ii. 3. 20.) The agreement was but the expression of the intention of the parties ; and this was ineffectual unless it was accompanied by the party being placed in possession to whom the thing Avas to be transferred. PrcBdia stipendiaria were provincial lands belonging to the people, trihutaria provincial lands belonging to the emperor. (Gai. ii. 21.) It will be remembered that, until Justinian de- stroyed all distinction between Italian and provincial land by a constitution (C. vii. 25), the Italicum solum was a res mancipi, and could only be transferred by the peculiar form of mancipation (See Introd. sec. 59.) 41. Venditse vero res et traditoe 41. But things sold and delivered non aliter emptori adqiiiriintur, are not acquired by the buyer until quam si is venditori pretium solve- he has paid the seller the price, or rit, vel alio modo ei satisfecerit, satisfied him in some way or otlier, as veluti expromissore aut pignore by procuring some one to be security, dato. Quod cavetur quidem etiam or by giving a pledge. And, although lege duodecim tabularum, tamen this is provided by a law of the recte dicitur et jure gentium, id est, Twelve Tables, yet it may be rightly jure naturali, id effici. Sed si is qui said to spring from the law of na- vendidit, fidem emptoris secutus est, tions, that is, the law of nature. But dicendum est statim rem emptoris if the seller has accepted the credit fieri. of the buyer, the thing then becomes immediately the property of the buyer. D. xviii. 1. 19. 53. The seller would generally not have the intention to transfer the property until he received the price ; but he might be con- tent to receive security for the payment of the price, or he might choose to accept the credit of the buyer instead of the price itself; and if, in either of these cases, he intended to pass the property, it would pass at once, irrespectively of the price being paid. For the meaning oi expromissor, see Bk. iii. Tit. 29. 3. LIB. II. TIT. I. 113 42. Nihil autem interest, utrum 42. It is immaterial whether the ipse dominus tradat alicui rem, an owner deliver the thing himself, or Toluntate ejus alius. some one else by his desire. D. xli. 1. 9. 4. 43. Qua ratione, si cui libera uni- versorum negotiorum administratio a domino permissa fuerit, isque ex his negotiis rem vendiderit et tradi- derit, facit eam accipientis. 43. Hence, if any one is intrusted by an owner with the uncontrolled administration of all his goods, and he sells and delivers anything which is a part of these goods, he passes the property in it to the person who receives the thins;. D. xli. 1. 9. 4. By the will of the owner, the manager of the property is able to deal with it ; and if he deals with it, the will of the owner is expressed through him. 44. Interdum etiam sine tradi- tione nuda voluntas domini sufficit ad rem transferendam, veluti si rem quam tibi aliquis commodavit aut locavit aut apud te deposuit, ven- diderit tibi aut donaverit ; quam vis enim ex ea causa tibi eam non tra- diderit, eo tamen ipso quod patitur tuam esse, statim tibi adquiritur proprietas, perinde ac si eo nomine tradita fuisset. 44. Sometimes, too, the mere wish of the owner, without tradition, is sufficient to transfer the property in a thing, as when a person has lent, or let to you anything, or deposited anything with you, and then after- ■\\ards sells or gives it to you. For, although he has not delivered it to you for the purpose of the sale or gift, yet by the mere fact of his con- senting to it becoming yours, you in- sta.ntly acquire the property in it, as fully as if it had actually been deli- vered to you for the express purpose of passing the property. D. xli. 1. 9. 5. When the person to whom the property in the thing was transferred was already in possession of the thing, then, if the wishes of the parties to give and receive the property in it were added to this, and the person who affected to give the property was the real owner, all the conditions of a transfer were com- plete. It made no difference what was their respective order in time. Generally the expression of will would precede the placing in possession, but not necessarily. When the person to whom the property in the tiling was transferred had only the mere detention of the thing, that is, had it in his keeping acd power as a hirer or depositary would have, but had not the possession of it, that is, had not also the intention of dealing with it as an owner, all that was necessary to change this detention into possession was a change in the animus with which it was held ; and of course the intention to hold it as an owner was sufficiently shown by accepting the transfer of the property. The person, in like man- ner, who transferred the property, by doing so sufficiently showed his intention of placing the other in possession. Thus the dif- ferent elements of traditio were broken up and separated, not, as I 114 LIB. II. TIT. I. usual, united in a single act ; and this is what is meant in the text by saying the property passes sine traditione. 45. Item si qiiis merces in horreo depositas vendiderit, simiil atque claves horrei tradiderit emptori, transfert proprietatein mercium ad emptorem. 45. So, too, any one, who has sold goods deposited in a warehouse, as soon as he has handed over the keys of the warehouse to the buyer, transfers to the buyer the property in the goods. D. xli. 1. 9. 6. The text does not state all that was necessary to transfer the property in such a case. It was requisite that the key should be given apud liorrea^ at the warehouse (D. xviii. 1. 74). A person who was at the w^arehouse and had the key in his hand was in a position to exercise immediate power over the contents of the warehouse ; the goods were in his custody, and he was thus placed in possession of them. The key was not symbolical, but was the means by which he was enabled to deal with the goods as an owner. 46. Hoc amplius, interdum et in incertam personam collata voluntas domini transfert rei proprietatem : ut ecce, prsetores et consules qui missilia jactant in vulgus, ignorant quid eorum quisque sit excepturus, et tamen quia volunt quod quisque exceperit ejus esse, statim eum do- minmn efficiunt. 46. Nay, more, sometimes the in- tention of an owner, although directed only towards an uncertain person, transfers the property in a thing. For instance, when the praetors and consuls throw their largesses to the mob, they do not know what each person in the mob will get ; but as it is their in- tention that each should have what he gets, they make what each gets imme- diately belong to him. D. xli. 1. 9. 7. 47. Qua ratione verius esse vide- tur, si rem pro derelicto a domino habitam. occupaverit quis, statim eum dominum effici. Pro derelicto autem habetur quod dominus ea mente abjecerit, utid rerum suarum esse noUet, ideoque statim dominus esse desinit. 47. Accordingly, it is quite true to say that anything which is seized on, when abandoned by its owner, becomes immediately the property of the person who takes possession of it. And any- thing is considered as abandoned, which its owner has thrown away with a wish no longer to have it as a part of his property, as it therefore imme- diately ceases to belong to him. D. xli. 7. 1. It might seem as if the property in things abandoned was transferred, like that in things thrown to the mob, by the wish of the owner to transfer it to the person who should first take pos- session of it ; but it is much more natural to consider, with the text, that the thing becomes a res nullius by being abandoned, and the property of the first occupant by being taken posses- sion of. 48. Alia causa est earum rerum qute in tempestate maris, levandte navis causa; ejiciuntur; hse enim do- 48. It is otherwise with respect to things thrown overboard in a storm, to lighten a vessel ; for they remain LIB. II. TIT. II. 115 minorum permanent, quia palam est the property of their owners ; as it is eas non eo animo ejici quod quis eas evident that they were not thrown habere non \^lt, sed quo magis cum away through a wish to get rid of ipsa navi maris periculum effugiat. them, but that their owners and the Qua de causa, si quis eas fluctibus ship itself might more easily escape expulsas, vel etiam in ipso mari nac- the dangers of the sea. Hence, any tus, lucrandi animo abstulerit, fur- one who, with a view to profit himself tum committit ; nee longe discedere by these, takes them away when washed ' videntur ab his quae de rheda cur- on shore, or found at sea, is guilty of rente non intelligentibus dominis theft. And much the same may be cadunt. said as to things which drop from a carriage in motion, without the know- ledge of their owners. D. xli. 1. 9. 8 ; D. xlvii. 43. 4. A thln^ could not be considered as abandoned and made a i^es nullius unless its owner intended to cease to be its owner. Tit. II. DE EEB13S INCORPOEALIBUS. Qusedam praeterea res corporales Certain things, again, are corporeal, sunt, quaedam incorporales. others incorporeal. Gal ii. 12 ; D. i. 8. 1. 1. Justinian, after having spoken of the natural modes of acquiring property in thiiigs, returns in this Title to the division of things, and adds one more division, that of things corporeal and incorporeal, to the divisions given at the beginning of the last Title. Our senses tell us what things corporeal are : things incorporeal are rights, that is, fixed relations in which men stand to things or to other men, relations giving them power over things or claims against persons. And these rights are themselves the objects of rights, and thus fall under the definition of things. For instance, the right to walk over another man's land is said to be an incorporeal thing ; for we may have a claim or right to have this right, exactly as, if the land belonged to us, we should have a rio;ht to have the land. These rio:hts over thino;s were termed jura in rem, and these /zecz«/zMm was always at the disposition of his master, and it made no difference what was the mode in which he acquired : he acquired it for his master even thou2:h his master had not consented or even known of the acquisition. Tiierefore, if the slave received anything in pursu- ance of a stipulation [sive quid stipulentur), he acquired it for his master, although he could not bind his master by promising any- thing to a person who stipulated for anything from him. The slave could not make his master's condition worse ; and as an inheritance might be more onerous than lucrative, for the debts of the deceased, which the heir was bound to pay, might exceed the value of his property, a slave was not permitted to accept an inheritance, except by his master's express command. A legacy, on the other hand, could not be otherwise than advantageous, and therefore a legacy given to a slave immediately belonged to his master. There was a minor difference between the institution of a slave as heir, and a gift to him of a legacy, which deserves mention. The right to a legacy dated from the death of the deceased ; the right to an inheritance dated from the time of entering on an inheritance. The slave, therefore, acquired a legacy for the benefit of the master to whom he belonged at the time when the deceased died ; but a slave instituted heir, acquired for the master to whom he belonged at the time of entering on the inheritance. If, therefore, the slave changed masters or became free between these times, he acquired a legacy for his former master, but took an inheritance for his new master, or, if free, for himself. The physical fact of possession might be accomplished through a slave, but not the intention, which was requisite for legal posses- sion. It was necessary that the master should have the intention of treating the thing possessed by the slave as if he himself were the owner. Animo nostro, says Paul, corj)ore etiam alieno, possidemus. (D. xli. 2. 3. 12.) The master could not, therefore, acquire through the slave legal possession, as opposed to mere detention, without his knowledge and consent, as he could acquire ownership ; except, indeed, when the slave possessed a thing as part of his peculiuyn, for then the permission to have a pecnliitm was considered as enabling the slave to exercise the intention of ownership. (D. xli. 2. 1. 5.) LIB. II. TIT. IX. 159 All that is said here of the slave may, with the necessary excep- tions as to the peculia castrense, quasi- castr ens e, and adventitium, be said of the filiusfcwiiilias, who equally stipulated for his father's benefit, could not make his father's position worse, took inheri- tances only under his father's direction, received legacies for his father's benefit, and possessed physically, but needed his father's animus possidendi. 4. De iis autem servis in qiiibus tantum usumfructuin liabemus, ita placuit, lit quidqiiid ex r^nostra vel ex operibus siiis acquirant, id nobis adjiciatiir ; quod vero extra eas causas persecuti sunt, id ad domi- num proprietatis pertineat : itaque si is servus lieres institutus sit, le- gatunive quid ei aut donatum fuerit, non usufructuario sed domino pro- prietatis acquiritur. Idem placet et de eo qui a nobis bona fide possi- detur, sive is liber sit, sive alienus servus : quod enim placuit de usu- fructuario, idem placet et de bona fide possessore ; itaque quod extra istas duas causas acquiritur, id vel ad ipsum pertinet, si liber est, vel ad dominum, si servus est. Sed bonse fidei possessor, cum usuce- perit servum, quia eo modo dominus fit, ex omnibus causis per eum sibi acquirere potest ; fructuarius vero usucapere non potest, primum quia non possidet, sed habet jus utendi fruendi, deinde quia scit servum alienum esse. Non solum autem proprietas per eos servos in quibus usumfructum habemus vel quos bona fide possidemus, aut per li- beram personam qua3 bona fide nobis servit, nobis acquiritur, sed etiam possessio. Loquimur autem in utri- usque persona secundum defini- tionem quam proximo exposuimus, id est, si quam possessionem ex re nostra vel ex suis operibus adepti fuerint. 4. As to slaves of whom we have only the usufruct, it has been decided that whatever they acquire by means of anything belonging to us, or by their own labour, shall belong to us ; but that all they acquire from any other source shall belong to the owner. So if a slave is made heir, or anything is given him as a legacy or gift, it is the owner, not the usufructuary, who re- ceives the benefit of the acquisition. It is the same with regard to any one whom we possess honajide, whether a freeman or the slave of another person (for the rule with regard to the usu- fructuary holds good with regard to the 6o?ia Jide possessor): everything the person possessed acquires, except from one of the two sources above mentioned, belongs to himself, if he is a freeman, and to his master, if he is a slave. When the bona fide possessor has gained the property in the slave by usucapion, he, of course, becomes the owner, and all that the slave acquires is acquired for him. But the usufructuary cannot acquire by use : first, because he has not the possession, but only the right of usufruct ; and secondly, be- cause he knows that the slave belongs to another. It is not only the ownership that is acquired for us by the slaves of whom we have the usufruct, or whom we possess bona fide, or by a free per- son whom we employ as our slave 6oHct fide ; we acquire also the possession. But in saying this we must be under- stood, with regard to both slaves and freemen, to adhere to the distinction laid down i^reviously, and to refer only to the possession they have ob- tained by means of something belong- ing to us, or by their own labour. Gai. ii. 91-94. The usufructuary was entitled to the fruits of the slave, that is, to his services, and to the profits derived from letting out his services to others ; but what the slave acquired by stipulation, gift, legacy, or similar means, was no part of the fruits, and, therefore, did not belong to the usufructuary. If the means of . 60 LIB. II. TIT. IX. acquisition were derived from the usufructuary, as, for instance, if the slave acquired by parting with any of the produce, then the case would be different. What is true of the usufructuary is true also of a bona fide possessor either of the slave of another, or of a person, in fact, free, but honestly believed to be a slave. And the bona fide possessor has the advantage over the usufructuary pointed out in the text, that as he has the possession, Avhich no usufructuary can have, for no usufructuary intends to treat the thing as if he were the owner, this possession may, if continued long enough, give the rights of usucapion over a moveable, or of iJossessio longi temporis over an immoveable. 5. Exhisitaqueapparet, perlibe- 5. Hence it appears that we cannot ros homines quos neque nostro jiiri acquire by means of free persons not subjectos habemus, neque bona fide in our power, or possessed by us bona possidemus ; item per alienos servos jide ; nor by the slave of another, of in quibus neque usumfructum habe- whom we have neither the usufruct mus neque possessionem justam, nor the possession. And this is meant, nulla ex causa nobis acquiri posse, when it is said, that nothing can be Et hoc est quod dicitur, per extra- acquired by means of a stranger ; ex- neam personam nihil acquiri posse : cept, indeed, that according to the excepto eo quod per liberam perso- constitution of the Emperor Severus, nam, veluti per procuratorem, placet possession may be acquired for us by non solum scientibus sed et igno- a free person, as by a procurator, not rantibus nobis acquiri possessionem, only with, but even without our know- secundum divi Severi constitutio- ledge ; and by this possession we ac- nem, et per hanc possessionem etiam quire the property, if it was the dominium, si dominus fuit qui tra- owner who delivered the thing, or the didit, vel usucapionem aut longi usucapion or prescription longi tempo- temporis prsescriptionem, si domi- ris, if it was not. nus non sit. Gai. ii. 95 ; C. iv. 27. 1 ; D. xli. 1. 20. 2 ; C. vii. 32. 1. The rule of the older law was that no person could be repre- sented per extraneam personam, i.e. by a person who was not under his power, in any of those acts which were regulated by the civil law. Thus, no one could acquire the ownership of a thing for another; if he received anything, as, for instance, by mancipation or in jure cessio, although he received it expressly for another, still this other person did not thereby acquire the property in the thing. But a mere natural fact such as that of possession could take place for the benefit of one person through another person, if the person for whose benefit the thing was possessed had but the intention of profiting by it, and then this possession might lead through usucapion to ownership. If, how- ever, a person was charo-ed with the management of the affairs of another, he could exercise an intention of possessing for the benefit of the person for whom he acted, which a mere stranger could not ; and thus it was possible Jion solum scientibus sed etiam ignorantihus, i.e. for persons who did not know even of the fact of possession, to acquire legal possession through an agent. But, though the text would be likely to mislead us> we learn from the constitution LIB. 11. TIT. X. 161 of Severus and Antoninus (C. vii. 32. 1), which does not appear to have made any great change in the law, that usucapion did not commence until the person, for whose benefit the thing was possessed, knew of the possession. If the procurator received possession from a person who was the owner, then it was not a question of getting ownership by usucapion, and the ownership immediately passed to the person for whom the procurator was acting, even though this person did not know of what was done. Si procurator rem mihi emerit ex mandato meo eique sit tradita rneo nomine, dominium mihi, id est proprietas, adquiretur etiam ignoranti. (D. xli. 1. 13.) 6. Hactenus tantisper admonuisse 6. Wliat we have said respecting sufficit, quemadmodum singulae res the modes of the acquisition of parti- nobis acqiiirantur ; nam legatorum cular things, may suffice for the jus, quo et ipso jure singulse res nobis present. For we shall speak more acquiruntur, item fideicommissorum conveniently hereafter of the law of ubi singulse res nobis relinquuntur, legacies, by which also we acquire opportunius inferiore loco referemus. property in particular things, and of Yideamus itaque nunc quibus modis fideicommissa, by which particular per universitatem res acquiruntur : things are left us. Let us now speak si cui ergo heredes facti sumus, of the modes of acquiring per U7iiver~ sive cujus bonorum possessionem sitatem. If we are made heir, or seek petierimus, vel si quem arrogaveri- possession of the goods of any one, or mus, vel si cujus bona libertatum arrogate any one, or goods are ad- conservandarum causa nobis addicta judged to us in order to preserve the fuerint, ejus res omnes ad nos trans- liberty of slaves, in these cases all eunt. Ac prius de hereditatibus that belonged to the person to whom dispiciamus, quarum duplex con- we succeed passes to us. First let us ditio est, nam vel ex testament© vel treat of inheritances, which may be ab intestate ad nos pertinent ; et divided into two kinds, according as prius est, ut de his dispiciamus quse they come to us by testament or ab ex testamento nobis obveniunt. Qua intestato. We will begin with those in re necessarium est initium de which come to us by testament ; and ordinandis testamentis exponere. for this, it is necessary in the first place to explain the formalities requisite in making testaments. Gai. ii. 97-100. We now pass to the acquisition of a universitas rerum, to the cases in which one man succeeded to the persona of another, and acquired in a mass all his goods and all his rights. (See Introd. sec. 74.) Tit. X. DE TESTAMENTIS ORDINANDIS. Testamentum ex eo appellatur, The word testament is derived from quod testatio mentis est. testatio meyitis ; it testifies the determi- nation of the mind. D. xxviii. 1. 1. With respect to this derivation it is scarcely necessary to say that mentum is merely a termination, and not derived from mens. Ulpian {Beg. 20. 1) gives as a definition of a testament, mentis nostrcE justa contestatio, in id solemniter facta, ut post mortem nostram valeat; and Modestinus (D. xxviii. 1. 1) gives vohin- M 162 LIB. 11. TIT. X. tatis nostrcE jiista sententia de eo quod quis post mortem suam fieri vuJt\ the y^ovdijusta implying in each, that, in order to be valid, the testament must be made in compliance with the forms of law. 1. Sed lit nihil antiqnitatispenitus 1. That nothing belonging to an- ignoretnr, sciendum est olim quidem tiqiiity may be altogether unknown, duo genera testamentorum in usu it is necessary to observe, that formerly fuisse : quorum altero in pace et in there were two kinds of testaments in otio utebantur, quod calatis comitiis use: the one was employed in times of appellabant ; altero, cum in prselium peace, and was named calatis comitiis^ exituri essent, quod procinctum di- the other was employed at the moment cebatur. Accessit deinde tertium of setting out to battle, and was termed genus testamentorum, quod diceba- procinctum,. A third species was after- tur per ses et libram, scilicet quia wards added, called per ses et libram, per emancipationem, id est, imagi- being effected by mancipation, that is, nariam quamdam venditionem, age- an imaginary sale in the presence of five batur, quinque testibus et libripende witnesses, and the lihripe7is, all citizens civibus Romanis puberibus prtesen- of Rome, above the age of puberty, to- tibus, et eo qui familise emptor di- gether with him who was called the cebatur. Sed ilia quidem priora emptor familise. The two former kinds duo genera testamentorum ex ve- of testaments fell into disuse even in teribus temporibus in desuetudinem ancient times ; and that made per gss abierunt ; quod vero per ees et li- et libram also, although it has con- bram fiebat, licet diutius permansit, tinned longer in practice, has now in attamen partim et hoc in usu esse part ceased to be made use of. desiit. Gal ii. 101-104. When the head of a family died, the law in ancient times de- termined on whom his persona, that is, the aggregate of his poli- tical and social rights, should devolve. But we cannot say that there was any definite period of Roman history when a man could not make a will. Originally, as we learn from the text which i& borrowed from Gains, testaments were made in the comitia calata, or in procinctu. By calata comitia is meant the comitia curiata summoned {calata^ for the despatch of what we may term private business. This took place twice a year. We do not know how far it was open to any one at the meeting to oppose a testament, or whether the comitia merely registered the testaments declared in their presence. Subsequently the mode of making testaments per (Bs et libram, that is, by a fictitious sale, was introduced, and both this mode and that of declaration before the comitia curiata were used indiiFerently, nor is there any evidence to show that the one form was considered more appropriate to the patres than the other. Only members of the patrician gentes sat in the comitia curiata, but that is no reason why the plebeians should not have come before these comitia to declare their testaments. The Twelve Tables declared uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suce rei, itajus esto, that is, every one's testamentary dispositions should be carried into effect, and the necessity for the provision may have arisen from some kind of tampering on the part of members of the comitia with the testaments of plebeians. Procinctus properly means an army in marching and fighting order. Procinctus est expeditus et armatus exercitus (Gai. ii. 101 ). LIB. II. TIT. X. 163 The testament is said to be procinctum, but properly it ought to be hi procinctu factum. Cicero speaks (^de Or. i. 53) of the testa- ment in procinctu as then in use, and describes it as made sine libra et tabidis, that is, -without the forms usual in the testamentum per CES et lihram. In the testamentwn per cbs et libram, the liereditas was sold by mancipatio to the purchaser. Originally the testator sold the in- heritance to the person who was really to be the heir. The purchaser, as Gains expresses it, heredis locum obtinebat, and the testator instructed him how he wished his property to be disposed of after his death. But as the sale was irrevocable, a testator might be very glad to escape from proclaiming an heir whose position he could not afterwards affect. The object was attained by selling the inheritance to a third person ; and the families emptor came to be thus a mere stranger, who was only appointed dicis gratia, to go through the form of sale. (GrAi. ii. 103.) The process of selling to this fictitious stranger is given at length in Gains (ii. 104). The testator summoned five witnesses, and a balanceholder (libripens), and then gave by mancipation his in- heritance to the purchaser. The purchaser, on receiving it, instead' of using the ordinary form, pronounced these words, Familiam pecuniamque tuam endo mandatam tutela custodelaque mea recipio eaque quo tujure testamentum facere possis secundum legem puh- licam hoc cere (or, as some added, ceneaque libra) esto mihi empta : he then, after striking the scale with it, gave the piece of copper to the testator, as the price of the inheritance. The testator then stated aloud the terms of his will, if he wished to make his testa- ment orally, or if he had written down the terms of his testament he produced the tablets on which his testament was written, and said, Hcec ita, ut in his tabulis cerisque scripta sunt, ita do, ita lego, ita testor, itaque vos, Quirites, testimonium mihi perhibetote. This announcement of his wishes was termed nuncupatio.. Nun- cupare est palam nominare. (Gai. ib.) The term is properly applicable to the oral statement ; but the expression of the testa- tor's wishes was really considered as always made orally, as the announcement that the written documents contained a declaration of the testator's wishes Avas taken as a c6mpendious mode of stating what those wishes were. (Gai. ib.) The concluding words of the paragraph, partim et hoc iri usu esse desiit, allude to the change above mentioned from a sale to the real heir to a sale to a stranger. The sale became a mere matter of form, and the testament was that which the testator wrote. When the mode of making testaments by the calata ( omitia fell into disuse we do not know, but probably at an early time of the Republic. The imperial constitutions (see next Title) gave all soldiers the power of making a testament without ob- serving the usual forms, and the testaments of soldiers under the Empire were valid, not being made in procinctu, that is, by virtue of the army being regarded as an assembly of citizens, but by the M 2 164 LIB. II. TIT. X. power which was given to each soldier of making an informal testament. In what way they gave greater liberty to the soldier than the old power of making the will in procinctu we cannot say ; but probably the making of the testament in procinctu was con- nected with the taking of the auspices, and thus was more liable to be declared informal. \ 2. Sed praedicta quidem nomina 2. These three kinds of testament testamentorum ad jus civile refere- belonged to the civil law, but after- ' bantnr. Postea vero ex edicto prre- wa,rds another kind was introduced by toris forma alia faciendorum testa- the edict of the prsetor. By the jus mentorum introducta est: jure enim lionorarimn no sale was necessary, but honorario nulla emancipatio deside- the seals of seven witnesses were suffi- rabatur, sed septem testium signa cient. The seals of witnesses were not sufRciebant, cum jure civili signa required by the civil law. testium non erant necessaria. i There was no necessity, as the text tells us, that a written will made in the old form per ces et lihram should be sealed. After the praetorian form of making wills became usual, a senatus- consultum provided (as we learn from Paulus, S. R. v. 25. 6) that a written testament should be made on tablets of wax. These tablets were held together at one margin with a wire, and in the opposite margin there was a perforation made through all the tablets, and through this was passed a triple linen thread, and then the tablets were covered with wax on the outside, and the witnesses placed their seal (that is, made a mark with their rings) on this external wax. It was also customary for them to write their names, and to state whose will it was they had witnessed (D. xxviii. 1. 30), but this was not a necessary part of the form until made so by a constitution of Theodosius and Yalentinian (C. vi. 23. 21). This constitution also permitted a will to be made in a roll, which, if the testator wished to keep the terms secret, he might close and seal up, leaving the foot of the roll open, on which the witnesses were to put their seals and sub- scriptions. The testator was under this constitution to subscribe his name or get an eighth witness to subscribe it for him. The praetor, as the text informs us, permitted an heir insti- tuted in a testament to have the inheritance, even though the form of mancipation was not gone through. He could not, indeed, make this person heir, for it was necessary that an heir should derive his rights exclusively from the civil law : but he gave him the honorum possession that is, permitted him to enjoy exactly what he would have enjoyed if he had been properly con- stituted heir, and then usucapion soon made him Quiritanian owner. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 6.) The praetor, however, required that the testament in which he was instituted should have been made in the presence and attested by the seals of seven witnesses. This was really the number of witnesses which there would have been, had the form of mancipation been gone through, if the libripens and families emptor were included. Thus the praetor. LIB. II. TIT. X. 165 while dispensing with the mere form of mancipation, retained ex- actly the same check against fraud, which that form would have afforded. (See Ulp. Reg, 28. 6.) 3. Sed cum paulatim, tarn ex usu liominum quam ex constitutionum emendationibus, coepit in unam con- sonantiam jus civile et prsetorium iiinofi, constitutum est ut uno eodem- que tempore (quod jus civile quo- dammodo exigebat) septem testibus adhibitis, et subscriptione testium (quod ex constitutionibus inventum est) et ex edicto preetoris signacula testamentis imponerentur : ut hoc jus tripartituna esse videatur, ut testes quidem. et eorum prsesentia u]io contextu, testamenti celebrandi gratia, a jure civili descendant ; sub- scriptiones autem testatoris et tes- tium ex sacrarum constitutionum observatione adliibeantur, signacula autem et testium numerus ex edicto prtetoris. 3. But when the progress of society and the imperial constitutions had produced a fusion of the civil and the praetorian law, it was established thafc the testament should be made all at one time, in the presence of seven witnesses (two points required by the civil law), with the subscription of the witnesses (a formality introduced by the constitutions), and with their seals appended, according to the edict of the prcetor. Thus the law of testament seems to have had a triple origin. The witnesses, and their presence at one continuous time for the purpose of giving the testament the requisite for- mality, are derived from the civil law ; the subscriptions of the testator and witnesses, from the imperial constitu- tions ; and the seals of the witnesses and their number, from the edict of the praetor. C. vi. 23. 21. The different formalities requisite were to be gone through one immediately following after another, so as to make the whole one transaction. Est autem uno contextu nullum actum alienum testamento intermiscere (D. xxviii. 1. 21. 3). It was by the above-mentioned constitution, enacted in the reign of Yalentinian the Third in the East, and of Theodosius the Second, his colleague, in the West, a.d. 439, that the new form of testament described in the text, and which received the name of testamentum tripartitum, was substituted for the ancient ones. But in the West the form per cbs et libram was never quite superseded, and traces of it are to be found even in the middle ag^es. 4. Sed his omnibus a nostra con- stitutione, propter testamentorum sinceritatem, ut nulla fraus adhibea- tur, hoc additum est : ut per manum testatoris vel testium nomen heredis exprimatur, et omnia secundum il- lius constitution is tenorem proce- dant. 4. To all these formalities we have enacted by our constitution, as an ad- ditional security for the genuineness of testaments, and to prevent fraud, that the name of the heir shall be written in the handwriting either of the testa- tor or of the witnesses ; and that every- thing shall be done according to the tenor of that constitution. C. vi. 25. 29. This additional formality, imposed by Justinian, was after- wards abolished by him. (Nov. 119. 9.) 5. Possunt autem omnes testes et 5. All the witnesses may seal the uno annulo signare testamentum. testament with the same seal j. for, ?is 166 LIB. IL TIT. X. Quid eniin si septem annuli una Pomponius says, what if the engraving sciilptura fuerint, secundum quod on all seven seals were the same I Pomponio visum est ? Sed et alieno And a witness may use a seal belonging quoque annulo licet signare. to another person. D. xxviii. 1. 22. 2. 6. Testes autem adhiberi possunt 6. Those persons can be witnesses ii cum quibvis testamenti factio est. with whom there is testamenti /actio. Sed neque mulier, neque impubes, But women, persons under the age of neque servus, neque furiosus, neque puberty, slaves, madmen, dumb per- mutus, neque surdus, nee cui bonis sons, deaf persons, prodigals restrained interdictum est, nee is qiiem leges from having their property in their jubent improbum intestabilemque power, and persons declared by law to esse, possunt in numero testium be worthless and incompetent to wit- adhiberi. ness, cannot be witnesses. D. xxviii. 1. 20. 4. 7 ; D. xxviii. 1. 26. When testaments were made per (bs et libram, as no one could 'take part in the ceremony of mancipation who did not share in the jus Quiintium, no peregrinus, no one who had not the com- mercium, could be a witness to a testament. It w^as equally necessary that the seller, i.e. the testator, and the purchaser, that is (in the old form), the heir, should share in the jus Quiritium. And therefore no one who had not the commerciiim could take any part in the testamenti factio, the ceremony of making a tes- tament, either as testator, heir,- or witness ; and this was expressed by saying that they were not persons with whom there was testamenti factio — not persons, that is, with whom any citizen could join in such a ceremony. * After the heir had ceased to take a part in the ceremony of mancipation, there was no longer any necessity for his having those qualifications which enabled him to join in the ancient cere- mony. Accordingly, any one who could take under a testament, or acquire for another, although unable to make a testament, was. then said to have the testamenti factio. An infant, for instance, a madman, or even a child born after the testator's death, had the testamenti factio in the sense of being able to be heir (see Tit. 19. 4), and a person might thus have the testamenti factio in one character without having it in another. He could be heir, and yet be unable "to be a testator or a witness. Women could take no part in such a solemn legal act as man- cipation, and therefore could not be witnesses ; nor could women imake wills if in the power of their father, or in the manus of their husband. If they were not in potestate, nor in manu, they could make a will, provided that the will was confirmed by the auctoritas of their tutor. By a fictitious sale, however, coemptio jidacicB causa, a woman could free herself from the power of her tutor, and then she could make a will independently of him. Infants and slaves could acquire by mancipation for those in whose power they were, but could not be witnesses. The prodigus cui bonis interdictum est was prevented from using his rights of com- mercium, and therefore could not take part in a mancipation. LIB. II. TIT. X. 167 (D. xxviii. 1. 18.) The mutus had not the testamenti f actio, because he could not utter the words of the nuncupatio, and the surdus also had not the testamenti f actio, because he could not hear the words of the emptor familicB. (Ulp. Frag. 20. 13.) By the later law, however, provision was made for giving validity to the wills of the deaf and dumb. (See infra, Tit. 12. 3.) A person who was made intestabilis for a crime could neither make a testament nor take part in the making of one. Among such persons were those condemned for libel, ob carmen farnosum (D. xxviii. 1. 18. 1), for spoliation, repetundarnm, (D. xxii. 5. 15), or adultery (D. xxii. 5. 14); or who, having acted as witnesses to a will, afterwards refused to acknowledge their signature and seal. (Theoph. Paraphr,) 7. Sed cum aliquis ex testibus tes- tamenti quidem faciendi tempore liber existimabatur, postea vero ser- vus apparuit, tarn divus Hadrianus Catonio Vero quam postea divi Severus et Antoninus rescripse- runt, subvenire se ex sua libera- litate testamento, ut sic habeatur atque si ut oportet factum esset ; cum eo tempore quo testamentum signaretur, omnium consensu hie testis liberorum loco fuerit, neque quisquam esset qui status ei quse- stionem moveret. 7. A witness, who was thought to be free at the time of making the testament, was afterwards discovered to be a slave, and the Emperor Ha- drian, in his rescript to Catonius Verus, and afterwards the Emperors Severus and Antoninus by rescript, declared, that they would aid such a defect in a testament, so that it should be consi- dered as valid as if made quite regu- larly ; since, at the time when the tes- tament was sealed, this witness was commonly considered a free man, and there was no one to contest his status. ' C. vi. 23. 1. Regard was had only to what was the condition of witnesses at the time of signature, not at that of the death of the testator, (D. xxviii. 1. 22. 1.) 8. Pater nee non is qui in potes- tate ejus est, item duo fratres qui in ejusdem patris potestate sunt, utrique testes in uno testamento fieri possunt ; quia nihil nocet ex una domo plures testes alieno ne- gotio adhiberi. 8. A father, and a son under his power, or two brothers under the power of the same father, may be witnesses to the same testament ; for nothing prevents several persons of the same family being witnesses in a matter which only concerns a stranger. No one of the same family with the testator or heir could be a mtness to the testament, a family comprising, in this sense, the head and those under his power ; for they had so intimate a con- nection with each other that they might be said to be witnesses for themselves, if they were witnesses for each other. 9. In testibus autem non debet esse, qui in potestate testatoris est. Sed et si filiusfamilias de castrensi peculio post missionem faciat testa- mentum, nee pater ejus recte adhi- betur testis, nee is qui in potestate ejusdem patris est ; reprobatum est 9. But no person under power of the testator can be a witness. And if a filiusfamilias makes a testament giving his castrense peculium after leav- ing the army, neither his father, nor any one in power of his father, can be a witness. For, in this case, the law 168 LIB. II. TIT. X. enim in ea re domesticmn testimo- does not allow of the testimony of a nium. member of the same family. Gal ii. 105, 106. This had been a point on which the jurists were disagreed. Justinian here follows the opinion of Gains (ii. 106), rejecting that of Ulpian and Marcellus. (D. xxviii. 1. 20. 2.) The question could only arise respecting a testament made post mlssionem, as, if it were made during service, it Avould be entitled to the exemptions accorded to military testaments. 10. Sed neque heres scriptus ne- que is qui in potestate ejus est, neque pater ejus qui eum habet in potes- tate, neque fratres qui in ejusdem patris potestate sunt, testes adhiberi possunt, quia totum hoc negotium quod agitur testamenti ordinandi gratia, creditur hodie inter testato- lem et heredem agi : licet enim to- tum jus tale conturbatum fuerat, et veteres quidem familias emptorem et eos ((ui per potestatem ei coad- unati fuerant, testimoniis repelle- bant, heredi et iis qui per potesta- tem ei conjuncti fuerant, concede- bant testimonia in testamentis prse- stare. Licet ii qui id permittebant, hoc jure minime abuti eos debere suadebant. Tamen nos eamdem observationem corrigentes, et quod ab illis suasum est in legis necessi- tatem transferentes, ad imitationem pristini familise emptoris, merito nee heredi qui imaginem vetustis- simi familiae emptoris obtinet, nee aliis personis quae ei, ut dictum est, conjunctse sunt, licentiam concedi- mus sibi quodammodo testimonia preestare: ideoque nee ejusmodi ve- teres constitutiones nostro codici inseri permisimus. Gai. ii. 108. When the heir had ceased to be the familioB emptor, he was no party to the transaction, and therefore, it was considered, he could be a witness. Gains (ii. 108) reprobates the custom, and Justinian here pronounces it illegal. Under his legislation, there being no longer any familicB. emptor, the whole transaction, to use the language of the ancient mode, was between the testator and the heir. 10. No person instituted heir, nor any one in subjection to him, nor his father, in whose power he is, nor his brothers under power of the same father, can be witnesses ; for the whole business of making a testament is in the present day considered a transac- tion between the testator and the heir. But formerly there was great corrfu- sion ; for although the ancients would never admit the testimony of the iardilisE, emptor, nor of any one con- nected with him by the ties of patria potestas, yet they admitted that of the heir, and of persons connected with him by the ties of patria potestas, only exhorting them not to abuse their pri- vilege. We have corrected this, making illegal what they endeavoured to pre- vent by persuasion. For, in imitation of the old law respecting the familix emptor, we refuse to permit the heir, who now represents the ancient/amiZi^e emptor, or any of those connected with the heir by the tie of patria potestas, to be, so to speak, witnesses in their own behalf ; and accordingly we have not suffered the constitutions of preceding emjDerors on the subject to be inserted in our code. 11. Legatariis autemet fideicom- missariis, quia non juris successores sunt, et aliis personis quae eis con- junctse sunt, testimonium non dene- gavimus. Imo in quadam nostra constitutione et hoc specialiter con- 11. But we do not refuse the testi- mony of legatees, or persons taking fideicommissa, or of persons connected with them, because they do not suc- ceed to the rights of the deceased. On the contrary, by one of our constitu- LIB. II. TIT. X. 169 cessimus, et miilto magis iis qui in eorum potestate sunt, vel qui eos habent in potestate, hujusmodi li- centiam damus. tions we have specially granted them this privilege ; and we give it still more readily to persons in their power, and to those in whose power they are. Gai. ii. 108. It would appear that the objection of his being interested, which would make the heir an unlit Avitness, might also have been urged against the legatee ; but the legatee was admitted as a witness on the technical ground of his not being the successor of the testator. The inheritance was not transmitted to him, and he Avas thus looked on as a stranger. By the Senatiis-consultum Libonianum, passed in the reign of Tiberius, a.d. 16, it was provided that if a man wrote a testa- ment for another, everything which he wrote in his own favour should be null. He could not, therefore, make himself a tutor (D. xxvi. 2. 29), an heir, or a legatee. (D. xxxiv. 8.) 12. Nihil ^utem interest, testa- mentum in tabulis an in chartis membranisve, vel in alia materia fiat. D. xxxvii. 11. 1. 12. It is immaterial, whether a testament be written upon a tablet, upon paper, parchment, or any other substance. 13. Sed et unum testamentum pluribus codicibus conficere quis potest, secundum obtinentem tamen observationem omnibus factis : quod interdum etiam necessarium est, veluti si quis navigaturus et seeum ferre et domi relinquere judiciorum suorum contestationem velit, vel propter alias innumerabiles causas quae humanis necessitatibus immi- nent. 13. Any person may execute any number of duplicates of the same testament, each, however, being made with prescribed forms. This may be sometimes necessary ; as, for instance, when a man who is going a voyage is desirous to carry with him, and also to leave at home, a memorial of his last wishes ; or for any other of the numberless reasons that may arise from the various necessities of man- kind. D. xxviii. 1. 24. Each codex was an original with all the solemnities which been the only one. 14. Sed hsec quidem de testa- mentis quse in scriptis conficiuntur. Si quis autem sine scriptis voluerit ordinare jure civiH testamentum, septem testibus adhibitis et sua vo- luntate coram eis nuncupata, sciat hoc perfectissimum testamentum jure civili firmumque constitutum. testament, valid only if itself made would have been requisite had it 14. Thus much may suffice con- cerning written testaments. But if any one wishes to make a testament, valid by the civil law, without writing, he may do so, if, in the presence of seven witnesses, he verbally declares his wishes, and this will be a testament perfectly valid according to the civil law, and confirmed by imperial con- stitutions. Thus a testator under the legislation of Justinian mig-ht either make his testament according to the form described in paragraph 3, or orally before seven witnesses. Sua voluntate nuncupata. The word nuncupatio was originally used to express the declaration of the testator's intentions, whether 170 LIB. II. TIT. XL the testament was written or not; but later usage appropriated the term nuncupata to testaments where there was no written will, and where the testator declared his wishes orally. Tit. XI. DE MILITARI TESTAMENTO. Supradicta diligens observatio, in ordinandis testamentis, militibus propter nimiam imperitiam consti- tutionibus principalibus remissa est ; nam quamvis ii neque legitimum numerum testiiim adhibuerint ne- que aliam testamentorum solemni- tatem observaverint, recte nihilo- miniis testantur : videlicet, cum in expeditionibus occupati sunt, quod merito nostra constitutio introduxit. Quoquo enim modo voluntas ejus suprema inveniatur, sive scripta sive sine scriptura, valet testamen- tum ex voluntate ejus. lUis autem temporibus, per quse citra expedi- tionum necessitatem in aliis locis vel suis aedibus degunt, minime ad vindicandum tale privilegium ad- juvantur ; sed testari quidem, etsi tiliifamiliarum sunt, propter mili- tiam conceduntur, jure tamen com- muni, eadem observatione et in eorum testamentis adliibenda, quam et in testamentis paganorum prox- ime exposuimus. The necessity for the observance of these formalities in the construction of testaments, has been dispensed with by the imperial constitutions, in favour of military persons, on account of their excessive unskilfulness in such matters. For, although they neither employ the legal number of witnesses, nor observe any other re- quisite solemnity, yet their testament is valid, but only if made while they are on actual service, a proviso intro- duced by our constitution with good reason. Thus in whatever manner the wishes of a military person are expressed, whether in writing or not, the testament prevails by the mere force of his intention. But during the times when they are not on actual service, and live at their own homes, or elsewhere, they are not permitted to claim this privilege. A soldier, although a JUiusfamilias, gains from military service the power of making a testament ; but, in this case, the same formalities are required to be observed, as we above explained to be necessary for the testaments of civilians. Gai. ii. 109 ; C. vi. 21. 17. The privilege of making valid testaments, independent of any formality, was one given to soldiers, among many others of a similar kind, rather as a special favour to them than from any consideration for their nimia imperitia. It dates from the time of Julius Csesar, who granted it as a temporary concession. It was made a general rule by Nerva, and confirmed by Trajan. If the testament of a soldier were written, no witness was necessary ; but if not, it is doubtful whether one witness was sufficient to prove it ; probably one witness sufficed, although the law, at any rate after the time of Constantino, required, as a general rule, that two witnesses at least should be produced in every case. (D. xxii. 5. 12 ; D. xlviii. 18. 17.) A soldier in the power of a father might make a testament disposing of his castrense, and, under Justinian, his quasi- castrense peculium. If he made it while on service, he need observe no formality in making the testament; if he did not make it while on service, he was bound to observe the usual formalities. (Gai. ii. 106.) The concluding words of LIB. II. TIT. XI. 171 the section are meant to express that it was by military service that the filiusfamilias gained the power of disposing at any time of his peculium castrense, but that this general right, unless the soldier was on service, had to be exercised with the observance of the usual forms. Whether before the time of Justinian the soldier could make a military testament when not serving on a campaign is doubtful. 1. The Emperor Trajan wrote as follows, in a rescript to Statilius Se- verus, with respect to military testa- ments : ' The privilege, given to mili- tary persons, that their testaments, in whatever manner made, shall be valid, must be understood as meaning that it must j&rst be clear that a tes- tament has been made (a testament may be made without writing even by persons not on military service). If, then, it appear that the soldier, concerning whose goods the action before you is now brought, did, in the presence of witnesses, called ex- pressly for the purpose, declare who he wished should be his heir, and to what slave he wished to give freedom, he shall be considered to have made in this way a testament without writ- ing, and effect shall be given to his wishes. But if, as is often the case in the course of conversation, he said to some one, ' ' I appoint you my heir," or, " I leave you all my estate," such words must not be regarded as a testament. No one is more inte- rested than soldiers themselves that such a precedent should not be ad- mitted ; otherwise it would not be difficult to procure witnesses who, after the death of a soldier, would affirm that they had heard him be- queath his estate to whomever they pleased to name ; and thus the real intentions of soldiers might be de- feated. ' D. xxix. 1. 24. Convocatis ad hoc hominihus. There was no necessary cere- mony of calling witnesses. If there was but proof of what the soldier's wishes were, and that he had declared them while on service, that was enough. 2. Quinimo et mutus et surdus 2. A soldier though dumb and miles testamentum facere potest, deaf may make a testament. D, xxix, 1. 4, 1. Plane de testamentis nlilitum divus Trajanus Statilio Severo ita rescripsit : ' Id privilegium quod militantibus datum est, ut quoquo modo facta ab iis testamenta rata sint, sic intelligi debet, ut utique prius constare debeat testamentum factum esse, quod et sine scriptura a non militantibus quoque fieri po- test. Is ergo miles de cujus bonis apud te quseritur, si convocatis ad hoc hominibus ut voluntatem suam testaretur, ita locutus est ut decla- raret quem vellet sibi heredem esse, et cui libertatem tribuere, po- test videri sine scripto hoc modo esse testatus, et voluntas ejus rata habenda est. Ceterum, si (ut ple- rumque sermonibus fieri solet) dixit alicui. Ego te heredem facio, aut bona mea tibi relinquo, non oportet hoc pro testamento observari : nee ullorum magis interest quam ipso- rum quibus id privilegium datum est, ejusmodi exemplum non ad- mitti ; alioquin non difficulter post mortem alicujus militis testes exis- terent, qui affirmarent se audisse dicentem aliquem relinquere se bona cui visum sit, et per hoc vera judicia subverterentur. ' It might happen, as Theophilus suggests, that a soldier, in- 172 LIB. II. TIT. XI. capacitated for actual service by becoming deaf or dumb, might yet not have received his missio causaria (discharge for an acci- dental reason). A testament made by him in the interval between his loss of capacity and his discharge would be considered entitled to all the privileges of a military testament. 3. Sed hactenus hoc illis a prin- cipalibus constitutionibus concedi- tur, quatenus militant et in castris degunt. Post missionem vero ve- terani, vel extra castra alii si faciant adliuc militantes testamentiim, communi omnium civium Romano- rum .jure facere debent ; et quod in castris fecerint testamentum, non communi jure, sed quomodo volu- erint, post missionem intra annum tantum valebit. Quid ergo si intra annum decesserit, conditio autem heredi adscripta post annum exti- terit ? An quasi militis testamen- tum valeat ? Et placet valere quasi militis. 3. This privilege is only granted by the imperial constitutions to mili- tary men, as long as they are on ser- vice, and live in the camp. There- fore, veterans after their discharge, or soldiers not in the camp, can only make their testaments by observing the forms required of all Roman citi- zens. And if a testament be made in the camp, and the solemnities of the law are not observed, it will con- tinue valid only for one year after discharge from the army. Suppose, therefore, a soldier should die within a year after his discharge, but the condition imposed on the heir should not be accomplished until after the year, would his testament be valid, on the analogy of the testament of a soldier ? We answer, it would be so valid. D. xxix. 1. 38, pr. and 1. A soldier enjoyed the privilege of making a military testa- ment while his name was inscribed on the list of the army {in numeris), and also for a year after it had been taken off, but this only provided he were not discharged ignominicB causa. (D. xxix. 1. 38.) The doubt as to the validity of a military testament, con- taining a condition under the circumstances mentioned in the text, arose from the doctrine of Roman law that, when the institution of the heir was conditional, the operation of the testament dated from the accomplishment of the condition, not from the death of the testator. If, therefore, the soldier died within a year after he had quitted the service, but the condition was not accomplished until the year w^as expired, the testament did not, strictly speak- ing, take effect within the year ; and therefore Justinian removes a difficulty which a rigorous adherence to the letter of the law suggested. 4. If a man, before becoming a soldier, has made his testament irregukrly, and afterwards, while on service, opens it, and adds something or strikes something out, or in any other way makes his wish manifest that this testament should be valid, it must be pronounced to be so, as being, in fact, a new testament made by a soldier. , 1. 20. 1. 4. Sed et si quis ante militiam non jure fecit testamentum, et miles factus et in expeditione degens re- signavit illud et qusedam adjecit sive detraxit, vel alias manifesta est militis voluntas hoc valere volentis, dicendum est valere hoc testamen- tum quasi ex nova militis voluntate. D. xxix LIB. II. TIT. XL 173 If tlie soldier manifested his intention of adhering to the dis- positions of his old testament, this was as much a fresh expression of his wishes as if he had made a new testament. If he was altogether silent on the subject, an informal testament made before his becoming a soldier was not valid, as it was necessary that there should be a positive declaration of his wishes made while he was on service to make his testament valid as a military one. 5. Denique et si in adrogationem 5. If a soldier is given in arro- datus fuerit miles, vel tiliiisfamilias gation, or, being a JUlusfamilias, is emancipatus est, testamentum ejus emancipated, his testament is valid quasi ex nova militis voluntate as though by a new expression of the valet, nee videtur capitis deminu- wishes of a soldier ; and is not con- tione irritum fieri. sidered as invalidated by the capitis deminutio he has undergone. D. xxix. 1. 22, 23. By the law of Rome every testament became void, irritum, by the testator, after its execution, suffering any of the three kinds of capitis deminutio. With soldiers it was otherwise ; their testament was not invalidated by undergoing either of the two greater kinds of deminutio, if it was merely for an infraction of military law that they were condemned to a punishment involving either of these kinds of alteration of status. (D. xxviii. 3. 6. 6.) Nor was it ever invalidated by their undergoing the third and least kind. The will of the soldier was supposed to be exercised so as to declare his wish that the old testament should be valid {quasi ex nova militis voluntate) ; and in this case it does not appear that any positive declaration of such a wish was necessary. His testament, made previous to his change of status, was effec- tual, to the fullest extent it could be in the new position he occupied. The testament made by a paterfamilias respecting his property became, after arrogation, an effectual disposition of his castrense peculium ; and one made by a filiusfamilias respecting his castrense peculium became, after emancipation, an effectual disposition of all his property. 6. Sciendum tamen est quod, ad 6. We may here observe, that, in exemplum castrensis peculii, tarn imitation of the castrense peculium, anteriores leges quam principales both old laws and imperial constitu- constitutiones quibusdam quasi cas- tions have permitted certain persons trensia dederant peculia, et horum to have a quasi-castrense peculium, quibusdam permissum erat efciam and some of these persons have been in potestate degentibus testari. permitted to dispose of this peculium Quod nostra constitutio latius ex- by testament, although they were in tendens permisit omnibus, in his the power of another. Our consti- tantiunmodo peculiis, testari quidem tution has extended this permission to sed jure communi. Cujus consti- all those who have this kind of pe- tutionis tenore perspecto, licentia culium, but their testaments must be est nihil eorum, quae ad prsefatum made with the ordinary formalities, jus pertinent, ignorare. By reading this constitution a person may learn all that relates to the privilege we have mentioned. 174 LIB. II. TIT. XII. VTe must not suppose, from the expression anteriores leges, that the peculiwm quasi-castrense belongs to a time of law when leges were really made. It is even doubtful, as we have said before, whether the passages in which it is mentioned by Ulpian, the only writer before Constantine who is supposed to refer to it, are genuine. (See note on Tit. 9. 1.) Horiim quihusdam. The right of disposing by testament of the quasi-castrense peculium had, before Justinian, been granted only to certain privileged classes, such as consuls and presidents of provinces, among those who were permitted to hold this kind of peculium. (C. iii. 28. 37.) Justinian granted it to all. (C. vi. 22. 12.) It is to be observed, that soldiers had other testamentary privileges besides those mentioned in the text. They could insti- tute as heirs persons who were generally incapacitated, such as those who had been deportati, or who were peregrini. (Gai. ii. 110.) They were not obliged formally to disinherit their children, their testament was not set aside as inofficious (C. iii. 28. 9), they could give more than three-fourths of their property in legacies (C. vi. 21. 12), they could die partly testate and partly intestate ( D. xxix. 1. 6), and could dispose of the inheritance by codicils (D. xxix. 1. 36). The succeeding Title will show how much they thus differed from ordinary citizens. Tit. XII. QUIBUS NOjST EST PERMISSUM FACERE TESTAMENTUM. Non tamen omnibus licet facere The power of making a testament testamentum. Statim enim ii qui is not granted to every one. In the alieno juri subjecti sunt, testamenti first place, persons in the power of faciendi jus non habent, adeo qui- others have not this right ; so much so, dem ut quamvis parentes eis per- that, although parents give permission, niiserint, nihilo magis jure testari still they cannot make a valid testament. 13ossint : exceptis iis quos antea We must except those whom we have enumeravimus, et prfecipue militi- already mentioned, and particularly bus qui in potestate parentum sunt, flliifcmiiUarum who are soldiers, for quibus de eo quod in castris acqui- the imperial constitutions have given sierunt, permissum est ex constitu- them the power of bequeathing what- tionibus principum testamentum ever they have acquired while on actual facere. Quod quidem jus ab initio service. This permission was at first tantum militantibus datum est, tarn granted by the Emperors Augustus and ex auctoritate divi Augusti quam Nerva, and the illustrious Emperor Nervae, nee non optimi imperatoris Trajan, to soldiers on service only ; Trajani ; postea vero subscriptione but afterwards it was extended by the divi Hadriani etiam dimissis a mi- Emperor Hadrian to veterans, that is, litia, id est, veteranis concessum to soldiers who had received their dis- est. Itaque si quod fecerint de cas- charge ; and therefore, it a,Jiliusfaniilias trensi peculio testamentum, perti- disposes by testament of his castrense nebit hoc ad eum quern heredem peculium, this peculium will belong to reliquerint. Si vero intestati de- the person whom he makes his heir; cesserint, nullis liberis v'el fratribus but, if he dies intestate, without chil- superstitibus, ad parentes eorum jure dren or brothers, this j9eett?Mtm will then communi pertinebit. Ex hoc intelli- belong, according to the ordinary law LIB. II. TIT. XII. 175 gerepossiimiis,qiiodincastrisacqui- of the patria potestas, to the person sierit miles qui in potestate patris in whose power he is. We may hence est neque ipsum patrem adimere infer, that whatever a soldier, although posse, neque patris creditores id under power, has acquired while on vendere vel aliter inquietare, neque service, cannot be taken from him even patre mortuo cum fratribus com- by his father, nor can his father's cre- mune esse, sed scilicet proprium ditors sell it, or otherwise disturb the ejus esse id quod in castris acqui- son in his possession, nor is he bound sierit; quamquam jure civili om- to share it with brothers upon the nium qui in potestate parentum death of his father, but it remains sunt, peculia perinde in bonis pa- his sole property, although, by the rentum computantur ac si servorum civil law, the peculia of all those who peculia in bonis dominorum mime- are in the power of parents, are rantur ; exceptis videlicet iis quae ex reckoned among the goods of their sacris constitutionibus et prsecipue parents, exactly as the peculium of a nostris propter diversas causas non slave is reckoned amongthegoods of his acquiruntur. Prseter hos igitur qui master ; those goods excepted, which, castrense vel quasi castrense habent, by the constitutions of the emperors, and si quis alius filiusfamilias testamen- especially by our own, are prevented, tum fecerit, inutile est, licet suae for different reasons, from being so potestatis factus decesserit. acquired. With the exception, there- fore, of those who have a castrense or quasi-castrense peculium^ if any other Jiliusfamilias makes a testament, it is useless, although he become sid juris before his death. D. xxviii. 1. 6 ; D. xxix. 1. 1 ; C. vi. 61. 3, 4 ; C. vi. 59. 11 ; D. xlix. 17. 12 ; D. xxxvii. 6. 1. 15 ; D. xxviii. 1. 19. The first thing, says Gaius (ii. 114), which we have to inquire^ if we wish to know whether a testament is valid, is whether the person who made it had the testamenti /actio, that is, in this in- stance, could take the part of testator in the making of a testa- ment. To be able to do this he must have the commercium ; and further, he must be sui juris, or otherwise, as he could have no property, he could have nothing to dispose of by testament. Every Roman citizen who was sui juris had the right of making a testament, and if he was capable of exercising hi& right, and made a formal testament, this testament was valid. The text only gives one instance of persons who, as not being citizens sui juris, were unable to make a testament, viz., sous in the power of their father ; but, of course, all who, like slaves, peregrini, and persons who had undergone the greater or middle capitis deminutio, were not in the possession of the rights of citizenship, were equally debarred from making testaments. The Jiliusfamilias could have no property independently of his father, and he could not dispose of the property he might have if he became sui juris by outliving his father, because a future interest would not pass by mancipation. This was a part of the public law (testamenti /actio non privati sed puhlici juris est, D. i xxviii. 1.3), and could not be waived by the mere consent of a I private individual. It required express enactment to alter the law, and it was so far altered as to permit a filiusfamilias to dis- I pose by testament of a castrense or quasi-castrense peculium. 176 LIB. II. TIT. XII. (See paragr. 6 of preceding Title.) If, however, the possessor of the peculium did not dispose of it by testament, the head of the family took it, previously to the time of Justinian, not as heir ah intestato^ but as lawful claimant of a peculium. For the possessor, not having exercised the powder the law gave him, was in the same position as if the law had never permitted such a disposition. Justinian deferred this claim of the head of the family, when the possessor of the peculium had left children or brothers. If he had not left any, the head of the family then took the peculium ; whether in right of his headship, or as heir ah intestato, is a dis- puted point. We have, however, the authority of Theophilus in the paraphrase of this paragraph for supposing, that when Jus- tinian in the text says he took it jure communis it is meant that he took it by the right of patria potestas, and there seems no necessity for understanding the passage otherwise. 1. Pr?eterea testamentum facere 1. Persons, again, under the age non possiint impnberes, quia nullum of puberty cannot make a testament, eorum animi judicium est ; item fu- because they have not the requisite riosi, quia mente carent ; nee ad rem judgment of mind, nor can madmen, pertinet, si impubes postea pubes, for they are deprived of their senses, aut furiosus postea compos mentis Nor does it make any difference that factus fuerit et decesserit. Furiosi the former arrive at puberty, or the autem, si per id tempus fecerint latter regain their senses before they testamentum quo furor eorum inter- die. But if a madman make a testa- missus est, jure testati esse viden- ment during a lucid interval, his tes- tur : certe eo, quod ante furorem tament is valid ; and, of course, a tes- fecerint, testamento valente ; nam tament which he has made before being neque testamenta recte facta, neque seized with madness is valid, for sub- ullum aliud negotium recte gestum, sequent madness can invalidate neither postea furor interveniens perimit. a previous testament validly made, nor any other previous act validly per- formed. D. xxviii. 1. 20. 4. f In this and the succeeding paragraphs of this Title, instances are given of persons who have the right, but are not capable of exercising it. A testament made by a person incapable of exer- cising the right was not rendered valid by his subsequently be- coming capable, nor one made by a person capable rendered invalid by his subsequently becoming incapable. 2. Item prodigus cui bonorum 2. A prodigal, also, who is inter- suorum administratio interdicta est, dieted from the management of his testamentum facere non potest ; sed own affairs, cannot make a testament ; id quod ante fecerit quam interdictio but a testament made before such in- suorum bonorum ei fiat, ratum est. terdiction is valid. D. xxviii. 1. 18. 3. Item surdus et mutus non 3. Again, a deaf and dumb person semper testamentum facere possunt. is not always capable of making a tes- Utique autem de eo surdo loquimur tament : by deaf, we mean one who is qui omnino non exaudit, non qui so deaf as to be unable to hear at all, tarde exaudit ; nam et mutus is in- not one who hears with difficulty ; and telligitur qui loqui nihil potest, non by dumb, we mean a person who can- qui tarde loquitur. Seepe etiam lite- not speak at all, not one who merely LIB. II. TIT. XII. 177 rati et eruditi liomines variis causis speaks with difficulty. For it often et aiidiendi et loquendi facultatem happens, that even men of good edu- amittunt. Unde nostra constitutio cation lose by various accidents the etiam his subvenit, ut certis casibus faculty of hearing and speaking. Our et modis secundum normam ejus constitution, therefore, comes to their possint testari, aliaque facere quae aid, and permits them, in certain cases, eis permissa sunt, Sed si quis post and Avith certain forms, to make testa- testamentum factum, ad versa vale- ments, and do many other acts accord- tudine aut quolibet alio casu mutus ing to the rules therein laid down, aut surdus esse coeperit, ratum nihi- But if anyone, after making his testa- lominus ejus permanet testamentum. ment, become deaf or dumb by reason of ill health or any other accident, his testament remains valid notwithstand- ing. C. vi. 22. 10 ; D. xxviii. 1. 6. 1. The constitution alluded to (C. vi. 22. 10) permits a testament to be made by any deaf or dumb person not physically incapable of making one, i.e. by any one not deaf and dumb from birth. 4, C?ecus atitem non potest facere 4. A blind man cannot make a tes- testamentum, nisi per observatio- tament except by observing the forms nem quam lex divi Justini patris which the law of the Emperor Justin, nostri introduxit. our father, has introduced. C. vi. 22. 8. Justin, besides the seven witnesses ordinarily necessary, re- quired, in the case of a testament made by a blind man, tliat a notary {tahularius) should be present, or else an eighth witness, who should either write at the dictation of the blind man, or read aloud to him a testament previously prepared. (C. vi. 22. 8.) 5, Ejus qui apud hostes est tes- 5. The testament of a captiv.e in tamentimi quod ibi fecit non valet, the power of an enemy is not valid, if quamvis redierit. Sed quod, dum made during his captivity, even al- in civitate f uerat, fecit, sive redierit, though he subsequently return. But valet jure postliminii, sive illic de- a testament made while he was still in cesserit, valet ex lege Cornelia. his own state is valid, either by the jus postliminii, if he returns, or by the lex Cornelia, if he dies in captivity. D. xlix. 25. 18. A captive was incapacitated from performing, during his cap- tivity, any act good in law ; and thus, though his right to make a testament was not lost, but only suspended, he was incapable, while a captive, of exercising the right. But if he had exercised it before his captivity, the testament was valid, whether he re- turned to his country or not. If he did return, the right not having been lost, and having been once duly exercised, the testa- ment was \^\\di jure postliminii. If he did not return, but died in captivity, it was still valid, as he was supposed, by a fiction of law, to have died at the moment when he was made captive, and so before his captivity had begun. This fiction was introduced by a rather strained construction of the terms of the lex Cornelia defalsis (686 A.u.c), which provided that the same penalty should N 178 LIB. II. TIT. XIII. attach to the forgery of a testament of a person dying in captivity as to that of a testament made by a person dying in his own country. It was argued that the law could never have intended to attach a penalty to the forgery of a testament which was in- valid. If it was valid, it could only be so by treating it as if made by a person who had not died in captivity, and whose right was not suspended at the time of his death. For it was necessary that a person should have the power of making a testament, not only at the time when he made it, but also at the moment of his death ; but in this we must distinguish between the right to make a testament and the capacity of exercising that right ; for the loss of capacity to make a testament did not, as we have seen, affect a testament made by one capable at the time of making it. This favourable interpretation of the lex Cornelia [benejicium legis Cot- iielice) (Paul. Sent. iii. 4. 8) was gradually extended, so as to embrace every branch of law, such as tutorship, heirship, &c., to Avhich it could be made applicable. In omnibus partihus juris is qui reversus non est ab hostibus quasi tunc decessisse videtur cum captus est. (D. xlix. 15. 18.) Tit. XIII. DE EXHEREDATIONE LIBEEORUM, Non tameii, ut omnimocio valeat testamentum, sufficit hsec observatio qiiam supra exposuimiis ; seel qui lilium in potestate liabet, curare debet ut eum lieredem instituat, vel exheredem eum nominatim faciat. Alioquin si eum silentio pneterierit, inutiliter testabitar : adeo quidem ut, etsi vivo patre filius mortuus sit, nemo lieres ex eo testamento ex- istere possit, quia scilicet ab initio non constiterit testamentum. Sed non ita de filiabus, vel aliis per virilem sexum descendentibus li- beris utriusque sexus, antiquitati fuerat observatum ; sed si non fue- rant heredes scripti scriptfeve vel exheredati exlieredatseve, testamen- tum quidem non infirmabatur, jus autem accrescendi eis ad certain portionem prsestabatur. Sed nee nominatim eas personas exheredare parentibus necesse erat, sed licebat inter ceteros hoc facere. Nominatim autem quis exlieredari videtur, sive ita exlieredetur, Titius filius mens exheres esto, sive ita, filius mens exheres esto, non adjecto proprio nomine, scilicet si alius filius non extet. The observation of the rules al- ready laid down is not, however, all that is required to make a testament valid. A person who has a son in his power must take care either to institute him his heir, or to disinherit him by name, for if he pass him over in silence, his testament will be of no effect ; so much so, that even if the son die while the father is alive, yet no one can be heir under the testament, because it was void from the beginning. But the ancients did not observe this rule with regard to daughters, or to grandchildren, through the male line, of either sex ; for although these were neither in- stituted heirs nor disinherited, yet the testament was not invalidated, only they had a right of joining themselves with the instituted heirs so as to receive a portion of the inheritance. Parents, also, were not obliged to disinherit them by name, but might include them in the term ceteri. A child is disinherited by name, if the words used are ^ let Titius my son be disinherited,' or thus, 'let my son be disinherited,' without the addition of a proper name, in case the testator has na other son. Gai. ii. 115. 123, 124. 127. LID. II. TIT. XIII. 179 The power of making a testament was a derogation of the strict law regulating the devolution of the property of deceased persons. Of those whose claims a citizen sni juris was permitted thus to set aside, the first and most important class was that of what were called the sjii heredes, that is, persons in the power of the testator, but becoming siii juris by the testator's death, whose ' own ' the inheritance was said to be in consequence of their posi- tion in the family. (See Introd. 77.) They were necessarily either children of the testator, or his descendants in the male line, and their position in the testator's family, together with their claim to his property if he died intestate, was considered to entitle them to have an express declaration of his intention from a testator who wished to use his power of depriving them of the inheritance. We have already seen, in the case of the castrense peculium (Tit. 12. pr.), that when the law permitted an exception to a general rule of law, unless advantage was taken of the exception, the general rule prevailed. So here, unless the testator expressly took ad- vantage of his power of disinheriting the sui heredes, the general rule that they succeeded to him prevailed. The law would not permit his intention to disinherit them to be inferred from his silence, thus drawing a distinction in their favour as compared with the other classes of persons who might inherit ah intestato. In order, therefore, as the text informs us, to disinherit a son, it was necessary that he should be referred to by name, or in a special and unmistakable manner, as, Tititis Jilius mens exliercs esto, or, in case of an only son, filius meus exheres esto. But daughters and the descendants of sons (those of daughters w^ould not, of course, be members of the family at all) might be disinherited by the general clause ceteri exlieredes sunto. Whenever a person existed at the time the will was made, to dis- inherit whom it was necessary to refer to him by name, but who was passed over altogether, the whole testament was entirely bad^ and the testator was considered to die intestate. Nor was the tes- tament made valid by this person ceasing to exist before the death of the testator, although this was a point not established in the time of Gaius (ii. 123). If a person existed at the time of making the testament, to disinherit whom it was only necessary the general clause should be employed, the testament which did not contain this was good, but the person, if the heir named and instituted in the testament was among the sui lieredes, took a jjars virilis of the inheritance, that is, was joined so as to make one more heir and one more equal sharer in the inheritance {jus ac- crescendi) ; if the heirs instituted were strangers, the person took one-half the inheritance. Scriptis heredihus accrescunt, suis qui- dem heredihus in partem virilem^ exiraneis autem in partem dimi- diam, (Ulp. Ee(/. 22. 17.) 1. Postumi quoqiie liberi vel lie- 1. Posthumous children, too, must redes ^ institui debent, vel exhe- either be instituted heirs, or disin- redari; et in eo par omnium con- herited; and the condition of all such N 2 180 LIB. II. TIT. XIII. ditio est, quod et filio postumo et children is equal in this, that if a post- quolibet ex ceteris liberis, sive humous son, or any posthumous de- feminini sexus sive masculini, pr?e- scendant of either sex, is passed over, terito, valet quidem testamentum, the testament is still valid ; but, by sed postea adgnatione postumi sive the subsequent agnation of a posthu- postumos rumpitur, et ea ratione mous child of either sex, its force is totum infirmatur. Ideoque si mulier broken, and it becomes entirely void, ex qua postumus aut postuma And therefore, if a woman from whom sperabatur, abortum fecerit, nihil a posthumous child is expected, should impedimento est scriptis heredibus miscarry, there is nothing to hinder ad hereditatem adeundam. Sed the instituted heirs from entering feminini quidem sexus postum?e upon the inheritance. Posthumous vel nominatim vel inter ceteros ex- females may be either disinherited by heredari solebant : dum tamen, si name, or by using the general term inter ceteros exheredentur, aliquid ccterl. If, however, they are disin- eis legetur, ne videantur pr^eterit^e herited by using the general term, esse per oblivionem, Masculos vero something must be left them as a legacy postumos, id est filium et deinceps, to show that they were not passed over placuit non aliter recte exheredari, through forgetfulness. But male post- nisi nominatim exheredentur, hoc humous children, i.e. sons, and other scilicet modo : Quicumque mihi descendants, cannot be disinherited filius genitus fuerit, exheres esto. except by name, that is, in this form, ' Whatever son is hereafter born to me, let him be disinherited. ' In the strictness of the old civil laAV, a child born after the death of the testator (^postumus) was incajDable of being insti- tuted. He had not, at the time of the testator's death, any certain existence ; and the law said, Incerta iicrsona heres institui non potest. (IJlp. Reg. 22. 4.) But still it might be that the child, when born, was a suits heres of the testator; and as his agnatio would be considered in law to date from the time of conception, not birth, the testator would pass over one of his sui heredes if he omitted to include him or exclude him in the testament ; although, if he had included him, the posthumous child could not have taken anything. In the course of time the law permitted the posthumous child, if a suus heres, to be instituted as an heir ; but the civil law never permitted the posthumous child of a stranger, i.e. a child born after the death of the testator, to be instituted. The prastor, however, gave him honorum possessio, and Justinian per- mitted such persons to be instituted. (Bk. iii. Tit. 9. pr.) And thus the institution of a posthumous suus heres having once been per- mitted, the next step was to consider it imperative on the testator, if he wished to exclude the posthumous child from a share in the in- heritance, to do so in the case of a son, by referring to him spe- cially {nominatim does not, of course, here mean ^ byname,' but by a phrase expressly referring to him, such as postumiLS exheres esto), and in the case of a daughter, or any descendant other than a son, by adopting the general clause of disinheritance, cetej^i ,i exheredes sunto, and also by giving the child some legacy, however trifling, in order to show that it was not by accident that the tes- tator allowed this clause to embrace the case of a posthumous child. The jurist Gallus Aquilius, who lived towards the end of the Ivepublic, invented a form of institution by which the case was LIE. II. TIT. XIII. 181 provided for of a son dying in the testator's lifetime^ and then the testator dying, and then there being born a posthumous son of the son, who would, of course, be a suus lieres of the testator. (D. xxviii. 2. 29.) 2. Those ought also to be placed on the footing of posthumous children, who, succeeding in the place of a suus heres, become by a kind of agnation sui heredes of their parents. Thus, for instance, if any one has a son in his power, and by him a grandson or granddaughter, the son, being first in degree, has alone the rights of a suus heres, although the grandson or grand- daughter by that son is under the same parental power. But, if the son should die in his father's lifetime, or should by any other means cease to be under his father's power, the grandson or granddaughter would succeed in his place, and would thus, by this kind of agnation, obtain the rights of a situs heres. In order, then, that the force of his testament may not be broken, the testator, who is, as we have said, obliged, in order to make an efiectual testament, to institute his son as heir or to disinherit him by name, is equally obliged to institute as heir, or to dis- inherit, a grandson or granddaughter by that son, lest, if, during his life- time, his son should die, and the grandson or granddaughter succeed in his place, the force of the testament may be broken by this kind of agnation. Provision has been made for this by the lex Junia Velleia, in which is given a mode of disinheriting in such a case like that of disinheriting posthumous children. Gai. ii. 134. A testament was made void, not only by the birth of a post- humous suus heres, but by any one coming into the position of a suus heres after the time when the testament was made. The testator might (under the ancient laAv) have subsequently married a wife m manu ; an emancipated son might come again into his father's power ; a captive son might return home ; or the testator might adopt a person into his fiimily. In all these cases, as well as in that mentioned in the text, the testament would be invali- dated by a process which bore a close analogy to agnation, that is, by these persons becoming, otherwise than by birth, the sui heredes of the testator, just as it Avould be by direct agnation, if a son were born to the testator after the date of the testament. The lex Junia Velleia (Gai. ii. 134), passed in the time of Augustus 2. Postumorum autem loco sunt et hi, qui in sui heredis locum suc- cedendo, quasi adgnascendo fiunt parentibus sui heredes. Ut ecce : si (piis filium et ex eo nepotem nep- temve in potestate habeat, quia filius gradu pr^ecedit, is solus jura sui heredis habet, quamvis nepos quo- que et neptis ex eo in eadem po- testate sint ; sed si filius ejus vivo eo moriatur, aut qualibet alia ratione exeat de potestate ejus, incipit nepos neptisve in ejus locum succedere, et eo modo jura suorum heredum quasi adgnatione nancis- cuntur. Ne ergo eo modo rum- patur ejus testamentum, sicut ix)sum filium vel heredem instituerc vel nominatim exheredare debet tes- tator, ne non jure faciat testamen- tum, ita et nepotem neptemve ex filio necesse est ei vel heredem in- stituere vel exheredare, ne forte eo vivo filio mortuo, succedendo in locum ejus nepos neptisve quasi adgnatione rumpat testamentum ; idque lege Juna Velleia provisum est, in qua simul exheredationis modus ad similitudinem postu- morum demonstratur. 182 LIB. II. TIT. XIII. (763 A.U.C.), provided (1st) that a testator miglit institute or exclude any one conceived before the date of the testament who should, after tlie date of the testament, be born his suus lieres in his lifetime, thus giving a new signification to postumus (such a person was termed a postumus Velleianus, Ulf. Frag. 22. 19), and (2ndly) that he might exclude a grandchild, or other descen- dant, born before the date of the testament, who might, if the son of the testator died in the testator's lifetime, step into the place of his father, and become a suus heres during the testator's lifetime. Previously such a person could not have been excluded in his capacity of suus lieres, for at the date of the testament he was not in that position, which he only attained subsequently. He could, however, have been instituted before the lex Junia Velleia, for he was an existing person, and therefore not a persona incerta; but perhaps the second head of the lex Junia Velleia was regarded as confirming his institution in the special quality of a suus lieres. (D. xxviii. 2. 29. 11 to end.) If persons, coming under the second head of the lex Junia Velleia, who received the name of quasi postumi V^elleiani, were excluded, the lex Junia required that, as in the case of posthumous sui lieredes, the males should be excluded nominatim, and the females inter ceteros, but with a legacy. In the case of the testator having subsequently a child not conceived when the testament was made and born in the testator's lifetime, and in the other cases of quasi-agnation mentioned above, no law helped the testator, and he had to make a new testament in order to die testate. 3, Emancipatos liberos jure civili 3. The civil law does not make it neque lieredes institnere neqne ex- necessary either to institute emanci- heredare necesse est, quia non sunt pated children heirs, or to disinherit sui heredes, Sed proetor omnes tarn them in a testament; because they are feminini sexus quam masculini, si not sui heredes. But the praetor ordains, heredes non instituantur, exhere- that all children, male or female, if dari jubet, virilis sexus nominatim, they be not instituted heirs, shall be feminini vero et inter ceteros ; quocl disinherited; the males by name, the si neque heredes instituti fuerint, females under the general term ceteri: neque ita ut diximus exheredati, for, if they have neither been instituted promittit eis pra3tor contra tabulas heirs, nor disinherited in manner before testamenti bonorum possessionem. mentioned, the prcetor gives them pos- session of goods contra tahulas. Gai. ii. 135. An emancipated child, passing out of the testator's family, ceased to be his suus lieres. But thous;!! he thus lost all lesfal claim upon the testator's inheritance,, yet he had gained no pro- vision by being emancipated, and the prsetor, therefore, came to Ills relief, and set aside the testament, if he had not been expressly excluded. He did not do this nominally, for the testament was legally good, but he did what amounted to the same thing ; he divided the j^roperty equally among all as if the testator had died intestate, giving the children what was termed ^ possession of the goods ; ' a j^ossession said, in this case, to be contra tabulas, as it lib.il tit. XIIL 183 overthrew the provisions contained in the tablets of the testament. The emancipated son, however, had to bring into account the pro- perty he had acquired since emancipation, if the effect of his getting the testament set aside was injurious to the properly instituted suus Jieres. The properly instituted suus heres mi^t, for example, have had only a quarter of the inheritance left him, and then he would gain, not lose, by the emancipated son getting the testament set aside and sharing the inheritance with him. (D. xxxvii. 4. 13.) An emancipated daughter might, under the praetorian system, be in a better position than an unemancipated, if both were passed over, and might in effect be in as good a position as the male suus heres who was passed over, the distinction mentioned in the note to the initiatory section being thus ignored. For if the emancipated daughter was passed over, the testament would be overthrown altogether, and she would, if an only child, take all the property; whereas, if the unemancipated daughter was passed over, she could only take half at most. Antoninus put them on an equality, by giving the emancipated only the share she would have had, had she not been emancipated. (GrAi. ii. 125, 126.) The old civil law permitted grandsons, not in the immediate power of the testator, to be disinherited by the general ceteri clause. The praetor required them to be disinherited nominatim. (Gai. ii. 129.) Further, whereas in the initiatory section we have been told that the testament was wholly void if a son passed over died in the lifetime of his father, and Gains tells us that this was the opinion of the Sabinians, yet there are passages which seem to show that the praetors sometimes upheld a contrary rule. (D. xxxvii. 11. 2. pr. ; D. xxviii. 93. 17.) 4. Adoptivi liberi, quamdiu sunt 4. Adoptive children, while under in potestate patris adoptivi, ejus- the power of their adoptive father, are dem juris habenturcu jus sunt justis in the same legal position as children nuptiis queesiti : itaque heredes in- sprung from a legal marriage ; and stituendi vel exheredandi sunt, se- therefore they must either be instituted cundum ea qu8e de naturalibus ex- heirs or disinherited, according to the posuimus. Emancipati vero a patre rules we have laid down respecting adoptivo, neque jure civili, neque natural children. But neither by the quod ad edictum prsetoris attinet, civil nor the praetorian law are children inter liberos numerantur : qua ra- emancipated by an adoptive father tione accidit ut ex diverso, quod ad reckoned among his natural children, naturalem parentem attinet, quam- Hence, conversely, adoptive children, diu quidem sint in adoptiva familia, while in their adoptive family, are extraneorum numero habeantur, ut considered strangers to their natural eos neque heredes instituere neque parents, who need not institute them exheredare necesse sit ; cum vero heirs or disinherit them; but if they emancipati fuerint ab adoptivo pa- are emancipated by their adoptive tre, tunc incipiant in ea causa esse father, they are in the same position in qua futuri essent, si ab i^Dso na- in which they would have been if turali patre emancipati fuissent. emancipated by their natural father. Gai. ii. 136, 137. If an adopted son were emancipated by his adoptive father, he would, under the old law, have no legal claim on the inheritance 184 LIB. II. TIT. XIII. of his adoptive or his natural father. But the praetor came to his aid, and gave him ' a possession of the goods ' of his natural father, unless he was expressly excluded by his natural father's testament. On his adoptive father, he would, after emancipation, in no case have any claim whatever, until Justinian altered the law in the manner alluded to in the next paragraph. 5. Such was the ancient law. Biity thinking that no distinction can rea- sonably be made between the two sexes, inasmuch as they equally contribute to the procreation of the species, and be- cause, by the ancient law of the Twelve Tables, all children were equally called to the succession ah intestato, which law the prsetors seem afterwards to have followed, we have by our consti- tution made the law the same both as to sons a,nd daughters, and also as to all other descendants in the male line, whether already born or j)Osthumous ; so that all children, whether they are sui heredes or emancipated, must either be instituted heirs or be disinherited by name ; and their omission has the same effect in making void the testa- ments of their parents, and taking away the inheritance from the insti- tuted heirs, as would be produced by the omission of children who were sui heredes or emancipated, whether they have been already born, or having been already conceived are born after- wards. With respect to adoptive chil- dren, we have established a distinction between them, which is set forth in our constitution on adoptions. C. i. 28. 4 ; C. viii. 47. 10, pr. and 1. Under the legislation of Justinian a testament would be ren- dered invalid by the omission of any one male or female whom it was necessary either to institute or exclude, and every exclusion must be made nominatim. An adopted son, if adopted by a stranger, i.e. not an ascendant, lost none of his claims upon his natural father's property, but only had a claim upon that of his adoptive father, if his father died intestate ; for if the adoptive father made a testament, it was not necessary he should notice the adoptive son. But an adopted son, if adopted by an ascen- dant, either a maternal grandfather or an emancipated father (see Bk. i. Tit. 11. 2), stood in the position of a suus heres to the ascendant, and a testament made by such ascendant would be invalid in which he was passed over. 5. Sed h?ec quidem vetustas in- troducebat. Nostra vero constitutio inter masculos et feminas in hoc jure nihil interesse existimans, quia utraque persona in hominum pro- creatione similiter naturae officio fungitur, et lege antiqua duodecim tabularum omnes similiter ad suc- cessionem ab intestato vocabantur, quod et prsetores postea secuti esse videntur, ideo simplex ac simile jus et in filiis et in filiabus et in ceteris descendentibus per virilem sexum personis, non solum natis sed etiam I)ostumis, introduxit : ut omnes, sive sui sive emancipati sunt, vel heredes instituantur vel nominatim exheredentur, et eumdem habeant effectum circa testamenta parentum suorum infirmanda et hereditatem auferendam, quern filii sui vel eman- cipati habent, sive jam nati sint, sive adhuc in utero constituti postea nati sint. Circa adoptivos autem filios certam induximus divisionem, quse nostra constitutione quam super adoptivis tulimus, continetur. 6. Sed si in exiieditione occupa- tus miles testamentum faciat, et liberos sues jam natos vel postumos 6. If a soldier on actual ser-^dce make his testament, and neither disin- herit his children already born, nor his LIB. II. TIT. XIV. 185 nominatim non exheredaveritj sed silentio preeterierit non ignorans an habeat liberos, silentium ejus pro exheredatione nominatim facta va- lere constitutionibus principiim can- turn est. posthumous children by name, but pass, them over in silence, although he is not ignorant that he has children, it is provided by the constitutions of the emperors, that his silence shall be equivalent to disinheriting them by name. D. xxix. 36. 2. 7. Mater vel a^^ls maternus ne- cesse non habent liberos suos aut heredes instituere aut exheredare, sed possunt eos omittere; nam si- lentium matris, aut avi materni et ceterorum per matrem ascenden- tium, tantum facit quantum exhere- datio patris. Nee enim matri filium filiamve, neque avo materno nepo- tem neptemve ex filia, si eum eamve heredem non instituat, exheredare necesse est, sive de jure civili qua3- ramus, sive de edicto praetoris quo IDrffiteritis liberis contra tabulas bo- norum possessionem promittit ; sed aliud eis adminiculum servatur, quod paulo post vobis manifestum fiet. 7. Neither a mother nor a maternal grandfather need either institute their children heirs, or disinherit them, but may pass them over in silence ; for the silence of a mother or a maternal grandfather, or of any other ascendant on the mother's side, has the same eft'ect as a father actually disinheriting them. For a mother is not obliged to disinherit her children, if she does not institute them her heirs ; neither is a. maternal grandfather under the neces- sity of instituting or of disinheriting his grandson or granddaughter by a daughter ; whether we look to the civil law, or 'the edict of the praetor, which gives possession of goods contra tabulas to those children who have been passed over in silence. But children, in this case, have another remedy, which we will hereafter ex- plain. Gai. ui. 71. The children could never be the sui heredes of their mother, for women never had any one in their power ; nor could they be the sui heredes of a maternal ascendant, except by adoption, and the case of adoption is not spoken of here. Aliud adminiculum. This refers to the action for setting aside the testament as inofficious, that is, made without proper regard for natural ties. (See Tit. 18.) Tit. XIY. DE HEREDIBUS INSTITUENDIS. Heredes instituere permissum est tarn liberos homines quam servos, et tam proprios quam alienos. Pro- prios autem, olim quidem secundum plurium sententias, non aliter quam cum libertate recte instituere licebat. Hodie vero etiam sine libertate ex nostra constitutione heredes eos in- stituere i)ermissum est. Quod non per innovationem induximus, sed quoniam a^quius erat, et Atilicino placuisse Paulus suis libris, quos tam ad Massurium Sabinum quam ad Plautium scripsit, refert. Pro- A man may institute as his heirs, either freemen or slaves, and either his own slaves or those of another. Formerly, according to the more re- ceived opinion, no one could properly institute his own slaves, unless he also freed them; but now, by our constitu- tion, a testator may institute his slave without expressly enfranchising him. And we have introduced this rule, not as an innovation, but because it seemed equitable; and Paulus, in his writings on Massurius Sabinus and Plautius, informs us that this was the opinion 186 LIB. II. TIT. XIV. prius autem servus etiam is intelligi- of Atilicinus. Among a testator's own tur in quo nuclam proprietatem tes- slaves is included one in whom the tator habet, alio usumfructum ha- testator had only a bare ownership, bente. Est tamen casus in quo nee another having the usufruct. But €umlibertateutiliter servus a domina there is a case, in which the institution heres instituitur, ut constitutione of a slave by his mistress is void, al- divorimi Severi et Antonini cavetur, though his liberty is expressly given cujus verba hsec sunt: 'Servumadul- to him, according to the provisions of terio maculatum non jure testamento a constitution of the Emperors Severus manumissum ante sententiam ab ea and Antoninus, in these words : ' Rea- muliere videri, quae rea fuerat ejus- son demands that no slave, accused of dem criminis postulata, rationis est ; adultery with his mistress, shall be al- quare sequitur, ut in eumdem a lowed, before his sentence is pro- domina collata institutio nullius mo- nounced, to be made free by the mis- menti habeatur,' Alienus servus tress who is alleged to be a partner in etiam is intelligitur, in quo usum- the crime. Hence, if a mistress insti- fructum testator habet. tute such a slave as her heir, it is of no avail.' In the term, ' the slave of another,' is included a slave of whom the testator has the usufruct. Oai. ii. 185-187 ; C. vi. 27. 5 ; C. vii. 15. 1 ; D. xxviii. 5. 48. 2 ; C. vii. 15. 1. By institution is meant tlie declaration who is to be heir, that is, who is to carry on the legal existence, the persona, of the tes- tator. And as, unless his existence were continued, there could be no thing or person from whom the testamentary dispositions €ould derive any force, or be of any efficacy,, the institution was the all-important part of the testament. It was veluti caput atqiie fiindamentum totius testamenti. All other dispositions were ac- cessories to it, being only conditions or laws imposed upon the heir. In the older law a peculiar form of words was appropriated to the institution. ' Titius heres esto ' was the recognised form. Even in the days of Gains and Ulpian (GrAi. ii. 116, 117 : Ulp. Reg. 20), such expressions as ^ Titius heres sitj' ' Titium heredem esse juheo^ terms of command, were considered right, and expres- sions such as ' Titium heredem esse volo^ ^heredem instituo^ ' heredem facio^ were considered wrong. And it was not till 389 A.D. that Constantine the Second permitted the institution to be made in any terms by which the meaning of the testator could be clearly ascertained. (C. vi. 23. 15.) Again, in the older law, as everytliing else in the testament derived its force from the insti- tution, it was considered that the institution ought to be put at the head or top of the testament, and any legacy or other disposi- tion placed before it was passed over, and had no effect. An ex- ception was made in behalf of an appointment of a tutor (see Bk. i. Tit. 14. 3); and the clause in which the testator disinherited his sui heredes was naturally placed before that in which he in- stituted testamentary heirs. Justinian, as we shall see in the 20th Title, paragr. 34, enacted that, provided the institution ap- peared in some part of the testament, it should be immaterial in what part it might be placed. Any one might be instituted, and consequently take as heir> LIB. 11. TIT. XIV. 187 who had the rights of a citizen, or, as it Avas technically termed, who had the tcstamentl /actio cum testators, i.e. the power of joining with the testator in going through the ceremonies of the jits Quiritium. This power was not enjoyed by -peregrini, dejjor- tati, dedititii, nor by the Latini Juniani, unless they became citizens before entering on the inheritance. Women were pre- vented by the lex Voconia (585 A.u.c.) (Gai. ii. 274) from being instituted in case the fortune of the testator reached 100,000 asses. Neither could any uncertain person be instituted (see Tit. 20. 27, as to the abolition of this rule by Justinian), nor any cor- porate body, or any of the gods, except those in whose favour, as the Tarpeian Jupiter (Ulp. Reg. 22. 6), a special exception had been made by a seiiatits-consultnm. All these distinctions had ceased in the time of Justinian, and none of those we have men- tioned, except peregrini and persons who had lost their civil rights by deportatio, were excluded. There were still, however, some to Avhom the capacity for institution was specially denied, such as the children of persons convicted of treason (C. ix. 8. 5. 1), apo- states and heretics (C. i. 7. 3) ; and children of, and parties to, pro- hibited marriages, could not be instituted by the parents or the other party to the marriage. (C. v. 6. Q.) A second husband or wife could not be instituted, when there was issue of the first marriage (C. v. 9. 6) ; nor natural, where there were legitimate children. (C. v. 27. 2.) Unmarried persons, ccciibes, and child- less persons, orbi, could be instituted, but under the lex Papia PoppcEa the former could not take any part of what was given them unless they were too young to be married or were near rela- tions of the testator, and the latter took only half of what was given them. (Gai. ii. 226.) These incapacities were removed by Constantino. (C. viii. 58.) If a person instituted his own slave, this was held to give the slave his liberty by necessary implication. If he instituted the slave of another, the slave took the inheritance for his master's benefit, provided the master had the testamenti factio with the testator ; but if he had not, the institution of the slave was void. In the law before Justinian, enfranchisement by a person who had only a bare property in a slave, was not held to confer freedom, a proprietatis domino manumissus non liber Jit, sed servas sine domino est. (ULr. Beg. 1. 19.) Under Justinian the slave became free, and could acquire for himself, and could take as heir ; but he was obliged to serve as slave to the usufructuary, during such time as the usufruct continued. The slave accused of adultery with his mistress might be sub- jected, as all slaves might, to the» torture, to extract evidence of his guilt. If he had been enfranchised, he would have escaped this, and thus the mistress might have defeated justice, unless she had been restrained from using her power of enfranchising him. 1. Serviis auteni a domino suo 1. A slave instituted heir by liis heres institutiis, si quidem in eadem master, if he remains in the same con- 188 LIB. II. TIT. XIV. causa manserit, fit ex testamento liber lieresque necessariiis ; si vero a vivo testatore maniimissus fiierit, suo arbitrio aclire liereditatem po- test, quia non fit necessarius, cum utrumque ex domini testamento non consequitur. Quod si alienatus fuerit, jussu novi domini adire liere- ditatem debet, et ea ratione per eum dominus fit lieres ; nam ipse alienatus neque liber neque lieres esse potest, etiamsi cum libertate lieres institutus fuerit ; destitisse enim a libertatis datione videtur do- minus, qui eum alienavit. Alienus quoque servus lieres institutus, si in eadem causa duraverit, jussu ejus domini adire liereditatem debet : si vero alienatus fuerit ab eo, aut vivo testatore, aut post mortem ejus antequam adeat, debet jussu novi domini adire ; at si manumissus est vivo testatore vel mortuo antequam adeat, suo arbitrio adire lieredita- tem potest. dition, becomes, by virtue of the tes- tament, free and necessary heir. But, if his master has enfranchised him before dying, he may at his pleasure accept or refuse the inheritance, for he does not become a necessary heir, since he does not obtain both his liberty and the inheritance by the testament of his master. But, if he has been alienated, he must enter on the inheritance at the command of his new master, who thus through his slave becomes the heir of the testator. For a slave once alie- nated cannot gain his liberty, or him- self take an inheritance by virtue of the testament of the master who alie- nated him, although his freedom was expressly given by the testament ; be- cause a master who has alienated his slave, has shown that he has renounced the intention of enfranchising him. So, too, when the slave of another is ap- pointed heir, if he remains in slavery, he must take the inheritance at his master's bidding; and if the slave bo alienated in the lifetime of the testa- tor, or after his death, but before he has actually taken the inheritance, it is at the command of his new master that he must accept it. But, if he be enfranchised during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death, and before he has accepted the inheritance, he may enter upon the inheritance or not, at his own option. Gai. ii. 188, 189. It was necessary that the heir, as being the person who carried on the legal existence of the testator, should be possessed of civil rights. If, then, a slave of the testator was instituted, as it was in the power of the testator to make him free, and he had invested him with a character requiring freedom, this institution was con- sidered to involve his freedom. The slave of any one else, if in- stituted, Avas only a channel by which his master, if possessed of civic rights, acquired the inheritance. (See Bk. i. Tit. 6. 1.) If a slave of the testator were instituted liis heir, and remained his slave at the time of the testator's death, the slave, immediately upon the testator dying, became his heres necessarius, that is, became his heir without any option of refusing or taking the in- heritance. But if it were given under any condition, and the condition failed, the institution then became invalid. If the slave instituted did not belonsf to the testator at the o time of the testator's death, his condition at the time of his taking on him the inheritance {aditio hereditoiis) determined for whom the inheritance w^ as acquired. If at that time he was a slave, he Lie. II. TIT. XIV. 189 acquired it for the person who was then his master ; if free, for himself. Disposing of the slave to another revoked the gift of liberty, because this was considered as a legacy, a mere accessory to the inheritance, to revoke which anything was sufficient, which showed a chano-e of intention on the part of the testator ; but it did not revoke the institution, because this was the keystone of the testa- ment, and could only be revoked by a new testament, or destruc- tion of the old one. 2. Servus aiitem alienus post do- 2. The slave of another may be in- mini mortem recte heres instituitur, stituted heir even after the death of quia et cum hereditariis servis est his master, a^ there i^ testaynenti f actio testamenti f actio : nondum enim with slaves belonging to an inheritance; adita hereditas person^e vicem sus- for an inheritance not yet entered on tinet, non heredis futuri, sed de- represents the jDerson of the deceased, f uncti ; cum etiam ejus, qui in utero and not that of the future heir. So, est, servus recte heres instituitur. too, the slave even of a child in the womb may be instituted heir. D. xxviii. 5. 31. 1; D. xxviii. 5. 64. After the death of a testator, and before the inheritance was entered on, the inheritance itself represented the person of the deceased, as it did that of an unborn child until the birth. A slave, during this interval, was said to belong to the inheritance, and if a testament was made by any one instituting as heir a slave belono^ino to the inheritance, the slave took the inheritance thus o-iven him for the benefit of that inheritance to which he belonged. And that he should do so, it was not necessary that the person by whose testament he was instituted heir should have testamenti f actio with the future heir, but it was only necessary that he should have it with the testator to whose inheritance the slave belonofed. o 3. Servus plurium cum quibus 3. If a slave belonging to several testamenti f actio est, ab extraneo masters, all capable of taking by testa- institutus heres unicuique domino- ment, is instituted heir by a stranger, rum cujus jussu adierit, pro portione he acquires a proportion of the inherit- dominii acquirit hereditatem. ance for each master by whose com- mand he took it, corresponding to the several interests they each have in him. D. xxix. 2. 07, 08. If the slave were instituted heir by one of his masters, then, if this master expressly gave him his freedom, he became the heres necessarius of the master instituting him, and free ; a due proportion of the price at which he was valued being paid to each of his other masters. But if his liberty were not expressly given him, the share which the testator had in him accrued proportion- ately to all those of his masters by v^^hose orders he entered on the inheritance. (See Tit. 7. 4 of this Book.) 4. Et unum hominem et plures 4. A testator may appoint one heir in infinitum, quot quis velit, here- or several, the number being (^uite des facere licet. ' unrestricted. 190 LIB. II. TIT. XIV. 5. Hereditas plerumque clividitur 5. An inlieritance is generally di- in duodecim uncias, qave assis ap- vided into twelve ounces, compre- pellatione continentur. Habent liended together under the term of an auteni et h^e partes propria nomina as, and each of these parts, from the ab nncia usqne ad assem, ut pnta ounce to the as, has its peculiar name, hsec : uncia, sextans, (piadrans, viz. uncia, sextans, quadrans, triens, triens, quincunx, semis, septunx, quincunx, semis, septunx, bes, dodrans,. bes, dodrans, dextans, deunx, as. dextans, deunx, as. But it is not ne- Non autem ufcique duodecim uncias cessary that there should be always esse oportet, nam tot unciai assem twelve ounces, for an as may consist of efficiunt, quot testator voluerit ;. et as many ounces as the testator pleases, si unum tantum quis ex semisse, If, for example, a man name but one verbi gratia, heredem scripserit, heir, and appoint him ex semisse, i. e. totus as in semisse erit : neque enim the heir of six parts, then these six idem ex parte testatus et ex parte parts will make up the whole as ; for intestatus decedere potest, nisi sit no one can die partly testate and miles cujus sola voluntas in testando partly intestate, except a soldier, spectatur. Et e contrario potest whose intention in making his testa- quis, in quantascumque voluerit ment is alone regarded. Conversely, plurimas uncias, suam hereditatem a testator may divide his estate into as dividere. many ounces more than twelve as he thinks proper. D. xxviii. 5. 50. 2 ; D. xxviii. 5. 13. 1, et seq. ; D. xxix. 1. G. In making a testament, where the testator wished to give different shares to his heirs, the singular system, alhided to in the text, was often adopted. The testator did not give a fifth, a fourth, &c., to each heir, hut gave so many parts, e.g. five or four parts, to one heir, and so many more to another. The number of parts given to each was added up, and the total formed the number of which these parts were taken to be a fraction. For instance, if a testator gave to A five parts, to B six, and to C two, the whole number amounting to thirteen, A took five-thir- teenths, B six-thirteenths, and C two-thirteenths. So far all was simple, but a greater complication was intro- duced by adopting, conjointly Avith this calculation of parts, a mode of reckoning derived from the familiar measure of the as, or pound weight, and its division into twelve ounces. The here- ditas was considered to be represented by the as, and the parts by the ounces. But the testator had the power of determining how many ounces there should be in this imaginary pound. In the instance above given, the as contains thirteen uncice. But sup- posing the testator assigned a certain number of parts to some of his heirs, and not to others, as, to A five parts, to B six parts,, and then made C a co-heir, but without assigning him any number of parts, the law supposed the testator to have divided his pound into twelve ounces a.s the standard number, and gave the heir to whom no number of parts was assigned such a number as made up the as. In this instance, therefore, C would have one ounce or part. But if the whole number of parts expressly given exceeded twelve, then the testator was supposed to have been measuring out his inheritance by the double as {dupondius), and the heir to whom no express number was given took the number LIB. II. TIT. XIV. 1 9 1 of parts wanting to make up twenty-four. If the parts expressly- given exceeded twenty-four, then the tripondius, containing thirty- six ounces, was the measure, and so on. The testator never died only partly testate ; for Avhatever he gave was taken to make up the whole inheritance. If his testament only disposed of a por- tion of his property in the way mentioned in the text, viz. by his only er -Jtiuversito^em; but, as we mentis deque hereddbus qui testa- have already spoken of testaments mento instituuntur, locuti sumus, and testamentary heirs, w^e ma,y not non sine causa sequenti loco potest improperly pass to the subject of heec juris materia tractari. legacies. Gai. ii. 191. LIB. 11. TIT. XX. 219 A legacy, being a mode by which the property in one or more particular things is acquired, ought not, properly, to be discussed in the part of the Institutes devoted to the discussion of the modes of acquiring a universitas rerum. In Roman law a legacy was an injunction given to the heir to pay or give over a part of the inheritance to a third person — Legatiim, quod legis modo id est imperative^ testamento relinc/uitur. (Ulp. Reg. 24. 1.) Without an heir there could be no legacy ; and, therefore, if no instituted heir entered on the inheritance, the gift of the legacy was useless. The term was never applied, as in English law, to a direct bequest. 1. Legatiim itaque est donatio 1. A legacy is a kind of gift left by qiiasdam a defuncto relicta. a deceased person. D. xxxi. 36. 2. Sed olim quidem erant legato- 2. Formerly, there were four kinds rum genera quatuor, per vindica- of legacies, namely, per vindicationem, tionem, per damna,tionem, sinendi per damncitionem, sinendi modo, and modo, per preeceptionem ; et certa per pjrdzceptionem. There was a cer- (jupadam verba cuique generi legato- tain form of words proper to each of rum adsignata erant, per qu^e singula these, by which they were distin- genera iegatorum significaban tur .guished one from another. But these Sed ex constitutionibus divoriun solemn forms have been wholly sup- principum solemnitas hujusmodi pressed by imperial constitutions. We verborum penitus sublata est, Nos- also, desirous of giving respect to the tra autem constitutio, quam cum wishes of deceased persons, and re- magna fecimus lucubratione, defunc- garding their intentions more than torum voluntates validiores esse cu- their words, have, by a constitution pientes, et non verbis sed voluntati- composed with great study, enacted bus eorum faventes, disposuit ut that the nature of all legacies shall be omnibus legatis una sit natura, et the same ; and that legatees, whatever ({uibuscumque verbis aliquid dere- may be the words employed in the lictum sit, liceat legatariis id i^erse- testament, may sue for what is left qui, non solum per actiones perso- them, not only by a personal, but by nales, sed etiam per in rem et per a real or an hypothecary action. The hypothecariam. Cujus constitutio- wisdom of this constitution may be nis perpensum modum ex ipsius easily seen by a perusal of its disposi- tenore perfectissime accipere possi- tions. bile est. Gai. ii. 192, 193. 201. 209. 216 ; C. vi. 37, 21 ; C. vi. 43. 1. Per vindica t'wjtem. The formula in this species of legacy ran thus : ' Hominem Sticlium do, lego,'' or ' do'' ; or ' capito, sumito, sihi habeto.'' The legacy was said to be ^^er vindicationem^ because, immediately on the heir entering on the inheritance, the subject of the legacy became the property of the legatee ex jure Quiritium, who could accordingly claim it by vindicatio. The testator could only give, in this way, things of Avhich he had the dominium ex jure Quiritium, both at the time of making the testa- ment and of his death ; excepting that such dominium at the time of death alone was sufficient when the subject of the legacy was anything appreciable by weight, number, or measure, as wine, oil, money, &c. (Gai. ii. 196.) Per damnationem. The formula ran thus : * Heres meus 220 LIB. II. TIT. XX. I damnas esto dare ;' or ' Dato, facito, heredem meum dare juheo.' The legatee did not, by this legacy, become proprietor of the subject of the legacy ; but he had a personal action against the heir to compel him to give {dare), to procure (prcBstare), or to do (facere), that which the terms of the legacy directed. Anything could be given by this legacy that could become the subject of an obligation, whether the property of the testator, the heir, or any one else. The rights it gave were, therefore, said to be the optimum jus leyati. (Ulp. Reg. 24. 11 ; Gai. ii. 204-208.) Sinendi modo. The formula of this kind of legacy was : ^ Heres meus damnas esto sinere Luciuvn Titium sumere illam rem. sibique habere.'' (GrAl. ii. 209.) The heir is to allow the legatee to take the thing given. This form, then, was applicable to a.ny- thing that belonged to the testator or to the heir, but not to anything belonging to a third person. The legatee did not become the owner of the thing given until he took possession. If the heir refused to allow the legatee to take possession, the legatee might compel him to do so by the personal action termed ' Quicquld heredem ex testamento dare facer e oportet.^ (GrAl. ii. 213, 214.) Per prcEceptionem. The formula ran : ^ Lucius Titius illam rem prcecipito'' (i.e. take beforehand). The proper application of this form was to a gift made to one already instituted heir, of somethino* which he was to take before receivino; his share of the inheritance. The heir could enforce his claim to this something beyond his share by the action termed judicium familifje ercis- cundcE, i.e. for having the inheritance portioned out by a judge, who assigned the thing given by the legacy to the heir as legatee. It was only by a mistake in language that this form Avas applied to a gift to a person not an heir ; but a gift made in this form to a person not heir was not void ; for the senatus- consuUum Neronianum, about A.D. 60, made every such legacy valid as a legacy per damnationem. Gains mentions that the Proculians attempted to get over the difficulty where the word prcBcipito was used to give a legacy to a person not heir, by reading ' prcecipito ' as ' capita ;' and this construction was con- firmed by a constitution of Adrian. (Gai. ii. 218-221.) Under the imperial legislation the value attached to these formulcB was gradually lessened. By the senatus-considtum Nero- idanum it was enacted that any legacy given in a form of words not suited to the gift intended should be as valid as one given in the form most favourable to the legatee. ' Ut quod minus aptis verbis lerjatum est per hide sit ac si opjtimo jure legatum esset.'' (Ulp. Beq. 2*4. 11 ; Gai. ii. 197. 218.) The formulce remamed, but a mistake in their use could no longer injure the legatee : and in every case the legacy, however expressed, had the effect of a legacy given per damnationem. In A.D. 342 a constitution of Constantine II., Constantius, and Constans, abolished the use of formulcB in all legal acts. (C. ii. 58. 1.) The division of legacies LIB. II. TIT. XX. 221 still theoretically remained, but the appropriate formulcB were no lono-er in use. Finally Justinian, as we see in the text, enacted that all legacies should be of the same nature, and that the legatee might enforce the legacy by personal, real, or hypo- thecary actions, according to the nature of the gift. 3. We have not, however, judged it expedient to confine ourselves within the limits of this constitution ; for, observing that the ancients confined legacies within strict rules, but ac- corded a greater latitude to fideicom- 7nissa as arising more immediately from the wishes of the deceased, we have thought it necessary to make all lega- cies equal to gifts in trust, so that no difference really remains between them. Whatever is wanting to legacies they will borrow from fideicommissa^ and communicate to them any superi- ority they themselves may have. But, that we may not raise difficulties, and perplex the minds of young persons at their entrance upon the study of the law, by explaining these two subjects jointly, we have thought it worth while to treat separately, first of lega- cies and then of trusts, that, the nature of each being known, the student thus prepared, may more easily understand them when mixed up the one with the other. 3. Sed non usque ad eam consti- tutionem standum esse existimavi- mus : cum enim antiquitatem inve- nimus legata quidem stricte conclu- dentem, fideicommissis autem, qu£e ex voluntate magis descendebant defunctorum, pinguiorem naturam indulgentem, necessarium esse duxi- mus omnia legata fideicommissis exgequare, ut nulla sit inter ea dif- ferentia : sed quod deest legatis, hoc repleatur ex natura fideicommisso- rum, et si quid amplius est in lega- tis, per hoc crescat fideicommis- sorum natura. Sed ne in primis legum cunabulis permixte de his exponendo studiosis adolescentibus quamdam introducamus difficulta- tem, oper^e pretium esse duximus interim separatim prius de legatis et postea de fideicommissis tractare, ut natura utriusque juris cognita facile possint permixtionem eorum eruditi subtiUoribus auribus accipere. C. vi. 43. 2. All that remained, after the changes noticed in the text, to distinguish legacies from Jideicommissa, was the general cha- racter of the expressions used. If they were imperative, the gift was a legacy ; if they assumed the form of a request, and were given precative, they were Jideicommissa. If a gift was in form imperative, but it was not valid as a legacy, it was valid as a trust. If such a gift could be valid as a legacy, it was of course regarded as a legacy, and not as a fideicommissnm. A difference still remained with respect to the gifts of libei'ty to a slave. (Vid. Tit. 24. 2.) A direct legacy of liberty made the slave the lihertus of the testator ; a gift of liberty by a fidei- commissum made the slave the lihertus of the Jideicommissarius. 4. Non solum autem testatoris vel heredis res, sed etiam aliena legari potest, ita ut heres cogatur redimere eam et pr?estare ; vel, si non potest redimere, sestimationem ejus dare. Sed si talis res sit cujus non est com- mercium, nee aestimatio ejus debe- tur, sicuti si Campum Martium vel I basilicas vel templa, vel quee publico 4. A testator may not only give as a legacy his own property, or that of his heir, but also the property of others. The heir is then obliged either to purchase and deliver it, or, if it cannot be bought, to give its value. But, if the thing given is not in its nature a subject of conmierce, or pur- chasable, the heir is not bound to pay the value to the legatee ; as if a man 222 LIB. II. TIT. XX. should bequeath the Campus Martius, the palaces, the temples, or any of the things appropriated to public purposes, for such a legacy is of no effect. But when we say that a testator may give the goods of another as a legacy, we must be understood to mean, that this can only be done if the deceased knew that what he bequeathed belonged to another, and not if he were ignorant of it ; since, if he had kno^vvn it, he would not perhaps have left such a legacy. To this effect is a rescript of the Emperor Antoninus, which also de- cides that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff, that is, the legatee, to prove that the deceased knew that what he left belonged to another, not upon the heir to prove that the deceased did not know it, for the burden of proof always lies upon the person who brings the action. Gai. ii. 202 ; D. xxx. 39. 7. 10 ; D. xxxi. 67. 8 ; C. vi. 37. 10 ; D. xxii. 3. 21. nullius momenti legatum est. Qviod autem diximus alienam rem posse legari, ita intelligendum est, si de- functus sciebat alienam rem esse, non et si ignorabat ; forsitan enim si scisset alienam, non legasset. Et ita divus Pius rescripsit ; et verius esse, ipsum qui agit, id est legata- rium, probare oportere scisse alienam rem legare defunctum, non heredem probare oportere ignorasse alienam, quia semper necessitas proband! incumbit illi qui agit. 5. Sed et si rem obligatam credi- tor! aliquis legaverit, necesse habet heres luere. Et hoc quoque casu idem placet quod in re aliena, ut ita demum luere necesse habeat heres, si sciebat defunctus rem obligatam esse ; et ita divi Severus et Antoni- nus rescripserunt. Si tamen defunc- tus voluit legatum luere et hoc ex- pressit, non debet heres earn luere. 5. If a testator gives as a legacy anything in pledge to a creditor, the heir is bound to redeem it. But in this case, as in that of the property of another, the heir is not bound to re- deem it, unless the deceased knew that the thing was pledged ; and this the Emperors Severus and Antoninus have decided by a rescript. But when it has been the wish of the deceased that the legatee should redeem the thing, and he has expressly said so, the heir is not bound to redeem it. D. xxx. 5. 7. ii 6. Si res aliena legata fuerit, et ejus vivo testatore legatarius domi- nus factus fuerit, siquidem ex causa emptionis, ex testamento actione pretium consequi potest ; si vero ex causa lucrativa, veluti ex causa do- nation is vel ex alia simili causa, agere non potest : nam traditum est, duas lucrativas causas in eumden hominem et in eamdem rem concur- rere non posse. Hac ratione, si ex duobus testamentis eadem res eidem debeatur, interest utrum rem an sestimationem ex testamento conse- cutus est : nam si rem, agere non potest, quia habet earn ex causa lucrativa ; si oestimationem, agere potest. 6. If a thing belonging to another is given as a legacy, and becomes the property of the legatee in the lifetime of the testator, then, if it becomes so by purchase, the legatee may recover the value, by an action founded on the testament ; but if the legatee obtained it by any way of clear gain to him, as by gift, or any similar mode, he cannot bring such an action, for it is a received rule, that two modes of acquiring, each being one of clear gain, can never meet in the same person with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the same thing be given by two testaments to the same person, it makes a difference, whether the legatee has obtained the thing itself, or the value of it, under the first, for, if he has already received the thing itself, he cannot bring an action, for he has received it by a LIB. II. TIT. XX. 223 mode of clear gain to him ; but, if he has received the value only, he may bring an action. D. XXX. 108 ; D. xliv. 7. 17 ; D. xxx. 34. 2. It may be observed, that if a person acquired the subject of a le2;acy by a causa lucratlva during the lifetime of the testator, and the legacy was made, not in his own favour directly, but was o;iven to his slave, or a descendant in his power, he could recover the value of the thing given from the heir. In such a case the two causcB lucrativcR were not considered so to unite in one person as to violate the general rule, although, in fact, the result was the same as if the rule had been directly violated. (D. xxx. 108.) In the beginning of this paragraph it is said that if the legatee acquire the thing during the lifetime of the testator by a causa lucratlva, he could not regain it or its value by legacy. The vivo testatore is merely an example ; it would be the same if the legatee acquired the thing by a causa lucratlva at any time before receiving it by way of legacy. 7. Ea quoque res quas in rennu 7. A thing not in existence, but natura non est, si modo futura est, which one day will be in existence, recte legatur : veluti fructus qui in may be properly given as a legacy, as, illo fundo nati erunt, aut quod ex for instance, the fruits which shall ilia ancilla natum erit. gi'ow on such a farm, or the child which shall be born of such a slave. Gai. ii. 203. 8. Si eadem res duobus legata sit 8. If the same thing is given as a give conjunctim sive disjunctim, si legacy to two persons, either conjointly ambo perveniant ad legatum, scindi- or separately, and both take the legacy, tur inter eos legatum; si alter defi- it is divided between them. But should ciat, quia aut spreverit legatum, aut either of the legatees fail to take it, vivo testatore decesserit, vel alio either from refusing it or from dying in quolibet modo defecerit, totum ad the lifetime of the testator, or from any collegatarium pertinet. Conjunctim other reason, the whole goes to his co- autem legatur, veluti si quis dicat, legatee. A legacy is given conjointly, Titio et Seio hominem Stichum do if a testator says, I give as a legacy my lego ; disjunctim ita, Titio hominem slave Stichus to Titius and Seius : but Stichum do lego, Seio Stichum do separately, if he says, I give as a legacy lego. Sed et si expresserit eumdem my slave Stichus to Titius ; I give as a hominem Stichum, aeque disjunctim legacy my slave Stichus to Seius. And legatum intelligitur. if the testator says, that he gives the same slave Stichus, yet the legacy is still taken to be given separately. Gat. ii. 199. A legacy might be void originally, wdien it w^as said to be taken pro non scripto, i. e. as if it had never been inserted ; or it might be valid originally, and yet before the rights of the legatee were fixed (i.e. to use the technical term (see note on paragr. 20), before the dies cedlt) the legatee might die or refuse the legacy, or become incapable to take, when the legacy was called irrltum or destitutum \ or the rights of the lescatee mio;ht be fixed, but before the legacy was actually delivered over to him, it might 224 LIB. II. TIT. XX. -A be taken away from him on account of something rendering him unworthy to receive it ; the legacy was then called erepiitium {qucB lit indignis eripitur). If there were no co-legatees, the legacy, if ereptitium, went to the Jiscus ; in the two other cases the failure of the legacy was for the benefit of the heir. The legacies were burdens with which he might have been, but was not, charged. But if there was a co-legatee the case was different. Co- leo^atees might be created, according to a division made by Paulus (D. 1. 16. 142), re, re et verbis, or verbis ; re being equivalent to the disjunctim of the text, when the same gift was made separately to two or more persons ; re et verbis, equivalent to the conjunctim of the text, when the same thing was given at once to two or more; and verbis^ in which the joint legacy was only apparent, the gift being made at once to two or more, but their respective shares being assigned them, as ' lego Titio et Seio ex cBquis partibus.^ The rights of co-legatees were very different at different periods of Roman law. Originally the interest of the co-legatee was determined by the formula under which the legacy was given. If it was per vindicationem, the right to the property in the whole thing given passed to each legatee. They had to divide it between them, but each had a right, as against the heir, to claim the whole. If it was given per damnationem, no right to the pro- perty passed, but each legatee was a creditor of the heir in respect of the thing given, and a difference was made according as the thing was given conjunctim or disjunctim. In the former case, each of the co-legatees, if there were two, was entitled to half only, and if either could not take, his half remained in the inheritance for the benefit of the heir. If the legacy was given disjunctim, then each had a claim against the heir for the whole, and if one got the thing from the heir, the other could get its value. (Gai. ii. 205.) If the legacy was given sinendi modo, and the heir allowed either co-legatee to take the thing, he had done his duty, and the co-legatee got nothing. (Gai. ii. 215.) If the legacy was given per prcBceptionem, the effect as between co-legatees was the same as in the case of legacies given per vindicationem. (Gai. ii. 223.) Before the lex Papia Poppcea there was no such thing as accrual of legacies between co-legatees ; each legatee was entitled to the property in the whole thing, or was creditor for the whole. The lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus (B.C. 13) and the lex Pa- pia Popp(Ea (a.d. 9), which are usually spoken of as one law, lex Julia et Papia, introduced great changes in testamentary law : the former to prevent unequal marriages, as of a senator with a liberta, and the latter to promote marriage and the birth of children. Two classes of persons, ccelibes and orbi, were affiected with in- capacities. They might be instituted or have legacies given them, i.e. the institution or gift was not void, but the benefit derivable from it was taken away from them and given to some one else. By ccelebs was meant a man betAveen the ages of twenty and LIB. II. TIT. XX. 225 sixty, or a woman between the ages of twenty and fifty, who had not been married or was a widower or widow. Men had a hundred days from the death of the testator in which they might marry, and thus avoid the penalties attaching to celibacy, and women were allowed two years from the death of a husband, and eighteen months from the time of divorce, in which to remarry. By orhus was meant a man between twenty-five and sixty, and a woman between twenty and fifty, who had not a child living at the time of the accrual of the right to take under the testament. Adop- tive children could not be counted, a senatus-considtum having been passed to exclude them. The lex Pajna fixed the time of accrual of rights under a testament, the dies cedit, as it was tech- nically termed, at the date of the opening of the testament, in- stead of the date of the testator's death, which had previously been the legal date. The ccelehs lost all, and the orhus one-half, of what was given him, and this lapsed portion {caducum, quasi ceciderit ah eo, IJLr. Reg. 17. 1) was given to some one else. These caduca produced by the person to whom they were given not being capable of taking them were not the only interests dealt with by the lex Papia, If a gift was originally invalid, as if it was given to a person already dead at the date when the testament Avas made, the gift was looked on as if it had never been made at all, j^ro non scripto. With such gifts the lex Papia had nothing to do. But a gift might have been valid originally and then become invalid, as if, e.g., it had been given to a person who died after the making of the testament and before the death of the testator. The old law prescribed how they should be treated, and gave them by accrual to co-heirs if given to an heir, or allowed them to fall in as part of the inheritance if given to a legatee. Such vacant things, however, were affected by the lex Papia, They were said to be in causa caduci ; and the caduca and the things in causa caduci devolved together to those who had the jus caduca vindicandi. In the first place there were certain excepted persons, viz. ascendants or descendants of the testator in the third degree, who were not aifected by the lex Papia at all. They lost nothing if they were ccelihes or orhi; they took all that the old law would have given them, although ccelihes or orhi. They were said to be solidi capaces, capable of taking all the testament gave them. Apart from them it was the jjatres, i. e. persons having a husband or wife and one child living, mentioned in the testament, who took the caduca and the thino:s in causa caduci. heirs takino' before legatees. If there were no persons answering to this description, the cer avium, or treasury of the people, as opposed to XhQjiscuSy or treasury of the emperor, took them. But the object of the law was not to get money for the treasury, but to reward mar- riage and the birth of children, and this is why testators were allowed to substitute heirs (who, of course, unless near relations or patresy could not take) so as to prevent the cBrarium taking. Q 22() LIB. II. TIT. XX. ^Yhcre there were co-legatees, the caduca of co-legatees Avere given, in the first place, to co-legatees who were patres ; but by a distinction, based apparently on no very good reason, it was only those joined re et verbis, and those joined verbis, who were considered co-legatees for this purpose ; those joined re were not, and only ranked with other legatees. If there were no co- legatees who were patres, the legacies went to the heirs who were •patres. If there were none, then to legatees generally who had children. If none had children, then to the (Erarium, (Gai. ii. 206, 207.) Any legacy given by the lex Papia Poppcea might be refused : if accepted, it passed with all the burdens attaching to it. Caduca cum sua onere fiunt. (Ulp. Rec). 17. 2.) By a constitution of Caracalia (Ulp. Peg, 17. 2), all caduca were given to \\\Q,fiscus, the distinction between the (crarium and the flscus having ceased to exist, and no legatee or heir any longer profited by the failure of legacies under the lex Papia Poppcea. Constantine abolished the law of incapacity arising from celi- bacy. (Cod. viii. 58.) And Justinian did away with all the law of caduca springing out of the lex Papia Poppcea. The dis- tinction between the kinds of legacies being no longer in existence, new provisions on the subject were made. (C. vi. 51. 11.) The right to bring a real action was to attach to every legacy ; and oo-legatees were placed in the position they would have occupied before the lex Papia Popjicea ; but it was enacted that in every case of a gift to a co-legatee failing, an accrual should take place to the other, or others joined with him. If they were joined re, the accrual was said to be obligatory on those conjoined ; but the burdens of the legacy did not pass with it. Really there was no accrual at all ; the co- legatees were in the same position as if the gift had only been made to one. If the co-legatees were joined re et verbis, the accrual was voluntary, but the burdens of the legacy passed with it. The co-legatees were looked upon as having really distinct interests, and, therefore, if the gift to one failed, the others had something to receive. But, at the same time, they took the share they gained, with all its burdens ; it might, for instance, be encumbered with n. Jldeicommissum. Lega- tees joined only verbis were not, properly speaking, co-legatees at all, and Justinian does not permit any accrual between them. There was thus a clear distinction made between le^iacies ffiven jointly to legatees re et verbis and tliose given verbis. In both distinct interests were in eftect given to all the legatees ; but in the former case these interests were so united, that, through the failure of the legacy of one legatee, his interest accrued to those joined with him. If the ris^hts of a co-lesiatee were once fixed, tlien even if he died before he received his legacy, the accrual on any failure still took place for his benefit, or rather that of his representa- tives, and was said to be given to his pars or share. (D. vii. 1. 33. 1.) LIB. II. TIT. XX. 227 9. Si cui fundus alienus legatus fuerit, et einerit proprietatem de- ducto usufructu, et ususfructus ad eum jDervenerit, et postea ex testa- mento agat, recte eum agere et fun- dum petere Julianiis ait, quia usus- fructus in petitione servitutis locum obtinet ; sed officio judicis contine- tur, ut deducto usufructu jubeat xestimationem prfestari. 9. If a testator gives as a legacy- land belonging to another, and the legatee purchases the bare ownership, and the usufruct come to him, and he afterwards brings an action under the testament, Julian says that an action claiming the land is well brought, because, in this claim, the usufruct is regarded as a servitude only. It is the duty of a judge, in this case, to order the value of the property, deducting the usufruct, to be paid. D. XXX. 82. 2, 3 ; D. 1. 16. 25. A^ fundus, or landed, estate, is left by legacy; the legatee "buys the naked ownership, but receives by a causa lucrativa (this is expressed by pervenerit) the usufruct. He is, of course, entitled to receive the value of what he has bought, but not of that which has already come to him by a causa lucrativa. Supposing he wishes to recover by action the value of the naked ownership from the heir, he can only demand •exactly that which was given him by the testament. He, there- fore, asks for the fundus ; but the fundus includes both the naked ownership and the usufruct. Will he not, then, be asking too much, and thus fail in his action from what was termed plus ,petitio? (See Bk. iv. Tit. 6. 33.) Julian answers that he will not, because in every demand of a fundus, the plaintiff must necessarily ask for it, subject to all its servitudes. Usufruct was a servitude, and, therefore, in demanding the fundus from the heir, he does not demand the usufruct, if the fundus is sub- ject to such a servitude. 10. Sed si rem legatarii quis ei 10. If a testator gives as a legacy legaverit, inutile est legatum, quia anything that already belongs to the legatee, the legacy is useless ; for what is already the property of a le- gatee cannot become more so. And, although the legatee has parted with the thing bequeathed, he would not be entitled to receive either the thing itself or its value. D. XXX. 41. 2. Et licet alienaverit earn. This is an application of what was called the rule of Cato, regula Catoniana (perhaps Cato Major), tIz. Quod, si testamenti facti tempore decessisset testator, inutile foret, id legatum quandocumque decesserit non valere (D. xxxiv. 7. 1), i.e. a legacy invalid when the testament was made, could never become valid. 11. Si quis rem suam quasi alie- 11. If a testator gives a thing be- nam legaverit, valet legatum ; nam longing to himself, as if it were the plus valet quod in veritate est, quam property of another, the legacy is quod in opinione. Sed et si legatarii valid ; for its validity is decided by Q 2 -quod proprium est ipsius amplius ■ejus fieri non potest ; et licet alie- naverit eam, non debetur nee ipsa nee restimatio ejus. 228 LIB. II. TIT. XX. piitavit, valere constat, qiiia exitiim what is the real state of the case, voluntas defiinctis i^otest habere. not by what he thinks. And if the testator imagines that what he gives be- longs already to the legatee, yet, if it does not, the legacy is certainly valid, because the wish of the deceased can thus take effect. D. xl. 2. 4. 1. The words 'plus valet quod^ &c., are not the statement of a general rule of law, but merely of what happens under the par- ticular circumstances referred to. Under other circumstances, exactly the opposite is laid down. Ulpian says, for instance, that a person thinking himself a necessarius lures, but really not being so, could not repudiate the inheritance, nam plus est in opinione quam in veritate. (D. xxix. 2. 15.) 12. Si rem suam legaverit tes- 12. If a testator gives his own pro- tator, posteaque earn alienaverit, perty as a legacy, and afterwards Celsus existimat, si non adimendi alienates it, it is the opinion of Celsus animo vendidit, nihilominus deberi ; that the legatee is entitled to the idemque divi Severus et Antoninus legacy, if the testator did not sell rescripserunt. lidem rescripserunt with an intention to revoke the le- eum qui, post testamentum factum, gacy. The Emperors Severus and prfedia quae legata erant pignori Antoninus have published a rescript dedit, ademisse legatum non videri ; to this effect. And they have also et ideo legatarium cum herede agere decided by another rescrijDt, that if posse, ut prsedia a creditore luantur. any person, after making his testa- Si vero quis partem rei legatee alie- ment, pledges immoveables which he naverit, pars qujB non est alienata has given as a legacy, he is not to be omnimodo debetur ; pars autem taken to have thereby revoked the alienata ita debetur, si non adi- legacy ; and that the legatee may, by mendi animo alienata sit. bringing an action against the heir, compel him to redeem the property. If, again, a part of the thing given as a legacy is alienated, the legatee is of course still entitled to the part which remains unalienated, but is entitled to that which is alienated only if it ap- pears not to have been alienated by the testator with the intention of taking away the legacy. Gai. xi. 198 ; D. xxxii. 11, 12 ; C. vi. 37. 3 ; D. xxx. 8. . Gains informs us that the opinion confirmed by Severus and Antoninus was not that generally entertained when he wrote. When the legacy "was given per mndicationem, it seemed impos- sible that if the thing were alienated the legatee could take any- thing ; and even if it were per damnationem, though there was nothing in the nature of the legacy to prevent the legatee making a valid claim {licet ipso jure debeatur legatum), it was considered that he might be repelled by an exception, because he would be acting against the wishes of the deceased. (GrAi. ii. 198.) 13. Si quis debitor! suo liberatio- 13. If a testator gives as a legacy nem legaverit, legatum utile est, et to his debtor a discharge from his LIB. II. TIT. XX. 229 neque ab ipso debitore neque ab lierede ejus potest heres petere, nee ab alio qui heredis loco est ; sed et potest a debitore conveniri, ut liberet eum. Potest autem quis vel ad tenipus jubere ne lieres petat. debt, the legacy is valid, and the heir cannot recover the debt from the debtor, his heir, or any one in the place of his heir. The debtor may by action compel the heir to free him from his obligation. A man may also forbid his ' heir to demand payment of a debt dur- ing a certain time. The debt was not extinguisliecl by the legacy of liberatio. But if the heir sued the debtor, then the debtor could repel him by the plea of fraud {exce-ptione doll mali), and, if the debtor wished, he could, by suing under the testament, compel the heir to release the debt, by consent only, if the obligation had been made in that manner, by acceptllatio, i.e. by the heir acknowledg- ing the receipt of the thing owed (see Bk. iii. Tit. 29. 1), if it had not. A legacy of a discharge from debt might be made indirectly by giving as a legacy to the debtor the chirographum, or bond by which he was bound. (D. xxxiv. 3. 3. 1, 2.) Vel ad tempus. The effect of such a legacy was, that if the heir sued the legatee before the time had expired, he could be repelled by an exception of dolus mains. 14. Ex contrario si debitor cre- ditor! suo, quod debet, legaverit, inutile est' legatum, si nihil plus est in legato quam in debito, quia nihil amplius habet per legatum. Quod si in diem vel sub conditione debitum ei pure legaverit, utile est legatum propter reprfesentationem. Quod si vivo testatore dies venerit vel conditio extiterit, Papinianus scripsit utile esse nihilominus lega- tum, quia semel constitit : quod et verum est ; non enim placuit sen- tentia existimantium extinctum esse legatum, quia in eani causam per- venit a qua incipere non potest. 14. On the contrary, a legacy given by a debtor to his creditor of the money which he owes him, is in- effectual if it includes nothing more than the debt did, for the creditor thus receives no benefit from the legacy. But if a debtor gives abso- lutely as a legacy to his creditor what was due only on the expiration of a term, or on the accomplishment of a condition, the legacy is effectual, because it thus becomes due before the debt. Papinian decides, that if the term expires, or the condition is accomplished, in the lifetime of the testator, the legacy is nevertheless effectual, because it was once good ; which is true. For we may reject the opinion that a legacy once good can afterwards become extinct, be- cause circumstances have arisen which would have prevented its being origin- ally valid. D. XXXV. 2. 1. 10 ; D. xxxv. 2. 5 ; D. xxxi. 82. 15. Sed si uxori maritus dotem legaverit, valet legatiun, quia ple- nius est legatum quam de dote actio. Sed si quam non accepit dotem le- gaverit, dii'i Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt, si quidem simpliciter legaverit, inutile esse legatum ; si ^.'^ero certa pecunia vel certum corpus 15. If a man gives as a legacy to his wife her marriage-portion, the legacy is valid, for the legacy is more beneficial than the action she might maintain for the recovery of her por- tion. But if he bequeath to his wife her marriage-portion, which he has never actually received, the Emperors 230 LIB. II. TIT. XX. aut instriimentum dotis in prsele- Severus and Antoninus have decided gando demonstrata sunt, valere le- by a rescript, that if the portion is gatum. given without any specification, the- legacy is void ; but if in the terms of the gift a particular sum or thing, or a certain sum mentioned in the act of dowry, is specified as to be received as a legacy before it could be received as dowry, the legacy is valid. D. xxxiii. 41. 2. 7, 8. In the cle dote, ov, as it was otherwise called, the rei uxorice actio, certain delays in the restitution of the doAvry were per- mitted ; and sums expended for the improvement of the property of the wife might be set off against the claim. The legacy had to be paid without delay, and no set-off was admissible. It was from the dowry being thus restored, w^hen made the subject of a legacy, sooner than when the action was brought, that the ex- pression prcelegare dotem was used ; the dos was given by legacy (legare) sooner {prcB) than it could otherwise be obtained. By the words ^ certa jpecunia^ &c., is meant that if the testator said, ' I give to my wife the sum she brought me as dowry,' and she had not brought anything, the legacy would be useless ; but if he said, * I give her the 100 aurei she brought me,' then the words referrino; to her havino; brougiht them would be only ^ falsa demonstration that is, an unnecessary particularity of expression, which would be passed over as if not written. (C. vi. 44. 3.) Instrumentum. dotis. So, if the testator said, ' I give the l^roperty mentioned in the act of dowry,' if there were no act of dowry, the gift would be useless ; but if he said, ' I give such or such a particular thing mentioned in the act of dowry,' if there were no act of dowry, the wife would receive the thing specified, and the words, ' mentioned in the act of dowry,' would be treated as superfluous. I 16. Si res legata sine facto he- redis perierit, legatario decedit ; et si servus alienus legatus sine facto heredis manumissus fuerit non te- netur heres. Si vero heredis servus legatus fuerit, et ipse eum manu- miserit, teneri eum Julianus scripsit, nee interesse utrum scierit an ig- noraverit a se legatum esse ; sed et si alii donaverit servum, et is cui donatus est eum manumiserit, te- netur heres, quamvis ignoraverit a se eum legatum esse. 16. If a thing given as a legacy perishes without the act of the heir, the loss falls upon the legatee. And, if the slave of another, given as a legacy, should be manumitted with- out the act of the heir, the heir is. not answerable. But if a testator gives as a legacy the slave of his heir, who afterwards manumits that slave, Julian says that the heir is answer- able, v/hether he knew or not that the slave was given away from him as a legacy. And it would be the? same if the heir had made a present of the slave to any one who had en- franchised him : the heir, though ignorant of the legacy, would be an- swerable. D. XXX. 35. 1 ; D. xxx. 112. 1. LIB. II. TIT. XX. 231 1l\\q factum of the heir means anything by which, however innocently, he may have been the cause of the thing perishing, &c. 17. Si qiiis ancillcis cum suis natis legaverit, etiamsi ancill^e mortiiEc fiierint, partus legato cedunt. Idem est, si ordinarii servi cum vicariis legati fuerint; et licet mortui sint ordinarii, tamen vicarii legato ce- dunt. Sed si servus cum peculio fuerit legatus, mortuo servo vel manumisso vel alienato et i)eculii legatum extinguitur. Idem est, si fundus instructus vel cum instru- mento legatus fuerit ; nam fundo alienato et instrumenti legatum extinguitur. 17. If a testator bequeaths his female slaves and their offspring, al- though the mothers die, the issue goes to the legatee. And so, if ordi- nary slaves are bequeathed together with vicarial, although the ordinary slaves die, yet the vicarial slaves will pass by virtue of the gift. But, whero a slave is bequeathed with his j^ecii- liurti, and afterwards dies, or is manu- mitted or alienated, the legacy of the peculinm becomes extinct. It is the same if the testator gives as a legacy, land ' provided with instruments,' or ' with its instruments of culture.' If the land is alienated, the legacy of the instruments of culture is extin- guished. D. xxxiii. 8. 1. 3 ; D. xxxiii, 7. 1, pr. and 1. An ordinarius servus was a slave who had a special office in th. e establishment, as cook, barber, baker, &c. The vicarii were his attendants, and were generally reckoned as part of his p culium. But in the case of this legacy, the law considered them as having an independent existence {propter dignitatem hominis), and not merely as accessories to the ordinarii. So, the children of the female slaves are not treated as mere acces- sories to her. Had they been so, they could not have passed without the principal to which they were attached. Fundus instructus is land, with everything on it, whether for use or ornament ; fundus cum instrumento, land, with the instruments of its culture only. (D. xxxiii. 7. 12. 27.) 18. Si grex legatus fuerit postea- que ad unam ovem pervenerit, quod superfuerit vindicari potest. Grege autem legato, etiam eas oves qupe post testamentum factum gregi ad- jiciuntur, legato cedere Julianus ait : est enim gregis unum corpus ex distantibus capitibus, sicut medium unum corpus est ex cohoerentibus laj)idibus. 18. If a flock is given as a legacy, and it is afterwards reduced to a single sheep, the legatee can claim what remains : and if a flock is given as a legacy, any sheep that may be added to the flock after the making of the testament, will, according to Julian, pass to the legatee. For a flock is one body, consisting of se- veral different heads, as a house is one body, composed of several stones joined together. D. XXX. 21, 22. 19. ^dibus denique legatis, co- 19. So, when a building is given as lumnas et marmora quse post testa- a legacy, any marble or pillars whicli mentum factum adjecta sunt, legato may be added after the testament is dicimus cedere. made wiU pass by the legacy. D. xxxi. 39. 232 LIB. II. TIT. XX. 20. Si peculimn legatiim fuerit, sine cliibio qiiicqiiid peculio accedit vel decedit vivo testatore, legatarii lucro vel damno est. Quod ei post mortem testatoris ante aditam here- ditatem servus acquisierit, Julianiis ait, siquidem ipsi manumisso pecu- lium legatum fuerit, omne quod ante aditam liereditatem acquisitum est, legatario cedere, quia liujus le- gati dies ab adita hereditate cedit ; sed si extraneo peculium legatum fuerit, non cedere ea legato, nisi ex rebus peculiaribus auctum fuerit. Peculium autem, nisi legatum fue- rit, manumisso non debetur ; quam- vis, si vivus manumiserit, sufHcit si non adimatur, et ita divi Severus et Antoninus rescripserunt. lidem rescripserunt, peculio legato non videri id relictum, ut petitionem habeat pecuniae quam in rationes dominicas impendit. lidem rescrip- serunt peculium videri legatum cum rationibus redditis liber esse jussus est, et ex eo reliqua inferre. 20. When the pecuUnm of a slave is given in a legacy, it is certain that if it is increased or diminished in the life of the testator, it is so much gained or lost to the legatee. And if the slave acquires anything between the death of the testator and the time of the heir entering on the inheritance, Julian makes this dis- tinction : if it is to the slave himself that the peculium, together with his enfranchisement, is given, then all that is acquired before the heir en- ters on the inheritance goes to the legatee, for the right to such a legacy is not fixed until the inheritance be entered on. But if it is to a stranger that the peculium is given, then any- thing acquired within the period above mentioned will not pass by the legacy, unless the acquisition v/ere made by means of something form- ing part of the peculium. His pecu- lium does not go to a slave manumit- ted by testament, unless expressly given ; although, if a master in his lifetime manumits his slave, it is enough if he does not expressly take it away from him ; and to this effect is the rescript of the Emperors Severus and Antoninus, who have also de- cided, that when his peculimn is given as a legacy to a slave, this does not entitle him to demand what he may have expended for the use of his master. The same emperors have further decided, that a slave is en- titled to his peculium when the tes- tator says he shall be free as soon as he has brought in his accounts, and made up any deficiency out of his peculium. D. xxxii. 65 ; D. xxxiii. 8. 8. ; D. xxxiii. D. XV. 1. 53. 6. 4 ; D. xxxiii. 8. 8. 7 Dies cedit, * the day begins,' and dies venit, ' the day is come,' are the two expressions in Koman law which signify the vesting or fixing of an interest, and the interest becoming a present one. Cedere diem (says Ulpian, D. L. 16. 213), signijicat incipere deheri pecuniam ; venire diem^ significat euin diem venisse, quo pecunia peti jiotest. Cedit dies may, therefore, be translated, ^ the right to the thing is fixed ; ' venit dies, '- the thing may be de- manded.' ITor instance, if A buys a horse of B, without any terms being attached to the purchase, the right of B in the pur- chase-money is fixed at once, and also he may at once demand it, et cessit et venit dies. If A agrees that the purchase- money shall be paid by instalments, then, dies cessit, B has a fixed interest in LIB. 11. TIT. XX. 233 the money ; but the dies can only be said venisse, as each instal- ment falls due, and with regard only to the portion becoming due. If, again, A only buys it on condition that C will lend him the money, then until C has done so, neque ccssit nequc venit dies, B has no fixed interest in, or right to, the purchase-money until the condition is accomplished. \¥ith regard to legacies, the dies cedit, the time at which the eventual rights of the legatee were fixed, was the day of the testator's death, excepting when the vesting or fixing of these rights was suspended by a condition in the testament itself. The dies venit, the time when" the thing given could be demanded, was not till the heir entered on the inheritance, and there Avas thus some one of Avhom to make the demand ; if the legacy was given after a term, or on a condition, the demand, of course, could not be made {dies noii venit) until the term ]iad expired, or the condition was fulfilled. An alteration was made by the lex Pajria Poj^pcea in fixing the dies cedit at the day wlien the testament was opened, not at that Avhen the testator died (see note to paragr. 8); but this had been done away with, and the old law Avas in force under Justinian. (C. vi. 51. 1. 1.) The legatee had the thing given exactly as it was at the time of the dies cedit. He took it, with all the gains and losses that had accrued to it since the date of the testator's death, and directly his rights were fixed, they were transmissible to his heirs. But if a testator gave his liberty to one of his slaves as a legacy, there was in this case an exception to the rule that the dies cedit dates from the death of the testator. If the gift of liberty was given to a slave as a legacy, he could not begin to acquire for his own benefit until an Iieir had entered on the in- heritance, as it was requisite there should be some one to free him. The peculium, therefore, if given to him, would be such as it w^as when the lieir entered on the inheritance ; while, if the peculiuni was given to a stranger, it would be such as it was at the death of the testator, excepting when the j)eculiuin was aug- mented by things derived from itself (ex rebus peculiaribns), as, for instance, if sheep or cattle, forming part of the peculium, had young. There was another case, that of personal servitudes, in which the dies cedit dated from the entrance on the inheritance, not from the death of the testator. These servitudes were exclusively attached to the person of the legatee, and as they were not trans- missible to his heirs, there could be no interest in them until the actual enjoyment of them was commenced. The terms of the second rescript referred to in the text are given by Ulpian. (D. xxxiii. 8. 6. 4.) When the master en- franchised his slave himself, he was present to demand the pecidium, and if he did not, it was considered evident that he intended the slave to keep it. Not so in a legacy of liberty, in 234 LIB. II. TIT. XX. giving whicli the master might so easily forget the pecuUum that some expressions were required to show that he remembered it^ and wished to 2;ive it to the slave. 21. Tarn autem corporales res le- 21. Things corporeal and incorpo- gari possunt, quani incorporales ; et real may be equally well given as a ideo quod defuncto debetur, potest legacy. Thus, the testator may give alicui legari, ut actiones suas heres a debt due to him, and the heir is then legatario priijstet, nisi exegerit vivus obliged to use his actions for the be- testator pecuniam ; nam hoc casu nefit of the legatee, unless the testatoi? legatum extinguitur. Sed et tale in his lifetime exacted payment, for legatum valet : Damnas esto heres in this case the legacy would become domum illius reficere vel ilium rere extinct. Such a legacy as this is also alieno liberare. good : let my heir be bound to rebuild the house of such a one, or to free him from his debts. D. XXX. 41 ; D. xxx. 39. 3, 4. The legacy of a debt due to the testator was usually called lef/atum nominis, (See D. xxx. 44. 6.) Of course the legatee could not sue for it, he could only compel the heir to sue for his benefit. 22. Si generaliter servus vel res 22. If a testator gives a slave or alia legetur, electio legatarii est, anything else as a legacy, without nisi aliud testator dixerit. specifying a particular slave or thing, the choice belongs to the legatee, un- less the testator has expressed the contrary. The jurists took care to lay down, with respect to what was called a legatum generis, that the class of objects must not be one too wide. Legatum nisi certce rei sit, et ad certom personam deferatur, nullius est momenti, (Paul, ^ent, iii. 6. 13.) For instance, the gift of ' an animal ' would have seemed rather in- tended to mock than to benefit the legatee, magis derisorium quam utile videtur. (D. xxx. 7.) Before Justinian, it depended on the formula with which the legacy was given whether the choice of the particular thing to be given to the legatee belonged to the heir or the legatee. In a legacy per vindicationem it belonged to the latter ; there was a real action for a thing which must have formed part of the testator's actual estate. In a legacy per damnationem it belonged to the heir ; there was only a personal action against the heir as debtor, and the debtor might discharge the obligation in the way most beneficial to himself. (Ulp. Reg, 24. 14.) The main difference between a legatum generis and a legatum optionis was that in the latter the legatee could choose the best of the kind in the possession of the testator : in the latter the legatee could not choose the best, nor the heir the worst. (D. xxx. 1. 37 ; D. xxx. 5. 2.) 23. Optionis legatum, id est, ubi 23. The legacy of election, that is testator ex servis suis vel aliis rebus when a testator directs his legatee to optare legatarium jusserat, habebat choose any one from among his slaves. LIB. II. TIT. XX. 235 in se conditionem ; et ideo, nisi ipse or any other class of things, was for- legatariiis vivus optaverit, ad here- merly hekl to imply a condition, so dem legatum non transmittebat. that if the legatee in his lifetime did Sed ex constitutione nostra et hoc ad not make the election, he did not meliorem statnm reformatum est, et transmit the legacy to his heir. But, data est licentia heredi legatarii op- by our constitution, we have altered tare, licet vivus legatarius hoc non this for the better, and the heir of the fecit. Et diligentiore tractatu habi- legatee is now permitted to elect, al- to, ethoc in nostra constitutione ad- though the legatee in his lifetime has ditum est, ut sive plures legatarii not done so. And, pursuing the sub- existant quibus optio relicta est, et ject still further, we have added, that dissentiant in corpore eligendo, sive if there are several legatees to whom unius legatarii plures heredes et in- an option is left, and they differ in ter se circa optandum dissentiant, their choice, or if thqjre are many heirs alio aliud corpus eligere cupiente, of one legatee, and they cannot agree ne pereat legatum (quod plerique what to choose, then to prevent the prudentium contra benevolentiam legacy becoming ineffectual, which the. introducebant), fortunam esse hujus generality of ancient lawyers, contrary optionis judicem, et sorte hoc esse to all equity, decided would be the dirimendum, utadquem sors veniat, case, fortune must be the arbitress of ilHus sententia in optione preecellat. the choice, and the dispute must be decided by lot, so that his choice, to whom the lot falls, shall x^revail. D. xl. 9. 3 ; D. xxxvi. 2. 12. 8 ; C. vi. 43. 3. When once the dies ced'it had fixed the rights of the legatee, he could transmit to his heirs all the rights he had himself. To this the Koman lawyers xionsidered the legatum optionis an excep- tion, as intended to be personal to the legatee himself. Justinian decides that the exception shall not exist. (C. vi. 43. 3.) We must distinguish the legatum generis, when an object, though an uncertain one, was given, from the legatum optionis, where only the right to select an object was given. The former was never treated as an exception to the general rule of the dies cedit. A testator might also leave as a legacy a part, as e.g. the half, of the inheritance (Tit. 23. 5. note); but still the heir took tlie Avhole inheritance as heir, and then had to divide it Avith the legatarius partiarius, although the legatee was really not getting a particular thing, but a share of a universal suc- cession. (Gai. ii. 254.) 24. Legari autem illis solis po- 24. A legacy can be given to those- test, cum quibus testamenti factio only, with whom the testator has ^es^a- est. menti factio. D. xli. 8. 7. We have already said (Tit. 14. 2) that the necessity of having the rights of citizenship in order to make, to witness, or to profit by a testament, excluded all peregrini. But even among those who were otherwise in a position to take as heirs or le- gatees, there were some who at different periods Avere specially precluded : First, the Latini Juniani (see Bk. i. Tit. 5. 3) could not be appointed tutors by testament, nor could they benefit at all by a testament, unless they had the full rights of citizenship 2:^6 LIB. II. TIT. XX. at the time of the testator's death, or acquired them within a hundred days after his decease. (Gat. i. 23 ; Ulp. Reg. 17. 1 and 22. 2.) Secondly, by the lex Voconia (585 A.u.c), the general object of which was to prevent the accumulation of large sums in the liands of women, no woman could be instituted by a person rated in the census as possessing a fortune of 100,000 asses. (Gai. ii. 274.) Thirdly, by the lex Julia de maritandis ordinihus, unmarried persons could take nothing under a testament, unless they were married at the death of the testator, or within one hundred days after his decease ; and by the lex Papia PoppcBa persons married, but childless, could only receive one-half of what was left them. {Ulp. Reg. 17. 2 and 22. 3.) Lastly, the disabilities of the lex Julia and the lex Papia PoppcBa were removed by the Christian emperors ; but a new kind of disability was created, by enacting that no heretic should take anything whatever, even under a military testament. (C. i. ^. 4, 5 and 22.) In the time of Justinian it may be said that ■every one had the testamenti f actio, excepting harhari, dejwrtati, and heretics. 25. Incertis vero personis neqiie legata neque fideicommissa olim re- linqiii concessum erat ; nam nee miles qiiidem incertfe personam po- terat relinquere, ut divus Hadrianiis rescripsit. Incerta autem persona videbatur, quam incerta opinione animo siio testator subjiciebat ; vel- uti si quis ita dicat : Quicumque filio filiam snam in matrimonium de- derit, ei lieres mens ilium fiindum dato. lUud quoque quod iis relin- ■quebatur, qui post testamentum. scriptum primi consules designati «runt, ?eque incert?e persons legari videbatur, et denique multte alias ejusmodi species sunt. Libertas •quoque incertse personog non vide- batur posse dari, quia placebat no- minatim servos liberari. Sub certa vero demonstratione, id est, ex cer- tis personis incertfe personse recte legabatur ; veluti, Ex cognatis meis qui nunc sunt, si quis filiam meam uxorem duxerit, ei lieres mens illam rem dato. Incertis autem personis legata vel fideicommissa relicta, et per errorem soluta, repeti non posse sacris constitutionibus cautum erat. 25. Formerly, it was not permitted that either legacies or fideiconnmissa should be given to uncertain persons, and even a soldier could not leave anything to an uncertain person, as the Emperor Hadrian has decided by a rescript. By an uncertain person was meant one who is not present to the mind of the testator in any defi- nite manner, as if he should say : Whoever shall give his daughter in marriage to my son, to him let my heir give such a piece of land. So, if he had left anything to the persons first appointed consuls after his testa- ment was written, this also would have been a gift to uncertain persons, and there are many other similar examples. Freedom likewise could not be con- ferred upon an uncertain person, for it was necessary that all slaves should be enfranchised by name ; but a legacy given with a certain demonstration, that is, to an uncertain person among a number of persons certain, was valid, as : Among my existing cognati, if any one shall marry my daughter, let my heir give him such a thing. But, if a legacy or jideicommissum to uncertain persons had been paid by mistake, it was provided by the constitutions, that such persons could not be called on to refund. Gai. ii. 238, 239. LIB. II. TIT. XX. 237 Neque Jideicommissa . It was by a senatus-consuUum, m the time of Hadrian, that the law was thus settled with respect to Jideicommissa. (GrAi. ii. 287.) Previously, a gift by way of Jideicommissum to an uncertain person had been valid. The lex Furia Caninia (Gai. ii. 239) required that slaves to whom freedom was given by testament should be expressly named, jubet servos nominatim liherari. 26. Postumo quoque alieno inii- tiUter legabatur. Est autem alienus postiimas, qui natus inter siios here- des testatori futures non est ; ideo- qiie ex emancipato iilio conceptusiie- pos extraneus erat postumiis avo. Gai. 26. Formerly, a legacy to a post- humous stranger was ineffectual ; a. posthumous stranger is any one who, if he had been born before the death of the testator, would not have been numbered among his sui heredes, and so a posthumous grandson, the issue of an emancipated son, was a posthu- mous stranger with regard to his grand- father, ii. 241. We have already seen (see Tit. 13. 1) how the rigour of this principle came to be modified with respect to a posthumous suus heres. It was as an incerta persona that the posthu- mous child was originally excluded from taking either as heir or legatee. 27. Sed nee hujusmodi - species penitus est sine justa emendatione relicta ; cum in nostro codice consti- tutio posita est, per quam et huic parti medemur, non solum in here- ditatibus, sed etiam in legatis et fideicommissis : quod evidenter ex ipsius constitutionis lectione clares- cit. Tutor autem nee per nostram constitutionem incertus dari debet, quia certo judicio debet quis pro tu- tela suse posteritati cavere. 27. These points have not, how- ever, been left without proper altera- tion, for a constitution has been placed in our code by which the law has been altered, not only as regards inherit- ances, but also as regards legacies and jideicommissa. This alteration will ap- pear from the constitution itself. But not even by our constitution is the no- mination of an uncertain tutor permit- ted, for it is incumbent upon every pa- rent to take care that his posterity have a tutor by a determinate appointment. C. vi. 48. There was, probably, a constitution treating of this subject inserted in the first Code (see Introd. sec. 29), which was not given in the Code we now^ have. 28. Postumus autem alienus he- res institui et antea poterat et nunc potest ; nisi in utero ejus sit, quae jure nostro uxor esse non potest. 28. A posthumous stranger could formerly, and may now, be appointed heir, unless it appear that he has been conceived by a woman who by our law could not have been married to his father. Gai. ii. 242. 287 ; D. xxviii. 2. 9. 1. 4. Posthumous children, who, if born in the testator's lifetime, would not have been in his power (this is the meaning of alienus), could not be instituted heirs under the civil law ; but the praitor gave them, if instituted, the possessio bonormn, Justinian per- mitted their institution. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 9. pr.) 238 LIB. II. TIT. XX. Nisi in utero ejus sit, that is, unless the posthumous child is the child of the testator, and of a woman whom the testator could not have married. 29. Si quis in nomine, cogno- mine, prtenomine legatarii erraverit, si de persona constat, nihilominus valet legatum. Idemque in here- dibiis servatnr, et recte ; nomina enim significandoriim liominuui gra- tia reperta snnt, qui si alio quolibet niodo intelliscantnr, nihil interest. 2B. Altliougli a testator may have mistaken the nomcn, cognomen, or pree- nonien of a legatee, yet, if it is certain who is the person meant, the legacy is valid. The same holds good as to heirs, and with reason ; for the nse of names is but to point out persons ; and, if they can be distinguished by any other method, it is the same thing. D. xix. 4. 30. Huic proxima est ilia juris Tegula, falsa demonstratione legatum non perimi, veluti si quis ita legave- rit, Stichum servum meum vernam do lego ; licet enim non verna sed emptus sit, si de servo tamen con- stat, utile est legatum. Et conve- nienter si ita demonstraverit, Sti- chum servum quem a Seio emi, sitque ab alio emptus, utile est legatum, si de servo constat. 30. Closely akin to this is the rule of law, that a legacy is not rendered void by a false description. For in- stance, if the testator were to say, I give as a legacy Stichus born my slave ; in this case, although Stichus was not born in the family, but bought, yet, if it is certain who is meant, the legacy is valid. And so if a testator marks out the particular slave in this way ; I bequeath Stichus my slave, whom I bought of Seius ; yet, although he was bought of an- other, the legacy is good, if no doubt exists as to the slave intended to be eiven. D. XXXV. 1. 17, pr, and 1. 31. Much less is a legacy rendered invalid by a false reason being as- signed for giving it ; as, if a testator says, I give my slave Stichus to Titius, because he took care of my affairs in my absence ; or, because I was ac- quitted upon a capital accusation, by his undertaking my defence. For although Titius has never taken care of the afiairs of the deceased, and although the testator was never ac- quitted by means of Titius defending him, the legacy will be valid. But it is quite different if the reason has been assigned under the form of a condition, as, I give to Titius such a piece of ground, if he has taken care of my affairs. D. XXXV. 1. 17. 2, 3. Ulpian shortly sums up the law of this and the two last paragraphs by the rule, ^ Neque ex falsa demonstratione, neque ex falsa causa legatum iiifirmatur.'' (Ulp. Reg. 24. 19.) Of course if the cause was so oiven as to constitute a con- 31. Longe magis legato falsa ■causa non nocet, veluti cum quis ita dixerit, Titio, quia me absente ne- gotia mea curavit, Stichum do lego; vel ita, Titio, quia patrocinio ejus capitali crimine liberatus sum, Sti- chum do lego. Licet enim neque ne- gotia testatoris umquam gessit Ti- tius, neque patrocinio ejus liberatus «est, legatum tamen valet. Sed si conditionaliter enuntiata fuerit cau- sa, aliud juris est, veluti hoc modo : Titio, si negotia mea curavit, fundum •do lego. LIB. II. TIT. XX. 239 :lit'ion, the legacy was only valid, if the condition had been accomplished. 32. An servo lieredis recte lega- mus, quferitur. Et constat pure Lnutiliter legari, nee quicquam pro- [icere, si vivo tesfcatore de potestate iieredis exierit ; quia quod inutile foret legatum, si statim post factum fcestamentum decessisset testator, Qon hoc ideo debet valere quia diu- bius testator vixerit. Sub conditione v^ero recte legatur, ut requiramus an quo tempore dies legati cedit, in potestate heredis non sit. 32. The question has been raised, whether a testator can give a legacy to the slave of his heir ; and it is evi- dent that such a legacy is quite in- effectual, nor is it at all helped by the slave having been freed from the power of the heir in the lifetime of the testator ; for a legacy which wonld have been void if the testator had expired immediately after he had made the testament, ought not to become valid, merely because he happened to enjoy a longer life. But a testator may give the legacy to the slave under a condition, and then Vv^e have to en- quire whether, at the time when the right to the legacy becomes fixed, the slave has ceased to be in the power of the heir. Gai. ii. 244 ; D. xxxiv. 7. 1. This paragraph is based on the rcgula Catoniana (see note on paragraph 10), though no express allusion to it is made. As to the doubts entertained on the subject, see Gai. ii. 244. 33. Ex diverso, herede instituto servo, quin domino recte etiam sine conditione legetur, non dubitatur ; nam etsi statim post factum testa- mentum decesserit testator, non ta- men apud eum qui heres sit dies legati cedere intelligitur ; cum here- ditas a legato separata sit, et possit per eum servum alius heres efFici, si priusquam jussu domini adeat, in alterius potestatem translatus sit, vel manumissus ipse heres efhcitur : quibus casibus utile est legatum. Quod si in eadem causa permanserit, et jussu legatarii adierit, evanescit lesratum. 33. On the contrary, it is not doubted, but that if a slave is ap- pointed heir, a legacy may be given to his master unconditionally ; for, although the testator should die in- stantly, yet the right to the legac}»" immediately after making the testa- ment, does not immediately accrue to the heir ; for the inheritance is sepa- rated from the legacy, and another may become heir by means of the slave, if he should be transferred to the power of a new ]uaster, before he has entered upon the inheritance, at the command of the master, who is the legatee ; or the slave himself, if enfranchised, may become heir ; and, in these cases, the legacy would be good. But, if the slave should remain in the same state, and enter upon the inheritance by order of the legatee, the legacy is at an end. Gai. ii. 245. 34. Ante heredis institutionem lnutiliter antea legabatur, scilicet quia testamenta vim ex institutione heredum accipiunt, et ob id veluti caput atque fundamentum intelli- gitur totius testamenti heredis in- stitutio. Pari ratione nee Hbertas 34. Formerly, a legacy placed be- fore the institution of the heir was in- effectual, because a testament receives its efficacy from the institution of the heir, and it is thus that the institution of the heir is looked on as the head and the foundation of the testament. 240 LIB. II. TIT. XX. ante lieredis institutionem dari po- terat. Sed quia incivilc esse piita- vimus ordinem quideiu scriptural seqiii, quod et ipsi antiquitati vitu- perandum fuerat visum, sperni au- tem testatoris voluntatem, per nos- traiii constitutionem et hoc vitium emeudavimus : ut liceat et ante heredis institutionem et inter medias heredum institutiones legatum re- linciuere, et multo magis libertatem cujus usus favorabilior est. So, too, freedom could not be given before the institution of the heir. But we have thought it unreasonable that tlie mere order of writing should be attended to, in contempt of the real intention of a testator — a thing of which the ancients themselves seem to have disapproved. We have, therefore, by our constitution, amended the law in this point ; so that a legacy, and much more a grant of liberty, which is always favoured, may now be given before the institution of an heir, or among the institutions of heirs where more than one. Gai. ii. 229, 230 ; C. vi. 23, 24. The nomination of a tutor, as not constituting any burden on the inheritance, had already been made an exception to the rule, that nothing in a testament could be valid that preceded the in- stitution of the heir. (Gai. ii. 231.) 1 35. Post mortem quoque heredis aut legatarii simili modo inutiliter legabatur, veluti si quis ita dicat : Cum heres mens mortuus erit, do lego. Item, pridie quam heres aut legatarius morietur. Sed simili modo et hoc correximus, firmitatem hujusmodi legatis ad lideicommis- sorum similitudinem prtestantes, ne vel hoc casu deterior causa lega- torum quam fideicommissorum inve- niatur. 35. A legacy made to take effect after the death of an heir or legatee, was also ineffectual ; as, if a testator said, ' When my heir is dead, I give as a legacy,' or thus, ' I give as a legacy on the day preceding the day of the death of my heir, or of my legatee.' But we have corrected the ancient rule in this respect, by giving all such legacies the same validity as Jideicommissa ; lest trusts should be found in this respect to be more favoured than legacies. Gai. ii. 232 ; C. iv. 38. 11 ; C. iv. 11. Gains remarks, that the second of these forms, Pridie quam^ though objected to because the time when the right was fixed could not be known until the heir was dead, was not objected to on any very good ground. For all that the principles of law forbad was, that the interest should not be fixed until after the death of the heir, for then it would have been the heir's heir, and not the heir, that was charged ; and that it should not be fixed until after the death of the legatee, for if he had no vested interest in his life, he could have nothing to transmit. But a legacy made so as to give a fixed right the day before either of their deaths, was not open to the same objections. 36. Poense quoque nomine inuti- liter legabatur et adimebatur, vel transferebatur. Poense autem no- mine legari videtur quod coercendi heredis causa relinquitur, quo magis aliquid faciat aut non faciat : veluti si quis ita scripscrit, Heres mens, si filiam suam in matrimonium Titio collocaverit, vel ex diverso si non 36. Also, formerly, if a testator had given, revoked, or transferred a legacy by way of penalty, he would have done so ineffectually. A legacy is considered as given by way of a penalty, when it is intended to con- strain an heir to do or not to do some- thing ; as, if a testator said, ' If my heir gives his daughter in marriage to Titius, LIB. II. TIT. XX. 241 collocaverit, clato decern aureos Seio ; aiit si ita scripserit, Heres mens, si serviim Sticlium alienaverit, vel ex diverse si non alienaverit, Titio decern aureos dato. Et in tantum lieec regula observabatiir, tit quam pluribiis principalibus constitutioni- nibiis signijBcetiir, nee principem quidem agnoscere quod ei poense no- mine legatum sit. Nee ex militis quidem testamento talia legata vale- bant, quamvis alise militum volun- tates in ordinandis testamentis valde observabantur. Quinetiam nee liber- tatem poena? nomine dari posse place- bat. Eo amplius nee lieredem poense nomine adjici posse Sabinus existi- mabat, veluti si quis ita dicat, Titius heres esto, si Titius filiam suam Seio in matrimonium collocaverit, Seius quoque heres esto. Nihil enini in- tererat, qua ratione Titius coerce- retur, utrum legati datione an co- heredis adjectione. Sed hujusmodi scrupulositas nobis non placuit, et generaliter ea quve relinquuntur, licet poenfe nomine fuerint relicta vel adempta vel in alios translata, nihil distare a ceteris legatia con- stituimus vel in dando vel in adi- mendo vel in transf erendo : exceptis videlicet iis quae impossibilia sunt, vel legibus interdicta, aut alias pro- brosa. Hujusmodi enim testamen- torum dispositiones valere, secta rneorum temporum non patitur. or, if he do not give her in marriage to Titius, let him pay ten aurei to Seius ; ' or, thus, ' If my heir shall alienate my slave Stichus, or, if my heir shall not alienate my slave Stichus, let him pay ten aurei to Titius.' And this rule was so rigorously observed, that it was expressly ordained by many constitutions, that even the emperor would not receive a legacy which was given by way of a penalty, nor could such a legacy be valid, even when given by the testament of a soldier ; although, in every other respect, the intention of a testator in a military testament was scrupulously adhered to. And even freedom could not be given by way of a penalty ; still less, in the opinion of Sabinus, could another heir be added ; as if, for instance, a testator said, * Let Titius be my heir, but if he gives his daughter in marriage to Seius, let Seius also be my heir. ' It made no difference how Titius was put under constraint, whether by the gift of a legacy, or the addition of a co- heir. But this scrupulous severity has not pleased us, and we have therefore ordained generally that things left, revoked, or transferred by way of penalty, shall be treated as other lega- cies, with the exception of anything that may be imj^ossible, prohibited by law, or contrary to good manners, for the principles of our age will not j)ermit testamentary dispositions of such a character. Gai. ii. 235, 236. 243 ; C. vi. 41. It is rather difficult to say how this rule sprang up in Roman law, or how the gift of a legacy poencB nomine differed from an ordinary condition. Theophilus, in his Paraphrase, gives as one reason that a legacy ought to spring from a feeling of kindness to the legatee, and not be used as a means to punish another. For want of a better reason, we may be content with this. The sections of this Title may be arranged under five heads. The first treats of the definition and general notions of a legacy (paragr. 1, 2, 3, 8) ; the second treats of the objects given by a legacy (paragr. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 23); the third treats of the persons to whom legacies can be given (paragr. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, and 33) ; the fourth of rules as to the position, terms, and construction of legacies (paragr. 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, and 36); and the fifth, of the loss, diminution, or increase of things given by legacies (paragr. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20). R 242 LIB. II. TIT. XXI. Tit. XXI. DE ADEMPTIONE ET TRANSLATIONE LEGATOKUM. Ademptio legatorum, sive eodem The revocation of a legacy, whether testamento adimantur legata sive made in the same testament or in a codicillis, firma est, sive contrariis codicil, is valid, and may be made in verbis fiat ademptio, veluti si quod terms contrary to those of the gift, as ita quis legaverit do lego, ita adi- when a testator gives in these terms, matur non do non lego ; sive ncn ' I give as a legacy,' and revokes it by contrariis, id est, aliis quibuscumque saying, ' I do not give as a legacy ; ' or verbis. . in terms not contrary, that is, in any other form of expression. D. xxxiv. 4. 3. 11. It was considered necessary, in the times when weight was attached to the formula under which the legacy was given, that the legacy should be revoked by words exactly opposite (^con- trariis verbis) to those by which it was given, as in a legacy per vindicationem the revocation ought to have been by the words ^ non do, non lego.'' (Ulp. Reg. 24. 29.) The text only speaks of direct revocation of legacies by an express declaration of the testator's wishes in some testamentary document ; but it was also revoked by the mere wish of the testator {nnda voliintate, D. xxxiv. 4. 3. 11) that it should be re- voked being in any way declared. In such a case the legacy was not, strictly speaking, taken away ; but the legatee who brought an action for it might be repelled by an exception of dohts malus. We have seen, in the last Title (paragr. 12), that a sale of the thing given as a legacy was held to be or not to be a revocation of the legacy, according as the testator intended or did not intend that such should be its effect. A legacy was also considered to be revoked by implication if something occurred after it was given which made it impossible to believe that the testator could have continued to wish the legatee to profit by his bounty ; as, for in? tance, if a notorious and deadly enmity sprang up between them. (D. xxxiv. 4. 3. 11.) 1. Transferri quoque legatum ab 1. A legacy may also be transferred alio ad alium potest, veluti si quis from one person to another ; as, 'I ita dixerit hominem Stichum quem give as a legacy to Seius my slave Titio legavi Seio do lego, sive in Stichus, whom I have given as a le- eodem testamento sive in codicillis gacy to Titius,' whether this be done hoc fecerit. Quo casu simul Titio in the same testament or in codicils ; adim^i videtur et Seio dari. and then at the same time a legacy is taken from Titius and given to Seius. D. xxiv. 4, 5. The translation had two effects : it took away a legacy from one person and gave it to another ; but it might have either effect without the other. The original legatee might be dead. LIB. II. TIT. XXII. 243 md thus the legacy useless, and yet the gift to the new legatee ivould be valid ; or the new legatee might subsequently die, and yet the legacy would be lost to the original legatee. (D. xxxiv. 1. 20.) Tit. XXII. DE LEGE FALCIDIA. Superest ut de lege Falcidia dis- It remains to speak of the lex Fal- piciamas, qua modus novissime lega- cidia, by which legacies have received tis impositus est. Cum enim olim their latest limitations. By the law of lege duodecim tabularum libera the Twelve Tables, a testator was per- erat legandi potestas, ut liceret vel niitted to dispose of his Avhole patri- totum patrimonium legatis erogare mony in legacies ; for the law said, ^quippe ea lege ita cautum esset, ' As a man has disposed of his pro- uti legassit su?e rei, ita jus esto), perty, so let the law be ; ' but it was visum est hanc legandi licentiam thought proper to restrain this licence coarctare. Idque ipsorum testato- even for the benefit of testators them- rum gratia provisum est, ob id quod selves, because they frequently died plerumque intestati moriebantur, intestate, the heirs they instituted re- recusantibus scriptis heredibus pro fusing to enter upon an inheritance nullo aut minimo lucro hereditates from wliich they could receive little adire. Et cum super hoc tam lex or no profit. With this object the lex Puria quam lex Voconia latse sunt, Furia and the lex Voconia were passed ; quarum neutra sufficiens ad rei con- and lastly, as neither of these was summationem videbatur, novissime found adequate to the piu'pose, the lex lata est lex Falcidia, qua cavetur ne Falcidia was enacted, which forbids a plus legare liceat quam dodrantem testator to give more in legacies than totorum bonorum, id est, ut sive three-fourths of all his property ; so nnus heres institutus esset, sive that, whether there be one or more plures, apud eum eosve pars quarta heirs instituted, there must now re- xemaneret. main to him, or them, at least one- fourth part of the whole. Gai. ii. 224. 227. The lex Furia testamentaria, which must not be confounded with the lex Furia, or Fusia Caninia, restraining the testamentary manumission of slaves (Bk. i. Tit. 7 ), was a plebiscit?im, probably of the year 571 A.u.c. Gains thus acquaints us with its pro- visions:— 'Qua, exceptis jjersonis quibusdam, cceteris plus niille ussibus legatorum nomine mortisve causa capere permissum non est :' more than 1000 asses could not be given as a legacy. The law failed to effect its object, as the testator was not restrained in the number of legacies he might give, but only in the amount of each legacy. (Gai. ii. 2. 25.) The lex Voconia, also called testamentaria, was a plebiscitum, of which the year 585 A.u.c. is given as the date. Gains says of it, * Qua cautum est, ne cui plus legatorum nomine mortisve causa capere liceret, quam heredes caperent :' no legatee was to have more than each heir had. This law also failed in its object ; as, by multiplying the number of legatees and giving each a trifling amount, the sum received by the heirs, which would be equally small, might be too trifling to make it worth their while to enter on the inheritance. (Gai. ii. 226.) The lex Falcidia was a plebiscitum passed in the year 714 R 2 244 LIB. II. TIT. XXII. A.U.C. Its principles were extended to Jideicommissa by the senatus-consultum Pegasianum (see next Title); to Jideicommissa imposed on heredes ah intestato by a rescript of Antoninus Pius (D. XXXV. 2. 18) ; to donations mortis causa by a rescript of Severus (C. vi. 50. 5) ; and lastly, to donations between husband and wife. (C. vi. 50. 12.) The mode in which the heir would avail himself of the lex Falcidia w^ould be by repelling by an exception the legatee who demanded the whole of his legacy, when less than the whole was due by the lex Falcidia. The part reserved to the heir is spoken of by the jurists as quarta or Falcidia. The commentators more usually employ the full term quarta Falcidia. 1. Et cum quaesitum esset duo- 1. Wlien two heirs are instituted, bus lieredibus institutis, veluti Titio as Titius and Seius, a question has et Seio, si Titii pars aut tota ex- been raised : supposing the share of hausta sit legatis quae nominatim ab Titius in the inheritance is either en- eo data sunt aut supra modum one- tirely absorbed, or very heavily bur- rata, a Seio vero aut nulla rehcta dened with legacies specifically charged sint legata aut quae partem ejus upon it, while the share of Seius is dumtaxat in partem dimidiam mi- wholly free, or has legacies charged on nuant, an quia is quartam partem it only up to half its amount, in such totius hereditatis aut amj^lius habet, a case does the circumstance of Seius Titio nihil ex legatis quae ab eo re- having a clear fourth or more of the licta sunt, retinere liceret. Placuit, inheritance, prevent Titius from re- ut quartam partem sua3 partis sal- taining out of the legacies charged vam habeat, posse retinere ; etenim upon his share, enough to secure a in singulis lieredibus ratio legis Fal- fourth part of his own moiety to him- cidise ponenda est. self ? It has been decided that Titius may retain the fourth of his own share, for the calculation of the lex Falcidia is applicable to each heir separately. D. XXXV. 2. 77. The testator is here supposed to give a distinct share of his . inheritance to two different persons, and to burden one share with leo-acies while leavino; the other free. The heir whose share is burdened is entitled to have a clear fourth of his share, although the legatees would be getting less in the whole than three-fourths of the inheritance. The reason was probably this : — Under the old civil law, if one heir refused to enter, his share accrued to the co-heir who did enter free of all burdens {sine onere). Unless, therefore, the heir whose share was burdened had been induced by the right of retaining the Falcidian fourth to enter, he would have refused to enter, and his share would have accrued si?ie onere to the co-heir, and the legatees would have got nothing. Under the lecjes caducaricB the accrual took place cum onere ; but even then, although, if the free share accrued to the owner of the burdened share, the two were taken as one for the benefit of the legatees, and the heir who took both could take nothing more than a fourth of the two conjoined, if the legacies were sufficient to exhaust the remainder, yet, if the burdened share accrued to the owner of the free share, he kept LIB. II, TIT. XXII. 245 lis free share unimpaired, and was allowed to keep a clear fourth )f the burdened share. (D. xxxv. 2. 78.) 2. Qiiantitas aiitem patrimonii ad [iiam ratio legis Falciclise redigitur iiortis tempore spectatur. Itaque si, ^erbi gratia, is qui centum aureorum )atrimonium in bonis habebat, cen- um aureos legaverit, nihil legatariis )rodest, si ante aditam hereditatem )er servos liereditarios aut ex partu -ncillarum liereditariarum aut ex a3tu pecorum tantum accesserit lereditati, ut centum aureis legato- um nomine erogatis lieres quartam )artem hereditatis habiturus sit ; sed lecesse est ut nihilominus quarta )ars legatis detrahatur. Ex diverso, i septuaginta quinque legaverit, et .nte aditam hereditatem in tantum lecreverint bona incendiis forte, aut laufragiis aut morte servorum, ut ion amplius quam septuaginta quin- [ue aureorum substantia vel etiam ninus relinquatur, solida legata lebentur. Nee ea res damnosa est leredi, cui liberum est non adire lereditatem : quae res efficit ut sit lecesse legatariis, ne destitute tes- amento nihil consequantur, cum lerede in portionem pacisci. 2. In order to apply the lex Fal cidla, regard is had to the value of the estate at the time of the testa- tor's death. Thus, for instance, if he, who is worth a hundred aurei at his decease, bequeaths the whole hun- dred in legacies, the legatees receive no advantage, if the inheritance, before it is entered upon, should so increase by the acquisition of slaves, the birth of children to female slaves, or the produce of cattle, that, after a full payment of the one hundred aurei in legacies, a clear fourth of the whole estate would remain to the heir, for the legacies notwithstanding would still be liable to a deduction of one- fourth. On the contrary, if the testa- tor has given only seventy-five aurei in legacies, then although, before the entrance of the heir, the estate should so decrease by fire, shipwreck, or the loss of slaves, that its whole value should not be more than seventy-five aurei or less, yet the legacies would still be due without deduction. 'Nor is this prejudicial to the heir, who is at liberty to refuse the inheritance, but it obliges the legatees to come to terms with the heir, so as to get a part, lest, if the testament were aban- doned, they should lose the whole. The calculation under the lex Falcidia was made at the time Df the testator's death, in accordance with the rule by which the dies cedit for most legacies was fixed at that time. It was, more- over, made then, even if the dies cedit was fixed at some other time. Between the death of the testator and the time of the heir entering on the inheritance, the estate might be so deteriorated as to make it disadvantageous to the heir to enter ; and in order to persuade him to do so, the legatees would have to enter into a compromise with him. 3. Cum autem ratio legis Falcidiae ponitur, ante deducitur ?es alienum, item funeris impensa et pretia ser- vorum manumissorum : tunc deinde in reliquo ita ratio habetur, ut ex eo quarta pars apud heredes remaneat, tres vero partes inter legataries dis- tribuantur, pro rata scilicet portione ejus quod cuique eorum legatum fuerit. Itaque si fingamus quadrin- 3. When the calculation of the lex Falcidia is made, the testator's debts, his funeral expenses, and the price of the manumission of slaves, are deducted, then what remains is di- vided, so that a fourth part remains for the heir, and the other three parts are divided among the legatees in proportion to the amount of their respective legacies ; for example, let 246 LIB. 11. TIT. XXIII. gentos aureos legates esse, et patri- us suppose that four hundred aiirei iQonii quantitatem ex qua legata have been given in legacies, and the erogari oportet quadringentorum estate out of which the legacies are esse, quarta pars legatariis singulis to be paid is worth no more, each debet detrahi ; quod si trecentos legatee must have a fourth part sub- quinquaginta legatos fingamus, oc- tracted from his legacy ; but, if we tava debet detrahi. Quod si quin- su^Dpose that the testator gave in le- gentos legaverit, initio quinta deinde gacies three hundred and fifty anrei, quarta detrahi debet : ante enim then an eighth ought to be deducted, detrahendum est quod extra bono- And if he gave five hundred aurei in rum quantitatem est, deinde quod legacies, first a fifth must be deducted, ex bonis apud heredem remanere and then a fourth. For that which oportet. exceeds the real value of the goods of the deceased must first be deducted, and then that which is to remain to the heir. D. XXXV. 2. 1. 19 ; D. xxxv. 2. 39 ; D. xxxv. 2. 73. 5. Octava debet detrahi, i.e. one-eighth of the whole, or fifty aurei, must be deducted from the whole sum given to the diiFerent legatees, the sum to be deducted from each share being in pro- portion to the relative amount of that share. Each share would be diminished by one-seventh. The lex Falcidia did not apply to military testaments. (D. xxxv. 2. 17.) By a Novel (1. 2. 2) Justinian provided that the Falcidian fourth should never be retained by the heir if the testator ex- pressly forbad its retention. If the heir renounced the inheri- tance, the legatees and other persons who were designed by the testator to take under the testament might, on giving security for carrying out all the dispositions of the testament, receive the inheritance. Even if the testator had not forbidden the retention of the fourth, it could not be retained unless the heir made an inventory of the property of the deceased. If he accepted the inheritance without making an inventory, he had to pay the legatees in full, even if he was obliged to draw upon his private funds to do so. Tit. XXIII. DE FIDEICOMMISSAEIIS HEKEDITATIBUS. Nunc transeamus ad fideicom- Let us now pass to Jideicommissa ; missa. Et prius est ut de heredita- and first we will treat of fideicommis- tibus fideicommissariis videamus. sary inheritances. Gai. ii. 246, 247. Fideicommissa, that is^ trusts, might be compared to the insti- tution of heirs, if the trust embraced the whole inheritance, and to the gift of legacies^, if it embraced only a part. In the former case they were termed hyihe^wYi^t^^fideicommissaricB liereditates\ in the \2itiQY, Jideicommissa singidcR rei. The text proceeds to speak of i\\Q JideicommissaricB hereditates. The Yfoxdi Jideicommissum has been generally retained in the translation, instead of trusts, because, as Jideicommissa include ! - LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. 247 only trusts carrying out tlie last wishes of a deceased person, the word trusts, which is used much more widely in its application, might lead to confusion. Ulpian gives {Reg, 25, 1) the following definition of ajidei- commissum : ' Quod non civilibus verbis, sed precative relinqidtur ; nee ex rigore juris civilis prqficiscitur, sed ex voluntate datur relin- quentisJ' 1. Sciendum itaque et omnia fideicommissa primis temporibus in- iirma esse, quia nemo invitus coge- batur jDrsestare id de quo rogatus erat. Quibus enim non poterant hereditatem vel legata relinquere, si relinquebant, fidei committebant eorum qui capere ex testamento poterant ; et ideo fideicommissa appellata sunt, quia nuUo vinculo juris, sed tantum pudore eorum qui rogabantur, continebantur. Postea divus Augustus semel iterumque gratia personarum motus, vel quia per ipsius salutem rogatus quis di- ceretur, aut ob insignem quorum- dam perfidiam jussit consulibus auctoritatem suam interponere. Quod quia justum videbatur, et populare erat, paulatim conversum est in assiduam jurisdictionem ; tan- tusque eorum favor factus est,, ut paulatim etiam prsetor proprius crea- retur, qui de fideicommissis jus di- ceret, quem fideicommissarium ap- I)ellabant. 1. At first fideicommissa were of little force ; for no one could be com- pelled against his will to perform what he was only requested to per- form. When testators were desirous of giving an inheritance or legacy to persons, to whom they could not di- rectly give either, they then entrusted them to the good faith of some per- son capable of taking by testament ; and fideicommissa were so called, be- cause their performance could not be enforced by law, but depended solely upon the good faith of the person to whom they were entrusted. Afterwards, the Emperor Augustus, having been frequently moved by consideration for certain persons, or because the request was said to have been made in the name of the empe- ror's safety, or on account of some striking instance of perfidy, com- manded the consuls to interpose their authority. Their intervention being favoured as just by public opinion, gradually assumed the character of a regular jurisdiction, and trusts grew into such favour, that soon a special pra3tor was appointed to give judgment in these cases, and received the name of fideicommissarius. Gai. ii. 274, 275. 278. 285 ; D. i. 2. 2. 32. The freedom given by the introduction of obligatory trusts was singularly wide. A testator, in order to give anything, was obliged to do so by a regular testament, to adopt prescribed for- mulae, to use the Latin tongue. He could not give anything to a peregrinus, to a person proscribed, to a posthumous stranger, or to an uncertain person. The system oi fideicommissa enabled him to give to almost any one he liked, and that in words the least formal, and even without a testament at all. The lieredes ah in- testato, if charged with a fideicommissum by the person to whose property they succeeded, were obliged to fulfil it. A man might give his whole inheritance by 2^ fideicommissum to a woman whom he was prevented by the lex Voconia from instituting as heir (Gai. ii. 274) ; and Latini Juniani (see Bk. i. Tit. 5. 2) could t^^Q fideicommissa, though not inheritances or legacies. (Gai. ii. 275.) The licence given to fideicommissa was, indeed, diminished 248 LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. by different enactments, and tliey were gradually placed more and more on the footing of legacies. Thus by one senatns- consultum, passed in the time of Hadrian, the power of giving a fideicommissum to a ijeregrinus (Gai. ii. 285), by another, the power of giving one to a posthumous stranger or uncertain person, was taken away. (Gai. ii. 287.) Again, the senatus-consultiim Pegasianum subjected fideicommissa to the rules of the lex Papia PoppcBa (Gai. ii. 286) ; and a testamentary tutor could never be ap- pointed by 2i fideicommissum, (Gai. ii. 289.) Fideicommissa v/eve, indeed, always something beside and foreign to the nature of Roman law. Augustus merely ordered that, in a case of great hardship, the consuls should interfere. Then a magistrate was created whose business it was to interfere in cases which warranted it; but there was nothing like an action at law to enforce fideicom- missa. The fideicommissarius applied for aid as having equity on his side ; and if the magistrate chose to interfere, the regular course of the law was stayed, and the trust enforced. (Ulp. Peg. 25. 12.) The proceeding was always extra ordinem (Gai. ii. 258), and the jurisdiction was exercised throughout the year, while legacies could only be claimed on days cum res aguntur, of which, under Marcus Aurelius, there were 230 in the year. (Gai. ii. 279. Demangeat, i. 790.) The fideicommissum itself did not, like a legacy, directly trans- fer the property in an inheritance or in any particular thing, and of course did not give any right to a real action. The restitution or giving up of the inheritance was, hoAvever, effected by the mere consent of the heir, even before tradition. 2, In primis igitur sciendum est, 2. We must first observe, that some opus esse ut aliquis recto jure tes- one must be duly appointed heir in tamento heres instituatur, ejusque the testament ; and then it must be fidei committatur ut earn heredita- entrusted to his good faith to restore tern alii restituat ; alioquin inutile the inheritance to some other person ; est testamentum, in quo nemo heres for the testament is ineffectual in instituitur. Cum igitur aliquis scrip- which no one is instituted heir. And, serit Lucius Titius heres esto, po- therefore, when a testator has said, terit adjicere, rogo te, Luci Titi, ut Let Lucius Titius be my heir, he may cum primum poteris hereditatem add, and I request you, Lucius Titius, meam adire, eam Caio Seio reddas that, so soon as you can enter upon restituas. Potest autem quisque et my inheritance, you will restore it and de parte restituenda heredem rogare, give it up to Caius Seius. A testator et liberum est vel j)ure vel sub con- may also request his heir to restore a ditione relinquere fideicommissum, part of the inheritance only, and may vel ex die certo. leave the Jideicommissum absolutely or conditionally, or on the expiration of a term. Gai. ii. 248. 250. Of course if there was no heir instituted, there could be no person to charge by testament with the trust (iiemofiduciarius) ; but the testator might charge the heredes ah intestato. The person who made \he fideicommissum was termed fidei- committens\ the person requested to perform it, fiduciarius ; and the person to be benefited by it, fideicommissarius. LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. 249 3. Restituta autem liereditate, is qnideni qui restituit, nihilominus lieres permanet ; is vero qui recipit hereditatem, aliquando heredis, ali- quando legatarii loco, habebatur. Gai. 11 3. After an heir lias restored the inheritance, he still continues heir. But he, who receives the inheritance, was sometimes considered in the light of an heir, and sometimes in that of a legatee. 251.. In order to protect himself, the heir who remained liable to all actions of creditors against the inheritance had recourse to a jfiction of law. He sold the inheritance to i\\Q Jideicominissarius, and they entered into mutual agreements called emptcB et venditcB liereditatis stipulationes (Gai. ii. 252), by which the Jiduciarius, though remaining in the eye of the law responsible for the charges upon the inheritance, was protected from ultimate harm by having a remedy against the fideicommissarius, who in his turn bargained that the Jlduciariys Avould hand everything over. Thus Gains says of the^ fideicommissarius, ' Olim nee heredis loco erat, nee legatarii ; sed potius emptoris.^ 4. Et Neronis quidem tempori- bus, Trebellio Maximo et Annceo Se- neca consulibus, senatus-consultum factum est : quo cautum est, ut si hereditas ex fideicommissi causa re- stituta sit, omnes actiones qu^ jure civili heredi et in heredem compe- terent, ei et in eum darentur cui ex fideicommisso restituta est hereditas. Post quod senatus-consultum praetor utiles actiones ei et in eum qui recipit hereditatem, quasi heredi et in here- dem dare cospit. 4. During the reign of Nero, in the consulship of Trebellius Maximus and Annseus Seneca, a senatus-consultum was passed, providing that, after an in- heritance had been restored under a Jideicommissifin, all actions, which by the civil law might be brought by or against the heir, should be permitted for and against him, to whom the in- heritance was restored. After this, the praetor began to give equitable ac- tions for and against the person who received an inheritance, as if he were the heir. Gat. ii. 253. The senatus-eonsultum Trehellianum (A.D. 62) did away with the necessity of any such fiction as that of a sale. The Jideicom- missarius stepj)ed at once into the place of the heres institutas. All the actions belonging to the inheritance were given him in the shape of aetiones utiles, (See Introd. sec. 106.) If creditors sued the heres institutus, he had the exeeptio restitutes liereditatis ; he might plead that he had parted with the inheritance as he had been directed. 5. Sed quia heredes scripti, cum aut totam hereditatem aut pene totam plerumque restituere roga- bantur, adire hereditatem ob nul- lum vel minimum lucrum recusa- bant, atque ob id extinguebantur fideicommissa, postea Vespasiani Augusti temporibus, Pegaso et Pusione consulibus, senatus censuit ut ei qui rogatus esset hereditatem restituere, perinde liceret quartam 5. But the instituted heirs, being in most cases requested to restore the whole, or almost the whole of an in- heritance, often refused to accept it, as they would receive little or no advan- tage, and thus fideicommissa were fre- quently extinguished. Afterwards, during the reign of the Emperor Ves- pasian, in the consulship of Pegasus and Pusio, the senate decreed, that an heir, who was requested to restore an 250 LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. partem retlnere, atque lege Falcidia inheritance, might retain a fourth, just ex legatis retinere conceditur. Ex as in the case of legacies he might by singulis quoq ue rebus quse per fidei- the Falcidian law. And the same de- commissum relinquuntur, eadem duction is allowed in particular things, retentio permissa est. Post quod which are left by a Jideicommissum. senatus-consultum ipse heres onera For some time after this senatns-con- hereditaria sustinebat ; ille autem sultum the heir alone bore the charges qui ex hdeicommisso recepit partem of the inheritance ; and he who had hereditatis, legatarii partiarii loco received a share or part of an inheri- erat, id est, ejus legatarii cui pars tance, under a Jideicommissum, was re- bonorum legabatur : quae species garded as a part legatee, that is, a legati partitio vocabatur, quia cum legatee having a legacy of a share of herede legatarius partiebatur here- the property, a species of legacy which ditatem. Unde qua3 solebant sti- was called partition, because the lega- pulationes inter heredeni et partia- tee took a part of the inheritance to- rium legatarium interponi, e^edem gether with the heir. Thus the same interponebantur inter eum qui ex stipulations which were formerly in use fideicommisso recepit hereditatem, between the heir and partiary legatee, et heredem, id est, ut et lucrum et were likewise made between the person damnum hereditarium pro rata parte who received the inheritance under the inter eos commune esset. Jideicommissum and the heir, that is, they stipulated they would share the benefits and the charges of the inheri- tance between them, in proportion to their respective interests. The senatus-consultum Trehellianum protected the Jiduciarius from any harm ; but it gave him no incitement to enter on the inheritance. Why should he take an inheritance which he had instantly to transfer to another ? The trust might thus perish ; and, to remedy this, the senatus-consultum Pegasianiun (a.d. 73) permitted the lieres Institutus to retain a fourth, just as the lex Falcidia permitted in the case of legacies. Even the term quarta Falcidia, was applied to the fourth retained by the Jiduciarius heres. (D. xxxvi. 1. 16. 9.) T.\\q fideicommis sarins thus became exactly like a legatee. As having a definite part of the inheritance, he was considered in the light of a legatee of a part of the inheritance, and, as the text says (sec. 3), the Jidei- commissarius was, under the senatus-consultum Trehellianum, placed in the position of an heir, and under the senatus-consultum Pegasianum in that of a legatee. A testator sometimes gave a legatee not a particular thing, but a certain share in his whole property. The legatee (then termed legatarius partiarius) took, in this case, per universitatem; but he was not thereby made an heir, not having been formally instituted ; and if there w^as no heir who entered on the inheri- tance, the legacy was extinguished. The claims of creditors against the inheritance were made exclusively against the heir, and the heir alone could recover sums due to the inheritance. Thus it was necessary that, if the heir paid a creditor, the legatee . should account to him for a part of the payment proportionate to his share of the inheritance ; while if the legatee wished that his share should be increased by the payment of a debt due to the LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. 251 inheritance, lie could only effect this through the heir. Accord- ingly they made stipulations with each other, termed stipulatioiies jmrtis et pro parte. By one of these stipulations the heir bound the legatee to pay a proportion of sums expended in satisfaction of claims against the inheritance ; by the other the legatee bound the heir to account to him for his share of sums received in satisfaction of debts owing to the inheritance. The Jideicommissarius was on the footing of such a legatee under the seiiatus'consultum Pegasianum, and the stipulationes partis et pro parte were made between the heir and ih.Q Jideicommissarius. 6. Ergo si qiiidem non pins quam dodrantem liereditatis scriptiis heres rogatus sit restituere, tunc ex Trebel- liano senatus-consiilto restituebatur liereditas, et in iitrumqiie actiones hereditaripe pro rata parte dabantur, in lieredem qiiidem j are civili, in eum vero qui recipiebat hereditatem ex senatus-consulto Trebelliano, tam- quam in lieredem. At si plus quam dodrantem vel etiam totam heredi- tatem restituere rogatus sit, locus erat Pegasiano senatus-consulto, et lieres qui semel adierit heredita- tem, si modo sua voluntate adierit, sive retinuerit quartam partem sive retinere noluerit, ipse universa onera hereditaria sustinebat : sed quarta quidem retenta, quasi partis et pro parte stipulationes interponebantur, tamquam inter partiariumlegatarium et heredem ; si vero totam heredita- tem restitueret, empt£e et venditse hereditatis stipulationes interpone- bantur. Sed si recuset scriptus heres adire hereditatem, ob id quod dicat earn sibi suspectam esse quasi dam- nosam, cavetur Pegasiano senatus- consulto ut, desiderante eo cui re- stituere rogatus est, jussu praitoris adeat et restituat hereditatem, per- indeque ei et in eum qui recipit hereditatem actiones darentur ac juris est ex Trebelliano senatus- consulto. Quo casu nullis stipula- tionibus est opus ; quia simul et huic qui restituit securitas datur, et ac- tiones hereditariae ei et in eum trans- feruntur qui recepit hereditatem, utroque senatus-consulto in hac spe- cie concurrente. 6. Therefore, if the instituted heir was not requested to restore more than three-fourths of the inheritance, he re- stored such part in accordance with the provisions of the senatus-consuUum Trehelliaiium ; and all actions which concern an inheritance, might be brought against each according to their respective shares — against the heir, by the civil law, and against him who re- ceived the inheritance, by the senatus- consuUum Trehellianum^ as against an heir. But if the instituted heir was requested by the testator to restore the whole inheritance, or more than three - fourths, then the senatus-consultwm Ferjasianmn became applicable ; and the heir who had once entered on the inheritance, provided he did so vo- luntarily, was obliged to sustain all the charges of the inheritance, whether he had retained or had declined to retain his fourth. But, when the heir did retain a fourth part, the stij)ula- tions termed pcvrtis et pro parte, were entered into, as between a legatee of part and an heir ; and, when the heir did not retain a fourth, then the stipu- lations termed empts& et venditse, here- ditatis, were made between them. But if the instituted heir refused to enter on the inheritance, alleging that he feared he should lose by doing so, it was provided, by the senatus-consul- tum Fegasianiim, that, on the demand of him to whom he had been requested to restore the inheritance, he should, under an order of the prsetor, enter on the inheritance, and restore it ; and that all actions might be brought by or against him who received the inhe- ritance, as in a case falling under the senatus-consultuTYh Trehellianum. And in this case stipulations are not neces- sary, for the heir, who restores the inheritance, is secured, and all actions concerning an inheritance are trans- 252 LIB. I.I. TIT. XXIII. ferred to and against liim, by whom it is received, there being, in this in- stance, a concurrent a^Dplication of both aenatus-consulta. Gai. ii. 255-258. The senatus-consultum Trehellianum was not abrogated by the Pegasianum. They applied to different cases. If the fourth was expressly reserved to the Iteres Jiduciarius, he took the other three parts, and immediately restored or transferred them to the Jideicommis sarins, who had the position of heres fideicommissarius, and all the actions belonging to the inheritance, so far as his share extended. But if the fourth was not reserved, the senatus- consultum Pegasianum became applicable. Thejiduciarius heres retained the fourth, and ihejideicommissarius held the position of a legatee. The heres institutus might, however, not choose to retain the fourth. He might enter on the inheritance, and at once voluntarily transfer the whole to the fideicommissarius. The jurists were divided in opinion as to the senatus-consultum under which he then entered. Gains thinks it was under the Pegasi- anum. (GrAi. ii. 256. 7.) If he refused to enter on the inheri- tance, the praetor compelled him, by a power given in the senatus- consultum Pegasianum, and he was placed exactly in the same position as if he had entered under the senatus-consultum Tre- hellianum. He had no fourth reserved for him ; and all action passed at once to the fideicommissarius. 7. Sed quia stipulationes ex se- natus-consulto Pegasiano descenden- tes et ipsi antiquitati displicuerunt ; et quibusdam casibus captiosas eas homo excelsi ingenii Papinianus appellat, et nobis in legibus magis simplicitas quam difficultas i^lacet, ideo omnibus nobis suggestis tarn similitudinibus quam differentiis utriusque senatus-consulti, placuit, exploso senatus-consulto Pegasia- no quod postea supervenit, omnem auctoritatem Trebelliano senatus- consulto prcestare, ut ex eo fidei- commissarise hereditates restituan- tur, sive habeat heres ex voluntate testatoris quartam, sive plus sive minus sive nihil penitus : ut tunc, quando vel nihil vel minus quarta apud eum remanet, liceat ei vel quartam vel quod deest ex nostra auctoritate retinere vel repetere so- lutum, quasi ex Trebelliano senatus- consulto pro rata portione actionibus tam in heredem quam in fideicom- missarium competentibus. Si vero totam hereditatem sponte restitue- rit, omnes hereditarise actiones fidei- 7. But, as the stipulations, which arose from the senatus-consultum Pega- sianum, were displeasing even to the ancients, and Papinian, a man of great genius, considers them in some cases as cai)tious ; and, as we prefer simplicity to complicity in matters of law, we have been pleased, upon comparing the points of agTeement and disagree- ment in these two senatus-consulta, to abrogate the senatus-consultum Pegasia- num, which was subsequent to the senatus-consultum, Trehellianum, and to give an exclusive authority to the se- natus-consultum Trehellianum, by which all Meicommissary inheritances shall be restored for the future, whether the testator has given by his will a fourth part of his estate to the insti- tuted heir, or more, or less, or even nothing, so that, when nothing is given to the heir, or less than a fourth part, he may be permitted to retain a fourth, or as much as will make up the defi- ciency, by virtue of our authority, or to demand repayment of it if he has paid it over ; and actions may be brought both against the heir and the LIB. II. TIT, XXIII. 253 commissario et adversus eum com- petuiit. Sed etiam id quod prfeci- pimm Pegasiani senatus- consult! fuerat, ut quando recusabat lieres scriptus sibi datam hereditatem adire, necessitas ei imponeretur to- tam hereditatem volenti fideicom- missario restituere, et omnes ad eum et contra eum transire actiones, et hoc transponimus ad senatus- consultum Trebellianum : ut ex hoc solo et necessitas heredi imponatur, si ipso nolente adire fideicommissa- rius desiderat restitui sibi heredita- tem, nullo nee damno nee commodo apud heredem remanente. fideicommissarius according to their re- spective shares, as if under the senatus- consuUum Trebellianum. But, should the heir voluntarily restore the whole inheritance, all actions concerning an inheritance may be brought either by or against the jideicommissarius. And, as to the most important provision of the senatus - consultum Pegasiauum, that, when an instituted heir refused to accept an inheritance, he might be constrained to restore it to the Jidei- commissarius if he demanded it, and to transfer all actions to and against him, we have transferred this provision to the senatus-consultum Trebellianum, by which alone this obligation is now laid upon the heir, when he himself re- fuses to enter on the inheritance, and the fideicommissarius is desirous that it should be restored, the heir in this case receiving neither gain nor loss. Justinian unites tlie two senatus-consulta into one, giving them the name of the senatus-consultinn Trehellianum. The heir is to retain a fourth, as under the senatus-consultum Pegasianum, but actions are to be brought for or against the heir and \hQ Jideicom- missarius in proportion to their ^\\2iVQ^,ih.Q Jideicommissarius being thus in loco heredis as to his share, asunder i\\Q senatus-consultuDt Trehellianum, If the heir would not enter, then he was compelled to do so, but was protected against all loss, as under the senatus- consultum Pegasianum, Before the legislation of Justinian, the heres could not re- demand the fourth, if he had once paid it over. (Paul. Sent, iv. 3. 4.) 8. But it makes no dijQTerence whether the heir is instituted to the whole inheritance, and is requested to restore the whole or a part, or whether being instituted to a part only, he is requested to restore that entire part, or a portion of it, for we enjoin that the same rules be observed in the latter case, as in case of restitution of the whole. 8. ]N"ihil autem interest, utrum aliquis ex asse heres institutus aut totam hereditatem aut pro parte re- stituere, an ex parte heres institutus aut totam eam partem aut partem partis restituere rogatus sit ; nam et hoc casu eadem observari prsecipi- mus, qu{3e in totius hereditatis resti- tutione diximus. Gai. ii. 259. 9. Si quis una aliqua re deducta sive pra3cepta quse quartam continet, veluti fundo vel alia re, rogatus sit restituere hereditatem, simili modo ex Trebelliano senatus-consulto re- stitutio fiat, perinde ac si quarta parte retenta rogatus esset reliquam hereditatem restituere. Sed illud interest, quod altero casu, id est, cum deducta sive proecepta aliqua re restituitur hereditas, in solidum ex eo senatus-consulto actiones transfe- 9. If an heir is requested by a testator to give up an inheritance, after deducting or excepting some particular thing, equivalent to a fourth of the whole, as a piece of land, or anything else, he will give it up under the senatus-consultum Trebellianum, exactly as if he had been requested to restore the remainder of an inheri- tance, after reserving a fourth. But there is this difference, that, in the first case, when an heir is requested 254 LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. to give up an inheritance, after de- ducting or excepting a particular thing, then, according to that senatus- consultum, all actions are transferred to and against the fideicommissarius, and what remains to the heir is free from all incumbrance, as if acquired by legacy. In the second case, when an heir is requested in general terms to give up an inheritance after re- taining a fourth to himself, all actions are proportionably divided ; those which regard the three-fourths of the estate being transferred to the fidei- commissarius, and those which regard the one -fourth to the heir. And, even if an heir is requested to give up an inheritance, after making a deduction or exception of some par- ticular thing, which comprises the greatest part of the whole inheritance, all actions are still transferred to the fideicommissarius, who ought always, therefore, to consider whether it will be expedient or not, that the inherit- ance should be given up to him. All this applies equally, whether an heir is requested to give up an inheri- tance after a deduction or exception of two, or more, particular things, or of a certain simi of money, which may comprise a fourth or even the greatest part of the inheritance. What we have said of an heir, who is instituted to the whole of an inlieritance, applies equally to one who is instituted only to a part. D. xxxvi. 1. 1. 16. 21 ; D. xxxvi. 1. 30. 3. If the testator gave a particular object to the heres institutes which was equal in value to the fourth of the inheritance, the law considered this as a specific legacy given to the heres» The fideicommissarius took the whole inheritance except this part, and all the actions of the whole inheritance were transferred to him. Justinian retains this distinction between a particular object being given, and a general direction to retain a fourth. If a particular object were given not equal in value to a fourth, the heir would retain enough to complete his fourth ; and all actions relating to the part so retained would pass to him, and all others to \\\Q fideicommissarius, (Cod. vi. 50. 11.) runtur, et res qufe remanet apud heredem sine ullo onere heredita- rio apud eum remanet, quasi ex legato ei acquisita ; altero vero casu, id est, cum quarta parte re- tenta rogatus est heres restituere hereditatem et restituit, scinduntur actiones, et pro dodrante quidem transferuntur ad fideicommissarium , pro quadrante remanent apud here- dem. Quin etiam, licet una re aliqua deducta aut prcecepta restituere ali- quis hereditatem rogatus est, qua maxima pars hereditatis contineatiu", {©que in solidum transferuntur ac- tiones, et secum deliberare debet is cui restituitur hereditas, an expe- diat sibi restitui. Eadem scilicet interveniunt, et si duabus pluri- busve deductis praeceptisve rebus restituere hereditatem rogatus sit ; sed et si certa summa deducta prse- ceptave, qure quartam vel etiam maximam partem hereditatis con- tinet, rogatus sit aliquis heredita- tem restituere, idem juris est. Quae autem diximus de eo qui ex asse heres institutus est, eadem transfe- xemus et ad eum qui ex parte heres ficriptus est. ! 10. Prseterea intestatus quoque moriturus potest rogare eum, ad quern bona sua vel legitimo jure vel honorario pertinere intelligit, ut hereditatem suam totam partemve ejus, aut rem aliquam, veluti fun- 10. Moreover, a man about to die intestate, may request the person, to whom his estate will pass, either by the civil or pra3torian law, to give up to a third person the whole inherit- ance, or a part of it, or any particular LIB. II. TIT. XXIII. 255 dum, liominem, pecuniam, alicui thing, as a piece of land, a slave, or a restituat ; cnm alioqnin legata nisi sum of money. Legacies, on the con- ex testamento non valeant. trary, are only valid when given by testament. Gai. ii. 270 ; D. xxxi. 36. Antoninus Pius extended the provisions of the senatu^-con- sulta Trebellianum and Pegasianum to trusts imposed on heredes ah intestato. (D. xxxv. 2. 18.) 11. Eum quoque cui aliquid re- 11. A Jideicoynmissarius may also stitiiitur, potest rogare ut id rursiim himself be requested to give up to alii, aut totum aut pro parte, vel another either the whole or a part of etiam aliquid aliud restituat. what he receives, or even anything else. Gai. ii. 271. l^h.Q Jidcicommissarius , who was thus only a vehicle to pass on the inheritance to another fideicommissarius, could not retain a fourth for himself. The object of the lex Falcidia was merely to secure an heir, not in all cases to give a fourth to the person who virtually had the inheritance ; but when the heir entered on the inheritance by order of the praetor, then the fideicommissarius stood in the place of the heir, so far as to be able to apply the lex Falcidia, as if representing the heir, against legatees, but not against a second Jideiconunissarius. (D. xxxvi. 1. 63. 4.) 12. Et quia prima fideicommis- sorum cunabula a fide heredum pendent, et tam nomen quam sub- stantiam acceperunt, et ideo divus Augustus ad necessitatem juris ea detraxit, nuper et nos eumdem prin- cipem superare contendentes, ex facto quod Tribonianus, vir excel- sus, qusestor sacri palatii suggessit, constitutionem fecimus per quam disposuimus : si testator fidei heredis sui commisit ut vel hereditatem vel speciale fideicommissum restituat, et neque ex scriptura neque ex quin- que testium numero qui in fideicom- missis legitimus esse noscitur, possit res manifestari, sed vel pauciores quam quinque, vel nemo penitus testis intervenerit, tunc sive pater heredis sive alius quicumque sit qui fidem heredis elegerit, et ab eo resti- tui aliquid voluerit, si heres i)erfidia tentus adimplere fidem recusat ne- gando rem ita esse subsecutam, si fideicommissarius jusjnrandum ei de- tulerit, cum prius ipse de calumnia juraverit, necesse eum habere vel jusjurandum subire quod nihil tale a testatore audivit, vel recusantem ad fideicommissi vel universitatis vel specialis solutionem coarctari, ne 12. Originally all fiduciary gifts depended only upon the good faith of the heir : whence they took their name as well as their character. To remedy this, the Emperor Augustus made them obUgatory in law, and we have lately endeavoured to surpass that prince ; and, on the occasion of a case brought to our notice by the most eminent Tri- bonian, the qusestor of our sacred pa- lace, we have enacted by a constitu- tion, that if a testator has entrusted to the faith of his heir the restoration of an inheritance, or any particular thing, and the fact cannot be proved either by any writing or by five wit- nesses (the legal number in such cases), there having been fewer, or perhaps no witnesses present, then, whether it is his father who has thus trusted to the good faith of the heir, and begged him to restore the inheritance, or whether it is any one else, if the heir perfidiously refuse to make the resti- tution, and deny the whole transac- tion, the Jldeicommissarius, having pre- viously himself sworn to his own good faith, may put the heir to his oath ; and thus force him either to deny having received any such trust upon oath, or to fulfil it, whether it relate to 256 LIB. II. TIT. XXIV. pereat ultima voluntas testatoris tidei heredis commissa. Eadem ob- servari censuimus, et si a legatario vel fideiconimissario aliquid similiter relictum sit. Quod si is a quo relic- turn dicitur, confiteatur quidem a se aliquid relictum esse, sed ad legis subtilitatem decurrat, omnimodo solvere cogendus est. tlie whole inheritance or to some par- ticular thing ; and this is allowed, lest the last wishes of a testator, committed to the faith of an heir, should be de- feated. The same process may be adopted against a legatee, or ajideicom- missarius charged with a restitution. And if any one so charged admits the trust, but endeavours to shelter him- self in the subtleties of the law, he may be compelled to perform his duty. C. vi. 42. 32. De calumnia juraverit, that Is, he must swear beforehand that he is acting honajide, and not inventing a ground of litigation. Tit. XXIY. DE SINGULIS REBUS PER FIDEI- COMMISSUM RELICTIS. Potest autem quis etiam singulas res per fideicommissum relinquere, veluti fundum, hominem, vestem, aurum, argentum, pecuniam nume- ratam ; et vel ipsum heredem rogare ut alicui restituat, vel legatarium, quamvis a legatario legari non possit. Gai. ii. 260. 271. A person may also leave particu- lar things by a Jideicommissum, as a piece of land, a slave, a garment, gold, silver, pieces of money ; and he may request either his heir to restore them, or a legatee, although a legatee cannot be charged with a legacy. 1. Potest autem non solum pro- prias res testator per fideicommis- sum relinquere, sed heredis aut legatarii aut fideicommissarii aut cujuslibet alterius. Itaque et le- gatarius et fideicommissarius non solum de ea re rogari potest, ut earn alicui restituat quae ei relicta sit, sed etiam de alia, sive ipsius sive aliena sit : hoc solum obser- vandum est, ne plus quisquam roge- tur alicui restituere, quam ipse ex testament© ceperit ; nam quod am- plius est, inutiliter relinquitur. Cum autem aliena res per fideicommissum relinquitur, necesse est ei qui roga- tus est, aut ipsam redimere et prse- stare aut aestimationem ejus solvere. 1. A testator may leave by Jidei- commiiissumj not only his own property, but also that of his heir, of a legatee, of a fideicommissariiis, or of any other person ; so that a legatee or Jideicom- tnissarius may not only be requested to give what has been left to him, but what is his own, or even what is the pro- perty of another. The only rule to be ob- served is, that no one shall be requested to restore more than he has received under the testament : for as to the excess the disposition is inefiectual. And , when the j^roperty of another is left by a fideicommissum, the person requested to restore it is obliged either to obtain from the proprietor and deli- ver the thing itself, or to pay its esti- mated value. Gai. ii. 261, 262. Ulpian {Reg. 25. 5) expresses the power of disposal hy Jidei- commissum, by saying that everything could be disposed of in that way, that could be given by a legacy per damnationem. Quod amplius est, inutiliter relinquitur. If, however, the thino- which the fideicommissarius was to give belonged to him- self, he was obliged to give it, whatever might be its value. LIB. II. TIT. XXIV. 257 if he accepted what was given to him by the fideicommissum, as he was considered to have had an opportunity of exercising his judgment, and not to have valued his own thing more highly than that which he received. (D. xl. 5. 24. 12.) 2. Libertas quoque servo per £deicommissum dari potest, ut heres eum rogetiir manumittere, vel lega- tarius vel fideicommissarius : nee interest iitrum de suo proprio servo testator roget, an de eo qui ipsius heredis aut legatarii vel etiam ex- tranei sit : itaque et alieniis servus redimi et manumitti debet. Quod si dominus eum non vendat, si modo nihil ex judicio ejus qui reliquit libertatem, recepit, non statim ex- tinguitur fideicommissaria libertas sed differtur ; quia possit tempore procedente, ubicumque occasio servi redimendi fuerit, prsestari libertas. Qui autem ex fideicommissi causa manumittitur, non testatoris fit li- bertus, etiamsi testatoris servus sit, sed ejus qui manumittit ; at is qui directo testamento liber esse jube- tur, ipsius testatoris libertus fit, qui etiam Orcinus appellatur. Nee alius ullus directo ex testamento liberta- tem habere potest, quam qui utroque tempore testatoris fuerit, et quo faceret testamentum et quo more- retur : directo autem libertas tunc dari videtur, cum non ab alio ser- vum manumitti rogat, sed velut ex suo testamento libertatem ei compe- tere vult. Gal ii. 263- 2. Freedom may also be conferred upon a slave by a Jideicommissum : for an heir, legatee, or Jideicom'tnissarius may be requested to enfranchise him ; nor does it signify whether it is of his own slave that the testator requests the manumission, or of the slave of his heir, or of a legatee, or of a stranger ; and therefore, when a slave is not the testator's own property, he must be bought, and enfranchised. But, if the proprietor of the slave refuses to sell him, as he may, if he has taken no- thing under the testament, yet the free- dom given by the jideicommissum is not extinguished, but deferred only until it may be possible in the course of time, on any occasion offering of purchasing the slave, to efiect his en- franchisement. The slave who is en- franchised in pursuance of a Jideicom- missum, does not become the freedman of the testator, although he was the testator's own slave, but he becomes the freedman of that person who enfranchises him. But a slave who receives his liberty directly from the testament, becomes the freedman of the testator, and is said to be Orcinus ; and no one can obtain liberty directly by testament, unless he were the slave of the testator, both at the time of the testator's making his testament, and also at that of his death. Liberty is given directly, when a testator does not request that freedom be given to his slave by another, but gives it him- self by virtue of his own testament. 267 ; C. vii. 4. 6. It was the opinion of Gains, that if the master of the slave refused to sell the slave for a reasonable price, the fideicommissum perished. (Gai. ii. 265.) Justinian, in accordance with a rescript of the Emperor Alexander (C. vii. 4. 6), decides that it is only delayed. If a testator enfranchised directly a slave that could not be so enfranchised, the gift of liberty would be as valid as Vijidei- commissum. Orcinus, from Orcus ; because he is the freedman of a dead person. 3. Verba autem fideicommisso- 3. The terms generally used in rum hsec maxime in usu habentur : making Jideicommissa are the follow- S 258 LIB. II. TIT. XXV. peto, rogo, volo, mando, fidei tuse ing : I request, I ask, I desire, I committo. Quae perinde singula commit, I entrust to thy good faith ; firma sunt, atque si omnia in unum and each of them is of as much force congesta essent. separately as all of them placed toge- ther. Gai. ii. 249. The expressions by which ^ Jideicommissum was created were* quite immaterial, provided that the wishes of the testator could be ascertained. Tit. XXY. DE CODICILLIS. Codicils were certainly not in use before the reign of Augustus ; for Lucius Lentulus, to whom the origin of Jideico7nmissa may be traced, was the first who introduced codicils. When dying in Africa, he wrote several codicils, which were confirmed by his testament ; and in these he requested Augustus by a fideicom- wissuni to do something for him. The emperor complied with the request, and many other persons, following his example, discharged Jideicommissa committed to them ; and the daughter of Lentulus paid debts, which in strictness of law were not due from her. It is said, that Augustus, having called together upon this occasion per- sons learned in the law, and among others Trebatius, whose opinion was of the greatest authority, asked whether codicils could be admitted, and whether they Avere not repugnant to the prin- ciples of law. Trebatius advised the emperor to admit them, as they were most convenient and necessary to citi- zens, on account of the great and long journeys v/hich they were frequently obliged to take, during which a man who could not make a testament, might be able to make codicils. And subse- quently, Labeo himself having made codicils, no one afterwards doubted their perfect validity. Codicilli were small tablets on which memorandums or letters were written. A testator might naturally address a short letter giving short directions to his heir. When Jideicommissa came to be enforced, these letters or directions w^ere enforced as creating Jideicommissa. As under the Roman law a testator could make no alteration in liis testament without making an entirely new testament, the use of codicils was obviously great. Codicils might be made without there being any testament at all. They Ante Augusti tempora constat codicillorum jus non fuisse, sed primus Lucius Lentulus, ex cujus persona etiam fideicommissa coepe- runt, codicillos introduxit. Nam cum decederet in Africa, scripsit codicillos testamento confirmatos, quibus ab Augusto petiit per fidei- commissum ut faceret aliquid ; et cum divus Augustus voluntatem ejus implesset, deinceps reliqui ejus auctoritatem secuti fideicommissa prsestabant, et filia Lentuli legata quae jure non debebat, solvit. Di- citur autem Augustus convocasse prudentes, inter quos Trebatium quoque cujus tunc auctoritas maxi- ma erat, et qucesisse an posset hoc recipi, nee absonans a juris ratione codicillorum usus 'esset ; et Tre- batium suasisse Augusto, quod diceret utilissimum et necessarium hoc civibus esse propter magnas et longas peregrinationes quae apud veteres fuissent, ubi si quis testa- mentum facere non posset, tamen codicillos posset. Post quae tempora, cum et Labeo codicillos fecisset, jam nemini dubium erat quin codi- cilli jure Optimo admitterentur. LIB. II. TIT. XXV. 259 were then directions addressed to the heredes ah intestato. But if there was a testament, they were always considered as attached to it : if the testamentary dispositions failed, they failed also, and all their provisions were taken with reference to the time when the testament was made. (D. xxix. 7. 2. 2. and 3. 2.) A testator by inserting an express clause to that effect, termed by commentators clausula codicillaris, might provide that his testament, if invalid as a testament, should take effect as a codicil, or, to speak more accurately, as codicils, for the word was generally used in the plural. As to Labeo and Trebatius, see Introd. sec. 20. 1. Not only a person who has already made his testament, may make codicils, but even a person dying in- testate may create Jidelcommissa by codicils. But when codicils are made before a testament, they cannot take effect, according to Papinian, unless confirmed by a special disposition in the testament. But the Emperors Severus and Antoninus have decided by rescript, that a thing, left in trust by codicils, made before a testament, may be demanded by the Jidc'tcomniissarlus, if it appears that the testator has not abandoned the intention which he at first expressed in the codicils. Gai. ii. 270. There was a distinction between codicils confirmed by testa- ment, and those not so confirmed ; for if codicils were confirmed by testament, their provisions could operate to give legacies or appoint a tutor, and not only to create Jideicornmissa. A testator could, by anticipation, confirm in his testament any codicils he mio-ht thereafter make. 1. Non tantum autem testamento facto potest quis codicillos facere, sed intestato quis decedens fidei- committere codicillis potest. Sed cum ante testamentum factum codi- cilli facti erant, Papinianus ait non aliter vires habere, quam si speciali postea voluntate confirmentur ; sed divi Severus et Antoninus rescrip- serunt, ex iis codicillis qui testa- mentum prsecedunt, posse fideicom- missum peti, si appareat eum qui postea testamentum fecit, a volun- tate quam codicillis expresserat, non recessisse. (D. xlix. 7. 8.) 2. Codicillis autem hereditas neque dari neque adimi potest, ne confundatur jus testamentorum et codicillorum ; et ideo nee exhere- datio scribi. Directo autem here- ditas codicillis neque dari neque adimi potest ; nam per fideicom- missum hereditas codicillis jure re- linquitur, Nee conditionem lieredi institute codicillis adjicere neque substituere directo potest. 2. An inheritance can neither be given nor taken away by codicils, as the different effect of testaments and codicils would be thereby confounded, and of course, therefore, no heir can be disinherited by codicils. But it is onlj'' directly that an inheritance can neither be given nor taken away by codicils, for it may be legally disposed of in codicils by means of a Jideicommissuw,. Nor, again, can a condition be imposed on the institution of an heir, nor a direct substitution be made, by codi- cils. Gai. ii. 273 ; D. xxix. 7. 6. 3. Codicillos autem etiam plures quis facere potest, et nullam solem- nitatem ordinationis desiderant. 3. A person may make several codi- cils, and they require no solemnity in their form. D. xxix. 7 s 2 6. 1. 260 LIB. II. TIT. XXV. Codicils were not originally subjected to any rules determin- ing the mode in which they were made. But by a constitution of Theodoslus, added to by Justinian, they were to be made uno contextii, m presence of five witnesses, and the witnesses were to subscribe them. If codicils were not so made, then the fideicom- mUsarius could, after having sworn to his own good faith, call on the heir to deny them on oath. (C. vi. 36. 8.) LIBBE TEETIUS. Tit. L DE HEEEDITATIBUS QU^ AB INTESTATO DEFERUNTUR. Intestatus decedit, qui aut om- A person dies intestate, who either nino testamentum non fecit, aut non has made no testament at all, or has jure fecit ; aut id quod fecerat rup- made one not legally valid ; or if the turn irritumve factum est, aut nemo testament he has made is revoked, or ex eo heres extitit. made useless ; or if no one becomes heir under it. D. xxxviii. 16. ]. If a person died without a testament, the law regulated the succession to the inheritance. So also it did, if he left a testa- ment that was fatally defective in form {iion jure factum), or if his testament was revoked, or, in the language of Roman law, broken {rupturn), or if it was set aside as inofficious, or made useless by a change of status in the testator {irritum), or if no heir would accept the inheritance under it. If there was no testament to determine the succession, the law of the Twelve Tables gave the inheritance first to the sui heredes, who were also necessarii heredes^ that is, could not refuse to accept the inheritance ; then to the agnati ; and then, if the deceased was a member of a gens, to the gentiles. In default of agnati, the praetor called to the inheritance the co^?z«i2, or blood-relations. (See Introd. sec. 45.) Perhaps the succession of gentiles lasted to a time later than that of this praetorian succession of the cognati ; but, at any rate, it did not outlast the Republic, and, therefore, speaking of the times when we are most familiar with Roman law, we may say that the succession was given first to the sui heredes, then to the agnati, then to the cognati. But some complication was introduced into the rules of succession, by certain classes of persons being, by different changes in the law, raised from the rank of agnati to that of sui heredes, and from the rank of cognati to that of agnati. These changes are not, however, very difficult to follow. 262 LIB. III. TIT. I. if we divide them according as they were effected, (1) by the praetor, (2) by senatus-tdnsulta, and Imperial enactments pre- vious to Justinian, (3) by Justinian himself. The first Title treats of the succession of sui heredes, and of those ranked among the sui heredes ; the second and two following Titles treat of the succession of oc/nati, and of those ranked among agnati. At the end of this Title will be found a short summary of the changes in the law relative to the succession of sui heredes : at the end of the fourth Title one will be found of the chansies relative to the succession of agnati, Justinian altered the whole mode of succession to intestates by the 118th and 127th Novels. This change, being effected several years after the publication of the Institutes, should not be allowed to interfere with the consideration of the law ot succession existing when the Institutes were published. But as it is too remarkable and too well known a part of Justinian's legislation to remain wholly unnoticed, a short account of it will be given at the end of the ninth Title, which closes the part ot the Institutes treating of successions ab intestato. 1. Intestatoriim autem heredi- tates ex lege diiodecim tabiilarum primum ad suos heredes pertinent. 1. The inheritances of intestates, by the law of the Twelve Tables, belong in the first place to the sui heredes. Gai. ill. 1. 2. Sui autem heredes existiman- tur, ut et supra diximus, qui in po- testate morientis fuerint, veluti filiuis filiave, nepos neptisve ex filio, pronepos proneptisve ex nepote ex filio nato prognatus prognatave ; nee interest utrum naturales sint liberi an adoi^tivi. Quibus con- numerari necesse est etiam eos qui ex legitimis quidem matrimoniis non sunt progeniti, curiis tamen civitatum dati, secundum divalium constitutionum quje super his po- sitse sunt tenorem, heredum suorum jura nanciscuntur ; necnon eos quos nostr^e amplexfe sunt constitutiones per quas jussimus, si quis mulierem in suo contubernio copulaverit, non ab initio aflectione maritali, earn tamen cum qua poterat habere con- jugium, et ex ea liberos sustulerit, postea vero affectione procedente etiam nuptialia instrumenta cum ea fecerit, et filios vel filias habu- erit, non solum eos liberos qui post dotem editi sunt, justos et in po- testate patris esse, sed etiam ante- riores qui et iis, qui postea nati sunt, occasionem legitimi nominis prsestiterunt. Quod obtinere cen- 2. And, as we have observed be- fore, those are sui heredes Avho, at the death of the deceased, were under his power ; as a son or a daughter, a grandson or a grand- daughter by a son, a great-grandson or great-granddaughter by a grand- son of a son ; nor does it make any ditFerence whether these children are natural or adopted. We must also reckon among them those, who, though not born in lawful wedlock, nevertheless, according to the tenor of the imperial constitutions, acquire the rights of sui heredes by being pre- sented to the airigs. of their cities ; as also those to whom our own con- stitutions refer, which enact that, if any person has lived with a woman not originally intending to marry her, but whom he is not prohibited to marry, and shall have children by her, and shall afterwards, feeling towards her the affection of a hus- band, enter into an act of marriage with her, and have by her sons or daughters, not only those born after the settlement of the dowry shall be legitimate, and in the power of their father, but also those born before, LIB. III. TIT. I. 263 who gave occasion to the legitimacy of the children born after. And this law shall obtain, although no children are born subsequent to the making of the act of dowry, or those born are all dead. But a grandson or grand- daughter, a great-grandson or great- granddaughter, is not reckoned among the sui heredes, unless the per- son preceding them in degree has ceased to be under the power of the ascendant, either by death, or some other means, as by emancipation. For, if a son, when the grandfather died, was under the power of his father, the grandson cannot be suus heres of his grandfather ; and so with regard to all other descendants. Post- humous children, also, who would have been under the power of their father, if they had been born in his lifetime, are sui heredes. Gai. iii. 1, 2; C. v. 27. 3. 10, 11. The sui heredes were the children, whether natural, adoptive, or made legitimate (see Bk. i. Tit. 10. 13), in the power of the de- ceased at the time of his death. We must not confuse persons made sui heredes bv the later legrislation, as these leo-itimated children were, with those permitted to rank with sui heredes. suimus, etiam si non progeniti fuerint post dotale instrumentum confectum liberi, vel etiam nati ab hac luce fuerint subtracti. Ita de- mum tamen nepos neptisve, pro- nepos proneptisve, suorum heredum numero sunt, si prsecedens persona desierit in potestate parentis esse, sive morte id acciderit, sive alia ratione, veluti emancipatione : nam si per id tempus quo quis more- retur, filius in potestate ejus sit, nepos ex eo suus heres esse non potest ; idque et in ceteris deinceps liberorum personis dictum intelli- gimus. Postumi quoque, qui si vivo parente nati essent, in potes- tate ejus futuri forent, sui heredes sunt. 3. Sui autem etiam ignorantes fiunt heredes, et licet furiosi sint, heredes possunt existere, quia qui- bus ex causis ignorantibus nobis acquiritur, ex his causis et fariosis acquiri potest. Et statim morte parentis quasi continuatur domi- nium, et ideo nee tutoris auctori- tate opus est pupillis, cum etiam ignorantibus acquiratur suis here- dibus hereditas ; nee curatoris con- sensu acquiritur furioso, sed ipso jure. 3. Sui heredes may become heirs, without their knowledge, and even though insane ; for in every case in which inheritances may be acquired without our knowledge, they may also be acquired by the insane. At the death of the father, ownership in an inheritance is at once continued ; accordingly, the authority of a tutor is not necessary, as inheritances may be acquired by sui heredes without their knowledge : neither does an insane person acquire by assent of his curator, but by operation of law. D. xxxviii. 16. 14. Directly the succession ab intestato commenced, which it did when the deceased died if there was no testament, and as soon as it was ascertained that the testament was ineffectual if a tes- tament had been made, the suus heres became at once heir with- out any act of his own. We may, however, apply here what we have already said of the power to abstain altogether from the inheritance given him by the praetor. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 19. 2.) 4. Interdum autem, licet in po- 4. But sometimes a child becomes testate parentis mortis tempore suus a suus heres, although he was not heres non fuerit, tamen suus heres under power at the death of IukS 264 LIB. III. TIT. I. parent! efficitur, veluti si ab hosti- parent ; as when a person returns from bus reversus quis fuerit post '^or- captivity after the death of his father, tern patris ; jus enim postliminii He is then made a suus heres by the hoc facit. jus postlimmii. 5. Per contrarium evenit ut, licet quis in familia defuncti sit mortis tempore, tamen suus heres non fiat, veluti si post mortem suam pater judicatus fuerit perduellionis reus, ac per hoc memoria ejus damnata fuerit : suum enim heredem habere non potest, cum fiscus ei succedit ; sed potest dici ipso jure suum here- dem esse, sed desinere. 5. On the contrary, it may happen that a child who, at the death of his parent, was under his power, is not his suus heres : as when a parent, after his decease, is adjudged to have been guilty of treason, and his memory is thus made infamous. He can then have no suits heres ^ as it is the fiscus that succeeds to his estate. In this case it may be said that there has in law been a suus heres, but that he has ceased to be so. D. xxxviii. 16. 1. 3. As a general rule, if the accused died before conviction, the prosecution was at an end. His succession went to his heirs by testament or in law. But to this there was one exception. If a person charged with perdiiellio (treason against the state or emperor) died before conviction, the prosecution was continued, and if he was found guilty, his memory was said to be con- demned {memoria damnata fuit), and, his sentence having a re- trospective effect, his property was confiscated exactly as if he had been condemned in his lifetime. 0. Cum filius filiave et ex altero filio nepos neptisve existunt, pariter ad hereditatem avi vocantur, nee qui gradu proximior est, ulteriorem excludit : sequum enim esse vide- tur nepotes neptesque in patris sui locum succedere. Pari ratione, et si nepos neptisve sit ex filio, et ex nepote pronepos proneptisve, simul vocantur. Et quia placuit nepotes neptesque, item pronepotes et pro- neptes in parentis sui locum suc- cedere, conveniens esse visum est non in capita sed in stirpes heredi- tatem dividi, ut filius partem dimi- diam hereditatis habeat, et ex altero filio duo pluresve nepotes alteram dimidiam. Item, si ex duobus filiis nepotes neptesve extant, ex altero unus forte aut duo, ex altero tres aut quatuor, ad unum aut duos di- midia pars pertineat, ad tres vel quatuor altera dimidia. Gai. 6. A son, or a daughter, and a grandson or granddaughter by another son, are called equally to the inheritance ; nor does the nearer in degree exclude the more remote ; for it seems just that grandsons and granddaughters should succeed in the j)lace of their father. For the same reason, a grandson or grand- daughter by a son, and a great- grandson or great-granddaughter by a grandson, are called together. And since grandsons and grand- daughters, great-grandsons and great- granddaughters, succeed in place of their parent, it appeared to follow that inheritances should not be divided per capita, but per stirpes ; so that a son should possess one half, and the grandchildren, whether two or more, of another son, the other half of an inheritance. So, where there are grandchildren by two sons, one or two perhaps by the one, and- three or four by the other, the inheritance will be- long, half to the grandchild or the two grandchildren by the one son, and half to the three or four grand- children by the other son. iii. 7, 8. LIB. III. TIT. I. 265 The expressions ^ dividing per stirpes and per capita ' may be rendered, dividing by the * stock ' and ^ by the head.' An inheritance is divided ' by the head ' when each head or person of those who take has an equal share in it ; it is divided ' by the stock ' when one share is distributed amonof all who are descended from one stock, i. e. are descended from the person who would, if he had been living, have taken the whole share. 7. Cum autem quaeritur an qiiis suns heres existere possit, eo tem- pore quserendum est quo certum est aliquem sine testamento decessisse, quod accidit et destituto testa- mento. Hac ratione, si Alius ex- heredatus fuerit et extraneus lieres institutus, et filio mortuo postea certum fuerit heredem institutum ex testamento non fieri heredem, aut quia noluit esse heres aut quia non potuit, nepos avo suus heres existet ; quia quo tempore certum est intestatum decessisse patrem- familias, solus invenitur nepos : et hoc certum est. 7. When it is asked, whether such a person is a suns lieres, we must look to the time at which it was cer- tain that the deceased died without a testament, including therein the case of the testament being aban- doned. Thus, if a son is disinhe- rited and a stranger is instituted heir, and after the death of the son it becomes certain that the instituted heir will not be heir, either because he is unwilling or unable to be so, in this case the grandson of the de- ceased becomes the su%is heres of his grandfather; for, at the time when it was certain that the deceased died intestate, there exists only the grand- child, and of this there can be no doubt. D. xxxviii. 16. 1. 8 ; D. xxxviii. 6, 7. 8. Et licet post mortem avi natus sit, tamen avo vivo conceptus, mor- tuo patre ejus posteaque deserto avi testamento, suus heres efiicitur. Plane, si et conceptus et natus fuerit post mortem avi, mortuo patre suo desertoque postea avi testamento, suus heres non existit, quia nuUo jure cognationis patrem sui patris tetigit : sic nee ille est inter liberos avi, quem filius eman- cipatus adoptaverat. Hi autem, cum non sint quantum ad heredi- tatem liberi, neque bonorum pos- sessionem petere possunt quasi proximi cognati. Hsec de suis heredibus. 8. And although a child is born after the death of his grandfather, yet, if he was conceived in the life- time of his grandfather, he will, if his father is dead, and his grand- father's testament is abandoned, become the suus lieres of his grand- father. But a child both conceived and born after the death of his grandfather, could not become the suus heres, although his father should die and the testament of his grand- father be abandoned ; because he was never allied to his grandfather by any tie of relationship. Neither is a person adopted by an eman- cipated son to be reckoned among the children of the father of his adoptive father. And not only are these adoptive children of an eman- cipated son incaj)able of taking the inheritance as children of the deceased grandfather, but they cannot demand possession of the goods as the nearest cognati. Thus much concerning sui heredes. D. xxxviii. 16. 6, 7. 9. Emancipati autem liberi jure 9. Emancipated children by the civili nihil juris habent : neque civil law have no right to the in- 266 LIB. III. TIT. I. enim siii heredes sunt, quia in potestate parentis esse desierunt, neque ullo alio jure per legem duodecim tabularum vocantur ; sed prffitor naturali fequitate motus dat eis bonorum possessionem undo liberi, perinde ac si in potestate parentis tempore mortis fuissent, sive soli sint, sive cum suis lieredi- bus concurrant. Itaque duobus liberis extantibus, emancipato et qui tempore mortis in potestate fuerit, sane quidem is qui in potes- tate fuerit, solus jure civili lieres est, id est, solus suns heres est ; sed cum emancipatus beneficio prpe- toris in partem admittitur, evenit ut suus heres pro parte heres fiat. heritances of their father ; being no longer under the power of their parent, they are not his sui heredes, nor are they called to inherit by any other right under the law of the Twelve Tables. But the praetor, obeying natural equity, grants them the possession of goods called unde liberi, as if they had been under the power of their father at the time of his death, and this, whether they stand alone, or whether there are also others, who are sui heredes. Thus, when there are two children, one emancipated, and the other under power at his father's death, the latter, by the civil law, is alone the heir, and alone the suus heres : but, as the emancipated son, by the indulgence of the praetor, is admitted to his share, the sims heres becomes heir only of a part. Gal iii. 19. 25, 26 ; D. xxxviii. 6. 1. Not only emancipated children, but, if they themselves were dead, their children conceived after the emancipation, had the possessio bonorum given them by the praetor (D. xxxvii. 4. 5. I) ; and a grandchild conceived before the emancipation, and who remained in the power of the grandfather, was allowed to succeed to the inheritance of the emancipated son. The praetor could not give these persons the title of ' heir,' as that only belonged to those who received it from the. jus civile-, but he gave them pos- sessio bonorum, for part of the inheritance [pro parte). If the emancipated son had children who remained in the power of the emancipator, he shared the inheritance with them, instead of ex- cludino^ them. (D. xxxvii. 8. 1. pr. 1.) Emancipated children were, however, obliged to bring into, and add to, the inheritance all the property they themselves possessed at the time of the father's death (co//«f/r; bonorum) \ because, if they had remained in the family, all that they had acquired would have been acquired for the paterfamilias, and thus have formed part of the inherit- ance ; and a married daughter succeeding as heres sua had to bring into the inheritance her dowry (collatio dotis). (C. vi. 20. 4.) When a person, after a capitis deminutio, was restitutus in inte- grum, he also had the possessio bonorum given him, and received what he would have had if his disability had not prevented him from succeeding as sicus heres. (D. xxxvii. 4. 1. 9.) 10. At hi qui emancipati a pa- rente in adoptionem se dederunt, non admittuntur ad bona naturalis patris quasi liberi, si modo cum is moreretur in adoptiva familia sint ; nam vivo eo mancipati ab adoptivo patre, perinde admittun- 10. But those, who after emanci- pation have given themselves in adoption, are not admitted as chil- dren to the possession of the effects of their natural father, that is, if, at the time of his death, they are still in their adoptive family. But if, in LIB. III. TIT. I. 267 tnr ad bona natiiralis patris, ac si the lifetime of their natural father, emancipati ab ipso essent, nee they have been emancipated by their umqiiam in adoptiva familia fuis- adoptive father, they are then ad- sent ; et convenienter, quod ad mitted to receive the goods of their adoptivum patrem pertinet, extra- natural father exactly as if they had neorum loco esse incipiunt. Post been emancipated by him, and had mortem vero naturalis patris eman- never entered into the adoptive cipati ab adoptivo, et quantum ad family. Accordingly, with regard to hunc peque extraneorum loco hunt, their adoptive father, they become et quantum ad naturalis parentis from that moment strangers to him. bona pertinet, nihilo magis libero- But if they are emancipated by ther rum gradum nanciscuntur : quod adoptive father after the death of ideo sic placuit, quia iniquum erat their natural father, they are equally esse in potestate patris adoptivi, ad considered as strangers to their adop- quos bona naturalis patris pertine- tive father ; and yet do not gain the rent, utrum ad liberos ejiis an ad position of children with regard to agnatos. the inheritance of their natural father. This has been so laid down, because it was unreasonable that it should be in the power of an adoptor to determine to whom the inheritance of a natural father should belong, whether to his children, or to the agnati. D. xxxviii. 16. 4 ; T>. xxxvii. 4. 6. 4. Until the time of Justinian, an adopted son, during his con- tinuance in his adoptive family, had no right of succession to his natural father, but was a smis heres of his adoptive father. If he left the adoptive family before the death of his natural father, he was called by the praetor to the succession of his natural father as a suits heres, but had, of course, no claim on the adoptive father. If he left the adoptive family after the death of his natural father, he had no claim to the succession of either natural or adoptive father, except as a cognatus of his natural father. Justinian, as we have seen in the First Book (Tit. 11. 2), altered this, and the adopted son, unless adopted by an ascendant, never lost his right to the succession of his natural father, although he gained a right to the succession ah intestato of his adoptive father. (See paragr. 14.) Justinian, it will be observed, does not in the text speak of the case of children given in adoption by their natural father, the changes he had made having altered their position. He speaks of children emancipated, and then giving themselves by arrogation to an adoptive father, and the position was not changed by his system. What is said in the text may, however, be applied to children given in adoption before the legis- lation of Justinian. What the text describes as unreasonable is that, after the natural father is dead, the adoptive father should have power to alter the succession of the natural father. 11. Minus ergo juris habent 11. The rights of adopted children adoptivi quam naturales : namque are therefore less than those of natural naturales emancipati beneficio prse- children, who, even after emancipa- toris gradum liberorum retinent, tion, retain the rank of children by licet jure civili perdunt ; adoptivi the indulgence of the prastor, although vero emancipati et jure civili per- they lose it by the civil law. But 268 LIB. III. TIT. I. dunt gradum liberorum, et a prse- tore non adjuvantur, et recte : naturalia enim jura civilis ratio perimere non potest, nee quia de- sinunt sui lieredes esse, desinere possunt filii filieeve aut nepotes iieptesve esse. Adoptivi vero eman- cipati extraneoruni loco incipiunt esse, quia jus nomenque filii filifeve quod per adoptionem consecuti sunt, alia civili ratione, id est emancipa- tione, perdunt. 12. Eadem haec observantur et in ea bonorum possessione, quam contra tabulas testamenti parentis liberis pneteritis, id est, neque lie- redibus institutis neque ut oportet exheredatis, praetor pollicetur ; nam eos quidern qui in potestate parentis mortis tempore fuerunt, et eman- cipatos vocat praetor ad eam bo- norum possessionem ; eos vero qui in adoptiva familia fuerint per hoc tempus quo naturalis parens more- retur, repellit. Item adoptivos libe- ros emancipatos ab adoptivo patre, sicut ab intestato, ita longe minus contra tabulas testamenti ad bona ejus non admittit ; quia desinunt numero liberorum esse. adopted children, when emancipated, lose the rank of children by the civil law, and are not aided by the praetor. And the distinction between the two cases is very proper, for the civil law cannot destroy natural rights ; and children cannot cease to be sons and daughters, grandsons or granddaugh- ters, because they may cease to be sui lieredes. But adopted children, when emancipated, become instantly stran- gers ; for the rights and title of son or daughter, which they have only obtained by adoption, may be de- stroyed by another ceremony of the civil law, that, namely, of emanci^ja- tion. Gai. i. 158. 12. The same rules are observed in the possession of goods which the prjetor gives contra tabulas to children Avho have been passed over, that is, who have neither been instituted heirs, nor properly disinherited. For the praetor calls to this possession of goods those children under the power of their father at the time of his death, and those also who are emancipated ; but he excludes those who were in an adoptive family at the decease of their natural father. So, too, adopted chil- dren emancipated by their adoptive father, as they are not admitted to succeed their adoptive father ah in- testato, much less are they admitted to possess the goods of their adoptive father contrary to his testament, for they cease to be included in the num- ber of his children. D. xxxviii. 6. 1. 6 ; D. xxxvii. 4. 6. 4. When a testament was made, but a person who was a sinis heres, or who was raised to the rank of a suus heres, was not expressly disinherited in the testament, the proetor gave him the possessw bonorum contra tabulas, i.e. contrary to the testament. Such a person is not raised to the rank of a suus heres so much as main- tained in his position of suus heres. 13. Admonendi tamen sumus, eos qui in adoptiva familia sunt, quive post mortem naturalis parentis ab adoptivo patre emancipati fuerint, intestato parente naturali mortuo, licet ea parte edicti qua liberi ad bonorum possessionem vocantur, non admittantur, alia tamen parte vocari, id est, qua cognati defuncti vocantur. Ex qua parte ita admit- 13. It is, however, to be observed that cliildren still remaining in an adoptive family, or who have been emancipated by their adoptive father, after the decease of their natural father, who dies intestate, although not admitted by the part of the edict calling children to the possession of goods, are admitted by another part, by which the cognati of the deceased LIB. III. TIT. I. 269 tuntur, si neque sui heredes liberi neque emancipati obstent, neque agnatiis qiiidem ullus interveniat ; ante enim praetor liberos vocat tarn snos heredes quam emancipatos, deinde legitimos heredes, deinde proximos cognatos. Gal iii. 31 ; 14. Sed ea omnia antiqiiitati quidem placuerunt, aliquam autem emendationem a nostra constitutione acceperimt, quam super his personis posuimus quae a patribus suis natu- ralibus in adoptionem aliis dantur : invenimus etenim nonnullos casus, in quibus filii et naturalium paren- tum succession em propter adoptio- nem amittebant, et adoptione facile per emancipationem soluta ad neu- trius patris successionem vocaban- tur. Hoc solito more corrigentes constitutionem scripsimus per quam definivimus, quando parens natu- ralis filium suum adoptandum alii dederit, Integra omnia jura ita ser- vari atque si in patris naturalis po- testate permansisset, nee penitus adoptio fuisset subsecuta, nisi in hoc tantummodo casu ut possit ab intestato ad patris adoptivi venire successionem. Testament© autem ab eo facto, neque jure civili neque prfetorio aliquid ex hereditate ejus persequi potest, neque contra ta- bulas bonorum possessione agnita, neque inofficiosi querela instituta : cum nee necessitas patri adoptivo imponitur vel heredem eum insti- tuere vel exheredatum facere, ut- pote nullo vinculo naturali copula- turn, neque si ex Sabiniano senatus- consulto ex tribus maribus fuerit adoptatus ; nam et in hujusmodi casu neque quarta ei servatur, nee ulla actio ad ejus persecutionem ei competit. Nostra autem constitu- tione exceptus est is quern parens naturalis adoptandum susceperit ; utroque enim jure tarn naturali quam legitime in hanc personam concurrente, pristina jura tali adop- tioni servavimus, quemadmodum si paterfamilias se dederit arrogan- dum ; quae specialiter et sigillatim ex praef atse constitutionis tenore pos- sunt colligi. are called. They are, however, only thus admitted in default of sui heredes, emancipated children, and agnati. For the praetor first calls the children, both the std heredes and those emancipated, then the legitimi heredes, and then the cognati. D. xxxvii. 15. 1. 14. Such were the rules that for- merly obtained ; but they have re* ceived some emendation from our con- stitution relating to persons given in adoption by their natural parents. For cases have occurred in which sons have lost by adoption their succession to their natural parents, and, the tie of adoption being easily dissolved by emancipation, have lost the right of succeeding to either pa- rent. Correcting, therefore, as usual, what is wrong, we have promulgated a constitution enacting that, when a natural father has given his son in adoption, the rights of the son shall be preserved exactly as if he had still remained in the power of his natural father, and no adoption had taken place ; except only in this, that the person adopted may succeed to his adoptive father, if he dies intestate. But, if the adoptive father makes a tes- tament, the adoptive son can neither by the civil law nor under the prae- torian edict obtain any part of the inheritance, whether he demands pos- session of the eflt'ects contra tabulas, or alleges that the testament is in- officious ; for an adoptive father is under no obligation to institute or disinherit his adopted son, there being no natural tie between them, not even if the adopted son has been chosen among three brothers, according to the senatus-considtum Sabinianum, for even in this case the son does not ob- tain the fourth part of his adoptive father's effects, nor has he any action whereby to claim it. But persons adopted by an ascendant are excepted in our constitution ; for, as natural and civil rights both concur in their favour, we have thought proper to preserve to this adoption its effect under the old law, as also to the arrogation of a paterfamilias. But this, in all its details, may be collected from the tenor of the above-mentioned constitution. C. viii. 47. 10, pr. 1, 2, 3. 270 LIB. III. TIT. I. Theophilus, in his Paraphrase, tells us that when a person adopted one of three male children, he was obliged, by the senatiis-cojisultum Sahinianum, to leave him a fourth part of his property, but gives no reason for the rule, and we have no means of ascertaining what the true reason was. Justinian did away with the provision of the senatus-consultum^ because it Vv^as not, under his legislation, necessary to protect specially the person thus chosen, inasmuch as no adopted child lost his share of his inheritance of his natural father. Children adopted by a stranger were, under Justinian's legis- lation, not, properly speaking, placed in the rank of sui heredes, but were sui heredes, for the adoption had no effect on their position in their natural family. The effect of adoption was de- stroyed, not its results specially provided against. 15. Item vetiistas ex masculis pro- genitos plus diligens, solos nepotes qui ex virili sexii descendunt, ad suo- rum vocabat successionem, et juri agnatorum eos anteponebat ; nepotes autem qui ex filiabus nati sunt, et proneptes ex neptibus, cognatorum loco numerans post agnatorum line- am eos vocabat, tarn in avi vel pro- avi materni quam in aviae vel proavi^ sive paternre sive matern?e succes- sionem. Divi autem principes non pass! sunt talem contra naturam injuriam sine competente emenda- tione relinquere : sed cum nepotis et pronepotis nomen commune est utrisque qui tarn ex masculis quam ex feminis descendunt, ideo eumdem gradum et ordinem successionis eis donaverunt. Sed ut amplius aliquid sit eis qui non solum natune, sed etiam veteris juris sulfragio muni- untur, portionem nepotum et neptum vel deinceps de quibus supra dixi- mus, paulo minuendam esse existi- maverunt : ut minus tertiam partem acciperent, quam mater eorum vel avia fuerat acceptura, vel pater eorum "vel avus paternus sive ma- ternus, quando femina mortua sit cuJQS de hereditate agitur ; iisque, licet soli sint, adeuntibus agnatos minime vocabant. Et quemadmo- dum lex duodecim tabular um tilio mortuo nepotes vel neptes, prone- potes vel proneptes in locum patris sui ad successionem avi vocat, ita et prill cipalis dispositio in locum matris auve vel a vise eos cum jam designata partis tertise deminutione vocat. 15. The ancient law, favouring de- scendants from males, called only grandchildren so descended to the succession as sui heredes, in preference to the agnati, while grandchildren born of daughters, and great-grandchildren born of granddaughters, were reckoned among cognatl, and succeeded only after the agnati to their maternal grandfather and great-grandfather, or to their grandmother, or great-grand- mother, maternal or paternal. But the emperors would not suffer such a violence against nature to continue without an adequate alteration ; and as the name of grandchild as inasmuch and great-grandchild is common, well to descendants by females as by males, they gave all the same right and order of succession. But, that persons whose privileges rest not only on nature, but also on the ancient law, might enjoy some peculiar advantage, they thought it right that the portions of grandchildren, great-grandchildren, an d other lineal descendants of a female, should be somewhat diminished, so that they should not receive so much by a third part as their mother or grand- mother would have received, or, when the succession is to the inheritance of a woman, as their father or grand- father-, paternal or maternal, would have received ; and, although there were no other descendants, if they entered on the inheritance, the em- perors did not call the agnati to the succession. And as, upon the decease of a son, the law of the Twelve Tables calls the grandchildren and great- grandchildren, male and female, to represent their father in the succes- LIB. III. TIT. I. 271 sion to their grandfather, so the im- perial legislation calk them to take in succession the place of their mother or gi'andmother, subject only to the above-mentioned deduction of a third part. C. vi. 65. 9. This section contains the substance of a constitution of the Emperors Theodosius, Yalentinian, and Arcadius. (Cod. Theod. V. 5.) Justinian here says, that when there were descendants by a female who entered on the inheritance, the agnati were not called to the succession. We knoAV, however, from the Code itself, that the agnati had a fourth part of the inheritance, as a sort of Falcidia. (See next paragr.) 16. Sed nos, cum adhuc dubitatio manebat inter agnatos et memoratos nepotes, quartam partem substantive def uncti agnatis sibi vindicantibus ex cujusdam constitutionis auctoritate, memoratam quidem constitutionem a nostro codice segregavimus, neque inseri eam ex Theod osiano codice in eo concessimus. Nostra autem constitutione promulgata, toti juri ejus derogatum est, et sanximus, talibus nepotibus ex filia vel pro- nepotibus ex nepte et deinceps su- perstitibus, agnatos nullam partem mortui successionis sibi vindicare : ne hi qui ex transversa linea veniunt, potiores iis habeantur qui recto jiu^e descendunt. Quam constitutionem nostram obtinere secundum sui vigo- rem et tempora et nunc sancimus : ita tamen ut, quemadmodum inter filios et nepotes ex filio antiquitas statuit non in capita sed in stirpes dividi hereditatem, similiter nos in- ter filios et nepotes ex filia distri- butionem fieri jubemus, vel inter omnes nepotes et neptes et alias de- inceps personas, ut utraque proge- nies matris suae vel patris avia; vel avi portionem sine ulla deminutione conseqviatur ; ut si forte unus vel duo ex una parte, ex altera tres aut qua- tuor extent, unus aut duo dimidiam, alteri tres aut quatuor alteram dimi- diam hereditatis habeant. 16. But, as there still remained matter of dispute between the agnati and the above-mentioned grandchil- dren, the agnati claiming the fourth part of the estate of the deceased by virtue of a constitution, we have re- jected this constitution, and have not permitted it to be inserted into our code from that of Theodosius. And in the constitution we have ourselves promulgated, we have completely de- parted from the provisions of those former constitutions, and have en- acted that agnati shall take no part in the succession of the deceased, when there are grandchildren born of a daughter, or great-grandchildren born of a granddaughter, or any other descendants from a female in the direct line ; as those in a collateral line ought not to be preferred to direct descend- ants. This constitution is to prevail from the date of its promulgation in its full force, as we here again enact. And as the old law ordered, that be- tween the sons of the deceased and his grandsons by a son, every inheri- tance should be divided j^er stirpes, and not per capita, so we also ordain, that a similar distribution shall be made between sons and grandsons by a daughter, and between grandsons and granddaughters, great-grandsons and great-granddaughters, and all other descendants in a direct line ; so that the children of either branch may re- ceive the share of their mother or father, their grandmother or grand- father, without any diminution ; and, if of the one branch there should be one or two children, and of the other branch three or four, then the one or 272 LIB. III. TIT. II. two shall have one half, and the three or four the other half of the inheri- tance. C. vi. 55. 12. Those who, not being iiui heredes, were admitted to rank as such, were not necessarii. They could accept the inheritance or not, which they only acquired when they entered on it, iis adeun- tibus. (Paragr. 15.) The changes in the succession of the sui heredes were these : — 1. Those at the time of his death in the power of the de cujus (i. e. the person of whose inheritance we are speaking), succeeded as sui heredes under the law of the Twelve Tables. 2. The praetor, by giving them the possessio bonorum, placed in the rank of sui heredes the following classes of persons : (1) emancipated children, and (2), if the emancipated father was dead, grandchildren conceived after his emancipation, or (.3), if the de cujus were the emancipated son, his unemancipated children conceived before the emancipation, and (4) sui heredes deprived of the power of inheriting by a capitis deminutio, but afterwards * restituti in integrum. 3. A constitution of Theodosius permitted the children and descendants of deceased daughters to succeed to the portion their mother would have received as suus heres, giving up one-third of it to other sui heredes^ if there were any, and, if not, one-fourth to the agnati. 4. Under Justinian, adoption by a stranger ceased to have any effect upon the position of the person adopted in his natural family ; and the persons referred to in the constitution of Theo- dosius just mentioned succeeded to the whole share of the deceased daughter without any deduction. Tit. II. DE LEGITIMA AGNATORUM SUC- CESSTONE. Si nemo suus heres, vel eorum "When there is no suus heres, nor quos inter suos heredes prsetor vel any of those persons called by the constitutiones vocant, extat qui sue- praetor or the constitutions to inherit cessionem quoquo modo amplecta- with sui heredes, to take the succes- tur, tunc ex lege duodecim tabula- sion in any way, the inheritance, rum ad agnatum proximum pertinet according to the law of the TAvelve hereditas. Tables, belongs to the nearest agnatus. Gai. iii. 9. All persons were agnati who, descended from a common an- cestor, would, if that ancestor had been living, have been in his power. The sui heredes w^ere thus agnati ; but as they had the title of sui heredes peculiar to themselves, only those agnati re- ceived the name of agnati who were connected with the de cujus by a collateral line. LIE. HI. TIT. II. 273 1. Sunt autem agnati, tit primo quoque libro tradidimus, cogiiati per virilis sexus personas cognatioiii jiincti, quasi a patre cognati : itaque eodem patre nati fratres agnati sibi sunt, qui et consanguinei vocantur, iiec requiritur an etiam eamdem matrem liabuerint. Item patruus fratris filio et invicem is illi agnatus est. Eodem numero sunt fratres patrueles, id est, qui ex duobus fra- tribus procreati sunt, qui etiam con- sobrini vocantur : qua ratione etiam ad plures gradus agnationis perve- nire poterimus. li quoque qui post mortem patris nascuntur, jura con- sanguinitatis nanciscuntur. Non ta- men omnibus simul agnatis dat lex liereditatem ; sed iis qui tunc proxi- miore gradu sunt, cum certum esse coeperit aliquem intestatum xleces- sisse. 1. Agnati, as we have explained in the First Book, are those cofpuUi who are related through males, that is, are cognati by the father ; and tlierefore brothers, who are the sons of the same father, are agnati to each other (they are also called consanguinei). and it does not make any difference whether they have the same mother. An uncle is also agnatus to his brother's son, and vice versa, the brother's son to his paternal uncle. So also fratres patrue- les, that is, the children of brothers (also called consohrini), are likewise agnati. We may thus reckon many degrees of agnation ; children, too, who are born after the decease of their father, obtain the rights of consangui- nity. The law does not, however, give the inheritance to all the agnati, but to those only who are in the nearest de- gree, at the time that it becomes certain that the deceased has died intestate. Gai. i. 156 ; iii. 10, 11. 2. Per adoptionem quoque agna- tionis jus consistit, veluti inter filios naturales et eos quos pater eorum adoptavit ; nee dubium est quin pro- prie consanguinei appellentur. Item, si quis ex ceteris agnatis, veluti fra- ter 8Ait patruus, a,ut denique is qui longiore gradu est, adoptaverit ali- quem, agnatos inter suos esse non dubitatur. 3. Cetemni inter masculos qui- dem agnationis jure hereditas, etiam longissimo gradu, ultro citroque ca- pitur : quod ad feminas vero ita placebat, ut ipste consanguinitati.s jure tantum capiant liereditatem, si sorores sint, ulterius non capiant ; masculi autem ad earum hereditates, etiamsi longissimo gradu sint, ad- mittantur. Qua de causa, fratris tui aut patrui tui filias vel amitae tu8e hereditas ad te pertinet, tua vero ad illas non pertinebat : quod ideo ita constitutum erat, quia commo- dius videbatur ita jura constitui, ut l)lerumque hereditates ad masculos confluerent. Sed quia sane iniquum erat in universum eas quasi extra- neas repelli, praetor eas ad bonorum possessionem admittit ea parte qua IDroximitatis nomine bonorum pos- sessionem pollicetur : ex qua parte ita scilicet admittuntur, si neque 2. The right of agna-tion arises also through adoption ; thus the natural and adopted sons of the same father are agnati. And such persons are without doubt properly included in the term consanguinei. Also, if one of your agnati, as, for example, a. brother, a paternal uncle, or any other agnatus, however remote, adopt any one, then the person so adopted is un- doubtedly to be reckoned among your ag)iati. 3. Agnation gives males, however distant in degree, reciprocal rights to the succession to inheritances. But it has been thought right that females should only inherit by title of consan- guinity if they were sisters, and not, if in a more remote degree ; while their male agnati, in however remote a degree, were admitted to succeed to them. Thus the inheritance of your brother's daughter, or of the daughter of your paternal uncle or aunt, will belong to you ; but not your inherit- ance to them. This distinction was made, because it seemed expedient that the law should be so ordered, that inheritances should for the most part fall into the possession of males. But as it was contrary to equity that females should be thus almost wholly excluded as strangers, the prretor ad- mits them to the possession of goods promised by his edict, on account of T 274 LIB. III. TIT. II. agnatiis ullus, neqne proximior cog- natiTs interveniat. Et hsec quidem lex diiodecim tabularum niillo modo introduxit ; sed simplicitatein legi- bus amicam amplexa, simili modo omnes agnatos sive masculos sive feminas cujusciimqiie gradiis, ad similitudinem siiorum, invicem ad successioneni vocabat. Media au- tem jurisprudentia, qups erat lege duodecim tabularum junior, impe- riali autem dispositione anterior, subtilitate quadam excogitata prse- iatam differentiam inducebat, et pe- nitus eas a successione agnatorum rej)ellebat : omni alia successione incognita, donee praetores paulatim asperitatem juris civilis corrigentes, sive quod deerat implentes, humano proposito alium ordinem suis edictis addiderunt, et cognationis linea proximitatis nomine introducta per bonorum possessionem eas adjuva- bant, et pollicebantur his bonorum possessionem qu?e unde cognati ap- pellatur. Nos vero legem duodecim tabularum sequentes, et ejus ves- tigia in liac parte conservantes, laudamus quidem prsetores su?e liumanitatis, non tamen eos in ple- num causDe mederi invenimus : quare etenim uno eodemque gradu naturali concurrente, et agnationis titulis tarn in masculis quam in feminis ffiqua lance constitutis, masculis quidem dabatur ad successionem venire om- nium agnatorum, ex agnatis autem mulieribus nulli penitus, nisi soli sorori, ad agnatorum successionem patebat aditus ? Ideo in plenum omnia reducentes et ad jus duodecim tabularum eamdem dispositionem exsequantes, nostra constitutione sanximus, omnes legitimas personas, id est, per virilem sexum descen- dentes, sive masculini generis sive feminini sint, simili modo ad jura successionis legitim^e ab intestato vocari secundum sui gradus priero- gativam, nee ideo excludendas quia consanguinitatis jura, sicutgermanse, non habent. Gai. iii. 14. 23. proximity ; but tliey are only admitted if there is no agnatus, nor any nearer cognatus. The law of the Twelve Tables did not introduce any of these distinctions ; but with the simplicity proper to all legislation, called the agnat'h of either sex, or any degree, to a reciprocal succession, in the same manner as sui hercdes. It was an in- termediate jurisprudence posterior to the law of the Twelve Tables, but prior to the imperial constitutions, that in a spirit of subtle ingenuity introduced tliis distinction, and en- tirely excluded females from the suc- cession of ag}iatl, no other method of succession being then known, until tlie praetors, correcting by degrees the as- perity of the civil law, or supplying what was deficient, were led by their feeling of equity to add in their edicts a new order of succession. The line of cognati was admitted according to the degrees of proximity, and relief was thus afibrded to females by the pmstor giving them the possession of goods called uncle cognati. But we, turning to the law of the Twelve Tables, and following in its steps, in our legislation on this point, praise the kind feeling of the praetors, but cannot think they have provided a complete remedy for the evil. Why, indeed, when males and females are placed in the same degree of natural relationship, and have equally the title of agnation, should males be j)ermitted to succeed to all their agnatl, while females, with the single exception of sisters, are entirely excluded ? We therefore, making a comj)lete change, and returning to the law of the Twelve Tables, have declared by our constitu- tion, that all legitimse. persoux, that is, descendants from males, whether them- selves male or female, shall be equally called to the rights of succession ab intestato, according to the proximity of their degree, and that females shall not be excluded on the ground that none but sisters have the right of consan- guinity. 29 ; C. vi. 58. 14. The inedia jurisprudentia here spoken of consisted of the opinions of the jurispru denies, who extended the principle of the lex Voconia^ which limited the succession of females under a tes- tament (see Bk. ii. Tit. 14. pr.) to their succession ab intestato. Fcemince ad hereditates legitimas ultra consanguineas successiones non admittuntur. Idquejure civili Voconia ratione videtur effectum. LIB, III. TIT. II. 275 (Paul. Se?it 4. 8. 22.) Thus a distinction was made among the agnatl themselves and the consangiiinei, that is, agnati in the second degree ; or, in other words, brothers and sisters, natural or adoptive, of the de ciijus, were made into a class apart and distinguished from the agnati properly so called. Consanguineus, when used to mark off a particular class of the agnati, merely means children of the same father, without any reference to the mother. 4. Hoc etiam addendum nostrte constitiitioniexistimavimus, Tit trans- feratur unus tantummodo gradus a jure cognationis in legitimam succes- sionem : ut non solum fratris tilius et filia, secundum quod jam defini- vimus, ad successionem patrui sui vocentur, sed etiam germanse con- sanguinese vel sororis uterinse filius et filia soli, et non deinceps personae, ima cum his ad jura avimculi sui per- veniant ; et mortuo eo qui patruus quidem est sui fratris filiis, avuncu- lus autem sororis suse soboli, simili modo ab utroque latere succedant, tamquam si omnes ex masculis de- scendentes legitimo jure veniant, sci- licet ubi frater et soror superstites non sunt. His etenim personis pr^ie- cedentibus et successionem admit- tentibus, ceteri gradus remanent pe- nitus semoti, videlicet hereditate non ad stirpes sed in capita dividenda. 4. We have also thought fit to add to our constitution, that one whole degree, but only one, shall be trans- ferred from the line of cognati to the legal succession. Not only the son and daughter of a brother, as we have just explained, shall be called to the succession of their paternal uncle, but the son or daughter of a sister, though she is only by the same father or only by the same mother, but no one in a more distant degree than a son and daughter of such a sister, may also be admitted to the succession of their ma- ternal uncle. Thus, when a person dies who is a paternal uncle to the children of his brother, and maternal uncle to the children of his sister, then the children of either branch succeed exactly as if they were aU descendants from males, and had a right by law to the succession. But this is only if the deceased leaves no brother or sister, for if he leaves any, and they accept the inheritance, the more remote de- grees are entirely excluded from the inheritance, as it is to be divided in this instance per capita and not per stirpes. C. vi. 58. 14. 1. The children of a sister, although only consanguinea, that is, having the same father, or uterina, having the same mother, were thus admitted to the succession as agnati. We might gather from this that uterine brothers and sisters themselves were admitted, although it is not expressed in the text. The Code contains a constitution of Justinian (C. vi. 56, 7) expressly admitting them. The changes in the law with respect to the admission of brothers and sisters and their children as agnati were as follows : — In A.D. 498 Anastasius gave the rights of agnation to emancipated brothers and sisters, except that they only received three-fourths of what they would have had if they had remained in the family. (See Tit. 5. 1.) The children of emancipated brothers and sis- ters still remained cogjiati only. Justinian gave the rights of agnation, in a.d. 528, to uterine brothers and sisters (C. vi. 56, 7); T 2 276 LIB. III. TIT. II. and in A.D. 532, to the children of uterine sisters (C. vi. 58. 14. 1); and thouMi the children of uterine brothers are not mentioned in the constitution, they must undoubtedly have beeu placed in the same position. Finally, in a constitution dated October, a.d. 534 (C. vi. 58. 15), and therefore subsequent to the promulga- tion of the Institutes, Justinian admitted as acjnati emancipated brothers and sisters without any deduction of a fourth, uterine brothers and sisters, and nephews and nieces being the children either of emancipated or uterine brothers and sisters. After that constitution there v/ere not, therefore, any but agnati in the second degree, nor any in the third degree except the uncles and aunts of the de ciijus. Agnatorum hereditates dioiduntur in capita. (Ulp. Reg. 26. 4.) There was no division per stirpes, which was originally only a consequence of the pairia potcstas, in the succession of agnati. If one of those in any degree of relationship was dead, his re- presentatives did not take his share. He was entirely passed over, and the others in that degree of relationship were alone called to the succession. Agnati were spoken of as legitimi heredes, because the inhe- ritance was given to them by the law of the Twelve Tables, whereas the cognati only received it from the praitor. 5. Si pliires sint grcadus agna- torum, aperte lex duodecim tabu- laiiim proximuni vocat. Itaque si (verbi gratia) sit defimcti frater et alteriiis fratris filius ant patruus, frater potior liabetur. Et quamvis singulari niimero usa lex proximum vocet, tamen diibiuni non est quin, et si plures sint ejusdem gradiis, omnes admittantur : nam et proprie proximiis ex pluribus gradibus in- telligitur, et tamen non diibium est quin, licet unus sit gradus agnato- rum, pertineat ad eos hereditas. 5. When there are many degxees of agnati, the law of the Twelve Tables expressly caUs the nearest ; if, for ex- ample, there is a brother of the de- ceased, and a son of another brother, or a paternal uncle, the brotlier is preferred. And, although the lav,^ of the Twelve Tables calls the nearest agnatus (in the singular number), yet Avithout doubt, if there be several in the same degree, they ought all to be admitted. And, although properly by the nearest degree must be understood the nearest of several, yet, if all the agnati are i'l the same degree, the inheritance undoubtedly belongs to them all. Gai. iii. 15. 6, Proximus autem, si quid em nullo testamento facto quisquam de- cesserit, per hoc tempus requiritur, quo mortuus est is cujus de heredi- tate quferitur. Quod si facto testa- mento quisquam decesserit, per hoc tempus requiritur, quo certum e5ise coeperit nullum ex testamento here- dem extiturum. ; tunc enim proprie quisque intestato decessisse iutelligi- tur. Quod quidem aliquando longo tempore deciaratur ; in quo spa,tio temporis ssspe accidit, ut proximiore 6. When a man dies without a testa- ment, the nearest agnatus is the agnatus who is nearest at the time of the death of the deceased. But, if he dies after having made a testament, then he is tlie nearest who is so when it becoines certain that there will be no testamen- tary heir ; for it is only then, that a man who has made a testament can be said to have died intestate, and this sometimes is uncertain for a long time. Meanwhile, the nearest agnatus may die, and some one become the nearest LIB. III. TIT. H. 277 mortuo proximns esse incipiat, qui v/lio was not so at the death of the moriente testatore non erat proxi- testator. mils. Gai. iii. 13. 7. Placebat autem in eo genere percipiendanim hereditatiim siicces- sioneiii non esse, id est, iTt quamvis proximus qui, secundum ea qu?e diximus, vocatur ad hereditatem, aut spreverit hereditatem, aut antequam adeat decesserit, nihilo magis legi- timo jure sequentes admittantur. Quod iterum pnietores imperfecto jure corrigentes, non in totum sine adminiculo relinquebant ; sed ex cognatorum ordine eos vocabant, utpote agnationis jure eis reduso. Sed nos nihil deesse perfectissimo juri cupientes, nostra constitutione quam de jure patronatus humani- tate suggerente protulimus, sanxi- mus successionem in agnatorum liereditatibus non esse eis denegan- dam ; cum satis absurdum erat, quod cognatis a praetore apertum est, hoc agnatis esse rechisum, maxi- me cum in onere quidem tutelarum et proximo gradu deficiente sequens succedit, et quod in onere obtinebat, non erat in lucro permissum. 7. But it was settled that in this order of succession there should be no devolution, so that if the nearest agnatv.s, called in the manner we have mentioned to the inheritance, either refused it, or died before he entered on it, his own legal heir was not thereby admitted to succeed him. Here, too, the praetors, though not introducing a complete reform, did not leave the agnati wholly without relief, but ordered that they should be called to the inheritance as cognati, since they were debarred from the rights of agnation. But we, desirous that our law should be as complete as possible, have decided by our consti- tution, which in our goodness we pub- lished concerning the right of patron- age, that a devolution in the succession shall not be denied to agnati. It was indeed absurd to refuse them a right which the prretor gave to cognaiiy especially as the burden of tutelage devolved on tlie second degree of agnati, if there was a failure of the first ; and thus the principle of de- volution was admitted to impose l)ur- dens, and was not admitted to confer advantages. Gai. ii. 12. 22. 25. 28. In liereditate legitima sitcccssioni locus non est. (Paul. Sent, 4. 23.) The suits liercs or sai licrcdes in the nearest degree be- came heirs by force of law. They could not help becoming so. But as to those who were only allowed to rank among the sui heredes Avithout being, strictly speaking, sui heredes, if those in the nearest degree refused to accept the inheritance, or died before entering on it, the succession did not devolve upon any other sui heredes, but went at once to the agnati. (D. xxxviii. 16. 1. 8.) If, in this case or any other, the nearest agnatus refused or died before entering on the inheritance, the succession passed to the cognati without first devolving on any of the more remote agnati. «Justinian alters this ; and under his system there was a devolu- tion of the succession to the agnati, and therefore probably to those ranked among the sui heredes. 8. Ad legitimam successionem 8. An ascendant also is called to nihilominus vocatur etiam parens the legal succession who has emanci- qui contracta fiducia iilium vel pated a son, a daughter, a grandson, hliam, nepotem vel neptem ac dein- a granddaughter, or other descendant ceps emancipat. Quod ex nostra under a fiduciary agreement. And by 278 LIB. III. TIT. II. constitutione omnimodo indicitiir, our constitution, every emancipation ut emancipationes liberorum sern- is now considered to have been made per videantur contracta fiducia fieri; under such an agreement, while cum apud antiquos non aliter hoc among the ancients the ascendant obtinebat, nisi specialiter contracta was never called to the succession fiducia parens manumisisset. unless he had expressly made this agreement at the time of the eman- cipation. D. xxxviii. 16. 10; C. viii. 48. 6. Under the old law the ascendant had nothing to do with the succession ah intestato of his descendant ; for if the descendant was in the power of the ascendant, the latter took all the pro- perty of which the former could dispose, but did not, as belong- ing to him by right of his patria potestas. If the descendant was emancipated, he was no longer in the family of the ascend- ant. The emancipated son, in short, had no agnati ; and in de- fault of sui heredes the inheritance went to his patron, that is, to the person who had emancipated him. This was the fictitious purchaser (see Introd. sec. 42), unless the ascendant who eman- cipated him made an agreement {contracta fiducia) with the pur- chaser, by which the purchaser made himself a trustee of the right of patronage for the ascendant. If this was done, the ascendant succeeded in default of sui heredes. By the later imperial constitutions three changes were made in the position of the ascendant. First, by a constitution of Theodosius and Valentinian (C. vi. 61. 3), and subsequently of Leo and Anthemius (C. vi. 61. 4), and lastly of Justinian (C. vi. 59. 11), in the case of goods coming to a son from his mother, the order of succession was thus fixed : 1st, his children and other descendants were admitted ; 2ndly, his brothers and sisters, whether of the whole or the half blood ; Srdly, his nearest ascend- ant, i. e. his father, was preferred to his grandfather. Secondly, Justinian, as we have seen in the 12th Title of the Second Book, arranged the order of succession to the peculium of a son, placing first the children, then the brothers and sisters, and lastly the father. But in this case the father was not pre- ferred to the grandfather ; for the ascendant did not really take in this instance ah intestato, but ^jure communi\ ' i.e. the claims of the patria poterMis had been deferred to let in the children and brothers ; but if there were no children or brothers, the ascend- ant, who is at the time the paterfamilias, took the peculium. Lastly, the succession of emancipated sons was altered by the constitution of Justinian, which made a fiduciary contract implied in every emancipation. The ancestor thus retained all his rights of succession as patron to the emancipated son, and would pro- perly have succeeded immediately after the sui heredes \ but Justinian admitted the brothers and sisters before him, and the ascendant who emancipated the son had thus the third place in the order of succession. (C. vi. ^'o, 2.) LIB. III. TIT. III. 279 Tit. hi. DE SENATUS-CONSULTO TEETULLIANO. Such was the rigour of the law of the Twelve Tables, so decided the preference given to the issue of males, and the exclusion of those related by the female line, that the right of reciprocal succession was not per- mitted between a mother and her children. The prsetors, however, ad- mitted such persons, but only in their rank as coguati, to the possession of goods called imde cognati. Lex duodecim tabularum ita stricto jure utebatur, et pneponebat masculorum progeniem, et eos qui per feminini sexus necessitudinem sibi junguntur adeo expellebat, ut ne quidem inter matrem et filium iiliamve ultro citroque hereditatis capiendie jus daret : nisi quod prfe- tores ex proximitate cognatorum eas personas ad successionem, bonorum possessione unde cognati accommo- data, Yocabant. Gal iii. 24, 25. 30. Until the senatus-consrdtum Tertidlianuni was made, a mother and her children had no right of succession to each other, except that which the praetor gave them as cognati. The chil- dren were not in the power of the mother, and were., therefore, not her siii heredes ; they were not in her family, and were, there- fore, not her agnati. If, indeed, the mother at her marriage passed in manum viri, she became, in the eye of the law, the daughter of her husband, and as she was thus of the same family with her children, she and they were agnati to each other. But even in the later days of the Kepublic, a marriage cum conven- tione in manum had probably become comparatively unusual. 1. Sed h£e juris angustias postea emendata? sunt, et primus quidem divus Claudius matri, ad solatium liberorum amissorum, legitimam eorum detulit hereditatem. 2. Postea autem senatus-consulto Tertulliano, quod divi Hadriani temporibus factum est, plenissime de tristi successione matri non etiam aviss deferenda cautum est : ut ma- ter ingenua trium liberorum jus habens, libertina quatuor, ad bona filiorum filiarumve admittatur in- testato mortuorum, licet in potes- tate parentis est ; ut scilicet, cum alieno juri subjecta est, jussu ejus adeat hereditatem cujus juri sub- jecta est. 1. But this strictness of the law was afterwards mitigated. The Em- peror Claudius was the first who gave the legal inheritance of deceased chil- dren to a mother, to console her grief for their loss. 2. Afterwards, the senatus-consul- tum Tertullianum, in the reign of the Emperor Hadrian, established the general rule that mothers, but not grandmothers, should have the me- lancholy privilege of succeeding to their children ; so that a mother, born of free parents, having three children, or a freedwoman having four, should be admitted, although in the power of a parent, to the goods of her intestate children. Except that a mother in the power of another can only enter upon the inheritance of her children at the command of him to whom she is sub- ject. This senatKs-consultiun was passed 158 A.D., in the time of Antoninus Pius, who is here called by his name of adoption. It was only an extension of the lex Pujria Pojipcea, which had con- 280 LIB. III. TIT. III. ferred on free persons having three children, and freed persons having four, many exceptional advantages. Husbands and wives, for examj^le, could, under these circumstances, leave to each other a larger share of their property than was otherwise permitted. (IjLr. Fr. 15, 16.) This jus trium Uberoriwi, as it was termed, was frequently conferred by special favour of the emperors on persons who had not the requisite number of children. 3. Prsef eriintur autem matri liberi defuncti qui sui sunt, quive suorum loco sunt, sive primi graclus sivo ulterioris. Seel et filipe suoe mortura iilius vel filia opponitur ex consti- tutionibus matri defunctre, id est, aviae sues. Pater quoque utriusque, non etiam avns vel proavus, matri anteponitur, scilicet cum inter eos solos de liereditate agitur. Frater auteni consanguineus tam filii quam filiaD excludebat matrem : soror au- tem consanguinea pariter cum ma- tre admittebatur ; sed si fuerat frater et soror consanguinei, et ma- ter liberis lionorata, frater quidem matrem excludebat, communis au- tem erat liereditas ex aequis partibus fratri.5 ct sororisj. 3. The children of the deceased son being sui hcredes, or ranked as such, either in the first or another degree, are preferred to the mother. And if it is a daughter sui juris Avho is dead, her son, or daughter, is preferred by the constitutions to her mother, i.e. to their gTandmother. The father of the deceased is preferred to the motlier; not so the grandfather or great-grandfather, at least when they and the mother are the only claimants of the inheritance. The brother by the same father, either of a son or a daughter, excluded the mother; but the sister by the same father was ad- mitted equally with the mother. If the deceased left a brother and a sister by the same father as himself, the brother excluded the mother, although rendered capable by the number of her children, and the inheritance was equally divided between the brother and sister. D. xxxviii. 17. 2. 15. 18, 19 ; C. vi. 56. 5. The mother was allowed to rank among the agnati by the senatus-considtum TertulUanum, but she had a relative position rather than a definitive position, as being in a certain degree of agnation. What her exact ])osition was at different periods of the law will be stated at the end of the Fourth Title. 4. Sed nos constitutione quam in Codice nostro nomine decorato po- suimus, matri subveniendum esse existimavimus, respicientes ad na- turam et puerperium et periciilum et ssepe mortem ex hoc casu matri- bus illatam ; ideoque impium esse credidimus casum fortuitum in ejus admitti detrimentum. Si enim in- genua ter vel libertina quater non peperit, immerito defraudabatur successione suorum liberorum ; quid enim peccavit, si non plures sed paucos peperit? Et dedimus jus legitimum plenum matribus, sive ingenuis sive libertinis, etsi non ter enixse fuerint vel quater, sed eum tantum vel eam qui qu?eve morte 4. But by a constitution, inserted in the Code which ].)ears our name, we have thought fit to come to the aid of the motlier, from considering- natural reason, as well as the pains of child-birtli, the danger, and death itself, which they often suffer. We, therefore, have esteemed it highly unjust that the law should turn to their detriment what is in its nature purely fortuitous ; for, if a married woman free-born does not give birtli to three children, or a freedwoman to four, they do not therefore deserve to be deprived of the succession to their children. For how can it be imputed to them as a crime to have had few children? We, therefore, have given LIB. III. TIT. III. 281 intercepti sunt, ut et sic vocentur in liberorum suorum leofitimam succes- sionem. a full right to every mother, whether free-born or freed, to be called to the legal succession of her children, although she may not have given birth to three or four children, or may not have had any other than the child whose inheritance is in question. C. viii. 59. 2. 5. Sed cum antea constitutiones jura legitima) successionis perscru- tantes, partim matrem adjuvabant, partim earn praegravabant et non in solidum eam vocabant ; sed in qui- busdam casibus tertiam ei partem abstrahentes certis legitimis dabant personis, in aliis autem contrarium faciebant, nobis visum est recta et simplici A^ia matrem omnibus per- sonis legitimis anteponi, et sine ulla deminutione filiorum suorum suc- cessionem accipere, excepta fratris et sororis persona, sive consanguinei sint, sive sola cognationis jura ha- bentes ; ut quemadmodum eam toti alii ordini legitimo pr^eposuimus, ita omnes fratres et sorores, sive logitimi sunt sive non, ad capiendas iiereditates simul vocemus ; ita tamen ut, si quidem soIdo sorores acjnatfB vel cognata) et mater de- f uncti vel defuncts© supersint, di- midiam quidem mater, alteram vero dimidiam partem omnes sorores ha- beant. Si vero matre superstite et fratre vel fratribus solis, vel etiam cum sororibus sive legitima sive sola cognationis jura habentibus, intes- tatus quis vel intestata moriatur, in cai)ita distribuatur ejus hereditas. 5. The constitutions of former emperors, relative to the right of succession, were partly favourable to mothers, and partly unfavourable. They did not always give the mothers the entire inheritance of their chil- dren, but in some cases deprived them of a third, which was given to certain agiiati ; and in other cases, doing just the contrary, gave a third. But it seems right to us that mothers should receive the succession of their children without any diminution, and that they should be decidedly and exclusively preferred before all legal heirs, except the brothers and sisters of the de- ceased, wliether by the same father or having only the rights of cognation. And as we have preferred the mother to all other legal heirs, we call all brothers and sisters, legal or not, to the inheritance together with the mother, the foUovvdng rule being ob- served. If there are living only sisters agnate or cognatx, and the mother of the deceased, the mother shall have one half of the goods, and the sisters the other half. But if there are living the mother, and also a brother or bro- thers only, or brothers and sisters, Avhether legal, or only having the rights of coynati, then the inheritance of the intestate son or daughter shall be divided in capita. C. vii. 56. T. In the code of Theodosius (v. 1. 1), we find two constitutions, one of Constantine, the other of Valentinian and Yalens, which made the first change in the jus liberorum introduced by the lepc Papia PoppcBa. By these constitutions it was enacted that if there were persons in a certain degree of agnation with the deceased, namely, a paternal uncle, or a paternal uncle's son or grnndson, or an emancipated brother, then the mother, instead of excluding them, as, if she had \\\QJus liberorum, she would have done, divided tlie inheritance wdth them, taking two- thirds if she had t\\QJus trium liberorum, and one-third if she had not. This enactment was, therefore, a gain to those who had not the jus liberorum, and a loss to those Avho had. Justinian did away alto- 282 LIB. III. TIT. IV. gether with the jus liherorum and the distinctions founded upon it. 6. Sed qiiemadmodiun nos matri- Ibiis prospeximus, ita ea,s oportet su«i soboli consiilere : scitiiris eis quod, si tutores liberis non petierint, vel in locum remoti vel excusati intra annum petere neglexerint, ab eorum impuberum morientium successione repellentur. 0. And as we have thus taken care of the interests of the mothers, they ought in return to consult the welfare of their children. Let them know, then, that if they neglect, during the space of a whole year, to demand a tutor for their children, or to ask for the appointment of a new tutor in the place of one who has been removed or excused, they v/ill be deservedly repelled from the succession of the children, if they die before the age of puberty. D. xxxviii. 17. 2. 43. 7. Licet autem vulgo qusesitus sit filius filiave, potest tamen ad bona ejus mater ex TertuUiano senatus- consulto admitti. 7. Although a son or a daughter is born of an uncertain father, yet the mother may be admitted to succeed to their goods by the senatus-consulUim Tertullianum. The natural tie is all that is regarded in this case : this is equally strong between the mother and child, whoever may be the father. Tit. IV. DE SENATUS-CONSULTO ORPHITIANO. Per contrarium autem, ut liberi ad bona matrum intestatarum ad- mittantur senatus-consulto Orphi- tiano, Orphitio et Rufo consul ibus, effectum est, quod latum est divi Ma,rci temporibus ; et data est tam filio quam filite legitima hereditas, etiamsi alieno juri subjecti sunt, et pr?eferuntur consanguineis et agna- tis defunct?e matris. Reciprocally children are admitted to the goods of their intestate mothers by the senatus-considtum Orphitiannm, made in the consulship of Orphitius and Rufus, in the reign of the Em- peror Marcus Antoninus. By this senatus-consnltum the legal inherit- ance is given both to the sons and daughters, although in the power of another, and they are preferred to the consangulnel, and to the agnati of their deceased mother. D. xxxviii. 17. 9 ; C. vi. 57. 1. The senatus-consultum Orpldtianum was made a.d. 178, in the time of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. Previously, chil- dren could not succeed to their mother, except as cognati. But by this senatus-consultum they were preferred to the consanguinel, that is, the agnati of the second degree, or, in other words, brothers and sisters, natural or adoptive, as well as to all other agnati. They were not, however, preferred to the mother of the deceased, who derived her right of succession from the senatus-consultum Tertullianum, but they shared the inheritance with her. Her claim to share it with them was, however, subsequently taken away by a constitution (C. vi. 57. 4) of Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius. LIB. III. TIT. IV. 283 1. Sed cum ex hoc senatus-con- sulto nepotes ad avise successionem legitimo jure non vocabantur, pos- tea hoc constitutionibus principali- bus emendatum est, ut ad similitu- dinem iiliorum filiarumque et ne- potes et neptes vocentur. 1. But since grandsons and gi-and- daughters were not called by this senatus-consultmn to the legal succes- sion of their grandmother, the omis- sion was afterwards supplied by the imperial constitutions, and grandsons and granddaughters were called to inherit, just as sons and daughters had been. C. vi. 55. 9. The constitution enacting this given in the Code is one of Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius. 2. Sciendum autem est, hu jus- modi successiones quse a Tertulliano et Orphitiano deferuntur, capitis deminutione non perimi, propter illam regulam qua nov^e hereditates legitim?e capitis deminutione non pereunt, sed ill^e solos qure ex lege duodecim tabularum deferuntur. 2. It must be observed that these successions, derived from the senatus- consulta Tertullimmm and Orphitla- lium, are not lost by a capitis demi- nutio. The rule is, that legitimate inheritances given by the late law are not destroyed by capitis deminutio, which afiects those only that are given by the law of the Twelve Tables. It is only the minima capitis deminutio which is here spoken of. Any one who sustained the maxima or minor deminutio, as he ceased to be a citizen, ceased to have any rights of succession. 3. Novissime sciendum est, etiam 3. Lastly, it must be observed, illos liberos qui vulgo quj^esiti sunt, that even children born of an un- ad matris hereditatem ex hoc sena- certain father are admitted by the tus-coiisulto admitti. " senatns-consnltum. Or^^hltianum to the inheritance of their mother. D. xxxviii. 17. 1,2. Justinian afterwards altered this, so as to exclude such chil- dren from the inheritance of their mother, if she was of hisfh rank {iUustris;\ or if she had other children born in lawful marriao^e. (C. vi. 57. 5.) 4. Si ex pluribus legitimis heredi- bus quidam omiserint hereditatem, vel morte vel aha causa impediti fuerint quominus adeant, reliquis qui adierint, accrescit illorum portio; et licet ante decesserint qui adierint, ad heredes tamen eorum pertinet. 4. When there are many legal heirs, and some renounce the in- heritance, or are prevented by death, or any other cause, from accepting it, then the portions of such persons accrue to those who accept the in- heritance : and if any of those who accept happen to die beforehand, the portions accruing to them will go to their heirs. D. xxxviii. 16. 9. This paragraph has nothing to do with the *S*. ('. Orphitiamim. It refers to the right of accrual enjoyed by all heredes lefjitimi. If any of those called to share an inheritance did not take liis share, it was divided among all those who entered on the inherit- ance ; and, if any of those who had entered died before receiving the share that accrued to him, this accruing share passed to his 284 LIB. III. TIT. IV. heirs, his interest in it having become fixed, and made transmis- sible to his heirs by his entering on the inheritance. The following Avere the principal changes in the law of the succession of the agnati. By the law of the Twelve Tables, agnati, i.e. collaterals in the same civil family, succeeded in default of sui heredes. Subsequently, different classes of persons were allowed to rank as agnativ^ho were not so. 1. Emancipated brothers and sisters were allowed to rank as agnati by Anastasius, and their children were allowed to do so by Justinian. 2. Under Justinian, a peculiar order of succession was fixed on for persons emancipated ; first came their children ; secondly, their brothers and sisters ; thirdly, the ascendant emancipator. 3. Justinian placed uterine brothers and sisters, and their children, on the same footing as consanguinei and their children. 4. The mother was allowed to succeed to her children by the senatus-consultum Tertullianum, and children to their mother by the senatus- consultant Oiyliitianum. As tliis is a subject of some complexity, it is treated separately at the end of this note. 5. Grandchildren succeeded to their grandmother by a constitution of Yalentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius. (Tit. 4. 1.) There were also two other points, besides the admission of these persons excluded by the strict definition of agnati, in which the law underwent alterations. First, the Twelve Tables made no distinction of sex in the agnati ; the prudentes limited the succession of females to the second de2:ree. Justinian restored the law of the Twelve Tables on this point, and permitted no distinction of sex. (Tit. 2. 3.) Secondly, under the law of the Twelve Tables, there was no devolution among the agnati', if the nearest refused, the more remote could not come in their place ; «Justinian permitted such a devolution to take place. (Tit. 2. 7.) To have a place in the succession under the S. C. TertuUia- num, the mother must have the jus liberorum, the privileges accorded to free persons having three or freed persons having four children, and she had not a definite place, but one varying ac- cording as there were or were not other persons to preclude or share her claim. The chief provisions of the law on this head may be stated as follows : — We will first consider the position of the mother, having the jus Uherorurn, when the father is dead. 1. If her son died leaving children, his children, if in his family, w^ould succeed as sui heredes. But these children might be in an adoptive family, and so have no claim, previously to Justinian's legislation, to the in- lieritance of their natural father. If there were agnati of the d.eccased, then the conflict was between the mother and these agnatic and tlie mother excluded them. If there were no agnati, then the conflict was between the mother and the children as cognati, and the children excluded the mother. (D. xxxviii. 17. 2. 9.) If her daughter died leaving children, they shared with the dau2;hter's mother under the *S'. C. Tertullianum LIB. III. TIT. IV. 285 (Tit. 4. pr.), and excluded her under a constitution of Gratian. 2. If her son or daughter died childless and without brothers or sisters living, the mother took. If there was a brother of the deceased, he excluded the mother and shared with the sisters, if any. If there were no brothers, but there were sisters, the mother shared with them. (Tit. 3. 3.) Until we get to the legislation of Justinian, it is only of brothers and sisters by the same father, con- san(/uinei{cB), thutyve are speaking. 3. Under the later emperors, previously to Justinian, the position of tlie mother with regard to acpiati of the third or a remoter degree was changed under a constitution of Constantine. If the mother had not the jus Uberorum.^ she was no longer excluded by such agnatic but took one- third of the inheritance. If she had the jus liber oruiriy she no longer excluded them altogether, but only took two-thirds. Under a constitution of Theodosius she was placed in the same position with regard to a brother of the deceased who had passed out of the family. (Tit. 3. 5.) Secondly, we will take the case of the father as w^ell as the mother having the jus llherorum being alive. 1. The father took if in the same family wdth the deceased chikl ; but the father might have been emancipated or given in adoption, and the deceased child not. Here, if there were ngnati of the deceased, the mother was excluded if there was a brother of \^q deceased amono; the agnati ; she shared with sisters, and excluded remoter agnati. If there were no agnati, then the conflict was between the father as one of the cognati and the mother, and then the father excluded the mother. (D. xxxviii. 17. 2. 17.) 2. If there was a grand- father and the father was dead, the mother excluded the grand- father ; but if the father was living and the deceased had been emancipated, then, if the mother was preferred to the grand- father, the father would be preferred to the mother (Tit. 3. 3), and the grandfather to the father. So it was simpler to say that the grandfather w^as preferred to the mother. (D. xxxviii. 17. 5. 2.) It is said in the text of Tit. 3. 3. that the mother is pre- ferred to the grandfather, but not to the father when the conflict is directly between them. If the father was living in the case just mentioned, the conflict was not between the mother and the grandfather, but between the mother and the father, and it -was through the l\ither that the grandfather v/as preferred, just as the mother was preferred to the father when the conflict was not between them directly, but between the mother and the agnati as noticed in the foregoing case (No. 1). Justinian made the following changes affecting the position of the mother. 1. He entirel}^ did away with t\\QJus liber orum, and put all mothers on an equality. (Tit. 3. 5.) 2. He put eman- cipated and uterine brothers and sisters and their children on a level with consanguinei[cE), and they therefore had to be taken into account when the mother's position had to be determined with regard to the brothers and sisters of the deceased. 286 LIB. III. TIT. V. Some other minor points as to the succession of mothers and children are worth noticing. (1) The rule as to there being no devolution among ar/nati did not apply to the mother. If the agnatl who preceded her refused, she took ; if she refused, the ogiiati Avhom she preceded took. (D. xxxviii. 17. 29. 14. 20.) (2) The minima capitis deminutio did not interfere with succes- sions under the S. C. Tertullianum or Or jjhitianum (Tlit. 4. 2); and (3) children born of an uncertain father inherited from their mother under the S, C. Orphitianum (Tit. 4. 3), and their mother from them under the S. C. Tertullianum {Tit, 3. 7). (4) Mothers were excluded from succeeding to their children dying under the age of puberty, if they had not provided them with tutors. (Tit. 3. 6.) Tit. V. DE SUCCESSIOXE COGNATOKUM. Post siios lieredes, eosque quos After tlie sui heredes and those inter suos heredes pmetor et consti- whom the praetor and the constitu- tutiones vocant, et post legitunos, tions call to inherit among the sui quorum numero sunt agnati, et hi heredes, and after the legal heirs, that quos in locum agnatorum tam is, the agnati and those whom the supradicta senatus-consulta quam above-mentioned senatus-consulta and nostra erexit constitutio, proximos our constitution have placed among cognatos prsetor vocat. the agnati, the praetor calls the nearest cognati. D. xxxviii. 15. 1 ; D. xxxviii. 7. 2. 4. The law of the Twelve Tables recognised only the succession of, (1) szii heredes; (2) agnati; (3) gentiles. If there were no gentiles, the inheritance lapsed to the state. In plebeian families, or rather in such plebeian families as were not parts of a 23lebeian gens, if there were no agnati, the inheritance would lapse at once. The subject of gentilitas is too obscure, and repays investiga- tion too little, to permit us to enter into it here. Probably the original notion of gentiles was that of members of some pure uncorrupted patrician stock, though not necessarily of the same descent, but bearing the same name, and having the same sacra. (See Introd. sec. 2.) Probably, also, freedmen and clients of gentiles were, in some degree, considered as themselves gentiles ; probably if their property was not claimed by their patron, it went to the members of his geiis, but they had not any claim on the property of any other gentilis. We know also that there were plebeian gentes, formed probably by the marriage of a pa- trician with a plebeian before the plehs received the conniibium. Members of plebeian gentes would, we may suppose, have the rights of gentilitas towards other members of the same plebeian gens, bat whether they had them towards the members of the patrician gens, from which they were an offset, is wholly uncer- tain. Of the mode in which the gentiles took the inheritance, we LIE. III. TIT. V. 287 know nothing, nor at liow late a period of history the gentes were still really in existence. Gains {\\i. 17) treats the subject as one of mere antiquarian interest. Probably at the time of the praetors' legislation there were few families that could boast a descent so pure and accurately known as to satisfy the requisites of gentilitas. At any rate, the pri\3tors felt themselves at liberty to favour, in every way, the tie of blood, and they accordingly called the cognati to the succession. 1. It is the natural relationship that is here looked to ; thus agnati who have undergone a capitis demi- nutio and their descendants are not included among the legal heirs by the law of the Twelve Tables, but they are called by the praetor in the third order. We must except an emanci- pated brother or sister, but not their children. For the law of Anastasius, calling an emancipated brother or sister, together with brothers whose rights still exist unaltered, to the legal succession of their brother or sister, not, indeed, giving them an equal share, but making a deduction set forth in the constitution, prefers, them to all agnati of an inferior de- gree, even though tliese agnati have undergone no capitis deminutio, and> of course, prefers them to all cognati. Gai. iii. 21. 27 ; C. v. 30. 4. We have already spoken of this lex Anastasiana in the note to Tit. 2. 4, and noticed the constitution of 534, by which Jus- tinian admitted as agnati the children of emancipated brothers and sisters, and did away with the deduction mentioned in the text, namely, that of one-fourth. 2. Hos etiam qui per feminini 2. Collateral relations united only sexus personas ex transverso cog- by the female line are also called by natione junguntur, tertio gradu the praetor in the third order of suc- XDroximitatis nomine pra3tor ad sue- cession, according to their proximity, cessionem vocat. Gai. iii. 30. 1. Qua parte naturalis cognatio specta^tur ; nam agnati capite demi- nuti, quique ex his progeniti sunt, ex lege duodecim tabularum inter legitimos non habentur, sed a pras- tore tertio ordine vocantur. Exceptis solis tantummodo fratre et sorore emancipatis, non etiam liberis eo- rum, quos lex Anastasiana cum fra- tribus integri juris constitutis vocat quidem ad legitimam fratris heredi- tatem sive sororis, non eequis tamen partibus, sed cum aliqua deminu- tione quam facile est ex ipsius con- stitutionis verbis coUigere. Aliis vero agnatis inferioris gradus, licet capitis deminutionem passi non sunt, tamen eos anteponit, et procul dubio coofnatis. 3. Liberi quoque qui in adoptiva familia sunt, ad naturalium paren- tmn hereditatem hoc eodem gradu vocantur. Gai. 3. Children, who are in an adoptive family, are likewise called in the third order of succession to the inheritance of their natural parents. iii. 31. Justinian's change in the law of adoption lelt the adoptive child, unless adopted by an ascendant, in his natural family, and, therefore, he could come in as a suus heres, or agnatus, and not merely as a cognatus. But the text would still be applicable 288 LIB. III. TIT. VI. to persons adopted by an ascendant and to persons &vi juris, who arroGfated themselves. 4. Vulgo qufiesitos nullum habere agnatum maiiifestuni est, cum agna- tic a patre, cognatio a ma,tre sit : lii autem nullum patrem habere intel- liguntur. Eadem ratione nee inter se quiclem possunt vicleri consan- guinei esse, quia consanguinitatis jus species est agnp.tionis ; tantum igitur cognati sunt sibi, sicut et matris cognatis. Itaque omnibus istis ea parte competit bonorum possessio, qua proximitatis nomine cognati vocantur. 4. It is manifest that children born of an uncertain father have no wjuciti, inasmuch as agnation proceeds from the father, cognation from the mother, and such children are looked upon as having no father. And, for the same reason, consanguinity cannot be said to subsist between these children, be- cause consanguinity is a species of agnation. They can, therefore, only be allied to each other as cognati by being related by their mother ; and it is for this reason that all such children are admitted to the possession of goods, which calls the cognati according to their degree of proximity. D. xxxviii. 8. 2. 4. 5. Hoc loco et illud necessario ad- monendi sumus, agnationis quidem jure admitti aliquem ad hereditatem, etsi decimo gradu sit, sive de lege cluodecim tabularum quseramus, sive de edicto quo prsetor legitimis here- 4ibus daturum bonorum possessio- nem pollicetur. Proximitatis vero nomine iis solis prrstor promittit bonorum possessionem, qui usque .ad sextum gradum cognationis sunt, et ex septimo a sobrino sobrinaque ;iiato nata3ve. 5. Here we may observe, that by right of agnation any one may be admitted to inherit, although in the tenth degree, both by the law of the Twelve Tables, and by the edict in which the prajtor promises that he will give the possession of goods to the legal heirs. But the prsetor pro- mises the possession of goods to cog- natl according to their proximity only as far as the sixth degree of cognation, and in the seventh degree to those cognati who are the children of a second cousin. D. xxxviii. IG. 2. 2. 4; D. xxxviii. 8. 1. 3 ; D. xxxviii. 8. 9. The acfiiati were not limited by the tenth degree. (See Tit. ■€. 12.) This degree is only given as an instance of how f;jr the succession might go. But the sixth degree vv-as the limit, with the exception given in the text, of the succession of cognati. Tit. VI. DE GRADIBUS COGNATIONIS. Hoc loco necessarium est expo- nere quemadmodum gradus cogna- tionis numerentur : quare in primis admonendi sumus cognationem •aliam supra numerari, aliam infra, aliam ex transverso, quae etiam a latere dicitur. Superior cognatio est parentum, inferior liberorum, •ex transverso fratrum sororumve, eorumque qui qussve ex his proge- nerantur, et convenienter patrui, umitse, avunculi, materterse. Et superior quidem et inferior cognatio It is necessary to explain here how the degrees of cognation are com- puted ; and first we must observe, that one cognation is reckoned by ascending, a second by descending, and a third by going transversely, or, as it is also called, collaterally. The cognation reckoned by ascending is that of ascendants ; that reckoned by descending is that of descendants ; that reckoned transversely is that of brothers and sisters, and their issue, and consequently that of uncles and LIB. III. TIT. VI. 289 a primo gradii incipit ; at ea quae ex aunts, whether paternal or maternal. transverse numeratur, a secundo. In the ascending and descending cog- nation the nearest cognatus is in the first degree; in the transverse, the nearest is in the second. D. xxxviii. 10. 1, pr. and 1. 1. Primo gradu est supra pater 1. In the first degree are, ascend- mater, infra filius filia. ing, a father or a mother ; descend- ing, a son or a daughter. D. xxxviii. 10. 1. 3. 2. Secundo, supra avus avia, infra 2. In the second degree are, as- nepos neptis, ex transverso frater cending, a grandfather or a grand- soror. mother ; descending, a grandson or granddaughter ; in the collateral line, a brother or a sister. D. xxxviii. 10. 1. 4. 3. Tertio, supra proavus proavia, infra pronepos proneptis, ex trans- verso fratris sororisque filius filia, et convenienter patruus amita, avun- culus matertera. Patruus est frater patris, qui Greece 7ra-fj(tiog vocatur; avunculus est frater matris, qui apud Greecos proprie p.i)ti.h?)uc et promis- cue ffiof dicitur. Amita est patris soror, matertera vero matris soror : utraque ^tia, vel apud quosdam rj;t-<(,- appellatur. 3. In the third degree are, ascend- ing, a great-grandfather or a great- grandmother ; descending, a great- grandson or great - granddaughter ; in the collateral line, the son or daughter of a brother or sister ; and so accordingly are an uncle or an aunt, whether paternal or maternal. Patruus is a father's brother, called in Greek -n-arfx^ng ; avunculus is a mother's brother, in Greek ^//ro^jJof ; f/iiof is applied indifierently to either; amita is a father's sister, matertera a mother's sister, and each is called in Greek fct^a, indifierently, and. some- times TtjI-tL. D. xxxviii. 10. 1. 5 ; D. xxxviii. 10. 10. 14. Schraecler substitutes in the text Trdrpois and /jbrjTpcjs, which are the forms used in classical Greek. 4. Quarto gradu, supra abavus abavia, mfra abnepos abneptis, ex transverso fratris sororisque nepos neptis, et convenienter patruus mag- nus amita magna, id est, avi frater et soror ; item avunculus magnus et matertera magna, id est, avise fra- ter et soror ; consobrinus consobrina, id est, qui quseve ex fratribus aut sororibus progenerantur. Sed qui- dam recte consobrinos eos proprie dici putant, qui ex duabus sororibus progenerantur, quasi consororinos ; eos vero qui ex duobus fratribus progenerantur, proprie fratres pa- trueles vocari : si autem ex duobus fratribus fili^e nascuntur, sorores patrueles appellari; at eos qui ex fratre et sorore propagantur, ami- 4. In the fourth degree are, as- cending, a great-great-grandfather, or a great-great-grandmother ; de- scending, a great-great-grandson, or a great-great-granddaughter; in the collateral line, the grandson or the granddaughter of a brother or a sister ; as also a great-uncle or great- aunt, paternal, that is, the brother or sister of a grandfather; or maternal, that is, the brother or sister of a grandmother; and first cousins, that is, the cMldren of brothers or sisters ; but to speak strictly, according to some, it is the children of sisters that are properly called consohrlni, as if consororini ; the children of bro- thers are properly fratres patrueles, if males ; sorores patrueles, if females ; U 290 LIB. III. TIT. VI. tinos proprie dici. Amitas tuae filii the children of a "brother and of a consobrinum te appellant, tu illos sister are properly amitini ; the chil- amitinos. dren of your amita (aunt by tli€ father's side) call you consobrinus. and you call them amitmi. D. xxxviii. 10. L 6. We see from the concluding words of this paragraph, thai consobrinus was used in another sense than its strict one of ' on€ of the children of two sisters.' 5. In the fifth degree are, ascending, a great-grandfather's grandfather, oi a great-grandfather's grandmother descending, a gTeat-grandson or a great-granddaughter of a grandson oi granddaughter ; in the collateral line, a great-grandson or great-grand- daughter of a brother or sister, as also a great-grandfather's brother oi sister, or a great-grandmother's bro- ther or sister ; also, the son or daughtei of a first cousin, that is, of a f rater oi soror patruelis, of a consobrinus oi consobriyia, or of an amitinus or amir Una ; also cousins who precede by a degree second cousins, that is, the son or daughter of a great-uncle oi great-aunt, paternal or maternal. D. xxxviii. 10. 1. 7. Propior sobrino is, to use the exact equivalent, a first cousin once removed. He is one degree nearer (^propior) than a sobrinus or second cousin. 5. Quinto, supra atavus atavia, infra adneptos adneptis, ex trans- verso fratris sororisque pronepos proneptis, et convenienter propa- truus proamita, id est, proavi frater et soror ; proavunculus promater- tera, id est, proaviae frater et soror. Item fratris patruelis sororis patru- elis, consobrini consobrinae, amitini amitinae filius filia, propior sobrino propior sobrina. Hi sunt patrui magni amitae magnae, avunculi magni materterae magnas filius filia. 6. Sexto gradu, supra tritavus tritavia, infra trinepos trineptis, ex transverso fratris sororisque abne- pos abneptis, et convenienter ab- patruus abamita, id est, abavi frater et soror, abavunculus abmatertera, id est, abaviae frater et soror. Item sobrini sobrinaeque, id est, qui quaeve ex fratribus vel sororibus patruelibus vel consobrinis vel ami- tinis progenerantur. 6. In the sixth degree are, ascend- ing, a great - grandfather's great - grandfather, or a great-grandfather's great-grandmother ; descending, the great-grandson or great-granddaugh- ter of a great-grandson or a great- granddaughter ; in the collateral line, a great-great-grandson or a great- great-granddaughter of a brother or sister ; as also, a great-great-grand- father's brother or sister, and a great- great-grandmother's brother or sister ; also, second cousins, that is, the sons and daughters of first cousins in general, whether the first cousins are sprung from two brothers or two sisters, or a brother and a sister. D. xxxviii. 10. 3. The nomenclature proper to the different degrees stops here, because the sixth degree was the limit of cognation. 7. Hactenus ostendisse sufiiciet, 7. It is sufiicient to have showTi quemadmodum gradus cognationis thus far how degrees of cognation are LIE. III. TIT. VI. 291 numerentur ; namque ex his palam est intelligere qiiemadniodum ulte- riores quoqiie gradus niimerare de- beamus, quippe semper generata quaeque persona gradum adjiciat : ut longe facilius sit respondere quoto quisque gradu sit, quam pro- pria cognationis appellatione qiiem- quam denotare. reckoned ; and, from the examples given, the more remote degrees may be computed ; for each generation always adds one degree ; so that it is much easier to determine in what degree any person is related to an- other than to denote such person by his proper term of cognation. D. xxxviii. 10. 10. 9. 8. Agnationis quoque gradus eo- 8. The degrees of agnation are dem modo numerantur. reckoned in the same manner. 9. Sed cum magis Veritas oculata fide quam per aures animis hominum infigitur, ideo necessarium duximus post narrationem graduum etiam eos pra3senti libro inscribi, quatenus possint et auribus et oculoriim in- spectione adolescentes perfectissi- mam graduum doctrinam adipisci. 9. But as truth is fixed in the mind much better by the eye than by the ear, we have thought it necessary to subjoin, to the account given of the degrees, a table of them, that the young student, both by hearing and by seeing, may gain a perfect know- ledge of them. Justinian intended that a scheme of relationship shoukl be here inserted ; but as the degrees of relationship are sufficiently obvious, it is scarcely necessary to place a scheme before the eyes of the modern reader. 10. lUud certum est, ad serviles cognationes illam partem edicti, qua proximitatis nomine bonorum pos- sessio promittitur, non pertinere ; nam nee uUa antiqua lege talis cog- natio computabatur. Sed nostra constitutione quam pro jure patro- natus fecimus (quod jus usque ad nostra tempora satis obscurum atque nube plenum et undique confusum fuerat) et hoc humanitate sugge- rente concessimus, ut si quis in ser- vili consortio constitutus liberum vel liberos habuerit sive ex libera sive ex servilis conditionis muliere, vel contra serva mulier ex libero vel servo habuerit liberos cujuscumque sexus, et ad libertatem his perveni- entibus, et ii qui ex servili ventre nati sunt libertatem meruerint, vel dum mulieres liberie erant, ipsi in servitute eos habuerint, et postea ad libertatem pervenerint : ut hi omnes ad successionem patris vel matris veniant, patronatus jure in hac parte sopito. Hos enim liberos, non sohim in suorum parentum successionem, sed etiam alteram in alterius mutuam successionem vo- cavimus : ex ilia lege specialiter eos vocantes, sive soli inveniantur qui in servitute nati et postea manu- 10. It is certain that the part of the edict in which the possession of goods is promised according to the degree of proximity, does not apply to servile cognation, which was not recognised by any ancient law. But, by our con- stitution concerning the right of pa- tronage, a right hitherto so obscure, so cloudy and confused, we have enacted, from a feeling of humanity, that if a slave shall have a child or children, either by a free woman or a slave, and reciprocally if a female slave shall have a child or children of either sex by a freeman or a slave, then if the father and mother are enfranchised, and the children, whose mother was a slave, become also free, or if the children of a free mother have a slave as father, and this slave afterwards attain his freedom, these children shall all succeed to their father or mother, the right of patron- age in this case lying dormant. And we have called these children to suc- ceed not only to their parents, but also mutually to each other, and thnt whether they have all been born in servitude and afterwards enfrancliised, or whether they succeed with others who were conceived after the en- franchisement of their parents ; and V 2 292 LIB. III. TIT. VI. missi sunt, sive una cum aliis qui also whether they have all the same post libertatem parentum concept! father and mother, or have a different sunt, sive ex eodem patre vel ex father or mother, exactly as would be eadem matre, sive ex aliis, ad simi- the case with the issue of parents litudinem eorum qui ex justis nup- legally married, tiis procreati sunt. D. xxxviii. 8. 1, 2. Not even in tlie case of emancipated slaves did the law recog- nise the claims of the kin of the slave to succeed to him ; all went to the patron if there were no sui heredes. 11. Repetitis itaque omnibus quae jam tradidimus, apparet non semper eos qui parem gradum eognationis obtinent, pariter vocari ; eoque am- plius ne eum quidem qui proximior sit cognatus, semper potiorem esse. Cum enim prima causa sit suorum heredum et eorum quos inter suos heredes jam enumeravimus, apparet pronepotem vel abnepotem defuncti potiorem esse quam fratrem aut patrem matremque defuncti ; cum alioquin pater quidem et mater (ut supra quoque tradidimus) primum gradum eognationis obtineant, fra- ter vero secundum, pronepos autem tertio gradu sit cognatus, et abnepos quarto, Nee interest in potestate morientis fuerit, an non, quod vel emancipatus vel ex emancipato, aut feminino sexu propagatus est. 11. To recapitulate what we have Baid on this subject, it appears that those who are in the same degree of cognation are not always called equally to the succession ; and fur- ther, that even the nearest in degree of cognation is not always preferred. For, as the first place is given to sui heredes, and to those who are num- bered with them, it is evident that the great-grandson or great-great- grandson is preferred to the brother or even the father or mother of the deceased, although a father and mother (as we have before observed) are in the first degree of cognation, a brother in the second, a great- grandson in the third, and a great- great-grandson in the fourth ; neither does it make any difference whether the descendants were under the power of the deceased at the time of his death, or out of his power, either by» being themselves emancipated, or byy being the children of those who were nor whether they were descended D. so by the female line. xxxviii. 10. 1, 2. 12. Amotis quoque suis heredibus, et quos inter suos heredes vocari diximus, agnatus qui integrum jus agnationis habet, etiamsi longissimo gradu sit, plerumque potior habetur quam proximior cognatus ; nam pa- trui nepos vel pronepos avunculo vel materterse prsef ertur. Totiens igitur dicimus, aut potiorem haberi eum qui proximiorem gradum eogna- tionis obtinet, aut pariter vocari eos qui cognati sunt, quotiens neque suorum heredum jure quique inter suos heredes sunt, neque agnationis jure aliquis prajferri debeat, secun- dum ea qua? tradidimus. Exceptis fratre et sorore emancij)atis, qui ad successionem fratrum vel sororum vocantur ; qui et'si capite deminuti i 12. But, when there are no sui heredes, nor any of those who are called with them, then an agnatus who has retained his full rights, although he be in the most distant degree, is generally preferred to a cognatus in a nearer degree ; thus the grandson or great-grandson of a paternal uncle is preferred to a ma- ternal uncle or aunt. Thus, when we say that the nearest in degree of cognation is called to the succession, or if there be many in the same de- gree, that they are all called equally, we only say so because there are no sui heredes, nor any of those who are called with them, nor any one who , ought to be preferred by right of agnatio, according to the principles i LIB. III. TIT. VII. 293 sunt, tamen prseferuntiir ceteris ul- we have laid down. And we must terioris gradus agnatis. notice the exception made in the case of an emancipated brother and sister who are called to the succession of their brothers and sisters ; for, al- though they have suffered a capitis demi- nutio, they are nevertheless preferred to all agnati of a more remote degree. Gal iii. 27. 29 : C. v. 30. 40. Tit. VII. DE SUCCESSIONE LIBERTOKUM. Nunc de libertorum bonis videa- We will now speak of succession to mus. Olim itaque licebat liberto freedmen. A freedman might for- patronum suum impune testamento merly, with impunity, omit in his prseterire ; nam ita demum lex duo- testament any mention of his patron, decim tabularum ad hereditatem for the law of the Twelve Tables called liberti vocabat patron um, si intes- the patron to the inheritance only tatus mortuus esset libertus nullo when the freedman died intestate suo herede relicto : itaque intestato without leaving any suus heres. There- quoque mortuo liberto, si is suum fore, though he had died intestate, yet heredem reliquisset, patrono nihil in if he had left a suus heres, the patron bonis ejus juris erat. Et si quidem had no claim upon his estate. And ex naturalibus liberis aliquem suum when the suus heres was a natural child heredem reliquisset, nulla videbatur of the deceased, the patron had no querela ; si vero adoptivus filius cause of complaint ; but when the suus fuisset, aperte iniquum erat niliil heres was only an adopted son, it was juris patrono superesse. . manifestly unjust that the patron should have no claim. Gal iii. 39, 40. The law of the Twelve Tables regulated the succession to enfranchised slaves as follows ; an enfranchised slave had no agnati, for he belonged to no civil family ; but he might marry and found a family of his own, and then his children would be his sui heredes, or he might gain sui heredes by adoption. If he died intestate, his sui heredes succeeded to him ; and in default of sui heredes, the patron, or, if the patron were dead, the children of the patron, took the place of agnati, and received the inherit- ance. The enfranchised slave had, however, full power to make a testament, and might pass over both his own sui heredes and his patron. A female slavCj however, if emancipated, could not ex- clude the patron from her inheritance ; for she could have no sui heredes, being a woman ; and as she was always, on account of her sex, considered under the tutela of her patron, she was inca- pable of making a testament, unless with the consent of her patron. (Ulp. Reg. 29. 2 ; Gai. iii. 43.) 1, Qua de causa, postea prsetoris 1. This unfairness in the law was edicto hcec juris iniquitas emendata therefore afterwards amended by the est. Sive enim faciebat testamentum edict of the prsetor. Every freedman libertus, jubebatur ita testari ut pa- who made a testament was commanded trono partem dimidiam bonorum to make such a disposition of his pro- 294 LIB. III. TIT. VII. siiorum relinqueret, et si aut nihil aut minus parte dimidia reliquerat, dabatur patrono contra tabulas tes- tamenti partis dimidise bonorum possessio ; sive intestatus morieba- tiir siio herede relicto filio adoj^tivo, dabatur aeque patrono contra hunc suum heredem partis dimidise bo- norum possessio. Prodesse autem liberto solebant ad excludendum patronum naturales liberi, non solum quos in potestate mortis tempore habebat, sed etiam emancipati et in adoptionem dati, si modo ex aliqua parte scripti heredes erant, aut prse- teriti contra tabulas bonorum pos- sessionem ex edicto petierant ; nam exheredati nullo modo repellebant patronum. perty as to leave one half to his patron; and, if the testator left him nothing, or less than a half, then the possession of half was given to the patron contra tabulas. And if a freedman died intes- tate, leaving an adopted son as his suus heres, still the possession of a half was given to the patron. But the patron was excluded by the natural children of a freedman, not only by those in his power at the time of his death, but by those children also who had been emancipated, or given in adoption, provided that they were in- stituted heirs for any part, or, in case they were omitted, had demanded the possession contra tabulas, under the praetorian edict. For disinherited chil- dren did not ever exclude the patron. Gai. iii. 41. The praetor considered it hard that a testament, or s?ii heredes gained by adoption, or by the marriage of a wife in manu, should exclude the patron. This was to exclude him by purely volun- tary acts of the slave. If the slave had children really born to him, that constituted a good reason why the patron should be excluded, and in this case the prastor did not interfere. It is to be observed that the praetor left the law as it was if it was a patrona, or a female child of the patronus^ who was excluded (Gai. iii. 49 ; Ulp. Reg. 29. 4) ; but by the lex Papia Poppcea women with a certain number of children were placed on a level with men in this respect. 2. Postea lege Papia adaucta sunt jura patronorum qui locupletiores libertos habebant ; cautum est enim ut ex bonis ejus qui sestertium cen- tum millium patrimonium relique- rat, et pauciores quam tres liberos habebat, sive is testamento facto sive intestato mortuus erat, virilis pars patrono deberetur. Itaque, cum unum quidem filium filiamve heredem reliquerat libertus, perinde pars dimidia debebatur patrono, ac si is sine uUo filio filiave iestatus decessisset : cum vero duos duasve heredes reliquerat, tertia pars de- bebatur patrono. Si tres reliquerat, repellebatur patronus. 2. But afterwards the rights of patrons, who had wealthy freedmen, were enlarged by the lex Papia, which provides that he shall have one equal share in the distribution of the effects of his freedman, whether dying testate or intestate, if the freedman has left a j)atrimony of a hundred thousand ses- terces, and fewer than three children. Thus, if a freedman possessed of such a fortune has left only one son or daughter as heir, a half is due to the patron, exactly as if the deceased had died testate, without having any son or daughter. But, when there are two heirs, male or female, a third part only is due to the patron ; and, when there are three, the patron is wholly excluded. Gai. iii. 42. 3. Sed nostra constitutio quam pro omnium notione Grasca lingua compendioso tractatu habito compo- 3. But our constitution, published in a compendious form, and in the Greek language, for the benefit of all LIB. III. TIT, VII. 295 suimus, ita hujiismodi ca^^sas defini- vit, ut si qiiidem libertus vel liberta minorescentenariis sint, id est, minus centum aureis liabeant substantiam (sic enim legis Papise summam inter- pretati sumus, ut pro mille sestertiis unus aureus computetur), nullum locum liabeat patronus in eorum successionem, si tamen testamentum fecerint ; sin autem intestati deces- serint nuUo liberorum relicto, tunc patronatus jus (quod erat ex lege duodecim tabularum) integrum re- servavit. Cum vero majores cente- nariis sint, si heredes vel bonorum possessores liberos liabeant, sive unum sive plures cujuscumque sexus vel gradus, ad eos successionem parentum deduximus, patronis om- nibus una cum sua progenie semotis ; sin autem sine liberis decesserint, si quidem intestati, ad omnem here- ditatem patronos patronasque voca- vimus. Si vero testamentum quidem fecerint, patronos autem vel patronas preeterierint, cum nullos liberos ha- berent, vel habentes eos exhereda- verint, vel mater sive avus maternus eos prseterierit, ita ut non possint argui inofRciosa eorum testamenta, tunc ex nostra constitutione per bonorum possessionem contra ta- bulas, non dimidiam (ut antea) sed tertiam partem bonorum liberti con- sequantur, vel quod deest eis ex constitutione nostra repleatur, si quando minus tertia parte bonorum suorum libertus vel liberta eis reli- querit ; ita sine onere, ut nee liberis liberti libertseve ex ea parte legata vel fideicommissa prsestentur, sed ad coheredes hoc onus redundaret : multis aliis casibus a nobis in pr?e- fata constitutione congregatis quos necessaries esse ad hujusmodi juris dispositionem perspeximus, ut tam patroni patroneeque quam liberi eorum, nee non qui ex transverso latere veniunt usque ad quintum gradum, ad successionem libertorum vocentur, sicut ex ea constitutione intelligendum est, ut si ejusdem patroni vel patronse, vel duorum duarum pluriumve liberi sint, qui proximior est ad liberti seu libertse vocetur successionem, et in capita non in stirpes dividatur successio, eodem modo et in iis qui ex trans- verso latere veniunt servando. Pene enim consonantia jura ingenuitatis nations, established the following rules. If a freedman or freedwoman are less than centenarii, i.e. when their fortune does not reach a hundred aurei (the amount at which we estimated the sum mentioned in the lex Papia, counting one aureus for a thousand sesterces), the patron shall not be entitled to any share in the succession, provided the deceased has made a testament. But where a freed man or woman dies in- testate, and without children, the right of patronage is maintained undimi- nished, and is as it formerly was, according to the law of the Twelve Tables. But if a freed person leave more than a hundred aurei, and has one child or several, whatever be their sex or degree, as his heirs or the possessors of his goods, such child or children shall succeed their parent to the exclusion of every patron and his issue ; but if he die without children and intestate, we have called the pa- trons or patronesses to his whole inheritance. If he has made a tes- tament, omitting his patron, and has left no children, or has disinherited them, or if a mother or maternal grandfather has omitted them, so how- ever that such testaments cannot be attacked as inofficious, then, according to our constitution, the patron shall succeed by a possession contra tahulas, not to a half as formerly, but to the third part of the estate of the deceased freedman, or shall have any deficiency made up to him in case the freed man or woman has left him a less share than a third of his or her estate. But this third part shall not be subject to any charge, so much so that it shall not furnish anything towards any legacies or fideicommissa, even though given for the benefit of the children of the deceased ; but the whole burden shall fall exclusively on the co-heirs of the patron. In the same constitution we have collected many other decisions which we thought necessary to settle the law on the subject. Thus, pa- trons and patronesses, their children and collateral relations, so far as the fifth degree, are called to the succes- sion of their freedmen and freed- women, as may be seen in the con- stitution itself. And, if there be several children, whether of one, two, or more patrons or patronesses, the nearest in degree is called to the sue- 296 LIB. III. TIT. VII. et libertinitatis fecimus. in successionibus cession of the freedman or freedwoman ; and the estate is divided per capita and not per stirpes. It is the same with colla- terals ; for we have made the laws of suc- cession almost the same as regards per- sons free born and enfranchised slaves. Doing away with all distinction of sex, and making the claim of the patrona the same as that of the patronus, and the position of the liberta the same as that of the libertus, Justinian thus regu- lates the succession ah intestato : first come the children of the freedman, whether in his power or not, or even if born before he was enfranchised ; then, if he has no children, come the patron and his descendants ; in default of these, the collaterals of the patron to the fifth degree. If the freedman has children, he can make any testament he pleases ; if he has not, he can only make what testament he pleases provided his fortune is less than one hundred aurei; if it is more, he must leave the patron one unen- cumbered third, or the law will give this third contra tabulas. 4. Sed hsec de iis libertinis hodie dicenda sunt, qui in civitatem Ro- manam pervenerunt, cum nee sunt alii liberti, simul dedititiis et La- tinis sublatis ; cum Latinorum legi- timse successiones nullse penitus erant, qui, licet ut liberi vitam suam peragebant, attamen ipso ultimo spiritu simul animam atque liberta- tem amittebant, et quasi servorum ita bona eorum jure quodammodo peculii ex lege Junia manumissores detinebant. Postea vero senatus- consulto Largiano cautum fuerat, ut liberi manumissoris non nomi- natim exheredati facti extraneis heredibus eorum in bonis Latino- rum prseponerentur. Quibus super- venit etiam divi Trajani edictum, quod eumdem hominem. si invito vel ignorante patrono ad civitatem venire ex beneficio principis festi- navit, faciebat vivum quidem civem Romanum, Latinum vero morien- tem. Sed nostra constitutione, prop- ter hujusmodi conditionum. vices et alias difficultates, cum ipsis Latiiiis etiam legem Juniam et senatus-consultum Largianum et edictum divi Trajani in perpetuum deleri censuimus, ut omnes liberti civitate Romana fruantur, et mira- bili modo quibusdam adjectionibus ipsas vias qu?e in Latinitatem du- cebant, ad civitatem Romanam ca- piendam transposuimus. Gai. iii. 56-58. 63- 4. What we have said relates in these days to freedmen who are citi- zens of Rome ; for there are now no others, there being no more dedltitii or Latinl. And the Latini never en- joyed any legal right of succession ; for although they lived as free, j^et, with their last breath, they lost at once their life and liberty : and their goods, like those of slaves, were claimed by their manumittor, as a kind of pecu- lium, by virtue of the lex Junia Norbana. It was afterwards provided by the senatus-consultum Largianum, that the children of a manumittor, not disinherited by name, should, in the succession to the goods of a Latin, be preferred to any strangers whom a manumittor might institute his heirs. The edict of the Emperor Trajan fol- lowed, by which, if a slave, either against the will or without the know- ledge of his patron, had obtained Roman citizenship by favour of the emperor, he was regarded as free during his life, but at his death was looked on as a Latin. But we, being dissatisfied with the difficulties attending these changes of condition, have thought proper, by our constitution, for ever to abolish the Latini, and with them the lex Junia, the senatus-consultum Largia- num, and the edict of Trajan ; so that all freedmen whatever become citizens of Rome. And we have happily con- trived, by some additional dispositions, that the manner of conferring the free- dom of Latins has now become the man- ner of conferring Roman citizenship. 65. 71-73 ; C. vii. 6. LIB. III. TIT. VIII. 297 Latini Juniani. See Bk. i. Tit. 5. 3. Senatus-consulto Largiano. This senatus-consultum was passed in the time of Claudius, and in the consulate of Lupus and Largus. (Gai. iii. 63-67.) As we might infer from the text, the rights of the children of the patron to the succession of a Latinus Junianus remained if they were disinherited in any other way than by name. By the edict of Trajan the rights of the patron were, in the case mentioned in the text, restored at the death of a Latinus exactly as if the Latinus had never become a citizen by imperial rescript. (Gai. iii. 72.) As to the modes in which a Latinus could acquire the rights of full citizenship, see note on Bk. i. Tit. 5. 3. Tit. YIII. DE ASSIGNATIONE LIBERTORUM. In summa, quod ad bona liberto- rum, admonendi sumus censiiisse senatum, ut quamvis ad omnes pa- tron! liberos qui ejusdem gradus sunt, fequaliter bona libertorum pertineant, tamen bcere parent! un! ex l!ber!s assignare libertum : ut post mortem ejus solus is patronus habeatur cui assignatus est, et ceteri liber! qui ipsi quoqiie ad eadem bona, nulla assignatione interveni- ente, pariter admitterentur, nihil juris in iis bonis habeant ; sed ita demum pristinum jus recipiunt, si is cui assignatus est decesserit nul- lis liberis relictis. Finally, with regard to the goods of freedmen, we must remember that the senate has enacted, that although the goods of freedmen belong equally to all the children of the patron who are in the same degree, yet a parent may assign a freedman to any one of his children, so that, after the death of the parent, the child, to vfhom the freedman was assigned, is alone con- sidered as his patron, and the other children, who would have been equally admitted had there been no assig- nation, are wholly excluded. But if the child to whom the assignation has been made, dies without issue, they regain their former right. D. xxxviii. 4. 1. The senate enacted this by the consultum mentioned in paragr. 3. 1. Nee tantum libertum, sed etiam libertam, et non tantum filio nepotive, sed etiam filise neptive assignare permittitur. D. xxxviii. 4. 1. Not only a freedman, but a freedwoman may be assigned, and not only to a son or grandson, but to a daughter or granddaughter. 1, and 3. 1, 2. But it was necessary that the child or grandchild should be in the power of the patron. 2. Datur autem haec assignandi facultas ei qui duos pluresve liberos in potestate habebit, ut iis quos in potestate habet, assignare ei liber- tum libertamve liceat. Unde qu£e- rebatur, si eum cui assignaverit 2. The power of assigning freed persons is given to him who has two or more children in his power, and it is to children in his power that a fa- ther may assign a freedman or freed- woman. Hence the question arose, 298 LIB. III. TIT. IX. postea emancipaverit, niim evanes- supposing a father assigned a freed- cat assignatio ] Sed placuit eva- man to his son, and afterwards eman- nescere, quod et Juliano et ahis cipated that son, whether the assign- plerisque visum est. ment would be destroyed. It has been determined that it is destroyed ; such was the opinion of Julian and of most others. D. xxxviii. 4. 1, and 13. I. The senatus-consultum did not allow the patron to give the freedman new heirs, but only to give a preference to particular heirs. If the children passed out of the power of the patron, they would cease to be heirs of the freedman. 3. Nee interest testament© quis assignet an sine testamento, sed etiam quibuscumque verbis patronis hoc permittitur facere ex ipso sena- tus-consulto, quod Claudianis tem- poribiis factum est Suillo Rufo et (^sterio Scapula consulibus. D. xxxviii. 4 3. It makes no difference, whether the assignment of a freedman be made by testament, or without a tes- tament. And patrons may make it in any terms whatever, by virtue of the senatus-cons'idtian passed in the time of Claudian, in the consulship of Suillus Rufus and Osterius Sca- pula, , 1, pr. and 3. The date of this senatus-consultum is given as a.d. 45. Just as any expression of the wishes of the patron sufficed to make an assignation, so any expression of a contrary wish sufficed to revoke it. (D. xxxviii. 4. 1. 4.) Tit. IX. DE BONOEUM POSSESSIONIBUS. Jus bonorum possessionis intro- ductum est a pr?etore, emendandi veteris juris gratia. Nee solum in intestatorum hereditatibus vetus jus eo modo prsetor emendavit, sicut supra dictum est, sed in eorum quo- que qui testamento facto decesse- rint ; nam si alienus postumus heres fuerit institutus, quamvis heredita- tem jure civili adire non poterat, cum institutio non valebat, hono- rario tamen jure bonorum possessor efficiebatur, videlicet cum a pr?etore adjuvabatur : sed et is a nostra constitutione hodie recte heres in- stituitur, quasi et jure civili non incognitus. The system of bonorum possessiones was introduced by the preetors as an amendment of the ancient law, not only with regard to the inheritances of intestates, as we have said above, but of those also who die after making a testament. For if a posthumous stran- ger were instituted heir, although he could not enter upon the inheritance by the civil law, inasmuch as his in- stitution would not be valid, yet by the praetorian law he might be made the possessor of the goods, because he received the assistance of the prtetor. Such a person may now, by our con- stitution, be legally instituted heir as being no longer unrecognised by the civil law. Gai. ii. 242 ; D. i. 1. 71 ; D. xxxviii. 6. 1. • The 7*7^.9 civile knew of no other mode of succession than that of those who were strictly heredes. The praetor introduced a new mode, LIB. III. TIT. IX. 299 that by giving possession of the goods. This was, in its origin, merely the placing the person best entitled in at least temporary possession of the liereditas in case this possession was dis])uted : and then the praetor being thus called on to admit to the posses- sion, in process of time regulated this admission by the feeling of natural justice which it was part of his province to entertain, and admitted, in many cases, those whose blood gave a claim, in pre- ference to those whom the course of the civil law marked out. He did not, indeed, admit any one whom the law expressly re- jected ; for the praetor could not openly violate the law ; but when the law was silent, the praetor took advantage of this silence to admit persons whom the law passed over. (D. xxxvii. 1. 12. 1.) He never gave the dominium Quiritarium in any of the goods of the inheritance, but only the dominium honitarium (see Introd. sec. 62), i. e., he made all that constituted the inheritance a part of the goods (* in bonis^) of the person to whom he gave the pos- session, and then usucapion gave this person the legal ownership. 1. Aliquando tamen neqiie emen- 1. But the praetor sometimes be- dandi neque impugnandi veteris stows the possession of goods with a juris, sed magis confirmandi gratia wish not to amend or impugn the old poUicetur bonorum possessionem ; law, but to confirm it ; for he gives nam illis quoque, qui recte facto possession secundum tabulas to those testamento heredes instituti sunt, who are appointed heirs by regular dat secundum tabulas bonorum pos- testament. He also calls sui heredes sessionem. Item ab intestato suos and agnati to the possession of the heredes et agnatos ad bonorum pos- goods of intestates, and yet the in- sessionem vocat ; sed et remota heritance would be their own by the quoque bonorum possessionem ad eos civil law, although the praetor did not pertinet hereditas jure civili. interpose his authority. Gai. iii, 34 ; D. xxxvii. 1. 6. 1. The person to whom the praetor gave the bonorum possessio could make use of the interdict (see Introd. sec. 107) begin- ning with the words ^ Quorum bonorum ; ' and as this was the readiest way of procuring the praetor's aid in being placed in pos- session, the heir might be glad to adopt it, though the possessio bonorum did not give him, as it did others, a title to succeed, which he would not otherwise have had. In cases provided for by the edict the praetor gave possession in the exercise of his executive authority [possessio edictalis). If there were special circumstances in the case, the prsetor would, after hearing opponents, give a special possession {possessio decre- talis) which was not always protected by the interdict Quorum bonorum, but might be protected only by an interdict forbidding forcible eviction. (D. xxxviii. 6. 14 ; xxxvii. 1. 3. 8 ; xliii. 4.) 2. Quos autem praetor solus vocat 2. But those whom the prastor alone ad hereditatem, heredes quidem ipso calls to an inheritance, do not in law jure non fiunt, nam praetor heredem become heirs, inasmuch as the praetor facere non potest : per legem enim cannot make an heir, for heirs are made tantum vel similem juris constitu- only by law, or by what has the efi'ect tionem heredes fiunt, veluti per of a law, as a senatus-consultum or an 300 LIB. III. TIT. IX. senatus-consulta et constitutiones principales ; sed cum eis preetor dat bonorum possessionem, loco here- dum constituuntur et vocantur bo- norum possessores. Adhuc autem et alios complures gradus prsetor fecit in bonorum possessionibus dandis, dum id agebat ne quis sine suc- cessore moreretur ; nam angustissi- mis iinibus constitutum per legem duodecim tabularum jus percipien- darum hereditatum prsetor ex bono et aequo dilatavit. imperial constitution. But when the prEetor gives any persons the possession of goods, they stand in the place of heirs, and are called the possessors of the goods. The prtetors have also devised many other orders of persons to whom the possession of goods may be granted, from a wish to insure that no man should die without a successor. In short, the right of succeeding to inheritances, which was confined within very narrow limits by the law of the Twelve Tables, has been extended by the prsetors in conformity to the prin- ciples of justice and equity. Gai. iii. 18. 25. 32. 3. The testamentary possessions of goods are these. First, that which is given to children passed over in the testament ; this is called contra tabulas. Secondly, that which the prsetor pro- mises to all those legally instituted heirs, and is therefore called possessio secundum tabulas. After having spoken of these, he passes on to intestacies ; and first he gives the possession of goods, called unde liheri, to the sui heredes, or to those who by the prae- torian edict are numbered among the sui heredes ; secondly, to the legal heirs ; thirdly, to the ten persons who were preferred to a patron, if a stranger ; and these ten persons were, a father ; a mother ; a grandfather or grand- mother, paternal or maternal ; a son ; a daughter ; a grandson or grand- daughter, as well by a daughter as by a son ; a brother or sister, either consanguine or uterine. Then, fourthly, he gave the possession of goods to the nearest cognati ; fifthly, ' turn quern ex familia,'' to the nearest member of the family of the patron ; sixthly, to the patron or patroness, and to their chil- dren and parents ; seventhly, to a husband and wife ; eighthly, to the cognati of the manumittor. Gai. iii. 26, 27. 30 ; D. xxxviii. 6. 1. The various kinds of possessions of goods may be divided accord- ing as they were testamentary (^ex testamento) or ah intestato. Under the first head come the two kinds called contra tabulas and secundum tabulas. 1. The possessio contra tabulas was given, as it is said in the text, to children passed over in the testament. It was not given against the testament of women, as they had no sui heredes. (D. xxxvii. 4. 4. 2.) 3. Sunt autem bonorum posses- siones ex testamento quidem hse : prima, qu^e pmeteritis liberis datur, vocaturque contra tabulas ; secunda, quam omnibus jure scriptis heredi- bus praitor pollicetur, ideoque voca- tur secundum tabulas. Et cum de testamentis prius locutus est, ad in- testatos transitum fecit : et primo loco suis heredibus, et iis qui ex edicto prsetoris inter suos connume- rantur, dat bonorum possessionem qua) vocatur unde liberi ; secundo legitimis heredibus ; tertio decem personis quas extraneo manumissori prseferebat. Sunt autem decem per- sonse life : pater mater, avus avia tam paterni quam materni ; item filius filia, nepos neptis tam ex filio quam ex filia ; frater soror, sive con- sanguinei sunt sive uterini. Quarto cognatis proximis, quinto tum quem ex familia, sexto patrono et patronse liberisque eorum et parentibus, sep- timo viro et uxori, octavo cognatis manumissoris. LIB. III. TIT. IX. 301 2. The possessio secundum tahuJas was given not only when the testament was in due form and valid, but also when it would have had no effect according to the civil law. The pra3tor gave the possession though the testament was defective in form, as, for instance, if it contained no familicB mancipatio or nuncupation. (Ulp. Reg. 28. 6. See Bk. ii. Tit. 10.) The praitor, again, only required that the testator should have been capable of making a testament at the time he made it and at his death, without regard to the intermediate time. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 10 ; D. xxxvii. 11. 1. 8.) He permitted the institution of the posthumous child of a stranger (see Bk. ii. 13), and would, in cases where a gift was conditional, place the heir or legatee in possession of the goods while the con- dition was pending, and remove him if the condition was not ful- filled. (D. xxxvii. 11. 5.) The possessio secundum tabulns was not given until after that contra tabulas, that is, not until it was ascertained that there were no children passed over, or that they had made no claim within the time fixed by law. (D. xxxvii. 11. 2.) If there was no testament, the praetor gave the possession under one of the following heads: Unde liheri — Unde legitimi — Unde decem personcB — Unde cognati — Turn quem ex familia — Unde liberi patroni patronceque et parentes eorum — Unde vir et uxor — Unde, cognati manumissoris. These are given in the text in the order in which they occurred in the edict; and those beginning wdth unde are in that form, by a contraction for ea pars edicti wide liberi vocantur; unde legitimi vocantur, &c. Four only have reference to the succession of persons of free birth : Unde liberi, unde legitimi^ unde cognati, unde vir et uxor. The other four are only applicable to freed men. 1. The possessio unde liberi w^as given to the sui heredes and those called with them, in case there was no testament, or one wholly inoperative. If there was a testament not allowed to operate, the possessio would be that contra tabulas. 2. That unde legitimi was given to all those who would be the heirs of the deceased by law, that is, to those summoned to the succession by the law of the Twelve Tables, and those placed in the same rank by subsequent legislation. Tum^ quem ei heredem esse oporteret, si intestatus mortuus esset. (D. xxxviii. 7. 1.) It included the sui heredes, if they did not apply within the shorter time prescribed to them as sui heredes, the agnati, those placed by the constitutions in the rank of agnati, the mother under the senatus-consultum Tertullianum, the children under the senatus- consultum Orphitianum, and the patron and his children as the heredes legitimi of their libertus, 3. That unde decem persoricB was given to the ten persons men- tioned in the text in preference to a stranger who might have emancipated a free person, after having acquired him in mancipio for the purpose of the fictitious sale necessary to emancipation. 302 LIB. III. TIT. IX. This emancipation made the emancipator the patron, and gave him rights of succession, which the praetor postponed by the edict. 4. The possessio unde cognati created a new class of persons interested in the succession by ties of blood which gave no claim except under the edict. The sui heredes and legitimi^ if they had omitted to come in within the time prescribed to them, might come in as coynati. 5. The possessio turn quern ex familia was given to the nearest member of the family of the patron, in default of the sui heredes taking under the unde legitimi. The words are an abridgment of part of the edict, * turn quern ex familia patroni proximum oportebit, vocaho,'' For the first two words is read sometimes tanquam^ sometimes turn qua ; but turn quern is much the most intelligible reading:. 6. The possessio unde liheri patroni patronceque et parentes eorum was given to the descendants of the patron, whether they had been in the power of the patron or not, and to the ascendants, whether the patron had been in their power or not — thus going a step beyond the last-mentioned possession, which was onlj^ given to a person in the family of the patron. This is as probable an account as any of the use of this and the last possessio ; bat so little is known respecting them, that we cannot be certain how they were applied. 7. The possessio unde vir et uxor gave husband and wife reciprocal rights of succession. The only mode in which one married person succeeded by iho, jus civile to the goods of another was when the wife passed into the power of her husband by in manum conventio. The husband and wife succeeded in default of cognati. 8. The possessio unde cognati manumissoris was given to all the blood relations of the patron. In the possession given exclu- sively with reference to the goods of freedmen, it was the same as with those given alike of the goods of free persons and of freed- men ; any one who might have applied for an earlier possession might, if he failed to do so within the prescribed time, apply for a later possession, in the terms of which he was included. Thus the quern proximum might apply as for the possessio unde liberi patroni, &c., and both he and one of the liberi patroni might have applied for that unde cognati manumissoris. If there was no one to whom possession of goods could be given, the right to the goods devolved to the people, and, in the times of the later emperors, to i\\Qjiscus. [Si nemo sit, ad quern bonorum possessio pertinere possit, aut sit quidem, sed jus suum omiserit, populo bona deferuntur ex lege Julia caducaria.) (Ulp. Reg. 28. 7.) 4. Sed eas quidem praetoria in- 4. Such are the possessions of goods ^ troduxit jurisdictio. A nobis tamen introduced by the praetor's authority, nihil incuriosum prseterraissum est ; We ourselves, who have passed over LIB. III. TIT. IX. 303 sed nostris constitutionibus omnia corrigentes, contra tabulas qiiidem et secundum tabulas bonorum pos- sessiones admisimus, utpote neces- sarias constitutas, nee non ab intes- tato unde liberi et unde legitimi bonorum possessiones. Quae autem in praitoris edicto quinto loco posita fuerat, id est unde decern personse, earn pio proposito et compendioso sermone super vacuam ostendimus. Cum enim pra3fata bonorum pos- sessio decern personas prseponebat extraneo manumissori, nostra con- stitutio quam de emancipatione liberorum fecimus, omnibus paren- tibus eisdemque manumissoribus contracta fiducia manumissionem facere dedit, ut ipsa manumissio eorum hoc in se habeat privilegium, et supervacua fiat supradicta bono- rum possessio. Sublata igitur prse- fata quinta bonorum possessione, in gradum ejus sextam antea bonorum possessionem induximus, et quintam fecimus quam praetor proximis cog- natis pollicetur. nothing negligently, but have wished to amend everything, have admitted by our constitutions as indispensably ne- cessary, the possession of goods contra tabulas and secundiini tabulas, and also the possessions ab i)itestato, called unde liberi and U7ide legitimi ; but with a kind intention, and in a few words, we have shown that the possession called unde decern per so nee, which held the fifth place in the praetor's edict, was superfluous ; for ten kinds of persons were therein preferred to a patron if a stranger ; but by our constitution on the subject of the emancipation of children, parents themselves are the manumittors of their children, as if under a fiduciary contract, which has now become an understood part of the manumission, so that this privilege belongs necessarily to the manumission they go through, and the possession unde decern personce is now useless. We have suppressed it therefore, and, putting the sixth in its place, have now made that the fifth, by which the praetor gives the succession to the nearest cog)iati. 5. Cumque antea fuerat septimo loco bonorum possessio turn quern ex familia, et octavo unde liberi patroni patronaeque et parentes eorum, utramque per constitutionem nos- tram quam de jure patronatus feci- mus, penitus vacuavimus. Cum enim ad similitudinem successionis ingenuorum, libertinorum successi- ones posuimus, quas usque ad quin- tum tantummodo gradum coarcta- vimus, ut sit aliqua inter ingenuos et libertinos differentia, sufficit eis tarn contra tabulas bonorum pos- sessio quam unde legitimi et unde cognati, ex quibus possunt sua jura vindicare, omni scrupulositate et inextricabili errore istarum duarum bonorum possessionum resoluto. 6. Aliam vero bonorum posses- sionem quae unde vir et uxor appel- latur, et nono loco inter veteres bo- norum possessiones posita fuerat, et in suo vigore servavimus, et altiore loco, id est sexto, eam posuimus ; decima veteri bonorum possessione, quae erat unde cognati manumis- soris, propter causas enarratas me- rito sublata, ut sex tantvimmodo bonorum possessiones ordinariae permaneant suo vigore pollentcs. 5. As to the possession tiim quern ex familia, formerly in the seventh place, and the possession unde liberi patroni patronoique et parentes eorum, in the eighth, we have now annulled them both by our constitution con- cerning the right of patronage. And having made the successions of liher- tini like those of ingenui, except that we have limited the former to the fifth degree, so that there may still remain some difl'erence between them, we think that the possessions contra tabidas, unde legitimi, and unde cognati may suffice for the ingenui to vindicate their rights ; all the subtle and intricate niceties of those two kinds of j^osses- sions, tum quem ex familia and unde patroni, being done away with. 6. The other possession of goods, called vir et uxor, which held the ninth place among the ancient possessions, we have preserved in full force, and have given it a higher place, namely, the sixth. The tenth of the ancient possessions, called unde cognati mann- missoris, has been deservedly abolished for reasons already given ; and there now, therefore, remain in force only six ordinary possessions of goods. 304 LIB, III. TIT. IX. 7. Septima eas secuta, qiiam op- tima ratione prastores introduxe- runt : novissime enim promittitur edicto iis etiam bonorum possessio, quibus ut detur, lege vel senatiis- consulto vel constitutione compre- hensiim est. Quam neqiie bonorum possessionibus qu8e ab intestato veniunt, neque iis quae ex testa- mento sunt, prsetor stabili jure con- numeravit ; sed quasi ultimum et extraordinarium auxilium, prout res exigit, accommodavit scilicet iis qui ex legibuSjSenatus-consultis constitu- tion ibusve principum ex novo jure, vel ex testamento vel ab intestato, veniunt. 1 on t V. To these a seventh possession has been added, which the praetors have most properly introduced. For by the last disposition of the edict, possession of goods is promised to all those to whom it is given by any law, senatus-consultum, or constitu- tion. The praetor has not positively numbere'd this possession of goods either with the possessions of the goods of intestates, or of persons who have made a testament ; but has given it, according to the exigence of the case, as the last and extraordinary resource of those who are called to the succes- sions of intestates, or under a testa- ment by any particular law, senatus- consultum, or, in later times, by an imperial constitution. D. xxxviii. 14. 1, pr. and 2. The difference between the possessio quib^is ut detur, lege vel senatus-consulto vel constitutione comprehensum est, or, as it was sometimes called, the possessio turn quihus ex legibus ("Theoph. Paraphr.\ and i\\Q possessio wide legitimi, was, that the first was given when the law% &c., expressly declared that the possession of goods was to be given; the latter w^hen the law, &c., gave the liereditas, and the prastor gave the possessio. It was, for instance, by means of the possession uti ex legihus, that the patron took concurrently with the children of the lihertus, by virtue of the lex Papia Poppcea. 8. Cum igitur plures species suc- cessionum praetor introduxisset, eas- que per ordinem disposuisset, et in unaquaque specie successionis saepe plures extent dispari gradu personae ; ne actiones creditorum difFerrentur, sed haberent quos convenirent, et ne facile in possessionem bonorum de- functi mitterentur, et eo modo sibi consulerent, ideo petendae bonorum possessioni certumtempus praefinivit. Liberis itaque et parentibus tarn na- turalibus quam acloptivis in petenda bonorum possessione anni spatium, ceteris centum dierum dedit. D. xxxviii. 9 8. The praetor, having thus intro- duced and arranged in order many kinds of successions, and as persons in different degrees of relationship are often found in the same place Avith regard to the succession, thought fit to limit a certain time for demanding the possession of goods, that the actions of creditors might not be delayed, but there might be a proper person against whom to bring them, and that the creditors might not possess themselves of the effects of the deceased too easily, and consult solely their own advantage ; the praetor therefore fixed a certain time within which the possession of the goods was to be demanded, if at all. To parents and children; whether natu- ral or adopted, he allowed one year, within which they must either accept or refuse the possession. To all other persons, agnati or cognati, he allows only a hundred days. 1, pr. and 12. The species successionum correspond to the dii^Qveni possessiones. LIB. III. TIT. IX. 305 . 9. Et si intra hoc tempiis aliquis bonoriim possessionem non petierit, ejusdem gradiis personis accrescit ; vel si nemo sit deinceps, ceteris bo- norimi possessionem perinde ex siic- cessorio edicto poUicetur, ac si is qui praecedebat ex eo numero non esset. Si qiiis itaqne delatam sibi bono- rum possessionem repudiaverit, non quousque tempus bonorum posses- sioni prsefinitum excesserit, expec- tatiir ; sed statim ceteri ex eodem edicto admittimtur. In petenda antem bonorum possessione dies utiles singuli considerantur. 9. And if any person entitled do not claim possession within the time limited, his right of possession accrues first to those in the same degree with himself ; and if there be none, the praetor, by the successory edict, gives the possession to the next degree, exactly as if he who preceded had no claim at all. If a man refuses the pos- session of goods when it is open to him, there is no necessity to wait until the time limited is expired, but the next in succession are instantly ad- mitted under the same edict. In reckoning the time allowed for appli- cations for the possession of goods, we only count those days which are utiles. D. xxxvii. 1. 3. 9 ; D. xxxvii. 1. 4. 5 ; D. xxxviii. 9. 1. 6. 8. 10 ; D. xxxviii. 15. 2. 10. Sed bene anteriores principes et huic causae providerunt, ne quis pro petenda bonorum possessione curet ; sed quocumque modo, si admittentis eam indicium intra sta- tuta tamen tempora ostenderit, plenum habeat earum beneficium. 10. Former emperors have wisely provided that no person need trouble himself to make an express demand of the possession of goods ; for if he has in any manner signified within the appointed time his wish to accept the succession, he shall enjoy the full benefit of it. C. vi. 9. 8, 9. Only those dies were considered utiles which were subsequent to the person entitled to the possession being aware of his right, and which were not days on which magistrates did not transact business (dies nefasti). Demand of possession was to be made before a magistrate, that is, before the prgetor in the city, and the frcBses in the province ; for the possession did not devolve, like the hereditas, by course of law, but had to be expressly asked for within a prescribed time. A particular formality in the terms of the demand was held necessary, the applicant having to say, ^ da mihi hanc honorum possessionem'' (Theoph. Paraphr.), until a constitution of the Emperor Constantius (C. vi. 9. 9) permitted the application to be made in any terms, and before any magis- trate, and another constitution excused those whom ifrnorance of what was the proper course, or whom absence prevented from making an application. (Cod. vi. 9. 8.) In the time of Justinian there was no application before a magistrate ; any act that mani- fested the wish to have the possession was enough. Sometimes the possession of goods was said to be given sine re, as opposed to cum re. (Gai. iii. 35 ; Ulp. Reg, 28. 13.) The possession might be claimed, in many cases, by persons who were entitled to enter on the inheritance as heirs under the civil law. If these persons entered on the inheritance without demanding possession of the goods, the right to this possession devolved, at the expiration of the time in which they might have claimed it, X 306 LIB. III. TIT. X. to the next class entitled to it. But if the person standing next in the order of praetorian succession demanded the possession in such a case, he received it, but only sine re, i.e. he was placed in the legal position of possessor of the goods, but did not really have any share in those goods which formed the inheritance of the heir under the civil law. As we have now finished the subject of successions ah intes- tato, as treated of in the Institutes, and seen the system prevail- ing when the Institutes were published, this is the most natural place to notice briefly the complete change introduced by the 118th and 127th Novels, which were issued respectively in the years 543 and 547. By this sweeping change, the diffe- rence between the possessio honorum and the hereditas, and that between agnati and cognati, were entirely suppressed, and three orders of succession were created : the first, that of descen- dants ; the second, that of ascendants ; the third, that of col- laterals. (1.) The descendants succeeded, whether emancipated or not, and whether adoptive or natural, to the exclusion of all other relations, and without distinction of sex or degree. When they were in the first degree, they shared the inheritance j)^'"' capita ; when in the second, they shared it per stirpes. (2.) If there were no descendants, the succession belonged to the as- cendants, except that, when there were brothers or sisters of the whole blood, the ascendants shared the inheritance with them, each person who had a claim to succeed taking an equal share. When there were no such brothers or sisters, the nearest ascendant took, excluding the more remote ; if two or more ascendants of the same degree were not in the same line, that is, were partly in the paternal, partly in the maternal line, then the ascendants of one line took one half, and the ascendants of the other took the other half, although there might be more of the same degree in one line than in the other. (3.) If there were no ascendants, then came, first, brothers and sisters of the whole blood, then brothers and sisters of the half blood, no distinction being made between consanguinei, -ce, and uterini, -cb. The children of a de- ceased brother or sister were allowed to represent their deceased parent, and to receive the share that parent would have received; but the o^randchildren of a brother or sister were not allowed to represent their grandfather or grandmother. If there were no brothers and sisters, or children of brothers and sisters, the nearest relation, in whatever degree, succeeded ; if there were several in the same degree, they shared the inheritance per capita. Tit. X. DE ACQUISITIONS PER ARROGATIONEM. Est et alteriiis generis per iiniver- There is also another kind of uni- sitatem successio, quae neque lege versal succession, introduced neither by duodecim tabularum, neque prae- the law of the Twelve Tables, nor by LIB. III. TIT. X. 307 toris edicto, sed eo jure quod con- sensu receptum est, introducta est. the edict of the praetor, but by the law which rests on general consent. Gai. iii. 82. We now pass to other modes of acquiring per universitatem. And the first is that of arrogation. 1. Ecce enim, cum paterfamilias sese in arrogationem dat, omnes res ejus corporales et incorporales, quse- que ei debitse sunt, arrogatori antea quidem pleno jure acquirebantur, exceptis iis quae per capitis deminu- tionem pereunt, quales sunt opera- rum obligationes et jus agnationis. Usus etenim et ususfructus licet his antea connumerabantur, attamen capitis deminutione minima eos tolli nostra prohibuit constitution 1. For if the father of a family gives himself in arrogation, his pro- perty corporeal or incorporeal, and the debts due to him, were formerly acquired in full ownership by the arro- gator, with the exception only of those things which were extinguished by tlie capitis demimitio, as the obligation of services and the rights of agnation. Formerly, use and usufruct were num- bered among these, but one of our constitutions prevents their extinction by the minima deminutio. Gai. iii 82.. 82 ; C. iii. 33. 16, pr. and 1, 2. Gains remarks that the property of the wife who passed in manum viri was acquired by her husband exactly as fully as that of the paterfamilias was by the person who arrogated him. Everything belonging to them passed to the husband or arro- gator, except only those things which were ij^so facta destroyed by the change of status^ ajs, for example, services which, as the price of his freedom, the freedman bound himself by oath to render to the patron, operarum obliyationes, were due to him per- sonally, and were no longer due if the patron passed into the power of another. The ties of agnation were also lost by the change of status, as the person arrogated passed out of his civil family» 2. Nunc autem nos eamdem ac- quisitionem quge per arrogationem fiebat, coarctavimus ad similitudi- nem naturalium parentum ; nihil et enim aliud, nisi tantummodo usus- fructus, tam naturalibus patribus quam adoptivis per filiosfamilias acquiritur in iis rebus quse extrirx- secus filiis obveniunt, dominio eis integro servato. Mortuo autem filio arrogato in adoptiva familia, etiam dominium ejus ad arrogatorem per- transit, nisi supersint alia3 personse quae ex constitutione nostra patrem, in iis qupe acquiri non possunt, an- tecedunt. 2. At the present day acquisitions by arrogation are restrained within the same limits as acquisitions by natural parents. Neither natural nor adoptive parents now acquire anything but the usufruct of those things which come to their children from any extraneous source, the children still retaining the dominium. But, if an arrogated son dies in his adoptive family, then the property also will pass to the arrogator, provided there exist none of those persons who, by our constitution, are preferred to tlie father in the succes- sion of those things which are not acquired by him. The order of succession fixed by later emperors and Justi- nian to the goods of the Jiliusfamilias coming to him from his mother, from legacies, gifts, or sources other than the father (/^ecz^- lium adventitium, which could not be acquired by the father, but X 2 308 LIB. III. TIT. XI. only the usufruct of which passed to him), was — 1. His children; 2. His brothers or sisters ; 3. His ancestors, the father taking be- (C. vi. 61. 3. 4. 6; C. vi. 59. 11.) fore the grandfather. 3. Sed ex diverse, pro so quod is debuit qui se in adoptionem dedit, ipso quidem jure arrogator non te- netur, sed nomine filii convenietur ; et si noluerit eum defendere, perniit- titur creditoribus per competentes nostros magistratus bona quae ejus cum usufructu futura fuissent, si se alieno juri non subjecisset, possidere et legitimo modo ea disponere.. 3. On the other hand, an arrogator is not directly bound to satisfy the debts of his adopted son, but he may be sued in his son's name ; and if he refuse to answer for his son, then the creditors may, by order of the proper magistrates, seize upon and sell in the manner prescribed by law those goods, of which the usufruct, as well as the property, would have been in the debtor, if he had not made himself subject to the power of another. Gal iii. 84. The arrogator succeeded to all the rights of action for debt which the person arrogated had, but not to the debts. For the ar- rogator was in the position of a father, who was not bound by the obligations of a son. But the property of the arrogated son was held answerable for the debts, and the pra3tor, creating a sort of resti- tutio in integrum in favour of the creditor, gave an action against the arrogated as if the capitis minutio had not taken place ; and then, if the arrogator did not guarantee the creditors, the pr^tor put the creditors in possession of the goods brought by the arro- gated to the arrogator, with leave to sell them. (D. iv, 5. 2. 1 ; Gai. iii. 84.) Tit. XI. DE EO GUI LIBERTATIS CAUSA BGNA ADDICUNTUK Accessit novus casus successionis ex constitutione divi Marci : nam si ii, qui libertatem acceperunt a domi- no in testamento ex quo non aditur hereditas, velint bona sibi addici libertatum conservandarum causa, audiuntur. A new species of sticcession has been added by the constitution of the Emj)eror Marcus Aurelius. For, if those slaves, to whom freedom has been given by the testament of their master, under which testament no one will accept the inheritance, wish that the property should be adjudged to them, in order that efltect may be given to the disposition for their enfranchisement, their request is granted. D. xl. 4. 50, pr. and 1. If no lieres ex testamento accepted the inheritance, it devolved to the heredes ah iiitestato, and if no heres ah intestato accepted it, it devolved to the fiscus ; if the Jiscus would not accept it, the creditors could have the goods of the deceased sold for their benefit. But if the deceased had by testament or codicil given freedom to any slaves, then, after the inheritance had been suc- cessively rejected by the heredes ex testamento, the lieredes ah intestato, and the Jiscus, application might be made to have the I LIB. III. TIT. XI. 309 goods given up to the applicant instead of being sold by the cre- ditors, the applicant undertaking to enfranchise the slaves, and to satisfy the creditors, and then the applicant became the bono- rum possessor, though not the owner, of all the property of the deceased. If the inheritance was accepted by any heir, or if there were no slaves to whom the deceased had left their liberty, then this addictio could not take place. Gains makes no mention of this mode of acquisition per uni- versitatem ; a circumstance used to fix his date, as showing that he wrote before the time when Marcus Aurelius issued the re- script contained in the next paragraph. 1. Et ita divi Marci rescripto ad Popilium Riifum continetur. Verba rescript! ita se habent : ' Si Virginio Valenti, qui testamento suo liberta- tem quibusdam adscripsit, nemine successore ab intestate existentC;^ in ea causa bona ejus esse coeperunt ut veniri debeant, is cujus de ea re notio est, aditus rationem desiderii tui ha- bebit : ut libertatum, tarn earum quee directo quam earum quae per speciem fideicommissi relictse sunt, tuendarum gratia addicantur tibi, si idonee creditoribus caveris de-solido quod cuique debetur solvendo. Et ii quidem quibus directa libertas data est, perinde liberi erunt ac- si liereditas adita esset ; ii autem quos heres manumittere rogatus est, a te libertatem consequentur : ita ut, si non alia conditione velis bona tibi addici, quam ut etiam qui directo libertatem acceperunt, tui liberti fiant ; nam huic etiam voluntati tu8e, si ii quorum de statu agitur consentiant, auctoritatem. nostram accommodamus.. Et ne hujus re- scriptionis nostras emolumentum alia ratione irritum fiat, si fiscus bona agnoscere voluerit, et ii qui re- bus nostris attendunt, scient com- modo pecuniario prseferendam liber- tatis causam, et ita bona cogenda ut libertas iis salva sit, qui eam adipisci potuerunt si hereditas ex testamento adita esset.' of Virginius given certain slaves, must 1. Such is the effect of a rescript addressed by the Emperor Marcus to Popilius Rufus, in the following terms : * If the estate Valens, who by testament has their freedom to necessarily be sold, there being no sue cessor ah intestato, then the magistrate who has the cognisance of the affair shall upon application attend to your request, that,.for the sake of preserving the liberty of those to whom it was given, either directly or by a jideicom- missiim, the estate of the deceased may be adjudged to you, on condition that you give good security to the creditors that their claims shall be satisfied in full. And all those,, to whom freedom was given directly, shall then become free, exactly as if the inheritance had been entered upon ;. but those whom the heir was ordered to manumit shall obtain their freedom from you only. However, if you do not wish that the goods of the deceased should be ad- judged to you on any other condition than that those slaves also who received their liberty directly by testament shall become your freedmen, and if those who are to receive their freedom agree to this, we are willing that your wishes in this respect shall be complied with. And, lest you should lose the benefit of this our rescript in another way, namely by the property being seized on behalf of the imperial treasury, be it known to the officers of our revenue, that the gift of liberty is to be attended to more than our pecuniary advantage ; and seizure shall be made of the pro- perty in such a way as to preserve the freedom of those who would have been in a situation to obtain it, had the inheritance been entered on under the testament. ' D. xl. 5. 2, and 4. 8. 11, 12. 17. 310 LIB. III. TIT. XI. By a constitution of Gordian, it was declared that the rescript of Marcus Aurelius extended to cases in which a stranger, and not one of the slaves of the deceased, applied for the addiction. (C. vii. 2. 6.) When the inheritance Avas not rejected, but accepted by the Jieredes ah intestato or by the fiscus^ the Jisciis, so far as regards the enfranchisement of the slaves, was placed by the latter part of this rescript in a difterent position from that which was occu- pied by the heredes ah intestato ; whichever accepted it, the addictio could not take place, but i\\Qjiscus was ordered to fulfd the wishes of the deceased, while the heredes ah intestato were at liberty to disregard them. 2. Hoc rescripto subventum est et libertatibus et defunctis, ne bona eorum a creditoribus possideantur et veneant. Certe si fiierint hac de causa bona addicta, cessat bonorum venditio : extitit enim defuncti de- fensor, et quidem idonens, qui de solido creditoribus cavet. 2. This rescript is meant to favour both the gift of liberty and also the deceased testator, whose effects it pre- vents being seized and sold by credi- tors : for, of course, when goods are thus adjudged, in order that liberty may be preserved, there cannot be a sale by creditors, for there is some one to answer for the deceased, who is solvent, and gives security to the cre- ditors for the full satisfaction of their claims. D. xlii. 4. 2, and 5. 3. 3. In primis hoc rescriptum toties locum habet, quoties testamento libertates datse sunt. Quid ergo si quis intestatus decedens codicillis libertates dederit, neque adita sit ab intestato hereditas ? favor constitu- tionis debebit locum habere. Certe si testatus decedat, et codicillis dede- rit libertatem, competere eam nemini dubium est. 3. This res, and levis in concreto^in this way. (1) A person responsible for culpa levis in abstracto has to show the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. (2) A person who is only responsible for lata culpa is not to be held liable until it is shown that he has not used as much care as he does habitually about his own things. A person who is re- sponsible for culpa levis in concreto has to show that he has used as much care as he does about his own things, i.e. in this case the burden of proof is on him. In each case the standard is the care which the person sought to be made liable takes about his own things. All responsibility for culpa is thus set under two heads of diligence, and in the same way there are two corresponding heads of negligence ; and negligence has a distinguishing mark added to it in the term crassa, as opposed to slight (minima), when it is meant that the person spoken of has not used in the case in question the care he habitually employs in matters that affect him. The higher degree of diligence, that of a bonus paterfa.milias, was required, or, in other words, the negligence from which liability would arise need not be crassa, or, in other words, the culpa causing liability might be levis and levis in abstracto, in the following set of cases : 1. Where the person responsible got the benefit of a contract, as, for example, when he borrowed a thing for his own use (commodatum) ; or (2) when both parties were interested in the obligation being carried out, but there was no joint interest in the thing, as, for example, mortgagor and mortgagee (D. xiii. 7. pr.), vendor and vendee (D. xviii. 6. 3), letter and hirer (D. xix. 2. 25. 7). 3. In case of agents (neyo- tiorum f/estores). Only the lower degree of diligence, that quanta in suis rebus, was required, or, in other words, the negligence from which liability would arise must be crassa, or, in other words, the culpa causing liability might be levis, hut levis in concreto, \u the following cases: 1. When the other person to the contract got the benefit from it, as, in a contract of deposit, the depositary is only liable for crassa negligentia, and it must be proved that he has not used the 320 LIB. III. TIT. XIII. quanta in suis rebus diligentla. 2. When both parties to the contract have a common interest in the thing as to which the (juestion of diligence or negligence arises, as partners, the husband in the management of the dotal estate, where he is a sort of part- ner (D. xxiii. 3. 17), co-heirs and co-legatees (D. x. 2. 25. 16). 3. Involuntary parties to a quasi contract, like tutors and cura- tors (D. xxvii. 3. 1, pr. ). 6. Interest, mora. — When a person bound by a contract delayed to execute it, and this delay (?/z^r«) was of such a kind that culpa could be imputed to him, he was subjected to something more than the necessity of fulfilling the contract, and especially he was in most cases liable to pay interest {usur(E). (D. xxii. 1. 7.) But interest was not ordinarily payable on debts except by express agreement, and there was a legal maximum of 12 per cent, or 1 per month, centesimce usurce, reduced by Justinian to 6 per cent, in most cases. (C. iv. 32. 26.) 7. Actions. — The subject of actions is treated of fully in the Sixth and following Titles of the Fourth Book, and it is only necessary here to notice generally that part of the subject which has to do with the enforcement of obligations, and especially of contracts. As an obligation was constituted a legal tie by having an action attached to it, it is necessary to know by what kind of action different obligations were enforced, and in almost every case the Institutes couple the mention of the kind of action attached with the mention of each kind of obligation. The main distinction to be now referred to is that between condictions and boncE Jidei actions, corresponding with the distinction noticed in Tit. 13. 1 between civil and praetorian obligations. The older actions of law (see Introd. sec. 94) afforded a very cumbrous machinery for the enforcement of rights against parti- cular persons ; and the lex Silia (510 A.u.C.) introduced a new kind of action, termed condictio, for the enforcement of obliga- tions binding a person to give the absolute ownership (dare) of a certain sum of money (pecunia certa) ; and the lex Calpurnia (520 A.u.C.) extended its application to a similar demand of any certain thing, as a definite quantity of oil or wheat. (Gai. iv. 19.) In process of time the condictio was made to embrace uncertain as well as certain things, and Avas applied to obligations binding a person facere, and hence Gains says, appellantur in personam actiones, quibus dari Jierive intendinius, condictiones (iv. 5). The condictio certi, i.e. the condictio in its older and stricter form, came thus to be opposed to the condictio incerti. We may therefore say that contracts dare or facere were enforced by a condictio, and that this condictio was certi or incerti according as a definite or indefinite thing was demanded. Whenever the contract was to do a thing, it was always uncertain, because the law could not compel the person bound by the contract to do the thing, but only to give a pecuniary equivalent ; and what sum of money was a reasonable compensation for the loss sustained by the thing not being done was left to be settled by the ludge. The LIB. III. TIT. XIV. 321 formula of the condictio certi r^in si paret eum \jlecem aureos\ dare oportere. (See paragr. 1 of next Title.) That of the condictio incerti YHia. quicquid paret eum dare facer e oportere. The condictio incerti, besides its general name, received also a special name derived from the kind of contract it was brought to enforce, or from the subject-matter of the contract itself. For instance, the action brought to enforce a stipulation for an uncertain sum was termed an actio ex stipulatu. When the condictio was certi, it was generally spoken of simply as condictio. Sometimes, however, though more rarely, it too received a special name, as the condictio eerti brouoht to enforce a mutiium, sometimes termed the actio jnutui. There was another class of actions in which a wide discretion was given to the judge, who was to take all the circumstances of the case into his consideration, and pronounce the sentence which equity demanded, thus acting as an arbiter rather than as 2i judex. Such actions were termed bonce Jidei actiones, and the obligations, to enforce which they were given, were termed bonce Jidei obliga- tiones. The right to have this equitable consideration of the whole case was inherent in the nature of the obligation, i.e. the action brought to enforce any of the boncB Jidei obligationes was always bonce Jidei. All actions instituted by the joratorian law were of this description. There was thus an opposition made between condictiones which were stricti juris, derived from the civil law, and in Avhich the judge was confined within the limits of the formula, and these bonce Jidei actiones. Among the bonce Jidei actiones we shall find several mentioned in the following Titles of this Book, as, for instance, the action ex empto, ex vendito, ex locato, ex conductOymandati, depositi, pro socio, &c. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 6. 38.) The bonce Jidei action given by the pra3tor to enforce innominate contracts was almost always one specially adapted to meet the facts of the particular case, and it received the name of the actio in factum, prcescriptis verbis. The formula was drawn up to meet the facts of the particular case {in factum\ and this w^as done by placing in the demonstratio a short statement of these facts {prcescriptis verbis). (Sec Introd. sec. 106.) Tit. XIY. QUIBUS MODIS EE CONTEAHITUR OBLIGrATIO. Re contrahitur obligatio, velnti An obligation may be contracted by iniitni datione. Mutui autein datio the thing, as, for example, by giving in iis rebus consistit qua3 pondere, a mutuwn. This always consists of numero mensiirave constant, velnti things which may be weighed, num- vino, oleo, frnmento, pecunia nmne- bered, or measured, as wine, oil, corn, rata, aire, argento, auro : quas res coin, brass, silver, or gold. In giving aut numerando, aut metiendo, aut these things by number, measure, or appendendo in hoc damns ut acci- weight, we do so that they may be- pientium fiant, et quandoque nobis come the property of those who re- non eredem res, sed alia3 ejusdem ceive them. The identical things lent naturseetqualitatisreddantur : unde are not returned, but only others of y 322 LIB. III. TIT. XIV. etiam mntuum appellatiim est, quia the same nature and quality ; and ita a me tibi datur, ut ex meo tuum lience the term mutuum, because, fiat. Et ex eo contractu nascitur what I give from being mine becomes actio qu?e vocatur condictio. yours. From this contract arises the action termed condictio. Gai. iii. 90 ; D. xii. 1. 9, pr. and 3. Obligations were said to be contracted re when the actual receipt of a thing under certain conditions imposed the necessity of fulfilling those conditions. Four kinds of contracts came under this head, all of which are noticed in this Title, viz. those named mutuum, commodatum, depositum, and pignus. By the contract of mutuum the property in the thing delivered passed to the receiver ; by that of pignus the recipient acquired possession ; in contracts of commodatum and dejiositum the recipient was only ill possessione. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 6.) The contract of mutuum was a contract of loan, where not the thing lent, but an equivalent, was to be returned. The obli- gation to return this equivalent arose on and by the delivery of the thing lent. It is scarcely necessary to say that the deriva- tion from ex meo tuum is quite erroneous. Things which were of such a nature that they could be replaced by equal quan- tities and qualities are termed, in barbarous Latin, fungihiles, because mutua vice funguntur (D. xii. 1. 6), they replace and represent each other : thus a bushel of wheat is said to be a res fungihilis, a particular picture is not. The distinction is much better expressed by saying that the classes of things which can represent each other are considered in genere, those which cannot are considered in specie. (See Introd. sec. 55.) If the person who lends the bushel of wheat receives in return a bushel of equally good wheat, consisting of grains totally different from those he lent, it is the same to him as if the identical grains were restored ; the v/heat may be considered in genere ; not so with the picture, which can only be considered in specie. But it is to be observed that it is the intention of the parties, not the nature of the thing, that makes the thing considered in genere rather than in specie. A person might lend a picture, and only require that a picture of some sort, whether the same picture or another, j should be given in return to him, in which case the picture would be considered in genere ; or a person might require the identical grains of v/heat to be returned, and then the wheat would be considered in specie. A thing lent in a mutuum was always con- sidered in genere, so that whenever it was the intention of the parties that the loan should be a mutuum, it was also their inten- tion that the thing lent should be considered in genere. The action for recovering the equivalent would be a condictio certi, as the equivalent was necessarily something fixed and de- termined on. In this case the condictio received the name of condictio ex mutuo, or sometimes actio mutiii, hut as it was always ccrti, it very seldom was termed anything but condictio y and LIB. III. TIT. XIV 323 perhaps the term actio mutui (C. vii. 35. 5) would not have been used in the thne of strict les^al lano;uaG;e. CD O O 1. Is quoqiie qui non debitum accepit ab eo qui per errorem solvit, re obligatur, daturque agenti contra euiD propter repetitionem condicti- tia actio ; nam perinde ab eo condici potest, si paret eum dare oportere, ac si niutuum accepisset : unde pu- pillus, si ei sine tutoris auctoritate non debitum per errorem datum est, non tenebitnr indebiti condictione, magis quam mutui datione. Sed lioec species obligationis non videtur ex contractu consistere, cum is qui sol- vendi animo dat, magis distraliere Toluit negotium quam contraliere. 1. A person, also, who receives a payment which is not due to him, and which is made by mistake, is bound- re, i.e. by the thing ; and the plaintiff may have against him an actio condic- titla to recover what he has paid. For the comUctio ' Si paret eum dare opor- tere,^ may be brought against him, ex- actly as if he had received a tnutiium. Thus a pupil, to whom a payment has been made by mistake without the au- thorisation of his tutor, is not subject to a condictio indebiti, any more than he would be by the gift of a imituiim. This species of obligation, however, does not seem to arise from a contract, since he, who gives in order to acquit himself of something due from him, intends rather to dissolve than to make a contract. Gai. iii. 91. In this case it is the law that imposes certain conditions, and not the intention of the parties, and, therefore, the obligation arises quasi ex contractu, under which head it is, indeed, subsequently placed. (Tit. 27. 6.) A pupil could not be bound without the consent of his tutor. If, therefore, without the consent of his tutor, a loan was made him, he was not bound to repay it, or if money not due to him Avere paid him, he was not bound to refund it. (See Bk. i. Tit. 21, pr.) 2. Item is cui res aliqua utenda datur, id est commodatur, re obliga- tur et tenetur commodati actione. Sed is ab eo qui mutuum accepit, longe distat ; namque non ita res datur ut ejus fiat, et ob id de ea re ipsa restituenda tenetur, Et is qui- dem qui mutuum accepit, si quolibet fortuito casu amiserit quod accepit, veluti incendio, ruina, naufragio aut latronum hostiumve incursu, niliilo minus obligatus permanet : at is qui utendum accepit, sane quidem ex- actam diligentiam custodiendaa rei prpestare jubetur, nee sufficit ei tan- tam diligentiam adhibuisse, quan- tam in suis rebus adhibere solitus est, si modo alius diligentior poterit earn rem custodire ; sed propter majorem vim majorcsve casus non tenetur, si modo non hujus ipsius culpa is casus inter venerit. Alioqui si id quod tibi couunodatum est, peregre tecum ferre malueris, et vel 2. A person, too, to whom a thing- is given as a commiodatmn, i.e. is given that he ma}'" make use of it, is bound re, and is subject to the actio commo- dati. But there is a wide difference between hun and a person who has received a rautiiuin ; for the thing is not given him that it may become his property, and he therefore is bound to restore the identical thing he re- ceived. And, again, he who has re- ceived a mut'tmm, if by p.nj accident, as fire, the fall of a building, ship- wreck, the attack of thieves or ene- mies, he loses what he received, still remains bound. But he who has received a thing lent for his use, is indeed bound to employ his utmost diligence in keeping and j^reserving it ; nor will it suffice that he should take the same care of it, which he was accustomed to take of his own property, if it appear that a mure careful person might have preserved Y 2 324 LIB. III. TIT. XIV, incursu Iiostium prsedoniimve vel naufragio amiseris, diibmm non est quin de restituenda ea re tenearis. Commodata autem res tunc proprie intelligitiir, si nulla mercede ac- cepta vel constituta res tibi utenda data est : alioqui mercede interve- niente locatus tibi usus rei videtur ; gratuitum enim debet esse commo- datum. it in safety ; but lie lias not to answer- for loss occasioned by superior force, or extraordinary accident, provided the accident is not due to any fault of his. If, however, you take with you on a journey the thing lent you to make use of, and you lose it by the attack of enemies or robbers, or by shipwreck, you are undoubtedly bound to restore it. A thing is properly said to be commodatum, when you are per- mitted to enjoy the use of it, without any recompense being given or agreed on ; for, if there is any recompense, the contract is that of locatio, as a thing, to be a com'inodatmn, must be lent gra- tuitously. D. xHv. 7. 1. 3, 4; D. xiii. 5, 6. 12. As the advantage is, in almost every case, entirely on the side of the receiver of the commodatum, he was bound to take every care of it, or, as Gains says, as great care as the most diligent patejifamilias takes of his own property. (D. xiii. 6. 18.) To use the technical phrase, it was ^ essential ' to the commo- datum that it should be gratuitous. Things incident to a con- tract may be essential to it, i.e. necessarily belonging; natural, i.e. belonging in the absence of express agreement to the con- trary; or accidental, i.e. belonging only by express agreement. The commodatum gave rise to the actio commodati, which v/as either directa or contraria ; by the actio commodati directa, the commodans made the receiver of the commodatum restore the thino; lent, after the receiver had had it in his possession for the time agreed on (for he could not reclaim it before), or made him pay for any loss accruing through his fault. By the actio commo- dati contraria, the receiver of the commodatum obtained from the commodans compensation for any extraordinary expenses which the preservation of the thing had entailed, or for any losses occa- sioned by the fault of the commodans. The actio was, in the former case, termed directa, because it proceeded from what v/as a • necessary part of the execution of the contract, viz. the thing lent being put in the possession of the receiver, while the actio contraria only arose from a thing which might happen or not, viz. there being some extraordinary expense, or some fault on the part of the commodans. (See D. xiii. 6. 17.) All the actions arising out of contracts re, except the condictio ex mutuo, vv-ere honcBJidei. 3. Prasterea et is apud quem res aliqua deponitur, re obligatur et ac- tione depositi ; qui et ipse de ea re quam accepit restituenda tenetur. Sed is ex eo solo tenetur, si quid dolo conimiserit ; culp?e autem nomine, id est, desidire ac negligentiee, non 3. A person with whom a thing is deposited, is bound re^ and is subject to the actio dcjwsiti, and must give back the identical thing which he re- ceived. But he is only a,nswerable if he is guilty of fraud, and not for a mere fault, such as carelessness or negli- J LIB. III. TIT. XIV. 325 tenetiir : itaqiie securiis est, qui gence ; and lie cannot, therefore, be pariim diligeiiter custoditam rem called to account if the thing de- furto amiserit, quia qui negligenti posited, being carelessly kept, is stolen, amico rem custodiendam tradidit. For he who commits his property to su£e facilitati id imputare debet. the care of a negligent friend, should impute the loss to his own want of caution. D. xliv. 7. 1. 5. Here the benefit is entirely on the side of the person Avho commits the thing to the care of one who receives it gratuitously. The latter, therefore, unless he specially agrees to be ansAverable for the thing entrusted to him, or himself offers to take care of it (D. xiii. 65. 2), is not liable for its loss or deterioration, if he is not guilty of dishonesty, or of such gross neglect as amounts to dishonesty. He has, however, no right to make use of the thing (D. iv. 1. 6), and would be guilty of theft if he did (Bk. iv. 1. 6) ; and as it is deposited for the benefit of the person depo- siting it, that person can reclaim it when he pleases, and need not, like the commodans^ wait for the expiration of the time a2;reed on. The depositum gave rise to the actio depositi, which was directa or contraria, upon the same principle as the actio cormnodati. The depositary was entitled to be recompensed for every expense incurred, and to compensation for every loss incurred by the fault of the deponens, however light that fault might be. If the depo- sitary had voluntarily offered to receive the deposit, he too would be answerable for loss occasioned by a cidpa levis, i. e. a slight fault, as opposed to culpa gravis, gross negligence. If a deposit was rendered necessary by circumstances of unforeseen and sud- den misfortune, as a shipwreck or fire, and if the depositary who had received the thing denied he had received it, double the value of the thing could be recovered. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 6. 23.) 4. Creditor quoque qui pignus ac- 4. A creditor also, who has received cepit, re obligatur ; qui et ipse de ea a pledge, is bound re, for he is obliged re quam accepit restituenda tenetur to restore the thing he has received, actione pigneratitia. Sed quia pignus by the actio pigneratltia. But, inas- utriusque gratia datur, et debitoris much as a pledge is given for the quo magis pecunia ei crederetur, et benefit of both parties, of the debtor creditoris quo magis ei in tuto sit that he may borrow more easily, and creditum, placuit suflicere quod ad of the creditor that repayment may eam. rem custodiendam exactam dili- be better secured, it has been decided gentiam adhiberet : quam si prsesti- that it will suffice if the creditor em- terit, et aliquo fortuito casu eam rem ploys his utmost diligence in keeping amiserit, securum esse nee impediri the thing pledged ; if, notwithstanding creditum petere, this care, it is lost by some accident, the creditor is not accountable for it, and he is not prohibited from suing for his debt. D. xliv. 7. 1. 6; D. xiii. 7. 13. 1. The oldest form of the contract of pledge was that of mancipa- tio, or absolute sale of the thing subject to a contract oi fiducia or agreement for redemption. There were so many things to which 326 LIB. III. TIT. XV. mancipatio was considered inapplicable, that the more simple contract of pignus quite superseded this mancipatio contracta Jiducia. A further simplification of the contract of pledge was the hypotlieca, in v/hich the thing pledged remained with the pledger. The mancipatio, it may be observed, transferred both the property and possession of the thing pledged ; the pignus gave the possession to the creditor^ but left the property in the thing with the debtor ; the liypotheca, left both the property and the possession with the debtor. (See note at end of Bk. ii. Tit. 5.) The right of the creditor over the thing pledged or hypothecated was protected by the actio quasi- Serviana (see Bk. iv. Tit. 6. 7), by which the creditor recovered the thing pledged if lost out of his possession, and got possession of the thing hypothecated. The text seems to draw a distinction between the position of the creditor and that of the recipient of a commodatum, in re- gard to the degree of responsibility for negligence. But practi- cally they Avere on the same footing. The creditor, like the receiver of a commodatum, could not make use of the thing placed in his possession ; and, although he could without agreement take them as against the principal of his claim (C. iv. 24. 1), it was only by special agreement that the creditor could take the fruits of the. thing pledged by way of interest. Creditor and debtor are terms used more widely in Roman law^ than in our own. Every one who possessed a personal right against another was termed a creditor, and every one who owed the satisfaction of a claim, or was the subject of a personal right, was a debitor. From the contract of pignus sprang the actio pigneratitia, which was directa when used by the debtor to constrain the cre- ditor to give back the thing pledged if the debt had been paid, or to pay over the surplus if the thing pledged had been sold^ and produced more than was due for the debt, or to obtain com- pensation from him for any injury to the thing pledged, arising through his fault. The actio pigneratitia was contraria Avhen used by the creditor to make the debtor reimburse him for all expenses incurred in keeping the thing safe, or compensate him for all in- juries sustained by the thing pledged through the fault of the debtor (D. xiii. 7. 31); or, again, to compensate him if the thing pledged proved to be in reality not the property of the debtor, and was claimed by the real owner. Until it was claimed, the fact that it belonged to another did not prevent a thing being made the subject of a contract of p^ignus, and the creditor was as much bound to restore it to the debtor, if the sum due was paid, as if it had really been the debtor's property. Tit. XV. DE VEEBORUM OBLIGATIONE. Verbis obligatio contraliitur ex An obligation by word of moutli is interrogatione et responsione, cum contracted by means of a question and LIB. III. TIT. XV. 327 quid clari fierive nobis stipulamiir ; an answer, when we stipulate that any- ex qua dura proticiscuntur actiones, thing shall be given to, or done for us. tarn condictio si certa sit stipulatio, It gives rise to two actions — the coii- quam ex stipulatu si incerta. Qufe diciio, when the stipulation is certain, hoc nomine inde utitur, quia stipu- and the actio ex stipulatu, when it is lum apud veteres hrmuni appella- uncertain. The term stipulation is batur, forte a stipite descendens. derived from stipuhon, a word em- ployed by the ancients to mea,n ' firm,' and coming perhaps from stipes, the trunk of a tree. D. xliv. r. 1. 7 ; D. xii. 1. 24. The stipulatio was, properly speaking, not a contract, but a means of making a contract, a solemn form giving legal validity to an agreement. This form consisted of a question and answer, and it was the question only which was, properly speaking, the stipulatio, it being only by an extension of the term that the word was applied to the whole mode of contracting, and that the answerer as well as the questioner was said, as in paragr. 1, to be one of the stipulantcs. Like all the old forms of obligation, tliis formula only bound one party, viz. the maker of the promise. The promissor had himself to become the stipulator, and to receive in his turn a promise, if he wished to secure reciprocal riglits. Oblij^ations mav be divided accordins: as they are unilateral and bind one party only, or bilateral and bind both parties. A stipu- lation gave rise to a unilateral obligation. Festus derives stipulatio_ from stips, coined money ; and Iso- dorus from stipula, a straw. ' Veteres enim, quando sibi aliquid promittehant, stipulam texentes frangebant, quam iterum jungentes, sponsiones suas agnoscebant.^ (Orig. iv. 24. Quoted by Ortolan.) Stipes and stipulam are a more probable source of the derivation of the word. When the stipulation was for something certain, as for a fixed sum of money, or for wine of a specified kind, it was enforced by the condictio certi\ when for something uncertain, as for wine of a good quality, for something to be done or left undone, by the condictio incerti. The term actio ex stipulatu is sometimes used to denote the condictio, whether certi or incerti ; but it is more usually employed to denote the condictio incerti, as when the condictio was certi, that is, was employed in its proper form, it generally received no other name than condictio. The action arising on a stipulation of any kind was always stricti juris. The stipulation was not the only contract made by going through a solemn form of words. By the dictio dotis the wife and her ascendants bound themselves to «ive the dos to the husband : and by a promise accompanied by an oath {jiLrata promisso liberti) the freedman bound himself to render his services to his patron. 1. In hac re olim talia verba tra- 1. Formerly the words used in dita fuerunt : Spondes ? Spondeo. making this kind of contract were as Promittis ? Promitto. Fidepromit- follows — Spondes ? do you engage your- 328 LIB. III. TIT. XV. tis ? FideiDromitto. Fidejubes ? Fidejubeo. Dabis ? Dabo. Fades? Faciam. Utriim autem Latina an Grreca vel qua alia lingua stipulatio concipiatur, nihil interest, scilicet si uterque stipulantium intellectum ejus lingupe habeat. Nee necesse est eadem lingua utrumque uti, sed sufficit congruenter ad interrogata respondere : quin etiam duo Grseci Latina lingua obligationem contra- liere possunt. Sed hvec solemnia verba olim quidem in usu fuerunt. Postea autem Leoniana constitutio lata est, qu£e solemnitate verborum sublata sensum et consonantem in- tellectum ab utraque parte solum desiderat, licet quibuscumque ver- bis expressus est. self ? Spondeo, I do engage myself. Promittis ? do you promise ? Promitto, I do promise. Fidepromittis ? do you promise on your good faith ? Flde- promitto, I do promise on my good faith. Fidejuhes ? do you make your- self fidejussor ? Fldejuheo, I do make myself fidejussor. Dabis? -will you give ? Dabo, I will give. Fades ? will you do ? Faciam, 1 will do. And it is immaterial whether the stipula- tion is in Latin or in Greek, or in any other language, so that the parties understand it ; nor is it necessary that; the same language should be used by each person, but it is sufficient if the answer agree with the question. So tvfo Greeks may contract in Latin. Anciently indeed it was necessary to use the solemn words just mentioned, but the constitution of the Emperor Leo was afterwards enacted, Vv^hich makes unnecessary this solemnity of the expressions, and only requires the apprehension and consent of each p»arty, in whatever words it may be expressed. Gai. iii. 92, 93; D. xlv. 1. 1. 6 ; C. viii. 37. 10. Spondes ? spondeo was the form exclusively proper when both parties were Homan citizens ; adeo propria civium, Romanorum est ut ne quidem in GrcBcum serinonem per interpretationem proprie transferri possit, quamvis dicatur a GrcBca voce Jigurata esse, (Gai. iii. 93.) This constitution of Leo was published a.d. 469. (C. viii. 37. 10.) 2. Omnis stipulatio aut pure aut in diem aut sub condition e fit : pure, veluti quinque aureos dare spondes ? idque confestim peti potest ; in diem, cum adjecto die quo pecunia solva- tur, stipulatio fit, veluti decern au- reos prim is calendis Martiis dare spondes 1 Id autem quod in diem stipulamur, statim quidem debetur ; sed peti priusquam dies venerit, non potest. At ne eo quidem ipso die in quern stipulatio facta est, peti potest, quia totus is dies arbitrio solventis tribui debet ; neque enim certum est eo die in quern promissum est, datum non esse, priusquam is prseterierit. 2. Every stipulation is made simply, or with the introduction of a particular time, or conditionally. Simply, as, ' Do you engage to give five aurei V in this case the money may be instantly demanded. With the introduction of a particular time, as when a day is mentioned on which the money is to be paid, as, 'Do you engage to give me ten aurei on the first of the calends of March ? ' That which we stipulate to give at a j^articular time becomes immediately due, but cannot be de- manded before the day arrives, nor can it even be demanded on that day, for the Avhole of the day is allowed to the debtor for payment, as it is never cer- tain that payment has not been made on the day appointed until that day is at an end. D. xlv. 1. 46 ; D. 1. 16. 213 ; D. xlv. 1. 18. 1. LIE. III. TIT. XV. 329 In the technical language of the jurists, Ubl pure quis stipu^ latus ftierit, et cessit et venit dies ; uhi in diem, cessit dies, sed non- dum venit. (See note on Bk. ii. Tit. 20. 20.) If the stipulation was made pure, the interest in the thing stipulated for passed at once to the stipulator {cessit dies), and he could at once demand to have it {venit dies), giving, of course, sufficient time for the debtor to fulfil his obligation. If the stipulation was made in diem, the interest in the thing stipulated for passed at once to the stipulator, but he could not demand it until the dies was past. There is a distinction in the respective effects of a stipulation in diem and of a conditional stipulation that deserves notice. When a stipulation was made in diem, the promise was binding at once, and the debt was already due, and therefore if any part of the debt were paid before the day named, it could not be recovered ; whereas, when a stipulation w\as made with a condition, if any- thing was paid before the condition was accomplished, it could be recovered back, because, until the condition was fulfilled, the stipulator had no interest in the thing stipulated for {nondum cessit dies). (See paragr. 4.) 3. At si ita stipuleris, decern an- 3. But, if you stipulate thus, ^ Do reos annuos quoad vivam dare you engage to give me ten aurei an- spondes ? et pure facta obligatio nually, as long as I live ?' the obligation intelligitur et perpetuatur, quia ad is understood to be made simply, and tempus deberi non potest ; sed heres is perpetual ; for a debt cannot be due petendo pacti exceptione submove- for a time only ; but the heir, if he bitur. demands 2:)ayment, will be repelled by the except io pacti. D. xlv. 1. 56. 4. Laj^se of time was not, in the Roman law, a mode by which a debt could be extinguished. Consequently, if it was owed, it was owed for ever ; but this technicality was prevented from working any injustice by the plea referred to in the text, namely, that there was an agreement to the contrary, or by that of fraud. Plane post tempus stipulator v el pacti conventi^ veldoli mali excep- tione submoveri poterit. (D. xliv, 7. 44.) If, however, a similar gift had been given as a legacy, the right to receive would be extinguished ipso jure by the death of the legatee. 4. Sub conditione stipulatio fit, 4. A stipulation is made condition- cum in aliquem casum dillertur obli- ally, when the obligation is made sub- gatio, ut si aliquid factum fuerit aut ject to the happening of some uncertain non fuerit, stipulatio committatur : event, so that it takes effect if such a veluti, si Titius consul fuerit factus, thing happens, or does not happen, as, quinque aureos dare spondes ? Si for instance, ' Do you engage to give quis ita stipuletur, si in Capitolium five aurel, if Titius is made consul?' nonascendero dare spondes l perinde Such a stipulation as ' Do you engage erit ac si stipulatus esset cum morie- to give five aurei if I do not go up to tur sibi dari. Ex conditionali stipu- the Capitol V is in eflect the same as latione tantum spes est debitum iri, if the stipulation had been, that five eamque ipsam spem in heredem cmrei should be given to the stipulator 330 LIB. III. TIT. XV transmittimns, si priiis quam conditio existat, mors nobis contio-it. I at the time of liis death. From a con- ditional stipulation, there arises only a hope that the thing will become due ; and this hope we transmit to our heirs, if we die before the condition is accomplished. T>. xlv. 1. 115. 1 ; D. 1. 16. 54. The heir or legatee, it mn.j be remembered (see Bk. ii. Tit. 14. 9), who died before the condition was accomplished^ did not transmit any interest in the inheritance or legacy to his heirs, wdiereas the stipulator did, as we learn from the text, transmit to his heirs the hope tliat the thing stipulated for w^ould be one day due to him (^spes dchitum iri). The reason of this difference is, that the testamentary dispositions were considered to be made to the heir or legatee personally. If the promissor attemjoted to defeat the condition by prevent- ing its being fulfilled, he was treated as if he had promised jmre^ and the thing could be demanded from him at once. It is here said that a promise to pay, if a person did not do a thing, was a promise to pay when he died. There was, however, this difference : the promissor was certain to die, and therefore the stipulation, with the words cum moriar, was really made in diem ; whereas it was not certain whether the promissor would or would not go up to the Capitol, and, therefore, the stipulation Avith tlie words si in Cajntoliam non ascendero was made suh conditione. 5. Loca etiam inseri stipulationi Solent, veluti Cartha,gine dare spon- des ? Qua? stipulatio, licet pure iieri videatur, tamen re ipsa habet tem- pus injectum, quo promissor utatur ad pecuniam Carthagine dandam ; et ideo si quis Pvomce ita stipuletur, hodie Carthagine dare spondes I inutilis erit stipulatio, cum impos- sibilis sit repromissio. D. xlv. 1. 73 6. Conditiones qure ad prfeteri- tum vel prsesens tempus referuntur, aut statim infirmant obligationem, aut omnino non dilierunt, veluti si Titius consul fuit, vel si Moevius vivit, dare spondes 1 nam si ea ita non sunt, nihil valet stipulatio ; sin autem ita se habent, statim valet. Quae enim per rerum naturam sunt certa, non morantur obligationem, licet apud nos incerta sint. 5. It is customary to insert a par- ticular place in a stipulation, as, for instance, 'Do you engage to give me at Carthage ? ' and this stipulation, al- though it appear to be made simply, yet necessarily implies a delay sufficient to enable the person who promises to pay the money at Carthage. And therefore, if any one at Home stipulates tiius, ' Do you engage to give to me this day at Carthage V the stipulation is useless, because the thing promised is imj^ossible. D. xiii. 4. 2. 6. 6. Conditions, which relate to timo present or past, either instantly make the obligation ;"oid, or do not suspend it in any way ; as, for instance, ' If Titius has been consul, or if Msevius is alive, do j ou engage to give me ] ' If the thing mentioned is not really the case, the stipulation is void ; if it is the case, the stipulation is immediately valid. Things certain, if regarded in themselves, although uncertain as far as our knoAvledge is concerned, do not delay the formation of the obligation. D. xlv. 1. 100 ; D. xii. 1. 37-39. i LIE. III. TIT. XVI. toi 7. Non solum res in stipiilatiim deduci possunt, sed etiam facta, iit si stipiilemur aliquid fieri vel non fieri, Et in liujusmodi stipulationibus optimum erit poenam subjicere, ne quantitas stipuiationis in incerto sit, ac necesse sit actori probare quid ejus intersit ; itaque si quis ut fiat aliquid stipuletur, ita adjici poena debet : si ita factum non erit, tunc j)cenn3 nomine decem aureos dare spondes I Sed si qaa3dam fieri, qupe- dam non fieri, una eademque concej)- tione stipuletur, clausula liujusmodi erit adjicienda : siadyersus ea factum erit, sive quid ita factum non erit, tunc poonse nomine decem aureos dare spondes I 7. i^ot only things, but acts, may be the subject of a stipulation : as when we stipulate, that something shall, or shall not, be done. And, in these stipulations, it will be best to subjoin a xDenalty, lest the amount included in the stipulation should be uncerbain, and the plaintifl' should therefore be obliged to prove how great his interest is. Therefore, if any one stipulates, that something shall be done, a penalty ought to be added as thus: 'If the thing is not done, do you engage ta give ten aui^ei by way of penalty?^' 13ut, if by one single question a stipu- lation is made, that some things shall be done, and that other things shall not be done, there ought to be added some such clause as this : ' If anything is done contrary to what is agreed on, or anything agreed on is not done, then do you engage to give ten aurei by way of penalty 1 ' D. xlv. 1. 137. 7 ; D. xlvi. 5. 11. Tit. XYI. DE DIJOBUS EEIS STIPULANDI ET PEOMITTENDI. Two or more persons may be par- ties together in the stipulation or in the promise. In the stipidation, if,, after all have asked the question, the promissor answers, ' Spondeo,^ ' I en- gage ;' for instance, when, two stipu- lators having each sejDarately asked the question, the promissor answers,, ' I engage to give to each of you.' For if he first answers Titius, and then, on, another i^erson putting the same ques- tion, he again answers him, there will be two distinct obligations, and not two co-stipulators. Two or more become co-promissors, thus : ' Msevius, do you engage to give five aureir ' Seius, do you engage to give five aurei?' each then separately answers, ' I do engage.'' D. xlv. 3. 28. 2 ; D. xlv. 2. 4. The word reus, strictly speaking, signifies the person who is liable, or subject, to a demand, but is used more generally ta signify a party to an obligation, whether active or passive : so here we have rei stipulandi, as well as ret promitfendi. It was immaterial whether the interrogation was put and] answered in the plural, spondetis 9 spondemus ; or in the singular^ spondes? spondeo. (D. xlv. 2. 4.) Et stipulandi et promittendi duo pluresve rei fieri possunt : stipulandi ita, si post omnium interrogationem promissor respondeat, spondeo, ut l)uta, cum duobus separatim stipu- iantibus ita promissor respondeat, utrique vestrum dare spondeo ; nam si prius Titio spoponderit, deinde alio interrogante spondeat, alia atque alia erit obligatio, nee creduntur duo rei stipulandi esse. Duo pluresve rei promittendi ita fiunt : Msevi, quinque aureos dare spondes 1 Sei, eosdem quinque aureos dare spondes I si respondent singuli separatim, spondeo. 332 LIB. III. TIT. XVI. It was not only in contracts made verbis that there could be joint creditors and joint debtors. In a commodatum or depositum, for instance, the parties might agree that several persons should be subject to a common obligation, and each be bound for the whole. (D. xlv. 2. 9.) 1. Ex liujusmodi obligationibus, 1. By virtue of sucli obligations, et stipulantibus solidiim singulis the whole thing stipulated for is due debetur, et promittentes singuli in to each stipulator, and from each pro- solidum tenentur ; in utraque tamen missor. tBut, in each obligation, there obligatione una res vertitur, et vel is only one thing due, and if either of alter debitum accipiendo, vel alter the joint parties receives the thing due, solvenclo, omnium perimit obliga- or gives the thing due, the obligation i/ionem et omnes liberat. is at end for all, and ail are freed from it. D. xlv. 2. 2. 3. 1. If we look to the thing which was the subject of the contract, we may say, however many were the joint parties, there was but one obligation, while, if we look to the persons by or to whom the promise was given, there were as many obligations as there were persons making or receiving the promise ; if, therefore, the thing Avas given, that is, payment or performance made, the ob- ligation was at an end, but the obligation binding on any one might be made to cease, as by the deminuti ocapitis of one of the co-promissors, without those binding on the others ceasing also. If, indeed, the aid of the law had been called in to enforce the obligation, the position of the parties was diiferent. If one co- stipulator sued the promissor, all the other parties to the stipulation were thereby prevented from suing him ; and if one co-promissor were sued, none of the others could be sued, the litis contestatio operating as an extinction of the debt ; but under Justinian, Avhen it appeared that there was a deficiency in what had been obtained from the promissor that had been sued, the others might then be sued to make up this deficiency. (C. viii. 41. 28.) The co- promissor who had paid all could recover, as a j^artner, their shares from the others, if there was a partnership between them, and if not, he could recover by paying to the creditor the whole sum, but separating the payment, paying his share absolutely, and paying the rest as the price of having the creditor's actions trans- ferred to him to use against the other co-promissors {heneficium cedendorum actionum)\ and probably, even if he had not actually made this separation, the praitor would allow him to bring an action against the other co-promissors in which he was feigned to have done it. (D. xxvii. 3. 1. 13.) 2. Ex diiobus reis promittendi 2. Of two co-promissors, one may alius pure, alius in diem vel sub engage simply, the other with the conditione obligari potest ; nee im- introduction of a particular time, or pedimento erit dies aut conditio, conditionally ; and neither the time quominus ab eo qui pure obligatus nor the condition will prevent payment est, petatur. being exacted from the one who binds himself simply. D. xlv. 2. 7. LIB. III. TIT. XVII. 333« Tit. XVII. DE STIPULATIOXE SERVOEUM. Servus ex persona domini jus stipulandi liabet ; sed hereditas in l)lerisque personse defuncti vicem sustinet ; ideoque quod servus here- ditarius ante aditam hereditatem stipulatur, acquirit liereditati, ac per hoc etiam heredi postea facto acquiritur. A slave derives from the persona of his master the power of making a stipulation. And as the inheritance in most respects represents the persona of the deceased, if a stipulation is made by a slave belonging to the inheritance before the inheritance is entered on, he acquires for the inheritance, and therefore for him who subsequently becomes heir. D. xli. 1. 34. 61. A slave had no persona, that is^ no capacity of acquiring civil or political rights. But his master, Avho had such a capacity, could make his own persona speak and act through the slave, who was thus only a channel by which the wishes of the master were expressed. (See Bk. i. Tit. 3, pr.) But although a slave could thus engage others for the benefit of his master, by a sti- pulation, he could not bind his master, and could not, therefore, be the promissor in a stipulation ; hence, the text only speaks of the stipulations, and not of the promises, of slaves. In pier isque persona defuncti vicem sustinet \ the inheritance represented the person of the deceased in most things, but there Avere some things which the slave could not acquire for the inhe- ritance, which he could acquire for a living master ; a usufruct, for instance, being always attached to a person, could not be stipulated for by a slave before the inheritance was entered on. (D. xlv. 3. 29.) 1. Sive autem domino, sive.sibi, sive conservo suo, sive impersonaliter servus stipuletur, domino acquirit. Idem juris est ct in liberis qui in potestate patris sunt, ex quibus causis acquirere possunt. 1. "VMiether a slave stipulates for his master, or for himself, or for his fellow-slave, or without naming any person for whom he stipulates, he always acquires for his master. It is the same with children in the power of their father, in all cases in which they acquire for him. D. xlv. 3. 15 ; D. xlv. 1. 45, pr. and 4. What is said here of the children in potestate must be taken with all the limitations made necessary by the power they had to acquire a jjeculiumioY themselves. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 9.) 2. Sed cum factum in stipulatione continebitur, omnimodo persona sti- pulantis continetur, veluti si servus stipuletur ut sibi ire agere liceat ; ipse enim tantum prohiberi non debet, non etiam dominas ejus. 2. If it is a licence to do something that is stipulated for, the benefit of the stipulation is personal to the stipu- lator ; for instance, if a slave stipulates that he shall have a right of passage for himself or beasts and vehicles, it is he himself, not his master, who is not to be hindered from passing. D. xlv, 1. 130. 134 LIB. III. TIT. XVIII. Even in this case the slave really acqfiires for the master. It is the master, and not the slave, who could enforce the stipulation by action. Of course this personal licence to cross land is some- thing quite different from a servitude. For a servitude euncli or agendi, stipulated for by the slave, could only be attached to the jjrcedium of the master. (D. xlvi. 3. 17.) 3. Servus communis stipulanclo iTnicuiqTie dominoriim. pro portione dominii acquirit ; nisi jussii iinius eoriim aut nominatim ciii eorum stipulatus est ; tunc enim ei soli acquiritiir. Quod servus communis stipulatur, si alteri ex dominis ac- quiri non potest, solidum alteri acquiritur ; veluti si res quam dari ■stipulatus est, unius domini sit. 3. If a slave held in common by several masters stipulates, he acquires a share for each master according to the proportion whicli each has in him, unless he stipulates at the command, or in the name of any one master, for then the thing stipulated for is acquired solely for that master. And whatever a sLave held in common stipulates for, is all acquired for one of his masters, if it is not capable of being acquired for the other; as for instance, if it belongs to one of his masters. Gai. iii. 167 ; D. xlv. 3. 7. 1. Tit. XVIII. DE mVISIONE STIPULATIONUM. Stipulationum alice sunt judici- 'ales, alise praetorise, alise conventio- nale s, alife communes tarn pr^torice quam judiciales. Stipulations are either judicial, or prretorian, or conventional, or common, that is, both praetorian and judicial. 1. Judiciales sunt dumtaxat quce a mero judicis officio proficiscun- tur : veluti de dolo cautio, vel de persequendo servo qui in fuga est, restituendove pretio. D. xlv. o. The division of stipulations here given is based on the dif- ference of the grounds on which they are entered into, the ground being sometimes the will of the parties, sometimes the direction of a person in authority. 1. Judicial stipulations are those which proceed exclusively from the office of the judge, such as the giving security against fraud, or the engage- ment to pursue a fugitive slave, or to pay his price. D. xlv. 1. 5 ; D. XXX. 69. 5. Before the magistrate the parties were in jure^ before the judex they v\^ere in judicio. (See Introd. sec. 98.) Tha judex sometimes ordered that the parties before him should enter into stipulations. Two instances are here given of stipulations directed by the judex. The first is the dc dolo cautio. This was a stipulation directed for the benefit of a plaintiff, that the sentence given in his favour might be executed, without any attempt at fraud {dolus malus) on the part of the defendant. For instance, if the de- fendant was ordered to make over the property in a slave, the LIB. III. TIT. XVIII= 335 judex would direct that he should stipulate that he had done nothing to lessen the value of the slave. Othervvdse the slave might be made over to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs claim be thus nominally satisfied, while it might really be evaded by the defendant wilfully doing the slave some material harm. (D. vi. 1. 20. and 45.) The other instance given is tliat of the stipulation dc perse- quendo servo qui in furja est, restitaendove pretio. A slave must be supposed to be demanded, and to run away before the decision is given. As the defendant, being the actual possessor, could alone reclaim the slave against third parties, the judex would compel iiim to engage by stipulation to follow and reclaim him, or to pay his price. If the slave escaped without any fault vv-hatsocver of the defendant, the judge merely directed that the defendant should engage to give up the slave if he came into his power, and to permit the plaintiff to bring an action in the defendant's name for the recoverv of the slave from any one who might detain him. (D. iv. 2. 14. H.) 2. Prajtorifie sunt, qu?e a inero 2. Prretorian stipiilation.s are those praitoris officio proficiscuntur, veiuti "which proceed exchisively from the dainni infecti vel legatorum. Prje- office of the pnetor ; as the givinsr torias auteni stipulationes sic exau- security against damniim infectnm, or diri oportet, ut in his contineantnr for the payment of legacies. Under etiam ^-SdiHtiss ; nam et hte a jiu'is- praetorian sti])ulations must be coia- dictione veniunt. prehended ^^dihtian, for these, too, proceed from a magistrate pronouncing the law. D. xl. 1. 5. Damnum infectum est damnum nan factum quod faturum veremur. (D. xxxix. 2. 2.) Supposing the damnum futurum which a man apprehended were an injury to his premises from the fall of the ill-repaired house of his neighbour, by the strict civil lavv', if he was to wait till the mischief were done, his neighbour might abandon his property in the fallen house, nnd the injured man could then obtain no reparation from him. To remedy this, the prsetor would, if he saw fit, order the neighbour to give security {cautio damni infecti) to indemnify the person applying against any damage that might be done. If this order was not obeyed, the praitor authorised the complainant to enter upon and occupy the premises {in possessionem 'mittehat) ; and, finally, if security was still refused, the praetor gave the com})lainant full possession of the premises, but he was liable to be dispossessed, if within a certain time the original proprietor made compensa- tion and complied with everything enjoined him. (See D. xxxix. 2. 4. 1.) Legatorum : this was a stipulation binding tlie heir to pay legacies, Avhen due, which were not yet payable ; otherwise the lieir might previously have spent and consumed all the inheritance. A jurisdictione veniunt, that is, come from a magistrate qui 336 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. jus dicit. Jurisdiction in its general sense, includes the whole officium of the jus dicentis, which is said to be latissimum^ for honorum possessionem dare potest, et in possessionem mittere, pupillis non hahentihus tutor es constituere, judices litiqantihus dare, (D. ii. 1. 1.) 3. Conventionales sunt, qupe ex 3. Conventional stipulations are conventione utriusque partis conci- those which are made by the agree- piuntur, hoc est, neque jussu judi- ment of parties ; that is, neither by cis, neque jussu pra3toris, sed ex the order of a judge nor by that of conventione contrahentium. Qua- the preetor, but by the consent of the rum totidem genera sunt qnot, pene persons contracting. And of these dixerim, rerum contrahendarum. stipulations there are as many kinds, so to speak, as there are of things to be contracted for. D. xlv. 1. 5. 4. Communes stipulationes sunt, 4. Common stipulations are those, veluti rem salvam fore pupilli ; nam for example, providing for the secu- et prjetor jubet rem salvam fore rity of the property of a pupil, for pupillo caveri, et interdum judex sometimes the prsetor, and sometimes, si aliter expediri ha3c res non potest ; too, when the matter cannot be ma- vel de rato stipulatio. naged in any other way, the judge, orders it should be entered into ; or, again, the stipulation thab a thing shall be ratified. D. xlv. 1. 5. Communes stipulationes were those sometimes directed by the prajtor, sometimes by the judex. They ought properly to have preceded the conventionales. Mention has already been made of the security a tutor or curator was obliged to give. (Bk. i. Tit. 24, pr.) It was pro- perly given before the tutor entered on his office, and it belonged to the pra3tor to see that it Avas given. But if, before it was given, the tutor sued a debtor of the pupil, and the debtor ob- jected that security had not been given, the judge, in order that tlie proceedings might not be put an end to, would direct security to be then given before him. The stipulation de rato, or rem ratam liaheri, was one entered into by a procurator bringing an action in the name of his prin- cipal that what he did would be ratified by his principal. It properly belonged to the praator to direct that this stipulation should be entered into before the litis contestatio (see Introd. sec. 105) ; but if he omitted to direct this, and there was ground for distrusting the authority of the procurator, the judge would direct that the procurator should bind himself by this stipulation. "(See Bk. iv. Tit. 11. 1.) Tit. XIX. DE INUTILIBUS STIPULATIOXIBUS. Omnis res quce dominio nostro Everything, of which we have the subjicitur, in stipulationem deduci property, whether it be moveable or potest, sive ilia mobilisj sive soli sit. immoveable, may be the object of a stipulation. LIB. III. TIT. XIX. 337 A stipulation is inutilis, i.e. invalid, when it produces no tie binding on the parties to it. It would seem to have been proper to have examined here the causes which make contracts of any kind invalid, and not to limit the inquiry to stipulations. But the stipulation was so much the most important kind of contract that it is taken to represent all other kinds. Some few of the causes of invalidity noticed in this Title are peculiar to stipulations, but most are common to all contracts. Lagrange thus classifies the reasons given in this Title for the invalidity of stipulations: they might be invalid (1) on account of their object (pr. paragr. 1, 2, 22, 24); (2) on account of the persons by whom (paragr. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12), for whom (paragr. 3, 4, 19, 20, 21), or between whom (paragr. 6) they were made; (3) on account of the manner in w^hich they were made (paragr. 5, 17, 18, 23) ; (4) on account of the time (paragr. 13, 14, 15, 16, 26), or the condition (paragr. 11, 25) subject to which they were made. 1. At si quis rem quse in rerum natura non est aut esse non potest, dari stipulatus fuerit, veluti Stichum qui mortuus sit, quein vivere crede- bat, aut Hippocentaurum qui esse non possit, inutilis erit stipulatio. Gai. iii. 97. 1. But, if any one stipulates for a thing which does not, or cannot exist, as for Stichus, who is dead, but whom he thought to be living, or for a Hip- pocentaur, which cannot exist, the stipulation is void. In such a case no claim could be made for the supposed value of the thing, nor even for a sum promised under a penal clause in case of non-performance. (D. xlv. 1. 69 and 103.) 2, Idem juris est, si rem sacram aut religiosam quam humani juris esse credebat, vel publicam quae usibus populi perpetuo exposita sit, ut forum vel theatrum, vel liberum hominem quern servum esse cre- debat, vel cujus commercium non habuerit, vel rem suam dari quis stipuletur : nee in pendenti erit sti- pulatio ob id quod publica res in privatum deduci, et ex libero servus fieri potest, et commercium adipisci stipulator potest, et res stipulatoris esse desinere potest ; sed protinus inutilis est. Item contra, licet initio utiliter res in stipulatum deducta sit, si postea in earum qua causa de quibus supra dictum est, sine facto promissoris devenerit, extin- guitur stipulatio. At nee statim ab initio talis stipulatio valebit, Lucium Titium, cum servus erit, dare spon- des ? et similia ; quia quae natura sui dominio nostro exempta sunt, in ob- ligationem deduci nullo modo pos- sunt. 2. It is the same if any one stipu- lates for a thing sacred or religious, which he thought to be profane, or for a public thing appropriated to the perpetual use of the people, as a forum or theatre, or for a free man, whom, he thought to be a slave, or for a thing of which he has not the comTnercmm, or for a thing belonging to himself. Nor will the stipulation remain in suspense, because the public thing may become private, the freemanmay become a slave, the stipulator may acquire the commer- cium of the thing, or the thing which now belongs to him may cease to be his ; but the stipulation is at once void. So, conversely, although a thing may have been validly stipulated for origi- nally, yet, if it afterwards fall under the class of any of the things before mentioned, without the fault of the promissor, the stipulation is extin- guished. Such a stipulation, too, as the following, is void ah initio, ' Do you promise to give me Lucius Titius, when he shall become a slave ? ' for 338 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. that which by its nature belongs to no i one, cannot in any way be made the object of an obligation. Gai. iii. 97 ; D. xlvi. 82, 83. 5. Cujus commercium non kabuerit. For instance, if, in the days of Gains, a perec/rinus had stipulated for 2, fundus Italicus ; or if, in the times of the Lower Empire, a heathen had stipulated for a Christian slave (C. i. 10). Of course, if the promissor had not the commercium of the particular thing, while the stipulator liad it, the promissor was ansAverable to the stipulator for a breach of contract if he did not fulfil his promise. (D. xlv. 1. 34.) Vel rem suam. It cannot belong to him more than it does ; but he might stipulate for its value, or for the thing itself if it ceased to belong to him. (D. xlv. 1. 31.) Extinguitur stipulatlo. And if it were once extinguished, no alteration of circumstances would renew it. In perpetuum sublata ohligatio restitui non potest. (D. xlvi. 3. 98. 8.) In a stipulation it made no difference that the stipulator was really ignorant that there was some character attaching to the object of the stipulation which made the stipulation invalid, as that it was sacred or jmblic. The fact that it was sacred or public invalidated the stipulation, and the stipulator had no further remedy against the promissor. We shall find (Tit. 24. 5) that if a person purchased in ignorance a thing of this nature, he would have a remedy against the seller to indemnify him for the loss he ;sustained by the purchase. 3. Si quis alium datiirum factu- rumve quod spoponderit, non obli- gabitnr, veluti si spondeat Titium quinque aiireos daturum. Quod si eftecturum se ut Titius daret, spo- ponderit, obligatur. D. xlv. 1. 83. 4. Si quis alii quam cujus juri subjectus sit, stipuletur, nihil agit. Plane solutio etiam in extranei per- sonam conferri potest, veluti si quis ita stipuletur, mihi aut Seio dare spondes ] ut obligatio quidem stipu- latori acquiratur, solvi tamen Seio etiam invito eo recte x)Ossit ; ut libe- ratio ipso jure contingat, sed ille adversus Seium habeat mandati ac- tionem. Quod si quis sibi et alii cujus juri subjectus non sit, dari decern aureos stipulatus est, valebit quidem stipuhatio ; sed utrum totum debeatur quod in stipulationem de- ductum est, an vero i^ars dimidia, dubitatum est ; sed placet non plus quam dimidiam partem ei acquiri. Ei qui juri tuo subjectus est, si sti- 4. If any one stipulates for the benefit of a third person, other than a person in whose power he is, the stipulation is void. But it may be arranged that payment shall be made to a third person, as if a person stipu- lates thus, ' Do you engage to pay to me or to Seius ? ' The stipulator alone, in this case, acquires the obli- gation ; but payment may be made to Seius even against his will ; the payer will then be at once freed from his obligation, while the stipulator will have against Seius an actio mandati. If any one stipulates that ten aurei shall be paid to him and to a third person, other than a person in whose power he is, the stipulation is valid ; but it has been doubted whether, in 3. If a man promises that another shall give or do something, he is not bound, as if he promises, that Titius shall give five aurei. But, if he pro- mises that he will manage that Titius shall give five aurei, he is bound. LIB. in. TIT. XIX. 339 iilatus sis, tibi acquiris ; quia vox this case, the whole sum is due to the Lia tainquam filii sit, sicuti lilii vox stipulator, or only half ; and it has imquam tua intelligitur in iis rebus been decided that only half is due. ua3 tibi acquiri possunt. But, if you stipulate for another, who is in your power, you acquire for your- self ; for your words are as the words of your son, and your son's words are as yours, with respect to all things which can be acquired for you. Gai. iii. 103 ; D. xlv. 1. 141. 3 ; D. xlv. 1. 39. 130 ; D. xxxix. 2. 42. No one who was not a party to a contract could gain or lose )y it. Res inter alios acta, aliis neque nocere, neque prodesse potest a maxim not to be found exactly in its present shape, but based )n C. vii. 60. 1). And as this was true of all kinds of contracts, 50 was it specially of stipulations, in which a particular formula lad to be spoken, and which could not properly be entered into by any one that was absent. The third person not being a party to the contract, could have no action to enforce it, and the stipulator 30uld not enforce it because he had no interest in it. If, indeed, he bad any interest in it, that is, any legal interest, which of course might happen, a stipulation for another was binding. Si stipuler alii cum mea interesset, ait Marcellus, stipulationem valere. (D. xlv. 1. 38. 20, and see paragr. 20 of this Title.) And when one per- son wished to stipulate for another, the object might generally be effected by adding a penalty for the non-performance of the promise. A stipulation binding the promissor to give something to Titius, or, if it were not given, to pay a penalty to the stipu- lator, was binding. It was, indeed, nothing but a conditional contract. In the event of something not happening, which might have happened, a certain benefit was to accrue to the stipulator. (D. xlv. 1. 38. 17.) It is because the thing might have happened that such a penal clause differs in its effect from one made to enforce the performance of a thing physically impossible. (See note on paragr. 1.) Mihi aut Seio. The third person, to whom payment might be thus made at the option of the payee, was said to be solutionis causa adjectus. (D. xlvi. 3. 95. 5.) Sibi et alii. We learn from Gains, that the Sabinians were of opinion that the whole sum specified was in this case due to the stipulator. Justinian adopts the contrary opinion. (Gai. iii. 103.) Every one could stipulate and promise for his heir. Every paterfamilias could stipulate for those under his power and his slaves ; every person under power and every slave could stipulate for the paterfamilias or master, and could promise so as to bind the paterfamilias or master, if authorised, directly or indirectly, to do so. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 7.) In the later law many kinds of stipulations could be made through another person, though this was contrary to the primary notion of a stipulation. For instance, the stipulation * rem pupillo z 2 340 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. salvam fore'' (see Tit. 18. 4) could be made, for a pupil who was infans, or absent, by a public slave, by a person appointed by the praetor, or by a magistrate if the parties came before him. (D. xxvii. 8. 1. 15.) 5. Prseterea inutilis est stipulatio, si quis ad ea quae interrogatus erit, non respondeat : veluti, si decern aureos a te dari stipuletur, tu quinque pro- mittas, vel contra ; aut si ille pure stipuletur, tu sub conditione promit- tas, vel contra, si modo scilicet id exprimas, id est, si cui sub condi- tione vel in diem stipulanti tu re- spondeas, prsesenti die spondeo : nam si hoc solum respondeas, pro- mitto, breviter videris in eamdem diem vel conditionem spopondisse ; neque enim necesse est in respon- dendo eadem omnia repeti, quae stipulator expresserit. 5. A stipulation, again, is void, if the answer do not agree with the demand ; as when a person stipulates that ten aurei shall be given him, and you answer five, or vice versa. A sti- pulation is also void, if a person sti- pulates simply, and you promise conditionally, or vice versa ; provided only that the disagreement is ex- pressly stated, as if, when a man stipu- lates conditionally, or for a particular time, you answer, * I promise for to- day.' But, if you answer only, ' I promise,' you seem in a brief way to agree to the time or condition he proposes. For it is not necessary, that in the answer every word should be repeated which the stipulator ex- pressed. D. xlv. 1. 1. 3, 4 ; D. xlv. 1. 134. 1. Si decern aureos, Ulpian, in the Digest, decides the question the other way. (D. xlv. 1. 1. 4.) 6. Item inutilis est stipulatio, si vel ab eo stipuleris qui tuo juri sub- jectus est, vel si is a te stipuletur. Sed servus quidem non solum do- mino suo obligari non potest, sed ne alii quidem ulli ; filii vero familias aliis obligari possunt. 6. A stipulation is also void if made with one who is in your power, or if such a person stipulate with you. A slave is incapable not only of entering into an obligation with his master, but of binding himself to any other person. But a filiusfamilias can enter into an obligation with others. Gai. iii. 104. 39 ; D. xliv. 7. 14. The slave could not contract civilly with his master ; but the later law recognised that there might be a naturalis ohHgatio created between them, so that if a master owed anything to a slave in the accounts kept between them, and paid it to the slave after he had been manumitted, the master could not recover it, as he was paying what, by a natural obligation, he was bound to pay. (D. xii. 6. 64.) The JiUus familias could bind himself civilly. Filiusfamilias ex omnibus cuusis tanquam "paterfamilias obUgatur, (D. xliv. 7. 39.) He could be sued and his person taken in execution, and his peculia could be made available for his creditors ; and Jus- tinian permitted him to make a cessio bonorum. (C. vi. 71. 7.) To protect filiifamiliarum, the senatus-consultum Macedonianum was passed, by which money lent to filiifamiliarum could not be recovered from them. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 7. 7.) i LIB. III. TIT. XIX. 341 7. Mutum neque stipulari neque promittere posse palam est, quod et in surdo receptum est ; quia et is qui stipulatur verba promittentis, et is qui promittit verba stipulantis audire de- bet : unde apparet non de eo nos loqui qui tardius exaudit, sed de eo qui omnino non audit. 7. It is evident that a dumb man can neither stipulate nor promise. And this is considered to apply also to deaf persons, for he who stipulates ought to hear the words of the pro- missor, and he who promises, the words of the stipulator. Hence, it is clear that we are not speaking of a person who hears with difficulty, but of one who cannot hear at all. Gai. iii. 105 ; D. xliv. 7. 1. 15. 8. Furiosus nullum negotium ge- 8. A madman can go through no rere potest, quia non intelligit quid legal act, because he does not under- agit. stand what he is doing. Gai. iii. 106. During lucid intervals a madman could make valid stipula- tions or promises. 9. Pupillus omne negotium recte gerit, ut tamen sicubi tutoris aucto- ritas necessaria sit, adhibeatur tutor, veluti si ipse obligetur : nam alium sibi obligare etiam sine tutoris auctoritate potest. 9. A pupil may go through any legal act, provided that the tutor takes a part in the proceeding in cases where his authorisation is necessary, as, for instance, when the pupil binds himself ; for a pupil can bind others to him without the authorisation of his tutor. Gai. ii. 107. 10. Sed quod diximus de pupillis, utique de iis verum est qui jam ali- quem intellectum habent : nam in- fans et qui infanti proximus est, non multum a furioso distant, quia hujus setatis pupilli nullum habent intel- lectum ; sed in proximis infanti, propter utilitatem eorum, benignior juris interpretatio facta est, ut idem juris habeant quod pubertati proximi. Sed qui in potestate parentis est impubes, ne auctore quidem patre obligatur. 10. This must be understood only of pupils who already have some under- standing ; for an infant, or one still near to infancy, difiters but little from a madman, for pupils of such an age have no understanding at all. But, in order to consult their interest, the law is construed more favourably to those who are near to infancy, and they are allowed the same rights as those near the age of puberty. A son in the power of his father, and under the age of puberty, cannot bind himself even if his father authorises him. Gai. iii. 109 ; D. xlv. 1. 141. 2. An infant was properly one qui fari non potest, a child not yet old enough to speak with understanding of what he said, i. e. was below the age of seven years. AYhen a child could talk, and began to have some degree of understanding, he was termed in- fanti proximus. He could now pronounce, and in some measure understand, the words of a stipulation, and the law permitted him to do so with the sanction of his tutor in certain cases, such as the acquisition of an inheritance, where his personal intervention w^as necessary. But the law did not allow him to stipulate except when the stipulation was clearly for his benefit. (D. xxix. 2. 9.) Just as the child who was older than an infant was said to be infanticB proximus, so one a little younger than a puhes was 342 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. said to be puhertati proximus. Theophilus, in his paraphrase of this paragraph, says, proximus infanti qualis fuerit qvi septimum ant octavum annum agit. The original notion seems to have been that the child infantice proximus could not do things which the puhertati proximus could do. There was a clear difference be- tween a child between seven and ei^ht and a child between thir- teen and fourteen. But the capacity existing in the inter- vening years would vary with the individual. Gradually the law recognised more and more the acts of the child over seven years, as this was considered, as the text says, the henignior interpre- tation the more favourable interpretation to the child, as removing doubts as to his competence, and avoiding the necessity of having recourse to a slave to stipulate for the child. (D. xlvi. 6. 6.) But, with regard to delicts, the benignior interpretotio would be to mark the distinction between different ao;es of children above seven; and so we are told (Bk. iv. Tit.. 1. 18) that the impuhes is only bound ex furto in so far as proximus puhertati intelligit se delinquere. The paterfamilias could not, like a tutor, supply his autho- rity to make up what was deficient in the power of the impuhes. The concluding words of this paragraph are taken from Gains, | who makes his statement more complete by adding puhes vero qui ™ in potestate est, proinde ac si paterfamilias obligari solet, (D. xlv. 1. 141. 5.) 11. Si impossibilis conditio obli- 11. If an impossible condition is gationibiis adjiciatnr, nihil valet added to an obligation, the stipulation stipulatio. Impossibilis antem con- is void. A condition is considered ditio habetnr, cui natnra impedi- impossible of which natnre forbids the mento est quominns existat, veluti accomplishment ; as, if a person says, si quis ita dixerit, si digito coehim ' Bo you promise if I touch the heavens attigero dare spondes 1 At si ita with my finger ? ' But if a stipulation stipuletur, si digito coelum non at- is made thus, ' Do you promise if I do tigero dare spondes ? pure facta not touch the sky with my finger ? ' obligatio intelligitur, ideoque statim the obligation is considered as uncon- petere potest. ditional, and performance may be in- stantly demanded. Gai. iii. 98 ; D. xlv. 1. 7. An impossible condition in a testamentary gift was treated as if it had never been inserted. In a stipulation or any other con- tract it made the contract void, a difference owing to the favour with which testamentary gifts were regarded. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 15. 10.) In the stipulation, ' If I do not touch the heavens,' &c., there > is really no condition ; there is nothing left undecided in the mind of the speaker or hearer. 12. Itemverborum obligatio inter 12. A verbal obligation, made be- absentes concepta inutilis est. Sed tween absent persons, is also void. But cum hoc materiam litium conten- as this doctrine afibrded matter of tiosis hominibus pr^stabat, forte strife to contentious men, who alleged, post tempus tales allegationes op- after some time had elapsed, that either LIB. III. TIT. XIX. 343 ponentibus, et non praesentes esse vel se vel adversaries sues conten- dentibns, ideo nostra constitutio propter celeritatem dirimendarum litium introducta est, quam ad Ca3sarienses advocates scripsimns : per qiiam disposiiimus tales scrip- tiiras quae presto esse partes in- dicant, omnimodo esse credendas, nisi ipse qui talibus utitur improbis allegationibus, manifestissimis pro- bationibus vel per scripturam vel per testes idoneos af)probaverit, in ipso toto die quo conficiebatur in- strumentum sese vel adversarium suum in aliis locis esse. they or their adversaries were not pre- sent, we issued a constitution, addressed to the advocates of Caesarea, in order to provide for the speedy determination of such suits. By this we have en- acted, that written acts which declare that the contracting parties were pre- sent, shall be considered as indisputable evidence of the fact, unless the party who has recourse to such shameless allegations makes it evident, by the most manifest proofs, either by writing or by credible witnesses, that either he or his adversary was in some other place during the whole day in which the instrument was made. Gai. iii. 138 : C. viii. 38. 14. Xo writing was necessary to make a verbal contract valid ; but one was generally drawn up as a record of the transactions, and called instrumentum or cautio, as being a security for the stipulator. 13. Post mortem suam dari sibi nemo stipulari poterat, non magis quam post mortem ejus a quo sti- pulabatur ; ac nee is qui in alicujus potestate est, post mortem ejus sti- pulari poterat, quia patris vel do- mini voce loqui videtur. Sed et si quis ita stipuletur, pridie quam moriar vel pridie quam morieris dabis ? inutilis erat stipulatio. Sed cum (ut ita dictum est) ex consensu contrahentium stipulationes valent, placuit nobis etiam in hunc juris ar- ticulum necessariam inducere emen- dationem : ut sive post mortem, sive pridie quam morietur stipulator sive promissor, stipulatio concepta est, valeat stipulatio. 13. A man could not formerly sti- pulate that a thing should be given him after his own death, any more than after the death of the promissor. Neither could any person in the power of another stipulate that anything should be given him after the death of the person in whose power he was, because it was his father or master who appeared to be speaking in him. And if any one stipulated thus, ' Do you promise to give the day before I die ? or the day before you die ? ' the stipu- lation was invalid. But since all sti- pulations, as we have already said, derive their force from the consent of the contracting parties, we have thought it proper to introduce a necessary alte- ration in this respect, so that now, whether it is stipulated that a thing shall be given after, or immediately before, the death either of the stipu- lator or the promissor, the stipulation is good. Gai. iii. 100 ; C. viii. 38. 11 ; C. iv. 11. A stipulation '^pridie quam moriar^ was held to be invalid, because the date when the thing promised became due could not be fixed until the death happened, and then the action would only be acquired for or against the* heirs, exactly as in the case of a stipulation ' dahis post mortem ' (Gai. iii. 100), and the heirs were looked on as those parties for whom a stipulation could not be made. Gains says, inelegans visum est ex heredh persona inci- pere obligatlonem ; it was out of the due order of things that a 344 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. man should enter into an obligation in which no action could be brought until after his death. Justinian does away with all these subtleties. 14. Itemsi quisitastipulatuserat, 14. Also, if any one stipulated si navis eras ex Asia venerit, liodie thus, ' If a certain ship arrives to- dare spondes ? inutilis erit stipu- morrow from Asia, do you engage to latio, quia pr^epostere concepta est, give to-day T the stipulation would Sed cum Leo inclytse recordationis be void, as being preposterous. But, in dotibus eamdem stipulationem since the Emperor Leo, of glorious me- quse prsepostera nuncupatur, non mory, decided that such a stipulation, esse rejiciendam existimavit, nobis which is termed prsepostera, ought not placuit et huic perfectum robur to be rejected with respect to marriage- accommodare, ut non solum in portions, we have thought it right to dotibus sed etiam in omnibus valeat give it complete validity, so that novr, hujusmodi conceptio stipulationis. every stipulation made in this way is valid, not only with respect to mar- riage-portions, but whatever may be its object. C. vi. 23. 25. Such a stipulation was said to be prcepostere concepta (i. e. the things which should come j^^st are placed pr«), because the payment is to be made at once, and thus is placed before {proi) instead of after (post) the fulfilment of the condition. Under Justinian's enactment the contract was binding at once, but pay- ment could not be enforced until the condition was fulfilled. (C. vi. 23. 25.) 15. Ita autern concepta stipulatio, 15. A stipulation made thus, as if, veluti si Titius dicat, cum moriar for instance, Titius says, ' Do you pro- dare spondes ? vel cum morieris ? et mise to give when I die,' or ' when you apud veteres utilis erat et nunc die V was considered valid by the valet. ancients, and is so now. D. xlv. 1. 45. 3. ' This stipulation was said to be valid because the thing was to be given ' jioji post moi^tem, sed ultimo vitce tempore.^ (GrAi. ii. 232.) The moment Avhen the performance of the engagement became due' was fixed before the time when the rights of the heir were distinct from those of the deceased. In the stipulation darl pridie quam morUir, the moment when the performance be- came due could only be ascertained after the death of the deceased. Until he had died it was not known when the day before the day of his death would be. But he must die, and the moment of his death might be taken as an epoch in itself. 16. Item post mortem alterius 16. We may also validly stipulate recte stipxilamur. that a thing shall be given after the death of a third person. D. xlv. 1. 45. 1. The death of a third person was an uncertain term, which might be as legitimately affixed to a stipulation or any other un- I LIB. III. TIT. XIX. 345 certain time. The reason which prevented the stipulation post mortem meam or tuam did not apply. 17. Si scriptum in instriiinento fuerit promisisse aliquem, perinde habetur atque si interrogatione prsecedente responsum sit. 17. If it is written in an instru- ment that a person has promised, the promise is considered to have been given in answer to a precedent interro- gation. See Paul. Sent. v. 7. 2. Ulpian says (D. ii. 14. 7. 12) that if, at the end of the instrument of an agreement, the words usually added were found, viz. rogavit Titius, spopondit Mcevius, the agreement was taken to be a stipulation unless it were expressly shown that it was in reality only a pactum. 18. Quoties plures res una stipu- latione comprehenduntur, si quidem promissor simpliciter respondeat dare spondeo, propter omnes tene- ^tur. Si vero unam ex his vel quasdam daturum se respondent, obligatio in iis pro quibus spopon- derit, contrahitur : ex pluribus enim stipulationibus una vel queedam \identur esse perfects© ; singulas enim res stipulari, et ad singulas respondere debemus. 18. When many things are compre- hended in one stipulation, a man binds himself to all, if he answers simply ' I promise to give.' But, if he promises to give one, or some of the things stipu- lated for, he is bound only with respect to the things comprised in his answer. For, of the difierent stipulations con- tained in the question, only some are considered to have been answered, as for each object a question and an answer is required. D. xlv. 1. 83. 4 ; D. xlv. 1. 4, 5. 19. Alteri stipulari (ut supra dictum est) nemo potest : invent^e sunt enim hujusmodi obligationes ad hoc ut unusquisque sibi acquirat quod sua interest ; ceterum, ut alii detur, nihil interest stipulatoris. Plane si quis velit hoc facere, poe- nam stipulari conveniet, ut nisi ita factum sit ut comprehensum est, committatur poense stipulatio etiam ei cujus nihil interest ; prenam enim quum stipulatur quis, non illud in- spicitur quid intersit ejus, sed quce sit quantitas in conditione stipula- tionis. Ergo si quis stipuletur Titio dari, nihil agit ; sed si addi- derit poenam, nisi dederis tot aureos dare spondes ? tunc committitur stipulatio. 19. No one, as we have already said, can stipulate for another, for this kind of obligations has been invented, that every person may acquire what it is for his own advantage to acquire ; and it cannot be for his interest that a thing should be given to another. But if any one wishes to stipulate for an- other, he should stipulate for a penalty payable to him, although he would otherwise receive no advantage from the obligation, so that if the promissor does not perform his promise, the sti- pulation for the penalty may be valid even for a person who had no interest in the performance of the promise ; for when a penalty is stipulated for, it is not the interest of the stipulator that is regarded, but the amount of the penalty. If, therefore, any one stipulates that a certain thing shall be given to Titius, this is void ; but if he adds a penalty, ' Do you promise to give me so many aurei if you do not give the thing to Titius 1 ' this stipula- tion binds the promissor. D. xlv. 1. 38. 17. 20. Sed et si quis stipuletur alii, 20. But, if any one stipulates for cum ejus interesset, placuit stipu- another, having himself an interest in 346 LIB. III. TIT. XIX. lationem valere. Nam si is qui pupilli tutelam administrare coepe- rat, cessit administratione contiitori suo, et stipnlatus est rem pupilli salvam fore ; quoniam interest sti- pulatoris fieri quod stipulatus est, cum obligatus futurus esset pupillo si male gesserit, tenet obligatio. Ergo et si quis procuratori suo dari stipulatus sit, stipulatio vires habe- bit ; et si creditori dari stipulatus sit, quod sua interest, ne forte vel poena committatur vel, prfedia dis- trahantur qua3 pignori data erant, valet stipulatio. the performance of the promise, the stipulation is valid. Thus if he who has begun to act as tutor afterwards gives up the administration to his co- tutor, and stipulates for the security of the estate of his pupil, since it is for the interest of the stipulator that the promise should be performed, as he is answerable to the pupil for malad- ministration, the obligation is binding. So if a person stipulates that a thing shall be given to his procurator, the stipulation is eflfectual. So, too, is a stipidation that a thing shall be given to a creditor of the stipulator, the stipu- lator having an interest in the perform- ance of the promise ; as, for instance, that he may avoid becoming liable to a penal clause, or that his immoveables, given in pledge, should not be sold. D. xlv. 1. 38. 20. 23. See note on paragr. 4. The tutor was liable for all his co- tutor did. (See Bk. i. Tit. 24.) 21. Versa vice, qui alium factu- rum promisit, videtur in ea esse causa ut non teneatur, nisi poenam ipse promiserit. 21. Conversely, he who undertakes for the performance of another, is not bound unless he promises under a penalty. D. xlv. 1. 38. 2. 22. Item nemo rem suam futu- ram, in eum casum quo sua sit, utiliter stipulatur. 22. No man can validly stipulate that a thing which may hereafter be- long to him shall be given him when it becomes his. D. xlv. 1. 87. When the time was come, the stipulation would have nothing on which to take effect. 23. Si de alia re stipulator sen- serit, de alia promissor, perinde nulla contrahitur obligatio, ac si ad interrogatum responsum non esset : veluti, si hominem Stichum a te quis stipulatus fuerit, tu de Pam- philo senseris quem Stichum vocari credideris. D. xlv. 23. If the stipulator intend one thing, and a promissor another, an obligation is no more contracted than if no answer had been made to the interrogation ; for instance, if any one has stipulated that you should give Stichus, and you understood him to refer to Pamphilus, thinking that Pamphilus was called Stichus. 1. 137. 1.- Stipulatio ex utriusque consensu valet. (D. xlv. 1. 83. 1.) And if the seeming consent implied in pronouncing the words of the stipulation was vitiated by a mistake under which one party spoke of one thing and the other of another, the stipulation was void ; but if the mistake was only with reference to something in, or relating to, the thing they were speaking of, i.e. if they were LIB. III. TIT. XX. 34: really speakiDg of the same thing, but one party was under some misapprehension respecting it, the stipulation was valid. So it was valid if fraud or violence had been used to procure it ; but though in such cases it was valid, the rights it gave were worthless under the jurisdiction of the prsetor, who always allowed exceptiones doli, metus^ &c., by which the action brought on the stipulation was repelled. 24. Quod turpi ex causa promis- 24. A promise made to effect a sum est, veluti si quis homicidium base purpose, as to commit homicide vel sacrilegium se facturum pro- or sacrilege, is not binding, mittat, non valet. D. xlv. 1. 26, 27. A thing was said to be promissum ex turpi causa, when it was promised, being itself illegal or immoral, or was the reward, or depended on the happening, of anything illegal or immoral. 25. Cum quis sub aliqua condi- tione stipulatus fuerit, licet ante conditionem decesserit, postea exis- tente conditione lieres ejus agere potest. Idem est et ex promissoris parte. 25. If a stipulation is conditional, although the stipulator dies before the accomplishment of the condition, yet if, afterwards, the condition is ac- complished, his heir can demand the execution of the promise ; and so, too, the heir of the promissor may be sued. D. xlv. 1. 57. 26. Qui hoc anno aut hoc mense dari stipulatus est, nisi omnibus partibus anni vel mensis prseteritis non recta petet. 26. A person who stipulates that a thing shall be given to him in such a year or month, cannot legally de- mand the thing promised until the whole year or month has elapsed. D. xlv. 1. 42. 27. Si fundum dari stipuleris vel hominem, non poteris continuo agere, nisi tantum spatium prteter- ierit quo traditio fieri possit. 27. If you stipulate for a piece of ground, or a slave, you cannot in- stantly demand the thing, but must wait until enough time has passed for delivery to have been made. D.xlv. 1. 73. Tit. XX. DE FIDEJUSSOEIBUS. Pro eo qui promittit, solent alii It is customary that other persons, obligari, qui fidejussores appellan- termed Jldejussores, should bind them- tur ; quos homines accipere solent selves for the promissor, creditors dum curant ut diligentius sibi cau- generally requiring that they should tum sit. do so in order that the security may be greater. Gal iii. 115. 117. We have already noticed in Title 16 the cases of persons who joined in making the same stipulation or who joined in 348 LIB. III. TIT. XX. making the same promise. We now come to the cases of persons who come in as accessories to the creditor or debtor. Many of the rules of law applying to the corei stlpulandi or promittendi applied to these accessories ; especially those rules applied so that if payment was made to the accessory of the creditor the debtor was free as against the creditor ; and if the principal debtor or any of his accessories was sued, no further action could, until Justinian permitted it, be brought by the creditor against those who were not sued, the litis contestatio operating as an extinction of the debt. Besides the principal parties to a stipulation, the stipulator and the promissor, there might be accessory parties, called respectively adstipulatores and adpromissores. The adstipulator either received the same promise as his principal did, and could, therefore, have the same actions, and equally receive or exact payment ; or he only stipulated for a part of that for which the principal stipu- lated, and then his rights were co-extensive with the amount of his own stipulation. In the early law, the chief use of an adsti- pulator was, probably, to supply the place of a procurator at a time when the law refused to allow stipulations to be made by procuration. A might make a stipulation, and know that at the time when payment would be due he would be abroad. He, therefore, joined B in the stipulation, who could receive payment or bring an action in his place. Before the time of Justinian no one could stipulate validly for a thing after his own death (see Tit. 19. 13); and, therefore, those who wished to make such a stipulation joined an a^.^^i/?z«/«fo?' with them, and this adstipulator could bring an action, or receive payment, after the death of the stipulator. As, in the days of Gains, all contracts could be made by procuration, it appears from bis account of the adstipulator ^ which is the only one we have, that the only use of the adstipulator was to make this ^t\^u\^i\on post mortem suam valid. (Gai. iii. 117.) The adstipulator could not transmit his right of action even to his heirs. His rights were purely personal, because he was selected by the stipulator, to whom he stood in the relation of a mandatary, from motives of personal confidence. (Gai. iii. 114.) The adpromissores were accessory to the promise, in order to give the stipulator greater security. They were guarantees for the fulfilment of the promise (Gai. iii. 116), and these guarantees were termed sponsores when Koman citizens, as they pledged themselves by the word spondeo, a word which citizens alone could utter, SLudJidepromissores when peregriiii (GrAi. iii. 120), because, in binding themselves, they used the expression ^of^ mea promitto. The sponsores and fidepromissores held a position, in many respects, the exact converse of the adstipulator. They made the same promise as their principal, or one not so extensive, for they might only choose to become guarantees to a certain extent ; they could not bind themselves for more than their principal was bound LIB. III. TIT. XX. ' 349 for. They were often employed to remove any objections that might be made to the capacity of their promissor, as, for instance, that he was impuhes and contracting without the consent of his tutor. Their heirs were not bound (Gai. iii. 120), and they might recover from their principal by an actio mandati what they had advanced for him. (Gai. iii. 127.) By the lex Furia (circ. 95 B.C.) their obligation was only binding for two years from the time when it could have been enforced against them, and the amount of the liability of all was divided equally among all living at the time when the guarantee could be enforced. These restrictions, the limitation of the intervention of spon- sores Sind Jidepromissores to verbal contracts, and their obligation dying with them, made it necessary that there should be a more unfettered mode of becoming surety for a party to a contract. This was supplied by the introduction of the Jidejussores, who could bind themselves in every kind of obligation, and who trans- mitted their obligation to their heirs. In the time of Justinian, sponsores and Jidepromissores had been long obsolete, and as, under his legislation, stipulations post mortem suam were allowed, there was no longer any occasion for the intervention of adstipv- latores, and, consequently, none of the additional parties to a verbal contract, exceipt Jidejussores, are mentioned in the Institutes. Gains mentions other laws besides the lex Furia, bearing on the subject of the additional parties to a contract; and as the effect of some of their provisions is traceable in what we read with respect to Jidejussores in this Title, it may be as well to notice them here. (1.) The lex Apuleia (102 B.C.) established a kind of partnership (^quandam societatem) between the different spon- sores or Jidepromis sores ; any one of them who had paid the whole debt could recover from the others what he had paid in excess of his own share by an action pro socio. (Gai. iii. 122.) (2.) A law, the name of which is illegible in the manuscript of Gains, required that the creditor should give notice beforehand, for what amount he was going to exact security, and how many sponsores ov Jidepromissores there were to be. (3.) The provisions of the lex Furia (95 B.C.) have been noticed above. (4.) A lex Cornelia (81 B.C.), referring not only to sponsores 2indi Jidepromissores, but to all sureties, and therefore to Jidejussores (which, perhaps, shows the date of the first introduction o^ Jidejussores) , provided that no one should bind himself for the same debtor, to the same creditor, in the same year [idem pro eodem, apud eundem, eodem anno), for more than 20,000 sesterces. (Gai. iii. 124, 125.) (5.) Lastly, a lex Puhlilia gave sponsores an advantage over any other sureties, for they were allowed, unless reimbursed in six months, to recover from their principal what they had paid by a special action {actio depensi), and, if he denied his liability, they recovered double, or they might, without judgment, proceed to personal execution, manus injectio, against him. (Gai. iii. 127.) 350 LIB. III. TIT. XX. Inter cedere was the proper term for becoming bound for the debt of another ; satisdare for the giving surety for the obhgation of the principal ; satisaccipere for the receiving it. Suretyship might be created, not only in the modes above mentioned, but by the surety offering himself as mandator pecunics credendcB, i. e. bidding the creditor to lend to the debtor, or by a pactum constitutes pecunice, an undertaking to pay an ascertained debt, and in this case the debt of another person. (Bk. iv. 6. 9.) The senatus-considtum Velleianum (D. xvi. 1. 2. 1), 46 A.D., forbad women ever to bind themselves for another person. 1. In omnibus autem obligationi- 1. Fldejussores may be added in bus assiimi possunt, id est, sive re, every kind of obligation, i.e. whether sive verbis, sive Uteris, sive con- the obligation is contracted by the sensu contractse fuerint ; at ne illud delivery of the thing, by words, by quidem interest utrum civilis an writing, or by the consent of the naturalis sit obligatio cui adjiciatur parties. Nor is it material whether fidejussor, adeo quidem ut pro servo the obligation to which the fidejussor quoque obligetur, sive extraneus sit is made an additional party, is civil qui fidejussorem a servo accipiat, or natural ; so much so, that a man sive ipse dominus in id quod sibi may bind himself as a fidejussor for naturaliter debetur. a slave, either to a stranger or to the master of the slave, when the thing due to him is due by a natural obli- gation. Gal iii. 119 ; D. xlvi. 1. 8. 5. In omni ohligatione, including obligations arising out of delicts. This was the principal advantage gained by the introduction of fldejussores. 2. Fidejussor non tantum ipse 2. A fidejussor not only binds him- obligatur, sed etiam heredem obli- self, but also his heir. gatum relinquit. D. xlvi. 1. 4. 1. This was the second chief point of difference hetween fldejus- sores and sponsores, or fidepromissores. There was no limit to the time during which fldejussores remained bound, such as the lex Furia had laid down for the benefit of sponsores audflde- promissores, 3. Fidejussor et prsecedere obli- S. A fidejussor may he added eithev gationem et sequi potest. before or after an obligation is entered into. D. xlvi. 1. 6, pr. and 2. Probably the formality of verbal contracts exacted that the words of the principal should precede those of the accessory. 4. Si plures sint fldejussores, 4. Where there are several fide- quotquot erunt numero, singuli in jnssores, whatever is their number, solidum tenentur : itaque liberum each is bound for the whole debt, and est creditori, a quo velit solidum the creditor may demand the whole LIB. III. TIT. XX. 351 petere. Sed ex epistola divi Hadri- from any of them he pleases. But, aiii compellitur creditor a singulis, by a rescript of the Emperor Hadrian, qui modo solvendo sunt litis con- the creditor is forced to divide his testatee tempore, partes petere : demand between all those Jidejitssores ideoque, si quis ex jBdejussoribus who are solvent at the time of the eo tempore solvendo non sit, hoc litis contestatio, so that, if any of the ceteros onerat. Sed si ab uno fide- Jidejussores is not solvent at that time, jussore creditor totum consecutus the rest have so much additional bur- fuerit, hujus solius detrimentum den. But, if the creditor obtains his erit, si is pro quo fidejussit solvendo whole demand from one of the Jide- non sit ; et sibi imputare debet, cum jussores, the whole loss falls upon him potuerit adjuvari ex epistola divi alone, if the principal debtor cannot Hadriani, et desiderare ut pro parte pay ; for he has no one but himself to in se detur actio. blame, as he might have availed him- self of the rescript of the Emperor Hadrian, and might have required that no action should be given against him for more than his share of the debt. Gai. iii. 121 ; D. xlvi. 1. 26. The provision of the lex Furia not applying to Jidejussores^ they were bound for all they had promissed ; and as each promised for himself alone, the one first sued had no remedy against the other Jidejussores, until the rescript of Hadrian provided one, and gave him what was called the heneficiuiin dlvisionis ; but under the lex Furia, the liability was divided among the different sureties ipso jure, whereas the surety first sued was obliged expressly to claim the benefit given by the rescript of Hadrian {benejlcium dlvisionis). There were two other privileges or heneficla of which the fidejussor might avail himself: one was, that cedendarum actlonum, by which, if the creditor, without suing the debtor, proceeded against the fidejussor, the surety, if prepared to pay the whole debt, could, before paying the creditor, compel him to make over to him the actions which belonged to the stipulator, and thus the fidejussor could sue those bound with him, or the principal debtor (D. xlvi. 1. 17), and this was often more advantageous to the fidejussor than having recourse to the rescript of Hadrian, because, if the creditor had taken pledges, they were transferred to the fide- jussor, if the actions were ceded to him. If the creditor refused to cede the actions and still sued the surety, he could be repelled by an exceptlo doll mall. (D. xlvi. 1. 59.) There was also a heneficiuru ordinis, or, as it was otherwise termed, excusslonls or discussionls, introduced by Justinian (Nov. 4. 1) ; by this a creditor was bound to sue the principal debtor first, and could only sue the sureties for that which he could not recover from the principal. 5. Fidejussores ita obligai non 5. Fidejussores cannot bind them- possunt, ut plus debeant quam selves for more than the debtor is debet is pro quo obligantur : nam bound for ; because their obligation eorum obligatio accessio est prin- is accessory to the principal obliga- cipalis obligationis, nee plus in ac- tion; and the accessory cannot con- 352 LIB. III. TIT. XX. cessione potest esse quam in prin- cipal! re ; at ex diverso, ut minus debeant, obligari possunt, Itaque si reus decern aureos promiserit, fidejussor in quinque recte obliga- tur ; contra vero obligari non potest. Item si ille pure promiserit, fide- jussor sub conditione promittere potest, contra vero non potest : non solum enim in quantitate, sed etiam in tempore minus et plus intelligi- tur; plus est enim statim aliquid dare, minus est post tempus dare. tain more than the principal. They may, however, bind themselves for less. Therefore, if the principal debtor promises ten aurei, the fide- jussor may be bound for five, but the fidejussor cannot be bound for ten when the principal debtor is bound only for five. Again, when the prin- cipal promises unconditionally, the fidejussor may promise conditionally, but not vice versa. For the terms more and less are used not only with respect to quantity, but also with re- spect to time ; it is more to give a thing instantly, it is less to give it after a time. Gai. iii. 113. 126. 6. Si quid autem fidejussor pro reo solvent, ejus recuperandi causa habet cum eo mandati judicium. 6. If a fidejussor has made payment for the debtor, he may have an actio mandati against him to recover what he has paid. Gai. iii. 127. If he had intervened without the knowledge of the prin- cipal, he would have an actio negotiorum gestorum, not mandati (Tit. 27. 1) ; and he would have no action at all if he had intervened in defiance of the wishes of the principal. (D. xvii. 1. 40.) 7. Greece fidejussor ita accipitur, sive fSovXofiai ; sed et si 6tp]i dix- erit, pro eo erit ac si dixerit Xfyw. 7. A fidejussor may bind himself in Greek, by using the expression rrj tfi?) tt'kttu KsXtvo (I order upon my faith), Xh'o (I say), f'!-\uj or fiuvXofiai (I wish) ; if he uses the word (pT]fxi, it will be equivalent to Xeyw, D. xlvi. 1. 8. The appropriate Latin formula was, ' Idem fide mea esse juheo,^ but this formula was, probably, never insisted on, as the formulae ^ spondeo ' and ' idem fide mea promitto ' were. 8. In stipulationibus fidejusso- rum sciendum est generaliter hoc accipi, ut quodcumque scriptum sit quasi actum, videatur etiam actum ; ideoque constat, si quis scripserit se fidejussisse, videri omnia solem- niter acta. 8. It is a general rule in all stipu- lations of fidejussores, that whatever is stated in writing to have been done, is considered really to have been done. If, therefore, any one states in writing that he has bound himself as a fide- jussor, it is presumed that all the necessary forms were observed. D. xlvi. 1. 30. Cautio was the general term for the documentary evidence of a contract. LIB. III. TIT. XXI. 353 Tit. XXI. DE LITERARUM OBLIGATIONE. Olim scriptura fiebat obligatio quae nominibus fieri dicebatur, quse nomina hodie non sunt in usu. Plane si quis debere se scripserit quod ei numeratum non est, de pecunia minime numerata post mul- tum temporis exception em opponere non potest ; hoc enim ssepissime constitutum est. Sic fit ut et hodie, dum queri non potest, scriptura obligetur, et ex ea nascitur con- dictio, cessante scilicet verborum obligatione. Multum autem tem- pus in hac exceptione antea quidem ex principalibus constitutionibus usque ad quinquennium procede- bat. Sed ne creditores diutius pos- sint suis pecuniis forsitan defrau- dari, per constitutionem nostram tempus coarctatum est, ut ultra biennii metas hujnsmodi exceptio minime extendatur. Formerly there was made by writ- ing a kind of obligation, which was said to be made nominibus. These nomina are now no longer in use. But if any one states in writing that he owes a sum which has never really been told out to him, he cannot, after a long time has elajDsed, use the ex- ception, non numeratsR pecuniae, i.e. that the money has not been told out. This has been often decided by im- perial constitutions ; and thus it may be said, even at the present day, as he cannot relieve himself from payment, he is bound by the writing, and that the writing gives rise to a condiction, in the absence, that is, of any verbal obligation. The length of time fixed as barring this exception, was, nnder imperial constitutions antecedent to our time, not less than five years. But, that creditors might not be ex- posed too long to the risk of being defrauded of their money, we have shortened the time by our constitu- tion, and this exception cannot now be used beyond the space of two years. Gai. in. 128-130. 133, 134; C. iv. 30. 14. A contract was said to be formed Uteris when it originated in a certain entry or statement of it being made in the books of the creditor with the consent of the debtor. Regularity in keeping accounts, and in entering all matters of business in a private ledger, was considered one of the first duties of a Roman citizen. Cicero speaks of a failure in this duty as an almost insupposable act of negligence and dishonesty. (See pro Roscio, 3. 1 and 3.) Events, as they occurred, were jotted down in rough memoran- dums called adversaria, and these were transferred at least once a month to the ledger {codex or tabulce). It was only this ledger which had any legal importance. If any one put down in his ledger that he had advanced such a sum of money to another {expensum ferre\ this entry {expensilatio) was an admissible proof of the fact. If the debtor also had made a corresponding entry in his ledger {acceptum referre), the tallying of the two together made what was called an obligatio Uteris. These two entries had, in fact, exactly the same effect as if the two parties had entered into a stipulation. But this was not all ; the creditor was not to be placed entirely at the mercy of his debtor, whose wilful or accidental negligence preventing a proper entry, might make the obligation fail. The real source of the obligation was taken to A A 354 LIB. III. TIT. XXI. be the consent of the debtor to the entry made by the creditor. If the debtor made a corresponding entry in his ledger, this was a conclusive proof that he had consented to the creditor's entry ; but if he did not, then the creditor might still prove, in any way that he could, that he had really made his entry mth the debtor's consent. Of course, if he had really paid the money over, this, if proved, would show beyond a doubt that the debtor had con- sented. The foundation of this contract Uteris being the payment of a sum certain by the creditor, the obligation was always for a sum or certain thing, and was therefore enforced by condictio certl, more usually termed simply condictio. As the creditor put down the name of his debtor, the word ^ nomen ' came to signify a debt : and Gains speaks of ' nomina transcriptia.'' He says transcriptio took place {\) are in personam, as w^hen something being already owed, as, for instance, under a contract of sale, or of letting to hire, the debtor assented to the creditor making an entry of the debt (Gai. iii. 129): this o])e- rated as a novatio (see Introd. sec. 89) of the old debt, and the creditor could now employ a condictio to enforce his claim; (2) the transcriptio took place a. persona in personam, viz. when one man took on himself the debt of another. ^Gai. iii. 130.) In both cases the effect was that the debtor recognised that a ficti- tious loan had been made to him. He assented to its beino; re- corded in the codex that he had received in account what he owed on the sale, or what the third person, whose debt he was taking over, had received. These contracts were peculiar to Roman citizens. Peregrini had, as a substitute, syngraphcE, sismed by both parties, or chirogra- pka, signed only by the debtor. These syngraphcB and chirographa were not mere proofs of a contract, but were instruments on which an action could be brought, and the making of which operated as a novation of an existing debt. The w^ord most usually employed for a mere memorandum intended to furnish a proof, and not to give a right of action, was cautio. In the time of Justinian there had ceased to be any real difference between chirographa and cautiones. Any w^riting stating that a sum was due sufficed as the ground of an action. In every period of the law, if there was a formal verbal con- tract, the written contract was thought subsidiary, and was merged in the stipulation, as the text says, nascitur condictio, cessante scilicet verborurn ohligatione. If the debtor had given what before Justinian w^as a mere memorandum, a ^ cautio,^ and then denied his liability, he had to prove that, in spite of the cantio, he was not bound. The burden of proof was against him ; but if a contract formed Uteris had been made, the civil law treated it exactly as it did a stipulation. The contract was conclusive evidence of the liability. Fairly or unfairly, the debtor must abide by this contract. The praetor. LIB. III. TIT. XXII. 355 however, when the debtor had not really received the money, permitted him to repel the action of the creditor by an exception called the ' exceptio non numerates pecumce,'' by which the debtor insisted that the money which formed the consideration of the obligation had never been told or counted out to him ; and here the burden of proof was considered to fall on the creditor. It was for him to prove that he had paid the money, not for the debtor to prove tliat he had not. The obligation Avas so often entered into before the money was really paid, that the law, to prevent fraud, insisted on the creditors proving the payment if it were denied ; but after a certain number of years, originally five, and reduced by Justinian to two, the debtor was bound by the writing conclusively. During these five or two years, however, the debtor who had not really received the money need not wait to be sued ; he might protest in a public act against any writing by which he admitted a debt, or bring an action against the creditor to compel him to give it up (C. iv. 30. 7;; and a constitution in the Code (iv. 30. 14. 4) permitted him to make his exception perpetual by a formal announcement to the cre- ditor of his intention to do so, and by his going through certain forms. Tit. XXII. DE CONSENSU OBLIGATIONE. Obligations are formed by the mere consent of the parties in the contracts of sale, of letting to hire, of partner- ship, and of mandate. An obligation is, in these cases, said to be made by the mere consent of the parties, be- cause there is no necessity for any writing, nor even for the presence of the parties : nor is it requisite that anything should be given to make the contract binding, but the mere consent of those between whom the transaction is carried on suffices. Thus these con- tracts may be entered into by tliose who are at a distance from each other by means of letters, for instance, or of messengers. In these contracts each party is bound to the other to renrl^r him all that equity demands, while in verbal obligations one party stipulates and the other promises. Gai. iii. 135. 137. AYe now pass to contracts which belong to the jus cjentivrn, which have nothing of the peculiar characteristics of the old civil law of Rome, and which are perfected by the simple consent (if the parties. As is remarked in the concludlrg words of the text, these contracts by simple consent, unlike the contracts of wljic!i A A 2 Consensu fiunt obligationes in emptionibus venditionibus, locatio- nibus conductionibus, societatibus, mandatis. Ideo autem istis modis consensu dicitur obligatio contrahi, quia neque scriptura neque pr?esen- tia omnimodo opus est, ac nee dari quidquam necesse est ut substan- tiam capiat obligatio ; sed sufficit eos qui negotia gerunt consentire : unde inter absentes quoque talia negotia contrahuntur, veluti per epistolara vel per nuntium. Item in his contractibus alter alteri obli- gatiir in id quod alterum alteri ex bono et pequo prsestare oportet, cum alioquin in verborum obligationibus alius stipuletur, alius promittat. 356 LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. we have hitherto spoken, are bilateral ; there is something which binds both parties ; whereas the older and peculiarly Roman con- tracts were only unilateral. In a stipulation, for instance, it was only the promissor that was bound. Commodatum, deposltum, and pignus were only bilateral in the sense that they gave rise to actiones contraricE under certain circumstances, so that then both parties were bound by them. These contracts ' consensu ' were not enforced by actions stricti juris, such as were proper to the peculiarly Koman contracts of mutuum, stipulation, and contracts made Uteris, but by actions ' bonce fidei,^ i.e. praetorian actions, in w^hich equi- table principles were permitted to govern the decision. (See Introd. sec. 106.) Tit. XXIII. DE EMPTIONE ET VENDITIONE. Emptio et venditio contrahitur simul atque de pretio convenerit, quamvis nondum pretium numera- tum sit, ac ne arra qiiidem data fuerit : nam quod arrse nomine datur, argument um est emptionis et venditionis contractse. Sed h^ec quidem de emptionibus et vendi- tionibus quae sine scriptura consis- tunt, obtinere oportet ; nam nihil a nobis in hujusmodi venditionibus innovatum est. In iis autem quae scriptura conficiuntur, non aliter perfectam esse venditionem et emp- tionem constituimus, nisi et instru- menta emptionis fuerint conscripta, vel manu propria contralientium, vel ab alio quidem scripta a con- tralientibus autem subscripta, et si per tabelliones fiant, nisi et com- pletiones acceperint, et fuerint par- tibus absoluta : donee enim aliquid deest ex Ms, et poenitentise locus est, et potest emptor vel venditor sine poena recedere ab emptione. Ita tamen impune eis recedere con- cedimus, nisi jam arrarum nomine aliquid fuerit datum : hoc etenim subsecuto, sive in scriptis sive sine scriptis venditio celebrata est, is qui recusat adimplere contractum, si quidem est emptor, perdit quod dedit ; si vero venditor, duplum restituere compellitur, licet super arris nihil expressum est. Gal iii. 139 ; C. iv. 21. 17. The contract of sale belonging to the y?/5 gentium was attended with none of those material symbols which characterised the forma- tion of contracts under the civil law. Directly one person agreed The contract of sale is formed as soon as the price is agreed upon, although it has not yet been paid, nor even an earnest given ; for what is given as an earnest only serves as proof that the contract has been made. This must be understood of sales made without writing ; for with regard to these we have made no alteration in the law. But, where there is a writ- ten contract, we have enacted that a sale is not to be considered completed unless an instrument of sale has been drawn up, being either written by the contracting parties, or at least signed by them, if written by others ; or if drawn up by a tabellio, it must be formally complete and finished throughout ; for as long as anything is wanting, there is room to retract, and either the buyer or seller may retract without suffering loss : that is, if no earnest has been given. If earnest has been given, then, whether the contract was written or unwritten, the purchaser, if he refuses to fulfil it, loses what he has given as earnest, and the seller, if he refuses, has to re- store doable ; although no agreement on the subject of the earnest was expressly made. LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. 357 to sell a particular thing, and another to buy it, for a fixed sum of money, the contract was complete ; no thing need be delivered, no money paid, in order that an obligation should arise. On the mutual consent being given, the seller was bound to deliver, the buyer to pay the price. The change which Justinian here intro- duced is that, when, in giving this mutual consent, they agree that the terms of the contract shall be reduced to writing, they shall be considered not to have consented to the contract until all the formalities have been gone through. The arr(B were either signs of a bargain having been struck, as, for instance, when the buyer deposited his ring with the seller (D. xix. 1. 11. 6), or consisted of an advance of a portion of the purchase-money. They were also intended as a proof that the purchase had been made. Justinian gave these deposits a new character by making them the measures of a forfeit in case either party wdshed to recede from his bargain, it being open to either party to retract if he chose to incur this forfeit. This power of retracting by forfeiture of the deposit, or double its value, was a great change in the law ; and when Justinian says ^V^ hiijusnwdi venditionihus nihil innovatum est, he must be understood only to be referring to unwritten contracts of sale, in which there w^as no deposit made as earnest. It will be seen from the text that this power of retraction was given whether the contract was made with writing or without. Besides a buyer and a seller, there must, in a contract of sale, be a fixed price and a particular thing sold. The jurists are very minute in their distinctions of the nature of the thing sold. There is a distinction with regard to things future and uncertain forming the object of a sale, which is worth mentioning. Either a proportionate price may be agreed to be paid on a greater or lesser number of things that may be actually realised, as ^ so much a head for all the fish I catch to-day,' which is termed rei speratce emptio ; or a definite sum may be agreed on as the price of the possibility of any number of things, more or less, being realised, as ' so much for the chance of all the fish I catch to-day;' and this was termed spei emptio. (D. xviii. 1. 8. 1.) 1. Pretium autem constitui opor- 1. It is necessary that a price tet, nam nulla emptio sine pretio esse should be agreed upon, for there can potest ; sed et certum esse debet, be no sale without a price. And the Alioquin si inter aliquos ita conve- price must be fixed and certain. If nerit, ut quanti Titius rem sestima- the parties agree that the thing shall verit, tanti sit empta, inter veteres be sold at the sum at which Titius satis abundeque hoc dubitabatur, shall value it, it was a question much sive constat venditio sive non. Sed debated among the ancients, whether nostra decisio ita hoc constituit, ut in such a case there is a sale or not. quoties sic composita sit venditio We have decided, that when a sale is quanti ille festima verit, sub hac made for a price to be fixed by a third conditione staret contractus, ut si person, the contract shall be binding quidem ipse qui nominatus est pre- under this condition — that if this third tium definierit, omnimodo secun- person does fix a price, the price to be dum ejus sestimationem et pretium paid shall be determined by that which 358 LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. persolvatur et res tradatur, ut vendi- tio ad effectiim perducatur emptore quidem ex empto actione, venditore ex vendito agente. Sin autem ille qui iiominatus est vel noluerit vel non potuerit pretium deiinire, tunc pro nihilo esse venditionem, quasi nullo pretio statute. Quod jus, cum in venditionibus nobis placuit, non est absurdum et in locationibus et conductionibus trahere. he fixes, and that according to his de- cision the thing shall be delivered and the sale perfected. But if he will not or cannot fix a price, the sale is then void, as being made without any price being fixed on. This decision, which we have adopted with respect to sales, may reasonably be made to apply to contracts of lettins: to hire. Gai. iii. 140 ; C. iv. 38. 15. 2. Item pretium in numerata pecunia consistere debet ; nam in ceteris rebus an pretium esse possit, veluti an homo aut fundus aut toga alterius rei pretium esse possit, valde qu?erebatur. Sabinus et Cassius etiam in alia re putant posse pre- tium consistere : unde illud est quod vulgo dicebatur, permutatione re- rum emptionem et venditionem con- trahi, eamque speciem emptionis et /enditionis vetustissimam esse ; ar- gumentoque utebantur Grseco poeta Homero, qui aliqua parte exercitum Achivorum vinum sibi comparasse ait, permutatis quibusdam rebus, his verbis : — "Evc^iv ci/j' oii/iC,opTO /ca jOj/KO/i 6 WIT fc,- 'Axaioi, "AWoi jikv ;(«X/cfpi, aWot d' a'iOojvi ai- "AWol de pipolc, aWoi S' avrolci j3v- "AXXoi ^' avcpmrdlinai. Diversse schol?e auctores contra sentiebant, aliudque esse existima- bant permutationem rerum, aliud emptionem et venditionem : alio- quin non posse rem expediri permu- tatis rebus, quae videatur res venisse et qu?e pretii nomine data esse; nam utramque videri et venisse et pretii nomine datam esse, rationem non pati. Sed Proculi sententia dicentis, permutationem propriam esse spe- ciem contractus a vendition e separa- tam, merito pr{3evaluit, cum et ipsa aliis Homericis versibus adjuvatur, et validioribus rationibus argumen- tatur. Quod et anteriores divi principes admiserunt, et in nostris Digestis latius significatur. 2. The price should consist in a sum of money. It has been much doubted whether it can consist in anything else, as in a slave, a piece of land, or a toga. Sabinus and Cas- sius thought that it could. And it is thus that it is commonly said that exchange is a sale, and that this form of sale is the most ancient. The tes- timony of Homer Avas quoted, who says that part of the army of the Greeks procured wine by an exchange of certain things. The passage is this : — ' The long-haired Achseans pro- cured wine, some by giving copper, others by giving shining steel, others by giving hides, others by giving oxen, others by giving slaves. ' The authors of the opposite school w^ere of a contrary opinion : they thought that exchange was one thing and sale another, otherwise, in an exchange, it would be impossible to say which was the thing sold, and which the thing given as the price ; for it was contrary to reason to con- sider each thing as at once sold, and given as the price. The opinion of Proculus, who maintained that ex- change is a particular kind of contract distinct from sale, has deservedly prevailed, as it is supported by other lines from Homer^ and by still more weighty reasons adopted by preceding emperors : it has been fully treated of in our Digests. Gai. iii. 141; D. xviii. 1. 1. 11; C. iv. 64. 7. A sale and an exchange differ so little that it might seem LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. 359 natural to treat the promise to exchange as raising an obligation equally with the promise to deliver a thing sold ; it was indeed the opinion of the Sabinians that it did so ; but this opinion did not prevail, and the law recognised no obligation as existing under an agreement to exchange unless one party had delivered to the other the thing he had promised. Ex placito permutationis nulla re secuta, constat nemint actionem competere. (C. iv. 64. 3.) Thus the distinction between sale and exchange was that in the former the contract was made consensu, in the other re : when one party had delivered the thing, the other was obliged to give the other thing. Perynutatio ex re tradita initiuni ohligationi prcebet, (D. xix. 4. 1. 2.) In a contract of sale the seller was not bound to make the buyer absolute master (^dominiis) of the thing sold, as he would have been in a stipulation. (D. xviii. 1. 25. 1.) What he was bound to do was this: 1st. He was bound to deliver the thing \i^e\f {pr(2stare, tradere) (D. xix. 1. 11. 2), to give free and un- disturbed })ossession of it (possessionem vacuam pr(Estare) (D. xix. 1.2. 1), and to give lawful possession of it {prcBstare licere habere^, (D. xix. 1. 30. 1.) 2ndly. He was bound, if the buyer was disturbed in his possession by the real owner (which was termed evictlo\ to recompense him for what he lost. (D. xix. 1. 11. 2.) And 3rdly. To secure the buyer against secret faults; if such faults were disco- vered, either compensation might be claimed by an actio cEstimatoria, to a greater or less amount, according as the seller had or not know- ledge of the defect (D. xix. 1. 13), or, at the option of the buyer, the contract might be rescinded, and the thing returned (which was termed redhibitio — redhibere est facere ut riirsus habeat vendi- tor quod liabuerlt). (D. xxi. 1. 21.) In order to fortify his position, the buyer could stipulate with the seller, and make the seller promise that he would give, not the free possession only, but the dominium of the thing, and that he would pay the buyer double the price if the buyer was evicted. The buyer would then have an action ex stipulatu to enforce the undertaking. Even if there was no such stipulation actually made, yet, after it had become usual to make such stipulations, custom was held to have so far imported the promise into the contract of sale that the buyer, in bringing the action appropriate to his contract, actio ex empto, could obtain double the price in case of eviction, as this action was bonct Jidei, i.e. the parties could be placed in a fair position towards each other, and it Avas considered that to have given the promise to pay double the price in case of eviction was a duty of the seller. (D. xxi. 2. 2.) The buyer was bound to make the seller the real owner of the money paid as the price (^emptor nummos venditor is facere cogitur, D. xix. 1. 11. 2), and was also bound to pay interest on the pur- chase-money from the day when he had received the thing sold. (D. xix. 1. 13. 20.) The lines cited in the text are from II. 7. 472 ; probably the 360 LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. alii versus alluded to are those describino; the exchano;e between - • DO Glaucus and Diomede (//. 6. 235.) 3. Cum autem emptio et venditio contracta sit, quod effici diximus simul atque de pretio convenerit, cum sine scriptura res agitur, peri- culum rei venditse statim ad emp- torem pertinet, tametsi ad hue ea res emptori tradita non sit. Itaque si homo mortuus sit vel aliqua f>arte corporis Isesus fuerit, aut sedes tot?e vel aliqua ex parte incendio con- sumptse fnerint, aut fundus vi ilu- minis totus vel aliqua ex parte abla- tus sit, sive etiam inundatione aquae aut arboribus turbine dejectis longe minor aut deterior esse cosperit, emptoris damnum est, cui necesse est, licet rem non fuerit nactus, pretium solvere. Quicquid enim sine dolo et culpa venditoris accidit, in eo venditor securus est. Sed etsi post emptionem fundo aliquid per alluvionem accessit, ad emptoris commodum pertinet ; nam et com- modum ejus esse debet cujus peri- culum est. Quod si fugerit homo qui veniit, aut surreptus fuerit, ita ut neque dolus neque culpa ven- ditoris interveniat, animadverten- dum erit an custodiam ejus usque ad traditionem venditor susceperit : sane enim si suscepit, ad ipsius peri- culum is casus pertinet ; si non sus- cepit, securus est. Idem et in ceteris animalibus ceterisque rebus intelli- gimus : utique tamen vindicationem rei et condictionem exhibere debebit • emptori, quia sane qui nondum rem emptori tradidit, adhuc ipse domi- nus est. Idem est etiam de furti et de damni injuri^e actione. 3. As soon as the sale is contracted, that is, in the case of a sale made without writing, when the parties have agreed on the price, all risk attaching to the thing sold falls upon the purchaser, although the thing has not yet been delivered to him. There- fore, if the slave dies or receives an injury in any part of his body, or a whole or a portion of the house is burnt, or a whole or a portion of the land is carried by the force of a flood, or is diminished or deteriorated by an inundation, or by a tempest making havoc with the trees, the loss falls on the purchaser, and although he does not receive the thing, he is ob- liged to pay the price, for the seller does not suffer for anything which, happens without any design or fault of his. On the other hand, if after the sale the land is increased by alluvion, it is the purchaser who re- ceives the advantage, for he who bears the risk of harm ought to receive the benefit of all that is advantageous. If a slave who has been sold runs away or is stolen, without any fraud or fault on the part of the seller, we must inquire whether the seller under- took to keep him safely until he was delivered over ; if he undertook this, what happens is at his risk ; if he did not undertake it, he is not responsible. The same would hold in the case of any other animal or any other thing, but the seller is in any case bound to make over to the purchaser his right to a real or personal action, for the person who has not delivered the thing is still its owner ; and it is the same with regard to the action of theft, and the action damni injuriae. D. xviii. 6-8 ; D. xviii. 1. 35. 4. The contract of sale was complete when the price had been fixed, but the thing sold did not pass to the buyer thereby. The seller retained the proprietorship (^dominiurn) until he delivered it to the buyer, and the buyer received it, or until the property in it was passed by the buyer having paid the price, or given security for it, or in someway satisfied the seller (^cere solufo, vel Jidejussore dato, vel alias satisfacto, D. xiv. 4. 5. 18). Until this happened, the seller retained the thing in his custody, and if it had, mean- while, any accretion, or suffered any diminution, he was still the dominus of the thing which was increased or decreased. But his obligation bound him to deliver the thing exactly in the state in LIB. III. TIT. XXIII. 361 which it might happen to be at the time of delivery ; and so it made no real difference to him whether there was an accretion or diminu- tion. If the thing was lost by accident, the loss fell on the buyer and not on the seller, the dominus ; so res domino perit could not be said of him. But, whatever happened to the thing sold, the price fixed on remained due. For the obligation of the buyer being a distinct and independent obligation, the price could not alter, but remained fixed. The seller was, however, answerable for the care with which he preserved the thing while in his custody, periculum rei ad emptorem pertinet dummodo custodiam venditor aut traditio- nem prcestet. (D. xlvii. 2. 14, pr.); and he was not only bound to guard against gross and ordinary negligence [dolmn et culpam prcBstare, D. xiii. 6. 5. 2), but to preserve it more carefully even than his own property, diligentiayn prcestet exactiorem, quam in suis rebus adiiiberet. (D. xviii. 6. 3.) He was bound to exercise the care of a bonus paterfamilias. In the text the case of a slave is taken, and a bonus paterfamilias might exercise the diligence pro- per to him, and yet a slave might run away. The loss would fall on the buyer, unless the seller had specially undertaken that he would keep him safely. The actio furti and the actio damni injuries are noticed in Tit. 1 and 4 of the Fourth Book. If the thing was stolen or injured by a third person, withont the fault of the seller, the buyer suf- fered the loss, but the seller was obliged to cede to the buyer the actions which as dominus he had against the thief or the doer of the injury. 4. Emptio tarn sub conditione 4. A sale may be made conditionally quam pure contrahi potest : sub or unconditionally ; conditionally, as, conditione, veluti si Stichus intra for example, ' If Stichus suits you certum diem tibi placuerit, erit tibi within a certain time, he shall be pur- emptus aureis tot. chased by you at such a price.' Gal iii. 146. The exact opposite might be contracted for : if within a certain time you find Stichus does not suit you, let it be considered you have not bought him. The jurists then said that the sale was apura emptio, qucB sub conditiojie resolvitur. (D. xli. 4. 2. 5.) Stichus is sold, but wdthin a certain time the contract may be rescinded. The generic name for the accessory agreements which modified the principal contract was pacta. Some of these pacta relating to the contract of sale are treated of at considerable length in the Digest (D. xviii. 2 and 3) ; diff'erent names being appropriated to those most frequently in use ; as, for instance, the i?i diem addictio, when the thing was sold, but if the seller had a better offer within a certain time, the contract mioht be rescinded (D. xvni. 2) ; and the lex commissoria, which was a general ao-ree- ment lor the rescission of the contract if either party violated its terms, and was especially used to enable the seller to de- mand back the thing sold, if the price was not paid by a certain day. 362 LIB. III. TIT. XXIV. We may observe that the Code (iv. 44. 2 and 8) permits a seller, at all times, to rescind a contract if he has not received half its real value. 5. Loca sacra vel religiosa, item 5. A sale is void wlien a person publica, veluti forum, basilicam, frus- knowingly purchases a sacred or re- tra quis sciens emit. Quse tamen si ligious place, or a public place, such pro profanis vel privatis deceptus a as a forum or basilica. If, however, venditore omerit, habebit actionem deceived by the vendor, he has sup- ex empto quod non habere ei liceat, posed that what he was buying was ut consequatur quod sua interest profane or private, as he cannot have deceptum non esse. Idem juris what he purchased, he may bring an est, si hominem liberum pro servo action ex empto to recover whatever emerit. it wonld have been worth to him not to have been deceived. It is the same if he has purchased a free man, supposing him to be a slave. D. xviii. 1. 4. 6; D. xviii. 1. 62. 1. This paragraph is probably inserted in order to contrast the effects of a contract of sale with those of a stipulation. In the strict civil law, ignorance that a thing was not a subject of com- merce, would not help the person who had stipulated for it. But in a contract of sale, if the seller had, and the buyer had not, known the real character of the thing he was buying, the buyer could recover against the seller anything he lost by entering into the bargain ; for instance, he would not only receive back the purchase-money, but also would be entitled to interest upon it from the date of its payment. The contract of sale gave rise to two actions honcB Jidei, the actio ex vendito or venditi, belonging to the seller, and the actio ex eynpto or empti, mentioned in the text, belonging to the buyer. Tit. XXIY. DE LOCATIONE ET CONDUCTIONE. Locatio et conductio proxima est The contract of letting to hire ap- emptioni et venditioni, iisdemque proaches very nearly to that of sale, juris regulis consistit : nam ut emp- and is governed by the same rules of tio et venditio ita contrahitur si de law. As the contract of sale is formed pretio convenerit, sic etiam locatio as soon as a price is fixed, so a con- et conductio ita contrahi intelligitur tract of letting to hire is formed as si merces constituta sit ; et competit soon as the amount to be paid for the locatori quidem locati actio, conduc- hiring has been agreed on ; and the tori vero conducti. letter has an action locati, and the hirer an action conducti. D. xix. 2. 2, and 15, pr. The contract of letting on hire (locatio-conductio), like that of sale, was complete by the mere consent of the parties, and, like it, produced only personal obligations, and not any real rights. The hirer was, however, not even entitled to the possessio ; the latter still remained the possessor in the eye of the law, his duty not hemg prcBstare rem licere habere, hut prcEstare refrui, uti licere. LIB. III. TIT. XXIV. 363 There were three principal heads of this contract : 1, locatio- conductio rerum, when one person let a thing and another hired it ; 2, locatio-conductio operarum, when one person let his services and another hired them ; 3, locatio-conductio operis faciendi, Avhen one person contracted that a particular piece of work should be done, and another contracted to do it. If in such a contract we look at the labour, &c., expended on the work, we should naturally call the person who did the work the locator, as it was he who let out his services for its performance ; but the Roman jurists gene- rally looked at the work itself that was to be done, and spoke of the person who contracted for its performance, i.e. gave it out, as its locator, and the person who engaged to perform or execute it, i.e. took it in, as the conductor. The price of, or consideration for, the letting, was properly called merces, sometimes prethtm (D. xix. 2. 28. 2), and, in the case of the letting of houses or Xnndi, pensio or reditus. In particular contracts, the conductor had special names, as the hirer of a house was called inquilinus, of a farm colonus. The duty of the letter was to guarantee the hirer against eviction, and to reimburse him for any useful or necessary ex- penses he had incurred ; the duty of the hirer was to take care as a bonus paterfamilias of the thing hired (see paragr. 5), to give up the thing hired at the end of the term for which it was let, and to pay the price agreed on. The -text gives us the names of the personal actions which belonged to the letter and the hirer respectively, the former hav- ing the actio locati, the latter the actio conducti. But actions of a very different kind were sometimes connected with this con- tract. In the case of land let to hire, certain instruments of farming and other property of the hirer were held as a security for the payment of the rent, and a real action, termed the actio Ser- viana, because first introduced by the prastor Servius, was given to the letter to enforce his riffht to these thinos in case of non- payment of the rent ; this action was gradually extended in its effects, and the extended action, under the name of actio quasi- Serviana, was used to enforce the rights of a creditor over any- thing given in pledge. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 6. 7.) The praetor, too, gave an interdict, termed the interdictum Salvianum, by which the letter got possession of things pledged for the rent of land. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 15. 3.) 1. Etquse supra diximus, si alieno 1. What we have said above of a arbitrio pretium promissum fuerit, sale in which the price is to be fixed eadem et de locatione et conductione by the decision of a third person, may dicta esse intelligamus, si alieno ar- be applied to the contract of letting to bitrio merces permissa fuerit. Qua hire, if the amount to be paid for the de causa, si fuUoni polienda curan- hire is left to the decision of a third dave, aut sarcinatori sarcienda ves- person. Accordingly, if any one gives timenta quis dederit, nulla statim clothes to a fuller to be cleaned, or to mercede constituta, sed postea tan- a tailor to be mended, without fixing turn daturus quantum inter eos con- the sum to be paid for their work, a venerit, non proprie locatio et con- contract of letting to hire cannot pro- 364 LIB. III. TIT. XXIV. ductio contrahi intelligitur, sed eo perly be said to be made ; but the nomine actio prsescriptis verbis circumstances furnish ground for an datur. action prsescriptis verbis. Gai. iii. 143 ; D. xix. 2. 25, pr. Qua de causa, i.e. ' the price ought to be determined, and therefore,' &c. ; the passage is taken rather unconnectedly out of Gains. Actio prcBscriptis verbis. (See note on Tit. 13. pr.) Or an actio mandati might be brought. (Tit. 26. 13.) 2. Prseterea, sicut vulgo qusere- batur, an permutatis rebus emptio et venditio contrahitur, ita quseri solebat de locatione et conduct] one, si forte rem aliquam tibi utendam sive fruendam quis dederit, et in- vicem a te aliam rem utendam sive fruendam acceperit. Et placuit non esse locationem et conductionem, sed proprium genus esse contractus : veluti si, cum unum bovem quis haberet et vicinus ejus unum, pla- cuerit inter eos ut per denos dies invicem boves commodarent ut opus facerent, et apud alterum bos periit, neque locati vel conducti neque commodati competit actio, quia non fuit gratuitum commodatum ; verum praescriptis verbis agendum est. 2. Moreover, just as the question was often asked whether a contract of sale was formed by exchange, a similar question arose with respect to the con- tract of letting to hire, in case any one gave you a thing to use or take the fruits of, and in return received from you something else of which he was to have the fruits or use. It has been decided that this is not a contract of letting to hire, but a distinct kind of contract. For example, if two neigh- bours have each an ox, and agree each to lend the other his ox for ten days to make use of, and one of the oxen dies while in the care of the person to whom it does not belong, .there will not be an action locati, or conducti, or commodati, since the loan was not gratuitous, but an action prsescriptis verbis. Gai. iii. 144 ; D. xix. 5. 17. 3. 3. Adeo autem familiaritatem aliquam inter se habere videntur emptio et venditio, item locatio et conductio, ut in quibusdam causis quasri soleat, utrum emptio et ven- ditio contrahatur, an locatio et con- ductio : ut ecce de prsediis quge per- petuo quibusdam fruenda traduntur, id est, ut quamdiu pensio sive redi- tus pro his domino prsestetur, neque ipsi conductori neque heredi ejus, cuive conductor heresve ejus id prsedium vendiderit aut donaverit aut dotis nomine dederit, aliove quoquo modo alienaverit, auferre liceat, Sed talis contractus quia inter veteres dubitabatur, et a qui- busdam locatio, a quibusdam ven- ditio existimabatur, lex Zenoniana lata est, quae emphyteuseos contrac- tus propriam statuit naturam, neque ad locationem neque ad vendition em inclinantem, sed suis pactionibus ful- ciendam. Et si quidem aliquid pac- tum fuerit, hoc ita obtinere ac si 3. Contracts of sale and of letting to hire are so nearly connected, that in some cases it is questioned whether the contract is one or the other. For instance, when lands are delivered over to be enjoyed for ever, that is, that as long as the rent is paid for the land to the owner, he cannot take away the land from the hirer or his heir, or any one to whom the hirer or his heir has sold, or given, or made a dowry of the land. As the ancients were in doubt as to this contract, some regarding it as a letting to hire, and some as a sale, the constitution of Zeno was made, which declared that the contract of emphyteusis was of a special nature, and was not to be con- founded either with letting to hire or with sale, but rested upon its own peculiar agreements ; and that if any special agreement was made, it was to be observed as if to have such an agreement was part of the nature of the contract ; but if no agreement was LIB. III. TIT. XXIV. 365 natura talis esset contractus : sin autem nihil de periculo rei fuerit pactum, tunc si quidem totius rei interitus accesserit, ad dominum super hoc redundare periculum ; sin particularis, ad emphyteuticarium hujusmodi damnum venire. Quo jure utimur. made as to the risks the thing might undergo, the risk of a total loss should fall upon the owner, and the detriment of a partial loss upon the occupier; and this we still wish to be considered the law. Gai. iii. 145 ; C. iv. QQ. 1. We have already given an account of emphyteusis in the note to Bk. ii. Tit. 5. 6. The law would naturally contemplate the contract under which the emphyteuta entered as a locatio-conductio ; but the dominus seemed to have parted with so much of his interest, that it appeared doubtful whether it ought not rather to be considered as a sale. Zeno enacted that it should be regarded as a separate form of contract. 4. Item quaeritur, si cum aurifice Titius convenerit ut is ex auro suo certi ponderis certaeque formse anu- los ei faceret, et acciperet verbi gratia aureos decern, utrum emptio et ven- ditio contrahi videatur, an locatio et conductio ? Cassius ait, materiae quidem emptionem et venditionem contrahi, operse autem locationem et conductionem ; sed placuit tan- tum emptionem et venditionem con- trahi. Quod si suum aurum Titius dederit mercede pro opera consti- tuta, dubium non est quin locatio et conductio sit. 4. It is also questioned whether, when Titius has agreed with a gold- smith to make him rings of a certain weight and pattern, out of gold be- longing to the goldsmith himself, the goldsmith to receive, for example, ten aurei, whether the contract is one of sale or letting to hire. Cassius says that there is a sale of the material, and a letting to hire of the goldsmith's work; but it has been decided that there is only a contract of sale. If Titius gives the gold, and a sum is agreed on to be paid for the work, there is no doubt that the contract is then one of letting to hire. Gai. iii. 147. 5. Conductor omnia secundum legem conductionis facere debet ; et si quid in lege praetermissum fuerit, id ex bono et aequo debet prsestare. Qui pro usu aut vestimentorum aut argenti aut jumenti mercedem aut dedit aut promisit, ab eo custodia talis desideratur, qualem diligentis- simus paterfamilias suis rebus adhi- bet : quam si praestiterit, et aliquo casu rem amiserit, de restituenda ea non tenebitur. 5. The hirer ought to do everything according to the terms of his hiring, and if anything has been omitted in these terms, he ought to supply it according to the rules of equity. Be who has given or promised a sum for the hire of clothes or silver, or a beast of burden, is required to bestow as great care on the safe custody of the thing he hires as the most careful father of a family bestows on the custody of his own property. If he bestows such care, but loses the thing through some accident, he is not bound to restore it. D. xix. 1. 25. 3. 7. The distinction here between the cases of a sale and of a letting on hire is to be noticed. Here the risk of fortuitous loss is with the owner, i.e. the locator, in accordance with the general 366 LIB. III. TIT. XXV. rule ; but in sale the risk of fortuitous loss is not with the owner, the seller, but with the buyer. 6. Mortuo condiictore intra tern- 6. If the hirer dies during the time pora conductionis, heres ejus eodem of his hiring, his heir succeeds to all jure in conductione succedit. the rights given him by the contract. C. iv. 65. 10. And the same may be said of the locator ; but in a locatio-con- ductio of personal services or of a thing to be done by a special person, the death of the person who let out his services terminated the contract. The contract, in the case of a locatio-conductio rei, was also terminated by the sale of the thing hired. The buyer was not considered bound by the contract. Emptor i fundi non necesse est stare colormm cui prior dominiis locavit ; nisi ea lege emit (C. iv. ^5. 9); but the conductor Qouldi demand compensation from the locator. The contract ceasing if the thing was sold serves clearly to distino;uish the interest of the conductor from a usufruct. The conductor had no real interest in the thing, but only a personal rio'ht ao:ainst the locator^ while the usufructuary had a servitude, i.e. a real rig^ht, in the thins^. The whole of the thinor over which the usufruct extended could not be sold, because part of it, namely the usufruct, had already been parted with. The contract was also terminated if the rent was two years in arrear (D. xix. 2. 54. 1); if the conductor grossly misused the thing hired (C iv. 65. 3) ; if the locator had indispensable need o^ ii, si propj'iis usibus dominus earn necessariam esse prohaverit (C. ib.); or if the conductor was prevented from getting benefit from it, as by armed force. (D. xix. 2. 13. 7.) Tit. XXV. DE SOCIETATE. Societatem coire solemus aut to- A partnership is formed either of torum bonorum, quam Graeci specia- the whole goods of the contracting liter K-nj J") TTioo^^f)' appellant, aut unius parties, to which the Greeks give the olicujus negotiationis, veluti manci- special name of Koivo-7rpati>, or for some piorum emendorum vendendorum- particular business, as the sale or pur- que, aut olei, vini, frumenti emendi chase of slaves, wine, oil, or wheat, vendendique. Gai. iii. 148. The text, borrowed from Gains (iii. 148), gives the general division of partnerships into two classes according as they are universal or particular. In the Digest we have a further division by distinguishing five kinds of partnership. (D. xvii. 2. 5.) 1. Societas universorum honorum/m which everything belong- ino* or accruing in any way to each partner is held in common. (D. xvii. 2. 1. 1.) Here the property belc^nging to each partner LIB. III. TIT. XXV. 367 at the time when the partnership was formed became the property of all, without delivery. (D. xvii. 2. 1. 1.) 2. Societas miiversorum quce ex qucestu veniunt, i.e. of all things which are gained or acquired by each partner through business transactions ; but not of things belonging or accruing in other ways, such as inheritances or legacies. 3. Societas negotiationis alicujus, formed to carry on a parti- cular business. 4. Societas vectigalis^ formed to carry on the farming of public revenues — a mere branch of the last, but subject to special rules. (D. xvii. 2. 5.) 5. Societas rei unius, when one or more particular things are held in common. 1. Et quidem si nihil de partibus lucri et dainni nominatim convenerit, sequales scilicet partes et in lucro et in damno spectantiir. Quod si ex- pressae fnerint partes, hye servari debent ; nee enim unquam dubium fuit quin valeat conventio, si duo inter se pacti sunt ut ad unuro qui- dem duse partes et lucri et damni pertineant, ad alium tertia. 1. Unless the proportions of gam and loss have been sjjecially agreed on, the shares of gain and loss are equal. If they have been agreed on, eflect ought to be given to the agreement, for, indeed, the validity of the agree- ment has never been questioned, if two partners have agreed that two- thirds of the gain and loss should be- long to the one, and one-third to the other. . Gai. iii. 150. j^quales partes, i.e. one equal share of the whole, not propor- tional to what each contributes. 2. De ilia sane conventione quse- situm est, si Titius et Seius inter se pacti sunt ut ad Titium lucri duse partes pertineant, damni tertia, ad Seium duse partes damni, lucri ter- tia, an rata debeat haberi conven- tio? Quintus Mutius contra naturam societatis talem pactionem esse exis- timavit, et ob id non esse ratam liabendam. Servius Sulpitius, cujus sententia prsevaluit, contra sensit, quia ssepe quorumdam ita pretiosa est opera in societate, ut eos justum sit conditione meliore in societatem admitti : nam et ita coiri posse societatem non dubitatur, ut alter pecuniam conferat, alter non con- ferat, et tamen lucrum inter eos commune sit, quia ssepe opera ali- cujus pro pecunia valet. Et adeo contra Quinti Mutii sententiam ob- tinuit, ut illud quoque constiterit posse conveniri, ut quis lucri par- tem ferat, damno non teneatur ; quod et ipsum Servius convenienter sibi existimavit. Quod tamen ita intelligi oportet, ut si in aliqua re lucrum, in aliqua damnum allatum 2. But doubts have been raised as to the following agreement. Supposing Titius and Seius have agreed that two- thirds of the profit and one-third of the loss shall belong to Titius, and two- thirds of the loss and one-third of the profit shall belong to Seius, ought such an agreement to be valid ? Quintus Mutius considered it as contrary to the nature of partnership, and as there- fore not to be held valid. Servius Sulpitius, on the contrary, whose opinion has prevailed, thought it valid, as frequently the services of particular partners are so valuable that it is just to give them advantages in the terms of the partnership. There can be no doubt that a partnership may be formed on the terms of one partner contributing money, and of the other not contributing, while yet the profit is common to both, as often a man's labour is equivalent to money. Tlie opinion, therefore, contrary to that of Quintus Mutius, has prevailed, and it is admitted that by special agreement a partner may share the profit, and yet not be responsible for the loss, as 368 LIB. HI. TIT. XXV. sit, compensatione facta solum quod Servius consistently held. This must superest intelligatur lucri esse. be understood as meaning that, if there is profit on one transaction and loss on another, the accounts must be balanced, and only the net profit be reckoned as profit. Gal iii. 149 ; D. xvii. 2. 30. A partnership in which one partner was totally excluded from gain was void. The jurists called it a leonina societas, as the other partner w^ould have the lion's share. (D. xvii. 2. 29. 1.) With respect to the power of one partner to bind another, a point not touched on by Justinian, we may observe that as between the partners themselves, any one who acted in behalf of the rest was their mandatary, and, beyond acts of pure administration of their affairs, could only be empowered to act by their express desire (mandatum). If he were so empowered, he had an action against them for all expenses and losses he incurred, and was bound to account to them for the profits. With regard to third persons, as the Roman law, strictly speaking, took no notice of any one who was not a party to the particular contract, they could not sue, or be sued by, the remaining partners, who were not parties. The prsetor, however, allowed the remaining partners to sue if they had no other means of protecting their interests (D. xiv. 3. 1, 2); and the stranger to sue, if the partners had benefited by the contract. (D. xvii. 2. 82.) 3. lUud expeditum est, si in una 3. Of course if the share on one causa pars fuerit expressa, veluti side only is expressly agreed on, as on in solo lucro vel in solo damno, in the side of profit only, or on that of altera vero omissa, in eo quoque loss only, the same share is to be con- quod prsetermissum est, eamdem sidered as held on the side of which partem servari. no mention is made. Gai. iii. 150. 4. Manet autem societas eousque 4. A partnership continues as long donee in eodem consensu persevera- as the partners continue to agree that verint ; at cum aliquis renantiaverit it shall do so ; but if any one partner societati, solvitur societas. Sed renounces the partnership, then the plane si quis callide in hoc renun- partnersliip is dissolved. If, however, tiaverit societati, ut obveniens he makes this renunciation with a aliquod lucrum solus habeat : veluti secret motive, such as that he may si totorum bonorum socius, cum ab alone enjoy a gain which he knows aliquo heres esset relictus, in hoc awaits him ; as, for instance, if an in- renun tiaverit societati ut heredita- heritance has been left to a member of a tem solus lucrifaceret, cogetur hoc partnership embracing all the property lucrum communicare ; si quid vero of each of the partners, and he re- lucrifaciat quod non captaverit, ad nounces the partnership to enjoy alone ipsum solum pertinet. Ei vero cui the advantage of an inheritance left renuntiatum est, quicquid omnino him ; he is compelled to share this post renuntiatam societatem acqui- source of gain with his partners. But ritur, soli conceditur. if he gains anything without such pre- vious design, he alone profits by it : while the partner who has received his renunciation acquires alone all that falls to him subsequently. Gai. iii. 151. LIB. III. TIT. XXV. 369 The contract of partnership may have different modifications. It may be made during or from a certain time, or conditionally. (D. xvii. 2. 1.) But there can be no partnership to last for ever, as no one can be forced to remain a partner against his will. (D. xvii. 2. 70.) Any partner may renounce, i.e. withdraw, when he pleases. The remaining paragraphs of this Title treat of the modes in which the partnership may be dissolved. Ulpian, enumerating the causes of the dissolution of partnerships, says, ' Societas solvihir ex personis^ex rehus, ex voluntate, ex actione,^ (D. xvii. 2. 63. 10.) Ex personis, when one of the parties is dead or incapacitated, as by confiscation (^publicatio) of goods, when the treasury succeeds to his persona (paragr. 7) ; ex re^w5, when the purpose of the partner- ship is effected, or its subject-matter has ceased to exist, as in the case of cession of goods (paragr. 8) ; ex voluntate, when one partner wishes to withdraw ; and ex actione, when one partner compels a dissolution of partnership by action. We may add ex tempore, if the partnership was only temporary. 5. Solvitur adhuc societas etiam 5. A partnership is also dissolved morte socii, quia qui societatem by the death of a partner, as he who contrahifc, certam personam sibi enters into a partnership chooses a par- eligit, Sed et si consensu pluriuui ticular person to whom he binds him- societas contracta sit, morte unius self. And even if there are more than socii solvitur, etsi plures supersint, two partners, the death of any one Tiisi in coeunda societate aliter con- dissolvesthe partnership although more venerit. than one survive, unless on the forma- tion of the partnership it has been otherwise agreed. Gai. iii. 152; D. xvii. 2. 65. 9. Although, in forming the partnership, the parties might agree that, if any one ceased to be a partner, the rest should still con- tinue partners, or, to speak more accurately, should immediately and without fresh agreement form a new partnership, yet no one could validly make it part of the contract that his heirs should, on his death, be admitted partners (D. xvii. 2. 59), the contract being personal. There was an exception made to this rule in the case of societates vectigales, (D. xvii. 2. 59.) 6. Item si alicujus rei contracta 6. If the partnership has been societas sit, et finis negotio im- formed for a single transaction, when positus est, finitur societas, the transaction is completed, the part- nership is ended. D. xvii. 2. 65. 10. 7. Publicatione quoque distrahi 7. It is evident, also, that a part- societatem manifestum est, scilicet nership is dissolved by the confiscation si universa bona socii publicentur ; of all the property of a partner ; for nam cum in ejus locus alius sue- this partner, as he is replaced by a cedat, pro mortuo habetur. successor, is considered dead. D. xvii. 2. 65. 12. 370 LIB. III. TIT. XXV. 8. Item si quis ex sociis mole 8. So, too, if one of the partners, debiti prsegravatus bonis siiis ces- borne down by the weight of his debts, serit, et ideo propter publica aut makes a cession of his goods, and his privata debita substantia ejus ve- property is therefore sold to satisfy his neat, solvitur societas ; sed hoc casu, debts, public or private, the partner- si adhuc consentiant in societatem, ship is dissolved. But in this case, if nova videtur incipere societas. the parties agree still to continue part- ners, a new partnership would seem to be begun. Gai. iii. 153, 154. The persona of an individual might, we know, be destroyed even in his lifetime and passed on to a successor, as, for instance, by the maxima and media capitis deminutio, and by the puhlicatio or confiscation of all the goods of the deminutus, which was one of their consequences, so that i\\Qjiscus was his successor (D. xlviii. 20. 1), or by the sale of his property in the mass, either for the profit of the treasury in the case of criminals (sectio bonorum, the old form of puhlicatio), or of private individuals in certain cases of insolvency {emptio bonorum), or when he had made a cessio bonorum under the lex Julia. (See Tit. 12 of this Book.) In the time of Justinian sales in one mass of a whole patrimony were obsolete, and therefore confiscation (j)ublicatio) , when the fiscus was the successor, and cessio bouorum are alone mentioned here ; the latter, however, as taking away the fortune of the partner, and not as destroying his persona. Of course the partnership might be immediately renewed with the partner whose goods had been confiscated or ceded to creditors, if the other partners were willing to enter into what was really a new partnership, as it might if the partner had lost his civitas by the media deminutio ; for partnership, being a contract of the jus gentium, could be formed with a stranger. The minima capitis deminutio did not cause a dissolution of the partnership, and a person arrogated or emancipated still remained a partner. (D. xvii. 2. Q6. 11.) (Poste's Gains, 348.) (Gai. iii. 154.) The arrogator, however, did not become a partner, as a new partner could not be introduced without the consent of the others, Societas, quemadmodum ad heredes socii non transit, ita nee ad arrogatorem, ne alioquin invitus quis socius ejfficiatur cui non vult, (D. xvii. 2. Qd. 11.) 9. Socius socio utrum eo nomine 9. It has been questioned whether tantum teneatur pro socio actione, si one partner can be made answerable to quid dolo commiserit, sicut is qui another by the action pro socio, if he deponi apud se passus est, an etiam has been guilty of malicious wrong, as culpse, id est desidias atque negli- a depositary is, or whether also for a gentise nomine, qusesitum est : prse- fault, that is, for carelessness and neg- valuit tamen etiam culpse nomine ligence. The opinion has prevailed teneri eum. Culpa autem non ad that he is also answerable for a fault, exactissimam diligentiam dirigenda but the fault is not to be measured by est : sufficit enim talem diligentiam a standard of the most perfect careful- in communibus rebus adhibere so- ness possible. It is sufficient that he cium, qualem suis rebus adhibere should be as careful of things belonging LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. 37 1 solet ; nam qui pariim diligentem so- to the partnership as he is of his own cium sibi assiimit, de se queri debet, property. For he who accepts as part- ner a person of careless habits, has only himself to blame* D. xvii. 2. 72. Societas Jus quodammodo fraternitatis in se hahet, (D. xvii. 2. 63.) Hence, while each partner had, if sued, an allowance (termed the heneficium competenticE) made for him, and was only held responsible to the extent of his means, yet, on the other hand^ if he was condemned in an action pro socio, he was marked with infamy. (D. xvii. 2. 63, pr. 1-3; D. iii. 2. 1.) The action pro socio was the remedy in almost every case that could arise between partners. It was employed, for instance, to enforce accounts, to get compensation for losses, and to dissolve the partnership. If any partner was guilty of a delict against his partners, such as theft, he would be made amenable by such actions as the actio fvrti, vi bonorum raptorum, or legis Aqiiilioe, of which we read in the Fourth Book. There was also another action incident to partnerships, called the actio communi dividundo^ which was brought to procure a partition, by the judex, of the common property. (See Introd. sec. 103.) Tit. XXYI. DE MANDATO. Mandatum contrahitiir qiiinque The contract of mandate is formed modis : sive sua tantum. gratia aliquis in five modes ; according as a mandator tibi mandet, sive sua et tua, sive gives you a mandate for his benefit aliena tantum, sive sua et aliena, only, or for his benefit and for yours ; sive tua et aliena ; at si tua tantum or for the benefit of a third person gratia mandatum sit, supervacuum only, or for his benefit and that of a est, et ob id nulla obligatio nee third person, or for your benefit and mandati inter vos actio nascitur. that of a third person. A mandate made for your benefit only is useless, and does not produce between you any obligation or action mmidati. J), xvii. 1. 2. In the theory of Roman law one person could not represent another. The person who actually made the contract, who uttered the binding words, or went through the binding formalities, was the only legal contractor ; he alone could sue and be sued. The law would not take notice that it was really in behalf of another that he made the contract. But a friend on whom reliance could be placed might be per- suaded to make the contract in his own name. Honour and friendship would then effect what the law would not compel. This friend would give up all that he gained by the contract to the per- son at whose request he entered into it. The promise to perform this act of friendship was given, in the old times of Roman B B 2 372 LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. manners, with an appropriate formality. The person really in- terested took the friend by the right hand, and told him that he placed in his hand the trust he was anxious to have discharged. The trust, or commission itself, was hence called mandatum (manu datum), Plautus thus describes the ceremony {Captiv. ii. 3) : Tynd. — HcBC per dexter am tuam, te dexter a retinens manu^ Obsecro, infidelior milii ne fuas, quam ego sum tibi, Tu hoc age, tu mihi herns nunc es, tu patronus, tu pater, Tibi commendo spes opesque meas. Ph. — Mandavisti satis. The execution of a mandatum was thus a discharge of an office of friendship. Originem ex officio atque amicitia trahit. (D. xvii^ 1. 1. 4.) And it' never lost the traces of its origin. It was always necessarily gratuitous ; the mandatarius, i. e. the person charged with the mandatum, was obliged to bestow on it the care of the most diligent paterfamilias (C. iv. 35. 13), and if he failed to discharge the trust, and was condemned in an actio mandati, he was stamped with infamy. (D. iii. 2. 1.) (Introd. sec. 48.) When the introduction of the praetorian system furnished a method by which every equitable claim could be enforced, friends who entered into such an agreement were obliged to discharge their reciprocal duties. The prajtor, by the actio mandati directa given to the mandator, compelled the mandatarius to account for all he received, and to pay over the profits, and, by the actio man- dati contraria given to the mandatarius, compelled the mandator (i.e. the person who requested the favour) to reimburse, with interest, the mandatarius for all expenses incurred, to indemnify him for all losses, and to free him from all obligations contracted in the execution of the mandate. The pra3torian law went a great step further, by allowing the mandator to bring equitable actions against, and to be sued by, the third party, with whom the mandatarius contracted. First as to actions brought by the mandator. Whatever direct ac- tions the mandatarius would properly have brought or was liable to, the mandator was allowed to bring in the shape of actiones utiles ; and if the mandator sued or intended to sue, the manda- tarius could not sue. As, for instance, where the mandatarius would have brought a condictio, or an actio empti or venditi, the mandator was allowed to bring a condictio utilis, or an actio utilis empti or venditi, (D. xix. 1.13. 25.) In the case of a special mandate, these actions were allowed, as of course ; in the case of a general mandate, only when the mandator had no other way of protecting his interests, a mandate being termed special when one man charged another with the execution of one or more particular things, and general when he asked him to represent him in all his affairs. (D. xiv. 3. 2.) Secondly as to actions brought against the mandator. There were some acts, of a solemn character, in which one citizen could, at no time of Koman law, act for another, such as bringing any LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. 373 of the legis actioncs^ mancipation, making testaments, or the cretio or aditio of an inheritance. Nor did the civil law ever permit any one, except a son or a slave (Tit. 28), to contract for another so as to make the person for whom he contracted directly re- sponsible or directly able to sue on the obligation. But the praetorian system gradually recognised the intervention of an agent. A cognitor, i. e. a person authorised formally to conduct a suit, was allowed to act on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant, and fully represented his principal. (See Bk. iv. Tit. 10.) The manager of a shop {instltor) and the captain of a ship (exercitor) were permitted to bind their employers (Bk. iv. Tit. 7), and by an extension of the actions appropriate to these cases, i. e. by allowing a utilem actionem quasi institoriam (D. xvii. 1. 10. 5), the prastor made all employers liable for acts of their agents authorised by or profitable to them, and allowed actions to be brought directly against the employer without regard to the procurator or agent ; and this was the mode in which the mandator was made responsible. Thus, ultimately, obligations were ac- quired by or against the mandator through the agent, and not for him by the agent. 1. Mandantis tantum gratia in- 1. A mandate is made for the bene- tervenit mandatum, veluti si quis fit of the mandator only; if, for in- tibi mandet ut negotia ejus gereres, stance, any one gives yon a mandate to vel ut fundum ei emeres, vel ut pro transact his business, to buy an estate eo sponderes. for him, or to become surety for him. D. xvii. 1. 2. 1. This is the usual case of a mandatum. Justinian employs here, it may be remarked, the word sponderes, although sponsores no longer existed. (See Tit. 20.) 2. Tua et mandantis, veluti si 2. A mandate is made for your mandet tibi, ut pecuniam sub usuris benefit and that of the mandator ; if, crederes ei qui in rem ipsius mutua- for instance, he gives a mandate to you retur ; aut si, volente te agere cum to lend money at interest to a person eo ex fidejussoria causa, tibi man- who borrows it for the purposes of the det ut cum reo agas periculo man- mandator ; or if, when you are about dantis, vel ut ipsius periculo stipu- to sue him as ?i fidejussor, he gives you leris ab eo quem tibi deleget in id a mandate to sue the principal at his quod tibi debuerat. risk, or to stipulate at his risk as against something owed by him to you, for payment from a person whom he appoints as his substitute. D. xvii. 1. 2. 4 ; D. xvii. 1. 45. 7, 8. Volente te agere cum eo ex fidejussoria causa. Under the law anterior to Justinian, the creditor could sue either the debtor or the fidejussor, but not both. If he proposed to sue the latter, the fidejussor might give him a mandatum to sue the debtor, and then, if the creditor did so, the fidejussor would be freed from any obli- gation as ^r/^M 550 r, but would be hound sls mandator ; and thus the mandate would be for the benefit of the fidejussor, because he 374 LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. would be sued after the principal, and for the benefit of the cre- ditor, because he could sue the principal first and then the surety in his quality of mandator, whereas he could not ordinarily sue both the principal and the surety, but was obliged to make his choice between them, as the litis contestatio in the action he first brought extinguished the obligation they had jointly made. This could not be of any use after Justinian had decided that the principal debtor should be sued first, and then, if there was any deficiency, the, fidejussor, (See Tit. 20. 4.) Ah eo quern tihi deleget. The debtor points out to the creditor a third person who owes the debtor a sum equal to his debt to the creditor ; and asks the creditor to stipulate with this third person for payment of the amount due from the debtor. If the third person does not pay, the debtor is held responsible as mandator. The creditor thus benefits, as he has two persons to sue, and the debtor benefits, because he employs his creditor to collect a debt due to him. 3. Aliena autem causa intervenit mandatum, veluti si tibi mandet ut Titii negotia gereres, vel ut Titio fundum emeres, vel ut pro Titio sponderes. 3. A mandate is made for the bene- fit of a third person, if, for example, the mandator bids you manage the affairs of Titius, or buy an estate for Titius, or become surety for Titius. D. xvii. 1. 2. 2. 4. Sua et aliena, veluti si de communibus suis et Titii negotiis gerendis tibi mandet, vel ut sibi et Titio fundum emeres, vel ut pro eo et Titio sponderes. 4. A mandate is made for the bene- fit of the mandator and of a third person, if, for example, the mandator gives you a mandate to manage afiairs common to himself and Titius, or to buy an estate for himself and Titius, or to become surety for himself and Titius. D. xvii. 1. 2, 3. 5. Tua et aliena, veluti si tibi mandet \\i Titio sub usuris crederes ; quod si ut sine usuris crederes, aliena tantum gratia intercedit mandatum. 5, A mandate is made for your benefit and for that of a third person, if, for instance, the mandator bids you to lend money at interest to Titius. Were the money lent without interest, the mandate would be only for the benefit of a third person. D. xvii. 1. 2. 5. 6. Tua gratia intervenit manda- tum, veluti si tibi mandet ut pecu- nias tuas in emptiones potius prae- diorum coUoces, quam foeneres ; vel ex di verso, ut foeneres potius quam in emptiones prsediorum colloces. Cujus generis mandatum magis consilium est quam mandatum, et ob id non est obligatorium ; quia nemo ex consilio obligatur, etiamsi non expediat ei cui dabitur, cum li- berum cuique sit apud se explorare 6. A mandate is made for your benefit only, if, for example, the man- dator bids you invest your money in the purchase of land rather than put it out to interest, or vice versa. Such a mandate is rather a piece of advice than a mandate, and consequently is not obligatory, as no one is bound by giving advice, although it be not judi- cious, as each may judge for himself what the worth of the advice is. If, therefore, you have a sum of money LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. 375 an expediat consilium. Itaque si lying idle in your house, and any one otiosam pecuniam domi te habentem advises you to make a jDurcliase with hortatus fuerit aliquis ut rem ali- it, or put it out to interest, although it quam emeres, vel earn crederes, may not be advantageous to you to quamvis non expediat tibi earn have made this purchase, or to have emisse vel credidisse, non tamen tibi lent your money, yet your adviser is mandati tenetur. Et adeo hsec ita not bound by an action inandati. So sunt, ut quassitum sit an mandati much so, that it has been questioned teneatur, qui mandavit tibi ut pecu- whether a person is bound by this niam Titio foenerares ? sed obtinuit action who has given you a mandate to Sabini sententia, obligatorium esse lend your money at interest to Titius. in hoc casu mandatum, quia non But the opinion of Sabinus has pre- aliter Titio credidisses, quam si tibi vailed, that such a mandate is obliga- mandatum esset. tory, as you would not have lent your money to Titius unless the mandate had been given. Gai. iii. 156 ; D. xvii. 1. 2. 6. It was a very narrow line which divided the expression of a mere opinion advising another person to do a thing, and such a re- quest to him to do it as involved the responsibilities of a mandatum. Everything depended on the intention of the parties. The ques- tion was, did the person who expressed the opinion, or made the request, mean to say that, if the opinion would not be adopted, or the request granted, unless he made himself responsible for the consequences, he was willing to become responsible ? If he did mean this, he was treated as a mandator. A mandator stood in this and similar cases almost exactly in the place of 2, fidejussor. Neque enim multum referre puto prcesens quis interrogatus fidejuheat, an ahsens mandet. (D. xvii. 1. 32.) Accordingly, in the Digest and the Code, the two are treated of under the same head, de fidejussoribus et mandatoribus. For the mandate might be an inter cessio, i.e. a mode in which a third party steps in between two others as a surety for one of them, and was subject to the general rules common to accessary contracts, such as the prohibition of the senatus-consultum Velleianum, with respect to women, the benefits of discussion under Justinian, i.e. that the principal should be sued first, of division under Hadrian's rescript, i.e. that the liabilities of co-sureties should be divided, and, to some extent, of cession of actions. (See Tit. 20. 4.) But the mandatum being a distinct, and not an accessary contract, it was, in some points, distinguished from a fidejussio. 1. The mandator was sometimes considered more responsible than the fidejussor. If a minor borrowed money under a guarantee, and was restitutus in integrum, Ulpian says it was doubtful whe- ther the loss should fall on the creditor or the fidejussor ; but he is clear it ought to fall on the mandator if the guarantee was given by mandate, nothj fidejussio. (D. iv. 4. 13. pr.) 2. The debtor and the fidejussor being liable for the same debt, the litis contestatio in a suit against the debtor released the fidejussor ; but this was not so in the case of the mandator, who was bound by a separate contract. Justinian altered the law, and made the action 376 LIE. III. TIT. XXVi. Sigamst the jftdejussor survive, thus, as he says, placing him in the position of the mandator. (C. viii. 41. 28.) 3. If once there was a litis contestatio in a suit against the fidejussor, it was no longer open to the fidejussor to demand that the actions against the debtor and the other Jidejussores should be ceded to him, for the litis contestatio had extinguished them ; but neither the litis contestatio nor judgment against the debtor affected the claim of the mandator for the cession of actions. (D. xlvi. 3. 95. 10.) 4. The fidejussor could only claim that the actions which the creditor actually had should be ceded to him ; but the man- dator was altogether released if the creditor had abandoned the right of bringing any action he could have brought, because, the contracts being distinct and the creditor bound by a bilateral contract to the mandator, if he had not fulfilled his duty, the mandator was free from his obligation. (D. xlvi. 3. 95. 11.) 7. lUud quoque mandatiim non est obligatorium, quod contra bonos mores est, veluti si Titius de fnrto aut de damno faciendo, aiit de in- juria facienda tibi mandet ; licet enim poenam istius facti nomine prsestiteris, non tamen uUarn habes adversus Titium actionem. 7. A mandate, again, is not obliga- tory which is contrary to honi mores ; as, for instance, if Titius gives you a mandate to commit a theft, or do a harm or injury ; although you pay the penalty of vrhat you may do, you have not in such a case an action against Titius. Gai. iii. 157 ; D. xvii. 1. 22. 6. 8. Is qui exequitur mandatum, non debet excedere finem mandati : ut ecce, si quis usque ad centum aureos mandaverit tibi ut fundum emeres, vel ut pro Titio sponderes, neque pluris emere debes, neque in ampliorem pecuniam fidejubere ; alioquin non habebis cum eo man- dati actionem, adeo quidem ut Sa- bino et Cassio placuerit, etiamsi usque ad centum aureos cum eo agere velis, inuti liter te acturum. Diversfe scholse auctores recte usque ad centum aureos te acturum exis- timant, quae sententia sane benig- nior est. Quod si minoris emeris, habebis scilicet cum eo actionem ; quoniam qui mandat ut sibi centum aureorum fundus emeretur, is uti- que mandasse intelligitur ut mino- ris, si possit, emeretur. 8. A mandatary must not exceed the limits of the mandate ; for instance, if a mandator bids you buy land or become surety for Titius up to the amount of a hundred aurei, you must not exceed this sum in making the purchase or becoming surety, otherwise you will not have an action mcutdati ; so much so, that Sabinus and Cassius thought that even if you limited your action to a hundred aurei, you would bring it in vain. The authors of the opposite school think that you may rightly bring an action limited to a hundred aurei, and this opinion is doubtless the more favourable. If you lay out less on the purchase, you can certainly bring an action against the mandator ; for a person who gives a mandate that an estate shall be bought for him at the price of a hundred aurei, is understood to mean that it should be bought for less if possible. Gai. iii. 161 ; D. xvii. 1. 3. 2 ; D. xvii. 1, 4, 5. Qui excessit, aliud quid facer e videtur. (D. xvii. 1. 5.) Sa- binus, in giving the opinion mentioned in the text, insisted very rigorously on the effect of the thing done being aliud quid. LIB. III. TIT. XXVI. 377 9. Recte quoque mandatum con- tractiim, si dum adhuc Integra res sit, revocatum fuerit, evanescit. Gai. iii. 159. 9. The mandate, although validly formed, is extinguished, if before it has been executed it is revoked. 10. A mandate is also extinguished, if, before it is executed, the mandator or mandatary dies. But motives of convenience have given rise to the decision, that if, after the death of the mandator, you, in ignorance of his de- cease, execute the mandate, you may bring an action mandatl : otherwise you would be prejudiced by what was allowable and natural ignorance. Simi- larly it has been decided that, if debtors make a payment to the steward of Titius, after he has been enfranchised, in ignorance of his enfranchisement, they are freed from their obligation, although, in strict law, they could not be freed, as they have made the pay- ment to a person other than him to whom they ought to have made it. Gai. iii. 160. Manumisso. It vrould be the same if the slave had not been enfranchised, but had been sold, or had his office of dispensator taken from him, without the knowledge of the debtors. (D. xlvi. 3. 51.) 10. Item si adhuc integro man- dato mors alterius interveniat, id est, vel ejus qui mandaverit, vel illius qui mandatum susceperit, solvitur mandatum ; sed utilitatis causa receptum est, si eo mortuo qui tibi mandaverat, tu ignorans eum decessisse executus fueris man- datum, posse te agere mandati ac- tione ; alioquin justa et probabilis ignorantia tibi damnum aflferet. Et huic simile est quod placuit, si debi- tores manumisso dispensatore Titii per ignorantiam liberto solverint, liberari eos ; cum alioquin stricta juris ratione non possent liberari, quia alii solvissent quam cui solvere debuerint. 11. Mandatum non suscipere cui- libet liberum est, susceptum autem consummandum est, aut quampri- mum renuntiandum, ut per semet- ipsum aut per alium eamdem rem mandator exequatur ; nam nisi ita renuntiatur ut Integra causa man- datori reservetur eamdem rem ex- plicandi, nihilominus mandati actio locum habet, nisi justa causa inter- cessit aut non renuntiandi aut in- tempestive renuntiandi. 11. Every one is free to refuse ac- cepting a mandate, but if it is once accepted, it must be executed, or else renounced soon enough to permit the mandator carrying out his purpose himself or through another. For, un- less the renunciation is made so that the mandator is still in a position to do this, an Miction mandati maybe brought in spite of the renunciation of the mandatary, unless some good reason has prevented him making the renun- ciation, or making it within a proper time. D. xvii. 1. 22. 11. Nisi justa causa. For example, a sudden and serious illness, a deadly enmity springing up between the mandator and the mondatarius, or the insolvency of the former. (D. xvii. 1. 23.) In the execution of the mandate the mandatarius was bound to use the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. (Tit. 27. 1.) 12. Mandatum et in diem difierri, 12. A mandate may be made to et sub conditione fieri potest. take effect from a particular time, or may be made conditionally. D. xvii. 1. 1. 3. 378 LIB. III. TIT. XXVII. 13. In siimma, sciendum est 13. Lastly, it may be observed, mandatum, nisi gratuitum sit, in that unless a mandate is gratuitous, aliam formam negotii cadere, nam it will take the form of some other mercede constituta incipit locatio et contract, for, if a price is fixed on, it is conductio esse. Et, ut generaliter a contract letting to hire. And gene- dixerimus, quibus casibus sine mer- rally we may say, that in every case in cede susce^Dto officio mandati aut which, whenever the duty being under- depositi contrahitur negotium, iis taken without pay, there is a contract casibus interveniente mercede loca- of mandate or deposit, in every such tio et conductio contrahi intelli- case, if pay is received, the contract is gitur ; et ideo si fuUoni polienda one of letting to hire. If, therefore, a curandave vestimenta dederis, aut person gives his clothes to a fuller to sarcinatori sarcienda, nulla mercede be cleaned, or to a tailor to be mended, constituta neque promissa, mandati without any pay being agreed on or competit actio. promised, an action mandati may be brought. Gai. ii. 162 ; D. xvii. 1. 1. 4. Althougli the execution of the mandatum was necessarily gratuitous, yet, without making the contract a locatio conductio, a mandator might offer a reward to the mandatarius, not exactly in payment of, but in gratitude for, his services. Such a recompense was called salarium or sometimes honorarium, a term that Avas especially applied to the recompense offered to those who exercised the liberal professions, such as philosophers, rhetoricians, physi- cians, advocates, &c. These honoraria could not be made the subject of an action ; but the magistrate, pr^tor, or presses of the province pronounced extra ordinem (see Introd. sec. 108) whether they were due and what was the proper amount. (D. L. 13. 1.) Tit. XXYII. DE OBLIGATIONIBUS QUASI EX CONTRACTU. Post genera contractuum enume- Having enumerated the difierent rata, dispiciamus etiam de iis obli- kinds of contracts, let us treat of those gationibus quse non proprie quidem obligations which do not spring, pro- ex contractu nasci intelliguntur ; perly speaking, from a contract, but sed tamen, quia non ex maleficio yet, as they do not take their origin substantiam capiunt, quasi ex con- from a delict, seem to arise, as it were, tractu nasci videntur. from a contract. If the oblio;ations were to be considered as always arisino; either ex contractu or ex delicto, one man could only be bound to another in one of two ways ; either by a mutual exercise of will he had entered into an agreement with him, or he had done him some injury which he ought to repair. But there were many instances in which justice required that he should be considered bound, where na contract had been made, and where nothing to which the law gave the technical term of delictum had been com- mitted. Such cases, however, if separately examined, would approach more nearly either to an obligatio ex contractu or to one ex delicto. If it more nearly resembled the former, the binding tie LIB. III. TIT. XXVII. 379 was called an ohligatio quasi ex contractu ; if the latter, it was called an ohligatio quasi ex delicto, (See Introd. sec. 87.) The leading distinction between oblio-ations ex contractu and those quasi ex contractu is, that in the former one person chooses to bind himself to another, in the latter he is placed in such circum- stances that he is thereby bound to another. To take, for instance, the examples given in the Title : if I take upon me the manage- ment of my neighbour's affairs, become tutor, have things in common with others who are yet not my partners, accept an inheritance, or receive money not due to me, the mere fact of my so conducting myself imposes on me certain duties which the law will force me to fulfil. Of course, if I make an express agreement in any of these cases, I am then bound by the agreement, and not by the circumstances of my position. It is only in the absence of any agreement that I am bound by an ohligatio quasi ex con- tractu. An ohligatio quasi ex contractu does not rest on any contract at all ; it rests on a fact or event, but there is an analogy between a contract and the kind of fact or events which give rise to an ohligatio quasi ex contractu ^-iox they both create rights in personam. (See Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Appendix xl.) The instances of obligations quasi ex contractu which follow are only meant as examples, not as an exhaustive list. 1. Igitur cum quis absentis ne- gotia gesserit, ultro citroque inter eos nascuntur actiones quae appel- lantur negotiorum gestorum ; sed domino quidem rei gestae adversus eum qui gessit, directa competit actio, negotiorum autem gestori contraria. Quas ex nullo contractu proprie nasci manifestum est ; quippe ita nascuntur istse actiones, si sine mandato quisque alienis ne- gotiis gerendis se obtulerit, ex qua causa ii quorum negotia gesta fue- rint, etiam ignorantes obligantur. Idque utilitatis causa receptum est, ne absentium qui subita festinatione coacti, nulli demandata negotiorum suorum administratione, peregre profecti essent, desererentur ne- gotia : quae sane nemo curaturus esset, si de eo quod quis impendisset, nullam habiturus esset actionem. Sicut autem is qui utiliter gesserit negotia, habet obligatum dominum negotiorum, ita et contra iste quo- que tenetur ut administrationis ra- tionem reddat : quo casu ad exactis- simam quisque diligentiam compel- litur reddere rationem, nee sufficit talem diligentiam adhibuisse qua- lem suis rebus adhibere soleret, si 1. Thus, if a person has managed the affairs of another in his absence, they have reciprocally actions negotio- rum gestoruTYi, the action belonging to the owner against him who has managed his affairs being an actio directa, and the action given to this person against the owner being an actio contraria. It is evident that these actions cannot pro- perly be said to arise from a contract, for they arise only when one person has, without receiving a mandate, taken upon himself the management of the affairs of another, and consequently those whose affairs are thus managed, are bound by an obligation, even with- out their knowing it. It is from mo- tives of convenience that this has been admitted, to prevent the entire neglect of the affairs of absent persons, who may be forced to depart in haste, with- out having entrusted the management to any one ; and certainly no one would pay any attention to them, unless he could recover by action any expenses he might be put to. On the other hand, just as he who has advantage- ously managed the affairs of another, makes this person liable to him by an obligation, so he himself is bound to render an account of his management. 380 LIB. III. TIT. XXVIl. mo do alius diligentior commodius administratiirus esset negotia. D. iii. 5. 2 And the standard which he is bound to observe in rendering an account, is that of the most exact diligence, nor is it sufficient that he should use such diligence as he employs in the manage- ment of his own affairs, that is, if it is possible a person of greater diligence could manage the affairs of the absent person better. D. xliv. 7. 5 ; C. ii. 18. 20. Fdiam ignor antes. If the owners had known of the part taken in the management of then* affairs, there would have been a mandatum taciturn. 2. Tutores quoque qui tutelae ju- dicio tenentur, non proprie ex con- tractu obligati intelliguntur (nullum enim negotium inter tutorem et pu- pillum contrahitur) ; sed quia sane non ex maleficio tenentur, quasi ex contractu teneri videntur. Et hoc autem casu mutute sunt actiones : non tantum enim pupillus cum tutore habet tuteloe actionem, sed ex contrario tutor cum pupillo habet contrariam tutelse, si vel impendent aliquid in rem pupilli, vel pro eo fuerit obligatus, aut rem suam cre- ditoribus ejus obligaverit. D. xliv. 2. Tutors, again, who are liable to the action tutelae, are not, properly- speaking, bound by a contract, for there is no contract made between the tutor and the pupil, but as they are certainly not bound by a delict, they seem to be bound quasi ex contractu. In this case, too, there are reciprocal actions, for not only has the pupil an action tutelde, against the tutor, but, in his turn, the tutor has an actio contraria tutelae against the pupil, if he has incurred any expenses in managing the pupil's property, or has entered into an obli- gation for him, or given his own pro- perty as security to the pupil's creditors. 7. 5. 1. We should add here the corresponding case of the curator. His negotiorum gestio did not give rise to a special action, but to the action negotiorum gestorum contraria, which he could avail himself of to reimburse himself for all reasonable expenses. (D. iii. 5. 3. 5.) Quasi ex contractu teneri videntur. The exact translation w^ould be ^ seem to be bound by a tie analogous to that by which persons are bound under contracts ; ' but as this is too long a phrase to repeat every time the words quasi ex contractu occur, the Latin has been retained in the translation. 3. Item si inter aliquos com- munis sit res sine societate, veluti quod pariter eis legata donatave esset, et alter eorum alteri ideo teneatur communi dividundo ju- dicio, quod solus fructus ex ea re perceperit, aut quod socius ejus solus in eam rem necessarias im- pensas fecerit, non intelligitur pro- prie ex contractu obligatus, quippe nihil inter se contraxerunt ; sed quia non ex maleficio tenetur, quasi ex contractu teneri videtur. D. xvii. 3. So, again, if a thing is common to two or more persons, without there being any partnership between them, as, for instance, if they have received a joint legacy or gift, and one of them is liable to the other by an action com- muni dividundo, because he alone has enjoyed the fruits of the thing, or be- cause the other party has incurred expenses necessary for the thing, he cannot be said to be bound by a con- tract, for no contract has been made ; but as he is not bound by a delict, he is said to be bound quasi ex contractu. 2. 31. 34. LIB. III. TIT. XXVII. 381 Necessarias Impensas. Useful expenses, and not merely neces- sary ones, could be recovered. (D. x. 3. 6. 3.) 4. Idem juris est de eo qui colie- 4. It is the same with regard to a redi suo familige erciscuudee judicio person who is bound to his co-heir by ex his causis obligatus est. an action familim erciscundx. D. xvii. 2. 34. The aciio familicB erciscundoi was that by which any one lieres applied to the judge to make a fair division of the inhe- ritance. 5. Heres quoque legatorum no- 5. The heir, too, is not bound to the mine non proprie ex contractu obli- legatee by a contract, for the legatee gatus intelligitur (neque enim cum cannot be said to have made a contract herede, neque cum defuncto ullum with the heir or with the deceased ; negotium legatarius gessisse proprie and yet, as the heir is not bound by a dici potest) ; et tamen quia ex male- delict, he is considered to be bound ficio non est obligatus heres, quasi qyiasi ex contractu. ex contractu debere intelligitur. D. xliv. 7. 5. 2. The circumstance of accepting the inheritance imposed on the heir the obligation of carrying out the testator's wishes, and this he was compelled to do by the actio ex testamento. If a particular thing were given as a legacy, so that the legatee could bring a vindicatio, he might exercise his choice between the personal and the real action. 6. Item is cui quis per errorem 6. A person to whom money not non debitum solvit, quasi ex con- due has been paid by mistake, is bound tractu debere videtur. Ideo enim quasi ex contractu. For so far is he non intelligitur proprie ex contractu from being bound by a contract, that, obligatus, ut si certiorem rationem to reason strictly, we may say, as we sequamur, magis (ut supra diximus) have said before, that he is bound ex distractu quam ex contractu pos- rather by the dissolution than by the sit dici obligatus esse : nam qui formation of a contract ; for a payment solvendi animo pecuniam dat, in hoc is generally made to dissolve, not to dare videtur ut distrahat potius ne- form, a contract ; and yet he who re- gotium, quam contrahat ; sed tamen ceives it in the case we have mentioned perinde is qui accepit obligatur, ac is bound exactly as if it had been given si mutuum illi daretur, et ideo con- him as a mutuum, and is therefore dictione tenetur. liable to a condictio. D. xliv. 7. 8. 3. If the person who paid what was not due was one who, like a pupil or madman, had not legally the power of passing the property in what he gave, no property in the thing paid passed by the transfer, and the tutor or curator recovered it by a viiidicatio, unless the thing ceased to exist, and then recourse was had to a con- dictio indehiti, i.e. a condictio where, as in an actio vfiutui^ the claim was for things to be given back of a like nature ; but if he had this power, the property was transferred by the delivery, and he could not recover the thing itself, but could only bring a co?z^2cf zo, in which he claimed that the defendant should give him what he ought to give to put the plaintiff in a proper position {dare oportere). 382 LIB. III. TIT. XXVII. If a person knowingly made a payment not due, he could not recover what he paid, as the payment was treated as a gift ; nor could he, if he paid what was due by a natural, though not by a legal, obligation, or paid sooner than he need have done what he must pay at a certain date ; but he could recover if he paid, under a conditional undertaking, before the event had happened. (D. xii. 6. 64.) The error which would permit him to reco- ver might be one arising from ignorance not only of fact but of law. Juris ignorantia swum petentibus non nocet. (D. xxii. 6. 7.) The word ' pay,' * solvo,^ must be taken in a much more ex- tended sense than the payment of money. It must be consi- dered as including anything given to or done for another. It is here said that the person who receives what is not due is bound not merely quasi ex contractu, but as if he had been bound by a particular contract, viz. mutuum. So the persons interfering in the affairs of another, the tutor and the curator, are bound as if by a mandate, and the persons mentioned in paragr. 3 and 4 as if they were bound by the particular contract of societas. 7. Ex quibusdam tamen causis 7. In some cases, however, money repeti non potest quod per errorem paid by mistake cannot be recovered ; non debitum solutum sit ; namque the ancients have decided that this is definierunt veteres, ex quibus causis so in cases in which the amount re- inficiando lis crescit, ex iis causis covered is doubled if the liability is non debitum solutum repeti non denied ; as, for instance, in actions posse, veluti ex lege Aquilia, item brought under the lex Aqiiilia, or with ex legato. Quod veteres quidem in respect to a legacy. The rule was iis legatis locum habere voluerunt, only applied by the ancients, in the quae certa constituta per damna- case of legacies, where specific things tionem cuicumque legata fuerant. were given per darmiationem. But our Nostra autem constitutio, cum unam constitution, which has placed all lega- naturam omnibus legatis et fidei- cies and Jldeicommissa on the same commissis indulsit, hujusmodi aug- footing, has extended to all the effect mentum in omnibus legatis et fidei- of denial in doubling the amount re- commissis extendi voluit ; sed non quired. It has not, however, given it omnibus legatariis prsebuit, sed tan- in behalf of all legatees, but only in tummodo in iis legatis et fideicom- the case of legacies and Jldeicommissa missis quse sacrosanctis ecclesiis et left to churches and other holy places ; ceteris venerabilibus locis, quse re- such legacies, although paid when not ligionis vel pietatis intuitu hono- due, cannot be recovered, rificantur, derelicta sunt. Quse, si indebita solvantur, non repetuntur. Gai. ii. 283 ; iv. 9. 171 ; C. iv. 5. 4 ; C. i. 2. 23. This penalty, first exacted from those who denied that a judg- ment pronounced against them had been pronounced, was ex- tended to cases of refusing to pay legacies given per damnationem, to cases under the lex Aquilia (Tit. 4. 3), and to many other cases. (Tit. 4. 6. 23.) In all cases where by denying his liability the person liable might have an increased amount ultimately recovered against him, it was considered that paying the thing for which he was, or for which he thought himself, liable, was but a mode of escap- LIB. III. TIT. XXVIII. 383 ing from paying a penalty, and that it was paid in order to attain security. If, therefore, it was discovered that the thing need not have been paid, yet, as the person who paid it had paid it to purchase security, he could not recover it back. Nostra constitutio. This constitution is not to be found in the Code, but we have provisions in the Code bearing on the sub- ject. (See C. vi. 43. 2. 1-3.) Ceteris venerahilibus locis. Such, for instance, as monasteries^ asylums for strangers, orphans, the aged, &c. (C. i. 2. 23.) Tit. XXYIII. PER QUAS PERSONAS NOBIS OBLIGATIO ACQUIRITUR. Expositis generibus obligationum qii£e ex contractu vel quasi ex con- tractu nascuntur, admonendi sumus acquiri nobis, non solum per nosmet- ipsos, sed etiam per eas personas qu83 in nostra potestate sunt, veluti per servos et fiiios nostros ; ut tamen quod per servos quidem nobis acqui- ritur, totum nostrum fiat ; quod autem per liberos quos in potestate habemus, ex obligatione fuerit ac- quisitum, hoc dividatur secundum imaginem rerum proprietatis et usus- fructus quam nostra discrevit consti- tutio : ut quod ab actione commodum perveniat, hujus usumfructum qui- dem habeat pater, proprietas autem filio servetur, scilicet patre actionem movente secundum noveUse nostrse constitutionis divisionem. After having gone through the different kinds of obligations which arise from a contract, or arise quasi ex contractu, we may observe that we may acquire an obligation, not only by ourselves, but also by those who are in our power, as our slaves or children. But there is this distinc- tion in acquiring by slaves or by chil- dren, that what is acquired for us by our slaves is entirely ours, while the benefit of the obligation acquired by our children is divided in the same way as our constitution has laid down with respect to the ownership and usufruct of things. Thus, of all that is gained by an action, the father will have the usufruct, and the ownership will be reserved for the son, that is to say, when the action is brought by the father in conformity with what is laid down by our new constitution. Gai. iii. 163 ; C. vi. 61. 8. 3. By acquiring an obligation is meant that we become creditors, and have a right to the action necessary to enforce the obligation. As to the division of the usufruct and ownership, see Bk.ii. Tit. 9. 1. It is the object of the obligation, it may be observed, not the obligation itself, that is thus divided between the father and the son. Only the father could bring the action to enforce the obligation. (C. vi. 61. 1. 3.) 1. Item per liberos homines et alienos servos quos bona fide possi- demus, acquiritur nobis ; sed tantum ex duabus causis, id est, si quid ex operis suis vel ex re nostra acquirant. 1. An obligation is also acquired for us by freemen, and by slaves be- longing to others, whom we possess bona Jide, but only in two cases, namely, when it arises from their labours, or from something belonging to us. Gai. iii. 164. See Bk. ii. Tit. 9. 4. 384 LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. Per liberos homines, i.e. by persons really free, but whom we bona fide believe to be slaves. 2. It is equally acquired for us in the same two cases by a slave of whom we have the usufruct or use. 2. Per eum quoque servum m quo usumfructum vel usum habe- mus, similiter ex cluabus istis causis nobis acquiritur. Gai. iii. 165 ; D. vii. 8. 14. See Bk. ii. Tit. 9. 4. In the case of a slave of whom we have only the use, we can only acquire when the two cases unite, i.e. when his labour is expended on something that is our property, for we cannot derive any benefit from his labour expended elsewhere. 3. Communem servum pro domi- nica parte dominis acquirere certum est, excepto eo quod uni noniinatim stipulanclo aut per traditionem ac- cipiendo, illi soli acquirit : veluti cum ita stipulatur, Titio domino meo dare spondes ? Sed si unius domini jussu servus fuerit stipulatus, licet antea dubitabatur, tamen post nostram de- cisionem res expedita est, ut illi tantum acquirat qui hoc ei facere jussit, ut supra dictum est. 3. A slave held in common un- doubtedly acquires for his different masters in proportion in their inter- ests in him, excepting that, in stipu- lating or receiving by tradition for one only, whom he mentions by name, he acquires only for this one ; for instance, if he stipulates thus, ' Do you engage to give to Titius my master ? ' But if the slave has stipulated by order of one master only, in spite of former doubts, there is no question since our constitution, but that he acquires, as we have already said, for him alone who has given him the order. Gai. iii. 367; C. iv. 27. 3. The text only notices the acquisition of obligations through others as recognised by the civil law, i.e. through slaves and sons in pote state, and does not notice the pr^torian changes by which the principal acquired obligations through his agent. (See Tit. 26. pr.) Tit. XXIX. QUIBUS MODIS OBLIGATIO TOLLITUE. Tollitur autem omnis obligatio solutione ejus quod debetur, vel si quis consentiente creditore aliud pro alio solverit. Nee tamen interest quis solvat, utrum ipse qui debet, an alius pro eo ; liberatur enim et alio solvente, sive sciente debitore sive ignorante vel invito solutio fiat. Item si reus solverit, etiam ii qui pro eo intervenerunt, liberantur. Idem ex contrario contingit, si fide- jussor solverit ; non enim solus ipse liberatur, sed etiam reus. Every obligation is dissolved by the payment of the thing due, or of something else given in its place with the consent of the creditor. And it makes no difference whether it is the debtor himself who pays, or some one else for him ; for the debtor is freed from the obligation, if payment is made by a third person, and that either with or without the knowledge of the debtor, or even against his will. If the debtor pays, all those who have become surety for him are thereby freed, just as if a surety pays, not only he himself is freed, but the principal is freed also. Gai. iii. 168 ; D. xlvi. 3. 53 ; D. xlvi. 3. 38. 2 ; D. xlvi. 3. 43 ; D. xlvi. 1. 66. LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. 385 We now pass to considering how an obligation once formed may be dissolved. Solvere, to unloose, dissolve the tie, is the appropriate term for the process, in whatever way it may be ac- complished — Solutionis verbum pertinet ad omnem liberationem quoquo modo factam (D. xlvii. 3. 54) — although most generally applied to the payment of money, as the mode by which contracts are usually terminated. It is by a slight extension of the strict use of the word that a person was said not solvere obligationem, but solvere pecuniam. The civil law, which imposed forms on the formation of a con- tract, imposed corresponding forms on its dissolution. And when these Avere fulfilled, the debtor was said to be freed from his obli- gation ' ipso jure.' In later times, in cases where these forms had not been gone through, but yet equity demanded that the debtor should be considered free, the pr^tor allowed him to repel, by an exception, the creditor who sued him ; and it has thence been said, * obligatio aut ipso jure, aut per exceptionem tollitur.'' When it is said in the text that if the fidejussor pays the principal is freed, the case must be understood to be referred to of ^fidejussor paying, without using his right of having the actions ceded to him. Pavment might be made to the creditor or his authorised agent, to the tutor or curator, or to the pupil if authorised. Of course, in every stage of the law, payment put an end to the contract. The claims of the contracting parties were satisfied, and nothing more remained to be done. But, supposing payment was not made, but one of the parties was willing to release the other, or one party could claim, for some reason, to be released, certain solemn forms had been entered into, which could not be made of no effect by the mere consent of the parties. Such forms were too solemn in the eyes of the law to lose their power unless other forms equally solemn were gone through. Accordingly, in such cases, where no real payment was made, there was what Gains calls an imaginaria solutio, varying in the method in which it was made according to the forms nexum, verbis, or Uteris, with which the contract had been formed. If, for instance, the contract had been formed per ces etlibram, not less than five witnesses and a libripens were called together. The debtor struck the scale with a piece of money and gave it to the creditor in the name of the whole sum owing. (Gai. iii. 174.) This form was also adopted in cases where payment of a legacy given per damnationem was remitted, probably because the testament was itself supposed to be made per ces et libram ; and also in cases where payment of money due by a judicial sentence was remitted, probably because the most formal mode of imaginary payment was adopted Avhen the money was due in a way which the law considered as specially solemn. (Gai. iii. 175.) This form of imaginary payment was also applicable c c 386 LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. wherever anything certain of those things which ' ponder e, numero. mensurave constant'^ was due. If the contract had been made ' verbis,^ the debtor asked the creditor if he held what was due, as received, ' Quod ego tihi jyro- misi, habesne acceptum ? ' The creditor answered that he did, * Habeo.'' The creditor was said ^ acceptum ferre^ and the pro- cess was called ' acceptilatio.'' (See next paragr.) If the contract had been made ' Uteris,'' the debtor probably entered on his tabulce the expenditure (^expensilatio) of the sum due, with the consent of the creditor, but we cannot learn any- thing from Gains on the subject. If the contract had been made re, the mere return of the thing was a sufficient sign that the contract was at an end. There was a visible act, and the whole object of the forms by which contracts were made and dissolved was to substitute visible acts for mere expressions of consent. Where the contract, as belonging to iho, jus gentium, coxAdi be made merely by consent, it could also be dissolved by consent. (See paragr. 4.) 1. Item per acceptilationem toUi- 1. An obligation is also put an end tiir obligatio. Est aiitem acceptilatio to by acceptilation. This is an ima- imaginaria solutio : quod enim ex ver- ginary payment, for if Titius wishes borum obligatione Titio debetur, id to remit payment of that which is due si velit Titius remittere, poterit sic to him by a verbal contract, he can do fieri ut patiatur hsec verba debitorem so by permitting the debtor to put to dicere, Quod ego tibi promisi habesne him the following question, ' Do you acceptum ? et Titius respondeat, Ha- acknowledge to have received that beo. Sed et Greece potest acceptum which I promised you ? ' Titius then fieri, dummodo sic fiat, ut Latinis answering, 'I do.' The acknowledg- verbis solet : tx^iQ Xai3(ov dijvama Torra; ment may also be made in correspond- iX^o \a66iv. Quo genere, ut diximus, ing Greek -words, f \etc Xa/iw»^ Sijvapia tantum eve solvuntur obligationes rona ; 6\'ai XaSdiv. In this way verbal quae ex verbis consistunt, non etiam contracts are dissolved, but not con- ceterpe : consentaneum enim visum tracts made in other ways : it seemed est, verbis factam obligationem aliis natural that an obligation formed by posse verbis dissolvi. Sed et id quod words should be dissolved by words ; alia ex causa debetur, potest in sti- but anything due by any other kind pulationem deduci et per acceptila- of contract may be made the subject tion em dissolvi. Sicut autem quod of a stipulation, and the debtor be freed debetur, pro parte recte solvitur, ita by acceptilation. And as part of a in partem debiti acceptilatio fieri debt may be paid, so acceptilation may potest. be made of a part only. Gai. iii. 169, 170. 172 ; D. xlvi. 4. 8. 4 ; D. xlvi. 4. 9. Properly the acceptilatio only operated as a release when the contract had been made verbis, but it was held, in all cases, to contain by implication a pact or agreement not to sue, and, there- fore, an exceptio could be grounded on it to repel the creditor Avho had entered into it. Si acceptilatio inutilis fuit, tacita pac- tione id acturus videtur, ne peter etur. (D. ii. 14. 27. 9.) The jurists, however, found a means of making the acceptilatio extend to every kind of contract. It was looked on as a stipulation which operated as a novation of the old contract, that is, which LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. 387 did away with the former contract, and substituted a new one in its place. 2. Est prodita stipulatio quae vvilgo Aqiiiliana appellatiir, per quam stipulationem contiiigit ut omnium rerum obligatio in stipii- latiim deducatur, et ea per accep- tilationem tollatur ; stipulatio enim Aquiliana novat omnes obligationes, et a Gallo Aquilio ita composita est : ' Quicquid te mihi ex quacumque causa dare facere oportet oportebit, prsesens in diemve, quarumque re- rum mihi tecum actio, quasque ad- versus te petitio vel adversus te persecutio est eritve, quodve tu meum habes, tenes possidesve, do- love malo fecisti quominus possi- deas : quanti quseque earnm rerum res erit/ tantam pecuniam dari stipulatus est Aulu-s Agerius ; spo- pondit Numerius Negidius. Item ex diverso Numerius Negidius in- terrogavit Aulum Agerium : ' Quic- quid tibi liodierno die per Aquilia- nam stipulationem spopondi, id omne habesne acceptum ? ' respondit Aulus Agerius : ' Habeo, acceptum- que tuli.' 2. A stipulation has been invented, commonly called the Aquilian, by which every obligation, whatever may be the- thing it concerns, is put into the form of a stipulation, and afterwards dissolved by acceptilation. This Aqui- lian stij)ulation effects a novation of all obligations, and was framed in the following terms by Gallus Aquilius : — ' Whatever for any cause you are or shall be bound to give or do for me, either now or at a future day, every- thing for which I have or shall have against you, actions, personal or real, or right to have recourse to the extra- ordiiiaria judicla of the magistrate ; everything of mine which you have, hold, or possess, or which you only do not possess through some wilful fault of your own, whatever shall be the value of all these things,' so much Aulus Agerius stipulated should be given him in money, and Numerius Negidius engaged to give it ; on the other hand, Numerius Negidius put to Aulus Agerius the question, 'All that I have promised you to-day by the Aquilian stipulation, do you acknow- ledge it as received ? ' and Aulus Agerius answered that he did acknow- ledge it. D. ii. 15. 4 ; D. xlvi. 4. 18. 1. This Aquilius Gallus was the friend of Cicero, whose col- league he was in the pr^&torship (b.c. 65). He was the pupil of Mucins, and the teacher of Sulpicius, and is mentioned in the Digest (i. 2. 2. 42) as of great authority with the people. He is said to have devised a means by which postumi sui might be instituted (D. xxviii. 2. 29) ; and Cicero informs us that he was also the author of certain formulae in the actions of theft. {De Off. iii. 14) (see page 180). We may remark with what care and forethought Aquilius Gallus has made his formula applicable to all possible cases. ' Causa ' is the generical expression. ' Oportet, oportebit ' embrace the present and the future. ' Prcesens in diemve ' (most texts add, ' aut sub conditione ') refer to what are termed the ' modalities ' to which contracts are liable. ' Actio ' is the ' actio in personam ; ' ' petitio ' is the ' actio in rem ; ' ' persecutio ' is the extraordinary proceeding before a magistrate ; ' habes ' refers to ' vindicatio ; ' ' tenes ' to physical detention ; ^ possides ' to ])OSsession. The expression, ' dolove malo fecisti quominus possideas,'' was added to express the obligation which bound a person who had frau- dulently destroyed a thing in his possession to prevent the owner c c 2 388 LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. reclaiming it. The stipulatio Aquiliana was equally applicable if the object was to effect a novation intended to operate as the foundation of a new contract to be really fulfilled by the parties. (D. ii. 15. 2 and 9. 2.) 3, Prseterea novatione tollitur obligatio, veluti si id quod tu Seio debeas, a Titio dari stipulatus sit ; nam interventii novse personse nova nascitiir obligatio et prima tollitur translata in posteriorem ; adeo ut interdum, licet posterior stipulatio inutilis sit, tamen prima novationis jure tollatur, veluti si id quod tu Titio debebas, a pupillo sine tutoris auctoritate stipulatus fuerit. Quo casu res amittitur, nam et prior debitor liberatur, et posterior ob- ligatio nulla est. Non idem juris est, si a servo quis fuerit stipulatus ; nam tunc prior perinde obligatus manet, ac si postea nullus stipulatus fuisset. Sed si eadem persona sit a qua postea stipuleris, ita demum novatio fit, si quid in posteriore stipulatione novi sit, forte si con- ditio aut dies aut fidejussor adji- ciatur aut detraliatur. Quod autem diximus, si conditio adjiciatur nova- tionem fieri, sic intelligi oportet ut ita dicam factam novationem si conditio extiterit : alioquin si defe- cerit, durat prior obligatio. Sed cum hoc quidem inter veteres con- stabat, tunc fieri novationem cum novandi animo in secundam obli- gationem itum fuerat ; per lioc autem dubium erat, quando no- vandi animo videretur hoc fieri, et quasdam de hoc prcesumptiones alii in aliis casibus introducebant. Ideo nostra processit constitutio quie apertissime definivit, tunc solum novationem fieri quotiens hoc ipsum inter contrahentes expressum fuerit, quod propter novationem prioris ob- iigationis convenerunt ; alioquin ma- nere et pristinam obligationem, et secundam ei accedere, ut maneat ex utraque causa obligatio secundum nostrse constitutionis definitionem, qiiam licet ex ipsius lectione aper- tius cognoscere. 3. An obligation is also dissolved by novation, as for instance, if Seius stipulates from Titius for that which is due to Seius from you. For by the intervention of a new debtor a new obligation arises, and the former obli- gation is extinguished by being trans- ferred into the latter ; so much so, that it may happen, that although the latter stipulation is void, yet the former, by the efiect of the novation, ceases to exist ; as for instance if Titius stipulates from a pupil not authorised by his tutor, for a debt due to Titius from you, in this case Titius loses his whole claim, for the first debtor is freed, and the second obligation is void. But the case is diiferent if it is a slave from whom he stipulates, for then the original debtor rem.ains bound as if the sub- sequent stipulation had never been made. But if it is the original debtor himself from whom you make the second stipulation, there will be no novation, unless the subsequent sti- pulation contains something new, as, for instance, the addition or suppres- sion of a condition, a term, or a surety. In saying that if a condition is added there is a novation, we must be understood to mean that the nova- tion will take place if the condition is accomplished, but that if it is not accomplished, the former obligation remains binding. The ancients were of opinion that the novation only took place when the second obliga- tion was entered into for the purpose of making the novation, and doubts consequently arose as to the existence of this intention, and difierent pre- sumptions were laid down by those who treated the subject according to the difierent cases they had to settle. In consequence, our constitution was published, in which it was clearly de- cided that novation shall only take place when the contractir.g parties have expressly declared that their object in making the new contract is to extinguish the old one ; otherwise the former obligation will remain binding, while the second is added to it, so that each contract wiU give rise LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. 389 to an obligation still in force, accord- ing to the provisions of our constitu- tion, which may be more fully learned by reading the constitution itself. Gai. iii. 176, 177. 179 ; D. xlvi. 2. 6. 8. 1, and foil.; C. viii. 41. 8. Novation is the dissolution of one obligation by the formation of another. Ulpian says, ^ Novatio est prioris debiti in aliam ohligutionem vel civilem vel naturalem, transfusio atque trans- latio : hoc est, cum ex prcEcedente causa ita nova constituatur, ut prior perimatur. Novatio enim a novo nomen accepit, et a nova ohligatione.^ (D. xlvi. 2. 1.) Every kind of contract could be superseded by novation, but the new contract must be either Uteris (see Tit. 21) or by stipu- lation, and the predominance of the use of stipulations as the instruments of novation was so great that the jurists generally refer to it alone. Qualiscumque obligatio sit qu(B prcEcesserit, novari verbis potest. (D. xlvi. 2. 1.) It was necessary that the obligation superseded should be existing at the time ; but whether it was civil, prastorian, or na- tural, was immaterial. (D. xlvi. 2» 1, 2.) And it was also necessary that the stipulation which superseded it should be binding, either civilly or naturally. In the text we have two instances of contracts which are not binding, owing to the inca- pacity of the parties, one made with a pupil, and one with a slave, and a distinction is drawn between them. The stipulation made with the pupil is a stipulation, though only one binding naturally : the pupil is a Roman citizen, and can pronounce the word spondeo ; but a stipulation made with a slave, except when the slave speaks merely as the mouthpiece of his master, is no stipulation at all. The slave cannot use the words of the formulary. There is no contract verbis to supersede the existing obligation. By a novation a new debtor might be substituted, even without the consent of the original debtor. If it was done with the con- sent of the original debtor, the new debtor was termed delegatus, and the process delegatio. If it was done without his consent, the new debtor was termed the expromissor, and the process ex- promissio ; but these terms, expromissor and expromissio, were also used in a wider sense, as implying the new debtor and the mode of contracting generally, without implying that the consent of the old debtor had not been given to the substitution. (D. xiii. 7. 10.) Of course, if both parties to the original contract were willing, a new creditor could be substituted as well as a new debtor, by a novation ; and if a new debtor was delegated who already owed a debt to the old debtor, there would necessarily be a change of creditor as well as debtor. A owes to B, and B to C, an equal sum. If B tells A to pay C, C has a new debtor, and A a new creditor. In the passage of Gains (iii. 177) on which the text is based, it is said that if a sponsor was added, there was a new contract. 390 LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. Sponsores being obsol-ete, Justinian substitutes fidejussor ; but although a contract mig^ht be extinguished by a surety being added, this would not be so if the parties did not mean it to have this effect. If the original contract was made in any other way than a stipulation, it could be superseded by a stipulation containing the same terms. But if it was made by a stipulation, then, unless some alteration were made in it, the new stipulation would be, in fact, the old one, and there could be no novatio, unless some new term was added. But suppose a new stipulation was made with a condition introduced into it, was the old stipulation extinguished at once by novation? The text lays down the general principle that it was not extinguished, as it is said in the Digest (xlvi. 2. 14) non statimjit novatio, sed tunc demum cum conditio extiterit\ the old contract endured until the condition was accomplished, and if the condition failed the old contract remained bindinor. But some of the jurists said that to extinguish the first contract might be the intention of the parties in making the second contract, or it might not. The question of novation was therefore a question of the intention of the parties in each particular case. Justinian lays down in the text that, unless the parties expressly declare it to be their wish that the first contract shall be extinguished by the second, the first contract shall be considered as subsisting. In personal actions something like novation took place at two points of the suit (Gai. iii. 180) — at the litis contestatio (see In- trod. paragr. 105), and w^hen judgment had been given. After the litis contestatio, the plaintiff could sue in a fresh action on wdiat was, at this period of the suit, ascertaiified to be his legal position, but not on the contract itself. After judgment was given, he could sue on the judgment. But in both cases all the beneficial accessories of the original contract were continued on to the new — such, for instance, as pledges given in security remained, and interest continued to run on, lite contestata usurcp. currunt (D. xxii. 1. 35), and so this juridical novation did not, like novation proper, quite supersede the original contract. (D. xlvi. 2. 29.) 4. Hoc amplius, ese obligationes 4. Those obligations which arc quae consensu contrahuntur, con- formed by consent alone, are dissolvec traria voluntate dissolvuntur ; nam by the expression of a contrary wish, si Titius et Seius inter se consen- If Titiiis and Seins have agreed thai serint, ut fundum Tusculanum emp- Seius shall purchase an estate ai tum Seius haberet centum aureorum, Tusculum for a hundred aurei, anc deinde re nondum secuta, id est, then, before the contract has beei neque pretio soluto neque fundo executed, that is, before the price ha: tradito, placuerit inter eos ut dis- been paid, or delivery made of tin cederetur ab ea emptione et vendi- estate, they agree to abandon th< tione, invicem liberantur. Idem est agreement for the sale, they are mutu in conductione et locatione, et inom- ally freed from their obligation. It i: nibus contractibus qui ex consensu the same in the contract of letting t< descendunt. hire, and in all other contracts formec by consent alone. D. xlvi. 3. 80 ; D. xviii. 5. 5. 1. LIB. III. TIT. XXIX. 391 This paragraph must be understood with the limitation that the contract could only be rescinded integris omnibus, i.e. if each party could possibly be placed in the position he held before. The text rather loosely expresses this by ' re nondum secuta.^ If all things were not integra, but the parties agreed to make them so, this would be a new contract extinguishing the old contract by novation, not an extinction of the contract by mere consent. There were other modes by which a contract was dissolved, as, if the subject of the contract being a thing certain perished with- out the fault of any party ; or if the qualities of debtor and creditor were united in the same person, as, for instance, if the debtor be- came heir of the creditor, which is termed confasio ; or if one debt was set oiF against another {comjiensatio), which, however, if the actions proper to the contract were actions stricti juris, would only give rise to an exception, and not to an extinction of the contract : in actions bonce fide I, ^h.QrQ equitable grounds of defence need not be stated in the formula, the compensatio would be necessarily taken notice of, and in such cases the contract may be said to have been virtually (see Bk. iv. Tit. 6.39) put an end to by the compensatio. There were also many other things which, although they left the contract still subsisting, prevented an action being brought on it. These will be treated of in the next Book under the head of Exceptions. LIBEE QUAETUS. Tit. I. DE OBLIGATIONIBUS QU^ EX DELICTO NASCUNTUE. Cum expositum sit siiperiore libro As we have treated in the preced- de obligationibus ex contractu et ing Book of obligations arising ex con- quasi ex contractu, sequitur ut de tractu and quasi ex contractu, we have obligationibus ex maleficio dispicia- now to treat of obligations arising ex mus. Sed illse quidem, ut suo loco maleficio. Of the obligations treated tradidimus, in quatuor genera divi- of in the last Book, there were, as we duntur : h?e vero unius generis sunt ; have said, four kinds ; of those we nam omnes ex re nascuntur, id est, are now to treat of, there is but one ex ipso maleficio, veluti ex furto aut kind, for they all arise from the thing, rapina aut damno aut injuria. that is, from the delict, as, for example, from theft, from robbery, or damage, or injury. Gal iii. 182 ; D. xliv. 7. 4. This part of the Institutes only treats of delicta, i. e. violations of the rights of property and of ingredients of status, such as liberty, security, and reputation, so far as they produce obligations and are the grounds of private actions. It is not the evil intent which makes an act a delict. Many acts done with evil intent are excluded, many done without are included in the number. Those acts only were delicts which had been characterised and provided against as such by the ancient civil legislation, and to which a particular action was attached. (See Introd. paragr. 88.) In this and the three following Titles we have the four principal kinds of delicts treated of, viz. furtum, vi bona rapta, damni injuria, and injuria. All the obligations attached to delicts are said in the text nasci ex re, i.e. from the evil act or thing done, ex ipso maleficio, to contrast them with the various modes in which obligations ex contractu are formed. Ut de ohligationihus ex maleficio dispiciamus. Many texts read, ut de obligationibus ex maleficio et quasi ex maleficio di- spiciamus. LIB. IV. TIT. I. 393 1. Furtmn est contrectatio rei 1. Theft is the fraudulent dealing fraudulosa, vel ipsius rei, vel etiam with a thing itself, with its use, or usus ejus possessionisve : quod lege its possession ; an act which is pro- naturali prohibitum est admittere. hibited by natural law. D. xlvii. 2. 1. 3. The definition of theft includes the term contrectatio rei, to show that evil intent is not sufficient ; there must be an actual touching or seizing of the thing : fraudulosa, to show that the thing must be seized with evil intent, and rei, usus, possessionis, to show the different interests in a thing that might be the subject of theft. It mis^ht seem that it would have made the definition more complete to have said contrectatio rei alienee. Perhaps the word aliencB was left out because it was quite possible that the dominus or real owner of a thing should commit a theft in taking it from the possessor, as, for instance, in the case of a debtor stealing a thing given in pledge ; and yet the res was scarcely aliena to the dominus. Many texts, after the words contrectatio fraudulosa, add lucri faciendi cfratia, i. e. with a design to profit by the act, whether the profit be that of gaining a benefit for one's self, or that of inflicting an injury on another. These words are found in the passage of the Digest (xlvii. 2. 1.3) from which this definition of theft is taken, but the authority of the manuscripts seems against admitting them here. Only things moveable could be the subject of theft. (D. xlvii. 2. 25.) 2. Furtum autem vel a furvo, id 2. The word furtum comes either est nigro, dictum est, quod clam et from furvum, which means ' black/ obscure fit, et plerumque nocte ; vel because it is committed secretly, and a fraude, vel a ferendo, id est aufe- often in the night ; or from fraus ; rendo. vel a Gneco sermone, qui or from /erre, that is, ' taking away,' ^iopcK^ appellant fures. Imo et Grseci or from the Greek word (piop, meaning ctTTo Tod (^jtpeiv 'j.wpar dixerunt. a thief, which again comes from (pipur, to carry away. D. xlvii. 2. 1. 3. Furtorum autem genera duo 3. Of theft there are two kinds, sunt, manifestum et nee manifes- theft manifest and theft not manifest ; tum ; nam conceptum et oblatum for the thefts termed conceptum and species potius actionis sunt furto ohlatum are rather kinds of actions cohserentes, quam genera furtorum, attaching to theft than kinds of theft, sicut inferius apparebit. Manifestus as will appear below. A manifest thief fur est, quem Grseci t-nr' avTu(pMf)qj is one whom the Greeks term stt' appellant, nee solum is qui in furto avrocpiopfi), being not only one taken deprehenditur, sed etiam is qui eo in the fact, but also one taken in the loco deprehenditur quo fit : veluti place where the theft is committed ; qui in domo furtum fecit, et nondum as, for example, before he has passed egTessus januam deprehensusfuerit; through the door of the house where et qui in oliveto oli varum aut in he has committed a theft, or in a plan- vineto uvarum furtum fecit, quam- tation of olives, or a vineyard where diu in oliveto aut vineto fur clepre- he has been stealing. We must also hensus sit. Imo ulterius furtum extend manifest theft to the case of a manifestum extendendum est, quam- thief seen or seized by the OAvner or 394 LIB. IV. TIT. I. diu earn rem fur tenens visus vel depreliensns fuerit, sive in publico sive in private, vel a domino vel ab alio, antequam eo pervenerit quo perferre ac deponere rem destinas- set ; sed si pertulit quo destinavit, tametsi deprehendatur cum re fur- tiva, non est manifestus fur. Nee manifestum furtum quid sit, ex iis quse diximus intelligitur ; nam quod manifestum non est, id scilicet nee manifestum est. any one else in a public or private place, while still holding the thing he has stolen, before he has reached the place where he meant to take and deposit it. But if he once reaches his destination, although he is after- wards taken with the thing stolen on him, he is not a manifest thief. What we mean by a not manifest thief may be gathered from what we have said, for a theft which is not a manifest theft is a not manifest theft. Gai. iii. 183-185 ; D. xlvii. 2, 3 ; D. xlvii. 2. 5, pr. and 1. The distinction between ^z^r^^^/Tz manifestum and nee manifes- tum is found in the law of the Twelve Tables, which affixed to a furtum manifestum the penalty of death if committed by a slave, and the penalty of being given over as a slave to the person injured if the thefts were committed by a freeman ; and attached to 2i furtum nee manifestum the penalty of double the value of the thing stolen, whether committed by a freeman or a slave. The praetor retained the penalty fixed in the latter case, but in the former altered the penalty to the payment of four times the value of the thing stolen, whether the theft was committed by a slave or a freeman. (Gai. iii. 189.) Gains tells us that the jurists were divided on the point of what It was that constituted 2i furtum manifestum ; some thinking the thief must be taken in the act, some that he need only be taken on the spot, some that he need only be taken with the thing stolen on him before he had transported it to its destination (this is the opinion received in the text), and some that time and place were immaterial so that he was taken with the thing stolen on him. (Gai. iii. 184.) 4. Conceptum furtum dicitur, cum apud aliquem testibus prsesentibus furtiva res qusesita et inventa sit ; nam in eum propria actio constituta est, quamvis fur non sit, quse appel- latur concepti. Oblatum furtum di- citur, cum res furtiva ab aliquo tibi oblata sit, eaque apud te concepta sit, utique si ea mente tibi data fuerit, ut apud te potius quam apud eum qui dedit, conciperetur ; nam tibi apud quem concepta sit, propria ad versus eum qui obtulit, quamvis fur non sit, constituta est actio quae appellatur oblati. Est etiam pro- hibiti furti actio ad versus eum, qui furtum quserere testibus prsesenti- bus volentem prohibuerit. Prseterea poena constituitur edicto prsetoris per actionem furti non exhibiti ad- versus eum qui furtivam rem apud se qusesitam et inventam non exhi- 4. There is what is termed con- ceptum furtum, when a thing stolen has been sought and found in the presence of witnesses in any one's house ; for although this person may not be the actual thief, he is liable to a special action termed concepti. There is what is termed furtum ob- latum, if a thing stolen has been placed in your hands and then seized in your house ; that is, if the person who placed it in your hands did so, that it might be found rather in your house than in his. For you, in whose house it had been seized, would have against him who placed it in your hands, although he were not the actual thief, a special action termed oblatL There is also the action prohibiti furti against a person who prevents another who wishes to seek in the presence of witnesses for a thing stolen ; there is, LIB. IV. TIT. I. 395 buit. Sed hse actiones, id est, con- too, by means of the action furti non cej)ti et oblati et furti prohibiti, nee exhibiti, a penalty provided by the non furti non exhibiti, in desue- edict of the prsetor against a person tudinem abierunt : cum enim requi- who has not produced a thing stolen sitio rei furtive© hodie secundum which has been searched for and found veterem observationem non fit, me- in his possession. But these actions, rito ex consequentia etiam praifatse concepti, oblati, furii prohibiti, and actiones abusucommunirecesserunt, furti non exhibiti, have fallen into cum manifestissimum est, qaod om- disuse ; for search for things stolen is nes qui scientes rem f urtivam sus- not now made according to the ancient ceperint et celaverint, furti nee practice, and therefore these actions manifesti obnoxii sunt. have naturally ceased to be in use, as all who knowingly have received and concealed a thing stolen are liable to the action furti nee manifesti. Gai. iii. 186-188. To the Jurhim concepfum and the furtum ohlotum a penalty of triple the value of the thing stolen was affixed by the Twelve Tables. To the furtum prohihitum , not noticed in the Twelve Tables, a penalty of quadruple the value was affixed by the prastor. (Gai. iii. 192.) The Twelve Tables noticed a kind of furtum coiiceptum of which no mention is made here ; it was called furtum lance licioque conceptum. The searcher entered the house of the supposed receiver, having nothing on his person but a cinc- ture ijicium) round his waist, and a plate (Janx) which he held wdth both his hands, so that there could be no suspicion that he had brought in with him the thing supposed to be stolen. If he then found the thing in the house, the receiver was punished as if he had committed 2^. furtum manifestum. (Gai. iii. 192.) This mode of search and the action founded on it were suppressed by the lex Mhutia. (AuL. Gell. Noct. Att, xvi. 10.) The actions furti concepti, oblati, and jjroliibiti, Avere still in use in the time of Gai us. Ulpian (D. L., 16. 13) explains the meaning of the word pce,na. Pcena is the punishment of an offence, noxce vindicta. It is contrasted with multa. Poena is a punishment imposed by some general law, affecting possibly the caput and existimatio of the person punished. Multa is a fine, a money fine in later law, a fine of cattle and sheep in earlier times {jpecuaria^. The value of the thing was the rei verum pretium, its worth under all the circumstances of the case. So if a slave was stolen, who was in a position to enter on an inheritance at his master's bidding (and then died before entering), the pretium hereditatis, the value of the inheritance thus lost was calculated in the value of the slave stolen. (D. xlvii. 2. 50, pr.) 5. Poena manifesti furti qua- 5. The penalty for manifest theft drupli est, tarn ex servi quam ex is quadruple the value of the thing liberi persona ; nee manifesti, dupli. stolen, whether the thief be a slave or a freeman ; that for theft not manifest is double. Gai. iii. 189, 190. 396 LIB. IV. TIT. I. 6. Furtiim autem fit non solum cum quis intercipiendi causa rem alienam amovet, sed generaliter cum quis alienam rem invito domino contrectat. Itaque, sive creditor pignore, sive is apud quern res de- posita est, ea re utatur, sive is qui rem utendam accepit, in alium usum earn transferat quam cujus gratia ei data est, furtum committit : veluti, si quis argentum utendum acceperit quasi amicos ad coenam invitatunis, et id peregre secum tulerit, aut si quis equum gestandi causa commo- datum sibi longius aliquo duxerit. Quod veteres scripserunt de eo qui in aciem equum perduxisset. 6. It is theft, not only when any- one takes away a thing belonging to another, in order to appropriate it, but generally when any one deals with the property of another contrary to the wishes of its owner. Thus, if the creditor uses the thing pledged or the depositary the thing deposited, or the usuary employs the thing for another purpose than that for which it is given, it is a theft ; for example, if any one borrows plate on the pre- tence of intending to invite friends to supper, and then carries it away with him to a distance, or if any one bor- rows a horse, as for a ride, and takes it much farther than suits such a pur- pose, or, as we find supposed in the writings of the ancients, takes it into battle. Gai. iii. 195, 196 ; D. xlvii. 2. 54. 7. Placuit tamen eos qui rebus commodatis aliter uterentur quam utendas acceperint, ita furtum com- mittere si se intelligant id invito domino facere, eumque si intellexis- set non j)ermissurum, at si permis- surum credant, extra crimen videri : optima sane distinctione, quia fur- tum sine affectu furandi non com- mittatur. 7. A person, however, w^ho borrows a thing, and apx)lies it to a pui'pose other than that for which it was lent, only commits theft, if he knows that he is acting against the wishes of the owner, and that the owner, if he were informed, would not permit it ; for if he really thinks the owner would per- mit it, he does not commit a crime ; and this is a very proper distinction, for there is no theft without the inten- tion to commit theft. Gai. iii. 197 ; D. xli. 3. 37. 8. Sed et si credat aliquis invito domino se rem commodatam sibi contrectare, domino autem volente id fiat, dicitur furtum non fieri. Unde illud qu?esitum est, cum Titius servum Mtevii sollicitaverit ut quas- dam res domino subriperet et ad eum perferret, et servus id ad Msevium pertulerit ; Msevius dum vult Titium in ipso delicto deprehendere, per- miserit servo quasdam res ad eum perferre, utrum furti an servi cor- rupti judicio teneatur Titius, an neutro. Et cum nobis super hac dubitatione suggestum est, et anti- quorum prudentium super hoc alter- cationes perspeximus, quibusdam neque furti neque servi corrapti actionem prsestantibus, quibusdam furti tantummodo. Nos hujusmodi calliditati obviam euntes per nostram decisionem sanximus, non solum furti actionem, sed et servi corrupti con- tra eum dari. Licet enim is servus 8. And even if the borrower thinks he is applying the thing borrowed con- trary to the wishes of the owner, yet if the owner as a matter of fact approves of the application, there is, it is said, no theft. Whence the following ques- tion arises : Titius has urged the slave of Mfevius to steal from his master certain things, and to bring them to him ; the slave informs his master, who, wishing to seize Titius in the act, permits his slave to take certain things to Titius ; is Titius liable to an action furti, or to one servi corrupti, or to neither ? This doubtful question was submitted to us, and we examined the conflicting opinions of the ancient ju- rists on the subject, some of whom thought Titius was liable to both these actions, v/hile others thought he was only liable to the action of theft ; and to prevent subtleties, we have decided that in this case both these actions may be brought. For, although the LIB. IV. TIT. I. 397 deterior a sollicitatore minime f actus est, et ideo non concurrant regnlse qu?e servi cornipti actionem intro- ducerent, tarnen consilium corrup- toris ad perniciem probitatis servi introductum est : ut sit poenalis actio imposita, tamquam si re ipsa fuisset servus corruptus, ne ex liujusmodi impunitate et in alium servum qui facile possit corrumpi, tale facinus a quibusdam perpetretur. slave has not been corrupted, and the case does not seem therefore within the rules of the action servi corrupti, yet the intention to corrupt the slave is indisputable, and he is therefore to be punished exactly as if the slave had been really corrupted, lest his impunity should incite others to act in the same criminal way towards a slave more easy to corrupt. Gai. iii. 198 ; C. vi. 2. 20. Was the slave corrupted ? No ; he had given a signal proof of his fidelity. Was the thing stolen ? No ; the owner had con- sented to its being taken. Thus had reasoned those who refused either action. Justinian avoids these subtleties, and decides that crime shall at any rate be punished, and reparation be made for a WTongful act. 9. Interdum etiam liberorum hominum furtum fit, veluti si quis liberorum nostrotum qui in potes- tate nostra sit, subreptus fuerit. 9. Sometimes there may be a theft of free persons, as, if one of our chil- dren in our power is carried away. Gai. iii. 199. Gains adds, as an example, the case of a wife in many being stolen. It was not the value of the person stolen which in such cases formed the measure of the penalty, for the value of a free person was inappreciable ; but it was the loss occasioned by the theft to the person in whose power the subject of the theft was. 10. Aliquando etiam sufe rei furtum quisque committit, veluti si debitor rem quam creditori pignoris causa dedit, subtraxerit. 10. A man may even commit a theft of his own property, as, if a debtor takes from a creditor a thing he has pledged to him. Gai. iii. 200. 11. Interdum furti tenetur qui ipse furtum non fecit, qualis est cujus ope consiUo furtum factum est. In quo numero est, qui tibi nummos excussit ut alius eos raperet, ant tibi obstitit ut alius rem tuam exci- peret, aut oves tuas vel boves fugavit ut alius eas caperet ; et hoc veteres scripserunt de eo qui panno rubro fugavit armentum. Sed si quid eo- rum per lasciviam, et non data opera ut furtum admitteretur, factum est, in factum actio dari delDet. At ubi ope Msevii Titius furtum fecerit, ambo furti tenentur. Ope consilio ejus quoque furtum admitti videtur, qui scalas forte fenestris supposuit, aut ipsas fenestras vel ostium efiregit ut alius furtum faceret ; quive fer- 11. A person may be liable to an action of theft, although he has not liimseK committed a theft, as, for in- stance, a person who has lent his aid and planned the crime. Among such is one who makes your money fall from your hand that another may seize upon it ; or has placed himself in your way that another may carry off some- thing belonging to you ; or has driven your sheep or oxen that another may make away with them, or, to take an instance given by the old lawyers, frightens a herd with a piece of scarlet cloth. But if such acts are only the fruit of reckless folly, with no design of assisting in the commission of a theft, the proper action is one in fac- tum. But if Meevius assists Titius to 398 LIB. IV. TIT. I. ramenta ad effringendum, aut scalas ut fenestris supponerentur, commo- daverit, sciens cujus gratia commo- daverit. Certe qui niillam opem ad furtum faciendum adhibuit, sed tan- tum consilium dedit atque liortatus est ad furtum faciendum, non tenetur furti. commit a robbery, both are liable to an action of theft. A person, again, as- sists in a theft who places ladders under a window, or breaks a window or a door, that another may commit a theft ; or who lends tools to break a door, or ladders to place under a window, knowing the purpose to which they are to be applied. But a person who does not actually assist, but only advises and urges the commission of a theft, is not liable to an action of theft. Gai. iii. 202 ; D. xlvii. 2. 54. 4 ; D. xlvii. 2. 36. 12. Hi qui in parentum vel do- minorum potestate sunt, si rem eis subripiant, furtum quidem illis fa- ciunt, et res in furtivam causam cadit, nee ob id ab ullo usucapi potest antequam in domini potes- tatem revertatur : sed furti actio non nascitur, quia nee ex alia ulla causa X^otest inter eos actio nasci. Si vero ope consilio alterius furtum factum fuerit, quia utique furtum commit- titur, convenienter ille furti tenetur, quia verura est ope consilio ejus fur- tum factum esse. 12. Those who are in the power of a parent or master, if they steal any- thing belonging to the person in whose power they are, commit a theft. The thing stolen, in such a case, is con- sidered to be furtiva, and therefore no right in it can be acquired by usu- capion before it has returned into the hands of the owner ; but no action of theft can be brought, because the re- lation of the parties is such, that no action whatever can arise between them. But if the theft has been com- mitted by the assistance and advice of another, as a theft is actually com- mitted, this person will be subject to the action of theft, as a theft is undoubtedly committed through his means. D. xlvii. 2. 17 ; D. xlvii. 2. 36. 1. 13. Furti autem actio ei competit cujus interest rem salvam esse, licet dominus non sit. Itaque nee domino aliter competit, quam si ejus intersit rem non perire. 13. An action of theft may be brought by any one who is interested in the safety of the thing, although he is not the owner ; and the proprietor, consequently, cannot bring this action unless he is interested in the thing not perishing. Gai. iii. 203. The right to bring the actio furti may belong to several per- sons at the same time. For instance, both the owner and the usufructuary had sufficient interest in the thing to support an action. But mere interest in a thino; was not sufficient unless the thing had been delivered to, and was or had been in the pos- session of, the plaintiff. A person, for instance, to whom a thing was due by stipulation could not bring an actio furti if the thing was stolen ; he could only compel the actual owner to allow him to bring an actio furti in the owner's name; nor could a cre- ditor bring an actio furti for a thing stolen from his debtor. (D. xlvii. 2. 14. 1. 49.) LIB. IV. TIT. I. 399 14. Unde constat creditorem de pignore subrepto furti actione agere posse, etiamsi idoneum debitorem habeat, quia expedit ei pignori po- tius incumbere quam in personam agere : adeo quidem ut, quamvis ipse debitor earn rem subripuerit, nihilominus creditori competit actio furti. 14. Hence, a creditor may bring this action if a thing pledged to him is stolen, although his debtor is sol- vent, because it may be more advan- tageous to him to rely upon his pledge than to bring an action against his debtor personally ; so much so, that although it is the debtor himself that has stolen the thing pledged, yet the creditor can bring an action of theft. Gai. iii. 204. 15. Item si fullo polienda curan- dave, aut sarcinator sarcienda ves- timenta mercede certa acceperit, eaque furto amiserit, ipse furti habet actionem, non dominus ; quia domini nihil interest earn rem non perisse, cum judicio locati a fuUone aut sarcinatore rem suam persequi potest. Sed et bonse fidei emptori subrepta re quam emerit, quamvis dominus non sit, omnimodo competit furti actio, quemadmodum et cre- ditori. Fulloni vero et sarcinatori non aliter furti competere placuit, quam si solvendo sint, hoc est, si domino rei sestimationem solvere possint ; nam si solvendo non sunt, tunc quia ab eis suum dominus con- sequi non possit, ipsi domino furti competit actio, quia hoc casu ipsius interest rem salvam esse. Idem est, et si in partem solvendo sint fullo aut sarcinator. 15. So, too, if a fuller receives clothes to clean, or a tailor receives them to mend, for a certain fixed sum, and has them stolen from him, it is he and not the owner who is able to bring an action of theft, for the owner is not considered as interested in their safety, having an action locati, by which he may recover the thing stolen, against the fuller or tailor. But, if a thing is stolen from a bona fide purchaser, he is entitled, like a creditor, to an action of theft, although he is not the proprietor. But an action of theft is not maintainable by the fuller or tailor, unless he is solvent, that is, unless he is able to pay the owner the value of the thing lost ; for if the fuller or tailor is insolvent, then the owner, as he cannot recover anything from them, is allowed to bring an action of theft, as he has in this case an interest in the safety of the thing. And it is the same although the fuUer or tailor is partially solvent. Gai. iii. 205 ; D. xlvii. 2. 20. 1. The owner has no interest in recovering the penalty if he can get compensation from the person whose services he has hired to the full amount of any loss he sustains by the theft ; but he would still be able to bring an action, i.e. a vindicatio, an actio ad exliihendum, or a condictio, to get the thing itself, or its value, from the thief. 16. Quae de full one et sarcinatore diximus, eadem et ad eum cui com- modata res est, transferenda veteres existimabant ; nam, ut ille fullo mer- cedem accipiendo custodiam pr?estat, ita is quoque qui commodum utendi percipit, similiter necesse habet cus- todiam praestare. Sed nostra pro- videntia etiam hoc in nostris deci- sionibus emendavit, ut in domini voluntate sit, sive commodati ac- tionem adversus eum qui rem com- modatam accepit, movere desiderat, 10. What we have said of the fuller and tailor was applied by the ancients to the borrower. For as the fuller by accepting a sum for his labour makes himself answerable for the safe keep- ing of the thing, so does a borrower by accepting the use of the thing he borrows. But our wisdom has intro- duced in our decisions an improve- ment on this point, and the owner may now bring an action commodati against the borrower, or of theft against the thief ; but when once his choice is 400 LIB. IV. TIT. I. sive furti aclversus eum qui rem sub- ripnit, et alterutra earum electa clo- miiium non posse ex poenitentia ad alteram venire actionem. Sed si qnidem furem elegerit, ilium qui rem utendam accepit, penitus libe- rari ; sin autem commodator veniat adversus eum qui rem utendam ac- cepit, ipsi quidem nuUo modo com- petere posse adversus furem furti actionem, eum autem qui pro re commodata convenitur, posse ad- versus furem furti habere actionem: ita tarn en, si dominus sciens rem esse subreptam, adversus eum cui res commodata fuit, pervenit. Sin au- tem nescius, et dubitans rem non esse apud eum, commodati actionem instituit, postea autem re comperta voluit remittere quidem commodati actionem, ad furti autem pervenire, tunc licentia ei concedatur et ad- versus furem venire, nullo obstaculo ei opponendo, quoniam incertus con- stitutus movit adversus eum qui rem utendam accepit, commodati actio- nem, nisi domino ab eo satisfactum est. Tunc etenim omnimodo furem a domino quidem furti actione libe- rari, suppositum autem esse ei qui pro re sibi commodata domino satis- fecit ; cum manifestissimum est, etiamsi ab initio dominus actionem commodati instituit ignarus rem esse subreptam, postea autem hoc ei cog- nito adversus furem transivit, omni- modo liberari eum qui rem commo- datam accepit, quemcumque caus£e exitum dominus adversus furem habuerit : eadem definitione obti- nente, sive in partem sive in solidum solvendo sit is qui rem commodatam accepit. Gai. iii. 206 ; 17. Sed is apud quem res deposita est, custodiam non praestat ; sed tan- tum in eo obnoxius est, si quid ipse dolo malo fecerit. Qua de causa, si res ei subrepta fuerit, quia resti- tuendse ejus rei nomine depositi non tenetur, nee ob id ejus interest rem salvam esse, furti agere non potest ; sed furti actio domino competit. made, he cannot change his mind and have recourse to the other action. If he elects to sue the thief, the borrower is quite freed ; if he elects to sue the borrower, he cannot bring an action of theft against the thief, but the bor- rower may, that is, provided that the owner elects to sue the borrower, knowing that the thing has been stolen . If he is ignorant or uncertain of this, and therefore sues the borrower, and then subsequently learns the true state of the case, and wishes to have re- course to an action of theft, he will be permitted to sue the thief without any difficulty being thrown in his way, for it was in ignorance of the real fact that he sued the borrower ; unless, indeed, his claim has been satisfied by the borrower, for then the thief is quite free from any action of theft on the part of the owner, but the borrower takes the place of the owner in the power of bringing this action. On the other hand, it is very evident that if the owner originally brings an action commodati, in ignorance that the thing has been stolen, and subsequently learning this, prefers to proceed against the thief, the borrower is thereby en- tirely freed, whatever may be the issue of the suit against the thief ; as, in the previous case, the thief would be freed as against the lender, whether the borrower was wholly or only par- tially able to satisfy the claim against him. C. vi. 2. 22. 1, 2. 17. A depositary is not answerable for the safe keeping of the thing de- posited, but is only answerable for wilful wrong ; therefore, if the thing is stolen from him, as he is not bound by the contract of deposit to restore it, and has no interest in its safety, he cannot bring an action of theft, but it is the owner alone who can bring this action. Gai. iii. 207. We must, in all cases of theft, bear in mind that an actio furti might also be brought against any one who had ' ope consilio ' participated in the theft, and the whole amount of the penalty LIB. IV. TIT. I. 401 could be recovered separately against each thief and each person taking an indirect part in the theft. (D. xlvii. 2. 21. 9.) Custodiam Jion prcBstat is equivalent to saying that he is not answerable for culpa levis. 18. In summa sciendum est quae- 1 8. It should be observed, that the situm esse an impubes, rem alienam question has been asked whether, if a amovendo, furtum faciat ? Et placet, person under the age of puberty takes quia furtum ex afiectu consistit, ita away the property of another, he com- demum obligari eo crimine impube- mits a theft. The answer is, that as it rem si proximus pubertati sit, et ob is the intention that makes the theft, id intelligat se delinquere. such a person is only bound by the obligation springing from the delict if he is near the age of puberty, and consequently understands that he com- mits a crime. Gal iii. 208|. 19. Furti actio, sive dupli sive 19. The action of theft, whether quadrupli, tantum ad poenae perse- brought to recover double or quad- cutionem pertinet ; nam ipsius rei ruple, has no other object than the re- persecutionem extrinsecus habet do- covery of the penalty. For the owner minus, quam aut vindicando aut con- has also a means of recovering the dicendo potest auferre. Sed vindi- thing itself, either by a vindieatio or a catio quidem adversus possessorem condidio. The former may be brought est, sive fur ipse possidet, sive alius against the possessor, whether the quilibet ; condictio autem adversus thief or any one else ; the latter may furem ipsum heredemve ejus, licet be brought against the thief or the heir non possideat, competit. of the thief, although not in possession of the thing stolen. Gai. iv. 8 ; D. xlvii. 2. 54. 3. The thief and those who assisted him had to pay a penalty as a punishment for their wrong-doing ; but something more re- mained for the thief himself to do ; he had to restore the thing stolen or its value. The owner could bring a vindieatio or an actio ad exiiibendiim, which were both actiones arbitrarice ; that is, the thief was directed to restore the thing or exhibit it, and if he did not do so, then the judge condemned him to pay what under the circumstances it was reasonable he should pay. These actiones might be brought against any possessor, against the thief, or any one who had received possession from the thief. As a general rule the person who could bring a vindieatio could not bring a condictio for the same thing ; for in the vindieatio he as- serted that the property in the thing was his, whereas in the con- dictio he asserted that the defendant dare oportere, ought to make over the property in the thing to him, and these were inconsistent assertions. In the case of theft, however, the plaintiff had an option given him in odiofurum (Tit. 6. 14), and it might sometimes be advantageous to have this option. For example, the thing might have perished, and it was a rule that res extinct(B vindieari non possunt. ExtinctcB res, licet vindieari non possiut, condici tamen furibus possunt (Gat. ii. 79). This condictio might be brought against the heirs of the thief» D D 402 LIB. IV. TIT. II. whereas the actio furti, which inflicted a punishment for a pei sonal wrongful act, could only be brought against the thief him self Every action against a thief or those who assisted hir might be brought by the heirs of any one entitled to brino- it ' ai Tiap KopaKCQ Trerpy, iiri t,j Kprjvy ApiOovny. 1. As the law does not speak gene- rally of four-footed beasts, but only of those which are reckoned among cattle, we may consider its provisions as not applying to dogs or wild animals, but only to animals which may be properly said to feed in herds, as horses, mules, asses, sheep, o:5ten, goats, and also swine, for they are included in the term cattle, for they feed in herds. Thus Homer says, as ^lius Marcianus quotes in his Institutes : — ' You will find him seated by his swine, and they are feeding by the rock of Corax, near the spring Are- thusa.' D. xi. 2. 2. 2 ; D. xxxii. 65. 4. The passage is from Od. 13, 407. 2. Injuria autem occidere intelli- gitur, qui nullo jure occidit. Itaque latronem qui occidit, non tenetur, utique si aliter periculum eflPugere non potest. 2. To kill wrongfully is to kill without any right ; consequently, a person who kills a thief is not liable to this action, that is, if he could not otherwise avoid the danger with which he was threatened. It was damage Aquilia applied. D. ix. 2. 5, pr. and 1. not necessary to consider the intent with which the was done. Was it done ^ nullo jure ? ' if so, the lex 3. Ac ne is quidem hac lege te- netur, qui casu occidit, si modo culpa ejus nulla inveniatur ; nam alioquin non minus quam ex dolo ex culpa quisque hac lege tenetur. 3. Nor is a person made liable by this law, who has killed by accident, provided there is no fault on his part, for this law punishes fault as well as wilful wrong-doing. Gai. iii. 202. 211. 4. Itaque si quis dum jaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum trajecerit, distinguitur : nam si id a milite in campo eove ubi solitum est excrcitari, admissum est, nulla culpa ejus intelUgitur ; si alius tale quid admisit, culpas reus est. Idem juris est de milite, si in 4. Consequently, if any one playing or practising with a javelin, pierces with it your slave as he goes by, there is a distinction made ; if the accident befalls a soldier while in the camp, or other place appropriated to military exercises, there is no fault in the soldier, but there would be in any one else 406 LIB. IV. TIT. III. alio loco quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus est, id admisit. besides a soldier, and the soldier him- self would be in fault if he inflicted such an injury in any other place than one appropriated to military exercises. D. ix. 2. 9. 4. 5. Item si putator, ex arbore de- jecto ramo, servum tuum transeun- tem Occident : si prope viam pub- licam aut vicinalem id factum est, neque proclamavit ut casus evitari possit, culpse reus est ; si procla- mavit, nee ille curavit cavere, extra cuipam est putator. ^que extra culpam esse intelligitur, si seorsum a via forte vel in medio fundo csedebat, licet non proclamavit ; qnia in eo loco nulli extraneo jus fuerat versandi. 5. If, again, any one, in pruning a tree, by letting a bough fall, kills your slave who is passing, and this takes place near a public way, or a way be- longing to a neighbour, and he has not cried out to make persons take care, he is in fault ; but if he called out, and the passer-by would not take care, he is not to blame. He is also equally free from blame if he was cutting far from any public way, or in the middle of a field, even though he has not called out, for by such a place no stranger has a right to pass. D. ix. 2. 31. 6. Prpeterea si medicus qui ser- vum tuum secuit, dereliquerit cura- tionem, atque ob id mortuus fuerit servus, culpse reus est. 6. So, again, a physician who has performed an operation on your slave, and then neglected to attend to his cure, so that the slave dies, is guilty of a fault. D. ix. 2. 8. 7. Imperitia quoque culpae ad- numeratur : veluti si medicus ideo servum tuum occiderit, quod eum male secuerit, aut perperam ei me- dicamentum dederit. 7. Unskilfulness is also a fault, as, if a physician kills your slave by un- skilfully performing an operation on him, or by giving him wrong medicines. D. ix. 2. 7, 8 ; D. ix. 2. 8 ; D. 1. 17. 132. 8. Impetu quoque mularum, quas mulio propter imperitiam retinere non potuerit, si servus tuus op- pressus fuerit, culpps reus est mulio ; sed et si propter infirmitatem eas retinere non potuerit, cum alius firmior retinere potuisset, seque culpse tenetur. Eadem placuerunt de eo quoque qui, cum equo vehe- retur, impetum ejus aut propter infirmitatem aut propter imperitiam suam retinere non potuerit. D. ix. 2. 9. His autem verbis legis, quanti id eo anno plurimi fuerit, ilia sen- tentia exprimitur, ut si quis homi- nem tuum qui hodie claudus aut mancus aut luscus erit, occiderit, qui in eo anno integer et pretiosus fuerit, non tanti teneatur quanti hodie erit, sed quanti in eo anno plurimi fuerit. Qua ratione credi- 8. So, too, if a muleteer, through his want of skill, cannot manage his mules, and runs over your slave, he is guilty of a fault. As, also, he would be if he could not hold them in on account of his weakness, provided thai a stronger man could have held then in. The same decisions apply to ai unskilful or infirm horseman, unabh to manage his horse. 9. The words above quoted, ' th( greatest value the thing has possessec at any time within a year previously, mean that if your slave is killed, bein^ at the time of his death lame, maimed or one-eyed, but having been within { year quite sound and of considerabL value, the person who kills him ii bound to pay, not his actual value, bu LIB. IV. TIT. III. 407 turn est poenalem esse hujiis legis actionem, quia non solum tanti quisque obligatur quantum damni dederit, sed aliquando longe pluris : ideoque constat in heredem earn actionem non transire, quee trans- itura fuisset, si ultra damnum num- quam lis sestimaretur. the greatest value he ever possessed within the year. Hence, this action may be said to be penal, as a person is bound under it not only for the damage he has done, but for much more ; and, therefore, the action does not pass against his heir, as it would have done- if the condemnation had not exceeded the amount of the actual damage. Gai. iii. 214 ; D. ix. 2. 23. 3. 8. 10. Illud non ex verbis legis, sed ex interpretatione placuit, non so- lum perempti corporis sestimatio- nem habendam esse, secundum ea quae diximus, sed eo amplius quid- quid prasterea perempto eo corpore damni nobis allatum fuerit : veluti si servum tuum heredem ab aliquo institutum antea quis occiderit, quam jussu tuo adiret, nam heredi- tatis quoque amisste rationem esse habendam constat. Item si ex pari mularum unam, vel ex quadriga equorum unum occiderit, vel ex comoedis unus servus occisus fuerit, non solum occisi lit sestimatio ; sed eo amplius id quoque computatur, quanti depretiati sunt qui super- sunt. 10. It has been decided, not by virtue of the actual wording of the law, but by interpretation, that not only is the value of the thing perish- ing to be estimated as we have saidy, but also the loss wliich in any way we incur by its perishing ; as, for instance, if your slave having been instituted heir by some one is killed before he enters at your command on the inherit- ance, the loss of the inheritance should be taken account of. So, tooj if one of a pair of mules, or of a set of four horses, or one slave of a band of come- dians, is killed, account is to be taken not only of the value of the thing killed, but also of the diminished value of what remains. Gai. iii. 212 ; D. ix. 2. 22. 1. 11. Liberum autem est ei cujus servus occisus fuerit, et judicio pri- vato legis Aquiline damnum perse- qui, et capitalis criminis eum reum facere. 11. The master of a slave who is killed may bring a private action for the damages given by the lex Aqnilia, and also bring a capital action against the murderer. Gai. iii. 213. A crimen capitale was one which affected the caput oi the condemned. The lex Cornelia (D. ix. 2. 23. 9 ; see also Title 18. 5, of this Book) gave the master the power to bring a criminal accusation against the murderer. The Code (iii. 35. 3} contain» a rescript of the Emperor Gordian, stating it as undoubted law that a criminal accusation did not prevent a master also bringing a private action under the lex Aquilia, 12. Caput secundum legis Aqui- lise in usu non est. 12. The second head of Aquilia is not now in use. the lex Gai. iii. 215 ; D. ix. 2. 27. 4. We learn from Gaius (Gai. iii. 215) that the second head of the lex Aquilia gave an action for the full value of the injury sustained to a stipulator, whose claim was extinguished by an ad- stipulator releasing the debtor by acceptilation. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 29.) The stipulator might also bring an actio mandaii 408 LIB. IV. TIT. III. against tlie adstipulator, if he preferred doing so ; but, as we see from Title 16 of this Book (paragr. 1), proceeding under the lex ■Aquilia gave the plaintiiF the advantage of having the amount he recovered doubled if the defendant denied his liability. 13. Capite tertio de omni cetero damno cavetur. Itaque si quis servum, vel earn quadrupedem quae pecuduin numero est, vulneraverit, sive earn quadrupedem qua3 pecu- dum numero non est, veluti canem aut feram bestiam vulneraverit ant Occident, hoc capite actio consti- tuitur. In ceteris quoque omnibus animalibns, item in omnibus rebus quae anima carent, damnum injuria datum hac parte vindicatur : si quid enim ustum aut ruptum aut frac- tum fuerit, actio ex hoc capite con- stituitur, quamquam poterat sola rupti appellatio in omnes istas causas sufficere ; ruptum enim in- telligitur, quod quoquo modo cor- ruptum est. Unde non solum fracta aut usta, sed etiam scissa et coUisa et ejffusa, et quoquo modo perempta atque deteriora facta, hoc verbo continentur : denique respon- sum est, si quis in alien um vinum aut oleum id immiserit quo naturalis bonitas vini aut olei corrumperetur, ex hac parte legis eum teneri. 13. The third head provides for every kind of damage ; and, therefore, if a slave, or a four-footed beast of those reckoned among cattle, is wounded, or a four-footed beast of those not reckoned among cattle, as a dog or wild beast, is wounded or kiUed, an action may be brought under the third head. Compensation may also be ob- tained under it for all wrongful injury to animals or inanimate things, and, in fact, for anything burnt, broken, or fractured, although the word broken (ruptum) would have sufficed for all these cases ; for a thing is ruphtm which is in any way spoilt (corruptiim), so that not only things fractured or burnt, but also things cut, bruised, spilt, or in any way destroyed or dete- riorated, may be said to be rv.pta. It has also been decided, that any one who mixes anything with the oil or wine of another, so as to spoil the goodness of the wine or oil, is liable under this head of the lex Aquilia. Gai. iii. 217; D. ix. 2. 27. 15. The terms of this third head of the Aquilian law are given by Ulpian (D. ix. 2. 27. 5): ' Cceteraj^um rerum, prceter hominern et pecudem occisos, si qids alter i damnum, facit^ quod usserit, fregerit^ ruperit mjuria, quanti ea res erit in diehus triginta proximis, tan- tuin ces domino dare damnas esto.^ 14. ex Illud palam est, sicut .primo capite ita demum quisque tenetur si dolo aut culpa ejus homo aut quadrupes occisus occisave fu- erit, ita ex hoc capite de dolo aut culpa de cetero damno quemque teneri. Hoc tamen capite, non quanti in eo anno, sed quanti in diebus triginta proximis res fuerit, obligatur is qui damnum dederit. 14. It is evident that, as a person is liable under the first head, if by wilful injury or by his fault he kills a slave or a four-footed beast, so by this head, a person is liable for every other damage, if there is wrongful injury or fault in what he does. But in this case, the offender is bound to pay the greatest value the thing has possessed, not within the year next preceding, but the thirty days next preceding. Gai. iii. 218 ; D. ix 2. 30. 3. 15. Ac ne plurimi quidem verbum adjicitur ; sed Sabino recte placuit, perinde habendam aestimationem ac si etiam hac parte plurimi verbum adjectum fuisset: nam plebem Ho- is. Even the word plurimi, i. e. of the gi'eatest value, is not expressed in this case. But Sabinus was rightly of opinion, that the estimation ought to be made as if this word was in the LIB. IV. TIT. III. 409 iiianam quae Aquilio tribune rogante law, since it must have been that the lianc legem tnlit, contentam fuisse plebeians, who were the authors of this quod prima parte eo verbo usa est. law on the motion of the tribune Aquilius, thought it sufficient to have used the word in the first head of the law. Gai. iii. 218 ; D. ix. 2. 1. 1. 16. Ceterum placuit ita demum directam ex hac lege actionem esse, si quis pr?ecipue corpore suo dam- num dederit. Ideoque in eum qui alio modo damnum dederit, utiles actiones dari solent, veluti si quis hominem alienum aut pecus ita in- cluserit ut fame necaretur, aut ju- mentum tam vehementer egerit ut rumperetur, aut pecus in tantum exagitaverit ut praecipitaretur, aut si quis alieno servo persuaserit ut in arborem ascenderet vel in pu- teum descenderet, et is ascendendo vel descendendo aut mortuus aut aliqua corporis parte Isesus fuerit, utilis actio in eum datur. Sed si quis alienum servum aut de ponte aut de ripa in fiumen dejecerit, et is suffocatus fuerit, eo quod projecit corpore suo damnum dedisse non difficulter intelligi poterit, ideoque ipsa lege Aquilia tenetur. Sed si non corpore damnum datum, neque corpus lc3esum fuerit, sed alio modo damnum alicui coiitigerit, cum non sufficit neque directa neque utilis Aquilia, placuit, eum qui obnoxius fuerit, in factum actione teneri : veluti si quis misericordia ductus alienum servum compeditum sol- vent, ut fugeret. 16. But the direct action under this law can only be brought if any one has, with his own body, done damage, and consequently utiles actiones are given against the jjerson who does damage in any other way, as, for in- stance, a utilis actio is given against one who shuts up a slave or a beast, so as to produce death by hunger : who drives a horse so fast as to knock him to pieces, or drives cattle over a preci- pice, or persuades another man's slave to climb a tree, or go down into a well, and the slave in climbing or descending is killed or maimed. But if any one has flung the slave of another from a bridge or a bank into a river, and the slave is drowned, then, as he has actually flung him down, there can be no diffi- culty in deciding that he has caused the damage with his own body, and consequently he is directly liable under the lex Aquilia. But if no damage has been done by the body, nor to the body, but damage has been done in some other way, the actio directa and the actio utilis are both inapplicable, and an actio in factum is given against the wrong-doer ; for instance, if any one through compassion has loosed the fetters of a slave, to enable him to escape. Gai. iii. 219 ; D. ix. 2. 33. 1 ; D. iv. 3. 7. 7. If the injury was done, to use the language of the jurists, covpore corpori, that is, with direct bodily force, to the body of a slave or beast, the actio (legis) Aquilice had place. If it was done corpori, but indirectly and not corpore, the actio vtilis AquilicB had place. If it was done neither to the body, nor yet with direct bodily force, the actio must be brought ia factum, that is, on the particular circumstances of the case. The directa actio Aquilice could only be brought by the owner ; the utilis might be brought by the possessor, usufructuary, and others having an interest less than that of ownership. As the action under the lex Aquilia was penal, the whole sum recoverable against one could be recovered separately against each or more than one offender. If the defendant denied his liability, the penalty under the 410 LIB. IV. TIT. IV. lex Aquilla was doubled, adversus inficiantem in duplum actio est. (D. ix. 2. 2. 1.) It might very often happen that the person injured could also bring an action arising from a contract against the doer of the injury, as, for instance, an actio pro socio, mandati, depositi, if the person who did the injury was a partner, a mandatary, or de- positary of the person to whom the injury was done. In such a case he could either bring the action on the contract, or proceed under the lex Aquilia. He could not do both ; but if he brought the action on the contract, and then found that if he had proceeded under the lex Aquilia he would have recovered a larger sum, he • was allowed to bring an action under the lex Aquilia to recover the surplus. (D. ix. 2. 7, 8 ; D. xliv. 7. 34. 2.) The subject of damnum is hardly noticed in the Institutes, except in connection with the lex Aquilia. (See Bk. iii. Tit. i8. 2.) By damnum is meant the diminution of a man's property, and it is treated of in the Digest according as it \& factum, that is already done, or infectum, that is apprehended, as if an adjoin- ing house seemed likely to fall. (D. xxxix. 2.) Damnum factum, more usually termed simply damnum, might arise from a mere accident, or from the free will of another. If it arose in the latter way, it might have arisen in the exercise of a right enjoyed by the person causing it, and then no reparation had to be made for causing it, non videtur vim facere qui jure sua utitur (D. L. 17. 155) ; or it might have been done wrongfully, damnum injuria datum ^ and then the person injured was entitled to compensation according to the rates provided by the lex Aquilia, if the damage came within the scope of the law ; if it did not, then an actio in factum was given (D. ix. 2. 33. 1), and compensation was made at rates differincr accordino; to the de2:ree of wrono-. If there had been dolus or culpa lata, the compensation was regulated by the value peculiar to the person injured : if the degree of culpa had been less, the common value was the measure of the compensation. In cases of damnum infectum, the owner of the property threatened could call on the owner of the property from which danger was apprehended to give security against any loss which might thus arise. (D. xxx. 12. 2. 5. 1.) Tit. IV. DE INJURIIS. Generaliter injuria dicitiir omne hijuria, in its general sense, signi- quocl non jure fit : specialiter, alias fies every action contrary to law ; in a contumelia, quae a contemnendo dicta special sense, it means, sometimes, the est, quam Grseci i''/3on' appellant ; same as contumelia (outj-age), which alias culpa, quam Gr?eci unKt)j:a is derived from contemnere, the Greek dicunt, sicut in lege Aquilia damnum vftptc ; sometimes the same as culpa injurise accipitur ; alias iniquitas et (fault), in Greek a^tKtjjjo, as in the lex injustitia,quamGr8eciaO(K-/Vn' vocant. Aquilia, which speaks of damage done Cum enim prsetor vel judex non injuria ; sometimes it has the sense of LIB. IV. TIT. IV. 411 jure contra quern pronuntiat, inju- iniquity, injustice, or in Greek aciKt'a; riam accepisse dicitur. for a person against whom the praetor or judge pronounces an unjust sen- tence, is said to have received an injuria. D. xlvii. 10. I. Injuria, then, is used in three senses — 1, a wrongful act, an act clone nullojure; 2, the fault committed by a judge who gives judgment not according to jus ; 3, an outrage or affront. 1. Injuria autem committitur, 1. An injury is committed not only non solum cum quis pugno, puta, by striking with the fists, or striking aut fustibus Cciesus vel etiam ver- with clubs or the lash, but also by beratus erit, sed et si cui convicium shouting till a crowd gathers round factum fuerit ; sive cu jus bona quasi any one ; by taking possession of any debitoris, qui nihil deberet, possessa one's goods, pretending that he is fuerint ab eo qui intelligebat nihil debtor to the inflictor of the injury, eum sibi debere ; vel si quis ad in- who knows he has no claim on him ; by famiam alicujus libellum aut car- writing, composing, publishing a libel men scripserit, composuerit, ediderit, or defamatory verses against any one, dolove malo fecerit quo quid eorum or by maliciously contriving that an other fieret ; sive quis matremfamilias does any of these things ; by following aut prsetextatum prgetextatamve ad- after an honest woman, or a young boy sectatus fuerit, sive cujus pudicitia or girl ; by attempting the chastity of attentata esse dicetur, et denique any one ; and, in short, by numberless aliis pluribus modis admitti injuriam other acts. manifestum est. Gal iii. 220. Convicium, Ulpian gives (D. xlvii. 10. 15. 4) the following derivation of the word : — ' Convicium autem dicitur vel a concita- tione vel a conventu, hoc est, a collatione vocum, quum enim in unum complures voces conferuntur, convicium appellatur, quasi convocium,^ any proceeding which publicly insults or annoys another, as gathering a crowd round a man's house, or shouting out scandal respecting another to a mob. Matremfamilias, i.e. every married woman of honest character. PrcBtextatum, -am, i.e. still wearing the prcEtexta, which was put off at the age of puberty. Adsectatus fuerit. Ulpian says (D. xlvii. 10. 15. 22),' Ad- sectatur qui ta.citus frequenter sequitur, assidua enim frequentia quasi prcebet nonnuUam infamiam.^ Pudicitia attentata. Paul says (D. xlvii. 10. 10), ' Attentari pudicitia dicitur cum id agitur, ut ex pudico impudicus Jiat.^ 2. Patitur autem quis injuriam 2. A man may receive an injury, non solum per semetipsum, sed not only in his own person, but in that etiam per liberos suos quos in po- of his children in his power, and even testate habet ; item per uxorem in that of his wife, according to the suam, id enim magis prsevaluit. opinion that has prevailed. If, there- Itaque si filire alicujus quae Titio fore, you injure a daughter in the nupta est, injuriam feceris, non so- power of her father, and married to lum filise nomine tecum injuriarum Titius, the action for the injury maybe agi potest, sed etiam patris quoque brought, not only in the name of the et mariti nomine. Contra autem si daughter herself, but also in that of 412 LIB. IV. TIT. IV. viro injuria facta sit, uxor injuria- the father or the husband. But, if a rum agere non potest : defendi enim husband has sustained an injury, the uxores a viris, non viros ab uxoribus wife cannot bring the actio injuriariiTrif sequum est. Sed et socer nurus for the husband is the protector of the nomine cujus vir in potestate est, wife, not the wife of the husband. The injuriarum agere potest. father in-law may also bring this action in the name of his daughter-in-law, if her husband is in his power. Gai. iii. 221 ; D. xlvii. 10. 2 ; D. xlvii. 10. 1. 3. Each person injured could bring an action. Take, for instance, the case of a married woman. She, her husband, her own father, and her husband's, have each an action, supposing both she and her husband are in potestate. But a person in potestate, though he had an action, could not bring it himself, except in certain cases, as in the absence of the paterfamilias. The paterfamilias would bring the action, and could sue either in his son's name or his own. The amount recovered in the respective actions differed according to the dignity of the person bringing it. It might happen, for instance, that the son was of higher rank than the father. Cum utrique tam filio quam patri adquisita actio sit, non eadem utique facienda (Bstimatio est: cum possit propter filii dignitatem major ipsi quam patri injuria facta esse. (D. xlvii. 10. 30, 31.) Although the wife was in power of the father, yet her husband could always bring an action for injury done to her, grounded on his natural duty to protect her. 3. Servis autem ipsis quidem 3. An injury cannot, properly nulla injuria fieri intelligitur, sed speaking, be done to a slave, but it is domino per eos fieri videtur, non the master who, through the slave, tamen iisdem modis quibus etiam is considered to be injured ; not, how- per liberos et uxores, sed ita cum ever, in the same way as through a quid atrocius commissum fuerit, et child or wife, but only when the act quod aperte ad contumeliam domini is of a character grave enough to make respicit : veluti si quis alienum it a manifest insult to the master, as servum verberaverit, et in hunc if a person has flogged severely the casum actio proponitur. At si quis slave of another, in which case this servo convicium fecerit, vel pugno action is given against him. But a eum percusserit, nulla in eum actio master cannot bring an action against domino competit. a person who has collected a crowd round his slave, or struck him with his fist. Gai. iii. 222. Under the civil law the master could not bring an action for injury done to his slave, unless the injury was done with intent to hurt or annoy the master. But the praetor gave an action pleno jure, i. e. which could be brought as a matter of right, if the slave was beaten or tortured without the master's orders, and an action cognita causa, i. e. allowed if the circumstances of the case seemed, on inquiry, to furnish good ground for it, if the injury had been slighter. Regard was had, in making this inquiry, and in estimating the amount of damage, to the class of slaves to which the slave belonged. (See paragr. 7.) The slave himself could in LIB. IV. TIT. IV. 413 no case bring an action for injury sustained by him. (D. xlvii. 10. 15. 34.) 4. Si communi servo injuria facta sit, sequum est, non pro ea parte qua dominus quisque est, sestima- tionem injuria} fieri, sed ex domi- norum persona, quia ipsis fit injuria. 4. If an injury has been done to a slave held in common, equity demands that it shall be estimated not accord- ing to their respective shares in him, but according to their respective posi- tion, for it is the masters who are injured. If the co-proprietors brought the action for injury done, or intended to be done, to them through their slave, then, as it is said in the text, it made no difference what was the amount of their interest in the slave. Each had equally had an insult offered him. But the co-proprietors might bring a praetorian action for harm done to the slave, when no insult or hurt was intended to them, but the only question was, how much was the slave damaged, and made unfit for work, and then the amount recovered was divided between them, proportionately to their respective interests in the slave. (See note on last paragr.) 5. Quod si ususfructus in servo Titii est, proprietas M8e\di, magis Msevio injuria fieri intelligitur. 5. If Titius has the usufruct, and Msevius the property in a slave, the injury is considered to be done rather to Msevius than to Titius. D. xlvii. 10. 15. 47. It might, however, happen that it could be shown that the intention was to injure and insult the usufructuary more than the proprietor. (D. xlvii. 10. 15. 48.) 6. Sed si libero qui tibi bona fide servit, injuria facta sit, nulla tibi actio dabitur ; sed suo nomine is experiri poterit, nisi in contumeliam tuam pulsatus sit : tunc enim corn- petit et tibi injuriarum actio. Idem ergo est et in servo alieno bona fide tibi serviente, ut toties admittatur injuriarum actio, quoties in tuam contumeliam injuria ei facta sit. 6. If the injury has been done to a freeman, who serves you bona fide, you have no action, but he can bring an action in his own name, unless he has been injured merely to insult you, for, in that case, you may bring the actio injuriarum. So, .too, with regard to a slave of another who serves you bona fide, you may bring this action whenever the slave is injured for the purpose of insulting you. D. xlvii. 10. 15. 48. 7. Poena autem injuriarum ex lege duodecim tabularum, propter membrum quidem ruptum talio erat ; propter os vero fractum nummarise poenae erant constitutpe, quasi in magna veterum paupertate : sed postea prajtores permittebant ipsis qui injuriam passi sunt, earn sesti- mare, ut judex vel tanti reum con- demnet, quanti injuriam passus ?esti- maverit, vel minoris, prout ei visum fuerit. Sed poena quidem injuria- 7. The penalty for injuries under the law of the Twelve Tables was a limb for a limb, but if only a bone was fractured, pecuniary compensa- tion was exacted proportionate to the great poverty of the times. After- wards, the prretor permitted the in- jured parties themselves to estimate the injury, so that the judge should condemn the defendants to pay the sum estimated, or less, as he may think proper. The penalty appointed 414 LIB. IV. TIT. IV. rum quse ex lege duodecim tabula- rum introducta est, in desuetudinem abiit ; quam autem prsetores intro- duxerunt, quse etiam honoraria ap- pellatur, in judiciis frequentatur, nam secundum gradum dignitatis vitaeque honestatera crescit aut mi- nuitur eestimatio injurise : quigradus condemnationis et in servili persona non immerito servatur, ut aliud in servo actore, aliud in medii actus homine, aliud in vilissimo vel com- pedito constituatur. by the Twelve Tables has fallen into desuetude, but that introduced by the prastors, and termed honorary, is adopted in the administration of justice. For, according to the rank and character of the person injured, the estimate is greater or less ; and a similar gradation is observed, not im- properly, even with regard to a slave, one amount being paid in the case of a slave who is a steward, a second in that of a slave holding an office of an intermediate class, and a third in that of one of the lowest rank, or one con- demned to wear fetters. Gai. iii. 223, 224 ; D. xlvii. 10. 15. 44. The greater part of the edict of the prastor on this subject is given by Ulpian in different parts of the extracts from his writ- ings. (See Digest, xlvii. 10. 15.) 8. Sed et lex Cornelia de injuriis loquitur, et injuriarum actionem in- troduxit, quae competit ob eam rem quod se pulsatum quis verberatumve, domumve suam vi introitam esse di- cat, Domum autem accipimus, sive in propria domo quis habitat, sive in conducta vel gratis sive hospitio re- ceptus sit. 8. The lex Cornelia also speaks of injuries, and introduced an actio in- juriarum, which may be brought when any one alleges that he has been struck or beaten, or that his house has been broken into. And the term ' his house ' includes one which belongs to him and in which he lives, or one he hires, or one in which he is received gratuitously or as a guest. D. xlvii. 10. 5, pr. and 2. The lex Cornelia de Sicariis (see Tit. 18. 5), though chiefly directed against murderers, also contained provisions against other deeds of Adolence. Lex itaque Cornelia ex tribus causis dedit actionem : quod quis pulsatus verberatusve domusve ejus vi introita sit. (D. xlvii. 10. 5.) 9, Atrox injuria sestimatur vel ex facto, veluti si quis ab aliquo vulne- ratus fuerit vel f ustibus csesus ; vel ex loco, veluti si cui in theatro vel in foro vel in conspectu prsetoris injuria facta sit ; vel ex persona, veluti si magistratus injuriam passus fuerit, vel si senatori ab humili in- juria facta sit, aut parenti patronove tiat a liberis vel libertis : aliter enim senatoris et parentis patronique, aliter extranei et humilis personse injuria sestimatur. Nonnunquam et locus vulneris atrocem injuriam facit, veluti si in oculo quis percusserit. Parvi autem refert, utrum patri- familias an filiofamilias talis injuria facta sit : nam et haec atrox sestima- bitur. 9. An injury is said to be of a grave character, either from the nature of the act, as if any one is wounded or beaten with clubs by another, or from the nature of the place, as when an injury is done in a theatre, a forum, or in the presence of the praetor ; sometimes from the quality of the person, as when it is a magistrate that has received the injury, or a senator has sustained it at the hands of a per- son of low condition, or a parent or patron at the hands of a child or freed- man. For the injury done to a senator, a parent, or a patron is estimated dif- ferently from an injury done to a per- son of low condition or to a stranger. Sometimes it is the part of the body injured that gives the character to the LIB. IV. TIT. IV. 415 injury, as if any one has been struck in the eye. Nor does it make any difierence whether such an injury has been done to a paterfamilias or 3i,filhts- familias, it being in either case con- sidered of a gi'ave character. Gal iii. 225 ; D. xlvii. 10. 7, 8 ; D. xlvii. 8, 9. 1, 2. If the injury was atrox, a freedman might bring an action against his patron, and the emancipated son against his father, but not otherwise. (D. xlvii. 10. 7. 3.) And the prastor him- self, in cases of atrox injuria, when he gave the formula to the judge, fixed the maximum of the condemnation, and the judge would not condemn the defendant in a less sum. (GrAi. iii. 224.) 10. In summa sciendum est, de omni injuria eum qui passus est, posse vel criminaliter agere vel civi ■ liter. Et si quidem civiliter agatur, sestimatione facta secundum quod dictum est, poena imponitur ; sin autem criminaliter, officio judicis extraordinaria pcena reo irrogatur. Hoc videlicet observando quod Ze- noniana constitutio introduxit, ut viri illustres quique super eos sunt, et per procuratorem possint actio- nem injuriarum criminaliter vel persequi vel suscij)ere, secundum ejus tenorem qui ex ipsa manifestius apparet. 10. Lastly, it must be observed, that in every case of injury he who has received it may bring either a criminal or a civil action. In the lat- ter, it is a sum estimated as we have said that constitutes the penalty ; in the former, the judge, in the exercise of his duty, inflicts on the ofiender an extraordinary punishment. We must, however, remark, that a constitution of Zeno permits men of the rank of illustris, or of any higher rank, to bring or defend the actio injuriarimi if brought criminally by a ^jrocurator, as may be seen more clearly by reading the constitution itself. D. xlvii. 10. 6; C. ix. 35. 11. It was only as a very peculiar exception that criminal actions could, like private actions, be brought or defended through a procurator. 11. Non solum autem is injuria- rum tenetur, qui fecit injuriam, id est, qui percussit ; verum ille quoque continebitur, qui dolo fecit vel cura- vit ut cui mala pugno percuteretiu*. 11. Not only is he liable to the actio injuriarum who has inflicted the injury, as, for instance, the person who has struck the blow ; but he also who has maliciously caused or con- trived that any one should be struck in the face with the fist. D, xlvii. 10, 11. 1. 12. Hsec actio dissimulatione aboletur ; et ideo si quis injuriam dereliquerit, hoc est, statim passus ad animum suum non revocaverit, postea ex po^nitentia remissam in- juriam non poterit recolere. , therefore, a person no account of the in- 12. This action is extinguished by a person dissembling to have received the injury ; and who has taken jury, that is, who immediately on re- ceiving it has shown no resentment at it, cannot afterwards cliange his mind and resuscitate the injury he has al- lowed to rest. D. xlvii. 10, 11. 1. 416 LIB. IV. TIT. V. If the person injured, though expressing indignation at the time, did not take any steps towards enforcing reparation within a year, the action was extinct. (D. xlvii. 10, 17. 6 ; C. ix. 35. 5.] The action was personal to the person injured, and could not be transmitted to his heirs, unless before his death the action had already proceeded as far as the litis contestatio. Tit. Y. DE OBLIGATIONIBUS QU^ QUASI EX DELICTO NASCUNTUR. Si judex litem suani fecerit, non If a judge makes a cause his own proprie ex maleficio obligatus vide- he does not, properly speaking, seen tur : sed quia neque ex contractu to be bound ex maleficio ; but as h< obligatus est, et utique peccasse ali- is neither bound ex maleficio nor ei quid intelligitur, licet per impru- contractu, and as he has, nevertheless dentiam, ideo videtur quasi ex male- done a wrong, although perhaps onh ficio teneri ; et in quantum de ea re from ignorance, he seems to be bounc i«quum religioni judicantis videbi- as it were ex maleficio, and will b( tur, poenam sustinebit. condemned to the amount whicl seems equitable to the conscience o the judge. D. 1. 13. 6. The Koman law characterised rather arbitrarily certain wrong ful acts as delicts, and then, as there were many other wrongfu acts which bound the wrong-doer to make reparation, and as i could not be said that the wrong-doer was bound ex delicto^he wai said to be bound quasi ex delicto, i.e. there was an evident analog] between the mode in which the obligation arose from other kinds o wronjx-doinfj and that in which it arose from the kinds of wrons;. doing technically called delicts. The principle was exactly th( same, but the particular act did not happen to be among thos< technically termed delicts. The first instance given is that of { judge qui litem sua m fecerit, that is, who, through favour, corrup tion, or fear (D. v. 1. 15. 1), or even ignorance of law {licet pci imprudentiam), gives a manifestly wrong sentence, and who thui makes the lis or suit to be sua, that is, affect himself by render ing him responsible for the sentence. Gains gives an example, ii the case of a iuds^e condemnino^ a defendant in a sum differen from that fixed in the formula. (Gai. iv. 52.) The defendant might, if he pleased, instead of bringing ai action against the judge, appeal from his decision ; and in som( cases, as when the judge had violated public law, or been cor rupted, he might treat the decision as null, and commence th( action afresh (D. xlix. 1. 5. 19); but his adversary might be in solvent, or his indignation, or many other reasons, might make hin prefer suing the judge. Ducaurroy points out that the distinction made between th( seemingly parallel cases of an ignorant physician and an ignorani judge, the fault of the former being punished under the lex Aquilia LIB. IV. TIT. V. 417 the latter being bound quasi ex delicto , arises from the injury of the physician being done to the body. The severity of the pe- nalty against a judge who was merely ignorant of the law, is owing probably to the great checks against ignorance which the judge possessed if he pleased to avail himself of them in the advice of the ' prudentes,' whose business it was to assist him, and in the possibility of having recourse to the magistrate who had given the action to him. 1. Item is ex cujus coenaculo, vel proprio ipsiiis vel in quo gratis habi- tabat, dejectum eflfusumve aliquid est, ita ut alicui noceretur, quasi ex maleficio obligatus intelligitur. Ideo autem non proprie ex maleficio ob- ligatus intelligitur quia plerumque ob alterius culpam tenetur, aut servi aut liberi. Oui similis est is qui, ea parte qua vulgo iter fieri solet, id positum aut suspensum habet quod potest, si ceciderit, alicui nocere : quo casu poena decern aureorum constituta est. De eo vero quod de- jectum effusumve est, dupli quanti damnum datum sit, constituta est actio : ob hominem vero liberum occisum, quinquaginta aureorum poena constituitur ; si vero vivat nocitumque ei esse dicatur, quantum ob eam rem sequum judici videtur, actio datur. Judex enim computare debet mercedes medicis praestitas, ceteraque impendia quse in cura- tione facta sunt, prteterea operarum quibus caruit aut cariturus est, ob id quod inutilis factus est. 1. So, too, he who occupies, whether as proprietor or gratuitously, an apart- ment, from which anything has been thrown or poured down, which has done damage to another, is said to be bound qimsi ex maleficio, for he is not exactly bound ex maleficio, as it is gene- rally by the fault of another, a slave, for instance, or a freedman, that he is bound. It is the same with regard to a person who, where there is a public way, keeps something placed or sus- pended, which may, if it fall, hurt any one ; in this case, a penalty has been fixed of ten aureL With respect to things thrown or poured down, an action is given for double the amount of the damage done ; and if a freeman has been killed, there is a penalty of fifty aurei. If he is not killed, but only hurt, the action is given for the amount which the judge considers equitable under the circumstances ; the judge ought to take into account the fees paid to the physician, and all the other expenses of the man's ill- ness, as well as the employment which he has lost, or will lose, by being in- capacitated. D. xliv. 7. 5. 5 ; D. ix. 3. 5, 6 ; D. ix. 3. 1 ; D. ix. 3. 7. The edict of the praetor, in the cases referred to in the text, is given, D. ix. 3. 1 ; and D. ix. 3. 5. 6. The action given in each case was popularis, that is, any one might bring it, but in the case of a freeman being killed, his heirs or relations, if they brought an action, were preferred to strangers. 2. Si filiusfamilias seorsum a pa- tre habitaverit, et quid ex coenaculo ejus dejectum effusumve sit, sive quid positum suspensumve habu- erit, cujus casus periculosus est, Ju- liano placuit in patrem nuUam esse actionem, sed cum ipso filio agen- dum. Quod et in filiofamilias judice 2. If a filiusfamilias lives apart from his father, and from a room in his house anything is throw^l or poured down, or is placed or sus- pended, the fall of which would be dangerous, Julian thinks that no action could be brought against the father, but only against the aon. Tlie E E 418 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. observandum est, qui litem suam same holds good with respect to a fecerit. Jiiiusfamilias, who, being a judge, has made a cause his own. D. xUv. 7. 5. 5 ; D. v. 1. 15. The Jiliusfamilias could be sued himself for delicts, but the father was not obliged to repair the injury done even to the extent of the son's peculiuniy which was only made to meet the contracts or quasi contracts of the son ; but if a slave had done the injury, the master was always bound to repair the damage, or to abandon the slave. (See Tit. 8. 7.) 3. Item exercitor navis aut cau- 3. The master of a ship, of an inn, ponee aut stabuli de damno aut furto or a stable, is liable quasi ex maleficio, quod in navi aut caupona aut stabu- for any damage or loss through theft lo factum erit, quasi ex maleficio te- occurring in the ship, inn, or stable, neri videtur, si modo ipsius nullum that is, if it is not he who has com- est maleficium, sed alicujus eorum mitted the wrongful deed, but some quorum opera navem aut cauponam one employed in the service of the aut stabulum exerceret ; cum enim ship, inn, or stable. For as the ac- neque ex contractu sit adversus eum tion given against him does not arise constituta hsec actio, et aliquatenus ex maleficio or ex contractu, and yet he culpae reus est, quod opera malorum is in fault in employing dishonest per- hominum uteretur, ideo quasi ex sons as his servants, he seems to be maleficio teneri videtur. In his au- bound quasi ex maleficio. In these tem casibus in factum actio com- cases it is an action in factum that is petit, quae heredi quidem datur, given, and it may be brought by the adversus heredem autem non com- heir, but not against the heir, petit. D. xliv. 7. 5, 6; D.ix. 3. 5. 13. The action was for double the value of the thing damaged or lost. (D. xlvii. 5. 2.) The person injured might also, at his option, have an actio furti, or AquilicB, as the case might be, against the actual wrong-doer. (D. xlvii. 5.) This action was different from that given by the prsetor against innkeepers and others for the restoration of things confided to them. (D. iv. 9.) Tit. VI. DE ACTIONIBUS. Superest ut de actionibus loqua- It now remains that we speak of mur. Actio autem nihil aliud est, actions. An action is nothing else quam jus persequendi judicio quod than the right of suing before a judge sibi debetur. for that which is due to us. D. xliv. 7. 61. We now come to the last division of the Institutes, that which treats of actions and the subsidiary subjects of exceptions and interdicts. A sketch has been given in the Introduction (sec. 90-111) of the old legal actions, of the formulary system, and of the system of extraor dinar ia judicia, by which, long before the time of Justinian, the formulary system had been replaced. In treating of actions the Institutes make such con- stant reference to the formulary system, and generally to the praetorian law on the subject, that it is necessary, for the compre- LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 419 hension of this part of the Institutes, to set out with a know- ledge of the law of actions while the formulary system prevailed. For a statement of the mode in which this system replaced the older actions, and of the scheme of the formula, the reader is referred to sections 98 to 106 of the Introduction. But it will be convenient to add here an outline of the principal divi- sions of actions under the pra&torian system, and to connect these divisions with the corresponding paragraphs of this Sixth Title. 1. Actions in rem, in personam, A main division of actions is that into real actions and personal actions, a division based on the difference in the thing which the plaintiff claims to be due. In a real action, the plaintiff claims that, as against all the world, a thing corporeal or incorporeal is his. The intentio of such an action ran — Si paret hominem ex jure Quiritium Auli Agerii esse. But under the formulary system every condemnation was in a sum of money. It was the value of the thing, not the thing, that was awarded ; and so the condemnatio in a real action ran — Quanti ea res erit tantam pecuniam Numerium Negidium Aulo Agerio condemna ; si non paret, absolve. A personal action was one in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant should give, do, or make good something to or for him — Cum intendimus dare, facere, prcestare oportere. For pnje- stare, as in the action of theft (Gai. iv. 37), the words damnum decidere, to make good the loss, were sometimes substituted. Con- dictio, used sometimes in the general sense of a personal action, had a special sense. Originally the condictio was the action by which the plaintiff demanded that the defendant should give, i.e. make over the full property in, something, and the thing to be given was something certum,. It was therefore specially attached to unilateral contracts, to contracts made re (which, it will be re- membered, are only indirectly bilateral) or verbis or Uteris, or to such obligations quasi ex contractu as that to restore money unduly paid. But the condictio was extended to things uncertain, to the p^ivinor or doing; something^ which was not fixed ; and the condictio in its primary application received the name of con- dictio certi, and in its extended application that of condictio incerti ; and the condictio certi, or simply condictio, was limited by usage to actions brought on contracts re, verbis, or Uteris, while condictiones certi, brought on other grounds, received special names, as the condictio indebiti, brought to enforce the repayment of money unduly paid. The condictio incerti always received a special name, according to the obligation it was brought to enforce, as ex stipulatu. Lastly, as the old condictio certi was, when first introduced by the lex Silia (510 A.u.c), given to enforce the giving of a fixed sum of money, and only extended by the lex Calpurnia (529 A.u.c. j to enforce the giving of other things, the condictio, when brought for anything else except a fixed sum of money, and whether certi ov incerti, was spoken of as iriticaria, from ^nY/cwm, wheat, one of the objects comprised in the extension made E E 2 420 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. by the lex Calpurnia. The intentio in the condictio certi ran — Si paret oportere dare (^decern aureos) ; and in the condictio incerti — Quicquid paret dare, facere oportere. Every action facer e being necessarily uncertain, the condemnatio was necessarily uncertain, even in condictiones certi, if the action was for anything but a fixed sum of money. If, for example, the action was to give a fixed amount of wheat, as every condemnatio was in a pecuniary shape, the defendant was condemned in the value, whatever it might be, of that amount of wheat — Quanti ea res erit. 2. Actions in jus, in factum, directed, utiles, JictiticB, in fac~ turn prcescriptis verbis. These terms applied to actions indicate the modes in which the praetor extended or modified the law by the shape he gave to the formula. In shaping actions the praetor introduced changes of two kinds. First, he gave actions for the enforcement of rights altogether outside the old civil law, but sanctioned by the edict ; or, secondly, he extended existing actions (generally civil, but sometimes praetorian) to cases and persons outside the limits in which these actions could be brought. The principal mode in which he effected the first object was to frame an action not in jus, but in factum. Probably the actio in factum concepta represents the formula in its earliest stage. The demonstratio and intentio were confounded or united in it. The praetor merely said, ^ If such a fact appears to be true, con- demn the defendant.' Such a formula would enable the praetor to give legal remedies to persons who, under the civil law, could not sue, as peregrini or Jiliifamiliarum, or to give a legal remedy where none previously existed. But when the formula was applied to actions properly within the sphere of the civil law, then the formula had reference to this law ; and in the intentio, separated from the demonstratio, it was said, ^ If the plaintiff has such and such a legal right, or the defendant is legally bound {oportet) to give or do, then condemn.' Reference being made to the law in this way, the formula was said to be in jus concepta. When there was an existing action and the praetor wished to extend it to persons or cases not within its sphere, the existing action was termed directa, and the extended action utilis. In framing actiones utiles, the praetor had two resources. He either gave an actio in factum, i.e. stated that if a fact was ascertained the defendant was to be condemned, so that actiones in factum were used both to give a new remedy and to enlarge an existing action, or he devised a fictitious action in jus. He said, ^ If some- thing were true which is not true, then what would the plaintiff's legal rights be ? ' For example, if a plaintiff claimed as if he had acquired by usucapion before the time of usucapion had run, the praetor said, si anno possedisset, what would be the plaintiff's rights ? and the judge treated the plaintiff as if the year had run. Lastly, where there was an innominate contract executed on one side, the praetor gave an action in jus termed actio in factum prcescriptis verbis, which was exactly like an action in jus on a LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 421 nominate contract, only that, as the contract did not fall under one of the recognised heads, the facts had to be stated in order to show how the legal obligation had arisen. 3. Actiones strlcti juris, bonce Jidei, arbitraricB. This division depends on the varying amount of latitude given to the judge. The action might be one in jus concepta, and within the limits of the civil law; and then the judge had simply to decide the question submitted to him without taking into account any con- siderations of equity. But in some actions of this kind the prgetor added the w^ords ex fide bona, quod cequius, melius, or some equivalent expression ; and then the judge imported equitable considerations, i. e. he took notice of dolus without an exceptio doli mali being inserted ; he looked to customs and usages ; he took cognisance of sets-ofF (^compensationes), without these sets-ofF being distinctly brought before him by the formula ; he allowed interest from the time of default. The actions in which the judge had this latitude allowed him were termed bonce fidei actiones, as opposed to those stricti juris, where he had no such latitude ; and, speaking generally, unilateral obligations gave rise to actions stricti juris, and bilateral obligations gave rise to actions bonce fidei. This division referred, however, to personal actions. In real actions the judge had a latitude by the actions being what was termed arbitrarice, i.e. an order to restore the thing was made, and if the thing was not restored (nisi restituat), then the defendant was condemned in a pecuniary equivalent fixed after taking all circumstances into account. Some special personal actions, such as the actio ad exhibendum, were also made arbitrarice. Actions in factum were not exactly stricti juris or bonce fidei, terms only applied to actions in jus conceptce, but practically they approached bonce fidei actions, as the praetor directed a condemna- tion if the facts were found as he thought proper to state them, and some of them were made arbitrarice, and all condictiones incerti were so far like actions bonce fidei thsit the judge had to fix the pecuniary value, as he might think proper, of an uncertain thing. 4. Judicia legitima, imperio continentia. — There is one more division of actions to be noticed in connection with the formulary system. It is one which flowed out of the original diversity of the application of the preetor's authority, according as he had cives or peregrini before him. When the formula was framed in Rome, or within a mile of Rome, when all parties were citizens, and when there was only one judge, the judicium was said to be legi- timum ; when any one of these three conditions was wanting, the judicium was said to be imperio continens, flowing out of the powers of the magistrate who gave the action. The chief distinc- tions were that in the judicia legitima, when the formula was once framed, the action lasted until the judge gave sentence, until a lex Julia in the time of Ausrustus fixed eisfhteen months as 422 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. the time in which sentence must be given, while the imperio con- tinentia depended on the magistrate who had given the formula continuing in office, and when his office came to an end, or if he died previously^ the action was at an end, and the parties had to begin over again. This division will be referred to under the head of Exceptions. (Tit. 13. 5.) The other three — viz. that accord- ing to the nature of the thing demanded, that according to the shape of the formula, and that according to the latitude given to the judge — are the principal divisions of actions. But, obviously, the same action may come under more than one division. Thus the actio Serviana (par. 7) was a real action in factum ; the action de constituta pecunia (par. 9) was a personal 'eiQ,t\ov\. in factum \ the actio empti (par. 28) was a personal bones Jidei action in jus concepta. The Institutes in this Title notice six divisions of actions : (1) that according to the nature of the thing demanded {in rem and in personam) (par. 1—11), and (2) that according to the lati- tude given to the judge (par. 28-31). As the formulary system had passed away, they do not ostensibly notice the division accord- ing to the shape of the formula, but they refer to one of its main features by noticing the distinction of actions (3) according as the action was a prastorian application of the civil law, or was a new creation of the prajtor (par. 3. 8). The other divisions noticed are subordinate, and refer (4) to the effect of the condemnation accord- ing as the action was penal or not (par. 16. 19) ; (5) according as the condemnatio was for the simple value, or for the double, treble, or quadruple value (par. 21-27) ; and (6) according as the whole sum in which the defendant miorht have been condemned was recoverable or not (par. 36-38). 1. Omnium actionum quibus inter 1. All actions whatever, by which aliquos apiid judices arbitrosve de any matter whatever is submitted to quacumque re quaeritur, summa di- the decision of judges or of arbitrators visio in duo genera deducitur : aut may be divided into two classes ; for enim in rem sunt, aut in personam, actions are either real or personal. Namque agit unusquisque aut cum Either the plaintiff sues the defendant, eo qui ei obligatus est vel ex con- because he is made answerable to him tractu vel ex maleficio, quo casu pro- by contract, or by a delict, in which ditse sunt actiones in personam, per case the plaintifi' brings a personal quas intendit adversarium ei dare action, alleging that his adversary is facere oportere, et aliis quibusdam bound to give to, or to do something modis ; aut cum eo agit qui nuUo for him, or making some other similar jure ei obligatus -est, movet tamen allegation. Or else the plaintiff brings alicui de aliqua re controversiam, an action against a person not made quo casu proditse actiones in rem answerable to him by any obligation, sunt : veluti si rem corporalem pos- but with whom he disputes the right sideat quis, quam Titius suam esse to some corporeal thing, and for such aflirmet et possessor dominum se cases real actions are given ; as for esse dicat ; nam si Titius suam esse example, if a man is in possession of intendat, in rem actio est. land, which Titius maintains to be his property, while the possessor says that he himself is the proprietor, the action is real. Gai. iv. 1. 3 ; D. xliv. 7. 25. LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 423 2. JEque si agat jus sibi esse f undo forte vel sedibus utendi fruendi, vel per fundum vicini eundi agendi, vel ex fundo vicini aquam ducendi, in rem actio est. Ejusdem generis est actio de jure prsediorum urbano- rum : veluti, si agat jus sibi esse altius aedes suas tollendi, prospi- ciendive, vel projiciendi aliquid, vel immittendi in vicini sedes. Contra quoque de usufructu et de servitu- tibus praediorum rusticorum, item prsediorum urbanorum, invicem quoque proditse sunt actiones, ut si quis intendat jus non esse adver- sario utendi fruendi, eundi agendi, aquamve ducendi, item altius tol- lendi, prospiciendi, projiciendi, im- mittendi. Istse quoque actiones in rem sunt, sed negativae. Quod genus actionis in controversiis rerum corporalium proditum non eat, nam in his is agit qui non possidet ; ei vero qui possidet non est actio pro- dita per quam neget rem actoris esse. Sane uno casu, qui possidet nihilominus actoris partes obtinet, sicut in latioribus Digestorum libris opportunius apparebit. 2. So, too, if any one alleges that he has a right to the usufruct of land, or of a house, or that he has a right of going or driving his cattle, or of con- ducting water, over the land of his neighbour, the action is real ; as also are actions relating to prsedial servi- tudes, as when a man alleges a right to raise his house, a right to an uninter- rupted view, a right to make part of his house project, or of inserting the beams of his building into his neigh- bour's walls. There are also actions relating to usufructs, and the servi- tudes of country and city estates, which are the reverse of these ; as when the complainant alleges that his adversary is not entitled to the usu- fruct, or has not the right to go, to drive, to conduct water, to raise his house, to have an uninterruj)ted view, to throw out projections, or to insert his beams. 1 hese actions are equally real, but are negative, and cannot therefore be used in disputes respect- ing things corporeal, for in these dis- putes it is the person out of possession who brings the action : for a possessor cannot bring an action to deny that the thing is the property of the plain- tiff. There is, however, one case, in which a possessor may act the part of plaintiff ; which will be more fully seen if reference is made to the books of the Digest. Gai. iv. 3 ; D. viii. 5. 2 ; D. xxxix. 1. 15. Usufructs, uses, rural and urban servitudes, might be the ob- jects of real actions. These actions were either confessoricE or jiegativce ; in the former the plaintiff claimed to exercise a servi- tude over the immoveables of another, in the latter he maintained that a servitude which another attempted to exercise over an immoveable belonging to the plaintiff was not due. The actio confessoria might be brought either when a per- son claiming a servitude found this right contested, or when any obstacle, as if a tree overhung a way over which a servitude vice or actus was claimed, prevented the free enjoyment of the servitude. (D. viii. 5. 4, 5). The actio confessoria might be brought by the person claiming the servitude, whether he was or was not in possession of the servitude. For example, a man claims a servitude non altius tollendi —that his neighbour should not build his house higher than that of the claimant. Before the neighbour has built his house higher the claimant of the servitude is in possession of the servitude. He has his servitude and enjoys the advantages of it. After the neighbour has built his house higher, the claimant of the 424 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. servitude has his servitude, but is no longer in possession of it. In either case the claimant of the servitude might bring his actio confessoria (D. viii. 5, 6. 1), although, if he was still in possession, he was further secured by being allowed to apply, if he pleased, for a prohibitory interdict (see Tit. lo) after interdicts were granted to protect servitudes. The actio negativa was virtually an affirmative action brought by the owner of the immoveable, claiming that the thing was his, freed from the servitude. Originally the possession of a servitude was not protected by interdicts, and the use of the actio negativa was to protect the enjoyment of the thing free from the servitude, or, in other words, to protect the enjoyment of that fragment of the dominium which constituted the servitude, as well as of all other fragments, while the possession of the thing itself was protected by the interdicts uti possidetis, (Tit. 16.) Subsequently the possession of servitudes was protected by interdicts, but still the actio negativa remained as a concurrent remedy with the possessory interdict to protect the enjoyment of that fragment of the domi- nium which constituted the servitude, just as the actio confessoria remained as a concurrent remedy with the prohibitory interdict to prevent a servitude being infringed. Sane uno casu. It is a subject of much dispute what is the one case in which the possessor could be plaintiff. Perhaps the words are but a summary of what has gone before. ' There is, indeed, but one case of a person in possession being plaintiff, that, namely, of the possessor of an incorporeal thing.' Perhaps they refer to a person repelling by an exceptio justi dominii the actio Puhliciana noticed in par. 4, as such a person had to prove he Avas owner. 3. Sed istse quidem actiones qua- 3. The actions just mentioned, and rum mentionem habuimus, et si those of a similar nature, are derived quae sunt similes, ex legitimis et from particular laws and from the jus civilibus causis descendunt. Alise civile ; but there are others, both real autem sunt quas praetor ex sua and personal, which the prsetor, by jurisdictione comparatas habet tam virtue of his jurisdiction, has intro- in rem quam in personam, quas et duced, and of which it is necessary to ipsas necessarium est exemplis os- give some examples : thus the praetor tendere : ecce plerumque ita per- often permits a real action to be mittitur in rem agere, ut vel actor brought, by which the plaintiff is diceret se quasi usucepisse quod non allowed to allege, that he has acquired usuceperit, vel ex diverso possessor something by prescription, which he diceret adversarium suum non usu- has not acquired ; or by which, on the cepisse quod usuceperit. contrary, the possessor alleges that his adversary has not acquired something by prescription, which, in reality, he has acquired. D. xliv. 7. 25. 2. The second division of actions, given in this Title, is that of civil and praetorian. The two methods principally adopted by the praetor to give an action in cases not provided for by the civil law, were, as already stated (p, 420), either to construct a formula on LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 425 a fictitious hypothesis, or make the action one in factum concepta. The three following paragraphs give examples of fictitious actions in rem. Justinian notices five prsetorian actions in rem, viz. the actio Puhliciana, the actio quasi Puhliciana, the actio Pauliana, the actio Serviana, and the actio quasi Serviana, and gives as instances of the numerous praetorian actions in personam, the actions de pe- cunia constituta, de peculio, &c. (See par. 8 and foil.) 4. Namque si cui ex justa causa 4. For instance, if anything is deli- res aliqua tradita fuerit, vehiti ex vered for a just cause, as a purchase, causa emptionis aut donationis aut gift, dowry, or legacy, to a person who dotis aut legatorum, necdum ejus has not yet become proprietor of the rei dominus effectus est ; si ejus rei thing delivered, if he chances to lose possessionem casu amiserit, nuUam the possession, he has no direct action habet directam in rem actionem ad for its recovery ; inasmuch as the civil eam persequendam, quippe ita pro- law only permits such actions to be ditse sunt jure civili actiones ut quis brought by the proprietor. But, as it dominium suum vindicet : sed quia was very hard that there should be no sane durum erat eo casu deficere ac- action given in such a case, the prsetor tionem, inventa est a prtetore actio has introduced one, in which the per- in qua dicit is qui possessionem ami- son who has lost the possession, alleges sit, eam rem se usucepisse, et ita he has acquired the thing in question vindicat suam esse. Quae actio Pub- by prescription, although he has not liciana appellatur, quoniam primum really so acquired it, and he thus a Publicio prsetore in edicto propo- claims it as his own. This action is sita est. ' called the actio Publicimia, because it was first placed in the edict by the praetor Publicius. Gai. iv. 36. When any one except the real owner of a thing (dominus) delivered over a thins^ on a o;round and in a mode which would have sufficed to pass the property, if he had had it to pass, or if an owner of a thing transferred a thing by a mode insufficient to pass the dominium, as if a res mancipi was delivered without mancipation, the person, in either of these cases, to whom the thing was delivered, being a bona fide possessor, could perfect his title to it by usucapion ; but if he lost the thing out of his posses- sion after it was delivered to him, but before the time necessary to complete the usucapion had expired, the civil law gave him no remedy, for he was not the dominus, and none but a dominus could claim a thing by ' vindicatio.^ The actio Publiciana, an actio fictitia in jus concepta, was therefore given for his relief by the prastor Publicius, perhaps the Publicius mentioned as prsetor by Cicero. (Pro Cluent. 45.) In this action the plaintiff was allowed to state what was in fact not true, that the usucapion was com- plete, and thus to claim as if his ownership was absolute. If the thing had fallen into the hands of a persoi who himself claimed to be really the dominus, and to have a bona, fide ground of re- pelling the actio Publiciana, it could be repelled by an exception termed the exceptio justi dominii. (D. vi, 2. 16.^ If it had fallen into the hands of a person who did not claim 426 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. to be the owner, but who had so acquired it as to be in a situa- tion to perfect his title by usucapion, i.e. who was also a bona fide possessor, and the plaintiff brought an actio Puhliciana for it be- fore the time of the usucapion had expired, the title of the actual holder of the thing was considered the better ; for in pari causa melior est conditio possidentis. The formula of the action ran thus : * Judex esto. Si quern liominem Aldus Agerius emit, quique ei traditus esset, anno possedisset, turn si eum liominem, de quo agi- tur, ejus ex jure Quiritium esse oporteret.^ (Gai. iv. 36.) The actio Puhliciana might also be useful to a person who was really the owner ; for while the distinction between res man- dpi and 7iec mancipi was retained, the owner of a thing requiring to be passed by mancipation might have himself received it by mancipation, but be unable to show that the person who trans- ferred it to him was really the dominus, and had in his turn re- ceived it by mancipation. If he lost the thing before he had perfected the title by usucapion, he could not bring a vindicatio, but was obliged to have recourse to the actio Puhliciana ; and be- fore the legislation of Justinian this action was especially useful to persons who had received a transfer of things which, like the provincial lands, could not be made the subject of a perfect domi- nium, and the title to which could not be perfected by usucapion (see Bk. ii. Tit. 6) ; for they were allowed to bring this fictitious action if they were deprived of the possession, at any rate after the time entitling them to use the pr^sscriptio longi temporis had elapsed. (C. vii. 39. 8.) 5. Rursus exdiv^erso si quiSjCum 5. On the contrary, if any one, reipublicse causa abesset vel in lios- while abroad in the service of his tium potestate esset, rem ejus qui in country, or a prisoner in the hands of civitate esset usuceperit, permittitur the enemy, has acquired by usucapion domino, si possessor reipublicse causa a thing which belongs to another per- abesse desierit, tunc intra annum son resident at home, then the proprie- rescissa usucapione earn rem petere, tor is permitted within a year after the id est, ita petere ut dicat possesso- return of the possessor, to bring an rem usu non cepisse, et ob id suam action by rescinding the usucapion ; rem esse. Quod genus actionis qui- that is, he may allege that the posses- busdam et aliis simili aequitate mo- sor has not acquired by prescription, tus prsetor accommodat, sicut ex and that the thing therefore is his. latiore Digestorum seu Pandectarum Similar feelings of equity have led the volumine intelligere licet. prsetor to grant this species of action in certain other cases, as may be learnt from the larger treatise of the Digest or Pandects. D. iv. 6. 21 ; D. iv. 1. 1, 2 ; D. iv. 6. 1. 1. This paragraph gives the converse case. Before, the usuca- pion was not complete, and the action supplied what was wanting to it. Here the usucapion is complete, and the action takes away its effect. Such an action might be wanted in either of two cases. Either the proprietor of the thing might be absent, or deprived, on some legitimate ground, of the power of attending to his affairs ; and LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 427 during this time the usucapion might have been completed against him ; or the possessor, the person in whose favour the time of usu- capion was running, might have been absent, and the proprietor, not being able to sue him, might have been unable to stop the usucapion. In either of these cases this kind of actio Piihliciana, called rescissoria, because the usucapion was rescinded, came to the aid of the proprietor. It is to be remarked that Justinian notices only the latter of the two cases, and yet he had provided a much more simple remedy in behalf of proprietors, who were allowed to interrupt the usucapion of an absent possessor by a protestation made before a magistrate. (C. vii. 40. 2.) The actio Puhliciana rescissoria, an actio Jictitia in jus concepta, had to be brought within a year, commencing from the time when it first became possible to bring the action. Intra annum, quo primum de ea re experiundi potestas ei'it. (D. iv. 6. 1. 1.) The year was a utilis annus, and its length, therefore, varied in dif- ferent cases, for which Justinian substituted the uniform term of four years. Quihusdam et aliis. Such as the restitutio in integrum, by which the praetor protected a person under the age of twenty-five years. (See Bk. i. Tit. 23, pr.) 6. Item, si quis in fraudem credi- 6. Again, if a debtor delivers to a torum rem siiam alicui tradiderit, third person anything that is his pro- bonis ejus a creditoribus ex senten- perty, in order to defraud his credi- tia prsesidis possessis, permittitur tors, who have seized on his goods by ipsis creditoribus rescissa traditione order of the prseses, the creditors are earn rem petere, id est, dicere earn permitted to rescind the delivery, and rem traditam non esse, et ob id in bring an action for the thing delivered ; bonis debitoris mansisse. that is, they may allege that the thing was not delivered, and that it there- fore continues to be a part of the debtor's goods. D. xlii. 8. 1, pr. 1, 2. Theophilus tells us that this action, an actio Jictitia in jus con- cepta, was called the actio Pauliana. The lex ^lia Sentia (see Bk. i. Tit. 7) had made enfranchisements in fraud of creditors void; but the law did not extend to alienations ; and the praetor, therefore, when the creditors had taken possession of the effects of the debtor, permitted them to reclaim anything which had been alienated after insolvency and with intent to defraud. This actio Pauliana, in rem (says Ortolan) is not spoken of else- where in the works of Roman law which have come down to us. It must not be confounded with the actio Pauliana in personam. treated of in the Digest (xxii. 1. 38, pr. and 4), which was given, not only in case of alienation, but of every act whereby the debtor had diminished his assets, and the intentio of which was directed against the particular person who had profited by such an act, and not as that of the actio in rem, which forms the subject of this paragraph, against any one who happened to be the person detaining the thing claimed. 428 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 7. Item Serviana, et quasi Servia- na, quae etiain hypothecaria vocatur, ex ipsiiis prsetoris jurisdictione sub- stantiam capiunt, Serviana autem experitur quis de rebus coloni, quae pignoris jure pro mercedibus fundi ei tenentur ; quasi Serviana autem, qua creditores pignora hypotliecasve persequuntur. Inter pignus autem et hypothecam, quantum ad ac- tionem hypotliecariam attinet, nihil interest ; nam de qua re inter credi- torem et debitorem convenerit ut sit pro debito obligata, utraque hac appellatione continetur, sed in aliis differentia est : nam pignoris appel- latione earn proprie rem contineri dicimus, quae simul etiam traditur creditori, maxime si mobilis sit ; at eam quae sine traditione nuda con- ventione tenetur, proprie hypothecse appellatione contineri dicimus. 7. The actio Serviana, and the actio quasi- Serviana also called hypothecaria, equally take their rise from the prse- tor's jurisdiction. The actio Serviana is brought to get possession of the effects of a farmer which are held as a pledge to secure the rent of the land. The actio quasi-Serviana is that by which creditors sue for things pledged or mortgaged to them ; and, as regards this action, there is no difference be- tween a pledge and a hijpotheca ; for the two terms are indifferently applied to anything which the debtor and cre- ditor agree shall be bound as security for the debt ; but in other points there is a distinction between them. The term pledge is properly applied to a thing which has actually been delivered to a creditor, especially if the thing be a moveable ; the term hypotheca means anything bound by simple agreement without delivery. D. XX. 2. 4 ; D. xx. 1. 17. 5. 1 ; T>. xiii. 7. 9. 2. We have already given a slight sketch of the jus pignoris, and the relative position of the creditor and debtor, at the end of the fifth Title of the Second Book. The interest of the creditor was not thought sufficient to support a vindicatio if he lost the thing pledged out of his possession, or wished to get the thing subjected to a hypotheca into his possession ; but a praetorian action enabled him to effect this. The actio Serviana mentioned in this para- graph was given to enforce the claim of the landlord to the farm- ing instruments, which, without any special agreement, were con- sidered, in law, to be held as a pledge for the rent of the farm, and the actio quasi- Serviana was an extension of this, giving a means to every creditor of enforcing his right to anything pledged or mortgaged. Both actions were in factum. Maxime si mobilis sit. An immoveable might of course be given in pledge ; but it would generally happen that things given in pledge were moveables. A thing subjected to successive hypotheccs belonged, as we have said in treating of the real right given by the jus pignoris (Bk. ii. Tit. 5), to the person in whose favour the first hypotheca was consti- tuted. If, therefore, a creditor, whose hyjwtheca was subsequent, brought the actio quasi-Serviana against a creditor whose hypotheca was prior, he would be repelled by an exception. (C viii. 18. 6.) 8. In personam quoque actiones 8. There are also personal actions ex sua jurisdictione propositas habet which the praetor has introduced in the praetor, veluti de pecunia constituta, exercise of his jurisdiction, as, for in- cui similis videbatur receptitia. Sed stance, the action de pecunia constituta, ex nostra constitutione, cum et si which that called receptitia much re- quid pleniiis habebat, hoc in actionem sembled. But t\ie actio receptitia h^s pecuniae constitutae transfusum est, been rendered superfluous by all its LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 429 ea quasi siipervacua jussa est cum advantages being transferred to the sua auctoritate a nostris legibus actio pecimix constitute, and has, recedere. Item praetor proposuitde therefore, by one of our constitutions, peculio servorum filiorumque fami- lost its authority, and disappeared lias, et ex qua quseritur an actor from our legislation. The praetor has juraverit, et alias complures. likewise introduced an action concern- ing the peculium of slaves, and oifilii- familiarum, an action in which the question is tried, whether the plaintiff has made oath, and many others. C. iv. 18. 2, pr. and 1. 9. De constituta autem pecunia 9. The actio de constituta pecunia cum omnibus agitur quicumque pro may be brought against any person se vel pro alio soluturos se consti- who has engaged to pay money, either tuerint, nulla scilicet stipulatione for himself or another, without having interposita ; nam alioquin, si stipu- made a stipulation ; for, if he has pro- lanti promiserint, jure civili te- mised a stipulator, he is bound by the nentur. civil law. D. xiii. 5. 14. 3. The actio de constituta pecunia was an action by which the praetor enforced a mere pact or agreement (not a stipulation, for then the action would have been ex stipulatu) by which a person promised again what he already owed, or promised what another owed, fixing the time for payment. This agreement {constltu- turn) did not operate as a novation, and was enforced as subsidiary to the main contract. The actio de constituta pecunia could only be brought within a year, and only applied to things which could form the subject of a mutuum, i.e. things quce numero^ pondere, mensurave constant. The pecunia was said to be constituta be- cause it was agreed to be paid on a particular day. The actio receptitia was an action given against bankers {argentarii) who promised to satisfy the demands of a creditor of one of their customers. This creditor was said recipere diem, to have a day fixed by the banker for payment of his claim, and hence the action was called receptitia. The mere promise of the banker was con- sidered enough to ground an action on, an exception to the ordinary rules of the civil law which must have grown out of the peculiar character of a banker's business. What the civil law confined to bankers only the praetor extended to every one alike ; and whenever any one, who owed a debt to another or had funds of another in his hand, promised to pay the money owed by or deposited with him on a particular day, the praetor gave the action de constituta pecunia to enforce the fulfilment of the promise. Justinian abolished the actio receptitia, and invested the actio de constituta pecunia with privileges which had before be- longed exclusively to the actio receptitia ; for he made it perpe- tual, and he allowed it to be brought whatever was the nature of the thing promised. (C. iv. 18. 2.) The pact to pay might be advantageous to the creditor, if it was the debt of another that was agreed to be paid, or if the antecedent 430 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. obligation was only a natural one, or if the time in which the original debt could be sued on was on the point of expiring. 10. Actiones autem de pecnlio ideo adversiis patrem dominiimve comparavit praetor, quia licet ex contractu filiorum servorumve ipso jure non teneantur, sequum tamen est peculio tenus, quod veluti patri- monium est filiorum filiarumque, item servorum, condemnari eos. 10. The praetor has introduced actions de peculio against fathers and masters, because, although they are not, according to the civil law, bound by the contracts of their children and slaves, yet they ought in equity to be bound to the extent of the peculium, which is a kind of patrimony of sons and daughters, and of slaves. D. XV. 1. 47. 6. Actions de peculio, are treated of in par. 4 of next Title. 11. Item si quis, postulante ad- versario, juraverit deberi sibi pecu- niam quam peteret, neque ei solva- tur, justissime accommodat ei talem actionem, per quam non illud quae- ritur an ei pecunia debeatur, sed an juraverit. 11. Also, if any one, when called upon by his adversary, makes oath, that the debt which he sues for is due and unpaid, the praetor most justly grants him an action, in which the inquiry is not whether the debt is due, but whether the oath has been made. D. xii. 2. 3. 5. 2. Either party mi^ht challenge the other to swear to the truth of his statement. This was done out of court, and if the party challenged took the oath, his statement could no longer be im- pugned by the person who had challenged him. For instance, if the creditor, being challenged, swore that the debt was due, the debtor was obliged to pay. The only question, therefore, which could be subsequently referred to a court of justice v*^as whether the oath had or had not been taken, inquiry into which circum- stance was made under an actio in factum given by the praetor. 12. Poenales quoque actiones bene multas ex sua jurisdictione intro- duxit ; veluti adversus eum qui quid ex albo ejus corrupisset, et in eum qui patronum vel parentem in jus vocasset, cum id non impetras- set ; item adversus eum qui vi ex- emerit eum qui in jus vocaretur, cujusve dolo alius exemerit, et alias innumerabiles. 12. The praetor has also introduced many penal actions by virtue of his jurisdiction. As, for instance, against a person who has damaged any part of the praetor's album ; against those who summon before the praetor their patron or father without previous per- mission from the proper magistrate ; against those who carry away by force any one summoned to appear before the praetor, or fraudulently induce a third person to carry him off ; and very many other actions. Gai. iv. 46. The album was the tablet suspended in the forum, containing the ordinances of the prsetor. Any attempt to injure or deface it was punished by an action de albo corrupto. (D. ii. 1. 7. pr.) The descendant or freedman who summoned before a magis- trate (in jus) his ascendant or patron without the permission of LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 431 the praetor, was liable to an action termed de parente aut patrono in jus vocato. (Gai. iv. 46.) The actio de in jus vocato vi exempto was given against a per- son who rescued with violence any one who, after disobeying a notice to appear in jure, was being forcibly conveyed before the magistrate. The penalty was a sum equivalent to that which the plaintiff would have received from the action he had commenced against the person rescued, while this person rescued remained still liable to the action he had been summoned to answer. The actions under all the heads mentioned in this paragraph were in factum, (D. ii. 7. 5. 1.) 13. Prsejudiciales actiones in rem 13. Prejudicial actions seem to be esse videntur ; quales sunt per quas real actions ; such are those by which quseritur an aliquis liber, an liber- it is inquired whether a man is bom tus sit, vel de partu agnoscendo. free, or has been made free ; whether Ex quibus fere una ilia legitimam he is a slave, or whether he is the off- causam habet, per quam quaeritur spring of his reputed father. But of an aHquis liber sit : ceterse ex ipsius these, that alone by which it is inquired praetoris jurisdictione substantiam whether a man is free, belongs to the capiunt. civil law. The others spring from the praetor's jurisdiction. Gai. iv. 44 ; C. viii. 47. 9. The object of a prcejudicialis actio was to ascertain a fact, the establishing of which was a necessary preliminary to further judi- cial proceedings. (See Introd. par. 104.) Such actions differ from actions i?i rem, because in an actio prcBJudicialis no one is condemned, only the fact is ascertained ; but they are said in the text to resemble actions in rem, because they were not brought on any obligation, and because in the intentio, which indeed composed the whole formula in this case, no mention was made of any par- ticular person. Questions of status, such as those of paternity, filiation, pa- tronage, and the like, were most commonly the subjects of actiones prcBJudiciales, but were by no means the only ones. We hear of others, such as quanta dos sit (Gai. iv. 44) ; an res de qua agitur major sit centwn sestertiis ; an bona jure venierint, (D. xlii. 5. 30.) The liheralis causa, the suit in which the status of a supposed slave was ascertained, was originally nothing else but a vindicatio. The person called the assertor libertatis claimed him, and the mas- ter of the slave defended his possession. If the decision wasin favour of the assertor, it was still open to another person to attempt to prove that the subject of the suit was really a slave ; if the deci- sion was in favour of the master, another assertor could bring a fresh suit ; but there could only be three assertores in all. If the supposed slave was thrice adjudged a slave, his status could be no further questioned. Justinian entirely altered the action, by allowing the slave himself to claim his liberty, and making the first decision final. (C. vii. 16.) 432 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 14. Sic itaque discretis actioni- bus, certum est non posse actorem suam rem ita ab aliquo petere, si paret eum dare oportere ; nee enim quod actoris est, id ei dari oportet, quia scilicet dari cuiquam id intel- ligitur, quod ita datur ut ejus fiat, nee res quae jam actoris est magis ejus fieri potest. Plane odio furum, quo magis pluribus actionibus tene- antur, efiectum est ut, extra poenam dupli aut quadrupli, rei recipiendse nomine fures etiam hac actione te- neantur si paret eos dare oportere, quamvis sit adversus eos etiam hc^ec in rem actio per quam rem suam quis esse petit. 14. Actions being thus divided, it is certain that a plaintiff cannot sue for his own property by such a for- mula as this, ' If it appears that the defendant ought to give.' For it is not a duty to give the plaintiff that which is his own. To give a thing is to transfer the property in it, and that which is already the property of the plaintiff cannot belong to him more than it does already. However, to show detestation for thieves, and to make them liable to a greater number of actions, it has been determined, that besides the penalty of double or quadruple the amount taken, they may, for the recovery of the thing taken, be subjected to the action, ' If it appear that they ought to give ; ' although the party injured may also bring the real action against them, by which the plaintiff demands the thing as proprietor. Gai. iv. 4. We have already seen (Tit. 1. 19) that the plaintiff might benefit by being allowed to bring a personal instead of a real action as the things taken might have perished. But why should the condictio be so shaped as described in the text ? The reason w^as this, the plaintiff, by being allowed to frame his action with the word dare, which was technically wrong, as this implied to transfer the full ownership, whereas the plaintiff remained the owner of the thing stolen, had the advantage, under the formulary system, of recovering the sponsio poenalis (Gai. iv. 171), or wager of one- third of the value of the thing, which was added to a condictio certi. (See Introd. par. 99.) 15. Appellamus autem in rem quidem actiones, vindicationes ; in personam vero actiones quibus dare facere oportere intenditur, condic- tiones. Condicere enim est denun- tiare, prisca lingua : nunc vero abu- sive dicimus, condictionem actionem in personam esse qua actor intendit dari sibi oportere ; nulla enim hoc tempore eo nomine denuntiatio fit. 15. Real actions are called vindi- cations ; and personal actions, in which it is maintained that something ought to be done or given, are called condic- tions ; for condicere, in old language, meant the same as denuntiare ; and it is improperly that condiction is now used as the name of the personal ac- tion, by which the plaintiff contends that something ought to be given to him, for there is no dermntiatio now actually in use. Gai. iv. 5. 18. Gaius says, ' actor adversario denuntiahat, ut ad judicem capi- endum die xxx, adesset^ (iv. 18). Thus the proper meaning of condictio is the appointing of a day. 16. Sequens ilia divisio est, quod 16. Actions may be next divided qusedam actiones rei persequendse into actions given to recover the thing. LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 433 gratia comparat?e sunt, qusedam actions given to recover a penalty, and pcense perseqnendi^, qusedam mixtee mixed actions. sunt. Gai. iv. G. We now come to the third division of actions, that, namely, according to the object for which they were brought ; they were divided under this head into three classes — those in which it was sought to get a thing, rei jpersecutorioi^ those in which it was sought to enforce a penalty, and those {mixtoi) in which both these objects were united. 17. Rei persequendj© causa com- paratse sunt omnes in rem actiones. Earum vero actionum qu£e in per- sonam sunt, eve quidem quse ex contractu nascuntur fere onmes rei persequendae causa comparatse vi- dentur : veluti, quibus mutuam pe- cuniam vel in stipulatum deductam petit actor, item com.modati, depo- siti, mandati, pro socio, ex empto vendito, locato conducto. Plane si dei)ositi agatur eo nomine quod tu- multus, incendii, ruinse, naufragii causa depositum sit, in duplum ac- tionem preetor reddit, si modo cum ipso apud quem depositum sit, aut cum herede ejus ex dolo ipsius age- tur : quo casu mixta est actio. 17. For the recovery of the thing are given all real actions ; and of per- sonal actions almost all those which arise from contract, as the action for a sum lent or stipulated for, a commoda- tnm, a deposit, a mandate, a partner- ship, a sale, or a letting to hire. But when the action on a deposit is brought for a thing deposited by reason of a riot, a lire, the fall of a building, or a shipwreck, the preetor always gives the action for the double of the value of the thing deposited, provided the suit is brought against the depositary him- self, or against his heir, if personally guilty of dolus mains, in which case the action is mixed. Gai. iv. 7 ; D. xvi. 3. 1. 1-4 ; D. xvi. 3. 18. The action against a fraudulent depositary was not in duplum, unless the depositor had been forced by fire, shipwreck, the fall of a building, or other sudden calamity, to make the de- posit. If, without being so forced, he had selected the deposi- tary, then the action was only for the single value. It was his own fault not to have chosen an honester man. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 13. 3.) 18. Ex maleficiis vero proditse actiones alire tantum poense perse- quendas causa comparafcco sunt, alij]e tarn pcense quam rei persequendse, et ob id mixtie sunt. Poenam tan- tum persequitur quis actione furti : sive enim manifesti agatur quadru- pli, sive nee manifesti dupli, de sola po^na agitur, nam ipsam rem propria actione persequitur quis, id est, suam esse petens, sive fur ipse earn rem possideat sive alius quilibet. Eo amplius, adversus furom etiam con- dictio est rei. 18. Actions arising from a delict are either for the penalty only, or both for the thing and the penalty, which makes them mixed. But, in an action of theft, nothing more is sued for than the i)enalty ; whether, as in manifest theft, the quadruple, or, in theft not manifest, the double, is sued for, the owner recovers the thing itself by a separate action, by claiming it as jjro- prietor, whether it is in the posses- sion of a thief or of any one else. He may also bring against the tliief a con- diction for the thing. Gai. iv. 8. 3 ; D. xiii. 1. 7. 1. 434 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. Persons who suffered from crimes had a private action against the wrong-doer for compensation, quite apart from, and indepen- dent of, the prosecution of the offender for his outrage on the laws of society. There was, indeed, something more than an exact compensation enforced by the private actions ; for, by way of penalty, the defendant had often to pay two, three, or four times the amount of loss actually sustained, and also to give back the thing or its value ; but still this penalty was given as a pu- nishment for the injury to the individual, and not as a punishment for the infraction of public law. 19. Yi autem bonorum raptoriim actio mixta est, quia in qiiadruplum rei persecutio continetur ; poena au- tem tripli est. Sed et legis Aqui- lise actio do damno injurise mixta est, non solum si adversus infician- tem in duplum agatur, sed inter- dum et si in simplum quisque agit : veluti si quis hominem claudum aut luscum occiderit, qui in eo anno in- teger et magni pretii fuerit ; tanti enim damnatur, quanti is homo in eo anno plurimi fuerit, secundum jam traditam divisionem. Item mixta est actio contra eos qui relicta sacro- sanctis ecclesiis vel aliis venerabili- bus locis legati vel fideicommissi no- mine dare distulerint, usque adeo ut etiam in judicium vocarentur : tunc enim et ipsam rem vel pecuniam qu?e relicta est, dare compelluntur, et aliud tantum pro poena, et ideo in duplum ejus fit condemnatio. 19. An action for goods taken by force is a mixed action ; because the thing taken is included under the quadruple value to be recovered by the action ; and thus the penalty is but triple. The action introduced by the lex Aquilia, for wrongful damage, is also a mixed action ; not only when brought for double value against a man denying the fact, but sometimes when the action is only for the single value ; for instance, according to the distinction previously laid down, when a man has killed a slave, who at the time of his death was lame, or wanted an eye, but within the year, previous to his decease, was free from any de- fect, and of great value. The action is also mixed which is brought against those who have delayed the payment of a legacy, or fideicommissum, left to our holy churches, or any other sacred place, until at last they have been sum- moned before a magistrate ; for then they are compelled to give the thing, or to pay the money left by the de- ceased, and in addition an equivalent thing or an equal sum besides, by way of penalty ; and thus they are con- demned in a double amount. C. ix. 33. 1 ; D. ix. 2. 23. 3-6 ; C. i. 3. 46, pr. and 7. Interdum si in simj)lum. An action could be brought in sim- plum under the lex Aquilia, if the object of the action was not to determine whether the defendant had done the injury, but to fix I the sum which would be the proper compensation for it. It could not be brought in simplum to determine the fact of the defendant having done the injury : for if he denied it, the action was in du- plum ; if he confessed it, there was no need of an action to prove what he confessed. Sacrosanctis ecclesiis. The punishment had formerly been enforced in the case of all legacies in which a certain sum had been given j9er damnationem, (See Bk. iii. Tit. 27. 7.) LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 435 Dare distulerint. Formerly the punishment had only been inflicted in case of an absolute refusal of the legacy. (C. i. 3. 46. 7.) The use in this paragraph of the word mixtcB in the sense of ' brought at once to recover a thing and to enforce a penalty,' seems to have suggested the reference in the next paragraph to actions which were mixtce in a very different sense, viz. '^ both real and personal.' 20.- Qiicedam actiones mixtam 20. Some actions are also mixed, as causam. obtinere videntiir, tam in being both real and personal ; as, for rem quam in personam : qualis est instance, the action familise, erciscundse, familif© ercisciindaB actio, qufe com- brought between co-heirs for the par- petit coheredibus de dividenda he- tition of the inheritance ; the action reditate ; item communi dividundo, de communi dividundo, between part- qnse inter eos redditur inter quos ners for the division of things held in aliquid commune est, ut id divi- common ; also, the action jinium re- datur ; item jfinium regundorum, gimdorum, between owners of con- quse inter eos agitur qui confines tiguous estates. And, in these three agros habent. In quibus tribus ju- actions, the judge, following the rules diciis permittitur judici, rem alicui of equity, may give any particular ex litigatoribus ex bono et aequo thing to any of the parties to the suit, adjudicare, et si unius pars prsegra- and then condemn him, if he seems to vare videbitur, eum invicem certa have an undue advantage, to pay the pecunia alteri condemnare. other a certain sum of money, D. x. 1. 2. 1 ; D. X. 1. 3 ; D. x. 2. 55. These actions, though entirely personal, as being founded on obligations and brought against particular persons, are here said to seem in one aspect like real actions, because they involved not only a condemnatio, but an adjudication Particular things were adjudged and given over to the parties. Even here, however, the analogy to real actions was not very complete, as real actions were always brought for some definite thing, ascertainable before the action was brought ; but in the actions mentioned in the text, the thing to be adjudged was only ascertained by the action. As to the formula in these actions, see Introd. sec. 103. In these actions no distinction can properly be made of plaintiff and defendant. Ulpian says, ^ Mixtce sunt actiones, in quihus uterque actor est.'' (D. xliv. 7. 37. 1.) The judge discharged the func- tion assigned him equally for the benefit of all persons interested in the subject-matter of the action. 21. Omnes autem actiones vel in 21. All actions are for the single, simplum conceptas sunt, vel in du- double, triple, or quadruple value ; plum, vel in triplum, vel in qua- beyond that no action extends, druplum ; ulterius autem nulla actio extenditur. D. ii. 8. 3. We have now the fourth division of actions, that, namely, according to the amount of the condemnation. In actions which were 2?2 dwplum, in triplum, ov in quadruplam €oncept(B, the intentio only contained an estimate of the single F F 2 436 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. value, the amount of actual loss, and then in the condemnatio this was doubled, tripled, or quadrupled, as the case might be; the word conceptcB, therefore, which properly refers to the intentio, is not very strictly used. 22. In simplum agitur : veluti ex stipiilatione, ex miitui datione, ex empto vendito, locate conducto, mandato, et denique ex aliis com- pluribus causis. 22. The single tiling itseK, or its simple value, is sued for ; as, for ex- ample, in case of a stipulation, a loan, a mandate, a sale, a letting to hire, and in numberless other cases. If a person stipulated that in a certain case his debtor should give him double or triple of the value of the sum owed, the action brought to enforce the stipulation would still be in simplum con- ce-i^ta. It Avould be the agreement, and not the action, which would double or triple the sum to be paid. 23. The double value is sued for ; as, for example, in an action of theft not manifest, of wrongful injury by the lex Aquilia, and, in certain cases, in an action of deposit. Also in an action on account of the corruption of a slave brought against him by whose advice or instigation the slave has fled from his master, has gro^vn disobedient towards him, become dissolute in his habits, or been made in any manner worse ; and, in this action, an estimate is also to be made of whatever things the slave has stolen from his master before his flight. An action also for the detention of a legacy, left to a sacred place, is brought for double value, as we have before remarked. Gai. iii. 190 ; Gai. iv. 9. 171 ; D. xvi. 3. 1. 1 ; D. xi. 3. 1 ; C. i. 3. 46. 7. Depositi ex quibusdam casibus, i.e. when made under the pressure of a sudden calamity. See note on par. 17. 23. In diiplum agimus ; veluti furti nee manifesti, damni injurige ex lege Aquilia, depositi ex quibus- dam casibus ; item servi corrupt!, qu?e competit in eum cujus hortatn consiliove servus alienus fugerit, aut contumax adversus dominum factus est, aut luxuriose vivere cosperit, aut denique c[uolibet modo deterior fac- tus sit. In qua actione etiam earum rerum quas fugiendo servus abstulit, gestimatio deducitur. Item ex legato quod venerabilibus locis relictum est, secundum ea qui?e supra diximus. 1 24. Tripli vero, cum quidam ma- jorem vera3 eestimationis quantita- tem in libello conventionis inseruit, ut ex hac causa viatores, id est ex- ecutores litium, ampliorem summam sportularum nomine exegerint : tunc enim id quod propter eorum causam damnum passus fuerit reus, in tri- plum ab actore consequetur, ut in hoc triple et simplum in quo dam- num passus est, connumeretur. Quod nostra constitutio induxit, qu?e in nostro Codice fulget, ex qua dubio procul est ex lege condictitiam emanare. 24. The triple value is sued for when any person inserts a greater sum than is due to him, in his statement of demand, so that the viatores, that is, the officers of suits, exact a larger sum as their fee. In this case the defend- ant may obtain from the plaintifl" the triple value of the loss he has sustained by giving the fee, but the amount properly expended in the fee is in- cluded in the triple value. Thus, a constitution inserted in our code has established, on which constitution, without doubt, a statutory condiction^ may be grounded. C. iii. 10. 2. 2. i LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 437 In the old law there had been other actions in triplum, as those furti concepti Sindfurti ohlati, (Gai. iii. 191 ; see Tit. 1.4, of this Book.) The action, of which Justinian speaks in this para- graph, had been substituted by him for the penalty of entirely losing all right of action, to which a plaintiff who sued for more than was due to him had been liable. The libellus conveniionis in the system of civil process obtain- ing in the Lower Empire, was the notification of an action and its grounds delivered by a bailiff of the court {executor) to a de- fendant, who, on the receipt of it, had to give security for his appearance before the judex. It thus, in the extraordinaria hf'dicia, replaced the old vocatio in jus, Condictio ex lege is lite- rally ' a condiction under a statute.' 25. Quadrupli, veluti furti mani- festi : item de eo quod metus causa :actum sit, deque ea pecunia quse in ioc data sit, ut is cui datur caliim- lise causa negotium alicui faceret, zel non faceret. Item ex lege con- iictitia a nostra constitutione oritur, n quadruplum condemnationem im- Donens iis executoribus litium, qui ;ontra constitutionis normam a reis juidquam exegerint. 25. Tlie quadruple value is sued for; as, for example, in an action for manifest theft, in an action ciuod metus causa, and an action relating to money given to any one to set on foot, or to desist from, a vexatious suit. The sta- tutory condiction is also for the qua- druple value, which is established in our constitution against those officers of suits, who demand anything from the defendant, contrary to the regula- tions of the constitution. Gai. iii. 189 ; D. iv. 2. 14. 1 ; D. iii. G. 1 ; C. iii. 2. 4. De ea pecunia qucB datur, Titius is bribed by some one to insti- tute a vexatious suit, or he threatens to bring a vexatious suit, md the person he threatens pays him not to bring it. In either iase an action in quadruplum lies against him. 26. Sed furti quidem nee mani- 'esti actio, et servi corrupti, a ceteris ie quibus simul locuti sumus eo dif- erunt, quod hse actiones omnimodo lupli sunt ; at illse, id est, damni in- urite ex lege Aquilia et interdum lepositi inficiatione duplicantur, in jonfitentem antem in simplum dan- ;ur. Sed ilia qu^e de iis competit iiTse relicta venerabilibus locis sunt, ion solum inficiatione duplicatur, jed etiam si distulerit relicti solu- ionem usquequo jussu magistra- :uum nostrorum conveniatur ; in ;onfitentem vero, et anteqnam jussu nagistratuum conveniatur solven- :em, simplum redditur. 2(5. But an action of theft not ma- nifest, and an action on account of a slave corrupted, differ from the others, which we have placed under the same head, in that they are always brought for double the value ; but the others, that is, the action given by the lex Aquilia for a wrongful injury, and the action of deposit under pressure, are brought for the double value in case of denial ; but if the defendant confesses, the single value only can be recovered. In actions brought for things given to sacred places, double is recovered, not only on the denial of the defendant, but also on payment being delayed until a magistrate orders an action to be brought ; but it is the single value only that can be recovered, if the debt be acknowledged and paid before such an order is siven. Oai. iv. 9. 173. 173 ; C. i. 3. 46. 7. 438 LIB. IV. TJT. VI. 27. Item actio de eo quod metns causa factum sit, a ceteris de quibus simul locuti sumus eo differt, quod ejus natura tacite continetur, ut qui judicis jussu ipsam rem actori resti- tuat, absolvatur. Quod in ceteris casibus non ita est sed omnimodo quisque in quadruplum condemna- tur ; quod est et in furti manifesti actione. 27. The action quod metus causa differs also from the other actions in- cluded under the same head, because it is tacitly implied in the nature of this action, that a defendant, who, in obedience to the command of the judge, restores the things taken, ought to be acquitted ; in all the other actions, on the contrary, the defendant must always be condemned to pay the four- fold value, as, for instance, in the ac- tion of manifest theft. D. iv. 2. 14. 1. 4. The actio quod metus causa was given to a person who had, while under constraint from the fear of actual or threatened violence, alienated anything, created real rights, or entered into an obligation. The action was, as the text informs us, arhitraria. (See Introd. sec. 106.) 28. Actionum autem qusedam boucse fidei sunt, quredam stricti juris, Bonse fidei sunt hse : ex empto ven- dito, locato conducto, negotiorum gestorum, mandati, depositi, pro socio, tutelse, commodati, pignerati- tia, famili^e erciscundse, communi dividundo, pr?escriptis verbis quse de eestimato proponitur, et ea qu?e ex permutatione com petit, et heredi- tatis petitio. Quamvis enim usque ad hue incertum erat, sive inter bon?e fidei judicia connumeranda sit hereditatis petitio, sive non, nostra tamen constitutio aperte eam esse bonse fidei disposuit. 28. Again, some actions are honse fidei, some are stricti juris. Of those hon[)e, fidei there are the following : — the actions empti and venditi, locati and co7iducti, negotiorum gestorum ; those brought on a mandate, deposit,, partnership, tutelage, loan, or pledge ; the action familise erciscundx ; that communi dividundo ; the action prse- scriptis verbis, arising from a commis- sion to sell at a fixed price, or an ex- change ; and the demand of an in- heritance. For, although it was, till recently, doubtful whether this last ac- tion should be included among those house fidei, our constitution has clearly decided that it is to be included among them. Gai. iv. 62; C. iii. 31. 12. 3. We here enter on the fifth division of actions, that, namely, according to the powers given to the judge, and according to which they are divided into actiones hones Jiclei, actiones stricti juris y and actiones arhitrarice. In actions bonce Jideiy the words ex bonajide, or some equivalent expression, were permitted to be added to the formula, so thati the intentio, which was always incerta, ran, quicquid dare, or Jacere, or prcBstare oportet ex bona fide. The actions in which this was permitted were all praetorian. Justinian here gives a list of them; and probably, though not quite certainly, the list is meant to be a complete one. The principal effects of this addition to the formula were: — (1) That all circumstances tending to show dolus malus were taken into consideration, with- out an exception doli mali being inserted. (D. xxx. 84. 5.) J LIB. IV. TIT. \L 439 (2) Every assistance Avhich the consideration of customs and com- mon use could give to the determination of the particular question was permitted to affect the decision of the judge. (D. xxi. 1. 31. 20.) (3) The judge would notice any counter claims which the defendant might have arising out of the same set of circumstances which gave rise to the action of the plaintiff (Gai. iv. 63), and would provide for future contingencies, as e.g., in an action pro socio, he met the case of one partner having taken on himself lia- bilities not as yet enforceable. (D. xvii. 2. 38. pr.) (4) And, lastly, interest was due on the thing withheld from the time it ought to have been given. (D. xxii. 1. 32. 2.) In the actions stricti juris, the judge was obliged to adhere strictly to the principles of the civil law. Dolus malus, or counter claims, could not be taken into consideration unless exceptions were inserted bringing them before the notice of the judge. And interest could not generally be claimed from before the time of the litis contestatio, except by special stipulation. (D. xii. 1. 31.) It was the actions derived from the /?/.§ civile, i.e. real actions and condictions, that were stricti juris. That a real action should, as in the case of the petitio hereditatis, be honoi Jidei, was quite an ex- ception. But the petitio hereditatis had characteristics which allied it with personal actions, habet prcestationes quasdam per- sonales, (D, v. 3. 25. 18.) It could only be brought against those who possessed an inheritance {1) j)ro Jierede, i.e. as heir or honorum possessor, ov (2) p)ro possessore. Pro possessore possidet prcedo qui interrogatus cur possideat, responsurus sit quia possideo, i.e. a possessor who does not pretend to justify his possession by any legal title. (D. v. 3. 11 and 12.) And not only was the petitio hereditatis thus personal in the sense of being limited to two classes of persons, but it had some of the consequences of a per- sonal action. By it the plaintiff could recover from the possessor moneys he had derived from the inheritance, and it could be brought against debtors of the deceased to make them pay what they owed to the inheritance in case these debtors claimed to retain their debts as being the right heirs. (D. v. 3. 13. 15 ; D. v. 3. 42.) The jurists had been divided on the point whether in a pe- titio hereditatis cognisance could be taken of dolus makes without an exceptio. Justinian decided that it could, the action being treated as one hones Jldei. Actiones arhitrarice are treated of in paragr. 31. An iiciiOYi prcescrijjtis verbis, otherwise in factum prcescriptis verbis, or civilis in factum, was, as we have elsewhere said, an ac- tion in which at the head of the formula were placed words stating the facts giving rise to a contract which did not come under any of the heads of contracts bearing a particular name. Of these actions, which were always boncB fidei and in jus conceptce, the two mentioned in the text are only examples. In the coniv£)iQt per mutatio, each party made a contract re^ i.e. by depo- siting the thing bartered with the other ; but the thing given was 440 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. n not given as a mutuum, a cornmodatum, a dejjositum, or 2i jjignus, and therefore the circumstances had to be stated specially. The action de (Estimato was given when a thing was entrusted to another to sell for a certain sum ; the agent being permitted to retain all he received above that given, and to give back the thing if he could not obtain the price fixed. This was not precisely a locatio, a societas, or a mandatum, and therefore the action was given in the form of one jjrcescriptis verbis. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 13. 2.) 29. Fuerat antea et rei uxorias 29, Formerly, the action rei uxorias actio una ex bonse fidei judiciis. Sed was included among the actions honx cum pleniorem esse ex stipulatu ac- Jidei ; but finding the action ex stipulatu tionem invenientes, omne jus quod to be more advantageous, we have, res uxoria ante habebat, cnm multis while establishing many distinctions, divisionibus in actionem ex stipulatu transferred to the action ex stipulatu, quse de dotibus exigendis proponitur, when given for the recovery of mar- transtulimus : merito rei uxorije ac- riage portions, all the effects before tione sublata, ex stipulatu qute x^ro attaching to the action rei uxorix ; the ea introducta est, naturam bonces actio rei uxorise being then reasonably fidei judicii tantum in exactione done away with, the action ex si ipitZa^it, dotis meruit, ut bonre fidei sit ; sed by which it is replaced, naturally as- et tacitam ei dedimus hypothecam. sumed the character of an action bo7i£& Prseferri autem aliis creditoribus in ^c^ei,but assumed it only when brought hypothecis tunc censuimus, cum ipsa for the recovery of a marriage portion, mulier de dote sua experiatur, cujus We have also given the wife an implied solius providentia hoc induximus. mortgage, but when we prefer her to mortgagees, we do so only whenever she herself sues for her marriage par- tion. For it is to her personally that we grant the privilege. D. iv. 5. 8; C. v. 13 ; C. viii. 18. 12. 1. In order to enforce the restitution of a marriage portion, the actio rei uxorice was given ; but sometimes the wife or other per- son entitled, not content with the remedy, stipulated with the husband for the restitution, and thus secured the power of bring- ing an action ex stipulatu. In the actio rei uxoricE, which was an action honcB fidei^ the husband could, for different reasons, make certain deductions in his restitution of the dos. He had three years in which to make restitution of all things, «/m^ numero, pondere, mensurave constant ; he could oppose to the action the heneficium competenticB, that is, he was only condemned to pay quantum facere potest ; and he could deduct the useful as well as the necessary expenses he had incurred in managing the dotal property. (See paragr. 37.) The wife could not transmit the action to her heirs, and if her husband was deceased, and she had benefited by his testament, she could not both accept the gift under the testament, and also ask for the restitution of her portion, but was obliged to abandon either the one advantage or the other. (Ulp. Reg. 6.) !None of these drawbacks attended the action ex stipulatu. There could be no deductions, no delay in payment, no regard to LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 441 the husband's power to pay. The action passed to the heirs of the wife, and she could take, in addition, anything given her by her husband's testament. Justinian united the two actions into one. However the dos might have been given, and whether there had really been any stipulation to restore it, a tacita stipulatio was, in every case, to be supposed. The actio rei uxoricB was to be abolished, and all actions for the restitution of a marriage portion to be brought ex stijmlatu. But then, this action was treated as one honce Jidei, and produced most of the advantages which the husband had «enjoyed under the actio rei uxoricR. He had a year in which to restore all moveables ; he could claim the heneficium competenticB, and might deduct the necessary expenses he had been put to. (See paragr. 37.) Lastly, in order to make the position of the wife more secure, Justinian gave her an implied mortgage on the effects of her husband, taking priority over all other incum- brances— a privilege, however, personal to herself. (C. iv. 13.) 30. In all actions honx jidei full power is given to the judge to deter- mine, according to the rules of equity, how much ought to be restored to the plaintiff ; whence it follows that when the plaintiff also is found to be in- debted to the defendant, the debtor ought to be allowed to set oft" the sum due to him, and to be condemned only to pay the diflference. Even in actions stricti juris, a rescript of the Emperor Marcus permitted a set-off to be claimed, by opposing the exception of fraud ; but our constitution, when the debt due to the defendant is evident, has given a greater latitude to claims of set-oft' ; for now actions, real or per- sonal, or of whatever kind, are ipso jure reduced by the claim, with the ex- ception only of the action of deposit, against which we have not judged it proper to permit any claim of set-oft" to be made, lest under this pretence any one should be fraudulently pre- vented from recovering the thing de- posited. Gai. iv. 61 ; C. iv. 31. 14, pr. and 1 ; C. iv. 34. 11. The subject of compensatio will be treated of more fully under paragr. 39. 30. In bon[3e fidei autem judiciis libera potestas permitti videtur ju- dici ex bono et oequo a^stimandi, quantum actori restitui debeat : in quo et illud continetur, ut si quid invicem prrestare actorem opDrteat, eo compensato in reliquum is cum quo actum est, debeat condemnari. 8ed et in strictis judiciis ex rescript© divi Marci, opposita doli mali excep- tione compensatio inducebatur. Sed nostra constitutio eas compensa- tiones qupe jure aperto nituntur, latius introduxit, ut actiones ipso jure minuant, sive in rem sive in personam, sive alias quascumque : excepta sola depositi actione, cui aliquid compensationis nomine ojd- poni satis impium esse credidimus, ne sub praitextu compensationis de- positarum rerum quis exactione de- fraudetur. 31. Prseterea quasdam actiones arbitrarias, id est, ex arbitrio judicis pendentes, appellamus : in quibus, nisi arbitrio judicis is cum quo agitur actori satisfaciat, veluti rem restituat, vel exhibeat, vel solvat, vel ex noxali 31. Some actions, again, arc called arbitrary, as dexDending upon the ar- hitrkmi of the judge. In these, if the defendant does not, on the order of the judge, give the satisfaction awarded by the judge, and either restore, ex- 442 LIB. lY. TIT. YI. causa servum cledat, condemnari de- hibit, or pay the thing, or give up a. beat. Sed istse actiones tarn in rem slave that has committed an injury, he quam in personam inveniuntur : in ought to be condemned. Of these ar- rem, veluti Publiciana, Serviana de bitrary actions some are real and some rebus coloni, quasi Serviana qufe personal : real, as the actions Publi- etiam hypothecaria vocatur ; in per- ciana, Serviana, and quasi Serviana, sonam, veluti quibus de eo agitur also called hypothecaria ; personal, as quod aut metus causa aut dolo malo those by which a suit is commenced factum est, item cum id quod certo on account of something done through loco promissum est petitur ; ad ex- fear or fraud, and that for which some- hibendum quoque actio ex arbitrio thing was promised to be paid at a judicis j)endet. In his enim ac- particular place ; the action ad exhi- tionibus et ceteris similibus permit- bendum also depends on the arhitriwnv titur judici ex bono et aequo, secun- of the judge : in these actions, and dum cujusque rei de qua actum est others of a like nature, the judge naturam, sestimare quemadmodum may determine, according to the prin- actori satisfieri oporteat. ciples of equity and the circumstances of the particular case, the satisfaction which the plaintiff ought to receive. D. vi. 1. 68 ; D. iv. 2. 14. 4 ; D. xiii. 4. 4. 1 ; D. x. 4. 3. 9 ; D. xx. 1. 16. 3 ; D. iv. 3. 18. In the actiones arhitraincE the judge was instructed only to condemn the defendant in a sum of money, if he did not satisfy the demand of the plaintiff, supposing that demand was well- founded. When, therefore, the judge had ascertained the validity of the plaintiff's claim, he issued an order {arbitrium?) to the de- fendant, and at the same time condemned him to pay, in case of his refusal, a sum proportionate to the value of AvhatAvas claimed, quanti ea res erit. This was fixed, if the defendant, when ordered to restore a thing, falsely stated that he had not the thing in his possession, by the plaintiff himself, who stated on his oath (D. xii. 3. 5) the amount he considered fairly due to him as compen- sation ; otherwise the judex fixed the amount according to the circumstances of the case. Probably, though this is a point on which there is a divergence of opinion, the manus militaris was employed, by the direction of the judge, to put the plaintiff in pos- session, when the defendant falsely stated that it was not in his possession, or when the defendant, after being condemned, would neither pay the amount fixed nor restore the thing. (D. vi. 1. 68.) Actions in rem were enforced by being made arbitrarics, and all actions in rem were so enforced. (See Tit. 17. 2.) In real actions the satisfaction ordered by the judge was to restore the thing. In the actio Serviana and quasi- Serviana, the arbitrium was alternative, and the defendant was ordered either to give up the thing pledged, or to pay the debt. (D. xx. 1. 16. 3.) It is to this case that the words ' vel solvat ' in the text refer. When the thino^ claimed was restored, the condemnatio mio^ht still be made available for the fr actus. (D. vi. 1. 68.) Among personal actions, those quod metus causa, de dolo malo, and ad exhibendum were arbitrarice, because they were brought virtually to have something restored or exhibited. The action de eo quod certo loco LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 443. promissicm est was made arhitraria^ for the peculiar reason men- tioned below. With respect to the actio quod metus causa, see paragr. 25 and 27. The actio de dolo malo was given to avoid the consequences of a dolus malus, but only when there was no other means of avoid- ing them (D. iv. 3. 1, 2); it was in simylum\ it subjected the defendant, if condemned, to infamy, and had to be brought with- in a year. (D. iv. 3. 29.) As will be found from Tit. 12. 2, in every action the defend- ant was to be absolved if, before sentence was given, he satisfied the demands of the plaintiff. Cum id quod certo loco promissum est petitur. When a con- tract was made in which it was agreed that payment should be made at a particular place, the creditor could not demand pay- ment anywhere else. If he did, he asked for more than was his due, and was subject to the consequences of a pluris-petitio. (See paragr. 33.) Supposing, indeed, the action brought on the obli- gation was one honcB Jidei, or had an intentio incerta, as being for an undetermined object, then, as the judge would take into account all the circumstances of the case, and allow the defendant the benefit of whatever difference being sued in a wrong place could be supposed to make to him, the consequence of this pluris- petitio would be immaterial. But if the action was stricti juris and for a thing certain, the plaintiff could not have brought it else- where than in the place named without incurring the consequences of a pLus-petitio, had not the praetor come to his relief and given him the actio arhitraria mentioned in the text. By this action the creditor was allowed to sue in the wrong place, but the praetor compensated the debtor by giving him an advantage. The action was made arhitraria, and the debtor was ordered to pay what the creditor claimed, or to give security that it would be paid in the place where due. If he did not do this, then in the condemnatio the judex fixed an amount in which the advantage it might have been to the debtor to have paid in the particular place was taken into consideration. (See paragr. 33.) The pra3tor, however, per- haps only allowed the creditor to take advantage of this action if the defendant absented himself from the place where the payment ought to have been made (D. xiii. 4. 1), and then the creditor could bring this action either at Kome or in any place where the defendant had a domicile, or in any place where the defendant con- sented to appear. (D. v. 1. 19. 4.) 32. Curare autem debet judex ut 32. A judge ought, as much as pos- omnimodo, quantum possibile ei sit, sible, to take care that liis sentence certse pecunia3 vel rei sententiam awards a thing or sum certain, even ferat, etiam si de incerta quantitate though the demand on which he pro- apud eum actum est. nounces may have been for an uncer- tain quantity. Gai. iv. 48. 52 ; C. vii. 4. 17. 444. LIB. IV. TIT. VI. CertcB jpeciimxE vel rei. Before the formulary system tlie judg- ment might be either to give a thing or to pay a sum of money. Under the formulary system the condemnatio was always to pay a sum of money. Under the system of judicia extraor dinar ia a return was made to the old law, and the condemnatio mis^ht be not only for a certain sum of money, but also for any other definite thing, that thus the object of the demand might be directly ob- tained. The condemnatio was always certain, even if the action was brought for a sum or thing uncertain ; the nature of the action might, indeed, be such as to give the defendant the choice of two alternatives, and the condemnatio would, of course, correspond; but even then the condemnation cannot properly be said to have been uncertain, as it compelled the defendant to choose between two definite thins^s. 33. Si quis agens in intentione sua plus coinplexus fuerit quam ad eum pertineret, causa cadebat, id •est, rem amittebat ; nee facile in integrum a pr^etore restituebatur, nisi minor erat viginti quinque annis : huic enim, sicut in aliis causis causa cognita succurrebatur, si lapsus juventute fuerat, ita et in hac causa succurri solitum erat. Sane, si tarn magna causa justi erroris interveniebat, ut etiam con- stantissimus quisque labi posset, etiam majori viginti quinque annis succurrebatur : veluti, si quis totum iegatum petierit, post deinde pro- lati fuerint codicilli quibus aut pars legati adempta sit, aut quibusdam aliis legata data sint, quce efficie- bant ut plus petiisse videretur pe- titor quam dodrantem, atque ideo lege Falcidia legata minuebantur. Plus autem quatuor modis petitur, re, tempore, loco, causa ; re, veluti si quis pro decern aureis qui ei de- bebantur, viginti petierit ; aut si is cujus ex parte res est, totam eam vel majore ex parte suam esse in- tenderit ; tempore, veluti si quis ante diem vel ante conditionem petierit : qua ratione enim qui tardius solvit quam solvere deberet, minus solvere intelligitur, eadem ratione qui prse- iiiature petit, plus petere videtur. Loco plus petitur, veluti cum quis id •quod certo loco sibi stipulatus est, alio loco petit sine commemoratione illius loci in quo sibi dari stipulatus fuerit : verbi gratia, si is qui ita sti- pulatus fuerit, Ephesi dare spondes ? Roma3 pure intendat sibi dare opor- 33. Formerly, if a plaintiff claimed in his intentio more than his due, he failed in his action, that is, he lost the thing owing to him, nor was it easy for him to get reinstated by the prsstor unless he was under the age of twenty-five years, for in this, as well as in other cases, it was usual to aid the plaintiff if it appeared that he had made an error owing to his youth. If, however, the reasons which betrayed him into the mistake were such as might have misled the most careful man, re- lief was given even to persons of full age. For example, if a legatee had demanded his whole legacy, and codi- cils were afterwards produced by which a part of it was taken away, or new legacies given to other persons, so that, the legacies being reduced by the lex Falcidia, the plaintiff appeared to have demanded more than three-fourths. A man may demand more than what is due to him in four ways — in respect to the thing, to the time, to the place, and to the cause. In respect to the thing, as when the plaintiff, instead of ten aurei, which are due to him, de- mands twenty ; or if, although owner of but part of some particular thing, he claims the w^hole, or a greater share than he is entitled to. In respect to time, as when the plaintiff makes his demand before the day of payment, or before the time of the performance of a condition ; for just as he who does not pay so soon as he ought is held to pay less than he ought, so whoever makes his demand prematurely, de- mands more than his due. In respect to place, as when any person demands LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 445 tere. Icleo autem plus petere in- telligitur, quia utilitatem quam lia- buit promissor si Ephesi solveret, adimit ei pura intentione. Propter quam causam alio loco petenti arbi- traria actio proponitur, in qua sci- licet ratio habetur utilitatis quae promissori competitura fuisset, si illo loco solveret : quce utilitas ple- rumque in mercibus maxima inve- nitur, veluti vino, oleo, frumento, quc^ per sing-ulas regiones diversa liabent pretia ; sed et pecunias nu- meratre non in omnibus regionibus sub iisdem usuris foenerantur. Si quis tamen Ephesi petat, id est, eo loco petat quo ut sibi detur stii)u- latus est, pura actione recte agit ; idque etiam praetor monstrat, scili- cet quia utilitas solvendi salva est promissori. Huic autem qui loco ]3lus petere intelligitur, proximus est is qui causa -plus petit : ut ecce, si quis ita a te stipuletur, hominem Sticlium aut decem aureos dare spondes ? deinde alterutrum petat, veluti hominem tantum aut decern aureos tantum. Ideo autem plus IDetere intelligitur, quia in ea genere stipulationis promissoris est electio, utrum pecuniam an hominem sol- vere malit ; qui igitur pecuniam tantum vel hominem tantum sibi dari oportere intendit, eripit elec- tionem adversario, et eo modo suam quidem conditionem meliorem facit, adversarii vero sui deteriorem : qua de causa talis in ea re prodita est actio, ut quis intendat hominem Stichum aut aureos decem sibi dari oportere, id est, ut eodem modo peteret quo stipulatus est. Pree- terea, si quis generaliter hominem stipulatus sit, et specialiter Stichum petat, aut generaliter vinum stipu- latus specialiter Campanum petat, aut generaliter purpuram stipulatus sit, deinde specialiter Tyriam petat, plus petere intelligitur ; quia elec- tionem adversario tollit, cui stipu- lationis jure liberum fuit aliud sol- vere quam quod peteretur. Quin etiam, licet vilissimum sit quod quis petat, nihilominus 'plus petere intelligitur ; quia stepe accidit ut promissori facilius sit illud solvere, quod majoris pretii est. Sed hrec quidem antea in usu fuerant. Postea autem lex Zenoniana et nostra rem coercuit ; et si quidem tempore plus fuerit petitum, quid statui oportet, that something stipulated to be de- livered at a particular place, should be delivered at some other place, without noticing the place fixed by the stipu- lation ; for example, if, after stipu- lating in these words, ' Do you promise to give at EphesusT any one should afterwards bring an action at P^-ome, merely stating that the defendant ought to give. In this case the plain- tifi" would demand more than his due, as he vv^ould, by his intentio thus con- ceived simply, deprive the promissor of the advantage he might have in paying at Ephesus. And it is thus, that an arbitrary action is given to a plaintifi' demanding payment in a place difierent from that agreed on, in which action allowance is made for the ad- vantage which the debtor might have reaped from j)aying his debt in the place agreed on. This advantage is generally found to be most consider- able in the different kinds of merchan- dise, as in wine, oil, corn, of which the price differs in different places. Money itself, again, is not lent every- where at the same interest. But if a man bring his action at Ephesus, that is, at the place fixed by the stipula- tion, he may validly bring an action conceived simply ; and this the proetor, too, points out, because all the advan- tage the debtor will have in paying at the particular place is secvired to him. To him who demands more than his due in regard to place, he approaches very nearly who demands more than his due in regard to the cause ; as, for instance, if any one stipulate thus with you, ' Do you promise to give either your slave Stichus or ten cmrei ] ' and then demand either the slave only, or the money only. He would in this case be held to have demanded more than his due, because in such a stipu- lation the promissor has the right to choose whether he will give the slave or the money. He, therefore, who claims either the money only, or the slave only, takes away his adversary's power of choice, and thus makes his own condition better, and that of his adversary worse. An action, there- fore, has been given by which in such a case the plaintiff maintains that either the slave Stichus ought to be given him, or the money, and thus makes a demand in conformity witli the stipulation. So, too, if a man sti- pulates generally that wine, or purple, 446 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. Zenonis divae memoriae loquitur con- stitutio. Sin aiitem quantitate vel alio modo plus fuerit petitum, omne si quod forte damnum ex liac causa acciderit ei, contra quem plus peti- tnm fuerit, commissa tripli con- demnatione, sicut supra diximus, puniatur. or a slave be given Iiim, and afterwards sues for the wine of Campania, the purple of Tyre, or the slave Stichus in particular, he is held to demand more than his due, for he thus takes the power of election from his adver- sary, to whom it was open by the terms of the stipulation to pay some- thing different from what is demanded. Nay, even if the thing actually sued for is of little or no value, yet the plaintiff is held to claim more than his due, because it is often easier for the debtor to i^ay a thing of greater value. Such was the law formerly in use. But the severity of the law on this point has been greatly restrained by the constitution of the Emperor Zeno, and by our own. If more than is due is demanded in respect of time, the constitution of Zeno must be ap- plied ; if in respect of quantity, or in any other way, then, as we have said above, the plaintiff is to be condemned in a sum triple the amount of any loss sustained by the defendant. Gai. iv. 53 ; D. iv. 4. 1. 1 ; D. iv. 4. 7. 4 ; D. iv. 6. 1. 1 ; D. xiii. 4 and foil. ; C. iii. 10. 1, 2. Under the system oi formulm, a j^lus-pctitlo or pluins-petltio liad the effect of making the plaintiff fail entirely in an actio stricti juris, when the error was in the intentio, and the intentio was for a ' thing certain. Supposing this were the case, as the formula would run si paret decern nummos, &c., condemna, si non absolve, then, if the defendant owed only nine nummi^ he did not owe ten, and so the judex could not condemn him. The plaintiff failed, and having once come injudicio, the litis contestatio ope- rated as a novation of the cause of action (see Bk. iii. Tit. 29), and his original claim being thus cut away, he was left entirely without remedy, and could take no further proceedings to enforce his demand. Of course, if the demand was for a thing uncertain, there could be no plus-petitio. If there were an error in the demon- stration the plaintiff was not at all prejudiced. If there were a mis- take in the condemnatio, making it more unfavourable to the de- fendant than it ought to have been, it was the defendant who would be prejudiced ; but the praetor would grant a new formula, and so rectify the mistake. (See Gai. iv. 53-60, reading in 57, &ed (reus cum) iniquam formulam acceperit.) Under the system of the judicia extraordinaria Sb plus-petitio would mean any claim in excess contained in the lihellus conven- tiouis. The text informs us of the mode in which such a mistake or misstatement was punished when the plus-petitio was not one tempore. If the plus-petitio was tempore, i.e. if the plaintiff suedj LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 447 before the proper time, he was condemned by the constitution of Zeno (C. iii. 10. 1) to Avait double the time he ought originally to have waited, and to reimburse the defendant all expenses he might have been put to by the action improperly brought Sicut supra diximus refers to the case of the damnum being the exaction of a larger fee by the executor, as mentioned in paragr. 24. 34. Si minus in intentione com- l^lexus fuerit actor quam ad eum pertineret, veliiti si, cum ei clecem deberentur, quinque sibi dari opor- tere intenderit ; aut si, cum totus fundus ejus esset, partem dimidiam suani esse petierit, sine periculo agit. In reliquum enim nihilominus judex adversarium in eodem judicio con- demnat, ex constitutione divse me- morise Zenonis. 34. If a plaintiff includes less in his intetdio than he has a claim to, de- manding, for instance, only five aurei when ten are due, or the half of an estate, when the whole belongs to him, he runs no risk, for the judge may, by the constitution of Zeno, of glorious memory, condemn in the same action the adverse party to pay the remainder of what is due to the plaintiii". Gai. iv. 56 ; C. iii. 10. 1. 3. Under the praetorian system, a plaintiff who claimed a less amount than was really due to him, could bring another action for the surplus if he waited until another praetor came into office. '(Gai. iv. 56.) Zeno allowed the judex to add the surplus in con- demning the defendant. 35. Si quis aliud pro alio inten- derit, nihil eum periclitari placet ; sed in eodem judicio, cognita veri- tate, errorem suum corrigere ei per- mittimus : veluti, si is qui hominem Stichum petere deberet, Erotem pe- tierit ; aut si quis ex testamento sibi dari oportere intenderit, quod ex stipulatu debetur. 35. When a plaintifi" demands one thing instead of another, he incurs no risk. For if he discovers the truth, he is allowed to correct his mistake in the same action : as if he should de- mand the slave Eros instead of Stichus, or should claim as due by virtue of a testament, what is really due upon a stipulation. Gai. iii. 55. In the time of Gains, a plaintiff who demanded one thing in- stead of another, lost the action, but could recover the thing really due in a subsequent action. Justinian permitted the mistake to be retrieved in the same action, as the text informs us. 36. Sunt prseterea qusedam ac- tiones quibus non solidum quod nobis debetur, persequimur, sed modo solidum consequimur, modo minus, ut ecce, si in peculium filii ■servive agamus : nam si non minus in peculio sit quam persequimur, in .solidum dominus jjaterve condem- Jiatur : si vero minus inveniatur, •eatenus condemnat judex, quatenus 36. There are, again, certain actions by which we do not always sue for the whole of what is due to us, but some- times for the whole, sometimes for less. For example, when a suit is brought so as to form a claim against the pcca- lium of a son or a slave, then if the peculium is suflicient to answer the demand, the father or master is con- demned to pay the whole debt ; but if 448 LIE. lY. TIT. VI. in peculio sit. Quemadmodum au- tem peculium intelligi debeat, suo ordine proponemus. 1 the peculimn is not sufficient, he i» condemned to pay only to the ex- tent of the peculkmi. We will here- after explain, in its proper place, how the peculium is to be estimated. C. iv. 26. 12. We here enter on another division of actions, according to which actions, by which the whole of what was due was obtained, are distino-uished from those bv which sometimes the whole, some- times less than the whole, of what was due was obtained. 37. Item, si de dote judicio mn- lier agat, j^lacet eatenus maritum condemnari debere quatenus facere possit, id est, quatenus facultates ejus patiuntur : itaque, si dotis quan- titati concurrant facultates ejus, in solidum damnatur ; si minus, in tan- tum quantum facere potest. Propter retentionem quoque dotis repetitio minuitur ; nam ob impensas in res dotales factas marito retentio con- cessa est, quia ipso jure necessariis sumptibus dos minuitur, sicut ex latioribus Digestorum libris cognos- cere licet. 37. Thus, too, if a wife brings an action for the restitution of her mar- riage portion, the husband must be condemned to pay only as far as he is able, i.e. as far as his means permit. Therefore, if his means admit of his. paying the whole amount of the por- tion, he mvist do so ; if not, he must pay as much as it is in his power to pay. The claim of a wife for the restitution of her marriage j)ortion may also be lessened by the husband having a right to retain something, for the husband is permitted to retain a sum equivalent to the expenses he has incurred about the things given, since the marriage portion is by law diminished by the amount of all ne- cessary expenses, as may be seen in fuller detail in the Digest. D. xxiv. 3. 12. 34; D. xxv. 1. 5. The privilege of having the condemnatio reduced, duntaxat in id quatenus facere potest, i.e. of being condemned only in an amount which he could pay without being reduced to a state of destitution (D. L. 17. 173), a privilege called by the commen- tators the heneficium competentlcB, was accorded to the defendant in several other cases besides those mentioned in the text and in the next paragraph and in paragr. 40. We may instance the cases of one brother sued by another, and every case arising between man and wife, except claims grounded on delicts. (D. i lil. 1. 20.) This privilege was always personal, and did not avail either heirs or sureties. If the debtor subsequently had funds, he had to pay what under the heneficium competentim he left unpaid. (C. v. 18. 8.)' i In calculating how much the debtor could pay, account was only taken of what he possessed, without deduction for what he owed, except in the one case of the donor, who might deduct his debts. (D. xlii. 1. 19, pr. 1.) Propter retentionem dotis. \ The husband mio'ht deduct the J LIB. IV. TIT. VI. 449 amount of all necessary expenses incurred in the management of the property constituting the marriage portion. If the ex- penses had been only profitably and not necessarily incurred, that is, were utiles, and not necessarice, Justinian only allowed the husband to bring an actio mandaii, or an actio negotiorum gesto- rum, to reimburse himself; whereas, previously, he had been able to deduct such expenses as well as those that were necessaries, (D. L. 16. 79. 1 ; C. V. 13. 1.) 38. Sed et si quis cum parente suo 38. If any person sues his parent or patronove agafc, item si socius cum patron, or one partner sues another in socio judicio societatis agat, non plus an action of partnership, he cannot actor consequitur quam adversarius obtain a greater sum than his adver- ejus facere potest. Idem est, si sary is able to pay. It is the same quis ex donatione sua conveniatur. when a donor is sued for his gift. D. xlii. 1. 16. 19, pr. and 1. 39. Compensationes quoque op- 39. When a set-ofF is opposed by positse plerumque efficiunt, ut minus the defendant to the demand of the quisque consequatur quam ei debe- plaintiff, it generally happens that the batur ; namque ex bono et aequo plaintiiF recovers less than what he de- habita ratione ejus, quod invicem mands, for the judge, proceeding on actorem ex eadem causa prsestare equitalDle principles, may deduct from oportet, in reliquum eum cum quo the demand of the plaintiff whatever actiim est condemnare, sicut jam he owes under the same head to the dictum est. defendant, and may condemn the de- fendant to pay the remainder only, as has been already observed. Gai. iv. 61. If the defendant was not only a debtor but a creditor of the plaintiff, if he had something owing to him from the plaintiff as well as owed something to him, it was evidently the most conve- nient way that he should be allowed to balance one debt against the other (compensafio, pensare cum), and only account for the surplus, supposing a surplus was still due from him. Under the praetorian system, in all actions honcujidei, the judge, who could take all the circumstances of the case into his consi- deration, set off as a matter of course any debt due to the defend- ant from the plaintiff in consequence of the same set of circum- stances {ex eadem causa) by which the debt on which the action was brought became due. (Gai. iv. 61.) In one case, however, viz. that of a banker {argentarius) , a much stricter system pre- vailed. The argentarius could only sue a customer for the sum due to him after allowing for what he owed to the customer. If he sued for more, it was a plus-petitio. (GrAi. iv. 64.) The bono- rum emptor, or purchaser of an insolvent's estate, had also to make a deduction of what was due to the defendant from the in- solvent when he sued a debtor of the insolvent. (Gai. iv. Q5.) Between this deductio and the compensatio required from the argentarius there were some differences : compensatio was only of things of the same kind, only of debts due, and had to be in- 450 LIB. IV. TIT. VI. serted in the intentio ; whereas the deductio was of things of dif- ferent kinds, of debts not due as well as due, and being inserted in the condemnatio did not expose the plaintiff to the risk of plus- petitio. (Gai. iv. 66-68.) In the actions stricti juris, which arose from unilateral, not bilateral contracts, there could be no recipro- cal rights, as in a bilateral contract, giving the defendant a claim €x eadem causa. But the rule grew up and was confirmed by a rescript of Marcus Aurelius (see paragr. 31), dolo facit qui petit quod redditurus est. (D. xliv. 4. 8.) If the plaintiff claimed a sum which directly he had obtained he would have to repay back to the defendant, he was guilty of a dolus ; he had acted as it he had a right to the money, whereas he had not. Accordingly the defendant could avail himself of the exception of dolus. What the effect of this exception was is not certain. Some think that if the plaintiff was found to owe the defendant anything of a similar kind, although ex dispari causa, which he had not allowed for in stating the amount of his claim, he entirely failed in his action. He did not recover any surplus which might be really due to him. The exception stopped the action altogether. The formula ran : Si in ea re nihil dolo malo Auli Agerii factum sit neque fiat . . . condemna, si non paret, absolve. Dolus nialus did appear, and all the judex could do was to absolve the defendant. (Paul. Sent. ii. 5. 3.) Others suppose that the defendant had to pay any balance found to be due by him. (See Demangeat, 2. 629.) But we must not suppose that compensatio was originally looked on as a means of extinguishing an obligation. In theory of law, each debt subsisted separately. Certainly in the case of the argentarius it is hard to draw any line between an extinc- tion of obligation and the way in which debts due to customers were necessarily deducted ; but it was necessary that the debts due to and from the argentarius, although ex dispari causa, should be in eadem re, that is, should both consist, for instance, of money or wine. This was an exceptional case, and, generally speaking, the two debts clearly subsisted together, although, w^hen, by submitting the facts to the knowledge of the judex in the case of actions hona | fidei, and by the exceptio doli in the action of law, the set-off was claimed, its effects were retroactive, and may be said to have com- menced from the moment when the two debts first began to exist together. (C. iv. 31.4.) Under Justinian the debts were held to operate as mutually i extinguishing each other ipso jure. When the parties came ; before the judex, he ascertained their respective claims on each other, and if there was, on the whole, a balance in favour of the plaintiff, awarded the amount to him. All the old distinctions were done away, and it no longer made any difference whether the two debts arose from the same transaction, or whether things of the same kind were payable (the words ex eadem causa in the text are, therefore, under Justinian's legislation, inaccurate). LIB. IV. TIT. VII. 451 But Justinian made it requisite that the defendant's claim should be clearly well founded, and that the amount should be at once ascertainable, and not need further inquiry to determine it (causa liquida){see C. iv. 31. 14. 1), and he would not allow any set-off to an actio depositi. (Seeparagr. 30.) 40. Eum quoque qui creditoribus suis bonis cessit, si postea aliquid {icquisierit quod idoneum emolu- mentum habeat, ex integro in id quod facere potest, creditores cum eo experiuntur : inhumanum enim erat spoliatum fortunis suis in soli- dum damnari. 40. So, when a debtor who has made a cession of his goods to his creditors acquires a fortune which makes it worth their while, the cre- ditors may compel him by action to pay as much as he is able, but not more, for it would be inhuman to con- demn a man to pay the whole debt who has already been deprived of all his property. D. xlii. 3, 4. 6. Tit. VII. QUOD CUM EO CONTRACTUM EST, QUI IN ALIENA POTESTATE EST. Quia tamen superius mentionem habuimus de actione, qua in pecu- lium filiorumfamilias servorumve agitur, opus est ut de hac actione et de ceteris quae eorumdem nomine in parentes dominosve dari solent, di- ligentius admoneamus. Et quia, sive cum servis negotium gestum sit, sive cum iis qiii in potestate parentis sunt, his fere eadem jura servantur, ne verbosa fiat disputatio, dirigamus sermonem in personam servi domi- nique, idem intellecturi de liberis quoque et parentibus quorum in potestate sunt ; nam si quid in his proprie observatur, separatim osten- demus. We have already spoken of the ac- tion which may be brought relative to the peculiwm of JiUifamiliarum or of slaves. And we must now speak of it more fully, and also of all other ac- tions which may be brought against parents and masters as representing children and slaves. But, as the law is almost the same, whether the deal- ing is with a slave, or with one under the power of a parent, to avoid pro- lixity, we will treat only of slaves and their masters, leaving what we say of them to be understood as applicable also to children and the parents, under whose power they are. For anything which is peculiar to children and pa- rents we will point out separately. Gai. iv. 69. By the strict rule of the civil law, the parent or master could not be bound or prejudiced by any act of a child or slave. But a sense of equity gradually broke in upon this rule, and, in cer- tain cases, the contracts and delicts of persons alienl juris, came to affect those in whose power these persons were. This Title treats of the contracts of persons alieni juris, which were considered to concern the master or parent (1) whenever they were made by his order ; and (2) whenever he had profited by them. 1. Si igitur jussu domini cum 1. Thus, then, if any one deals servo negotium gestum erit, in soli- with a slave acting under the command dum praetor adversus dominum ac- of his master, the proator will give an G G 2 452 LIB. IV. TIT. VII. tionem pollicetur ; scilicet quia qui ita contraliit, fidem domini sequi videtur. action against the master for the whole of what is due under the contract ; for, in this case, the person who contracts does so as relying on the faith of the master. Gai. iv. 70. The jussus domini extended to cases where the master subse- quently ratified the contract, the ratification being equivalent to a mandate. (D. xv. 4. 1. 6.) If the slave had been merely the instrument of his master, if, for instance, the master arranged that money borrowed for himself" should be told out to his slave, the praetor would give a condictio, not an action guod jussu, (D. xv. 4, 5, pr.) 2. Eadem ratione praetor duas alias in solidum actiones pollicetur, quarum altera exercitoria, altera in- stitoria appellatur. Exercitoria tunc habet locum, cumquis servum suum magistrum navi prseposuerit, et quid cum eo ejus rei gratia cuiprsepositus erit contractum fuerit : ideo autem e unfair. LIB. IV. TIT. ::iii. 471 In factum composita, i.e. shaped so as to raise the question whether a statement of a particular fact was or was not true. Some particular fact is submitted by the prsetor to the judex, in- stead of such a general inquiry as whether the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud. For instance, to use the example given in the Digest (xlv. 1. 22), the inquiry directed to be made might be whether the plaintiff has not made the defendant believe that the subject of stipulation, which is made of brass, was made of gold. The exceptio in factum composita was thus, like the actio in factum composita, opposed to one in jus concepta. For instance, the exceptio doli mali, which was in jus concepta, not only raised a question of fact, but made it requisite that the judex should affix a certain character to the acts of the parties. It may be observed that this general exception doli mali would always answer every purpose which could be gained by using an exception in factum composita ; for any particular fact which, if stated as an exception and proved, would furnish a bar to the action, would be taken notice of under the exception ^o/zttz a /z. But the magistrate would not always allow an exception doli mali to be inserted when he would give permission to employ one in factum composita ; for in- famy was attached to a plaintiff against whom an exception doli mali was proved ; and when the plaintiff stood to the defendant in any such near relation as that of patron or ascendant, the ma- gistrate would not allow an exception to be used which would have any further consequence than to protect the defendant. (D. xliv. 4. 4. 16.) The instances of exceptions in the following para- graphs are all instances of exceptions in factum, 2. Idem juris est, si qiiis quasi 2. It is the same, if any one should credendi causa pecuniam stipulatus stipulate from you for the repayment fuerit, neque numeraverit ; nam of money he is to lend you, and then eam pecuniam a te petere posse eum does not pay to you the sum borrowed ; certum est, dare enim te oportet, in such a case, he could certainly de- cum ex stipulatione tenearis ; sed mand from you the amount you have quia iniquum est eo nomine te con- engaged to repay him, and you are demnari, placet per exceptionem bound to give it, for you are tied by pecuniae non numeratse te defendi the stipulation. But as it would be debere,cujustemporanos (secundum unjust that you should be condemned quod jam superioribuslibrisscriptum in such an action, it has been thought est) constitutione nostra coarctavi- right you should have the defence of mus. the exception pecunise non numerate. The time within which this exception can be used, has, as we have said in a former Book, been shortened by our constitution. Gat. iv. 116 ; C. iv. 30. 14. Quasi credendi causa, i.e. had made the defendant promise to pay a sum, as if he, the plaintiff, were going to lend the sum to the defendant. It will be remembered that, in this exception, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, instead of, as in other exceptions, on 472 LIB. IV. TIT. XIII. the defendant, and then it must be pleaded within five years, a term reduced by Justinian to two years. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 21.) 3. Prseterea debitor, si pactus fuerit cum creditore ne a se pete- retur, nihilominiis obligatiis manet, quia pacto convento obligationes non omnimodo dissolvuntur. Qua de causa efficax est adversus eum actio qua actor intendit, si paret eum dare oportere ; sed quia iniquum est con- tra pactionem eum damnari, defen- ditur per exceptionem pacti conventi. 3. Again, the debtor who has agreed with his creditor that payment shall not be demanded from him, still remains bound. For an agreement is not a mode by which obligations are always dissolved. The action, there- fore, in which the inte^itio runs, * If it appears that he ought to give,' may be validly brought against him ; but as it would be unjust that he should be condemned in contravention of the agreement, he may use in his defence the exception pacti conventi. Gal iv. 116. Obligations formed re or verbis could not be dissolved by a simple pact. As the contract was a subsisting one, an exception was necessary. The exception pacti conventi ran thus : Si inter Auluni Agerium et Numerium Negidium non convenit, ne ea pecu- nia peter etur. (Gai. iv. 119.) 4. So, too, if the debtor, when the creditor challenges him to swear, affirms on oath that he ought not to give, he still remains bound. But as it would be unjust to examine whether he has perjured himself, he is allowed to defend himself with the exception jurisjurandi. In actions in rem, these exceptions are equally necessary ; for instance, if the possessor, on being challenged by the claimant, swears that the property is his, and yet the plaintiff still persists in his real action. For the claim of the plaintiff might be well founded, and yet it would be un- just to condemn the possessor. D. xii. 2. 9, pr. and 1 ; D. xii. 2, 3. 1 ; D. xii. 2. 11. 1. The exceptio jurisjurandi was only necessary when the fact whether the defendant had accepted the oath when offered him was disputed. If it was acknowledged, the prastor would not give an action at all. (D. xii. 2, 3.) The oath terminated the right of the plaintiff to an action ; jusjurandum speciem trans- actionis continet, major eraque habet auctoritatem quam res judicata. (D. xii. 2. 2.) 4. ^que si debitor creditore de- ferente juraverit nihil se dare opor- tere, adhuc obligatus permanet ; sed quia iniquum est de perjurio quseri, defenditur per exceptionem jurisju- randi. In iis quoque actionibus quibus in rem agitur, seque neces- sarise sunt exceptiones, veluti si pe- titore deferente possessor juraverit eam rem suam esse, et nihilominus petitor eamdem rem vindicet ; licet enim verum. sit quod intendit, id est, rem ejus esse, iniquum tamen est possessorem condemnari. 5. Item si judicio tecum actum fuerit, sive in rem sive in personam, nihilominus obligatio durat, et ideo ipso jure de eadem re postea ad- versus te agi potest ; sed debes per exceptionem rei judicatse adjuvari. 5. Again, if an action real or per- sonal has been brought against you, the obligation still subsists, and, in strict law, an action might still be brought against you for the same ob- ject, but you are protected by the exception rei judicatse. Gai. iv. 106, 107. LIE. IV. TIT. XIII. 473 Under the system of the actions of law, if a cause had once been decided, no further action could again be brought on the same grounds (Gai. iv. 108) ; but this was not the case under the praetorian system. To understand the effect of a previous action having been brought under the praetorian system, we must notice the distinction drawn by Gains in the part of his Fourth Book which treats of exceptions between Jw6/zcz« legitima andj?^- dicia imperio continentia. A. judicium legitimum, i.e. founded on the old jus civile, was an action given in the city of Rome, or within the first milestone round the city, between Koman citizens, and tried by a single judge. A. judicium imperio continens, i.e. founded on the authority of the praetor, was an action given out of Kome, or tried by recuperatores, or one or both parties to which was a peregrinus,ov v^qyq peregrini. Judicia imperio continentia never extinguished the right of action, and therefore the plaintiff who brought an action for the second time had to be met with an ex- ception. With respect to judicia legitima, a further distinction is to be made. If they were in rem or in factum, the nature of these actions prevented the litis contestatio in their case operating as a novation ; and therefore, if a fresh action was brought, the defendant had to repel it by the exception rei judicatce. Accord- ingly we may say, in brief, that under the prsetorian system none hut judicia legitima in personam extinguished the right of action, and therefore in all other cases an exception was necessary. In the time of Justinian these distinctions had disappeared, and therefore he says generally that the res judicata produces an exception. It was to have the same force as it had formerly had in the case oi judicia imperio continentia, and not that it had re- ceived in judicia legitima. Whether the action was real or per- sonal, as the text informs us, the principal obligation still sub- sisted, and, no novation having taken place, a second action could only be repelled by an exception. But, practically speaking, under the system oi judicia extraordinaria, as the judge did not receive instructions from a magistrate, and was not bound within the limits of a formula, the distinction between the res judicata operating as a bar or as an exception was a very immaterial one. In order that a res judicata should be available either as a bar or an exception, it was necessary that there should have been, in the former action, the same thing as the subject-matter of the litigation, the same quantity, the same right, the same ground of action, the same parties. Cum qucRritur hcBc exceptio noceat necne, inspiciendum est an idem corpus sit : quantitas eadem, idem jus : an eadem causa petendi, eadem conditio personarum — qu(B nisi omnia concurrant, alia res est, (D. xliv. 2. 12. Bk. 14.) Gains also mentions the exceptio rei in judicium deducted, i.e. either that the case was already before the tribunals, as where, one of two {duo reipromittendi) having been sued, the other if sued could say that the case was already in the way of adjudication, or that the case had reached the litis contestatio, and had not been ended 474 LIB. IV. TIT. XIII. within the appointed time, i.e. within eighteen months if it was 2i judicium legitimum, or not within the duration of the power of the magistrate if it was imperio continens. See introductory note to Tit. 6. (Gai. iv. 107.) 6. Hsec exempli causa retulisse 6. The above examples of excep- sufficiet. Alioquin, quam ex multis tions may suffice. It may be seen in variisque causis exceptiones neces- the larger work of the Digest or Pan- saricie sint, ex latioribus Digestorum dects how numerous and how different seu Pandectarum libris intelligi po- are the causes which make exceptions test. necessary. 7. Quarum qua3dam e legibus vel 7. Some of these exceptions are ex iis quse legis vicem obtinent, vel derived from the laws, and from other ex ipsius praetoris jurisdictione sub- enactments having the force of law, or stantiam capiunt. from the jurisdiction of the prsetor. Gai. iv. 118. E legibus ; such as the exception nisi bonis cesserit, relative to the cession of the debtor's goods, under the lex Julia. Ex iis qucB legis vicem obtinent, i.e. senatus-consulta and con- stitutions. The exception under the rescript of Hadrian, permit- ting the employment of an exception doli mali when a plaintiff neglected to notice a counter-claim (see Tit. 6. 39), may serve as an example. 8. Appellantur autem exceptio- 8. Exceptions are either perpetual nes, aliee perpetuce et peremptorise, and peremptory, or temporary and aliae temporales et dilatorise. dilatory. D. xliv. 1. 3. The duration according to which exceptions are said to be perpetucE or temporales, is the length of time in which they can be used by the defendant if he has occasion, not the length of time during which their effect continues if they are employed. All exceptiones perpetucB were necessarily peremptoricB ; if found to be justified by the facts, they set the matter in litigation at rest for ever. All exceptiones temporales were necessarily dila^ toricB ; they did but defer the decision of the matter in question till the expiration of a certain time. 9. Perpetua3etx>eremptorisesunt, 9. Those are perpetual and per- quae semper agentibus obstant, et emptory which always present an ob- semper rem de qua agitur perimunt : stacle to the demand, for we cut away qualis est exceptio doli mali, et the ground on which it is brought ; quod metus causa factum est, et as, for instance, the exception doli pacti conventi, cum ita convenerit mali^ that metus causa, and that pacti ne omnino pecunia peteretur. conventi, when it has been agreed that no demand for the money shall ever be made. D. xHv. 1. 3. An act might be used for ever as an exception ; and yet if an action were brought grounded on it, that action might possibly LIE. IV. TIT. XIII. 475. have to be brought within a certain time. For instance, if fraud or violence had been used in the making of a contract, the ex- ception would be good whenever an action was brought on the contract ; but the person injured could only bring an actio doli or metus causa within a limited time. Hence it came to be said that such things were temporalia ad agendum, perpetua ad excipiendum. (SeeD. iliv. 4, 5, 6.) 10. Temi)orales atqtie dilatorise sunt, quae ad tempus nocent, et tem- poris dilationem tribiiunt : qualis est j)acti conventi, cum ita convenerit ne intra certum tempus ageretur, veluti intra quinquennium ; nam finito eo tempore non impeditur actor rem exequi. Ergo ii quibus intra certum tempus agere volenti- bus objicitur exceptio aut pacti conventi aut alia similis, differre debent actionem et post tempus agere ; ideo enim et dilatorise istse exceptiones appellantur. Alioquin, si intra tempus egerint, objectaque sit exceptio, neque eo judicio quid- quam consequerentur propter excep- tionem, neque post tempus olim agere poterant, cum temere -rem in judicium deducebant et consume- bant, qua ratione rem amittebant. Hodie autem non ita stricte hsec pro- cedere volumus ; sed eum qui ante tempus pactionis vel obligationis litem inferre ausus est, Zenonianae constitutioni subjacere censemus, quam sacratissimus legislator de iis qui tempore plus petierint, protulit : ut si inducias quas ipse actor sponte indulserit vel natura actionis con- tinet, contempserit, in duplum ha- beant ii qui talem injuriam passi sunt ; et post eas finitas non aliter litem suscipiant, nisi omnes expensas litis antea acceperint, ut actores tali poena perterriti tempora litium do- ceantur observare. 10. Those are temporary and dila- tory which present an obstacle for a certain time and procure delay. Such is the exception pacti conventi when it has been agreed that no action shall be brought for a certain time, as, for in- stance, for five years ; when once this period has elapsed, the plaintiff is not prevented from liringing his action. Those, therefore, who seek to bring the action before the expiration of the time, and are repelled by the exception pacti conventiy or any similar one, ought to put it off and to bring it after the time has elapsed ; hence these excep- tions are termed dilatory. If plaintiffs, have brought the action before the ex- piration of the time, and been repelled by the exception, they will not gain anything by the action they bring, be- cause of the exception ; and, formerly, they would not have been able again to bring an action on the expiration of the time, because they had rashly brought their claim before a judge,, and so used up their right to bring an action, and lost all they could claim. But at the present day we do not wish to proceed so rigorously ; any one who- shall venture to bring an action before the time fixed by the agreement or obligation shall be subject to the dis- positions of the constitution of Zeno, published by that emperor with respect to those who, in regard to time, ask more than is due to them. Conse- quently, if the plaintiff shall disregard the delay which he himself has volun- tarily accorded, or which results from the nature of the action, the delay shall be doubled for the benefit of those who have sustained such a wrong ; and even after the expiration of the time, these persons shall not be obliged to defend the action unless they have been first reimbursed for all the ex- penses of the former action, that a penalty so heavy may teach plaintiffs to have due regard to the delays that are to elapse before actions are brought. Gai. iv. 122, 323; C. iii. 10. 47 G LIB. IV. TIT. XIV. Alia similis. Gaius gives, as an instance, the exceptio litis divi- duce, given to repel a plaintiff who broke up into two actions his remedy for a single thing, and sued within the same prsetorship for the part he did not include in his first action. Gaius defines dilatory exceptions as those quce non semper locum liabent, sed £vitari possunt, (iv. 122.) ZenoniancE constitutioni. See Tit. 6. 33. 11. Prseterea etiam ex persona 11. There are also dilatory excep- dilatorise sunt exceptiones, quales tions by reason of the person : snch sunt procura>tori£e, veluti si per mi- are those objecting to a procurator ; litem aut mulierem agere quis velit : as, for instance, if a plaintiff wishes to nam militibus, nee pro patre vel have his cause conducted by a soldier matre vel uxore, nee ex sacro re- or woman, for soldiers cannot be pro- scripto, procuratorio nomine expc- curators even for their father, or riri conceditur ; suis vero negotiis mother, or wife, not even by virtue of superesse sine offensa disciplinse an imperial rescript ; but they may possunt. Eas vero exceptiones qua) conduct their own affairs without any olim procuratoribus propter infa- breach of discipline. As to the excep- miam vel dantis vel ipsius procu- tions formerly opposed to procurators ratoris opponebantur, cum in judi- on account of the infamy, either of the ciis frequentari nuUo modo perspe- person appointing the procurator, or ximus, conquiescere sancimus ; ne of the procurator himself, since we dum de his altercatur, ipsius negotii found that they were no longer used disceptatio proteletur. in practice, we have enacted that they shall be abolished, that no discussion as to their effect may prolong the course of the action itself. D. xUv. 1. 3 ; C. ii. 13. 7. 9. The exception to the procurator as an improper person only produced a delay ; directly the plaintiff appointed a proper per- son as procurator, the action proceeded. The infamia was that produced by being condemned in cer- tain actions, as in the actio tutelce, depositi^ pro socio, &c. After noticing exceptions, Gaius notices prescriptions, which orio:inallv had been limitations of the action inserted on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant. We have had an instance of the one inserted for the protection of the defendant in the pr(Rscrij)tio longi temporis (Bk. ii. Tit. 6. pr. note) ; but by the time of Gains all prescriptions on behalf of the defendant were ranked among ex- ceptions. Prescriptions on behalf of the plaintiff still remained where it was to the interest of the plaintiff that not all his right, but only so much of it as had given rise to an existing liability, should be sued on, so that he might not be barred from suing when other liabilities came into existence. (Gai. iv. 130. 9.) Tit. XIY. DE REPLICATIONIBUS. Interdum evenit ut exceptio, qure Sometimes an exception which at prima facie justa videatur, inique first sight seems just, is really unjust, noceat. Quod cum accidit, alia In this case, to place the plaintiff in allegatione opus est adjuvandi ac- a right position, it is necessary there LIB. IV. TIT. XIV. 477 should be another allegation, termed a replication, because it unfolds and resolves the right given by the excep- tion. For example, supposing a cre- ditor has agreed with a debtor not to demand payment, and then makes an agreement to the contrary ; that is, that he may demand payment ; if, when the creditor brings his action, the debtor uses the exception, alleging that he ought only to be condemned if his creditor is not under an agreement not to demand payment, this exception presents an obstacle to the creditor. For it remains true that this agree- ment was made, although a contrary agreement was afterwards made. But as it would be unjust to deprive the creditor of his remedy, he will be per- mitted to use a replication founded on the latter agreement. Gai. iv. 126. All that has been said on the use and nature of exceptions is applicable to replications, which are but exceptions of an excep- tion. (D. xliv.^1. 22.) It is to be remarked that there could not be an exceptio doli mail to an exceptio doli niali. If the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud, it could not strengthen his right of action that the defend- ant had also been guilty. (D. xliv. 4. 4. 13.) toris gratia, quae replicatio vocatur, quia per earn replicatur atque re- sol vitur jus exceptionis : veluti, cum pactus est aliquis cum debitore suo ne ab eo pecuniam petat, deinde postea in contrarium pacti sunt, id est, ut creditori petere liceat. Si agat creditor, et excipiat debitor, ut ita demum condemnetur, si non con- venerit ne eam pecuniam creditor petat, nocet ei exceptio. Convenit enim ita : namque nihilominus hoc verum manet, licet postea in contra- rium pacti sint ; sed quia iniquum est creditorem excludi, replicatio ei dabitur ex posteriore pacto convento. 1. R-ursus interdum evenitut re- plicatio, qufle prima facie justa est, inique noceat. Quod cum accidit, alia allegatione opus est, adjuvandi rei gratia, quae duplicatio vocatur. 1. The replication, in its turn, may, at first sight, seem just, and yet be really unjust. In this case, to aid the defendant, it is necessary there should be a further allegation, termed a duiMcatio. Gai. iv. 127. 2. Et si rursus ea prima facie justa videatur, sed propter aliquam cau- sam actori inique noceat, rursus alia allegatione opus est, qua actor ad- juvetur, quae dicitur triplicatio. 2. And if, again, the duplicatio may seem just, but is really unjust, there is wanted to aid the plaintiflf a still further allegation, termed a triplicatio. Gai. iv. 128. 3. Quarum omnium exceptio- num usum, interdum ulterius quam diximus, varietas negotiorum intro- ducit : quas omnes apertius ex Di- gestorum latiore volumine facile est coenioscere. 3. The great diversity of affairs has made it requisite to carry still further the use of these exceptions. A clearer knowledge of them all may be obtained by reading the fuller work of the Digest. Gai. iv. 129. 4. Exceptiones autem quibus de- bitor defenditur, plerumque accom- modari solent etiam fidejussoribus ejus et recta ; quia quod ab iis pe- 4. The exceptions given for the protection of the debtor are also for the most part given in behalf of his Jldejnssores, and rightly so ; for wliat ■478 LIB. IV. TIT. XV. titur, id ab ipso debitore peti vide- tur, quia mandati judicio redditurus est eis quod ii ^Dro eo solverint. Qua ratione, et si de non petenda pecunia pactus quis cum reo fuerit, placuit perinde succurrendum esse ]per exceptionem pacti conventi illis quoque qui pro eo obligati essent, ac si cum ipsis pactus esset ne ab eis ea pecunia peteretur. Sane queedam exceptiones non solent hisaccommo- dari ; ecce enim debitor, si bonis suis cesserit, et cum eo creditor ex- periatur, def enditur per exceptionem nisi bonis cesserit ; sed lii^ec exceptio lidejussoribus non datur, ideo scilicet quia qui alios pro debitore obligat, hoc maxime prospicit, ut cum facul- tatibus lapsus fuerit debitor, possit ab iis quos pro eo obligavit, suum consequi. is demanded from them is really de- manded from the debtor, because by the actio mandati he will be forced to repay them what they have paid for him. Hence, if a creditor agrees with his debtor not to demand payment, the exception pacti conventi may be em- ployed by those who are bound for him, exactly as if the agreement not to demand payment had been made with them personally. There are, however, some exceptions not allowed them ; for instance, if the debtor has made a cession of his property, and the creditor sues him, he may protect himself by the exception nisi bonis ces- serit ; but this exception is not allowed to fidejussores. For, in taking security for the payment of a debt, Avhat the creditor principally looks to is reco- vering what is owed him from the sureties, in case of the insolvency of the principal. D. xliv. 1. 19 ; D. ii. 14. 32. Exceptions were divided into r-ei cohcBrentes, which affected the right to claim, and personce cohcercntes, which only protected the debtor himself. As an instance of an exceptio cohcBvcns rei may be given an exceptio doli mali, or a general pact not to sue. As an instance of an exceptio colicer^ens personcR may be given that mentioned in the text, where the debtor was protected by having given up all his property, or a particular pact not to sue the debtor personally. Generally the fidejussors of the defendant could use the exceptions which he could have used ; but this was not always, as the text points out, true of those personce cohcerentes, as in the case of the exception nisi bonis cesserit. Tit. XV. DE INTEKDICTIS. We have now to ;^reat of interdicts and the actions which supply their place. Interdicts were certain for- mulas by which the prsetor ordered or forbad something to be done ; they were chiefly employed in disputes as to possession or quasi possession. Sequitur ut dispiciamus de inter- dictis, seu actionibus quse pro his exercentur. Erant autem interdicta formae atque conceptiones verborum quibus prsetor aut jubebat aliquid lieri, aut fieri prohibebat : quod tunc maxime faciebat, cum de possessione aut quasi possessione inter aliquos contendebatur. Gai. iv. 138, 139. An interdict was a decree or edict of the praetor made in a special case. The praetor published a general edict stating the leadino- principles on which he would act. But in certain cases he would make an edict applicable only to particular persons and particular things. Instead, for instance, of referring the party applying to him for relief to the general rule of law that one man LIB. IV. TIT. XV, 479 should not be allowed to interfere with the watercourses of an- other, he made an edict that A should not interfere with the watercourses of B. According to the circumstances of the case such a command might be either positive or negative ; and though, as is remarked in paragr. 1, the word inter dictum was considered to apply more properly to a negative command only, it was, as a matter of usage, applied to all such special edicts indifferently : and Justinian seems to suppose that interdicere does not mean, as Gains assumes, to forbid, but inter duos dicere, to decide between two parties. (See paragr. 1.) If the person to whom the special edict was addressed obeyed its directions, no further proceedings were necessary ; if he as- serted that he had not done wrong, the pr^tor allowed an action to be brought grounded on the interdict. A sketch of the mode in which the proceedings grounded on an interdict were conducted ivill be found in the notes to paragr. 8. There was always something of a public character in the rea- sons which induced the praetor to grant an interdict. He adopted it as a speedy and sure remedy in cases when danger was threat- ened to objects which public policy is especially interested to pre- serve uninjured, such as public roads and waters, burial-grounds, or sacred places ; and though interdicts were granted where the quarrel was entirely between private parties, it was originally, perhaps, only when the subject of dispute was such as to render a breach of the public peace the probable result, unless the matter was set at rest by the summary interposition of legal authority. If, for instance, it was a possession or quasi-possession that was •disputed, it might be feared that the claimant would adopt force to eject the actual occupier, that force would be met by force, and the public peace be broken ; and the limitation of the time — one year — within which, as we shall see, interdicts had in many cases to be applied for, seems to connect the acts giving rise to them with delicts. (Poste, Gai, 501.) This public character attaching to interdicts may suggest that they were originally given to pro- tect public, not private interests. Niebuhr (Hist. Bom. vol. ii. 149) and Savigny (Possess. Bk. iv. 44) think that in the private occupancy of the ager puhlicus may be seen an interest so little protected otherwise, and calling so precisely for some such aid as the interdict, that it can hardly be doubted that the early use of interdicts was directed to meet the exigencies of this particular case. Anyhow, as the civil law did not deal with possession apart from ownership, a remedy became necessary when the proctors recognised possession, and, after the prastorian system was fully established, a character of settled law was imposed upon the mode of giving interdicts by the pra3tor announcing in his edict that he would grant a particular interdict under particular cir- cumstances. Interdicts were given, as the text informs us, to protect not only the possession of corporeal things, but the quasi- possession of servitudes. (See Bk. ii. Tit. 3, 4.) 480 XI B. IV. TIT. XV. Even before the introduction of the system of extraor dinar ia judicia, interdicts had become, probably, less frequently used, there being a tendency to go direct to the action grounded on them, and to do away with the interdict as a preliminary step. In the time of Justinian persons who under the praetorian system would have applied for an interdict, brought an action. In con- ducting this action, the magistrate would be greatly guided by the old law relating to interdicts ; but otherwise, the subject of interdicts was one with which the law of the Lower Empire had very little to do. 1. The principal division of inter- dicts is, that they are prohibitory, re^ stitntory, or exhibitory. Prohibitory interdicts are those by which the preetor forbids something to be done, as, for example, to use force against a person in lawful possession, or against one who carries a dead body to a spot where he has a right to carry it, or to build on a sacred place, or to do any- thing in a public river, or on its bank, which may impede the navigation- Restitutory interdicts are those by which the prsetor orders something to be restored, as, for instance, when he orders to be restored to the possessor the possession of the goods of an in- heritance possessed by another as heir or as possessor, or when he orders the; possession of land to be restored to the person who has been violently expelled from it. Exhibitory interdicts are those by which the j)ra3tor orders to exliibit ; for instance, to exhibit the person whose freedom is being ques- tioned, or the freedman whose services are claimed by the patron, or to ex- hibit to the father the children in his power. Some, however, think that the term interdict ought, strictly speaking, to be applied to those which are j^roliibitory, because interdicere means ' to denounce, to prohibit,' while those that are restitutory or exhibi- tory ought to be called decreta. But usage has applied the word interdict to aU alike, as they are all given be- tween two parties. Gai. iv. 139, 140. 142. 144 ; D. xliii. 1, 2. 1. The formula of many of the interdicts most ordinarily in use is preserved to us in the Digest. It would take up too much space to give many of these at length. One or two examples of each kind must suffice. The formula of the prohibitory interdict generally ended with 1. Summa autem divisio inter- dictorum hasc est, quod aut prohi- bitoria sunt, aut restitutoria, aut ex- hibitoria. Prohibitoria sunt, quibus vetat aliquid fieri, veluti vim sine vitio possidenti, vel mortuum in- ferenti quo ei jus erat inferendi, vel in loco sacro sedificari, vel in flumine publico ripave ejus aliquid fieri quo pejus navigetur. Restitutoria sunt, quibus restitui aliquid jubet, veluti bonorum possessori possessionem eorum quae quis pro herede aut pro possessore possidet ex ea hereditate, aut cum jubet ei qui vi possessione fundi dejectus sit, restitui posses- sionem. Exhibitoria sunt per qu£e jubet exhiberi, veluti eum cujus de libertate agitur, aut libertum cui patronus operas indicere velit, aut parent! liberos qui in potestate ejus sunt. Sunt tamen qui putant pro- prie interdicta ea vocari qua3 prohi- bitoria sunt, quia interdicere est de- nuntiare et prohibere ; restitutoria autem et exhibitoria proprie decreta vocari ; sed tamen obtinuit omnia interdicta appellari, quia inter duos dicuntur. LIB. IV. TIT. XV. 481 the words veto or vim fieri veto. That forbidding nuisances in public ways ran thus : — In via publica itinereve publico facere, immittere quid, quo ea via idve iter deterius fiat, veto. (D. xliii. 8. 2. 20.) That forbidding interruption in the use of a burial-ground ran thus : — Quo quave illi (the person protected), inferre invito te (the person against whom the interdict wasgranted),j*z^5 est^ quominus illi eo eave mortuum inferre et ibi sepelire liceat, vim fieri veto, (D. xi. 8. 1.) Other prohibitory interdicts may be found relating to sacred places (D. xi. 8. 1), tombs (D. xi. 8. 1), public places (D. xliii. 8. 2. 20), navigation (D. xliii. 12. 1). Restitutory interdicts ran, for example, thus : — Quod in fiumine publico ripave ejus factum, sive quid in flu- men ripamve ejus immissum liabes si ob id oliter aqua fiuit, atque uti prior e (Estate fluxit, restituas, (D. xliii. 13. 11.) Restituere is used in a very wide sense, as it includes not only, as in this example, putting back things into the state they were before, and giving back possession, but giving possession to a per- son who had not had possession. Of exhibitory interdicts, which were used as the preliminary of a vindication, we may take as a specimen that de libero homine exhibendo, granted to make any one who had a freeman in his cus- tody produce him, and thus render it impossible that he should be illegally retained in his custody. It ran thus : — Quern liberum dolo malo retineas, exhibeas. (D. xliii. 29. 1.) 2. Sequens divisio interdictorum 2. The second division of interdicts hsec est, quod qiiaedam adipiscendse is, that they are given to some to ac- possessionis causa comparata sunt, quire, some to retain, and others to qusedam retinendse, qusedam recu- recover possession. perandie. Gai. iv. 143. As interdicts were mainly applied to questions of the possessory rights of private persons, those interdicts which distinctly referred to such possession are here classed together. But they fall under the heads of the first division. Interdicts retinendcB possessionis were prohibitory ; interdicts adipiscendcB or recuperandce possessionis were restitutory. 3. Adipiscendse possessionis causa 3. To acquire possession an inter- interdictum accommodatur bonorum diet is given to the honorunn possessor, possessori, quod appellatur quorum termed Quorum honorum, of which the bonorum. Ejusque vis et potestas effect is to compel the person possess- hsec est, ut quod ex iis bonis quisque ing, as heir or possessor, any of the quorum possessio alicui data est, pro goods of which the possession is given, herede aut pro possessore possideat, to make restitution to the bonorum id ei cui bonorum possessio data est possessor. A person is said to possess restituere debeat. Pro herede autem as heir, who thinks himself to be heir, possidere videtur, qui putat se here- and as possessor, who, without any dem esse ; pro possessore is possidet, right, and knowing that it does not qui nullo jure rem hereditariam vel belong to him, possesses a part or the I I 482 LIB. IV. TIT. XV. etiam totam hereditatem, sciens ad whole of an inheritance. It is said of so non pertinere, possidet. Ideo this interdict, that it is given to acquire autem adipiscendee possessionis vo- possession, because it is only available catur interdictum, quia ei tantum for a person who wishes to gain, for utile est qui nunc primum conatur the first time, possession of a thing, adipisci rei possessionem : itaque si If, then, a person who has gained pos- quis adeptus possessionem amiserit session loses it, he cannot avail him- eam, hoc interdictum ei inutile est. self of this interdict. There is, too, Interdictum quoque quod appel- another interdict given to acquire pos- latur Salvianum, adipiscendae pos- session, viz. the interdictum Salvia- sessionis causa comparatum est, num., to which an owner of land has eoque utitur dominus fundi de re- recourse to enforce his right over the bus coloni, quas is pro mercedibus things belonging to the farmer, which fundi pignori futuras pepigisset. the farmer has pledged as a security for his r^Qt. Gai. iv. 144. 147. The interdict Quorum honorum ran thus : — Quorum honorum ex edicto meo illipossessio data est, quod de his bonis pro herede aut pro possessore possides, possideresve si nihil usucaptum esset, quod quidem dolo fecisti ut desineres possidere, id illi restituas, (D. xliii. 2.) Although the interdict was only given when the honorum possessor had never before had possession, yet it was restitutory, a term used very widely, as has been observed in the note to paragr. 1, and the wordi restituas appears in its terms. Restituas, therefore, must be used as meaning * to give up,' not ^ to give back.' The use of this interdict was to secure the possession to those whom the praetor treated as having a right to the inheritance, but who had not a right recognised by the civil law. Not being heirs, properly so called, they could not bring a real action for the inheritance. (See Bk. iii. Tit. 9.) It will be observed from the formula that the interdict might be used against the person pos- sessing pro herede or pro possessore, although the time of usu- capion had run in his favour, and against such a person if, having possessed, he had, through dolus malus on his part, ceased to possess. The person possessing pro possessore, i.e. without any alle- gation of title, is sometimes spoken of as prcedo. (See page 439.) We must not confound the interdictum Salvianum with the actio Serviana (see Tit. fi. 7), but it was probably only a step to that action, and may have fallen into disuse when the actio Serviana was established as a means of redress for the creditor. The inter- dictum Salvianum was not given to every mortgage creditor, but only to the owner of a rural estate, as a means of getting posses- sion of the goods of the occupier of the estate which had been pledged for the rent. Probably the interdict was granted even if the goods had passed into the hands of a third party. (D. xliii. 33. 1, but see C. viii. 9. 1.) Gains mentions two other interdicts coming under this head, one given to honorum emptores, and one to sectores, or purchasers of public goods, (iv. 155, 156.) 4. Retmendae possessionis causa 4. To retain possession there are comparata sunt interdicta uti possi- given the interdicts uti possidetis and LIB. IV. TIT. XV. 483 utruhi, when, in a dispute as to the ownership of a thing, a dispute first rises which of the parties ought to be possessor and which plaintiff. For, unless it is first determined to which the possession belongs, it is impossible to shaj)e the real action, as law and reason both require that one party should possess, and the other bring his claim against him. And as it is much more advantageous to possess than to claim the thing, there is gene- rally a keen dispute as to the right to possess. The advantage of possession consists in this, that even if the thing does not really belong to the possessor, yet, if the plaintiff does not prove himself to be the owner, the possessor still remains in possession, and, there- fore, when the rights of the parties are doubtful, it is customary to decide against the claimant. The interdict uti possidetis applies to the possession of land and buildings, the interdict utruhi to that of moveables. There were formerly great differences in their effects ; for, in the interdict uti possidetis, he prevailed who was in possession at the time of the in terdict, provided that he had not acquired possession from his adver- sary by force, or clandestinely, or as a concession ; but it made no difference if he had acquired it from any one else, by forcibly expelling him, secretly depriving him of possession, or obtain- ing from him possession as a conces- sion. In the interdict utruhi, on the contrary, he prevailed, who during the greater part of the preceding year had had the possession without having obtained it as against his adversary by force, clandestinely, or as a concession. At the present day it is different, for the two interdicts have the same effect as regards possession, so that whether the thing claimed is an immoveable or a moveable, he prevails, who, at the time of the litis contestatio, is in pos- session, without having obtained it as against his adversary by force, clan- destinely, or as a concession. Oai. iv. 148-150 ; D. vi. 1. 24; D. xliii. 17. 1 ; D. xliii. 31 ; C. iv. 19. 2. The interdict uti possidetis ran thus : — Uti eas aides, quihus de agitur, nee vi, nee clam, nee precario alter ah altera possidetis, quominus ita possideatls vim fieri veto. (D. xliii. 17. 1.) It was granted to defend the possession of all immoveables^ I I 2 -detis et utrubi, cum ab utraque parte de proprietate alien jus rei contro- versia sit, et ante quseritur uter ex litigatoribus possidere, et uter petere debeat : namque, nisi ante explora- rtum fuerit utrius eorum possessio sit, non potest petitoria actio insti- tui, quia et civilis et naturalis ratio facit ut alius possideat, alius a pos- sidente petat. Et quia longe com- modius est possidere potius quam petere, ideo plerumque et fere sem- j)er ingens existit contentio de ipsa possessione. Commodum autem pos- sidendi in eo est, quod etiamsi ejus res non sit qui possidet, si modo actor non potuerit suam esse pro- bare, remanet suo loco possessio : propter quam causam, cum obscura -sunt utriusque jura, contra petito- rem judicari solet. Sed interdicto quidem uti possidetis de fundi vel medium possessione contenditur, utrubi vero interdicto de rerum mobilium possessione. Quorum vis ac potestas plurimam inter se diffe- rentiam apud veteres habebat : nam uti possidetis interdicto is vincebat, qui interdicti tempore possidebat, si ■modo nee vi nee clam nee precario nactus fuerat ab adversario posses- sionem, etiamsi alium vi expulerat, aut clam arripuerat alienam posses- sionem, aut precario rogaverat ali- quem ut sibi possidere liceret ; utrubi vero interdicto is vincebat, qui ma- jore parte ejus anni nee vi nee clam nee precario ab adversario posside- bat. Hodie tamen aliter observatur ; nam utriusque interdicti potestas (quantum ad possessionem pertinet) exsequata est : ut ille vincat et in re soli et in re mobili, qui possessionem nee vi nee clam nee precario ab ad- versario litis contestatse tempore detinet. 484 LIB. IV. TIT. XV. except cloaccB, which, were expressly excepted by the praetor's edict. The word cedes in the text of the interdictis only an example. By -possessing precario is meant possessing by having extorted possession by prayer and entreaties. When the person from whom the possession had been extorted wished to do so, he could always resume it ; and hence the word precarius came to mean uncertain. Perhaps the origin of precaria possessio was the in- terest that clients had in a portion of the ager publicus, which their patron might permit them to use, and which they were bound to restore immediately if their patron demanded it back. The words alter ah altera are inserted, because it would be no ground for disturbing the possession that it had been obtained vi, clam, or precario, unless it had been so obtained from the other litigant party. It was necessary that application should be made for this in- terdict within a year after the security of the possession had been threatened. (D. xliii. 17. 1.) It did not signify how it had been threatened. The text only refers to the case of an action being brought to dispute it, but the interdict would be granted in whatever way the possession had been attacked. The interdict utruhi ran thus : — TJtruhl hie homo quo de oqitur majore parte hujusce anni fuity quominus is eum ducat, vim Jiero veto. (D. xliii. 31.) The example is taken from the case of the disputed possession of a slave, but the interdict applied to the case of all moveables» This interdict was considered one retinendce possessionis, although, as it was granted to the person who had possessed during the greater part of the preceding year, it might happen that it was granted to a person who had not the possession at the exact time it was granted, but who had possessed the thing during more months in the year than the person Y\^ho happened to be in pos- session at the end of the year. 5. Possidere autem videtur quis- 5. A person is considered to pos- que, non solum si ipse possideat, sess not only when he himself pos- sed et si ejus nomine aliquis in pos- sesses, but also if any one is in sessione sit, licet is ejus juri sub- possession in his name, although not jectus non sit, qualis est colon us et a person in his power, as the tenant inquilinus. Per eos quoque apud of a farm or building. He may also quos deposuerit quis, aut quibus possess through a depositary or a commodaverit, ipse possidere vi- borrower, and this it is that is meant detur ; et hoc est quod dicitur, by saying, that a person may retain retinere i)ossessionem posse aliquem possession by any other who possesses per quemlibet qui ejus nomine sit in his name. Moreover, it is held that in possessione. Quinetiam animo possession may be retained by mere quoque retineri possessionem placet, intention only, that is, that although a id est, ut quamvis neque ipse sit person is not in possession himself, nor in possessione, neque ejus nomine is any one else in his name, yet, if it is alius, tamen si non derelinquendse not with any intention of abandoning possessionis animo, sed postea re- the thing, but of returning again to it, versurus inde discesserit, retinere that he has placed himself at a dis- possessionem videatur. Adipisci tance from it, he is considered still to vero possessionem per quos aliquis retain the possession. Through whom LIB. IV. TIT. XV. 485 potest, secundo libro exposuimus ; possession may be acquired, we have nee uUa dubitatio est quin animo already explained in the Second Book, solo adipisci possessionem nemo But it most certainly can never be ac- potest. quired by mere intention only. Gai. iv. 153. In tlie introductory note to Bk. ii. Tit. 6, the distinction has been pointed out between civilis possessio, that is, possession bona jide and ex just a causa., which could be transmuted by usucapion into ownership, and naturalis possessio, which again is divided into possessio where, although there is not possession such as will ripen by usucapion, there is still possession as a matter of fact, coupled with the intention of treating the thing as if the possessor were the owner, and in possessione esse, where the person has the deten- tio, but not the animus possidendi. Civilis possessio and naturalis j)ossessio with the intention of ownership were protected by these possessory interdicts, whereas the being merely in possession was not. This paragraph points out (1) that one person may be in possession while another is the possessor, and that the first is not, while the second is, entitled to the interdicts ; and (2) that a pos- sessor may sometimes possess only with the animus without being actually on the spot possessing. An instance given in Gains is that of a man who possesses a mountain pasture, and leaves it when the season for its use is over, with the intention of returning. (Gai. iv. 153), although the mere intention to possess as owner, without the physical fact of detention having ever taken place, was of no avail. 6. Recuperandsepossessionis causa solet interdici, si quis ex possessione fundi vel sediiim vi dejectus fuerit ; nam ei proponitur interdictum unde vi, per quod is qui dejecit, cogitur «i restituere possessionem, licet is ab eo qui dejecit vi vel clam vel precario possidebat. Sed ex constitutionibus sacris, ut supra diximus, si quis rem per vim occupaverit, si quidem in bonis ejus est, dominio ejus priva- tur ; si aliena, post ejus restitutionem etiam sestimationem rei dare vim passo compellitur. Qui autem ali- quem de possessione per vim deje- cerit, tenetur lege Julia de vi pri- vata, aut de vi publica : sed de vi privata, si sine armis vim fecerit ; sin autem cum armis eum de pos- sessione expulerit, de vi publica. Armorum autem appellatione non solum scuta et gladios et galeas sig- nificari intelligimus, sed et fustes et lapides. 6. To recover possession an inter- dict is given in case any one has been expelled by violence from the posses- sion of land or a building. He has then given him the interdict unde vi, by which he who has expelled him is forced to restore to him the posses- sion, although the person to whom the interdict is given has himself taken by force, clandestinely, or as a concession, the possession from the person who has expelled him. But, as we have said above, the imperial constitutions provide that if any one seizes on a thing by violence, he shall lose the ownership of it, if it is a part of his own goods, and if it belongs to another, he shall not only restore it, but, in addition, pay to the i)erson who has sustained the injury, the amount at which the thing is estimated. More- over, a jjerson who has expelled by violence another from his possession, is liable under the lex Julia for pri- vate or for pubHc violence ; for private violence, if his violence was exercised without the use of arms ; for public 486 LIB. IV. TIT. XV. violence, if the expulsion from pos- session was made by armed force. Under the term arms are included, not only shields, swords, and helmets^ but sticks and stones. Gai. iv. 154, 155 ; D. xlviii. 7 ; D. 1. 16. 41 ; C. viii. 4. 7. The interdict wide vi ran thus : — Unde tu ilium, vi dejecisti, aiit familia tua dejecit, de eo, quce- que ille tunc ihi hahuit, tantummodo intra annum, post annum de eo quod ad eum qui vi dejecit pervenerit, judicium daho. (D. xliii, 16. 1.) Formerly a distinction was made in granting this interdict, according to the degree of violence used. If it had been ordinary- violence {vis quotidiand), the interdict was only granted if the. possession had not been obtained vi, clam, or precario, with respect to the adversary (Gai. iv. 144), and could only be obtained within a year ; but if vis armata had been employed, the interdict was granted in all cases. (Cic. Epist. xv. 16.) This difference had ceased long before the time of Justinian, and apparently before the time when the interdict assumed the shape in which we now find it in the Digest, by which, as will be seen, possession was given within a year, of the thing as it then was ; after a year, only of the^ thing as it came into the hands of the dispossessor. The interdict unde vi only applied to immoveables (D. xliii.. 16. 6) ; but the constitution of Valentinian, Theodosius, and Ar- cadian, A.D. 389, referred to in the text (and in Tit. 2. 1), pro- tected moveables as well as immoveables. (C. viii. 4. 7.) The lex Julia de vi is treated of in Tit. 18. 8. Possession could be recovered by uti and utrubi possidetis as well as by unde vi, and it was by utruhi possidetis that, previously to the constitution above mentioned, possession of moveables was recovered. But the interdict unde vi was in some respects more- advantageous than uti possidetis, (1) It gave a remedy where not the dispossessor, but a third person, was in possession (D. xliii.. 16. 1. 40) ; (2) it gave, if brought within a year, t]iQfructus from the time of the ejectment, not as uti possidetis merely from the commencement of proceedings (D. xliii. 16. 1. 40) ; and (3) it was not, if the vis had been armata, or after the distinction between the characters of the violence employed had been done away, barred by the vices of the possession of the applicant for the interdict ;> (4) it applied not only to immoveables, but to any moveables^ thereon. (D. xliii. 16. 1. 6.) There were other interdicts under the head of recuperandcB possessionis— that de precario and that de clandestina possessionem (D. xliii. 26. 2, pr. ; D. x. 3. 7. 5) ; but little is known of them. 7. Tertia divisio interdictorum 7. The third division of interdicts, hsec est, quod aut simplicia sunt, is, that they are either simple or aut duplicia. Simplicia sunt, veluti double. Those are simple in whiclt. LIB. IV. TIT. X7. 487 in quibus alter actor, alter reus est, qualia sunt omnia restitutoria aut exhibitoria : namque actor est, qui desiderat aut exhiberi aut restitui, reus est is a quo desideratur ut resti- tuat aut exhibeat. Prohibitoriorum autem interdictorum alia simplicia sunt, veluti cum prohibet praetor in loco sacro vel in flumine publico ripave ejus aliquid fieri ; nam actor est qui desiderat ne quid fiat, reus est qui aliquid facere conatur. Du- plicia sunt, veluti uti possidetis in- terdictum et utrubi ; ideo autem duplicia vocantur, quia par utrius- que litigatoris in his conditio est, nee quisquam prsecipue reus vel actor intelligitur, sed unusquisque tarn rei quam actoris partes sustinet. one person is plaintiff and the other defendant, as is the case in all that are restitutory or exhibitory. For he is the plaintiff who wishes that a thing shall be exhibited or restored, and he is defendant against whom the claim is made. But of prohibitory inter- dicts some are simple, some double : simple, as, for instance, when the prae- tor forbids anything to be done in a sacred place, or in a public river, or on its banks ; for he is plaintiff who wishes that the thing should not be done, and he is defendant who wishes to do it : double, as in the case of the interdicts uti possidetis and utruhi ; and these interdicts are called double, because in them the position of each party is equal, for neither can be said to be properly plaintiff or defendant, but each is at once plaintiff and de- fendant. Gai. iv. 156-160. Diiplicia sunt^ veluti uti J) OS sidetis inter dictum et utruhi. These interdicts here and in Gains (Gai. iv. 160) are, seemingly, only adduced as examples, but we know of no others having the same character. 8. De ordine et vetere exitu in- terdictorum supervacuum est hodie dicere ; nam quoties extra ordinem jus dicitur (qualia sunt hodie omnia judicia), non est necesse reddi in- terdictum ; sed perinde judicatur sine interdictis, ac si utilis actio ex causa interdicti reddita fuisset. 8. Of the process and effect of in- terdicts in former times it would be now superfluous to speak. For when- ever the jurisdiction is extraordinary, as is the case now in all actions, there is no necessity for an interdict ; for judgment is given without interdicts, exactly as if a utilis actio had been given in pursuance of an interdict. C. viii. 1. 3. From the Institutes of Gains we gather a general notion of the manner in which the proceedings on an interdict were con- ducted. But the text of Gains is, in this part, very imperfect and difficult to understand, and as the whole process was obsolete in the time of Justinian, a very short sketch of the proceedings must suffice here. The parties were made to appear in jure exactly in the same way when an interdict was to be applied for as when an action was to be brought. The prsetor heard the statement of the party who made the application, and if the adversary confessed the truth of the statement, or the facts were manifest, the praetor an- nounced his decree at once, and had it executed, if necessary, by the strong arm of the law {manu militari). If the merits of the case were doubtful, and the defendant asserted that he had not done wrong, the prajtor gave an action based upon the interdict, to ascertain whether the facts were as the plaintiff, in applying for 488 LIB. IV. TIT. XVI. the interdict, alleged ; that is, the intentio of the formula was the language of the interdict put as a hypothetical case. The interdict would run, — Hoc vel illud te facere veto : the intentio, Si hoc vel illud A. A. fecerit (^condemna, &c.). The parties bound themselves by a sponsio and restipulatio in a penal sum, which the defendant was to pay if he was in the wrong, and to receive if he was not. But this practice, which was always adopted when the interdict was prohibitory, was probably gradually abandoned when the interdict was restitutory or exhibitory ; and in these cases, in order to com- pel the actual performance of the act ordered by the prsetor, an action was given with a formula arhitraria, so that the judex might issue a preparatory order to the defendant, and, if it was not complied with, might make him pay the amount of all damage sustained (^quanti ea res erit), (Gai. iv. 161, and foil.) Tit. XVI. DE PCENA TEMERE LITIGANTIUM. Nunc admonendi sumus magnam We may here observe, that the curam egisse eos qui jura sustine- authors and preservers of our law bant, ne facile homines ad litigan- have always sought most anxiously dum procederent, quod et nobis to hinder men from engaging too studio est ; idque eo maxime fieri recklessly in law-suits, and it is what potest, quod temeritas tam agentium we ourselves desire also. And the best quam eorum cum quibus ageretur, method of succeeding in it is, to repress modo pecuniaria pcena, modo juris- the rashness alike of plaintiffs and of jurandi religione, modo infamise defendants, sometimes by a pecuniary metu coercetur. penalty, sometimes by the sacred tie of an oath, sometimes by the fear of in- famy. Gai. iv. 174, and foil. In the days of Gains, the means of punishing persons who recklessly brought or defended a suit were more numerous. The plaintiff was restrained from recklessly bringing an action not only by being condemned in damages and costs, but (1) by an action of calumny — that is, the defendant could bring against a plaintiff who had sued him dishonestly an action by which the defendant could recover one-tenth of what the plaintiff had claimed, if by action, and one-fourth of what he had claimed, if by interdict (Gai. iv. 1175); (2) by what was termed the "contrary action " the unsuccessful plaintiff, although he had honestly brought his action, was made to pay a tenth or a fifth of what he claimed, but then it was only failing in a few special actions, such as that injuriarum, that exposed him to this risk ; (3) by oath, i.e. by the defendant calling on him to swear to his bona fides, but if the defendant did this, he could not afterwards bring an action of calumny, or the contrary action ; and (4) by restipulatio, i.e. by being called on to wager a sum to be lost if he failed, which was allowed in certain actions ; this mode of proceeding excluded the three others previously mentioned. In the law as described by Gaius, the defendant was restrained from recklessly defending an action (1) by the sponsio, or wager LIB. IV. TIT. XVI. 489 that he would lose, allowed in certain actions (the sponsio and restipulatio made up the wager) ; (2) in certain actions, as, for instance, for deposit in case of necessity, the penalty was double in case of denial (Tit. 6. 17), and all actions with a penalty are looked on by Gaius as restraining the defendant (i v. 171); (3) if the case was one where no restraint operated under these first two heads, the defendant was obliged to take an oath of hona fides ; (4) certain actions carried infamy with them against the persons condemned. 1. And first, under our constitu- tion, an oath is administered to all defendants. And the defendant is not admitted to state his defence until he has sworn that it is from a persua- sion of the goodness of his own. cause that he resists the demand of the plaintiff. In many cases the action is raised so as to be for the double or treble value against those who deny; for instance, in the case of wrongful damage, or of legacies left to holy places. There are other cases, in which, from the beginning, the action is more than for the single value, as, for instance, the action /itr^i manifesti for the quadruple, and furti nee mani- festi for the double. In these cases and in some others, whether the de- fendant denies or confesses, the action is for more than the single value. The litigiousness of the plaintiff is also re- strained, for he is obliged by our con- stitution to take the oath de calwmnia. The advocates also of each party take an oath prescribed by another of our constitutions. All these formalities have been introduced to replace the old action calumnise, which is fallen into disuse, for it subjected the plain- tiff to a fine of the tenth of the value of the thing in dispute ; but we have never known this penalty enforced. In its stead, there has, in the first place, been introduced the oath we have just mentioned ; and, in the next place, a person who brings a ground- less action is made to reimburse his adversary for all losses and expenses he has been put to. Gai. iv. 173 ; C. ii. 59. 2 ; C. iii. 1. 13. 6 ; C. iii. 1. 14. 1. For the terms of these oaths see C. ii. 59. 2 ; C. iii. 1. 14. 1. Vel tripli. We know of no actions in which there was a penalty of treble against a defendant who denied the claim. Perhaps the word tripli has slipped in from the text of Gaius, in which it refers to actions /wr^z oblati, &c. (Gai. iv. 171. 173.) 1. Ecce enim jusjurandum om- nibus qui conveniuntur, ex consti- tutione nostra defertur ; nam reus non aliter suis allegationibus utitur, nisi prius juraverit quod putans sese bona instantia uti ad contra- dicendum pervenit. At adversus inficiantes ex quibusdam causis du- j^li vel tripli actio constituitur, vel- uti si damni injurias aut legatorum locis venerabilibus relictorum no- mine agatur. Statim autem ab in- itio pluris quam simpli est actio, veluti furti manifesti quadrupli, nee manifesti dupli ; nam ex his causis et aliis quibusdam. sive quis neget sive fateatur, pluris quam simpli est actio. Item actoris quoque ca- iumnia coercetur, nam etiam actor pro calumnia jurare cogitur ex nostra constitutione ; utriusque etiam partis advocati jusjurandum subeunt, quod alia nostra constitutione comprehen- sum est. Haic autem omnia pro ve- teris calumniee actione introducta sunt, quse in desuetudinem abiit, quia in partem decimam litis actores mulctabat, quod numquam factum esse invenimus : sed pro his intro- ductum est et prsefatum jusjuran- dum, et ut improbus litigator et damnum et impensas litis inferre adversario suo cogatur. 490 LIB. IV. TIT. XVI. 2. Ex quibusdam judiciis dam- nati ignominiosi fiunt : veluti furti, vi bonorum raptorum, injuriarum, de dolo ; item tiitelse, mandati, de- posit! directis non contrariis actioni- bus ; item pro socio, quse ab utraque parte directa est, et ob id quilibet ex sociis eo judicio damnatus igno- minia notatur. Sed furti quidem aut vi bonorum raptorum, aut in- juriarum, aut de dolo, non solum damnati notantur ignominia, sed etiam pacti, et recte : plurimum enim interest, utrum ex delicto ali- quis an ex contractu debitor sit. 2. In certain actions the person condemned becomes infamous, as in the actions furti, vi bonorum raptorumy injuriarum, de dolo ; as also in the ac- tions tutelae, mandati, depositi, if direct,, but not if contrary ; and also in the action pro socio, which is direct, by whichever of the contracting parties^ it may be brought, and in which in- famy is attached to whichever of these; parties may be condemned. But in the actions furti, vi honorum raptorum, injuriarum, and de dolo, it is not only to have been condemned that makes a person infamous, but also to have agreed for the commission of the offence ; and rightly, for there is a great difference in being debtor by a» delict, or by a contract. Gai. iv. 182 ; D. iii. 2. 7. Directis non contrariis. Contraries actiones were such as those brought against the pupil, the mandator, or depositor, by the tutor, mandatary, or depositary. There could be no reason why infamy should attach to a pupil who did not know the amount of the claims of the tutor, or to a depositor who did not know the amount of the expenses to which the depositary had been put. The consequences of infamy were to prevent the guilty person from being a witness, receiving any public honours, or bringing a public prosecution. We have also seen (Tit. 13. 11) that, pre- vious to the legislation of Justinian, a person declared infamous could not appear as procurator in the cause of another. 3. Omnium autem actionum insti- tuendarum principium ab ea parte edicti projBciscitur, qua praetor edi- cit de in jus vocando ; utique enim in primis adversarius in jus vocan- dus est, ad eum qui jus dicturus sit. Qua parte praetor parentibus et pa- tronis, item parentibus liberisque patronorum et patronarum hunc prsestat honorem, ut non aliter liceat liberis libertisque eos in jus vocare, quam si id ab ipso praetore postulaverint et impetraverint ; et si quis aliter vocaverit, in eum poenam solidorum quinquaginta constituit. 3. In bringing any action, the first thing is, to comply with that part of the edict in which the praetor treats of the vocatio in jus. For the de- fendant must always be summoned in jus, i.e. before the magistrate who has the jurisdiction. In this part of the edict the praetor wishes that such re- spect should be shown towards ascen- dants, patrons, and even towards the ascendants and children of patrons, that children and freedmen cannot summon them in jus, unless they have first obtained permission from the praetor ; and he subjects persons who summon them without having obtained the praetor's permission, to a penalty of fifty solidi. Gai. iv. 46 ; D. ii. 4. 1 ; D. ii. 4. 4. 1 ; D. ii. 4. 24. The earliest method of vocatio in jus was to seize on the de- fendant, and drag him before a magistrate. Afterwards the seiz- ing became symbolical, and the plaintiff called some one to witness that the defendant had been seized, but would not come. LIB. IV. TIT. XVII. 491 Tit. XYII. DE OFFICIO JUDICIS. Superest ut de officio judicis dis- piciamus. Et qiiidem imprimis il- lud observare debet judex, ne aliter judicet quam legibus aut constitu- tionibiis aut moribus proditum est. It remains to treat of the office of the judge. His first care ought to be,, never to judge otherwise than accord- ing to the laws, the constitutions, or customary usage. D. V. 1. 40. 1 ; D. xlviii. 10. 1. 3. Judex qui contra sacras principum constitutiones, contra jus publicum quod apud se recitatum est, pronunciat, in insulamdepor- tatur. (Paul. Sent. v. 25. 4.) If the judge gave a sentence manifestly wrong, or if the sum was fixed in the condemnation by the praetor, and the judge con- demned the defendant in a different sum (see Tit. 4. 9. 1.), the sentence was treated as void without any appeal being necessary* If the judge was mistaken, as, for instance, in the mode in which he regarded some fact, an appeal was allowed, which had to be brought within two days (prolonged to ten days by Justinian in Nov. 23) after the sentence, or three days if a procurator, and not the party himself, had conducted the suit. The appeal lay from the judge back to the praetor, from the praetor to the senate, or, in later times, to the council of the emperor with the praetorian praefect as its head judge, and finally to the emperor himself 1. Ideoque si noxali judicio ad- dictus est, observare debet, ut si condemnandus videatur dominus, ita debeat condemnare : Publium Msevium Lucio Titio decem aureos condemno, aut noxam dedere. 1. Consequently, in a noxal action, if he thinks the master ought to be condemned, he ought thus to shape the condemnation : ' I condemn Publius Msevius at the suit of Lucius Titius to pay ten aurelj or to abandon the cause of the injury.' D. xlii. 1. 6. 1. 2. Et si in rem actum sit, sive contra petitorem judicaverit, ab- solvere debet possessorem ; sive contra possessorem, jubere eum debet ut rem ipsam restituat cum fructibus. Sed si possessor neget in prfesenti se restituere posse, et sine frustratione videbitur tempus restituendi causa petere, indulgen- dum est ei, ut tamen de litis sesti- matione caveat cum fidejussore, si intra tempus quod ei datum est non restituisset. Et si hereditas petita sit, eadem circa fructus in- terveniunt, quae diximus interve- nire in singularum rerum petitione : illorum autem fructuum quos culpa sua possessor non perceperit, in utraque actione eadem ratio pene habetur, si prsedo fuerit ; si vero 2. In a real action, if he determines against the claimant, he ought to ab- solve the possessor ; if against the possessor, he ought to order the pos- sessor to give up the thing itself to- gether with the fruits. But if the possessor states that it is out of his power to give up the thing at once,, and his request for delay seems ho- nestly made, some indulgence should be accorded him ; but he must first furnish a fidejussor to give security to the amount of the value of the thing in dispute, in case he should not restore it within the time allowed him. If the action is for an inheri- tance, the rules with regard to the fruits are the same as those we have laid down in the case of particular things. Of the fruits not gathered by 492 LIB. IV. TIT. XVII. bona fide possessor fuerit, non habe- tur ratio consumptoruin, neque non perceptorum. Post inchoatam au- tem petitionem, etiam illorum fruc- tiium ratio liabetur qui culpa pos- sessoris percepti non sunt, vel per- oepti consumpti sunt. the fault of the possessor, account is taken almost in the same way in both actions, when the possession is inala Jide. The bona fide possessor has not to account for fruits, whether con- sumed or not gathered. But from the time when the claim is made, the possessor has to account for all fruits not gathered through his fault, or gathered and consumed. D. vi. 1. 17. 1; D. vi. 1. 35. 1; D. vi. 1. 62. 1 ; C. iii. 32. 22. What the words eadem pene ratio refer to is not easy to say. Perhaps they may have reference to the lesser degree of severity with which an account of fruits not gathered was exacted in the case of an inheritance, the possessor not being accountable for all, but only for those which it could be fairly said he ought to have gathered. (D. v. 3. 25. 4.) Justinian here says that the position of a bona Jide possessor was the same in the case of an inheritance and of a particular ob- ject ; for that in neither case was he answerable for fruits gathered and consumed. But this was not the case after a senatus-con- sultum made in the time of Hadrian (D. v. 3. 20. 6), which made the bona Jide possessor of an inheritance answerable for all that he had profited by (D. v. 3. 28) ; and he was therefore answerable for the fruits he had consumed. Perhaps the text may be based on some passage in the writings of a jurist who wrote before the senatus-consultum was made. i 3. Si ad exhibendum actum fue- rit, non sufficit si exhibeat rem is cum quo actum est ; sed opus est ut etiam rei causam debeat exhibere, id est, ut eam causam habeat actor quam habiturus esset, si cum primum ad exhibendum egisset, exhibita res fuisset : ideoque si inter moras usu- oapta sit res a possessore, nihilominus condemnabitur. Prseterea fructus medii temporis, id est, ejus quod post acceptum ad exhibendum judi- cium ante rem judicatam intercessit, rationem habere debet judex. Quod si neget is cum quo ad exhibendum actum est, in praesenti exhibere posse, et tempus exhibendi causa petat, idque sine frustratione postu- lare videatur, dari ei debet, ut tamen caveat se restituturum. Quod si neque statim jussu judicis rem ex- hibeat, neque postea exhibiturum se caveat, condemnandus sit in id quod actoris intererat ab initio rem ex- hibitam esse. 3. In the action ad exhibendum it is not sufficient that the defendant exhibits the thing, but he must also exhibit everything derived from the thing, that is, he must place the claimant in the same position as he would have been in, if the thing had been exhibited immediately on the demand being made. If, therefore, during the delay, the possessor com- pletes the usucapion of the thing, he will still be condemned. The judge ought also to make him account for the fruits of the intermediate time, that is, of the time elapsed between the granting the action ad exhibendum and the sentence. If the defendant states that it is out of his power to make the exhibition immediately, and his request for delay seems honestly made, he should have time given him, but he must first give security that he will give the thing up. But if he neither exhibits the thing at once, upon the order of the judge, nor gives security for exhibiting it afterwards, he must be condemned in an amount LIB. IV. TIT. XVII. 493 D. X. 4. 9. 5, 6 4. Si familise erciscundse judicio actum sit, singulas res singulis heredibus adjudicare debet ; et si in alterius persona praegravare yi- deatur adjudicatio, debet hunc in- vicem coheredi certa pecunia, sicut jam dictum est, condemnare.^ Eo quoque nomine coheredi quisqiie suo condemnandus est, quod solus fructus hereditarii fundi percepit, aut rem hereditariam corruperit aut consumpserit. Quae quidem simi- liter inter plures quoque quam duos coheredes subsequuntur. equivalent to the interest of the claim- ant in having it exhibited immedi- ately. D. X. 4. 12. 4, 5. 4. In the action familise erciscun- dse, he ought to adjudge each object to each heir separately, and, if any one heir has more than his share ad- judged him, the judge ought, as we have said above, to condemn him to pay his coheir a fixed sum as an equivalent. So, too, an heir ought to be condemned to make compensation to his coheirs, who has alone enjoyed the fruits of the land of the inheritance, or has damaged, or consumed anything forming part of the inheritance. And these rules apply, whether the coheirs, are two or more. D. X. 2. 51, 52. 2. As to the office of the judge in the three actions noticed in this and the two succeeding paragraphs, see Introd. sec. 103. 5. Eadem interveniunt, et si communi dividundo de pluribus rebus actum fuerit. Quod si de una re, veluti fundo, si quidem iste fundus commode regionibus divisio- nem recipiat, partes ejus singulis adjudicare debet, et si unius pars praegravare videbitur, is invicem certa pecunia alteri condemnan- dus est. Quod si commode dividi non possit, veluti homo forte aut mulus erit de quo actum sit, tunc totus uni adjudicandus est, et is invicem alteri certa pecunia con- demnandus. 5. It is the same in the action communi dividundo for the division of a number of things. If there is only one object to be divided, for instance, a piece of land, the judge ought, if the land easily admits of division, to adjudge their respective shares to the several co-proprietors. And if one of them receives too large a share, the judge ought to order him to pay a sum of money as compensa- tion to the other. If the thing is one that cannot be advantageously divided, as, for instance, a slave or mule, then the whole must be adjudged to one, and he must be condemned to pay a fixed sum as compensation to the other. D. x. 2. 55 ; C. iii. 37. 3. 6. Si finium regundorum actum fuerit, dispicere debet judex an necessaria sit adjudicatio : quae sane uno casu necessaria est, si eviden- tioribus finibus distingui agros com- modius sit, quam olim fuissent dis- tinct! ; nam tunc necesse est ex alterius agro partem aliquam alte- rius agri domino adjudicari, quo casu conveniens est ut is alteri certa pecunia debeat condemnari. Eo quoque nomine damnandus est quisque hoc judicio, quod forte circa fines aliquid malitiose com- 6. In the action finium regundorum the judge ought to examine if the adjudication is necessary, and it is so only in one case, viz. if it would be advantageous that the boundaries should be more clearly marked than before. In that case it becomes necessary to adjudge to one party a portion of the field of the other, and consequently the person to whom it is adjudged ought to be condemned to pay a fixed sum as compensation to the other. In this action he ought also to be condemned who has fraudu- 494 LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. misit, verbi gratia, quia lapides £nales fiiratus est, vel arbores finales cecidit. Contumacise quoque nomine qiiisque eo judicio condem- natur, veluti si quis Jubente jndice metiri agrod passus non fuerit. lently interfered with the boundaries, as, for instance, by carrying off the boundary stones, or cutting down the trees that mark the limit, A person may be also condemned by this same action for contumacy, who, in defiance of the order of the judge, opposes the measurement of the fields. D. X. 1, 2. 1 ; D. X. 1. 3, 4. 3, 4. 7. Quod autem istis judiciis ali- <5ui adjudicatum sit, id statim ejus fit cui adjudicatum est. See Introd. sec. 103. 7. In these actions, anything ad- judged becomes at once the property of the person to whom it is adjudged. Tit. XVIII. DE PUBLICIS JUDICIIS. Publica judicia neque per ac- tiones ordinantur, neque omnino quidquam simile habent cum cete- ris judiciis de quibus locuti sumus, magnaque diversitas est eorum et in instituendis et in exercendis. Public prosecutions are not intro- duced by actions, and bear no resem- blance to the other legal remedies of which we have been speaking. There is a great difference between them, both in the mode in which they are begun and in that in which they are carried on. • The subject of public prosecutions is foreign to a treatise which, like the Institutes, professes to treat only of private law. It is not noticed at all in the Institutes of Gains, and is treated in a very cursory manner in this Title. For the comprehension of this Title, it will be sufficient to observe that, in the later times •of the Republic and in the first years of the Empire, a series of laws was made, fixing the penalty to be attached to particular crimes, and prescribing the procedure to be employed in the trial. Many of these laws are briefly referred to in this Title ; and it was the trials conducted under their provisions that alone received the name o^puhlica judicia. Under the Empire, most of the crimes not coming under these special laws, and especially those pro- vided against by a seiiatus-consultum or constitution, were judged by the prcetor or prcsfectus urbi in a more summary method. The judicium was then said to be, not publicum, but extra ordinem ; and gradually the method of procedure prescribed by the law for the different puhlica judicia fell into desuetude, and nothing was retained of the special laws but the penalty they fixed (D. xlviii. 1. 8), the procedure being the same as in the judicia extraordinaria, (See Introduction, sec. 112.) 1. Publica autem dicta sunt, 1. They are called public, because quod cuivis ex populo executio generally any citizen may institute eorum plerumque datur. them, D. xxiii. 2. 43. 10. LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. 495 There were certain persons excluded from the right of bring- ing a criminal accusation ; for instance, women, unless the injury- complained of was done to themselves or their near relations, persons below the age of puberty, persons made infamous by a judicial sentence, and persons so poor as not to possess fifty aureu (D. xlviii. 2. 2. 8 and 10.) But, generally speaking, it was the right of any one to make a criminal charge, although he might be totally unconnected by any ties with the person who suffered from the crime. 2. Publicorum judiciorum quse- dam capitalia sunt, quaedam non capitalia. Capitalia dicimus, quae ultimo supplicio afficiunt, vel aquae et ignis interdictione, vel deporta- tione, vel metallo ; cetera, si quam infamiam irrogant cum damno pe- cuniario, haec publica quidem sunt, non tamen capitalia. 2. Some public prosecutions are capital, some are not. We term capi- tal those which involve the extreme punishment of the law, or the inter- diction from fire and water, or depor- tation, or the mines. Those which carry with them infamy and a pecu- niary penalty are public, but not capital. D. xlviii. 1, 2. 3. Publica autem sunt haec : lex Julia majestatis, quae in eos qui contra imperatorem vel rempubli- cam aliquid moliti sunt, suum vigo- rem extendit. Hujus j)cena animae amissionem sustinet, et memoria rei etiam post mortem damnatur. 3. The following laws have refer- ence to public prosecutions. The lex Julia majestatis, which subjects to its severe provisions all who attempt any- thing against the emperor or State. The penalty it inflicts is the loss of life, and the memory of the guilty is condemned even after his death. D. xlviii. 4. 11. The lex Julia majestatis was passed in the time of Julius Caasar. (D. xliii. 4.) Aliquod moliti sunt. The design, without any overt act, was enough to sustain the charge. Etiam post mortem, (See Bk. iii. Tit. 1. 5.) 4. Item lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis, quae non solum temera- tores alienarum nuptiarum gladio punit, sed et eos qui cum masculis nefandam libidinem exercere au- dent ; sed eadem lege Julia etiam stupri flagitium punitur, cum quis sine vi vel virginem vel viduam honeste viventem stupraverit. Poe- nam autem eadem lex irrogat pec- catoribus, si honesti sunt, publica- tionem partis dimidiae bonorum ; si humiles, corporis coercitionem cum relegatione. 4. Also the lex Julia de adulteriis, which punishes with death not only those who defile the marriage bed, but those also who give themselves up to works of lewdness with their own sex. The same law also punishes the seduc- tion without violence of a virgin, or of a widow of honest character. The penalty upon offenders of honourable condition is the confiscation of half their fortune, upon those of low con- dition, corporal punishment and rele- gation. D. xlviii. 34, pr. and 1. 496 LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. The lex Julia de adulteriis belongs to the time of Augustus, about B.C. 17. Gladio pnnit. The lex Julia only punished the guilty with confiscation of a portion of their property and relegation. (Paul. Sent. ii. 26. 14.) Constantine affixed the graver penalty. (C. ix^ 9. 31.) 5. Item lex Cornelia de sicariis, qu8e homicidas ultore ferro perse- quitiir, vel eos qui hominis occi- dendi causa cum telo ambulant. Telum autem, ut Gains noster in interpretatione legum duodecim tabularum scriptum reliquit, vulgo quidem id appellatur, quod ab arcu mittitur ; sed et omne significatur quod manu cujusdam mittitur. Se- quitur ergo ut lapis et lignum et ferrum hoc nomine contineatur, dictumque ab eo quod in longin- quum mittitur, a Grjeca voce c'nro Tov rrjXoi'. Et hanc signification em invenire possumus et in Graeco no- mine : nam quod nos telum appel- lamus, illi fitXog appellant dvo mu iSdXXtaoai. Admonet nos Xeno- plion, nam ita scribit : Kal rd jS'sXri ofiou i(/£|0£ro, Xoyxai, Tottiijiara, rr^.fi'- S6i>ai. TvXtlaroi dk Kal XiOot. Sicarii autem api)ellantur a sica, quod sig- nificat ferreum cultrum. Eadem lege et venefici capite damnantur, qui artibus odiosis tam venenis quam susurris magicis homines oc- ciderint, vel mala medicamenta pub- lice vendiderint. 5. Also the lex Cornelia de sicariisy which strikes with the sword of ven- geance those who for the purpose of killing a man go armed with a telum. By telum, according to the interpreta- tion given by our Gains in his com- mentaries on the Twelve Tables, is ordinarily meant anything that is shot from a bow, but it equally signifies anything sent from the hand. Thus, a stone, a piece of wood, or of iron, is included in the meaning of the term, for it merely implies something im- pelled to a distance, being derived from the Greek word ti]Xov. And the corresponding word in Greek has the same signification, for what we call telum., they call pf.Xoc, from jSdXXeaQai, as we may learn from Xenophon, who says, ' they carried /StX?/, viz. spears, arrows, slings, and a great quantity of stones.' Assassins are called sicarii from sica, a short sword. By the same law, poisoners are condemned who by hateful arts use poisons or magic charms to kill men, or publicly sell hurtful drugs. D. xlviii. 8. 1 ; D. 1. 16. 233. 2. Lex Cornelia de sicariis, passed during the dictatorship of Sylla, B.C. 80. 6. Alia deinde lex asperrimum crimen nova poena persequitur, quse Pompeia de parricidiis vocatur. Qua cavetur, ut si quis parentis aut filii, aut omnino aff'ectionis ejus quae nuncupatione parricidii continetur, fata properaverit, sive clam sive palam id ausus fuerit, nee non is cujus dolo malo id factum est, vel conscius criminis existit, licet ex- traneus sit, poena parridicii puni- atur. Et neque gladio neque igni- bus neque uUa aha solemn! poena subjiciatur, sed insutus culeo cum cane et gallo gallinaceo et vipera et simia, et inter eas ferales angus- tias comprehensus, secundum quod 6. Another law, the lex Pompeia de parricidiis, inflicts on the most horrible of crimes a singular punishment. It provides, that anyone who has hastened the death of a parent or child, or of any other relation whose murder is legally termed parricide, whether he acts openly or secretly, and whoever instigates, or is an accomplice in the commission of the crime, although a stranger, shall undergo the penalty of parricide. He will be punished, not by the sword, nor by fire, nor by any ordinary mode of punishment, but he is to be sewed up in a sack with a dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and en- closed in this horrible prison he is to I LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. 497 regionis qualitas tulerit, vel in vi- cinum mare vel in amnem projicia- tur : nt omnium elementorum usu vivus carere incipiat, et ei coelum siiperstiti et terra mortno auferatur. Si qnis autem alias cognatione vel affinitate conjunctas personas neca- verit, poenam legis Cornelise de si- cariis siistinebit. be, according to the nature of the place, thrown into the sea, or into a river, that even in his lifetime he may- begin to be deprived of the use of the elements, and that the air may be de- nied to him while he lives, and the earth when he dies. He who kills persons allied to him by cognation or alliance, shall undergo the penalty of the lex Cornelia de sicariis. J), xlviii. 9. 1. 9 ; C. ix. 17. Lex Pompeia de parricidiis, passed in the consulship of Pom- peius, B.C. 52. The punishment mentioned in the text is bor- rowed from the legislation of the Twelve Tables. The lex Pompeia, under the term parricidium, embraced the murder of any ascend- ant, of a husband or wife, of consobrmi, of a step-father, step-mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, &c., of a patron, and of a child if killed by the mother or grandfather, but not if killed by the father. (D. xlviii. 9. 1.) If there was no river at hand, the offender was torn to pieces by wild beasts. (D. xlviii. 9. 9.) 7. Item lex Cornelia de falsis, qure etiam testamentaria vocatur, pcienam irrogat ei qui testamentum vel aliud instrument am falsum scrip- serit, significaverit, recitaverit,-sub- jecerit ; quive signum adulterinum fecerit, sculpserit, expresserit sciens dolo malo. Ej usque legis poena in servos ultimum supplicium est (quod etiam in lege de sicariis et veneficis servatur), in liberos vero deportatio. 7. Also the lex Cornelia de falsis, otherwise called testamentaria, pun- ishes any one who shall have written, sealed, read, or substituted a false tes- tament, or any other instrument, or shall have made, cut, or impressed a false seal, knowingly and wilfully. The penalty is, upon a slave, the ex- treme punishment of the law, as is pronounced by the lex Cornelia upon assassins and poisoners ; that upon freemen is deportation. D. xlviii. 10. 1. 13. 16. 1. Lex Cornelia de falsis, or Cornelia testamentaria, was passed under the dictatorship of Sylla, B.C. 80. 8. Item lex Julia de vi publica seu privata adversus eos exoritur, qui vim vel armatam vel sine armis commiserint : sed si quidem armata vis arguatur, deportatio ei ex lege Julia de vi publica irrogatur ; si vero sine armis, in tertiam partem bonorum publicatio imponitur. Sin autem per vim raptus virginis vel viduffi vel sanctimonialis vel alte- rius fuerit perpetratus, tunc et pec- catores et ii qui opem flagitio dede- runt, capite puniuntur, secundum nostra; constitutionis deiinitionem ex qua hoc apertius est scire. 8. Also the lex Julia de vi publica seu privata punishes those who are guilty of violence, whether with armed force or without. For violeiice with armed force, the penalty inflicted by the lex Julia de vi piddica is deporta- tion. For violence without arms, it is the confiscation of a third of the offender's property. But in case of the rape of a virgin, a widow, a per- son devoted to religion, or any one else, both the ravishers and all who have aided in the commission of the crime are punished capitally, accord- ing to the provisions of our constitu- tion, in which may be found fuller information on this head. D. xlviii. 6. 10. 2 ; C. ix. 13. 1, pr. and foil. Iv K 498 LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. Lex Julia de vi, passed in the time of Julius Caesar or Au- gustus, but its exact date is not known. 9. Item lex Julia peciilatns eos punit, qui pecuniam vel rem publi- cara vel sacram vel religiosam f urati fuerint. Sed si quidem ipsi jiidices tempore administrationis publicas pecunias subtraxerint, capitali ani- madversione piiniantur ; et non so- lum hi, sed etiam qui ministerium eis ad hoc exhibuerint, vel qui sub- tractas ab his scientes susceperint. Alii vero qui in hanc legem incide- rint, poense deportationis subju- gantur. D. xlviii. 13. 9. Also the lex Julia peculatus pun- ishes those who have stolen public money, or anything sacred or religious. Magistrates, who, during the time of their administration, have stolen the public money, are punishable capitally, as also are all who aid them in their robbery, or who receive their plunder from them. Other persons who offend against this law are subject to the penalty of deportation. 1. 3 ; C. ix. 28. I Lex Julia peculatus. The exact date of this law is also un- known. It probably belongs to the same epoch as the lex Julia de vi. 10. Est et inter publica judicia lex Fabia de plagiariis, quae inter- dum capitis poenam ex sacris consti- tutionibus irrogat, interdum levi- orem. 10. There is also the lex Fahia de plagiariis, which inflicts, in certain cases, capital puishment according to the constitutions, sometimes a lighter punishment. C. ix. 20. 7. Cicero refers to this law {pro Rahirio, 3), but nothing more is known of it. A plagiarius was one who knowingly kept in irons, or confined, sold, gave, or bought a citizen (whether freeborn or a freedman) or the slave of another. 11. Sunt prseterea publica judi- cia, lex Julia ambitus, lex Julia rex^etundarum, ex lege Julia de annona, et lex Julia de residuis : quse de certis capitulis loquuntur, et animse quidem amissionem non irrogant, aliis autem poenis eos sub- jiciunt qui prsecejDta earum negle- xerint. 11. The following laws also pertain to public prosecutions : the lex Julia de amhitu, the lex Jidia repetundarum, the lex Julia de annona, and the lex Julia de residuis. These laws apply to certain special cases, and do not carry with them the punishment of death, but lesser punishments, against offenders. D. xlviii. 11 ; D. xlviii. 13. 2. 4, 5 ; D. xlviii. 12. 2, pr. and foil. ; D. xlviii. 14. Lex Julio, de amhitu, made in the time of Augustus, to repress illegal methods of seeking offices. (D. xlvii. 14.) Lex Julia repetundarum, made in the time of Julius Cassar, to punish magistrates or judges for receiving bribes. Lex Julia de annoyia, made to repress combinations for height- eniDg the price of provisions. Lex Julia de residuis, made to punish those who gave an incom- plete account of, or misappropriated, public moneys committed to the^r charge. (D. xhiii. 13. 2.) LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII. 499 It is uncertain whether these last two laws belong to the time of Julius Cagsar or of Augustus. 12. Sed de publicis judiciis hsec 12. This notice of public prosecii- exposuimus, ut vobis possibile sit tions has only been meant to give you summo digito et quasi per indicem the merest sketch that might serve you ea tetigisse : alioquin diligentior as a guide to studying them. You eorum scientia vobis ex latioribus may, with the blessing of God, gain a Digestorum sen Pandectarum libris, more complete knowledge of them from Deo propitio, adventura est. the fuller account given in the Digest or Pandects. KK 2 SUMMAEY. BOOK L SOURCES OF LAW. Private Laav : its Sources. — The Institutes treat of private law, jas privatum^ the law that has to do with individuals, as distinguished from jus j^uhlicimi, that which regards the Roman Empire and regulates reli- gious worship and civil administration. (Tit. 1. 4, note.) The sources of private law are natural law, the law of nations, and the civil law. (A.) The two first are, in the system of Gains, identical. That law which right reason commands, jus natuixde, is also that law which is found to be common to the legal systems of different nations. Justinian sometimes adopts this method of speaking, and sometimes borrows passages in which the jus nahirale has a larger sense, is thus distinguished from the jus gentium^ and is extended to the rules which instinct makes animals obey. (Tit. 2. pr. note.) (B.) The civil law is the special law of the Romans, and is derived from the following sources : — Sources of the Jus Civile. — 1. Laws {leges) passed by the comitia curiata or centuriata. 2. Flebiscita, which by the lex Hortensia bound the whole people. (Tit. 2. 4.) 3. ASe?ia^ziS-consw/^rt, which, especially after the beginning of the Empire, had the force of laws. (5.)* 4. The imperial con- stitutions, which, by virtue of the lex regia or law passed by the comitia curiata conferring the imperiuin^ had the force of law, and which were of three kinds : (a) epistolce, mandata, rescripta^ announcements of the im- perial will to different authorities ; (b) clecreta^ judicial decisions of the Emperor ; (c) edicta, enactments. (6.) 5. The edicts of the praetors (jus honorarium), who announced at the beginning of their year of office the rules they would follow in what was termed the edictum perpetuum, which ran on from year to year under successive praetors, with such additions and changes as each might think necessary, and which assumed a final shape in the time of Hadrian. The curule aBdiles also issued edicts, which were part oi t\\e jus honorarium. (7.) 6. The responsa prudentum, v^ho ^\ ere fir^t called on officially by Augustus to give their opinions, and whose decisions, v/hen those who gave them agreed, were invested by Hadrian with the force of law. Special authority was given by Theodosius to the writings of the five great jurists, and, in case of their disagreement, to the writings of Papinian. (8.) 7. Custom, too, is one of the sources of private law, for cus- * When a number is placed between brackets, as here (5), it shows to which paragraph of the Title last mentioned reference is made. 502 SUMMAEY. toms are like laws, legem {mitantu7\ Laws might be abrogated by desuetude (11), but particular customs could not prevail against general law. (9.) LAW RELATING TO PERSONS. Private law relates to persons, to things (including obligations), and actions. The law relating to persons is first treated under the three heads of status, that is, the legal capacity of persons, viz. libertas, civitaSj and familia ; and as libertas comes first, the first division of persons noticed is that into persons who are not free, i.e. slaves, and those who are fi'eed, libertini, or free by birth, ingeimi. Slaves. — Slavery, contrary to the law of nature, but recognised by the law of nations, is based on the fact that those who were originally treated as slaves had been preserved from death when defeated and cap- tured in war. But all slaves are not captured in war : how then do these others become slaves? 1. By birth, for the children of a female slave always follow her condition ; and, 2, slavery is inflicted as a punishment on persons born free, as upon a free person who, to share the price, colludes with a fictitious vendor who sells him as a slave, and on others guilty of great crimes, servi j^oence. (Tit. 3.) Opposed to slaves are those who are born free, born in matrimony, or, if not, of a woman who at any time after conception was free. (Tit. 4.) Lastly, there is an intermediate class, those born slaves, but made free {libertini), and their position depended on the mode and circumstances of the manumission. Manumission. — If manumission was made in any one of the three modes known to the old law, censu, vindicta, or testamento, the slave became by manumission a Roman citizen until the time of Augustus, when, by the laws -^lia Sentia and Junia Norbana, another con- dition was imposed, and it was necessary that unless the manumission was made vindicta, the emancipated slave should be thirty years old and the manumittor twenty (Tit. 6. 4) ; unless some good cause (5) for dispensing with this rule was shown to the council. The require- ment of age in the testator, in the case of manumission by testament, was first reduced by Justinian from twenty years to seventeen, and subse- quently done away with. (Tit. 6, 7, note.) It was also necessary that the master should have complete ownership of the slave. (Tit. 5. 3, note.) But if the manumission failed in any of these respects, or, if it was made in a private manner, as by letter, or in presence of friends, the emanci- pated slave was in the position of a Latinus, not in that of a Roman citizen, it being, however, open to him to rise to the position of a citizen by certain modes, and chiefly by rendering public services. (Tit. 5. 3, note.) If, previously to emancipation, slaves had been guilty of some great crime, then they were only raised by emancipation to the rank of dedititii or surrendered enemies. Justinian abolished these distinctions and made every emancipated slave a Roman citizen. (Tit. 5. 3.) Further, the lex JElia Sentia nullified manumissions made in prejudice of creditors, except that a slave, for the purpose of administering the inheritance, might be made the sole and necessary heir of the testator (Tit. 6. pr. 1) ; and the lex Fusia BOOK I. 503 Caninia^ abolished by Justinian, limited the number of slaves a testator might manumit (Tit. 7). The power of a master over his slave, formerly unlimited, was gradually subjected to many restrictions. The Emperor Antoninus Pius extended the provisions of Sylla's law, the lex Cornelia de sicariis, which punished with death or exile the homicide of the slave of another, to the case of a master killing his own slave ; and also protected slaves cruelly treated and fleeing to the statue of the emperor. (Tit. 8. 2.) Gradually, not only the life, but the person, and even the property, in fact though not in law, of the slave were protected. (Tit. 8. 2, note.) CiviTAS is indirectly treated in the preceding notice of Latini, and in the twelfth and sixteenth Titles, in which the loss of citizenship is noticed. But the subject mainly belongs to the sphere of public law, and the rest of the first book is occupied with considering the third head of status, Familia. — Here the main division is into persons not sui juris and persons sui juris. The position of persons not sui juris is a consequence of the patria potestas. The subject of the patria potestas, the power of the father over his descendants, originally not much less than that of a master over his slaves, is discussed in the ninth and three following Titles. Justinian inquires, 1, How it arises? 2, How it is ended ? Patria Potestas: how it arises. — It arises in three ways, by, 1, Marriage ; 2, Legitimation ; 3, Adoption. I. Marriage. — In order that marriage may give rise to the pat7'ia potestas it must be according to law (justce miptice), and for this there were three requisites: 1, Puberty (fourteen years for husband, twelve for wife) ; 2, Consent of the parties, the intention to be married mani- fested by the woman passing into the possession of the man ; and, 3, Con- nubium ; the parties must be legally capable of being married to each other. There were three ways in which the parties might fail to have this legal capacity. 1. They, or one of them, might be persons or a person whom the State held to be incapable of forming the nexus termed justce nnptice ; as, for instance, a citizen and a foreigner could not form the tie of justce nuptice, &c. (Tit. 10, pr. and 11.) 2. They might be within the prohibited degrees of relationship (Tit. 10. 1-10) ; and it is to be re- marked that relationship by adoption, as well as by blood, constitutes a bar. (Tit. 10. 2.) 3. They might, or one of them might, be m potestate, and then, unless the consent of the person in whose potestas they were was obtained, the marriage was invalid. (Tit. 10. pr.) Divorce was always permitted by mutual consent, but repudiation by one party only under penalties, except in case of misconduct, and with certain solemn forms. II. Legitimation, by which the oifspring o£ concubinage were placed in the position of libe7'i legitimi, and this could be eifected in three ways. 1. Oblation to the curia, i.e. enrolling the child in the number of those on whom the chief burdens of provincial towns fell. 2. The subse- quent marriage of the parents; an act attesting the marriage and the ratification by the children being necessary. 3. The rescript of the emperor, granted in case one of the parents was dead. (Tit. 10. 13.) III. Adoption. — A general term, under which is included adoptio properly so called, when a person in potestate was given in adoption, 504 SUMMARY. and arrogatio when the person adopted was sui juris. (Tit. 11.) Adop- tion in the old law was effected by three sales to destroy the patria potestas of the person giving in adoption, and a fictitious process, in jure cessw, by which the person adopted was given over to the adopter ; for which process Justinian substituted the execution of a deed before a magis- trate. Arrogatio had a more public character, and was made originally before the curia, then before lictors representing the curia, and subse- quently by imperial rescript. ( 1 .) Originally a person adopted or arrogated was in the potestas of the person adopting or arrogating, exactly as if he had been so by birth, and was not in any way protected against him ; but Justinian entirely altered the law as to adoptio, and under his legislation (unless the adopter was an ascendant paternal or maternal of the adopted, in which case the rules of the old law operated), the person adopted did not pass at all into the family of the adopter, but remained in his natural family ; and the only effect of adoption was to give the adopted a right of succession to the adopter if intestate. Provisions were also made to pro- tect the arrogated if he was not of the age of puberty. Such an arrogation was not permitted unless after inquiry it had been found to be beneficial to the arrogated, and if he was emancipated under the age of puberty, although for a good reason, he got all his own property back, while, if he was disinherited or emancipated without good reason before that age, he not only got his own property back, but got a fourth of the arrogator's property {quaria Antonina) ; and lastly, when he attained puberty, he could have the arrogation rescinded if prejudicial to him. (3, note.) Women, who had lost their own children, were permitted by the emperors to adopt. (10.) The chief rule as to the capacity of adopting is that adoption is said to imitate nature, and therefore the adopter must be eighteen years at least older than the adopted, so as to permit physically of his having been the natural father. (4.) Patria Potestas : how ended. — The patria potestas might be dissolved in four ways. 1. Death of the parent-, the grandson, however, Avhose father was living, passing into the power of the father, on the grand- father's death. (Tit. 12. pr.) 2. Deminutio capitis; the father or son losing that civic position which was necessary for the exercise of patria potestas ; and this might happen by (a) deportatio in insulam (12) ; (b) condemnatio to be a servus jjwnce (3) ; and (c) captivitas. But if the capite minutus was restored by the emperor to his former rights (1), or if the prisoner became free, then (by what in the second of these cases was termed postliminium) the father was placed in exactly the same position as if the deportatio or captivitas had not taken place. (5.) 3. Attain- ment of dignities, by the son attaining the patriciate (4) or, subsequently to the date of the Institutes, other dignities. (4, note.) 4. Emancipa- tion, which, under the old law, was effected by three fictitious sales made by the father, and then the purchaser reselling the son to the father, who then manumitted him ; the object of this being that the father, being the manumittor, might have the rights of patronage, the chief of which was the same right of succession to the son as the manu- mittor of a slave had, in case of his enfranchisement. (Tit. 12. 6, note, and I i BOOK I. 505 Tit. 5. 3, note.) Under the legislation o£ Justinian, emancipation was eiFected by a declaration before a judge or magistrate (Tit. 12. 6). Other Forms of Potestas. — In order to make the subject of Potestas complete, we ought to notice not only 1, the power of the master of the slave, and 2, the power of the father over his descendants, but 3, the power of the husband over the wife who passed in mamini, as she did when married, by (a) confarreatio ; (b) coemptio, or fictitious sale ; and (c) usus, the parties living together for a year without the wife breaking the use by three nights' absence (Tit. 10. pr. note) ; and, 4, the power, in the old law, of the purchaser over a person m mancipio, that is, sold to him by the father of the person sold, the person in mancipio being, as regards the purchaser, almost in the position of a slave, although, as regards others, he was still ingemms. (Tit. 8. pr. note.) Persons sui Juris : their Incapacities. Tutors and Curators. — From the beginning of the 8th Title we have been considering persons in jwiestate. We now turn to persons sui j^tris ; but it is only of certain incapacities of persons sui juris, that the Institutes treat : incapacities arising from, 1, age; 2, physical or mental infirmity; or (so far as refe- rence is made to an earlier period of law), 3, sex. Tutors were appointed to protect the interests and authorise the acts of pupils under the age of puberty; and curators might be appointed to watch over, 1, prodigals ; 2, persons afflicted with mental or great physical infirmity ; 3, persons above the age of puberty, but under the age of twenty-five years. The rest of this book is taken up with the subject of tutors and curators. Tutors : how appointed.— Tutors are first divided, according to the mode of their appointment, into, 1, Testamentary, 2, Legitimate, 3, Fidu- ciary, and 4, Given by the magistrate. I. Testamentary Tutors : ivJio may appoint. — The paterfamilias may appoint testamentary tutors to all descendants under his power who become svi juris on his death. (Tit. 13. 3.) This excludes grand- children having a father living, who, by the death of the paterfamilias, come under the power of their own father (3), and includes posthumous children of t\\Q paterfamilias, who become sui juris at his death. (4.) The wishes of the father were also carried out by the magistrate (usually as a matter of course), if he appointed a testator by his testament to an eman- cipated child ; and the magistrate generally ratified, after he had inquired into the circumstances, the appointment of a testamentary tutor by a father in case of his natural children, or such an appointment by others who had a strong interest in, or had left property to, any child under the age of puberty. (5, note.) Testamentary Tutors: ivJio maybe appointed. — A f liusf ami lias could be appointed to the office, as it was of a public character. (Tit. 14. pr.) Women could not, although the emperor would sometimes interfere to confirm their appointment. (Tit. 14. pr. note.) Slaves could not ; and, if a slave of the testator was appointed tutor, the appointment was held to carry the freedom of the slave with it, and if the testator ap^^ointed the slave of another, this imposed on the testamentary heir the duty of pur- chasing, if possible, the freedom of the slave. If a madman, or a person 506 SUMMAE^. under the age of twenty-five years, was appointed a testamentary tutor, lie could only act if lie became sane, or after he was twenty-live, and, mean- time, the magistrate appointed another tutor. (2.) A tutor could be ap- pointed to hold his office after or up to a certain time (3), but he could not be appointed to discharge one portion only of the functions of a tutor, as he was given to the person, not to the property. (4.) II. Legitimate Tutors (i.e. called to their office by the statute law) come under three heads : In case no testamentary tutor had been ap- pointed, the agnati had a claim, under the law of the Twelve Tables, to be tutors, and hence were called legitimi tutores (Tit. 15. pr.), and this includes the case of the testamentary tutor dying in the lifetime of the testator. (2.) Under the later emperors the mother, and even the grand- mother, might be appointed tutors, where none was appointed by testament, (3, note.) The right to be tutor did not belong to all the agnati, but only to those nearest in degree, all those in the same degree sharing the office. (Tit. 16. 7.) Capitis Deminutio. — The tie of agnation being severed by capitis deminutio, the Institutes digress to explain, in the 16th Title, what capitis deminutio means. It means a change in the caput, or legal existence, of a person, so that his status undergoes change in one or more, or all, of its elements, viz. liberty, citizenship, and family. (Tit. 16. pr.) The demi- nutio is termed maxima when all three elements are lost, when the capite minutus ceases to be free and to be a citizen, and loses his family position, as would happen in the case of servi pcenw, freedmen condemned to be again slaves for ingratitude, and freemen joining in a fraudulent sale of them- selves. The capitis deminutio was called media when liberty was not touched, but citizenship was lost, and with it family position, as would happen in the case of any one interdicted fire and water, or deported to an island. (2.) The capitis deminutio was said to be minima when liberty and citizenship were not touched, but the family position was altered, as in the case of adoption, arrogation, emancipation, or, in the old law, a ^vife passing in manum. (3.) The rights of agnation are affected by all the three kinds, but those of cognation only by the maxima and media, (Tit. 16. 6.) The minima capitis deminutio, or change of family, so far changed the legal existence of the person undergoing it that, under the old law, he not only lost his place in the intestate succession of the family he quitted, but he could not be sued for his antecedent debts, and any usu- fructs he held came to an end (3, note). Mere loss of dignity, and even infamy, produced no change of status. (5.) 2. To return to the subject of legitimate tutors. Patrons are the legitimate tutors of their freedmen and freedwomen. In case the manumittors are dead, their children are the legitimate tutors of the freedmen and freedwomen. (Tit. 17.) 3. Parents are the legitimate tutors of their children or other de- scendants whom they have emancipated below the age of puberty. (Tit. 18.) III. Fiduciary Tutors. — In case the master emancipated his slave, and died before the freedman attained the age of puberty, the tutelage of this slave passed by law, or rather, by an extension of the law of the EOOK I. 507 Twelve Tables (Tit. 17), to the children of the emancipator. But if a parent emancipated his descendant, and died before the person emancipated attained the age of puberty, the tutelage also passed to the children of the emancipator, but it was not supposed to do so by any ex- press law, and the tutors in this case were called, not legithni, hut Jldu- ciarii, a term properly applied to the nominal tutor, who, in case of emancipation, did not resell to the father, but himself emancipated the son, and had thus, as emancipator, the tutelage, which he held in trust (whence he was called Jiduciarius) for the father. (Tit. 19.) IV. Tutors appointed by the 7nagistrate. — Tutors were appointed by the magistrate under the lex Atiliana and the lex Junta Titia. Under the first of these laws a tutor was appointed at Rome by the prastor and a majority of the tribunes ; and under the second, in the provinces, by the presses (Tit. 20. pr.), if there was no tutor on whom the office devolved under the heads of appointment already noticed ; or if from any cause there was a vacancy in the office. (1, 2.) Subsequently, under the empire, the tutor was in such cases appointed at Rome by the pi^ce- fectus urbij if the position of the pupil was a high one, and by the prwtor urbanus if it was not. The proeses appointed in the provinces and, in cases of small importance, the local magistrates ; but these magistrates needed the preliminary authority of the prceses. In all cases, inquiry was made into the circumstances before the appointment was made. (Tit. 20. 4.) Justinian, in cases where the fortune of the pupil or adult (for here we have a provision extending to curators) did not exceed 500 solidi, allowed the local magistrate to appoint without any authorisation, merely taking security from the person appointed, without inquiring into the circumstances of the case. (5.) Tutelage of Women. — Under the old law women were in tutelage all their lives, even after they had become sui juris ^ the tutor being appointed by the testament of the husband, if she was in manu^ and the husband could not only appoint a tutor, but give the wife the option of choosing one. If no testamentary tutor was appointed, the nearest agnatus was the tutor ; and the tutor might be changed, either by his act, or on the woman's application. After she had attained the age of puberty, the woman under tutelage managed her own affairs, but the tutor had to intervene in order to sanction solemn acts. All this tutelage of women above the age of pu- berty had become obsolete before the time of Justinian. (6, note.) Authority of the Tutor. — The tutor had, in the first place, to manage the affairs of the pupil ; and, in the second place, to add his auctoritas, i. e. the supplement of what was wanted to make the pupil legally competent to act. If the pupil was under seven years old, the tutor could only in very rare cases, where the benefit was clearly great for the pupil, go through any acts on behalf of the infant beyond such as were necessary for the ordinary management of his affairs. It was only, for example, at a late period of the empire, that the tutor was allowed to enter on an inheri- tance on behalf of the infans. Between the ages of seven and fourteen, the pupil could contract without the authorisation of the tutor, so far as the contract was beneficial to him ; but every unauthorised contract was 508 SUMMARY. inoperative to his prejudice. (Tit. 21. pr. note.) Tlie pupil could not take any very serious step involving possible risk, such as entering on an inheritance, demanding possession of goods, or taking an inheritance under a Jideicomm{ss2i7n, without the authorisation of the tutor. (1.) The tutor was obliged to give this authorisation personally, not by writing, and could not give it by ratification. (2.) If there was a suit between the tutor and pupil, a curator was appointed to intervene in this suit on behalf of the pupil. (3.) Termination of Tutor's Office. — The office of a tutor came to an end, — («.) By the pupil reaching the age of puberty, which had previously been regarded as a time varying according to the facts of each case, eighteen years being the maximum, but which Justinian fixed at fourteen for males, and twelve for females. (Tit. 22. pr.) (b.) By the pupil being arrogated, deported, reduced to slavery, or made a captive, or dying. (Tit. 1, 2.) (c.) By the condition being fulfilled on which the testamentary tutor was to cease to be tutor, or the time having expired during which the testamentary tutor was to act. (Tit. 21. 3. 5.) (d.) By the tutor dying (3); or — {e.) Undergoing, however appointed, the maxima or media capitis deminutio ; and (/) In the case of a tutor legitimus, his undergoing the minima capitis deminutio. (4.) And (^.) By the tutor being removed as suspected, or being relieved from his office on good grounds of excuse. (6.) Curators : whom they were to protect. — Curators were appointed to protect the property and interests of four classes of persons : — 1. Madmen {furiosi). — This was by the law of the Twelve Tables, and was extended by the praetors so as to include all forms of mental alienation (Tit. 22, note), and the deaf, mute, and perpetually infirm. (4.) 2. Prodigals (i. e. persons wasting recklessly their property). — This was also by the law of the Twelve Tables, but that law only applied to the case of a prodigal wasting goods received under an intestate succession, while the pr^tor extended it to all cases of prodigality. The fact of the madness or prodigality was first ascertained, by the prastor, and then the prodigus was absolutely interdicted from managing his own afl?airs, but the furiosus was not so interdicted, and was only placed under the care of the curator. When the case came within the law of the Twelve Tables, the curatorship of the fariosus and prodigus belonged to the nearest agnate. The magistrate appointed in cases of the praetorian ex- tensions of the terms, and in the time of Justinian in all cases. (Tit. 23. 3.) 3. Adolescentes. — Persons of either sex, above the age of puberty, and under the age of twenty-five years. The lex Plcetoria subjected to prosecution and infamy persons over- reaching adolescents under twenty-five years, and possibly allowed cura- tors to be appointed to prot^ect them. Subsequently praetors protected such persons by ordering, in case they had been prejudiced, a restitutio in inte- grum, that is, that they should be put in the same position which they BOOK I. 509 would have occupied if not prejudiced. Lastly, Marcus Antoninus ordered that curators should be appointed in all cases on the application of the minor. (Tit. 23. pr. note.) The adolescent was not obliged to have a curator for general purposes unless he wished, but a curator could be forced on him in case of a lawsuit, or his debtor wishing to pay him, or his late tutor wishing to settle accounts with him ; and if he had a curator he could not aliene any part of his property without the sanction of the curator. (Tit, 23. 2, note.) The curator to an adolescent could only be ap- pointed by the magistrate, the same magistrates appointing who appointed tutors ; but a magistrate would generally have regard to the wishes, as to curatorship, expressed in the testament of a person who could have appointed a tutor. (1.) 4. Pupils. — Pupils sometimes received curators, as, for example, if the tutor legitimus was unfit, a curator was appointed to protect the pupil and act, to a great extent, instead of the tutor : or, if the testamentary tutor, or the tutor appointed by the magistrate, was unfit, a curator was appointed to act conjointly with him, and curators were assigned in place of tutors excused for a time only. (Tit. 23. 5.) If a tutor was prevented by illness or other cause from administering the affairs of his pupil, a person might be appointed to act for him, but this person was not a curator, but a delegate of the tutor. (Tit. 23. 6.) Modes of Protection against Tutors and Curators. — Persons having tutors and curators were protected against the misconduct of tutors and curators in the following ways : — ] . Security was required and enforced by the exaction of pledges from tutores and curator es legitimi, and from those appointed by inferior magis- trates. (Tit. 24. pr.) 2. If such security was not taken, or was taken to an insuflScient degree, the magistrate was himself liable in an action, Avhich extended to his heirs. (Tit. 24. 2.) 3. Every tutor or curator was bound to make an inventory of the property of the pupil or person under care. (Tit. 24. pr. note.) 4. Every tutor or curator was, after the publication of the 78th novel, obliged to pledge himself by oath that he would act as a bonus paterfamilias. (Tit. 24. pr. note.) 5. The property of tutors and curators was subjected to a tacit hypothec to make good losses sustained through their neglect. (Tit. 24. pr. note.) 6. An action might be brought against tutors or curators when their office was ended, to make them account. (Tit. 22. 6, note.) 7. Tutors and curators might be removed by the actio suspecti. (Tit. 26.) Removal on Suspicion. — All tutors, including the patron (though in his case the grounds of a decision against him were not to be disclosed in order to save his reputation — Tit. 26. 2), and all curators, might be re- moved, after and even before entering on office, on a charge of suspicion, suspecti crimen — a charge permitted by the Twelve Tables (Tit. 26. pr.) — being successfully brought before the praetor at Rome, the j^rcEses, or pro- consular legate, in the provinces, by any one, even a woman (3), except that the pupil could not bring this charge against his tutor, while the minor could bring it against his curator. (4.) Infamy attached, if fraud, but not if neglect, was proved. (6.) The tutor or curator might be removed 510 SUMMAEY. although solvent (5), and although he offered to give security, (12.) While the action was pending, the accused was suspended from his admi- nistration (7), but if he died the action was at an end. (8.) It was the duty of the tutor to provide his pupil with maintenance. If he failed to do so, this was a ground for his being removed on a charge of suspicion. (9.) If he falsely asserted that the pupil's means did not suffice to allow main- tenance, he was to be handed over to the prcefectus urbi, or presses, to be punished, as also was a tutor who had obtained his office by bribery, and a freedman proved to be guilty of fraud while acting as tutor to the son or grandson of the patron. (10.) Where there were more than one tutor or curator, one might offer to his co-tutor or co-curator to give security, and alone act as adminis- trator, the other co-tutor or co-curator having, however, the preference if he, when thus challenged, was willing to give security. If no tutor or curator came forward in this way, the person, if any, appointed by the testament to administer was allowed to act ; and, if there was no such person, the majority of the tutors or curators was to decide who should act, and, if an agreement could not be come to in this way, the magistrate would decide. (Tit. 24. 1.) Tutors and Curators when excused. — Tutors and curators might be excused from holding their offices on grounds which may be classed under four heads : — 1. Having rendered a service to the public, or being engaged in the dis- charge of some public duty,- — (a) Having a certain number of children living (three at Rome, four in Italy, five in the provinces), children slain in battle, and grandchildren, in lieu of their parent, being reckoned in (Tit. 25. pr.) ; (b) being engaged in the administration of the fisciis (1) ; (c) being absent on the service of the State (2) ; (d) being magis- trates, military persons (14), or members of learned professions. (15.) 2. Being in a position adverse to the pupil or adult. — (a) Being a creditor or debtor (4, note) ; (b) being appointed by a father through enmity (9) ; (c) having been in deadly enmity with the father (11); (d) having had their status questioned by the father (12); (e) being the husband of the woman under care. (19.) 3. Being incompetent to sustain the burden of the office. — (a) Through being in extreme poverty; (b) being in bad health (7) ; (c) not being able to read (8) ; (e) being over seventy years of age. (3.) 4. Filling, or having filled, similar offices. — (a) Holding already three offices of the kind in question (3) ; (b) having already been the tutor of the person to whom a curator was to be appointed. (18.) 511 BOOK 11. LAW RELATING TO THINGS. Distinctions of Things. — We now come to the law relating to things; but the Institutes only deal with private law. The first step is, therefore, to notice the distinction of things according as they are exti^a nostrum ■patrimonium or in nostro patrimonio, that is, according as they are or are not capable of being the property of private persons. It is only of things in nostro patrimonio that the Institutes treat. Of things within the compass of private law the principal division is that into things corporeal and incorporeal ; of things like a field, quce tangi possimt, and things like a right of way over a field, an inheritance, or an obligation, qu(B tangi non possunt. (Tit. 2.) Modes of Acquisition. — How do we acquire things in 7iostro patri- monio^ whether corporeal or incorporeal ? The answer to this question takes up the Second Book of the Institutes, and the Third Book down to the end of the Twelfth Tide. First the inquiry is made how we acquire particular things, res singular, and then how we acquire groups of things, universitates rerum, like an inheritance. "We acquire particular things by, 1, Occupatio; 2, Accessio ; 3, Tra- ditio ; 4, Usucapio ; 5, Donatio ; the first three being modes of acquiring jure naturali ; the last two, ju7^e civili. We acquire groups of things, by, 1, Testamentary succession ; 2, Intestate succession; 3, Arrogation; 4, Bonorum addictio ; 5, Bonorum venditio ; 6, Forfeiture under the senatus-consultum Claudianum. The First Title of the Second Book treats of the distinction of things according as they are extra nostrum patrimonium or in nostro patrimonio, and then of the acquisition of particular things by occupatio, accessio, and traditio. Res extra nostrum Patrimonium are, 1, Communes, common to ail men, such as' the air, the sea, and the sea-shore as far as the highest winter flood runs up (Tit. 1, 1. 3) ; every one being allowed to use the sea-shore, as for drying nets (5) ; avoiding, however, injury to existing buildings thereon (1); and each State having the sea-shore adjacent to its territory under its supervision. (2, note.) 2. Publicw, belonging to the State, as rivers and ports, and the right of fishing therein, and the use for purposes of navigation of the banks thereof, although these banks might belong to private proprietors. (2. 4.) 3. Universitatis, belonging to a cor- porate body, as e. g., a racecourse belonging to a city. 4. Nullius, in the sense of being so devoted to the gods that they cannot belong to men, and such res nullius may be (a) sacrce, consecrated, as temples, by the pontiffs, with the sanction of the State, (b) Religiosce, invested with a religious character by interment, private proprietors being at liberty to impress this 512 SUMMARY. character on their ground by simply burying a dead body there; and (c) sanctce, holy, or protected against violation, like the gates or walls of a city. (10.) Modes of acquiring Particular Things jure naturali. — Particular things in nostra patrimonio are acquired by — I. OccuPATio, i.e. the taking or holding, as the holder's own, of res nuUhis, in the sense of things which previously belonged to no one, such as (a) Avild animals wherever found, which you have actually captured, not merely wounded (Tit. 1. 13), and not let go again. (Tit. 1. 12.) Bees you have hived. (Tit. 1. 14.) (But swarms issuing from your hive and staying in your sight and power (Tit. 1. 14) ; wild animals, such as pigeons and deer, that have acquired the habit of returning to your keeping, and fowls, not wild, but that stray from your keeping (Tit. 1. 16), are con- sidered as your property and not i^es nullhis, and to take them is theft.) (Tit. 1. 16.) (b) Things taken from the enemy; if the things taken from the enemy by a Roman army have been previously taken by him from a citizen, they will, as a general rule, form part of the prceda or booty of the Roman army ; but special things, such as land and slaves, are, by a kind of postliminy applied to them, allowed to revert to the owner. (17, note.) (c) Anything found on the sea- shore. (18.) (d) Islands formed in the sea. (22.) (e) Things found which have been intentionally abandoned by their owner (47), as distinguished from things which the owner has not wished to cease to own, as things thrown overboard in a storm or dropped out of a carriage. (48.) II. AcCESSio. There is no notice in the Institutes ofaccessio as a dis- tinct mode of acquisition. The subject is treated as growing out of occupatio. Acquisition by accession may be regarded as arising in two classes of cases. 1. In case<=! of natural increment. 2. In cases where, the things of two owners being mixed, the law decides which owner shall have the thing resulting from the mixture. ] . Accession hi/ natural increment. — 1. An owner gains something new by natural increment in the following instances : — (a) The young of his animals. (19.) (b) New soil added imperceptibly to his soil by alluvium. (20.) (c) A portion of his neighbour's soil borne by a river to his soil and remainino- there till the roots of trees thereon become attached to his soil. (21.) (d) An island being formed in a river; he has the ownership in this island up to the line of the mid channel. (22.) (e) The bed of a river left dry, up to the same line. (23.) Accessions by natural increment might occur when a possessor or a usufructuary, and not the owner, held the land. To whom did the fruits belong ? It is only of gathered fruits we can speak, for if the owner dispossessed the possessor, the owner immediately took all the fruits ungathered, and if the usufructuary died the same thing happened. With regard to the possessor, the bona fide possessor was not responsible for the fruits he had consumed, while the mala fide possessor was responsible. (1. 30, note.) The usufructuary had a right to take all the fruits, includ- ing the young of animals ; but the children of female slaves belonged to tlie owner, not to the usufructuary. (36, 37.) BOOK II. 513 2. Accession in favour of one of two owners. — The following in- stances are given in the Institutes, of cases where, the things o£ two owners being mixed, the law decides which owner shall have the thing resulting from the mixture. 1. A makes a thing with the materials of B. Here, if the thing can be reduced to its rude materials, like a vessel of silver, the thing made belongs to B ; if not, it belongs to A, as the maker of a nova species. (25.) A makes a thing partly with his own materials and partly with the materials of B. The thing made belongs to A. (25.) 2. A weaves in his garment the purple of B. If the purple is still separable the purple belongs to B, if not to A, the garment being considered the principal, the purple the accessary thing. (26.) 3. Two owners consent to mix their materials, the product belongs to them in common. (27.) 4. The materials of two owners are mixed by accident. If the mixed particles are physically inseparable, as when two metals are fused together, the product belongs to them in common. (27.) If the mixed particles are physically separable, as Avhen two qualities of wheat are mixed, each remains the owner of his share of the mixed wheat. (28.) 5. The owner of the soil builds with the materials of another. The owner of the materials remains the owner, but he cannot have the house pulled down. He may wait, if he pleases, till the building is destroyed, and then reclaim his materials, or he may bring an action de tigno injuncto and get double the value of the materials, and then his claim for the materials is at an end if the o^vner of the soil did not know that the materials were not his ; but if he did this, the owner of the materials may first bring the action de tigno injuncto^ and then also, if the building is pulled down, reclaim the materials. (29.) 6. The owner of materials builds on the soil of another. (ct) Let us suppose the owner of the materials is still in possession of the soil. The owner of the soil seeks to recover it. He is obliged to compensate the owner of the materials for the additional value given by the building to the soil, if the builder did not know that he was building on another's soil. If he did know this, the owner is obliged to let him take away such of the materials as can be removed without damage. (6) Let us suppose the owner of the materials is not still in possession of the soil. Then, whether he knew or did not know that he was building on another's soil, he may, if the building is destroyed, reclaim the mate- rials (30), but can get no compensation for the additional value he has given to the soil. 7. A tree belonging to A is planted in the soil of B. Until it takes root in the new soil, the tree continues the property of A; but a rooted tree is always the property of the owner of the soil. (31.) 8. The wheat of A is sown in the land of B. Sown wheat is on the footing of rooted trees. The wheat belongs to B ; but the sower, if in bona fide possession, is protected against B turning him out without compensation for the value of the wheat sown. (32.) L L 514 SUMMARY. 9. A writes a poem or history on the parchment or paper of B. B, the owner of the parchment, still remains owner, after the parchment has been written on. But if B is in bona fide possession of the parch- ment, A cannot get it from him without offering to pay him the cost of writing. (33.) 10. A paints a picture on the tablet of B. Here, in consequence of the possible value of pictures, the decision is the other way. The painted canvas belongs to A. If B, the owner of the tablet, is in possession of it after it has been painted on, A cannot get it from him without offering to pay the cost of the tablet. If, however, A is in possession of the tablet, B may claim the tablet by an action in which he is supposed still to be the owner, offering to pay the cost of the painting ; but the painter could stop the action by paying the cost of the tablet. (34.) 11. A finds treasure in the land of B. Half goes to A, half to B. (39.) III. Traditio : or delivery. Its constituent elements are three. 1. The owner of a thing means by the transfer to pass the property he transfers. 2. He, or any one entitled to act for him (42, 43), transfers by actually passing the thing, or by giving the transferee command over it, as when he gives the keys of a granary. (45.) 3. The transferee, meaning thereby to become owner, receives it. Traditio was necessary to pass property of all kinds; and in Justinian's time, land, wherever situated, passed by tradition. (40, note.) The handing over and the meaning to pass the property are both necessary. The seller may hand over a thing, but he generally does not mean to pass the property till he is actually paid ; and then not till the seller is paid, does the thing handed over become the property of the buyer. (41.) The lender, again, hands over a thing, not meaning to cease to be owner o£ it. If he changes his mind and wishes to give it, his purpose of giving unites with the previous act of handing over, and the legal traditio is accomplished. (41.) Things on board ship may be thrown overboard to lighten the ship, but their owners do not mean to cease to be owners, and therefore the property in them does not pass to those who may pick them up. (48.) It is not, however, necessary that the transferee should be a person definitely ascertained, for if money is thrown to a mob, the incertcB personce who pick it up become the owners by traditio. (40.) Servitudes. — The Institutes, at the end of this explanation of the modes of acquiring particular things jv7'e naturali, pause, before speaking of the modes of acquiring such things jure civili, to treat of servitudes, which are introduced by noticing at the beginning of the Second Title the division of things into corporeal and inco?^poreal, and saying that among incorj)oreal things are servitudes, or portions of the right of ownership enjoyed by persons other than the thing itself. Servitudes are («) prwdial when enjoyed over one thing in virtue of the ownership of another thing ; (prsedial servitudes being of two kinds : rural and urban), and (b) personal when attached to the person of the owner of the servitude. Prcedial Servitudes. — Rural prcedial servitudes were so called be- cause they were of kinds most frequently met with in the country ; while urban prandial servitudes were so called because they were of kinds BOOK 11. 515 most frequently met with in the city. The four kinds of rural preedial servitudes noticed in the Institutes, with an intimation that there are others (Tit. 3. 2), are, 1, iter, the right of passing; 2, actus, the right of driving cattle; 3, via, the right of driving a vehicle over another man's land ; the more extensive always involving the less extensive right ; and, 4j aquwductus, the right of conducting water through another man's land. (Tit. 3. pr.) Of urban servitudes the instances given in the Institutes are the right, 1, to make a neighbour's house sustain the weight o£ that of the owner of the servitude ; 2, to insert a beam in another man's house ; 3, to make another man receive the overflow of water from the roof or gutters (or to allow him not to be subject any more to the .servitude of receiving such an overflow, if this, which does not seem a servitude, is the meaning of stillicidiuni non recipiendi) ; 4, to prevent another man raising his house higher than that of the owner of the servitude ; 5, to prevent another man blocking up the lights of the owner of the servitude. (Tit» 3. 1.) Personal Servitudes are the following: 1, Ususfructus ; 2, Usus ; 3, Hahitatio. Ususfructus is the right of using and taking the fruits of anything, the fruits including \h.e.fructus civiles, or the profits derived from selling or letting the right of taking the fruits. The usufructuary or owner of this servitude had to act as a good paterfamilias, taking, and giving security that he would take, good care of the thing, and making losses good. If the substance of the thing ceased to exist, his servitude was at an end, and it was personal to himself and did not pass to his heirs, and only the fruits actually gathered by him belonged to him. (Tit. 4. pr.) In the old law only things not consumed in the use could be the subjects of usufruct ; but things consumed in the use, such as garments or v/ine, might, under a senatus-considtum oi the time of Augustus, be made subject to a usufruct, the usufructuary having, in some cases, as e.g., if he was a legatee, to give security that at the termination of the usufruct he would pay their value as estimated at the commencement of the usufruct. (2.) Usus, or the naked use, is the right of using the thing, not of taking the fruits of it, except for his daily wants. (Tit. 5. 1.) In the case of a house, it is the use for the purpose of living in it with his family only, and at the most receiving a guest in it. (Tit. 5. 2.) Hahitatio is the use of a house for the purpose of living therein, with something more added on, the right of letting it. (Tit. 5. 5.) Creation of Seuvitudes* — Servitudes were created in the following ways : — 1. Mancipatio. — This only applied to praedial rural servitudes. 2. In jure cessio. — (Both these Avere obsolete in the time of Justinian.) 3. Pacts and stipulations, followed by ^?/as?-tradition, i.Ci affording the means of actual exercise of the rights. 4. Testament. 5. Adjudicaiio. 6. Deductio. — A thing is transferred^ minus the servitude, which is re- served by the transferrer. 7. Usucapion. — The acquisition of servitudes by usucapion was forbidden by the lex Scrihonia-, but long posses- sion of them, or at least of some of them, was protected by the prajtor after a time, the length of which is uncertain, but which was probably LL 2 516 SUMMAEY. ten years for those present, and twenty years for those not present, in the same province. If land was acquired by usucapion, so were the servitudes that existed with it, and a servitude lost by disuse might be regained by usucapion. Usucapion applied principally to pr^edial urban servitudes. It also applied to at least some prsedial rural servitudes, and probably to usufructs. (Tit. 3. 4, note; Tit. 4. 1, note.) 8. Lege, or express enactment. This only applied, perhaps, to usufructs, an instance being the acquisition by the father of the usufruct of the son's peculium under Justinian's legislation. (Tit. 4. 1, note.) Extinction of Servitudes. — Servitudes were extinguished in the fol- lowing ways (Tit. 4. 3, note): — 1. In jure cessio, the owner of the servitude denying that he owns it (obsolete in time of Justinian). 2. Con- fusio or co7isolidatio ; the right to the res serviens and the res dominans, or to the dominium and the usufruct, vesting in the same person. 3. The termination (a) of the rights under which the servitude is created, as if an heir holding till a condition is fulfilled creates a servitude, the con- dition being fulfilled, and the heir ceasing to be the owner, the servitude is at an end; or (b) the termination of the duration of the servitude, i.e. the period for which it has been fixed by the creator. 4. Non-usage ; not using it for a period which, previously to Justinian, was two years, and, after Justinian's legislation, was fixed at ten or twenty, according as the parties were present or absent. If the servitude was a prsedial urban one, it was necessary that, to free the res serviens by usucapio, the person affected by the servitude should do some distinct act inconsistent with sub- mission to the servitude (usucapio lihertatis). (Tit. 4. 3, note.) In usufructs, if the usufructuary did not use the thing according to the terms of the usufruct, it came to an end. (Tit. 4. 3, note.) Hahitatio did not cease by non-usage. (Tit. 5. 5, note.) 5. Perishing of the thing in virtue of which, or over which, the servitude was exercised. 6. In the case of usufruct and use, the death or capitis deminutio (including, before Justinian, the minima capitis deminutio) of the owner of the servitude. Emphyteusis, Superficies, Jus Pignoris. — Before returning to the modes of acquisition of particular things, we have to notice three other incorporeal rights, which naturally connect themselves with personal ser- vitudes. \. Emphyteusis. 2. Superficies. ^. Jus pignoris. (A summary of the law relating to them is given at page 132.)* IV. Usucapion. — The Institutes, as v/e have said, notice five modes of acquiring res singula, three being modes of acquiringji/re naturali, and two being modes of acquiring jure civili. We now come to the first of these two latter, viz., usucapion, or the process by which possession ripens into ownership by lapse of time. It is only civil possession that is capable of so ripening. Civil is op- posed to natural possession. If a man has physical control over a thing, detains it, as the jurists say, he is in possession of it ; but, to possess it, he must mean to hold it as his own. If he not only is in possession of it, and means to hold it as his own, but if also his possession is bona fide and * Where a summary of any distinct portion of law is given in the body of the work, it is not repeated in this general Summary. BOOK II. 51? ex justa causa, then such possession is civil possession, the possession that in Eoman law (civilis) gave rise to usucapio, I£ he is merely in possession, or if he has also the animus possidendi, but his possession is not bona fide and ex justa causa, then his possession in either case is only- natural, and does not give rise to usucapio. The civil possessor and the natural possessor, who had the animus possidendi, were protected in their possession by praetorian interdicts, but the person merely in possession was not. (Tit. 6. pr. note.) With regard to usucapio, we have to ask three questions. 1. What things can be acquired by usucajyio ? 2. What is meant by the terms honafide and ex justa causa, as applied to possession ? 3. What time was requisite to run before usucapio ripened the possession into ownership ? 1. What things can he accjuired by usucapio ? — At the outset we have to notice a point of great importance. Lands in the solum p)rovinciale never could become the property of an individual. The possessor could not, therefore, become the owner of such land by usucapio. But after a certain length of possession the prastor protected his possession by allowing a plea, praisct-iptio, of long possession to be effectual in an action brought against him for the recovery of the possession of the land he held. But as the time was much longer that was required to run for the protection in this way than the time required for usucapio, the term proiscriptio, or possessio longi temporis, was used to describe, Avith regard to the solum jyrovinciale, the equivalent of usucapio with regard to moveables and solum Ifalicum. There were some differences in their operation ; the chief of which were, 1, thsit possessio longi temporis did not give ownership; 2, that usucapio was only interrupted by a judgment; longi temporis possessio by a litis contestatio, and 3, under usucapio the thing was acquired subject to its liabilities, i.e. servitudes or mortgages ; and under longi temporis jjossessio, it was held free from them. Yet as they were nearly of the same effect, and as the requisites of possession in each case were the same, they are generally spoken of together. (Tit. 6. pr. note.) Under Justinian's legislation (Tit. 6. pr.) the possessio longi temporis gave the dominium. Moveables, it may be added, could, in all parts of the Roman Empire, be acquired by usucapio, and the posssssio longi temporis did not apply to them. (Tit. 6. pr. note.) We may, therefore, break the first question into two heads. 1. What moveables could be acquired by usucapio. 2. What immoveables could be acquired by usucapio or possessio longi temporis. Generally speaking, all things in nostro patrimonio could be so ac- quired, but things such as res sacra', or a free man, could not. Nor, as a general rule, could things incorporeal. (1, note.) Things stolen could not be acquired, and a fugitive slave was reckoned among such things. (1.) The thief, of course, could not acquire by usucapio what he had stolen ; but neither could an innocent holder, and, as theft included every handing over by a person of a thing he knew not to be his, it was rare that moveables could be acquired by usucapio (3) ; but it might happen, as if an heir bona fide deals with a thing merely deposited with the tes- tator as if it had belonged to the testator (4) or a usufructuary so deals 518 SUMMAEY. witli the child of a female slave, believing bona fide that it is his pro- perty. There is no taint of theft, and the thing when alienated by the heir, or usufructuary, may be acquired by nsucapio. Theft only applied to moveables. As to immoveables, they could not be acquired by usucapio or longi temporis possessio, if they were 7'es vi possesses^ forcibly seized on (2) ; but if the possession was originally sine vi, but still mala fide, e. g. if a person took possession of land left unguarded, knowing it not to be his, and then alienated it to a bona fide possessor, this possessor could gain the ownership by usucapio, and therefore usvcapio applied much more frequently to immoveables than to moveables. (7.) The goods of the fiscus, before being reported on as such (vacantia), could, but afterwards could not, be acquired by usucapio. (9.) Nor could things belonging to pupils or minors, or things forming part of a dowry. (10.) 2. What ivere the requisites of civil possession ? What ivere the con- ditions possessioji must fulfil in order for usucapio to opei^ate ? (1.) The thing possessed must not have any vitium in it, i.e. must not be of any of those kinds of things which we have just described as in- capable of being acquired by usucapio. (10.) (2.) The thing must be possessed ex justa causa, that is, must have come into the power of the possessor by some recognised legal mode of acquisition, such as sale or gift (10, note) ; and, if there had been a mis- take about this, and the causa, or title, was not just, the error, under Justinian's legislation, prevented usucapio. (11.) (3.) The possession must be bona fide ; the possessor must not know that he was possessing Avhat did not belong to him, and, although reason- able ignorance of facts could be permitted, ignorance of leading principles of law could not. In the case of a sale it was necessary that the bona fides should exist at the making, and also at the performance of the bargain. The general rule was that the possession must be bona, fide at its com- mencement. Subsequent discovery of the real facts did not stop the process of usucapio. (10, note.) This was equally true, if not the same, but two persons possessed, one taking from the other, the thing during the time requisite for usucapio. If, at its commencement, the possession of the testator was bona fide, that of the heir was available for usucapio, although the heir knew that the testator had been mistaken. (12.) The times during which two persons held the thing, the one from the other, as in the case of a seller and a buyer, counted together for the purposes oi usucapio. (13.) UsuKPATio. — The interruption of usucapio, the breaking the use, was termed usurpatio, as if the possessor lost possession or fell into the power of the enemy, or an action was brought to contest the right, the use being, under Justinian, broken from the time of the first moving of the controversy {inota controversial, instead of from the litis contestatio, which had no longer the important place it had under the formulary system. (13.) In three exceptional cases the 7nala fide possessor might acquire by usucapio : — 1, Under the old law (altered by Hadrian), if the thing possessed was an inheritance, or part of one, the mala fide possessor could in a year acquire the thing, whether moveable or immoveable ; 2, so EOOK II. 519 could the original owner of a thing given over in trust as against the fidu- ciary ; and 3, the original owner of a thing sold by the State for non- payment of a mortgage debt could acquire it, as against the prcediator^ or purchaser, from the State, but in this case two years' possession was necessary for immoveables. (10, note.) 3. What time was required for the possession to run on in order that usucapio might take effect ? By the Twelve Tables it was provided, that usucapio should be com- pleted in two years in the case of moveables, and in one year in the case of immoveables. (Tit. 6. pr.) The longi temporis jjossessio, introduced by the praetors chiefly for the protection of possessors of provincial lands, required ten years if the parties were domiciled in the same province, inter prcBsentes ; and twenty years if they were not, inter absentee. (Tit. 6. pr. note.) Justinian changed the system generally. He lengthened the time for the acquisition of moveables from one year to three, and gave the name of usucapio to the acquisition of moveables by possession during three years. He made the lo7igi temporis possessio apply to lands everywhere (abolishing the distinction between solum Italicuni and solum pr^ovinciale), and he made the longi temporis possessio give the ownership and not merely bar actions. (Tit. 6. pr. note.) Possessio longissimi temporis. — There was also possessio longissimi temporis, by which possession lasting in the case of ecclesiastical property and the patrimonial estate of the emperor for fifty years, and in other cases for thirty years, enabled the possessor before Justinian to repel all actions, and under Justinian to become owner of the thing possessed, whatever the defect in the possession might be. (13, note.) Possession for five years of things purchased from the fiscus gave, imder an edict of Marcus Aurelius, complete ownership to the purchasers, whatever might be the defects of the possession, as if, for example, there were rights of an owner or mortgagee which the fiscus ought to have respected. Those damnified by the action of the fiscus were during five years at liberty, under a constitution of Zeno, to seek compensation from thQ fiscus, while the purchasers had under this constitution an incon- testable title at once. (14.) Gift. — The second mode of acquisition jure civili noticed in the Institutes is gift, but, unless on account of the ceremonies accompanying gifts under Justinian's legislation, it is not properly a mode of acquisition separate from tradition. It is a delivery of a thing from a particular motive. (Tit. 7. pr.) The subject of gifts is treated of under three heads : gifts mortis causa, gifts inter vivos, and gifts propter nuptias. i. Donationes mortis causa. — Gifts on account of death {donationes mortis causa) were gifts made in contemplation of death, revocable before the death of the donor, and failing if the donee died first. They might be made in either of two ways. The donor might hand over the thing to the donee, but the gift was not to be completed until the donor was dead ; or . the donor might hand over the thing, giving it there and then, but bargaining that it was to be restored to him if he did not die on the occa- 520 SUMMARY. sion contemplated. In either case, although he had certainly in the second case lost the dominium^ the donee was allowed to get back the thing by a real action. (Tit. 7. pr. note.) Justinian required that a donatio mortis causa should be made in the presence of five witnesses. (1, note.) Donationes mortis causa very closely resembled legacies. They were subjected to the deduction of the Falcidian fourth, and were not valid if the giver was insolvent : but they differed from legacies in the following particulars. 1. They took effect on the death of the donor without it being necessary the heir should enter. 2. The same person who could take or could not take the one, could or could not take the other, but capacity was regarded, in the case of donationes mortis causa, at the time of the death only, not, as in the case of legacies, also at the time of the dis- position. 3. A fdiusfamilias could, with his father's permission, make donationes mortis causa ; but could not give legacies of other things than his peculium castrense. 4. A peregrinus could make donationes mortis causa, but could not give legacies. (1, note.) ii. Gifts inter vivos require tradition, but if the intentions of the donor have been manifested he is bound to deliver. A mere agreement to give was not originally binding, but Constantine enacted that such an agree- ment should be binding if in writing, and Justinian made the agreement binding in every case. Some donations looked on with peculiar favour, such as gifts to or from the emperor, were valid, without anything more than the intention to give being manifested ; but other gifts, if exceeding 200 solidi previously to Justinian, and 500 solidi under his legislation, needed to be registered by public deeds. Gifts requiring to be registered were, however, valid up to the limit below which registration was not necessary. Gifts, as a rule, were not revocable : but Justinian made them revocable in case of the ingratitude of the donee. (2.) iii. Gifts propter nuptias. — Gifts between husband and wife were prohibited by law. But as an equivalent to the dos or dowry contributed by the wife, the husband frequently made a gift before marriage, donatio ante nuptias, which was the inalienable property of the wife managed by the husband ; and this donation might, like the dowry, be increased after marriage. Justinian enacted that such gifts, like dowries, might be not only increased, but made after marriage, and should receive the more appropriate name of donationes propter, instead of ante, nuptias. The wife, if survivoi', received a portion of the donatio, equal in quantity before Justinian, and in value under Justinian, to that wliich the husband, if survivor, would have received out of the dos. (3, note.) Justinian, in closing the subject of the mode of acquiring particular things by the civil law, notices that there had been at one time a mode of acquiring per jus accrescendi, which took effect when one joint owner of a slave enfranchised him in such a way that if the enfranchisement had been effectual, the slave would have become a citizen; the share of the enfran- chising owner passed by accrual to the other owner, and this other owner became the sole owner of the slave. Justinian did away with this by enacting that in such a case the slave should be free, and the other BOOK 11. 521 part-owner should receive a pecuniary compensation from the enfran- chising part-owner. (4.) Before passing to consider the modes of acquiring groups of things the Institutes deal with two subsidiary subjects, viz. 1, Separation of ownership from the power of alienation, and 2, Acquisition through others. i. Separation from Ownership of the Power of Alienation. 1. A pej'son who is owner cannot always aliene. Two instances are given, (a) A husband cannot aliene immoveables forming part of the dowry (dos) of his wife, although the owner^ship is in him. The Ux Julia prevented a husband selling such immoveables when in Italico solo, without his wife's consent, or mortgaging them with her consent. Justinian enacted that immoveables, forming part of the dos, wherever situated, could not be sold or mortgaged by the husband, even with the consent of the wife. (Tit. 8. pr. note.) (b) A pupil cannot, without the authorisation of the tutor, aliene. The pupil could not transfer the property in anything belonging to him, but he could acquire the property in anything transferred to him. Three illustrations of this doctrine are given. (a.) A pupil unauthorised could not enter into the contract of mu- tuwn, i.e. could not lend a thing so that the thing lent became the property of the person to whom it was lent, he in his turn having to give as much back. W the pupil made such a contract, he could by a real action get the thing back, if not consumed: if consumed bo7ia fide, he could recover the value of it by a condlctio ; if consumed mala fide, he could get not only the value, but damages by an actio ad exliibendum. (b.) If the pupil unauthorised paid a debt, he could not make the money paid belong to the creditor. It was still his, and if not spent might be got back by a real action from the creditor ; if spent bona fide, the debt due by the pupil was considered as liquidated ; if spent mala fide, the pupil would have an actio ad exhibendum. (c.) If a debtor made a payment to a pupil without the tutor autho- rising the payment, the money paid became the joroperty of the pupil, and the debt still remained unextinguished. If the pupil sued for the sum owing, the debtor could only repel the action to the extent to which the pupil then had the money in hand, and if the pupil had spent it all, the debtor had to pay over again. Even if the tutor authorised the payment, the debtor was not quite safe, for the tutor might not hand over to the pupil the money paid ; and then the praetor might give a restitutio in integrum, placing the pupil in the position in which he would have been if the debt had not been paid, and so the creditor might have to pay over again. To obviate this risk, Justinian enacted that if the debtor paid under the authority of a judicial order, which was to be given gratis, he was to be absolutely secure, and under no circumstances could he have to pay again. (Tit. 8. 2, note.) 2. A person not owner can sometimes aliene. The instance given is that of a creditor who has a power (of which he cannot be deprived even by agreement) of selling the thing pledged or mortgaged {jngnus, hypolheca). 522 • . SUMMARY. Justinian enacted, tliat unless the parties otherwise agreed, the sale should take place two years after notice to pay ; and in two years more, if no purchaser could be found, the creditor should be considered the owner. (Tit. 8. 1.) ii. Acquisition through others. — We may acquire through, 1, filii- familiarum. 2, Through slaves belonging to us, and, to a certain extent, through slaves of whom we have the usufruct. 3, Through procurators. 1. Acquisition through Jiliifamiliarum. — The old rule of law was that everything acquired by a filiusfamilias was acquired for and belonged to the paterfamilias. The son might have a peculium or property under his control, which, so far as third persons went, who could sue and recover to the extent of the peculium^ was like the son's property ; but the father remained the legal owner of it, and it was only under the son's control because the father permitted this. The first change was the intro- duction of the PECULIUM CASTRENSE, dating from the beginning of the empire, consisting of everything given to a son on setting out for military service, or acquired while that service lasted. This peculium was the son's ; he could dispose of it as he pleased in his lifetime or by testament, but if he did not dispose of it by testament, then his father took it not as the heir of the son, but as the claimant of a peculium. Justinian, however, allowed the children or brother of the Jiliusfa?nilias to take the peculium before the father. The next change was the introduction by Constantine, or perhaps previously, of the peculium quasi-castrense, i.e. property acquired by the son in personal attendance on the emperor, and this peculium too could, under Justinian, be, like the castrense, given by testament. (Tit. 9. 1, note.) Lastly, Constantine introduced the peculium adventitium, which, having been previously confined to property coming from a mother or maternal ancestor, or husband or wife, was made by Justinian to include all pro- perty coming to the filiusfamilias^ except the peculium profectitiuvi, i.e. the property coming to him from the father himself Of this peculium adventitium the son had the ownership, the father the usufruct. (Tit. 9. 1, note.) From the peculium falling under the three above heads as not belonging to the father, a third used to be deducted by the father when he emancipated the son. Justinian gave the father the usufruct of half, in- stead of the ownership of a third of such peculium^ in case of emancipation. 2. Acquisition through slaves. — (a) The slave stipulates for the master's benefit, but cannot make his master's position worse. The slave enters on an inheritance only if the master directs him, for the inheritance may be such as to cause loss. The slave takes a legacy for the benefit of the master, whose slave he was at the date of the decease of the testator. The slave possesses for the master, who must have knowledge of the possession and supply the animus, the slave only being capable of physical detention — except when the slave possessed a thing as part of his peculium ; for the master, in allowing him to create this peculium (which always belonged to the master), has exercised the animus necessary for possession.. And what is here said of the slave may, with the necessary exceptions as to the 2)eculia castrense, quasi-castrense, and adventiti^im, be said of the filius- BOOK II. 523 famih'as, who equally stipulated for his father's benefit, could not make his father's position worse, took inheritances only under his father's direction, received legacies for his father's benefit, and possessed physi- cally for his father, but needed his father's animus 2Jossidendi. (Tit. 9. 3, note.) {h) Through slaves of whom any one has the usufruct, he acquires whatever they acquire (including possession as well as ownership) by means of anything belonging to the usufructuary or by their own labour. Everything else which they acquire, as for example an inheritance or a legacy, is acquired for their owner. The same may be said of a slave possessed honafide^ but who is really not the slave of the possessor, either as being free or belonging to another. If the slave possessed bona fide becomes in time the property of the possessor by usucapio (which cannot happen in case of a slave of whom there is a usufruct), he acquires thence- forth everything for the owner by usucapio. (4.) 3. Acquisition through Procurators. — On the other hand, a man could not acquire by means of free persons not in his power or possessed by him bona fide, nor by slaves belonging to another, of whom he had neither the usufruct nor the bona fide possession. He could acquire nothing '■per extranemn personam,^ except that a procurator could acquire possession for his principal, even when his principal did not know of the acquisition, and then if the thing possessed was handed over by the owner, the ownership was acquired by the principal in any case, but if it was not handed over, then the usucapio began to run on behalf of the prin- cipal only for the time when he knew of and adopted the possession. (Tit. 9. 5.) Testaments. We now come to the first mode of acquiring universitates reruniy viz. by testament, and this subject occupies the rest of the Second Book. We have to consider (1) the legal position of the maker of the testa- ment : {a) how he must make it, which will vary according as he is or is not a soldier ; {h) who are legally incapable of making wills ; (c) the duties and powers of the testator as to the disinherison, institution, and sub- stitution of heirs ; (d) the causes that make a testament invalid ; and (2) the legal j)Osition of those who take under a testament, that is, of {a) heirs, (J) legatees, and (c) those who receive or benefit by a trust. 1. Legal Position of the Maker of the Testament. 1. Form of the Testament. — In the earliest period of Roman law, a testament might be made {a) in the calata comitia, called twice a year for this purpose, where the gentes watched over the transfer of the hereditas, or (b) in procinctu, in time of war, when an army was setting out to fight. Then a new form of will Avas introduced in the shape of a fictitious sale, by which originally the heir figuring as the familio' emptor bought the inheritance from the testator in the presence of the holder of the scales and five witnesses. Afterwards the familiw emptor became 524 SUMMARY. merely an outsider, going through the ceremony for the benefit of the heir, whose name was concealed during the life-time of the testator. (Tit. 10. 1.) Then came the praetorian testament. The form of sale was no longer required. The libripens and the familice emptor became two additional witnesses, making seven in all, but the seven witnesses had to go through a new formality. They had to seal the testament with their seals. (2.) Lastly came the imperial form of will introduced in the fifth century by Theodosius the Second. Here a new precaution was in- troduced : the seven witnesses had not only to seal, but to subscribe the testament, and so had the testator, or if he could not write, an eighth witness had to subscribe for him. This testament was said to be tripar- titum. that is, taking its origin from three sources. The necessity for the testament being made at one single time, and the necessity of the presence of seven witnesses, came from the old civil law ; the sealing of the testa- ment by the witnesses came from praetorian law ; the subscription of the witnesses and the testator came from imperial law. (3.) Justinian added, and subsequently abolished, another requirement, that the name of the heir should be in the handwriting of the testator or of one of the wit- nesses. (4.) It made no difference what seal the witnesses used, and before the time of Theodosius and Valentinian they used, and after that time they were obliged, to write by the side of the mark of their seal their names and the name of the testator. (4, and 2, note.) Any one, as a general rule, could be a witness with whom the testator had testamenti factio, i.e. to whom he could leave his inheritance. But there were exceptions : such as women, children below the age of pubert)'', slaves, the mad, the deaf, the dumb, and persons considered as intesta- biles on account of having committed certain offences, such as writing libels or denying their signature to a former testament which they had witnessed. (6.) A testament would, however, be valid, although wit- nessed by a slave, if, at the time of witnessing it, he was reputed to be free. (7.) Members of the same family might be witnesses of the same testament (8) ; but the filiusfamilias could not be a witness of the father's testament, nor could the father be a witness of the son's testament affecting h\^ peculium castrense. (9.) Neither the heir nor any one in the same family with him could be a witness — but legatees and Jide{co7n7nissaru, and those connected with them, might. (10, 11.) The testament might be written on any material, wax, parchment, &c. (12) ; and any number of duplicates of a testament might be made. (13.) A testament need not be made in writing at all. It might be merely nuncupative, that is, the testator might orally declare his wishes in the presence of seven witnesses. Military Testaments. — Special privileges, however, as to making testaments were accorded to soldiers by Julius Cjesar, and confirmed by other emperors. A soldier, while serving in a campaign, was not re- quired to observe the formalities incumbent on civilians ; and this applied to a s,o\diev jiliusfamilias making a testament as to his peculium castrense. EOOK II. 525 But if he was not in a campaign, the filiusfamilias had to observe the usual formalities. Under Justinian it was undoubtedly necessary that the soldier's testament should be made during a campaign, but whether this had previously been the law is doubtful. (Tit. 11. pr.)' The following were the chief privileges of soldiers with regard to military testaments : {a) All that was necessary for the validity of a soldier's testament, was that he should have meant in some way to express his testamentary intentions ; if orally, in the presence of a witness, (h) Any words would suffice to institute his heir. (Tit. 11. 1.) (c) The soldier might die partly testate and partly intestate, (d) He need not disinherit his children, {e) His testament would not be rendered invalid by those causes which would render invalid the testament of a civilian (pagamts)^ and his testament, however informally made, would suffice for revocation of a previous testament. (Tit. 17. 2^ note.) (/) He could institute as heirs persons generally incapacitated, such as deportati and peregrini. (Tit. 11. 6.) {g) He could give more than three-fourths of his property in legacies. (Tit. 22. 3.) (Ji) He could dispose of the inheri- tance by codicils. (Tit. 11. 6, note.) (i) He might make a testament although deaf or dumb. (2.) {j) A testament made irregularly before he acquired the power of making a military testament became valid, as the expression of his wishes after he had acquired that power. (4.) {k) Nor did a minima capitis deminntio affect the validity of a military testament, nor the two greater kinds, if inflicted for merely military offences. (5.) (/) The rule treating institutions ex certo tempore or ad certum tempus as a superfluity, did not extend to military testaments. (Tit. 14. 9.) [m) Soldiers could make a testament for their children without having made their own, and could substitute to emancipated children and to strangers. (Tit. 16. 9, note.) The testament of a soldier made without the forms required from civilians, remained in force for a year after his discharge {post juissionem) ; and if he inserted a condition that could not be fulfilled within a year, yet his testament was valid, supposing he died while he could make a military testament. After a year from his discharge had elapsed, he was obliged, to die testate, to make a testament with the ordinary forms. (Tit. 11. 3.) 2. Persons incapable of Testation. — All persons, however, could not make testaments. This power was confined to Eoman citizens sui juins. The filiusfamilias could, however, dispose by testament of his pecvlium castrense^ and this privilege was first in some, and then in all, cases extended to the j9ecwZm??z quasi castrense (Tit. 12. pr. ; Tit. 11. 6) ; the father taking these p^eeidiay however, by the patria potestas, if the son died intestate. (Tit. 12. pr.) Children under age, mad persons, except in lucid intervals (Tit. 12. 1); interdicted prodigals (2); dea-f and dumb and blind people, except under special precautions provided by the em- perors (3, 4), could not make testaments. Captivity. — A testament made by a man during captivity was in- valid, but a testament made before he became captive was valid, by the jus postliminii, if he returned ; or if he died, by a deduction from the 526 SU^IMARY. terms of the lex Cornelia^ punishing the forgery of the testament of a person dying in captivity. It was argued that a testament made by a person who subsequently died in captivity must be vaHd, or the law would not punish a forgery of such a testament. (5, note.) 3. We now come to the rules as to the (a) disinherison, (5) institution, and (c) substitution of heirs. {a) Disinherison. — The sui heredes of the testator, i.e. those persons who were made sui juris by his death, had such an interest in the inheri- tance that if he wished to exclude them he must do so expressly. He had to exclude his sons by name, and if he did not, the testament was wholly invalid. Other sui heredes, such as daughters, he might exclude by the general term ccBteri exheredes sunto ; but if he did not do this, then the testament was not invalid, but these excluded sui heredes took by a kind of accrual their proper share, if the instituted heirs were sui heredes, and half the inheritance if the instituted heirs were strangers. (Tit. 1 3. pr. note.) The birth of a new suns heres, after the testament had been made, introduced a new participator in the inheritance, and unless this person was expressly disinherited by anticipation, the testament was made invalid. The term posthumous was in strictness applied to any person born after the death of the testator. In the theory of law, postumi were incertce per- sonce, and could not be instituted or disinherited ; but the civil law per- mitted the institution of postumi sui heredes, born after the death of the testator (6, note); and the lex Junia Velleia permitted the institution of postumi sui heredes, conceived before and born after the date of the testament, but born before the testator's death {postumi Velleiani). (2, note.) And postumi who could be instituted must be disinherited. The jurist Gallus Aquilius invented a form of institution by which the case was met of a son dying in the testator's lifetime, and then the testator dying, and then there being a posthumous son of the son, who would be a suus heres of the testator. (1, note.) There was also another way in which new sui heredes might come into existence after the date of the testament. A son might die in the life- time of the testator, and then the children of that son would pass into the rank of sui heredes. The lex Junia Velleia, by a further provision, per- mitted the disinherison of all such children who were said to hepostumorum loco {postumi quasi Velleiani). (2, note.) The disinherison of postumi had to be made nominatim : Quicumque mihi filius genitus fuerit exheres esto. (1.) PostumcB might be disinherited by the general cceteri clause. It was, however, necessary that the postumo"., if disinherited by the general clause, should have something left them, to show they were not passed over through forgetfulness. (1.) Other persons, who came into the family after the date of the testament, such as children subsequently adopted, and children both conceived and born after the date of the testament, in the lifetime of the testator, necessarily invalidated the testament. (2, note.) So far we have been considering the provisions of the civil law. The praetor also came to the aid of those who were not, in his opinion, BOOK II. 527 properly disinherited, by giving them lonorum possessio contra tabulas. (3, note.) If a daughter or a grandchild was omitted, the prsetor permitted the testament to be set altogether aside, but the Emperor Antoninus made a distinction, and allowed the daughter to have only what she would take by the jus accrescendi, that is, her share, which, if the instituted heir was a stranger, would be one-half, whereas the grandson, if omitted, could get the testament set aside, and would take all the inheritance, as against an instituted stranger. (3, note.) Under the praetorian law grandsons as well as sons must be disinherited nominatim. (3, note.) Perhaps also the praetor did not permit the tes- tament to be set aside because a son had not been properly disinherited who died in the lifetime of the testator, although the law is laid down by Justinian positively to this effect, that the testament was ipso facto in- valid in such a case. (Tit. 13. pr. and 3, note ) The praetor required all sons and grandsons to be disinherited, whether they were or were not in the power of the testator, provided they were not in another family. This included those emancipated (3), and those given in adoption, and subsequently emancipated by the adoptive father. (4.) The emancipated son, however, had to bring into account the pro- perty he had acquired since emancipation, if the effect of his getting the testament set aside was injurious to a properly instituted suus heres. (3, note.) Justinian made some further changes. 1. He required the child and the grandchild, male or female, whom it was necessary to disinherit at all, to be disinherited nominatim. (5.) 2. In case this was not done, the testament was absolutely invalid. There was no longer any jus accres- cendi for daughters and grandchildren. (5.) 3. The testator was obliged to disinherit his child given in adoption to any one but an ascendant. (5, note.) Soldiers in expeditione were not obliged to disinherit expressly any one. (6.) Mothers and maternal ancestors, also, were not obliged to disinherit expressly those who would have taken their inheritance ab intestato. Their silence was sufficient ; but then these persons, if unjustly passed over, might present a querela inofficiosi testamenti^ just as those might who, although disinherited in due form, complained that their disinherison was unjust. (7, note.) {h) Institution. — The institution of the heir was the basis of the whole testament. In the old law some such formal phrase as Titius heres esto was considered necessary, but, under the empire, any form of institution would suffice. (Tit- 14. pr.) Wlio could he instituted, — Those only could be instituted heirs who had the testamenti /actio with the testator, who had, in the old language of the law, the commercium with him. Many persons, however, who had not the testamenti /actio in the sense of being able to make a testament, had the testamenti /actio in the sense of being capable of being instituted as heirs, as, for instance, persons below the age of puberty. Among those who could not be instituted were peregrinij deportati, and uncertain per* 528 SUMMARY. sons ; an example of an uncertain person being ' whoever shall marry my daughter,' but a person whom the testator had not seen was not an uncertain person. (12.) The institution of uncertain persons was per- mitted by Justinian. Further, it was not permitted to institute munici- palities ; the gods, with certain exceptions, and so forth ; and, under the law of Justinian, certain others, as apostates, heretics, or persons whose institution seemed contrary to the rules of law or of justice as to marriage ; and, though ccelibes and orhi could be instituted as heirs, the former took (unless of an age too young for marriage, or in case of near relationship to the testator) nothing, and the latter only half of what was given them by the testament, so long as the lex Papia Poppcea^ abolished by Con- stantine, was in force. (Tit. 14. pr. note.) Institution of Slaves. — The master might institute his slave, and, under Justinian, without expressly enfranchising him, and Justinian permitted the institution of a slave in whom the testator had only a bare ownership, the slave having, however, still to serve the usufructuary ; but a mistress could not institute, and so enfranchise, a slave accused of adultery with her. (Tit. 14. pr.) The slave of the testator, if instituted, was obliged to take the inheritance, if not emancipated before the testator's death. If the testator instituted the slave of another, the master of the slave decided whether the slave should accept the inheritance, and the slave took it for his master, or masters, if there were several, rateably (3) ; and if the master of the slave was dead, the slave could take the inheritance of the testator for the benefit of his dead master's inheritance. (2.) In order to decide, in cases of the slave being alienated, for what master the inheri- tance was taken, it was necessary to look to the time when the inheritance was actually accepted, as the slave took the inheritance for the master to whom he then belonged. (1.) A testator might appoint one heir, or as many as he pleased. (Tit. 14. 4.) Calculation of the parts of an inheritance. — The calculation of the parts into which the testator divided the inheritance was made in the terms of the «s, its multiples and its fractions. The real as contained twelve ounces, but the testamentary as^ or unit of the inheritance, was held to contain as many ounces as the testator pleased. A person could not die partly testate and partly intestate, and so, if a testator instituted only one heir and gave him six ounces, it was held that the as in this case only contained six ounces, and he took the whole. (5.) If he instituted several heirs, and the number of parts, or ounces, he gave to each, came, in the whole, to 11 or 13, this was taken to be the number included in the as. But if he gave two parts to one, and two to another, and insti- tuted a third heir, without expressing how many parts were given him, then recoiu'se was had to the normal as, and this third heir had the number of parts (eight) necessary to make up the twelve ounces of the as ; or if the parts given reached, or exceeded, twelve, then the testator was sup- posed to have had the double as, or dupondins, in mind, and the instituted heir, to whom no express number of parts was given, took the number of parts necessary to make up the dupondius, i. e., if twelve were given, he 1 BOOK II. 529 took twelve, or one half of the inheritance, and, i£ more than twelve, as thirteen or twenty-five, were given, then he took enough parts to make up the diipondius, or, if necessary, the tripondins. The fractions o£ the du- pondius or tripondius could, of course, be brought back to fractions of the «5. (Tit. 14. 6. 7. 8.) Conditional Institution. — Sui lieredes could not be instituted condition- ally unless the condition was one in their own power to fulfil, and was one lawful to carry out (9), but other heirs might be instituted condi- tionally. An impossible condition — and conditions of a kind contrary to law or honi mores were reckoned among impossible conditions — Avas treated simply as if it had not been inserted at all, and the institu- tion was valid. (10.) So, too, if an heir was instituted from, or to, a certain time, this was treated as something altogether superfluous, for to say that a man, after a date, or up to a date, should be heir, offended, the former against the rule that a testator could not die partly testate, and the latter against this rule, and also against the rule seviel heres seinper heres. But if the time was uncertain, in the sense that the heir was to be heir when a thing did happen that must happen some time, as when A died, this uncertain time was looked on merely as a condition, and the inheritance was in abeyance until it was seen whether the instituted heir survived A. If he did, he entered on the inheritance, and, in all cases when an heir entered on a condition being fulfilled, his rights were made, by his entering, to date back to the time of the death of the testator. (c) Substitution, which was either ordinary, or to a pupil. Suhstitutio vulgaris^ as opposed to p^upiUdriSj was the institution of another heir in case the heir first named did not take ; and the law allowed any number of such substitutions, to which resort was had, partly from the prevailing wish not to die intestate, and partly because, while the lex Julia et Papia Poppcea Avas in operation, the testator by substituting an heir could give to a person he wished to benefit the share of an instituted heir disqua- lified from taking under this law. (Tit. 15. pr. 1.) One important use of the power of substitution was that which regarded co-heirs. Three instances are given which show the benefits of substitu- tion to co-heirs. 1. Their position, if substituted to each other, was better than their position under the law of accrual, jus accrescendi. For though the share of an instituted heir who did not take it passed to co-heirs by the right of accrual, the effect was not the same as in case of substitu- tion, for those substituted had a liberty of choice as to taking this vacant «hare, whereas they must take what accrued to them. 2. The surviving substituted co-heirs might possibly get more in the case of one of their number dying, for one co-heir might die after entering on his own share of the inheritance, but before the share of a co-heir sub- sequently renouncing was offered him. If there was no substitution, the heirs of this co-heir would take by accrual the vacant share ; but the benefit of substitution was personal. If the co-heir did not live to take the vacant share, it did not go to his heirs, but went to the surviving co-heirs, who thus had the advantage of excluding his heirs. 3. Under the lex Julia et Papia some persons might take what was M M 530 SUMMARY. given them as co-heirs, who could not take caduca. Substitution might be beneficial to them, and they took as substituted heirs Avhat they were disqualified from claiming as caduca. (1, note.) Unless the testator otherwise provided, substituted co-heirs, if instituted with unequal shares, took the same unequal shares of what they got by substitution. (Tit. 15. pr.) If one of two co-heirs is substituted to the other, and a third person is substituted to the substituted co-heir, the third person is taken to be substituted also to the other co-heir, and, if both co-heirs die, takes the shares of both, although the co-heir to whom he was expressly substituted, died first (3.) If a testator substituted an heir to an instituted heir, who, really a slave, was thought by the testator to be free, the master of the instituted slave and the substituted heir were permitted, by a kind of rough equity, each to take half. (4.) Suhstihitio jn/j>27Zam. — Custom had also sanctioned what was termed 2')up{llar{s suhstihitio. A testator might, but only as a part of his own testament (Tit. 16. 5), substitute to each or to any of his children in his poAver at the time of making the testament and at his death (including posthumous children), (4) if they became heirs, but died under the legal age of puberty, or any previoiis date fixed by the testator (8) ; and a person substituted (whether specially named, or generally, as whoever might be the heir of the testator) (7) to such a child, was considered ta be substituted both by vidgaris substitution so that he took if the child never lived to take the inheritance, and by j^^pdlaris suhstitutio, so that he took if the child lived to take the inheritance but died under puberty. (Tit. 16. pr.) A substitution {quasi-jnqnllaris), framed on the model of the pupillaris, permitted any ascendant to substitute to persons of puberty dejorived of reason any one of the descendants, or, if there were none, one of the brothers of the insane. (1.) By|m^9z7/am suhstitutio the one testa- ment of the father operated on two inheritances, and the substituted heir took all the inheritance of the son, and not only that which came from the father. (2.) The father might, if he thought proper, substitute, but not let the name of the substituted heir be known, unless the son died within the age of puberty, so as to guard against the substituted heir having an interest in the death of the child. (3.) Fathers might substitute to disin- herited children, but not to emancipated, as they were no longer in the testator's power, and the patria 2'>otestas was the basis of the custom. (4, note.) If the impuhes was arrogated the substitution was at end, but the arrogator was obliged to undertake, in case the child died impuhes, to give up to the substituted heir all he would have taken if the substitution had remained in force. (4.) As the basis of the custom was the jmtria j^otestas, a father could not substitute to a stranger or to a son above the age of puberty. All he could do was to impose a fideicommissum on the person instituted, binding him, if he died within a certain time, to give back that which came to him from the testator to the person whom the testator wished in that case to benefit. (9.) 4. Causes that made a Testament invalid. — A testament legally made remained valid until revoked (^rvptum), or rendered ineffectual {irritwn). (Tit. 17. pr.) BOOK II. 531 Testamentum 7mptum. — A testament was revoked (i-uptum), 1, by the subsequent arrogation or (if the testator was an ascendant) adoption o£ a siius lieres^ unless the new suus heres had been mstituted by anticipa- tion. (1.) 2. By the testator subsequently making another testament validly made (2), or made in any way under which there could have been an heir. I£ the heir under the second testament could take ah intestato, the second testament, although not made with sufficient formalities, revoked the first, and was treated as an expression of the testator's wishes binding on the hei'es ah intestato. 3. The testament was also revoked by the testator tearing or defacing it, or, if it had been made ten years when the testator died, by the testator having before witnesses, or by a deed, signified his wish that it should not remain in force. (2, note.) If the heir in the second testament was instituted for certain things only, and it was declared that the first testament should be valid, the first testament was revoked, but the heir in the second had to content himself with the things so given him, or with a fourth of the inheritance, as would be most favourable, and had to restore the rest of the inheritance to the heirs instituted in the first testament. (3, note.) Testamentum irritum. — A testament was rendered ineffectual {irritum^ by the testator subsequently undergoing a capitis deminutio. But if the testator had reverted to his former position, and had been a citizen and siii juris at the time of his _ death, then the prajtor would give the heir instituted in his testament honorum p)ossessio secundum tahvlas^ a distinct expression of the testator's wish to that effect being, however, required in case a testator who Avas arrogated after making the testament had been subsequently emancipated. (G, note,) The emperors, after Pertinax, would not accept an inheritance when they were instituted on account of a suit, or to cure the informality of an informal testament, or if instituted by word of mouth. (8.) 4. b. Querela inofficiosi testamenti. — Under the general head of the invalidity of testaments we have to notice the special cases when a tes- tament would be attacked as inofficiosum. There were certain persons who might bring an action called the querela inofficiosi testamenti before the centumviri, to have the testament set aside, although it was formally perfect. The ground of the action was that the testator had not done his duty by them in his testament, and that he had cast a slur on their good fame by unjustly excluding them from sharing the inheritance, and, if this was made out, the testament was set aside under the fiction that the testator could not have been of sound mind when he made his testament. (Tit. 18. pr.) On the ground of being unjustly disinherited or omitted, children, in- cluding posthumous children and children adopted by an ascendant (2), might attack the testaments of fathers or grandfathers in whose power they were. (Tit. 8. pr.) On the ground or being unjustly omitted, children might attack the testament of their mother, and grandchildren those of their maternal grandfather. (Tit. 18. pr. 1.) Parents might, if omitted, attack ^he testaments of their children ; M M 2 532 SUMMARY. and i£ infamous persons were preferred to them, brothers and sisters of the testator might attack the testament, and this liberty, which originally was given only if the tie of agnation continued, was extended by Justinian to brothers and sisters, if the tie of agnation had ceased, and even to brothers and sisters of the half blood on either side. (1, note.) No more distant relation could bring the action, nor could any one bring it, unless as a last resource, and if he could not get anything any other way. An arrogated pupil, for example, disinherited by the arrogator, had the quarta Antonina, and so could not bring the querela de inofficioso, Portio legitima. — No one, if anything whatever was left to him by the testament, could attack it as inofficiosum. But he had a right to bring the actio in suiyplementum legitimcBy to have that which was left to him. made up, if below, to the fourth part of that which he would have taken ah intestato. Before Justinian, if the gift to him had not reached the amount of this fourth, he could attack the testament, unless the testator had directed that the deficiency should be made up to him. Justinian directed the fourth to be made up without the direction on the part of the testator. (3.) If a person received the fourth part in any way under the testament, as heir, legatee, ov fideicommissariuSj or by a donatio rnortis causa, or had received it by a donatio inter vivos, expressly as this fourth, or for the purchase of military rank, or had received it from a parent, as part of a dos or donatio ante nuptias, this person could not attack as inofficiosmn the testament of the person from whom the part was thus received. (6, note.) If there were several persons entitled to bring the action, each was to have the fourth of what he would have taken ah intestato. (6.) Extinction of the action. — The right to bring the actio de inofficioso was extinguished, 1. By the person entitled to the quarta legitima having died without having manifested an intention to dispute the testament ; if he had done so, the action passed to his heirs. 2. If he had allowed five years to elapse without bringing the action. 3. By acquiescing directly or indirectly in the testament (6, note): but a tutor who had acquiesced in the testament on behalf of his pupil might still attack the testament on his own account (4), just as if he had attacked the testament on behalf of the pupil unsuccessfully, he did not lose to ihejiscus what was given to himself, this being the usual penalty of unsuccessful attack. (5.) , System of the Novels. — Justinian in the Novels introduced a new system (Tit. 17. 6, note.) 1. TliQ portio legitima was fixed in a new way. If the number of those who could claim it was four or a less number, then they were all to- gether entitled to one-third of the testator's whole inheritance, which third they shared between them. 2. Those entitled to receive a portio legitima must be instituted as heirs, and it was not enough to prevent the testament being attacked as inqfficiosum, that they got their portions in some other way than as heirs. 3. If the testament was set aside as to the heirs, it still remained in force for all else, for trusts, legacies, and so forth. 4. The causes of just disinherison were enumerated, and on a specified one of these the testator must express himself to be acting. EOOK II. 533 11. Legal Position of those taking under a Testament. This is the second head of testamentary law, the legal j)osition of the testator having been the first. Those taking under a testament were, 1, Heirs; 2, Legatees; 3, Fideicoinmissaim, I. Heirs. — Heirs are of three kinds : (1) JSfecessarii ] (2) Sui et neces- sarii; and (3) Extranet. (Tit. 19. pr.) Heredes Necessarii. — The heroes necessarius was a slave instituted by his master. He became at once free on the death of the testator, and he had no option as to taking the inheritance. He was obliged to take it {necessarius), and the object of the institution was that the testator might be sure of having a testamentary heir, so that if the testator was insol- vent, his goods might be sold, not as his, but as those of the heir, and thus the testator's memory be saved the disgrace of such a sale. (Tit* 19. 1.) The lieres necessarius might claim the henejicium separationis, that is, to have his property acquired after the death of the testator, or anything due to him from tlie testator, kept distinct from the property of the tes- tator, and free from claims against the testator's inheritance. (1, note.) Sui Heredes. — Sui et necessarii heredes are the descendants of the testator, in his power at the time of his death, and not having any one preceding them in whose power they became by the death of the testator, as would be the case with the testator's grandson who had a living father. (2.) Sui heredes were so called because they were, even in the lifetime of the j^;«^er/am?7/«5, looked on as in a manner partners in the inheritance. They were, so to speak, heirs to their own inheritance ; and the inheri- tance came to them without their entering on it, or wishing to have it, or proving that it came to them. They were, in the old civil law, obliged to take the inheritance, but the proctor gave them the heneficium abstinendi, — that is, allowed them to abstain if they pleased — and unless they mixed themselves up with the inheritance, the prcetor inferred from their holding aloof that they wished to abstain, and then, if the goods were sold, they were sold in the name of the testator, and no actions could be brought against the suns heres as heir, although, if he pleased, he might afterwards alter his mind and accept the inheritance. (2, note.) Extranei Heredes. — Heirs not subject to the power of the testator, are termed stranger heirs, extranei heredes. Children not within hia power if instituted, children instituted by the mother, slaves instituted and subsequently manumitted, are extranei. (3.) These heirs were re- quired to have the testamenti /actio (in the sense, not of being able ta make a testament, but of being able to take under a testament) at three epochs, (a) the making of the testament; (b) the death of the testator; (c) the entering of the heir on the inheritance. (4.) If his capacity was lost and regained between the first two of these epochs, the heir could enter on the inheritance, but not so if the loss and regaining 534 SUMMARY. took place between tlie second and third epochs. (4, note.) The ex- traneus Jieres was at liberty to accept or renounce the inheritance. Entering on the Inheritance. Cretio. — How did the heir accept it ? First, there was a method of instituting, obsolete by the time of Justinian, in which there was a cretio or direction to the heir, to make up his mind in a given delay, either from the time he knew of his rights, cretio vulgaris^ or from the time his rights accrued to him, cretio contimia. The heir, within the delay fixed, could alter his mind. If he accepted, he announced his acceptance in a solemn form. (7, note.) Ordinarily the heir entered on the inheritance either by doing some act as heir {pro lierede gerere) or by the mere expression of his willingness to be heir. (7.) The heir, in acting as heir, must know that he is heir, and that the testator is dead. (7.) There was no fixed time in which the heir must make his decision ; but the praetor would, on application, fix the time, allowing not less than one hundred days, and Justinian extended this to nine months, or, by imperial favour, a year. If the heir did not decide within the time, he was, in an action on the part of the heredes ah intesfato, taken to have rejected, and, in an action on the part of creditors, to have accepted, the inheritance. (5, note.) A person could not enter for another, nor on part of an inheritance, nor conditionally; if he entered he succeeded to the i^ersona of the deceased. (7, note.) If the extraneus heres wished to renounce, he might do so by the mere expression of his unwillingness to accept. (7.) If he accepted, he could, if under twenty-five years, be relieved from his position, if a disadvantageous one, by the prsetor giving a restitutio in integrum. (5.) If he was over twenty- five, he could not be relieved, and must abide by all the consequences of accepting the inheritance, including the liability to pay the debts of the testator ; but on a very special occasion, Hadrian relaxed this rule, and Gordian ordered that it should never be enforced against soldiers. (6.) Justinian introduced a new system by which the heirs might enter on the inheritance of even an insolvent testator without risk. The heir might claim to have an in- ventory made {henejlcimn inventarii) of the inheritance, this inventory to be begun within thirty, and finished within ninety, days of the time when he became acquainted with his rights, and made in the presence of a notary, or three witnesses. Out of the property specified in the inventory he had to pay the creditors, paying himself anything that might be due to him. If the property was more than sufficient he took the surplus. If insufficient, his own estate was in no way liable. (6.) II. Legatees. — Although legacies constitute a title to particular things, not to groups of things, it is convenient to treat of legacies while treating of testaments. (Tit. 20. pr.) A legacy is a gift left by a deceased person (1), and the subject of legacies may be treated under six heads. 1. General Notions as to Legacies and their Forms. (^A) Forms. — In the old law there were four modes of giving legacies : {a) per vindicationem^ when the testator gave {Siichum do, lego) the Quiritary ownership of the 1 BOOK II. 535 thing given ; {h) jjer damnationem, when the testator bound the heir, heres meus clamnas esto, to give a thing to the legatee, who could compel him by a personal action to give it ; (c) sinendi modo^ when the testator ordered the heir to allow the legatee to take the thing given, the legatee having a personal action to make the heir give the opportunity of taking it ; and {d) 2')er prceceptionem, a form strictly applicable to the heir, who was thus allowed to take something as a legacy before receiving his share of the inheritance. The senatus-consultum Neronianum provided that every form of legacy should be treated as equal to that per damnationem, which was the most favourable to the legatee, as anything could be given by it. Justinian enacted that all legacies should be of the same nature, and might be enforced by every kind of appropriate action. (2, note.) Justinian assimilated ^<:Ze2Comm/ssa to legacies, except that a slave was the lihertus of the testator or of the Jideicommissarius, according as he re- ceived his liberty by a legacy or n fideicommissum. (3.) (B) Co-legatees. — The same thing might be left to more than one legatee. It might be left conjunctini, or, in other language, re et verbis, as, I give my slave to A and B ; or disjunctim, or, in other language, re, as, I give my slave to A, I give the same slave to B ; or verbis, when the co-legacy was only nominal, as, I give my slave to A and B in equal shares. Under the old law the effect of co-legacies differed according to the formula employed. Each under per vindicationem or per p)rcecep- tionem could demand the whole thing, and then had to divide it, but under pter damnationem the heir had to give the thing to one, and also its value to another ; under sinendi modo, having given the thing to one he was free as to the other. There was originally no accrual of legacies. But the lex Papia Poppcea introduced a new system, disqualifying ccelibes from taking at all, and orbi from taking more than half, and giving the lega- cies thus lapsed (caduca), and also all other legacies lapsed under the general law (ill cansa caduci), to those mentioned in the testament in the following order, if they were jmtres: — (a) co-legatees, (b) heirs, (c) other legatees, and in default to the public treasury (cerarium). Ascendants or descendants to the third degree were exempted from the effect of the lex Papia. Caracalla gave all caduca to the Jiscus; Constantine abolished the law of incapacity arising from celibacy ; and Justinian did away Avith the lex Papia altogether. Any legacies passing carried with them burdens, and it was optional to accept them. Justinian gave rights of taking by accrual to every co-legatee, excluding those joined verbis, who were really not co- legatees, with this difference, that if the co-legacies were given re, the accrual was obligatory, but the burdens of the legacy did not pass. If re et verbis, the accrual was voluntary, but the burdens did pass. (8.) ( C) Time of Vesting. — The rights of a legatee were vested {dies cedit) at the date of the testator's death, or, under the lex Papia, at the day of the opening of the testament. The time when the thing was to be demanded {dies venit) was the time of the heir's entering on the inheri- tance. The legatee took the thing, and his heirs, if he subsequently died, represented him in taking the thing as it was at the time of the dies cedit, excepting in the case of a gift of liberty to a slave or a gift of a personal 536 SUMMARY. servitude, when the dies cedit dated from the entering on the inheritance. (20, note.) 2. What coidd be given ly way of Legacy, — The testator might give not only his property, or that of his heir, but a thing belonging to another, provided it was not a thing extra commerciu?n, and provided that the legatee, on whom the burden of proof lay, could show that the testator knew that this thing belonged to another. The heir, if he could not pur- chase the thing, had to give the legatee its value. So the heir was obliged to redeem, unless the testator expressly said the legatee was to redeem, a thing which the testator gave as a legacy knowing it to be pledged. (5.) If the legatee had, before claiming under the testament, already got the thing given him as a legacy, he could claim the value if he had bought it, but not if he had taken it by a causa lucraiiva, e.g. gift, unless he had taken it through a slave or descendant in his power. If he had received only the value of the thing, not the thing, under one testament by a causa lucjntiva, he still could claim the thing under the testament of a different person. (6.) Future things might be given by way of legacy. (7.) A legatee might claim land given him by legacy, although he had already had the usufruct, for this was treated as taking the thing with a servit^^de on it. (9.) A thing belonging to the legatee when the testament was made could not be given to him as a legacy, even if he had afterwards parted with it ; such a case fell under what was termed the regida Catoniana, the rule that a legacy invalid when the testament was made remained always invalid. (10.) If the testator gave what he thought belonged to himself, although it belonged to another, the gift was valid, and so it was if he gave what he thought belonged, but did not really belong, to the legatee. (11.) The legatee was entitled to a thing alienated by the testator, and to have redeemed a thing pledged by the testator, after the testament was made. (12.) A legacy to a debtor of what was due to the testator was valid, and the heir coiild not recover from the legatee, and might be made to release him, and the debtor might also, by a legacy, have the time of payment deferred. (13.) But a legacy to a creditor of what the testator owed him was invalid, as it gave the creditor nothing unless the testator gave abso- lutely, or at once, what was previously due conditionally, or after a time. (14.) A husband might give to his wife her dos as a legacy, for the legacy gave her a more speedy way of recovering the dos ; if he gave her her dos, and he had not received it, the legacy was void ; but if he gave her, by legacy, a definite sum or thing, describing it Avrongly as having been brought by her as part of the dos, or as mentioned in the instrumentum dotis, this description Avas taken as surplusage, and she could take the legacy. (15.) Things incorporeal as well as corporeal might be given by way of legacy. Thus the testator might give a debt due to him, unless he had exacted payment in his lifetime, and the heir would have to sue for the benefit of the legatee ; or he might order the heir to rebuild a house for the legatee, or release him from debt. (21.) If he gave a slave or any- thing else generally, the legatee had the choice among the things of this BOOK II. 537 description belonging to the testator. (23.) Under Justinian, this right of choice, which had previously been personal to the legatee, went to his heirs, i£ the legatee died after his rights had accrued ; and if there were more than one legatee to whom the right of choice belonged, they must decide by lot which Avas to make the choice if they could not otherwise agree. (23.) Unless a distinct legacy of choice was given, the legatee could not choose the best of the kind. (22, note.) A legatee might have a share of the inheritance given him (Jegatarius partiarius\ and not a sj^ecific thing, but still he remained in the position of a legatee as towards the heir. (23, note.) 3. To ivliom might legacies he given ? — To those with whom the tes- tator had testamenti /actio ; dejyoj^tati, jjeregrini, Latini Jiiniani^ unless they became citizens within a fixed delay, women under the lex Voconia, the unmarried or childless (to the extent above mentioned, p. 535) under the lex Papia, and heretics under the Christian emperors, were excluded. (24.) A legacy under the old law could not be given to an uncertain person, as e. g. to the man who might marry the testator's daughter, unless it was to an uncertain member of a certain class, as that one of the tes- tator's cognati who might marry the testator's daughter ; nor, as being art uncertain person, to a posthumous stranger, Justinian made all the lega- cies to uncertain persons valid, and permitted a posthumous stranger to be instituted heir (25) ; and even previously to Justinian a legacy paid to an uncertain person was not to be refunded. (25, 26, 27.) A legacy to the slave of an heir, unless given conditionally, was invalid ; but not so a legacy to the master of a slave instituted heir, for he might not be the master at the time when the slave entered on the inheritance. (32, 33.) 4. Rules as to the position, terms, and construction of legacies. — A mistake in the name of the person benefited does not invalidate a legacy, or the institution of an heir, provided it is certain who is meant ; nor is a legacy rendered invalid by either a falsa demonstration as if the testator gives ' Stichus my born slave ' (Stichus passes though not the born slave of the testator), or by a falsa causa or reason assigned wrongly, as * I give to Titius, because he took care of my affairs.' The legacy is valid whether or not, in fact, Titius did take such care ; but if the legacy was conditional, as ' I give to Titius, if he has taken care,' then, of course, the condition must have been fulfilled for the legacy to be valid. (29, 30, 31.) Justinian made it immaterial where in the testament a legacy was placed. Previously, if it was placed before the institution of the heir, it was invalid (20. 34), and he made legacies valid which were to take effect after the death of the heir or legatee; whereas such gifts, except as fideicommissa, had previously been invalid, as even had legacies given to take effect the day before the death of the heir or legatee. (35.) Jus- tinian also made valid gifts by way of legacy, or institution of heirs (and revocation and transfers of such legacies) made posnoi nomine, that is, when something given to one of the persons benefited was to be given to another if the person originally benefited did or did not do something, such deal- ings with heirships or legacies having been previously considered invalid, 538 smEVIARy. €ven tliough the penalty was given to the emperor or a soldier, as intended to punish one man rather than to benefit another. (36.) 5. LosSj diminution^ or increase of tilings given hy way of legacies. — The loss of a thing given as a legacy falls on the legatee, unless the loss has been caused, however innocently, by the heir, on whom the loss then falls. (16.) If a female slave is given with her offspring, the legatee takes the offspring though the mother may be dead, and so he takes the vicarial slaves under a legacy of ordinary and vicarial slaves, though the ordinary slaves may have all died. But under a legacy of a slave, with his pecu- lium, or of land with its instruments of use or ornament, the legatee, if he cannot take the slave or the land, cannot take the peculium or the instruments. (17.) Under a legacy of a flock of sheep the flock will pass, though reduced to one sheep or increased by young. Under a legacy of a house, marble or pillars subsequently added by the testator will pass. (18, 19.) But as to the gift of a 2^€Ci(lium, there is this distinction to be made : — If the gift was to a stranger, the amount of the j^cculi inn that passed was the amount at the death of the testator, with any increase arising out of the things contained in the j^^ouliuiii ; but if the gift was to the slave himself, the slave had no right until the heir entered and was able to free him, and so for him the amount of the peculium was the amount when the heir entered. A gift by legacy to a slave of his peculium must be express, although if a man in his lifetime freed a slave the slave kept his p)eculium,, unless the emancipator demanded it. (20.) 6. Ademption and transfer of legacies, — Legacies may be revoked by using directly contrary words, ' Avhereas I gave I do not give,' or by any other words, or even by the naked wish of the testator becoming in any way declared, the legatee being then repelled by an exception of dolus malus if he sued for the legacy, or by some cause having arisen, e.g. an enmity having sprung up between him and the testator, which made it clear the testator could not, at the time of his death, have wished to benefit him. (Tit. 21. pr.) A legacy may also be transferred, as by saying what I gave to A I give to B, and then B would take even if A had died, and A would not take if B had died. (1.) Lex Falcidia. — The wide testamentary power given by the Twelve Tables (idi legassit suce rei ita jus esto) and practically used, so that the inheritance being exhausted by legacies, there was no inducement to the heir to enter, was restrained (a) by the lex Furia, forbidding more than 1,000 asses to be given as a legacy, but ineffectual, because any number of legacies to that amount might be given ; (b) by the lex Voconia, pro- viding that no legatee was to have more than each heir had, but also in- effectual, as the number of legatees Avas not limited ; and, lastly (c), by the lex Falcidia, by which a testator was restrained from giving away in legacies more than three-fourths of the inheritance. A fourth, the quarta Falcidia, must always remain to the heirs. (Tit. 22. pr. note.) If the testator gave distinct shares in his inheritance to different heirs, each heir had a right to one-fourth of his share, even though the total thus deducted on the different shares exceeded one-fourth of the whole inheritance. (1.) . BOOK II. 539 In the application of the lex Falcidia regard was had to the value of the estate at the time of the testator's death. A subsequent increase did not augment, nor did a subsequent decrease diminish, the amount the legatees received. But if the estate subsequently fell in value, so that the heir would get nothing bj entering, the legatees would have to come to terms with him, to induce him to enter. (2.) In order to apply the lex Falcidia^ the testator's debts, his funeral ex- penses, and the price of the manumission of slaves were first deducted, and then the heir took a fourth of what remained, each lega^tee having a proportionate amount deducted from his legacy if the testator had given more than three-fourths in legacies. If he had given more than the value of the whole inheritance, no account was taken of the excess, and the heir received a fourth of the actual value. (3.) The lex Falcidia did not apply to military testaments. (3, note.) The Novels introduced a new system. The heir could not claim a fourth unless he first had an inventory made, and he could not retain it at all if the tes- tator forbad its retention, the legatees and other persons interested being then permitted to take under the testament, although the heir refused to enter. (3, note.) III. FiDEicoMMissARii. — Fideicoiiimissa, or requests to the heir to do something in favour of some one else, and any words of request sutHced (Tit. 24. 3), were expressions of the last wishes of the person who made them, and were dispositions of the inheritance, or of parts of it, the posi- tion of the person profiting by them being in the former case analogous to that of an heir, in the latter to that of a legatee. Either testamentary heirs or heirs ah intestato Ym^\t'h2ive Jideicommissa imposed on, them, and Jideicommissa could be made by testament or by codicils, or orally. (Tit. 23. pr. note.) The person making \\\q Jideicommissum was termed \hQ fideicommittens, the person requested to perform it JlduciariuSj and the person to be benefited by it Jideicommissarius. (2, note.) The object oi Jideicommissa, when originally introduced, was to benefit persons legally incapable of taking as heirs or legatees. Augustus first gave them legal validitj'-, by desiring the consuls to interfere to see them carried out. By degrees a permanent jurisdiction was established to main- tain them, under a special magistrate, the i^a^tor Jideicommissarius . The proceeding was always extra ordinem. No action lay to enforce Jidei- commissa. but the magistrate interposed if he thought it equitable to enforce them. (Tit. 23. pr. 1, note.) When first introduced, Jideicommissa gave the maker of them a very wide range. He could by them give to jjeregrini, to a posthumous stranger, to an uncertain person, to Latini Juniani, and the whole inheritance to a woman prevented by the lex Voconia from being instituted as heir ; and the leges caducarioi did not apply. But subsequently this latitude was re- stricted : fideicommissa in favour of iieregrini, posthumous strangers, and uncertain persons were declared invalid, and the rules of the lex Papia Foppwa were made to apply to them. A tutor could not at any time be given by a fideicommissum. (Tit. 23. pr. note.) 540 SUMMARY. If a Jideicommissinn was made by testament, tlie testament must duly institute an heir, or there Avould be no one to carr j out the Jideicojumissum. Originally the heir sold the inheritance to the JideicommissariuSy the former binding the latter, by stipulation, to indemnify him against all claims in regard to the inheritance, and the latter binding the former to hand everything over (emptce et venditcB hereditatis stijndationes). (Tit. 23. 3, note.) The Senatus-consultum Trebellianum protected the heir, by en- acting that, directly the heir gave up the inheritance, all the actions for and against the inheritance should at once pass to the Jideicommissarius in the shape of actiones utiles^ and the heir be allowed to protect himself against all actions by an exception restitutce hereditatis. (4.) Senatus-consultum Pegasianum. — But, though the heir was thus pro- tected, there was no inducement to him to enter on the inheritance. Accordingly the senatus-consultum Pegasianum was passed, which per- mitted the heir to retain a fourth of the inheritance agsiiiist Jideico7nmissarii as against legatees. The Jideiconimissaimis, who had been placed by the senatus-considtum Trebellianum in the position of an heir, was now placed in the position of a legatee, or, to speak more strictly, of a legatarius 2'>ariiarius^ that is, of a legatee who had a legacy, not of a thing, but of a share in the inheritance. When legacies of a share were given, actions belonging to the inheritance were brought by, and against, the heir, but the heir stipulated that the legatee should contribute to all outgoings in pro- portion to his share, and bound himself to pay what was due to the legatee for his share. Similar stij)ulations were, subsequently to the senatus-consultum Pegasianum^ made between the heir and the fidei- commissarius {stipulationes partis et pro jyctrte). (5.) The senatus-consultum Trehellianum was, however, still in force, for it operated (a) if the Jideicommissa did not exceed three-fourths of the in- heritance, and (b) if the heir refused to enter in spite of being sure of his fourth under the senatus-consultum Pegasianum, the prcetor made him enter, and then all the actions were transferred to, or against, ihefidei- commissarius, and he was in the position in which he would have been if the heir had entered under the senatus-consultum Trehellianum. (6.) Justinian united the two senatus-consulta, retaining the name of the senatus-consultum Trehellianum. The heir was to retain his fourth, as under the senatus-consult^im Pegasianum \ but actions were to be brought by, or against the heir, or the fideicommissarius^ according to their shares, as under the senatus-consultum TrehelUanum, so that the jideicommissarius was, as to his share, in loco heredis. If the heir would not enter, he was compelled to do so, being protected against all loss, as imder the senatus-consultum Pegasianum. The heir could, under Justinian, but could not previously, redemand the fourth if he had paid it over. (7.) If the heir had a specific thing given him to retain, equal in value to, or greater in value than, a fourth of the inheritance, he retained it as if he had had a specific legacy of the thing, and all actions as to the whole inheritance passed to, or against, the Jideicommissarius. If the specific thing to be retained by the heir was less in value than a fourth, then the BOOK II. 541 heir retained also enongli to make up the fourth, and the actions for and against passed to the heir, as to the share retained to make up the differ- ence. (9.) A Jideicommissarms might himself be turned into a Jiduciarius^ and be requested to give up to another all, or a part, of what he received ; and he was not allowed, like the heir, to retain a fourth. (11.) Fideicommissa might also be imposed by a person about to die on his lieredes ah intestato (Tit. 23, 10), either by a written or oral declaration. If, under Justinian, such an oral declaration was made of his wishes to the heir, before five witnesses, the proof was sufficient. But if it was alleged to have been made before less than five witnesses, or before none at all, t\iQ fideicommissariuSj having previously sworn to his own good faith, might call on the heir to deny, on his oath, that the fideicommissum had been made, as alleged. (12.) Fideicommissa of i^avticvlar things. — An heir or a legatee might be charged by 2i fideicommissum to give up a particular thing specified by the testator (Tit. 24. pr.), and even a particular thing belonging to another ^^erson, the fidnciarius being thus obliged, if he could, to buy it for the fideicommissarius^ or, if he could not buy it, to give its value to the fidei- commis sarins. (Tit. 24.) Freedom, too, might be given to the slave of another person by a fideicommissum, and, if the fiduciarius could not at once purchase the freedom of the slave, he must wait to see if any oppor- tunity of doing so might arise. The slave so enfranchised was the freed- man of the fideicommissarius, whereas slaves who received their freedom directly by testament (and only those who were slaves of the testator, both at the time of his making the testament a,nd at the time of his death, could so receive their freedom) were the freedmen of the dead man, and hence were called orcini. (2.) Codicils. — Codicilli, or small tablets containing memoranda addressed to the heir, were held to create binding fideicommissa in the time of Augustus, on the authority of Trebatius and Labeo. (Tit. 25. pr.) If there Avas no testament, they were binding on the lieres ah intestato. (2.) If there was a testament, then being considered as attached to the testa- ment, they failed if it failed, but a testator could, by inserting in his testament an express clause to that effect {clausula codicillaris), provide that his testament should, if invalid as a testament, be valid as a codicil. (Tit. 25. pr. note.) If the codicils were made before the testament, and not confirmed by it, they were binding, unless a contrary intention ap- peared in the testament. If made after the testament, and not confirmed by anticipation in it, they were binding as creating fideico7n?nissa, but by codicils made before or after the testament, and confirmed by it, not only fideicommissa could be created, but legacies given or a tutor appointed. (1, note.) No form was necessary for codicils. Thcodosius enacted that they were to be made in the presence of five witnesses, who were to subscribe them. If they were not so made, the fideicommissarius might, having sworn to his own good faith, call on the heir to deny them on oath. (3, note.) 542 SUMMAEY. BOOK IIL INTESTATE SUCCESSION. We now come to the second mode of acquiring umuersitates rei-um, that is, intestate succession. In this there were three ranks : — 1, sui heredes; 2, agnati ; 3, in substitution for the gentiles of the old law, cognati. I. Sui Heredes. — When a person died intestate, which might happen in five ways, — (a) his having made no testament, (b) his testament not being legally valid, (c) its being revoked, or (d) made useless by change of status, or {e) no heir entering under it, — the inheritance passed, by the law of the Twelve Tables, in the first place, to the sui heredes (Tit. 1. pr. 1), i. e. the children natural, adoptive, or made legitimate, in the power of the de- ceased at the time of his death (2), or, to speak more accurately, at the time when it is established that he died intestate (7) ; a grandson, how- ever, the son of a deceased son, both conceived and born after the grand- father's death, but before the fact of intestacy becoming established, not ranking as a suus heres, as not having been connected with the deceased while alive by any tie of relationship, (8.) A child, however, might be- come a suus heres^ though not in the power of the deceased at the time of his death, if he was a captive, and, returning subsequently to his father's death, was made a suus lieres by postliminy. (4.) And, on the other hand, a child, though in the power of the deceased at the time of death, might not be a suils Jieres; for the deceased might be adjudged, even after his death, to have been guilty of perduellio (treason), and then, as \h.Qfiscus took his estate, there could be no suus Jieres. (5.) Sui heredes were, under the old law, obliged to take the inheritance (necessarii), and, as they could take it Avithout their knowledge or assent, the sanction of a tutor of a pupil, or of the curator of an insane person, was not required. All children, of both sexes, took equally ; more remote descendants j)ai(na potestas, unless the deceased descendant had been emanci- pated. If emancipation had taken place with an understanding that the nominal emancipator should take everything he got as patron in trust for the emancipating ascendant (and, under Justinian, every emancipation was taken to be made on these terms), then this ascendant took as patron in default of sui heredes, but Justinian placed the brothers and sisters of the de cujus before him. (8, note.) Under the later ' empire the goods coming from his mother to the de cujus passed (a) to his children and other descendants, {h) then to his brothers and sisters, and (c) to his father in preference to his grand- father. This too, under Justinian, was the order of succession to the peculium of a deceased son, except that here the rights given by the patria jwtestas were so far preserved that the father took after, not before, the grandfather. (8, note.) 4. The reciproccd Succession of Mothers and Children, — The mother was allowed to succeed to her children by the senatus-considtum Trehellianum, and children to their mother by the senatus-consultum Orphitianum. A summary of the details of the law, under this head, is given at page 284. III. CoGNATi. — After the sui heredes and the agnati came, in the old law, the gentiles, or members of the same gens. But the succession of the gentiles became obsolete, and the praetor substituted the cognati, that is, persons bound together by blood relationship. (Tit. 5.) The cognati included those who had undergone a capitis deminutio (1), i.e. emanci- pated children, and children in an adoptive family (3), collaterals by the female line (2), and children born of the same mother, but of an uncertain father. (4.) Later legislation, as has been shown in the first four Titles of the Book, took many persons out of the rank (ordo) of cognati and made them rank with sui heredes or agnati. (1.) There was no limit to the remoteness in which agnation was recognised, but the praitor only gave the p)ossessio bonorum imde cognati to blood relations within the sixth degree, or, in the one case of children of a second cousin, to those in the seventh degree. (5.) The degrees of relationship of ascendants and descendants are calculated by the stages of ascent or descent. There is a stage to the father or the child, a second to the grandfather or the grandson. The degrees of collateral relationship are calculated by going up to and down from a common ancestor, and adding up the total number of stages. (Tit, 6.) Justinian, altering the old law, so far recognised ties of cognation among slaves, that in the case of the parents and the children being enfranchised, they had reciprocal rights of succession, and the children were in the position of children born in a regular marriage. (10.) It is scarcely necessary to add that among persons of the same natural degree {gradus) of relationship, those are preferred who belong to a higher rank {ordo), i.e. who are or rank with sui heredes or agnati. (11,12.) Before quitting the subject of intestate succession, we have to notice two subsidiary points connected with it. (1.) The succession (modified by BOOK III. 545 the assignation) of freedmen, and (2) the machinery by which the praetor modified intestate succession, bonorum possessio. I. Succession of Freedmen. — Under the law of the Twelve Tables the sui heredes of the freedman, including adopted children and a wife passing in manum, excluded the patron, who, and whose children, suc- ceeded only if there were no sui heredes, and the freedman might make what testament he pleased and exclude the patron. A freedwoman, how- ever, being in the patron's tutela, could only make a testament with her patron's consent, and as she could have no sui heredes he necessarily succeeded to her if she died intestate. (Tit. 7. pr.) Under the praetorian system, the prsetor thinking it hard that the patron should be excluded by adoptive sui heredes, or a wife married in manu, gave the patron posses- sion of half the goods, whether the freedman died testate or intestate ; the patron being still excluded altogether by natural children, although they had passed out of the freedman's family, unless they w^ere properly disin- herited. This change, however, did not apply in favour of a patrona or the daughter of a patronus ; but by the lex Papia Poppcea, women having the jus liherorum were placed on a level with men in this respect. (1.) The lex Papia Poppcea also introduced a change in favour of patrons. If a freed- man left a fortune of 100,000 sesterces, and fewer than three children, the patron took a virile part (i.e. half if there was one child, and a third if there were two) of the inheritance, whether the freedman died testate or intestate. (2.) Justinian did away with all distinction between \hQ> patrona. and the patronus, and between the liberta and the libei^tus, and regulated the succession of freed persons as follows : — First came the children of the freedman (to speak only of a man), whether in his power or not, or even if born before he was enfranchised. Then, if he had no children, came the patron and his descendants ; in default of these, the collaterals of the patron to the fifth degree. If the freedman had children, he could mnke any testament he pleased ; if he had not, he could only make what testament he pleased if his fortune was less than 100 aurei ; if it was more, he must leave one-third to the patron. (3.) By a change, sub- sequent to the date of the Institutes, Justinian, in case the freedman left no children, preferred the father and mother, the brothers and sisters of the deceased to the patron. While, before Justinian, there were still Latini Juniani, their goods were treated as a peculium, which passed in all cases on their death to the manumittor — who could deal with it by testament as he pleased, but by the se?iatus-consultum Largianum the children of the patron, unless duly disinherited, were preferred to extranei heredes ; and by an edict of Trajan the rights of a patron were restored at the death of a Latinus Junianus, who was, against the will or Avithout the knowledge of the patron, made a Eoman citizen by imperial rescript. (4.) I. {A) Assignation of Freedmen. — A patron having two or more children in his power (Tit. 8. 2) mighty instead of allowing the goods of a freedman to go equally to all the patron's children in the same degree, as they otherwise would do (Tit. 8. pr.), assign, by or without a testament, and in any terms (3), to any person in his power (2), a freed man or woman, so that after the death of the parent the person to whom the freed person 546 SUMMAEY. is assigned is alone considered tlie patron, and excludes all other children. (Tit. 8. pr.) But if the assignee died or was emancipated (Tit. 7. pr. 2), the force of the assignment was at an end. II. BoNORUM PossESSiONES. — The praetor placed the person best en- titled in possession of the hereditas, in case the possession was disputed (Tit. 9. 1); and then in process of time regulated this admission as he thought best to amend, to correct, or to supplement the civil law (1) ; and usucapion ripened into ownership the possession he gave. The pos- sessor was ordinarily protected by the interdict quorum honorum ; and to obtain this protection, the heir who had under the civil law an indispu- table title often demanded the honorum possessio ; the prsetor generally actins: under his executive authority and giving possession according to his edict (possessio edictalis), and sometimes giving a special possession (possessio decretalis) after hearing the parties, and then sometimes only giving an interdict forbidding violent eviction. (1.) The various kinds of possession of goods are divided according as there was or was not a testament; out of ten kinds known before Justinian, two referred to testate, and eight to intestate succession. To testate succession belonged (1) possessio contra tabulas, given to children passed over; (2) possessio secundum tabulas, given (but only after it had been ascertained that the possessio contra tabulas was not due) when the heir, under a duly made and valid will, washed for pro- tection of the interdict quorum bonorum, when the prsetor wished to uphold a testament defectively made, or in other cases, as that of the institution of a posthumous stranger, or of an heir under an unfulfilled condition. To intestate succession belonged eight, four relating to the succession of freemen, four to that of freedmen. A summary is given of these eio-ht kinds of possession at page 301. If there was no one to whom possession could be given, the a^rarium, or, later, the Jiscus, took the goods. (3.) Out of the ten kinds of possession just mentioned, Justini^-n suppressed four of those relating to intestate succession, viz., the unde decern personce^ suppressed because under his system parents were themselves the manu- mittors of their children ; the turn quern ex familia, the unde liberi patroni patronceque et parentes eorum, and the unde cognati manumissoris, rendered obsolete by his system, and regulating the rights of patronage. He, how- ever, retained a kind of possession, known to the previous law, though not reckoned in the ten ordinary kinds ; that, namely, uti ex legibus, when possession was given in pursuance of a direct enactment, as, e.g., when the patron shared with the children of the libertus under the lex Papia Popp'^a. (7.) Possession of goods had to be demanded by parents and children within a year, and by all others within a hundred days of the time of their knowino- of their rights (8. 10), dies utiles alone being counted. (9.) If not demanded, then the rights of possession of the person not demanding at the time fixed, or refusing it, passed to those in the same degree, and if there were none, then to those in the next degree. (9.) Demand was made before a magistratcj and special terms of demand, da mihi hanc BOOK III. 547 possessionem^ were necessary, until Constantius permitted any terms to be iised, and Justinian did away with the necessity of an application to a magistrate. If a person having, as civil heir, right to demand possession, did not demand it, and the next in the order of praetorian succession did, after the delay had expired, demand possession, it was given him, but only sine re as opposed to cum re : he got the technical j)ossessio, but not an interest in the goods conclusive against the heir. (10.) System of the Novels. — In the years .543 and 547, by the 118th and 127th Novels, Justinian introduced a totally new scheme of intestate succession, a summary of which is given at page 306. Other Modes of acquiring a Universitas Eerum. "We now pass to the four remaining modes by which a universitas rerum was acquired, in addition to testamentary and intestate succes- sion. i. Arrogation. — The first is arrogation, which is specially mentioned as forming part of the customary law. (Tit. 10. pr.) By arrogation all the property and all the debts due to the arrogated passed to the arrogator,, except only those things which were extinguished by the eajyitis deminutio which arrogation involved, such as the rights of agnation, and the services which a freedman bound himself by oath, as the price of his freedom, to pay to the patron, and which, being personal to the patron, were extin- guished if the patron Avas arrogated. (1.) The arrogator was not l)ound to pay the debts of the arrogated, just as a paterfamilias was not bound to pay the debts of the son ; but the property of the arrogated was made answerable, the praetor, by a sort of restitutio in integrum, allowing the creditors to proceed as if the arrogation had not taken place against the arrogated, and unless the arrogator satisfied them the praetor trave tliem possession of the goods and allowed them to be sold. (3.) Under Justinian's legislation, if any property was acquired by the arrogated from any source except the arrogator, the usufruct only went to the arrogator, and if the arrogated died, the property in it passed to the children, and if none, to the brothers and sisters of the deceased, and only in default of them, to the arrogator. (2). What is said of arrogation as a mode of acquiring a universitas rerum is true of the conventio in manum of a wife under the old law. (1.) ii. BoNORUM Addictio. — The mode next noticed of acquiring a uni- versitas rerum is the honorum addictio, introduced by a constitution of Marcus Aurelius. (Tit. 11. pr.) If a testator (even by codicils) gave liberty to any slaves, then, after the inheritance had been successively (4) rejected by the heredes ex testa?nento, the heredes ah intestato, and the Jiscus, any of these slaves, or, under a constitution of Gordian, any one else (1), might apply to have the goods given over to him {honorum addictio), on his undertaking to satisfy the creditors in full, the application being enter- tained both in favour of liberty, and to spare the deceased the disgrace of a sale of his goods. (2.) The slaves enfranchised by the testament were, when manumitted, the slaves of the deceased (orcini), unless there N N 2 548. SUMMARY. was only a fiduciary direction to manumit them, or the slaves had agreed to be the freedmen of the person to whom the addictio was made. The constitution further directed that even when, in such a case, the Jiscus accepted, the directions as to liberty should be carried out. (1.) If a person while under twenty-five years did not accept as lieres ah intes- tato an inheritance, and liberty was acquired by the addictio bonorum, then, although when he was twenty-five he might be restituhis in integrum and uccept, yet the liberty once given could not be taken away. (5.) Justinian extended the addictio to cases where freedom was given not by testament hut inter vivos OY mortis causa (6), and also provided that the addictio rm^\t be made afi:er a sale by the creditors had taken place, if the appli- cation was made within a year fi'om the sale, which was then rescinded ; and that a composition accepted by the creditors, or only enfranchise- ment of some of the slaves directed to be enfranchised, should be accepted, if necessary, as satisfactory ; and that if those entitled to apply for an addictio did not all apply at the same time, the first applicant should have the possession. (6, 7.) iii. Bonoi^m Venditio. — The mode next noticed of acquiring a uni- versitas rerum is the honomim venditio^ one of the praetorian modes of execution by which a transfer of the entire property of a debtor was made to the person who, in consideration of receiving it, would pay the largest jjroportion of the creditors' claims. A summary of the mode in which, and the circumstances under which, this process was carried out, is given at page 312. In the time of Justinian this process had become obsolete, and the goods of the debtor being handed over to the creditors, were sold by them separately as occasion might offer {honorum distractio). (Tit. 12. pr.) iv. Forfeiture under the Senatus-Considtum Claudianum. — A univer- sitas rerum was acquired under the senatiis-consultmn Claudianum^ when a free woman Avas denounced three times by the master of a slave as having formed a disgraceful connection with the slave. A magisterial decree reduced her to the condition of an ancilla, and she and her property passed to the owner of the slave. If it was a freedwoman who formed such a connection, she became again the slave of her patron, unless he had assented to her conduct, in which case she became the slave of the owner of the slave with whom she had disgraced herself. Justinian abolished all this as unworthy of his empire. (Tit. 12. 1.) Obligations. We now pass to obligations. A summary is given in the text, at p, 314, of the meaning of the term obligation, and of the main features of Ecman law with regard to the sources of obligations, contracts, culpa, interest, and the actions attached to obligations. Of the ten recognised heads of contracts, the first noticed are those made re. Contracts Re. — There were four kinds of contracts made re, i.e. by the delivery of the thiug, mutuuni, commodatum, dejpositum, pignus. In I BOOK IIL 549 mutuum the receiver became tlie owner, in 2^ijnus he became the possessor, in commodatum and depositum he became in possessione of the thing delivered. (Tit. 14. pr.) Mutuum. — Here the deliverer of the thing makes over the thing as the property of the recipient, who by receiving it binds himself to return an exact equivalent in genere^ and who, if he fails to do this, can be sued by a condictio certi (1), although the thing handed over to him may have perished through mere accident. (2.) Commodatum. — Here the deliverer gratuitously puts the recipient in possession of a thing which the recipient wishes to make use of. As it is the recipient who benefits by the contract, he has to take the care of it which a bonus paterfamilias exercises, and not merely the care he takes of his own property, but he is not answerable if the thing is lost through causes wholly beyond his control. He can, when the term for which the thing was lent has expired, be made to restore this identical thing or its value by the actio commodati directa^ having in turn an actio commodati con- traria (both actions being honcE Jidei) for any extraordinary expenses or for losses through the fault of the deliverer. (2.) Dejjositum. — Here the deliverer for his own benefit puts the recipient (who receives gratuitously) in possession of a thing which the deliverer wishes to have kept for him. The recipient, as he is conferring a benefit, is answerable not for carelessness, but only for negligence so great as to amount to fraud. When, however, the deposit was made in circumstances of sudden calamity, as fire, shipwreck, the recipient had to pay double the value of the thing if lost through his negligence. The identical thing can be reclaimed at any time by the deliverer, and must not be made use of by the recipient. The deliverer had the actio depositi directa for the restitution of the thing, and the recipient the actio depositi contraria (both actions being bonce Jidei) for all expenses incurred and losses sustained through the fault of the deliverer. (3.) Pignus. — Here the deliverer, the debtor, puts the recipient, the creditor, in possession of the thing ; but the creditor cannot make use of it, and al- though he may apply the fruits in reduction of principal, he cannot take them except by special agreement for interest. The creditor was bound to use the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias, but he was not liable for loss by accident. The creditor was compelled by the actio pigneratitia directa to restore the thing when his claim was settled, and could bring the actio pigneratitia contraria (both actions being bonoi jidei) to recoup Inmself for expenses and for losses caused by the debtor. Contracts made Verbis. — There were two forms of contract made verbis, besides stipulations known to the old law, but obsolete in the time of Justinian, the dictio dotis and the jurata promissio liherti (Tit. 15. pr. note) ; but it is only of stipulations that any notice need be taken. Stipulations. — Stipulations were a form of unilateral contract, in which the stipulator or questioner asked the promissor whether he would enter into the engagement proposed, and on the promiser replying that he would, the contract was complete. Originally the peculiar words, spondesne, spondeo, could only be used by Koman citizens, but in later times no special form 550 SUMMARY, of words was necessary as long as there was a question and an answer. A stipulation may be made simply {pure), or may be modified, either with reference to a term {in diem), or by being subjected to a condition. When a stipulation is made in diem, as to give on a future day named, the interest in the stipulation is at once fixed {cessit dies) ; and if the promissoj' pays before the day named, he cannot get his money back : but the time for enforcing the obligation does not come {non venit dies) until the whole of the future day fixed has expired. (2.) If a person promises to give in a distant place, a delay sufficient to make the execution of the promise possible is implied. (5.) Lapse of time was not a means recognised by law for the extinction of an obligation or promise to pay so much to a man every year while he lived : it was therefore theoretically never extinguished, but the heir of the stipulator would be prevented by an exception from enforcing the promise after the stipulator's death. (3.) When a stipulation is made conditionally, the interest of the stipulator is not fixed till the condition is fulfilled. He has only a hope that the thing will be owed to him, but this hope {spes dehitum iri) passes to his heirs, and they can enforce the contract when he could have enforced it. A promise to give if a man does not do something in his power is equivalent to a promise to give when he dies, and, as he must die some day, is made in diem. (4.) If the condition relates to past or present time, the knowledge of the parties as to the event is immaterial. Either the con- dition has not been fulfilled and the stipulation is of no effect, or it has been fulfilled and the stipulation can be enforced at once. (6.) Where the promise is to do something or not to do something, the proper course is to fix in the stipulation the penalty to be paid if the thing is not done or is done, as this avoids uncertainty as to what amount ought to be paid for the breach of promise. (7.) Co-stipulators. Co-promissors. — A verbal contract might be made so that more than one person should be joined in the stipulation, the pro- missor undertaking to give to each, or in the promise, each promissor answering affirmatively the question. These contracts might also be made so as to create joint creditors or joint debtors (Tit. 16. pr.), and one promissor might answer so as to bind himself simply ; the others in a modified manner. (2.) The thing was due to each co-stipulator and from each co-promissor. If the thing was given by or to any of the joint parties, the obligation was at an end. If one co-promissor ceased, as by deminutio capitis, to be bound, the other co-parties remained bound. If, however, an action was brought on the contract, then the obligation was at an end, but, under Justinian, if the co-promissor sued could not pay entirely, the others might be sued for the deficiency. (1, note.) The co- promissor who had paid all could recover their shares from the other joint debtors, either as a partner, if there was a partnership, or if not, by so paying, or by the law allowing him to feign that he had so paid, that the actions of the creditors were made available for his benefit. (1, note.) Stipidations of slaves. — A slave can stipulate (though he cannot pro- mise) for his owner (Tit. 17. pr.), whether he names his owner or not (1); BOOK III. 551 and i£ a slave stipulates after his owner's death and before the entry of the heir, he acquires for the inheritance (Tit. 17. pr.) He may stipulate, however, for a personal right for himself, as for leave to cross a field, but he exercises this for his master's benefit. (2.) When a slave is held in common, he acquires for his joint owners in proportion to their interests in him, unless he is acting by the orders or in the name of one only of them, or unless the thing cannot be acquired, as, e.g., if it is already owned by one of his owners. (3.) Division of Stipulations, — Stipulations may be divided according as they are voluntary or not. (Tit. 18. pr.) Those that are not voluntary are, 1, judicial, required by the judge; 2, praetorian, required by the prsetor or sediie ; 3, common, required properly by the prsetor, but often, for the sake of avoiding delay, by the judge. Instances of those required by the judge are the security required de dolo, that a thing shall not be restored, if injured by the defendant's fault, without compensation, and de persequendo servo, that a defendant will pursue or pay the price of a slave the subject of litigation, who has, through the defendant's fault, escaped out of the defendant's possession. (1.) Instances of those required by the pr^tor are damni infecti, security against apprehended injury, and lerjatorum, security by the heir that he will pay the legacies. (2.) Instances of those required sometimes by the praetor, sometimes by the judex, are rem salvam fore pupillo, security for the property of a pupil, and de rato, that a principal will ratify what the procurator does for him. (4.) Stipulationes inutiles. — Stipulations are invalid for various reasons, which may be classed under the following heads : — i. On account of their object, as when the stipulation is for (a) a thing that does not or cannot exist (Tit. 19. pr.) ; or (b) for a thing of which the stipulator has not the commercium, as for a res saci'a or a freeman ; and in such cases the stipulation is invalid at once, though the thing may afterwards become such as he is capable of holding, and the stipula- tion becomes void if the thing, without the fault of the promissor, becomes such as the stipulator cannot hold (2) ; (c) for a thing belonging to the stipulator or in case it may belong to him (2. 22) ; or (d) ex turpi causa, as to commit murder. ii. On account of the persons by, for, or between whom they are made. — 1. Stipulations are invalid when made by (a) dumb or wholly deaf persons (7); (b) madmen (8); (c) an infant pupil; or (d) a filius- familias below the age of puberty. (9. 10.) 2. Stipulations are invalid when made for (a) a third person other than a person in whose power the stipulator is. (4.) But such a stipu- lation may be made valid by adding that, if payment to the third person is not made, a penalty shall be payable to the stipulator (19); and whenever the stipulator has an interest in the payment to a third person being made, as if it is a co-tutor who on retiring stipulates, to save him- self, that the property of the pupil shall be safely administered by the remaining tutors, or if the third person is a procurator or creditor of the stipulator, the stipulation is valid. (20.) If a stipulator engaged for pay- 552 SUMMAEY. ment to himself or another, payment to the other extinguished the obliga- tion. If he stipulated for payment to himself and another, he can recover half the sum stipulated for. (4.) (b) The stipulation was also invalid if the promise was so made to bind a third person as that this third person should give or do something (3. 21) ; but the stipulation might be made valid either by the promissor promising that he would manage that the third person gave or did the thing, or that he himself would pay a penalty in case the third person did not give or do the thing. (3. 19.) 3. Masters cannot stipulate with their slaves, nor fathers with their children in their power. (6.) iii. On account of the manner in which they ivere made. The parties must consent to the same thing (5. 23); and if several things are included in the question, the promissor is, unless he gives a general assent, only bound as to those things to which he bound himself by his answer. (18.) The question is inferred from the record of the answer in a written docu- ment embodying a stipulation. (27.) iv. On account of the time or the condition subject to which they are made, (a) Ti7ne. — A stipulation was invalid that a thing should be given after the death of the stipulator or the possessor, because the right to have the engagement performed would then accrue not to the party to the contract, but to his heirs, who were in the position of third persons. (13.) An engage- ment to give the day before death was equally invalid, as until the death occurred it could not be known when the day was. (13.) But an en- gagement to give at the time of death was valid, as the performance was considered to become due before the heir occiipied his position as heir (15), and a stipulation to give after the death of a third person was valid as being merely an uncertain term. (16.) A preposterous stipulation, that is, if something happens to-morrow, will you give me to-day, was invalid. Under Justinian, however, all the causes of invalidity under this head and as to the time of death were removed. (13, 14.) (b) Condition. — An impossible condition makes a stipulation void, but a stipulation is valid and the thing is due at once, if it is given in case an impossible condiiion is not performed. (11.) The heirs of the stipulator and the promissor could sue and be sued if the condition of a properly made conditional stipulation was fulfilled after the death of the party to whom they were heirs. (25.) FiDEJUSSORES. — The general term for becoming surety was intercession and the principal modes of intercessio were (1) adpromissio^ (2) fdejussio, (3) giving a mandate credendce pecunice, and a subsequent pactum consti- tute pecunice, an engagement to pay the ascertained debt of the principal. The Institutes only treat of fidejussores. The corei stijmlandi et p)ro- 7Jiittendi, mentioned in Title 16, were parties to the same verbal contract. But it was also possible for persons to enter into a contract as accessories to the principal contract. If one of these accessories, or the principal, was sued, no further action could, until Justinian's time, be brought by the creditors against those not sued, the debt being extinguished by the litis contestation and payment to the accessory of the creditor v/as a good pay- ment as against his principal. (Tit. 20. pr.) BOOK III. 553 In stipulations there could be added an adstipulator, and the prin- cipal use of adding one was, before procurators were recognised, to put a person in the position of a procurator, and after procurators were recog- nised, to make valid a stipulation for something after the death of the stipulator. The rights of the adstipulator did not pass to his heirs. The adpromissores {sponsor es^ if Roman citizens, fidepromissores, if peregrini) might bind themselves for as much as, or for less than, their prin- cipal bound himself, not for more. Their heirs were not bound, and they had against their principal an actio mandati. Several laws were made for their protection. By the lex Apuleia any one of them who had paid the whole debt could recover all beyond his share from the others by an actio pro socio. By a law of uncertain name the creditor had to give notice beforehand for what amount he was going to exact security, and how many accessories there were to be. By the lex Furia the obligation was only binding for two years, and the amount of the liability of all was divided equally among all living when the guarantee was enforced. The lex Puhlilia gave a special privilege to sponsores (not to fidepromissores)^ allowing them, unless reimbursed in six months, (a) to bring against their principal a special action, actio depensi, and to recover double if he denied his liability, or (b) to take his person in execution. The lex Cornelia pro- vided that no one should bind himself for the same debt or to the same creditor, in the same year, for more than 20,000 sesterces. The lex Cornelia applied, however, not only to adjjromissores, but to fidejussores, which marks the first introduction of a form of suretyship which, at last, superseded entirely the use of adpromissores. l^h.e fide- jussor bound himself by saying in Latin or in Greek (7) that he also ordered the thing on his faith, but no strictness of the formula was here necessary. Like the adp)romissor, the fidejussor could not bind himself for more than his principal (5), and had an actio mandati, or, if he had intervened without the principal's authority, an actio negofiorum jus- torum, against the principal for what he paid ibr him. (6.) The advantages of having fidejussores over adpromissores were (a), they could be used to guarantee any kind of obligation, including obli- gations arising out of delicts and natural obligations, whereas adpromis- sores could only guarantee verbal contracts, (b) The fidejussor bound his heirs, the adpromissor did not. (2.) (c) There was no limit to the time during which fidejussores were bound, whereas adpromissores were only bound for two years from the time when the obligation could have been enforced against them. (2, note.) (d) The fidejussio might be made beforehand to guarantee a principal contract not yet made — adpi^omissio could not. (3.) The fidejussores were each liable for the whole debt, and one who paid had no means of making the others contribute, except by taking advan- tage of the beneficium cedendarum actionum, that is, the surety who was willing to pay in full could repel the creditor by an exceptio doli maliy unless the creditor would cede his actions to the surety who paid him ; and, by means of these actions, the surety could force the princij)al, or his co-sureties, to pay him what he was entitled to receive. Hadrian, how- 554 SUMMARY. ever, enacted that, if any fidejussor was sued, he should have what was termed the heneficium divisioms, i. e. he might force the creditor to divide his demand among all the fidejussores who were solvent at the time of the litis contestatio ; but the fidejussor must make this demand formally, since the heneficium did not take place ipso jure, as the provisions of the lex Furia did in favour of adpromissor es. And it might still be more to the interest of the surety to take advantage of the heneficium cedendarum actionum, as he thus took over any property pledged to the creditor, and might satisfy his claim in this way. (4.) Justinian introduced what was termed the heneficium oi'dinis, by which a surety might require that the principal should be sued first, and the sureties only called on to pay what could not be recovered from him. (4, note.) By the senatus-consultum Velleianum women were forbidden to bind themselves for another person. (Tit. 20. pr. note.) A fidejussor who signs a writing (cautio), by which he binds himself as fidejussor , is taken to have gone through all the necessary forms. (8.) Contracts made Literis. — A contract was made Uteris when an entry, expensilatio, under the name of the debtor, was made in the ledger {codex) of the creditor with the assent of the debtor, to the effect that the creditor had paid, and the debtor received, a certain sum of money. The best evidence of the assent of the debtor was his making a corresponding entry in his ledger, but this was not necessary. As the contract was for a sum certain advanced, it was enforced by a condictio ; and as the remedy by condictio was a short and simple one, other debts, as e. g. what was owing under a sale, were changed by novation into debts due under a literal con- tract (transcriptio a re in personam), by the debtor owning to having received as a loan the sum due from him on the sale ; and, in the same way, the debtor might take, under a literal contract, the debt of a third person {transcriptio a persona in personam), by assenting to an entry that he, the debtor, had received a loan to the amount of the sum owed by the third person. Contracts literis were peculiar to Eoman citizens. Peregrini had as a substitute syngraphce, signed by both parties, and chirographa, signed by the debtor only. These were not merely documentary evidence, but were writings on which an action could be brought, as opposed to cautiones, which were mere records of the transaction until Justinian's time, when the distinction was done away, and an action could be brought on any document stating that a sum was due, unless there was also a formal verbal contract ; for if there was a stipulation, this was always looked on as the contract, and the writing was only evidentiary. Although a debtor had admitted in writing a debt as due from him, he"might, during five years (re- duced by Justinian to two), plead the exceptio non numeratce pecunice, and make the creditor prove that he had really paid the money ; or if the debtor could show that he had not had the money, he could ask to have the writing, on which he was sought to be charged, given up to him. After the five, or two, years had elapsed, the debtor was conclusively bound by any written admission of debt, but, under Justinian, the debtor, by going BOOK III. 555 through certain forms, at any time during the two years, might get his exception made perpetual. Consensual Contracts. — We now come to the four kinds of contracts made simply by consent. No writing nor earnest is necessary ; they may be made inter absentes, and all give rise to bonw fidei actions. They are all bilateral, i. e. both parties are bound by them, whereas contracts under the three former heads were unilateral, except so far as co?nmodatum, depo- situm^ and pignus might give rise to actiones contrariw. These four kinds of contract are sale, letting and hiring, partnership, and mandate. (Tit. 22. pr.) i. Sale. — The contract of sale is formed as soon as the price, i. e. a definite sum of money, not anything else than money, is fixed on. Earnest (aiThce), previously to Justinian, only served as a proof that the contract had been made. (Tit. 23. pr.) Justinian made two changes. 1. If the parties chose to reduce their contract to writing, which they need not do, he enacted that they should not be bound until it had been reduced to writing, and one of three conditions had been fulfilled : viz. that the writing was (a) written by the parties, or (b) signed by them, or (c) formally written by a notary. 2. The earnest (arrlice), instead of a proof of the contract, became a measure of damages for not fulfilling the contract, whether written or unwritten, the purchaser for- feiting the earnest if he retracted, and the seller if he retracted forfeiting double. The thing sold must be defined in some way, but it might be defined in many ways, as, e. g. by selling at so much a head the fish to be cauglit on a day, rei speratcB emptio, or the chance of the whole take of fish on a day, spei emptio. (Tit. 23. pr.) The price must be fixed and certain. If a thing is sold at the price at which Titius shall value the thing, Justinian decides that if Titius does fix a value this is a contract of sale : but, if he does not, there is no con- tract of sale. (1.) The price must be in money, or else the contract is one of exchange (permi(tatio), not sale, the difference being that, if a contract of sale was made, the consent was the basis of the contract, but in exchange the contract was made re, by the delivery of one thing in exchange for which the other thing was to be given. The duties of the seller were, 1, to deliver the thing and to give lawful and undisturbed possession of it (not to give the dominion of it). 2. To recompense the buyer, if evicted. 3. To secure the buyer against secret faults. If secret faults were discovered, the buyer might, at his option, (a) by an actio (sstimatoria, recover damages, greater or less, according as the seller knew (or did not know) of the faults, or (b), by what was redhibition get the contract rescinded, and return the thing to the seller. But this was not all. In order to fortify himself, the buyer frequently exacted by stipulation a promise from the seller that he would give him the dominium^ and that, if the buyer was evicted, he would pay him double the purchase money. After the use of this fortifying stipulation had become familiar, it was 556 SUMMARY. held that custom so far imported such a stipulation into the contract, that the buyer, who had not demanded such a promise, and who, there- fore, could not sue ex stipulatu if evicted, yet, if evicted, could, in the honce fidei actio of emjjtio, recover double the purchase money, on the ground that the seller ought to put the hirer in as good a position as if the stipu- lation had been made. The buyer was bound, 1, to make the seller the receiver of the money fixed as the price, and, 2, to pay interest from the day of receiving the thing until he paid the price.. (2.) The contract of sale was complete when the price was fixed, but the thing sold remained in the ownership of the seller until he delivered it. If, after the sale was made, the thing bought improved in value, the buyer profited, and if it lost in value without the fault of the seller the buyer had to take it as it was. The risk, after the price was paid, was that of the buyer, and if the thing was wholly lost, by some cause beyond the control of the seller, the loss fell on the buyer, not on the seller, although the seller was the dominus, while generally it is true that res domino peril. But then the seller had to take the care of a good paterfamilias of the thing while it was in his custody, and, if he did not, the buyer could sue him for da- mages, and, if the seller chose, he might take even a fiirther responsibility and specially engage to be answerable even beyond the measure of respon- sibility of a bonus paterfamilias, as, e.g., that a slave purchased should not in any case escape out of his custody. If the thing, while retained by the seller, was injured, or stolen by a third person, the seller had to cede to the buyer the action which, as dominus, he had against the wrong-doer or thief. (3.) The contract of sale might be made to be fulfilled on a condition hap- pening, or to be at end on a condition happening, or with a subsidiary agree- ment added to it, such as (a) that it might be rescinded if the seller had a better offer before a given day {in diem addictio), or (b) a lex commissoria, a general agreement for the rescission of the contract, if not executed, this agreement being specially used to enable the seller to get back the thing if he had delivered it, and was not paid by a certain day. A seller could, under Justinian, have a sale rescinded, or the difference made up to him, if he had sold for less than half the value. (4.) If the seller knowingly sold something that cannot be sold, as a res puhlica, or a freeman, the buyer could recover from the seller all he had lost by entering into the bargain : he could, e. g., get interest on his pur- chase money. The honce fidei actio of the buyer was termed ex empto or empti, that of the seller ex vendito or venditi. (5.) ii. Letting on Hire. — The contract of letting and hiring (locatio- conductio) is the second of the consensual contracts, and was formed as soon as the price of the letting {merces) was fixed. The three heads of this contract were, 1, locatio-conductio rerum, when one person let and another hired a thing ; 2, locatio-conductio operarum, where one person let his services and another hired them ; 3, locatio-conductio open's faciendi, where one person, the locator, delivered over a thing, to have BOOK III. 557 something done to it for a price, by another person, the conductor. (Tit. 24. pr.) The price must be fixed, but might be left to be fixed by another person, but if no price was fixed the contract was not technically one of locatio-conductiOy but was an innominate contract. The price must be in money, and so if one man lets his ox in exchange for the hirer in turn letting his ox to the first letter, this is not locatio-conductio, but an innominate contract. (2.) Emphyteusis, which resembles sale in re- gard to the largeness of the interest passed by it, and locatio-conductio in- asmuch as the property still remains in the creator of the emphyteusis, was declared to be a separate form of contract by Zeno. In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, the risk in emphyteusis of a total loss fell on the owner, the risk of a partial loss fell on the occupier. (3.) If a man gives his gold to a goldsmith to have rings made of it for a fixed price, this is locatio-conductio ; but if the rings are to be made of the gold of the goldsmith, it is a sale. (4.) The hirer has to bestow on the thing hired the care of a honus paterfamilias, but fortuitous loss falls on the owner, that is, the letter ; a distinction being thus established between the contract of locatio-conductio and that of sale, where the risk of fortuitous loss is not with the dominus, the seller, but with the buyer (5), who still remained possessor in the eyes of the law. The duties of the letter were, 1, to give the hirer the free use of the thing ; 2, to guarantee him against eviction ; 3, to reimburse him for necessary or useful expenses. The duties of- the hirer were, 1, to give the care of a honus paterfamilias to the custody of the thing ; 2, to give the thing up when the term of hiring was at end ; and, 3, to pay the agreed price of hiring. (Tit. 24. pr.) The contract was terminated, 1, by the death of a person who had contracted to let out his personal services or who specially was to do a thing ; but it was not terminated in other cases by the death of the locator or conductor, the contract passing to the heirs of each ; 2, by the sale of the thing, the conductor having a right to damages against the locator for being turned out, but having no title to hold against a purchaser ; 3, by rent being two years in arrear ; or by gross misuse on the part of the conductor ; 4, by the locator having indispensable need of it ; and, 5, by the conductor being prevented from getting benefit from it, as by armed force. (6, note.) The hirer \i?idith.Q actio conducti; the letter had, 1, the actio locati, and, 2, a real action, actio Serviana, by which he was enabled to seize on the farming instruments of the hirer of land if rent was not paid ; and, 3, could apply for the interdictum Salvianum, by which he got possession of things pledged for the rent of land. (Tit. 24. pr.) iii. Partnership. — The third kind of consensual contracts, partnership, may be considered under the following heads : — 1. The objects of the partnership. — Partnership might be (a) univer- sorum bonorum (/coivoTrpa^/a), of everything belonging or accruing to each partner in any way, and goods belonging to the partners at the time of the contract passed to all without delivery ; (h) universoru7n qua: ex quastu veniunt, of things acquired in the course of business, but not of inheritances, 558 SUMMARY. legacies, &c. ; (c) negotiationis alicujus ; (d) vectigalis, for farming the public revenues ; (e) rei unius. (Tit. 25. pr.) 2. The shares of the pai''tne7^s. — In the absence of special agreement each partner has an equal share in the profit and loss. (1.) But they may agree that one-third of the profits and one-third of the loss shall be- long to one partner — or one may have the profit after a balance has been struck and not be responsible for loss — or one may contribute money and another only services ; but a leonine partnership, by which one partner took all the profit, was not permitted. (2.) If a share of gain is assigned to one partner, he has, in the absence of special agreement, to take an equal share of loss. (3.) 3. The dissolution of the partnership. — A partnership was dissolved (rt) ex personis^ when one person is dead or incapacitated. As to death, it may be remarked that the death of one of many partners dissolved the whole partnership, but that a societas vectigalis passed to the heirs. (5, note.) Incapacity might under Justinian be caused by puhlicatio or confiscation, when the fiscus was looked on as the successor; and this was one of the consequences of the maxima or media capitis deminutio. (b) Ex rebus, when the purpose of the partnership has been accomplished or the condition to which it was made subject, for partnership might be made conditionally, has been fulfilled (4), or when the subject matter of the partnership has ceased to exist, as in the case of a cessio hoiiorum, when the goods of the insolvent were all lost to him. (7.) But the outgoing partner might form a new partnership with his old partners, and as partnership, being a contract jus gentium, could be formed with a peregrinus, a new partnership might be formed even with a person who, having undergone the media capitis deminutio, had lost his civitas. The minima capitis deminutio did not dis- solve a partnership, and a person arrogated or emancipated was still a partner. (^8.) (c) Ex voluntate, when one partner wished to retire; but if, "vvhen the partnership is universorum honorum, he renounces from a desire to profit exclusively by some gain, as an inheritance, accruing to himself, he is compelled to share this gain with his partners. (4.) {d) Ex actione, when one partner compelled a dissolution by action, (e) Tempoir, by the time during which the partnership was to last having expired. (4.) 4. The powers and duties of the partners. — Each partner was the mandatary of the others, but, for anything beyond mere ordinary admini- stration, required an express mandatum. Properly, only the particular partner who was party to a contract could sue or be sued by third parties, but the pr^tor, if necessary, allowed actions to be brought by or against the other partners. Each partner had a bonoi fidei action p)ro socio against the others to recover his just expenses and make them answerable for his losses or their negligence. (2, note.) Each partner was bound to take as much care of goods belonging to the partnership as he did of his own, and to this extent he was answerable, not only for dolus, but culpa. (9.) There was such 2^, fraternitas between partners, that while on the one hand a partner could not in an actio pro socio be condemned beyond his means {beneficium competenticB), yet condemnation in this action carried infamy with it. If a partner committed a delict against his partners, BOOK III. 559 they had the appropriate actio ex delicto against him, and a partition of the partnership property could be enforced by an actio communi dividundo. (9, note.) iv. Mandate. — The fourth of the consensual contracts is mandate, by which one person charges another to do something : originally, one friend (the mandator^ charges another friend, in whom he has confidence (the mandatarius), to do something for him, and as a pledge places his hand in his friend's {manns datio). The relations thus created were after- w^ards enforced by the bonce fidei actions mandati directa, by which the mandator compelled the mandatarius to account to him, and mandati contraria^ by which the mandatarius compelled the mandator to reimburse him for expenses and losses. (Tit. 26. pr.) Still the original character of the contract was traceable in mandate always remaining a gratuitous contract (13), and the mandatarius who was adjudged in an action to have failed to discharge his duty w^as stamped with infamy. (Tit. 26. pr.) Gradually the scope of mandate was much enlarged by the prgetor allowing third parties with whom the mandatarius had contracted to sue or be sued by the mandator^ in the form of actiones utiles. There were still some acts, such as making a testament, or entering on an inheritance, which every man must do for himself ; but, in general terms, it may be said, that a law of agency was thus created, as these actions could be brought without the concurrence of the agent or procurator, and thus the principal and third parties were placed in direct relations. (Tit. 26. pr.) Fo7ins of Mandate. — Mandate may assume five forms, according to the persons interested in the contract. It may be made (a) for the benefit of the mandator only, as when he charges the mandatarius to buy an estate for him. (1.) (^) For the benefit of the mandator and the manda- tarius, as, 1, when the mandator guarantees a loan which the mandatarius makes with interest to a third party, but for the benefit of the man- dator ; or, 2, when the mandator, being already a fidejussor, gives the mandatarius, who is about to sue him as such, a mandate to sue the principal. (Here both gain, or rather, before Justinian introduced the heneficium ordinis, they gained, the mandator by having the principal sued first, and the mandatarius by having two persons to sue, one after the other;) or, 3, when the debtor gives the creditor a mandate to stipulate for something owed the mandator by a third party. (Here again both benefit ; the mandator gets his debt collected for him, and the mandatarius has two persons to sue.) (2.) (c) For the benefit of a third person, as a mandate to manage the affairs of Titius. (c7) For the benefit of the man- dator, and a third person, as when the mandatarius is charged to buy an estate for Titius and the mandator jointly, (e) For the benefit of the mandatarius and a third person, as when the mandator charges the man- datarius to lend money at interest to Titius, an opportunity of lending money at interest being here, as above in (b 1), treated as a benefit to the lender. (5.) A mandate for the benefit of the mandatarius only, as to invest his money in the purchase of an estate, is merely a piece of advice, and cannot be reckoned a mandate at all, unless the mandator meant to say that if his advice was followed, he, and not the mandatarius, 560 SUMMARY. was to take the risk. (6.) A mandate may be made conditionally, or to have eifect from a particular time. (12.) Mandate used as a mode of Suretyship. — A mandate was almost the same as, Jidejussio as a means of creating suretyship, and was subject to the same general rules as to the inability of women, under the senatKS- considtum Velleianum^ to enter into it for this purpose, and as to the bene- fits of discussion {ordinis), i.e. that the principal should be sued first, under Justinian, and of division, that is, that the liabilities of co-sureties should be divided among them, under Hadrian's rescript, and, to some extent, of the cession of actions. But the mandator axidi fidejussor differed in some respects. 1. The mandator was considered sometimes more responsible. It was, for instance, doubted by the jurists whether if an adolescent who had borrowed under a guarantee was restitutus in integrum^ the creditor or the fidejussor was to suffer the loss, but it was considered clear that the mandator rather than the creditor was to suffer. 2. Before the time of Justinian, who placed them on an equality, the fidejussor was released by the principal being sued — not so the mandator^ as his contract was a separate one. 3. The fidejussor could not demand that the actions against the debtor and the co-sureties should be ceded to him after a litis contestatio in a suit by the creditor against the fidejussor \ but the man- dator was not affected by a litis contestatio or judgment in an action against the debtor. 4. The mandator was released if the creditor had wilfully abandoned any of the remedies the mandator could call on him to cede, while the fidejussor could only call on the creditor to cede such as he had to cede. (6, note.) Duties and poivers ofi the Mandatarius. — No one need accept a mandate, but if accepted, it must be executed, unless renounced soon enough for the mandator to carry out his purpose himself or through another. Otherwise the mandatarius will be liable to an actio mandati, unless some such reason as a sudden illness or enmity has prevented him from renouncing or renouncing soon enough. (11.) If the inandator revokes before execution, the mandate is at an end. (9.) A mandate is also extin- guished, if, before it is executed, either the majidator or mandatarius dies, but the mandatarius has an actio mandati, if he executes the mandate when the mandator is really, but not to his knowledge, dead ; just as a payment to a steward, enfranchised or ceasing to have power to act as steward, is good against his master if the person paying the money does not know that the steAvard is not still a slave or has ceased to have power to act as stcAvard. (10.) A mandate contra honos mores^ as to commit theft, is not obligatory ; the mandatarius may have to pay a penalty in such a case, but he has no remedy against the person who charges him to commit the theft. (7.) The mandatarius must not exceed the limits of his mandate. If a mandator charges the mandatarius to spend 100 aurei^ the manda- tarius may spend less but not more ; and he can make the mandator responsible up to 100 aurei, though not for the excess. (8.) In the execu- tion of the mandate, the 7nandatarius Avas bound to exercise the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. (11, note.) Gratuitous character of the Contract. — A mandate is always gratuitous ; BOOK III. 561 and a contract which, if gratuitous, would be a mandate, will, if not gratuitous, almost always take the form of locatio-conductio, and so vice versa, if a person gives out his materials to be done something with, but does not fix the price, an actio mandati may be brought. But although the mandate was gratuitous, yet an honorary payment (Jionorariwii) might be arranged for and given, as to doctors, &c., and although the payment could not be enforced by an action, yet the magistrate in the exercise of his extraordinary jurisdiction would regulate it and see it was paid. (13.) Obligations quasi ex Contractu. — We now come to cases where an obligation exists, not arising from a contract, but from Euch a state of things that one man is bound to another as if there was a contract. These obligations, moreover, resemble not only obligations generally, but those arising from some particular form of contract. The three first of the examples that follow, for example, closely approach obligations arising from a mandate. The two next closely approach obligations arising from a societas. The last closely approaches the obligation arising from mutuum. (Tit. 27. pr. 6.) The following are the examples (which are merely examples) given in the Institutes. 1. If one man manages the affairs of another who is absent, without being charged to do so, there is no contract between them, but in order that the affairs of absent people might not be neglected, the law treated the parties as if a mandate had been given, the person whose affairs had been managed having an actio yiegotiorum gestotmm against the gestor to make him account, and the gestor having an actio contraria against him, but (in distinction to the case of a mandate) only for what he has usefully expended, not for all his expenses. The gestor has to show the diligence o^ a bonus paterfamilias. (1.) 2. Tutors and, 3, curators are bound to the pupil or adolescent, who have a direct action to make them account, and are subject to a contrary action for losses and all expenses. (2.) 4. If two persons, not being partners, have a thing in common, and one has received the fruits or borne necessary or useful expenses, he can be sued or sue as if the other had been a partner (3) ; and, 5, the same may be said of two co-heirs, who have a right to apply to have the inheri- tance divided. (4.) 6. The heir, though not bound by a contract to the legatee, is under an obligation to hiva, quasi ex contractu, to curvy out the dispositions of the testator, and the legatee had an actio ex testamento to make him do this ; having also, if a particular thing was so given as a legacy as to give the legatee the right to bring a vindicatio, the choice between the real and the personal action. (5.) 7. A person to whom money not due is paid by mistake, is not bound by a contract, for payment is generally rather the fullilment than the origin of a contract, but he is bound to repay it by an obligation quasi ex contractu. (6.) In order that the person paying might be able to recover, three con- ditions must be fulfilled : (a) the payment must be really not due ; a, 0 0 562 SUMMARY. person could not recover if what he paid was due, although by a merely natural obligation, or if he paid sooner than necessary what he must some day pay ; but he might recover what he paid under a conditional under- taking before the event happened ; (b) he must have paid under a mistake arising from ignorance of fact or law ; for if he paid knowingly, he was treated as having made a gift (6) ; (c) he must not have paid when liable to pay double the amount claimed, as he would be if he denied that a judgment pronounced against him had been pronounced, or in actions under the lex Aquilia, or, before Justinian, in cases of legacies giyen j:)e?' damiiationem. Justinian put all legacies and fideicommissa on the same footing in this respect, but only in favour of certain legatees, such as churches, asylums, monasteries, and so forth. If when a person in such cases chose to pay the simple sum claimed, he could not re- cover it, as he was taken to have paid it to obtain security from the penalty. (7.) If the thing not due was paid by some one not having the power to pass property in that which he gave as payment (and when payment is spoken of it is not money only that is meant), then the thing paid, if still in existence, could be reclaimed by a vindicatio. If not in existence, or if the property had been transfeired by some one having power to transfer it, then the person paying had a condictio — which would be indehiti in the first case, as he claimed things like what he had given — or dare oportere in the second case. (6, note.) Acquisition of Obligations thuough others. — Fathers and masters acquire obligations, i.e. are creditors, and can bring actions, through sons in potestate (subject to the changes made by Justinian as to the i^eculium, the father, however, having alone the right to bring the action when he had the usufruct) and slaves. (Tit. 28. pr.) In the cases of slaves, or of per- sons supposed to be slaves, of whom there is bona fide possession or a usufruct, the master acquires the obligations as to all that arises from their laboiu's or from something belonging to the master. In the case of slaves of whom the master has the use, the master acquires the obligations as to all that arises from their labours expended on the master's property. (1, 2.) The slave held in common acquires, in the absence of something to show the contrary, for his masters in proportion to their interest in him. (3.) The Institutes do not notice the acquisition of obligations through procurators. Dissolution of Obligations. — The last Title of this Book treats of the dissolution of obligations, and the case of obligations being dissolved ijjso jure must be distinguished from that of the right to sue on an obligation being met by an exception, a subject reserved for the 4th Book. There are three modes of the dissolution of contracts noticed in the Institutes : 1. Payment; 2. Novation; 3. Use of a form of dissolution corresponding to the form of the obligation. (Tit. 29.) i. PaTjment. — Sohitio, a term applicable generally to every mode of loosening the tie of the obligation, is specially applied to payment in its widest sense, i.e. executing the contract. There are as to this three questions to be answered : 1. Who may pay ? Either the debtor himself may pay. or any third person with or without the debtor's knowledge, or EOOK III. 563 even against his will, may pay for Iiim. If the debtor pays, the fidejussor is released, and if \h.Q fidejussor pays and does not require the actions to be ceded to him, the principal is released. 2. To whom might the pay- ment be made ? To the creditor himself, his authorised agent, to the tutor, curator, or authorised pupil. 3. What might be given in payment ? Not only the thing itself, but, with the consent of the creditor, something else in lieu of it. (Tit. 29. pr.) ii. Novation. — Novation is the dissolution of one obligation by the formation of another. Any contract, civil or natural, could be extin- guished by a new contract, operating either civilly or naturally, being formed ; the new. contract being one either Uteris^ or (so generally as to be spoken of as the one recognised mode) verbis. The new contract must be different from the old, and might be different in three ways: 1. The terms might be altered ; 2. A new debtor might be introduced, and even if the new debtor is unable, as e.g. an unauthorised pupil, to contract, still, though the new contract, except as a natural obligation, is void, yet the first is extinguished ; but it wouM be otherwise, if the new contract had been made with an unauthorised slave, for then there would be no new contract at all. The new debtor might be substituted even without the consent of the old debtor ; this new debtor was termed expromissor^ in the strict sense of that word. If the old debtor substituted another person as the new debtor in his own place, this was termed delegatio. A new creditor might also be introduced, 3. If the parties remained the same, then if the preceding contract was not a stipulation, the forming the same contract by stipulation operated as a novation of the first contract ; but if the preceding contract is a stipulation, something new must be intro- duced ; conditions of time or fidejussores, for exarapffe, must be added or taken away. If the second contract is m^ade conditionally, the first is not extinguished until the second becomes operative by the condition having been fulfilled. (3, note.) Justinian enacted that no contract should be extinguished by a new one being forhied, unless the parties clearly expressed their intention that this should be the effect of the new contract. (3.) Both the litis contestatio and a judgment produced a novatio, but the effect was not exactly the same as in novatio proper, as the beneficial accessories of the old contract, such as pledges and interest, were con- tinued. (3, note.) iii. Form of Dissolution corresponding to the Forms of the Ohligation. If payment was not made, nor novation made by a new stipulation, the proper mode of dissolving a contract was by a form {imaginaria solufio in the first three of the following cases) corresponding to the form in which the obligation had been contracted. A nexum was dissolved by the debtor striking the scale with a piece of money and giving it to the creditor as representing the debt ; and this form was used to remit pay- ment of a legacy per damnationem, or of money due on a judgment, or of anything certain, pondere, numero mensurave. (Tit. 29. pr.) A contract verbis was dissolved by acceptilatio, i.e. by the creditor saying Habeo to the debtor's question Habesne acceptu7n. (1.) A contract Uteris was dis- o o 2 564 SUMMARY. solved by the debtor making the expensilatio of an imaginary payment in his books. A contract re was dissolved by the thing being returned, and one made consensu was dissolved by consent, if each party could be put in his former position. (4.) If a contract had been made in some other way than verbis, and the parties subsequently went through an acceptilatio, this operated as giving an exception preventing the creditor from suing. But in order that the preceding obhgation might be extinguished, and not merely an exception allowed, there was invented what was terriied the Aquilian stipulation. The terms of the former contract were thrown into the form of a stipu- lation, which extinguished the old contract by novation, and then this new stipulation was dissolved by acceptilatio. (2.) Acceptilatio may be apphed to a part of a debt as well as to the whole. (1.) There were also the folloAving modes in which an obligation might be dissolved besides the three above mentioned : 1. The obligation becoming impossible to execute, as if the thing perished. 2. Confusio, i.e. t\iQpersonce of the creditor and the debtor becoming merged, as if the debtor became heir to the creditor. 3. Compensation or set-off, in the sense that it was taken notice of in honcejidei actions without an exception. 565 BOOK IV. DELICTS. We now proceed to notice obligations arising ex delicto^ or quasi ex delicto. Delicts. — Obligations arising from delicts, i. e. violations of the rights of propertjT-, or of such ingredients of status as liberty, security, or repu- tation, arise from the thing done {ex re),, without necessary reference to an evil intent, and the kinds of delicts recognised by the law are four : — Furtum^ rapina, damni injuria , injuria^. (Bk. iv. Tit. 1. pr.) FuRTUM. — Theft is the fraudulent dealing with a moveable thing, with its use or its possession. (1.) By fraudulent is meant ^with the intention of committing a theft,' and among impuheres it was only a person puhertati proximus who was held old enough to have such an intention. (18.) If a borrower converts the thing borrowed to a purpose other than that for ■which it was lent, he does not commit a theft, if he honestly thinks the owner would permit it (7), or if the oAvner would, as a matter of fact, nave permitted it. (8.) But a person tempting a slave to bring him the property of his master, and then receiving the things by direction of the master to whom the slave has revealed the facts, is guilty both of theft and of corrupting a slave. (8.) There is theft of the use of a thing, as when a creditor or a depositary uses for his own purposes the thing com- mitted to him as a pledge or in deposit, or a borrower uses a thing for a purpose other than that for which it is lent, e. g. borrows a horse for a ride, and takes it into battle. (6.) There is theft of the possession, as if a debtor takes from the creditor the thing he has pledged to him. Free persons, as, e. g. children inpotestate, are among the things that may come within the law of theft. (10.) A person who assists in a theft, as by placing a ladder by which the thief mounts, is liable to an action, of theft, but not so if he only counsels the theft. (11.) If persons in the power of another steal from that person, they cannot be sued for theft by that person, but the thing is furtiva, and cannot be acquired by usucapion, and a person assisting them is liable to an action of theft. (12.) In case of theft the owner of the thing could sue for the thing, if in the possession of the thief, by the ordinary means, vindication or an action ad exhibendum, and, if the thing was no longer in the possession of the thief, he could recover the value of the thing stolen and interest by a con- dictio furtiva, or he might, if he pleased, bring this action although the thing was in the thief's possession. But, besides these actions, he had an actio furti, an action to recover a penalty for the wrong done him; but this, though it could be brought by the heirs of the owner, could not be 566 SUMMARY. brought against those of the thief. (19, note.) It could, as we have just seen, be brought against the accomplices o£ the thief. (11.) Two questions arise as to this action. 1. What was the amount of the penalty ? 2. Who could bring the action ? 1. The amount of the penalty varied according as the theft was manifest or not manifest. A manifest theft is one in which the thief is detected in the act, or in the place of the theft, or with the thing on him before he reaches his destination. The penalty for a manifest theft, which had been under tlife Twelve Tables for a slave death, and for a freeman being given over as a slave to the person injured, was fixed by the praetors at four times the value of the thing stolen. The penalty for non-manifisst theft was twice the value. Any accidental circumstance that, at the time of the theft, gave a special value to the thing, was reckoned in the value, the quadruple or double of which was to be given. (5.) In the older law there had been other variations of theft, or concealing stolen property, to which actions had been attached, wirh varying penalties, under the heads of furtum conceptum, oblat^im, prohibitum, and non exliibitum. (4.) 2. The person or persons Avho were interested in the thing not being lost could bring the actio furti. In the case of a thing subjected to a usufruct, both the domimis and the usufructuary had such an interest, and both could bring the action. (13, note.) The creditor, from whom a thing given in pledge is stolen, even if the debtor is the thief, may bring it, be- cause to have the thing pledged in possession is a gain, although the debtor may be able to pay. (14.) The bona Jide purchaser, too, has the action although he is not the dominus. (15.) The conductor operis, the tailor, or* fuller, who has clothes to mend or ecunia constituta, de peculio, de jurejurando. Further, there are certain actions which are said to be mixtce, i.e. partly real and partly personal. i. Civil Real Actions, — 1. Vindicatio, under which head may be noticed the characteristic of real actions, that the intentio ran. Si p)aret Titii rem. esse, if it appears that Titius has a right against all the world, without the name of any alleged violator of that right being men- tioned. (1.) 2. Actio confessoi'ia, brought to enforce a servitude con- tested or impeded, and brought indifferently whether the claimant was or was not in possession of the servitude. (2.) 3. Actio negativa, brought by the owner of a thing to regain an alleged right of exercising a servitude over that thing, although the owner was in possession, whereas, as a rule, real actions could not be brought by a possessor. The possessor of a servitude had a concurrent remedy in a prohibitory interdict, so far as concerned the actio confessoria, and in a possessory interdict so far as concerned the actio negativa. (2.) 4. Actio jrra^judicialis, a preliminary action to ascertain a fact, was an actio in rem, but only one such action, that to determine whether a man was or was not free, was civilis. This action, kno^^^l as caiisa liheralis, was originally carried on by a person who, as assertor liber- BOOK IV. 571 tatis, claimed a slave as against a master, and liberty might be thrice asserted in this way, if on the tvro first occasions a decision was given for the master. Justinian allowed the slave himself to claim his liberty, and made the first decision final. (13.) 5. Petitio hereditatis, or a claim for an inheritance. This (contrary to what was the case with other actions ill rem) was a hona^ Jidei action ; Justinian decided that dolus mahis could be taken into consideration in it without any exception being pleaded. It had some affinity to a personal action, as (a) it could only be brought against two classes of persons, those possessing an inheritance pro herede, and those possessing pi^o possessore^ (i.e. avowedly without title,) and (b) the plaintiff could recover by it moneys derived by the possessor from the inheritance, and could enforce by it debts due to the inheritance from debtors claiming to be heirs. (28.) ii. Pr.etorian Real Actions. — Five instances are given, the three first being fictitious actions, in jus conceptce, the two last being in factum. 1. Actio Publiciana, given to protect a person Avho, while the time of usu- capion is running, loses the thing out of his possession, and to recover it is allowed to feign that his title by usucapion is complete. (4.) 2. Actio quasi Publiciana, or Publiciana rescissoria, given to protect a person against whom the time of usucapion has run, while he was unable through absence or other legitimate cause to attend to his affairs, or if the pos- sessor in whose favour the term was running was absent, and so the usu- capion could not while running have been stopped by legal means. The preetor allowed the owner in such a case to rescind the usucapion and to claim the thing by feigning that the usucapion had not been perfected. (5.) 3. Actio Pauliana, given to rescind alienation of goods in defraud of creditors. (6.) 4. Actio Serviana, by which possession was obtained of the effects of a farmer, looked on as mortgaged in law, to recover the payment of rent. 5. Actio quasi Serviana, by which creditors generally, and not landlords only, obtained things mortgaged or pledged to them. (7.) Two instances are also given of prejudicial actions created by the praetor (13): that to decide whether a person is ingenuus or libertus, and that to decide whether a person is the son of his reputed father. (13.) Personal Actions. — Three instances are given of personal actions created by the praetor : 1. De constituta pecunia, given to enforce a pact for the payment of a sum already due. Such a pact was advantageous to the creditor, if the thing due was owed by another person, or if the ante- cedent obligation was a natural one, or if the time during which an action on this antecedent obligation might be brought was on the point of expiring ; and this action was by Justinian made perpetual and allowed to be brought whatever was the nature of the thing promised, those qualities having pre- viously belonged only to the actio receptitia, an action specially given to enforce an undertaking by an argentarius to pay what he owed. (8, 9.) 2. De jyecidio, given to make patresfamiliarum liable to the extent of the peculiimi of their sons in potestate and slaves, for the engagements of those sons and slaves. (10.) And, 3. De jurejurando, given to ascertain whether a party to a suit had, when challenged to do so, sworn that the facts on which he rested his claim or defence were true. (11.) 572 SUMMARY. i Mixed Actions. — The actions familioB erciscundfE, communi divi- dundo, and finium regundorum are said to be mixed, i.e. both real and personal, because although they were otherwise personal actions in form, yet by the addition of an adjudicatio things were adjudged to belong to the different parties. (20.) Before proceeding to notice the division of actions according to the latitude given to the judge, the Institutes notice two subsidiary divisions. i. Penal Actions (many of which actions, as de albo corrupto, de parente aut patrono in jus vocato, and de in jus vocato vi exempto, were created by the praetor) (12) as distinguished from actions brought to get the thing only (re^ persecutorice) and those in which both these objects were united (inixtce), — As a rule, all actions in rem or ex contractu were only rei 2^ersecutoricB, except that when an actio depositi was brought against a person or his heir, if personally guilty of dolus malus, to whom things had been entrusted under the pressure of sudden calamity, such as fire or shipwreck, when the value of the things, and also as much again, was recoverable, and so the action was mixta. (17.) Actions arising from a delict always carried with them a penalty, and were simply penal in the case of theft, for then the value of the thing was recoverable by a sepa- rate action, or were mixta^, as in actions vi honorum raptorum^ and under the lex Aquilia, and for legacies given but not duly paid to holy places, the value of the thing, and something more by way of penalty, being re- coverable by such actions. (18, 19.) ii. Actions differing according to the amount of the Condemna- tion.— This goes very nearly over the same ground as the previous division, i. Actions i^ei persecutorice, to get the thing due, were in simplum. (22.) ii. Actions (a) for non-manifest theft, (b) for damnum injurice under the Aquilian law, (c) for deposit when the deposit was denied, if it had been made underpressure of calamity, (d) for corrupt- ing a slave and (e) for not paying a legacy given to a holy place, were ill duplum. (23.) iii. An action given against a person who asked more than due, so that the officials of the court got a larger fee, was in triplum of the loss sustained by the payment of this fee, the amount properly expended being, however, included in the condeimiatio in triphnn. (24.) iv. Actions (a) for manifest thefts ; (b) actions cpiod inetus causa ; (c) actions for money paid to hire a man to bring a vexatious suit, or to induce a man to desist from a vexatious suit which he threatens to bring ; and (d) actions brought against officers of the court guilty of inijust exaction, were in quadrvplum. (25.) Two observations, however, have to be made. Of those actions which are said above to be given in duplum^ that under the lex Aquilia and that for deposit under pressure were only in duplum if the defendant denied his liability ; and in the case of legacies given to holy places, if the defendant denies or will not pay until the magistrate makes an order that the action shall be brought. (26.) Secondly, the actio quod metns causa, given to a person who had been threatened or coerced into doing anything, was only m quadruplum if the defendant would not obey the preliminary order of the judge (arhitriuni) and restore the thing. (27.) BOOK IV. 573 We now come to the division of actions according to the latitude of the judge. According to this division, actions are bonce Jidei, stHcti juris, or arhitraricc. 1, Actions bon^ fidei. — In certain praetorian actions, principally those arising out of bilateral contracts, the words ex bona fide or some equivalent words were added to qidcquid oportet in the intentio, which was. always uncertain, and then the judge had to take all equitable considera- tions into view in determining the liability of the defendant. The judge in bonce fidei actions took notice of dolus malus without an exceptio doli mail ; noticed customs and usages ; took into account counter claims arising out of the same set of • circumstances (30); provided for future liabilities arising; and gave interest for the time the thing had been due. (28, note.) A list of actions bonco fidei is given (28): 1, Empti and venditi ; 2, locati and conducti, S,negotio7mmgestorum- 4,mandati; b,depositi\ Q^pro socio ; 7, tutelce ; 8, commodati ; 9, pigneratitla ; 10, familice erciscundce ; 11, communi dividundo-^ 12, de c^stimato: I'd, ex permutatione ; 14:, hereditatis petitio ; 1^, ex stipidatu in exactione dotis. (29.) This last-mentioned action replaced a bonoe fidei action called rei uxoricB, under which the husband had certain advantages when sued by his wife for the restitution of her dos. If the wife had stipulated for the restoration of the dowry to her, she could bring an action on the stipulation which, being stricti juris, did not afford the husband those advantages, the principal of which were, (a) that he had three years to make restitution of things qucje niimero, pondere mensurave constant', (b) he had the beneficium compctentice; (c) he could deduct the useful as well as the necessary expenses he had been put to in the management of the other property (37) ; (d) the wife could not transmit the action to her heir ; (e) she could not ask for her dos, and also for any benefit by her husband's testament. Justinian amalgamated the two actions, calling the new action ex stipulatu, although in fact no stipulation might have been made. But he made it bonce Jidei, and the husband under it had a year for the restoration of all moveables, and he had the beneficium conipetentice, and could deduct necessary though not useful expenses ; but he could recover the impensce utiles by a separate action. Justinian, on the other hand, gave the wife a tacit jus Injpotliecoe on all the husband's effects for her dos, but this was only available when she herself sued for her dowry. (29.) 2. AcTiONES STRICTI JURIS, i.e. real actions and condictiones. — In these actions, dolus inalus or counter claim could only be taken notice of, if pleaded by an exception, and interest, except by express agreement, only ran from the litis contestatio. (28, note.) 3. AcTiONES ARBiTRARiiE. — In thesc actions the judge made a pre- liminary order on the defendant to do something, as to restore or exhibit a thing, or to pay a sum. If this order was not obeyed, then the defendant was to pay a sum fixed in the condemnatio so as to meet all the cir- cumstances of the case. If the defendant falsely denied having the thing in his possession, or did not either obey the order or pay the sum fixed in the condemnatio, the manus militaris was employed by the direction of the judge to compel obedience. All real actions were arbitraricej and the 574 SUMMARY. following personal actions, (a) quod metus causa ; (h) de dolo malo ; (c) ad exhibendum '^ (d) de eo quod certo loco promissam est. (31.) The action de dolo tnalo, given when there was no other means of avoid- ing the consequences of dolus malus, was in simplum, carried infamy with the condemnation and had to be brought within a year. The actio de eo quod certo loco was an action brought by a creditor against a debtor who, having promised and failed to pay in a particular place, was not to be found, and so could not be sued there, and the judge allowed the cre- ditor in this case to sue elsewhere without risk of plus-petitio. But the debtor had this advantage : he was given the option of paying or giving security for paying what was due in the right place under an ctrhi- triuiii, and then if he did not obey the arhitrium^ he was condemned in an amount in which the benefit it would have been to him to pay in the place named was taken into consideration. (31.) It was the business of the judge to make the condemnatio in the for- mulary system for a sum certain, and under the judicia extraordinaria for a thing certain or a sum certain (32), and this leads us to consider three special matters which affected the result of the action. 1. Plus-petitio. 2. Beneficium competentice. 3. Compensatio. 1. Plus-petitio. — Under the formulary system, if the plaintiff asked in the intentio of an actio stricti juris for a thing certain, and asked for more than he was entitled to, he could not succeed in the action at all, and the claimant being barred by the novation operated by the litis con- testation he had no fuither remedy, unless the preetor chose to give him a restitutio in integrum, which was granted as a matter of course to plaintiffs under 25 years, but to persons over that age only if the mistake had been such as a most careful man might have made : as if a legatee had asked for his whole legacy, and then codicils had been discovered by which he lost part or had to share with others. A plaintiff might ask too much in four ways : 1, re, in regard to the thing asked for, as if when ten auj^ei were due he asked for twenty, or if when part was due he asked for the whole ; 2, tempore, in regard to time, as if he asked before the day of payment or before the fulfilment of a condition ; 3, loco, in regard to place, as if a creditor sues at Rome for what is due at Ephesus, thus depriving the debtor of any advan- tages he might have from goods being cheaper or interest lower at Ephesus. But if the debtor absented himself from the place named, the creditor had the actio arhitraria de eo quod cei^to loco mentioned above ; 4, genere, in re- gard to the circumstances of the contract, as if when the debtor promised to give either one thing or another, the creditor sued depriving him of the choice. It made no difference, even if the thing he asked for was of less value than the other thing. (33.) If too much was stated in the demonstratio, the plaintiff was not pre- judiced, and if too much was asked for in the condemnatio, the defendant could get the formula rectified. Under the later emperors, the effects of a plus-petitio, i.e. any excess in the lihellus conventionis, were changed, the plaintiff being no longer shut out from his legal remedy, but being punished for his mistake. If the plus-petitio was tempore, the plaintiff was, under a constitution of BOOK IV. 575 Zeno, obliged to wait double the time he ought to have waited and to reimburse the defendant all expenses for his loss through the action having been improperly brought. If the plus- i)etitio was in any other way, Justinian made the plaintiff pay three times the amount of loss sustained by the defendant through the action having been improperly brought. (33.) If the plaintiiF claimed in the intentio less than was due, he could under the formulary system bring another action for the surplus Avhen another praetor came into office. Zeno allowed the judex to add the sur- plus in condemning the defendant. (34.) If the plaintiff asked for one thing when another was due, he could, under the formulary system, bring another actio for the right thing, and, under Justinian, he could have the mistake corrected. (35.) In certain actions, which may be made a sixth division of actions, the defendant was condemned in less than was due to him. 1 . In the actio de peculio a paterfamilias could only be condemned in the amount of the peculium of his son or slave. (36.) 2. In certain actions the defen- dant had the beneficium coMPETENTiyE, i.e. he was only condemned in so far as he could pay without being reduced to destitution. The instances given are, (a) the husband in a suit brought by his wife to get back her dos (37) ; {b) a parent sued by a child ; (c) a patron sued by a lihertus ; {d) one partner sued by another ; (e) a donor sued for his gift (38) ; (/) a debtor who has made a cessio honorum sued by his creditors after lie has subsequently acquired property. (40.) We may add a brother sued by a brother, and all cases, except delicts, when one of two married persons is sued by the other. In all these cases, if the debtor could subsequently pay in full, without being reduced to destitution, he had to do so ; and in the estimation of what he could pay, his assets only, without deduction for debts, were looked to, except in the one case of the donor, who might deduct his debts. CoMPENSATio. — In bonce Jidei actions, the judge, without any exception being pleaded, set off any debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff from the same set of circumstances (ex eadem re). In actions stricti juris ^ the plaintiff could be repelled by an exceptio doli mali, if he asked for what was due without having taken into consideration what he owed. It is uncertain whether the exception stopped the action altogether, or whether the plaintiff only recovered any surplus due to him. An argentarius who sued a customer without giving credit for what was due of the same kind, as money or wine, {in eadem re,) was guilty of n jylus- jietltio under the formulary system and failed altogether in his action. A bonorwn emptor had also, in suing a debtor of the insolvent, to deduct what was due from the insolvent to that debtor ; but as the deductio was inserted in the condemnation not, as compensation in the case of the argentarius, in the intentio, the risk of plus-petitio was not run. Deductio varied also from compensatio, as it included debts of things of different kinds and debts not yet due. Except, perhaps, in this case of the argentarius, the two debts did not extinguish each other, until Justinian made them so operate, ipso jure, and under Justinian it no longer made any difference whether the two debts were due from the same set of cir- 576 SUMMARY. cumstances, or wlietlier things of the same kind were payable, but the defendant's claim was to be a causa liqmda, i.e. clearly ascertainable. (39.) Justinian allowed no set-ofFto an action of deposit. (30.) The subject next treated is that of the responsibility of domini and patresfamiliamm for the contracts or delicts of those in their power. What is said is, however, chiefly devoted to the contracts and delicts of slaves ; what is to be said as to slaves being, with some slight exceptions, applicable to sons in j)otestate. (Tit. 7. pr.) 1. Contracts of persons alieni juris. — If the slave was merely the instrument of the master, merely received, e.g., pieces of money made in payment, this was not a contract of a person alieni juris at all. (1, note.) The cases in Avhich the slave did contract may be grouped under four heads. 1. llie slave contracts under the directions of the master. — Here the praetor gives an action quod jussu against the master for the whole of the debt. (1.) 2. The slave contracts as an exercitor or institor. — The master sets the slave up as the master of a vessel, or the keeper of a shop, or the con- ductor of any business. The master thus authorises the slave to do all things necessary for his master. Here the prajtor gives an actio exerci- toria or institoria against the master for the whole of the debt. (2.) 3. The slave trades with his peculium to the knowledge of the master. If debts are to be satisfied and the master is a creditor of the slave, the peculium and its proceeds are to be divided proportionately between him and the other creditors. The master makes the division, and if he does not make it fairly, any creditor prejudiced has an actio tributoria against him. (3.) 4. The slave contracts without the direction or authorisation of the master. — Here an action is given against the master, not for the whole debt, but, 1, so far as he has profited by what the slave has expended, and, 2, to the extent of the slave's peculium. The action is de peculio et in rem verso^ and the condemnation is double ; the judge first taking into account the profitable outlay, and then the jMculium : but from the peculium is first deducted what the slave owes the master or any one in his power ; unless, indeed, he owes it to a vicarius, who is part of the 2yeculium, for deduction would then be useless. (4.) The actio exercitoria or institoria must always be better for the creditor than that de peculio et in rem verso ; for in the former action the master is bound for the whole debt. But the actio tributoria may be sometimes more favourable than that de peculio^ sometimes less so to the creditor, and he must judge which he will bring. In the actio tributoria the creditor gains by there being no deduction made from the peculium of that which is due to the master. On the other hand, the actio de peculio affects the whole peculium, while the actio tributoria only affects that part of it en- gaged in trade. (5.) What is said of the slave may be nearly, but not quite, said of the son in power. There are three points of difference to be noticed. 1. A father was bound to the extent of the son's peculium by the son's becom- ing ?.. fidejussor. 2. The filiusfamilias could be sued civilly, and if he was BOOK IV. 577 condemned to pay, an actio judicati could be brought against tlie father to the extent of the son's pecuUum. There was no corresponding liability in either of these cases as to the slave. (6.) 3. By the senatus-consultum Macedonianum^ prohibiting money to be lent to children or grandchildren of either sex in potestate, an action was refused for money so lent against the child, either while in potestate or become sui juris ^ and against the paterfamilias. If there was any doubt as to the facts, the action was permitted, and the senatus-consultum allowed on the ground of an excep- tion. (7.) The actions above mentioned, quod jussu, exercitoria, and de p)eculio^ were not properly separate actions. They were rather modifications of the pr^torian actions under which, according to the nature of the contract, the master was sued. In process of time the praators permitted not only preetorian actions, but condictions to be brought against the master or father, where, had he contracted himself, a condiction would have been the appropriate remedy. (8.) ii. Delicts of persons alieni juris. — A master could be sued under the praetorian or civil law, according to the origin of the actio (Tit. 8. pr.), for the delicts (noxia) of the slave, but he had the choice of paying the penalty, or giving up the wrongdoer (yioxa), (1), to the persons injured (Tit. 8. pr. 2), before or after the litis contestation (the action being arhi- traria^ i.e. togive the slaveup or pay) (Tit. 8. pr.) ; and the slave, if given up, became the property of the person injured, unless he could procure money to pay the penalty, and then he became free, even if his new master would have preferred to keep him. (3.) The action always followed the person of the delinquent and was brought against his master for the time being, or, if he was manumitted, against the slave ; and so if a freeman became a slave after having committed a delict, the action was against his master. (5.) The master had no action against his slave for a delict, nor the slave any action against his master for injury, nor did any right of action arise subsequently, though the slave was transferred to another master or became free ; and if a slave who had committed a delict became the property of the person injured, the right of action was extinguished. (6.) In old times children in potestate might be abandoned like slaves if they com- mitted delicts. In later times this was considered barbarous. The son could be sued for the delict, and then an action judicati brought against the father to the extent of the son's peculium. Pauperies. — By the Twelve Tables when an animal (cpiadrupes, ex- tended by interpretation to all animals) of vicious habits did harm ( pauperies)j the owner might, instead of paying for the damage, deliver up the animal (Tit. 9. pr.). If an animal of fierce nature, such as a bear, was kept where there was a public way, got loose and did injury, then, if it was a freeman that was injured, the amount of the condemnation was left to the discretion of the judge ; if a slave or anything else was injured, the condemnation was for double the damage done. (1.) A delict might consist really of two offences, and then a separate action lay for each ; or it might come under two heads of delict, and then, although an action lay under each head, the plaintiff could only recover P P 578 SUMMAKY. in the second anything which under that action happened to be recover- able beyond what he had recovered in the first. (1, note.) The discussion of the heads of actions is now interrupted to notice two points of procedure. Representation in Suits. — Under the old law one man could not sue in the name of another. To this rule there were exceptions in the cases of, 1, an actio pupillaris ; 2, an assertio lihertatis ] 3, actions brought by tutors for their pupils. 4. The lex Hostilia permitted an actio furti to be brought in the names of (a) persons in captivity ; {b) persons absent on the service of the State ; (c) those in the tutela of such per- sons. (Tit. 10. pr.). Subsequently this rule was relaxed and a person was allowed to appear in a suit; as (1) a cognitor ; (2) a procurator. The cognitor had to be appointed formally and in the presence of the adversary. When sentence was given, the actio judicati lay against, not the cognitor, but the party to the suit. The procurator, Avhose introduction was of a later date, was appointed by simple mandate and without communication with the adversary, and originally acted in his own name, giving security that the party in the suit for whom he was acting Avould ratify what he did, and if he was acting for the defendant, that the sentence should be carried out. A person desirous of representing another might be admitted to act as negotiorum gestor, although he could not show his mandate, if he gave security. The actio judicati was given for or against the procurator. At a later period, if the mandate was clearly proved, the procurator was considered to represent his principal ; and this was extended to the case of a negotiorum gestor, who, acting at first without authority, afterwards showed that his principal ratified his action. The actio judicati was then given for or against the principal, and the procurator was in the position of the cognitor (Tit. 10. pr. note), only that the mode of his appointment was not necessarily formal, or made in the presence of the adversary. (1.) The tutor or curator represented the pupil or adolescent to, or against, whom the actio judicati was given, unless the tutor or curator had intervened unnecessarily when it was given to or against him. (2.) Giving security. — There were certain securities exacted from the parties to suits or their representatives. Considerable changes in this re- spect were made by Justinian. We have to consider, 1, whether the action was real or personal ; 2, whether the party appeared personally or by a representative; 3, the law before and after Justinian. (Tit. 11. pr.) ii. (^A) The action is in rem, (a) The plaintiff had to give no security. The procurator of the plaintiff, while still looked on as a simple mandatary, had to give security, rem ratam dominum (the party was termed dominus litis) habiturum, i.e. that the plaintiff would not bring another action in his OAvn name. The cognitor and the procurator, when the procurator came to be looked on as a mere representative, had to give no security. The tutor or curator had to give security, rem ratam dominum hahiturum, but this security was, as regards these persons, often dispensed with, when they were plaintiffs. BOOK IV. 579 (b) The defendant had to give the cautio judicatum solvi, that he would either restore the thing, or pay its value (litis cesfimatio.) If he did not give this security, the plaintiff, if willing to give it, was put by an inter- dict in possession of the thing. The judicatum solvi contained three clauses: 1, de re judicata, that the thing should be given up or its value paid ; 2, de re defendenda, that the defendant would appear and re- ceive the sentence of the judge ; 3, de dolo malo, that there should be no dolus 7nalus, e.g. the thing should not be restored in a deteriorated condition. The defendant as well as his surety gave the cautio judica- tum solvi in order that the plaintiff might have the easy remedy of suing on a stipulation. Naturally, as the defendant had to give this cautio, his representative had. (B) The action is in personam: (a) As to the plaintiff the rules are the same as when the action is in rem. (b) The defendant, appearing personally, had not, unless in some ex- ceptional cases, to give the caution judicatum solvi. If he appeared by a cognitor, the defendant had to give the judicatum solvi on behalf of the cog- nitor. If he appeared by a procurator, the procurator, while still a man- datary, had himself to give the judicatum solvi. iii. Under Justinian. — There was, under Justinian, no difference whether the action was real or personal. The plaintiff appearing personally had to give no security. The defendant appearing personally had not, in either a real or a personal action, to give Xhe judicatum solvi ; but, in both, he had to engage pro re d.efendenda, that is, he was bound by the second clause of the judicatum solvi, viz., that he would appear and receive the sentence of the j udge, but not by the first or third. If, however, he was a vir illustris, it was enough that he engaged to do this by oath, cautio ju- ratoria, or even by a simple promise. (2.) If the plaintiff appeared by a procurator, whose mandate was registered officially, or given by the plaintiff personally before the judge, the procu- rator had to give no security. If the plaintiff appeared by a procurator not so appointed, the procurator had to give security rem ratam dominum habiturum : and this rule applied to tutors and curators. (3.) If the defendant appeared by a procurator, whom he appointed per- sonally before the judge, the procurator had not to give security, but the defendant had to bind himself, on behalf of the procurator, toall the three clauses of the judicatum solvi. If he appeared by a procurator, not ap- pointed before the judge, both the procurator and the defendant, asjide- jussor of the procurator, had to give the judicatum solvi,. with all its three clauses made binding on each. The defendant further, whether the pro- curator was appointed before the judge or not, had, as a guarantee for the judicatum solvi, to subject all his property to a hypothec. This obligation passed to his heirs, and he had also to give security that he himself would appear personally to receive the sentence of the judge. (4.) If the defendant did not appear, but some one volunteered to defend the action for him, this was allowed, if this voluntary defensor gave secu- rity judicatum solvi. (5.) p p 2 580 SUMMARY. The subject of actions is resumed, and concluded, by noticing two more distinctions. 1. AcTiONES PERPETUiE, TEMPORALES. — Actions differed in the time during which they could be brought. Actions arising from the law, or a senatus-consulUnn^ or constitutions, were j)erpetuce, i. e. could be brought without limit of time, until Theodosius II. imposed a general limit of thirty years on all actions real or personal, a limit subsequently, in some few exceptional instances, as in that of actions on hypothec, extended to forty years. Praetorian actions were annual, i. e. must be brought before the close of an annus iitilis from the time when they could first have been brought. To this, however, there were so many exceptions that we may say that prsetorian actions also were perpetuoe^ except when they were penal (the actio furti manifesti being, however, perpetual), or when they were for the value of the thing, but were in opposition to, not in extension of, the civil law, like the Publiciana rescissoria. (Tit. 12. pr.) Actions passing to or against the Heir. — It is only penal actions that are to be noticed, as all other actions passed to and against the heir. Penal actions do not pass against the heirs of the wrongdoer, except to make them account for any benefit they may have derived from the dehct. But penal actions do pass to the heir of the person injured, except in such cases as that of injuriarum (personal insult). After the litis contestation however, all penal actions pass both to and against the heir. (1.) Finally, it may be remarked that all actions are ahsolutorice, that is, if after the proceedings have commenced, the formula has been given, or an equivalent stage reached, the defendant satisfies the plaintiff, the judge must absolve the defendant, and need not go on in any case to give sen- tence. (2.) Exceptions. — If the plaintiff's action is well founded, but there is any reason why it is unjust that it should be effective against the defen- dant, he can avoid its effect by the introduction of an exception, allowed by some particular law, or by the praetor (Tit. 13. 7), into the formula, while the formulary system lasted. In actions bonce fidei it was not necessary that the exception should be pleaded, as Xh.^ judex took cog- nisance of all matters that would form the groundwork of an exception. In other actions, actiones stricti juris^ in factum^ arhitrarice, including actions in rem (Tit. 13. 4), and penal, the exception had to be pleaded, and the defendant had to prove it, just as the plaintiff had to prove his case. Under Justinian an exception meant any defence other than a denial of the subsistence of the alleged right of action. (Tit. 13. pr.) The following instances of exceptions are given, and are all supposed to be pleaded to an action ex stvpulatu. 1. Error. A mistake not as to the subject of the stipulation, but as to some fact which was not known to the defendant, and which, if known, would have prevented his promis- ino- ; 2, metus causa, a general exception, fear caused by any one ; 3, doli mali, the bad faith of the plaintiff himself, either when the obligation was formed or subsequently ; 4, in factum (1), that is, the prastor merely stated a circumstance which, if established, was to bar the action of such BOOK IV. 581 exceptions. The following examples are given : — (a) Pecunice non nume- ratce, when a person agreeing to lend money, and stipulating for its repayment, does not really pay it. Here the plaintiff had to prove that he had really paid the money, but the exception could only be pleaded within five years, before Justinian, and two years under Justinian (2) ; (h) pacti conventi, when the plaintiff has agreed not to demand payment, but the contract, as being verbis or re, could still be sued on (3) ; (o,) juris - jurandi, when, the plaintiff having challenged the defendant, and the de- fendant having denied his liability, the plaintiff went on with the action. (4.) The exceptio dolt mail covered all cases of exceptions in factum, and might be pleaded in lieu of them, except that as its being found true carried in- famy Avith it, the magistrate would not allow it to be employed when the plaintiff was a patron or ascendant (1, note); 5, rei judicatce, that judgment had already been given in the matter, it being necessary that there should have been in the former action the same subject matter of litigation, the same quantity, the same right, the same ground of action, the same parties. If the former action was a judiciimi legitimum in j^erso- nam, the right of action was extinguished, and no exception was necessary. If it was B. judicium legitimum in rem, or in factum, or was 2i judicium im- perio continens, the right of action not being extinguished by novation, the exceptio rei judicatce was necessary to stop the second action. Under Jus- tinian the exception was in _ every case necessary. Gains also mentions the exceptio rei in judiciuin deducts, i. e. that the case was virtually before the tribunals, or that, after the litis contestatio, the time within which sentence was obliged to be given had j^assed without its being given, which was a stop to all further proceedings. (5.) Exceptiones perpetuoe, temporarice, p)er emptor im, dilatorice. Exceptions were either jierpetuce, i. e. could be used by the defen- dant without restriction of time, or temporales, i. e. were subject to such a restriction ; and they -were jieretnptoiia^, i. e. put an end to the litigation, or dilatorice, i. e. only stopped it for a time. (8.) Perpetual exceptions were always peremptory ; as instances are given the exceptions doli mali, metus causa, and pacti conventi, if the agreement has been that no demand shall be at any time made. Temporary exceptions were always dilatory. As an instance is given that of j;ocif« conventi, when the agreement has been that no demand shall be made during a given time, e. g. five years. If he sued before the five years had elapsed, the plaintiff might be repelled by an excejytio. Previously, if the plaintiff was thus repelled, he was guilty of plus-petitio in regard of time, and could take no further proceed- ngs. Under a constitution of Zeno, the plaintiff suing prematurely had o wait twice as long as he ought to have waited, and he must reimburse he defendant for all losses sustained through the demand being premature. 10.) As another instance. Gains gives that of a j^laintiff suing under ;he same praetorship for another part of a thing (10), for one part of vhich he had already sued. Some dilatory exceptions have regard, not to he thing sued for, but to the person, as when objection was taken to a )rocurator, that he or she was a soldier or a woman, as neither could act as 582 • SUMMARY. procurator, or that he was an improper person, as having been stamped with infamy ; but Justinian did away with exceptions on this last ground. (11.) Prescriptions. — Gains notices prescriptions after noticing exceptions, i. e. hmitations of the action entered on behalf of the plaintiff, as, for ex- ample, to confine the action to so much of the plaintiff's right as had pro- duced an existing liability, or for the defendant, as the prcescriptio longi temporis ; but prescriptions for the defendant had already, in the time of Gains, been classed among exceptions. (11, note.) Replications. — There might be an exception to an exception, i. e. there might be grounds on which the exception, although founded on fact, could not be allowed to operate, as if an agreement had been made not to sue, and then this agreement had been rescinded. In this case a repli- cation that the agreement had been rescinded would be inserted, to do away with the effect of the exceptio pacti conventi (Tit. 14. pr.), and so there might be a duplicatio (1) to a repUcatio, and there might be even, if necessary, a triplicatio. (2.) Exceptions may be divided into rei cohcerentes, affecting the rights to claim, and personce cohcerentes, protecting the debtor personally, as the ex- ceptio pacti conventi. As a general rule, the Jidejussores of the defendant could use all the exceptions the defendant could use ; but this was not universally true of exceptiones cohcerentes personce. For a debtor who had made a cessio bonorum was protected from the actions of his creditors by the exception nisi cesserit bonis ; but his Jidejussores could not use this exception, as the very object of their suretyship was to guard against the debtor not being able to pay. (4.) Interdicts. — We now come to what was often a preliminary step under the prsetorian system to the commencement of one kind of actions, those that regarded possession and ^wa^/- possession, i. e. the possession of servitudes. The prgetor issued an interdict or decree regulating possession, and then, if the facts on which the applicant relied were contested by the other party, the praetor threw the decree into the shape of an action to be decided according to the real facts. Probably the praetor interfered by interdict to protect and determine possession before he gave actions to try the right to possession, and not improbably the interests arising out of the possession of the ager publicus may have first suggested the praetorian in- tervention by interdicts. Gradually the action was regarded as the point of real importance, although, as the granting of the action depended on the rules as to interdicts, the study of these rules preserved its importance. By the time of Justinian interdicts had become whoUy obsolete, and all questions as to possession were determined by actions without recourse being had to the preliminary step of interdicts. The interdict was issued by the magisterial authority of the praetor, and interdicts always bore traces of their origin in two ways. 1. First issued as special edicts to meet special cases, they were afterwards issued under standing regulations incorporated in the praetorian edict, but they were always, perhaps, theoretically, grounded on infractions of public order, and the time in which most possessory interdicts had to be applied BOOK IV. 583 for (one year) connects them with the law of delicts. 2. They were all, directly or indirectly, connected with possession, with keeping things as they ought to be. They were of three main kinds: — (a) Prohibitory, (b) Restitutory, and (c) Exhibitory. By the first the praetor ordered something not to be done which infringed the use of something public, as a road, or of something which, for the sake of public order, he protected, as the right of possession of individuals. By the second the praetor ordered things to be put into the state they were in before something wrong had been done, as, e. g., buildings to be demolished, which impeded the use of a public river or its banks; or possession to be given or restored to the right person. By the third the praetor ordered the thing or person, if it was a person that formed the subject of contest, to be produced by the person who had got hold of it, so that the claimant might not be prejudiced by the thing being concealed. Gains understood inUrcUcere as 'to prohibit,' and says that prohibitory interdicts alone ought strictly to be called interdicts, and interdicts of the other kinds ought to be called decreta. Justinian says, all may be called interdicts, as he considers irderdicere to mean to pronounce between two parties. (Tit. 15. pr. note.) If the interdict was prohibitory, the parties in the time of Gains bound themselves by a wager, in a sum to be paid by the losing party in the action. If the interdict was restitutory or exhibitory, the action was arbitraria, and the judex issued his preliminary order against the party concerned, and, in the event of its not being obeyed, gave a condemnatio quanti ea res erat. (8, note.) Those interdicts, which distinctly referred to the possessory rights of private persons, were given to acquire, to retain, or to recover possession, those to retain possession being prohibitory, and those to acquire or to restore being restitutory. (2.) 1. Adijnscendce jwssessioms causa. — The chief interdict under this head was that known as quorum bonorum, given to secure the possession to those whom the pr^tor, contrary to the rules of civil law, treated as having a right to an inheritance. It was given against two classes of persons : (a) persons possessing pi^o herede, i.e. thinking themselves to be the real heirs ; (b) persons possessing pro possessore {prwdo7ies), i. e. persons merely possessing without any claim of title. It was given against both classes, even if the term of usucapion had run in their favour, and also against them if they had through their own dolus malus ceased to possess. (3.) This interdict was never given except to a person getting possession for the first time, so that restituas, the word in the formula, must be used (as well as the term restitutory applied to interdicts) in a very wide sense. (3.) Under this head was also given the interdictum Salvianum, by which an owner of a rural estate got possession of the goods of the occupier (and probably even if they had passed into third hands) in case of non-payment of rent. This interdict was a step historically to the actio Serviana. (3.) 584 SUMMARY. 2. Retinendce possessionis causa. — The two main interdicts under this head were those titi possidetis and utruhi possidetis^ the former applying to immoveables and the latter to moveables. The object of these interdicts was to determine which of two disputants as to ownership was entitled to the possession, and to have this point determined in his favour was of great advantage to a disputant, as he remained in possession if his adversary failed to show lie was the real owner. The interdict iiti possidetis had to be applied for within a year after the possession had been in any way threatened. Previously to Justinian the interdict utruhi possidetis was given to that disputant who himself, or by any one through whom he claimed, had been in possession during the greater part of the preceding year. Under Justinian possession was confirmed to the person in pos- session at the time of the litis contestation provided (which had always been a condition as to both interdicts) that he had not obtained his pos- session as against his adversary, c/am, vi^ or precario, the last term meaning by permission of the adversary. (4.) Only persons having civilis possessio or naturalis possessio "with the animus of ownership, could obtain these interdicts. Persons simply in possessionem detaining the thing without the animus possidendi, could not obtain them, but the person on behalf of whom such persons were in possessions, possessed through them : thus the owner possessed through the tenant, or the deposit or through the depositary, or the lender through the borrower. Without the animus there can be no interdictory possession, but if a person has the animus he need not always have the corporeal de- tention, as, for example, if a man uses in the seasou an Alpine pasture and leaves it when the season is over with the intention of returning to it, he still possesses it. (5.) 3. Recuperandce possessionis causa. — The main interdict under this head was that unde vi. Here there having been an illegal use of violence, the wrongdoer had to restore possession, although the person to whom he restored it had himself got it from him clam, vi, or precario. In the days of the Republic there had been a distinction according to the kind of violence used. If the violence had been ordinary (^quotidiana) the posses- sion would only be restored if it had not been obtained by the applicant clam, vi, or precario, and the application must be made within a year. If the violence had been armata, the possession was restored, although obtained vi, clam, or precario, and there was no limit as to the time for asking for the interdict. This distinction, however, had become obsolete before the timeAvhen the formula of the interdict was shaped as it is found in the Digest. The interdict unde vi only applied to imrnoveables. But by a consti- tution of A.D. 389 it was provided that any one who seized on anything with violence should lose the ownership if it was his, or give it up, and also pay its value, if it was not. This constitution applied to moveables as well as immoveables. (6.) Previously to this constitution, possession of moveables had been re- covered by the interdict utruhi, and both this and the interdict uti may be looked on as means of recovering as well as of retaining possession. BOOK IV. 585 But the employment o£ the interdict wide vi had, as compared with that uti possidetis^ the following advantages: (a) it could be used Avhen a third person was in possession ; (b) it gave the fructus from the time of ejectment, not that of the commencement of proceedings ; (c) it was given although the possession had been obtained as against the adversary vi, clam, or precaiio ; {d) it included moveables on the estate. (6, note.) Simple, double Interdicts. — The interdicts uti possidetis and utruhi may be said to be double, i.e. each party is at once plaintiff and defendant, as opposed to other interdicts, where one party claims and the other defends. (7.) Two points with regard to the proceedings in actions remain to be noticed : 1, the checks on reckless litigation ; 2, the duty of the judge. 1. Checks on reckless Litigation. — A summary is given at page 488, of the checks on reckless bringing or defending actions in the time of Gains. Under Justinian, both parties were obliged to swear, the plaintiff de calumnia that he was not bringing an action vexatiously or without cause, the defendant, that it was from a belief in the justness of his cause that he resisted the demand of the plaintiff; and the advocates of both parties had also to take an oath. The plaintiff was liable to pay damages and costs. (Tit. 16. 1.) The defendant was restrained {a) by the action sometimes being in duplum (the Institutes add in triplum, but no instances are known) when there was a denial on the part of the defendant, as in cases of damni injurice and legacies left to holy places ; (h) by the action being for more than the single value, as in the case of theft (1) ; (c) by infamy, which attends condemnation in an action tutelce, mandati or depositi if direct, and /)ro socio (which is direct for both parties), and which attends not only condemnatio, but an agreement to commit the offence, in actions furti, vi honorum raptorum, injuriarwni and de dolo. (2.) The first step in an action was the vocatio in jus, the summons to the defendant to appear before the magistrate. Children and freedmen, however, cannot summon ascendants, patrons and their children, and ascen- dants of patrons, without having first received the permission of the praetor. If they act without this permission, they are liable to a fine of fifty aurei. (3.) 2. The Office of the Judge. — The Institutes first lay down the general duty of the judge, which is to judge according to the law, the constitutions or customary usage. (Tit. 17. pr.) If the judge gave a sentence wrong on the face of it, or fixed the condemnation below what the prsetor had fixed it, the sentence was void, and no appeal was neces- sary. If the judge was merely wrong as on mere questions of fact, an appeal had to be brought within two days (or, if the defendant had appeared by a procurator, three days), enlarged by Justinian to ten days. An appeal lay to the prsetor, and from him to the senate, or, in later times, to the emperor's council, and lastly to the emperor. Secondly, the Institutes point out what judgment ought to be given in certain actions : 586 SUMMAEY. (a) In a noxal action the judge ought to state the condemnation by ordering a sum to be paid, or the noxa abandoned. (2.) {h) In a real action, if he determines against the claimant, he ought to absolve the possessor ; if against the possessor, he ought to order the thing and its fruits to be given up, and, after the time of Hadrian, all the fruits consumed had to be accounted for, whether the possession was bona fide or mala Jide^ if the thing possessed was an inheritance. Before Hadrian as to inheritance, and before and after his time as to single objects, the rule was that a bona fide possessor had to account for fruits after the bringing of the action, the mala fide possessor for all. If the possessor showed that he could not give up the possession at once, he obtained a delay on giving security to give up within a time allowed him. (c) In an action ad exhibendum the defendant must exhibit the thing and everything derived from it, as e.g. the fruits, since the bringing the action ; nor will usucapion accomplished subsequently avail him. If he himself states that he cannot exhibit at once, he can obtain a delay on giving security, but if he neither exhibits nor gives security, he is to be condemned in an amount representing the interest of the plaintiff in having the thing exhibited at once. (d,e,f) In the actions familice erciscundce, commiini dividundo^ and finium regimdot'um, the judge ought, if he gives one more than another, and one thus receives more than another, to make this favoured person pay a pecuniary equivalent. (4, 5, 6.) In the action finium regundorum, a person ought to ]^e condemned who has destroyed boundary marks, or opposed, in defiance of the judge's order, the measurement of the land. (6.) In all these three actions anything adjudged becomes at once the pro- peity of the person to whom it is adjudged. (7.) Crimes. — The subject of public prosecutions being altogether outside the general subject of the Institutes, which treat of private law (Tit. 18. pr.), may be omitted here. A sketch of Koman criminal law is given in the last section of the Introduction. INDEX. ABS ABSTINENDI beneficium, 214 Acceptilatio, 386 Aquiliana, 387 Accessio, li, 98 Accrescendi jus, 150, 195 Actio, Ix, 320, 419 meaning of term, Ixx, 418 divisions of actions, Ixxi, 422 ad exhibendum, Ixxii, 154, 401, 442, 492 aestimatoria, 359 arbitraria, Ixviii, Ixxi, 421, 442 bonge fidei, Lxxi, 321, 420 calumnise, 488 commodati. 324 communi dividundo, 103, 123^ 493 confessoria, 423 contraria, 490 damni injurise, 404 de aestimato, 450 de constituta pecunia, 428 de dolo malo, 443 deinofficioso, 208, 211 de peeulio et in rem verso, 455 de tigno injimcto, 104 depensi, 349 depositi, 325 directa, lxxi, 420 empti, 362 exercitoria, 452 familise ereiscundse, 123, 493 fictitia, 420 finium regundorum, 493 furti, 398, 437 hypothecaria, 467 in duplum, 433, 436 in factum concepta, lxxi, 420 in factum prsescriptis verbis, lxxi, 420 in jus concepta, lxxi, 420 in personam, 419 in rem, 419 in supplementum legitimse, 209 injuriarum, 412 institoria, 452 judicati, 455, 459, 462 legati, 381 legis, Ixii, Ixv mandati, 372 mixta, 433, 435 negativa, 421 negotiorum gestorum, 379 AFP noxalis, 457 Pauliana, 427 perpetua, 466 persecutoria rei, 433 pigneratitia, 326 poenalis, 433 popularis, 417 prsejudicialis, 431 Publiciana, 425 quasi institoria, 373, 443 quasi Publiciana, 426 quasi Serviana, 154, 428, 442 quod dolo malo, 443 quod jussu, 452 quod metus causa, 437 receptitia, 429 rei uxorise, 440 servi corrupti, 451 Serviana, 363, 428, 442 strict! juris, lxxi, 320, 421 temporalis, 466 tributoria, 453 tutelae, 71 utilis, lxxi, 420 venditi, 362 vi bonorum raptorum, 404 Actus, 117 Addict io, 15 bonorum, 308 Aditio hereditatis, 188, 218 Adjudicatio, lii, 123 Adjunctio, 102 Adoption, xl, 30-46, 183 plena, minus plena, 41 Adpromissor, 348 Adstipulator, 348 Adversaria, 353 -Sjlrarium, 325 Aflfinitas, 34 Ager publicus, 479 vectigalis, 91, 367 Agnati, xli, liv; succession of, 272-286 Agri limitati, 98 Album, XX, xxi, 430 Alluvio, 98 Animus doraini, 93, 136, 485 possidendi, 136, 485 revertendi, 95 Annus utilis, 248 Appeal, xii, 491 588 INDEX. AQU Aquae ductus, 117 Aquilius Gallus, 387 Arbiter, Ixi, 421 Argentarius, 425, 429, 449 Arrha, 357 Arrogatio, xl, liii, 42 ; acquisition by, 306 As, 190 Ascripti glebse, 15 Assertor libertatis, Ixv, 17, 431 Aureus, 66 BENEFICIUM abstinendi, 214 cedendarum actionum, 332, 351 competentise, 441, 448 divisionis, 351 deliberandi, 216 inventarii, 217 legis Cornelige, 178, 349 ordinis, 351 S. C. Velleiani, 350 separationis, 212 Bona vi rapta, 402 Bonitarium dominium, xlix Bouorum addictio, 308 ; cessio, 312 distr actio, 313 emptio, 312 possessio, 69, 164, 205, 298-306; sine re, 305 sectio, 307 venditio, 312 Buildings, 104 OADUCA, 196, 225 Calata, comitia, 162 Calumnia, 256, 488 Capitis deminutio, xliii, 47-59, 205 Capito, xxvii Captivi, 177 Caput, 59 Catoniana regida, 227, 239 Cautio, 343, 354 judicatum solvi, 463 Census, 17 Centumviri, xxi, Ixi, Ixyi, 207 Cessio bouorum, 312 injure, lii, Ixvi. 89, 122 Chirographum, lyii, 354 Civitas, xxxvii, 14 Code, Thedosian, xxx Justinian's, xxxi, xxxiii Codicils, liv, 258 Coelebs, 225 Coemptio, xlii, 30 Cognati, xli, liv ; succession of, 286 degrees of, 288 Cognitio extraordinaria, xxx Cognitor, 461 Co-heir, 195 Co-legatee, 223, 226 CoUatio bonorum, 266 Colonus, 15, 110 DET Comitia calata, 162 centuriata, xi, xii, Ixxiv curiata, x, xii tributa, xiii, xvii, Ixxii Commercium, xxxvii, 166 Commissoria lex, 361 Commixtio, 103 Commodatum, h-i, 323 Compensatio, 391 449 Concubinage, xlii Condemnatio, Ixvii, Ixviii, 444, 491 Condictio, Ixiy, Ixxi, 320 furtiva, 401 Conditions, 193, 361 Conductor, 362 Coofarreatio, xli, 30 Confusio, 103 Connubium, xvii, 31 Consanguinei, 275, 285 Consensus, 316 Consilium, 23 Constitutum, 23, 422 Contract, Iv, Ivii, 3, 6 consensual, Ivii, 356 formal, Iviii, 317 formless, Iviii, 317 literal, Ivii, 353 real, Ivi, 321 verbal, Ivii, 826 Contractus innominati, Iviii, 317 Contubernium, 35 Conventio in manum, 30 ConA'entus, Ixvi Co-rei promittendi, 331 stipulandi, 331 Creditor, Iv, 315 Cretio, 216, 218 Crime, Ixxiv, 494 Culpa, 318 Curator, xl, 71 ; suspected, 83 Curatorum satisdatio, 75 excusationes, 78 Curia, x. Customary law, 12 DAMNUM, 410 infectum, 410 Damnum injuria da,tum, 404 Dare, Iv, 315 Debitor, Iv, 315 Decemvirs, xiii, xvii Decretum, 10 Dedititii, 18, 20 Deductio, 449 Deliberandi potestas, 216 Delict, Iv, Iviii, 392 Demonstratio, Ixvii, Ixviii, 420, 446 Denuntiatio, Ixxiv Deportatio, 47 Depositum, Ivi, 323 miserabile, 323, 433, 436 Derelicts, 114 Detentio, 135, 485 I^JDEX. 589 DIE Dies cedit, 225, 232 continui, 82 fasti et nefasti, 305 utiles, 82, 305 venit, 232 Digest, xxxii Diiigentia, 318 Disinheriting, liii, 178-185 Divorce, 38 Dolus, 318, 433, 471 Dominica potestas, 14 Dominium, xlix, 87 bonitiirium, xlix Quiritarium, xlix Donationes, lii, 145 inter vivos, 147 mortis causa, lii, 146 ante nuptias, 158 propter nuptias, 158 Dos, 149, 151, 230 Duplieatio, 477 E DICTUM, xxi perpetuum, xxi, xxvi, 11 repentinum, 11 Emancipatio, xxxix, 50 Emancipated children, 50, 182, 200, 266 Emphyteusis, 1, 133, 364 Emperor, xxv, 10 Emptio et venditio, Ivii, 112, 356 Epistola, 10 Exchange, 359 Exceptio, Ixix, 469 dilatoria, 474 doli mali, 471 jurisjurandi, 472 metus causa, 470 non numeratge pecuniae, 355, 471 pacti conventi, 475 peremptoria, 47 personse cohfierens, 478 procuratoria, 476 rei cohserens, 478 rei in judicium deJuctse, 473 rei judicatee, 472 restitutge hereditatis, 249 Execution, Ixiv, Ixv, Ixxiii Executor, Ixxiv, Ixxvi, 437 Exercitor, 373 Exheredatio, liii, 178-185 Existimatio, xliii, 207 Expensilatio. 353 Extranei, 217 Extraordinaria judicia, Ixx, Ixxii, Ixxiii, 437, 444, 480 FACERE, Iv, 315 Familia, xxxviii, 14, 26 Famili» emptor, 163, 168 Ferae, 95 Fictions, 420 Fideicommissa, liv, 246-258, 259 INT Fidejussor, 347 Fidepromissor, 348 Fiduciarius, 248 Fiduciary Tutor, 63 Filiusfamilias, 155, 175, 417, 451, 456, 459 Fiscus, 140, 144, 224, 265, 310 Formula, Ixvii Formulary system, Ixvii Fructus, 124, 129, 492 Fundus, 227 Furiosi, 73 Furti vitium, 138 Furtiva condictio, 401 Furtum, 130, 393 manifestum, 393 nee manifestum, 393 GAIUS, xxviii Gentes, x, 286 Gentilis, liv, 286 HABITATIO, 131 Hereditatis petitio, 439 Heres, liii, 211 extraneus, 217 intestati, 261 necessarius, liv, 22, 212 suns, liv, 179, 212, 262, ranking with, 272 Honorarium, 378 Hypotheca, li, 76, 133, 152, 326, 428, 441, 465 TMPERIUM, Ixi X In jure cessio, I, Ixvi, 89, 122 In jusvocatio, xiv, 431, 480 Indebiti solutio, 381 Infii,mia, xliii, 476, 490 Infans, 68, 341 Infanti proximus, 341 Ingenui, 15 Injuria, 410 Institor, 373 Institutes, xxxiii Institution of heirs, 111, 185 Insula, 98 Intentio, Ixvii, Ixviii Intercessio, 350 Interdictio aquse et ignis, 60 Interdictum, Ixxiii, 478 adipiscendse possessionis, 481 de clandestina possessione, 486 de precario, 486 exhibitorium, 480 possessorium, 481 prohibitorium, 480 quorum bonorum, 482 recuperandae possessionis, 485 restitutorium, 480 retinendae possessionis, 482 590 INDEX. INT Salvianum, 482 simplex et duplex, 486 unde vi, 485 uti possidetis, 481 utrubi, 483 Interest, xvi, 320 Intestate succession, liv, 261 ; under the Xovels, 306 Islands, 98 Italy, conquest of, Italicum solum, 111, 134 Iter, 117 1UDEX,xxi, Ix O duties of, 491-494 liability of, 416 Judicis postulatio, Ixiv Judicatum solvi, 463 Judicia extraordinaria, Ixx, Ixxii, Ixxiii, 437, 444, 480 Judicium imperio continens, 421, 473 legitimum, 421, 473 publicum, 494 Judge, xii, xxi, Ix, Ixxiii, Ixxv Jurisdictio, Ixi Jurisprudentes, xxi, xxviii, 11 Jus, XXXV, xlvii, Iv civile, xxiii, 7, 12 gentium, xxiii, 7, 13 honorarium, xxi, 11 in personam, xlviii in rem, xlviii, 87 Italicum, xix Latinum, xix naturale, xxii, 7, 13, 14 Qiiiritium, xx sacrum, xvii Jusjurandum, 256, 430, 472 Justa causa, 141 manumissionis, 23 Justinian, xxxi LABEO, xxvii, 258 Latini, xix, 14, 26, 296 Latini Juniani, 18, 151, 235, 247, 296 Latinitas, xix Legacies, 218 ademption and transfer of, 262 contrasted with fideicommissa, 248 Legatarius partiarius, 235 Legatum, 218 ereptitium, 224 generis, 235 incertse personse, 236 optionis, 235 per damnationem, 219 per prseceptionem, 220 per vindicationem, 219 poense nomine, 240 sinendi modo, 220 Legis actioues, Ixii, Ixv Legitimation, 38 MAN Lex, 9 ^butia, Ixvi ^lia Sentia, 18, 21 Anastasiana, 287 Apuleia, 349 Aquilia, 404 Atilia, 64 Atinia, 138 Calpurnia, Ixiv, 36, 320, 420 Canuleia, xvii Cincia, 148 Claudia, 67 Cornelia, 178, 349, 497 de sicariis, 27, 414, 496 Fabia, 498 Falcidia, liii, 11, 209, 243-246 Furia, 243, 349 Furia Caninia, 24, 237 Hortensia, xviii, 9 Julia, Ixvi de adidteriis, 150, 151, 495 de ambitu, 498 de annona, 498 de maritandis, 224, 236 de peculatu, 498 de residuis, 498 de vi publica, 486, 497 majestatis, 495 repetundarum, 498 Julia et Titia, 64 Junia, xix Junia Norbana, 18 Junia Velleia, 181 Papia Poppgpa, xxvi, 36, 67, 78, 187, 195, 224, 233, 236 Petronia, 27 Plsetoria, 72 Plautia, xix, 138 Pompeia, 497 Publilia, 9, 349 Eegia, 10 Scribonia, 123 Silia, Ixiv, 320 Valeria, xii, 9 Voconia, 187, 236, 243, 247 Libellus conventionis, 437 Liberalis causa, 431 Liberorum jus, 284, 294 Libertas, xxxvi, 14 Libertus, succession to, 290 assignation of, 293 Libertimis, 16-21 Libripens, Ivi, 163 Lis et vindiciae, Ixiii, 463 Lis sua, 416 Litis contestatio, Ixii, Ixx, Ixxiv, 390, 416 Litis dominus, 464 Locatio et conductio, Ivii, 362 Longi temporis possessio, 123, 137, 160 Longissimi temporis possessio, 144 MAGISTRATE, Ix Mancipatio, xlvii, Ivi INDEX. 591 MAN PEO Mancipi res, xlvi Mancipium, 26 Mandator compared with fidejussor, 375 Mandatiim, Ivii, 10, 371 Manumission, 17-25 Manns, xlii, xlvii, 30 Manus injectio, Ixiv, Ixv Mannnm consertio, Ixiii Marriage, 28, 29 Matrimonium, 16, 36 Merces, 363 Missio in possessionem, Ixxiii Modestinns, xxix Mora, 320 Multa, 395 Mutuiim, Ivi, 322 NATUEAL LAW, xxii, 7 Necessarins heres, liv, 22, 212 Negligence, 318 Negotiorum gestio, 380 Nexum, Ivi, 316 Nomen transcriptitinm, 354 Novatio, lix, 389 Novels, xxxiii Noxa, 457 Noxalis causa, 457 Nudum pactum, 317 Nuncupatio, 169 Nuptise, 28 ; justse, 29, 36 OBLATION to the Curia, 38 Obligatio, Iv, lix ex contractu, Iv, 321 ex delicto, Iviii, 392 naturalis, 317 quasi ex contractu, Ivii, 378 quasi ex delicto, lix, 416 Obligation, definition of, Iv, 313, 316 dissolution of, lix sources of, 315 Occupatio, li, 93 Operse, 363 Operarum obligationes, 357 Orbi, 224 Orcinus, 257 PACTUM, Ivi, 317, 361 adjectum, 317,361 legitimum, 317 nudum, 317 prsetorium, 317 Papinian, xxviii Partnership, 366 Paterfamilias, 26 Patria potestas, xxxix, 28 dissolution of, 46 Patricians, 48 Patrimonium nostrum, things in or not in, xlvii, 8 Patrona, 296 Patronus, 62, 294 Paulus, xxix"^ Pauperies, 459 Peculium, 155, 451 adventitiura, 157 castrense, 155, 167, 173 profectitium, 157 quasi castrense, 156, 173 Peregrini, 12, 147, 248, 338, 348, 354 Permutatio, 359 Persona, xxxvi, xliii, 13 Petitio hereditatis, 439 Pictures, 107 Pignoris capio, Ixiv, Ixv Pignus, li, ivii, 132, 152, 325 Plebiscita, xxiv, 9 Plebs, ix, xi, xvii Pluris petitio, 444 Poena, 394 Pollicitatio, 316 Populus, ix, X. Portio legitima, 211 Possessio, xlix, 135 civilis, 136 decretalis, 209, 485 edictalis, 299 longi temporis, 123, 137, 160 longissimi temporis, 144 naturalis, 136, 485 pro herede, 143, 439 pro possessore, 143, 439 possessione, esse in, 136, 485 Possessor, 105, 109 bona fide, 141, 160,492 male fide, 105, 492 Postliminium, 48, 65, 96, 144, 264 Postumus, 179, 237,247 Veil ei anus, 182 quasi Velleianus, 182 Potestas domiuica, 14 patria, xxxix, 28 Prsedia rustica, 112 stipendiaria, 111 tributaria, 118 urbana, 117 Prsediator, 142 Prsedo, 439 Prsefectus urbi, 65 Prsejudicium, Ixix, 431 Prses, Ixiii Prsescriptio, lii, Ixix longi temporis, 137, 426 longissimi temporis, 144 Presides, Ixvi, Ixxiii Prsestare, Iv, 315 Prgetor, Iviii, 11 peregrinus, xx, Ixvi, 11 Precario, 484 Pretium, 357 Privilegium, xvi Pro herede gerere, 218 Procinctus, 162 Proculians, xxviii Procurator, 160, 461 592 INDEX. PRO Prodigi, 73 Provinciale solum, 137, 139 Pubertati proximus, 68, 342, 401 Pubes, 68, 341 Publicatio. 370 Pupil, contracts of, 154 QU^STIO, Ixxv Quarta Antonina, 42, 208 Falcidia, 244 legitima, 211 Pegasiana, 204 Quasi-contract, Iviii, 378 delict, Ivix, 416 posses?io, 115, 122 traditio, 116, 122 Querela inofficiosi testamenti, 208 Quiritarian ownership, xlix RAPINA, 403 Eecuperatores, xxi, Ixi, Ixvi Redhibitio, 359 Eegula Catoniana, 227, 239 Relegatio, 47 Remancipatio, 50 Eeplicatio, Ixix, 477 Kepudium, 38 Rerum universitas, xlv, xlvi, li, liii, 88 Res, 87 communes, xlvii, 89, 115 corporales, xliv, 115 dominans, 118 fungibiles, 322 incorporales, xliv, 115 mancipi, xlvi nee mancipi, xlvi privatse, xlvii, 89, 93 publicse, xlvii, 89 religiosse, xlvi, 92 sacrse, xlv, 92 sanctse, xlvi, 93 serviens, xlv, 118 Rescripta, 10 Responsa prudentum, xxi, xxviii, 11 Restipulatio, 488 Restitutio in integrum, Ixxiii, 47, 73, 216 Rivers, 80, 98, 99 q ABINIANS, xxviii kJ Sacramentum, Ixii Sale, 356 Salvius Julianus, xxviii Satisdntio, 462 judicatum solvi, 463 tutorum, 75 Seashore, GO Senate, x, xxiv, Ixxiv Senatus-consultum, xxiv, 9 Claudianum, 15, 312 Hadrianum, 237 Largianum, 296 TRA Libonianum, 169 Macedonianum, 456 Neronianum, 220 Orphitianum, 282 Pegasianum, 248, 251 Tertullianum, 279 Trebellianum, 249, 250 Velleianum, 350 Servitudes, 1, 117-134 personal, 1, 129 prsedial, 1, 117 rural, i, 118 urban, 1, 118 Servius, xi. Servus poense, 48 Slavery, 14 Slaves, acquisition through, 157, 384, 451 institution of, 188 stipulations of, 333 abandonment of, for delicts, 457 Societas, Ivii, 366 universorum bonorum, 366 Solidus, 66 Solutio, lix, 385 imaginaria, 385 indebiti, 381 Specificatio, 97 Sponsalia, 35 Sponsio, Ixvii, 432, 488 Sponsor, 348 Spurii, 366 Status, XXX vi, 14 Stipulatio, Ivii, 327 empfse et venditse hereditatis, 249 inutiles, 336 partis et pro parte, 251 Subscriptio, 165 Substitntio pupillaris, 197 quasi-pupillaris, 199 vulgaris, 194 Succession, testamentary, liii, 161 intestate, 261 Sui juris, xxxix, 52, 53, 213 Superficies, 1, 133 Suspecti crimen, 83 Syngraphse, Ivii, 354 TESTAMENTI factio, liii, 55, 66, 175, 215, 236 Testamentum, liii, 161 calatis coraitiis, 162 in prociiictii, 162 inofiflciosum, 185, 207 irritum, 173, 202, 205 militare. 170-174 non jure factum, 202 nuncupatum, 170 per 8es et libram, 163 ruptum, 202 tripartitum, 165 Theft, 139 Thesaurus, 111 Traditio, li, 113 INDEX. 593 TEA Transcriptio, 354 Trebatius, xxvii, 258 Tribes, Eoman, xxxvi Tribonian, xxxii Triplicatio, 477 Tutela, xl, 52, 70 of freedmen, 62 of women, 66 Tutor Atilianus, 54 dativijs, 64 fiduciarius, 63 legitimus, 57 testamentariuR, 55 Tutor, removal of, 83 Tutoris auctoritas, 68 excusationes, 78 satisdatio, 75 Twelve Tables, xiii-xvii TTLPIAN, xxix. 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Acton's Modern Cookery 44 4 ird's Blackstone Economised 44 Mpine Club Map of Switzerland 38 Upine Guide (The) 38 Althaus Medical Electricity 27 4 ;«fj-' J' Jurisprudence 10 Primer of the Constitution 11 Anderson's Strength of Materials 20 4 r;«j'/'r(3;?^'i' Organic Chemistry 20 4 r«(?/£/' J Manual of English Literature ... 13 ^rw*??^/;^^ Life of Lord Denman 7 \,therstone Priory 39 \.uthority and Conscience » 36 Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson ... 14 Ayre's Treasury of Bible Knowledge 43 3acon. s 'Essz.ys, hy Whafely 11 Life and Letters, by Spedding ... 11 Works II 3(1171 s Mental and Moral Science 12 on the Senses and Intellect 12 ?(2//'^ Guide to the Central Alps 38 Guide to the Western Alps 38 Guide to the Eastern Alps 38 3ayldon' s Rents and Tillages 32 3eckcrs Charicles and Gallus 39 lenfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary 17 3 lack's Treatise on Brewing 44 3lackley s German- English Dictionary 16 3laine s Rural Sports 41 3loxanis Metals 20 3oase and Courtney s Bibliotheca Cornu- biensis 7 3oultbee on 39 Articles 32 3o2irjie's Catechism of the Steam Engine . 30 Handbook of Steam Engine 30 Treatise on the Steam Engine ... 30 Improvements in the same 31 3o%vdlcrs Family Shakspcare 41 3 ram ley-Moore's Six Sisters of the Valley . 39 3rande's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art 24 3ray's Manual of Anthropology 23 Philosophy of Necessity 12 3renchley's Cruise of the ' Cura9oa' 37 Irinkley's Astronomy 18 Irowne's Exposition of the 39 Articles 32 3runeTs\JS.Q oi Brunei 8 luckle's History of CiviHsation 3 Posthumous Remains 12 3ull's Hints to Mothers 44 Maternal Management of Children . 44 3unsen's Prayers 36 kirgomaster's Family (The) 39 3urkes Rise of Great Families 9 Burke s Vicissitudes of Families 9 Burton's Christian Church 6 Busk's Folk-lore of Rome 39 Butler s Physical Geography 20 Cabinet Lawyer 44 Campbell' s Norway 37 Cafes' s Biographical Dictionary 9 and PFffj^war^^'j Encyclopaedia ... 5 C^r/j- and i^^r/zV J- Moral Emblems 28 Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths ... 14 Chesncy s Indian Polity 3 Modern Mihtary Biography 3 Waterloo Campaign 3 Christ the Consoler 36 C lough's Lives from Plutarch 4 Codringto7i' s (Admiral) Memoirs 7 Ctf/t7iJ-(? on Moabite Stone &c 36 's Pentateuch and Book of Joshua, 36 Speaker's Bible Commentary ... 36 Collins' s Perspective 30 Colojnb's Slave Catching in the Indian Ocean 36 Commonplace Philosopher in Town and Country, by A. K. H. B 14 Comte's Positive Polity 9 Corny n's Elena 39 Congreve's Essays 9 Politics of Aristotle 11 Conington s Translation of Virgil's ^neid 41 Miscellaneous Writings 15 C(7^?/(?;/j'^c??e Caisne and Le Mao/it's Botany 24 De Morga/i's Paradoxes 14 Disraeli's Lord George Bentinck 8 Novels and Tales 40 Dobson on the Ox 42 Doves Law of Storms 19 Doyle's Fairyland 28 Z^/'^zf'i- Reasons of Faith 33 Eastlahe s Gothic Revival 29 Hints on Household Taste 29 i?c/^?/'j' Queensland 38 Edwards's Rambles among the Dolomites 37 Elements of Botany 23 EllicoW s Commentary on Ephesians 33 Galatians 33 Pastoral Epist. 33 Philippians, &c. 33 Thessalonians . 33 Lectures on Life of Christ 32 Epochs of History 6 Erichsen s Surgery 26 ^t^rt'??/^ Ancient Stone Implements 23 Ewald's Antiquities of Israel 34 History of Israel 34 Fairlaini s Application of Cast and Wrought Iron to Building... 31 Information for Engineers 31 Treatise on Mills and Milhvork 31 Farrar's Chapters on Language 13 Families of Speech 13 Fitztvygra7)i on Horses and Stables 42 Forsyth' s ILssviys 9 Fowler's Collieries and Colliers 44 Francis's Fishing Book 41 Freema}i' s l\\stox\c3.\ Geography of Europe 6 From January to December 14 /^n?//(5'^' J- English in Ireland i History of England i Short Studies 12 Gairdners Houses of Lancaster and York 6 Gamgee on Horse-Shoeing 42 G allot' s Elementary Physics 20 Natural Philosophy 20 Gardiner s Thirty Years' War 6 Garrod's Materia Medica 27 Gilbert's Cadore 38 and Churchill' sDolormiQS 37 Girdlestone s Bible Synonyms 33 Golds7nith's Poems, illustrated 41 Goodeve s Mechanics 20 Mechanism 20 Steam Engine 20 Grant's Ethics of Aristotle 11 Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson 14 Gray s Anatomy 26 Griffin s Algebra and Trigonometry 20 Griffith s Fundamentals 32 Sermons for the Times 32 Grove on Correlation of Physical Forces ... 20 Giiyot's Earth and Man 23 Gwilt's Encyclopaedia of Architectvire 29 Harding's Texts and Thoughts 32 Hare on Election of Representatives 15 Hartwig s Harmonies of Nature 22 Polar World 22 Sea and its Living Wonders ... 22 Subterranean World 22.; Tropical World 23 Ha ughtofis Ani m al M echanics 20 Hayward' s Biographical and Critical Essays 8- Helniholtz s Scientific Lectures 2q Helmsley's Trees, Shrubs, and Herbaceous Plants 2^ //£?rjf/?6'/'i- Outlines of Astronomy 19 Hodgson's Time and Space 13 Theory of Practice 12 Holland's Recollections 7 Holmes's Surgical Treatment of Children . 25 System of Surgery 2.i Howitt's Rural Life of England 37 Visits to Remarkable Places 38 Hiibner's Pope Sixtus the Fifth 8 Humboldt' s Life 8 Hume'sY.ss-^y% 12 Treatise on Human Nature 12 //z/z^'i' History of Rome 5 Ingelow's Poems 41 Jameson's Legends of Saints and Martyrs . 28 Legends of the Madonna 28 Legends of the Monastic Orders 28 Legends of the Saviour 28 Jenkih s Electricity and Magnetism 20 Jerraih s Ly cidas of Milton 40 jferrold's Life of Napoleon i Johnston's Geographical Dictionary 17 Kalisclis Commentary on the Bible 34 A'lj/^-^'j Evidence of Prophecy 33 Kenyon' s (Lord) Life 7 Kerl's Metallurgy, by Crookes 2iXvd, Rohrig, 31 Kirby and Spence's Entomology 22 Lang's Ballads and Lyrics 40 Latham's English Dictionary 15 Laiightoh s Nautical Surveying 19 Laverack's Setters 42 Latvrence on Rocks 23 Lecky's History of European Morals 5 ■ ■ Rationalism 5 Leaders of Public Opinion 8 Leisure Hours in Town, by A. K. H. B. ... 14 Lessons of Middle Age, by A. K. H. B.... 14 Lester's Atlantic to the Pacific 36 Lewes s Biographical History of Philosophy 6 Liddell 2iX\d Scott's Greek-English Lexicons 16 Life of Man Symbolised 28 Lindley an,d Moore s Treasury of Botany... 24 Z,/ty'^'j' Wave-Theory of Light 21 LoTigman's Chess Openings 44 Edward the Third 2 — Lectures on History of England 2 Old and New St. Paul's 29 Loudon's Encyclopaedia of Agriculture ... 32 Gardening 32 Plants 24 Lowndes's Engineer's Handbook 31 NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS & CO. 47 Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation 23 Lyra Germanica 28, 35 Lytloji s Odes of Horace 41 Macau lay's (Lord) Essays 2 ■ History of England ... 2 Lays of Ancient Rome. 40 Miscellaneous Writings 13 Speeches 13 Works 2 McCulloch's Dictionary of Commerce 17 Maclcod's Principles of Economical Philo- sophy II Theory and Practice of Banking 44 Markha7n' s History of Persia 4 Marshall's Physiology 26 Todas 23 Marshman s History of India 3 Life of Havelock 9 Martineau s Q\ix\%\}.dcc\. Life 35 Hymns 35 Maunder s Biographical Treasury 43 Geographical Treasury 43 Historical Treasury 43 Scientific and Literary Treasury 43 Treasury of Knowledge 43 Treasury of Natural History ... 43 Maxivcll's Theory of Heat 20 May s History of Democracy 2 History of England 2 Melville s Digby Grand 39 General Bovmce -. 39 -Gladiators 39 Good for Nothing 39 Holmby House 39 Interpreter 39 Kate Coventry 39 Queen's Maries 39 Mendelssohn' s Letters 8 Merivale's Fall of the Roman Republic ... 4 Romans under the Empire 4 Merrifield' s Kx\\}:\T<\Q.\Xc and Mensuration... 20 Geometry and Mechanical Drawing 20 Magnetism 19 Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing 42 on Horse's Teeth and Stables 42 Mill (J.) on the Mind 10 (J. S.) on Liberty 10 Subjection of Women 10 on Representative Government 10 Utilitarianism 10 ' s Autobiography 7 Dissertations and Discussions 10 Hamilton's Philosophy 10 System of Logic 10 Political Economy 10 Unsettled Questions 10 Miller's Elements of Chemistry 25 Inorganic Chemistry 20 Mi?ito's (Lord) Life and Letters 7 Mitchell s Manual of Architecture 29 '■ Manual of Assaying 32 Modern Novelist's Library 39 Mon sell's ' Spiritual Songs ' 35 Moore's lv\shMe\o<:\\cs, illustrated 40 Lalla Rookh, illustrated 40 Moreli s Elements of Psychology 12 Mental Philosophy 11 Morris's French Revolution 3 Mossman s Catholic Church 6 Mailer s Chips from a German Workshop. 13 Science of Language 13 Science of Religion 5 Murchison on Liver Complaints ::6 on Continued Fevers 26 New Testament Illustrated with Wood Engravings from the Old Masters 28 Norihcott on Lathes and Turning 30 O' Conor's Commentary on Hebrews 34 Romans 34 St. John 34 Od ling's Course of Practical Chemistry ... 25 O' Keeffe Case (The) 15 Owe/i's Comparative Anatomy and Physio- logy of Vertebrate Animals 21 Lectures on the Invertebrata 21 Packe's Guide to the Pyrenees 38 Paget' s Lectures on Surgical Pathology ... 25 Payen's Industrial Chemistry 29 Pereira's Elements of Materia Medica 27 Per kin's Profitable Book on Domestic Law 44 Petit' s History of Mary Stuart 3 Petviner's Comprehensive Specifier 44 Pierce's Chess Problems 44 Pole's Game of Whist 44 Preece and Siveiuright' s Telegraphy 20 P/r;/rt^(:/'^^/a?/a?' J Queens of England 9 Sunday Afternoons at the Parish Church of a University City, by A. K. H. B 14 Supernatural Religion 35 J'^ry/i^r'i' History of India 3 [Jeremy) Works, edited hy Eden. 35 Text-Books of Science 20 Tyz/V/ry^?//' J- History of Greece 4 Thoinson s Laws of Thought 11 Thorpe's Quantitative Analysis 20 and Muir's Qualitative Analysis ... 20 7'>^?i;^zV^///«'j- Chemical Physiology 25 Todd (A.) on Parliamentary Government... 2 and Bozvjnati's Anatomy and Physiology of Man 26 Trench's Realities of Irish Life 13 Trollope's Barchester Towers 39 Warden 39 Tw/j-^^/^' J Examples in Mechanics 30 First Lessons in Mechanics 30 TyndalV s American Lectures on Light ... 21 Diamagnetism 21 Fragments of Science 21 Hours of Exercise in the Alps... 37 Lectures on Electricity 21 Lectures on Light 21 Lectures on Sound 21 Heat a Mode of Motion 21 - — Molecular Physics 25 C/(?(5^rw^yj System of Logic 12 t/;/wz;^'j- Machine Design 20 Ure s Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines 31 Walker s [Patricius) Rambles 37 Walters' s Home and Rural Life of Shak- speare 7 Watso7i's Geometry 20 Principles and Practice of Physic 25 IFa^'/j J- Dictionary of Chemistry 25 Webb's Objects for Common Telescopes ... 19 Weinhold's Experimental Physics 21 Wellington' s Life, by Gleig 8 West on Children's Diseases 27 Whately's EngUsh Synonymes 15 Logic II Rhetoric 11 White and Donkin's English Dictionary... 16 and Riddle's Latin Dictionaries ... 16 'j St. Mark's Gospel 34 St. John's Gospel 34 IF/z/Vwcr/Zz on Guns and Steel 31 Wilcocks's Sea-Fisherman 42 Williams's Axisioile's Ethics 11 Willis's Principles of Mechanism 30 Willoughby's (Lady) Diary 39 Wood's Bible Animals 24 Homes without Hands 22 Insects at Home 23 Insects Abroad 23 Out of Doors 22 Strange Dwellings 22 Wordsworth's Christian Ministry 33 Yo?rge's History of England 3 Enghsia-Greek Lexicons 17 Horace 41 EngUsh Literature 13 Modern History 3 Yoziatt on WiQ Tiog 42 on the Horse 42 Z