FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981–1988, VOLUME XVI, SOUTH AMERICA Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988 Volume XVI South America Editor: Nathaniel L. Smith General Editor: Kathleen B. Rasmussen U.S. Department of State Washington 2026 Office of the Historian Shared Knowledge Services Bureau of Administration U.S. Department of State Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. South America (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XVI) Contents About the Digital Edition About the Series Preface Sources Abbreviations and Terms Persons South America Region (Documents 1–30) Argentina (Documents 31–108) Bolivia (Documents 109–160) Brazil (Documents 161–222) Chile (Documents 223–315) Colombia (Documents 316–367) Ecuador (Documents 368–397) Paraguay (Documents 398–413) Peru (Documents 414–443) Uruguay (Documents 444–459) Venezuela (Documents 460–485) About the Digital Edition About the Digital Edition Foreign Relations of the United States , 1981–1988, Volume XVI, South America is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations series that documents the foreign policy decision making of the administration of President Ronald Reagan. This web page explains the current status of the volume’s digital edition. To provide timely access to the volume’s documents, the Office of the Historian will publish chapters as they are cleared. To date, the following chapters have been published: Title Publication Date Ecuador September 18, 2026 Paraguay September 18, 2026 Uruguay September 18, 2026 Venezuela September 18, 2026 The volume’s landing page provides a complete list of its front matter and chapters, even those not yet published. When readers access portions of the volume that have not yet been published, they will encounter a note explaining this and linking to this page for further details. Some front matter sections will be updated with each chapter. For example, Sources presents a list of the sources from the chapters that have been published. The chapters and sections that have been published can be searched and viewed online and downloaded as ebooks and as TEI XML. When the remainder of the volume is cleared for publication, a volume-length PDF will be released. This page will be updated to note significant additions to the volume. Last updated September 18, 2026 About the Series About the Series The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991. Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.). The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The records that constitute the Department’s central files, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will be transferred eventually to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department’s decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing. Research for Foreign Relations volumes is also undertaken through special access to restricted Presidential Library and other U.S. Government agency records. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. Archivists and declassification reviewers are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be publicly available in their entirety at the time of publication. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Team Lead of the Editing and Publishing Team. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Bracketed insertions are used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). Words and phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designations such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram. The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents. The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record. Some of the research for volumes in the Ronald Reagan subseries was done in Reagan Presidential Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) project. This project, which was administered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification review of classified records held in various Presidential libraries. Throughout the course of the project many, but not all, such records at each Presidential library were scanned. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the Foreign Relations series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Presidential library file. In such cases, some editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.” Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations. John C. Powers The Acting Historian Kathleen B. Rasmussen General Editor Sources Sources Unpublished Sources Department of State, Washington, D.C. Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. P Reels D Reels N Reels Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. Lot 95D407: Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary Files, Special Collection—Iran Contra—Noriega Lot 94D432: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Secretariat Memorandums, 1979–1983 Lot 87D327: Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz Lot 91D371: Western Hemisphere Affairs Records, Policy, Planning, and Coordination, Security Assistance Program Files Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California White House Staff and Office Files Coordination Office, National Security Council Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Country File Head of State File Subject File System File Roger W. Fontaine Files Robert H. Lilac Files Latin American Affairs Directorate, National Security Council President’s Daily Diary Jacqueline Tillman Files WHORM: Subject File Personal Papers George P. Shultz Papers George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas Vice Presidential Records Donald P. Gregg Files Central Intelligence Agency Office of Support Services (DI) Job 82T00565R: Production Case Files (1981) Job 86T01017R: Intell Publications Files (1985–87) Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987) Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis Job 04T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files–Production Case Files (1984) Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986) Published Sources Brinkley, Douglas, ed. The Reagan Diaries, Unabridged . Volume I: January 1981–October 1985. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. Brinkley, Douglas, ed. The Reagan Diaries, Unabridged . Volume II: November 1985–January 1989. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. Department of State. Executive Agreement Series, No. 288 . Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald W. Reagan, 1981–1988. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982–1991. Washington Post Abbreviations and Terms Abbreviations and Terms A/S, Assistant Secretary ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AD, Acción Democrática (Democratic Action Party), Venezuela AID, Agency for International Development APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), Peruvian political party ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARA/AND, Andean Affairs Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARA/ECP, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARA/PPC, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARA/SC, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State AVC, ¡Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (Eloy Alfaro Popular Armed Forces), Ecuador BIT, Bilateral Investment Treaty BPD, barrels per day CAP, Carlos Andrés Pérez CAR, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State CBI, Caribbean Basin Initiative CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command CIVS, International Commission for Verification and Follow-Up (Central America) COM, Chief of Mission COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization), Venezuelan political party Contadora Group, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State EB/IFD/OMA, Office of Monetary Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State EC, European Community EEP, Export Enhancement Program ESF, Economic Support Fund Exdis, exclusive distribution EXIM / Eximbank, Export-Import Bank of the United States FDR, Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Revolutionary Democratic Front), El Salvador FMS, Foreign Military Sales FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FY, fiscal year GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP, Gross Domestic Product GOE, Government of Ecuador GOH, Government of Haiti GOJ, Government of Japan GON, Government of Nicaragua GOP, Government of Paraguay; Government of Peru GOES, Government of El Salvador GOU, Government of Uruguay GOV, Government of Venezuela GRN, Revolutionary Government of Nicaragua HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State HA/HR, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDB, Inter-American Development Bank ICERC, Inter-Agency Country Exposure Review Committee ID, Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left), Ecuador IFI, International Financial Institution IG, Interagency Group IMF, International Monetary Fund IMET, International Military Education and Training INM/P, Office of Program Management, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State JOOGG, Junta de Oficiales Generales (General Officers’ Council), Uruguay Limdis, limited distribution LOS, Law of the Sea M-19, Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19th Movement), Colombian leftist guerrilla group MAP, Military Assistance Program MDB, Multilateral Development Bank MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFO, Multinational Force and Observers/Multilateral Force Observers (Sinai) NAM, Non-Aligned Movement NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIO, National Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency Nodis, no distribution Noforn, no foreign dissemination NSC, National Security Council NSDD, National Security Decision Directive OAS, Organization of American States OASGA, Organization of American States General Assembly OAU, Organization of African Unity OFDA, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development OMB , Office of Management and Budget OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State PD, Presidential Directive PL-480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) RPT, repeat S, Office of the Secretary of State S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S-I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SI, Socialist International SPR, Strategic Petroleum Reserve Stadis, State Department distribution only STR, Office of the Special Trade Representative SWAPO, South West Africa People’s Organization UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNITAS, annual U.S.-South American naval exercise UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General USAID, United States Agency for International Development USCINCSO, Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command USG, United States Government USSOUTHCOM, United States Southern Command USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations USTR, United States Trade Representative USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VAF, Venezuelan Air Force Persons Persons Abrams, Elliott, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, from May 13, 1981 until December 1, 1981; Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, from December 12, 1981 until July 17, 1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, from July 17, 1985 until January 20, 1989 Alberti, Francesco J., Deputy Director, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State Alfonsín, Raúl, President of Argentina, from 1983 until July 8, 1989 Allen, Richard V. “Dick”, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982 Álvarez, Gregorio, President of Uruguay, from 1981 until 1985 Arias Sánchez, Oscar, President of Costa Rica, from 1986 until May 8, 1990 Armacost, Michael H., Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from May 1984 until March 1989 Azcona del Hoyo, José Simón, President of Honduras, from January 1986 until January 27, 1990 Baker, James A., III “Jim”, White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President, until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr. “Mac”, Secretary of Commerce, from January 1981 until July 1987 Barco Vargas, Virgilio, President of Colombia, from August 7, 1986 until August 7, 1990 Barrios Tassano, Uruguayan Foreign Minister, from 1988 to 1990 Batlle, Jorge, Uruguayan senator, from 1985 until 1989 Belaúnde Terry, Fernando, President of Peru from 1963 until 1968 and, from July 28, 1980 until July 28, 1985 Betancur, Belisario, President of Colombia, from August 7, 1982 until August 7, 1986 Blanco Estradé, Juan Carlos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay, from 1973 Borja Cevallos, Rodrigo, President of Ecuador, until August 10, 1992 Bremer, L. Paul, III, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, from February 2, 1981 until March 27, 1983 Briggs, Everett E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, until September 1982 Brock, William E., III, U.S. Trade Representative, from January 23, 1981 until April 22, 1985 Bucaram, Abdala, Ecuadorian political candidate Buckley, James L., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from February 18, 1981 until August 20, 1982 Bush, George Herbert Walker, Vice President of the United States, from January 20, 1981 until January 20, 1988 Bushnell, John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, from 1977 until 1982 Carlucci, Frank C., III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, until February 4, 1981; Deputy Secretary of Defense, from 1981 until December 31, 1982; President and Chief Operating Officer, Sears World Trade, Inc., from 1983 until 1984; Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Sears World Trade, Inc., from 1984 until 1986; member and chair, General Advisory Committee, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1986 Castro, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, from October 3, 1965, until April 19, 2011 Clark, William P., Jr. “Judge”, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, from February 1982, until November 1983 Colson, Janet, Executive Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, until April 1981; Special Assistant to the President and Assistant to the National Security Adviser, from 1981, until 1982 Conable, Barber B., President of the World Bank Group, from July 1986 until September 1991 Consalvi, Simón Alberto, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, from March 13, 1985, until January 11, 1988 Córdovez, Diego, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, from 1988, until 1992; Personal Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Afghan Negotiations D’Escoto Brockmann, Miguel, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, from July 19, 1979, until April 25, 1990; member of the Group of 12 Deaver, Michael K., Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President, from January 1, 1981 until May 10, 1985 De Larosière, Jacques, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, from June 17, 1978, until January 15, 1987 Derwinski, Edward, Counselor of the Department of State from March 23, 1983, until March 24, 1987; Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs from March 24, 1987, until January 21, 1989 Duarte Fuentes, José Napoleón, President of El Salvador, from June 1, 1984, until June 1, 1989 Durán-Ballen Cordovez, Sixto, Ecuadorian congressman, from 1984, until 1988; cofounder of Ecuador’s right-wing Christian Social Party Eagleburger, Lawrence Sidney “Larry”, Assistant Secretary of State-designate for European Affairs, until May 14, 1981; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from February 12, 1982 until May 1, 1984; Career Ambassador, from April 1984 Enders, Thomas O., U.S. Representative to the European Community until May 27, 1981, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, from June 23, 1981 until June 27, 1983; U.S. Ambassador to Spain, from September 15, 1983 until July 6, 1986 Febres-Cordero Ribadeneyra, León, President of Ecuador, from 1984 until 1988 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, opposition leader of Uruguayan Blanco Party Figueiredo, João Baptista de Oliveira, President of Brazil from March 15, 1979, until March 15, 1985 Fontaine, Roger W., member, National Security Council Staff from February 1981 until November 1983 García Pérez, Alan, President of Peru, from July 28, 1985, until July 28, 1990 González, Felipe, Prime Minister of Spain from December 2, 1982, until May 5, 1996; Secretary-General of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party from 1979 until 1997 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, from March 11, 1985 until August 24, 1991 Greenspan, Alan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1974 until 1977 Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., Secretary of State, from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982 Hart, Samuel Friedlander, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, from December 22, 1982, until April 5, 1985 Hernández, Valentín, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, from 1984 until 1989 Herrera Campins, Luis, President of Venezuela, from March 12, 1979, until February 2, 1984 Herrington, John, Secretary of Energy, from February 1985 until January 1989 Holwill, Richard N., U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, from July 1988 until November 1989 Hyde, Henry J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois), from January 3, 1975, until January 3, 2007 Kalb, Bernard, Department of State Spokesman, from January 1, 1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, from August 12, 1985 until October 8, 1986 Kilday, Lowell C., Director, Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1980 until 1983; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, from 1983 until 1985 Kimmitt, Robert M., Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, from February 4, 1981 until April 1, 1985; President’s Representative to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission); member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Kissinger, Henry A., President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1969 until November 3, 1975, and Secretary of State, from September 21, 1973 until January 20, 1977; chair, National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission); member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, from 1984 Lacalle de Herrera, Luis Alberto, member, Uruguayan Blanco Party; President of Uruguay, from March 1, 1990 Laino, Domingo, Paraguayan opposition leader Landau, George Walter, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, from August 25, 1982 until June 4, 1985 Larrea, Osvaldo Hurtado, President of Ecuador, from May 24, 1981, until August 10, 1984 Luers, William H., U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, from December 29, 1978, until June 28, 1982 Lugar, Richard G. (Dick), Senator (R–Indiana), from January 3, 1977, until January 3, 2013; Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1985 until 1987 Luisi, Héctor, Uruguayan Ambassador to the United States, from 1985 until 1990. Lusinchi, Jaime, President of Venezuela, from February 2, 1984, until February 2, 1989 Maeso, Carlos, Uruguayan Foreign Minister from September 2, 1982, to March 1, 1985 Manley, Michael, Prime Minister of Jamaica from March 1972 to November 1980; thereafter, opposition leader of the People’s National Party McAllister, Eugene J., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, from April 5, 1988, until November 4, 1992 McFarlane, Robert C., “Bud”, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1982 until 1983; President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from October 7, 1983, to December 4, 1985 McPherson, M. Peter (Pete), Director, Agency for International Development, from February 27, 1981 until August 7, 1987 Meese, Edwin, III, Counselor to the President, from January 20, 1981, until February 25, 1985; thereafter Attorney General until August 12, 1988 Menges, Constantine C., Senior Director, Latin American Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 24, 1984 until 1985 Middendorf, J. William, II, Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, from June 12, 1981, until June 21, 1980 Mitterrand, François, President of France, from May 26, 1981, until May 17, 1995 Montanaro, Sabino, Paraguayan Minister of the Interior, from 1966 until 1989 Montes de Oca, Rafael Andrés “Pepi”, Venezuelan Minister of Internal Affairs, from March 1979 until March 1982 Morales Paúl, Isidro, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, from February 2, 1984, until March 13, 1985 Motley, Langhorne Anthony “Tony”, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 12, 1983, until July 3, 1985 Namphy, Henri, interim President of Haiti, from February 7, 1986, until February 7, 1988 Nogués, Alberto, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Noriega Morena, Gen. Manuel Antonio, Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces, from August 12, 1983, until December 20, 1989 Ortega Saavedra, José Daniel, Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, from March 4, 1981, until January 10, 1985; thereafter, President of Nicaragua Ortiz Mena, Antonio, President of the Inter-American Development Bank from 1971 until 1988 Pérez, Carlos Andrés, President of Venezuela, from February 1989; President of Venezuela from March 1974 until March 1979 Pinochet, Gen. Augusto, President of Chile, from December 1974 until March 1990 Poindexter, John M., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from October 1983 until December 1985; President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, from December 4, 1985 until November 25, 1986 Ravenna, Walter, Uruguayan Minister of Defense, from February 13, 1973, until September 1, 1981 Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States, from January 20, 1981 until January 20, 1989 Regan, Donald T. “Don”, White House Chief of Staff, from February 4, 1985, until February 27, 1987 Reich, Otto J., U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, from June 6, 1986, until July 17, 1989 Rockefeller, David, member, Kissinger Group; Chair of the Council on Foreign Relations, from 1970 until 1985 Roldós, Jaime Aguilar, President of Ecuador from August 11, 1979, until May 24, 1981 Rondon, Fernando Enrique, Member, National Security Council Staff; Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, from August 8, 1985, until July 26, 1988. Saldívar, Carlos Augusto, Paraguayan Foreign Minister from 1983 until 1988 Sanguinetti Coirolo, Julio María, President of Uruguay, from March 1, 1985, until March 1, 1990 Sarney Costa, José, President of Brazil, from March 15, 1985, until March 15, 1990 Schneider, William, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1982 until 1986 Seaga, Edward, Prime Minister of Jamaica from November 1, 1980, until February 10, 1989 Shoemaker, Christopher C. “Chris”, Member of the Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1982 Shlaudeman, Harry W., Executive Director, National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission), from 1983 until 1984; Ambassador at Large and Special Envoy for Central America, from March 26, 1984 until July 7, 1986 Shultz, George Pratt, Secretary of State, from July 16, 1982, until January 20, 1989 Soares, Marió, Prime Minister of Portugal, from March 9, 1986, until March 9, 1996 Soares, João Clemente Baena, Director General, Organization of American States, from 1984 until 1994 Stroessner, Alfredo, President of Paraguay, from August 15, 1954, until February 3, 1989 Taylor, Clyde D., U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, from November 12, 1985, until September 12, 1988 Terán, Edgar, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, from 1984 until 1987 Tillman, Jacqueline, Deputy Director, Latin American Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1984 until 1987 Towell, Timothy L., U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, until April 27, 1991 Tyson, Charles P., II, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (for Coordination), Office of Coordination, from 1981 until 1983 Valverde, Alfonso Barrera, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister until 1981 Valencia Rodríguez, Luis, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister from November 15, 1981, until September 8, 1984 Valdés Otero, Estanislao, Uruguayan Foreign Minister from February 17, 1981, until September 2, 1982 Volcker, Paul, Chair of the Federal Reserve, from August 6, 1979, until August 11, 1987 Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A., USA (Ret.), U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, from May 22, 1985, until March 15, 1989 Weinberger, Caspar W., “Cap”, Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1981, until November 23, 1987 Whitehead, John C., Deputy Secretary of State, from July 9, 1985, until January 20, 1989 Wilkey, Malcolm Richard, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, from November 28, 1985, until May 10, 1990 Zambrano Velasco, José Alberto, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, from 1979 until 1984 South America Region South America Region [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 1 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 2 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. 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For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 27 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 28 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 29 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 30 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 1 Document 1 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 2 Document 2 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 3 Document 3 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 4 Document 4 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 5 Document 5 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 6 Document 6 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 7 Document 7 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 8 Document 8 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 9 Document 9 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 10 Document 10 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 11 Document 11 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 12 Document 12 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 13 Document 13 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 14 Document 14 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 15 Document 15 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 16 Document 16 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 17 Document 17 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 18 Document 18 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 19 Document 19 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 20 Document 20 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 21 Document 21 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 22 Document 22 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 23 Document 23 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 24 Document 24 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 25 Document 25 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 26 Document 26 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 27 Document 27 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 28 Document 28 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 29 Document 29 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 30 Document 30 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Argentina Argentina [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 31 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 32 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 33 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 34 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 35 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 36 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 37 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 38 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 39 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 40 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 41 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 42 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 43 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 44 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 45 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 46 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 47 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 48 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 49 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 50 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 51 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 52 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 53 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 54 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 55 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 56 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 57 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 58 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 59 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 60 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 61 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 62 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 63 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 64 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 65 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 66 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 67 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 68 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 69 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 70 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 71 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 72 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 73 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 74 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 75 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 76 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 77 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 78 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 79 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 80 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 81 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 82 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 83 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 84 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 85 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 86 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 87 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 88 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 89 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 90 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 91 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 92 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 93 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 94 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 95 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 96 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 97 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 98 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 99 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 100 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 101 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 102 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 103 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 104 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 105 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 106 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 107 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 108 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 31 Document 31 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 32 Document 32 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 33 Document 33 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 34 Document 34 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 35 Document 35 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 36 Document 36 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 37 Document 37 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 38 Document 38 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 39 Document 39 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 40 Document 40 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 41 Document 41 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 42 Document 42 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 43 Document 43 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 44 Document 44 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 45 Document 45 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 46 Document 46 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 47 Document 47 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 48 Document 48 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 49 Document 49 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 50 Document 50 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 51 Document 51 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 52 Document 52 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 53 Document 53 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 54 Document 54 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 55 Document 55 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 56 Document 56 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 57 Document 57 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 58 Document 58 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 59 Document 59 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 60 Document 60 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 61 Document 61 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 62 Document 62 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 63 Document 63 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 64 Document 64 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 65 Document 65 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 66 Document 66 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 67 Document 67 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 68 Document 68 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 69 Document 69 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 70 Document 70 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 71 Document 71 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 72 Document 72 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 73 Document 73 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 74 Document 74 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 75 Document 75 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 76 Document 76 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 77 Document 77 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 78 Document 78 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 79 Document 79 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 80 Document 80 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 81 Document 81 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 82 Document 82 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 83 Document 83 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 84 Document 84 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 85 Document 85 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 86 Document 86 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 87 Document 87 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 88 Document 88 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 89 Document 89 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 90 Document 90 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 91 Document 91 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 92 Document 92 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 93 Document 93 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 94 Document 94 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 95 Document 95 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 96 Document 96 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 97 Document 97 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 98 Document 98 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 99 Document 99 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 100 Document 100 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 101 Document 101 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 102 Document 102 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 103 Document 103 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 104 Document 104 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 105 Document 105 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 106 Document 106 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 107 Document 107 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 108 Document 108 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Bolivia Bolivia [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 109 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 110 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 111 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 112 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 113 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 114 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 115 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 116 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 117 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 118 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 119 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 120 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 121 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 122 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 123 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 124 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 125 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 126 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 127 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 128 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 129 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 130 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 131 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 132 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 133 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 134 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 135 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 136 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 137 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 138 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 139 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 140 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 141 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 142 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 143 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 144 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 145 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 146 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 147 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 148 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 149 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 150 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 151 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 152 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 153 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 154 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 155 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 156 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 157 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 158 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 159 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 160 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 109 Document 109 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 110 Document 110 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 111 Document 111 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 112 Document 112 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 113 Document 113 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 114 Document 114 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 115 Document 115 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 116 Document 116 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 117 Document 117 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 118 Document 118 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 119 Document 119 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 120 Document 120 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 121 Document 121 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 122 Document 122 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 123 Document 123 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 124 Document 124 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 125 Document 125 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 126 Document 126 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 127 Document 127 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 128 Document 128 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 129 Document 129 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 130 Document 130 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 131 Document 131 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 132 Document 132 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 133 Document 133 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 134 Document 134 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 135 Document 135 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 136 Document 136 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 137 Document 137 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 138 Document 138 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 139 Document 139 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 140 Document 140 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 141 Document 141 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 142 Document 142 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 143 Document 143 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 144 Document 144 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 145 Document 145 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 146 Document 146 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 147 Document 147 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 148 Document 148 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 149 Document 149 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 150 Document 150 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 151 Document 151 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 152 Document 152 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 153 Document 153 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 154 Document 154 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 155 Document 155 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 156 Document 156 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 157 Document 157 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 158 Document 158 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 159 Document 159 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 160 Document 160 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Brazil Brazil [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 161 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 162 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 163 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 164 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 165 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 166 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 167 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 168 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 169 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 170 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 171 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 172 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 173 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 174 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 175 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 176 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 177 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 178 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 179 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 180 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 181 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 182 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 183 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 184 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 185 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 186 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 187 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 188 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 189 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 190 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 191 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 192 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 193 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 194 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 195 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 196 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 197 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 198 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 199 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 200 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 201 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 202 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 203 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 204 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 205 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 206 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 207 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 208 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 209 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 210 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 211 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 212 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 213 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 214 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 215 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 216 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 217 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 218 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 219 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 220 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 221 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 222 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 161 Document 161 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 162 Document 162 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 163 Document 163 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 164 Document 164 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 165 Document 165 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 166 Document 166 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 167 Document 167 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 168 Document 168 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 169 Document 169 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 170 Document 170 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 171 Document 171 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 172 Document 172 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 173 Document 173 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 174 Document 174 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 175 Document 175 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 176 Document 176 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 177 Document 177 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 178 Document 178 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 179 Document 179 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 180 Document 180 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 181 Document 181 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 182 Document 182 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 183 Document 183 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 184 Document 184 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 185 Document 185 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 186 Document 186 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 187 Document 187 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 188 Document 188 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 189 Document 189 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 190 Document 190 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 191 Document 191 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 192 Document 192 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 193 Document 193 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 194 Document 194 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 195 Document 195 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 196 Document 196 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 197 Document 197 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 198 Document 198 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 199 Document 199 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 200 Document 200 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 201 Document 201 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 202 Document 202 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 203 Document 203 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 204 Document 204 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 205 Document 205 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 206 Document 206 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 207 Document 207 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 208 Document 208 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 209 Document 209 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 210 Document 210 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 211 Document 211 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 212 Document 212 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 213 Document 213 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 214 Document 214 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 215 Document 215 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 216 Document 216 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 217 Document 217 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 218 Document 218 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 219 Document 219 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 220 Document 220 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 221 Document 221 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 222 Document 222 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Chile Chile [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 223 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 224 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 225 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 226 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 227 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 228 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 229 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 230 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 231 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 232 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 233 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 234 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 235 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 236 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 237 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 238 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 239 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 240 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 241 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 242 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 243 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 244 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 245 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 246 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 247 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 248 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 249 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 250 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 251 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 252 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 253 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 254 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 255 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 256 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 257 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 258 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 259 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 260 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 261 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 262 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 263 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 264 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 265 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 266 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 267 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 268 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 269 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 270 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 271 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 272 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 273 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 274 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 275 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 276 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 277 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 278 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 279 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 280 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 281 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 282 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 283 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 284 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 285 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 286 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 287 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 288 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 289 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 290 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 291 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 292 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 293 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 294 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 295 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 296 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 297 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 298 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 299 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 300 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 301 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 302 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 303 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 304 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 305 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 306 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 307 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 308 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 309 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 310 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 311 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 312 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 313 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 314 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 315 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 223 Document 223 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 224 Document 224 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 225 Document 225 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 226 Document 226 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 227 Document 227 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 228 Document 228 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 229 Document 229 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 230 Document 230 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 231 Document 231 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 232 Document 232 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 233 Document 233 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 234 Document 234 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 235 Document 235 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 236 Document 236 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 237 Document 237 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 238 Document 238 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 239 Document 239 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 240 Document 240 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 241 Document 241 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. 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For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 363 Document 363 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 364 Document 364 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 365 Document 365 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 366 Document 366 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 367 Document 367 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Ecuador Ecuador 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, February 5, 1981, 1607Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810055–0755. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima. Drafted by Eaton; cleared by Bushnell and in S/S, S/S–O; approved by Baltimore. 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, April 14, 1981, 1654Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810177–0671. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Lima, Caracas, Mexico City, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, San Salvador, Bogota, USSOUTHCOM, and CINCLANT. Drafted by Hart; cleared in S/S–O and ARA; approved by Enders. 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, June 10, 1981, 0236Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810271–0467. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Bogota, Lima, Caracas, La Paz, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Hart; approved by Briggs. 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State Quito, July 23, 1981, 1411Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810344–1030. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Guayaquil and USUN. 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, December 24, 1981, 0058Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810010–0317. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima, San Salvador, and Guayaquil. Haig visited the Castries, St. Lucia, December 2–4, to attend the OAS General Assembly meeting. 373. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 26, 1982, 11:40 a.m.–12:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) February 1981. Confidential. The meeting took place in Haig’s office. Drafted by Hart; cleared by Haig and Enders. Goldberg initialed for Haig. 374. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the White House and the Department of State Bogota, August 9, 1982, 2028Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820415–0348. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Panama City, San Jose, and Santiago. Sent for information Immediate to Quito. Bush visited Bogota, August 6–8, to attend the inauguration of President Betancur. 375. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan Washington, March 31, 1983 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 28E, Latin America. Confidential. Drafted on March 18 by Scott; cleared in ARA/PPC, ARA/ECP, P/M, S/P, P, EB/FD/OMA, E, OES, AID/LAC/SA, IO/UNP, INR, and INM/P. Enders sent the memorandum to Shultz under cover of a March 30 memorandum in which he wrote: “Hurtado’s working visit affords us the opportunity to reinforce our generally good bilateral relations with Ecuador; there are no urgently pressing issues in dispute.” See Document 376 and footnote 1 thereto. 376. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan Washington, April 7, 1983 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Ecuador (03/29/1983–11/01/1983). Top Secret. Prepared by North. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan signed his initials at the top of the page. No memoranda of conversation have been found. Attached as Tab A, but not printed, are talking points. Attached as Tab B, but not printed, is Shultz’s March 31 memorandum to Reagan. See Document 375. Attached as Tab C, but not printed, are background papers, papers on the political situation, the economic situation, foreign relations, and the Panama Canal tolls, and a CIA Special Analysis/Bio Brief. Tab D, a departure statement, was not attached. Reagan and Hurtado’s remarks are in Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, p. 517. Hurtado visited Washington for an official working visit April 7–9. According to the President’s Daily Diary, on April 8 Hurtado met with Reagan in the Oval Office from 11:36 a.m to 12:17 p.m, followed by a working luncheon in the State Dining Room from 12:17 to 1:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, April 9, 1983, 2112Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830211–0187. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to La Paz, Bogota, Caracas, Lima, and USCINCSO. Drafted by Hart; cleared by Enders and in ARA/AND, and S/S–O; approved by Shultz. 378. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Ecuador New York, October 5, 1983, 1325Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830576–0951. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Guayaquil, Lima, and USUN. 379. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 26, 1984, 9:45–10 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 47F, Latin America. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, June 29, 1984, 0132Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840417–0818. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Lima. Drafted by Rondon; cleared by McPherson, Wallis, and McKinley, and S; approved by Motley. 381. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, August 1984 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1984), Box 1, Folder 14: Ecuador’s New Administration: Challenges & Prospects, August 1984. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the DO. Based on information available as of August 1. 382. Memorandum of Conversation Guayaquil, February 28, 1985 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 51E, Ecuador. Confidential. Drafted in the Embassy in Ecuador; cleared by Motley and McKinley and PA, OAS, and S. The meeting took place in the Guayaquil airport. Shultz visited Guayaquil on February 28 before travelling to Montevideo for Sanguinetti’s inauguration, March 1–2. 383. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House March 1, 1985, 0157Z Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (07/15/1984–04/02/1985). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the Delegation’s aircraft. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the page. An unknown hand wrote “3/1/85” beneath his initials. 384. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Stockman) Washington, July 29, 1985 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (04/03/1985–08/01/1985). Secret. A copy was sent to Bush. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “Help for Febres.” Bush wrote at the top of the page: “I strongly concur!! GB 7–31.” Tillman sent the memo to McFarlane under cover of a July 18 memorandum, in which she wrote: “I have felt for some time that it is a legitimate and effective use of US power to send political signals to countries and governments that are in sync with US goals and values. Money is such a signal, and Ecuador is infinitely deserving.” Tillman also noted: “Febres-Cordero’s economic program—he’s doing all the right things, and his success will encourage other Latins to consider implementing similar economic policies. And, as a conservative, he is and will continue to be helpful to us on issues ranging from Central America, Cuba, and the politicization of the debt issue.” 385. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 18, 1985 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary Files, Special Collection—Iran Contra—Noriega, Lot 95D407, Ecuador/Uruguay. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the South American Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and the Office of Central Reference and coordinated with DO. Prepared at the request of Tillman. Information available as of December 1985 was used in the preparation of the paper. 386. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan Washington, January 8, 1986 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Trip File, Trip Book for Brazil (Tillman) 2/23/1986–02/26/1986 (1). Secret. 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador Washington, January 23, 1986, 0003Z Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) October 1985–present. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by McLean; cleared by Abrams, McKinley, and Gelbard and S/S–O and S; approved by Shultz. Febres-Cordero made a State visit to Washington January 12–16. 388. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1986, 10:30–11:45 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Ecuador State Visit President Febres-Cordero 01/14/1986. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter under cover of a January 14 memorandum. An uninitialed briefing memorandum from Poindexter to Reagan on the meeting is in the Reagan Library, NSC Records, Coordination Office, State Visit of President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador 01/14/1986. For Reagan and Febres-Cordero’s January 14 arrival ceremony remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, March 1986, pp. 63–64. Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “A St. visitor—Pres. Febres Cordero of Ecuador. Of all the Latin Am. Leaders he is the closest to us in philosophy and politically. He’s a self made businessman who filled his cabinet with people like himself. Our outdoor ceremony was in the cold—28˚ plus a wind & falling snow. It was really cold—7 spectators including one Marine passed out from the cold. Our meeting went well.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 561) 389. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, April 23, 1986 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 86T01017R: Intell Publications Files (1985–87), Box 7, Folder 716: ALA M 86–20017. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared for Casey in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of April 23. 390. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan Washington, undated Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (1/16/1987). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen 1/20.” Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the page. Tillman sent the memorandum to Carlucci for signature under cover of an undated memorandum, along with telegram 590 from Quito, January 16, in which Rondon described the transport arranged for the Ecuadorian Special Forces. Rondon commented: “This will convey strongest possible message to Ecuadorean army that we support army effort to rescue President and uphold constitutional order.” 391. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Washington, undated Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Action File, Ecuador (01/16/1987–04/02/1987). Confidential. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. Sorzano sent the paper to Carlucci under cover of a March 12 memorandum. 392. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (Derwinski) and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (McPherson) to Secretary of State Shultz Washington, April 30, 1987 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 58C, Ecuador. Confidential. Sent through Whitehead. Drafted on April 16 and revised on April 28 and April 30 by Boyce; cleared by Gelbard and T, AID/PPC, AID/LAC, and EB. A stamped notation at the top of the first page indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. 393. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 29, 1987 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987), Box 1, Folder 38: ALA 87–20046, Ecuador: The Danger of a Military Coup. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. 394. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State Washington, February 9, 1988, 2151Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880114–0055. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Guayaquil and Lima. 395. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House August 11, 1988, 0612Z Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 22C, 1988 June–August, Memoranda for President Ronald Reagan. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent from the Delegation’s aircraft. Shultz travelled to Quito to meet with President-elect Borja, August 10. 396. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State Quito, August 11, 1988, 2238Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880705–0074. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 397. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State Quito, October 26, 1988, 2017Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880953–0506. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Guayaquil. 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, February 5, 1981, 1607Z 30231. Subject: Conversation between Secretary Haig and Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Barrera. 1. S—Entire text. 2. Secretary Haig met for about 20 minutes at the OAS headquarters with Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Barrera on the morning of February 3. Accompanying Barrera was Ecuadoran Ambassador Crespo. Accompanying Haig were Bushnell and Eaton. The principal concentration of the conversation was on the Ecuador-Peru border conflict. 2 Other subjects discussed were Central America and the US attitude toward the internal politics of other countries. 3. Barrera opened by expressing Ecuador’s sincere thanks for the US positive approach to the current dispute. Ecuador was in favor of a role for the US, Brazil, Argentina and Chile in the achievement and consolidation of peace but Ecuador was also convinced that there must be an Organization of American States involvement. 3 Ecuador’s future attitude toward the OAS would be critically affected by whether or not it had a role. It wanted something in writing that would specify that the four countries presently involved in peacemaking were not acting solely (SIC) as guarantors but also as representatives of the OAS. It wanted to know the USG position on this point. 4. The Secretary noted that he had a special familiarity with this issue because an Ecuadoran by the name of Roca from Guayaquil had been his roommate at West Point in 1944. He said it was most unfortunate that this conflict had developed now when the hemisphere was faced with other problems that were so serious. He welcomed the ceasefire and said that he hoped there could be a decoupling of forces because of the inadvertent return to hostilities that could occur if there were not a disengagement. He hoped the two parties could reach a solution to the problem between themselves. He recognized the overlapping of or contradictions between the two international forums in which the dispute was being discussed. He said that the US would have to look into the issue more closely. 5. Barrera said—in apparent reference to the aggressiveness and vehemence of his presentation before the OAS the night before—that he would be speaking in the OAS today in as constructive a tone as possible. He wanted to underscore that we are talking about an area where the US has no legally binding position because the Rio Protocol does not establish what the border is. Since there is no agreed border, peace in the area is precarious. The keeping of that peace should not be confined to the guarantors. He, therefore, asked the US support for three points: (1) that it is acting in this issue as a friendly country, (2) that the OAS has a role in addition to the four countries presently involved, and (3) that whatever commission is established be continued for years if necessary. 6. The Secretary replied that he would wish to consider the three points made by Ecuador with care before responding. He thought it important to move carefully and not too rapidly in such matters. He lauded Barrera for his reputation as a diplomat and said that it had been confirmed by his presentation. 4 7. Central America. The Secretary said that in only two weeks the Reagan Administration had verified a massive Cuban intervention in El Salvador principally through Nicaragua. This kind of intervention is unacceptable to this administration. It will adopt fundamentally different policies with regard to it. In this respect it will want to have unusually close and cordial consultations with other countries of the hemisphere and especially with friends like Ecuador. Barrera replied with apparent conviction that he was in one hundred percent agreement. It was a fundamental principle of the hemisphere that there should be no intervention. Too often this was taken in Latin America to refer only to the US. Ecuador was convinced that it should apply to all countries. Ecuador does not see why any Latin American country should be exempt from this principle. 8. US attitude toward the internal politics of other countries. Secretary Haig said that the US had no preconceived ideas about the appropriate internal regimes of other countries and President Reagan would not try to impose the US model on other countries. Human rights are important but it is also important to concentrate on legal social change without foreign intervention. Haig 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810055–0755. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima. Drafted by Eaton; cleared by Bushnell and in S/S, S/S–O; approved by Baltimore. 2 In telegram 19262 to Lima and Quito, January 24, the Department reported that Crespo had informed Eaton on January 23 that a “Peruvian helicopter had crossed border and shot at Ecuadorean helicopter on the ground, seriously wounding Ecuadorean pilot.” On January 24, Crespo telephoned Eaton and told him that “the situation looked bad,” as “Peru had mobilized on border and was threatening attack.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810036–0828) On February 10, Edward Schumacher wrote in the New York Times : “Ecuadorean soldiers were expelled from three border posts after five days of fighting in which Peru says one of its soldiers was killed and Ecuador says it lost eight, though the reliability of the figures and the reported ferocity of the fighting have been questioned. The outposts are up to nine miles past a line that the Peruvian and Ecuadorean armed forces informally drew as a cease-fire line after similar clashes three years ago. Sometime since then the Ecuadoreans secretly moved in and occupied the jungle posts. It was that occupation, discovered by Peruvian patrols more than two weeks ago, that led to the idea that Ecuador precipitated the incident.” (Edward Schumacher, “Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment,” New York Times , February 10, 1981, p. A2) This five-day border war, known as the Paquisha War (or Fake Paquisha War), was a part of a centuries-old border dispute between Ecuador and Peru; see footnote 3 , below. 3 In 1941 Peru successfully invaded Ecuador. The United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile helped to negotiate a peace treaty. The 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol, with the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile serving as guarantor nations, ceded Ecuadorean territory to Peru and determined the border in the Cordillera del Cóndor. For the protocol between Ecuador and Peru regarding peace, friendship, and boundaries signed at Rio de Janeiro on January 29, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 288, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1818. During the Paquisha War (or Fake Paquisha War) the four countries helped to negotiate a cease-fire. See “Peru Claims Victory; Ecuador Says Battle Goes On,” New York Times , February 2, 1981, p. A1; and “Peru and Ecuador Agree to Cease-Fire,” Washington Post , February 3, 1981, p. A27. See also Document 414 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto. 4 In a March 6 memorandum to Allen, Fontaine noted: “For the moment, this issue has been put on the back burner, but we are not very close to a settlement—even a temporary one.” Fontaine added: “The U.S. is considering sales of the F–5 or approval of the Israeli Kfir to Ecuador. Other things being equal either would be o.k. But this is not a case of ceritus paribus. The sale of U.S. F–5s in particular at this time would be very provocative, causing endless political grief for Belaunde Terry, the pro-American President of Peru. This matter must be very carefully reviewed—with the most important consideration which is political—dealt with as the highest priority.” (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Chronological File, [03/05/1981–03/06/1981]) 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, April 14, 1981, 1654Z 95067. Subject: Conversation with President Roldos. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Summary: Ambassador Enders met with President Roldos for one hour and 45 minutes in Houston on April 12. The atmosphere was very cordial and constructive. Principal topics of discussion were the situations in Central America, the future of human rights and democracy in the hemisphere, the Peru/Ecuador border dispute, U.S. arms sales policy and the tuna issue. We believe the meeting was quite useful. End summary. 3. Ecuadorean President Jaime Roldos accompanied by Ambassador to the U.S. Crespo and OAS Ambassador Falconi received Ambassador Enders and ARA/AND Director Hart for one hour and 45 minutes conversation in Houston on April 12. The atmospherics of the talks were completely relaxed and positive. The main points which emerged are summarized below. 4. The future of democracy. Roldos opened by observing that there is no single Latin American view on what the proper U.S. or Latin American policy should be toward the promotion of democracy. Many Latin Americans have a superficial and emotional perception that the U.S. is allied with the “haves” in the hemisphere. They resent what they believe is overemphasis of the communist danger. Roldos does not think that Latin America and U.S. goals are contradictory. We both want democracy and reject the idea that anti-communism means denial of social justice. We share the concern about the efforts of the small but well-organized extremists of the right and left in Latin America to capture the initiative from the much more numerous (maybe 90 percent of the population) moderate forces. The extremes use any tactics to polarize societies rather than to work for gradual social, economic and political progress. Again, there is no difference with the U.S. on this approach. At the same time, there may be a wave of “new mercantilism” developing in the region to the detriment of democracy. The military play a powerful role in all the Latin American countries, including those with civilian constitutional governments. Because of the international economic crisis which all but the large oil exporting countries must face, governments are forced to concentrate on financial problems such as inflation and the balance of payments. Social programs to a large extent have had to be deferred despite the widening gap in the economic/social structure which had occurred as the result of economic growth in 1960’s and 1970’s. This plays into the hands of the communists and others who adopt pseudo-popularist rhetoric to fool the public. Where communism has been clearly posed as an alternative to the people, it has been rejected. Everyone knows that the experiment in Cuba has failed. In response to Ambassador Enders’ observation that there were also positive developments concerning democracy, and Roldos commented that Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil were the most important countries in the region for the U.S. and probably will serve Latin America as different models for democracy building. 5. Human rights. Enders outlined our new approach to human rights, using private rather than public diplomacy. Roldos did not respond directly, but talked about the need to lower the emotional content of the political debate within countries and to avoid the polarization that the extremists seek. Human rights in Latin America is linked mentally with the constitutional process. Protection of human rights is not a position of weakness; it’s a policy of strength on which we cannot turn our backs. Respect for human rights is needed to give credit to the center and discredit the extremes. In this respect, Roldos placed particular value on the direct dialogue he has established with Viola in Argentina. He mentioned that he may visit Brazil in October and is considering plans to meet soon with Herrera of Venezuela and Royo of Panama. 6. Central America. After Enders’ observation that it is precisely the need to strengthen the center which is at the heart of the problem in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America, Roldos offered the opinion that many in Latin America see Duarte as being too closely tied to the junta. Duarte has a creditability problem because people see the Salvadoran political situation in black and white. Roldos mentioned his meeting with Duarte in Santa Marta. 7. The border conflict. Roldos thanked the U.S. warmly for its help in the recent crises. 2 In his view, there has been a change in Ecuador’s attitude on the settlement of this problem. Although there is no national consensus on the shape of the solution and the emotional content on the subject is very high, Ecuador has now lowered its sights on what can be achieved. It wants a friendly solution. Unfortunately, Peru has been very hard-nosed and has been unwilling to discuss even the more modest ideas Ecuador has put forward. On a strictly private basis, Enders suggested that a look at some of the European arrangements for river use might provide imaginative ideas which would give Ecuador an outlet to the Amazon. 8. Arms purchase by Ecuador. Roldos was told that the U.S. understood Ecuador’s feelings that it had to buy new aircraft at this time. Under our new arms policy, we had approved the sales of the Kfir and F–5. 3 At the same time, we believe it’s important that direct and frank dialogue be establish with Peru on delicate matters such as this to avoid a misinterpretation of motives. 4 Given Peru’s deep suspicion of Ecuador’s intentions, Peru probably would respond with large arms purchases of its own to the announcement of an Ecuadorean buy. Roldos replied that it is ridiculous to believe that Ecuador is a military threat to Peru. The planes would be purely for defense. Ecuador needs some kind of deterrent capability against Peru’s overwhelming military superiority. Roldos left the impression that Ecuador would buy the Kfirs fairly soon. 5 He did not react to the suggestion that communication with Peru on this and other subjects by someone like Galo Plaza is desirable. 9. Tuna. There was an agreement that both sides want to avoid having the tuna boat seizure problem interfere with our excellent overall relations. 6 We must search for practical solutions to avoid conflicts which could arise because of our different political and juridical position. Enders explained how we might soon be faced with a difficult situation in the Congress when a replenishment of funds for the Fisherman’s Protective Act is considered. There will be congressmen who will want to deduct payments to U.S. tuna boats seized by Ecuador from our foreign assistance. If the present situation continues it will be hard to say they are wrong. We want to continue aid to Ecuador and believe it would be very useful if we can begin soon to discuss an interim solution to our dispute pending the outcome of law of the sea negotiations. Enders mentioned the Micronesia Tuna Agreement as worth consideration as a way of having a modus vivendi while leaving our juridical positions intact. Negotiations between the U.S. and Ecuadorean Fishing Association might be the best way to look at the problem. They might find some contractual basis on which they want to do business. Roldos said he wanted to avoid a vicious circle of conflict over tuna. He had no problem with discussions between the US and Ecuadorean fishery industries. It was agreed that further talks between ourselves and Ecuador on how we wish to proceed should take place. Ambassador Crespo and Hart will be in touch. Comment: Our main objective in this meeting was to establish a constructive personal relationship between Ambassador Enders and the President. We also wished to probe Roldos’ views on hemispheric problems and to provide our own thoughts on selective regional and bilateral matters. We are satisfied that both goals were accomplished. Haig 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810177–0671. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Lima, Caracas, Mexico City, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, San Salvador, Bogota, USSOUTHCOM, and CINCLANT. Drafted by Hart; cleared in S/S–O and ARA; approved by Enders. 2 See Document 368 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto. 3 In telegram 43870 to Quito and Lima, February 20, the Department wrote about the sale of Israeli Kfirs to Ecuador: “Department informed Israelis on February 20 that we are favorably disposed toward to the sale and intends to notify Congress of intent to approve sale as soon as Peru-Ecuador situation permits. We briefed them on reasons for delay. We will seek GOI assurances that they will consult with the USG on the delivery schedule for the Kfirs (assuming sale is consummated) in order that the timing of their arrival does not come at a critical stage in the negotiations or a period of high tension between Ecuador and Peru.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810080–0879) 4 In telegram 43798 to Quito and Lima, February 20, the Department wrote: “We believe it is necessary to discuss frankly with the Governments in Quito and Lima the policy we are applying to their arms requests so long as the serious threat of hostilities between those countries persists. Therefore, the following talking points are provided for Ambassadors Corr and Gonzalez to use promptly at the highest level of their host governments: —Since the outbreak of hostilities, we have received requests from both countries for various kinds of military equipment and supplies (FYI principally from Ecuador). —We have been processing these requests in a routine manner. —Our policy of normal processing includes the application of the same criteria for case-by-case decisions to both countries and is intended to avoid any indication of favoritism. —We would like to impress on both governments how important we believe it is that they not increase military expenditures as a result of the unfortunate border incident. —Unusually difficult decisions are required when major items of hardware, such as combat aircraft, are involved. As you know, we have authorized in principle the sale of F–5E/F’s, A–37’s and T–37’s to Ecuador and Peru and conveyed an initially favorable response to the Israeli’s on sale of Kfirs to Ecuador. You should be aware, however, and you may so inform Peru and Ecuador, that we will take a close look at the prospect of conflict between the two countries before delivery of any major weapon system is actually carried out.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810082–0423) 5 A June 5 Department of State paper noted: “Ecuador signed an agreement with Israel in late May to purchase 12 Kfir fighters and is continuing negotiations for six more. Six Kfirs were being moved out of a storage area in the last week of May for probable sea delivery to Ecuador, according to the Defense Attaché in Tel Aviv. INR Comment : Ecuador probably chose the Kfirs because they can shipped more rapidly than US-built F–5’s; Ecuador’s military reportedly fears renewed conflict with Peru later this year. The deal is Israel’s first export of the Kfir. Latin America accounted for just over one-half of Israel’s total arms deliveries between 1976 and 1980.” (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Ecuador [January 1981–June 1981]) 6 In telegram 82 from Guayaquil, January 16, the Consulate reported: “U.S. flag tuna boat Rosa D was seized by an Ecuadorian naval vessel January 15, 1981.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810023–0565) In telegram 20466 to Quito, January 27, the Department transmitted talking points for Gonzalez to use in a démarche to Roldós, indicating that “the USG is seriously concerned over the seizure of the Rosa D and the January 19 decision of the San Cristobal tribunal to penalize the Rosa D under Ecuadorean law as if it had been illegally fishing.” The evidence suggested that “the Rosa D was simply transiting the waters off the coast of Ecuador,” the talking points noted, “and a GOE decision to fine the boat and confiscate the fish on board the Rosa D would be viewed with great seriousness.” The Department also instructed Gonzalez to “mention to Roldos that in wake of this recent seizure and hopeful that a resolution can be worked out, it is perhaps a propitious time for USG and GOE representatives to meet to consider a solution to this problem. The USG is ready to engage in exploratory technical talks.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810038–1165) 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, June 10, 1981, 0236Z 151070. Subject: Conversation with Ecuadorean Ambassador Crespo. 1. (C—Entire text). 2. Ecuadorean Ambassador Crespo, who returned last week from Quito, discussed a number of subjects with ARA/AND Director Hart on Monday, June 8. The major points were as follows: — Crespo has known Hurtado for some time. They had fairly lengthy talks while Crespo was at home attending the Roldos funeral. 2 Hurtado asked Crespo to remain at his post in Washington. — Crespo reassured Hurtado that his being a Christian Democrat would not cause the US to be suspicious of him (something Hurtado said concerned him). Hurtado is not opposed to the private sector as many Ecuadoreans believe, notwithstanding some views he stated in a book some years ago. Hurtado has an open mind and is responsive. He is well disposed toward the United States but quite uninformed about it. Crespo described him as a typical Latin American politician whose lifelong orientation had been primarily toward Europe. His only visit here has been in Miami for medical treatment. It would be quite useful, Crespo believes, for Hurtado to come to the states and meet with President Reagan at an early date so that a personal relationship could be established. It did not have to be a state visit. Crespo will look for a chance to explore possibilities and be in touch with US. — On Cuba, Central America and the Caribbean, Hurtado comes out in about the same place as Roldos. He is aware of Cuban attempts to stir up trouble, but he believes that the basic problem is the political, economic and social situations in such places as El Salvador. — Hurtado is aware of the tuna issue with the US and wants to continue looking for practical bilateral solutions. — Hurtado very much would like to have some assurances from the United States that we continue to support civil constitutional Government in Ecuador. — His attitude toward the Peruvian/Ecuadorean border dispute is to seek a pacific solution. Hurtado will make sure that Ecuador does nothing to upset the status quo. Hurtado has decided that Ecuador will buy no new arms beyond those already contracted. (Crespo thought this would involve only 12 Kfirs, although he was not sure on this point.) He was not aware of the status of the radar contract. In Crespo’s opinion, the time still probably is not right for direct talks with the Peruvians. 3. Hart explained to Crespo why it had not been possible on such short notice for a high-level US mission to attend the Roldos funeral as we had hoped. Crespo was asked to pass to Hurtado our assurances that we continue to support democracy in Ecuador and elsewhere and that we look forward to the further strengthening of our already very close and friendly relationship with Ecuador. On the subject of a Hurtado-Reagan meeting, Hart explained the difficulty of scheduling an official visit over the short and medium term. We will, of course, give careful consideration to any proposals for a brief informal get together if an opportunity arises. Haig 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810271–0467. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Bogota, Lima, Caracas, La Paz, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Hart; approved by Briggs. 2 In telegram 3874 from Quito, May 25, the Embassy reported that Roldós and his wife Martha, Minister of Defense General Marco Aurelio Subia Martínez and his wife, and at least two other people had died in a plane crash on May 24 and that Hurtado had assumed the presidency. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810245–0278) 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 371. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 1 Quito, July 23, 1981, 1411Z 5289. Subject: Letter from President Reagan to President Hurtado. Ref: State 174484 2 1. Entire text Confidential. 2. I delivered the signed original of the President’s letter (reftel) to President Hurtado on July 21. Hurtado, who had already seen the message which was transmitted through the Foreign Ministry upon receipt of the cabled text, expressed his personal satisfaction at receiving the original letter. He made two substantive comments regarding the President’s letter: A. Hurtado stated he was determined to reciprocate President Reagan’s hope to eliminate obstacles hindering improved bilateral relations and he affirmed his intention to maintain the best possible relationships with the U.S. He commented that as Vice President he had followed our cooperation in development closely and that he would continue to do so from the presidency. These remarks offered me the opening to bring up our technical talks with the Foreign Ministry on fisheries, which I said constituted a good example of how both governments could work together to overcome bilateral problems. Hurtado said he was pleased at these efforts to find practical solutions to our tuna problems without prejudice to our juridical positions on LOS and repeated his determination to maintain good relations with the U.S. B. President Hurtado also referred to President Reagan’s remarks regarding joint endeavors to encourage the development of more humane and secure societies elsewhere. He said he was very concerned about the situation in Central America; not only El Salvador but also Guatemala. Hurtado said we should talk about what can be done to alleviate suffering and violence in Central America while assuring the right of self-determination in those countries. I said the USG shares his concerns and referred to the Nassau conference in which the Governments of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and the U.S. consulted on a Caribbean Basin development initiative. 3 We agreed that Central America and Caribbean Basin should be a topic for discussion when Ambassador Kirkpatrick calls on him on her forthcoming visit to Quito. 4 3. After our meeting, I sent the President the Spanish text of Ambassador Enders’ speech on El Salvador with a note referring to our conversation. 5 Gonzalez 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810344–1030. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Guayaquil and USUN. 2 In telegram 174484 to Quito, July 2, the Department sent the text of a letter from Reagan for delivery to Hurtado. In the letter, Reagan shared condolences regarding the death President Roldós and hope that Ecuador and Peru “resume direct, high-level conversations and dispel the present atmosphere of mutual distrust,” as well as for improved bilateral relations with “hemispheric cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810311–0403) The signed original of Reagan’s letter has not been found. Copies of both the Spanish language original and a translation of Hurtado’s August 12 letter of reply are in the Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Ecuador [July 1981–December 1981]. 3 See Document 318, footnote 2 . 4 In telegram 5823 from Quito, August 13, the Embassy sent a report on Kirkpatrick’s August 11 meetings with Hurtado and Barrera. Kirkpatrick told Hurtado that the “only purpose of her trip was to begin what US hoped would be frequent consultations between the two governments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810379–0368) 5 See Department of State Bulletin , September 1981, pp. 70–73. 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, December 24, 1981, 0058Z 339302. Subject: Secretary’s bilateral meeting at OASGA with Ecuadorean ForMin Valencia, December 4, 1981. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Following is memcon of the Secretary’s bilateral with ForMin Valencia. 3. Summary. The Secretary met with Ecuadoran ForMin Luis Valencia afternoon of December 4 at OASGA in St. Lucia. Valencia sought continued US assistance in alleviating the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Valencia was concerned about reports that the US is planning to sell fighter planes to Peru. The Secretary replied emphasizing the importance to both the USG and GOE of reducing Soviet influence in Peru; Amb. Enders added that the US was not now processing any Peruvian request to buy planes, which the Ecuadoreans found encouraging. On the subject of seizure of tuna boats, Valencia mentioned new regulations on the innocent passage of ships and the possibility of a regional approach to the problem, which both sides viewed as positive steps. Participating were Assistant Secretary Enders and former GOE OAS Ambassador Galo Leoro. 4. Border dispute with Peru. After initial pleasantries, ForMin Valencia immediately raised the GOE’s primary concern over its continuing dispute with Peru. The GOE is anxious to initiate fruitful conversations with the GOP and feels the USG can be of assistance in facilitating such discussion. The Secretary assured the ForMin that the GOE can rely on the full assistance of the US. 5. Planes for Peru: ForMin Valencia expressed GOE concern that the USG may be planning to sell fighter planes to Peru, adding that he had hoped for a freeze on new acquisitions of arms in the area. The Secretary replied that the US is not anxious to contribute to increases in arms in Peru or anywhere, but we are anxious to have the GOP terminate its dependence on the Soviet Union. Amb. Enders underscored the extent of that dependence, noting that the Soviet Union has more advisers in Peru than the US has in the whole continent. The Secretary added that reduction in Soviet influence is particularly in the interest of the GOE, since the USSR is primarily interested in promoting conflict between Peru and Ecuador. Amb. Enders then pointed out that, although aware of interest in Peru, the USG has not received a request to purchase planes from the GOP and therefore is not even processing any such request. The Ecuadoreans found this news encouraging, Amb. Leoro noted that he thought a request was already being processed. The Secretary closed the discussion of Peru, saying that the USG is aware of and understands the GOE’s concerns, and will do its best to ameliorate the dispute. 6. Seizure of tuna boats: Before proceeding to specific bilateral issues, the Secretary commented that bilateral relations are generally quite good, with which ForMin Valencia wholeheartedly agreed. The Secretary then raised the problem of Ecuador’s seizures of US tuna boats. ForMin Valencia indicated that the GOE plans to introduce new regulations regarding innocent passage of ships and mentioned that there had been a determination that the recently seized boat Sea Wolf had been engaged in innocent passage. The Secretary informed Valencia that he had raised the tuna boat problem with the Mexicans. Amb. Enders noted that the Mexicans know there are problems with a regional approach, but will take another look at such a possible solution. Valencia responded that the GOE plans to discuss the tuna boat problem early next year in conference with Colombia, Chile, and Peru and perhaps in a broader framework thereafter. The Secretary and Amb. Enders commented on the positive nature of GOE steps. 7. NASA tracking station agreement: The Secretary expressed USG hopes for an extension of the agreement on NASA’s tracking station in Ecuador. ForMin Valencia understood that the requested 6-month extension had already been or was ready to be signed, so there was no longer any problem. 8. El Salvador: The Secretary stressed the importance of elections in El Salvador as a first step in a peaceful process and the importance of OASGA support for that process. When Valencia said it was difficult to support the GOES given the situation there, the Secretary replied that the alternatives are far worse. Amb. Enders cited the Andean Pact precedent of Venezuela, which went on fighting but held democratic elections. Amb. Leoro replied that that situation was not as critical as El Salvador. Amb. Enders agreed, but re-emphasized that a moderate resolution from the OAS could be quite helpful. Amb. Leoro replied that the GOE felt it would be better off working with the Andean Pact nations as a group; and that at the UN, it is planning to abstain on the El Salvador resolution as a group, as well as on human rights resolution regarding Chile. 9. The Secretary closed the meeting by thanking the GOE for its help and cooperation. Participating were Assistant Secretary Enders and former GOE OAS Ambassador Galo Leoro. Haig 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810010–0317. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima, San Salvador, and Guayaquil. Haig visited the Castries, St. Lucia, December 2–4, to attend the OAS General Assembly meeting. 373. Memorandum of Conversation 373. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 26, 1982, 11:40 a.m.–12:15 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting with Ecuadorean Foreign Minister PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders Samuel F. Hart (Notetaker) Ecuador Foreign Minister Luis Valencia Rodriguez Ambassador Ricardo Crespo Zaldumbide After an exchange of pleasantries concerning the last meeting between Valencia and the Secretary at St. Lucia, 2 Valencia proceeded to outline his thoughts on several issues he wished to discuss with the Secretary. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS Valencia said Ecuador has followed with great interest US statements on the importance of democracy and human rights. As a young democracy with a coalition government, Ecuador wants to strengthen its relations and cooperation with the US on these grounds. CBI. Ecuador welcomes the CBI and will watch its development with interest. It should promote a better political and economic atmosphere in the Caribbean Basin. However, it could have negative trade implications for Ecuador and other countries not included. Perhaps another program should be started which includes countries such as Ecuador, and he would be happy to talk with the US about developing this idea. ECUADOR AND PERU BORDER DISPUTE. Ecuadorean President Hurtado was very pleased with his visit to Brazil and his discussions with President Figueiredo about the border problem with Peru. Ecuador seeks a peaceful and permanent solution and welcomes the help of other interested countries in achieving this. There must be no unilateral placing of border markers. Figueiredo said that Brazil will cooperate with the other guarantor powers to find a solution acceptable to both countries which respects their national dignity. Valencia recalled the leading role the US played in helping resolve the border incident of a year ago and expressed the hope that the US would continue its active interest. TUNA Ecuador is concerned about the continuation of the US tuna embargo. It wants to solve the matter of US boats fishing within 200 miles of Ecuadorean territory. 3 LOS Ecuador held consultations last week in New York about the renewal of the Law of the Sea Conference. It is looking for the cooperation of all countries, including the US, to conclude the negotiations successfully. Secretary Haig responded that we are fully behind Ecuadorean democracy. Although democracies have trouble, the system offers the greatest benefit for the governed. Ecuador can rely on our support. Its record on human rights is impeccable, and we want to have close communications. The Secretary continued that, since his talk with Valencia at St. Lucia about the border dispute, we have been very conscious of the matter and have followed it closely. It must be settled peacefully, and we are prepared to do what we can to bring about a satisfactory solution. Assistant Secretary Enders added that we expect to get together soon with Brazil and the other guarantors to see what we can do. However, our contacts with Peru concerning their position are not encouraging at present. It is a difficult problem also for Peru. Brazil will probably be in touch and we will proceed. On the CBI, the Secretary commented that Ecuador’s concerns may be overdrawn. Any new program has its growing pains. The CBI is now on the launching pad. We have been encouraged by the reactions of a number of governments, including some Europeans, who might help us as well. We understand Ecuador’s concern about possible adverse effects on its agricultural exports. We should watch this closely and ask Ecuador to bring it to our attention if a real problem arises. We doubt that it will. Enders added that there is an impact on Colombia and Brazil but he doubts that Ecuador will be hurt. Ambassador Crespo agreed. Moving to the LOS negotiation, Secretary Haig explained that early in the Reagan administration there was internal controversy on what to do about the LOS treaty. The Secretary said he is pleased that the US had decided to go ahead. In most areas there is no trouble. The major exception is on the deep-sea mining regime. We hope that when negotiations start again we can work from that end of the problem. It is vitally important that a successful outcome be achieved because it would be a major international accomplishment. We are going in with an open mind. The US Congress would not have ratified the old draft treaty without modifications of deep-sea mining provisions. The delays have not hurt, and we are more optimistic than pessimistic. The US negotiator will work closely with Ecuador and our other friends. Valencia added that there will be a meeting next week of the G–77 to consider the precise wording of changes the US wants. The Secretary commented that he hoped the Soviets would not cause us problems on the LOS. The Secretary said that we are most concerned about foreign intervention in Nicaragua and El Salvador. We have hard proof of what is happening there. Our role is difficult historically, because President Reagan is dedicated to the idea that the US cannot be the policeman of the hemisphere. In response to Valencia’s comment that he was impressed with that part of the President’s CBI speech, Ambassador Enders commented that it was in the President’s own words. 4 Secretary Haig said it is important that we are not going into the CBI with excessive expectations. Our attitude toward the security problem is much the same. The development of the CBI concept is very important and Ecuador has been helpful. Ambassador Enders said that we are about to announce the US delegation to observe the El Salvador elections. Senator Kassebaum, Father Hesburgh and Clark Kerr are among our six representatives. Valencia noted that Ecuador is sending two people from its elections board. Ambassador Enders mentioned that the US was encouraged by the formation of the Central American Democratic Community and hoped that other countries would join eventually. Venezuela and Colombia are supportive. Enders suggested that maybe the Andean Pact as a whole would at some point express its approval of the organization. Valencia commented that the St. Lucia resolution on Central America and the Caribbean was a very good step. Secretary Haig said that there was a new spirit in the OAS. We must be wise enough to nurture it. The US is prepared to do all it can to assist and encourage. 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) February 1981. Confidential. The meeting took place in Haig’s office. Drafted by Hart; cleared by Haig and Enders. Goldberg initialed for Haig. 2 See Document 372 . 3 The United States imposed an embargo on tuna imports from Ecuador on November 3, 1980. The fishery dispute hinged upon Ecuador’s assertion of offshore territorial claims of 200 miles and the U.S. recognition of 12 offshore miles of territorial rights for migratory species, including tuna. See Juan de Onis, “U.S., in Reprisal, Bans Imports of Tuna From Ecuador,” New York Times , November 7, 1980, p. 7. 4 Reagan’s February 24 remarks on the CBI to the OAS Permanent Council are in Public Papers , Reagan, 1982, Book I, pp. 210–215. Also see Foreign Relations , 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 82 . 374. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the White House and the Department of State 374. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the White House and the Department of State 1 Bogota, August 9, 1982, 2028Z 8491. Subject: Vice President Bush’s meeting with Ecuadorian President Oswaldo Hurtado, August 7, 1982. 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. The Vice President was accompanied by Admiral Murphy, National Security Advisor Nancy Bearg Dyke, DAS Everett Briggs, Don Barnes (interpreter), and Gerald Whitman (notetaker). Foreign Minister Luis Valencia accompanied President Hurtado. 3. Summary: The meeting was animated, frank, and very cordial, lasting more than 45 minutes. In response to the Vice President’s expression of strong U.S. interest in and support for the democratic process in Ecuador, President Hurtado said he had followed and appreciated the position of the U.S. with respect to that process. The discussion revealed considerable differences of view over the U.S. role in the Malvinas/Falklands crisis 2 and over its significance for Latin America; Hurtado expressed support for the administration’s human rights policies but called for more U.S. attention to Latin America, particularly in the economic area. End summary. 4. Hurtado said his late arrival in Colombia was due to preparations for the opening of Congress on August 10. He said Ecuador was passing through a critical moment in its history. The Vice President said the U.S. administration attached great importance to the democratic process in Ecuador and in its continuation; Hurtado said he had been following and appreciated the U.S. interest in Ecuador’s democratic evolution. 5. In response to the Vice President’s request for Ecuador’s views on U.S. relations with the hemisphere following the Malvinas crisis, Hurtado said he hadn’t noted any overt hostility toward the U.S. in Ecuador. However, it was evident that strong anti-U.S. sentiment existed there as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere. Hurtado asked for clarification to help him understand the U.S. position; it seemed the crisis had demonstrated that the U.S. gives higher priority to its ties with the North Atlantic countries than to its relationship with Latin America. Ecuador didn’t agree with Argentina’s aggression, but at the same time it could not ignore the juridical rights of a country to territory which had been taken by a colonial power. 6. The Vice President told Hurtado there had been much misunderstanding of the U.S. role. First the United States had used its good offices to attempt to negotiate a peaceful solution and Secretary Haig had worked hard to avoid bloodshed and avert military action. When the Argentines took military action the U.S. had no alternative but to support the UN resolution against aggression. The U.S. position reflected opposition to the use of force to resolve territorial disputes, but it did not signify support for colonialism. The U.S. has had a close historical relationship with Great Britain, but that did not mean the U.S. had assigned a low priority to Latin America. President Reagan from the beginning has emphasized the area as one of great importance to U.S. interests. In terms of priorities, this administration had tried to turn around what it felt was neglect by its predecessors. We sought to improve relations with Brazil and Argentina, adopting a more balanced approach toward the region on human rights. President Reagan reached out immediately to the President of Mexico. The reality was that the U.S. recognized its vital interests in the region, but the Latin American perception of this was different and that was the problem. 7. Hurtado said that the Malvinas episode had given the U.S. an opportunity to review its relationship with Latin America. An essential element of that review should be the international economic crisis. Never in the last thirty years has Latin America had an economic situation as dangerous to the stability of its institutions. He agreed with the Vice President that the strength of the U.S. economy was an important factor affecting Latin American economies; U.S. decisions could either favor or damage their development. One such favorable decision was the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative, but the U.S. needed to do more such as devoting more resources to multilateral financial institutions. 8. The Vice President emphasized that the health of the U.S. economy was the key to continued or expanded U.S. assistance. It was unrealistic politically to expect the U.S. Congress to expand assistance when the economy was suffering. A recovery in the U.S. was in process now, not as strong as we would like, but the worst has passed. The U.S. would do what it could, but present day economic realities precluded anything like a Marshall Plan for Latin America. 9. Hurtado said that he realized the initial impression by some that the Reagan administration would not care about human rights had been wrong. The U.S. had demonstrated its continued concern for these ideals in its support for Ecuador. He also acknowledged the more balanced approach the U.S. had taken world wide in applying its human rights policies. 10. Hurtado expressed concern over the greater U.S. tendency toward bilateral diplomacy, saying it was important also to conduct relations through multilateral fora as well, particularly as regards economic issues. He asked whether the U.S. would be receptive to a new multilateral forum which would address hemispheric economic issues. In response, the Vice President said the use of multilateral channels had been prejudiced by irrelevant political rhetoric. For example, violently anti-U.S. positions in the OAU and NAM had set back U.S. public support for multilateral organizations. However, if a Latin American proposal were advanced for a multilateral forum to address economic issues, the U.S. would give it serious consideration as a constructive use of multilateral diplomacy. 11. In closing, Hurtado thanked the Vice President for his deep interest in Latin America. He said the Vice President’s presence in Colombia was evidence that the USVP was indeed interested in Latin America, and such expressions of interest would solidify hemispheric relations. Boyatt 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820415–0348. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Panama City, San Jose, and Santiago. Sent for information Immediate to Quito. Bush visited Bogota, August 6–8, to attend the inauguration of President Betancur. 2 See Document 47, footnote 2 . 375. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 375. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 1 Washington, March 31, 1983 SUBJECT Official Working Visit of President Osvaldo Hurtado of Ecuador I. SETTING President Hurtado visits Washington at the most troubled time since Ecuador returned to democracy in 1979. Economic activity is at its lowest level in years and has fueled discontent with the government in business, labor and military sectors. Hurtado’s courageous decision in March to impose essential austerity measures needed to come to terms with the IMF prompted a potentially dangerous general strike. U.S. political support has been important to Hurtado. He very much wanted and welcomed the White House invitation. 2 (He was scheduled for a visit in May 1982 but requested a postponement because of the South Atlantic conflict.) 3 Democracy’s roots in Ecuador are tender but Hurtado is dedicated to nurturing them. As a scholar and leader of the left-of-center Christian Democrats, his hope has been to wean Ecuador away from destructive cycles of personalism and militarism. His party’s minority position and the financial emergency, however, have hampered his efforts. Since mid-1982, his main goal has been to see Ecuador through to the elections in 1984. The President draws some strength from the democratic structure he is trying to preserve. Most politicians and influential newspapers still back the constitutional order. Despite political unrest, Ecuador remains free of guerrillas and terrorists. Moderate military leaders realize they have no better proposals for dealing with the economic crisis than do the civilians. Helpful, too, have been the patience and understanding of foreign banks. Finally, widespread awareness that the U.S. and other hemispheric democracies would not look kindly on a coup has restrained plotters. Hurtado faces formidable problems. Unfulfilled hopes raised by the oil wealth of the seventies haunt the country. Inflation, now 30 percent, pinches the man on the street. The business community is troubled and distrusts the President’s motives. The congress avoids responsibility for painful economic measures. Unions sometimes press unreasonable demands. Some military leaders are restive and ambitious; even those who are not brood about the impact of the economic crisis on military income and hardware procurement. Should the armed forces not intervene effectively on Hurtado’s behalf in case of sustained popular unrest, the government could fall. Hurtado’s style contributes to his troubles. Formerly the Vice President, he was thrust unexpectedly into the limelight when President Roldos died in an aircraft accident in 1981. 4 He is thoughtful, rather remote, and ill at ease with political infighting in a society which expects flamboyance and demagoguery from its leaders. While respected for his personal integrity and honesty, his seeming immobility in the face of difficult decisions leads to accusations of indecision. II. OBJECTIVES 1. Support For Democracy We want to demonstrate our strong commitment to Ecuador’s democratic system to Hurtado’s allies and adversaries and to the hemisphere as a whole. The U.S. already has played a key role through public support at nervous moments, visits of senior U.S. officials, CCC credits, the recent lifting of our tuna embargo 5 and, most importantly, in the Presidential invitation. 2. Ecuador’s Economic Problems We have told the Ecuadoreans not to expect additional economic assistance from this trip, but they will probably seek greater support in dealing with their current problems and with hemisphere debt problems generally. We should commend Hurtado’s efforts to reach agreement with the IMF and indicate our willingness to convey to the commercial banks our support for his economic reform program. 3. Bilateral Relations Our relations are generally excellent. Our economic and security assistance is modest but welcome. The Ecuadoreans are seeking reconsideration of the recent increase in Panama Canal tolls. Central America is not a major concern in Ecuador but the visit is a good opportunity to relate our strategy to Hurtado’s interest in hemisphere security. We should avoid any attempts to draw us into Ecuador’s historic dispute with Peru over access to the Amazon. 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 28E, Latin America. Confidential. Drafted on March 18 by Scott; cleared in ARA/PPC, ARA/ECP, P/M, S/P, P, EB/FD/OMA, E, OES, AID/LAC/SA, IO/UNP, INR, and INM/P. Enders sent the memorandum to Shultz under cover of a March 30 memorandum in which he wrote: “Hurtado’s working visit affords us the opportunity to reinforce our generally good bilateral relations with Ecuador; there are no urgently pressing issues in dispute.” See Document 376 and footnote 1 thereto. 2 Reagan’s May 4, 1982, letter inviting Hurtado for a June 21–23, 1982, working visit is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Ecuador (03/29/1983–11/01/1983). 3 In telegram 3865 from Quito, June 2, 1982, the Embassy reported on the cancellation of Ecuador’s participation in military exercise UNITAS XXIII and of Hurtado’s U.S. trip describing the later as a “last minute decision” and that “his decision was later explained to us by Foreign Ministry as taken reluctantly—out of a desire not to expose himself to press questions, at this juncture, on the South Atlantic crisis which could embarrass U.S.-Ecuadorean relations, either through adverse domestic reaction or by giving offense to U.S. hosts.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820290–0522) 4 See Document 370, footnote 2 . 5 In telegram 33460 to Quito, February 4, the Department wrote: “Dept. agrees with Ambassador that conditions now permit the U.S. to lift the embargo on Ecuadorean tuna products imposed in 1980” and instructed the Embassy to seek Ecuadorean participation in a regional licensing agreement. “In sum, Embassy may advise appropriate GOE officials that the USG is now willing to remove the embargo against Ecuadorean tuna products and is preparing the paperwork necessary to accomplish this, but that we do not want any public announcement concerning embargo at this time.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830066–0222) The “Removal of Prohibition on Importation of Tuna and Tuna Products From Ecuador and Peru,” was published by the Customs Service in the Federal Register , vol. 48, No. 76, April, 19, 1983, pp. 16798–16799. 376. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan 376. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan 1 Washington, April 7, 1983 I. PURPOSE Our main objective should be to buttress President Hurtado’s effort to maintain democracy in Ecuador. Our political support has helped him in this regard. By demonstrating our strong commitment to the democratic system, we will give a clear message not only to Hurtado’s allies but to his adversaries as well and to the hemisphere generally. 2 President Hurtado probably will seek additional U.S. assistance in overcoming Ecuador’s current economic crisis. He may also comment generally on the hemisphere’s debt problems. Ecuador is also seeking reconsideration of the recent increase in Panama Canal tolls. II. BACKGROUND Hurtado assumed the Presidency in 1981 when President Roldos was killed in an aircraft accident. Hurtado has managed his portfolio as well as could be expected given Ecuador’s fledgling democracy, unstable economy, and erratic foreign policy. Economic activity, aggravated by a failure to adjust spending patterns to lower petroleum prices, is the lowest it has been in years. This has resulted in discontent in the business and labor communities and within the military. Inflation is 30 percent. The business community distrusts President Hurtado’s motives; and the military has been plotting to unseat him almost since he assumed power. Hurtado’s decision to impose austerity measures needed for a $170M stand-by agreement with the IMF prompted a potentially dangerous general strike last month. Despite political unrest and severe economic problems, Ecuador does not have a guerrilla or terrorist problem. Because of the many problems he faces across a broad spectrum, Hurtado’s primary goal is to see Ecuador through to next year’s elections. Relations between our countries are generally excellent. We have recently lifted our tuna embargo and should indicate support for Hurtado’s economic reform measures and efforts to reach agreement with the IMF. 3 [Omitted here are a list of participants, a press plan, and a schedule.] 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Ecuador (03/29/1983–11/01/1983). Top Secret. Prepared by North. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan signed his initials at the top of the page. No memoranda of conversation have been found. Attached as Tab A, but not printed, are talking points. Attached as Tab B, but not printed, is Shultz’s March 31 memorandum to Reagan. See Document 375 . Attached as Tab C, but not printed, are background papers, papers on the political situation, the economic situation, foreign relations, and the Panama Canal tolls, and a CIA Special Analysis/Bio Brief. Tab D, a departure statement, was not attached. Reagan and Hurtado’s remarks are in Public Papers: Reagan, 1983 , Book I, p. 517. Hurtado visited Washington for an official working visit April 7–9. According to the President’s Daily Diary, on April 8 Hurtado met with Reagan in the Oval Office from 11:36 a.m to 12:17 p.m, followed by a working luncheon in the State Dining Room from 12:17 to 1:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) 2 Reagan wrote in his personal diary on April 8: “Pres. Hurtado of Ecuador arrived—a good meeting & working lunch in the St. Dining Room. He’s an intelligent young man and dedicated to maintaining the new found democracy in his country & wants to see it spread throughout Central & So. America.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries , vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 214) 3 See footnote 5, Document 375 . In telegram 3004 from Quito, April 18, the Embassy wrote: “Several April 17 newspapers carried an Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry statement denying the signing of a fishing agreement with the United States recently. The denial was prompted by the allusion made by an Ecuadorean TV panelist April 14 to President Reagan’s White House remarks April 8 in the presence of President Hurtado. The panelist, ex-Foreign Minister and opposition alternate Congressman (CID) Julio Prado, chose to construe the White House remarks as suggesting a behind-the-scenes quid pro quo for lifting of the Ecuador tuna embargo.” The Embassy added that the Ecuadorean “clarification highlighted Ecuador’s claim to jurisdiction over tuna within the 200-mile zone.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830215–0908) 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, April 9, 1983, 2112Z 97975. Subject: Conversation between President Hurtado and Secretary Shultz, April 7, 1983. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Summary. In a very cordial 40-minute conversation, President Hurtado and Secretary of State Shultz discussed Ecuador’s economic situation and the general financial crisis in Latin America. Hurtado stressed the need for fresh capital flows to be resumed in the region to cover short-term liquidity problems. Secretary Shultz expressed admiration for the courageous steps Ecuador has taken. He agreed with much of the economic analysis of President Hurtado and pledged continuing US support for Ecuadorean democracy. End Summary. 3. The bilateral between Secretary Shultz and President Hurtado took place at the home of Ecuadorean Ambassador Crespo on April 7, 1983. It began at 9:40 a.m. and lasted approximately 40 minutes. Also present at the discussion were Foreign Minister Valencia, Ambassador Crespo, Assistant Secretary Enders, Ambassador Hart (notetaker), Stephanie Van Reigersberg (interpreter), and Paul Williams (interpreter). 4. Following Secretary Shultz’ words of welcome, President Hurtado launched immediately into a discussion of Ecuador’s economic problems and the general difficulties of the region. He said that Ecuador is now concluding the renegotiation of its public foreign debt, has started discussions to restructure the private sector debt and expects to reach agreement on a standby with the IMF soon. Changes in Ecuador’s debt profile will alleviate its liquidity problem but will not resolve the longer-term difficulties. The government is attempting to increase internal savings to finance development. In past years, Ecuador has relied on external savings for investment and has found this type of development to be very fragile. The GOE has recently raised taxes on consumption items such as tobacco and beer as well as public service and utility prices. In this way it hopes to extract savings from the more prosperous sector of society. At the same time, it has lowered subsidies on petroleum and other products of primary necessity. This has been very difficult politically because Ecuador has a weak presidency and under-developed institutions. Two weeks ago the country passed through a very serious political crisis following the latest increase in petroleum prices and the second devaluation of the sucre in a year. 5. Hurtado continued that these measures in themselves are insufficient to resolve Ecuador’s economic problems. Since last August the country has been cut off from loans from private international banks. No economy can stand such a shock when it has become used to large flows of bank credit. In New York yesterday Hurtado explained the country’s need for fresh credits to the banking community. The country’s recovery also depends on continued low international interest rates and no further fall in the prices of Ecuador’s exports. Hurtado noted that a one percent rise in the interest rate and a one dollar decrease in oil-prices costs Ecuador a total of 80 million dollars in foreign exchange per year. Ecuador’s problems are common to most of Latin America and their resolution is required to preserve democracy. Many think it is a miracle that Ecuadorean democracy has survived the recent stress. Its future will depend on international cooperation. 6. Secretary Shultz expressed his appreciation for Hurtado’s comments and offered his views on Ecuador and the international economic situation. The Secretary congratulated Hurtado on the success he has had in implementing measures which will be very beneficial over time. He expressed US support for what Hurtado has done and for Ecuadorean democracy. It is important that the democratic process be preserved in Ecuador both for that country’s own sake and as a demonstration to the hemisphere of what can be accomplished. The Secretary praised Ecuador’s efforts to raise domestic savings to finance development. This is a problem of world scale. President Reagan is also pursuing policies to this end in the United States. The US is heavily involved with the IMF and other institutions which will help our neighbors to cope with their debt. We are concentrating on the IMF as the major instrument to achieve this—recognizing that all measures taken are interrelated. The US believes all members of the world economy must pull together to resolve the present financial crisis. To achieve this, we need a general economic expansion so that increased trade will finance debt repayment. The US is trying to raise its growth rate and is urging other strong economies like Japan and Germany to adopt stimulative measures. We recognize the need to preserve liquidity and an open trading system. US policy is to support countries which are dealing with their short-term debt problem while we try to create an expanding world economy without excessive inflation—one of the reasons for our present difficulties. 7. President Hurtado responded that the interdependence of the world economy unfortunately is not understood elsewhere, such as in some private banks. The US must help to raise the consciousness of others to this. If Latin America’s problems are not resolved, it will cause other countries’ recovery to falter. He welcomed the recent good news about the US economy, but pointed out that it will take time for its benefits to be felt in Latin America. It could take one–three years before Ecuador’s export prices rise. Meanwhile, the short-term problem is serious and societies with weak institutions are in danger. The very survival of democracy in Ecuador is threatened. In such circumstances the IMF must realize that it cannot impose unreasonable conditionality on its loans. It must avoid applying mechanical formula without considering the social, political and cultural conditions in borrowing countries. 8. Secretary Shultz commented that the IMF can, through its conditions, help countries to do economically necessary things which are politically difficult. However, it must try to find the right mix between the politically possible and the economically desirable so that it does not go too far. If there are particular things in Ecuador’s negotiations with the fund that it would like the US to bring up, the Secretary said he would be glad to know about them. 9. President Hurtado commented that he knew the US did not control the IMF. The focus of present discussions between the Central Bank and the Fund is over the size of the fiscal gap. He did not know if this had been resolved in recent days. In any case, the IMF must recognize that the present crisis is different from those in the past because it is generalized and not limited to a few countries. 10. Secretary Shultz agreed with this point and said the IMF is increasingly aware of it. The world must also recognize that the locomotive idea of any single economy pulling along a world recovery is wrong. It will require a much more integrated process. 11. President Hurtado said that protectionist policies are obstacles to an economic recovery. Ecuador relies on foreign trade. Due to structural problems, import demand is rigid. 12. Hurtado then shifted the subject to Ecuador’s classification some months ago as a “sub-standard risk” by a United States Agency which advises US banks. Hurtado expressed the hope that Ecuador’s credit worthiness would be moved to a higher category as soon as it reaches agreement with the IMF and creditor banks. He asked Secretary Shultz if the committee could meet soon to reconsider Ecuador’s classification. 13. The Secretary said he was glad to be alerted to this problem. Assistant Secretary Enders stated that he would follow-up on the matter. The Secretary closed the meeting by reiterating US support for Ecuadorean democracy and pledging continued cooperation. He suggested to President Hurtado that he repeat some of the analysis on the world economic situation to President Reagan during the talks scheduled for April 8. 2 Eagleburger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830211–0187. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to La Paz, Bogota, Caracas, Lima, and USCINCSO. Drafted by Hart; cleared by Enders and in ARA/AND, and S/S–O; approved by Shultz. 2 See footnote 1, Document 376 . 378. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Ecuador 378. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Ecuador 1 New York, October 5, 1983, 1325Z Secto 10039. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with President Hurtado. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Summary. Hurtado’s principal focus was economic with a call for greater flexibility and understanding by the IMF and the IFI’s for the problems Ecuador faces and the tough austerity measures it has already undertaken. Despite its economic problems, the Ecuadorean democratic process remains on track. The Secretary was sympathetic to Hurtado’s concerns, especially the impact of austerity programs on international trade, but noted that the IMF had to be strict if long-term recovery is to be assured. Hurtado noted a more positive and pragmatic attitude in the NAM. He also said he would be proposing development projects with Peru to eventually resolve their border problems. End summary. 3. The Secretary and President Hurtado had a cordial 30 minute exchange at Hurtado’s New York hotel suite evening of September 30. Hurtado was accompanied by FonMin Valencia, Ambassadors Crespo, Falconi OAS and Albornoz U.N. On the U.S. side, Under Secretary Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary Motley, Ambassador Hart and ARA/AND Deputy Director Scott notetaker also attended. 4. The Secretary opened by regretting that poor weather had delayed his arrival in New York, forcing postponement of their meeting scheduled that morning. Hurtado said that weather seems to affect his visits to the U.S., recalling the delay in his arrival for his official working visit to Washington last April, a visit he termed very productive. 2 The Secretary recalled well their earlier meeting. He noted that the U.S. economy had strengthened in recent months even more than had been anticipated when he had talked with Hurtado last. While this should help the world economy, the Secretary recognized that Ecuador faced particularly difficult problems, including the El Nino flooding, but he admired and supported the GOE’s efforts to deal with the situation. Hurtado noted that indeed everything seemed to be conspiring against his government and the democratic system—except the Ecuadorean armed forces. Despite the problems, however, democracy was surviving, the election campaign was underway and the transition to the new government next year would be peaceful. 5. Hurtado then turned to the principal focus of his discussion—Ecuador’s difficulties with the international financial institutions. Hurtado asserted that while Ecuador still faces many problems in its domestic economy, there are hopeful signs as well. The economy is stabilizing, the private sector is growing, inflation is coming down and unemployment remains relatively low. Despite this progress, Hurtado wanted to express his concern to the Secretary about the attitudes of the IMF and the IFIs. Hurtado commended President Reagan’s strong support for increased funding for the IMF which reflected an understanding by the U.S. of North-South issues. However, the IMF and the IFI’s do not apparently share this understanding. The IMF is a “frozen” institution, insufficiently flexible in its criteria, and interventionist in its approach. Ecuador recognizes its own responsibilities for getting its economic house in order and has already taken tough austerity measures. For example, it has cut the GOE’s budget deficit from 7 to 4 percent of the GDP to meet IMF targets. But there are political limits to such measures and there must be an end to them in sight if the people are to accept them. The IMF’s difficult attitude also affects Ecuador’s access to international commercial credits. 6. Hurtado asserted that the IDB and the World Bank are similarly inflexible in their demands, often based on economic theories rather than political realities. The IDB, for example, demanded impractical positive sub-lending interest rates at least 60 percent at Ecuador’s current rate of inflation, in an emergency agriculture sector loan to rebuild flooded farmlands. Similarly, the GOE had to reject a 100 million dollars World Bank loan for electric power development because it required a doubling of electric rates—even though the GOE is already increasing the rate by 3 percent per month. When the Secretary noted that 3 percent would still be a negative rate, Hurtado argued that Ecuador’s current high rate of inflation is abnormal and temporary, due almost exclusively to the El Nino floods and the resulting sharp increase in food prices. 7. The Secretary agreed that Hurtado’s concerns were legitimate, although he noted he did not have all the details about Ecuador’s particular problems. However, IMF funds are limited and must be carefully allocated. While some adjustments by the IMF to individual country situations are possible, its programs must be fairly consistent if reforms needed to ensure long-term economic growth are to succeed. The Secretary did note that the austerity aspects of IMF programs are perhaps overdone. The U.S. faces a 70 billion dollars trade deficit this year; other economies must expand if we are to reduce that deficit. Nonetheless, the IMF has to have tough standards to carry out its responsibilities. In so doing, it must mind the business of others, an inevitable conflict. The Secretary again complimented President Hurtado on his government’s performance and termed the reduction in the GOE deficit remarkable. He assured Hurtado he would bear the President’s thoughts in mind during USG deliberations on development policy. 8. Turning to NAM, Hurtado said he had called on the leaders of India, Yugoslavia and Egypt during the UNGA and had attended the NAM Chiefs of State meeting September 29. He had told the NAM leaders that Ecuador and much of Latin America would welcome a return by the NAM to its original principles. Hurtado was encouraged by the current atmosphere in the NAM, less ideological and confrontational, more pragmatic. The Secretary said that we shared his assessment of a more positive attitude on the part of the truly non-aligned nations and are working hard to encourage it. The USSR, however, appeared to remain very confrontational in its approach. 9. Hurtado touched briefly on Ecuador’s relations with Peru. Ecuador wants to reduce tensions between two peoples who have so much in common. Hurtado hopes to propose soon a program of border development projects which will gradually create the conditions needed to settle the border issue. The Secretary welcomed Hurtado’s views which he termed constructive. 10. The Secretary concluded by wishing Hurtado well with his economic program and for the future of Ecuador’s democratic system. Hurtado asked that the Secretary convey his personal greetings to President Reagan. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830576–0951. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Guayaquil, Lima, and USUN. 2 See Documents 375 and 376 . 379. Memorandum of Conversation 379. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 26, 1984, 9:45–10 a.m. SUBJECT President’s Meeting with Ecuadorean President-elect Leon Febres Cordero PARTICIPANTS President Ronald Reagan Vice President George Bush Secretary of State George P. Shultz Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Council RADM John M. Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Constantine Menges, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC Samuel F. Hart, U.S. Ambassador President-elect Leon Febres Cordero Vice President-elect Blasco Penaherrera Congressman-elect Sixto Duran Ballen President Reagan welcomed the President-elect and congratulated him on his recent electoral victory. 2 The President said that Vice President Bush would represent him at the August 10 inauguration in Quito. 3 Febres Cordero thanked the President and explained that he had campaigned on the same policies as President Reagan—i.e., use of the market to set prices. He then explained how Ecuador’s economic condition had worsened since 1979 when the country had returned to democracy from military rule. The size of the, budget, the deficit, the rate of inflation, the number of public sector employees and the external debt were all much greater today than five years ago. The Febres Cordero government has the political will to make the necessary changes to correct this situation, but they will need help from the US, he said. If the new government fails in Ecuador, the democratic system will fail. The new government takes office with a 100,000 vote margin of victory, but this could easily change. If the government succeeds, an historic victory will have been achieved and Ecuador can become the showplace for American democracy. President Reagan responded that we wish to help, but we also have constraints. Secretary Shultz added that Peter McPherson has been discussing ways in which PL–480 and our housing program can be used early in the new administration to provide a political offset to politically difficult actions such as major increases in gasoline prices. 4 President Reagan continued that the deterioration in such matters as the size of the budget and inflation had occurred in the US as it had in Ecuador. One of the successes of this Administration had been to reduce the inflation rate to 1/3 of what it had been earlier. The biggest improvement, however, had been in putting people to work. Six million jobs have been created in the last 18 months through the activities of free enterprise. The Ecuadorean President-elect outlined Ecuador’s difficulty in servicing its external debt. The country exports approximately $2.5 billion a year. In 1979, 15% of exports were used to service the debt. Now interest alone consumes 40% of exports. Yesterday’s rise of 1/2% in the US prime rate will cost Ecuador approximately $35 million. President Reagan responded that the high interest rates are a great frustration to him and that he believes the problem is mainly psychological. The financial community still does not believe that the Administration will not revert to inflationary policies. The government does have control, President Reagan said, and he is mad about the bank actions. Vice President Bush pointed out that Febres Cordero will be meeting tonight with the major international banks and the President-elect said that he would pass on the President’s thoughts. The meeting closed with Febres Cordero’s extension of best wishes to President Reagan in the upcoming US elections. He said that the western world needs President Reagan’s leadership. ACTION COMMITMENTS: The Vice President will represent the President at the August 10 inauguration in Quito. 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 47F, Latin America. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 2 Febres-Cordero won the May 6 election. See Alan Riding, “Businessman Wins in Ecuador Vote,” New York Times , May 7, 1984, p. A13. 3 In message WH6462 to the Department of State and the Embassy in Ecuador, August 13, the White House sent a summary of Bush’s August 11 meeting with Febres-Cordero at the Ecuadorian Presidential Palace. (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, OA/ID 19809–016, Foreign Travel Files, 19809–016, Vice President’s Trip to Ecuador, August 10–11, 1984: Memcons) Reagan’s August 8 congratulatory letter to Febres-Cordero is in the Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (07/15/1984–04/02/1985). 4 In telegram 190917 to Quito, June 29, the Department reported on Shultz’s June 6 meeting with President-elect Febres-Cordero, writing: “The Secretary told President-elect Febres Cordero that the United States will work for the success of its free market approach to Ecuador’s development. Febres said he hopes to end the government’s practice of subsidizing prices in his country but wants to move concurrently to provide food and housing. On relations with the communists, Febres declared that he has warned both the Cuban and Soviet Ambassadors that they must behave.” The Department also reported that McPherson, who attended the meeting, “expressed the hope that the USG can help through the housing investment guarantee program. We hope to be able to dedicate PL 480 proceeds to housing, McPherson continued. The creation of employment and visible housing would give political cover to measures such as raising gasoline prices.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840417–0818) 380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, June 29, 1984, 0132Z 190917. Subject: Meeting between Secretary Shultz and President-elect Febres Cordero, June 26, 1984. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary: The Secretary told President-elect Febres Cordero that the United States will work for the success of its free market approach to Ecuador’s development. Febres said he hopes to end the government’s practice of subsidizing prices in his country but wants to move concurrently to provide food and housing. On relations with the communists, Febres declared that he has warned both the Cuban and Soviet Ambassadors that they must behave. End summary. 3. Participants: Secretary Shultz, Under Secretary Wallis, Assistant Secretary Motley, AID Administrator McPherson, Ambassador Hart, and ARA/AND Director Rondon were present on the American side; President-elect Leon Febres Cordero, Vice-President-elect Blasco Penaherrera, Congressman-elect Sixto Duran Ballen, as well as the President-elect’s two brothers: Nicolas and Agustin, represented Ecuador. 4. The Secretary congratulated President-elect Febres Cordero on his election, expressing enthusiasm for the ideas of the new Ecuadorean President. The Secretary said we want to be helpful. 5. Ecuador today. The President-elect compared today’s situation in Ecuador to 1979. He said the 70’s was the decade of the oil boom in Ecuador. By 1979 foreign reserves stood at 800 million dols, there was a seven percent rate of inflation, there were 150,000 civil servants, and it took about 15 percent of exports to service an external debt of 3 billion dols. Febres lamented that his predecessors did not take advantage of this to build the country’s agricultural infrastructure. Instead, by 1984, inflation has reached 50 percent annually, the bureaucracy has doubled, the public debt risen to 8 billion dols which takes 35 percent of exports just to service interest, and the fiscal deficit has ballooned. And now, he lamented, the U.S. prime rate has risen by one-half point which will cost Ecuador 33 million dols. 6. Economic plans. The new President spoke of his determination to end price subsidies, stating that if the price of gasoline were doubled to seventy-five cents the budget deficit would be eliminated. He cautioned, however, that raising the price of gasoline will cause social unrest. He warned that it would be very easy for Ecuador to slip to the left given the relatively-slim 100,000 vote margin by which he won over his presidential opponent. Febres said he wanted us to know that if Ecuador is helped, his new administration will show that the democratic/market mechanism process can develop a country. 7. The Secretary suggested that if the price of gasoline is increased, that it be done the first week in office. The Secretary recalled President Reagan’s decision to decontrol oil prices. This was done in the first days of the new administration and today is considered as one of the smartest actions of the administration. But the decision was a source of considerable upset at the time it was taken. Febres Cordero commented that the Ecuadorean economy as not as responsive as the American. He felt a need to compensate the working people for whatever steps he takes, mentioning a desire to provide housing. 8. U.S. assistance. AID Administrator McPherson expressed the hope that the USG can help through the housing investment guarantee program. We hope to be able to dedicate PL 480 proceeds to housing, McPherson continued. The creation of employment and visible housing would give political cover to measures such as raising gasoline prices. The idea, McPherson went on, is that the difficult steps be taken in tandem with improvement of the housing/food situation. McPherson said he would be disappointed if programs were not ready for implementation at the time of the new President’s inauguration. 9. The Secretary declared he would be disappointed too if we cannot get the programs rolling by then. 10. Central America/Cuba. The President-elect changed subjects, expressing his belief in self determination and non-intervention. He said that Ecuador will help work for peace in Central America. He referred in passing to the existence of a frontier problem with Peru but said no more. 11. The Secretary pointed to Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan intervention in Central America, including their attempt to subvert El Salvador. Such subversion stands in the way of the economic development we seek to promote in Central America. It will be hard to achieve these goals if Nicaragua is allowed to exist as a privileged sanctuary for guerrillas. The Secretary noted that the outgoing Hurtado administration had upgraded relations with Cuba. He asked how Febres Cordero would handle the Cuban connection. 12. The President-elect referred to conversations he has had with the Cuban and Soviet Ambassadors. With the former, Febres Cordero said he was very direct and told the Cuban Ambassador that he wanted no problems with Havana, as long as Castro keeps hands off Ecuador. Febres Cordero also reported that he informed the Soviet Ambassador that Ecuador would not invade the USSR, and that he expects reciprocity. Febres Cordero thought he had made his point to the Soviets. 13. In a closing comment, Febres Cordero stated that his victory broke the invincibility of the left in Latin America. This fact will unify Ecuador’s fractioned left against the Febres Cordero Government. 14. The Secretary repeated that we want the Febres Cordero administration to succeed and we will help it. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840417–0818. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Lima. Drafted by Rondon; cleared by McPherson, Wallis, and McKinley, and S; approved by Motley. 381. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 381. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA 84–10082 Washington, August 1984 [Omitted here is a title page.] Ecuador’s New Administration: Challenges and Prospects The new conservative administration of President Leon Febres-Cordero faces an array of serious, interrelated problems, the most difficult of which is the struggling economy. He has inherited high inflation and unemployment, depressed manufacturing and construction sectors, and a foreign debt service burden that will consume 35 percent of export earnings this year. Rising interest rates and a continued slump in the market for oil—one of Ecuador’s principal exports—will plague Febres-Cordero’s efforts to improve the country’s external accounts. Meanwhile, the stringent, free market adjustment measures he promises to employ to foster recovery in the domestic economy will produce negative political repercussions, such as labor unrest and congressional obstructionism. His plans to cut basic commodity subsidies, decrease regulation, and liquidate state monopolies will leave him open to attacks from opponents on the center-left and left, who control a majority of the seats in Congress. The President’s own coalition—six conservative groups out of Ecuador’s legally registered parties—is only a loose union. Leftist subversive groups—relatively new to Ecuador—hope that Febres-Cordero’s conservative policies will swell the pool of alienated youth and leftists from which they draw recruits. Armed terrorist groups—including members of the Alfaro Vive Carajo (“Alvaro Lives, Damn It” or AVC) organization and militants from the Ecuadorean Socialist Revolutionary Party—are currently small but [ less than 1 line not declassified ] are planning increased violent activities this fall. Moreover, the latter is receiving Cuban assistance, and [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Havana may be considering offering similar aid to what we believe is the AVC. In attacking these problems, Febres-Cordero has a number of advantages: • Foreign bankers are reported to be pleased with his plans for economic recovery, and this will improve the chances for new lending and foreign investment. • His economic philosophy and background as a businessman will garner strong political support from Ecuador’s private sector. • The conservative armed forces, according to the US defense attache [ less than 1 line not declassified ] solidly favor the administration’s political and economic programs and its pro-US stance in foreign affairs. • The President’s political skills and charismatic style—always important considerations in Ecuador’s fragmented political environment—will enable him to retain substantial popular backing. • Febres-Cordero’s opponents are not united, ideologically or otherwise, and they are vulnerable to a variety of political carrots and sticks that are at the President’s ready disposal. We believe Febres-Cordero will marshal these assets sufficiently well to keep opposition activity at controllable levels at least during his first year in office and thus continue the consolidation of Ecuador’s five-year-old democracy. We believe he will act promptly on economic matters while foreign lenders are sympathetic and before domestic opponents can organize their forces. Even under favorable circumstances, however, he will have recurring difficulty, in our view, meeting foreign debt payments, keeping Ecuador in compliance with IMF criteria, and paying for imports to reactivate the industrial sector. We expect the President to use populist tactics—such as low-cost subsidized housing and job-creation programs—as well as patronage and legal sanctions to keep labor and leftist political challenges under control. We judge that security force countermeasures and public hostility toward violence will prevent the nascent terrorist movement from growing quickly enough to threaten the government’s stability over the next two years or so. US interests in Ecuador will be served by the new administration’s intention to follow a moderate course in foreign affairs and to support US positions in international forums. This does not necessarily assure that Febres-Cordero will avoid cooperation with some of the more aggressive Latin American debtors at regional meetings on the debt question. Despite his nationalistic rhetoric, we doubt that Febres-Cordero will provoke tensions over Quito’s border dispute with Peru. He probably will not reverse his predecessor’s renewal of diplomatic ties with Cuba, since it could rally his leftist political opponents, unless he receives solid evidence that Havana is abetting terrorism against his government. [Omitted here is the body of the assessment.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1984), Box 1, Folder 14: Ecuador’s New Administration: Challenges & Prospects, August 1984. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the DO. Based on information available as of August 1. 382. Memorandum of Conversation 382. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Guayaquil, February 28, 1985 SUBJECT Secretary’s Meeting with Ecuadorean President Leon Febres-Cordero PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Assistant Secretary Langhorne A. Motley Assistant Secretary Bernard Kalb Ambassador Samuel F. Hart Ambassador-Designate Richard T. McCormack J. A. Purnell, Notetaker Ecuador President Leon Febres-Cordero Foreign Minister Edgar Teran Ambassador Mario Ribadeneira Ambassador Marcelo Fernandez de Cordova Ambassador Jaime Molestina SUMMARY President Febres-Cordero made an insistent appeal for additional U.S. assistance in his meeting with the Secretary. He emphasized the social costs which his economic rationalization policies have entailed. 2 Febres-Cordero said more U.S. aid would help him convince the Ecuadorean people that the temporary sacrifices he has asked them to bear will pay off. He asserted that he could not carry out his program without additional U.S. help. Febres-Cordero specifically mentioned PL–480, ESF, oil sales, and a multi-year Paris Club rescheduling agreement. The Secretary promised to look into how the U.S. might be able to increase assistance after he returns to Washington. END SUMMARY. The Secretary stopped at the military portion of Guayaquil Airport for three hours on February 28 for a bilateral and lunch hosted by President Leon Febres-Cordero. The initial bilateral lasted almost 40 minutes. The Secretary told President Febres-Cordero that he directed much of his time to arms control and the Middle East. Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq are responding to our concern that they come forward and actively seek progress toward peace. But President Reagan wishes to give primary foreign policy attention to our own neighborhood. We recognize that Febres-Cordero and we are on the same wavelength, and we appreciate that he is a democratically-elected president. Febres-Cordero responded that his policies, both foreign and domestic, were coherent. He had done in his seven months in office exactly what he had said he would do. His policies were designed to support democracy and free enterprise—not only in Ecuador, but as a model for all South America. He had told us in June when he had met with the President, the Vice-President, and the Secretary that he needed our assistance. On taking office, he discovered that the economic situation of the country was worse than he had believed. He said he now needed our help desperately. Febres-Cordero said he had to state very candidly, however, that so far he had received only sympathy rather than action. The aid he expected, which he thought he had a right to expect in view of his effort to promote shared policies and values, had not come. His policies were not conditioned on U.S. assistance, but we should understand that he lacked the resources to succeed on his own and that he was isolated from the rest of South America. He was thus shocked to get a report from the Foreign Ministry that for FY 1986, Ecuador was absolutely at the bottom of the list of U.S. aid recipients in Latin America. Febres-Cordero said he hoped to make the Secretary understand that what was at stake was the stability of democracy in Ecuador. It will take time for his economic stabilization measures and encouragement of private enterprise to show results. In the meantime, he needed resources to convince the people that the current sacrifices will lead to greater well-being. Febres-Cordero noted that the U.S. would need oil for its strategic petroleum reserve. He hoped Ecuador could supply some reasonable portion, such as 40,000 BPD, to stabilize its production and income. 3 The Secretary said it might be useful if we reviewed each type of aid to see what could be done, although he didn’t have all the numbers in his head. The Secretary recalled that Febres-Cordero and he had discussed a housing program last May. 4 Febres-Cordero said that program seemed to be working well up until now, but that he understood that the Treasury Department had opposed a Housing Guarantee program beyond FY 1985. The Secretary explained that we are well-off as a country, but that President Reagan was concerned about reducing our budget deficit. Subsidies were being reduced in several areas, including housing, but so far as he knew our assistance to the Ecuadorean housing program was going forward. The Secretary said he would be glad to push for more help in Washington, but the Ecuadoreans had to single out particular areas and programs, rather than simply asking for more assistance in general. Febres-Cordero responded that he had requested $25 million in PL–480, but we had agreed to only $15 million. The extra $10 million in assistance would make a tremendous difference to the growth of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the GOE had agreed with the steering committee of the private banks on a multi-year rescheduling of official debts, but it would need our help in negotiating a similar arrangement with official creditors in the Paris Club. The Secretary agreed to look into both these matters, though he noted that questions of precedent and comparability would have to be considered in the Paris Club. The Secretary returned to the question of PL–480, asking if ten million more in FY 1985 would satisfy the Ecuadoreans. Febres-Cordero said yes; Ambassador Hart noted that negotiations were set to begin on the $15 million that had been approved for FY 1985. Febres-Cordero noted that the USG was proposing $15 million in ESF for Ecuador in FY 1986 and asked that Ecuador receive at least that much. He tied his need for short term assistance to next January’s congressional elections, which he said would amount to a verdict on his entire administration and policy orientation. The Secretary again agreed to look into Febres-Cordero’s request on his return to Washington. The President asserted that he has had to make extraordinary efforts himself, indeed to go beyond the limits of Ecuador’s obsolete drug laws, to make progress in the fight against illicit drug trafficking. The effort has been perhaps the most successful of all his Government’s initiatives, precisely because the U.S. had responded to Ecuador’s request for assistance in fighting drug traffickers. This kind of cooperation and mutual effort should be replicated in other areas. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the GOE’s interdiction efforts and noted that it was in Ecuador’s own interests to prevent the drug traffickers from getting out of control as they had in Colombia. The Secretary agreed with Febres-Cordero’s emphasis on making a market economy work. But he told Febres-Cordero that Ecuador’s economy seemed to be doing better than the President was giving himself credit for. The Secretary praised the President’s prudent prediction of two and a half percent real growth in 1985, in spite of optimistic predictions of over four percent growth by some of his advisers. Better to predict two or three percent and achieve four percent than vice versa. The Secretary further noted that the U.S. must take into account economic performance in deciding how much help a country needed when allocating its assistance to various aid recipients. Febres-Cordero rejoined that political concurrence among aid donors and recipients also should be considered. Moreover, he faced an unprecedented alliance between bitterly divided Moscow-line and Maoist-line communists. It was precisely his strong preference for a free market policy which had overcome the communists’ strong internal rivalries. He also faced intervention from Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries, but he could handle their subversive activities. What he could not handle was a popular reaction to his economic rationalization measures during a transition to a thriving free market economy. The Secretary reiterated his willingness to push for more help for Ecuador on his return to Washington. The initial meeting then turned into a smaller bilateral, with only the President, the Secretary, the Foreign Minister, and Assistant Secretary Motley remaining. 5 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 51E, Ecuador. Confidential. Drafted in the Embassy in Ecuador; cleared by Motley and McKinley and PA, OAS, and S. The meeting took place in the Guayaquil airport. Shultz visited Guayaquil on February 28 before travelling to Montevideo for Sanguinetti’s inauguration, March 1–2. 2 In telegram 11483 from Quito, December 18, 1984, Hart wrote: “President Febres-Cordero vented his frustrations to me on December 16 about what he considers to be inadequate U.S. financial support for his government. I set the record straight by citing our extensive economic assistance, but I doubt he was convinced.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840015–0003) 3 Shultz sent a March 15 letter to Secretary of Energy John Herrington requesting Department of Energy cooperation in “arranging a joint Department of Energy/Defense Fuel Supply Center team to visit Quito, Ecuador, to discuss SPR procurement procedures with the Febres-Cordero government.” (Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 51E, Ecuador) In an April 5 memorandum to Shultz, Motley noted that the Department of Energy “plans no further purchases of sour crude, the only type Ecuador has to offer for the remainder of FY85.” Furthermore, given the probability of an SPR purchase moratorium in FY86, Motley recommended that no joint team be sent to Ecuador. Shultz approved the recommendation. (Ibid) 4 No memorandum of conversation for a May meeting between Shultz and Febres-Cordero has been found. See footnote 4, Document 379 . 5 See Document 383 . 383. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 383. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 1 March 1, 1985, 0157Z Secto 4012. Subject: Memorandum for the President: Ecuador. 1. Secret entire text. 2. Memorandum for: The President 3. From: George P. Shultz 4. Subject: Ecuador 5. I met with President Febres-Cordero in Guayaquil on a three hour stop enroute to Uruguay. I extended your invitation for an official working visit in the second half of 1985 which he immediately accepted and indicated that November would be good for him. 2 We left it that our respective staffs would coordinate a mutually convenient date. I also gave him the agricultural report and read your letter to him in a joint appearance before his press. 3 6. Febres, in his usual forthright, energetic free market manner gave me a quick report of seven months in office. He focused on three main points. First that he was a much watched experiment of a free market society in our hemisphere, secondly he could not do it without our help, and finally that we had not been forthcoming as much as he had hoped. 7. We discussed the various U.S. AID levels in FY 85 and 86 in addition to his efforts with the commercial banks and Paris Club. The net result was a mixed bag as far as our support and I took his points. I will follow up on some of his suggestions such as the Paris Club, PL–480 and possible strategic petroleum reserve purchases of Ecuadorean oil. I did tell him of your determined efforts to cut our deficit and the attendant result on all programs. Overall, I was impressed with his sincerity, unemotional but effective presentation, and this reminded me of our need—if possible—to go the extra mile for one of the few genuine free market Presidents in Latin America. 8. At Febres-Cordero’s request I had a smaller meeting (his Foreign Minister, Tony Motley) with him where he raised the subject of Nicaragua, Cuba and President Betancur of Colombia. 9. Febres-Cordero is one hundred percent in accord with US in seeing the communist danger in our hemisphere. Especially the increasing danger in Nicaragua. He told me that Betancur shared his assessment (a reversal he felt on the part of Betancur whom he has known for many years) and that to avoid the risk of U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua it was necessary to remove the Cuban impact/influence in Nicaragua, thereby isolating Nicaragua, and causing it to wither away. He also mentioned that possibly it might be necessary to address U.S.-Cuban difficulties in order to achieve the Cuban withdrawal from Nicaragua. He then told me that Betancur not only had great insight into Castro but also considerable influence. He also emphasized that he was authorized by Betancur to relay this discussion to me. 10. I really am not sure what to make of this conversation. Febres-Cordero is one of us. He is strongly anti-communist, gutsy and recognizes the danger to all if the Sandinistas consolidate. At the same time, Betancur is known to us as one who flirts with Castro, is persuasive and loves a mediating role. We also know that Castro has recently launched yet another peace offensive and with it come “signals” from all quarters of Castro’s sincerity and determination. I have asked Harry Shlaudeman and Tony Motley to mull this over and report back to me. Shultz 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (07/15/1984–04/02/1985). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from the Delegation’s aircraft. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the page. An unknown hand wrote “3/1/85” beneath his initials. 2 In a February 26 memorandum from Martin, McFarlane approved the recommendation that Shultz invite Febres-Codero for an official working visit. (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Coordination Office, State Visit of President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador (1)) 3 Reagan’s February 27 letter to Febres-Cordero forwarding the Report of the Presidential Agricultural Task Force to Ecuador is in Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (07/15/1984–04/02/1985). 384. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Stockman) 384. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Stockman) 1 Washington, July 29, 1985 SUBJECT FY 1985 ESF for Ecuador (C) I have been impressed with the free market economic policies developed by Ecuadorean President Febres-Cordero and believe we have a stake in the success of his programs because of the positive influence this would have on other Latin American Countries. 2 I believe that the political support President Febres-Cordero has given to us has also been helpful on issues that are important to US interests—Central America, Cuba, and the increasingly politicized approach to the debt problem. (S) In terms of strict economic need, Ecuador might not seem in as great a need for American help as other countries. Yet, I believe, that from time to time, it is both a legitimate and effective use of US power to send political signals to governments that are in sync with US goals and values. The Government of Ecuador fulfills that criteria. They have requested that we assist them, and I believe that ESF funding is appropriate for their current needs. (C) I would appreciate it if the ad hoc group, chaired by William Schneider, that was established to deal with this type of problem could be promptly convened to explore the possibility of securing FY 1985 ESF for Ecuador . 3 (C) Robert C. McFarlane 4 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (04/03/1985–08/01/1985). Secret. A copy was sent to Bush. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “Help for Febres.” Bush wrote at the top of the page: “I strongly concur!! GB 7–31.” Tillman sent the memo to McFarlane under cover of a July 18 memorandum, in which she wrote: “I have felt for some time that it is a legitimate and effective use of US power to send political signals to countries and governments that are in sync with US goals and values. Money is such a signal, and Ecuador is infinitely deserving.” Tillman also noted: “Febres-Cordero’s economic program—he’s doing all the right things, and his success will encourage other Latins to consider implementing similar economic policies. And, as a conservative, he is and will continue to be helpful to us on issues ranging from Central America, Cuba, and the politicization of the debt issue.” 2 Bush drew a checkmark on the left-hand margin next to “positive influence.” 3 Bush drew a line along this paragraph on the left-hand margin and underlined: “explore the possibility of securing FY1985 ESF for Ecuador.” 4 McFarlane signed the memorandum “Bud McFarlane” above his typed signature. 385. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 385. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M–85–10130 Washington, December 18, 1985 ECUADOR: The Febres-Cordero Administration After One Year Summary President Leon Febres-Cordero’s state visit to Washington in January comes at the one-and-a-half year point in his four-year term and at a time when he has made some significant progress on several fronts. 2 In particular, he has made great strides in setting the country on the road to a slow but steady economic recovery by adopting market-oriented strategies to promote entrepreneurial activity, stimulate investment, and revive growth. His economic and financial moves, some of them politically difficult, are already producing positive results in both external accounts and domestic recovery. The chief threat to this economic revival is the weakness of the world market for oil, Ecuador’s chief foreign exchange earner. Febres-Cordero also has launched a vigorous and successful drug enforcement campaign, with Ecuador accounting for 25 percent of the cocaine hydrochloride seized in South America in the first half of 1985. Despite his highly publicized and divisive legislative battles—often leading to charges that he has dictatorial tendencies—the President has consolidated his power base by gaining control of Congress and is close to attaining a majority in the Supreme Court. His principal shortcomings to date—failure to control the fledgling guerrilla organization Alfaro Vive, Carajo—is largely attributable to the military’s inability and unwillingness to develop an effective counterinsurgency capability. During his scheduled meeting with President Reagan, Febres-Cordero is likely to request substantial increases in US assistance, particularly for counterinsurgency training, and added training and funding for drug enforcement efforts. He probably will argue that, as a strong proponent of democracy and free enterprise and because of his vigorous efforts to combat Communism, drug trafficking and terrorism, the United States should be more forthcoming with aid to what he sees as Washington’s staunchest ally in South America. [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary Files, Special Collection—Iran Contra—Noriega, Lot 95D407, Ecuador/Uruguay. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the South American Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and the Office of Central Reference and coordinated with DO. Prepared at the request of Tillman. Information available as of December 1985 was used in the preparation of the paper. 2 In a November 29 memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane noted “Shultz’s strong interest in upgrading the Febres-Cordero visit to a State visit,” and wrote: “We believe that President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador merits a State visit. He is one of the few Latin Americans vigorously implementing free market economic policies, has taken a strong stand against the Sandinistas, and has cooperated extensively with the U.S. on narcotics and other important issues. He is an open and enthusiastic friend of the United States. We would like to highlight this cooperation and friendship and strongly support the Department of State and Secretary Shultz’s request that his visit be upgraded from an official working visit to a State visit. The Department of State has requested expedited treatment of this request because of time constraints.” Reagan approved. (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (12/31/1985–03/31/1986)) 386. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 386. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 1 Washington, January 8, 1986 SUBJECT State Visit of Ecuadorean President Leon Febres-Cordero I. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND? ○ Very close since August 1984 inauguration of conservative, businessman/President Febres-Cordero. ○ We helped preserve civilian rule under previous GOE administration, and to this one we stress our commitment to the process and practice of democracy. ○ As promised in his June 1984 meeting with you, Febres-Cordero has pursued market based, growth oriented policies. ○ Febres-Cordero agrees with us on Central America, narcotics and terrorism. — He broke relations with Nicaragua in October after exchanging harsh words with Ortega. — He has taken a tough posture against narcotics traffickers and an increasingly dangerous local terrorist group. II. WHAT DO WE WANT? ○ That democracy grow stronger. Febres-Cordero has given questionable interpretations to an admittedly ambiguous constitution. He needs to be reminded of our concern for strong democratic institutions. ○ That Febres-Cordero’s free market approach succeed. ○ That narcotics production be halted. ○ That the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) terrorists be defeated. III. WHAT DOES FEBRES-CORDERO WANT? ○ Anxious to have visible and tangible US support. This State Visit will play well at home. Our record of assistance gives substance to our words of support. — But, given his close affinity with us, Febres Cordero expresses surprise that our aid has not come more rapidly and in greater quantity. — He has asked for PL 480 Title I to help continue agricultural sector reforms begun with the FY 85 Title I program. OMB and Treasury are resisting. ○ Participation in the U.S. Program for Sustained Growth. Ecuador follows most of the policies we support for debt management and growth. — Febres-Cordero will host a working breakfast for Secretary Baker, Chairman Volcker, myself and heads of international financial institutions in pursuit of this goal. 2 IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT? ○ A re-emphasis of US support for the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices in Ecuador. ○ Praise for a small South American country’s courageous effort to implement its market based philosophy 3 in a region long addicted to statist solutions. ○ A sharp contrast between Ecuador, a democracy with a solid market based economic program and a good human rights record, and Nicaragua, a totalitarian state with growing state control of its economy. — Febres-Cordero publicly denigrated the Sandinistas for not holding free elections. Ortega’s critical retort led to Febres-Cordero breaking relations. 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Trip File, Trip Book for Brazil (Tillman) 2/23/1986–02/26/1986 (1). Secret. 2 In telegram 31956 to Quito, January 31, the Department reported on the January 15 breakfast hosted by Febres-Cordero for Shultz, Baker, Volcker, the IMF and IDB Presidents, and the IBRD Acting President, noting “Secretary Shultz said the Ecuadorean program is bound to be successful and Secretary Baker said those present could help encourage a return to voluntary commercial lending.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860081–0481) In a January 15 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz described the meeting, writing that “Febres-Cordero demonstrated clearly that Ecuador is a country that has already adopted the type of economic program we have been urging on debtor countries. The breakfast meeting will underscore publicly our private support for Febres-Cordero’s efforts to get the commercial banks to renew voluntary lending.” (Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 33, President’s Evening Reading January–March 1986) 3 See Document 379 and footnote 3, Document 200 . 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador 1 Washington, January 23, 1986, 0003Z 21120. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with Ecuadorean President January 13. 1. (S—Entire text). 2. Summary. Secretary met with Febres-Cordero at President’s suite in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel 4:30 PM, January 13. Discussion centered on Ecuador’s domestic politics with particular stress on human rights and terrorism, Ecuador’s economic performance and the Baker Plan, Central America, Ecuadorean relations with Peru and Cuba, and protectionism. End summary. 3. Febres-Cordero began meeting by stressing the importance he places on good relations with the U.S. He effusively praised Ambassador Rondon for his willingness to work closely with the Ecuadorean Government. He said he wanted to describe some of the problems he faces domestically. He has a problem with the press which falsely accuses him of having stopped elections. He said on the contrary he would veto any move by the Congress to extend its term by cancelling elections. He said that although he now has a working majority in Congress, that coalition of votes does not function on every issue. He will be calling for electoral reform, particularly to open up political participation to people who do not belong to political parties. Under the present system only the 20 percent of the populous which belongs to political parties can run for office and this tends to give a leftist tilt to politics. If the Congress defeats his reform proposals, he will ask for approval of his measures in a plebiscite to be held at the same time as the Congressional elections in June. 4. Human rights. The President claims he receives “a thousand letters a week” from as far away as Finland but always asking about the rights of terrorists, never expressing concern about the kidnappings of private citizens by terrorists. Upon arriving in August, Ambassador Rondon stressed the importance of the human rights issue. Febres-Cordero said he subsequently established an office to deal with the human rights question. He assured the Secretary his record will leave no doubt that his government respects and protects the rights of its citizens. The Secretary expressed admiration for Febres-Cordero’s human rights and narcotics policies. 5. Terrorism. The President quickly added that while respecting human rights, his government will be strong in the fight against terrorism within Ecuador and on international scene. Referring to the Isaias kidnapping, he said by refusing to negotiate with the kidnappers he had set in train events which ended with the death of one of his best friends. It was one of the most difficult decisions of his life but if he had not made it, no one in his country would have been safe. He thanked the U.S. for the assistance we have been providing. His government is having some successes in identifying the movements of the AVC hierarchy. The second in command was killed in a fire fight in recent days. The President specifically backs the U.S. effort to stop all international terrorism. He felt the U.S. was not receiving enough backing for its policy, but assured the Secretary that “big U.S. and little Ecuador will stand together”. The Secretary thanked Febres-Cordero for his several messages of support. 6. Central America. The President said he felt Contadora is “agonizing”. Knowing the participants, he had always been skeptical that anything would come out of it. The Secretary agreed that Contadora is in trouble but what must come out of the process is a pluralistic form of government in Nicaragua. The basic problem is that Mexico has difficulty accepting that essential ingredient. It is necessary for us to show that we are doing everything possible to come up with an agreement for peace. Meanwhile, we will continue to help the Contras. We want to do more and it would be better if it can be done out of the public limelight. In a month or so, we will go to Congress seeking new authorizations. We must help the other countries so the healthy economies provide a strong contrast to Nicaragua’s failures. 7. Relations with Nicaragua. The Secretary noted the Sandinistas are being discredited by the connection with the M–19. Unfortunately, President Betancur has trouble acknowledging the link because he started his term in office cast as a peacemaker and has never been able to change his role. Febres-Cordero said that if Betancur broke with Nicaragua, Lusinchi would follow suit. Unfortunately, if the Colombian President does not sever relations now with the clear evidence he has, he will never do it. He undertook to call Betancur to add to the pressures he is under from within his own party. Lusinchi had confirmed to Febres-Cordero during his visit to Caracas that weapons found in the Colombian Palace of Justice were originally given by the Venezuelans to the Sandinistas. The President feels the Sandinistas’ position is shaky. After he called for free elections in Nicaragua and the subsequent break in relations, the Sandinistas felt threatened to the point that they further restricted domestic liberties. 8. Cuba. The President frankly stated that in his initial months in office he had played with Castro and that this tactic did result in lessening Cuban support for Ecuadorean terrorists. But he is aware of U.S. concerns and has instructed his cabinet that there will be no dealings with the Cubans which results in a transfer of technology, specifically he mentioned the shrimp and the petroleum industries. The Secretary expressed his appreciation. 9. Peru. Febres-Cordero said he was perplexed at what Peruvian President Garcia might do. Money is flowing out of Peru to the extent that it is a factor disturbing Ecuador’s free market exchange rate. Garcia is a leftist and his policies are likely to contribute to inflation, unemployment and increasing scarcities. On the other hand, of all Peru’s parties, APRA had been historically the most friendly towards Ecuador and Peruvian Foreign Minister Wagner’s visit to Quito was an historic and positive step. For Ecuador, it would be a major disaster if Garcia’s bad domestic policies led to collapse of democratic government and the return to the belligerent military. The Secretary noted that Garcia does have wide popular support but he is going about things in the wrong way. In contrast, poor Bolivia is trying to straighten itself out and Ecuador has become a bright spot in the region. 10. The program for sustained growth. According to Febres-Cordero, Secretary Baker’s initiative is being distorted. Leftists have painted “No to the Baker Plan” on the walls in Quito. The positive effects of the US initiative are not understood. Unconsciously, Ecuador was already pursuing the type of stringent policy Secretary Baker called for. The President said now he needs help to make his policies show positive results in the short time remaining in his term of office. Businessmen are worried about what will happen after he leaves office. The World Bank is too slow and bureaucratic. It could not understand how cheaply the government has been able to build popular housing. The President felt that the IMF and President De Larosiere understood his policies better. The GOE also had good relations with the IDB. The Secretary said that the purpose of the January 16 breakfast would be to create an atmosphere indicating Ecuador is moving forward and deserves support. 11. The Secretary concluded by saying that President Reagan was looking forward to seeing Febres-Cordero the next day. He assured Febres-Cordero that he would encounter only friends in Washington. The U.S. was proud to be standing at his country’s side. 2 Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) October 1985–present. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by McLean; cleared by Abrams, McKinley, and Gelbard and S/S–O and S; approved by Shultz. Febres-Cordero made a State visit to Washington January 12–16. 2 In an evening report to Reagan, Shultz described his January 13 meeting with Febres-Cordero, writing: “In my meeting with him today he indicated the strongest possible support for our anti-terrorism strategy and his own determination to halt narcotics trafficking and block terrorist groups in his own country. He related how he was forced to make a difficult decision in refusing to negotiate with terrorists even though this led to the death of a close friend. He is also standing with us on Central America and will be urging Colombian President Betancur to take a bolder stand publicly against the Sandinistas’ aid to Colombia’s M–19. Finally, the Ecuadoran President is anxious to present his country as already having adopted the rigorous economic policies Secretary Baker called for in his Seoul speech. Your meeting tomorrow should be a lively and pleasant exchange.” (Memorandum from Martin to Wigg, January 14; Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (12/31/1985–03/31/1986)) 388. Memorandum of Conversation 388. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1986, 10:30–11:45 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting Between President Reagan and Ecuadorean President Febres-Cordero (U) PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President Secretary of State George P. Shultz Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker, III Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Fernando E. Rondon, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Jacqueline Tillman, NSC Ecuador President Leon Febres-Cordero Foreign Minister Edgar Teran Finance Minister Francisco Swett Ambassador Mario Ribadeneira The two presidents met privately after the photo opportunity for approximately five minutes. 2 The rest of the party then joined them in the Oval Office. (U) President Reagan . We’ve been talking about entrepreneurs, small independent businessmen and what they have meant to our economy. It apparently is the same in Ecuador, people building their future by themselves. I met with some minority leaders yesterday 3 who were doing it on their own in public housing. They have been enrolling people to become owners of their own homes and what a difference that makes. (U) President Febres-Cordero . That’s because its their own property to defend. Small entrepreneurs, small businessmen fight harder for their principles because they have gone up the hard way. (U) President Reagan . There’s an entrepreneur, a young fellow who works right around the corner. He has a large life size cardboard photo of me and he charges five bucks for people to pose with me. Some have shown these pictures to me and they look very real. (U) President Febres-Cordero . I saw it myself yesterday. You’ve got a very sporty jacket on (laughter). (U) President Reagan . I saw one of me with this very attractive young lady, and she was holding my arm and was very pregnant and pointing at me. It made me tremble a little bit (laughter). (C) President Febres-Cordero . I want to be very candid with you. I met yesterday with my advisers to organize our remarks for this meeting today. I decided to do away with everything that was suggested and made my own personal notes of things I felt should be discussed today with you. (S) First, I want to express for myself, for my government and for the people of Ecuador our deep and sincere thanks for the help the United States has given us. For the friendship, for the sympathy, from every point of view, that you have made us feel that we are not alone, that our battles are shared by a great nation like the United States. (S) I would not be sincere if I did not tell you how worried I am about Latin America. I know Ecuador’s problems and many of our problems are common to the other countries. Large countries, small countries, it doesn’t matter, the same patterns appear in all. Look at the Continent. Take South America. Venezuela has good leadership under Lusinchi, but I’m afraid that Carlos Andres Perez is going to be the next president. I was just in Venezuela, and met with him and I wasn’t all that nice to him. I feel that CAP will probably win and we will have problems in Venezuela. Colombia is a sound democracy. Barco and Gomez are good leaders and if either one wins, we won’t have problems. They will give Colombia stronger leadership than my good friend, Belisario Betancur, has given. Peru is in a very delicate point. The terrorists are a big problem in Peru. We have good relations with the Government of Garcia, from the point of view of overall diplomacy. The Secretary of State of Peru visited us recently and this was important because it was the first visit in a long time of a Peruvian official. But I’m very worried about the internal economic problems, the wrong handling of the debt and if terrorism gets out of hand it will affect us and cause large problems for Bolivia. I’m afraid that Peru is going radical. Chile. I confess a personal liking for Pinochet and believe he was backed by the electorate in a popular referendum. But if there were an election now I am afraid that the communists would win or the Christian Democrats, which is almost the same thing. If you investigate the campaign that elected Allende, the Christian Democrat that ran against Allende was so radical, I probably would have voted for Allende. I think Pinochet is sincere about holding democratic elections in 1989. But his lengthy stay in power may throw it to the left. (S) President Reagan . I thought there were three factions: a moderate group and a communist faction. Are you saying that they are very close together? (S) President Febres-Cordero . The democratic group is mainly headed by the Christian Democrats. We have had the same experience with our Christian Democrats and are paying the consequences now. I don’t like Christian Democrats. There are some good ones like in Italy or El Salvador, each country can have different kinds, but some are very radical like in Chile. So as the Chilean process moves to elections we have to watch it very closely. In Argentina, Alfonsin is doing an excellent job. They have the strongest middle class in South America and are against the left, so there is hope there. We have good relations with Sanguinetti but his economic problems are very serious. Brazil worries me. I was there in March. I was shocked when I went from the hotel to the Congress building for the inauguration. There were thousands of people waving the communist flag. It scared me to death. The minimum wage is $30 a month and inflation is 230% a month. Sarney is doing a good job but it’s such a large country with so many different regions and such a huge difference between the wealthy and the poor. On Central America, well, you are the expert on that. If I can sell you one idea today that would be that the United States has to look south with great concern. We feel that without the help of the United States, Latin America will get out of hand. (S) President Reagan . Perhaps we’ve been too involved with Central America. The issues you have raised concern me. When I was at the United Nations in New York, 4 I sat near the Vice President of Bolivia. He told me they had more communists and more narco-traffickers there than anywhere in the hemisphere and asked for our help. We have constraints that come from the past. There is this image of the big colossus in the north and this of course bothers us. We are very concerned about Central America and Nicaragua and are determined to see it through. We are encouraged with the progress the elections have brought to El Salvador. I like to use this as an example when I am speaking and so forth about Central America. In El Salvador you have a government that offered amnesty and appealed to the guerrillas to participate in elections and to settle their differences with peaceful negotiations. And the guerrillas refused. In Nicaragua it is the guerrillas that have offered to lay down their arms and negotiate and the Sandinista government that has refused. It shows the similarity between the Sandinistas and the guerrillas in El Salvador. (S) President Febres-Cordero . In my notes here I wrote down two things that worry me very much. That is that U.S. citizens are being killed. I am speaking of course about terrorism. We have had terrorism in Ecuador. A life-long friend, a banker, was kidnapped by terrorists and I had to sacrifice him. I feel so close to him that I have two nephews of his with me on this trip. But I believe the sacrifice was worthwhile because if I had negotiated with the terrorists I would only have had to face more kidnappings and more death. There was another case of attempted kidnapping quite recently. Fortunately, the man was armed and shot two of them and his son came out and shot too and they were able to escape. But your agencies are helping us. We now have a team of people equipped to deal against terrorism and put them on the defensive. I’m going to hit them as hard as I can. We are not violating human rights, although you may hear we are. But we are persecuting them. When I leave in 1988 I hope terrorism will be finished in Ecuador and I am making all efforts to that end. And have no doubts that we back up the United States against Libya. I saw Kaddafi on TV and I almost dropped dead. He is crazy! (S) President Reagan . I saw him on the air too. He was saying we were threatening innocent civilians in their homes with bombs. This from a person who called it a “heroic deed” to kill an 11-year-old child. (U) President Febres-Cordero . The narco-traffickers are working hand in hand with the terrorists to find armaments and move drugs out. (U) President Reagan . Are they working together? (U) President Febres-Cordero . Yes, and we are finding something very interesting. The guerrillas were used as a means of protection for transporting drugs but now we find they are going into the drug business themselves because of the profits. We pushed them underground to make their operations more expensive and inefficient. But it backfired and now they are robbing banks to get money. They need money and they are blackmailing by phone. Unfortunately many pay, the guerrillas get money, then they buy arms and we have problems. But we are fighting hard and we are receiving excellent help from you and are working well together. (C) President Reagan . We increased our ability to confront terrorists by greatly improving our intelligence collection. We aborted worldwide 126 acts; these were headed off in advance. (C) President Febres-Cordero . We have been very clear in the press about how we feel. I have said that we will back up any government, not just the United States, against terrorism regardless of how radical they go. (C) Secretary Shultz . After the attacks in Vienna and Rome, the first message of solidarity and support that I received came from the Foreign Minister of Ecuador. On instructions from the boss, I understand (laughter). (U) President Febres-Cordero . On Nicaragua and Contadora, I think we are in general agreement. I see Contadora agonizing. I never believed in Contadora, as long as the Mexicans are there. The Mexicans say privately they are all for the gringos but publicly never! (S) President Reagan . Henry Kissinger passed on this analysis to me also. He said Mexicans will storm against you publicly and drink a champagne toast to you privately. (S) President Febres-Cordero . Keeping Contadora alive is a stand I take publicly. I met with Ortega in Brazil for 45 minutes and I gave him a really hard time. I told him that I had asked his Counselor to leave and that if he kept it up I was going to tell his Ambassador to leave. I moved to break relations with him, it was my own initiative. I was tired of the drugs and the subversion and so I designed a plan to confront him. I hoped others would break too and I am trying to convince others that the only solution is democratic elections in Nicaragua. In 1984 I wrote to de la Madrid, Lusinchi, Betancur, all of them except Nicaragua, to stop these elections because these elections are a joke, I said. The only way is to isolate them through pressure. So Betancur will play a strategic role if he breaks with Nicaragua because of the weapons. But Ortega hasn’t said anything about me recently. I think Castro told him not to. I spent 16 hours alone with Castro and I told him to stop fooling around with us and I think I have seen an improvement. As I told Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Rondon, I have instructed all my ministers to boycott anything to do with Cuba. 5 Castro has requested some assistance with oil and technology with shrimp and we are riding him along. Ortega was very aggressive against me and suddenly it stopped. I traveled to Venezuela and the Dominican Republic and hit him hard, but he didn’t open his mouth. I think he was pressed by Castro not to fight with me. I think Castro told him that Febres-Cordero was close to Betancur, to Lusinchi, and to let it die out. We need to press the Latin Americans and I am pressing hard to see if they will pressure Nicaragua. (S) President Reagan . If the OAS only could act. They made those promises about what the revolution was about to the OAS. Yes, it is the boil that needs lancing in the Western Hemisphere. We will not retreat but we have our problems with Congress. The Nicaraguans have developed quite a disinformation network. There is a good example of something that happened several years ago. An American Bishop was trying to get some refugees out. The press here said he was attacked by the Contras. I talked to him when he was in Iowa and asked him about it. He said the Sandinistas attacked the refugees and they had all been rescued by the Contras. (S) President Febres-Cordero . The problem with the press is that they always change things and always advocate helping leftists. (C) President Reagan . And we are always to blame. (U) President Febres-Cordero . Two other things in Latin America. One is the public debt. Castro intelligently tried to improve his image away from subversion and violence in the minds of Latin Americans by saying something people could understand, “don’t pay the debt.” People don’t understand this issue. Mr. Baker’s idea is very interesting but is being mishandled in Latin America. The left is crying “no” to the Baker plan. The Foreign Ministers met recently in Montevideo and I told my Foreign Minister not to go because we don’t know yet what the Baker plan is. We have a feeling about it but it is being distorted in the newspapers. The communist party and labor unions that are controlled by the communists are trying to force me to reject the Baker plan. (S) Secretary Baker . They are trying to politicize the problem so they want to move it in that direction. (C) President Febres-Cordero . We will talk tomorrow about the Baker plan. 6 We look to inaugurate the Baker plan in Ecuador. There is one other thing. Sometimes I have the feeling to accomplish certain political things, some of the things we have do, we have to move away from sound economic principles. Housing for the poor is important and so for this, any type of subsidy is justified. I know this is unorthodox, especially coming from us. But you are a head of state and you know that sometimes you have to combine and compromise between economics and politics and we request that you help us so that the impossible can be fulfilled. Our experience is going beyond our frontiers. (C) President Reagan . We have serious economic constraints ourselves but I want you to know that we are looking everywhere we can to help you succeed in what you are doing. Now that you mentioned housing I remember talking several years ago to D.K. Leonard. He showed me photos of buildings that he could put up at $2,500 a house and putting them up in a week with unskilled workers. Not here, overseas. These were prefab concrete jobs and the houses were attractive and sound. The only skilled workers you needed were for wiring and plumbing. Is D.K. still alive? We ought to find out how it was done because housing is a worldwide problem. (C) President Febres-Cordero . We can take a shack and clean it up and in five days we can have a decent house that a human being can live in. And it only costs $1,800 with 10–year terms. (C) President Reagan . That’s really wonderful and very interesting. You should have interrupted me when I was talking about old D.K. (C) President Febres-Cordero . I was saying to Secretary Shultz yesterday that I thought the Baker plan was an excellent initiative. But I am concerned because it is tangled up with the World Bank as the center of operations. I have serious doubts about their efficiency. It’s hard to get something out of them. If the Baker initiative is to succeed the World Bank will have to move. And that’s going to be hard, it’s like moving a building (laughter). (C) Secretary Baker . Of course part of the plan is exactly that, faster disbursements from the Bank and this will take reforms. That is part of the proposal. (C) President Febres-Cordero . The IMF is tough but de Larosiere can talk intelligently. What bothers me is that the Bank doesn’t accept reasons and they impose worse conditions than the IMF. (C) Secretary Baker . It is complicated and this is what we will be working on. (C) President Febres-Cordero . I want to leave you with the tranquility of knowing that Ecuador is fully democratic. We have tough elections, but we live by the constitution and we have free speech and free press. The international press claims I stopped elections but I didn’t. Congress did and in June we’ll have elections for the House. I have put forward some constitutional reforms to the Congress which they probably will deny. 7 So I will go to the people but this is a good experience in democracy. To close I wish to thank you for inviting us, for receiving us. Be assured that we have the same goals, democracy and freedom. But a democracy with peace and order. (C) President Reagan . We are so happy to have you here. We want to help because we believe in you and agree with what you are doing. And think that it is important for the three Americas: North, Central, and South. (U) 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Ecuador State Visit President Febres-Cordero 01/14/1986. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter under cover of a January 14 memorandum. An uninitialed briefing memorandum from Poindexter to Reagan on the meeting is in the Reagan Library, NSC Records, Coordination Office, State Visit of President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador 01/14/1986. For Reagan and Febres-Cordero’s January 14 arrival ceremony remarks, see Department of State Bulletin , March 1986, pp. 63–64. Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “A St. visitor—Pres. Febres Cordero of Ecuador. Of all the Latin Am. Leaders he is the closest to us in philosophy and politically. He’s a self made businessman who filled his cabinet with people like himself. Our outdoor ceremony was in the cold—28˚ plus a wind & falling snow. It was really cold—7 spectators including one Marine passed out from the cold. Our meeting went well.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries , vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 561) 2 No memorandum of conversation has been found. 3 According to the President’s Daily Diary he met with members of the Council for a Black Economic Agenda, January 13, 2:15–2:52 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) 4 See footnote 2, Document 147 . 5 See Document 387 . 6 See footnote 2, Document 386 . 7 In telegram 12186 from Quito, December 27, 1985 the Embassy wrote: “President Febres Cordero stated he will not seek immediate re-election nor allow the present Congress to extend their terms of office. He intends to propose wide-ranging constitutional reform in January, limiting the power of political parties while strengthening the emergency powers of the presidency, abolishing the constitutional guarantees court and de-politicizing the Supreme Court.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850926–0957) 389. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 389. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M–86–20017 Washington, April 23, 1986 ECUADOR: The Febres-Cordero Administration and Its Challenges Summary During his first one and a half years in office, President Leon Febres-Cordero has demonstrated forceful, often controversial, leadership in implementing conservative policies that frequently have been closely aligned with US interests. He has been especially vigorous in his efforts to reorient and revive the economy. His market-oriented strategies achieved early positive results in both the external accounts and domestic recovery, but the rapid decline in world market prices for oil—Ecuador’s chief foreign exchange earner—now threatens to reverse many of the gains. Febres-Cordero has also launched a dedicated and successful drug enforcement campaign. He has had frequent battles with the legislature over his efforts to expand presidential powers—resulting in charges that he has dictatorial tendencies—and a recent military mutiny 2 tainted his administration with accusations of corruption. 3 His efforts to counter the terrorist activities of the fledgling guerrilla organization, Alfaro Vive Carajo, have lately met with some success due to police penetrations, but he faces growing opposition from leftist political groups likely to win seats in the 1 June Congressional elections. [Omitted here is the body of paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 86T01017R: Intell Publications Files (1985–87), Box 7, Folder 716: ALA M 86–20017. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared for Casey in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of April 23. 2 The New York Times reported that on March 14: “About 2,000 soldiers, backed by tanks and artillery, today recaptured a Quito air base held by the former armed forces Chief of Staff, who had called for the overthrow of the President. A Government spokesman said the rebel leader, Frank Vargas Pazos, had been captured.” Vargas first “rebelled March 7, taking over the air base in the coastal city of Manta, after Mr. Febres Cordero dismissed him for demanding the resignation and imprisonment of the Defense Minister and the army commander, whom he had accused of misuse of public funds. Defense Minister Luis Pineiros and Gen. Manuel Albuja, the army commander, resigned on Tuesday. Mr. Vargas surrendered that night and was taken from Manta to the base in Quito, saying he had the President’s ‘word of honor’ that he would be tried by a military court. But on Thursday, Mr. Vargas was freed by sympathetic officers and he took over the Quito base, asserting that the Government had broken the surrender agreement.” (“Ecuador Rebels Routed And Leader Is Captured,” New York Times, March 15, 1986, p. 3) In a March 14 memorandum drafted by Gelbard for Shultz’s meeting that day with Reagan, Gelbard wrote: “It was clear that Febres-Cordero had to act decisively in the face of Vargas’s ‘declaration of war’ against Febres, since he was already being seen as indecisive in the way he handled the first Vargas confrontation.” (Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 4B, 1986 Latin America) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz and Poindexter met with Reagan on March 14 from 1:31 to 2:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) 3 In telegram 3012 from Quito, April 3, the Embassy reported that Febres-Cordero had said that day that the military crisis led by rebel Air Force General Frank Vargas “represented 3 coup attempts. Two came from Vargas who wanted to overthrow the government and the other from the military who wanted Febres Cordero to assume dictatorial powers. Febres Cordero told his Army commanders that he would go home before violating his constitutional oath. He ordered the Army to subdue Vargas or replace him as President. The Army opted to support the constitutional order and Febres Cordero states democracy emerged strengthened in Ecuador.” (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (03/24/1986–01/15/1987)) 390. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan 390. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT Today’s Developments in Ecuador Ecuadoran President Leon Febres-Cordero has been taken hostage by elements of Ecuador’s Air Force. 2 You may recall the successful State Visit last January we had with this pro-U.S., pro-free market Latin American President. 3 Along with the President, the Chairman of the Ecuadoran Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three chiefs of their armed services were taken hostage. These events occurred this morning at Taura Air Force Base near Guayaquil, Ecuador. The renegade Air Force elements are supporters of Air Force General Vargas, who staged a mutiny in March 1986 and is currently in prison. 4 This issue has become a contentious legislative/executive confrontation in Ecuador because the leftist-opposition controlled Congress has voted that Vargas be amnestied, but Febres-Cordero has refused to implement this citing the act unconstitutional. The State Department has issued a strong statement in support of Ecuador’s constitutional democracy and urged the unconditional release of Ecuador’s democratically elected President. 5 We have requested the White House Press Office to make a similar statement. In response to a request from the Government of Ecuador, US Ambassador to Ecuador, Fred Rondon, has authorized a US Air Force pilot to fly an Ecuadoran C–130 transport aircraft to ferry Ecuadoran Army Special Forces personnel to a secure area in Guayaquil. 6 Ambassador Rondon has stressed that this action will not take the US pilot to any scene of potential conflict. The Government of Ecuador has also requested a few US hostage rescue experts to advise them on how to proceed. 7 We are currently studying this request. 8 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (1/16/1987). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen 1/20.” Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the page. Tillman sent the memorandum to Carlucci for signature under cover of an undated memorandum, along with telegram 590 from Quito, January 16, in which Rondon described the transport arranged for the Ecuadorian Special Forces. Rondon commented: “This will convey strongest possible message to Ecuadorean army that we support army effort to rescue President and uphold constitutional order.” 2 January 16. 3 See Documents 386 , 387 , and 388 . 4 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 389 . A January 16 White House Situation Room Note stated that “Vargas reportedly has left his barracks and been taken by helicopter to an undisclosed location” and that Febres-Cordero had “issued a statement from Taura airbase which asked the Ecuadorean people to remain calm” and “gave instructions to the military to stop their mobilization.” (Ibid) 5 In telegram 15855 to all American Republic posts, January 16, the Department wrote: “At 0830 on January 16 President Leon Febres Cordero of Ecuador was taken hostage by a rebellious air force unit near Guayaquil. The USG is calling for his immediate and unconditional release. If appropriate and if you have not already done so, you are requested to contact host governments to urge immediate statements calling for the release of President Febres Cordero.” The Department also included the text of its statement, including: “We call upon those holding the President and his aides to release them immediately and abide by the constitution and the democratic process in Ecuador.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870042–0656) 6 See footnote 1 , above. 7 Request has not been found. Febres-Cordero was freed after he ordered Vargas’ release and pledged not to punish his captors. (See Jorge Ribadeneira, “Ecuadorean President Seized, Freed,” Washington Post , January 17, 1987, p. A13) In telegram 102 from Guayaquil, January 17, the Consulate wrote that Febres-Cordero had stated “that he is convinced that Vargas’ instructions to the mutineers was assassinate the president—not to capture him. The paratroopers opened fire indiscriminately at the group and did not kill the president only because when he was not hit in the first volley they would have had to have shot him lying on the ground in full view of a ‘comitiva’ of more than 25 dignitaries and media reps. LFC believes the exchange of prisoners was improvised when the rebels found themselves with a live Febres-Cordero on their hands. He added that when it occurred, there were people in Quito who acted as if his government was at an end and were discussing formation of a new administration.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N870001–0285) 8 In telegram 673 from Quito, January 18, Rondon reported that he had met on January 17 with Ecuadorian Government Minister Lucho Robles who said “that Febres Cordero was shattered by his experience in Taura” and “dumbfounded by the fact that it took 12 hours to free him.” Robles also commented that the “President appears to have thought his government would not act to liberate him.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870042–0656) Reagan called Febres-Cordero on January 20, from 12:02 until 12:05 p.m., to share his relief that Febres-Cordero “emerged unharmed.” (Memorandum of Conversation, January 20; Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Action File, Ecuador (01/16/1987–04/02/1987)) 391. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 391. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council 1 Washington, undated Ecuador Earthquake Update To follow-up on your conversation on Monday with Ecuador’s President Febres-Cordero, NSC staff chaired a meeting to coordinate our response to the disaster and economic crises caused by last week’s earthquake in Ecuador. 2 The following is an update on USG efforts: Disaster Relief : Between 20–60,000 Ecuadorans have been affected by the earthquakes. Under the direction of The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), tents, blankets and other equipment were sent to Ecuador immediately. We have encouraged the Government of Ecuador (GOE) to make an appeal to the UN Disaster Relief Organization so donor countries can make donations of funds to be used for local procurement of goods and services for the disaster relief effort. US Agency for International Development (USAID) specialists are on the ground to assess and assist the GOE with the human dimension of the disaster. Their efforts are proceeding effectively and expeditiously. Economic Crisis : Rarely does a natural disaster destroy the economic lifeline of an entire nation. But that is precisely what has happened in Ecuador. Prior to the earthquake, Ecuador’s revenues from oil exports had fallen by half over 1986 because of the drop in oil prices, and Ecuador was unable to service its debt in January and February of this year. 3 The most significant damage is to 25 miles of the principal oil pipeline, which extends from jungle oil fields to the Pacific coast. The estimated cost of repairs exceeds $350 million, and Ecuador’s already limited ability to service the international debt will be further reduced. Two major bridges located in the difficult Andean terrain were also destroyed. A US Army Corps of Engineers team has tentatively assessed that the most optimistic estimate to repair the bridges is about four months. The economic loss has enormous consequences: the disaster may cost Ecuador as much as 2 percent of its GDP this year. Early this week, Treasury officials contacted World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) officials to discuss possible responses. We have been supportive of Ecuador’s request for an emergency loan from the World Bank. The IDB may be able to piggyback an emergency loan on the World Bank loan. Eximbank officials have indicated their receptivity to request from US firms for financing for US-sourced exports. Once US evaluations of the scope of the disaster are complete, we will most likely consider sending a supplement request for Emergency Support Funds (ESF) to the Congress or develop a reprogramming. Either will obviously be problematical both within the executive and with the Congress. A supplemental will require offsets; reprogramming will require shifting funding from other regions. But we must assess the costs of not exercising a leadership role; it is doubtful that other countries will respond adequately if the US does not take the lead. Political Repercussions : Indications thus far are that the dimensions of this crisis offer Febres-Cordero a unique opportunity to reinvigorate his presidency and rescue his reputation, so damaged after he was taken hostage in January. 4 If Febres-Cordero can put past rancors behind him and maximize the political “truce” that has developed because of the disaster, his presidency may recover. Time will tell. 5 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Action File, Ecuador (01/16/1987–04/02/1987). Confidential. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. Sorzano sent the paper to Carlucci under cover of a March 12 memorandum. 2 The Washington Post reported about March 8: “Two earthquakes that burst a natural dam on a rain-swollen river have killed at least 100 people and left 15,000 homeless in the Andes Mountains of eastern Ecuador, a local official said today.” (“100 Said to Die in Ecuadoran Quake Zone,” Washington Post , March 9, 1987, p. A15) No memorandum of conversation for the March 9 phone call has been found. According to the President’s Daily Diary the call took place from 11:00–11:04 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) 3 In telegram 11817 from Quito, November 24, 1986, the Embassy reported on Febres-Cordero’s November 21 meeting with Mulford in which Febres-Cordero raised a warning about “Ecuador’s coming inability to service its external debt.” (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Ecuador (03/24/1986–01/15/1987)) 4 See Document 390 . 5 In telegram 3447 from Quito, March 23, the Embassy reported on Bush’s March 22 meeting with Febres-Cordero in which Bush, on a humanitarian mission in response to the earthquake, “promised to present Ecuador’s case within United States Government circles, to commercial banks and to multilateral institutions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870222–0907) A copy of Bush’s March 27 letter to the President of the World Bank, Barber Conable, urging “the bank to do all possible to be helpful to Febres-Cordero and Ecuador,” is in the George H.W. Bush Library, Vice President Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Samuel J. Watson Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19865–030, Ecuador Disaster. 392. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (Derwinski) and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (McPherson) to Secretary of State Shultz 392. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (Derwinski) and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (McPherson) to Secretary of State Shultz 1 Washington, April 30, 1987 SUBJECT ESF for Ecuador After the Earthquake ISSUE FOR DECISION Whether to identify $20 to $25 million in FY 1987 ESF to reallocate to Ecuador to help offset the economic effects of the earthquake’s destruction of the oil pipeline. ESSENTIAL FACTORS Coming off a year in which declining oil prices had already seriously affected its fiscal revenues and foreign currency earnings, Ecuador has experienced a series of further economic catastrophes in 1987 including coffee price declines, floods, land slides and, most recent, the earthquake in the eastern part of the country which destroyed the country’s vital oil pipeline. Vice President Bush visited Ecuador following the earthquake and would like to see the United States take the lead in providing additional assistance. 2 The NSC is also interested and has chaired three interagency meetings designed to address the extent of the current financing crisis in Ecuador, identify existing sources of funding, and ascertain the possibilities for additional U.S. assistance. 3 Following the last NSC-chaired meeting, the Department prepared a background paper describing the current financial situation in Ecuador (Tab 1). 4 In our estimation, Ecuador faces a 1987 balance of payments financing gap of about $1 billion. Potential contributions from international financial institutions, commercial banks and Paris Club official creditors could provide $900 million, leaving about $100 million still unfunded. ARA believes that a U.S. contribution on the order of $30 million would help encourage provision of the remaining amounts from other donors such as the Japanese. (The USG has provided over $30 million in disaster-related assistance, but this did not deal with the balance of payments gap. We have also allocated $12.5 million in FY 1987 ESF to Ecuador, which was programmed before the earthquake and has yet to be obligated. Thus the $30 million would be additional to these amounts.) In the NSC-chaired meetings, the Department and AID have taken the position that any decisions and recommendations on possible reallocations of existing foreign assistance funds to Ecuador should be made by you. We have discussed the possibility of providing additional PL 480 wheat; however, the Embassy opposes this option and we could also expect difficulties in the interagency process because it would replace likely commercial sales. We will also deobligate some $5 million in the Ecuador DA pipeline and the current year DA budget for reobligation for reconstruction purposes. Deobligation of DA from other countries in the ARA region and reobligation to Ecuador does not seem to be a likely possibility in this case. The only remaining possibility is thus reallocation of unobligated balances remaining in FY 1987 ESF. Of the $3,550 million in ESF appropriated under the FY 1987 CR, $1,938 million remains unobligated as of April 1. However, of this amount, $1,711 million is either earmarked or in Central America, accounts which enjoy Congressional support. Of the earmarked funds, all but Cyprus ($15 million), Ireland ($35 million) and Uruguay ($12 million) represent our own highest priorities (Egypt, Pakistan, Philippines, etc.). Any effort to use earmarked money for Ecuador would require consultations under Sec. 614 authority. We doubt we could obtain Congressional support to break either Cyprus or Ireland (based on past experience) and any success with Uruguay is also doubtful, given last year’s experience. The remaining balance is therefore $227 million, as shown in Tab 2. 5 Over 40 percent of the total is in Africa and another 23 percent in moderate Arab states (Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Mideast Regional). All of it has, of course, already been publicly allocated (some of it due to be obligated imminently) and any reductions will have repercussions with the countries concerned. Moreover, we still remain committed to provide $10 million ESF in support of the South Pacific fisheries treaty. Thus the outlook for available ESF is bleak. Nonetheless, Febres Cordero will be bitterly disappointed if we cannot reciprocate his vigorous and principled support of policies we favor with the emergency ESF he seeks. The decision, then, is whether the need to help Ecuador is great enough to merit creating problems elsewhere by reallocating money already committed to other countries. If you believe so, we suggest John Whitehead chair a meeting with the regional Assistant Secretaries and ourselves to sort out where the necessary reductions will be made. If you choose not to reallocate FY 1987 ESF for Ecuador, we will so inform the NSC and continue with our efforts to find other sources of assistance. The principal option for non-ESF assistance appears to be limited to PL 480 food aid. RECOMMENDATIONS That John Whitehead chair a meeting with the regional Assistant Secretaries and ourselves to determine how much and from where additional FY 1987 ESF will be reallocated to Ecuador. 6 Alternatively: That we inform the NSC that the ESF situation is too tight to allow for reallocation to Ecuador and that we will therefore continue to seek other sources of additional assistance. 7 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 58C, Ecuador. Confidential. Sent through Whitehead. Drafted on April 16 and revised on April 28 and April 30 by Boyce; cleared by Gelbard and T, AID/PPC, AID/LAC, and EB. A stamped notation at the top of the first page indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. 2 See footnote 5, Document 391 . 3 No minutes of these meetings have been found. 4 Attached but not printed is a background paper 5 Attached but not printed is a paper on the remaining balance. 6 There is no indication of Shultz’s approval or disapproval of this recommendation. 7 Shultz indicated his approval by writing his initials, which were dated May 1 by a stamped notation. 393. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 393. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M87–20046 Washington, July 29, 1987 Ecuador: The Danger of a Military Coup Summary Next year promises to be a difficult and crucial period for Ecuador’s strained democracy as balloting to elect its next president is scheduled to begin in January. We anticipate that political infighting between a resurgent left and President Febres-Cordero’s weakened government will escalate soon. Although we judge that the Ecuadorean military would prefer not to take power directly, the Army in particular has become increasingly enmeshed in politics—as Febres-Cordero’s most loyal defense—and therefore has gradually grown more politicized. Recent reporting from the Embassy [ less than 1 line not declassified ] suggests that top military leaders fear that the left—which they consider subversive and communist—is becoming increasingly powerful and disruptive. We do not believe a military coup is imminent, chiefly because the majority of senior officers support Febres-Cordero and apparently see him as effective in countering leftist provocations. Frequent political clashes between the left and the government, however, are a virtual certainty from 10 August 1987 when Congress opens until the next government takes office in August 1988. If the military deems it necessary to step in to defend Febres-Cordero or to restore public order, particularly on a repetitive basis, the potential for a general or a group of senior officers to take power will grow. [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987), Box 1, Folder 38: ALA 87–20046, Ecuador: The Danger of a Military Coup. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. 394. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 394. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 1 Washington, February 9, 1988, 2151Z 1742. Subject: Meeting with Febres Cordero. Ref: Quito 1738. 2 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. Summary. President Febres Cordero is very pessimistic about Ecuador’s future. He views Bucaram and Borja as the difference between cancer of the liver and cancer of the pancreas. He is determined to oversee fair elections and transfer power to his successor. He does not believe there is danger of a military coup at this time. End summary. 3. Ambassador met with President Febres Cordero for 45 minutes on February 9. Febres Cordero was extremely warm but gloomy about this country’s future. 4. He said that he had met with the military high command shortly after the election and, presumably, in answer to talk of a coup told the generals that there is absolutely no excuse at the present time for military intervention. He warned the military that a coup at this time would result in devastating consequences for Ecuador, which would be the subject of terrible international isolation. Febres Cordero believes that his military agreed with him. 5. He dismissed chances of a coup before August 10. He doubted that there would be any coup in 1988. He felt that the political and economic situation would have to deteriorate far more significantly before there was serious danger of military intervention. 6. Febres Cordero voiced his disregard for both Abdala and Borja. He felt that Ecuador is confronted by either a cancer of the liver or a cancer of the pancreas. What is the difference, he asked, when either one will kill you. 7. On Abdala, he described him as a mad man capable of anything. He stated that as mayor, Abdala was supported by the smugglers, narcotics traffickers and white-slavers of Guayaquil. He felt that Bucaram would intimidate Ecuador the same way he had intimidated and extorted Guayaquil’s businessmen. The President heaped even more contempt on Rodrigo Borja. He said that Borja has spouted socialism all his political life and is surrounded by leftists. Borja is a weak leader, Febres Cordero continued, and would not be able to resist the socialistic advice of his followers. 8. Febres Cordero foresaw a bloody campaign. He stated that Abdala Bucaram’s party will refuse to allow Borja to enter Guayaquil. This would anger Quito, which would seek to block Bucaram. Lives will be lost, the President stated, and “my government will be caught in the middle” trying to protect the candidates. 9. Whether it is Bucaram or Borja, it is going to be bad news for both Ecuador and the U.S. The U.S. is soon to lose the only real friend it has had in South America, Febres Cordero stated. Wait and see, he predicted either one of those two candidates is going to oppose your policies on debt and in Central America. 10. When the subject turned to Frank Vargas and the imprisoned commandos, Febres Cordero thought that Bucaram and Borja would release the commandos quickly. He doubted very much that the Army would lift a finger to prevent the release of the commandos, because the armed forces’ new leaders would be too busy trying to impress their new President. 11. What might lie in store for Frank Vargas was another matter, because Febres Cordero acknowledged that Vargas would threaten whatever President was foolish enough to reintegrate him into the armed forces. 12. In answer to Ambassador’s question on whether Ecuador might be headed for a new constitution (another way of asking whether a coup is in the cards sometime in the future), Febres Cordero felt it is likely. “That means that there is likely to be a presidential contest between you and Hurtado,” Ambassador stated questioningly. “No,” Febres Cordero answered, “I don’t think I would return.” He accused Hurtado of responsibility for the present constitution and said he is convinced that Hurtado will do all he can to return to power, which means that the present constitution will either have to be reformed or rewritten. 13. Comment: President Febres Cordero’s assessment of the current situation could not have been gloomier, he holds out no hope for a responsible government by either Bucaram or Borja. The first, he believes will be outrightly corrupt, while the second will subordinate everything to the socialistic theories of his Izquierda Democratica (ID) Party. Interestingly, he suspects that the military would go along with either of the 2 presidents, so long as their own nests are feathered appropriately. 14. In a separate conversation earlier in the day, Government Minister Moeller complained about Ecuador’s businessmen, who are in a mad scramble to raise prices because neither Bucaram nor Borja will permit such increases. He said that he is opposed to jailing businessmen who are fueling inflation, as some of the President’s advisors want, and he cannot believe that Febres Cordero would institute price controls. “We don’t know what to do” he lamented. Rondon 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880114–0055. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Guayaquil and Lima. 2 In telegram 1738 from Quito, February 9, the Embassy reported that Febres-Cordero had indicated that day “that he wished to send people he trusts to Washington urgently in order to brief the Secretaries of State and Treasury on the economic and political stability of Ecuador. The President was very pessimistic about the future of Ecuador but insistent that impartial elections will be held on May 8 and that he will transfer power to his democratically elected successor. He felt that the election campaign will be marked by bloodshed that will test sorely the country’s fragile democracy. He also feels beset by financial difficulties and is anxious for the U.S.’ understanding and help.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880113–0826) 395. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 395. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 1 August 11, 1988, 0612Z Secto 15096. Subject: Memorandum for the President. 1. Memorandum for the President. From: George P. Shultz. Subject: My day in Ecuador, August 10. 2. Today I attended President Borja’s inauguration in Ecuador and sat through his two-and-a half hour inaugural address. 2 His speech was a bigger bomb than the one that hit my motorcade in Bolivia, 3 and Fidel Castro himself was sitting up there on the platform consulting his watch and muttering that it would never end. 3. During the day I had a series of interesting meetings. The Chilean Foreign Minister said their plebiscite was on track, but I told him we’d like to see it be truly fair, including fair access to TV for the opposition. I told Columbia’s Pres. Barco how impressed all Americans are with his brave fight against the deadly drug trafficker-guerrilla alliance. And Portugal’s Pres. Soares told me he had met with Castro and was moderately optimistic that a settlement in Angola might be forthcoming. 4. I also had a good private meeting with Borja and lunch with his economic team. 4 He and they seemed serious and well-intentioned, and I wished them the very best. The extreme leftist head of the Congress commissioned a mural for the hall where the inauguration was held. And the painter—another leftist who was Castro’s host there—included a Darth Vader-like figure with the letters “CIA” on his helmet. Borja apologized and noted he couldn’t control what Congress had done. And I told a press conference that the message of the mural was insulting to the US, but that if a bomb hadn’t driven us out of Bolivia, a mural wasn’t going to keep us away from this inauguration in Ecuador. 5 A lot of Ecuadorians agree, and one Quito paper editorialized today that “What happened is damnable because it shows in both the artist and the commission-giver a skewed knowledge of history—product of a generalized anti-American prejudice.” 5. But while Borja talked sense privately, his inaugural address seemed to collect every bad idea of the last fifty years. (Maybe that’s why it was so long: That’s a lot of territory to cover.) He began with a very good section on the crucial importance of democracy, but went on to a strange pastiche of intellectual pretension, economic illiteracy, and an endless recitation of statistics. By the time he finished, his popularity rating had probably dropped ten points. 6. One final point: Quito is smashingly beautiful. A city of hills and valleys 9,600 feet up in the Andes, it is clean, unmarred by visible poverty, and with enough of the old colonial heritage visible to remind you of Spain. Borja is a social democrat, and I left hoping he, like Mitterrand, will drop the ideology and do what works to help the people of that lovely land. Shultz 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 22C, 1988 June–August, Memoranda for President Ronald Reagan. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent from the Delegation’s aircraft. Shultz travelled to Quito to meet with President-elect Borja, August 10. 2 In telegram 6140 from Quito, May 9, the Embassy reported the unofficial results of the May 8 presidential election with Borja winning by 190,000 votes. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880398–0684) In telegram 10567 from Quito, August 11, the Embassy sent an overview of Borja’s inaugural address, which “emphasized the theme ‘peace and unity’ but called upon the nation to make considerable sacrifice to pull Ecuador out of its ‘chaotic’ economic situation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880705–0315) 3 See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 160 . 4 See Document 396 . In telegram 10530 from Quito, August 11, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s August 10 luncheon meeting with Borja’s economic team. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880704–0606)) 5 Telegram Secto 15089 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation, August 10, transmitted the text of Shultz’s press statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880700–0278) 396. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 396. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 1 Quito, August 11, 1988, 2238Z 10566. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with President-elect Rodrigo Borja. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary: President-elect Borja warmly welcomed the Secretary to Quito and expressed his hope for a close and productive relationship between our two countries. He stated that his administration would take a hard line against terrorism and narcotics, and that he welcomed continued mutual cooperation in these areas. Borja requested the Secretary’s assistance in avoiding a downgrading of Ecuador’s credit worthiness at forthcoming ICERC review, and asked for a 50 million dollar bridge loan to help the new government overcome a difficult foreign exchange crisis. 3. The Secretary expressed U.S. desire to continue the constructive relationship, and the willingness to reciprocate the Borja government’s approach toward that relationship. Regarding the 50 million dollar bridge loan, the Secretary noted that this is a decision for the Secretary of the Treasury, and approval would depend on having in place the necessary arrangements that would guarantee repayment of the loan. The Secretary noted that he would be making a public comment on the insult to the U.S. contained in the new mural at the Ecuadorian Congress, but that he would not allow the mural to deter him from attending the inauguration at the Congress. End summary. 4. The Secretary met with President-elect Rodrigo Borja for 50 minutes on August 10. Ecuadorian participants, in addition to the President-elect, were the incoming Minister of Foreign Relations Diego Cordovez, Minister of Government Andres Vallejo, Monetary Board President Abelardo Pachano, Central Bank Manager Jose Morillo, Secretary General for Administration Washington Herrera, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Mario Aleman, and Ambassador Jose Antonio Correa representing the Foreign Ministry’s Office of Protocol. The U.S. delegation included, in addition to the Secretary, Ambassador Holwill, Assistant Secretary Abrams, Assistant Secretary Redman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Gelbard, DCM Eisner (notetaker) and interpreter Van Reigersberg. 5. Borja initiated the conversation with a warm welcome to the Secretary and his presence at this democratic celebration of the people of Ecuador. He noted that those coming to the inauguration represented a wide spectrum of countries and ideologies, and their presence in Quito was reflective of the new Ecuadorian Government’s desire for pluralistic relations and its tolerance of diverse viewpoints. Borja continued that his government would seek the most cordial relations with the U.S. on the basis of a common democratic vocation and friendship. He looked forward to strengthening commercial ties, and to working out equitable solutions to conflicts in such key areas as foreign debt. 6. The Secretary expressed appreciation for Borja’s warm welcome, and delivered to the President-elect a letter from the President expressing good wishes for the new administration. 2 He noted that his presence here as a special representative of the President was in support of freedom, the rule of law and democracy. These were the values that guided the U.S., and they were the basis of any just society. Differences of opinion would always exist between the U.S. and Ecuador. Mutual respect would be a key: The U.S. will frankly express its views with the intention of promoting common interest and working through differences. As friends, we are prepared also honestly to agree to disagree. 7. The Secretary noted the positive and mutual effort of the U.S. and Ecuador in the fight against narcotics and terrorism. These forces can tear a country apart, as we have seen in Peru and Colombia. The U.S., the Secretary said, is willing to continue to help Ecuador in these areas. 8. Referring to the area of economic cooperation, the Secretary stated that he looked forward to the opportunity to discuss over lunch these issues with Borja’s economic team. 3 He was interested in their views, noting that the decisions made in the first few weeks of an administration are often critical to eventual success or failure. It is easier to make tough decisions during an administration’s early honeymoon period, and then to enjoy the fruits of these policies three years or so down the road. The Secretary noted that it was a different age in which we lived—an age in which information was the key. Recalling a recent conversation in Rio de Janeiro, he noted that open and democratic societies were those best able to take advantage of this reality. 9. The Secretary noted that the U.S. is prepared to reciprocate the warmth and quality of the relationship that the Borja government wishes. The U.S. will respect Ecuador’s decisions. The message conveyed by the international media to the American people—by the presence in Quito of Daniel Ortega and Fidel Castro and by the new insulting mural on the walls of the Congress—was of a government turning sharply to the left. The Secretary noted that, in his own statements to the press, he was expressing that Ecuador is a friendly, democratic country that believes in the same values of freedom. His visit was an opportunity to pay respect to those shared values. The Secretary noted that he had been advised not to go to Congress because of the offensive mural. Despite the insult, he would go to the inauguration to underline U.S. support for Ecuador’s democratic transition. The Secretary noted that he would have to make a statement to the press, however, regarding the insulting mural. 10. Borja stated that he had no doubt about the U.S. support for democratic regimes in Latin America. There were, however, three threats to democracy in the region. The Secretary had mentioned the first two—terrorism and drug trafficking. His administration would confront these threats with a strong hand, fully aware of the danger they pose to Latin American democracy. There was, however, a third danger not mentioned by the Secretary—the foreign debt. Borja stated that he had inherited a difficult domestic situation. He would need the U.S. comprehension and the Secretary’s personal help in working out a non-traditional approach that addresses the debt issue without destabilizing Ecuador and undercutting popular support for democracy. 11. Specifically, Borja stated that he had two requests to make of the Secretary: — Ecuador hoped for his support to avoid a down grading of the country’s credit worthiness at the forthcoming inter-agency country exposure review committee review. A “value impaired” determination would cause serious problems for the new administration in its effort to renegotiate its debt with the private banks. — Secondly, Borja noted that his administration needed a bridge loan of 50 million dollars. He was assuming office with negative foreign exchange reserves and with heavy food import needs. He stated that the problem, in part, was deliberately caused by the outgoing administration which wished to portray his government in the worse possible light by forcing a major devaluation of the local currency during his first weeks in office. 12. Borja noted that his party, the Democratic Left (ID), was a moderate leftist and social democratic organization with ties to the socialist international. He, himself, was a Vice President of SI. The U.S. could be assured that, notwithstanding the negative image in some of the press, his administration would follow a moderate and democratic program. His administration had no intention of nationalizing any private firms because it knew that this was inefficient and lowered both the quality and quantity of production. Rather, his party’s roots were firmly planted in the same soil as those of Mario Soares of Portugal and Felipe Gonzalez of Spain. The party’s support came from the lower classes of Ecuador, and the Democratic Left Party was a bulwark against radical, communist efforts to dominate the country. 13. The Secretary stated that Mario Soares and Felipe Gonzalez were very close and good friends. I am a pragmatic man, the Secretary continued, and, while I have my own philosophy, I have found that I can work best with those interested in solving common problems rather than indulging in dogmatic posturing. The Secretary noted that former Ambassador to Portugal Frank Carlucci had worked constructively with Mario Soares in benefit to both the U.S. and Portugal. 14. Borja expressed his pleasure in the Secretary’s having been “vaccinated” against the bad information on the Socialist International and its members. He noted that the continued existence of the ID was central to stability in Ecuador. The Secretary agreed and noted, looking around the room at the ID Ministers, that it looked to him that the party was in no danger of disappearing. 15. Recalling an earlier conversation with Felipe Gonzalez, the Secretary noted that the Spanish Prime Minister had told him how he had learned from Mitterrand’s mistakes in France. Gonzalez avoided the pitfalls involved in trying to translate a strong electoral victory into sweeping socialistic reforms. Gonzalez had taken a pragmatic program, and Spain was now booming economically. Mitterrand had had the courage to admit his mistakes, and to reverse course before it was too late. 16. Borja expressed his amazement that there were so little differences in the way he and the Secretary saw the world. He had expected many more differences, but now concluded that the only distinction between the two was whether golf or tennis was the better game. 17. Turning to the discussion of foreign debt, the Secretary noted that there was general recognition that this was a serious international issue. It had been a central theme during his meetings in Brazil, 4 Uruguay, 5 Argentina 6 and Bolivia 7 had been the subject of general remarks that he had made in Montevideo. 8 He would be pleased to provide to Borja’s economic team a copy of his remarks. The Secretary noted that, while countries would have to take tough measures, all the benefits of such reforms could not be restricted to creditors alone; incentives for Ecuadorians must also exist. At the same time, the Secretary stated the Borja regime is coming to power at a good time—the worse is over regarding the fall in oil prices and, hopefully, the nation would not suffer another damaging earthquake. Non-traditional exports were positive. With good economic management, Borja would be in a good position to argue for re-scheduling. Peru had started off by walking away from any solution to the debt problem and this had worked against a successful economic program. Working within the system, the Secretary stated that Borja should be in a good position to challenge the other members of the system to work with Ecuador in good faith. 18. Regarding the bridge loan, the Secretary noted that this was a matter within the competence of the Secretary of Treasury. As a former Secretary of the Treasury, he respected that Department’s preeminence in this area. The Secretary, however, stated that it would be helpful for Borja and his economic team to understand the concept behind a bridge loan. Fundamentally, it was a link between two piers, the latter pier an agreed and convincing program that guaranteed that the bridge loan would be repayed. As an example of a firm pier, the Secretary noted the recent Argentine agreement to undertake economic reforms that would release a pending World Bank loan. On the basis of this Argentine-IBRD understanding, the U.S. could offer a bridge loan to cover the period until the World Bank loan can be disbursed. 19. Borja expressed interest in the continuation of the economic discussion during the Secretary’s lunch with his economic team. He hoped that the Secretary could discuss further the length of the bridge. The Secretary said he looked forward to the discussion, but that the focus should be on the strength of the press not on the bridge’s length. 20. Borja noted that he would like to mention the “small and big” problem of the mural at the Congress. He had only received information of the insult to the U.S. at a late date and had taken all efforts within his power to change the mural. He had had some qualitative changes made, but not all that was desired. It was hard to work with an internationally prominent and difficult artist. Borja stated that he very much appreciated the Secretary’s attendance at the inauguration, and expressed hope that the mural would not cast a shadow over the good relations he desired with the U.S. 21. The Secretary took his leave of the President-elect, again noting his intention to emphasize to the press that his presence in Ecuador was evidence of the good and warm relations the U.S. wanted with a fellow democracy. The meeting Ended. Holwill 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880705–0074. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 The letter has not been found. In telegram 9465 from Quito, July 20, the Embassy sent suggested letters from Reagan to Borja and Febres-Cordero. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880625–0651) 3 See footnote 4, Document 395 . 4 See Document 215 . 5 See Document 459 . 6 See Document 104 . 7 See Document 159 . 8 Shultz’s August 4 remarks to businessmen and bankers in Montevideo are in Department of State Bulletin , October 1988, pp. 8–12. 397. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 397. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State 1 Quito, October 26, 1988, 2017Z 13627. Subject: Meeting with President Borja, October 25. 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. I met with President Borja on October 25 for an hour’s general conversation, ranging from bilateral questions and adjustment policy to whether Cubans would be involved in his literacy campaign. (They won’t be.) 2 He displayed an impressive grasp of Ecuadorian/Latin American realities, criticizing both Castro and Pinochet. He went on at length to explain his policies and his personal style. 3. I opened by admitting that we did not yet know how the October 24 ICERC debt review had come out (see septel) 3 and I congratulated Borja on the efforts of various ministers in responding to our concerns about his government’s debt policy. 4 I added that I looked forward to dealing with them regarding the adjustment program to assure that the gains made on August 30 would endure. Doing so would facilitate disbursement of the dols 6.5 million under the FY 87 ESF. 4. Responding to my comment that this effort was designed to cooperate rather than to “dictate” any policy to them, Borja explained—somewhat passionately and in considerable detail—that he was an unusually independent person who literally “could not accept” another person or another country telling him what to do. He claimed he had been this way “even with my father when I was four years old.” 5. Following this intense response, we touched the Texaco incident and I urged him to consult with us in advance on such matters in order to avoid frictions. 5 He comfortably acknowledged that the presentation of the decision had been botched by the GOE, and said they had learned the need for better communications. In any case, He said Texaco had been a good partner and he hoped the company would accept the GOE’s offer of a new “concession”. Comment: An extraordinary word from him, which he subsequently repeated. End comment. 6. We discussed how relations could be improved, and Borja expressed satisfaction that agrement had just been received for Jaime Moncayo as his Ambassador to Washington. I knew of his concern that we believed that 800 Cubans were to be imported for a literacy program. I preempted his denial of that report by explaining that I had traced down the story and had learned that a UNESCO mission on literacy had included two Cubans and two Nicaraguans. Borja thanked me for making this effort, saying that he has begun to see how such rumors were hurting the USG-GOE relationship. He emphatically said that “they’ve already left Ecuador.” He categorically rejected any foreign participation in the upcoming campaign itself. Borja seemed to want to dispel the idea that he was sympathetic to communism. He commented that he tried to be even-handed in his international dealings, “but frankly I don’t enjoy my contacts with Russians—their journalists always ask leading questions and their diplomats try to trap you.” 7. In another vein, Borja said that he had tried to persuade labor unions that the government was defending their interests with his anti-inflation program. “On the other hand, I wouldn’t deceive them” with exaggerated promises, so there will be a national strike (on November 24) “and we’ll hold the line on our policies.” I said that we had reported positively on the GOE’s tight and effective monetary policy; he responded that bank reserve requirements would be hiked again in coming weeks. He bitterly criticized the Febres Cordero government for tolerating massive dishonesty in its exchange-rate regime, and noted that the new rate mechanism resulted in a reduced spread between the trade and free rates (now about 80 sucres, down from over 250 three months ago). 8. Comment: I was surprised by Borja’s knowledge of the details of economic policy and his responsiveness on bilateral matters. This implies both that he is personally involved in the economic programs and that it is not likely to change greatly if there are personnel changes in the cabinet. Also interesting was his explanation of personal style; he approaches the office like a manager, not an autocrat. It was anything but “l’etat c’est moi.” He also said he would try to come to our election-night party, and obviously warmed to a bit of inside gossip on U.S. political developments. Holwill 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880953–0506. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Guayaquil. 2 In telegram 13101 from Quito, October 14, the Embassy sent a lengthy assessment of Borja which began: “Having assumed office with a mandate for evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, Rodrigo Borja has taken a number of positive initiatives during his first two months in office. The economic emergency program announced in late August contains measures needed to begin stabilizing Ecuador’s economy. The tone of internal political discourse—often vitriolic in the past—has been softened, the GOE leadership has listened to divergent opinions, and Borja has demonstrated a commitment to reduce corruption in government and to respect human rights. He has also moved to establish cooperative executive-military relations, to stabilize the labor front, and to support the police in anti-narcotics efforts. At the same time, the new president has had to respond to strong pressures from radicals within his own party and from other extremist elements during his first sixty days.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880916–0108) 3 No minutes of this meeting have been found. In telegram 13626 from Quito, October 24, the Embassy reported that Holwill informed Córdova: “about the possibility of an October 24 ICERC decision which could have negative consequences for Ecuador.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880953–0833) 4 In telegram 392103 to Bogota, December 5, the Department noted: “The ICERC, a technical committee that passes judgment on foreign bank debt, has informed US banks with exposure in Ecuador that long-term Ecuadorian obligations are ‘value impaired.’ (Banks must set aside reserves against the day they may be forced to write off the loans.)” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881064–0280) In telegram 15641 from Quito, December 15, the Embassy reported on how Ecuador was adjusting to the value-impaired debt rating. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881096–0801) 5 In telegram 9141 from Quito, September 20, the Embassy reported that on September 19, “Energy Minister Diego Tamiriz announced that the state petroleum firm CEPE would take over from Texaco operation of the Transecuadorian pipeline and of the consortium which produces three-fourths of Ecuador’s crude.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880840–0715) Paraguay Paraguay 398. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, July 28, 1981, 1600Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810352–0125. Confidential; Immediate; Eyes only to USOAS. 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay Washington, August 28, 1981, 0213Z Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) August 1981. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Service, cleared in S, S/S, and S/S–O, approved by Enders. 400. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, November 11, 1982, 1445Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820586–0589. Confidential; Priority. 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, April 27, 1983, 1945Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830238–0557. Confidential. 402. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, May 18, 1984, 2203Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840328–0066. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Buenos Aires. 403. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley) to Secretary of State Shultz Washington, July 20, 1984 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 49G, Paraguay. Confidential. Sent through Armacost. A stamped notation at the top of the first page indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. 404. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, August 30, 1984, 1600Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840554–0030. Secret; Immediate. 405. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, August 22, 1985, 1706Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850599–0102. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 406. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 9, 1986 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 43: Paraguay: Scenarios for Sudden, Unexpected Change. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Information available as of July 8 was used in the preparation of the memorandum. 407. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to Secretary of State Shultz Washington, January 5, 1987 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary Files, Special Collection—Iran Contra—Noriega, Lot 95D407, Chron (1987). Confidential. Drafted on December 15, 1986 by Bolton; cleared by Gelbard and Flower. Printed from an uninitialed copy. 408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay Washington, February 12, 1987, 0520Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870110–0254. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and Montevideo. Drafted and approved by Gelbard. 409. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) Washington, February 21, 1987 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums, Lot 94D432, Nodis Memorandums February 1987. Confidential. Drafted on February 19 by Bolton; cleared by Gelbard and Howard. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that Armacost saw the memorandum on February 24. 410. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, September 15, 1987 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987), Box 1, Folder 47: Paraguay’s Public Enterprises: Destroying Economic Growth. Confidential; Noforn. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, April 25, 1988, 1844Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880765–0007. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN and Buenos Aires. 412. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, May 6, 1988 Source: Department of State, Western Hemisphere Affairs Records, Policy, Planning, and Coordination, Security Assistance Program Files, Lot 91D371, Paraguay, 1984–1988. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and coordinated with DO. 413. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, October 28, 1988, 1519Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880959–0507. Secret Noforn; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis. 398. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 398. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, July 28, 1981, 1600Z 2862. Subject: Ambassador Middendorf’s visit to Paraguay. 1. (Confidential—Entire text.) 2. Begin summary. During his July 22–24 visit Ambassador Middendorf was given an extraordinarily warm welcome as the first high-ranking representative of the Reagan administration to visit Paraguay. President Stroessner returned early from a trip to the Chaco expressly to receive him. In that meeting as in those with the Foreign Minister and several other senior GOP officials the Ambassador emphasized the high priority which the administration places on improved relations with Latin America including the Southern Cone and specifically Paraguay, our development plans and hope for support in the troubled Caribbean Basin, the need for cooperation against international terrorism, OAS budget concerns, and the importance of the private sector’s role in national and regional development. On all these subjects he was assured of Paraguayan support. Ambassador Middendorf also visited a major OAS/IDB rural development project, and met with a group of private businessmen. Press coverage of the visit was extensive and uniformly favorable. End summary. 3. Meeting with the President. President Stroessner returned early from a visit to the Chaco region especially to receive Ambassador Middendorf, accompanied by Ambassador Lane, for nearly an hour early on July 24. Ambassador Middendorf conveyed the warm greetings of President Reagan and Secretary Haig to the President and people of Paraguay, and their intention to give the highest priority to good relations with the countries of Latin America. The President expressed his great appreciation of these greetings, reciprocated them, and said that close relations with the U.S. are of historical importance to Paraguay. He recalled that Paraguay had joined with the U.S. in sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 in its desire to help avoid another Cuba in Latin America. Paraguay is a homogeneous, firmly anti-communist country which seeks liberty with order. This approach has brought good results to the country which is developing rapidly. Ambassador Middendorf responded that the U.S. values its close, historical ties with Paraguay, appreciates its support in the Dominican crisis, and recognizes the rapid growth and stability of this country with a minimum of social disparities. He praised the export-oreinted, private sector orientation of Paraguay which has been emulated by other countries. In this connection he stressed the contribution that American companies like Allis-Chalmers (a major bidder on the Yacyreta hydroelectric project) can make in the development of Paraguay and as “goodwill ambassadors.” As illustrative of the new U.S. approach to the developing world he provided copies of his address on “The Reagan Administration and Economic Development in the Third World” and USTR’s “statement on U.S. trade policy” which the President said he would read carefully. 2 4. Ambassador Middendorf reviewed briefly for the President our hopes for cooperative action to help in the Caribbean Basin, 3 not as an anti-Castro effort but rather to strengthen the economies of that region. He said we hope for the support of Paraguay and other countries of the hemisphere in this effort. Stroessner replied “of course”, and went on to elaborate his strong views on the danger of communism and the need to deal with it firmly. Ambassador Middendorf said that we will keep GOP informed on Caribbean Basin planning and that we will wish to consult with Paraguay and other countries as it progresses. 5. Noting a reference by President Stroessner to communist support of terrorism, Ambassador Middendorf said that the U.S. believes strongly that terrorist attacks against independent countries must be stopped and that nations must cooperate to this end. The U.S. will do our share. Stroessner responded that this is necessary since communism and Moscow are against us. He added that the communists kill people and then invoke human rights to defend themselves as in Nicaragua and Cuba. He added that he supports human rights and that his government doesn’t kill anyone. Indeed it protects its citizens. As a result Paraguayans are better off. The only ones who criticize him are communists. He then mentioned once observing communist propaganda in the lobby of a hotel in San Francisco. Ambassador Middendorf commented that in a democracy like the United States such manifestations are of course permitted but the communists are a fringe group of no real importance. 6. Observing that the administration wants improved relations with the countries of the Southern Cone, Ambassador Middendorf referred to the change of policy on votes in the MDBs. 4 President Stroessner replied that his government is very pleased with the policies of the President and Secretary Haig. He went on to criticize the role of a former Ambassador (clearly Ambassador White) in Paraguay, particularly for his intimate association with the unrecognized opposition parties; while avoiding direct criticism of the former President, Stroessner then observed that some officials around Carter benefited communism. Avoiding any direct response to those remarks, Ambassador Middendorf said only that President Reagan and his administration have the fullest confidence in Ambassador Lane. 7. Ambassador Middendorf expressed U.S. appreciation for Paraguay’s support on efforts to reduce the OAS budget and to effect a better sharing of the organization’s costs, two thirds of which the U.S. now bears. Stroessner replied that our concerns on the budget are warranted, but that the U.S. must not relinquish its firm position of leadership on which small countries threatened by communism, like El Salvador, depend. He concluded the discussion by expressing his strong personal opinion that the Governments of South Africa and Taiwan deserve our support because they are firmly anti-communist. He said we must not support SWAPO and allow another Rhodesia. Ambassador Middendorf made no comment. 8. Meeting with Foreign Minister. In a meeting with Foreign Minister Alberto Nogues on July 23, Ambassador Middendorf stressed the high priority which the President and Secretary of State place on improved relations with Latin America. Nogues expressed his appreciation of this policy and said he very much hopes to call on Secretary Haig in Washington prior to the UNGA. 5 Middendorf promised to look into the possibilities for such a meeting but pointed out the scheduling problems. He then proceeded to deal at length with the issues of the Caribbean Basin Plan, international terrorism, OAS budget matters, and the importance of the role of the private sector in development. Nogues took note of the developmental as distinct from anti-Cuban thrust of the new initiative in the Caribbean, but stressed Paraguay’s particular concern with Cuba’s disturbing role throughout Latin America. He welcomed Middendorf’s promise of future consultations with the GOP as Caribbean Basin planning progresses, and expressed confidence that Paraguay will be receptive and supportive. On terrorism, Nogues agreed that international cooperation is indispensable—as is U.S. leadership. He said that the Stroessner government has sought to provide peace and stability to permit development. Despite past political differences, Paraguay has always been a loyal friend of the U.S. Paraguay shares and attempts to emulate U.S. democratic ideals, but it must be recognized that some countries are able to reach those goals faster than others due to special historical and political realities. When Ambassador Middendorf mentioned the recent change of U.S. voting policy in the MDBs as a recognition of human rights progress in Paraguay, Nogues coupled appreciation of that decision with the statement that Paraguay should really never had been included in the same category with the other Southern Cone countries in the first place since it has fortunately avoided their political problems and is perfecting its democratic institutions. 9. Referring to OAS projects in Paraguay, Ambassador Middendorf said the U.S. welcomes GOP efforts and support to reduce the OAS headquarters bureaucracy in order to continue sound programs in the field, and to reduce the U.S. share of the normal budget by 1 percent per year. He added that the administration is seeking a $1 million increase in voluntary contributions to the OAS this year. Nogues responded positively, and commented that the headquarter’s bureaucracy is like a cancer. 10. Ambassador Middendorf praised Paraguay’s emphasis on the private sector which has proved a model for development. Nogues agreed that the GOP’s philosophy favors the free market and private enterprise. Both were of the opinion that good business relations are important in international relations. Middendorf said he was pleased at the prospects for U.S. business in Paraguay, and emphasized that Allis-Chalmers is an important and influential company. Minister Nogues replied that Allis-Chalmers has excellent prospects of winning the turbine contract at the Yacyreta project, and that in Paraguay there is no complex against “Yankee imperialism.” Middendorf gave the Minister copies of his speech on “The Reagan Administration and Economic Development in the Third World” and the USTR statement on U.S. trade policy. The conversation concluded with a discussion of Paraguay’s potential as world breadbasket, its projects to increase production and transport facilities for soybean and other foodstuffs, and complementary OAS projects to benefit small farmers. 11. Meeting with businessmen. On July 23, Ambassador Middendorf met for coffee at the residence with twelve prominent local U.S. and Paraguayan business executives. He described the Reagan administration’s objective of maintaining close and friendly relations with Paraguay and all other nations in the region. He also explained the Caribbean Basin initiative, and emphasized the administration’s belief that the private sector should continue to play a leading role in the economic development of the region. See septel for report of the businessmen’s comments concerning the problems of doing business locally. 6 12. Visits to OAS/IDB project. In addition to briefings on OAS and IDB projects in Paraguay which he received at their respective local offices, Ambassador Middendorf made a field trip on July 23 to an integrated rural development project in the Department of Paraguari (about one hour’s drive southeast of Asuncion) which was designed by the OAS and will be financed by a $31 million IDB loan in cooperation with the GOP. The project is aimed at improving agriculture, developing small byproduct industries, and providing service infrastructure (roads, electricity, health, education) for some 60,000 people in the project area. Ambassador Middendorf spoke to both local and OAS/IDB officials to emphasize the importance of timely implementation, cost-control and the multiplier effect of private sector involvement to assure the future success of this and other projects. 13. Other activities. Other activities in Ambassador Middendorf’s crowded schedule included a supper hosted by Ambassador Lane at which presidential confidant and counselor Conrado Pappalardo presented a long and highly partisan account of Paraguay’s troubled political history. Ambassador Middendorf was able deftly to underscore the legitimacy of the non-communist opposition in democratic development and the seriously adverse impact of allegations of widespread corruption—whether well-founded or not—on Paraguay’s image abroad. At a luncheon in his honor hosted by the Foreign Minister and attended also by the Ministers of Interior, Industry and Commerce, and Education as well as prominent Colorado Party legislators, Middendorf heard further discourses on Paraguay’s political situation and economic prospects including its encouragement of foreign—especially U.S.—investment. In this regard the Minister of Industry and Commerce noted that no foreign enterprise has ever been expropriated in Paraguay. In response to reaffirmations of Paraguay’s steadfast anti-communist stance and friendship for the U.S., Middendorf again emphasized U.S. friendship for Paraguay, support for this country’s private sector emphasis in national development, and determination to deal with the threat of communism in Latin America. He again noted the important role that a non-communist opposition can play in a democratic society. In both these affairs, Middendorf reiterated U.S. support for Allis-Chalmers. In his final activity, Ambassador Middendorf attended the formal inauguration of the fourth international cattle show as the special guest of President Stroessner. 14. Press coverage. Ambassador Middendorf’s visit received wide coverage in the press, with front page photos and articles appearing in all major dailies. There was considerable conjecture before and during the visit as to its purpose and its meaning. An editorial in government-line La Tribuna published the day before Middendorf’s arrival stated that the visit showed “the importance that the U.S. gives to relations with our country” and that it was a reward for Paraguay’s constant support of U.S. foreign policy. It was also anticipated that from this improvement in political relations “mutual economic benefits” could follow. Other papers echoed the thought that the visit signaled an improvement in U.S.-Paraguayan relations. Speculation that the Ambassador was on a secret mission to orchestrate the isolation of Cuba was muted, probably as a result of his strong denial carried in wire service reports from Buenos Aires. Lane 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810352–0125. Confidential; Immediate; Eyes only to USOAS. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 318, footnote 2 . 4 In telegram 2582 from Asuncion, July 8, the Embassy reported that Paraguayan officials had been informed of the U.S. decision to approve an MDB loan for Paraguay based on “progress noted in our 1980 annual human rights report of Paraguay.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810318–1024) 5 See Document 399 . 6 In telegram 3021 from Asuncion, August 6, the Embassy reported on Middendorf’s July 23 meeting with businessmen in Paraguay. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810367–1183) 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay 399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay 1 Washington, August 28, 1981, 0213Z 230020. Subject: Paraguayan Foreign Minister’s meeting with the Secretary. 1. (C) Entire text. 2. Summary. At a fifty minute meeting, August 25, Foreign Minister Nogues expressed President Stroessner’s and his own admiration for the President and Secretary, their satisfaction that relations are now much better than previously, and their hope that the United States will fully reciprocate Paraguay’s historic position as a faithful ally. The Secretary responded by emphasizing the convergence of our interests and viewpoints and discussing the Soviet/Cuban threat to the hemisphere. He also mentioned the residual problem of human rights and he urged that the GOP do what it can to ensure prompt award of the turbine contract for Yacyreta to Allis-Chalmers. In departing, the Nogues party commented almost as one that this meeting constituted a dramatic change from recent previous encounters. End summary. 3. Participation at the meeting included Lopez Escobar, Conrado Pappalardo and the GOP’s UN Ambassador for the Paraguayans, Gonzalez Arias, Ambassador Enders and ARA/SC Director Service for the Department. Nogues began by expressing his satisfaction and that of President Stroessner with the fact that this meeting was taking place and, more generally, with the course of US/Paraguay relations since President Reagan assumed office. Stroessner admired the Secretary both as a soldier and as a statesman. Nogues then gave a brief summary of the accomplishments of Paraguay under Stroessner. He suggested that Paraguay might well serve as a model for other Latin American countries and said his government was concerned that the Marxist threat, particularly in Central America, was preventing stable and peaceful development elsewhere in the hemisphere. Nogues concluded this introductory portion with the assertion that Paraguay has always been a faithful ally of the US and that it asks, indeed claims, a reciprocal friendship from us. He said he had made the same points to Secretaries Kissinger and Vance but had wanted to make this special trip to Washington to express personally to the Secretary the interest of his government in the closest possible relations. 4. The Secretary replied by noting that there is a great convergence of viewpoints and interests between Paraguay and the US. He said that he had been following events in Paraguay since the early 1960’s and that he is an admirer of Stroessner. The Secretary discussed briefly the Soviet/Cuban effort to take advantage of long standing economic and social problems in the hemisphere and assured Nogues that this administration is determined to prevent the success of those efforts. He noted in this respect that persons who have the wisdom and courage to speak out on the problem are often subjected to very harsh criticism from some sectors. The Secretary asked that Nogues convey to President Stroessner this administration’s absolute desire to move ahead in improving relations, noting that some steps have already been taken. 5. The Secretary then raised Yacyreta, urging that the GOP do whatever it could to ensure a decision prior to the expiration of the EXIM credit terms in September. He said this was important to both the Paraguayan and Argentine Governments in order to avoid extra costs; and he asked if there was anything we could do to help. Nogues assured the Secretary that the GOP fully supports the Allis-Chalmers bid but that the matter has been tied up for more than a year because of problems in Argentina and because a decision must first be made on contracts for the civil works. 6. The Secretary described human rights as a “residual problem” which we will address as one friend speaking to another and through diplomatic channels. He said his own preference would be to use the term “personal liberties” rather than human rights because the very term human rights has unfortunately become loaded with emotional and political connotations. In addressing human rights matters, it is important that we not lose sight of the security concerns that the countries of this hemisphere share. 7. In response to a question from the Secretary on the extent of the security threat within Paraguay, Nogues noted that his country had been the first to break with Cuba, that the Cubans had assisted an attempted invasion twenty years ago from Argentina, that Havana was behind the Somoza assassination, and that propaganda continues, but that the GOP is on top of the situation. Stroessner firmly believes that the communists never sleep and that therefore he and others in the GOP are always on the alert. 8. The meeting concluded with reiteration of expressions of good will and certainty that relations will improve steadily. As they were departing, the Paraguayans commented that this meeting marked a very sharp contrast with the recent past. They were delighted with their reception and the length of the meeting. Haig 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons) August 1981. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Service, cleared in S, S/S, and S/S–O, approved by Enders. 400. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 400. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, November 11, 1982, 1445Z 5389. Subject: Ambassador’s luncheon meeting with President Stroessner. 1. (Confidential—Entire text.) 2. On November 10, 1982, President Stroessner lunched privately at residence with the Ambassador. This was his first visit to the residence since Ambassador Landau held his “despedida” in 1977; and, according to the President’s private Secretary, the first ever private luncheon with any Ambassador. 3. During this friendly, chatty luncheon, the subjects we discussed covered a wide range of issues such as the United Nations, OAS, other Latin American alliances (Stroessner is particularly disturbed with the non-aligned countries movement), the errors of the Yalta Agreement, a short conversation on the Bolivian threat to Paraguay (especially noting the communist cabinet members in Bolivia) plus comments on new Mariscal Estigarribia airstrip. 4. In the over-two hour meeting, I was impressed with President Stroessner’s remembrance of names and dates of historical events and military feats worldwide, from World War I onward. The President has a good political mind and is a charming and able conversationalist. He is an avid reader and has a wealth of great information on world affairs and world history. He particularly has the ability to recall military actions that have occurred world wide (in his story of his visit in the late fifties or early sixties to army posts throughout the USA, he recalled the names of the generals in command and in most cases told who succeeded them). 5. It is obvious that the President is quite alert, has no visible disabilities, except a tender right hand, and seems to be enjoying good health (after the morning and evening get toegthers for Stroessner’s birthday on Nov 3, longer-term diplomats here felt he looked better and more agile than two years ago). 6. President Stroessner indicated that he is a great admirer of President Reagan who, he feels, is constrained by Congress in fighting communism. For example Stroessner would like to see the United States back Taiwan more strongly. 7. The only point of possible friction in the conversation was the President’s observation that he felt the methods being utilized in this country were best for the Paraguayan people as shown by the peace and tranquility in the country. I did not push the item other than to state that he was well aware of our feelings on the state of siege and the “detenidos”. The President then stated he feels fascism is as evil as communism and he is a believer in democratic government. At this point he indicated a desire to invite members of the U.S. Congress to observe the February 6 elections in Paraguay. 8. Comment: Believe that this was an extremely useful first private contact with the President. Obviously, the President felt likewise as it was mutually agreed to follow up with frequent private meetings which should be beneficial to both parties. I plan to follow up this offer and initial exchange, if possible on a monthly basis, and will pursue subjects in depth during these meetings. It is interesting that about an hour after the end of the luncheon, President Stroessner called on direct residence phone without benefit of secretary to clear up several dates and names we both could not come up with at luncheon (Such as Mihajlovic of Yugoslavia after Yalta Conference). He then gave several names of authors of books I had expressed an interest in, and about an hour later his personal secretary arrived at the residence with two literary works on the triple alliance war which we had discussed. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820586–0589. Confidential; Priority. 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, April 27, 1983, 1945Z 1605. Subject: April 26, 1983: President Stroessner/Ambassador meeting. 1. (Confidential—Entire text.) 2. Summary: While main reason for invitation was supposedly to express gratitude for arrival of five-man flood evaluation team, it became evident that President wanted to express his discontent at present trend of press coverage by “ABC Color” newspaper. Other subjects discussed were record publicity, Laino expulsion, military and economic aid, and, of course, events in Bolivia. 2 End summary. 3. Flood conversation opened by expression of gratitude for our disaster relief funds allocated to Indian colonies along the Paraguay River plus profuse thanks for the fast cooperation in arrival and meetings with the five-man evaluation team. President mentioned great aid to Argentina by Vatican and others while only USA had come to Paraguay’s help thus far. Then stating that Paraguayans were tough and took their bad times and setbacks stoically and without tears as they had through history, the general then launched into a tirade against the negative criticisms of “ABC Color.” 4. “ABC Color” activities. Not only the Colorados have been discussing the consistent anti-government articles by “ABC” but even the general public and some opposition members have privately expressed concern at the frequency and vehemence of some “ABC” articles. Zuccolillo (Owner of “ABC”) has several times expressed concern at prospect of closing and as recently as a month ago Ambassador had expressed to Minister of Interior Montanaro the negative effects on Paraguay that such a closure would have. 3 However, immediately after expressing these concerns two weeks ago, “ABC” carried a Laino interview, which could hurt efforts to get Laino’s return approved and certainly strengthened displeasure of government. 5. President Stroessner first decried the unbalanced amount of anti-government criticism and seemed especially provoked by report on the ineffectiveness of the legislature and the negative comments on Paraguay’s participation in Itaipu. President stressed that criticism should be made on basis of grounds to improve conditions and not merely as a confrontation between press and government. Seriousness of his concern was the denunciation of Conrado Pappalardo’s sister, who is married to Zuccolillo, apparently to let Ambassador know such association would not affect his decision. He was also provoked that “ABC” did not carry his anti-communist interview of several days ago although a copy was provided to them. 6. Ambassador noted traditional right of free press and value of dialogue to keep all on their toes plus impressing upon Stroessner the vast negative effects of any closure on our mutual personal efforts over last nine months as well as the relations between our two countries. 7. Never could Ambassador extract a promise or statement from President that “ABC” would not be closed but received half-hearted agreement that nothing would happen during Ambassador’s trip to the US. 8. The mention of effecting our relations, brought the question of when we could give more military and economic aid to Paraguay. Ambassador stated the betterment of human rights in Paraguay was a step in the right direction but a newspaper’s closure would cancel any prospects. 9. Aid for Paraguay. President then repeated his previous remarks that we should grant Paraguay at least the same aid as Bolivia and again repeating the comparison of pro-communist and anti-US Bolivia to anti-communist and pro-US Paraguay. The theme “amigos con nuestros amigos” was once again heard. 10. Ricord. Once again Ambassador was requested to compile everything possible on information on the Ricord case, particularly if we have anything on statements by Ricord as to his associates in drug trafficking in Paraguay. 4 President pledged his support and cooperation to counteract the small drug trafficking in Paraguay. 11. Visit by Assistant Secretary Enders. 5 President stated his pleasure at Ambassador Enders’ visit for his “Cambio de Mando” on August 15. 6 (Upon leaving, Conrado Pappalardo also talked about Ambassador Enders’ trip for August 15 and stated he had urged that Mrs. Enders be sure to accompany her husband.) 12. Upon leaving, Ambassador reiterated his concerns over any closure of “ABC” and any prolonged expulsion of Laino and surprisingly, as opposed to Minister Montanaro’s remarks (Asuncion 1582). 7 President stated that plans were being studied for his return. 13. Comments: Several times during conversation Ambassador attempted to interject discussion on opening up the political process in Paraguay 8 and finally was told “lets’s meet on that upon your return.” 9 14. President Stroessner seems to be in excellent health, more alert and active than nine months ago. He also seems to be watching his weight and getting more rest than previously. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830238–0557. Confidential. 2 In telegram 1155 from Asuncion, March 28, the Embassy reported: “The prominent exiled opposition leader Domingo Laino was prevented by the GOP from entering Paraguay. Laino’s return was designed to test the genuineness of the Interior Minister’s claim that exiles would be allowed into Paraguay if they returned one by one. The GOP’s refusal to allow Laino to enter the country has provided the opposition with new ammunition to conduct its public relations sniping of the GOP.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830171–0246) 3 Memorandum of conversation for this meeting has not been found. 4 Reference is to Auguste Ricord who was extradited to the United States in 1972. See Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 574 . 5 In telegram 1330 from Asuncion, April 7, the Embassy confirmed a “request by GOP officials for luncheon April 13 with Assistant Secretary Enders.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830193–0180) In telegram 1370 from Asuncion, April 11, the Embassy described: “personalities probable topics for Enders-Montanaro/Pappalardo luncheon April 13.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830200–0539) No memorandum of conversation for the meeting has been found. 6 No indication of an August 15 visit by Enders has been found. In telegram 3369 from Asuncion, August 16, the Embassy reported: “President Alfredo Stroessner was sworn in on August 15 for seventh term as President of Paraguay, capping three days of ceremonies. The general populace appears to have taken the President’s inauguration for another 5-year term as simply a matter of course, and virtually the only event which provided much occasion for comment and speculation was the installation of three new cabinet members.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830471–1013) In telegram 228836 to Asuncion, August 12, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a message from Reagan to Stroessner upon his inauguration: “Dear Mr. President: Please accept my congratulations and best wishes as you commence a new presidential term. The American people share my hope that the close friendship between Paraguay and the United States will continue in the years ahead. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830463–0863) 7 In telegram 1582 from Asuncion, April 26, the Embassy wrote: “In Ambassador Davis’ first meeting with Minister Montanaro since Paraguayan group luncheon with Assistant Secretary Enders, points discussed at this meeting were present condition of human rights in Paraguay and possible Enders visit. Minister Montanaro was very pleased with his treatment in Washington and felt Ambassador Enders had conversed in a friendly and open manner with them. Minister was openly impressed by Ambassador Enders’ knowledge of Paraguay’s problems.” Additionally, the Embassy noted that Stroessner had “called off” Laino’s return and that “it was evident that only the president can made new decision to allow the return should it be requested.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830233–0634) 8 In telegram 3428 from Asuncion, August 19, the Embassy wrote: “The inauguration August 15 of President Alfredo Stroessner for a seventh term (1983–1988) occurred within the context of (A) discouraging economic and political developments and trends in Paraguay, and (B) a rapidly changing hemispheric and regional environment. The Embassy believes it timely, therefore, to propose a careful review of U.S. interests and objectives in Paraguay in the light of the current context in order to arrive at appropriate and agreed USG policy responses and courses of action.” Furthermore: “I must say I have been quite disappointed that I have not been more successful in my efforts to talk sense to the Stroessner government, to urge it to understand that its own interests lie in better observance of democratic rules. Maybe after about thirty years in office, President Stroessner just is not going to change. It is a pity, because by not loosening up, he is creating a dangerous situation for the future. I don’t think that we can afford to be identified with that wrong approach if we are going to have an influence on the situation later on. Fortunately, a lot of Colorados and even a lot of generals agree with me, or at least they say so.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830505–0170) 9 In telegram 281942 to Asuncion, October 1, the Department wrote: “Department welcomed Embassy’s review of developments and trends in Paraguay and related recommendations regarding USG policy objectives and agrees that a cautious shift in the balance of our policy objectives toward Paraguay is called for. However, in implementing the above strategy, we want to avoid, whenever possible, jeopardizing GOP cooperation on hemispheric or international issues and/or compromising access to and influence with key Paraguayans on domestic issues such a human rights, democracy and the economy. Periodic evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of this policy adjustment as it is implemented would be helpful to the Department in understanding the situation and tuning our course appropriately.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830571–0025) 402. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 402. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, May 18, 1984, 2203Z 2802. Subject: (C) Discussion with President Stroessner on U.S-Paraguayan relations. 1. (Confidential—Entire text.) 2. Summary: The Ambassador met May 18 with President Stroessner. An exchange on problems in our bilateral relations stemming from human rights problems in Paraguay dominated the discussion. 2 Stroessner was stung at the decision not to permit the visiting U.S. Army band and parachute team to March in the national day parade. He questioned whether the USG, with all its problems, really cared about this, or about the closure of ABC Color , which, as the Ambassador explained, prompted us to curtail the band’s activities in Paraguay. 3 The Ambassador stressed the importance the U.S. attached to the ABC problem and told the President that it would continue to affect our bilateral relations. They also exchanged views on the recent abortive visit by the Americas watch group, with the Ambassador stressing concern over the Paraguayan handling of the incident and Stroessner confirming assurances by other members of his government that the group could return to Paraguay if it wanted but would have to abide by Paraguayan laws including customs inspection. End summary. 3. The Ambassador met with President Stroessner May 18. In the course of a long conversation the two discussed strains in U.S.-Paraguayan relations which have arisen primarily as a result of recent human rights developments in Paraguay, and the U.S. reactions thereto. It was apparent that the President was most upset about the decision not to permit the visiting U.S. Army band and parachute team to march in the national day parade on May 15. He returned to this subject several times. 4. Stroessner argued that the U.S. had its hands full with problems all over the world—from the Persian Gulf to relations with China (over which he chided the U.S. for the apparent warmth of relations with the PRC). No one in the U.S. or the U.S. Government, he insisted, would have known or cared about the participation of the band in Paraguay’s National Day parade. Thus, he could not understand why this had been cancelled. 5. The President took the occasion to point to the participation by his “good friends” the Brazilians, who brought in two warships—whose crews marched in the parade—and sent a group of Mirage fighters to overfly the parade route. They also presented the Paraguayan Air Force with two reconditioned C–47 aircraft. 6. The Ambassador responded that the USG decision was made in reaction to the closure of ABC Color . He emphasized that it was his choice, not something forced on him by the Embassy staff (this to counter an assertion the President raised several times). Moreover, the Department fully endorsed the decision, although some in Washington suggested stronger measures. 4 7. The Ambassador noted that there had been strenuous efforts by certain members of the Paraguayan Government to turn the decision around but that this was not possible, given the importance we attached to the “ABC” incident. This led the President to request that in the future the Embassy deal on such matters with Foreign Minister Saldivar, and not with Conrado Pappalardo. 8. Continuing on the “ABC” matter, the President complained about the statement issued by the Embassy in the immediate wake of the closure. 5 Stroessner argued that he had consulted with the leadership of his party and the government and that they were unanimous in recommending closure of the paper in order to protect “the welfare and security of the Paraguayan people.” “ABC’s” owner, Aldo Zuccolillo, he insisted, couldn’t be controlled, and he had to be stopped for the good of the country. Again he argued that the U.S., with all its problems around the world, could not possibly care much about what happened to a newspaper in Paraguay and complained about U.S. “interference” in this matter. 9. The Ambassador responded that as far as the U.S. was concerned the “ABC” affair was not finished. He emphasized that the GOP’s action would continue to affect our bilateral relations, and that it would certainly affect the way in which the U.S. Congress would look upon future cooperation with Paraguay. The congressional reaction to the “ABC” closure, he noted, had only begun. 10. The Ambassador also underlined once again our concern over the handling of the recent visit by the Americas watch group, and our satisfaction at the GOP’s decision to invite them to return. He emphasized the stature of the organizations which the group represented, and that the members of the group were serious people who were well-connected and respected within the U.S. and abroad. He urged that the GOP look upon such a visit as an opportunity, not a threat. The President repeated the assurances given by others that the group could return to Paraguay if it wanted to, but insisted that they would have to abide by Paraguayan laws if they did. He asked that the Embassy continue to discuss such matters related to human rights cases with Interior Minister Montanaro. 11. Throughout the meeting President Stroessner was animated, affable and alert, and he showed no signs whatever of any problems with his health. While he was clearly concerned over problems in our relations, and particularly upset over the band incident, his manner was friendly throughout. While we doubt that he fully comprehends why we have reacted so strongly to the “ABC” closure, the band incident does appear to have brought home to him that the U.S. does attach considerable importance to human rights problems in Paraguay. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840328–0066. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Buenos Aires. 2 In telegram 3688 from Asuncion, September 1, 1983 the Embassy reported on Davis’ August 30, 1983 meeting with Stroessner who “went into a serious and long discussion of why the USG and the members of Congress could not judge his government and country on their many good points instead of basing the decisions on isolated detentions of troublemakers and repression of media trying to cause trouble for his country.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830505–0227) In telegram 5039 from Asuncion, November 2, 1983 the Embassy wrote: “During week of October 24th, three meetings with Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and the President mainly concentrated on their displeasure and speeches concerning press reports on human rights statements of Asst. Secretary Abrams and Congressmen Michels before congressional committees.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830643–0987) See “Our Human Rights Policy Has Been a Force for Good Throughout the Southern Cone,” American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1983, pp. 1426–1434. 3 In telegram 1846 from Asuncion, March 22, the Embassy reported: “The Paraguayan Government closed down the nation’s leading newspaper, ABC Color , the morning of March 22, for an indefinite period.” Additionally, the Embassy included a proposed statement in response to the closure to be delivered from the Embassy and the Department, stating in part: “The Government of the United States has been encouraged by a number of positive steps taken by the Government of Paraguay since December 1983. However, we deeply deplore the closure of ‘ ABC Color ,’ which represents a serious violation of the principal of freedom of the press. The Government of the United States is firmly committed to the principal of freedom of the press, which is recognized by all democratic governments as one of the necessary conditions for the flourishing of democracy. We hope to see a reopening of ABC Color —without restrictions—at the earliest possible moment. The Government of the United States will continue to follow this event with great interest and concern.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840189–0259) 4 In telegram 94234 to Asuncion, March 31, the Department wrote: “We agree the GOP closure of ABC Color and arrest of owner/publisher is a development that requires strong response from USG. Our public statement was intended to accomplish that objective.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840211–0633) In telegram 101954 to Asuncion, April 7, the Department reported that Kilday had delivered a note to Martínez Mendieta on April 6 stating: “We deeply deplore the closure of ABC Color as a serious violation of the principle of freedom of the press, which is an essential condition of democracy. In the spirit of friendship that has characterized relations between our two countries, the Department of State urges that the Government of Paraguay reconsider this action, which can only prejudice Paraguay’s standing in the international community.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840229–0127) 5 See footnote 3 , above. 403. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley) to Secretary of State Shultz 403. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Motley) to Secretary of State Shultz 1 Washington, July 20, 1984 SUBJECT A strategy to obtain the reopening of Paraguay’s only independent newspaper, ABC Color ISSUE FOR DECISION Whether to agree to a meeting with Paraguayan Foreign Minister Saldivar as part of a strategy to obtain the reopening of Paraguay’s only independent newspaper. ESSENTIAL FACTORS Almost totally isolated from the rest of Latin America, Paraguay’s government invites disdain and ridicule. President Stroessner and the Colorado Party continue to run the country as a private fiefdom. The Stroessner regime has traditionally been impervious to outside pressure in the area of human rights and the development of democratic institutions. Therefore any opportunity to influence the GOP in a manner consistent with our policy goal of more explicitly identifying ourselves with democratic ideals and processes should be considered worth pursuing. We have been offered the opportunity to effect the reopening of Paraguay’s only independent newspaper, ABC Color . Since last March, when president Stroessner closed ABC for effectively “disturbing the peace”, we have carefully orchestrated a campaign to persuade him to permit the newspaper to reopen. In the process, the ABC case has become something of a cause celebre among press and human rights groups and the Congress (see attached documents). 2 Stroessner understands that there is no chance of improving relations with the U.S. so long as the paper remains closed. President Stroessner’s Foreign Minister has now come to us with the outline of a deal. Essentially, it is that if we take measures to ease USG public pressure on Paraguay, Stroessner will consider permitting ABC to reopen in September. In addition, and implicitly part of the deal, Foreign Minister Saldivar has asked for a meeting with you. A Paraguayan Foreign Minister has not been received by a U.S. Secretary of State since Saldivar’s predecessor met with Secretary Haig in August 1981. 3 There could be a trap here. President Stroessner values our good opinion and friendship and is bothered by the extent of our protest, but he may just be looking for an opportunity to sell the GOP’s arguments justifying the paper’s closure. Saldivar may view a meeting with you as a means of gaining favorable publicity in Paraguay for the Government and for himself. The risk is worth taking. If we do not follow up on this opportunity, there is no question but what ABC will remain shut. If ABC reopens, it will be a nice victory for the administration’s quiet diplomacy in the area of human rights, especially when viewed in conjunction with our successful efforts to achieve a decrease in the number of political prisoners, improved judicial processing, and a slightly more liberal, if still tenuous, approach to opposition political activities. If Stroessner does not keep his end of the bargain, your meeting with Saldivar can be defended as a final effort to get ABC Color back in business. We wish to firm up the deal offered by the GOP, including getting reasonable assurances that if we were to ease up on public pressure and arrange a visit for Saldivar, ABC would be reopened. We will ask our Ambassador to seek assurance directly from Stroessner, if necessary. We would not wish to proceed under other circumstances, considering the depth of feeling in the Congress and the fact that elections are coming up in November. Your contribution to this effort would be to agree to receive Foreign Minister Saldivar for a brief (20–30 minutes) substantive meeting. Minister Saldivar is prepared to come to Washington at your convenience, but he would like to come before the Colorado Party convention starts September 15. He wishes “to explain Paraguay’s case” on ABC . Since he is not a stimulating interlocutor, we would view the meeting as an opportunity for you to confirm to him our concern about the closure of ABC , our appreciation for human rights improvements in other areas and our desire to support democratic trends in the Southern Cone. RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize us to offer Saldivar a meeting with you at a mutually convenient time before September 15, providing we are satisfied that such a meeting will lead to the re-opening of ABC Color . 4 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 49G, Paraguay. Confidential. Sent through Armacost. A stamped notation at the top of the first page indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. 2 Attached but not printed are a copy of the protest delivered on ABC Color ’s closure by Kilday to Martínez on April 6; House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 309, May 17, that condemned the closure; a June 21 letter to Shultz from eleven Republican Senators; and a May 8 letter to Stroessner from three Republican members of the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. 3 See Document 399 . 4 Shultz wrote below the “Approval” or “Disapproval” lines: “how about doing this the other way around—guarantee a meeting when ABC Color is [granted permission to] reopen. G.” Brackets are in the original. A typed transcription of Shultz’s comments is dated July 24. 404. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 404. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, August 30, 1984, 1600Z 5204. Subject: (C) Ambassador’s August 29 meeting with President Stroessner: “ABC Color.” Ref: Asuncion 5144 2 1. (Secret—Entire text.) 2. Summary: The Ambassador discussed the closure of “ABC Color” with President Stroessner on August 29. In exchanges that went on for an hour, the President repeatedly insisted that he did not want to talk about the “ABC” issue, while the Ambassador described the widespread U.S. concern over the matter and cautioned him about the continued problem it would pose for our bilateral relations. Out of the blue, Stroessner renewed his earlier requests for C–130 and F–5 aircraft for his air force. The Ambassador responded that this was precisely the kind of thing the U.S. could not do while “ABC” remained closed. Stroessner concluded by saying that he considered the matter to be a “dead issue.” End summary. 3. The Ambassador called on President Stroessner August 29 to discuss the problem of the continued closure of “ABC Color.” The Ambassador opened the discussion by describing his recent consultations in Washington, stressing the concern throughout the USG over the matter. He noted that this concern crossed party and ideological lines in the Congress, as indicated by the recent resolution on the subject. 3 4. President Stroessner interjected at this point that as far as he was concerned the “ABC” issue was something he did not want to talk about anymore. The Ambassador responded that it was important for the GOP to understand that the continued closure of “ABC” would mean continued problems in our bilateral relations. It would prevent the U.S. from deepening cooperation with Paraguay in matters affecting our mutual interests. Would the President give him a definitive answer on “ABC’s” future? 5. Sliding away from a direct response, Stroessner reiterated his desire not to pursue the discussion. He said the closure of “ABC” had been necessary, adding that for the sake of the Paraguayan people he could not afford to relax his grip. He pointed to Peru and Argentina as examples of what happened when there was “democracy without firmness.” He went on to recite a somewhat colored version of Paraguay’s chaotic political history during the first half of the 20th century, up until his accession to power. This could not be allowed to recur. He repeated that he did not wish to discuss the subject further. 6. The Ambassador asked if the GOP had any flexibility on the “ABC” issue. Perhaps “ABC” owner Zuccolillo might be willing to discuss conditions under which the paper could re-open. The President dismissed this possibility, leaving no doubt that he was not willing to treat with Zuccolillo. He added that U.S. complaints over the “ABC” matter were interference in Paraguay’s internal affairs, and said he was particularly stung by the Embassy’s public protest over the paper’s closure in March. No other country, he said, had raised the matter with him. Even the UK Deputy Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who called on him earlier this month, had agreed that it was an internal matter and had accepted the fact that the “ABC” question was now closed. 7. At this point, the President said there was something he wanted to raise. Paraguay, which had supported the U.S. faithfully over the years, needed U.S. help. He said the U.S. had promised to provide a C–130 aircraft to the Paraguayan Air Force back in 1971. He was still waiting. In addition, he said, his air force needed some F–5 aircraft, provision of which should cause the U.S. no difficulty since they were purely defensive. Defense Minister Martinez would be in touch with the Ambassador shortly to provide details. 8. The Ambassador said he hadn’t wanted to seem to be threatening but was surprised at this request, and at the apparent unwillingness of the GOP to listen to what he had been repeating over the past two years about how human rights issues affected our ability to provide military equipment. He said there was no prospect that the U.S. would be willing to sell such equipment to Paraguay as long as “ABC” was closed. Moreover, the closure placed even our modest IMET program in serious jeopardy in the Congress. This was exactly what he meant when he said that continued closure of “ABC” would limit possibilities for mutual cooperation. 9. The Ambassador added that as he had told Foreign Minister Saldivar, a meeting between Saldivar and the Secretary during Saldivar’s forthcoming trip to the U.S. would not be possible. The Embassy would, however, seek to arrange a meeting with Assistant Secretary Motley. The President said that this would be fine. 4 10. At this point, the conversation turned to other matters (which will be reported in separate messages). 5 As the Ambassador was leaving, however, the President reminded him of his desire for F–5s and commented philosophically that he remained in office not because he liked the job, but to protect his people against the kind of political upheavals which had convulsed Paraguay so often in the 20th century. 11. The President was calm and relaxed throughout the meeting, though he clearly did not relish the persistent discussion of “ABC.” We take his comments to be a definitive “no” to any re-opening of “ABC”. Our views on the U.S. response to this position will be the subject of a separate message. 6 Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840554–0030. Secret; Immediate. 2 In telegram 5144 from Asuncion, August 28, the Embassy reported on Davis’ August 27 meeting with Saldívar writing: “The Ambassador discussed the ‘ABC Color’ closure with the Foreign Minister August 27, emphasizing the widespread concern over the case throughout the USG. The Foreign Minister argued for a meeting with the Secretary to present Paraguay’s side of the case, but avoided saying anything definitive about the paper’s future.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840547–0813) 3 House Congressional Resolution 331 passed on June 29 and was approved by the Senate on July 27, stating, in part: “Concurrent resolution to condemn the closing of ABC Color, the only independent newspaper in Paraguay, and to urge the Government of Paraguay to permit the reopening of that newspaper and to guarantee freedom of the press.” 4 No memorandum of conversation of has been found. 5 In telegram 5227 from Asuncion, August 30, the Embassy reported that during his August 29 meeting with Davis, Stroessner had discussed his possible travel plans. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840555–0328) In telegram 5229 from Asuncion, August 30, the Embassy reported on developments in the Colorado Party, noting that during Davis’ August 29 meeting, Stroessner described “the open competition within the party as an example of democracy in action.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840555–0353) 6 In telegram 5531 from Asuncion, September 14, the Embassy wrote: “The Embassy believes there is little or no chance of persuading President Stroessner to permit the reopening of ‘ABC Color.’ To underline our concern and disapproval, we should therefore distance ourselves from the Stroessner government. To do this, we should carefully monitor the activities of all U.S. agencies to reduce our profile and cut back on those that suggest too close identification with the government.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840587–0282) 405. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 405. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, August 22, 1985, 1706Z 4361. Subject: Meeting with President Stroessner. Ref: Asuncion 4295 2 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary: During a lengthy and relaxed conversation, President Stroessner confided to me about his health, his attitude toward reelection in 1988, concerns about Bolivia, and the change in U.S. Ambassadors here. He displayed a vigor which belies public questions about the state of his health. End summary. 3. After having been informed by ForMin Saldivar on Monday that President Stroessner would be too busy to receive me this week, I was advised on Wednesday (August 21) that he wanted to see me the next morning. Thus, I had the opportunity for a lengthy tour d’horizon, which the President said he wanted. 4. Health: Stroessner raised this issue by pointing to a scratch on his hand and saying he wanted me to know it was from an accident, and that he was having no further skin problems. I noted that the city was abuzz with rumors about a possible gallbladder operation. He confirmed that his doctors told him he needed an operation, that although it was not urgent, it should be done soon and that he would have it here in Asuncion. He later returned to his health saying that he sometimes lacks pep (falta animo) in the morning when he wakes up, but that the thought that people are waiting to see him in his office gets him moving. 5. Reelection: Stroessner commented, in the context of speculation about his candidacy for reelection in 1988, that he lives in the present, not the future. He is interested in serving, he said, as long as “God, my health and the Paraguayan people allow me to.” (Comment: He later reiterated he would serve “as long as the Paraguayan people want me.” This is a switch from his past line that he would serve as long as the Colorado Party wanted him as its candidate. This may be an intended or unconscious reflection of the fact that he is currently facing some independent jockeying for position within the party. End comment.) 6. Contacts with Colorados: I knew from Interior Minister Montanaro that the President was interested in learning details of my contacts with various elements of the Colorado Party. Stroessner raised the issue anew and wanted to know why I would waste time meeting with what he described as an unimportant group of Colorado Party legislators, which, he pointed out, included people who were “not disciplined.” He knew I was going to have some of the “kamikaze” group (the Frutos clan) to lunch on Friday. 3 7. I said that it was important that I be able to inform Washington accurately on all political currents here. In that context I mentioned that I planned to lunch the following week with Mario Abdo Benitez (who is at the forefront of the opposite “militant” faction). The President asked, in the same tone as previously, “Why are you meeting with him?” I went through the same explanation again, probably to no avail. (Comment: This is a sensitive area for him. It is extremely clear that he spends a great deal of time U.S. Embassy watching. End comment.) 8. Change of Ambassadors: Stroessner said in terms of the upcoming change of Ambassadors that Ambassador-designate Taylor “could be valuable here.” He mentioned his narcotics program direction experience. I assured him that Taylor is a well-rounded career officer, not just a narcotics specialist. 9. Military assistance: Stroessner said that Paraguay could use the resumption of foreign military sales from the U.S. he spoke of the military imbalance between Bolivia and Paraguay and referred to the historical context of the Chaco War. The U.S. sale of a patrol craft to the Bolivians also came up, with Stroessner pointing out that the ship is now visiting in the Asuncion port. The threat is growing, he said. I used that opportunity to once again explain to the President that as long as his government continues to take actions such as closing the ABC Color newspaper and taking Radio Nanduti off the air 4 that there will be no disposition in Washington to resuming this kind of military assistance. 10. Exchange rate: As I was leaving, I remarked on the skyrocketing value of the dollar compared to the guarani. He replied abruptly that there would be no devaluation of the currency. I understand from other well-connected sources that the President has said he will not replace MinFin Barrientos. This conversation coincided with the unprecedented leap in the dollar-guarani exchange rate from about 1:800 on August 19 to 1:1050 and approaching 1100 on August 21. The President appeared not to understand that the outside world could and was devaluing the guarani. 11. Comment: Stroessner was the most relaxed and voluble I have seen him. He did not seem overly preoccupied by his health, beyond a normal focus on the aging process. A bit of bile entered the conversation in terms of my meeting with Colorado Party dissidents and the GOP’s handling of media criticism. In general, however, Stroessner’s vital signs show little indication that he is losing his grip although his economic blindspot remains as glaring as ever. Davis 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850599–0102. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 In telegram 4295 from Asuncion, August 19, the Embassy reported on rumors of gall bladder surgery for Stroessner. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850588–0608) 3 August 24. 4 In telegram 2799 from Asuncion, July 12, 1983 the Embassy wrote: “The Paraguayan Government July 9 closed down a local radio station, Radio Nanduti, for 30 days, accusing the station of having ‘disturbed the public order.’”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830395–0406) In telegram 7179 from Asuncion, November 8, the Embassy reported: “The Paraguayan authorities moved once again against Humberto Rubin, owner of the popular radio station Radio Nanduti. On November 6 the telecommunications authorities prohibited Rubin from working as an announcer. The move came on the heels of a meeting between Rubin and the Under Secretary for Information, Anibal Fernandez, who, according to Rubin, warned him that if he did not stop interviewing leaders of the unrecognized opposition parties and otherwise providing so much coverage to their activities, his station would have to close.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840716–0281) 406. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 406. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M 86–20034 Washington, July 9, 1986 PARAGUAY: Scenarios for Sudden, Unexpected Change Summary We believe that despite growing opposition activity in Paraguay, President Stroessner is in control, will be re-elected in 1988, and probably will remain in power until he dies, when the military and the ruling Colorado Party will choose a successor. Nevertheless, change in Paraguay could come about suddenly, leading either to a regime that initiates some democratic reforms or to right- or left-wing authoritarian rule more repressive than Stroessner’s. We believe that Asuncion will move toward democracy if the traditionalist faction of the Colorado Party, reformist elements in the military, or the opposition parties depose Stroessner. The President could, however, be ousted by rightist elements intent on protecting lucrative narcotics and smuggling interests or—in the longer term—Paraguay could fall prey to leftist subversion after a brief, chaotic democratic interlude. All these scenarios, in our view, are highly unlikely, but none can be discounted. [Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 43: Paraguay: Scenarios for Sudden, Unexpected Change. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Information available as of July 8 was used in the preparation of the memorandum. 407. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to Secretary of State Shultz 407. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to Secretary of State Shultz 1 Washington, January 5, 1987 SUBJECT Paraguay: An Old Caudillo Faces the Future SUMMARY: President Stroessner is struggling to contain opposition not only from frustrated sectors with increased political and economic expectations, but from within his own party, as well. He has resorted to his traditional method of applied political acumen, combined with selective repression, to contain this latest wave of opposition. END SUMMARY. During the past few months, the GOP has taken the offensive against its moderate democratic opposition: —An independent, privately-owned radio station has been all but driven off the air (and into bankruptcy) by government-sanctioned jamming and signal overriding; —An increasing number of noncommunist opposition leaders have been jailed on spurious charges of sedition; —Labor leaders have been arrested and publicly beaten for attempting to organize, and peacefully demonstrate and strike. —Private meetings of the democratic opposition have been violently disrupted. —Rural workers involved in legitimate land disputes have been physically mistreated by local police authorities. President Stroessner, 74, has consistently defeated previous surges of opposition activity with combination of repression and personal political acumen. Moreover, he has been able to count on the support of the military and the 100 year-old Colorado Party. The situation is evolving, however, and today, the Colorado Party is suffering serious internecine conflict arising from disparate elements maneuvering for position in the “post-Stroessner” era. Deteriorating economic conditions are impacting adversely on the recently-expanded middle class, which previously looked to Stroessner to provide order and stability, but now is beginning to see him as an impediment to modernization. The GOP thinks its visceral anti-communism should guarantee visible USG support and purports to be surprised when successive US Ambassadors do not deliver it. Ambassador Taylor’s contacts with the democratic opposition have incurred its wrath, as did our November 20 press statement calling on it to respect freedom of assembly and expression. 2 The FRG in Bonn and the EC in Asuncion have made démarches, as we have done in Washington. 3 Further, the GOP can no longer rely on the tacit approval of now-democratic Argentina and Brazil. On the other hand, the GOP has benefited politically and financially from support from the Japanese Government. Paraguay, with a relatively large Japanese emigre community, is the largest Latin American recipient of bilateral Japanese aid. We have made the GOJ aware of our human rights concerns, but the GOJ has continued to devote a disproportionate amount of its assistance to Paraguay. The opposition (both within and outside the Colorado Party) has identified the 1988 elections as a showdown, and can be expected to continue turning up the heat on Stroessner. We are not optimistic that increased internal and external pressure will cause Stroessner to moderate his policies, as he prepares for yet another term. 1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary Files, Special Collection—Iran Contra—Noriega, Lot 95D407, Chron (1987). Confidential. Drafted on December 15, 1986 by Bolton; cleared by Gelbard and Flower. Printed from an uninitialed copy. 2 In telegram 363989 to Asuncion, November 21, 1986 the Department forwarded the text of its November 21 press statement noting the detention of Paraguayan opposition leaders and urging the Paraguayan Government “to consider the release of these individuals as a demonstration of its respect for internationally accepted norms regarding freedom of assembly and speech.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860890–0946) 3 In telegram 395249 to Asuncion, December 23, 1986 the Department noted that on December 18, Gelbard had given Martínez a démarche regarding Radio Nanduti and political repression in Paraguay. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860975–0127) 408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay 408. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay 1 Washington, February 12, 1987, 0520Z 41359. Subject: DAS Gelbard’s Conversation with Paraguayan Foreign Minister Saldivar. Ref: State 930321 2 1. C—Entire text. 2. As mentioned reftel, Paraguayan Foreign Minister Saldivar telephoned ARA DAS Gelbard on February 10 just as Paraguayan Ambassador Martinez had entered Gelbard’s office to receive the USG’s formal protest against the teargassing of Ambassador Taylor. 3 Saldivar was clearly uncomfortable; he began with a lengthy, highly apologetic monologue, which gave the impression that the police officials who caused the incident had not been acting on the basis of instructions from higher authority. Saldivar repeatedly expressed his deep regrets for this incident. He noted his complete awareness of Gelbard’s previous conversations with Ambassador Martinez in the wake of Minister of Interior Montanaro’s statements against Ambassador Taylor. 4 In this regard, he stated that he had provided the guarantees of security for Ambassador Taylor and all Americans in Paraguay pursuant to Gelbard’s request. 3. Gelbard responded by covering essentially the same points as in his conversation with Ambassador Martinez (reftel). He expressed extreme concern about the direction in which the GOP was taking bilateral relations. If the police were not acting from higher level instructions, he asked rhetorically, does this mean that the Paraguayan Government’s control is breaking down? The USG has responsibility for the safety of its citizens and we had to wonder if we should alert American citizens to possible dangers which could befall them in Paraguay. Should we ask the American Davis Cup team to postpone or cancel the matches set for Asuncion in March? It was clear, at any rate, that the earlier statement of security guarantees given privately had had no worth. It was also clear that this incident represented a serious violation of the Vienna Convention, since the police were fully cognizant of the presence of Ambassador Taylor at the dinner and were in violation of some of the basic concepts of international conduct. Gelbard noted that in his visit to Asuncion last July GOP officials had spoken throughout of Paraguay’s vaunted “peace and tranquility;” it was clear that this does not exist and it was clear that the GOP was trying to make Ambassador Taylor a scapegoat for the complete range of Paraguay’s economic, political and social problems. 5 Gelbard said that it was imperative, at this point, in order to allay USG concerns for the GOP to make a public apology to Ambassador Taylor and to the Paraguayans present at the dinner and to repeat publicly the guarantees of security for Ambassador Taylor and all Americans in Paraguay. Gelbard concluded by saying that the USG wants good relations with Paraguay. Our Ambassador was acting in ways that were fully consonant with accepted international behavior, contrary to the GOP’s statements. At this point, we needed clear signs from the GOP that it wants good bilateral relations with US. 4. Saldivar pleaded for USG assistance in helping the GOP find a way out of this problem. He urged that we not “humiliate” them. Gelbard said that we certainly did not wish to do that and under the circumstances the public statement was a minimal request. Gelbard also noted that we, of course, expect the GOP and their associates in the Colorado Party to live up completely to the accepted standards of international behavior. 4. Saldivar closed by saying that he had spoken with Ambassador Taylor several times already and expected to work with him closely to resolve this extremely unfortunate incident. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870110–0254. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and Montevideo. Drafted and approved by Gelbard. 2 Not found. 3 In telegram 555 from Asuncion, February 10, the Embassy wrote: “Ambassador and Mrs. Taylor and other diplomats were tear gassed in Asuncion on February 9, while attending a reception at a private residence in the Ambassador’s honor hosted by a nonpartisan group called Mujeres por la Democracia (Women for Democracy) a group equivalent to our League of Women voters. The event occurred when the police threw up a cordon around the neighborhood to prevent invitees from attending the reception. After consulting with higher authorities, the police permitted diplomats to enter, after carefully checking their credentials. Then, after the well-heeled and smartly-dressed invitees plus onlookers being held on the periphery, whose number had grown to three hundred or more, did not disperse, the police called in their equivalent of a SWAT team and began launching tear gas at this group. Then, about a half-hour later, clearly aware of the presence of the Ambassador, his wife, and other U.S. and Argentine diplomats, who had previously identified themselves to the police and had been allowed to pass into the residence, the police launched a tear gas grenade from the adjoining property onto the rear patio where the diplomats, and those few Paraguayans who arrived before the police, were assembled.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870445–0034) 4 In telegram 22319 to Asuncion, January 27, the Department wrote that Gelbard had “urgently summoned Paraguayan Ambassador Martínez to the Department on January 23 to express the Department’s deep concern over the threatening tone of the recent spate of public attacks on Ambassador Taylor spear-headed by Interior Minister Montanaro.” Gelbard stressed that “the USG will hold Montanaro, and the GOP, responsible should any harm befall Ambassador Taylor, or any member of the American community resident in Paraguay.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870065–0169) 5 Gelbard visited Paraguay July 19–23, 1986 and met with Stroessner on July 22. (Telegram 2766 from Asuncion, July 24, 1986; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860568–0300) In telegram 2795 from Asuncion, July 25, 1986, the Embassy wrote: “Gelbard’s visit to Paraguay was busy and advanced U.S. objectives. Government contacts have apparently made up their minds in advance to view the visit in a favorable light and did not take umbrage at clear statements of the need for the GOP to begin a process of political opening. Opposition contacts were uniformly pleased with the private and public message they heard about the U.S. commitment to convincing the GOP to open the political process. Gelbard’s call for pragmatism was universally accepted. Press coverage was extensive, and most of the message delivered in private conversation also found its way in to the public domain even before the departure press conference. We expect to see no dramatic change in the mind-set of the GOP, but believe the visit will encourage the moderate forces in the Colorado party and the political opposition to echo his message with their own preoccupations over the future direction of the country.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860572–0551) 409. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) 409. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Abrams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) 1 Washington, February 21, 1987 SUBJECT Request to Call In Paraguayan Ambassador Although you earlier declined 2 to meet with the Paraguayan Ambassador after the teargassing of Ambassador Taylor, I feel that the GOP’s inadequate—and even insulting—diplomatic note of explanation warrants your doing so now. On February 18 we received the GOP’s formal response to our protest note over the incident. 3 It is inadequate in both tone and substance. In essence, it says Ambassador Taylor is lying, accuses him of interference in Paraguay’s affairs, and does not provide the apology we asked for, or the guarantee for Americans’ safety. The GOP insists upon trying to separate its treatment of Ambassador Taylor from its bilateral relations with the USG. By raising this with Ambassador Martinez, you would confirm the seriousness of the incident and our demand that Ambassador Taylor—and the government which he represents—be treated with deference and respect. Recommendation That you agree to call in Ambassador Martinez. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums, Lot 94D432, Nodis Memorandums February 1987. Confidential. Drafted on February 19 by Bolton; cleared by Gelbard and Howard. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that Armacost saw the memorandum on February 24. 2 Not found. 3 Attached but not printed is telegram 48182 to Asuncion, February 19, in which the Department transmitted a translation of the Paraguayan response given by Martínez to Gelbard on February 18 to the U.S. protest of Taylor’s teargassing. The Department, noting that it was “dissatisfied with both the tone and substance of this response,” asked the Embassy for its analysis and recommendations. Also attached but not printed is telegram 695 from Asuncion, February 19, in which the Embassy provided an analysis of the Paraguayan response, characterizing it as “clearly unacceptable because it denies the facts as we witnessed them.” 4 Armacost indicated his approval by writing his initials. A stamped notation indicated that he did so on February 24. An unknown hand wrote “Feb 25” and “11:00” on the “Date” and “Time” lines, respectively. In telegram 58055 to Asuncion, February 28, the Department noted that on February 25 Armacost had called in Martínez “to emphasize USG’s disappointment “with the GOP’s response to our diplomatic note” on the teargassing incident. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870157–0247) In telegram 98136 to Asuncion, April 2, the Department reported that in an April 1 meeting with Gelbard, Martínez had presented an “acceptable” clarifying note on Paraguay’s original note; in turn, Gelbard gave Martínez a note on U.S. “satisfaction, particularly with regard to the expressions of regret and assurances concerning the personal security of Ambassador Taylor.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870254–0865) 410. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 410. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M 87–20056 Washington, September 15, 1987 PARAGUAY’S PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: DESTROYING ECONOMIC GROWTH Summary Paraguay’s large and inefficient state-owned enterprises, which expanded rapidly in the wake of the economic boom of the 1970s, have emerged as the country’s most significant economic burden and as a powerful magnet for massive corruption opportunities. Far from acknowledging growing criticism from domestic groups and international financial officials calling for dramatic spending cuts and the privatization of state firms, government officials are instead using the state entities to enhance their political control and increase their personal wealth. Despite some emerging pressure from the business sector, we see little prospect for reforms. We believe that the regime’s continued pursuit of statist economic policies and its pervasive corruption will boost Paraguay’s foreign debt, encourage capital flight, and nurture the country’s growing role as a regional smuggling and narcotics center. Over the longer term, these factors will likely contribute to political instability after President Stroessner’s death. [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 90T00114R: Intelligence Publications Files (1986–1987), Box 1, Folder 47: Paraguay’s Public Enterprises: Destroying Economic Growth. Confidential; Noforn. Prepared at Gelbard’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, April 25, 1988, 1844Z 1819. Subject: Ambassador Walters’ tête-à-tête with President Stroessner. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Background: The following is an account drafted by Ambassador Vernon Walters on his 15 minute tête-à-tête with President Stroessner on April 22. 2 It followed his hour and 15 minute meeting with the President (reported septel), which also included Major General Johannsen, two of Ambassador Walters’ staff and Ambassador Taylor. 3 3. Begin text: President Stroessner said he had asked to speak to me alone for a few minutes because he could speak more frankly that way. I said I also had some things I could say to him. 4. President Stroessner said that he was very disturbed that U.S. Government officials had accused senior Paraguayan officials of being active in drug trafficking. He had asked for names and specifics. He had received none. If the U.S. was not prepared to furnish the names, then they should refrain from such public accusations. He said if we would give him names and locations, he would take action against the drug traffic, if necessary, using the army. He felt that traffic in narcotics was a threat to every nation. Bolivia was a producer. Paraguay was not. I said that there were recent indications of two large shipments to Europe having transited Paraguay. Again he asked for names, dates and places. 5. President Stroessner said that he felt that Embassies were for the purpose of improving relations. Sometimes he felt ours in Paraguay was not helping this. I replied that he must understand that our policies were determined in Washington, and the Ambassador, like me, received his instructions from our government. These instructions were often the result of legislative action arising from a congressional perception of what was happening in Paraguay. If he wanted better treatment from us, he must help us to help him. 6. I said the Paraguayan people were grateful to him for the improvements in Paraguay and for stability and leadership he had provided. He could easily open things up in the area of the media. A hostile speech on the radio or a hostile article in the press were no threat to him, and would certainly improve the image of his country in the U.S. and in Congress. I said he was strong enough to allow some opposition. He replied that communists and others were trying to destabilize Paraguay and that was not in our interest. 4 I said that I agreed but that a little more flexibility in allowing freedom of expression would help. 7. I said another matter that helped give him a bad image abroad was the matter of political prisoners who had taken asylum in foreign embassies in Asuncion, and who were not allowed to leave the country. President Stroessner said that they were not political prisoners, but criminals. However he had decided to let them leave the country. He said the Argentines, who disliked his government, were willing to take them, and they would be allowed to leave the country “in a matter of days.” I told him that this was a wise move (I had previously reminded him that in 1976 he had released another political prisoner, Chase Sardi, at my request). 5 8. President Stroessner said that the present Argentine Government had armed, trained and sent agents across the border to stir up guerrilla activity in Paraguay. This had failed because guerrillas needed popular support and they had obtained none in Paraguay. He then attacked Argentina and Alfonsin for their hostility toward Paraguay. 9. Finally, he said that he appreciated the chance to speak frankly to me and the fact that I would speak frankly to him. He hoped I would remember what he had told me, and he would think over the things I had told him. End text. Taylor 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880765–0007. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN and Buenos Aires. 2 In telegram 113881 to USUN and Asuncion, April 12, Abrams wrote to Walters about his April 22–23 trip to Paraguay, warning him “that Stroessner’s request that he receive you and Ambassador Taylor together briefly, but then would expect Clyde to withdraw so that he could have a separate private meeting with you is an obvious ploy that would undercut the Ambassador and create the appearance of a division between a senior representative of the administration and the Ambassador.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880746–0203) 3 In telegram 1841 from Asuncion, April 26, the Embassy reported on Walters’ and Taylor’s April 22 meeting with Stroessner. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880358–0705) In telegram 1862 from Asuncion, April 27, the Embassy provided an overview of Walter’s April 22–23 visit to Paraguay, noting that Walters had “underscored our support for democracy and our commitment to fight narcotics trafficking.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880362–0156) 4 In telegram 297181 to Asuncion, September 23, 1987, the Department reported on Abrams’ September 22, 1987, meeting at the UN General Assembly with Saldívar, who “claimed that recent repressive acts by the Paraguayan Government were necessary because conciliation would have been mistaken by the opposition as weakness and thus have led to chaos.” In reply, “Abrams stressed US concern that GOP’s acts would polarize society, and, almost inevitably, lead to radical violence. The future course and how the world would judge events in Paraguay can still be affected by the decisions of the GOP.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870785–0833) 5 In telegram 2712 from Asuncion, July 1, 1976, the Embassy reported the “release of Professor Miguel Chase Sardi.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D760255–0283) 412. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 412. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA M 88–20036 Washington, May 6, 1988 Paraguay: Expanding Illegal International Activities Summary President Stroessner has deliberately fostered institutionalized corruption in Paraguay to help preserve his authoritarian control over the country. Corruption, which extends into every level of the bureaucracy, has facilitated the growth of a thriving underground economy. We believe, however, that Paraguay’s lawless atmosphere is now encouraging more ominous international illegal activities—involving passport sales, arms transfers, technology transfers, and counterfeit US currency—often with a narcotics connection. These operations are increasingly bringing together corrupt local officials and fugitive foreign criminals, and we believe that recent reporting only scratches the surface of the problem. [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Western Hemisphere Affairs Records, Policy, Planning, and Coordination, Security Assistance Program Files, Lot 91D371, Paraguay, 1984–1988. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and coordinated with DO. 413. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 413. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State 1 Asuncion, October 28, 1988, 1519Z 4704. For Asst Secretary Abrams only from Ambassador Towell. Subject: Advancing U.S. interests in Paraguay. Refs: A. Asuncion 4653, 2 B. State 317594, 3 C. State 345774, 4 D. State 344039, 5 E. State 351103 6 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. With a three-day official mourning period decreed following the death of Colorado Vice-President Montanaro’s mother, which forced a postponement of my courtesy calls on senior Paraguayan officials, I take this occasion to slow the pace, step back, take a breath, and send you an abbreviated look at where we are since I arrived in Paraguay, and what comes next. My preliminary views on Paraguay, and our perception here of what is to be done, are firmly grounded on my two extensive conversations with you before I left for post, 7 your guidance to me following my initial meeting with Foreign Minister Acevedo (Ref B), the Secretary of State’s precise letter of instructions to me (Ref C) and, finally the detailed reporting cable of Under Secretary Armacost’s meeting with the new Paraguayan Foreign Minister, which confirmed that we are all speaking to the GOP with one voice (Ref D). 8 3. Relations with Stroessner: You gave me the challenging task of re-establishing a relationship/rapport with the President for the purpose of advancing U.S. interests, especially emphasizing the 3–D triad of democracy, drugs and derechos humanos. My first shot was the long-delayed, formal credentials ceremony where I advanced the less confrontational drug issue out front, rather than highlighting the more emotionally charged themes of democracy and human rights at what Paraguayans viewed as a ceremonial, not substantive, event. When I was then invited to sit on the gilded couch with Stroessner for a brief chat, the press hovered around us with lights and cameras for a significant portion of our time together, and I judged it imprudent to hold a serious bilateral exchange with the chief of state live on the evening news. As I left the palace, I told a senior GOP aide that I would like to have, at an unspecified future time, another, informal, substantive discussion with the President to go over a number of serious issues, when the President’s health so permitted. The morning of the next working day, another senior presidential aide contacted me and said the President would see me as soon as I wished. This same invitation was confirmed to me directly again this morning through a third senior GOP aide. Unless you think I should slow the pace, I plan to take up that invitation shortly and use that meeting to continue to carry out my instructions to build an effective working relationship with Stroessner so that I can attempt to advance U.S. policy interests directly with a man with whom we have had no bilateral link for some time. 4. I have just come out of a meeting with the new Foreign Minister (septel) 9 where my aim was-under the rubric of getting a readout on his Washington meetings with you and under Secretary Armacost—to drive home the point (lest anyone is still not getting the message) that U.S. policy, including 3–D, is constant; that you say it in Washington and I say it in Asuncion; and that the policy is bi-partisan and won’t change after the election, nor with the arrival of the new, smiling boy-Ambassador in Paraguay. I judge my meeting with Acevedo as a tentative success in my approach of seeking to advance U.S. interests in a careful, balanced and professional manner. And as I was unhinging my jaw to suggest to Acevedo what you in Washington proposed to him—that he get President Stroessner publicly to say in Paraguay what he said at the UN about GOP opposition to drug trafficking—at that moment, without coaching, Acevedo told me he has already recommended to Stroessner that he say publicly that very thing in Asuncion. 10 5. I want to assure you that I am firmly on board with the 3–D triad, which is the policy of the United States of America. At the same time, I firmly believe that a constant drum-beat recitation of all three elements—and with equal weight and equal volume at all times and in every forum—is not the most effective way to advance our interests. 6. To put it bluntly, as Bob Gelbard did with Rose, 11 our policy of public confrontation with the GOP failed. My country team feels strongly that three years of public friction with the GOP did very little to advance the three D’s. To be sure, we have won points with the Paraguayan opposition, and that is certainly helpful with the U.S. Congress and the human rights groups you and I talked about. I do not believe, however, that the approval of Paraguayan opposition is not the foremost goal of U.S. foreign policy here; advancement of the 3–D’s is. 7. I do believe, as does my country team, that to be effective on the three D’s we must build a closer relationship with the GOP and its top officials. We are not proposing a shift in policy. We are advocating tempering our public criticism and strengthening our private dialogue. I believe that public criticism is a more valuable policy tool when it is used sparingly. 8. The Secretary’s instruction to me urges “balance” in conducting our foreign policy here. That is exactly what I have in mind. In the short term it may give the appearance to some skeptical outsiders of a change in policy or a weakening of our commitment to the three D’s. In the long term, however, I believe it will bear fruit. If through quiet diplomacy we can persuade the GOP to move to direct elections of municipal officials in 1990, to enact electoral law reform so that the atomized non participating opposition will unite and participate, or to allow the Christian Democrats to hold their convention, I believe these would be real milestones on the long road to democracy. More importantly, our building a relationship with Stroessner and those around him would position us well to influence the transition towards post-Stroessner democracy in this country. 9. Interestingly, in the conversations Rose Likins has had with the opposition 12 they have been the ones to advocate that we use more balance in our relationship with the GOP. The President of the Febrerista Party (Si Affiliate) told Rose that I should not visit the Casa del Pueblo—his party headquarters and scene of Clyde’s fall from grace with the GOP “because the USG has everything to lose and nothing to gain” from such an act, and that “You can’t get me out of jail if you don’t have a relationship with Stroessner.” 10. I am very much aware of the importance of maintaining our excellent relationship with the opposition. Even before I presented credentials, I used the pretext of Mike Shelton’s orientation visit here to meet with the wide variety of senior dissident Colorado and opposition figures well known in Washington, including Domingo Laino, Humberto Rubin, and Aldo Zuccolillo’s deputy at ABC Color . Realistically speaking, however, we recognize that real progress on at least two of the D’s may well not occur until Stroessner dies. Until then, we can try to chip away at the margins and prepare ourselves for the real work that will come in influencing the transition. Even then, changes are likely to come slowly. 11. In summary, I think we are on the right track here and, equally importantly, in tune with what you wish us to accomplish here. I have asked permission to come up to Washington to have Thanksgiving with my young daughter, and would like to meet with you and Mike Skol to review the situation and see if we need any major or minor course corrections. 13 12. As I am going to press with this, your 351103 is coming off the wire. If there are substantial points we have not covered above after we have digested it, I will be back in touch. Best regards. 14 Towell 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880959–0507. Secret Noforn; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis. 2 In telegram 4653 from Asuncion, October 26, the Embassy wrote: “Following on the heels of Friday’s formal credentials ceremony with Stroessner at the presidential palace, the Ambassador began his first round of required courtesy calls on senior GOP officials early Monday October 24 with a visit to Chamber of Deputies President Luis Martinez Miltos. On October 25 he made back-to-back calls on long-time Colorado apologist and Senate President Gonzalez Alcina and departing Supreme Court President Argana. In each of these calls, the Ambassador reiterated the constancy of U.S. emphasis on democracy in its policy toward Paraguay and the bipartisan nature of this policy. He underscored the importance of combating narcotics trafficking and congratulated legislative leaders for imminent passage of a hard-hitting Paraguayan narcotics law.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880952–0148) In telegram 4603 from Asuncion, October 21, Towell confirmed that he had presented his credentials to Stroessner, the twelfth ambassador to do so. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880939–0029) 3 In telegram 317594 to Asuncion, September 28, the Department sent a message from Abrams to Towell, writing, in part: “As we discussed here it is important that your first steps be managed carefully to minimize the possibility that some might misinterpret a new style as a diminution in our support for democracy.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880868–0549) 4 Not found. In an October 21 letter of instruction to Towell, Shultz wrote, in part: “Relations with President Stroessner and his government are correct and should be so maintained as you and your country team seek to advance U.S. interests in Paraguay looking toward a post-Stroessner era. Recognizing the difference between the democratic system President Stroessner claims to have established in Paraguay and the basic elements of genuine democracies, U.S. interest are best served by 1) a peaceful evolutionary process that strengthens democratic forces and values within Paraguayan society, and 2) sustaining balanced, continuing attention to socio-economic development and human rights improvements. To achieve this evolutionary process will require your Mission’s contact with both the present government and non-governmental groups. Apparently, President Stroessner and mortality alone will determine his tenure in office. We do not expect the nature of his regime to change appreciably as long as he is in office, although, demographic, economic, and political pressures for change are evident.” (Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 31E, Paraguay) 5 Not found. In telegram 3805 from Asuncion, September 1, the Embassy recommended “that a bilateral meeting with Under Secretary Armacost be offered to Paraguayan FonMin Acevedo in conjunction with Acevedo’s travel to the UNGA. We believe it is important to use this opportunity, which coincides roughly with the arrival of a new U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, to restate U.S. policy goals in Paraguay—narcotics, human rights, democratization—at the outset of Acevedo’s tenure as Foreign Minster.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880776–0803) In telegram 4687 from Asuncion, October 27, the Embassy reported on Towell’s meeting with Acevedo, writing: “Ambassador conducted a wide-ranging tour d’horizon with Foreign Minister Acevedo October 27 to discuss the latter’s visit to Washington and several matters of local business. In the course of the discussion the Ambassador reiterated the primacy of the three D’s—democracy, derechos humanos (human rights), and drugs—in U.S. policy toward Paraguay. The FonMin expressed his great satisfaction with his calls in the Department especially his meeting with Under Secretary Armacost. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880956–0193) No memorandum of conversation has been found. 6 In telegram 351103 to Asuncion, October 27, the Department sent a message from Abrams to Towell, writing, in part, that apparently “you concluded that it would not be appropriate to attempt to discuss with President Stroessner the importance the USG continues to ascribe to democracy and human rights. We certainly understand your concern about starting on the right foot with the GOP but we worry that Stroessner may be misled into thinking perceptions in Washington concerning his mode of governing have improved. As you know, they have not—and Foreign Minister Acevedo’s visit, at best, was an example of the GOP treading water and wasting opportunities.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880956–0031) In telegram 4378 from Asuncion, October 6, the Embassy reported on Acevedo’s travel plans including a visit to Washington “sometime between October 13 and 18 to call on OAS Secretary General Baena Soares.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880893–0552) 7 No memoranda of conversation have been found. 8 See footnote 5 , above. In telegram 3309 from USUN, October 14, the Mission reported on Walters’ meeting that day with Acevedo, writing: “Ambassador Walters asked Acevedo if thought is being given to a likely successor to Stroessner. Ambassador Walters also encouraged Acevedo to make public GOP opposition to narcotics trafficking.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880917–0027) In telegram 342499 to Asuncion, October 20, the Department reported on Wrobleski’s October 17 meeting with Acevado “to discuss narcotics-related issues in Paraguay.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880931–0444) 9 See footnote 5 , above. 10 In telegram 3269 from USUN, October 13, the Mission reported on Acevado’s statement at the 43rd UN General Assembly, including that he “reported that the Paraguayan legislature is presently occupied with the sanction of a new law to repress drug trafficking.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880912–00014) 11 Not found. 12 Not found. 13 No memoranda of conversation have been found. 14 In telegram 4757 from Asuncion, November 2, the Embassy wrote: “I was summoned to the palace October 31 for a twenty-minute one-on-one meeting with President Stroessner with no press in evidence. Although he may be a sick man, I also found him to be a rambling, nostalgic, frail old man living more in the past than in the present. I told him I wanted a frank, open and productive dialogue with him and his government, and thanked him for seeing me so soon after presenting credentials. I said that U.S. policy has not changed as a result of my arrival, explained our policy acronym 3-D (drugs, democracy, and derechos humanos) and discussed in depth why support for democracy was a basic U.S. foreign policy tenet. Going carefully so I would be invited back again, I was surprised that he took this all in seemingly pleasantly and didn’t bother to give me his standard civics lesson on Paraguayan-style democracy versus chaos. He spoke of Paraguayan friendship for and support of the U.S. (in D.R., at the U.N. etc.,) and rambled on amicably, keeping me when I made various moves to leave after an appropriate period of time. After my drug pitch, Stroessner reacted in a bizarre way: he spoke of the Chaco War (‘where I was wounded’) and expressed his concern that the U.S. is arming Paraguay’s former enemy Bolivia in the course of our war on narcotics. After twenty-minutes of conversation, he seemed to tire. He walked me to the door and invited me to return for further conversations. I will.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880974–0102) Peru Peru [This chapter will be published once all documents have been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 414 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition.] Document 415 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. 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For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 440 Document 440 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 441 Document 441 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 442 Document 442 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Document 443 Document 443 [This document will be published once its chapter has been cleared for publication. For more information, see About the Digital Edition .] Uruguay Uruguay 444. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State Montevideo, August 10, 1981, 1447Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D81372–0002. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, and USUN. Kirkpatrick visited Montevideo August 4–5. 445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay and the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 9, 1981, 2104Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810479–1012. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts, Cairo, Tel Aviv, USSOUTHCOM, and CINCLANT. Drafted by Alberti; cleared in ARA/SC, ARA, S/S, and S–O; approved by Haig. 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay Washington, November 3, 1983, 0959Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830643–0855. Confidential. Sent for information to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Snyder; cleared in HA/HR and HA; approved by Abrams. 447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay Washington, October 10, 1984, 0307Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840642–1032. Confidential. Immediate. Drafted by Kinney; cleared by Kilday and ARA/SC; approved by Motley. 448. Article in Latin America Review Washington, January 18, 1985 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Subject File, Uruguay. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. The Latin America Review was a classified serial publication of the CIA. 449. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Mission in Geneva Montevideo, March 2, 1985, 0324Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850142–0520. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shultz was in Montevideo March 1–2 to attend Sanguinetti’s inauguration. 450. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House March 2, 1985, 2137Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003–0271. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the Delegation’s aircraft. 451. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State New York, September 25, 1985, 2317Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850684–0008. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Montevideo. 452. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, January 1986 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986) Box 1, Folder 2: Uruguay: Challenges to Democracy, January 1986. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis with a contribution from the Office of Central Reference and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of November 14, 1985. 453. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, June 6, 1986 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 42: Uruguay: Prospects for Sanguinetti, June 1986. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared at Tillman’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of June 6. 454. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan Washington, June 16, 1986 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Presidential Appointments: Meeting with Uruguayan President Sanguinetti 06/1986. Secret. Prepared by Tillman. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it on June 17. Attached as Tab B, but not printed are talking points. Attached as Tab C, but not printed, are biographies. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter for signature under cover of a June 13 memorandum. 455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay Washington, June 19, 1986, 0443Z Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons), October 1985–present. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information Priority to Santiago and Asuncion. Drafted by Durkee; cleared by Gelbard and Abrams and S/S–O and S; approved by Shultz. Sanguinetti made a State visit to Washington June 16–19; he then visited New York, June 19–20. 456. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 17, 1986, 10:35–11:50 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Presidential Appointments: Meeting with Uruguayan President Sanguinetti 06/1986. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter under cover of a June 18 memorandum. 457. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State New York, September 30, 1987, 0516Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870804–0111. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Montevideo, Santiago, and Asuncion. 458. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House August 4, 1988, 2319Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N880006–0059. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the delegation’s aircraft. Shultz travelled to Montevideo to meet with Sanguinetti and senior Uruguayan officials, August 4. He also gave an address to businessmen and bankers and gave a news conference; see Department of State Bulletin, October 1988, pp. 2–20. 459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay Washington, August 15, 1988, 2333Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880715–0286. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the Central American Caribbean Basin Collective, Buenos Aires, and Panama. Drafted by Grant; cleared by Gelbard, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Abrams. 444. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State 444. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State 1 Montevideo, August 10, 1981, 1447Z 2876. Subject: Ambassador Kirkpatrick visit to Uruguay: Conversation with President-designate Alvarez. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary. Ambassador Kirkpatrick had a very cordial and successful meeting with President-designate Alvarez. 2 They agreed that bilateral relations had improved greatly under the Reagan Administration and that a mutual basis had been established for future cooperation. They discussed the need to search for improved hemispheric formulas of economic cooperation, primarily in trade, not aid. Ambassador Kirkpatrick promised to look into the leather apparel issue on her return. Alvarez said Uruguay wanted to assist and contribute to the achievement of President Reagan’s laudable global objectives. In response to Amb. Kirkpatrick’s suggestion, he indicated, albeit with some caution, that Uruguay might play a modest but constructive role in Central America. Discussion of the Sinai MFO issue, also very positive, reported septel. 3 End summary. 3. Bilateral relations. Ambassador Kirkpatrick opened by telling General Alvarez that President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig had asked her to extend their best wishes. No area in the world was more important to this administration than Latin America. And few areas were as important. More high-level officials of this administration were knowledgeable and concerned about hemispheric problems than in any prior administration. No one in this administration would confuse Uruguay with Mexico. We recognized Uruguay as important and unique. Latin America was an area with many common problems but also great differences in individual situations and in national approaches to resolving problems. There was a long history of friendship between the U.S. and Latin America. Nowhere had it been stronger than in Uruguay, with our many common traditions. Noting that there had been a recent “interruption” in our traditional friendship, Ambassador Kirkpatrick said she wanted to convey the deep sense of embarrassment in the administration regarding certain policies of the recent past. We knew the situation Uruguay faced had been difficult and that the government was now moving back toward Uruguay’s traditional constitutional rule. We considered ourselves friends and partners, and were determined to act in the future as equals. General Alvarez thanked the Ambassador deeply. He assured her that he, personally, and Uruguay as a whole, had always viewed the U.S. as a friend. Although the recent past could be characterized as one full of disappointments and letdowns, which sometimes were difficult to forget, he felt deeply encouraged, not only by the words of the Ambassador, but by the actions of the Reagan Administration. President-elect Alvarez asked the Ambassador to tell President Reagan that he wished him nothing but the best in striving to accomplish his objectives. Alvarez pledged Uruguay’s cooperation “in any way possible” to help achieve these goals. He said we should regard his commitment to contribute positively as a “blank check.” Uruguay was a country that wanted only to live peacefully, to work and pursue its well being. It was not embarked on an indiscriminate arming of its armed forces, since Uruguay’s main concern was internal defense. Uruguay had managed to subdue terrorist activity once and, if necessary, would find the way to do it again. All he really wanted to ask of the U.S. was our assistance in ensuring that Uruguay would have the opportunity to live and work in peace. The problems Uruguay faced, he said, were not insoluable. They could be overcome by plain hard work. Ambassador Kirkpatrick expressed her understanding of General Alvarez’ comments and stated she was fully aware of Uruguay’s unfortunate experience with the Tupamaro guerrilla movement and that the communist-inspired group had temporarily disrupted Uruguay’s democratic processes and institutions. 4. Hemispheric problems. Ambassador Kirkpatrick explained U.S. concern with Soviet expansionism throughout the world. The threat was now greatest in the Middle East and Central America. The preservation of peace was everyone’s responsibility. She briefly described the Cuban buildup in Central America. Given Uruguay’s successful experience in overcoming foreign-inspired terrorism, she said, perhaps Uruguay was in a position to give advice to countries like El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica. Alvarez quipped, “Then they’ll probably accuse us of exporting counter-revolution,” but he clearly took the point and nodded his understanding and appreciation. 5. Economic issues. General Alvarez related that in the past the biggest problems Uruguay encountered were due to the internal capitalization of certain sectors of the Uruguayan economy, based on commitments which subsequently were ignored. How could he encourage those previously hurt once again to make new investments, so necessary for a prosperous economy. Export income from meat and wool sales in 1980 was not even sufficient to cover the cost of Uruguay’s petroleum imports. Although Uruguay’s coffers now were full of foreign currency and precious metals, it was due mostly to the ingenuity of Uruguayans who had been able to cope with an almost untenable economic situation. There were serious issues. Alvarez said he would like very much to get together with a senior economic representative of the U.S. Government to discuss these issues in detail. (The Foreign Minister later confirmed that the President-elect considers economic issues to be at the forefront of Uruguay’s national agenda and critical to its foreign relations. “I’ve been pushing economic themes more than most people, “He said, “But Gen. Alvarez will push them twice as hard.”) 4 Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that although knowledgeable about some of Uruguay’s economic problems, she had not been aware prior to coming here of Uruguay’s problems with the U.S. International Trade Commission regarding leather exports and subsidies. She promised to pursue this issue at the highest levels when she returned, including with her friends Bill Brock and Mac Baldridge. She could not guarantee results, but said she would certainly raise the issue and was optimistic, at least so far as increased U.S. understanding of Uruguay’s situation and possibly of concrete results. General Alvarez, referring to Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s expertise in history and geopolitics, noted that while the U.S. Marshall Plan had satisfied our allies’ material needs, communism continued to spread, because we had failed to confront it ideologically, in the battle for men’s minds. Latin Americans, because of their heritage, were very proud. American aid would not satisfy their needs either. Mutual cooperation, as partners, were therefore an essential cornerstone to future relations. Ambassador Kirkpatrick agreed, adding that since many of these hemispheric problems are, in fact, common ones, we have to find common solutions. The new U.S. attitude of cooperation had already been manifested by our unilateral actions such as affirmative votes on loans for the Southern Cone countries in the international banking institutions, by our support in the UN Human Rights Commission, and by the efforts of the Reagan Administration to lift restrictions on arms sales related to Uruguay and others. A main obstacle remained in the U.S. Congress, but we were making extensive efforts to move ahead and to cooperate. Ambassador Kirkpatrick affirmed she favored a broader basis of mutual economic cooperation. Perhaps this process could best be started on a bilateral basis with multilateral agreements with other countries sharing our objectives to follow. General Alvarez fully concurred with the bilateral approach, taking problems one at a time. If successful, he said, others would want to join. 6. The remaining part of the conversation concerned the Sinai MFO issue, reported septel. The meeting ended on a very pleasant note with both participants expressing their profound best wishes for the success of the other. 7. Alvarez press comment. Following the meeting, President-designate Alvarez called in the large number of journalists, who formed around the two principals in a roped-off area at the back of the large room. In a statement which received considerable press play and subsequent attention in political circles, Alvarez said, quote “On the formal aspects of our conversation I must tell you that after speaking with Ambassador Kirkpatrick I am filled with happiness because it means to me the coming together again with a brother; with the brother we all admire so much, which is the United States of America. To depart from formality, I want to take the opportunity, in the person of this distinguished and talented lady, to pay homage to American women, specifically to the mothers, the wives, and to the sons of man of a country that has the responsibility of preserving and defending democracy and liberty in the world.” Unquote. Smith 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D81372–0002. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, and USUN. Kirkpatrick visited Montevideo August 4–5. 2 In telegram 2771 from Montevideo, July 31, the Embassy wrote: “Mission sources confirm that retired General Gregorio Alvarez has been selected as Uruguay’s next President by the Junta of General Officers (JOOGG).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810358–1200) 3 In telegram 2875 from Montevideo, August 10, the Embassy reported Kirkpatrick’s discussion with Álvarez about possible Uruguayan participation in the Sinai MFO. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810371–1074) 4 No memorandum of conversation has been found. 445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay and the Mission to the United Nations 445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay and the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 9, 1981, 2104Z 27112. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with Uruguayan Foreign Minister. 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. Summary: Secretary Haig met Uruguayan Foreign Minister Valdes Otero September 24 at the UN. The first half of the cordial meeting was devoted to a long monologue by Valdes in which he set forth his impressions of improving U.S./Uruguayan relations plus thoughts on terrorism; the international situation; Sinai MFO; bilateral economic relations; and multilateral relations. The Secretary replied that present USG positions reflected a popular mood which would not change; we will not express public criticism on human rights; both countries see eye to eye on Marxism, subversion and terrorism; the U.S. people and Congress strongly support the Sinai MFO; and the USG will cooperate closely on human rights reports, the Sinai MFO and hemispheric security issues. End summary. 3. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Valdes Otero in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. The conversation lasted approximately one hour and was noteworthy for the high degree of candor and good will evident on both sides. Besides the principals, those attending were Uruguayan Ambassador Pacheco, Director of Political Affairs Posadas, and Embassy Minister Sordo; on the U.S. side were U.S. Ambassador-designate Aranda, notetaker Alberti and interpreter Seidenman. 4. The Secretary noted that the USG was grateful to Uruguay for insisting upon a return to the democratic process, thereby serving as a model of encouragement for the rest of Latin America. And, he noted, we are particularly grateful for the GOU’s courageous decision to participate in the Sinai MFO. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, he said, brought to his attention some trade issues which are outstanding between the two countries. 2 With the Secretary’s support, Ambassador Kirkpatrick will call STR Brock to improve the situation. 5. Improving bilateral relations. Valdes Otero responded that as a sign of improving relations, during the past several months there have been a number of high level visitors from the U.S. 3 The interesting and important thing about those visits is that each has built upon the earlier visits to improve relations further and each has had its own important characteristics. Improvement in bilateral relations is particularly important because on multilateral relations issues we already see eye-to-eye. The GOU had found common ground with visitors such as Middendorf, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and General Walters. 4 With all the GOU had held long and productive meetings. The present meeting between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister was seen as a logical culmination and further evidence of warming of bilateral relations. Valdes then embarked upon a rather lengthy exposition of a number of agenda items (which the GOU had made available to us prior to the meeting). 6. Terrorism. The Foreign Minister said that we may have the impression that the GOU’s interests in world affairs are disproportionate to the country’s small-size, but Uruguay has gained a nearly unique experience from which many countries may profit. Uruguay was one-of the first nations to confront an early, very serious terrorist attack and to surmount it (he drew a distinction between surmount and conquer). It is interesting to remember, he said, that President Alvarez was the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with responsibilities for combating the terrorist threat. The GOU had meager material resources but utilized intelligence in the struggle. The GOU does not want to publicize the means it used to combat terrorism since the terrorists also learn by experience and may profit from exposition of such means. Ambassador Pacheco, then President, was the first to enunciate the principle that one must never negotiate with terrorists; this principle has since been adopted by many countries. 7. International situation. Concerning the international situation, Valdes said, the GOU is worried about other countries in Latin America who are either Marxist, pro-marxist, or who have not yet learned the hard lessons about Marxism and continue with perhaps good intentions to assist Marxism. Some of these countries carry on bilateral trade with socialist states to such an extent that they become dependent on them. Uruguayans have a genuine and legitimate interest in the global situation. 8. Sinai MFO. Participation in the Sinai MFO was for Uruguay a very difficult decision. But having taken that decision the GOU is committed. The philosophic reasons for the decision are clear: future conflicts will not be limited to the Middle East but will affect other areas of the world; Uruguay believes that small countries are often in a better position to act usefully than are great powers. Valdes Otero continued to describe what the Uruguayan decision on MFO means and what it does not mean. He said the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo tried to get him to explain the GOU’s decision but that he had deliberately saved the explanation for the Secretary: it is an act of confidence and faith which, if the MFO should fail, could prove to be an act of naivete. In making this decision the GOU had to confront and set aside serious concerns: A. If there should be new elections and a change of administration in the U.S., where would the GOU be then? History is not very reassuring in this regard. B. Within the present administration, can the Department of State control the unfriendly acts of other departments? C. Beyond the executive branch, is the administration able to control unfriendly acts by the Congress? D. What influence can the administration exert on press and public opinion? We must, therefore, see that this decision was indeed an act of confidence and faith. It would be fatuous to believe that the Congress and the media will refrain entirely from criticizing the MFO; but the GOU does believe that a much more favorable public attitude could be achieved by steadfast adherence to a clear policy by the Reagan Administration. Valdes said that the GOU expects that their friendship will be returned by friendship and they would appreciate a public statement from the USG expressing support for Uruguay. 9. Bilateral economic relations. The USG should recognize that under no circumstances can or will the Uruguayan economy harm the U.S. economy. Uruguay has an open economy, a market economy and monetary stability. By the same token, the GOU does not want to be harmed by those persons “lacking a sense of proportion” who seek punitive measures against Uruguay. The GOU was pleased by Ambassador Middendorf’s idea that U.S. private-investment in Uruguay should be stimulated. This could be the U.S.’s greatest contribution to Uruguay. 10. Multilateral relations. The GOU would like to see instituted a regime of regular consultations on bilateral, regional, and Sinai MFO issues. The U.S. and Uruguay should support each other on regional and global issues, and in multilateral fora. This does not mean that Uruguay would subordinate its independent international policy. We have different positions on Law of the Sea, Iraq, and North/South issues. Valdes pointed out that Uruguay had not changed its well-known positions in these regards. Uruguay seeks USG assistance in closing out the Uruguayan case in the UN Commission on Human Rights, for example. GOU has already begun its effort in the UN Secretariat; it would appreciate the U.S.’s help toward this end. 11. The Secretary responded to Valdes’ concerns on the vagaries of the U.S. political process. He said that even if the Reagan Administration fails to win the next election (which the Secretary does not expect), it would—be misleading to predict a shift in this basic public attitude; the magnitude of the change of the U.S. people’s mood should not be underestimated. 12. Concerning the U.S. position on human rights, the Secretary assured Valdes that this administration will not, as a matter of principle, rely on public criticism to achieve its human rights objectives. If there is need for criticism, and there may well be, these criticisms will be brought to the GOU’s attention quietly and frankly, in the spirit of friendship. 13. Regarding the convergence and coordination of policies, especially policies concerning the common global threat, the Secretary said the GOU can be sure that its participation, in the Sinai MFO will be most helpful. But even without MFO we know that both countries have a common view toward Marxism, subversion and terrorism. Naivete will not solve this problem which in fact will be with us for a long time to come because the Soviets and their friends will never cease probing for our weak spots. This fact serves for us as an ongoing and unifying bond which will endure because the motive and need for it will continue. 14. The U.S. people and Congress will consider the Sinai MFO as a positive and favorable development, which will only redound to the credit of those participating. The USG is endeavoring to expand the base of contributors to give the MFO a broader character. Talks held this week with both Begin and Sadat give the USG some cause for confidence that the Camp David process and the autonomy negotiations will succeed. Nations with the courage and vision to participate in the Middle East peace efforts will be judged favorably by history and will never incur discredit. 15. The GOU knows where the U.S. stands concerning human rights reports. Recent visitors to Uruguay including Ambassador Kirkpatrick, General Walters and Ambassador Middendorf are all of the same view, as is Ambassador Enders. The Secretary urged the Foreign Minister to call to his attention any exceptions in the USG he might encounter. He then assured Valdes of the closest U.S. cooperation and coordination not only on the Sinai MFO but on the overall hemispheric security issue. The U.S., he said, is losing patience with Fidel Castro and is also concerned by the apparent Nicaraguan slide into Marxist totalitarianism. We desire to work jointly with other Latin American Governments and to profit from the Uruguay experience in countering subversion. 16. In closing, the Secretary noted that our new Ambassador to Uruguay had been hand-picked to serve as an extension of this administration’s views. He expressed his admiration and gratitude for Uruguay’s courage and said that Ambassador Pacheco should feel free to call on him at any time. 17. Ambassador-designate Aranda assured the Uruguayan delegation that the Secretary a few days earlier had expressed exactly the same views to him and to Ambassador Boeker (FSI), and pointed out that these were not views enunciated especially for the Uruguayan audience. Mr. Aranda assured the Uruguayans of his belief that Uruguay may in the future emerge as the major success story for the Reagan Administration’s Latin American policy. Clark 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810479–1012. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts, Cairo, Tel Aviv, USSOUTHCOM, and CINCLANT. Drafted by Alberti; cleared in ARA/SC, ARA, S/S, and S–O; approved by Haig. 2 No memorandum of this conversation has been found. 3 In telegram 1767 from Montevideo, May 22, the Embassy reported on Bushnell’s May 11–14 visit “with key government officials and a broad spectrum of Uruguayan elites” in which Bushnell’s “central message was that the US and Uruguay are traditional friends, that relations are improving and will continue to improve;” that “the U.S. retains a strong interest in human rights, but our interest will be expressed through quiet diplomacy;” and that “it is necessary to build support for our policy in the Congress and with the public.” The Reagan administration hoped that “the GOU will be patient regarding the pace of policy evolution and can take actions which help the process.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810242–0739) 4 In telegram 2678 from Montevideo, July 24, the Embassy reported on Middendorf’s July 21–22 visit during which he met with President Mendez Manfredini, Valdés Ortero, other officials, and Uruguayan businessmen. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Uruguay (06/06/1981–11/23/1981)) For Kirkpatrick’s visit see Document 444 . In telegram 3318 from Montevideo, September 12, the Embassy reported on Walters’ September 2–3 visit terming it “an astounding success.” His meeting with Álvarez “on the new President’s first full day in office, carried heavy symbolic meaning for Uruguay’s international political orientation,” the Embassy noted. Moreover, “his presence and his message made a marked impact on senior Uruguayan officials, deepening the basis for future cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810430–0128) 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 1 Washington, November 3, 1983, 0959Z 313724. Subject: Meeting with Colorado Party Leader Dr. Julio Sanguinetti. 1. (C—Entire text). 2. Summary: On October 11 HA Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams met with Colorado Party Leader Dr. Julio Sanguinetti. Sanguinetti reviewed recent political developments in Uruguay and commented on the now suspended political negotiations with the military. 2 He expressed concern for the problems created by the personal ambitions of President Alvarez. 3 Sanguinetti commented that the practice of maltreatment and torture of political detainees continues, although he believes that the number of incidents has declined. He stated that a majority of the leaders of both political parties believe that the proscription of a few prominent politicians such as Wilson Ferreira should not be permitted to block an accord with the military. Sanguinetti opined that US policy toward Uruguay has been good and the US should not act in a manner that would affect its ability to influence the GOU. Sanguinetti said that many political prisoners have been imprisoned for periods disproportionate to the seriousness of their crimes, and they should be released, whereas others would be in jail for their serious crimes under any government. He also said that he did not consider the human rights organization Servicio Paz Y Justicia to be subversive, but said he keeps his distance from them because some of their leaders had previously expressed sympathy for the Tupamaros. End summary. 3. Colorado Party Secretary General, Dr. Julio Sanguinetti, met with HA Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams and HA officers on October 11. After a brief statement by Abrams expressing US support for the democratization process in Uruguay, Sanguinetti said that after ten years of problems in the area of human rights under this military government there have been some recent improvements. Many problems continue, however, particularly in the areas of freedom of the press, freedom of association and mistreatment of detained individuals. Sanguinetti added that human rights is part of the general problem in Uruguay. When the democratization process is brought to a successful conclusion, the question of human rights will automatically be resolved. 4. Sanguinetti reviewed developments in Uruguay since the defeat of the 1980 draft constitution. He said that the current talks between the military and the political parties regarding amendments to the constitution, broke down on July 5 because the military insisted on retaining a number of prerogatives, such as the right to cordon off an area to search for suspects and the right to invade homes at night. There were a total of twenty-four proposed amendments that were unacceptable. 5. Sanguinetti said that the parties expected that, as part of this dialogue with the military, the number of people proscribed would decrease; instead the number of proscriptions has increased. This made it impossible for the political parties to continue with the dialogue or to resume it once it was stopped. The military had tried to get the political parties to resume talks, and some senior military officials visited Sanguinetti recently at his home just before his departure for the U.S. in an effort to convince him to resume the discussions, but Sanguinetti explained to the generals that the atmosphere generated by the proscription of Eladio Fernandez and by the closing of the weekly publications made this impossible. Sanguinetti said that the military did not seem to understand that proscriptions were an important issue and that these actions made it impossible for the political parties to justify to their rank and file a return to the political dialogue. Sanguinetti continued that before a dialogue can resume, the military must take actions such as ending Constitutional Act No. 7, which allows the government to fire any public employee for political reasons, and ending the practice of closing newspapers. He continued that the political parties are willing to run the risk of antagonizing the military in order to obtain some concessions before returning to the bargaining table. 6. Sanguinetti said that the worst thing the military can do would be to interrupt the political process. This would do to the Uruguayan military what the Malvinas defeat did for the Argentine military (inferring that they would be totally discredited in public opinion). 7. Sanguinetti then reviewed the differences between President Alvarez and the rest of the military. He said that Alvarez is personally responsible for the recent banning and the closing of the journals, and he takes a far harder position than do the rest of the senior officers in the military. According to Sanguinetti, 90 percent of the problem in reaching agreement with the military is a result of the personal ambition of President Alvarez, and Alvarez himself encourages the other 10 percent of the problem which is caused by military fear of change. Since some officers have been tried in Argentina, the military has a natural fear, encouraged by Alvarez, that the Uruguayan political parties would try to do the same thing once democracy is restored in Uruguay. The political party leaders have talked very frankly with the military saying that they do not intend to take any revenge for previous actions, but Alvarez has told them that the parties may not be able to control their rank and file. 8. Asked to go into some more detail on the prevalence of torture, Sanguinetti said that torture has not been eliminated but the number of incidents has decreased. He said that dictatorships generally create situations in which there is little respect among the police for the people. Moreover, there are certain police groups which use torture in their fight against terrorists. Since terrorism has declined, the use of torture has declined as well. Nevertheless, two months ago a group of youthful communist activists started to organize themselves and were arrested and placed before a military court. This was wrong because they were neither terrorists nor members of the military and therefore should have been tried by civil authorities. Sanguinetti stated that they were definitely maltreated while in the custody of the military, thereby demonstrating that torture still does occur. 9. On the subject of Wilson Ferreira, Sanguinetti said the Ferreira question is one of the most serious problems to be resolved between the politicians and the military. The military are insistent that they will not accept his return to political life. Sanguinetti believes that the Colorado Party as well as a majority of the Blanco Party, including the leadership of the party, are in agreement that the question of the political status of one or two people like Wilson Ferreira cannot be allowed to stand in the way of reaching an agreement with the military on a return to democratic government. Sanguinetti added that he recently had met with Ferreira in Bolivia and, not surprisingly, Ferreira did not agree. Ferreira believes that the Colorado Party would prefer to have him outside the country because it would then be easier for the Colorados to win their election. Sanguinetti differed, saying that he beat Ferreira in 1971 and it would be easier to beat him again then to run against Ferreira’s stand-in, who could exploit the political issue of Ferreira’s proscription. Asked about the Colorado Party leader, Jorge Batlle, Sanguinetti said that like Ferreira, Batlle remains banned, but he does live in Montevideo and despite legal proscriptions against him does participate normally in internal Colorado Party activities. He cannot, however, be a candidate in the 1984 elections. Asked whether he thought the proscription against Batlle might be removed, Sanguinetti replied that if the proscription against Juan Ferreira remained in effect, for purposes of balance the proscription against Batlle would probably remain in effect. Sanguinetti continued that he has told Wilson Ferreira’s son, Juan, that it might be best for ten people to remain proscribed than for the democratization process to be torpedoed as a result. 10. Asked for his opinion of U.S. policy and U.S. public statements on the movement toward democratic government in Uruguay, Sanguinetti responded that he thought the U.S. position has been a good one. The U.S., he said, should act in a way that will not affect its ability to influence the GOU. Sanguinetti then recalled that under President Carter the U.S. used to criticize the GOU publicly. This angered the military but made the people happy. With the election of President Reagan the military were happy, and in fact the Navy Commander said that the Carter nightmare was over. The Uruguayan military were then surprised at the position of the Reagan Administration. In particular he considered a U.S. statement issued after the August 2, 1983 suspension of public political activity to be excellent. 4 Although the military prohibited the daily newspapers from publishing it, the influential weekly political journals, which operate in a legally nebulous area, published the statement, and the government did not retaliate. Sanguinetti added that at times the political parties would like the U.S. to exert more pressure, but they realize that the U.S. cannot do so without losing its influence with the GOU. 11. Asked about the status of political prisoners in Uruguay, Sanguinetti said that he divides them into three categories. The first consists of typical political prisoners, such as General Seregni, who was a leftist candidate for President in 1971. He was later arrested and accused of participating in a public disturbance in 1973 and of being a traitor because, as a military officer, he joined the Communist Party. Sanguinetti said that Seregni’s crime warranted a maximum of 6 months in prison, maybe even a year if it were a very serious disturbance, but certainly not 8 years in prison. A democratic government would let people like Seregni out immediately, and it would be far better for the military to begin this process while they are still in office. 12. The second category consists of those people who would be imprisoned under any government because of their having participated in violent acts such as terrorism. These cases, however, should be reviewed and the number reduced to the bare minimum. The third group consists of prisoners who may have belonged to subversive organizations but who either did not receive a fair trial or who have already served their sentences. A democratic government would have all these cases reviewed and liberate most of these people. 13. Asked to comment on the cases of Massera and Hiber Conteras, Sanguinetti said that he is very familiar with Massera and in fact served in the Congress with him. Massera is a communist mathematician who attended Berkeley and is now 65 years old. Sanguinetti opined that he clearly falls in the first category. He has never been accused of any crime other than of being a member of the Communist Party which was a legal party when he was a member. 14. Sanguinetti said that he was not very familiar with the Conteras case. He knows that Conteras was a writer and a journalist, but although he read some of his material he never met him. He believes that Conteras would fall in the third category and a judge should review his case. 15. On the subject of human rights groups, Sanguinetti said that the recently formed Human Rights Commission is composed of important and prestigious democratic personalities such as Dr. Reta, a former university professor and specialist in penal law, who is no longer allowed to teach at the university. This newly formed group has not yet done anything, but it will be important simply because of the prominence of its members. 16. Regarding Servicio Paz y Justicio, Sanguinetti said it is composed of people who have taken a more confrontational position. The Colorado Party shares their general views but has reservations about the group because some of them, such as Father Perez Aguirre, were sympathetic to the Tupamaros during the terrorist period. Although they were not then nor are now a subversive group, Sanguinetti said he has kept his distance from them because of their political leanings. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830643–0855. Confidential. Sent for information to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Snyder; cleared in HA/HR and HA; approved by Abrams. 2 In telegram 4244 from Montevideo, August 3, the Embassy reported: “The GOU announced August 2 a decision to limit public political activity, control political reporting and commentary, and extend the applicability of rules concerning proscription. Announcement also reiterated government’s commitment to hold elections in 1984 for a government to take office March 1985.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830442–0755) 3 In telegram 4283 from Montevideo, November 1, 1982, the Embassy sent a lengthy review of Álvarez’s “mixed record” after his first year as President: “While his inaugural promises have been partially fulfilled, his administration in many respects is hardly distinguishable from its lackluster predecessor. In foreign policy, the GOU played a useful moderating role during the South Atlantic crisis; bilateral relations took a downward turn during the conflict but have improved in recent months. On the economic front, Uruguay under Alvarez has had great difficulty developing coherent policies to deal with the country’s severe recession. With internal party elections scheduled for the end of November, Alvarez continues to hold to his commitment to restore elected government to Uruguay in 1985.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D82565–0246) 4 In telegram 219613 to multiple posts, August 4, the Department sent the text of press guidance calling the Uruguayan suspension of political activities “potential obstacles to democracy in Uruguay” and “cause for particular concern,” while noting the Uruguayan Government’s “renewed commitment” to 1984 elections and its “declaration that the armed forces are open to a dialogue with Uruguay’s political parties.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830446–0230) 447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 1 Washington, October 10, 1984, 0307Z 299847. Subject: Maeso/Motley UNGA bilateral. 1. Confidential (Entire text). 2. Summary: Foreign Minister Maeso had no real agenda for his October 4 bilateral with Assistant Secretary Motley, but his message was clear: You’ll miss us when we’re gone. Maeso noted the warmth of our bilateral relations in recent years 2 but cautioned that the US could expect relations to cool in the future, regardless of who wins the election. Maeso warned that Cuba will help revivify the left in Uruguay and that this will contribute to more strident criticism of U.S. policy in Central America, among other things. He noted that the Blanco Party is already moving to the left under the leadership of Wilson Ferreira’s son, Juan Raul. 3 According to Maeso, the natural custodians of democracy in Uruguay are the armed forces, and he urged that the US enhance relations with them. Maeso characterized negotiations with the IMF as going badly and asked the US to “talk to the IMF” on Uruguay’s behalf. As he said good-bye, Maeso invited the USG to send observers to the November elections. 3. On October 4, 1984 Assistant Secretary Motley, accompanied by the desk officer, met with Foreign Minister Maeso, Uruguayan UN Ambassador Juan Carlos Blanco and MFA Foreign Policy Director Alvaro Alvarez. The Foreign Minister initiated the conversation by noting that this would be his last UNGA and then commented on the state of U.S.-Uruguayan relations. In the hour long conversation that followed, most of which was guided by a few questions from Ambassador Motley, Maeso made the following points: Our bilateral relations will cool: Maeso predicted that with the help of conservative former President Pacheco, the Colorados will win in November. No matter who wins, however, the US should expect cooler relations with Uruguay as the country repudiates the current regime and looks toward Europe for support. Maeso urged the US to be patient. He believes that institutional and political ties forged between our countries in recent years are now too strong to be entirely undone or forgotten. Relations with Brazil will cool: Maeso expects the next government to tilt towards Argentina. He asserted, however, that his government’s efforts to strengthen ties with Brazil would endure, in part because Brazil would not permit otherwise. 4 The left will gain ground in Uruguay: Maeso warned that after the elections relations are likely to be restored with Cuba, which will cause problems for Uruguay and the U.S. alike. Cuba will abet the left in its efforts to extend its influence internally. In foreign policy this will lead to more strident criticism of U.S. policy in Central America among other things. According to Maeso, there are 1,500 Uruguayans with Tupamaro connections in Cuba. GOU intelligence services indicate that for the last eight months former Uruguayan guerrillas and sympathizers have been drifting back towards home. Maeso is particularly concerned that the left will be able to play a spoiler role in the Uruguayan Parliament, where he does not expect moderates to control more than 40 of the votes even if the Colorados win. (The remaining 60 would presumably be composed of leftists drawn primarily from the majority faction of the Blanco Party and the leftist coalition Frente Amplio.) Maintain ties with the military: The Foreign Minister urged that the U.S. enhance relations with the armed forces, which he characterized as perhaps not up to the job of governing but not corrupt and certainly not tainted with human rights abuses as in Argentina. He does not believe that the Uruguayan military will be infiltrated by the left as has happened elsewhere in Latin America because in Uruguay the armed forces are “the natural custodians of democracy.” Six months after the inauguration, Maeso predicted, people will longingly remember the tranquility afforded by the current government. Assistant Secretary Motley noted that he and Ambassador Aranda shared the view that we should make an effort to shore up the confidence of Uruguay’s military and demonstrate that there are rewards in returning the country to its democratic traditions. The Foreign Minister agreed and praised Ambassador Aranda for his warmth and the exceptional way he has integrated himself into the Uruguayan scene. We need help from our friends: In response to queries about the IMF negotiation, Maeso noted that negotiations are going badly. Despite sound economic policies and a responsible posture on regional debt, Uruguay now finds itself alone—“like Adam without Eve”—as it tries to negotiate with the IMF. Vegh is demoralized and angered by the IMF’s refusal to consider less tangible, but equally important, social and political factors in negotiating a new stand-by agreement. A failure to gain IMF approval will undermine moderates in the elections and increase anti-American feeling, the Foreign Minister warned. He then asked for the U.S. to “talk to the IMF” on Uruguay’s behalf. Ambassador Motley noted that the IMF staff is stretched thin but is gradually coming to understand the importance of the socio-political factors to which Maeso referred. For that reason it is essential that the GOU continues its talks with the fund, as difficult and frustrating as this may be. As for talking to the fund, Motley pointed out that contrary to common belief, we do not own it and indeed must be very circumspect in our dealings with its officials. The most anyone could do would be to address the Uruguayan case at the margins and in the context of broader concerns. This we could and would do. 4. As the meeting closed Maeso said he would not attend the Panamanian inauguration on his way home but would visit Costa Rica instead. He also extended an invitation for the USG to send observers for the elections in November. Uruguay, he noted pointedly, has a tradition of welcoming serious observers who do not come with preconceived notions. 5 Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840642–1032. Confidential. Immediate. Drafted by Kinney; cleared by Kilday and ARA/SC; approved by Motley. 2 In telegram 4810 from Montevideo, August 14, Aranda wrote for Motley: “I agree that, despite the difficulties, the political transition in Uruguay is going well and that our policy of evenhandedness and quiet support for the return to democracy is paying off. I also agree with your feeling about perceptions perhaps not reflecting this reality in Washington, but disagree that our efforts are not widely appreciated in Uruguay. They are understood and appreciated by most Uruguayans, including the PLP faction (Ferreira) of the Blanco Party, whose leaders continue to regard us as effective interlocutors with Uruguayan authorities.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009–0604) In telegram 244788 to Montevideo, August 18, the Department reported on Abrams’ August 16 meeting with Ravenna, who “began by emphasizing the correctness and effectiveness of US ‘quiet diplomacy’ over the past several years. In his view, this had played a decisive role in stimulating favorable trends toward the restoration of democratically elected civilian leaders in Uruguay; he added that a strident, public posture on the part of outsiders could well have produced the opposite effect. Thus, Ravenna said, virtually all segments of the political spectrum were in agreement about the need for the upcoming transition to popularly elected civilian leadership after the November 25 elections.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840528–0469) 3 In an October 13 memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane noted that Betancur had written to Reagan urging him “to support democracy in Uruguay and to intercede on behalf of the detained opposition leader, Wilson Ferreira.” McFarlane called Ferreira’s detention “the major flaw in an otherwise positive picture” regarding the restoration of Uruguayan democracy. Reagan agreed to send an October 17 letter to Betancur affirming U.S. support for the democratic transition in Uruguay and noting, among other things, his administration’s “special effort” to “convey privately to Uruguayan officials” U.S. concerns about Ferreira’s June arrest. “We are hopeful,” Reagan wrote, “that our continuing representations will help to assure just and humane treatment for Dr. Ferreira.” (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Country File, Colombia (10/10/1984–11/30/1984)) 4 In telegram 338277 to Montevideo, November 19, 1983, the Department reported on Motley’s November 18, 1983 meeting with Maeso during which Maeso asked for the U.S. to help convince Brazil to grant Uruguay more favorable trading status. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830701–0744) 5 In telegram 7196 from Montevideo, November 26, 1984, the Embassy reported on Uruguay’s national elections, writing “Sanguinetti and the Colorados win.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840753–0535) Alan Riding wrote in the New York Times : “In the last 11 years, while thousands of Uruguayans were jailed and tens of thousands more were forced into exile, Julio María Sanguinetti avoided a confrontation with the military regime, convinced that it could be coaxed—but never forced—out of office. Mr. Sanguinetti’s election Sunday in Uruguay’s first presidential elections since 1971 provided the vindication of this strategy: two outspoken political leaders were banned as candidates, but the dictatorship should end on March 1.” (Alan Riding, “Peacemaker For Uruguay: Julio María Sanguinetti,” New York Times , November 27, 1984, p. A10) In telegram 350439 to Montevideo, November 28, 1984, the Department forward the text of Reagan’s congratulatory message to Sanguinetti, in which Reagan noted, “The American people and I have looked forward to the day when Uruguay could return to its democratic traditions” and, “We look forward to enhanced cooperation with Uruguay and its people as we strive to address the great issues facing our nations and the hemisphere.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840758–0960) 448. Article in Latin America Review 448. Article in Latin America Review 1 ALA LAR 85–003 Washington, January 18, 1985 Uruguay: Sanguinetti and the Military The Uruguayan armed forces will turn over power to President-elect Julio Sanguinetti on 1 March, ending more than 11 years of military rule. Predominantly conservative and anti-Communist, the military strongly favored Sanguinetti’s centrist Colorado Party over its center-left and leftist rivals in the November 1984 election. Sanguinetti has indicated that he will generally pursue cautious policies to avoid angering the armed forces. Military leaders, however, may be displeased with some steps he is likely to take in the areas of foreign policy and the military budget. According to various sources, some officers have remained opposed to the restoration of civilian rule, but most support it out of desire to shed responsibility for the country’s worsening economic difficulties. The armed forces have also been influenced by the return of democracy in neighboring Argentina and other South American countries. The Commander in Chief of the Army, Gen. Hugo Medina, has been a key figure in the transition process. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Medina has strongly supported Sanguinetti, believing him to be the only politician capable of leading the country through a smooth transition. Medina, said to be highly respected within the armed forces, reportedly is working hard to convince fellow officers that they have no reason to fear civilian rule under Sanguinetti. [ 4 lines not declassified ] Areas of Agreement Implementation of the 1984 Accord . Sanguinetti apparently plans to honor the agreement that he and his party reached with the armed forces in August 1984, paving the way for the restoration of civilian rule. The accord—which was strongly opposed by the Colorados’ main rival, the center-left Blanco Party—provides for limited military participation in the new government during its first year in office. For example, it calls for the formation of a National Security Council, composed of both military and civilian members, that will serve in an advisory capacity. It also grants the armed forces a voice in appointments of senior military officers. A constituent assembly will be convened later this year to work out constitutional reforms that would replace these transitional arrangements. Amnesty for Political Prisoners . According to a variety of sources, the military supports Sanguinetti’s approach to the sensitive issue of amnesty for political prisoners. While the Blancos and the leftist Broad Front coalition, Uruguay’s third main party, advocate a general and unconditional amnesty for all of the approximately 500 people imprisoned on political grounds, Sanguinetti favors immediate release only for those detained since the 1973 military takeover. The cases of those jailed earlier on charges of involvement in far-left guerrilla activity against elected Uruguayan governments will be considered by the courts on an individual basis. Military acceptance of Sanguinetti’s policy on this issue is reflected in the outgoing regime’s recent decision, reported by the US Embassy, to free many of the post-1973 political prisoners before leaving office. 2 Punishment for Human Rights Abuses . Many members of the Blanco and Broad Front parties have demanded that the new government use civilian courts to prosecute military officers accused of committing human rights violations during the period of military rule. Sanguinetti and the Colorados, however, will not pursue civilian prosecution of these officers, but will leave the question of trials to the military courts, according to US Embassy reporting. This is the approach that military leaders have insisted upon. Economic Policy . We believe the Sanguinetti government also will pursue economic policies acceptable to the military as it confronts a four-year-old recession, inflation that is 70 percent and rising, 15 percent unemployment, and a $5.5 billion foreign debt. Sanguinetti and other Colorado leaders have indicated that they are not planning any sharp departures from current economic policies. According to US Embassy and other reporting, 3 the new government will try to stimulate private industry and preserve the outgoing regime’s free-market approach. Although the Colorados may seek greater government control over the banking sector, they do not favor bank nationalization as advocated by the Blancos and the Broad Front. The Colorados plan to look to the United States and other Western countries for aid and trade concessions. Labor . Sanguinetti’s policy toward the restive labor unions is also likely to meet with the approval of the anti-Communist military leadership. His goal is to weaken the strong influence that Uruguayan Communists have long wielded within the labor movement. His plan, which he has discussed publicly, is to seek legislation providing for secret-ballot voting in strike calls and elections of union leaders. Sanguinetti apparently believes that such a reform would lead eventually to a more moderate and more pluralistic labor movement. According to US Embassy reporting, however, the new government may delay introducing its planned labor legislation to give moderates within the unions time to get organized. 4 Areas of Potential Disagreement Although a variety of reporting indicates that Sanguinetti for the most part will follow policies palatable to the armed forces, for political reasons he may take some foreign initiatives that would not be well received by military leaders. Moreover, budget considerations may force him to cut military spending below the levels sought by leaders of the armed forces. Foreign Policy . According to US Embassy [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Sanguinetti’s foreign policy will emphasize ties with the United States, Western Europe, and Uruguay’s South American neighbors. Nevertheless, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] he also intends to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba, expand cultural and commercial ties with the USSR, and possibly upgrade relations with Nicaragua by permitting Managua to open an embassy in Montevideo. In addition, we believe he may periodically criticize US policy in Central America Sanguinetti recognizes that the military would be displeased by such actions. He probably reasons, however, that military commanders generally support him and are unlikely to challenge his diplomatic initiatives early in his administration. He apparently is more concerned with keeping leftist political opponents off balance through measures that reflect an independent foreign policy. Military Budget . Because of the financial squeeze facing Uruguay, the new government almost certainly will closely examine military spending. It is likely to impose restrictions on military wage increases and on purchases of new equipment and supplies. Sanguinetti also has said publicly that he will gradually reduce the number of military personnel, which has nearly doubled to 68,000 in recent years. Although these policies run the risk of sparking military resentment, Sanguinetti has indicated that he will proceed as cautiously and flexibly as possible and look for ways to soften the impact of cuts. Outlook We believe that the new government’s overall policy mix will be accepted by the armed forces, at least during the early stages of civilian rule. Moreover, Sanguinetti is an adroit, careful politician who is likely to pursue his policies with prudence and flexibility. He will also be careful to appoint commanders who favor keeping the military out of government and focused on professional pursuits. The danger of a military move against Sanguinetti will grow if he proves unable over time to ease Uruguay’s economic troubles and bring labor unrest under control. A resurgence of leftist-led political violence stemming from a prolonged period of ineffectual civilian rule would further heighten the chances of military intervention. 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Subject File, Uruguay. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. The Latin America Review was a classified serial publication of the CIA. 2 In telegram 6634 from Montevideo, October 26, 1984, the Embassy reported that the Uruguayan Government announced on October 23 the release of national security prisoners. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840689–0035) In telegram 7369 from Montevideo, December 3, 1984, the Embassy reported that Wilson Ferreira had been released on November 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840771–0906) In telegram 7850 from Montevideo, December 26, 1984, the Embassy reported the release of more national security prisoners. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840823–0839) 3 In telegram 7449 from Montevideo, December 6, 1984, the Embassy reported on Aranda’s December 4 meeting with Sanguinetti, whose “initial priorities will be securing debt relief and finding new markets for Uruguay’s exports. Sanguinetti’s designation of Ricardo Zerbino as his point man for discussions with US on economic topics is a welcome indication that, under a Sanguinetti administration, the Uruguayan economy will remain open.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840782–0082) 4 In telegram 6654 from Montevideo, October 26, 1984, the Embassy described Sanguinetti’s October 24 speech promising a new labor law. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840689–0024) In telegram 7772 from Montevideo, December 21, 1984, the Embassy reported on the new Uruguayan Government’s concerns about labor strife. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840817–0680) 449. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Mission in Geneva 449. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Mission in Geneva 1 Montevideo, March 2, 1985, 0324Z Secto 4020. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with Uruguayan President-elect Sanguinetti. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary: During one-hour meeting with President Sanguinetti Secretary congratulated Sanguinetti on the return to democracy in Uruguay, and promised our support. Sanguinetti made special plea for support in economic area and for help in closing UNHCR books on Uruguay. 2 He said Central America was special problem, and GOU policy would be based on quest for peace and justice. He expressed concern that Central America, and especially Ortega’s request to meet with Secretary in Uruguay, not become an issue in our relations. 3. Sanguinetti opened the meeting by explaining the importance of this day to Uruguay. Uruguay has the oldest democratic tradition in Latin America, and the re-establishment of democratic institutions is important not only here but throughout the region. But democracy would not solve all problems, especially the economic ones. The policies of the new government would be moderate. He anticipated good relations with the U.S. and asked for support and understanding, especially in the economic area. He emphasized the need for investment and market access, but acknowledged the legal constraints on our policies. He noted that Uruguay’s economy had declined dramatically in the past three years, and it would be difficult for the people to accept new austerity programs. He made a commitment to seek agreement with the IMF, World Bank and commercial banks. He emphasized that to pay debt Uruguay must export, to export, Uruguay must have investment. 4. In foreign policy, Uruguay would not depart from traditional lines. The GOU would join no bloc, support peace and maintain relations with other nations on a non-ideological basis. Agreement had been reached to re-established relations with Venezuela, and discussions have started with Cuba. He recognized the risks of relations with Cuba, and would establish clear limits on their presence and activities in Uruguay. 5. On Central America, the GOU would support international law and peace. Ortega of Nicaragua seeks relations with GOU, seeks a meeting with U.S. in Montevideo. The GOU does not want to mediate between the Nicaraguans and U.S. in any meeting in Montevideo. 6. In his response, the Secretary noted the importance of March first as the day democracy returned to Uruguay. He promised U.S. support and understanding because of the special importance of the return to democracy in Latin America for President Reagan and the USG. The Secretary recognized the special importance of economic recovery to the preservation of democracy, agreed growth was the answer to the debt and recession problems, and reiterated our promise of support. He said there were limits on what we can do, but offered to cooperate in any possible way. Most important to recovery, however, were GOU policies. 7. The U.S. is the most open market in the world, continued the Secretary. Citing figures on the increase of Uruguayan exports to the U.S., he said we are already doing a lot. We are not protectionist, but have some problems in special areas, such as textiles. 8. The Secretary delivered a letter from President Reagan inviting President Sanguinetti to make a state visit to the U.S. later this year. 3 He explained that the invitation was not only important as a symbol of our support for Uruguay, but also would enable Sanguinetti to convey a message to U.S. businessmen and investors. He promised to do everything we can to make the trip a success. 9. Sanguinetti expressed appreciation for the invitation and reiterated his interest in good relations with the U.S. 10. In the area of human rights, Sanguinetti said the problem was solved for Uruguay. He said the issue of human rights in Uruguay was being considered this week in Geneva by the UNHCR and asked for our support in closing the books on Uruguay. He said the matter was urgent because if no decisions were reached this week, Uruguay would be maintained on the UN’s problem list for some time to come. He asked for our support. 11. Returning to the problem of Nicaragua, the Secretary said we had received no request for a meeting in Montevideo. He said we would meet if requested, but emphasized he was here in Montevideo to celebrate the return of democracy, not to meet with Ortega. The presence of Ortega in Montevideo on this occasion was ironic because Nicaragua was one of the few exceptions to the return of democracy in Latin America. With respect to relations with Cuba, the Secretary said this was a Uruguayan decision. He warned of the risks, however, and noted that Cuba uses embassies as a base for interfering in the internal affairs of the host country. He offered to provide information on this if requested. 12. In closing, the Secretary reiterated our support for democracy in Uruguay. We want to find ways to help the new GOU within our limitations. He said the U.S. wanted to work with the GOU on specific ideas for cooperation in the economic area, and said consultations could begin soon. Sanguinetti responded the GOU was working on specific ideas as well and looked forward to discussions. 13. As the meeting broke up, Assistant Secretary Motley returned to the problem of Nicaragua. He said we had received no request for a meeting, the U.S. delegation and the Nicaraguan delegation were in the same hotel, and we would be ready to meet provided the request didn’t come too late. Foreign Minister Iglesias said he would convey this message to the Nicaraguans. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850142–0520. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shultz was in Montevideo March 1–2 to attend Sanguinetti’s inauguration. 2 In telegram 7339 from Montevideo, November 30, 1984, Aranda reported that he had called Sanguinetti to congratulate him on his election and “alert him to the coming call for consultations on another wool textile category,” to which Sanguinetti reacted “sullenly.” Aranda commented: “I can fully understand Sanguinetti’s deep disappointment that our first major action in the economic field following his victory should be another call for textile consultations, especially in light of his election-eve plea to Uruguay’s democratic friends abroad to keep their markets open to Uruguay’s products.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840767–0497) In a February 8 memorandum to McFarlane, Tillman wrote: “You should be aware that we have gotten off to a rather shaky start with the new civilian government in Uruguay…over trade consultations about textiles.” (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Subject File, Uruguay) 3 In telegram Secto 4021 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation, March 2, Shultz wrote to Reagan that during his meeting that morning, Sanguinetti accepted Reagan’s invitation for a State visit. Shultz noted: “I conveyed our policy of support for democracy in Uruguay and throughout the hemisphere. Sanguinetti seems genuinely committed to democracy, to rational economic policies and to good relations with us. He intends however to have normal diplomatic relations with both Cuba and Nicaragua. I warned him that we considered both to be enemies of democracy and that there internal risks associated with this policy.” (Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 51G, Uruguay) Reagan’s February 27 letter to Sanguinetti is in the Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Subject File, Uruguay. 450. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 450. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 1 March 2, 1985, 2137Z Secto 4032. Subject: Memorandum for the President: My talks with the Uruguayan leaders. 1. Secret: Entire text. 2. Memorandum for: The President. 3. From: George P. Shultz. 4. Subject: My talks with the Uruguayan leaders. 5. In three separate sessions in Montevideo this morning I met with the Vice President and Congressional leaders, the new economic team, and the Foreign Minister. 2 6. All seem to be over their post inauguration euphoria. Justifiably proud of their return to democracy, they are sobered by the difficulties of making it work in the face of serious economic deterioration. The Finance Minister impressed me with his very persuasive recitation of the current situation, and the long downhill slide Uruguay has seen in the last ten years. The GDP has declined 15 percent in the last three years and real wages are one-half of ten years ago. Uruguay was an early leader in establishing a welfare state. The Uruguayan leadership recognizes that it has a lot of internal housekeeping to do and (a refreshing change) that direct foreign capital investment (as opposed to loans) is the needed ingredient to invoke growth. Good intentions notwithstanding, they have a significant challenge ahead. 7. The Foreign Minister appears as capable as the Finance Minister but in a more open, effusive way. He’s well schooled in the international economic arena and I think they’ll be a strong team. 8. In summary, in my initial evaluation of the new government I count as pluses their aim to see direct foreign investment as a needed boost, a capable foreign policy and financial team, and a generally moderate albeit independent foreign policy. Among the minuses, the hint that Sanguinetti likes to appeal to leftist elements among his constituencies and the attendant dangers of posturing being turned into policy, as in the recognition of Cuba, announced the day of the inaugural. 3 Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003–0271. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the Delegation’s aircraft. 2 In telegram 1171 from Montevideo, March 2, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s March 2 breakfast meeting with Uruguayan Vice President Enrique Tarigo and Senators Jorge Batlle (Colorado Party) and Luis Alberto Lacalle (Blanco Party). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850144–0091) In telegram 1172 from Montevideo, March 2, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s March 2 meeting with Sanguinetti’s new economic team. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850144–0095) In telegram 1170 from Montevideo, March 2, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s March 2 meeting with Iglesias during which they “agreed that sound economic policies were the key to Uruguay’s economic recovery.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850144–0089) 3 Under cover of a March 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Tillman sent a report on her trip to Sanguinetti’s inauguration noting, “that the Sandinistas had done excellent advance work” to ensure a warm welcome for Ortega while “we, in turn, were frequently greeted with chants of ‘yanqui asesino’ (yankee assassins) and ‘no pasaran’ (they won’t get through), a favorite Sandinista war chant. It helped underscore the well-organized left which confronts Sanguinetti. However, the staged nature of the demonstrations against us became clear as we left to go to the airport. Seeing the U.S. flag on the limo, ordinary Uruguayans, on the beach, on the streets, stood to applaud and wave at us. Their friendliness was heartening.” (Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Subject File, Uruguay) 451. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 451. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 1 New York, September 25, 1985, 2317Z Secto 19025. Subject: The Secretary’s meeting with President Sanguinetti of Uruguay. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Summary: The Secretary’s meeting with President Sanguinetti addressed the domestic situation in Uruguay, where political conditions have stabilized but labor unrest is on the rise, and the country’s foreign debt and trade problems. 2 Sanguinetti emphasized the need to increase trade and expressed concern about protectionism, especially on the part of the EC, whose agricultural subsidies are undercutting Uruguayan exports. Sanguinetti expressed gratitude for U.S. support for Uruguay’s debt rescheduling and other efforts to help, including the recent modest cheese quota and congressional authorization for dols 30 million in economic assistance in FY 86 and FY 87. The Secretary said he hoped the Congress would appropriate the funds needed to implement the authorization. Foreign Minister Iglesias renewed his proposal for informal private talks with selected leaders on the debt and trade issues; the Secretary described the complexity of the current situation and said the U.S. was carefully studying how best to proceed. 3. On Central America, Sanguinetti said the new Contadora support group was intended to clarify public understanding of the Contadora process and that his government was pressing the Nicaraguans on the issues of Soviet influence and internal democracy. The Secretary asked for continued Uruguayan cooperation on UN issues. Sanguinetti reiterated his desire to accept President Reagan’s invitation for a state visit to Washington; 3 the Secretary explained that the President’s operation and recovery had required changes in his schedule and the visit had to be rescheduled. Tone of meeting was cordial throughout. End summary. 4. Participants: The Secretary met with President Sanguinetti of Uruguay at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, September 24, at the Uruguayan UN Mission. The Secretary was accompanied by USUN Ambassador Walters, ARA Assistant Secretary Abrams, ARA/SC Director Durkee note taker, Deputy Press Spokesman Redmond, White House fellow Karen Galatz, and Stephanie van Riegersberg interpreter. President Sanguinetti was accompanied by Foreign Minister Iglesias, UN Ambassador Lupinacci, and Ambassador to the US Luisi. 5. Situation in Uruguay: After opening pleasantries, Sanguinetti offered six-month assessment of developments since last discussion in Montevideo at March inauguration: 4 — Country was stabilizing, with democratic institutions functioning and political parties cooperating; — Main domestic problem was labor unrest, but this was understandable after twelve years of repression; — Internal dynamic was somewhat unbalanced, with business sector too discouraged and labor leaders too aggressive; — GOU working to restore balance, first by getting agreement on external debt, which has been accomplished through negotiations with IMF, World Bank, and private banks, with next priority to ease domestic debt problems. 6. U.S. support for refinancing: The Secretary noted that the US had tried to be supportive of Uruguay’s debt rescheduling; Sanguinetti expressed appreciation for the U.S. efforts. 7. Trade problems: Sanguinetti went on to stress GOU concerns over foreign trade problems, which he described as more important than debt problems. Uruguay’s export earnings were down 10 percent so far in 1985; worse yet, prices of Uruguay’s major export products still declining, thanks to European subsidized competition. He had spoken same morning to French Foreign Minister to explain problem and to insist that EC had to make changes, but no solution in sight. As example, he mentioned that Brazil was offered EC meat at dols 600 per ton, a price that was about half the market price, and Uruguay simply could not compete under such conditions; the EC had 900,000 tons of meat in storage, and that overhang depressed the market. 8. U.S. support on trade: The Secretary agreed that European agricultural policies caused serious distortions and encouraged Sanguinetti to continue to make that point to EC leaders. He noted that the U.S. had opened up the U.S. cheese market to Uruguay through a modest quota, and added his hope that the Congress would provide the appropriation needed to implement the authorization for ESF for Uruguay. Sanguinetti expressed understanding of the difference between authorizations and appropriations. 9. Congressional visits: The Secretary said we had encouraged congressional leaders to visit Uruguay and were pleased that Senator Lugar had returned with very positive impressions. 5 Sanguinetti agreed that such visits were very useful to gain clear understanding of complexity of managing transition following long period of dictatorship. Radical rhetoric was to be expected in such conditions, but Uruguayan voters had demonstrated moderation. This tendency was reinforced by positive Argentine example. 10. New GATT round: The Secretary expressed appreciation for GOU support for new GATT round, noting that best defense against protectionist pressures was good offense in favor of opening markets to trade. The U.S. still offers world’s most open market, and we want other countries to open theirs as well, in order to provide quote level playing field unquote. Sanguinetti said GOU had similar view of objectives but was concerned about pace of events. The situation in Latin America could change quickly, as in Mexican and Peruvian cases, and it was important not to lose more time. 11. Informal debt dialogue: Iglesias recalled discussion in Montevideo regarding possible informal, private discussions about approaches to trade and debt problems, noting that the U.S. had concentrated on strengthening the international financial institutions. This was important but more needed to be done, since new money infusions from private banks were declining sharply. Quiet, informal discussions could help clarify thinking on new approaches and improve coordination. The Secretary said he understood the point and USG was working hard to find practical solutions. Respective roles of IMF and IBRD had to be clarified. Public perception of lead role of IMF led to misconception that debt problem could be resolved through monetary adjustments, when in fact debt problems needed to be addressed in ways in which World Bank was key factor. Debt-ridden countries did not need more debt but rather more equity, which meant that more had to be done to attract capital, especially capital from the affected countries that had gone abroad. These were complex questions, and the U.S. continued to study how best to address them. 12. Central America: Recalling Ambassador Shlaudeman’s recent visit to Montevideo and other capitals of the Contadora support group, the Secretary asked for Uruguayan views of Central American situation. 6 Sanguinetti replied that GOU supported the Contadora process and wanted new support group to be helpful. New initiatives were sometimes misunderstood, as when the Cartagena group was initially misperceived as a debtors cartel, but Contadora support group was intended to clarify public understanding in Latin America of Central American issues. For GOU, avoiding armed conflict in Central America was domestic issue as well as foreign policy problem. The GOU has pressed Nicaragua, most recently in discussions with VP Ramirez, on two key points: First, Soviet influence is very negative; second, there must be progress toward internal democracy. Ramirez understands these points, but the commandantes have the power. The GOU understands the U.S. position that there will be no military intervention but U.S. will support those forces putting pressure on Sandinistas. It was very important that such activities be perceived as consistent with international principles and standards of conduct, since small countries were often forced to depend on such principles more than major powers. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the Uruguayan comments and said we wanted to stay in close touch through Ambassador Shlaudeman. 13. UN affairs: The Secretary explained that the U.S. took seriously what happened at the UN, for which reason we had assigned one of our best Ambassadors. We appreciate past cooperation with the GOU and looked forward to working closely with them at this session of the UNGA. 14. State visit: Sanguinetti said he had very much appreciated President Reagan’s kind words on receiving the credentials of Ambassador Luisi. 7 He reiterated his desire to accept the invitation to visit Washington. The Secretary said we were looking forward to that visit and explained that the President’s unexpected surgery and need to recuperate had disrupted his schedule. The President has recovered well, but the visit has had to be rescheduled for later. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850684–0008. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Montevideo. 2 In telegram 2980 from Brasilia, March 22, the Embassy reported on Bush’s March 15 meeting with Sanguinetti in Brasilia, in which Bush responded to a “request for U.S. help with Uruguay’s international creditors” by expressing “understanding of Sanguinetti’s position and our desire to help our friends, but pointed to the limits placed on the United States ability to be helpful by the current deficit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850198–0111) 3 See footnote 3, Document 449 . 4 See Document 449 . 5 In telegram 3915 from Montevideo, July 8, the Embassy described Senator Richard Lugar’s (R–IN) July 2 visit and meeting with Sanguinetti. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850480–0276) 6 In telegram 10444 from Lima, September 13, the Embassy reported on Shlaudeman’s September 11 meeting with Iglesias about Central America. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850652–0597) 7 Reagan hosted an Oval Office ceremony to receive diplomatic credentials from Ambassadors including Luisi. Reagan’s remarks have not been found. ( Public Papers: Reagan, 1985 , Book II, p. 1516) 452. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 452. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA 86–10001 Washington, January 1986 [Omitted here is a title page.] Uruguay: Challenges to Democracy Julio Sanguinetti, who in March 1985 became Uruguay’s first civilian President in 12 years, is facing growing challenges as he attempts to govern the smallest of South America’s fledgling democracies. Although Sanguinetti initially enjoyed the support and cooperation of opposition party leaders and the military, much of that support is dissipating as economic problems and attendant pressures mount: • The deteriorating economy—Uruguay registered 3.5-percent negative growth in 1985—is, in our view, Sanguinetti’s most serious long-term problem. High inflation and unemployment, coupled with a decline in exports and a foreign debt burden of $5 billion, have convinced the President to implement unpopular austerity measures recommended by the IMF. The recently signed agreement with the Fund enables Uruguay to reschedule its debt, but its call for belt-tightening also provides organized labor and leftist parties with a cause to rally opposition to the government. • Labor unrest is Sanguinetti’s most critical near-term challenge. Labor is becoming increasingly militant, and violent confrontations with the government are growing in frequency and scope. Sanguinetti’s dialogue with labor has so far failed to reduce tensions, and recent government actions indicate that the President has now decided to take tougher steps to control strikes and labor violence. • Sanguinetti’s relations with the political left have also grown more confrontational, and in recent months he has countered obstructive parliamentary maneuvers by the leftist Broad Front coalition and given the police free rein to control leftist-inspired riots and demonstrations. We expect increased agitation by the Broad Front and by Communist-dominated student groups. Another potentially serious development, in our view, is the reappearance on the political scene of the far-left Tupamaro guerrilla movement. Although some Tupamaro factions have pledged to participate in electoral politics, others have stated their intention to resume violence. • Another concern of Sanguinetti is the recent increase in Cuban activity in Uruguay, according to the US Embassy. 2 The Embassy [ less than 1 line not declassified ] report that Cuba is cultivating ties to labor and leftist leaders, including the Tupamaros. Although Cuban involvement to date has been very low-key so as not to upset recently restored diplomatic ties to Uruguay, any signs of growing instability or government ineptitude might spur greater Cuban activity. The military is carefully monitoring the domestic political situation and is worried by the labor unrest and the resurgence of the left. In our view, however, the officer corps’ greatest concern is that the President might accede to leftist demands for Argentine-style trials of military personnel accused of human rights abuses under past military governments. [ 2 lines not declassified ] Sanguinetti, however, has demonstrated a keen awareness of military sensitivities, has generally consulted with the services before taking action on controversial issues, and probably is aware of the limits of the military’s tolerance. We believe the Sanguinetti government has a slightly better than even chance of remaining in power over the coming year. The President’s more assertive policies have strengthened his political standing; polls show that he remains Uruguay’s most popular public figure. Although Sanguinetti will continue to face economic problems, labor unrest, and leftist agitation, we expect that he will be able to hold civilian opposition to manageable levels. Moreover, the President will in all likelihood retain the support of the armed forces—primarily by resisting pressure for widespread human rights trials. We cannot rule out, however, that Sanguinetti will revert to the erratic and indecisive style of his first months in office, thereby emboldening labor and the left to intensify antigovernment agitation. If the economy deteriorated dramatically and the President appeared to lose control of events, factions of the Tupamaros might return to armed struggle. Under such circumstances, hotheads in the military—particularly junior officers of an ultranationalist and vaguely anti-US bent—could attempt a coup. The chances of a successful military intervention, in our view, would increase substantially if Sanguinetti attempted to placate the left by permitting human rights prosecutions of military officers. A strong, stable, civilian government in Montevideo would clearly buttress the US goal of promoting democracy throughout the region. A military takeover, however, could produce a highly volatile regime that, at least initially, might adopt populist anti-US rhetoric and policies. A coup in Uruguay would underscore the vulnerability of Latin America’s young democracies. [Omitted here is the table of contents, a map, and the body of the Assessment.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986) Box 1, Folder 2: Uruguay: Challenges to Democracy, January 1986. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis with a contribution from the Office of Central Reference and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of November 14, 1985. 2 Embassy report not found. 453. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 453. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA 86–20029 Washington, June 6, 1986 URUGUAY: Prospects for Sanguinetti Summary President Julio Sanguinetti, Uruguay’s first civilian President in 12 years, enjoys strong popular support. Sanguinetti is pragmatic, moderate, and generally friendly to the West, although he has expanded ties with the Soviet Bloc. The President has skillfully handled a number of sensitive issues since he took office in March 1985, capitalizing on the electorate’s preference for orderly reform and politics by consensus. He successfully negotiated a controversial IMF agreement and has maintained open relations with both the political opposition, which controls Congress, and the armed forces. Sanguinetti has fostered cooperation between his Colorado Party and its chief political rival and has made some inroads dealing with the country’s faltering economy, but he faces several tough challenges in the coming year. He has yet to make the structural reforms—such as pruning the overblown public sector and diversifying exports—that might lead to prolonged economic growth. Labor unrest continues to generate political tensions—the Communist-dominated union confederation has called for a general strike during Sanguinetti’s visit to Washington—and sap industrial productivity. Also, the armed forces remain nervous as they await the Supreme Court decision regarding possible trials of officers for human rights violations committed under the previous military regime. [Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files—Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 42: Uruguay: Prospects for Sanguinetti, June 1986. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared at Tillman’s request in the South America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with DO. Based on information available as of June 6. 454. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan 454. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan 1 Washington, June 16, 1986 Meeting with Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti I. PURPOSE To support Uruguay’s return to democracy, to strengthen bilateral relations, to bring Uruguay more firmly into the West, to explain our policies on Central America and terrorism. II. BACKGROUND President Julio Sanguinetti, Uruguay’s first civilian President in 12 years, is a serious, articulate statesman who is pragmatic, moderate and generally friendly to the West and the United States. Uruguay’s almost century-long democratic tradition was interrupted when the military seized power in 1973 following several years of economic decline, labor agitation and urban guerrilla (Tupamaros) violence. Uruguay’s political leaders have traditionally espoused a social democratic philosophy which led to an extensive social welfare system that eventually became unsustainable and an economy dominated by the state which grew in inefficiency over the decades. One only has to drive through the lovely capital city, Montevideo, to see how tarnished Uruguay’s reputation as the “Switzerland of Latin America” has become: once handsome homes and buildings now shabby and crumbling, boarded-up small stores and factories, youth idle in the streets. President Sanguinetti’s bold and skillful leadership has bolstered his political position but large challenges remain. You invited him for a state visit in a letter delivered to him by Secretary Shultz at Sanguinetti’s inauguration in March 1985 as a concrete gesture of support for Uruguay’s return to democracy, a theme which we anticipate will dominate this state visit. 2 Return to Democracy and Consolidation : President Sanguinetti and his Colorado Party played an active role in the transition to democracy by helping negotiate a face-saving formula for the military to relinquish power by allowing it limited participation in the government. The Uruguayan electorate remains pluralist; there are three major parties, the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties, and the newer Broad Front, a coalition of leftist groups spanning the ideological spectrum from democratic socialism to Marxism-Leninism. A “National Accord” between the three parties signed last April has been badly eroded over the past two months, making Sanguinetti’s ability to maintain opposition support in the Congress difficult. Although rebuilding the economy is his principal long-term challenge, labor unrest is the greatest immediate problem. Aggressive leftwing union leaders and communists called over 200 strikes and organized 223 new unions in the first six months of the Sanguinetti administration. Labor leaders are planning a general strike on June 17, the day of your meeting with Sanguinetti. Sanguinetti has also had to walk a fine line between meeting demands from the left and appeasing an apprehensive military, which is concerned about leftist demands for Argentine-style trials of officers for alleged human rights abuses committed under the military regime. Long-term prospects for stability in Uruguay are uncertain at best. During your meeting with Sanguinetti, you could show sympathy for the challenges he faces in consolidating democratic rule in Uruguay. The Economy and US Assistance : 3 During his first year in office, President Sanguinetti implemented modest free market reforms and austerity measures that enabled Uruguay to obtain an IMF-supported stabilization program and arrange for new commercial loans. Cheaper oil imports and lower interest rates will probably generate economic growth this year of roughly two percent while the government’s anti-inflationary wage policies will hold down price increases. Despite these accomplishments, Montevideo has not implemented the basic reforms needed to make the Uruguayan economy internationally competitive: pruning back the public sector and overblown welfare programs, giving concrete production incentives to private entrepreneurs, and diversifying exports. Domestic and congressional opposition will make it difficult for him to address these problems. The Uruguayan government has publicly stated its desire for foreign investment and since 1985, we have been negotiating with them on what would be the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in South America. The BIT will in all likelihood not be ready for signing during President Sanguinetti’s visit and has become a sensitive issue in Uruguay. The Foreign Minister has requested that we not publicly mention the BIT but you could privately encourage a BIT as an important step in attracting US investors to Uruguay. Trade issues are the primary irritant in relations. Uruguay appreciates that we are its largest customer, but is deeply concerned about protectionism and falling prices for its products. They are especially concerned about the negative impact of the export provisions of the Farm Act, particularly the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and the rice and dairy programs. You can tell President Sanguinetti that there were sections of the Farm Bill which you did not support, and that the Executive Branch has formulated its programs to minimize the harm caused to non-subsidizing exporters. You can tell him as well that we believe the new trade round is the best hope to iron out problems in agricultural trade and that we are pleased that Uruguay will host the GATT Ministerial in September. You might mention that we expect to join together in our concern about EC agricultural policies, and that we would appreciate their support on services. The US will provide Uruguay $14.4 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and this agreement will be signed during the state visit. We have a small MAP (military assistance) program that will assist President Sanguinetti to demonstrate to the military that democracy yields some rewards. President Sanguinetti is not aware that we have arranged for you to show our support for Uruguay with some small gestures that you may choose to mention during the meeting: — a program which Sanguinetti just requested to provide top business and academic agricultural experts to consult on modernization is available, — a longstanding countervailing duty issue regarding leather wearing apparel can be lifted, — the temporary cheese quota granted to Uruguay in 1985 has been slightly increased and is a permanent quota, — Trade Development Program funds for feasibility studies related to development projects are available as well. Foreign Policy and Central America : Besides maintaining Uruguay’s traditionally close relations with the United States and Western Europe, Sanguinetti is paying greater attention to regional issues. Its position of leadership in the Cartagena Group on the debt issue has permitted it to exert a moderating influence. It has played a minor role in the Contadora Support Group. Uruguay has also strengthened relations with the Soviet bloc and established relations with Cuba after a 21-year hiatus in order to placate Uruguay’s domestic leftists. Sanguinetti and his government appear to be particularly fearful of a US invasion of Nicaragua because of the impact they believe this would have on domestic Uruguayan politics. They oppose US assistance to the contras. You can reassure him that the United States has no intention to intervene militarily in Central America. You can point out that South Americans talk to you about democracy, but seem to draw the line when it comes to supporting a democratic outcome in Nicaragua. You might suggest to Sanguinetti that if he cannot openly support the resistance, you hope he might refrain from publicly opposing our efforts to assist them. The Soviets, Terrorism and Libya : We want the new Latin American democracies to feel that they are part of the “inner circle” of Western democracies by discussing high priority issues with them. You can explain to Sanguinetti that improving our relationship with the Soviets is a long-term task and that we are prepared to be patient. Sanguinetti will most likely welcome being better informed about your decision on Interim Restraint based on Soviet noncompliance on arms control treaties. You can assure him that the US will continue to exercise utmost restraint while protecting strategic deterrence and working for reductions in strategic arsenals on both sides. Sanguinetti publicly criticized our military actions against Libya. You might explain to him that we are making concentrated efforts with our allies to combat state-supported terrorism and because we share Uruguay’s belief that international cooperation is necessary to successfully combat terrorism. Irrefutable evidence indicates Sandinista support to Colombia’s M–19 in Palace of Justice incident. Short One-on-One : Your Ambassador in Uruguay, Judge Malcolm Wilkey, suggested that a short one-on-one with Sanguinetti about Central America, after the Oval Office meeting concludes and the participants are walking to the departure area, will help him understand the significance of this matter to the US government and underscore our determination to see democracy flourish in Nicaragua. You might emphasize to him once again your belief that US military intervention in Central America will not be necessary if the democracies of this hemisphere work together to produce a democracy in Nicaragua. You could explain that our national security concerns about Nicaragua extend to concerns about the security of South America’s new democracies because of Sandinista expansionist tendencies. [Omitted here are a list of participants, a press plan, and a sequence of events.] Tab A Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 4 SUBJECT State Visit of Uruguayan President Julio Sanguinetti I. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND? ○ A year after Uruguay’s peaceful return to its democratic traditions, our relations with pragmatic President Sanguinetti and his government are excellent. ○ A century-old statist tradition, popular Uruguayan skepticism about the U.S. and a leftist majority in parliament circumscribe Sanguinetti’s actions. — Uruguayan public opinion is generally more critical of USG policies than that of the GOU, especially on economic issues and Central America. ○ Unequivocal USG support for Uruguay’s return to democracy, frequent contact with political leaders, and concrete gestures of support such as $14.4 million in ESF assistance have improved communication between our governments and also improved our public image in Uruguay. ○ Uruguay is deeply concerned about trade issues and protectionism. — It needs trade to service its external debt and build support for Sanguinetti’s free market economic program, but its principal exports of meat, woolen textiles, and leather goods are highly import sensitive. — It appreciates that the United States has become its largest customer, over traditional markets in Argentina, Brazil and the EC. ○ Uruguay will host the GATT Ministerial in September. We are both concerned about EC agricultural policies. We want GOU support for including services on the agenda. ○ Uruguay favors democracy in Central America, but strongly opposes support for the Nicaraguan resistance. ○ The GOU has exerted a moderating influence on the regional debt question through Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias. II. WHAT DO WE WANT? ○ Success for Sanguinetti and a mature relationship with his friendly, democratic government. ○ Greater understanding of our policies on Central America and terrorism. ○ Continued sound economic policies and responsible behavior on the debt question. ○ Support for a comprehensive agenda for the new trade round, to include services, intellectual property, investment and agriculture. III. WHAT DOES SANGUINETTI WANT? ○ Greater market access for its exports. ○ Not to have Central America dominate the visit. ○ To identify areas of agreement and potential cooperation. ○ Agriculture high on the agenda in new trade round. ○ Foreign investment to help promote economic growth. ○ Military assistance to demonstrate to the Armed Forces the benefits of democracy. ○ Technical assistance in the area of agriculture and strengthening the private sector. IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT? ○ Engage Sanguinetti in a more personal relationship with USG officials. ○ Demonstrate support for Uruguayan democracy and Sanguinetti’s responsible economic program. ○ Give Sanguinetti a good hearing on trade issues and seek GOU support for a comprehensive agenda in the new trade round that includes both services and agriculture. ○ Heightening of Sanguinetti awareness of importance we attach to Nicaragua, our unhappiness with South American democracies’ role so far. ○ Share with Sanguinetti our concerns about Libya and Syria and hopes for East/West relations. ○ Sign an ESF agreement, a Transportation Technical Assistance Agreement, and encourage completion of negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty. 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Presidential Appointments: Meeting with Uruguayan President Sanguinetti 06/1986. Secret. Prepared by Tillman. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it on June 17. Attached as Tab B, but not printed are talking points. Attached as Tab C, but not printed, are biographies. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter for signature under cover of a June 13 memorandum. 2 See Document 449 and footnote 3 thereto. 3 In telegram 3137 from Montevideo, May 23, the Embassy reported on Whitehead’s May 22–23 meetings with Sanguinetti, Iglesias, and Zerbino, writing: “The Sanguinetti government has accomplished a great deal in its first year in power. Uruguayan democracy is healthy, thanks in large part to the cooperation of the opposition political parties and the military. Although the economy is still sluggish, Sanguinetti has reversed decades of statist stultification and set Uruguay on a sensible path toward economic growth.” Whitehead noted “the fact is that Uruguayan exports to the US have increased by 70 percent since 1982; we are now Uruguay’s leading export market; and we import twice as much from Uruguay as we export to them. How, I asked the Foreign Minister, can we then be accused of protectionism? Iglesias responded that he fully realized that the US economy was far more open than the EC or Japan, and promised that both he and Sanguinetti would make this clear during next month’s visit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860005–0564) 4 Confidential. 455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 1 Washington, June 19, 1986, 0443Z 193388. Subject: The Secretary’s meeting with President Sanguinetti. 1. (C—Entire text.) 2. Summary: The Secretary met President Sanguinetti June 16 for a cordial overview of the topics to be addressed during the state visit. Sanguinetti made clear that the GOU wanted to use the visit as political boost and asked for US help on trade matters to consolidate the return to democracy. He noted that he would avoid being drawn into public debate on US aid to the Contras. Sanguinetti asked for working level discussions to consider possible trade agreements covering specific sectors, such as textiles, leather goods, or dairy products (Finance Minister Zerbino later added services to this list). The Secretary noted that the US is already Uruguay’s largest market and that textile trade is particularly sensitive, but said we could explore possible areas of mutual benefit. Sanguinetti also mentioned GOU interest in military assistance and in a new route for Pluna, the state airline. At the Secretary’s request, Sanguinetti reviewed the situations in Paraguay, where he hoped there could be an evolution within the Stroessner regime, and Chile, where he foresaw serious problems if Pinochet continued to take a hard line and if the democratic opposition failed to present a clear alternative for the future. End summary. 3. The Secretary called on President Sanguinetti at the Madison Hotel, June 16 at 4:15 P.M. to review the main points to be addressed during the state visit. President Sanguinetti was accompanied by Foreign Minister Iglesias, Finance Minister Zerbino, Ambassador Luisi and members of the presidential staff. Accompanying the Secretary were Assistant Secretary Abrams, AID Director McPherson, Ambassador Wilkey, ARA/SC Director Durkee (notetaker) and Stephanie Van Reigersberg (interpreter). 4. GOU overview of visit: Sanguinetti began by sketching out his approach to the visit, explaining first that he wished to project it as a political event in order to avoid confusion or expectations on economic issues that might be exploited by his opponents. Secondly, he said that he would not get drawn into public debate over the issue of U.S. aid to the Contras, although he was prepared to discuss Central American issues in private. 5. Trade issues: Thirdly, within the framework of very good bilateral relations, he saw trade issues as central and therefore wished to explore how to increase trade with the U.S. He suggested discussions at the working level to consider free trade agreements covering specific sectors, given the likely difficulty of working out a comprehensive free trade agreement such as that between the U.S. and Israel. When the Secretary asked what sectors he meant, Sanguinetti said they would have to be analyzed but that for Uruguay the most beneficial would be textiles, woolens, hides, leather goods; the U.S. obviously could export many more products than Uruguay. Subsequently, Finance Minister Zerbino noted that services (banking and informatics) were also possible candidates. While this matter was being explored, he also hoped for consideration of increasing Uruguayan shares in those markets regulated by quotas. 6. Pluna route request: Sanguinetti also mentioned that discussions were underway to consider changes in civilian air services, and he wanted the Secretary to know that the route request for Pluna was significant as part of the GOU plan to increase the role of the private sector by making Pluna a joint venture. 7. Military assistance: Sanguinetti expressed satisfaction with the state of civilian-military relations, which were vital for the stability of democratic government. He believed that the Army was in reasonably good condition and would benefit from continued U.S. training, but he asked for material assistance for the Air Force and Navy, whose equipment was very old. 8. The Secretary responded that the U.S. viewed the re-emergence of democracy in Uruguay as very important for the region, and we wanted the visit to be a celebration of that achievement. He added that we attached similar importance to promoting democracy in Central America. Regarding trade, he expressed satisfaction at the increase in bilateral trade and hoped it would continue to grow. If it were possible to identify specific sectors of mutual benefit, all the better, but he noted that any trade agreements must be based on two-way flows, adding that textile trade was particularly sensitive. The Secretary went on to point out that the GOU would have a good platform from which to promote freer trade when it hosts the GATT Ministerial meeting in September. He concluded that the U.S. appreciated the effort by Sanguinetti and Zerbino to strengthen the economy and wanted to help. Sanguinetti responded by expressing appreciation for US help and hoped that Uruguay could demonstrate that democracy and economic growth went hand-in-hand, a hope the Secretary said he shared. 9. Review of Paraguay and Chile: In response to the Secretary’s question about Uruguayan views of Paraguay and Chile, Sanguinetti commented that the two countries had very different histories and situations. Paraguay he described as still a 19th century country, a big ranch which needed a strong foreman. In his view, change in Paraguay must come from within the regime, because the opposition was too weak and too divided to offer an alternative. Unfortunately, Stroessner, like all dictators, wanted to hold on forever, and this was dangerous. If he could step back at the end of his current term and let others of his party take over, he could be safe while gradual changes occurred. But if he insisted on staying, he would become even less able to deal with problems and the opposition might become radicalized. 10. With regard to Chile, he said Pinochet was still strong but constant struggle with the opposition was eroding his base of popular support. At the same time, the communists were getting more aggressive and violent. He believed that a reasonable solution depended on strengthening the democratic center, helping it to overcome divisions and to present a clear alternative. Sanguinetti said he had tried to convey two points to Chile: First, that as in Uruguay, it was possible for Pinochet to leave power and not wind up like Somoza or Duvalier; second, the opposition cannot just insist that Pinochet must leave without explaining who would replace him. In the end, the Chilean majority, as in Uruguay, would avoid the extremes of either Pinochet or the communists if the democratic parties could show that they had a reasonable plan to govern afterwards. 11. The Secretary thanked Sanguinetti for his views and said he hoped there would be further opportunities for discussions during the visit. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Secretary Memorandums of Conversation (Memcons), Secretary Haig and Shultz, Lot 87D327, Secretary Shultz (Memcons), October 1985–present. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information Priority to Santiago and Asuncion. Drafted by Durkee; cleared by Gelbard and Abrams and S/S–O and S; approved by Shultz. Sanguinetti made a State visit to Washington June 16–19; he then visited New York, June 19–20. 456. Memorandum of Conversation 456. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 17, 1986, 10:35–11:50 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting Between President Reagan and Uruguayan President Julio Sanguinetti (U) PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Vice President Chief of Staff Donald Regan Secretary of State George P. Shultz National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams Ambassador Malcolm Wilkey Jacqueline Tillman, NSC Uruguay President Julio Maria Sanguinetti Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias Finance Minister Ricardo Zerbino Ambassador Hector Luisi President Reagan . It is a genuine pleasure to welcome you to the White House. Supporting democracy in this hemisphere is a top priority of my administration, and we are particularly happy about the return to democracy in your great country. I’m sure you must have an agenda of things you’d like to discuss. (U) President Sanguinetti . Our agenda is brief but important. The first thing is to inform you, Mr. President, regarding the great and unique efforts we undertook to have a peaceful outcome in our transition back to democracy. Things are now going well and we think our example is of great value in terms of South America. We are convinced a peaceful transition is the only way for those left who don’t have a democracy yet, that they can follow our path. Conditions are never identical but a search for a peaceful solution that gives room to all sectors of the society is the key. (C) The second thing is fulfilling public expectations once the democracy is won. It is not easy to consolidate democracy, to manage the accumulated problems of 12 years when our democracy was repressed. To reorder the economy, to lower the deficit, to improve exports, to reduce inflation, all at once! This is all especially difficult when a country is having difficulties with international trade. I am emphasizing the subject of trade in this visit. We have always felt where the foreign debt is concerned that the real subject was trade, not debt. We have said this in the Cartagena meetings, and at first, we were not always understood. The real problem is for the economies in the region to grow, and for that to happen, trade has to grow. This is especially important in a small country like ours. Our domestic markets are small, so we have to export. (C) We have been looking at this subject from a number of vantage points. Uruguay has supported the idea of the new GATT conference. We have many arguments with our friends, some of which are our neighbors and who have slightly different approaches than ours. We tell them that it is very important to see the situation as it actually is. Our country has suffered a great deal from protectionism from the EC. There has been a great deal of harm not only in the EC, but in third country markets. The sale of subsidized commodities at below market prices is almost impossible to compete with. In addition to this problem is the response of the US today to this practice. It hurts us with rice, beef, grains. We have to offset the damage done by these practices. We are working to achieve a more open and free world market. (C) Bilateral US-Uruguay trade is greatly improved—a good deal and progress can continue. We have entered into some agreements with Argentina and more recently with Mexico and Brazil regarding negotiations on specific markets. The idea we wish to pursue with the US is to see if we can study the issue and see if there is a way which would allow us free trade in specific sectors. Perhaps some sectors could be open to free trade in both directions, food stuffs, prepared feed, textiles, leather apparel, and services as well. The fundamental issue is to explore support for the idea in the short term, to work to promote a more open trade system that would open the way in a different direction. In the short term, we need the quotas that we do have with the US to be doubled. I’ve spoken to the Secretary of State about this and a few other items: a task force on agriculture, civil aviation, military assistance which we can channel with relative ease. 2 (C) Uruguay is a small, moderate country. We are in between large countries like Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile. We had a mature transition, are proceeding with economic sanity. Our first goal was the health of the country, moving later to economic expansion on the basis of free trade. We could demonstrate to the region that we are a model to imitate. We are in a region full of problems. Chile is in an upheaval. Argentina is somewhat turbulent. Things are going well in Brazil, but Brazil is a country that tends to look inside itself. We have a special relationship with Brazil, they listen to us the most. Paraguayan political instability is beginning and playing a constructive role is important. This is why we are convinced that in Uruguay we can demonstrate a great factor of stability. (C) Relations with our armed forces are good. It was not easy, the transition in Uruguay. We were a century old democracy, a peace loving people. For 100 years the army was not in politics. Then in the 60s and 70s, the intellectual guerrillas, with no popular base in the country, forced the armed forces out of the barracks. We suffered a lot, it was a national shame, a disgrace. We are working now to incorporate the military into our civic life. We do not want a humiliated army, like in Argentina. A humiliated army is dangerous. We are succeeding in reintroducing the army into the life of the country. We are receiving extraordinary cooperation from the Generals. Well, this is how we see things. (C) President Reagan . Like you, six years ago I inherited a difficult economic situation. I know how difficult it is to change the direction of a national economy and reduce the size of the government. So I am very sympathetic. But I can assure you it is worth the effort. You and your economic team, especially Finance Minister Zerbino, have accomplished much during the last year. I commend you on your responsible policies. I hope we can sign a Bilateral Investment Treaty. This would be a strong signal to US investors about your economic intentions. Someone once said, a country grows great with imports and people. I am pleased that you will sign the Economic Support Fund agreement during your visit. (C) Now, I know there has been a recent piece of legislation which has caused you some problems. The Farm Bill. I opposed our Congress on parts of this bill, but the Congress had its way. I believe the GATT round offers us the best chance to deal with agricultural trade issues and fully support you on this. I hope your government will support the inclusion of services. It has taken us a long time to get the Europeans to go along with the new GATT round. We made some progress in Tokyo. (C) I regret that there is nothing I can do about our Export Enhancement Program for the moment, but I have tried to find other ways we might be helpful. I am pleased to respond favorably to your request to make available a team of agricultural experts from the business and academic communities to consult on modernization and other issues. The countervailing duty on leather wearing apparel can be lifted. Your temporary cheese quota will be made permanent, and we are prepared to fund feasibility studies for projects designed to support economic innovation and development. (C) On another issue. The Nicaraguan opposition, armed and unarmed, is struggling for the same political rights which you have insisted on in your own country. We attach great importance to the views of the four democratic governments in Central America. They understand the Nicaraguan threat. President Azcona of Honduras was very clear during his visit here that there can be no peace without democracy. Arias of Costa Rica has said the same. The present Contadora draft would not ensure democracy in Nicaragua. It needs a timetable to make sure they comply. The Nicaraguan resistance is genuinely democratic. They are ready for a dialogue. They have said three times they would lay down their arms and engage in a dialogue. They have been turned down each time by the Sandinistas. We are seeking to make the freedom fighters have enough leverage to bring on negotiations. (C) To switch to another issue, we have made some progress in US-Soviet relations but improving the relationship is a long-term process and we just have to be patient and determined. But I believe Gorbachev will honor his agreement to a summit this year in the US. Non-compliance of the Soviets on arms control agreements is a major problem. My decision on Interim Restraint followed years of unsuccessful efforts to improve Soviet performance in this area. We will continue utmost restraint but on a more realistic basis than Salt II. We hope the Soviets will act more constructively, including at the Geneva arms reduction negotiations. There is room for some optimism. I believe Gorbachev is the first Russian leader that has actually ever proposed eliminating nuclear weapons. Our great hope is that we can eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, so the world can be a safer and more peaceful place. We share your belief that international cooperation is necessary to combat terrorism. We made some gains in that regard in Tokyo. 3 (C) President Sanguinetti . Some agreements were made? (U) President Reagan . On terrorism? (U) President Sanguinetti . Yes. (U) President Reagan . Yes. We agreed to an exchange of intelligence but especially working on the states that sponsor terrorism. It is pretty hard to catch the individual terrorist. So we need to get to the governments where actual support for terrorists is being given. In the case of Libya, we had irrefutable proof that they were behind the Berlin bombings, where two of our men were killed. With this evidence in hand, it was necessary to let them know we knew. It has had a good effect so far. In Tokyo, we talked about jointly initiating economic measures, expelling people from the so-called People’s Bureaus. They don’t call them Embassies, they call them People’s Bureaus. (C) On trade. We are opposed on protectionism and will take actions where there are cases of unfair denial of markets or subsidizing. We are striving for free and fair world trade. We recently took some actions with our neighbors to the north. It seems that over the last few years, they had developed a monopoly here so we’ve taken some temporary actions aimed at building our domestic industry. There was the element of subsidy on the other side. (C) President Sanguinetti . How do you see the difficulties in Mexico? (C) President Reagan . Well, we want to help them with the banks and want them to get out of the hole they are in. George, do you want to contribute something? (C) Secretary of State Shultz . Mexico is our close neighbor. The President has gone out of his way to establish close relations with our neighbors. One index of this effort is that he has met with his counterparts in Mexico and Canada more than anyone else. So it has been a big effort. The Mexicans have severe economic problems but they are solvable if they would go down the path you’ve been talking about. We talked about this when we met in Cartagena. The Mexicans need to create the conditions to bring back the money that has fled; there is something like 60 billion of Mexican money outside the country. This is the essence of their problem. We don’t appreciate at all Mexico’s role in Central America. They take the Nicaraguan’s part and work on treaty arrangements that give the advantage to them and work against the Central American democracies in the region. So we have differences about this that we argue about in our many meetings. And they are always voting against us in the UN. So there are some points of tension. But until the capital returns, the conditions in the country are going to remain difficult. The more you can say to them about this the better. We spoke about Paraguay and Chile yesterday. I believe the President would be interested in your views. (S) President Sanguinetti . Yesterday, we talked about Chile and Paraguay. There are very different situations. Paraguay is a very isolated country and has been since colonial days. It is just an enclave there. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] In the first one and a half centuries of its history, there are four names, Sanchez, Lopez, Lopez and Stroessner. So that is the context that one has to think about Paraguay. It is not like Chile, Uruguay, Argentina. The Southern Cone countries are European countries; the Andes are Spanish-Indian countries, and the coastal countries are Latino-African. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] This is the time to find a political solution there before there is a real problem. But you have to find a political solution inside the regime, not outside. The opposition is very weak, there are no leaders. But inside the regime there are some possibilities. The difficulty is to convince Stroessner and his people to do this. They have absolute power, but Stroessner is in a decline. It could be that the next elections could be freer, that someone in his party could win, and he could be a “father figure” from his home. But you have to look inside for change. (S) In Chile, there are two groups to convince: Pinochet and the opposition. Chile is a distinct situation. It too has a long democratic tradition and a high cultural level. But they have also had a Marxist experience and this has conditioned the people. Twenty percent of the people support Pinochet. Eighty percent are against him. But that eighty percent don’t want change for change’s sake. They are asking, what is coming next? They don’t want another Marxist. The great weakness is that there is a communist opposition who is using violence. There is a center but there is no unity and too many leaders. There is not one person that can stand above the rest to find a solution. Pinochet is weakening, about that there is no doubt. If your regime is based on law and order but there is no law and order there is no reason for a dictatorship. That is what is happening to Pinochet. (S) We talk to the opposition on an ongoing basis. I gave a press conference recently and all the Chilean press was there and I talked about Uruguay and our experience to give a clear signal. I said, “there are two feelings present during transitions: the fear of those who are leaving power and the impatience of those coming to power.” The problem is to manage those feelings. I talk sometimes about a swimming pool. You don’t dive into a pool with no water. The opposition asks is there water in the pool, but some are saying, we need two feet of water, others say, we have to have ten feet. And the military have to know they can swim too. And Pinochet has to believe there is more for him than Somoza’s fate, to end up assassinated in Paraguay. If not, there will be a fight to the death. I tell the opposition they have to go one step at a time. If they try to jump up three steps at a time, they will fall down. We spent two and a half years arguing with our military. There was a plebiscite in 1980, a year of debate after that, parties were organized but there were obstacles all the way. But we made it clear to the military that we are at the table and we were staying at the table. Also, and most important, we convinced the military that they had a future. It isn’t easy. (S) Another case is Central America. We share the same objectives, peace and democracy. But there is no clear, common strategy. The important thing is to win the war, not just the battle. We don’t see things exactly your way. We believe force reinforces Ortega’s position, and the military people gain in strength as well. The question is how to set up the political option so the political solution becomes dominant because it is clear that this can only be solved within a political scenario. No military victory is possible. So we are trying to force Ortega to come to a negotiated position. (S) Secretary of State Shultz . But you have to have strength to back up negotiations. (C) President Sanguinetti . But you have to support a negotiated solution to prevent Ortega from becoming more consolidated militarily. (C) President Reagan . But there is great erosion in support for the Sandinistas, even in the military. They have had thousands of deserters. They are waiting to join the freedom fighters but need supplies and help. I met recently with a Nicaraguan Monsignor who told us that Ortega had stepped up repression. He told us that the people of Nicaragua want what was promised to them, the promises to the OAS of democracy, respect for human rights and so forth. We are concerned that they will become a threat to all of the Americas once they are consolidated. Because their policy is an expansionist policy. They have not abandoned the dream for world communism. They were more open about this earlier, when Mr. Ortega talked publicly about revolutions with no borders. And history has not given one example of a communist state that has ever given up total power. Faced with enough force, they would have to give up their stranglehold, to go out and try to win votes, to take their chances in a democratic system. Their power today comes from the barrel of a gun. I also met with three Nicaraguans recently, two were former Sandinistas who turned away from the Sandinistas. The third was a Creole minister from a Protestant church. The Sandinistas came and arrested him because he was a minister preaching the word of God. And they tortured him, and cut off his ears. Then one day in prison, another prisoner told him he had to escape because they were going to kill him. So he did escape. All this suffering because he was a minister. (C) And I agree that there is a danger in Chile. I believe if it were only a matter between the Chilean people and Pinochet it could be worked out. But there is a third force that is not democratic and whose tactics is to keep the other two fighting and look for their chances. Well, I must be messing up your schedule by keeping you here. (C) Finance Minister Zerbino . Mr. President, I wanted to mention just briefly once more the economic theme. We are enjoying some relief from lower oil prices and interest rates. But the projections are somber. Exports decreased in value in spite of the fact that volume is up 5 percent. Our principle commodities are down ten percent of normal export prices. So, as I said, projections are somber. We share similar objectives with the US. It will be some time before we can develop substitutions for agriculture. Rice is a major problem which is affected by the Farm Bill. The drop is more than one-half of one percent of GDP. Translate one-half a percent of GDP to yours and you will understand that this is a very significant amount. This is why our President is emphasizing the trade area and our desire to be closer to the US. We need short term measures to overcome our problems in international trade. (C) 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Presidential File, Presidential Appointments: Meeting with Uruguayan President Sanguinetti 06/1986. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Tillman sent the memorandum to Poindexter under cover of a June 18 memorandum. 2 See Document 455 . 3 The twelfth G7 summit was held in Tokyo, May 4–6, and issued a “Statement on International Terrorism,” on May 5. See Department of State Bulletin , July 1986, p. 5. 457. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 457. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 1 New York, September 30, 1987, 0516Z Secto 15048. Subject: UNGA: Secretary’s meeting with Uruguayan Foreign Minister Iglesias. 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. Summary: The Secretary met with Uruguayan FM Enrique Iglesias on September 28 in New York City during the 42nd UNGA. 2 The meeting centered on regional and debt issues. The Foreign Minister acknowledged the Secretary’s positive impression of internal Uruguayan economic and political development. The Secretary urged that Uruguayans proceed with caution on fisheries negotiations with the USSR. Iglesias warned that unless the Chilean opposition ceases its internal bickering, Pinochet could ultimately successfully—and, by default, legitimately—maintain himself in power. Iglesias also foresaw worsening relations with Paraguay both because of increasing intransigence on the part of the Colorado Party, and an increasingly negative public opinion of Uruguay being formed as a result of a child custody dispute. The Secretary urged Iglesias to encourage his Contadora colleagues to insist that the Nicaraguan Government negotiate a cease fire directly with the democratic resistance prior to November 7. 3. On debt, Iglesias saw rising interest rates as the primary threat to recovery and urged increased concessions from US commercial banks; the Secretary pointed to Chile as a country not afraid to develop and implement creative debt management schemes. The Foreign Minister was accompanied by his UN Ambassador Paolillo and UN Minister Fisher. Assistant Secretaries Abrams and Redman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Gelbard, and Country Officer Bolton (notetaker) also participated. End summary. 4. Domestic political situation: Shultz commented favorably on Uruguay’s apparent success in its democratic transition, encouraging the military’s positive attitude, and developing responsible economic programs. The Secretary said the GOU’s success was all the more remarkable given the potentially turbulent influence of Uruguay’s neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. Iglesias praised President Sanguinetti’s fundamental goal to establish political and economic stability in Uruguay that would help insulate it from its neighbors’ policy swings. Although sufficient signatures may have already been gathered to bring the de facto amnesty law to a referendum, Iglesias predicted the law would survive a vote. For economic progress to continue, Iglesias said the commercial bank creditors will have to narrow the interest rate spread. Uruguay, he continued, was being penalized for having responsibly gone to the banks two years ago, rather than delay as did Argentina who renegotiated a rate much more favorable than Uruguay’s. 5. USSR/Fisheries: In view of the imminent Shevardnadze visit, the Secretary inquired about the status of the fisheries agreements already initialed by the GOU and USSR and cautioned Iglesias that despite recent developments in the arms control field, the Soviets should not be underestimated. Iglesias assured the Secretary that the Uruguayans will be cautious and that the initialed agreements are in fact under review. Iglesias claimed the GOU is actually interested in the port services agreement, rather than in the agreement allocating fishing zones since the waters under consideration are already experiencing ecological strain. Iglesias confirmed to the Secretary that he would be in Uruguay for FM Shevardnadze’s visit. He noted that Cuba would be the last stop, which indicated to him that the USSR is sending a clear message that it has no intention of consulting with its surrogate prior to Shevardnadze’s travel. 6. Regional: Argentina: Iglesias sees the Alfonsin government as excessively discouraged by the recent Peronist election gains. During President Sanguinetti’s recent visit, Iglesias said his President used the Uruguayan situation (the Colorados lack a parliamentary majority) as an example of minority government that can succeed and encouraged Alfonsin to be prepared to work with this new generation of Peronists. After all, he continued, genuine democratic development requires that an alternative to the incumbent government exist. Iglesias expressed deep concern over what he sees as the increasing influence of the military in Argentine political life; to avoid a similar phenomenon in Uruguay, Iglesias explained that even token MAP assistance would increase the rate of the Uruguayan military’s integration into the democratic political society. The Secretary cited our budget constraints, but alerted Iglesias that we were looking for end-of-year funds for FY 87 and had budgeted both Uruguayan IMET and MAP for FY 88. 7. Regional: Brazil: Iglesias expressed confidence in Brazil’s ability to revive its economy. He described Brazil as being under less economic stress than Argentina because of its greater resources which in turn gives it greater flexibility. 8. Regional: Chile: The Secretary, interested in encouraging democratic reforms during a time of increased political awareness preceding the plebiscite, asked the Foreign Minister for his analysis of the Chilean political and economic situation. Iglesias cited the democratic opposition’s continued inability to rally around one effective, serene candidate as almost a guarantee that Pinochet may in fact be able to maintain himself in power legitimately. When asked by the Secretary to explain further, Iglesias described a scenario in which Pinochet could lose the plebiscite, but among a field of bickering, shrill opposition candidates in an electoral campaign, eventually emerge as the candidate of choice by default. 9. Regional: Paraguay: Iglesias predicted that Uruguay’s bilateral relations with the entrenched and inflexible GOP would worsen as a result of a child custody case just beginning to attract Uruguayan public attention. He said it was unlikely that the GOP would return the child, whom the GOU suspects is the offspring of Uruguayan citizens who disappeared in Argentina during the “Dirty War,” but the emotional nature of the issue is sure to inspire resentment among Uruguayans. Iglesias said the recent Peronist gains in Argentina have made the GOP more intransigent and less likely to cooperate with Uruguay or Argentina as the GOP sees the Peronists as almost natural allies. 10. Debt: Iglesias predicted that calls for capped interest rates will increase markedly during the next few months. He cautioned that adjustment programs based on rising interest rates are doomed to failure and therefore it is incumbent upon the commercial banks to consider additional concessions, such as capped interest rates even though losses may result. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry on debt equity swap schemes in the region, Iglesias said that Uruguay and Argentina are developing proposals, while Brazil is reluctant to begin since debt equity swaps would require politically-difficult denationalization. Chile, however, has managed to discount about 20 per cent of debt successfully. The Secretary immediately used the Chilean success as an example of how much a country can do itself to manage its debt if it has initiative and courage. 11. Central America: Iglesias expressed overall satisfaction with the progress of the Central American peace process and looked forward to Uruguay’s participation in the verification committee. The Secretary strongly criticized the Nicaraguan Government for refusing to negotiate with the democratic resistance to implement a cease-fire prior to November 7. Shultz described how essential a cease-fire is to the Guatemala accords, and that a successful one can only emerge from direct negotiations between the two parties and cannot be imposed from above even at the last minute. He assured Iglesias that the democratic resistance was ready to talk and strongly urged Iglesias to use his influence to bring pressure to bear on Managua to negotiate a cease-fire with the democratic resistance, if the Guatemala accords are to have any hope for success. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870804–0111. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Montevideo, Santiago, and Asuncion. 2 In telegram 173311 to Montevideo, June 6, the Department reported on Shultz’s June 2 meeting with Iglesias who “expressed optimism about the political and economic situation in Uruguay, particularly over progress in reintegrating the Uruguayan military into civilian society. He asked for US military assistance to help this process and focus the military on professional tasks.” Shultz indicated “that the US would make a special effort to try to help Uruguay with its modest military needs.” They “also discussed Soviet overtures to reach a fishing and Aeroflot agreement package with Uruguay. Iglesias said the GOU is weighing the political risks and economic benefits. The Secretary encouraged him to use caution in reaching any such agreements with the Soviet Union. Iglesias also touched on Uruguay’s concerns regarding an economically viable US route for its national airline, Pluna.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870440–0867) 458. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 458. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 1 August 4, 1988, 2319Z Secto 15030. Subject: Memorandum for the President: Uruguay, August 4. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Memorandum for the President. From: George P. Shultz. Subject: My day in Uruguay, August 4, 1988. 2 3. The old line about Uruguay is that when either of its (comparatively) huge neighbors, Argentina or Brazil, sneeze, Uruguay catches cold. Right now, though, they are sneezing and sniffling and Uruguay is managing to stay pretty healthy. 4. Certainly Uruguay is ahead of both Brazil and Argentina in opening up its economy and in restoring a relaxed, totally open democratic system. It is a good example of the latter that Pres. Sanguinetti invited to his luncheon for me the leaders of all the opposition parties—and they all came. 3 5. Sanguinetti is, as you will recall from his state visit in 1986, a very perceptive and equally charming man. He has managed Uruguay’s transition to democracy brilliantly, and travelled the world to bring recognition to his small country. He has a realistic view of the Sandinistas, wants to be helpful on Panama if there’s anything constructive Uruguay can do, 4 and offers some real insights about countries as varied as Chile and the Soviet Union. Here, as in Argentina, the return to democracy has brought to the fore a team of very impressive leaders. The consolidation of democracy seems secure, and if they can succeed with their economic plans 5 they’ll give some meaning to the old description of Uruguay as the Switzerland of Latin America. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N880006–0059. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the delegation’s aircraft. Shultz travelled to Montevideo to meet with Sanguinetti and senior Uruguayan officials, August 4. He also gave an address to businessmen and bankers and gave a news conference; see Department of State Bulletin , October 1988, pp. 2–20. 2 In telegram 4953 from Montevideo, August 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of Shultz’s August 4 press conference in Montevideo. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880683–0333) 3 No memorandum of conversation has been found. In telegram 5057 from Montevideo, August 9, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s August 4 meeting with Uruguayan political officials at the Ambassador’s residence. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880695–0318) 4 In telegram 4985 from Montevideo, August 5, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s August 4 meeting with Barrios Tassano in which they discussed Panama, writing: “After both the Secretary and Barrios Tassano had explored every development in the U.S.-Noriega imbroglio, the situation was left that Barrios Tassano and Sanguinetti would use their best efforts to obtain from the Noriega regime a statement of the terms and conditions on which Noriega would depart, and would keep the Ambassador in Montevideo fully informed of any developments.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880683–0717) 5 In telegram 5042 from Montevideo, August 9, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s August 4 meeting with Zerbino in which they discussed “market-oriented measures undertaken by the Sanguinetti administration; Zerbino’s thoughts on the Uruguay Round; Zerbino’s apprehension regarding the U.S. trade bill; the seventh replenishment of the IDB; and the upcoming bilateral textile negotiations in Washington.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880695–0027) 459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay 1 Washington, August 15, 1988, 2333Z 265225. Subject: Secretary Shultz’s meeting with President Sanguinetti, August 4, 1988. 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. Summary: Secretary Shultz and Uruguayan President Sanguinetti met for over an hour August 4 in Montevideo. 2 Sanguinetti discussed Uruguay’s consoliation of its democratic transition and intention to stick with its successful economic program in spite of renewed strikes aimed at forcing policy changes. He urged the Secretary to provide more military assistance to help in the reinforcement of Uruguay’s democracy. The Secretary expressed strong support for what Sanguinetti and Uruguay had accomplished and noted that we had provided some equipment and considerable training. However, financing was a limiting factor, but we would look into additional used equipment. On Panama, the Secretary expressed appreciation for FM Barrios’ efforts, while stressing the need for Noriega to make a written proposal. 3 He also described the current Panamanian situation. On Central America, Secretary Shultz contrasted the many positive developments among the four democracies with the continuing downward slide and repression of the Sandinistas. Sanguinetti agreed on the dismal Nicaraguan picture and both analyzed the Salvador and Honduran situations. Finally, the Secretary analyzed developments in the USSR and the PRC. End summary. Uruguay’s Transition 3. President Sanguinetti began with a tour d’horizon of the Uruguayan situation. He said Uruguay still had problems but was handling them well. The unions were difficult and were again creating difficult problems as in 1986, with lots of strikes. They were pushing hard for a changed economic policy, but the GOU would not go along and would stick to current policy; in any event, the unions had not paralyzed the country as they would like. Exports were up 60 percent from 1985 when his government began. Inflation was still a problem because the fiscal deficit was still too large. Politically, Uruguay was doing well, but it was now paying the price of a successful transition and was back in a political “spring” with the rampant strikes. It was not good for politics to keep a tough economic policy. Sanguinetti observed that later, at lunch, there would be present a cross-section of all political leaders, including the left. Sanguinetti related that he himself had called Gen. Liber Seregni, leader of the left coalition Ecuador for President Borja’s inauguration, although Seregni could only accept the trip to Quito “on a personal basis.” While this showed Uruguay’s sense of political “fair play”, the left continued to accuse Sanguinetti of being a friend of the military and the imperialists. Sanguinetti added that the situations of his neighbors—Brazil and Argentina—was troubling. They could not control inflation in Uruguay with instability on both borders. 4. Secretary Shultz responded that Sanguinetti had done an excellent job. He recalled the country’s situation at the time of the inauguration; now, democracy was strong and a success was assured. It was not a transition anymore but continuity. The economy had advanced; compared to others in Latin America or elsewhere it looks quite good. The GOU’s policies have worked and as it pushes further it will work even better. The transition for the military had also been accomplished well. The Secretary mentioned that the USG had tried to help with training and some equipment, but was not able to provide all the equipment Uruguay would like. There were no restrictions, simply our own financial constraints. 5. Sanguinetti said the GOU was not asking a lot, only for used military equipment. Some additional help would be greatly appreciated and highly useful. For example, the A–37 used aircraft had made a real difference with the Air Force. It was not easy for the military to make the transition from power to power, so help was important. 6. The Secretary agreed that the USG had done all the Air Force requested. For the Army, the USG would look into possibilities for surplus equipment. The Navy was more difficult to help because ships were expensive, hard to find, and the PE the GOU wanted was used in anti-narcotics programs. IMET funds were somewhat more available, especially with end-of-year possibilities. Ambassador Wilkey added that this issue was a high U.S. priority; some USG offers had been declined though. Congressman Hyde, as a result of his recent visit, had asked for a list of Army and Navy equipment. 4 Everyone agreed the GOU list was reasonable. Panama 7. Secretary Shultz mentioned that he and FM Barrios had had a good private talk on the current situation. Uruguay had handled this in an excellent manner. It was right for Uruguay to be careful and to get a written commitment from Noriega. Barrios and the Secretary had agreed a low-key approach was best. Everyone wanted to mediate issues involving the USG and we needed an authoritative channel; Uruguay was it. If the situation developed to the point where an agreement might be possible, the USG might have to get involved directly because of legal aspects. Overall, the Secretary stressed, the Foreign Minister’s and Foreign Ministry’s professionalism had been impressive. On Panama itself, it was unacceptable that a country was under control of the drug trade and the USG would not stop trying to get Noriega out. Delvalle’s removal through a 15-minute meeting was in essence a bloodless coup, so civilian government did not really exist. Regarding U.S. sanctions, the Secretary acknowledged that some assets had been frozen, but private investors and financial institutions see political instability as the main problem to keeping funds in Panama. With an economy based almost completely on services (banking, shipping, insurance, tourism), the political instability has a major economic result. At this point, the Secretary concluded, a transition government headed by Delvalle or someone else is required, but not Solis Palma. Central America 8. Turning, at Sanguinetti’s request, to Central America, Secretary Shultz noted that many good things have happened: Instead of one democracy, there are now four, even if in various stages of fragility; the emergence of the rule of law is very important; there is positive, low inflationary growth. The negative side is that the Nicaraguan people are taking a terrible beating: Real per capita income has been halved; inflation is now either 2,000 percent (our estimate), but either means an end to the money economy; there are large flows of arms from the USSR and the Sandinistas continue to supply guerrillas in El Salvador. He noted that Argentina was also concerned with Sandinista links to guerrillas. The recent additional repression was troubling since it gives us all a belief that they will not change absent pressure. What is healthy is that the four democracies are trying to solve their own problems, in part, with significant U.S. economic aid, which we hope to institutionalize. The Secretary added that he had now tried to accelerate our diplomacy. The press was trying to treat the meetings in Guatemala badly, but they had gone quite well and he would return August 9. 9. Sanguinetti agreed it was fundamental to get the four Central American democracies to solve their own problems. Until he visited Nicaragua and the other Central Americans in December 1987 he had not realized how bad the economic situation was. Managua looked like a neutron bomb had exploded: Buildings but no people in the streets. He had not realized the degree of poverty and deprivation. Sanguinetti noted that he was a politician and looked for action signs: Nobody was applauding Ortega and there was no joy in the streets. Thus, Nicaragua is no longer a model and is losing support among its neighbors. 10. On El Salvador, the Secretary described President Duarte as a valiant man. After the assembly elections last year, Arena looked the favorite for the presidential election, but Chavez Mena has developed a good chance. The people are committed to an honest political process, the economy is giving and inflation is under control in spite of the earthquake and guerrillas. Duarte, because of his dedication to the democratic process and rule of law, among other issues, has made an immense contribution, although economic reform is his weak suit. Turning to Honduras, the Secretary noted that they were about to have their third election. In Guatemala, there had almost been a coup and we are trying to shore up the democratic process, although sometimes it is difficult to help them. Nevertheless, Guatemala is the relative heavyweight in the region historically. Overall and unfortunately, people are reluctant to speak up regarding the Soviets’ heavy arms shipments. Arias. 11. Sanguinetti agreed that he admired Duarte greatly; it was a miracle what he had accomplished to organize a democracy. Guatemala was complicated, but going reasonably well. Assistant Secretary Abrams urged greater South American support for the four democracies which felt abandoned by South America’s democracies, and mentioned that Sanguinetti’s trip had helped in this regard. Unfortunately, the South Americans had backed down in the CIVS and supported the Sandinistas against the four democracies. Sanguinetti acknowledged that Abrams’ point was fair and true, but they were now in close contact with the democracies. This in itself was a good justification for keeping the group of 8 going, so that Uruguay could influence bigger countries like Mexico. Global Themes 12. Secretary Shultz said that prospects for U.S. relations with the USSR are reasonable, although we needed to maintain a certain skepticism. What they were trying to do internally was particularly difficult, although he said he was more optimistic than some about their ability to affect internal reform. The U.S. and USSR could now talk about most problems, but not Central America. We have worked heavily with them on Southern Africa, Middle East consultations, Afghanistan, arms control and chemical and nuclear weapons. We were now starting talks on ballistic missile technology, which is one of the three most destabilizing problems extant, along with nuclear and chemical weapons. 13. U.S.-Chinese relations were also better. Both of those countries were trying to change internally, but going about it very differently. China, from the bottom up and with agrarian reform, was an instant success by providing incentives. Deng Xiao Peng told me the success is so obvious people now want more reform and they are moving it into larger enterprises, utilities and even political reform. In contrast, the Soviets seem to be doing it the opposite way, from the top down with the bureaucracy fighting it since it is not in the Russian tradition. The Chinese, differing from the Soviets, have a strong entrepreneurial tradition. Gorbachev economic reform has not taken place yet. The Secretary mentioned that Premier Ryzhkov, who is running the economic side, complained to him about central planning and described its stupidity. The Secretary added that he did not expect the Soviets to do much on foreign trade until this internal market is reformed. 14. Sanguinetti commented that, in his view, Eastern Europe and the internal nationalities question, which were in a way the same issue, would prove Gorbachev’s toughest. Greater freedom in the system will allow much faster growth among certain nationalities—Armenians and Balts, for example—but not among Russians. So there were many problems around the corner. Shultz Whitehead 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880715–0286. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the Central American Caribbean Basin Collective, Buenos Aires, and Panama. Drafted by Grant; cleared by Gelbard, and in S/S and S/S–O; approved by Abrams. 2 In telegram 135848 to CIA, April 29, the Department reported on Walters’ April 17–19 visit to Montevideo and his April 18 meeting with Sanguinetti. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880366–0768) 3 See footnote 4, Document 458 . In telegram Secto 15050 from Secretary of State Shultz’s delegation in Brazil, August 6, the delegation reported on Shultz’s August 4 meeting with Barrios Tassano and other Uruguayan officials. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880685–0270) 4 In telegram 4625 from Montevideo, July 22, the Embassy noted Congressman Henry Hyde’s (R–IL) discussions with Barrios Tassano, and Embassy officials provided a proposed list of military equipment for Uruguay. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880635–0780) Venezuela Venezuela 460. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) Washington, March 24, 1981 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/28/1981–04/03/1981). Confidential. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Allen under cover of a March 25 memorandum in which he noted that arguments for a full State visit “are cogent and convincing,” adding: “But the matter has already been decided. There will be full State visit for President Herrera.” 461. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) Washington, March 30, 1981 Source: Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [February 1981–March 1981]. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to John Treat of the National Security Council staff. An unknown hand wrote and underlined “JC & BN have seen” at the bottom of the page. 462. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) Washington, April 15, 1981 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [04/01/1981–04/15/1981]. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Timothy Deal and Carole Farrar of the National Security Council staff. 463. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan Washington, May 13, 1981 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. 464. Memorandum From Robert Schweitzer, Roger Fontaine, Robert Kimmitt, and Chris Shoemaker of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) Washington, May 19, 1981 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. Sent for action. Shoemaker initialed on behalf of Fontaine. A stamped notation at the top of the first page reads: “SIGNED.” In an April 17 memorandum to Haig, Allen referred to Haig’s April 15 memorandum to Reagan (see Tab B, Document 462) and noted that the sale of F–16A aircraft to Venezuela was a policy issue that would require a specific memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [04/16/1981–04/30/1981]) 465. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 20, 1981, 4–5 p.m. Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. Drafted by Luers; cleared by Enders on May 21. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room. In a May 15 information memorandum to Haig, Enders noted that in the interest of “achieving some degree of Latin American consensus on foreign policy issues,” Herrera had called for “a meeting of all Latin American and Caribbean countries” and Zambrano was “trying to arrange a more modest initial meeting with Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.” Enders recommended that Haig not take a position on the subject during his meeting with Montes de Oca and García. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Secretariat Memorandums, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1981 ES Sensitive May 13–20) 466. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting Washington, undated Source: Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [June 1981]. Secret. Kimmitt sent the minutes to Schweitzer under cover of a June 2 memorandum in which he noted that the meeting took place on June 1. Reagan wrote in his personal diary for June 1: “Later an N.S.C. meeting. I okayed reversing the Carter policy against selling arms to our friends. Venezuela wants to buy F16 fighter planes.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 44) 467. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, August 1981 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00565R: Production Case Files (1981), Box 1, Folder 23: Venezuela—Latin America: Reaching For a Unified Foreign Policy. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with DO, the Office of Economic Research, and the NIO for Latin America. Information available as of July 16 was used in the preparation of the memorandum. 468. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 16, 1981, 5:35–6:35 p.m. Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [October 1981–November 1981]. Confidential. Drafted on November 17 by Hart; cleared by Haig, Luers, and in S/S. Goldberg signed for Haig. The meeting took place at Blair House. In telegram 10292 from Caracas, October 30, the Embassy sent briefing information for Herrera’s visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810514–0990) Herrera made a State visit to Washington, November 16–19. 469. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 17, 1981, 11 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In a November 12 memorandum to Reagan, Allen wrote that “it is vital that you discuss fully and frankly with President Herrera Campins the situation in Central America” and that “above all, President Herrera Campins must understand your determination to keep democracy and the hope for democracy alive in the region, and that we will not permit Cuban interventionism to succeed. American firmness on this question—particularly—in your direct, private talks with the Venezuelan President—will help strengthen his resolve despite internal Venezuelan pressure to do otherwise.” (Reagan Library, WHORM: Subject File, Republic of Venezuela, CO171, 033898) 470. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 17, 1981, 11:30 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. 471. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 18, 1981, 11:30 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. For documentation on U.S.-Venezuela discussions about the South Atlantic crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984, Documents 122, 204, and 236. 472. Memorandum From Constantine Menges and Oliver North of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) Washington, December 21, 1983 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (11/02/1982–12/20/1983). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “SIGNED.” 473. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, January 1984 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files–Production Case Files (1984), Box 1, Folder 2: Venezuela: Challenges Facing the New Administration. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the Director of Operations. Based on information available as of December 6, 1983. 474. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House February 3, 1984, 1542Z Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the Delegation’s aircraft. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. Shultz visited Caracas, February 1–3, to attend the inauguration of Lusinchi and meet with Central American Foreign Ministers. In telegram 475 from Caracas, January 17, the Embassy reported on Walters’ January 16 meeting with Lusinchi, who “devoted much of a warm and friendly meeting to a discussion of his many contacts with the Venezuelan military since the elections and to his satisfaction that the military was solidly behind Venezuela’s democratic processes and his presidency.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840001–0420) 475. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the White House and the Department of State Rio de Janeiro, February 4, 1984, 2045Z Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Shultz travelled to Brazil February 3–7, 1984. See Documents 181 and 182. 476. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State Caracas, May 4, 1984, 2230Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840292–0585. Confidential; Immediate. Also sent Immediate to the White House and the Department of the Treasury. 477. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan Washington, December 1, 1984 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Miscellaneous Issues File, President Lusinchi/Venezuela. Secret. Prepared by Menges. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, James Baker, and Deaver. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “President has seen.” Tab A, a memorandum from Shultz, was not found attached. Tab B, Talking Points, are attached but not printed. Tab C, a biography of Lusinchi, was not found attached. 478. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 4, 1984, 10:50–11:50 a.m. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (12/04/1984–12/14/1984). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Lusinchi made a state visit to Washington, December 3–5. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Menges sent the memorandum of conversation for approval to McFarlane under cover of a December 4 memorandum upon which Poindexter initialed approval. 479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Bolivia, France, Spain, Chile, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany Washington, December 6, 1984, 2322Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840782–0523. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Rondon; cleared by Kilday and McKinley and S/S–O, and ARA/SC in draft; approved by Shultz. 480. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State New York, October 2, 1985, 0750Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no n number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 481. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Venezuela Palo Alto, California August 8, 1986, 1750Z Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 23A, Memcons 1985–1986. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Port au Prince, Bogota, Kingston, and the Contadora Collective. Shultz visited Bogota, August 6–7, to attend Barco’s inauguration. See Document 349. 482. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 1986 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files–Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 33: Venezuela: Struggling with Declining Oil Revenues. Secret; Noforn; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis with contributions from the Office of Leadership Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Based on information available as of November 15. 483. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State New York, September 26, 1987, 0227Z Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums, Lot 94D432, Exdis Memorandums, August 1–December 1987. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Caracas and the Contadora Collective. In telegram 9315 from Caracas, September 17, Reich provided briefing information for Shultz’s meeting with Lusinchi, noting that Lusinchi would likely raise the issues of debt and drugs, two issues about which Lusinchi felt “very strongly.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870771–0377) 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela Washington, October 20, 1988, 2312Z Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880935–0429. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Maracaibo, Lima, Port-au-Prince, and the Interest Section in Havana. Drafted by Yale; cleared in NSC, ARA/AND, ARA, CAR, CCA, P, S/S, and S/S–O; approved by Abrams. 485. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State Caracas, December 30, 1988, 2035Z Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, OA/ID 19874–015, Country Files, Venezuela–1988. Secret; Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. An unknown hand wrote “GOOD VIBES!” in the right-hand margin. 460. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 460. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 1 Washington, March 24, 1981 SUBJECT Visit of Venezuelan President Herrera Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins has been advised of President Reagan’s invitation to visit Washington April 13. 2 The Venezuelans are delaying their acceptance until we can clarify what the visit will involve. We strongly recommend that it be a state visit, or at least one that is comparable in style. Venezuela is one of the three countries in Latin America most important to the United States, not only because of its petroleum but also because of its active and positive political role in Central America and the Caribbean. Venezuela pursues foreign policy goals in the hemisphere which generally coincide with ours, seeking to compete effectively with Cuba in the Caribbean area and strongly supporting the government of El Salvador. Previous Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez made a state visit in June 1977. 3 Any significant disparity between the treatment accorded President Herrera and his predecessor, who is from the opposition party, would be widely commented on, and damaging politically, in the lively competition between the two major parties of Venezuela’s vigorous democracy. President Herrera is Venezuela’s Chief of State. We believe we can design a state visit along the lines of the attached illustrative schedule 4 which would take little more of President Reagan’s time than a working visit, yet would indicate to the Venezuelans and all Latin Americans the importance this Administration attaches to our relationship with Venezuela, with consequent benefits to our relations. Venezuelan Ambassador Perez Chiriboga planned to go to Caracas on March 24 to consult with his government on acceptance of the invitation and planning for the visit. He is delaying his trip until we are able to be specific on the outlines for the schedule. We would therefore appreciate a response as soon as possible. L. Paul Bremer Executive Secretary 5 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/28/1981–04/03/1981). Confidential. Fontaine sent the memorandum to Allen under cover of a March 25 memorandum in which he noted that arguments for a full State visit “are cogent and convincing,” adding: “But the matter has already been decided. There will be full State visit for President Herrera.” 2 In telegram 72867 to Caracas, March 21, the Department instructed the Embassy to invite Herrera on Reagan’s behalf to visit Washington on April 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810135–0150) In telegram 2965 from Caracas, March 23, Luers reported that he had conveyed the invitation to Foreign Minister Zambrano who asked for details about the proposed visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810135–1102) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin America Region, Document 336 . 4 Attached but not printed is an illustrative schedule. 5 Kelly signed for Bremer above Bremer’s typed signature. 461. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 461. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 1 Washington, March 30, 1981 SUBJECT IG Meeting on Venezuela, March 27, 1981 (Chaired by John Bushnell) (U) The cancelled Herrera visit robbed the IG of its reason for being, but we met anyway. It became a general seminar of US-Venezuelan relations with two issues discussed. 2 (C) First, possible F–16 or FX sales to Venezuela. State representatives expressed skepticism of Venezuela’s need for the F–16 while DOD representatives argued that Venezuela’s full and equal partnership with the US in the Caribbean gave it the right to request what it wanted with the expectation of getting them. Final decision awaits our arms sales policy. (C) Second issue involved the final settlement of oil companies’ expropriation by the Venezuelan government. Half the compensation remains in an escrow account subject to Venezuelan legal claims which are currently going through the Venezuelan courts. Until now, the US has had no policy and the matter has dragged on for five years. Therefore, a subgroup of the IG will write a paper over the next three weeks sketching out the options. 3 (S) Finally, Deputy Secretary Eaton told the IG that no mention of the aborted Venezuelan visit should be made. Leaking of it would cause some embarrassment, etc. Since 25 people were present, leaking seems inevitable. (S) 1 Source: Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [February 1981–March 1981]. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to John Treat of the National Security Council staff. An unknown hand wrote and underlined “JC & BN have seen” at the bottom of the page. 2 In a March 30 memorandum to Venezuela IG members, Bushnell reported the March 27 interagency meeting on Venezuela. (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [February 1981–March 1981]) 3 Not found. 462. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 462. Memorandum From Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 1 Washington, April 15, 1981 SUBJECT The President’s Letter to Venezuelan President Herrera Campins (U) At Tab B is Secretary Haig’s memorandum summarizing President Herrera’s letter to the President and the current status of relations with Venezuela. Secretary Haig notes our commonly held views vis-a-vis Cuba and the Duarte government in El Salvador. The Secretary also recommends that we hold up notification re the sale of F–16s to Venezuela until the exchange of the Presidents is complete. (C) At Tab A is the President’s response to President Herrera, which covers the pertinent issues including a gentle critique of President Herrera’s proposal that Latin America be a “zone of peace,” a concept that implies the US should have no responsibilities in the region. 2 At Tab I is your memorandum to the President recommending that he sign the letter to President Herrera Campins. 3 (C) NOTE: Foreign Minister Zambrano of Venezuela indicated a strong interest in a September meeting of the two Presidents. This was not an “official request” but it was proposed to Ambassador Luers. (C) RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum at Tab I. (U) The President’s reply at Tab A has been cleared with the speechwriters. (U) Tab B Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan 4 SUBJECT Letter from Venezuelan President Venezuelan President Herrera’s letter to you regretting that he cannot visit in April gives a frank presentation of Venezuelan views on hemispheric affairs. 5 Venezuela pursues foreign policy goals in the hemisphere which largely coincide with ours, including strong support for the Duarte government in El Salvador. Still, we believe an important reason for Herrera’s decision not to accept your invitation at this time was concern about having to situate himself in public vis-a-vis U. S. policies in Central America and the Caribbean. Venezuela recognizes its profound self-interest in countering Cuba in the Caribbean area and actively opposes Cuban destabilization. U.S. and Venezuelan interests coincide in this respect. It is in our interest to encourage, influence and work with Venezuelan activism in the region. However, in his letter Herrera also repeats the idea he has been developing publicly that Latin America must be a “zone of peace without foreign interference.” That is simply not realistic, and we should tell him so, courteously and warmly. I recommend that you send the attached reply to Herrera. Meanwhile, we should hold up notification of our decision to sell Venezuela F–16A’s (desirable in itself) until your exchange is complete. 6 Attachment 2 Excerpt of a Paper Prepared in the Department of State 7 3. Embassy Comment on Venezuelan President’s Letter to the President : Ambassador Luers believes that Venezuelan President Herrera’s letter to the President, which the Venezuela ambassador in Washington delivered to State Department last week, constitutes an effort to explain why the April 13 date for a visit was not acceptable; advises the U.S. on Venezuelan actions in Jamaica; and expresses Venezuelan views on regional affairs and how they differ from U.S. policies. Luers believes the heart of the message is the last part in which Herrera indicates that problems in Central America and the Caribbean must be solved by Latin Americans in a “zone of peace” without foreign powers introducing tensions through “bloc conflicts.” In this part of the letter, Venezuela is warning us that an effective U.S. policy in this hemisphere should involve broad development programs, non-intervention, less emphasis on Cuba and East/West issues and not promoting rightist governments. Nonetheless, Luers believes the Herrera letter should be taken as an effort to open a candid dialogue between friends. What Herrera and his advisers need is some personal exposure to the administration. As Latins they need to touch and feel the Reagan administration. The personal and tactile values will play a large role in narrowing our differences. (Caracas 3528, PSN 12734) 8 (C) 1 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [04/01/1981–04/15/1981]. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Timothy Deal and Carole Farrar of the National Security Council staff. 2 Tab A was not found. A signed copy of Reagan’s April 21 letter to Herrera and an initialed copy of Allen’s April 17 covering memorandum to Reagan are in the Reagan Library, Roger W. W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [04/16/1981–04/30/1981]. 3 Attached but not printed, is an undated and uninitialed memorandum from Allen to Reagan. 4 Confidential. 5 Attached as Attachment 2 but not printed are Herrera’s March 27 letter to Reagan and a translation. 6 In an undated note to Allen, Colson wrote: “RVA: I think (and Fontaine concurs) that Haig’s memo contains another effort to end-run the White House on the sale of F–16s to Venezuela. As you know, we have told State that such a sale will not proceed until there has been a comprehensive Presidential review of arms transfers/sales in general. Haig seems to ignore this in paragraph #3 of his memo to the President, when he states that ‘meanwhile we should hold up notification of our decision to sell Venezuela F–16A’s (desirable in itself) until your exchange is complete.’ Have we/has the President decided to sell the Venezuelans the F–16??? Janet.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Venezuela: President Herrera (8100642–8202071)) 7 Confidential. Only this excerpt was attached. 8 Telegram 3528 from Caracas, April 5, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (04/05/1981–05/19/1981). 463. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan 463. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan 1 Washington, May 13, 1981 SUBJECT F–16A Aircraft for Venezuela The Venezuelan Air Force has officially requested planning and review data for the possible purchase of up to 24 F–16A fighter aircraft. 2 We should not provide these data unless we are prepared in principle to approve a sale of such aircraft. A sale to Venezuela would represent the first introduction of US aircraft of this level of capability into the Latin American region, though F–16s have been sold to or authorized for a number of NATO allies, Australia, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Egypt, and Israel. Should we not approve this request, Venezuela might turn to the French for advanced Mirages. Prior to mid-1980 the F–5E was the most capable fighter the US would sell in the Latin American region. Last year the marketing of relatively more advanced intermediate export fighters (F–5G and F–16/79) was approved for a number of Latin American countries, including Venezuela. The F–16A would take us a step beyond the F–5G and F–16/79 class in terms of capability, principally because of the F–16A’s more powerful engine. Venezuela is one of our leading oil suppliers and trading partners, with which we need to maintain close relations. For its part, Venezuela is concerned about growing Cuban military capabilities, and sees a need to replace its aging Mirage III and CF–5 aircraft with more advanced aircraft. Our willingness to sell F–16As to Venezuela might enhance a number of US policy objectives aimed at insuring security and stability in the Caribbean and Central America. These include maintaining and perhaps increasing Venezuelan security and economic assistance to El Salvador and Jamaica; the supply of Venezuelan military equipment, training, and credit to Caribbean nations; a Venezuelan role in defense of Caribbean sea lanes of communication; and closer interaction between the US and Venezuelan Armed Forces. Approval, however, would make it difficult to turn down subsequent requests for F–16 aircraft from other major friends in the Latin American region. For example, if we are successful in getting Congress to repeal the current ban on military sales to Argentina, that country might be interested. It would be particularly difficult to turn down a request from Colombia, since the US has traditionally maintained an even-handed approach on arms transfers to that country and Venezuela. The two nations view each other as potential adversaries because of a border dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela. However, the high cost of the F–16A might make it unattractive to Colombia and most other potential customers in the region. Given budgetary stringencies, we do not anticipate that Foreign Military Sales financing will be available for the purchase of advanced aircraft in the region. Since Colombia is less able to pay cash than Venezuela, there could be some Colombian resentment, though we do not believe it would be serious enough to warrant disapproval of the Venezuelan request. Approval of the F–16A for Venezuela would be consistent with the Administration’s forthcoming formal policy statement on conventional arms transfers, which is now being reviewed on an interagency basis before submission to you for approval. The policy statement will emphasize our interest in meeting the legitimate defense needs of our allies and friends. It will also include references to a recipient’s absorptive capacity and economic situation, neither of which poses a problem in the case of Venezuela. The policy statement will make reference to regional stability, which we feel would not be endangered if we maintain an even-handed approach on possible subsequent requests for the F–16A from other major Latin American countries. I recommend that you approve in principle the sale of up to 24 F–16A aircraft to Venezuela. Defense and ACDA concur. 3 1 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. 2 In telegram 3254 from Caracas, March 28, the Embassy reported: “The Venezuelan Air Force (VAF) has officially requested planning and review data for the F–16A fighter,” noted the “sale of the F–16A to Venezuela requires a major policy decision by the administration and, we believe, consultations with congressional leaders,” and recommended “that an administration decision on the sale of the F–16A be made prior to providing the VAF with P&R data on that aircraft.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/28/1981–04/03/1981)) In telegram 3281 from Caracas, March 28, the Embassy transmitted additional reporting on the Venezuelan Air Force data requests regarding the F–16A. (Ibid) 3 There is no indication of Reagan’s approval or disapproval. 464. Memorandum From Robert Schweitzer, Roger Fontaine, Robert Kimmitt, and Chris Shoemaker of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 464. Memorandum From Robert Schweitzer, Roger Fontaine, Robert Kimmitt, and Chris Shoemaker of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) 1 Washington, May 19, 1981 SUBJECT F–16 Aircraft for Venezuela (C) Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Haig (Tab A), which recommends approval of the sale of F–16A aircraft to Venezuela. (C) We are very much worried about this action. To be sure, State and Defense are aboard. Venezuela wants this particular aircraft very badly; no other bird will satisfy because of the hard sell the Air Force has done, to include personal involvement by General Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff. (C) Because of the oil lever and the fact the Venezuelans were persuaded by our Air Force to forget about the KFIR and the MIRAGE in favor of the F–16, the decision to buy the F–16 is unalterable in Venezuelan minds. Were we to non-concur, there would be heavy policy damage. The Venezuelans plan to purchase only some 24 F–16s; no real change in the military balance will occur with such a modest number. (C) We had hoped to market the lower performance FX to Third World countries, rather than our first-line aircraft. Northrop and General Dynamics developed the FX (a generic term to describe Northrop’s F–5G and General Dynamics’ F–16/79) for this purpose. This approach might have worked, but as Northrop complains, every time they enter a market area set aside by USG policy for this aircraft, they find the US military has sold the F–16 to the prospective buyers. Northrop may well press a complaint through the political channel. Unfortunately, the lower performance FX is unattractive to foreign airmen. (C) We have a similar problem arising in Pakistan where the Paks appear to be on the way to using $2.5 Billion of hard-found Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to buy high-performance airplanes instead of the kind of less glamorous defensive arms they need. (C) The Carter philosophy of refusing to sell sophisticated technology to friends in the Third World only drove those friends to foreign markets where they purchased the same technology with less quality and at higher prices. In the course of these actions we alienated the Latins and lost influence with them. (C) Some other salient facts: — There is no real threat that would occasion the need for such sophisticated technology. Were Cuba or the Soviet Union to “attack” Latin countries, the US would be obliged by the Rio Treaty and our own self-interest to defend them; hence the sophisticated technology the Latins need for their least probable threat is already in place without cost to them. — The real threat to Latin America is not classic invasion by Cuba, but subversion; the best way to meet this form of aggression is to preempt the Communists with social, economic, and political reforms. — Venezuela is the only Latin nation which in any sense is able to afford the money, but a single visit to any barrio of Caracas would convince a visitor they do not have the money for F–16s either. — Although other Latin nations cannot afford the F–16s, we can be sure that the Venezuelan purchase will unleash demands of their neighbors for the same aircraft in equal or greater numbers. Colombia, which is a fairly sure bet to come in early, and others will plead their very real financial plight and ask for generous terms, low prices or low-cost leasing. Honduras would probably ask for outright grant aid. There is recent cable traffic proposing that the F–16 be sold to Peru; (there already is a proposal by the USAF Vice Chief of Staff to put the Peruvian AF Chief of Staff into an F–16 cockpit this week: “we have to do it because we did it for the Venezuelans”—and all without a national policy). The foreign credit ramifications for OMB in next year’s budget are potentially great. State and DOD will be preoccupied unnecessarily in long negotiations dealing with requests. However, there is a wider point which troubles us even more: once more the President is being placed in a narrow box where the only alternative to approving the sale at this time is to rupture our relationship with an important oil supplier and friend as well as lose the sale to France or Israel. (C) Accordingly, this issue should be discussed at the next NSC meeting. In addition to resolving the policy issue, NSC discussion could stress the need for all services to receive prior approval for future attempts to sell expensive, sophisticated systems throughout the world. Unless the President provides the guidance, there is every indication sales of sophisticated aircraft in particular, and other systems will continue to be pushed in the Third World. At the end, the only option for the President will be the kind of forced choice he is faced with in this situation. The problem is serious, even grave, and has more than a disciplinary implication if the President is to be sole organ of foreign policy as the Constitution prescribes. (C) Ambassador Luers told Frank Carlucci on May 15 2 that time is of the essence, but OSD sources agree with us that this issue can be delayed a week. One reason for Venezuelan urgency is that the current chief of staff of the Venezuelan Air Force is retiring in July. His replacement does not want to purchase F–16s; he wants A–7s and A–10s instead, either of which makes more sense. (C) RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I, seeking approval for discussion of the Venezuelan F–16 sale at the next NSC. 3 (C) Tab I Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan 4 SUBJECT F–16 Aircraft for Venezuela (C) Al Haig recommends approval of the sale of F–16 aircraft for Venezuela (Tab A). Cap Weinberger agrees. Both argue that considerable policy damage with an important oil supplier would occur if we did not approve this sale. Disapproval would also mean that the Venezuelans would probably place an early order for either the French MIRAGE or Israeli KFIR, neither of which they like or want. (C) Because this sale reverses a policy against first-line fighter sales to Latin America that goes back at least to the Nixon Administration, I asked the Secretaries to provide the memorandum for your review. (C) We had hoped to induce the Latin nations to procure the lower performance, less expensive FX aircraft. However, the FX is unattractive to well-educated and professional airmen in Third World countries, and our Air Force has pursued a vigorous policy of selling sophisticated aircraft like the F–16 without prior interagency deliberation or adequate consideration of the real needs of recipient states in the Third World. You need to provide guidance, because other cases (Peru and Colombia, and others) will arise, with some nations wanting generous terms. Accordingly, I propose that you direct full consideration of this issue at the next NSC meeting. (U) RECOMMENDATION That we discuss this issue more fully at the next NSC prior to final approval. 5 (U) Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Haig 6 1 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. Sent for action. Shoemaker initialed on behalf of Fontaine. A stamped notation at the top of the first page reads: “SIGNED.” In an April 17 memorandum to Haig, Allen referred to Haig’s April 15 memorandum to Reagan (see Tab B, Document 462 ) and noted that the sale of F–16A aircraft to Venezuela was a policy issue that would require a specific memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [04/16/1981–04/30/1981]) 2 No memorandum of conversation has been found. 3 An unknown hand indicated Allen’s approval by writing a check mark and the date May 21. 4 Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President has seen.” Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, and Baker. 5 There is no indication of Reagan’s approval or disapproval. 6 Not found attached. See Document 463 . 465. Memorandum of Conversation 465. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 20, 1981, 4–5 p.m. SUBJECT Vice President’s Meeting with Venezuelan Minister of Internal Relations PARTICIPANTS VENEZUELA Rafael Andres Montes de Oca, Minister of Internal Relations Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos, Minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga U.S. The Vice President Secretary Haig Assistant Secretary-designate Thomas O. Enders Ambassador to Venezuela William H. Luers Charles Tyson, NSC Roger Fontaine, NSC Stephanie von Reigersberg, Interpreter The Vice President welcomed the visitors and said that President Reagan would say, if he were present, that the United States has great respect for the way Venezuela is handling its international affairs and for Venezuela’s democratic system. He said we identify with what Venezuela is doing. Some wonder what this new U.S. Administration is doing. In the human rights area we know Venezuela is concerned. We want Venezuela to know we care about human rights and reform programs. We believe that more attention needs to be given the human rights violations that occur in countries like Cuba. We support Duarte in Salvador like Venezuela does. We can learn from the Venezuelan model. We want to make clear we are concerned about Communism. Minister Montes de Oca said Venezuela believes human rights violations must be condemned wherever they occur. But Marxists seem more able than democracies to appear as defenders of human rights, while the Marxists are in the process of trampling human rights. We do not have an effective way of competing in the information field. Democracies must devise a better system of providing information to persuade the world or else we can lose the vital war of public opinion. In the case of El Salvador, for example, said the Minister, President Herrera’s Government has gone to the media repeatedly to defend its program and support Duarte against the strong criticism from the Venezuelan left and Social Democrats. This open debate in a free society has helped people understand. But still the left in its propaganda is able to use people and institutions which are not Marxist. We must defeat this effort and find ways to attract the “useful fools” away from the Marxists. The Vice President described the real information problems the U.S. government faces here and in Europe over policy toward El Salvador. Minister Montes de Oca stressed that the U.S. and Venezuela must talk more about how more effectively to orient public opinion. In El Salvador we must focus public attention on the election process that will lead to a more stable democratic life there. The Vice President then said that the U.S. goal is to improve relations with as many countries as possible in the hemisphere. We will have a different style from the previous administration in handling human rights violations and will try to work quietly with friendly countries toward improvement of the situation. Minister Montes de Oca replied that this U.S. objective is desirable. He believes it should be accompanied by support for two important interests of nations that are often seen as separate routes. We should on the one hand support strongly the evolution of political democracy and liberty by demonstrating, more in our actions than in our talk, the force of liberty in defense of human rights. At the same time we must promote social progress and economic development, in order to be on the side of people struggling against poverty. In this way we can promote integral democracy and thus most effectively fight Marxist insurrection. The Minister said he was delighted, in his talks with Secretary Haig, to learn that the U.S. also strongly supports the need for such integral development—political democracy and economic development must go together. 2 The Vice President asked about the Minister’s views on Cuban-supported guerrilla intervention in Colombia. The Minister said that the M–19 began as a serious, bold home grown terrorist group which earned, as such terrorist groups often wrongly do, a reputation for being populist. Fidel then penetrated this group and gave it support. The M–19 made the mistake of all guerrilla movements everywhere of writing everything down. The Colombians found some documents which enabled them to capture many key M–19 leaders. The Minister said that the difficult economic/social situation in Colombia makes it a logical object of Marxist insurrection. But he believes that Fidelismo can be fought there effectively as elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Minister spoke of two other examples of ways to fight Fidelismo. In Costa Rica, a tradition of near Athenian democracy exists without an armed force. The strengthening of this democratic system alone has not immunized that country, however, against Marxist insurrection. The Costa Rican leaders realize they must develop an internal security force, and they have told the Venezuelans they plan to do so following the next Costa Rican elections. Jamaica is another example of how to defeat Fidelismo, said the Minister. The election process in Jamaica resulted in the defeat of Manley and his Cuban friends. We, after talks and cooperation with the United States, have won an important victory in Jamaica. If we continue to work together, when we finish we will have the best example of how to respond to the Marxist threat—democracy and economic development together. The Vice President said the U.S. fully agrees with the need to cooperate to help Jamaica now and described President Reagan’s initiative in asking David Rockefeller to engage the U.S. private sector in the effort. The Vice President then turned to the problem of the tax claims against oil companies stemming from nationalization. 3 He said we have heard from the oil companies about these problems and we hope that we can resolve this one potential problem that exists in our close friendly relationship. He said he hopes that there can be progress toward resolving the issue and believes that Ambassadors Enders and Luers will have more to say on that subject later. Then Secretary Haig said that the discussions the U.S. has had this week with the Venezuelan visitors have been precious and said we are grateful to President Herrera for sending them to Washington to discuss these important issues. We are sorry that President Herrera’s visit did not work out earlier, but we are certain that when the visit does take place it will be very successful. Minister Montes de Oca said he wanted to reply to the Vice President’s remarks on the oil issue. He said, first, the petroleum nationalization was carried out seriously and under law in a manner that made it an example of comity and justice among nations. Secondly, he said, many of the claims are before the courts, and as the U.S. knows, in democracies there is separation of powers which poses limitations on the Executive branch. But, he added, Venezuela is disposed to discuss this matter with the Ambassadors consistent with our friendship with and respect for the United States. The Minister said he was pleased the Vice President had raised this delicate matter not in a formal way and not making a major point of it. The Minister concluded by conveying his best wishes to President Reagan and expressing the Venezuelan Government’s pleasure with the work of Ambassador Luers in Venezuela. 4 1 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/19/1981–05/25/1981]. Confidential. Drafted by Luers; cleared by Enders on May 21. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room. In a May 15 information memorandum to Haig, Enders noted that in the interest of “achieving some degree of Latin American consensus on foreign policy issues,” Herrera had called for “a meeting of all Latin American and Caribbean countries” and Zambrano was “trying to arrange a more modest initial meeting with Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.” Enders recommended that Haig not take a position on the subject during his meeting with Montes de Oca and García. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Secretariat Memorandums, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, 1981 ES Sensitive May 13–20) 2 No memorandum of conversation has been found. In telegram 159045 to Caracas, June 17, the Department reported on the May 17–22 visit of the Venezuelan delegation headed by Montes de Oca. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810285–0197) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1977–1980, vol. XXIV, South America; Latin America Region, Document 334 . 4 In telegram 137539 to Caracas, May 27, the Department reported that on May 21 Enders gave Montes de Oca a letter from Haig which summarized their discussions and thanked Montes de Oca for the visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810289–0296) 466. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting 466. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting 1 Washington, undated Arms Transfer Policy & F–16As for Venezuela Mr. Allen opened the discussion by stating that the Secretaries of State and Defense submitted a proposed arms transfer policy statement, and that the NSC Staff prepared a draft National Security Decision Directive predicated on the Secretaries’ statement. 2 The NSDD makes a clean break with PD–13 3 and establishes a positive, flexible, and pragmatic approach toward arms transfers. Consideration of the policy statement also provides a good opportunity to discuss the sale of F–16A fighter aircraft to Venezuela. Secretary Weinberger stated that there was agreement on the arms transfer policy statement. On Venezuela, he noted that there are MIG–21 and 23 fighters in Cuba, with airfields being built in Nicaragua and Grenada, thereby giving an expanded arc of capability to unfriendly air forces. This new arms transfer policy will permit consideration of all factors involved in a decision of this sort, rather than basing decisions on preconceived notions about arms transfers. 4 The President asked whether this decision might lead countries less able to pay for F–16s to request such aircraft for political reasons. Secretary Weinberger responded that such requests could be received, and that they would be reviewed in the light of the new arms transfer policy. The President then asked for a description of the differences between the FX fighter and the F–16. General Jones responded that both the F–5G and the F–16/79 are very capable planes, but that the F–16 variant has an edge in capability and has a better image than the F–5G. The President then asked whether it were true that the F–5G could outperform the F–16 in some categories and was it easier to maintain. General Jones responded in the affirmative, noting that many F–5s have been sold around the world, some as part of coproduction ventures, and that they are cheaper, more easily maintainable aircraft. The President asked how the F–5G compares against the Mirage. General Jones responded that the advanced Mirage would be a good competitor for the FX, which includes both the F–5G and F–16/79, while the older Mirage aircraft are not as capable. The President then remarked that, given these very positive features of the F–5G, we should promote actively both the F–5G and F–16 in future sales efforts. Secretary Haig then noted that we are really discussing two issues: the policy statement and F–16As for Venezuela. The policy statement is a long overdue revision of the Carter policy. It lays out, on page 2, the important issues that will be considered on an interagency basis prior to decision, including threat and absorptive capacity. Under Secretary Jim Buckley will oversee implementation of the policy at the interagency level. If a case raises significant policy issues, it will be forwarded to the President or the NSC for approval, in a paper that lays out the pros and cons of the particular sale. The policy itself should go out over the President’s signature, with State doing both briefing and background work. Mr. Allen then asked whether Jim Buckley had already given a preview of this policy both to the Hill and to industry. Secretary Haig responded that he had, noting that industry was very supportive because they thought that the Carter policy was misguided. The President agreed, noting that if we ever have to accelerate defense production, we would not have the capability to do so as matters now stand. Secretary Haig reported that consultations had been undertaken on the Hill. House members, reflecting the Democratic majority, urged the use of more restraint-oriented language, while those in the Senate were more enthusiastic about the forthcoming nature of the policy. In sum, he foresaw no major problems on the Hill. Mr. Allen stated that an NSDD revoking PD–13 would be forwarded to the President. Secretary Haig then turned the group’s attention toward the proposed sale of F–16A aircraft to Venezuela, noting that the F–16A is more capable than the F–16/79. General Jones agreed, saying that the F–16A is a high performance aircraft substantially more capable than the F–5G. The President asked exactly which plane was being proposed for Venezuela. General Jones responded that it was the high performance F–16A. Secretary Haig stated that if the F–16A were not approved, the Venezuelans indicated that they would purchase Mirage aircraft from France. At this point, we are only providing details to the Venezuelans so that they can make a final decision on whether to purchase the aircraft. Mr. Allen asked whether the decision was required before the Herrera visit. Secretary Haig suggested that if the President were to approve the State-Defense-ACDA recommendation, we could provide the details now and, if the Venezuelans are interested, the final decision to sell could be announced when the President sees Herrera. Mr. Allen then asked the cost of an F–16A as compared to the FX aircraft. General Jones responded that both the F–16A and the F–16/79 would cost approximately $30 million per aircraft, including support. The F–5G would be cheaper. Secretary Haig then noted that this decision would have implications elsewhere in the world, particularly in Pakistan, which is also interested in F–16. The President then remarked that anyone objecting to the sale should make his objections known. Secretary Weinberger stated that it might be better to approve the sale before the Herrera visit so that it would not look as if the decision had been extracted from the President. It would also make for a better atmosphere at the meeting with Herrera. Secretary Haig said that advance approval would also avoid making the President look like an arms merchant trading weapons for bilateral concessions. The Vice President then asked what threat would be countered by this sale, since the new arms transfer policy makes clear that threat is a primary consideration. Secretary Weinberger responded that primary threat for Venezuela is MIG aircraft that are based in Cuba and that perhaps would be based in airfields in Grenada and Nicaragua. Secretary Haig said again that if the Venezuelans did not receive approval to buy the F–16A, they would turn to the Mirage. Secretary Weinberger stated that the F–16/79 would probably be sufficient to counter the threat to Venezuela, but since the Venezuelans are good friends and can pay for the F–16A, we should approve the sale. Mr. Schneider agreed that the Venezuelans can afford the aircraft but noted that the other countries [ less than one line not declassified ] cannot. He suggested, therefore, that a policy be developed that would take the recipient’s financial situation into account before considering a sale of first-line fighters. Also, if one reason for making the sale is to reduce unit costs and warm the production base, we should consider the full range of first-line fighters, including the F–18. The President remarked that this approach made good sense. Secretary Haig noted that we will breach “the sound barrier” with this first-line sale to Latin America, and that we may be approached by other “have” nations ([ less than one line not declassified ] for example) once the decision has been made. The fact is, however, that we have been lagging and the Europeans have been gaining. Thus, when new requirements develop, we will assess them against the new policy guidance. Mr. Allen said that arms transfers raising significant issues should be considered good topics for the NSC advance notice calendar. Mr. Meese underscored that this would be the first introduction of first-line fighter aircraft into Latin America. General Jones said that if we were “free agents” on this issue, we would probably prefer to sell the FX to Venezuela. However, we were not free to do so in this case because of European competition. Mr. Meese remarked that national prestige was also involved. Mr. Allen stated that, in the guidance accompanying announcement of this decision, there should be some reference to our not desiring to spur an arms race by virtue of this sale. Secretary Weinberger agreed, noting, however, that we should not establish a policy of selling first-line aircraft only to those who could pay, because there may be cases in which we wish to provide such aircraft to poorer nations. Secretary Haig said that State and Defense would prepare the necessary guidance to accompany this decision. Mr. Baker asked whether the guidance would state only that the decision to provide details had been made. Secretary Haig said it would be better to say that the President has approved the sale in principle. Mr. Allen said that memoranda to the parties concerned would be prepared. Mr. Baker asked whether we should defer announcing the decision if Herrera were to visit in July. Secretary Weinberger thought not, since we should avoid the appearance of the sale being extracted from the President. Secretary Haig agreed, saying that advance approval would also provide a better atmosphere for the visit. 5 1 Source: Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [June 1981]. Secret. Kimmitt sent the minutes to Schweitzer under cover of a June 2 memorandum in which he noted that the meeting took place on June 1. Reagan wrote in his personal diary for June 1: “Later an N.S.C. meeting. I okayed reversing the Carter policy against selling arms to our friends. Venezuela wants to buy F16 fighter planes.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries , volume I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 44) 2 Haig and Weinberger’s May 19 memorandum to Reagan about conventional arms transfer policy is in the Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [May 27–31, 1981]. The draft NSDD is in the Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [July–August 1981]. 3 See Foreign Relations , 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271 . 4 In a May 27 memorandum to Allen, Kimmitt wrote: “This first introduction of first-line U.S. fighters into Latin America is based not on the policy parameters contained in the Secretaries’ statement, but rather on the fact that the Venezuelans, who have been convinced by U.S. representatives that this is the aircraft they need, would react very sharply if it were now denied to them. In effect, the President is being told that he must approve earlier promotional efforts by U.S. representatives or cause serious bilateral problems with Venezuela.” (Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [05/26/1981–05/31/1981]) 5 Under cover of a June 8 memorandum to Reagan, Allen forwarded an undated “Decision Memorandum” on which Reagan initialed his approval of this decision made at the June 1 NSC meeting: “The Administration agrees in principle to the sale of F–16A aircraft to Venezuela. The announcement of this decision will be made in advance of the proposed visit to Washington by Venezuelan President Herrera Campins.” (Reagan Library, Robert H. Lilac Files, Arms Transfer: Country File, 1981–1983, AT: Venezuela [July–August 1981]) 467. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 467. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 PA 81–10302 Washington, August 1981 [Omitted here are title pages.] Venezuela-Latin America: Reaching for a Unified Foreign Policy Summary Venezuela’s continuing attempts to convene a foreign ministers’ meeting with Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—proposed as the first step toward formulating a coordinated foreign policy—reflect the Herrera administration’s concern over what it perceives as the East-West thrust of the emerging US policy for Latin America. Fearing that the region could become the setting for bipolar conflict, Caracas is trying to focus and project Latin American uneasiness before Washington settles on its course. The four nations, however, hold widely divergent political views and pursue some dissimilar goals. Although they share the region’s general uneasiness over the potential effect of superpower interference on security interests and economic development, their differences—at any multilateral meeting—would color discussions of Central America, Cuba, and US policy. Thus, on balance, talks among the four would offer a forum for reiterating traditional Latin American positions on nonintervention and self-determination—positions that, while couched in global terms, would be directed primarily at the United States. But on the issues fundamental to a unified foreign policy, a meeting is likely to be more revealing in underscoring regional disharmony than in establishing bases from which to proceed. [Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00565R: Production Case Files (1981), Box 1, Folder 23: Venezuela—Latin America: Reaching For a Unified Foreign Policy. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with DO, the Office of Economic Research, and the NIO for Latin America. Information available as of July 16 was used in the preparation of the memorandum. 468. Memorandum of Conversation 468. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 16, 1981, 5:35–6:35 p.m. SUBJECT Venezuelan President Herrera Campins and Secretary Haig Bilateral PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Ambassador William H. Luers Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders Samuel F. Hart (Notetaker) Venezuela President Luis Herrera Campins Foreign Minister Zambrano Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos Minister of Finance Ugueto Minister of Defense Lael Minister of Agriculture Zapata Ambassador Perez Chiriboga Ambassador Cardozo Corina Balzalo The following substantive issues were discussed during this meeting: NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES Herrera Campins said that at Cancun expectations had been created that the North/South global negotiations would go forward. 2 It is important to consolidate what has been achieved by the setting and implementation of partial, concrete goals. One such place to begin would be assistance by the industrialized countries to the developing countries in food and agriculture, a theme that was flagged at Cancun. Another possibility would be the development of a special Inter-American Development Bank Trust fund which would help the private sector. Since Cancun should be seen as a defeat for the Soviet Union, we must take advantage of the opportunity now before us. Secretary Haig responded that since Cancun President Reagan has begun steps to implement his commitment on agriculture. This involves consultations with other countries. Furthermore, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has been instructed to explore informally with all interested nations how we should go forward with the global negotiations. The experience at Cancun had a profound impact on President Reagan despite the difficulties. The US is optimistic that the spirit of Cancun will be an historic achievement. President Reagan is very much engaged and will welcome President Herrera’s observations. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE Secretary Haig then moved to a discussion of the status of the CBI. A successful regional effort strengthens global negotiations. Not enough preparatory work had been done before the last ministerial meeting to give the CBI real shape. After January 1, President Reagan will announce important new efforts by the US in trade, investment and economic assistance. This should be kept confidential because the Congress and other interested groups have not yet been fully consulted. Our efforts reflect our concern about the Caribbean and Central America and we are convinced that the poor and hungry there need help in solving their problems, not just words. Unless we can relieve the social crisis, our security assistance will fail. If President Herrera can express concern about the economic crisis in the region while in the US, this could help convince the US Congress to provide the resources. Of course, it would also be useful for President Herrera to mention the security threat and aggression in the region. We hope that at a minimum President Herrera will not find it necessary to say anything which would hamper our efforts to get economic and security resources. EL SALVADOR President Herrera noted that he believed time was on the side of democracy in El Salvador. He asked about some pessimistic statements attributed to the Secretary. The Secretary responded that we have a fine line to walk in painting a grave enough picture to get resources from the Congress while at the same time not making it seem so grave as to discourage our friends. The government of El Salvador must understand that it has to go forward with elections. President Herrera commented that the military and right must receive no encouragement to interfere with free elections. His information was that even the hardest liners on the Salvadoran Right are beginning to accept this need. Secretary Haig reiterated our commitment to the election process. He added that it would be useful if the Venezuelan military could share the benefits of its anti-guerrilla experience in the 1960’s with the Salvadorans. We are worried because the Salvadoran military only reacts now and they should be taking initiatives as Venezuela did. NICARAGUA Secretary Haig said that we have become increasingly concerned in recent weeks about Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Government is systematically eliminating its opposition. It is important that the other nations of the region appear as concerned about this as we are. We appreciate the Venezuelan reaction of diplomatic disapproval toward the Sandinistas and welcome Venezuelan ideas on how to deal with the problem. President Herrera said he was also concerned about Nicaragua and had made a declaration on the subject, as had Acting President Montes de Oca. While there is severe pressure on the democratic forces, information indicates that the time may be approaching when the democratic countries of the hemisphere can undertake a political step to reverse the trend there. The GRN is susceptible to international pressure. Nicaragua is not lost; the door must be kept open for those Nicaraguan forces which are fighting for pluralism. We should not leave them alone. For example, help must be given to the press which is being strangled economically and to free radio stations to keep them operating. Venezuela realizes that what happens in Nicaragua and elsewhere will have its effect throughout the continent. F–16’s The Secretary said that we had gone ahead with the notification to Congress of the F–16 sale to Venezuela on Thursday, November 12, and that we expect approval of this without major difficulties because Venezuela is such a highly regarded democracy. 3 We are also committed to try to deliver the first aircraft before President Herrera leaves office. OIL EXPROPRIATION/COMPENSATION This issue, Secretary Haig noted, is one of the few bilateral problems between us. It would be useful if President Herrera could help find some solution. FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES It was mentioned by Secretary Haig that sometimes friends dwell too much on their areas of difference and too little on their many areas of agreement. We deeply value our friendship with Venezuela. Because of Venezuela’s democratic history and its influence in the region, it can do much that we cannot. We don’t want to burden Venezuela with a requirement of endorsement of our policy. It is more important that our values converge. We sincerely welcome advice and criticism from Venezuela and President Reagan is looking forward to fuller exploration of several of the subjects discussed above in his talks with President Herrera. President Herrera said that one of the attributes of friendship is that one can talk about everything frankly. 1 Source: Reagan Library, Roger W. Fontaine Files, Subject File, Venezuela [October 1981–November 1981]. Confidential. Drafted on November 17 by Hart; cleared by Haig, Luers, and in S/S. Goldberg signed for Haig. The meeting took place at Blair House. In telegram 10292 from Caracas, October 30, the Embassy sent briefing information for Herrera’s visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810514–0990) Herrera made a State visit to Washington, November 16–19. 2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Herrera October 21 at the Cancun Summit conference on North-South issues. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation has been found. 3 See Document 466 . In a November 6 action memorandum from Enders, Fairbanks, and Burt, Buckley approved their recommendation that Congress be informally notified on November 12 of the F–16 sale to Venezuela. (Reagan Library, Jacqueline Tillman Files, Subject File, Venezuela 11/07/1981) 469. Memorandum of Conversation 469. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 17, 1981, 11 a.m. SUBJECT President Reagan’s Meeting with Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins PARTICIPANTS The President The Vice President The Secretary of State Mr. Richard V. Allen Ambassador William H. Luers President Luis Herrera Campins Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga President Reagan welcomed President Herrera. He said that we are concerned about the deteriorating situation in Central America and are persuaded that we cannot permit Marxist subversion there to be successful. We are also doing everything we can to bring about elections in El Salvador and we support President Duarte. We would like to hear President Herrera’s ideas on what more we can do. President Herrera thanked President Reagan for the warm welcome that he has received. He said that all of Latin America has a great concern about what is happening in Central America. In Venezuela there is great expectation about President Herrera’s visit to Washington and about these talks because the US and Venezuela both are democratic nations which try to project these values in their foreign policy. In the Caribbean and Central America there are two types of action where we should work jointly. One action is through government and private cooperation. We should try to help the nations of that region to overcome the difficulties that they face. President Herrera said he hopes that Mexico, the United States, Canada and Venezuela will achieve concrete results from what was begun at Nassau. 2 We cannot allow the social/economic problems and the injustices in the region to be exploited by Communist forces to subvert these nations. President Herrera said we must, however, be conscious of the need not to act in such a way that creates problems for other countries in the area not already affected by Communist subversion. He said that the most delicate point which the President felt he should make concerned the great fear in Latin America that the principle of non-intervention not be violated. In its search for security, the U.S. must proceed with prudence and great wisdom or else the search could affect us all negatively and damage world peace. President Herrera said that one other example of how we can work together is the case of Jamaica, where Fidelist tactics received their major setback. We will be able to deliver a second noble blow to Communist subversion if we succeed in finding a democratic way out in El Salvador. The strongly-held collaboration between the United States and Venezuela could help this effort significantly. We have to demonstrate that Communist subversion in El Salvador does not today have the strength it had before. Also secondly, we must be certain that the forces of the Right do not think they can count on support from the U.S. to carry out a coup against the existing government. President Reagan said that he can personally assure President Herrera that the U.S. considers both the Right and the Left as extremists and that the U.S. is working hard to support Duarte in his efforts to maintain a central government. The President said that the U.S. and Venezuela are thinking more similarly perhaps than President Herrera realizes. He said that history has made Latin American countries suspicious of the Colossus of the North. This is precisely why the United States has proposed the Caribbean plan which should be worked out with the cooperation of other nations. The President said he also agreed fully that the Jamaica example has a great importance. If together we can show other nations that through our programs we mean not to interfere in their internal affairs but we mean to allow nations to find democratic ways to eliminate social injustice, then we will have accomplished a great deal. The President said that Venezuela is important in this process. We fully intend to work with Venezuela and learn from them. On the other hand, the President added, he is concerned that time is not on our side. We see a significant military arms buildup in Nicaragua which is threatening Nicaragua’s neighbors. President Herrera said that he would like to recall an important event that is relevant to the situation in Nicaragua. In the last months of the Manley Government in Jamaica, the opposition party asked President Herrera to cut off petroleum shipments and economic assistance to the Manley Government. President Herrera said that he reviewed this request and decided to continue the assistance to Manley. The next time President Herrera saw PM Manley he assured Manley that he would fulfill his commitments to ship oil and provide some assistance. But President Herrera also said that there is a political problem that in Jamaica could be resolved by free elections. After the discussion, Manley promised to hold elections and set an appropriate date for them. President Herrera then told the opposition to make themselves ready for the elections since he believed Manley would agree to hold them. The elections were finally held and, of course, the opposition won. This is reality not theory. The President, turning to Nicaragua, said he has grave concerns about the problems there: La Prensa , the large Cuban presence, the difficulties of the private sector and the trade unions. However, the President said, he believes this is a moment in which international political pressure can be brought to bear on the Nicaraguan Government by democracies, particularly Latin American democracies, that could lead to an opening up in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguans are having serious problems economically including liquidity problems. They now are beginning to realize that they must do something. Internally it is essential that pluralist Nicaraguan forces that need support receive it; such as the political parties, the church, the press, the trade union movement and human rights organizations. The President said he believes that there is a possibility of changing the Council of State into a more important body—with characteristics of a legislature. The President said that, as long as there is a chance for pluralism in Nicaragua, it is the obligation of the governments of the hemisphere to try to achieve an opening and to work toward expanding the forces of pluralism. That is why Venezuela continues to have cordial relations with the Junta and very friendly relations with the parties and other groups of the opposition. President Herrera said that he realizes that it is difficult to learn much from a reading of the press which often distorts events. He said he believes security is a goal that every nation must try to achieve in its way. However, with the interdependence that exists in this hemisphere, and, indeed in the world, the unilateral search for security by one nation could damage the peace of the entire world and bring about insecurity for us all. As concerned as Venezuela is about events in Nicaragua, Salvador and Cuba, the President said he wanted to permit himself, as a friend of the United States, to urge that, in its search for security, the United States Government take steps that are very well thought out in advance because searches for security that are not well thought out might lead to the destruction of peace throughout the world. President Reagan said that that is precisely why we are placing such emphasis on a political solution, through elections, in El Salvador. President Herrera said that he was pleased to hear this. It must be clear, he added, that Salvador has become a neuralgic point for world Communism and Communist forces have set a victory in Salvador as a point of honor for them. Therefore, President Herrera said the defeat of Communism in Salvador will have worldwide significance that would have impact in favor of democracy throughout the world. President Herrera said democracies have special qualities. For example, after the French/Mexican Communique, democratic and non-democratic nations in the hemisphere got together to ensure that further support did not develop for this damaging document. By acting quickly and concretely, we minimized the effect and turned the Communique into a negative factor. We believe that there is much ground for political action on the part of democracies. President Reagan replied that the U.S. had agreed and welcomed Venezuela’s actions and believe that it was an unfortunate statement that French and Mexicans had made. He said the U.S. seeks a political solution in Salvador through elections. But he added we also know that the other side is building up its forces, strengthening and arming the forces of subversion. President Herrera replied that he believes that there are ways to dissuade or deter the forces of subversion from being successful. President Reagan said we would be very interested over the next two days in hearing President Herrera’s thoughts as to how this could be accomplished. The two Presidents then moved from the Oval Office into the Cabinet Room to meet the larger delegations. 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In a November 12 memorandum to Reagan, Allen wrote that “it is vital that you discuss fully and frankly with President Herrera Campins the situation in Central America” and that “above all, President Herrera Campins must understand your determination to keep democracy and the hope for democracy alive in the region, and that we will not permit Cuban interventionism to succeed. American firmness on this question—particularly—in your direct, private talks with the Venezuelan President—will help strengthen his resolve despite internal Venezuelan pressure to do otherwise.” (Reagan Library, WHORM: Subject File, Republic of Venezuela, CO171, 033898) 2 See footnote 2, Document 318 . 470. Memorandum of Conversation 470. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 17, 1981, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT President Reagan’s Expanded Meeting with Venezuelan President Herrera Campins PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. Richard V. Allen Ambassador William H. Luers Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders Mr. Roger Fontaine, NSC VENEZUELAN President Herrera Campins Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco Finance Minister Ugueto Arismendi Defense Minister Leal Puchi Minister of Energy Calderon Berti Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos Minister of Agriculture Zapata Ambassador Perez Chiriboga Ambassador Cardozo Ambassador Sosa Rodriguez Admiral Lanz Castellanos President Reagan briefly reviewed for the enlarged group what he and President Herrera had discussed in the Oval Office. The President then asked Secretary Haig what might be covered in this meeting. The Secretary said that Secretary Weinberger might wish to discuss the F–16’s. 2 We should also touch on the residual petroleum nationalization issues and on the follow-up to Cancun. 3 The Secretary said President Herrera might also have some matters to raise. Secretary Weinberger said that the Reagan Administration has agreed to the sale of F–16’s to Venezuela, but for tactical reasons the proposal was not submitted to Congress until recently, so that this sale would not become confused with other arms sales problems. Now we believe that Congress will approve the sale. The Congress is, however, an independent body and one can never be certain. Secretary Weinberger said that we will make strong arguments and we are confident we will see it approved by Congress. We will also try to speed up delivery of some of the aircraft as much as possible. President Reagan asked whether President Herrera would like to bring up other issues. President Herrera said that there are three main issues, aside from bilateral questions between our two governments, that he believes should be discussed during his visit to Washington: — First is the concrete and rapid implementation of the discussions of the four nations at the Nassau Meeting. — Second is an effective search for a democratic way out in Salvador. — And third is the follow-up to Cancun on global negotiations. These three issues relate to the support for democracy in the world. The first two relate directly to democracy. If we can be successful we will achieve a worldwide blow against Communism. On the follow-up to Cancun, democracies should come up with some proposals that will demonstrate that democracies are more creative and more able than other systems to deal with the changing world. He said that these three topics can be discussed at later meetings. President Herrera thanked Secretary Weinberger for his comments on the F–16. President Reagan concluded the meeting by saying that in the Wednesday meeting the two Presidents should discuss Cancun and bilateral issues. 4 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. 2 See Documents 466 and 468 . 3 In telegram 10293 from Caracas, October 30, the Embassy provided suggested topics to raise during Herrera’s visit. Regarding the petroleum nationalization claims the Embassy wrote: “We hope the President will bring this issue directly to Herrera’s attention. He might point out that it unfortunately represents a potential sore point in the otherwise excellent relations between our two countries. We feel strongly that justice needs to be done. Moreover, we fear that failure soon to come to an equitable settlement could damage Venezuela’s international reputation and standing with the world’s lending agencies.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810515–0034) 4 November 18. See Document 471 . 471. Memorandum of Conversation 471. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 18, 1981, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT President Reagan’s Wrap-up Meeting with Venezuelan President Herrera Campins PARTICIPANTS The President The Secretary Mr. Richard V. Allen Ambassador William H. Luers President Luis Herrera Campins Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco Minister of the Presidency Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga President Herrera said that he listened to the President’s speech that morning from the Press Club on arms limitations and was left with a magnificent impression. 2 He said the entire delegation had listened to it in Blair House with much sympathy. He said it would make a great contribution to the relaxation of tension in the world. The Venezuelans welcomed this initiative taken at such a difficult moment in international relations. The President congratulated President Reagan most sincerely and cordially on the speech. He said the only thing he regretted was that because the Venezuelans had already scheduled the noon luncheon at the Press Club, President Reagan had to speak in the morning. President Reagan thanked President Herrera for his kind remarks. President Reagan then said we are going forward on our Caribbean plan and we should have some specific ideas ready by the first of next year. He said we are also ready to move ahead on global negotiations on the basis of the terms agreed to at Cancun. The President said that he thought that the Caribbean plan would provide some showcases on how, in practical ways, the ideas we have in mind might work in developing relations between the industrialized and developing countries. The President said he would welcome President Herrera’s ideas. President Herrera thanked President Reagan for mentioning the global negotiations in his morning speech. This reference, he said, will contribute greatly to the attitudes of the countries in the developing world which will recognize that the highest authority in the United States has expressed himself publicly again in favor of moving forward. President Herrera said he had been talking that morning with his principal adviser on these issues, Ambassador Perez Guerrero, who is optimistic that we can begin soon on these negotiations. He said there was no desire on the part of the Third World nations, who have a majority in the United Nations, to impose their will on the minority—the industrial nations. The developing nations seek a consensus approach to these very important issues. President Herrera said that a beginning could be made by discussing issues relating to agriculture and food or even trade and energy, leaving until later the more delicate issues such as monetary reform. President Herrera also agreed with President Reagan that if the four Nassau nations could design programs for economic cooperation and place into action these programs for the development of the Caribbean region, this would be evidence that specific results from the North/South relationship are possible. President Herrera said he believes that in the Caribbean we should take advantage of Canada’s special connection with the English-speaking islands. He said the Canadian Ambassador who recently presented his credentials in Venezuela had stressed Canada’s desire to cooperate closely with the US and Venezuela on this Caribbean initiative. Herrera said that we must continue to maintain contacts on this matter at the political level and at the technical level. He reiterated his interest in including private and public sector elements in the program. President Reagan said that we are moving well along now on these matters. He asked President Herrera how he would like to move forward on elections in El Salvador and to help our friend Duarte. President Reagan also asked what were the possibilities that steps could be made to press some elements of the FDR into the electoral process. President Herrera responded by saying there were a number of things that must be done. First, we must make certain that the Duarte Government has enough sense of stability that it is and can be confident in implementing the elections. In order to assure the stability of Duarte, we must support the Junta against all forces from the Right and from the Left. President Reagan replied that we did everything we could during the visit of President Duarte to demonstrate to all that we support his central government against both extremes, on the Left and on the Right. Duarte met with members of Congress and the press and he impressed upon them his task and problems. President Herrera continued by saying that a second objective should be to promote broader participation in the process from other groups, even those that are not now political parties, and assure all opposition elements that they will have adequate time to prepare for the elections to the constitutional assembly. We must promote political contacts with Ungo and other social democrats to try to infuse them with more enthusiasm for this electoral process. Thirdly, President Herrera said, we should encourage international supervision of the electoral process in El Salvador to demonstrate the serious democratic intention of the Duarte Government. Organizations, such as the OAS and other international bodies, could participate in the supervision. The Duarte Government has indicated it welcomes this approach. President Herrera then said, we should discourage those who are pressing for the participation of the guerrillas or subversives in the electoral process. No government would be able to accept the inclusion of terrorists in the government or in the armed forces as a precondition for elections. President Reagan said that he agreed with those points. But, he said, the problem we are facing today is that the moderates who are in the FDR refuse to join the process and are not inclined to separate themselves from the guerrillas. President Reagan agreed that there is no way the terrorists should be included in the government. If, however, we are to attract moderates on the Left to support the elections, Venezuela would probably be far more effective than the United States in this endeavor. President Herrera said Venezuela has identified some elements that would be useful in this regard. For example, the Herrera Government has held discussions with the Venezuelan social democratic party, Accion Democratica. Accion Democratica (AD) has close working relations with other social democratic parties. Herrera’s Government has tried to motivate AD to establish contacts with visiting members of the Salvadoran Junta. During some recent visits to Venezuela these relations have become quite cordial. President Herrera said there is one card that has not been played but that might be considered. We should approach the left wing of the German social democratic party—the followers of Willy Brandt through the German liberal party on which the coalition government of Helmut Schmidt depends. He believes that if we could convince the liberals to influence the social democrats in Germany we could perhaps move the SD’s to encourage the social democrats in El Salvador to participate in the electoral process. President Herrera said finally that subversion threatens to destabilize a country both economically and politically. The political situation in El Salvador depends very much on the economic situation. We should not forget, therefore, the need over the coming months to keep the economy as healthy as possible. President Reagan said he wanted to make clear that, in bringing about a settlement in El Salvador, we must be careful to steer clear of elements that could be permanent destructive factors in the society. The President used the example of Laos, where we persuaded a government to join with hard core Communists in a coalition. The hard core Communists eventually became the government of Laos. Secretary Haig said that there was one more issue that the Treasury Department had raised with President Herrera 3 —the question of the claims against the nationalization of petroleum companies. The Secretary said that he believes we should continue to discuss this problem to try to put it behind us. President Reagan agreed and the meeting disbanded. The two Presidents then went to make their press statements. 4 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/19/1981–11/27/1981). Secret. Drafted by Luers; cleared in S/S and the NSC. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. For documentation on U.S.-Venezuela discussions about the South Atlantic crisis, see Foreign Relations , 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984, Documents 122 , 204 , and 236 . 2 Reagan’s remarks are in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981 , pp. 1062–1067. The address is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 69 . 3 No memorandum of conversation has been found. 4 The press statements are in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981 , pp. 1067–1069. 472. Memorandum From Constantine Menges and Oliver North of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) 472. Memorandum From Constantine Menges and Oliver North of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) 1 Washington, December 21, 1983 SUBJECT Secretary Shultz’ visit to Venezuela, Brazil, and El Salvador Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President concerning the proposal by Secretary Shultz that he lead the delegation to the inauguration of President-elect Lusinchi, and subsequently visit Brazil and El Salvador as had been planned in October. The memo from Shultz to the President is attached at Tab A. Your memo endorses the proposal of Secretary Shultz. It also informs the President that there are two factions within the just-elected social democratic party of Venezuela—one led by the President-elect with a strong labor union base which is realistic about the communist threat in Central America, and the other led by former President Carlos Andres Perez, which has been naive in expecting positive results from coalitions with the communists in Central America. 2 We think it important that, between now and the visit of Secretary Shultz, we send one or two senior officials to meet with President-elect Lusinchi in Caracas, Venezuela for an exchange of views on the situation in Central America and our objectives. Yesterday, a leading member of the Venezuelan private sector and friend of the President-elect, urged that this be done in the course of a meeting on another subject with [ less than one line not declassified ] and Menges. 3 The weeks before President-elect Lusinchi assumes the responsibilities of office is an ideal time to provide him and his key advisors with the factual information and background briefing materials which can prepare the way for constructive results when Secretary Shultz and his group arrive. You had approved my travel with Secretary Shultz to Brazil and El Salvador in October, and I would like to request that you approve my travel with the Secretary on this trip to Venezuela, Brazil and El Salvador. As an observer at the various meetings with our Ambassadors, I believe such a trip would add to my effectiveness here at the NSC. RECOMMENDATION That you sign and forward the memo to the President, and that you approve my travel with the Secretary on this trip and suggest this to him. 4 Tab I Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan 5 SUBJECT Secretary Shultz’ visit to Venezuela, Brazil and El Salvador Issue Venezuela will inaugurate its sixth consecutive democratically elected President Jaime Lusinchi on February 3, 1984, and Secretary Shultz suggests that he lead the delegation and then continue on to visit Brazil and El Salvador. Facts Dr. Lusinchi and his Social Democratic Party won the Venezuelan elections by a large margin and want to establish a close working relationship with us. The President-elect has told us that Venezuela will continue to stress the importance of democracy in Central America as part of the Contadora negotiating process. 6 Venezuela must also reschedule its $35 billion foreign debt and cope with severe economic problems triggered by the fall in price of its major export, oil. In Brazil, Secretary Shultz wants to demonstrate symbolic support to follow-up on your visit of last year and to assist both the continuation of the democratization process and the orderly resolution of its economic problems—especially the continuing refinancing of its $90 billion foreign debt. 7 In El Salvador, Secretary Shultz wants to follow-up the Vice President’s successful visit of December 11, and have a regional strategy meeting with U.S. Ambassadors from the area. Discussion The just-elected Social Democratic Party of Venezuela has two factions—one led by the President-elect with a strong labor union base which is realistic about the communist threat in Central America, and a second group, led by former President Carlos Andres Perez, which has been naive in expecting positive results from coalitions with the communists in Central America. It is very important that the U.S. provide the new President-elect with timely information and support so that his group will shape Venezuela’s foreign policy in the Caribbean region in a constructive way. Secretary Shultz’s visit can be an important part of that process. His visit to Brazil and El Salvador—delayed by the October tragedy in Lebanon and our rescue mission in Grenada—also can make a positive contribution. Recommendation That you approve the request of Secretary Shultz to visit Venezuela, Brazil and El Salvador in February 1984. 8 Tab A Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan 9 SUBJECT My Visit to Venezuela, Brazil and El Salvador Venezuela’s sixth democratically elected president, Jaime Lusinchi, will be inaugurated between February 2 to 4. With your approval I would like to lead the delegation to the inauguration. As part of the same trip I would also hope to visit Brazil and El Salvador as planned in October. The winner by a landslide, Lusinchi wants to establish a close working relationship with us. Under his leadership Venezuela will continue to stress the importance of democracy in Central America and in the Contadora process. Lusinchi also must tackle immediately the rescheduling of Venezuela’s $35 billion foreign debt and a severe economic downturn triggered by the fall in oil prices. In Brazil, we will conclude our report on the five Working Groups which you and President Figueiredo created a year ago. 10 Brazil wants and badly needs external support, both financial and symbolic. Its economy is severely constrained by its external imbalance and its political democratization has created a sense of uncertainty. The Brazilian government has been concerned that the US would not give sufficient importance to bilateral ties. Without a definitive show of external support, the country might not have sufficient self-confidence to resolve its economic problems in an orderly fashion and to conclude successfully its political democratization. While in Brazil, I also plan to meet with our Ambassadors in South America. In El Salvador I will follow up George Bush’s successful visit last week with a full court press on the GOES to make and announce essential changes in several key areas that should strengthen our hand with the Congress. I also plan to review regional strategy at a meeting with our Ambassadors from the area. I recommend you authorize me to lead the U.S. delegation to Venezuelan President-elect Lusinchi’s inauguration. 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (11/02/1982–12/20/1983). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “SIGNED.” 2 In telegram 10564 from Caracas, December 5, the Embassy reported on Landau’s meeting with Lusinchi in the early hours of December 5 following the December 4 election, noting “the president-elect made it very clear that good relations with the United States will be a major priority of his administration.” The Embassy added: “In total I left this meeting more convinced than ever that Lusinchi will go to great lengths to prove his friendship for the United States and that he will be a practical leader who listens to advice but one who has some very strong convictions as specific vision of what Venezuelan-U.S. relations should be.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830715–0831) 3 No memorandum of conversation has been found. 4 McFarlane indicated his approval by writing his initials. 5 Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, Deaver, and Herrington. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum. Reagan also wrote his initials at the top of the page. 6 In telegram 10935 from Caracas, December 15, the Embassy reported on Stone’s December 13 meeting with Lusinchi who “said his government would place a high priority on Central America and would take a more vigorous and authentic role in the currently stalled Contadora process.” Referring to El Salvador, Lusinchi “said that regimes that negate democracy cannot be accepted.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830741–0196) 7 See Documents 170 and 181 . 8 Reagan indicated his approval by drawing a check mark and signing his initials. 9 Secret; Limdis. 10 See Documents 170 and 180 . 473. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 473. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA 84–10082 Washington, January 1984 [Omitted here is a title page.] Venezuela: Challenges Facing the New Administration Venezuela’s new President Jaime Lusinchi will face serious economic and political challenges when he takes office on 2 February 1984. Despite a solid majority of the presidential votes and majority control of the bicameral legislature, we do not believe that he will succeed in easing his country’s financial difficulties or reviving the recession-ridden economy during his first year. Lusinchi is by most accounts [ less than one line not declassified ] without well-formulated views on political and economic issues. The US Embassy believes that the magnitude of his victory represents more a repudiation of incumbent President Herrera and proof of the organizational capability of Lusinchi’s Democratic Action Party (AD) than a vote of confidence in the President-elect’s qualifications for the job. We and the US Embassy believe that his announced preference for a consensus approach to government will hinder his efforts to establish his authority over a divided ruling party, an influential labor sector that believes it will receive favored treatment from his administration, and unusually uncooperative opposition parties. Indeed, the combination of a humiliated and divided Social Christian Party (COPEI) and the AD’s impressive victory—the largest since democratic government was restored in 1958—could undermine the traditional spirit of cooperation and shared economic and social objectives between the country’s two dominant, centrist parties. We believe Lusinchi is likely to follow moderately expansionary economic policies, which are traditionally characteristic of Democratic Action administrations. This seems to us implicit in his statements both before and after the elections and would represent a compromise among various and competing economic advisers. Although reduced export earnings, which have fallen by over 30 percent from the 1981 peak, and pressures from international lenders will force Venezuela to implement some austerity, we believe Caracas feels relatively self-assured by its growing foreign exchange reserves, which have risen to over $11 billion, and its ability to cut imports by 40 percent since last February. Because of these two factors—and traditionally ardent nationalism—Caracas is unlikely to risk the political costs of seeking a formal IMF agreement. Lusinchi may instead seek an unofficial IMF “endorsement” of a self-imposed austerity program or some arrangement that would gain the Fund’s stamp of approval with minimal conditionality. In the short term this could be a viable political and economic strategy, but neither it nor other feasible options are likely to be sufficient to move Venezuela out of recession over the next year. More importantly, Lusinchi’s probable course will only postpone—and intensify—the structural adjustments the government would have to make to assure stable economic growth over the longer run. The government also will pay other costs: growing inflationary pressures, greater erosion in investor confidence in Venezuela’s economy, and increased unemployment. Minor policy adjustments, especially to protect against any significant losses of labor backing, are likely. Venezuela’s outlook—tough political sledding for President Lusinchi and continued economic stagnation—will adversely affect traditionally close relationships with the United States. Lusinchi rejects any idea of a special relationship between Caracas and Washington. If he continues his circumspect approach to foreign policy—and preoccupation with economic problems may incline him to do so—the foreign affairs arena will be left more open for the aggressive former President Carlos Andres Perez to implement his Third World views. Perez, in any event, is likely to be a growing power in the administration as he marshals forces for a run at the presidency in 1988. On the economic side, we believe that continued import and foreign exchange controls will sharply reduce US exports to Venezuela in 1984. Although we believe it is highly unlikely, Caracas could decide to carry out its threats of continued debt repayment moratoriums and even debt repudiation if it sees no progress in negotiating debt relief with foreign creditors. This would especially hurt US creditors, who hold 48 percent of Venezuela’s $36 billion external debt. We believe that such an action, if successful, could set a precedent that other debtor nations might be inclined to emulate. [Omitted here is the table of contents, a map, and the body of the Assessment.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files–Production Case Files (1984), Box 1, Folder 2: Venezuela: Challenges Facing the New Administration. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the Director of Operations. Based on information available as of December 6, 1983. 474. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 474. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House 1 February 3, 1984, 1542Z Secto 2023. Subject: Sec-Pres Caracas February 1–2. 1. (Secret—Entire text). 2. Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz. 3. Visit to Venezuela, February 1–2, 1984. The inaugural ceremonies here were the center piece of the day, well attended and promising. President Lusinchi’s inaugural address was moderate and statesmanlike. I had an excellent private meeting with the Central American core four Foreign Ministers and bilaterals with the Presidents of Argentina and Bolivia. 2 4. A dozen heads of government and more than 70 delegations, including numerous representatives of the Soviet bloc, marked Venezuela’s global reach. Behind the fanfare, however, this is a country aware that it is in deep economic trouble but which remains committed to Western values and hemispheric stability. 5. Lusinchi’s inaugural address was statesmanlike and confident. In domestic matters, he stressed the need to put Venezuela’s finances in order, making an appeal for the support of all parties for the “years of penitence” that lie ahead because of Venezuela’s debt. He made no cheap shots at the banks. 6. On foreign affairs, Lusinchi was equally moderate. On Central America, he named no names, but made clear that Venezuela would continue to support democracy. Indeed, in what could be construed as an indirect warning to the Nicaraguans, he stressed that support for democracy elsewhere is a principle enshrined in the preamble to Venezuela’s Constitution. 7. I will be seeing Lusinchi for breakfast February 3. 8. The highlight of my private meetings was breakfast with the Foreign Ministers of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Though we had word of some personal and tactical tensions among them, we readily reached agreement on the need for close coordination to keep pressure on Nicaragua in the Contadora process. And although the civilians are generally not up on the military side, they seemed aware of the special importance of cooperation against the Salvadoran guerrillas before the elections. The two areas we need to work on are first, once again, to get the resources to do the job, both economically and militarily, and [garble] convince the Guatemalans that we are serious and that they will only hurt themselves if they stay aloof from the common cause. 9. Nicaragua’s Ortega was in town telling everyone who would listen that we were the source of all evil and that Kissinger had secretly recommended an invasion of both El Salvador and Nicaragua. That line is wearing a bit thin even down here. I took advantage of my press conference 3 to point out that Ortega’s imagination was playing tricks on him, but that he had every reason to be worried after the way the Sandinistas had betrayed Nicaragua. 10. My bilaterals with the Presidents of Bolivia and Argentina were less productive. Bolivia’s Siles stressed his country’s economic problems, which are [garble] and not all his fault, and said he would do better in the future. I said we understood and supported his role in returning Bolivia to democracy, but were concerned by the drug trafficking and the growing influence of the left. We will see. 11. Argentina’s Alfonsin was one of the media heroes here and obviously a man to watch. But my meeting with him was cut short by Caracas traffic and ceremonies. The Falklands issue remains high on the Argentina agenda, as does the debt issue, and Alfonsin seems to be looking for political hay on both. Alfonsin insisted that a NATO military base on the Falklands would lead to a Soviet response. I assured him that we are not considering turning the Falklands into a NATO base. Time ran out before we could get further. Alfonsin remembered very warmly the Vice President’s visit for his inauguration. 4 Shultz 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent from aboard the Delegation’s aircraft. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan wrote his initials at the top of the first page. Shultz visited Caracas, February 1–3, to attend the inauguration of Lusinchi and meet with Central American Foreign Ministers. In telegram 475 from Caracas, January 17, the Embassy reported on Walters’ January 16 meeting with Lusinchi, who “devoted much of a warm and friendly meeting to a discussion of his many contacts with the Venezuelan military since the elections and to his satisfaction that the military was solidly behind Venezuela’s democratic processes and his presidency.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840001–0420) 2 See Documents 58 and 133 . 3 See Department of State Bulletin , April 1984, pp. 20–22. 4 See footnote 3, Document 56 . 475. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the White House and the Department of State 475. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the White House and the Department of State 1 Rio de Janeiro, February 4, 1984, 2045Z Secto 2035. Subject: Memorandum for the President: Meeting with President Lusinchi, Feb 3. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. To: The President. From: George P. Shultz. 3. President Lusinchi was visibly moved by your letter of congratulations and accepted in principle our invitation to make a State visit May 15. 2 4. Lusinchi is a veteran politician with good instincts. But he faces massive problems and is not fully informed on their wider implications. We need to move quickly to consolidate our ties, and I am arranging an interagency follow-on to brief him on Central America. 3 5. Three themes dominated my private meeting with him. They were Venezuela’s economic difficulties, Central America, and how to strengthen our cooperation on both. 6. Lusinchi wants to play a role on Central America. He is convinced that Cuba is an enemy of Venezuela quite as much as of the United States, and wants to be supportive on Grenada. But his information on Nicaragua and El Salvador comes more from the political left than his own military and intelligence communities. We agreed that our Ambassador George Landau would coordinate a continuing exchange of information beginning with a visit to Caracas by a combined State-Defense intelligence team. Details for Cap’s, [ less than one line not declassified ] and Bud’s consideration will follow separately. 7. Lusinchi brought up Venezuela’s economic troubles persistently. He knows that he has a lot to do himself, but is eager for our help in debt rescheduling and with the banks. He also specifically mentioned EXIM, CCC credits, and the high cost of the F16 fleet they bought from us. I told him we wanted to be constructive, the bankers were aware of Venezuela’s problems but our influence over them was limited. I added that Venezuela could improve the climate by settling the problem of oil compensation. Lusinchi agreed and may take action on this long-lingering issue. 8. While we are not in a position to offer much concrete assistance to Venezuela, I offered to arrange consultations over the full range of Venezuela’s economic problems. I will talk to Don Regan and others about this when I return to Washington. Venezuela’s economic problems are so deep they will require very careful management to prevent social unrest and a negative impact on our relations. Both State and Treasury will have to sharpen their focus on these issues. At the same time, as in the case of Argentina, its resource base is such that sound management can bring stability and growth in a reasonable time. Shultz 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Shultz travelled to Brazil February 3–7, 1984. See Documents 181 and 182 . 2 Reagan’s letter of congratulations to Lusinchi has not been found. In telegram Secto 2049 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation in Brasilia, February 6, the Delegation sent a memorandum of Shultz’s February 3 private meeting with Lusinchi, Landau, and Morales Paúl. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003–0011) In telegram 1050 from Caracas, February 3, the Embassy reported on Shultz’s February 3 working breakfast with Lusinchi and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840075–0370) 3 In telegram Secto 2036 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation in Rio de Janeiro, February 4, Shultz informed McFarlane, Weinberger, and [ name not declassified ] that he had “agreed February 3 with President Lusinchi that we would provide him continuing in-depth political/military intelligence on Central America. It is obvious to us that he is getting poor information. We should strike while the iron is hot.” Shultz then outlined a briefing plan. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984)) 476. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State 476. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State 1 Caracas, May 4, 1984, 2230Z 3921. Subject: President Reagan’s telecon with President Lusinchi of Venezuela of April 4, 1984. 2 1. (Confidential—Entire text.) 2. During President Reagan’s call to President Lusinchi, thanking him for Venezuela’s assistance with the Argentine debt package, President Lusinchi indicated that he had some thoughts on the overall Latin American debt crisis, and that he would convey them through me. Subsequently, President Lusinchi and I discussed this matter. Today he sent me a note on the subject through the Minister of Finance. A translation of the note is as follows: 3. Quote. The Government of Venezuela is very concerned about the increase in interest rates in the United States and the existence of expectations of further increases in the near future, which make extremely onerous the servicing of debt contracted with the international banks by Latin American countries. In some cases it may make it impossible to fulfill the obligations contracted. For the stability of the international financial system, and the recovery of the economy of these countries, it would be advisable to have preferential fixed interest rates established in agreements which are entered into for refinancing the debt. 3 End quote. Landau 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840292–0585. Confidential; Immediate. Also sent Immediate to the White House and the Department of the Treasury. 2 See Document 64 . 3 In a May 9 memorandum to McFarlane, Burghardt and Menges noted: “Venezuela has $35 billion in outstanding debt. The public sector portion—$27 billion—is up to date, but the private sector portion is $800–900 million in arrears. The GOV has decided that it will not enter into an IMF agreement or Paris Club arrangement and, instead, will unilaterally reschedule the private debt—a very unusual approach. Treasury is particularly concerned about how some $200 million in ExIm Bank claims will be covered and has threatened negative actions. But there appears to be general agreement (even in Treasury) to avoid punitive measures as long as the GOV demonstrates its seriousness in dealing with the debt problem. The Lusinchi government is a marked improvement over its predecessor on this score.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984)) 477. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan 477. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan 1 Washington, December 1, 1984 Subject: Meeting with Venezuelan President Lusinchi. I. PURPOSE To reaffirm the friendly bilateral relationship based on shared democratic values. To review the situation in Central America, clearly explain our policy there and seek constructive cooperation from Venezuela in obtaining a Contadora treaty which assures the implementation of democracy in Nicaragua and preserves our ability to help El Salvador. II. BACKGROUND Venezuela made the transition to democratic government in 1958 and then faced ten years of Cuban-supported subversion and guerrilla warfare (1959–69). President Lusinchi is a member of the social democratic party ( Accion Democratica ) which has alternated in power with the more conservative Christian democrats. During the last decade Venezuela used its oil wealth and democratic institutions to provide leadership in the Caribbean and Central America. President Lusinchi has an especially close relationship with the social democratic leaders of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Argentina. He understands the need to defeat Cuban-supported subversion and terrorism and among the Contadora nations (Colombia, Panama, Mexico) it is Venezuela which has given the strongest support to Duarte in El Salvador and shared our views about the need for a good Contadora treaty. Lusinchi distrusts the Sandinistas, is skeptical of their elections and refuses their request for economic assistance. We should use this state visit to build on these positive attitudes in order to obtain more active Venezuelan cooperation in Central America. President Lusinchi needs to be encouraged to take the lead away from Mexico among the four Contadora countries and bring about a new Contadora treaty draft which meets the legitimate security needs of Central America by: (1) including the provision that the security portions of the treaty enter into force simultaneously with the finding by the OAS that Nicaragua has implemented its 1979 commitment to hold genuinely democratic elections; (2) provides for an effective verification structure which is governed by a majority vote of the five Central American countries; and, (3) preserves our ability to help El Salvador. We view the Venezuelan “political solution” of the 1960s with their communist guerrillas as a model for Central America since it combined military attrition of the guerrillas, with offers of amnesty and future participation in elections for those guerrillas who laid down their weapons and ended subversive cooperation with Cuba. There is progress along these lines in El Salvador but the communist threat will continue until Nicaragua implements its 1979 democratic commitments to the OAS and that is why Venezuela needs to take the lead away from Mexico in the Contadora process. You can assure President Lusinchi that our Central America policy continues to have the four mutually reinforcing elements of support for democracy, economic improvement, active diplomacy and security assistance to threatened governments and that the US opposes the violent right as well as the violent left. Venezuela welcomed the rescue of Grenada and is contributing to the democratic process there. President Lusinchi will be concerned by our recent intelligence that Cuba and the Soviet Union are encouraging what is likely to be a pro-Soviet coalition government in its neighbor Guyana, which has been the object of a significant Soviet-bloc Cuban penetration effort for some years. Venezuela is also concerned about the consequences of the far left penetration of the Bolivian government but at the same time opposes a military coup there. We should suggest increased cooperation in the Caribbean and countries which border Venezuela in order to simultaneously accomplish two objectives which we share: (1) the strengthening of genuinely democratic institutions through timely action and assistance; and, (2) preventing and countering Soviet-bloc Cuban and Nicaraguan subversion. In the economic area, oil-rich Venezuela entered into a period of crisis when the price of oil dropped. President Lusinchi has given the economy priority and has succeeded in rescheduling his country’s public sector debt on favorable terms without an IMF program. His strategy is based on reducing government spending, increasing employment and business confidence. Venezuela is not seeking economic assistance from the US. One issue of concern to us is Venezuela’s tardiness in dealing with private sector debt, which affects our Export-Import Bank. We also would like Lusinchi to seek prompt resolution of an old irritant in our relations—compensation claims by US companies dating from the 1976 nationalization of the oil industry. President Lusinchi has a strong interest in combating the illegal narcotics market and has cooperated on this with us and other countries. [Omitted here are a list of participants, a press plan, and a schedule] 1 Source: Reagan Library, NSC Records, Latin American Affairs Directorate, Miscellaneous Issues File, President Lusinchi/Venezuela. Secret. Prepared by Menges. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, James Baker, and Deaver. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “President has seen.” Tab A, a memorandum from Shultz, was not found attached. Tab B, Talking Points, are attached but not printed. Tab C, a biography of Lusinchi, was not found attached. 478. Memorandum of Conversation 478. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 4, 1984, 10:50–11:50 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting with President Jaime Lusinchi of the Republic of Venezuela (U) PARTICIPANTS The President The Vice President Secretary of State George P. Shultz Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs George Landau, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela Harry W. Shlaudeman, Ambassador-at-Large and President’s Special Envoy for Central America Constantine Menges, National Security Council Roger Robinson, National Security Council President Jaime Lusinchi Foreign Minister Isidro Morales Paul Ambassador Valentin Hernandez Minister of the Presidency Simon Alberto Consalvi Presidents Reagan and Lusinchi met briefly in the Oval Office and then joined the group in the Cabinet Room at 10:50 a.m. (U) President Reagan welcomed the President of Venezuela and made a joke about finding talking points in his coat pocket for a previous royal visitor. 2 (U) President Lusinchi expressed his appreciation for the generous and warm welcome. (U) President Reagan said that the United States is honored to have President Lusinchi as a visitor. Among the issues for discussion a very important one is Central America, where U.S. policy continues with four mutually reinforcing elements: support for democracy; economic help to improve living conditions; security assistance; and, active diplomacy. The United States would feel much more comfortable if Venezuela would take the leading position among the four Contadora countries in an effort to define a workable treaty. (C) President Lusinchi said Venezuela is willing to do more but must be careful and prudent. Last week there were discussions with Ambassadors Landau and Shlaudeman about the Contadora process, and it seems that in the last few days there are new international possibilities for Central America in the attitude of the Contadora countries and the United States. I agree with what you said in your earlier welcoming remarks 3 that the elections in Nicaragua were not true elections, but it is a political fact which strengthens in some way the Nicaraguan government and gives it—in the view of some governments—international legitimacy which it did not have before. There should not be a communist regime in Nicaragua; and there can be an opening of the regime because, unlike Cuba, it is not an island or the producer of one crop. I believe the Nicaraguan leaders are communist and want to create a communist state, but there are more possibilities in Nicaragua. I believe the Nicaraguan leaders will not be able to impose communism and that contradictions will appear. At the same time, there cannot be a military solution, since that would have negative side effects. In the discussions with Ambassadors Landau and Shlaudeman, we talked about the creation of the constituent assembly in Nicaragua as providing some way for the democratic opposition to participate in drafting a new constitution. If there had been fair democratic elections in Nicaragua, I think the Sandinistas would have lost and there certainly are opportunities now for political possibilities to open up the Sandinista regime. What is your view? (C) President Reagan said I believe we have a situation in Nicaragua like that in Eastern Europe. The government is Marxist-Leninist, it does not care what the people think, and it can hold onto power. If the people were free to speak they would want the government that was promised by the original revolution—a genuinely democratic government. But, just like Castro did in Cuba to the democratic groups which believed him and united to overthrow a rightist dictator, the Sandinistas have betrayed the democratic Nicaraguans who joined with them against Somoza. I do not think that any of us who believe in democracy can allow the Sandinistas to consolidate themselves and continue as a center for the subversion of other countries. That is why pressure has to be kept on Nicaragua. This is just what you did in Venezuela—you kept the pressure on the communist guerrillas while providing amnesty for those willing to lay down their weapons and participate in their democratic elections. (C) President Lusinchi said the most difficult international problem is the Nicaraguan export of subversion and alliance with the USSR and Cuba, and, in this respect, we must impose pressure on the Sandinistas. The Contadora draft Acta can be modified, the observations of the other Central American countries can be taken more into account. We agree fully with you that it is not permissible to tolerate the export of the Nicaraguan revolution to other countries nor can we allow Nicaragua to become the focus of military imbalance in the region. Nicaragua says it does not have offensive military equipment. They told us recently they would be willing to start international inspections. They say the Soviet ships did not carry supersonic or offensive weapons. A Nicaraguan official told us recently that they would permit Venezuela to have complete information for this trip to Washington so we could share this with you and the State Department, but Nicaragua has not sent this information to us. (C) President Reagan said I can give you an example of how difficult it is to inspect what is coming into Nicaragua. Some time ago a Soviet-bloc ship was in the Panama Canal with a cargo which included military helicopters and we said so publicly. The Sandinistas denied this and said they would invite the international press to inspect the ship’s cargo when it docked. The only press they invited was the Cuban press, and we don’t put much faith in what they report. Concerning the recent ships we suspected might have MIG jet fighters, it did seem strange that this ship went all the way around South America instead of going through the Panama Canal. They know we can often tell what’s on the ship if it goes through the Panama Canal. Right now we still do not know for sure whether there were MIGs, yes or no? I doubt that Nicaragua would give any of us a real look at the weapons they have. If all of us stay firm and indicate what we want is a restoration of the democratic institutions that the revolution was designed to achieve, then, the other things would follow and work out well. (C) President Lusinchi said yes the Sandinistas made those original promises of democracy and a mixed economy. We have complained publicly in a telegram to Nicaragua that they are not carrying out those democratic promises. We are certainly willing to continue making efforts to compel Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments. In the Contadora treaty and outside we identify ourselves with your views; there is no disagreement between us. (C) President Reagan said if we keep pressing for democracy then things will work out in Nicaragua. The first two drafts of the Contadora treaty did not meet the Contadora 21 objectives. Those drafts left some big gaps which Nicaragua could use to accomplish its purposes. A former Sandinista official said in a newspaper article a few days ago that Nicaragua is actually an occupied country with Cuba and the Soviet bloc being the occupation forces. That person pointed out that if you take the 9,000 Cuban and Soviet-bloc personnel and the 250,000-man army which the Sandinistas have said they want to build in Nicaragua and translate that in proportion to the U.S. population, it would be the same as though in the U.S. there were 300,000 Cuban military and security advisors, 300,000 Cuban technical advisors, 300,000 Soviet-bloc personnel, and as though we had an army of 25 million. (C) President Lusinchi said you are right. We have a full coincidence of views. If we use most of the suggestions made by the Central American countries, we could force the Contadora draft to be acceptable. I am optimistic that we can propose a modified Contadora treaty that will provide for democratization and the other goals. (C) President Reagan said, in our view if Venezuela, rather than some other country, took a leading role in producing the draft Contadora treaty, we would feel better about it. (C) President Lusinchi said yes, but we must be discreet. We do not want to go against the sensibilities of any other country. We do want to arrive at a better Contadora treaty, and, you can be certain that this will be our behavior. If we combine this with the Manzanillo talks, which are well-led by Ambassador Shlaudeman, then there may be a better chance for a solution. Another situation of interest in Latin America is the Southern Cone where the signature of the treaty between Argentina and Chile will definitely help the democracy in Argentina. 4 And, we have to take into account that in Chile there has been a strengthening of opposition to the democratic transition. I think that U.S. action with discretion would help the democratic transition to occur in Chile. There is an opportunity for this democratic transition based on the Christian Democratic Party and certain parts of the Socialist Party, not including those elements which are cooperating with the communists. A dramatic situation also exists in Bolivia where a number of political groups are cornering President Siles with their irrational behavior. The President himself is acting somewhat irrationally, and I have information that he is thinking of committing suicide. The government is opposed by communist groups and communist trade unions. Elements of the military are pulling in different directions, and the economic situation is the worst ever. Perhaps we can find a way to send additional food supplies to Bolivia because the economic situation is dramatically serious. Some military personnel are trying to overthrow Siles, but what will come after? Some of the armed forces are penetrated by the narcotics traffickers, and they would use the power of government to increase the narcotics problem. (S) On drug trafficking, we have prepared some information items for you. The situation in Venezuela is more serious than many people think, and we are concerned not only about Venezuela but also about Latin America as a whole. There is an increasing connection between drugs and subversion and terrorism as we are seeing in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Vice President Bush showed (in Quito, Ecuador) documents and photos illustrating the relationship between drugs and Nicaragua and Cuba. 5 Perhaps we should take the Cuban government into the international court because of its connection with the illegal drug traffic. This is all part of the internationalization of subversion. For us it is a matter of legitimate self defense, and we would like you to help us with all the knowledge you have about methods to fight the drug traffic. The chief of the Venezuelan Navy recently went to Puerto Rico for naval maneuvers and told me there are useful opportunities for cooperating with the United States Navy. There is a U.S. program, IMET (International Military Education and Training), through which you give support to military students from Latin America, but we have been excluded along with Mexico, due to a lack of U.S. funds. Before, there was a budget of $1 million for 153 Venezuelan students. Now, we are able to send only 20 students on a budget of $150,000. Colombia received $750,000, and we would like to train more of our military through this program and train our pilots for the F–16 fighter aircraft. (C) Turning to foreign trade, you have been handling the foreign trade laws of the U.S. well, but we think it would be helpful if you could adapt several aspects of this law to the Venezuelan situation. Also, we ask the United States to support Venezuela in obtaining financing from the Inter-American Bank, the World Bank and commodity credit. We have important priority needs which we have explained to those organizations, and we would welcome your support. We want to exchange views with you and the State Department on the international debt problem. We have successfully refinanced our debt, and urge that the United States take the lead to readjust interest rates, which, although they have gone down recently, might go up again in the future. (C) Yesterday I received your letter on EXXON and the refinery in Aruba. 6 You are correct in your approach, and I would like to see if we could find a way to contribute to economic development in those islands since they are right off our coast. Due to lack of time, I won’t discuss specific solutions but, together, we should be able to find solutions. I will be leaving an Aide Memoire with you which will give you details. 7 (C) President Reagan noted that the U.S. is very eager to cooperate with Venezuela on narcotics issues. On Chile, I shall leave the discussion to you and Secretary Shultz. About the EXXON refineries, I agree that solutions must be found. On interest rates, we’re doing everything possible so that they do not go up again. (C) Secretary Shultz said that he would have to leave soon in order to be at the State Department to welcome President Lusinchi for lunch. (U) President Lusinchi said, perhaps I talk too much, but Latin Americans like to talk and Spanish does not lend itself to synthesis as does English. We are totally willing to be of assistance in having harmonious, friendly, and cooperative relations. We are admirers of your country and of you, personally, and we believe that the second Reagan administration will be fruitful for the United States and its friends. (U) President Reagan commented that there are no problems which cannot be solved if we talk to each other rather than talking about each other. (U) President Lusinchi said, at the risk of embarrassing the individual, I want to tell you how pleased we are to have Ambassador Landau as your Ambassador. He is doing an excellent job and knows our country well, and we hope you keep him in Venezuela for the entire second term. (U) 1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (12/04/1984–12/14/1984). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Lusinchi made a state visit to Washington, December 3–5. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Menges sent the memorandum of conversation for approval to McFarlane under cover of a December 4 memorandum upon which Poindexter initialed approval. 2 In his personal diary for December 4, Reagan wrote: “A visit by Pres. Lusinchi of Venezuela—a bright cold day with a formal ceremony on the S. lawn. Almost a diplomatic Faux Pas. I slipped into my topcoat. When time came for my opening remarks I took my notes out of my pocket & horror of horrors it was a speech welcoming ‘His Royal Highness’ the Duke of Luxemburg. I couldn’t imagine how they could have given me the wrong speech. I stared to ad lib & then remembered I’d worn my top coat last on the day of the Grand Duke’s arrival. Today’s speech was in my suit coat pocket. I made a switch & got away with it pretty well.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries , volume I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 403) 3 Reagan’s remarks are in Public Papers: Reagan, 1984 , Book II, pp. 1859–1861. 4 See footnote 3, Document 77 . 5 Documentation on Bush’s presentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1981–1988, vol. XLVI, War on Drugs. 6 Under cover of a December 3 memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane forwarded for his signature a letter to Lusinchi that “indicates our concern about developments on Aruba, but offers no promise of USG assistance.” Lusinchi’s November 1 letter to Reagan expressed concern about increased unemployment caused by the closing of an EXXON refinery in Aruba. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Venezuela: President Herrera (8400143–8408232)) 7 Reagan wrote to McFarlane on the cover page of the Spanish-language Aide Memoire: “To Bud M. Bud–I don’t think I’ll read these. RR.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, Venezuela (02/03/1984–12/17/1984)) 479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Bolivia, France, Spain, Chile, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany 479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Bolivia, France, Spain, Chile, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany 1 Washington, December 6, 1984, 2322Z 360395. Subject: Meeting between Secretary and President Lusinchi, December 4, 1984: Chile, Bolivia and Bilateral issues. 1. (C—Entire text). 2. Summary. In addition to Central America and the Caribbean (Guyana, Aruba), Secretary and President Lusinchi discussed a number of bilateral issues as well as Chile and Bolivia. 2 Secretary shared Venezuela’s concern over developments in both these countries. The Secretary had strong praise for Venezuela’s progress on public debt negotiations, urging resolution of the private debt question as well as an improvement in the investment by settlement of the oil nationalization claims. Lusinchi put in a plug to have a Venezuelan replace Ortiz Mena as President of the Inter-American Development Bank. 3. Secretary Shultz called on President Lusinchi during latter’s December 3–5 State visit. Foreign Minister Morales Paul, Minister of the Presidency Consalvi, Finance Minister Azpurua and Ambassador to U.S. Hernandez were with Lusinchi. Ambassador Shlaudeman, Assistant Secretary Motley, Ambassador Landau and ARA/AND Director Rondon accompanied Secretary. 4. Chile. The Secretary told President Lusinchi that we shared the concerns the Venezuelan President expressed over Chile and Bolivia earlier in the day to President Reagan. 3 In Chile, the Secretary stated that our policy has three objectives: to support a return to democracy, to let Pinochet know privately and publicly that we oppose the recent wave of repression and to encourage the moderate opposition to stay away from the communists. If the moderates align themselves with the extreme left, they will lose the support of moderate elements elsewhere in the world, the Secretary commented. In addition, the Chilean moderates would give Pinochet a handle with which to beat them. The Secretary added that we do not want to see the communists supplant Pinochet. We do want to give Chilean centrists a chance to express their views. 5. Secretary Shultz expressed concern over French and Spanish efforts with the extreme left in Chile. 6. President Lusinchi opined that Chilean Socialists such as Altamirano and Almeyda have little weight. He thought that the centrists are getting stronger in Chile. The Secretary urged that the United States and Venezuela stay in close touch on Chile. 7. Bolivia. We have provided lots of support for Bolivia, the Secretary stated, but as things stand now the Siles government has to take measures we are able to support. Assistant Secretary Motley noted that American help to Bolivia has run at the rate of about dols 100 million a year. He stressed that the economy is weak in Bolivia and failure to adopt effective economic measures is exacerbating the political situation. 8. Narcotics. The Secretary welcomed narcotics cooperation between the United States and Venezuela. He pointed to the interest of both the President and Mrs. Reagan in narcotics control. He asked to be kept informed if the United States is not forthcoming in the field of narcotics. 9. IMET. Secretary Shultz referred to President Lusinchi’s request to President Reagan for a greater American contribution to the IMET program between the United States and Venezuela. The Secretary said we want to be helpful and will double our program this year, from dols 50,000 to dols 100,000. 10. Venezuelan steel. The Secretary expressed surprise that Venezuela is concerned over its steel exports to the United States. He commented that Venezuela is a relatively small exporter and its sales have not drawn great attention in the United States, where we are more concerned over steel sales by large producers. Secretary Shultz cautioned, however, that there can be no guarantee that there might not be concern in the future. Lusinchi explained that his government is simply anticipating possible problems. 11. Debt Negotiations. You must have a genius for a Finance Minister, if you can resolve your debt problems without recourse to the IMF, the Secretary commented. He expressed the hope that Venezuela would be able also to clear up the question of private indebtedness. Lusinchi thanked Shultz for his words of encouragement and the goodwill of the United States. 12. Investment climate: Oil nationalization claims. The Secretary observed that it is fundamental to get people to invest in Venezuela. In this connection, the Secretary urged resolution of the oil compensation issue. He recalled that he raised this matter with President Lusinchi in Caracas at their breakfast in February. 4 He felt that a settlement would not be very costly for Venezuela and would impact very favorably on investor attitudes. He urged President Lusinchi to work with Ambassador Landau to find a solution. 13. Inter-American Development Bank. President Lusinchi also put in a plug to have a Venezuela citizen replace Antonio Ortiz Mena as President of the Inter-American Development Bank. The Secretary noted that Ortiz Mena has been retiring for a long time and said the United States would look at a Venezuelan candidate with interest. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840782–0523. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Rondon; cleared by Kilday and McKinley and S/S–O, and ARA/SC in draft; approved by Shultz. 2 In telegram 359904 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, December 6, the Department reported on the Caribbean issues discussed by Shultz and Lusinchi in their December 4 meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840782–0242) A memorandum of conversation for Shultz’s December 4, 4:30 p.m. meeting with Lusinchi on Central America in the Presidential Suite of the Madison Hotel is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1984 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums, Lot 94D91, Nodis Memorandums, December 1–31, 1984. 3 See Document 478 . 4 See footnote 2, Document 475 . 480. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 480. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 1 New York, October 2, 1985, 0750Z Secto 19061. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral with President Lusinchi October 1. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary. In a lengthy conversation with Secretary Shultz October 1, Venezuelan President Lusinchi gave assurances that his government is not deceived by the Nicaraguans but has rather consistently warned GON leaders against interfering in their neighbors’ affairs. 2 The Secretary reviewed US views on a final Contadora agreement and pointed out the Core Four’s objections to Contadora’s recent report to the UNSYG. The Secretary gave Lusinchi advance notice of the possible meeting with Ortega and the upcoming meeting with the Soviets. Discussion of the current COM vacancy in Caracas is reported septel. 3 End of summary. 3. Secretary met morning October 1 with Venezuelan President Lusinchi in his suite at the St. Regis Hotel, New York. FonMin Consalvi and Ambassador to the US Valentin Hernandez were most prominent among the many Venezuelans present. Others on US side were A/Sec Elliott Abrams, Spokesman Bernard Kalb, Stephanie von Reigersberg (interpreter) and ARA/AND Phil McLean (notetaker). 4. Lusinchi began with personal compliments for the Secretary’s skills. He then delivered a lengthy exposition of Venezuelan views on Central America. He said the Venezuelan position is to promote dialogue and achieve democratic solutions in each of the Central American States. Pursuing that peace has been the GOV’s main activity at this UNGA. In a region easily influenced by outside forces, the Nicaraguans are acting as Soviet pawns. The kidnapping of President Duarte’s daughter is an idiocy which postpones any possibility of making progress on peace in El Salvador and may lead the guerrillas into a final confrontation. Until intelligence confirmed the leftists’ role, the GOV suspected it was a rightist provocation. The GOV is contacting UNGO and others to see what it can do. The situation in Costa Rica is also dangerous. At least in Guatemala the crisis is easing. Mejia is acting reasonably and, he noted with pleasure, the US is encouraging progress. He cautioned the US not to overemphasize the region’s “negative factors”, apparently a reference to the Contras who he claimed are ineffective because of their ties to the Somozistas. 5. The Secretary began his reply by noting our appreciation of Venezuela’s candid and realistic appraisals. The US supports Contadora and wants to see it come to a positive conclusion, but because of the track record of communist governments the agreement must include simultaneity, verification and a schedule of provisions for national reconciliation. Without these elements, any agreement would not bind the Nicaraguans at all. On the other hand, if the US undertakes to stop aid, it will stop aid. The decrease in US influence would leave the communists in the driver’s seat. The Secretary said he had just talked to the four Central American Foreign Ministers who say they will challenge an inaccurate and biased report they say the Contadora countries are going to submit to the UNSYG. 6. FonMin replied that none of the countries have indicated displeasure to the GOV, though there had been meetings with two of them just that day. The report, already submitted to the UNSYG, is a simple recounting of the Contadora process up to this point without any evaluation or intention to favor any side. It does outline the three issues which remain to be resolved, i.e. armaments, follow-up on security systems and reconciliation. Lusinchi interjected to assure the Secretary that the GOV consistently tells the Nicaraguans there is no role from them in solving their neighbors’ problems, either by invoking “revolutionary solidarity” with the Salvadorean rebels or supporting “autonomous groups” in Costa Rica. 7. The Secretary concluded by raising three topics briefly. First, the GOV may hear that Amb. Schlaudeman will be meeting with Ortega. The purpose will be to say the Manzanillo talks can only be re-started if a national dialogue under church sponsorship is underway. Second, later this month A/Sec Abrams will be meeting with the Soviets to discuss Central America and the Caribbean. The purpose is to tell the Soviets that their activities in the region are unwelcome and unwarranted. The GOV should know the US will make no deals with the Soviets. Third, Puerto Rico is not a colony. The only difference among the Puerto Rican people is whether they should seek statehood or remain with their present status. This subject has no place in the UN as a decolonization subject. The Venezuelans gave no reaction to these last points. 8. At the conclusion of the discussion the Secretary raised the current COM vacancy in Caracas. That discussion is reported septel. 9. Department please pass to Caracas, San Salvador, Managua, Guatemala, San Jose and Tegucigalpa. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no n number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 In an October 1 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: “Venezuelan President Lusinchi assured me today that his government is not deceived by the Sandinistas and will not tolerate their interference in Costa Rican or Salvadoran affairs. The Venezuelans are doing what they can with their Salvadoran guerrilla contacts to encourage the release of Duarte’s daughter. Lusinchi heard me out as I conveyed your support for Otto Reich’s nomination to be our next Ambassador in Caracas. He told us of his predecessor’s bad experience with President Kennedy’s Ambassador, Teodoro Moscoso, a person who seemed to have badly rankled the Venezuelans. In the end, Lusinchi said the AFL-CIO had now recommended Otto’s qualifications, and in view of our traditional friendship, his government will agree to the nomination when his name is submitted.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Records, System File, System II, Case 91018) 3 Reference is to telegram Secto 19058 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no film number]) 481. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Venezuela 481. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Venezuela 1 Palo Alto, California August 8, 1986, 1750Z Secto 16015. Subject: Secretary Shultz’s Meeting with Venezuelan President Lusinchi, August 7, Bogota - memorandum of conversation. 1. C—Entire text. 2. Summary. Secretary Shultz and Venezuelan President Lusinchi met the morning of August 7, prior to the Barco inauguration, for an hour long discussion of Colombia, Central America, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica. On Colombia, both expressed the need to fortify Colombia’s efforts in the face of the serious narco-terrorist threat to its democratic institutions. They agreed that President Barco is in a good position to play a positive role for Colombia’s future. On Haiti, at the Secretary’s request, Lusinchi agreed to announce some economic assistance (petroleum and food) next week as a means of encouraging movement toward democracy, but was reluctant to do all that Venezuela is eventually prepared to do until a democratic transition is clearer and more advanced. He also urged multilateral cooperative efforts to educate Haitians on developing democratic institutions. On Central America, the Secretary stressed Nicaragua’s increased isolation and, while Lusinchi agreed that pressure must be kept on them, he urged acceptance of a political solution. He also characterized the Sandinistas as “stupid” and “immature,” and agreed on the need to bolster the four Central American democracies. On Puerto Rico, the Secretary strongly opposed any UN resolutions, but Lusinchi and Consalvi gave no promises. Lusinchi also pressed for greater U.S. contacts with Michael Manley in view of Lusinchi’s expectation that Manley stands in good chance of returning to power and the consequent need to work together to moderate his behavior. Lusinchi was accompanied by FM Consalvi, Finance Minister Azpurva and the GOV Ambassador to Colombia. With the Secretary were A/S Abrams, A/S Kalb, Ambassador Gillespie, NSC staffer Tillman and DAS Gelbard (notetaker). End summary. 3. Colombia. The Secretary and President Lusinchi began by expressing their mutual pleasure at being able to attend the inauguration of yet another democratically elected president in Latin America, especially in a country with such a long democratic tradition. Lusinchi noted that in spite of Colombia’s serious narco-terrorism and the tragedies involving the Palace of Justice and the Ruiz volcano, there was a significantly higher than normal level of participation in this year’s Colombian elections. This would greatly fortify Colombia institutionally, a fact very important to Venezuela because of their close bilateral ties. Virgilio Barco, according to Lusinchi, is a great believer in democracy and can be trusted. He described Barco as steady and as one who “does not change with the wind”; this was particularly important for Colombia at this time. Lusinchi stressed that we all needed to help defend Colombia. Any collapse would be destructive “in all senses” to all of Latin America. Geopolitically Lusinchi felt it was the region’s most important country, even more so than Bolivia. As a result, he said, Castro was undoubtedly making significant plans to undermine Colombia. Lusinchi described the internal subversion as serious, with the terrorist-drug link even more dangerous. However, he felt that the Colombian military had now resolved to fight this. The linkage between the terrorists and drug traffickers had caused this to happen; their alliance had thus been a serious mistake and would lead to the destruction of both. The Secretary expressed total agreement with Lusinchi’s analysis and said that U.S. was fully prepared to cooperate and collaborate with Barco’s government. 2 4. Haiti. Secretary Shultz expressed the view that Haiti was very important to both the U.S. and Venezuela, with the mutual hope that something positive would emerge. The U.S. had been providing an increased flow of aid and encouragement to Namphy, who has been cleaning house politically, has announced a date for elections, is getting out with the people and, overall, is heading in the right direction. However enormous problems exist and he, (the Secretary) plans to visit Haiti next week to express U.S. support. He noted that the U.S. and GOV have the most potential influence and effect on the GOH’s behavior; some eastern Caribbean countries also have influence, but they do not have the resources to affect Haiti’s behavior. He asked about the GOV’s intentions regarding aid, so he would know in anticipation of his trip. 3 5. Lusinchi stated the GOV’s clear intention to help Haiti for both moral and political reasons. But Venezuela wants to condition its aid on movement to democracy as rapidly as possible. In this, we needed to block Castro, who already has a plan to send his people into Haiti. Lusinchi said that we made mistakes with Nicaragua and Cuba and cannot afford to make an error here. Therefore, we needed to be certain of a transition to democracy. Secretary Shultz agreed wholeheartedly, saying this was why economic assistance had to be presented in the context of Namphy moving towards democracy: The more he does, the more forthcoming donors would be. Thus, we did not need to provide all aid now, but enough to provide incentives. 6. Lusinchi agreed that he had confidence in Namphy but not in all members of the GOH. The GOV was encouraging the Haitian exiles they knew and also the church to be helpful. Haitians were all, he said, a bit crazy, so the transition had to be done carefully. Lusinchi acknowledged the GOV could help by giving petroleum and surplus agricultural products. In response to the Secretary’s request that some be announced next week so that the Secretary could supplement it with a U.S. aid announcement, Lusinchi agreed to announce such GOV aid. Lusinchi also offered to invite young Haitians to Venezuela for military training and other programs. He proposed that in conjunction with the Dominican Republic and other countries, meetings could be held with moderate Haitians (such as Manigot) to orient them towards accomplishing a peaceful transition to democracy. 7. Central America. Secretary Shultz noted that everyone is increasingly aware that Nicaragua is the Central American problem. The Sandinistas are increasingly isolated and we all need to help the four Central American democracies. He expressed his understanding of the GOV’s reluctance to help the Nicaraguan opposition, but said it was necessary. As the USG considered the negotiating process, we have tried to listen to and report the views of the four impressive, recently elected Central American presidents. Lusinchi replied that he continued to believe Central America could only be resolved politically. The situation was deteriorating rapidly and the Sandinistas were behaving stupidly. He cited as an example their “absurd” fight against the Catholic Church and the Protestants, which was a real mistake since both have enormous popular support. Other blunders, such as closing “La Prensa” and Ortega’s travels to Havana and Moscow, showed they always did the wrong thing and are very immature, even to the point of using outmoded communist rhetoric. When the Secretary stressed the need to keep the pressure on, Lusinchi agreed but urged avoiding the “big stick” interventionist approach. Lusinchi concluded by saying that his relations with Nicaragua were not good, but the GOV was helping the four democracies. 8. Puerto Rico. The Secretary emphatically stated that the UN had no business getting involved in Puerto Rico; it is gross interference in U.S. internal affairs. Countries were shifting their views, but every year there was a UN resolution on Puerto Rico and we do not like it. Lusinchi replied that Venezuela had a consistent policy of support for self-determination and acceptance of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status. Consalvi added that the issue would probably disappear after this year with the expected demise of the De-Colonization Committee. However, it was hard for the GOV to change its traditional position while the committee still existed. They tried to be fair, he added and consulted the Puerto Rican Government first. 9. Jamaica. Lusinchi said he was worried that Seaga is losing public support because of the economic situation and it is extremely difficult to change the Jamaican reality. Michael Manley is thus in a good position to move back into power and Lusinchi urged that Venezuela and the U.S. should improve relations with Manley now so he does not consider all of us enemies. He had no formula to propose, but we need to avoid rejecting him outright; he was not rejecting Seaga now either, but felt we had to be careful. Abrams noted that he would be in Jamaica in two weeks and would meet with Seaga and open a dialogue with Manley. The Secretary stressed that the main issue is to improve the economy; they had had bad luck with bauxite, but have not faced up to their other problems. 10. Ambassador Reich. In closing, Lusinchi expressed great pleasure with the new U.S. Ambassador. He said that Reich was doing all the right things, consulting closely with him and his government on a wide range of issues, getting to know many people and travelling extensively. He felt Mrs. Reich was also making an excellent contribution to the U.S. presence and efforts in Venezuela. The Secretary agreed that the Ambassador was outstanding and said he was pleased to get this report. Shultz 1 Source: Reagan Library, George P. Shultz Papers, Box 23A, Memcons 1985–1986. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Port au Prince, Bogota, Kingston, and the Contadora Collective. Shultz visited Bogota, August 6–7, to attend Barco’s inauguration. See Document 349 . 2 In telegram 9488 from Caracas, October 1, the Embassy reported on Crowe’s visit to Caracas and his September 29 meetings with Venezuelan military leadership and Lusinchi. The Embassy noted: “Both political and military leaders are concerned about instability in the region, are focusing on the threat of narcoterrorism, and are anxious for greater U.S.-GOV military cooperation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860748–0073) 3 Shultz visited Port-au-Prince on August 15 to meet with Haitian President Henri Namphy. 482. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 482. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 ALA 86–10051 Washington, December 1986 [Omitted here is a title page.] Venezuela: Struggling With Declining Oil Revenues Key Judgements The unexpected depth of the oil market collapse in 1986 has set back President Jaime Lusinchi’s efforts to stabilize the Venezuelan economy. In response to the steep decline in oil revenues, Lusinchi has urgently introduced new adjustment measures aimed at checking the economy’s slide and bolstering the nation’s debt service capacity. The President’s efforts, however, are unlikely to provide more than temporary relief to an economy suffering from overdependence on oil revenues and an excess of government intervention. In our view, the Venezuelan economy is likely to remain in recession at least through the 1988 presidential election—a situation that could result in a defeat for President Lusinchi’s conservative, pro-US Ortodoxo faction of the ruling Democratic Action party. According to US Embassy and press reporting, Lusinchi is already under attack from his political opponents for his management of the economy. Continued recession is also likely to negatively affect US interests by depressing demand for US products and by limiting Venezuela’s capacity to provide economic assistance in the Caribbean Basin. We expect Lusinchi to succeed in protecting the nation’s capacity to meet its servicing obligations on the external public debt. International bankers are likely to acquiesce in Venezuela’s request that most of the principal due through 1990 be rescheduled—providing Venezuela insurance against the risk that oil prices might descend again to $10 per barrel. To conserve foreign exchange, Lusinchi has imposed new restrictions on imports and has devalued the bolivar. These measures, and Venezuela’s relatively large foreign exchange reserves, should allow Caracas to meet its external payments obligations over the next three years, even if oil revenues remain depressed. We believe, however, that success will continue to elude Lusinchi in his efforts to extricate the economy from a recession that has persisted for more than eight years. The economy’s problems extend far beyond a temporary inadequacy of foreign exchange. According to the US Embassy, the principal impediments to growth are deficient institutions and policies that over several decades have resulted in a pervasive presence of the state in the economy—a presence that Lusinchi has not aggressively attacked. His failure to liberalize the economy, his abrupt policy reversals on such issues as the external private debt, and the uncertainty over oil revenues rule out, in our view, a significant revival of private investment in the medium term. Because the oil revenue shortfall also constrains government and consumer spending, we see no plausible engine to pull the economy out of its doldrums. A growing danger is the possibility that Lusinchi, out of frustration, will try to spend Venezuela out of recession. We concur in the IMF judgment that such a strategy would provide only a transitory stimulus to the economy—while risking a sharp increase in inflation that would handicap future efforts to generate self-sustained economic growth. The moribund economy has become the principal issue in domestic politics and may play a determining role in presidential succession. With campaigning for the 1988 election already under way, COPEI, the Christian democratic opposition, has made modest gains in public opinion polls by stridently assailing Lusinchi’s economic management. COPEI’s chances to seize the presidency will continue to improve as the economy deteriorates, but we believe COPEI will fall short in the 1988 election—unless Democratic Action, the ruling social democrats, splits over the selection of a candidate. Within Democratic Action, Lusinchi’s Ortodoxo faction is being challenged by maverick ex-President Carlos Andres Perez, who also hopes to capitalize on Lusinchi’s problems with the economy. Although Perez is fighting an uphill battle against the party machine, his chances are boosted by his immense following among party rank and file and by the Ortodoxos’ inability to settle upon a candidate to succeed the popular Lusinchi, who cannot seek a consecutive term in 1988. Perez’s bitter relations with the Ortodoxos suggests the possibility that—if his bid falls short—he might refuse to endorse the party’s nominee or might even accept a third-party nomination. The economic crisis poses no threat to the stability of democratic government over the medium term, in our judgment. Public acceptance of Venezuela’s political institutions remains strong and the radical left is almost nonexistent. Labor peace is virtually assured by the intimate relationship between Democratic Action and the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers—the nation’s dominant labor organization. Over the longer term, however, the inability of the economy to generate sufficient jobs for the nation’s rapidly expanding labor force could become a destabilizing factor. US interests will be adversely affected by Venezuela’s continuing foreign exchange crisis and economic recession. Over the medium term, US exports to Venezuela will continue to be limited by Venezuelan trade restrictions and chronic recession, while US creditors—who hold about one-third of Venezuela’s $35 billion external debt—are almost certain to experience continued difficulties in collecting principal and interest payments from Venezuelan borrowers, especially in the private sector. Venezuelan economic assistance to fledgling democracies in the Caribbean Basin—usually coincident with US interests—has been trimmed substantially from precrisis levels and is unlikely to recover soon. US-Venezuelan bilateral relations will probably be strained if the US increases its trade barriers to Venezuelan oil, steel, and aluminum exports—or if the failing Venezuelan economy contributes to the election of Perez, whom we believe would once again use the presidency to project himself internationally as a spokesman for Third World causes. [Omitted here are the table of contents, a map, and the body of the assessment.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin America, and African Analysis, Job 04T00794R: Intelligence Publication Files–Production Case Files (1986), Box 1, Folder 33: Venezuela: Struggling with Declining Oil Revenues. Secret; Noforn; [ handling restriction not declassified ]. Prepared in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis with contributions from the Office of Leadership Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Based on information available as of November 15. 483. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 483. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State 1 New York, September 26, 1987, 0227Z Secto 15035. Subject: Secretary’s meeting with Venezuelan President Lusinchi. 1. (C—Entire text). 2. Summary. President Lusinchi concurred with the Secretary’s exposition of urgency of Nicaragua challenge and of uncertain prospects that Guatemala Accord can lead to acceptable solution: a Cuba-like presence in Nicaragua is dangerous and unacceptable to both countries; Sandinista promises alone are insufficient; ceasefire is impossible without negotiations with the resistance; and Contras are best insurance of reasonable follow-through to Guatemala. Lusinchi did not agree, however, that Mexico is acting consciously against U.S. interests in this area. Bottom line from the Venezuelan: U.S. policy is correct and Venezuela itself must be “vigilant ... categorical” with the Nicaraguans. 3. Referring repeatedly to the dangerous narco/terrorist situation in Colombia and its effect on his own country, Lusinchi agreed that the spreading problem must be dealt with internationally. He praised U.S.-Venezuelan anti-drug cooperation, and thanked USG for assistance during recent flood emergency. Lusinchi noted strong Venezuelan economy, good oil and other development prospects, and ongoing excellent relations with U.S. banking community; he asked, though, that USG provide “a little political push” to accelerate private sector and multilateral agency cooperation. The Secretary said that Venezuela’s international financial record merits respect and support. 4. The Secretary praised Venezuela’s efforts to help Suriname and deal with Guyana, suggested more aid for Haiti. Lusinchi agreed on common U.S./Venezuelan stake in Caribbean and outlined his country’s assistance to several nations, including Haiti. He added his concern about Libyan activity in the region, suggesting U.S. and Venezuela work together on that problem. End summary. 5. Secretary Shultz talked 22 September with Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi in latter’s New York hotel suite. Accompanying Lusinchi were Foreign Minister Consalvi and Ambassador to the U.S. Hernandez. On the U.S. side: Ambassador to the U.N. Walters, Assistant Secretary Redman, ARA DAS Gelbard and ARA/AND Director Skol (note-taker). Nicaragua 6. The Secretary began with Central America. The U.S. would like to see the Guatemala Agreement turn out to be a workable one. The U.S. posture is to help the people involved put the pieces together. But much work has to be done. One example: there are currently no active negotiations between the Nicaraguan Government and the resistance with regard to a ceasefire, yet a ceasefire is called for by November 7. The Secretary insisted that a ceasefire is a complicated thing to negotiate, that it can’t simply be declared, and that the people doing the actual fighting must come to agreement on the terms. 7. The major problem for U.S. interests revolves around the question of armaments, the Cuban/Soviet presence. These are a direct threat to us. The Soviets have a major base in Cuba; from there they collect electronic intelligence, they fly missions on our coasts, they service their ships. We do not intend to see established a similar security threat in Nicaragua, enabling the Soviets for example to do on our west coast what they are now doing on the east coast. 8. The Secretary added that some of the specific positions in the Contadora drafts were helpful in areas where the Guatemala Agreement is vague or postpones key decisions into the future. What we want is to see peace in Central America, to see democracy in Central America, and we have to work together to achieve those goals. To that end, we believe strongly that one of the reasons the Nicaraguan communists were ready to sign the agreement was the existence on the ground of the capabilities represented by the resistance; they are the best insurance policy that there will a follow-through on the Guatemala Agreement. At the same time, if in fact the agreement’s goals are achieved, our funding for the resistance can be used for humanitarian purposes. Unfortunately, we see a grouping—Nicaragua, with Cuban and Mexican support—working in ways contrary to our interests. In response to Lusinchi’s quick question about the inclusion of Mexico in the list, the Secretary insisted that though Mexico is our neighbor and we are working hard and successfully to bolster the bilateral relationship, Mexico’s international policy remains a serious problem for us. He added that he has said the same thing directly to the Mexicans. 9. Lusinchi said he agreed with the Secretary, with the exception of his characterization of Mexican policy. There indeed must be close follow-up to the Guatemala Agreement. It would be “naive, suicidal” to trust Nicaraguan intentions just because certain declarations had been made. Lusinchi indicated he had said just that to the Sandinistas, as to Foreign Minister d’Escoto in Caracas. The Nicaraguans have to “open up,” fulfill their commitments, disconnect their ties to the Soviets. It is not RPT not permissible to have a base in Nicaragua along Cuban lines. 10. With regard to Mexico, Lusinchi suggested that policy toward Nicaragua reflected nothing more than traditional Mexican adherence to the non-interference doctrine, that Mexico was not RPT not in fact skewing its support in favor of Nicaragua. He noted that in his visit to Mexico, he saw nothing “suspicious” in Mexican attitudes. The Mexicans, for example, were not changing their suspension of oil shipments. Mexico, he insisted, had “well-refined” perceptions of the situation. It would be “naive, stupid” for anyone to underestimate Cuban and Soviet intentions in the area. 11. Lusinchi agreed on the need to be vigilant against the Nicaraguans, noted again that Venezuela had been “categorical” in its approaches. He added that “We believe that your position is a good position, the right one, the right course.” He recalled the expression, “Pray to God, but make sure you take action yourself.” To which the Secretary related a story from President Reagan on the need to take action: About the God-fearing man caught in a flood, who rejected one rescue boat, saying he would rather trust his faith; then another boat, and finally a helicopter, each time stating his trust in God. After he drowned he went to heaven and complained to God about being deserted. The Lord replied that he had in fact sent “two boats and a helicopter.” 2 Narco-Terrorism 12. The Secretary recalled USG assistance during the recent flood disaster, noting that the U.S. is a true friend of Venezuela. 3 Lusinchi thanked the Secretary for the quick help provided through the Embassy in Caracas. He then turned to “even more important” aid—U.S. assistance in the anti-drug campaign. He noted excellent cooperation with DEA and cited the challenge presented to Venezuela by the seriousness of the narcotics and terrorism situation in Colombia. “We end up paying the price,” even though Venezuela itself does not have a drug or guerrilla problem. He agreed with the Secretary’s point that, whatever the origin of the drug threat, it does quickly spread, and therefore must be dealt with on a genuinely international basis. Lusinchi stressed Venezuelan resolve and uniqueness—not only Colombia, but Ecuador and Peru faced overwhelming threats from drug traffickers and terrorists. Venezuela has a solid, diverse democracy, unpenetrated by drug corruption as in Colombia and Ecuador. He said that Ecuadorean President Febres Cordero had even told him that he constantly had to change troops on the border because of how quickly they were compromised by drug money. Economic Relations 13. Lusinchi said that, although Venezuela remained free of guerrilla and narcotics activity, economic and social stability had to be maintained in order to keep it that way. He asked that the USG help with the private sector and with multilateral financial organizations to accelerate financial cooperation with Venezuela. He cited past excellent relations with Paul Volcker, just concluded favorable talks with Morgan and other U.S. banks, and word—from the bankers—that Alan Greenspan was favorably inclined. Lusinchi added that prospects for aluminum and new, light oil investment are excellent, and reiterated Venezuela’s “special case” status vis-a-vis its neighbors. The Secretary replied that the international financial record of Venezuela merited respect and support and that he was certain that Venezuela would be able to develop fine relations with Alan Greenspan. Lusinchi noted, however, that “a little political push” from the USG would certainly help. The Caribbean 14. The Secretary praised Venezuela’s efforts vis-a-vis Suriname and Guyana, noting that we had a common stake in democratic development in the Caribbean. He added that Haiti remained shaky and could use some additional Venezuelan assistance. Lusinchi replied that Venezuela was helping Haiti. With arms and troop housing, and would continue to provide assistance, as it was as well in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. Trinidad is an example of a country which needed not so much more money, but help with better economic planning. He opined that only the U.S. and Venezuela were really doing anything useful in the region (although Consalvi noted that, from his observations, the Grenadians felt that the U.S. was “neglecting” them). The Secretary told Lusinchi that the two countries should maintain close contact on the subject of Caribbean assistance. Libya 15. Lusinchi raised Palestinian and Libyan activity in the area, citing Venezuela’s capture of a Palestinian and Libyan. The former, a “major terrorist” was turned over to the U.S. The Libyan, and the documents captured with him, revealed that Khaddafi was “not just crazy,” but dangerously active in the Caribbean. He had been traveling from Suriname to Panama and was involved in a “more dangerous” variation of Castro’s plans for the subversion of the black Caribbean. Lusinchi suggested that the U.S. and Venezuela should confer on the Libyan threat, and on what to do about it. The Secretary agreed. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1987 Nodis and Exdis Memorandums, Lot 94D432, Exdis Memorandums, August 1–December 1987. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Caracas and the Contadora Collective. In telegram 9315 from Caracas, September 17, Reich provided briefing information for Shultz’s meeting with Lusinchi, noting that Lusinchi would likely raise the issues of debt and drugs, two issues about which Lusinchi felt “very strongly.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870771–0377) 2 In telegram Secto 15005 from Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation in New York, September 23, Shultz reported to Reagan about his meeting with Lusinchi: “Nicaragua was the keynote of my discussion with Venezuelan President Lusinchi. He agrees that a Cuba-like Nicaragua is dangerous and unacceptable, that Sandinista promises alone are not enough, and that Contras are the best insurance to protect our interests. Trouble is, that’s Lusinchi talking in private; in public, he lets his left-leaning Foreign Minister run the show.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N87008–0218) 3 In telegram 12183 from Caracas, December 11, the Embassy sent an addendum to its final report on the Maracay mudslide and flooding disaster caused by a tropical storm beginning on September 5. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871019–0497) 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela 1 Washington, October 20, 1988, 2312Z 343588. Subject: The Reagan-Lusinchi Pull-Aside. Ref: (A) 88 Caracas 10236, 2 (B) 88 State 336400 3 1. Confidential—Entire text. 2. Summary. As expected (Caracas 9556), President Lusinchi used President Reagan’s September 26 pull-aside to comment on Peru’s plight. 4 Lusinchi also expressed concern for Haiti. The Venezuelan Chief Executive, in a talkative mood, commented on U.S. elections, Venezuelan elections, changes in the Soviet Union and his travels to Eastern Europe. Given the nature of the encounter—a reception—President Reagan did not respond to any specific points and there were no action implications. End summary. 3. President Reagan took President Lusinchi aside at a U.S.-hosted reception for heads of delegation attending UNGA to tell him that he was a bulwark for the cause of democracy in a key Latin American country. Lusinchi assured President Reagan that the transition period in Venezuela would be uneventful. Lusinchi described Carlos Andres Peres (CAP), his likely successor, as a strong anti-communist. Comment: Lusinchi clearly sought to assure the USG of the GOV’s continued interest in exercising regional leadership and in cooperating with the U.S. End comment. 4. Lusinchi manifested his interest in the region’s fledgling democracies by discussing Alan Garcia. The Secretary, also present, said Garcia had squandered a good opportunity to help his country at the beginning of his administration. Lusinchi admitted that Garcia was immature, but insisted there were no alternatives; we should support Garcia. Lusinchi said that Venezuelan military leaders were in contact with their Peruvian counterparts at the request of Garcia. 5. Haiti was another topic of concern for Lusinchi. He said Avril was a good man and, again, urged U.S.-Venezuelan cooperation in Haiti. Lusinchi expressed specific concern for Haitian exile communities in Venezuela and Cuba. Comment: We note that Lusinchi’s positive disposition to Avril contrasts with the views of other Venezuelans (Caracas 10081), who are reserving judgment on the September 17 coup. 5 End comment. 6. Ref B. responds to Ref. A points not discussed above. Shultz 1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880935–0429. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Maracaibo, Lima, Port-au-Prince, and the Interest Section in Havana. Drafted by Yale; cleared in NSC, ARA/AND, ARA, CAR, CCA, P, S/S, and S/S–O; approved by Abrams. 2 In telegram 10236 from Caracas, October 14, Reich wrote to Abrams requesting a readout of Reagan’s conversation with Lusinchi and a September meeting between Herrington and Venezuela Energy Minister Julio César Gil. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880918–0099) 3 In telegram 336400 to Caracas and the OPEC Collective, October 14, the Department reported on Gil’s September 28–29 meetings with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Eugene McAllister and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy and Resources Policy John Ferriter: “Gil’s main message was Venezuela’s need for more foreign investment inflows and debt rescheduling to balance an expected 33 percent drop in oil revenues this year.” The Embassy also noted: “Reporting cable on Gil’s September 29 meeting with DOE Secretary Herrington is at DOE for clearance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880916–0509) 4 In telegram 9556 from Caracas, September 23, the Embassy reported on Reich’s September 22 meeting with Lusinchi, who expressed serious concern about Peru. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880854–0448) 5 In telegram 10081 from Caracas, October 7, the Embassy sent an overview of Venezuelan views on the Avril coup in Haiti. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880899–0161) 485. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State 485. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State 1 Caracas, December 30, 1988, 2035Z 6123. Subject: Ambassador’s call on President Carlos Andres Perez. 1. Secret—Entire text. 2. Summary: Ambassador met with President-elect Carlos Andres Perez (CAP) on December 28 to follow up on issues discussed at CAP’s meeting with President-elect Bush in Washington on December 13. 2 Issues discussed included: — CAP’s perception of the Bush-CAP meeting; — Panama; — Nicaragua; — Oil prices and possible SPR sales by Venezuela to the U.S.; — Narcotics cooperation; — CAP’s inauguration and possible participation by Castro and Ortega; — The occidental claim; — Bilateral trade; — Tenure of current U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela; — CAP’s travel plans; — Debt; and — Trade and investment, including barter arrangements. These issues will be reported by septels. 3 Throughout the meeting CAP was short on specifics but appeared very pleased by his conversation with President-elect Bush. End summary. 3. General perception of CAP-Bush meeting: CAP spoke at length and very warmly about his meeting with President-elect Bush. He used a number of adjectives such as “warm,” “open,” “knowledgeable,” “sensible,” “understanding,” and “strong” to describe President-elect Bush. He was, as we have heard from various sources in the CAP team, obviously pleased with the personal treatment accorded him by Vice President Bush, including the “extra” unexpected gestures by the Vice President such as meeting CAP at the driveway, accompanying him and presenting him to the press corps, and finally taking him personally to his limousine and waiting until the departure of CAP’s motorcade. This Embassy has heard from various sources that the Venezuelans were extremely impressed by the courtesies accorded to CAP by the person they consider to be the most important man in the world after January 20, 1989. 4 The Ambassador has been told that CAP has stated, “He (Bush) treated me as an equal,” not only in the courtesies extended but in truly listening to CAP’s opinion and eliciting his suggestions and recommendations. 4. Embassy believes that, although differences of opinion are bound to emerge between the U.S. and Venezuelan administrations which are to take office on January 20 and February 2 respectively, the CAP-Bush meeting has created an opportunity for close cooperation, at least in the short term, on extremely important hemispheric issues. Reich 1 Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, OA/ID 19874–015, Country Files, Venezuela–1988. Secret; Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. An unknown hand wrote “GOOD VIBES!” in the right-hand margin. 2 A memorandum of conversation of Bush’s December 13 meeting with Pérez is ibid. In telegram 393002 to Caracas, December 6, the Department forwarded Reagan’s letter of congratulations to Pérez on his election as President. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881066–0023) In telegram 393003 to Caracas, December 6, the Department forwarded Shultz’s letter of congratulations to Pérez. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881066–0025) In telegram 393943 to Caracas, December 6, the Department forwarded Bush’s letter of congratulations to Pérez. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881068–0853) 3 In telegram 12566 from Caracas, December 31, the Embassy reported Reich and Pérez’s discussion of oil. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890001–0577) In telegram 12568 from Caracas, December 31, the Embassy reported Reich and Pérez’s discussion of Nicaragua. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890001–0581) In telegram 12569 from Caracas, December 31, the Embassy reported on Reich and Pérez’s discussion of debt. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D890001–0582) In telegram 12556 from Caracas, December 30, the Embassy reported on Reich and Pérez’s discussion of Noriega. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D881134–0727) 4 Bush drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin beside this paragraph and wrote: “Tiny things that are ‘nothing’ to us do matter. GB.”