Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/30 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200970101-1 STAT I NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE APPEARED 13 OCTOBER 1981 ON PAG E A—/ £z~€.LAMen Linked \ T o Overseas Selling i Of Sensitive Systems . This article is based on reporting' by Philip Taubmanand JeffCerth and was ,. writtenbyMnTaubman. . : Special YortThne* WASHINGTON, Oct 12— Two former Agency joined forces with a small Calk forcia electronics company in the 1970*5 in an effort to maxfcet sensitive Ameri- can technology abroad, according to current and former company executives and company documents. . The former agents, Edwin P. Wilson and Frank £1 T erpil, were indicted last year on charges of illegally shipping ex- plosives to Libya and are now fugitives', living abroad. ’ > The California company, the Stanford Technology Corporation, apparently provided a legitimate base for some of Mr. Wilson’s and Mr. Terpil’s question- able transactions. * v ( For example* they used the name of a Stanford Technology subsidiary, with- out the knowledge of company officials,:! to negotiate a deal to train terrorists in Libya and to sell military supplies to Idi Amin, then the leader of Uganda, ac- cording to Federal investigators and former associates of Mr. Wilson. For its part; Stanford Technology, which had no association with Stanford University, hoped that the former agents would use their intelligence con- nections to generate business and gain Government approval for the compa- ny’s exports, company officials saidj Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil had left the C.I.A. by the time they joined Stanford ^Technology as salesmen, but they said *they still worked for the agency, and -company officials say they believed it. 1 The relationship between the com- pany and the former agents did not, in •the end, lead to much business for ei- ther, and Stanford Technology execu- •tives now say Mr. Wilson and Mr..Terpil 'created more trouble than business. But 'the relationship illustrates a twilight area of international commerce where some of the world’s most sensitive and secret technology is traded purely for profit, with only limited control by the ..Federal Government The authorities say they are con- the Government to monitor and prevent » the unauthorized export of American. military technology and to control the activities of its former agents. These issues are now being investigated by th " House Select Committee on Intelli- gence. Stanford Technology had offices in Sunnyvale, Calif., in the heart of the Sili- con Valley, where some of the nation’s most sophisticated electronic and com- puter hardware is designed and manu- factured. Earlier this year, as part of a reorganization, the company became a subsidiary of Analog Devices, a large electronics manufacturer. There is no evidence that Analog Devices knew of “Mr. Wilson’s and Mr. TerpU’s associa- tion with Stanford Technology. Before the two agents became affili- ated with Stanford Technology the com- pany had already engaged in transac- tions that raised foreign policy and ex- port questions. ' In 1975, Stanford Technology sold Iran a sophisticated electronic surveillance system that Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi planned to use to spy on the communications of his top military commanders, according to former em- ployees of the company. American intel- ligence officials later said the equip- ment should not have been approved for export because of its advanced technolo- gy. The principal owner of Stanford Tech-/ nology, an Iranian businessman, oper- ated a company in Teheran that pro- vided Iranian Government officials with instructions about how they could dis- guise sophisticated electronic equip- ment like the surveillance system sold by Stanford Technology and avoid ex- port licensing problems in the United States by assembling the systems out- side America. The owner declined to be interviewed. Radar Deal Sabotaged Also in 1975, Stanford Technology put together a proposal to bid for a Turkish contract for an advanced radar warning system. At that time American arms sales to Turkey were banned because the Turks had invaded Cyprus, using United States-supplied military equip- ment in violation of a pact on how those arms were to be used, A company engi- neer who worked on the Turkish pro- posal said that, in light of the ban, he sabotaged the deal by watering down the proposal so it would be unacceptable to the Turks. After Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil be- came affiliated with Stanford Tech- nology in 1976, they arranged for Stan- ford Technology’s parent corporation in Switzerland to construct a building to house computers in Libya. The con- I — 17 port of sensitive electronic warfare equipment from Stanford Technology to Egypt, according to a former associate of Mr. Wilson. He also arranged for the Iranian owner of StanfordTedmology to meet with the same C.f.A. official, ac- cording to a former company employee. The deal was never struct • Some of Mr. Wilson’s and Mr. Terpil’s transactions involving Stanford Tech- nology were done without the knowledge of company officials. For example, they used the marketing subsidiary of Stan- ford Technology, Intercontinental Tech- nology Inc., to conclude their deal to train terrorists in Libya, according to Federal investigators, and they eventu- ally drew up the contract on the affili- ate's stationery. Richard T. Ashcroft, president of In. ternational Imaging Systems and head of Stanford Technology before the name ‘ change, minimized the involvement of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil in the compa- ny’s affaire. "Stanford Technology never obtained a contract through Wil- son," he said in an interview. Mr. Ashcroft acknowledged that Mr. Terpil had generated business for Stan! ford Technology. »' ■ < . ■ Subsidiary’s Involvement Denied L John N. Adams, a vice president of In- ternational Imaging; said in an inter- . view that the American&ased subsidi- ary of his company was not involved in deals with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil that were consummated and that other questionable transactions were handled by Stanford Technology’s parent com- pany in Switzerland, the Stanford Tech- nology Corporation, S.A."- A Federal investigation of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil; which includes inquiries into possible bribery of Government of- ficials, the use of Army Special Forces veterans to train terrorists in Libya and the possible involvement of Mr. Wilson in the attempted assassination of a. Libyan student in Colorado last year, has hot focused on the Stanford Tech! nology connection, according to Justice Department officials. 1 Senior officials in the Reagan Admin- istration, including Secretary of De- fense Caspar W. Weinberger, say they are increasingly concerned that the i transfer of technology abroad may un- I dermine American superiority in mili- ComusmEp ’ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/30 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200970101-1