) Prep: Ss A. Stern/aw/3-13- él rs ae ne einen al Pid. ce:.. Mr.-Willens Re 'S AY=* Sk o * Sa a. Sterno Se Be PS eR tue OS a ley aoe yi Files."*« + oe Ri, Darien HT Sed Hy si YASS oe 3 4 Sos . a Yead t JI ew ; ae of fi Det et Maw sh Sy Ta in : MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE 3 ve “At $:¢ 00 P; Me on Wednesday, March 11,. vuptenentattved of ‘thie testinal of the reamury and of the Comission mat to consier Secretary “Dillon's letter of neces 28,: 196k, +t to the ee end his response of ee Pebeaaey 28, 1964. - Present for the Consdaniog,. - Chairman Warren, | General Counsel Rankin, Messrs. Willens and Stern; for the ‘Treasury - Chief Rowley of i - Secret Service and Robert Carswell, Special Assistant to Secretary Dillon. Chaizman Warren explained that he had two basic problems: _ 2 ge the Comission 18 unvilling to agree in advance to any Lmita- * 3 tion upon “ite prerogative of Suggesting any change in arrangements for é; | ve Presidential protection which it may consider desirable. of course, the i at ; x "Commi aston hes no interest in publishing in tts report any information witch % might in any way suggest opportunities to a possible assailant. However, ~~ > the danger of thie happening should be eliminated by restricting the ine ~~ : ‘formation which the Commission obtains about particular protection matters é : (see point b. below). ‘The Chairman felt that the Commission vould itebif i _ have to determine what could properly, be covered in ate report, without ‘Saipan subject to veto by the arency involved, or by the President.* ‘The question of an ultimate Sevindsatien ‘by the | President siete ° information should appear in the report arose because of a suggestion made at an earlier meeting, on March 6, 1964, when Messrs. Rankin, Willens, and. ._ 2 Stern met with Mr. Carswell and General Counsel of the Treasury Belin. At» _ that conference, a possible solution was discussed which would involve notice by the Commission to the Agency originating information concerning - . Presidential protection that the Commission intended to treat this Sarcinne ie tion in its public report, an opportunity by the agency involved to ee ... to dissuade the Commission from doing so because of security, and an ens to seek ee anon of any ae "'s :Sarcinne ie tion in its public report, an opportunity by the agency involved to ee ... to dissuade the Commission from doing so because of security, and an ens to seek ee anon of any ae "'s --- PAGE BREAK ---its public report, an opportunity by the agency involved to ee ... to dissuade the Commission from doing so because of security, and an ens to seek ee anon of any ae "'s --- PAGE BREAK --- <2 2 Wap oe b. The Chairman also stated that it did not appear to him necessary for the Commission to be informed as to any detail of present procedures for S Presidential protection where any question of security is involved. The. Commission's main function in this area is to appraise the Job done ~— = time of the upetnnbiettoes by the federal agencies sharing responsibility, and only secondarily to suggest any ascent in procedures or ‘liaison arrange- ments which eccur to ‘the Commission in the course of ite main inquiry. In the Chairman's view, ‘the Comission does not require detailed knowledge of present ' operating procedures which are highly classified and the revelation of which Sony might increase the powensa) danger to the President. The CaeAemen stated . 3; (oe that he would not want any member of the Comm.ssion or its starr to have a M3 é i ; v5 burden of knowing such classified details. Thi s should not, in his view, ae. a Research preventative activities. : ; Pe PY ms Pree the Commission fron any useful and unclassified informtion as to Bg } operating procedures, and particularly information regarding Protective : my | There ensued a general discussion of the best mamer in which to "ig afford the Commission the 4nformation it requires, without compromising | eed - important security considerations. © The Treasury representatives made clear ay, the desize of the Department of the Treasury to withhold nothing from the. ; " Commission, provided appropriate security measures could be observed. - #4 : A sharp distinction was drawn between information regarding the: i actual events in Dallas and the advance preparations for the Dallas trip 3 on the one hand, end general procedures and arrangements for the future. | . re to the information regarding | Dallas, all agreed that the Commission . Was vitally concerned vith specific details, ana that it. phowla be ‘t . ' entirely free to comment upon any aspect of the Becret Service performance - during and immediately before the Texas trip, subject $Y ‘to discussion © with Treasury of any ampegs which s mies. raise seourtty concems. + = ~*~. “hee: sn 99 . * a =.vice performance - during and immediately before the Texas trip, subject $Y ‘to discussion © with Treasury of any ampegs which s mies. raise seourtty concems. + = ~*~. “hee: sn 99 . * a =. --- PAGE BREAK --- -ay * ~ * os a Sa: + ne . (For example, the unlikely case of something witich seemed to the | Commssion a defect in protection arrangements, but which the Secret Service regarded as incurable, and where revealing the defect would in« crease the potential danger.) However, as to any examination by the Coumission of procedures and erranceanerts for the future, security con= | cerns would be paramount, and would Lmtt the information to be mde | available to the Commission. | It was evident that the mtter could not satisfactorily be ‘Considered in abstract propositions, but rather that it vas preferable to proceed on a tentative basis, to ascertain the extent of the inform- tion reasonably required for this aspect of the Commission's task and the “questions, if any, raised thereby. As a first step, it was agreed that the Comission would prepare a series of questions on any aspect of Presidential protection, both at Dallas and as to future procedures and arrangements. These questions would be submitted to the Treasury Depart- “ment and form answers given, within the limite of security. Whenever’ it became apparent that a question could not be answered satisfactorily withows revealing security information, the mtter would be discussed further. However, it was hoped that the staff of the Commission working with the Secret Service and Mr. Carswell, would be able to obtain all Se SIE WA Renae OS Sie eateries it the tasks, - : "anit, siden sehen Seaeatey, quested ’ 3 7 ere ~% . rat .»® ‘ ‘ ; 4 Le fe ’ ‘* Ss é = ¥ % 4 a + wv. . : ’ ‘ ‘ Osta ’ se . : * * "+ r . + ’ ’ ‘ ate < ‘ «, . > * > ° S ' -* . = . ° : ws t c , ‘ . s i 5 *y - , .*