FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–7, DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH ASIA, 1969–1972 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–7 Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 United States Government Publishing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969-February 1971 (Documents 1-121) India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971 (Documents 122-197) U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972 (Documents 198-323) Afghanistan, 1969–1972 (Documents 324-372) Bangladesh, December 1971–December 1972 (Documents 373-437) Sources Sources Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration Lot Files. These files have been or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59. INR/IL Historical Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files AGR 15 PAK: food supply, Pakistan AV 2 INDIA: general aviation reports and statistics, India AV 12 INDIA: aircraft and aeronautical equipment, India AID 9 INDIA: loans for economic development, India AID 9 PAK: loans for economic development, Pakistan AID (US) INDIA: general policy, U.S. aid to India AID (US) PAK: general policy, U.S. aid to Pakistan AID (US) 9 INDIA: U.S. loans to India for economic development AID (US) 15 PAK: PL–480, Food for Peace program, Pakistan AID (US) 15–8 PAK: commodity sales for foreign currency, Pakistan AID (US) 15–8 PAK: PL–480, Title I commodity sales, Pakistan DEF PAK–US: defense affairs, Pakistan–United States DEF 1–1 ASIA SE: contingency military planning, Southeast Asia DEF 7 PAK–US: military visits and missions, Pakistan–United States DEF 12–5 ASIA SE: procurement and sale of armaments, Southeast Asia DEF 12–5 INDIA: procurement and sale of armaments, India DEF 12–5 PAK: procurement and sale of armaments, Pakistan DEF 15 PAK–US: bases and installations, Pakistan–United States DEF 15–10 PAK–US: establishment, construction, and termination of bases and installations, Pakistan–United States DEF 18–8 INDIA: testing and detection of nuclear explosions, India DEF 21 PAK: military communications, Pakistan E 8 PAK: economic conditions, Pakistan FT 18–1 INDIA–US: licenses for foreign trade, India–United States INCO–RICE 17 BANGLADESH–US: industries and commodities, rice, Bangladesh–United States LEG 7 FRELINGHAUSEN: legislative visits, Peter Frelinghausen ORG 7 S: organization and administration, visits by Secretary Rogers ORG 7 U: organization and administration, visits by the Under Secretary of State POL INDIA–PAK: political affairs and relations, India–Pakistan POL INDIA–US: political affairs and relations, India–United States POL PAK: political affairs and relations, Pakistan POL PAK–US: political affairs and relations, Pakistan–United States POL 1 INDIA–US: general policy, India–United States POL 1 PAK–US: general policy, Pakistan–United States POL 1 ASIA SE–US: general policy, Southeast Asia–United States POL 1–1 INDIA–PAK: contingency planning, India–Pakistan POL 7 INDIA: visits and meetings with Indian leaders POL 7 PAK: visits and meetings with Pakistani leaders POL 7 US/Connally: visits and meetings, John Connally POL 7 US/KISSINGER: visits and meetings, Henry Kissinger POL 12 INDIA: political parties, India POL 12 PAK: political parties, Pakistan POL 14 INDIA: Indian elections POL 14 PAK: Pakistani elections POL 15 PAK: government, Pakistan POL 15–1 INDIA: Indian head of state POL 15–1 PAK: Pakistan head of state POL 15–1 US/Nixon: United States head of state POL 15–2 PAK: legislature, Pakistan POL 15–5 PAK: constitution, Pakistan POL 17 PAK/US: diplomatic and consular representation, Pakistan–United States POL 18 PAK: provincial, municipal, and state government, Pakistan POL 21 INDIA–USSR: peace and non-aggression, India–USSR POL 23–8 PAK: demonstrations, riots, and protests, Pakistan POL 23–9: rebellion and coups POL 23–9 PAK: rebellion and coups, Pakistan POL 27 INDIA–PAK: military operations, India–Pakistan POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK: truce, ceasefire, and armistice, India–Pakistan POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK/UN: truce, ceasefire, and armistice, India, Pakistan, and the UN POL 29 PAK: political prisoners, Pakistan POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK: India-Pakistan border disputes PR 11–3: press conferences and interviews REF PAK: refugees and migration, Pakistan SOC 10 BANGLADESH: disasters and disaster relief, Bangladesh SOC 10 PAK: disasters and disaster relief, Pakistan SOC 11–5 AFG: traffic in narcotics, Afghanistan SOC 11–5 INDIA: traffic in narcotics, India SOC 11–5 PAK: traffic in narcotics, Pakistan Lot Files NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69 Subject files of Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco for 1970–1971, maintained by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA Files: Lot 73 D 376 Country and special files of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rodger Davies, 1967–1970, maintained by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51 Country Director’s miscellaneous subject files, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 387 India political subject files for 1972, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 349 India political files for 1945–1970, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 356 India political and defense files for 1969, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377 India political subject files for 1969–1970, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17 India political files for 1970, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 444 India economic files for 1971–1972, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 446 Bangladesh refugee files for 1971–1972, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 76 D 30 India political and defense files for 1971, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 77 D 51 Country Director’s miscellaneous subject files, 1969–1971, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 77 D 387 India political files for 1972, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/INS Files: Lot 78 D 60 Country Director’s files, 1963–1974, maintained by the Office of India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 74 D 179 East Pakistan/Bangladesh political files for 1971, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 74 D 191 Pakistan subject files for 1970, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 74 D 214 Pakistan economic files for 1970, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 52 Pakistan subject files for 1972, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 91 Pakistan subject files for 1971, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 285 Pakistan economic files for 1971, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98 Pakistan military subject files for 1971, 1972, 1974, and 1975, maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAF Files: Lot 72 D 70 Pakistan political files for 1969, maintained by the Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAF Files: Lot 72 D 138 Pakistan economic files for 1969, maintained by the Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387 Records of official visits abroad by President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, Secretary of State Rogers, and former Vice President Humphrey, January 1969-February 1970. Conference Files: Lot 71 D 227 Records of official visits by heads of state and foreign ministers to the United States and international conferences attended by the President, the Vice President, or the Secretary of State for 1970, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Nixon Presidential Materials Project National Security Council Files Backchannel Files Briefing Books for HAK’s SEA and PRC trips Country Files: USSR, South Asia, India, India/Pakistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh Haig Chronological File Kissinger Office Files Indo-Pak Crisis Files Indo-Pak War Files NSC Unfiled Material Presidential Correspondence Presidential/HAK Memcons President’s Daily Briefing Files President’s File–China Trip President’s Trip Files Saunders Files Subject Files Items to Discuss with the President HAK/Richardson Meetings National Security Study Memoranda Presidential Determinations President/Kissinger Memos VIP Visits National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) White House Special Files President’s Office Files Staff Member and Office Files H. R. Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries Helmut Sonnenfelt White House Central Files Staff Members and Office Files, Office of Presidential Papers and Archives, Daily Diary White House Tapes National Security Council Intelligence Files Central Intelligence Agency NIC Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Job 79–R01012A Office of the Deputy Director for Plans Files, 1969, Job 79–01229A Office of the Deputy Director for Plans Files, 1970, Job 79–01440A Files of the Deputy Director for Plans, 1971, Job 79–480A DCI (Helms) Files, intergovernmental files, Job 80–B01086A, DCI (Helms) Files, miscellaneous files, 1966–1972, Job 80–B01285A DCI (Helms) Files, geographic and subject files, Job 80–M01048A, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD Files: FRC 330 74 142 Top Secret files from the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969–1972 OSD Files: FRC 330 75 089 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969 OSD Files: FRC 330 75 103 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 0028 Chronological files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1958–1973 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 067 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Sectary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1970 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 076 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1970 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 197 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1971 OSD Files: FRC 330 76 207 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1971 OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094 Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1972 OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0095 Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1972 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 6308 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1969 OSAD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 6309 Secret Files for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1969 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1975 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1970 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74 083 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1971 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74 115 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1971 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 125 Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1972 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 155 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1972 Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Manuscript Division Kissinger Papers Published Sources Documentary Collections U.S. Department of Defense, Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Laird, 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1972) U.S. Department of State, Bulletin , 1969–1972. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of The United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973) Sheelendra K. Singh, et al, eds., Bangladesh Documents , Volume I (Madras: B.N.K. Press, 1971) Memoirs Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. Abbreviations Abbreviations ABM, anti-ballistic missile ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ADB, Asian Development Bank ADC, aide-de-camp AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AFS, Afghanis, Afghan currency AID, Agency for International Development AID/ASIA/NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau for Asia, Agency for InternationalDevelopment AID/GC, Office of the General Counsel, Agency for International Development AID/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development AID/PPC, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development AID/PRI/DRD, Disaster Relief Division, Office for Private Overseas Programs, Agency forInternational Development AICC, All India Congress Committee AL, Awami League (Pakistan) Amb, Ambassador AMCITS, American citizens A/OC/T, Bureau of Administration, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications, Communications Center, Department of State A/OPR/RS, Bureau of Administration, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, Records Services Division, Department of State AP, Associated Press APC, armored personnel carrier ARMATT, Army Attaché ASAP, as soon as possible BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BD, Bangladesh BDG, Bangladesh Government B/G, Brigadier General BNDD, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice BOB, Bureau of the Budget BSF, Indian Border Security Force CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CENTO, Central Treaty Organization CF, contingency funds Chicom(s), Chinese Communist(s) CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIA/ONE, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates CINC, Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics; Commander in Chief CINCARPAC, Commander in Chief, Army, Pacific CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe CL, commercial list CND, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs COMECON, Council on Mutual Economic Assistance ConGen, Consulate General CONTO, series indicator for telegrams sent from John Connally while outside of Washington CPM, Communist Party Madras CPI, Communist Party of India CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CWC, Congress [Party] Working Committee, India DAC, Democratic Action Committee, Pakistan DATT, Defense Attaché DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DEA, Department of External Affairs, India DefSec, Defense Secretary del, delegate; delegation Dept, Department Deptel, telegram from the Department of State DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency Dissem, dissemination DL, development loan DMZ, demilitarized zone DOD, Department of Defense DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs DOD/ISA/NESA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs, Office of Near Easternand South Asian Affairs DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State E/IFD, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic Affairs E/IFD/ODF, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau ofEconomic Affairs EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State EA/VN, Office of the Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs EBR, East Bengal Regiment ECAFE, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council EEC, European Economic Community ELINT, electronic intelligence ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva Emb, Embassy Emboff, Embassy officer EP, East Pakistan EPADC, East Pakistan Development Corporation EPCAF, East Pakistan Civil Armed Force EPR, East Pakistan Rifles EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution) Ex-Im, Export Import Bank of Washington FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom FDR, Franklin D. Roosevelt FFW, Food for Work FMS, Foreign Military Sales FODAG, United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture FonMin, Foreign Minister FonSec, Foreign Secretary FPREPORT, Foreign Policy Report FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSL, Foreign Service Local FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GA, United Nations General Assembly GAO, General Accounting Office GBD, Government of Bangladesh GMT, Greenwich Mean Time GNP, gross national product GOBD, Government of Bangladesh GOEP, Government of East Pakistan GOI, Government of India GON, Government of Nigeria GOP, Government of Pakistan GOT, Government of Turkey H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State HAK, Henry A. Kissinger HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare HMG, Her Majesty’s Government, United Kingdom HRH, His Royal Highness IA, Indian Army IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICC, International Control Commission ICRC, International Committee, Red Cross IDA, International Development Association IFY, Indian Fiscal Year IG, Inspector General IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/DDC, Directorate for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research INR/DRR/RNA, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research INR/DRR/RSE, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research INR/DRR/RSG, Office of Strategic and General Research, Directorate for Regional Research,Bureau of Intelligence and Research INR/IL, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs IRBM, Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile ISID, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Indian and Pakistani equivalent of CIA) IST, Indian Standard Time J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JP, Justice Party, Pakistan J/PM, Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for PoliticalAffairs kg, kilogram LDC, less developed country Limdis, Limited Distribution LTG, Lieutenant General MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAC, Military Assistance Command MAI, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Afghanistan MAP, Military Assistance Program MB, Mukti Bahini (People’s Brotherhood, East Pakistani guerrilla force) MCH, Ministry of Children’s Health ME, Middle East MEA, Ministry of External Affairs MFA, Minister/Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIDEASTFOR, Middle East Forces MIL, military MINAG, Ministry of Agriculture MINPLAN, Ministry of Planning Misoff, Mission officer ML, Muslim League; military list MLA, Martial Law Administrator/Administration, Pakistan MNA, Member of the National Assembly, Pakistan MP, Member of Parliament MPA, Member of Provisional Assembly, East Pakistan MPH, Ministry of Public Health MPW, Ministry of Public Works MT, metric ton NAC, North Atlantic Council NAP, National Awami Party, Pakistan NAP/L, National Awami Party, Left, East Pakistan NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC, National Broadcasting Company NDF, National Democratic Front, Pakistan NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/INC, Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and Maldive Islands, Bureau of Near Easternand South Asian Affairs NEA/INS, Country Director for India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldive Islands, Bureau of NearEastern and South Asian Affairs NEA/PAB, Country Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Easternand South Asian Affairs NEA/PAF, Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and SouthAsian Affairs NEA/RA, Office of the Director of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, and South AsianAffairs NEFA, Northeast Frontier Agency NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development NGO, non-governmental organization NI, Nizam-E-Islam (Pakistani political party) Niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate action NIC, National Intelligence Council NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NLF, National Liberation Front Nodis, No Distribution (other than to persons indicated) Noforn, no foreign dissemination NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee NSCIG/NEA, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and SouthAsia NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum NVN, North Vietnam NWFP, Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan O/CT, Bureau of Administration, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications,Communications Center OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OBE, overtaken by events OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness OMB, Office of Management and Budget OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PA, purchase authorization PAF, Pakistan Air Force PAK, Pakistan, Pakistani PAO, Public Affairs Officer PDM/AL, Pro-PDM Awami League (Pakistan political party) PDP, Pakistan Democratic Party PIA, Pakistan International Airlines PL, Public Law PM, Prime Minister PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State PM/AE, Office of Atomic Energy and Aero-Space, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs PM/MAS, Office of Military Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs PML, Pakistan Muslim Leagu PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants POLAD, Political Adviser POLOFF, Political Officer POW, prisoner of war PPP, People’s Party of Pakistan PR, Public Relations PRC, People’s Republic of China PriMin, Prime Minister R&D, research and development RCD, Organization of Regional Cooperation for Development reftel, reference telegram rep(s), representative(s) res, resolution RG, record group RGA, Royal Government of Afghanistan S, Office of the Secretary of State S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State S/R, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM, surface-to-air missile SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State SDR(s), Special Drawing Right(s) SEA, Southeast Asia SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington septel, separate telegram SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SIGINT, signals intelligence SITREP, situation report SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate Sov, Soviet SRG, Senior Review Group SVN, South Vietnam SYG, United Nations Secretary-General TA, technical assistance TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) TDY, temporary duty Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while outside of Washington U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAR, United Arab Republic UK, United Kingdom UKG, United Kingdom Government UN, United Nations UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea UNEPRO, United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in Pakistan UNROD, United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca UNSC, United Nations Security Council UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General US, United States USAF, United States Air Force USAFI, United States Air Force Intelligence USAFSS, United States Air Force Security Service USAID, United States Agency for International Development USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, European Command USCINCMEAFSA, United States Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa Southof the Sahara USDA, United States Department of Agriculture USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USIB, United States Intelligence Board USINFO, United States Information Service USIS, United States Information Service (overseas branches of USIA) USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaty USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations in New York VC, Vietcong VOA, Voice of America VOLAGS, voluntary agencies VP, Vice President WESTPAC, Commander, Western Pacific WFP, World Food Program WH, White House WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group Persons Persons Abbas, M.M., Director General for Americas and Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Pakistan Abshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 1970 Agha Khan, Prince Sadruddin, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States, January 1969–October 1973 Ahmad, Khondkar Mushtaq, Vice President of the Awami League and Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April–December 1971 Ahmad, M.M., Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission in Pakistan, Economic Adviser to President Yahya Ahmed, Aziz, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Ahmed, Tajuddin, General Secretary of the Awami League and Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April 1971–January 12, 1972; thereafter Minister of Finance of Bangladesh Ahsan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad, Deputy Martial Law Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy until August 1969; Governor of East Pakistan, August 1969–February 1971 Ali, Iftikar, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan from April 1972 Ali, M. Hossain, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States from December 1972 Ali, Mahmud (Mahood), Head of Pakistan’s delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, October 1971 Alvie, Momtaz A., Additional Foreign Secretary of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry Annenberg, Walter H., United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969 Ayub Khan, Mohammad, President of Pakistan until March 1969 Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, March 1969–January 1973 Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid, Leader of the National Awami Party in East Pakistan Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, December 7–December 19, 1971; thereafter President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense of Pakistan Blee, David H., Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency Blood, Archer K., Consul General in Dacca until June 1971 Bowles, Chester, Ambassador to India until April 1969 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bush, George H. W., Republican Congressman from Texas until January 1971; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, February 1971–January 1973 Cargo, William I., Director of the Policy and Coordination Staff, Department of State Cargill, Peter, Director, South Asia Department, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps until December 1971 Chaudhry, Air Marshal Zafer, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force from March 1972 Chavan, Yashwantrao B., Indian Minister of the Interior until June 1970; thereafter, Indian Minister of Finance Chowdhry, Abu Ayed, President of Bangladesh from January 12, 1972 Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 1969 Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971–May 1972 Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, May 1969–December 1971 Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970–1971 DePalma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Desai, Morarji Ranchhodji, Indian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister until July 1969 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Durrani, S.U., Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Bangladesh from September 1972 Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1969 Etemadi, Nur Ahmed, Prime Minister of Afghanistan until May 1971 Farhadi, Rawan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Farland, Joseph S., Ambassador to Pakistan, September 1969–April 1972 Farooqi, Zahir M., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of Pakistan Firyubin, Nikolai Pavlovich, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India Giri, Varahagiri Venkata, Vice President of India until May 3, 1969; Acting President, May 3–July 29, 1969; President from August 20, 1969 Gordon, Herbert, Consul General in Calcutta Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969; also, Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970 Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gross, Nelson, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State, and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters Guyer, Roberto, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Haig, General Alexander M., Jr., Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969–June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 1970–January 1973 Haksar, Parmeshwar Narain, Secretary to Prime Minister Gandhi Haldeman, H. R., Assistant to the President Hamed, Samad, Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Turkey, May 1969–April 1973 Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development, April 1969–October 1973 Haq, Major General Inam-ul, Director General, Defense Procurement, Pakistan Ministry of Defense Hassan, Lt. General Gul, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, from December 1971–March 1972 Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973 Henry, Paul-Marc, Assistant Administrator and Associate Director, Bureau of Operations and Programming, UNDP; Coordinator, UN Relief Operations in Dacca (UNROD), 1971 Hilaly, Agha, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until September 1971 Holdridge, John H., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970–1972 Hoskinson, Samuel M., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970–1972 Hussain, Zakir, President of India until his death, May 3, 1969 Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 1969 Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State Islam, Syed Nazrul, Acting President of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April–December 1971 Jha, Lakshmi Kant, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India until May 1970; thereafter, Indian Ambassador to the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969 Jung, Nawab Ali Yavar, Indian Ambassador to the United States until May 1970 Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency Karim, Muhammad Enayet, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States, May–August 1972; thereafter Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Karim, S. A., Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh until August 1972 Kaul, Triloki Nath, Foreign Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs from February 1969 Keating, Kenneth B., Ambassador to India, May 1969–July 1972 Kellogg, Francis L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs from January 1971; also Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Pakistani Refugee Relief Kennedy, Richard T., member of the National Security Council staff, January 1970–January 1972 Khan, General Abdul Hamid, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Khan, Abdul Monem, Governor of East Pakistan until March 1969 Khan, Lieutenant General Tikka, Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan, February–September 1971; Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army from March 1972 Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah, Leader, Democratic Action Committee of Pakistan Khan, Air Marshal Nur, Deputy Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kittani, Ismat, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs; also Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Assistance to East Pakistan Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Laingen, L. Bruce, Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan until July 1971; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, January 1969–January 1973 Lall, K. B., Indian Defense Secretary Lewis, Samuel W., Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan MacDonald, Donald G., Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development Mace, Charles, Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Macomber, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1969; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) October 1969–April 1973 Malik, A. M., Special Assistant to President Yahya for Displaced Persons and Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in East Pakistan, July–September 1971; thereafter Governor of East Pakistan Malik, H. R., Chairman of the East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation, 1971 Malikyar, Abdullah, Afghan Ambassador to the United States Manekshaw, General Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969 McNamara, Robert S., President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Meyer, Armin H., Special Consultant in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from April 1972 Mitchell, John, Attorney General, January 1969–February 1972 Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nalle, David, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency Nass, Charles, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Afghanistan Narayan, J. P., elder statesman, Indian Congress Party Niazi, Lt. General Amir Abdullah Khan, Martial Law Administrator for East Pakistan from September 1971 Neumann, Robert G., Ambassador to Afghanistan Newberry, Daniel O., Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan from October 1972 Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States, January 10, 1969–August 9, 1974 Noyes, James H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., Ambassador to Pakistan until July 1969 Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1971 Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971–January 1972; Secretary of Commerce, January 1972–January 1973 Patel, I. G., Special Secretary, Indian Ministry of Finance Pickard, Sir Cyril, British High Commissioner in Pakistan Popper, David H., Ambassador to Cyprus Qaiyum Qazi Zahirul, member of the Pakistan National Assembly, Awami League representative Quainton, Anthony C. E., Political and Economic Affairs Officer, New Delhi, 1969; thereafter member of the Office of Nepal, India, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, (Mujib), President of the Awami League; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Bangladesh from January 1972 Ram Jagjivan, Indian Minister of Defense from June 1970 Rasgotra, Maharajakrishna, Minister for Political Affairs of the Indian Embassy in the United States Raza, Major General Nawabzada Agha Mohammad, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, November 1971–April 1972 Rees, C. Herbert, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969–June 1970 Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rogers, William P., Secretary of State, January 1969–September 1973 Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 1969–February 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 1972–January 1973 Ryan, General John D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Sathe, R. D., Joint Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs Samad, Abdus, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Sarabi, Abdul Wahed, Afghan Minister of Planning Saunders, Harold H., member of the National Security Council staff Scali, John, Special Consultant to the President, January 1971–January 1973 Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969; Acting Deputy Director, 1969–1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1971; thereafter, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Schneider, David T., Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969 Selden, Armistead I., Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Seraj, Dr. Majid, Afghan Minister of Public Health Sethi P. B., Indian Minister of State for Finance Shafiq, Mohammad Moussa, Afghan Foreign Minister, July 1971–December 1972; thereafter also Prime Minister Shahi, Agha, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations Shakespeare, Frank, Director, United States Information Agency, February 1969–February 1973 Sher Ali Mohammad, Pakistani Minister of Information and National Affairs Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 1969–July 1970; Director, Office of Management and the Budget, July 1970–May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury, and also Assistant to the President, May 1972–May 1974; also head of the Council on Economic Policy from December 1972 Singh, Dinesh, Minister of External Affairs of India, February 1969–June 1970 Singh, Kewal, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of India from November 1972 Singh, Swaran, Indian Minister of Defense until June 1970; thereafter Minister of External Affairs Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; also Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia Sober, Sidney, Director of the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until November 1969, thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member of the National Security Council staff, 1969–1972 Sorabi, Abdul Wahid, Minister of Planning of Afghanistan Spain, James W., Director of the Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January–July 1969; Chargé d’ Affaires in Pakistan, July–November 1969; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan Spengler, William F., Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, July 1970–July 1971 Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, September 1969–August 1973 Spivack, Herbert D., Consul General in Dacca, June 1971–September 1972 Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969–January 1972 Stone, Galen L., Chargé d’Affaires in India from August 1969 Sultan Khan, Mohammad, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan until April 1972, thereafter Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Timmons, William, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, January 1969–February 1970; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971 Van Hollen, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, May 1969–September 1972; thereafter, Ambassador to Sri Lanka Volcker, Paul A., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Vorontsov, Yuli M., Minister of the Soviet Embassy in the United States Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 31, 1971; thereafter, Secretary-General Weinberger, Caspar W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and the Budget, July 1970–May 1972; Director, May 1972–January 1973; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Westmoreland, General William C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 30, 1972 Williams, Maurice J., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development; Chairman of Interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief Winspeare-Guicciardi, Vittorio, Under Secretary General of the UN and head of the UN’s Geneva office, appointed at the end of December 1971 as Special Representative of the Secretary General to deal with the humanitarian problems growing out of the conflict in South Asia Yahya Khan, General Agha Mohammad, Chief Martial Law Administrator, President, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, March 1969–December 1971 Yost, Charles W., United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 1969–February 1971 Zahir, Abdul, Afghan Prime Minister, June 1971–December 1972 Zahir, Mohammad, King of Afghanistan Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President, January 1969–January 1973 Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., Chief of Naval Operations India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969-February 1971 India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969-February 1971 1. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for President Nixon Washington, undated The memorandum, prepared by the NSC staff and sent by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to Nixon, analyzed the causes underlying the riots occurring in Pakistan and the implications for Pakistani President Ayub Khan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs. Secret. The memorandum is undated but was sent to the President on January 27 by Kissinger under cover of a briefing memorandum that summarized a number of foreign policy issues. Kissinger indicated that he was forwarding the attached memorandum because of the President’s interest in Khan. Kissinger’s memorandum stated that he had prepared the analysis of the situation in Pakistan, but it was apparently prepared by members of the National Security Council staff. (Ibid.) Kissinger also attached to his memorandum copies of telegrams 284 from Dacca, January 24, 292 from Dacca, and 247 from Karachi, both dated January 25. The telegrams reported on the rioting. (Ibid.) 2. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, January 29, 1969, 0824Z The Embassy commented on the possibility that Pakistani President Ayub Khan might not stand for reelection. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 3. Telegram 1238 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, February 5, 1969, 1100Z The Embassy reviewed mounting political unrest in Pakistan and concluded that Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s “eventual withdrawal from the political scene must be considered likely.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Dacca, Lahore, Peshawar, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE. 4. Intelligence Memorandum No. 612/69 Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, February 6, 1969 The memorandum assessed the politically volatile situation in Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem 5. Telegram 19762 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, February 7, 1969, 0126Z In a conversation with Secretary Rogers, Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly outlined Pakistan’s concerns about reduced economic assistance from the United States and the delay in promised military supplies. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAK–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 6 by James W. Spain (NEA/PAF), cleared by William J. Handley (NEA), and approved for transmission by Spain. The conversation took place on February 6. Rogers reported on the conversation in a memorandum that he sent to the President on February 6. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs, Feb 1–8, 1969) 6. Intelligence Note No. 82 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 11, 1969 The note assessed the implications of Pakistani President Ayub Kahn’s call for the opening of a dialogue with the political opposition. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 7. Telegram 1439 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, February 11, 1969, 1058Z Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the protracted effort to arrange for military supplies for Pakistan and urged a “prompt liberalization of policy” to expedite the process. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, New Delhi, Laird, JCS, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. 8. Telegram 2308 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State and the White House New Delhi, February 19, 1969, 1114Z Ambassador Bowles took sharp exception to Ambassador Oehlert’s proposal to expedite military assistance to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis 9. Intelligence Note No. 117 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 20, 1969 INR assessed the situation in Pakistan, where rioting by mobs in the streets created “chaos, in many places approaching anarchy.” Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s attempt to foster a compromise with the opposition through a round table conference had apparently collapsed. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Telegraphic reports of riots and demonstrations are ibid. Student supporters of former Foreign Minister Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto rioted in Karachi on February 17 following his release from prison. (Telegram 512 from Karachi, February 18; ibid.) The release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from prison on February 22 had the effect of calming passions in East Pakistan and opened the prospect of reviving the round table conference. (Telegram 697 from Dacca, February 22; ibid., POL 29 PAK) President Ayub Khan’s announcement on February 21 that he would not be a candidate in the next election also facilitated the revival of negotiations with his political opponents. (Telegram 1832 from Rawalpindi, February 21; ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) The round table conference convened in Rawalpindi on February 26, and Ayub accepted demands for direct elections and a parliamentary system, but negotiations collapsed on March 13 following the withdrawal of Mujibur Rahman over the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan. Telegraphic reports on the round table conference are ibid., POL 12 PAK and POL 23–8 PAK. 10. National Security Study Memorandum 26 Washington, February 21, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed that a study be prepared on military supply policy in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 1–42. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture, and to the Chairman of the JCS. 11. Intelligence Note No. 190 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 19, 1969 INR analyzed the implications of a serious food shortage in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 15 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 20, 1969 Nixon approved a recommendation from Kissinger involving the subsidized sale of food to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. 13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 25, 1969 Kissinger informed Nixon that Ayub Khan had resigned as President of Pakistan after declaring martial law and appointing General Yahya Khan martial law administrator. The principal question, he noted, was whether the people of East Pakistan would accept the change. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it and that a copy was sent to Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council staff. Ayub’s resignation and the establishment of martial law were reported from Rawalpindi on March 25 in telegrams 2954, 2956, 2957 and 2958. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) 14. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 27, 1969 Hilaly transmitted a message from General Yahya Kahn to President Nixon in which he explained former Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s decision to relinquish power to Pakistan’s defense forces, and Yahya’s subsequent assumption of the position of martial law administrator. Yahya expressed his commitment to restore democratic rule and a civilian government as soon as possible. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential. Sent to the White House on March 29 under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger. Nixon returned a reply to Yahya on April 22 in which he wrote: “I wish you well in your efforts as President to restore normal conditions.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69) 15. Telegram 50241 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, April 2, 1969, 2250Z Under Secretary of State Richardson questioned Deputy Martial Law Administrator Admiral Ahsan about the restoration of normal political processes in Pakistan and indicated that the U.S. traditionally reserved judgment in its dealings with authoritarian governments. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 PAK–US. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Drafted by Spain; cleared by Howard B. Schaffer (NEA/INC) and Joseph Sisco (NEA); and approved by Richardson. Vice Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Navy and one of three Deputy Martial Law Administrators appointed by General Yahya Khan, was Pakistan’s representative at the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. A memorandum of Ahsan’s conversation with Nixon on March 31, during which Ahsan offered the assurance that the Pakistani military forces had no desire to perpetuate themselves in power, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 1, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 30, 1969. Ahsan subsequently told Spain that he “got the message” that while the U.S. might understand the necessity for martial law in Pakistan, future actions of the martial law administration in governing the country and establishing a timetable for a return to representative government would determine how helpful the United States could be to Pakistan. (Telegram 50354 to Rawalpindi, April 2; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) 16. Telegram 4797 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, April 10, 1969, 1049Z Ambassador Bowles urged that positive action be taken on a proposal, which had been under consideration for several years, to establish a binational foundation in India to fund mutually agreed educational, scientific, and cultural activities. The foundation would be funded by excess U.S.-held rupees generated by loan repayments and the sale of PL–480 commodities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, enacted July 10, 1954, as amended. (68 Stat. 454) PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. 17. Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, April 16, 1969, 1050Z Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the history of U.S. military supply policy for South Asia and argued for a revision to increase supplies to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House, Department of Defense, the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, JCS, and CINCSTRIKE. 18. Telegram 4169 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, April 25, 1969, 0845Z The Embassy outlined U.S. policy options in Pakistan and recommended increased economic and military assistance as leverage to encourage progress toward the reestablishment of civilian government and an equitable settlement of the grievances of the eastern wing of the country. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, DIA, Ankara, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Moscow, Peshawar, Tehran, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Kabul, and Kathmandu. 19. Telegram 4275 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, April 29, 1969, 0832Z Ambassador Oehlert reported that the Pakistani Government was offering to consider a continuation on a “smaller and less visible basis” of the U.S. use of the facilities at Peshawar. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. The Department responded on April 30 that Oehlert should not take the initiative in discussing continuation of the operations at Peshawar, and if Yahya raised the issue, Oehlert was instructed to take a non-committal attitude and report to Washington. (Telegram 66922 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 20. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 16, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed economic assistance for Pakistan with M.M. Ahmad, the principal economic adviser to President Yahya. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Harold Saunders, and approved in S/S on June 1. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “version sent State.” 21. Telegram 7466 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, May 21, 1969, 1750Z The telegram reported the results of the Pakistan consortium meeting, May 19–20. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 PAK. Limited Official Use. Joint State/AID message. Sent also to Rawalpindi. Repeated to New Delhi for Spain. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to Pakistan met in Paris, May 19–20, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund also sent observers. 22. Telegram 7699 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Secretary of State Rogers in New Delhi Paris, May 23, 1969, 1922Z The telegram reported the results of the India consortium meeting, May 22–23. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Priority. Joint State/AID message. Repeated to the Department of State. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to India met in Paris, May 22–23, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund sent observers. 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State Tehran, May 26, 1969, 0950Z Rogers reported on his conversation with Pakistani President Yahya during his stop in Pakistan on May 24. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Sent as Secto 111/2059. Repeated to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Saigon, Bangkok, London, and the mission at Geneva. Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25. 24. Telegram Secto 143 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State May 29, 1969, 2237Z Rogers met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the morning of May 24 during his stop in India to discuss U.S. relations with India and U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent as Secto 143/WH 90729 with an instruction to repeat to New Delhi. Rogers sent the telegram from his plane while crossing the Atlantic Ocean from London en route to the United States. The meeting between Gandhi and Rogers took place on the morning on May 24. A copy of Nixon’s letter to Gandhi, which commended Rogers to her and emphasized the importance of India and its economic development to his administration, can be found ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 366. The Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister Singh was reported to the Department on May 24 in telegram 7246. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S) 25. Telegram 6484 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, July 2, 1969, 1100Z The Embassy renewed its arguments for limited direct sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and New Delhi. On July 8 the Embassy in New Delhi commented on the recommendations advanced in telegram 6484 from Rawalpindi as follows: “We must emphasize that any policy change permitting direct sales to Pakistan of lethal end items—even on a severely limited basis—would evoke sharp GOI reaction and severely damage our position in India.” (Telegram 9574 from New Delhi; ibid.) 26. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 10, 1969, 4:37–5:15 p.m. President Nixon and Indian Foreign Minister Singh discussed relations between the U.S. and India in advance of Nixon’s forthcoming visit to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on July 12. The meeting was held in the Oval Office of the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Singh was visiting the United States in response to an invitation extended by Rogers in New Delhi on May 24. A summary of Singh’s conversations with Rogers on July 10 and 11 was sent to New Delhi on July 11 in telegram 115492. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69) Singh also met with Kissinger on July 10. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 16, 1969 Kissinger analyzed a political crisis for Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and the possible effect on Nixon’s impending visit to India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The Embassy in New Delhi reported on the political crisis on July 15 in telegram 10025, and on July 16 in telegram 10082 (both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 INDIA) On July 19 Gandhi’s government issued an ordinance nationalizing 14 of the country’s largest banks. The Embassy commented: “By boldness and swiftness of her move on July 19 to nationalize leading banks, Prime Minister Gandhi has achieved leadership of Congress Party and confounded her powerful opponents within that party.” (Telegram 10333 from New Delhi, July 21; ibid.) 28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 18, 1969 Nixon approved proposals put forward by Kissinger for economic assistance to India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations. Attached but not published at Tab A was a July 3 memorandum to Nixon from Robert P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, entitled “Proposed P.L. 480 Program for India.” Attached but not published at Tab B was a June 23 memorandum to the President from Rogers, entitled “Economic Assistance to India.” 29. Memorandum of Conversations New Delhi, July 31, 1969, 3–4:45 p.m. and August 1, 1969, 8:30–10 a.m. U.S. relations with India were discussed on July 31 in a conversation between the advisers to President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, including Kissinger and Indian Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul. On August 1 Nixon and Gandhi joined the discussion. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on August 1. The combined conversations were apparently typed from notes taken by Saunders that were not refined into finished memoranda of conversation. The conversations recorded in this memorandum were also reported to the Department on August 2 in telegram 11040 from New Delhi. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 383) The conversations were held in the Panel Room of the President’s Palace in New Delhi during Nixon’s visit to India July 31–August 1. Nixon was on a round-the-world trip that began on July 23 with the observation of the splashdown and recovery of the Apollo 11 spacecraft from the deck of the USS Hornet, followed by an overnight stop in Guam. He then embarked on a series of official visits to meet with chiefs of state and heads of government of the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The President also made an unannounced visit to the Republic of Vietnam, an official visit to Romania, and a brief stopover at Mildenhall Air Force Base in England to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The President returned to the United States on August 3. 30. Memorandum of Conversation New Delhi, August 1, 1969, 7:45–8:30 a.m. Before the second meeting of advisers, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with P.N. Haksar, his counterpart in the Indian Government. Haksar suggested that good relations between the U.S. and India depended upon the U.S. willingness to recognize the situation on the subcontinent and cease equating India with Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. No classification marking. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Presidential Palace. 31. Memorandum of Conversation Lahore, August 1, 1969, 2:30–4:30 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the Nixon Doctrine and discussed U.S. relations with Pakistan with senior advisers to Pakistani President Yahya. Presidents Nixon and Yahya joined the conversation at the end. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is similar to the memoranda prepared by Saunders of the conversations in New Delhi on July 31 and August 1. This memorandum was apparently also prepared from the unrefined notes Saunders took during the meeting. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore during Nixon’s visit from August 1–2. According to another record of the meeting between Nixon and Yahya, relations with China were discussed at some length. Nixon said that in any discussion of Asia’s future, China could not be ignored. He said that he recognized the need for a dialogue to bring China into the community of nations, but it would take time before the U.S. public accepted that point of view. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 2, 1969; ibid., Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I (1970)) According to Kissinger, who was present at that part of the meeting, Nixon also told Yahya that the United States would not be party to any arrangement to isolate China and asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180–181) Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who was traveling with the President, recorded in his diary on August 2 that Yahya had made a strong impression on Nixon “as a real leader–very intelligent—and with great insight into Russia-China relations.” He added that Nixon felt that “Yahya can be valuable channel to China esp.–but also USSR.” (Ibid., Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, H.R. Haldeman Journal, Trips I, February 23, 1969–September 1970) 32. Memorandum of Conversation Lahore, August 1, 1969 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Air Marshal Nur Khan to discuss China, Indo-PAK relations, and the question of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted on August 7 by Spain. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore. 33. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of India, Nepal, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) Washington, August 15, 1969 Schneider analyzed a developing political crisis in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer. 34. Telegram 140939 From the Department of State to the White House Washington, August 20, 1969, 2348Z The Department assessed Indian Prime Minister Gandhi’s victory over her rivals in the Congress Party and concluded that it would improve prospects for political stability in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell, and approved by Schneider. Sent with an instruction to pass to San Francisco for Rogers and to San Clemente for Kissinger. 35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, September 12, 1969 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. [2 pages of source text not declassified.] 36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, September 15, 1969 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. [2 pages of source text not declassified.] 37. Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon Rawalpindi, October 1, 1969 Yahya requested urgent approval of the sale of 1.7 million tons of wheat under PL–480 to offset a serious food shortage in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. No classification marking. The Consulate General in Dacca underlined the problem of food shortages in East Pakistan on October 10 in telegram 2855 from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 18 PAK ) 38. Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, October 6, 1969 Chargé Spain traced the history and drew the lessons from the experience of the Air Force communications facility at Peshawar. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 21 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 2, and cleared in draft by General Geary and in the political section by Stephen E. Palmer and Alan D. Wolfe. Repeated to New Delhi, Ankara for Handley, Tehran for Minister Thacher, London for Minister Hughes, the Peshawar Air Station for the Commanding Officer, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, USAFI for Hilbert, CIA for Sheldon, NSA for General Carter, USAFSS, and DOD/ISA. The 10-year agreement governing the communications facility at Peshawar was not renewed by Pakistan and expired on July 17, 1969. A limited number of U.S. personnel remained after July 17 to effect an orderly turnover of the facility to Pakistan. A brief ceremony effected the turnover on January 7, 1970, rather than on February 28 as anticipated by Spain. (Telegram 001 from Peshawar, January 8, 1970; ibid., DEF 15–10 PAK–US) 39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, October 16, 1969 Nixon approved the sale of 1 million tons of wheat to Pakistan under PL–480. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A was an October 10 memorandum from John Hannah to Nixon; attached at Tab B was an October 13 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; neither is published. The October 1 letter from Yahya to Nixon, attached at Tab C, is printed as Document 37. The President initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 22. On November 13 Nixon sent a letter to Yahya indicating that the United States was prepared to negotiate a PL–480 agreement of 1 million tons of wheat for Pakistan. (Ibid., Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, (1969–1970) ) 40. Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, October 16, 1969, 1713Z Secretary Rogers reviewed Indo-U.S. relations with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul and warned that Indian recognition of North Vietnam would have a “serious and lasting” negative effect on relations with the United States. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider on October 14, cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and James D. Rosenthal (EA/VN), and approved by Rogers. Sent also to Saigon, Rawalpindi, and Paris. The telegram sent to Paris was also numbered Todel 3367. Kaul was in Washington as head of the Indian delegation to the Indo-US Bilateral Talks; see Document 42. The Secretary’s meeting at the United Nations with Foreign Minister Singh on September 29, during which he raised similar objections to the proposed Indian recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, was reported to the Department on October 1 by USUN in telegram 3325. (Ibid,. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70) 41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, October 27, 1969 Rogers reported to Nixon that Southeast Asia was the principal focus of bilateral talks held in Washington between U.S. and Indian delegations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret. The bilateral talks were the second round in what were anticipated to be annual talks between the United States and India. The initial talks took place in New Delhi from July 26 to 28, 1968. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, South Asia, vol. XXV, Document 509. A 69-page record of the talks on October 16–17 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Box 503, Lot 70 D 387, CF 409. The talks were reported to New Delhi in telegrams 177194, 179522, and 180313, dated October 18, October 23, and October 24 respectively. (All ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US) 42. Analytical Summary Prepared For the National Security Council Review Group Washington, November 22, 1969 The summary is of a paper prepared in the Department of State in response to NSSM 26 and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The paper reviewed U.S. military supply policy toward South Asia and outlined options for consideration by the Review Group. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Secret. This summary is of a paper drafted in the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in response to NSSM 26 (Document 10), and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. Sisco, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent the paper on November 14 to Kissinger, the Chairman of the NSC Review Group. The paper, entitled “U.S. Military Supply for South Asia–Response to NSSM 26,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Saunders sent the analytical summary and the paper to Kissinger on November 19 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger’s handwritten note reads: “Hal–The President wants action not study. When are the tanks moving? When will the lawyers decide? Please get me quick answers.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Pakistan Military and Intelligence, 1/20/69–12/31/69) 43. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Review Group Washington, November 25, 1969, 3:15–3:55 p.m. Discussion of military supply policy toward South Asia focused on the question of resuming military sales and assistance to Pakistan and the cost to U.S. relations with India of doing so. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meeting, Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For a summary of the paper prepared in response to NSSM 26, see Document 42. 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, November 29, 1969 Nixon approved a recommendation to endorse the sale of 100 U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 6. 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 21, 1969 Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers’ objections to the sale of tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Kissinger reiterated his support for the sale. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for action. The attached memorandum is dated December 18. Nixon did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but wrote on the memorandum as follows: “K Discuss with me.” On December 23, David Schneider, Country Director for India, sent a letter to Keating about the memorandum that Rogers sent to Nixon. He wrote of Rogers: “We met with him to discuss the proposal and he was quite emphatic in his opposition to it.” He added, however, “the recurrent theme one hears from the NSC staff is that the President ‘wants to do something for Pakistan.’” (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence 1969/1970) 46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 31, 1970 Kissinger summarized a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Yahya in which Yahya pressed for a decision on military supply policy. Nixon indicated that he was disposed to respond favorably. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1969–1970). Secret. Sent for information. The attached letter from President Yahya to President Nixon is dated January 19. The December 20 letter to which Yahya responded can be found ibid. The reference to a speech on November 3, 1969, is to Nixon’s address to the nation on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909. Nixon underlined the last seven words of point 5 and added the following handwritten instructions in the margin: “1 Let’s give them spare parts immediately as basis of keeping the US word. 2 I lean to the Turkish tanks unless it raises too much hell with Congress. I don’t care about Indian reaction.” He also wrote on the memorandum: “K–doesn’t this show advantage of our letter idea? Let’s continue the practice on a selective basis.” 47. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon Washington, February 10, 1970 Richardson recommended that the U.S. maintain the embargo on military supplies to South Asia. If, however, Nixon felt he was under an obligation to Pakistani President Yahya, Richardson recommended that military supplies for Pakistan be limited to a one-time exception. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 6, and cleared by Sisco. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “OBE. See S/S 8019. RLBrown 6/10/70.” For a citation to the paper entitled “U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia,” see Document 42. The enclosures to the memorandum are not printed. In the order in which they are cited, the enclosures are an undated memorandum entitled “Recent Developments Affecting South Asia Military Supply Policy Issue,” another undated memorandum entitled “Possible Gestures Toward Pakistan,” and the December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, printed as an attachment to Document 45. 48. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 20, 1970 Saunders summarized the contending arguments advanced with regard to military supply policy for South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. The attached cable is telegram 1333 from Rawalpindi, February 18. (Ibid.) It can also be found ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Ambassador Keating sent a telegram from New Delhi on February 20 making the anticipated arguments against revising the existing arms policy for the subcontinent. (Telegram 1961 from New Delhi; ibid.) Kissinger’s handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “We must move this.” He added: “Let me see my memo.” The memorandum is marked in an unknown hand to indicate that Saunders had the action responsibility to respond to Kissinger’s instructions. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred was sent to the President on March 16 and is printed as Document 54. 49. Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, February 27, 1970, 2153Z The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Secretary Rogers to Foreign Minister Singh concerning India’s decision to close five USIS cultural centers. Rogers expressed regret over the decision and asked for evidence to support the allegation that the centers had been engaged in “political and other undesirable activities.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Richardson, and in USIA by Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia David Nalle; and approved by Rogers. The decision by India on February 10 to close five USIS cultural centers was triggered by a Soviet request on December 3, 1969, to open a cultural center in Trivandrum. The Soviet request led to a review of all foreign cultural centers operating in India and a decision to close the U.S. centers in Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Chandigarh, Ranchi, and Varauasi. These were the only such centers operating in cities without diplomatic or consular representation, and they operated on the basis of an understanding reached by former Ambassador Chester Bowles and Prime Minister Nehru. The Soviet Union sought to establish a cultural center in Trivandrum on the same basis. 50. Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, March 3, 1970, 1532Z Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the “not so pleasant” issue of the impending closure of the U.S. cultural centers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 51. Letter From the Indian Chargé d’Affaires (Rasgotra) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 5, 1970 Rasgotra transmitted a letter from Foreign Minister Singh to Rogers. Singh explained that the Indian decision to close the U.S. cultural centers was part of an effort to establish a uniform policy with regard to such centers and was not directed against the United States. No suggestion of improper activities on the part of the U.S. was intended. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377, India 1970, US Cultural Centers. No classification marking. The text of the letter was also conveyed to the Department from New Delhi on March 5 in telegram 2505. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70) 52. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 7, 1970 Saunders and Haig sent a memorandum to Kissinger, conveying Nixon’s reaction to the closure of the cultural centers: “Tell Sisco I’d like to take a stronger line on this. Not to object to closing-but to accept it and close some other facilities which may ‘irritate’ them a bit.” Saunders and Haig surveyed the possibilities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. Haig and Saunders sent the memorandum through David Young of the NSC staff for Kissinger. Attached is a copy of the page of the briefing memorandum with the President’s comments. 53. Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, March 9, 1970, 2152Z Secretary Rogers instructed Ambassador Keating to see Indian Foreign Minister Singh to ask him to issue a public statement absolving the U.S. of any “political or other undesirable activities” in the cultural centers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Van Hollen; revised in S by Herbert S. Okun and Rogers; cleared by Sisco, and Alan Carter, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia (USIA); and approved by Rogers. 54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 16, 1970 Kissinger’s memorandum laid out the options for the question of military supply for India and Pakistan, which in practice related largely to Pakistan. Nixon indicated that he favored continuing the policy of selling replacement parts to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A but not published is a January 7 paper, apparently prepared by the NSC staff, entitled, “Issues For Decision.” Attached at Tab B but not published is Secretary Rogers’ February 10 memorandum to the President. Both are ibid. Rather than approving or disapproving the recommendation put forward in the memorandum, Nixon responded with handwritten comments in the margins. The thrust of his comments was that he preferred the course of action outlined as option 4. He highlighted the second paragraph of the discussion of option 4 and wrote “OK” next to it. He underscored the first sentence of the following paragraph and wrote next to it, “I agree we do this by all means.” He began his comments under the approval line as follows: “I believe option 4 is less provocative politically in the U.S.–& for that matter in India.” He considered that option 4 plus an increased economic package constituted a substantial gesture in support of Pakistan that he could more easily support politically than the other options detailed in the memorandum. In a handwritten comment in the margin, Kissinger concurred with the President’s response: “I think option 4 gives Paks most.” He added an instruction to Haig: “Al–Get note from Hal [Saunders] what it means.” He was apparently referring to a more complete discussion of the implications of adopting option 4 as policy. 55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 27, 1970 Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. accept the closure of the cultural centers by India without complaint, while reserving the possibility of a further response. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached draft of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Saunders and revised by Kissinger. The President initialed the approval line on April 2. Not published is the attached March 17 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. 56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Nixon approved a recommended $102.5 million program of economic assistance for Pakistan for fiscal year 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated April 6. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. Attached at Tab A but not published is Rogers’ March 12 memorandum to Nixon on the economic assistance program. Mayo summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in a March 24 memorandum to the President; attached at Tab B but not published. 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 13, 1970 Kissinger asked Nixon to clarify his decision on South Asian arms policy. Nixon reaffirmed the sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment and approved a revision of the embargo on the sale of lethal equipment to allow a “one-time exception” for Pakistan for a limited number of items. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. For the previous memorandum dealing with the supply of arms to South Asia to which Kissinger refers, see Document 54. Nixon checked the first option to indicate his approval of a one-time sale to Pakistan. He added the following handwritten instruction: “Hold until we see whether the Indians will be in a control commission.” Nixon’s instruction raised questions as to which control commission he meant, and what he hoped to achieve with regard to India’s participation in a control commission by delaying a decision on arms supply to South Asia. Saunders posed these questions in a memorandum he sent to Haig on April 27. Saunders assumed the President was referring to one of the control commissions in Southeast Asia. Haig did not answer the questions but responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: “Hal–Pres is inclined to move but wants to wait at least until next week.” (Ibid.) 58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 15, 1970 Eliot reported that the five cultural centers at issue in India would be closed on May 16. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. The May 6 memorandum cited by Eliot is ibid. 59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Nixon approved a recommended program of $193 million in economic assistance for India for fiscal year 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum itself is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated May 19. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. The Rogers to Nixon memorandum, attached at Tab A but not published, is dated March 20. James R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in an April 30 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid. 60. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:30–3 p.m. Ambassador Farland warned Secretary of Defense Laird that Pakistan was disappointed with the U.S. and was turning increasingly to China and the Soviet Union for military supplies. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 22, Pakistan 1970, 000.1–100. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz and approved by Nutter on May 26. The conversation was held in Laird’s office. 61. Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (Schneider) to the Chargé d’ Affaires in India (Stone) Washington, May 26, 1970 Schneider informed Stone of the decision made by Nixon to provide military assistance to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. Published from a copy that bears Schneider’s typed signature. 62. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 27, 1970, 3:30–4 p.m. Ambassador Keating warned Secretary of Defense Laird that a decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan would have a “devastating” effect on U.S. relations with India. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 19, India 1970, 000.1–334. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz, and approved on June 1 by Nutter and on June 5 in Laird’s office. The conversation was held in Laird’s office. 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 11, 1970 Nixon confirmed his decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan to the arms embargo for South Asia, and he specified the inclusion of tanks and B–57 bombers. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers. 64. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, June 12, 1970, 11:30 a.m. Kissinger and Sisco discussed the President’s decision to include tanks and B–57 bombers in the one-time exception package for Pakistan. Sisco warned that to do so would increase opposition in the Congress and cause a greater reaction in India. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 65. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, June 12, 1970, 4:40 p.m. Sisco and Kissinger discussed the contemplated one-time exception again, and Sisco revised the proposal to eliminate the tanks and change the 6 bombers to 12 interceptor fighters. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. 66. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly of President Nixon’s decision to make a one-time exception to the embargo on arms supplies for South Asia on Pakistan’s behalf. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, June 18, 1970, 2220Z The Department instructed Ambassador Farland to inform Pakistani President Yahya about President Nixon’s decision on arms supplies for Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 68. Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, June 21, 1970, 1353Z Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Yahya was “deeply pleased and appreciative of President’s action.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 69. Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 16, 1970, 1615Z Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Swaran Singh, the new Minister of External Affairs, in which Singh said that a U.S. decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan would “greatly impair” his efforts to improve relations between India and the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. 70. Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating) Washington, July 17, 1970 Nixon wrote to Keating to explain the rationale behind his decision to provide “at least one package of equipment” to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Secret; Eyes Only. 71. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to India (Keating) Washington, July 19, 1970, 2:18 p.m. Kissinger confirmed the information concerning arms for Pakistan that was sent to Keating in a letter from President Nixon on July 17. He added that India’s pending decision on recognition of North Vietnam would “be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Haig for Kissinger. The message is undated, but an attached note indicates that it was sent on the date and at the time given. Telegram 112500 to New Delhi is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. 72. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 22, 1970 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the United States and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. A copy was sent to David Young. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. The time of meeting is not indicated on the memorandum. 73. Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, July 29, 1970, 2210Z The Department transmitted the text of a letter from Indian Foreign Minister Singh to Secretary of State Rogers in which Singh expressed his interest in improving Indo-U.S. relations but warned that a U.S. decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan would have “serious repercussions.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Limdis. Drafted on July 28 by R. Grant Smith (NEA/INC), cleared by M. Gordon Tiger (NEA/INC) and by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Rawalpindi. 74. Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, August 17, 1970, 0624Z Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca on severe flooding in East Pakistan that had led Pakistani President Yahya to postpone national elections from October to December. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The telegram, signed by Consul General Blood, was sent by Farland. Nixon followed Farland’s advice. On August 18 Farland was authorized to deliver a letter from Nixon to Yahya that was virtually identical to the letter proposed by Farland. (Telegram 134524 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 75. Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, September 10, 1970, 1125Z President Yahya told Chargé Sober that his decision to postpone national elections until December should not be taken to mean that he was wavering in his determination to restore civilian government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–PAK. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore. 76. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 24, 1970 Ambassador Farland summarized his conversation with President Nixon during which he reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s enthusiastic reaction to Nixon’s offer of a one-time exception to the embargo on military sales to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98, Military Supply–PAK Requests. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Farland. For the message delivered by Farland to Yahya on June 20, see Document 67 77. Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, September 29, 1970, 1809Z The Embassy was instructed to inform the Indian Government that the U.S. intended to make a limited sale of arms to Pakistan as a one-time exception to the arms supply policy established in 1965. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton and Schneider on September 28; revised and cleared by Van Hollen; cleared by Spengler, Chapman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice (H), Saunders, Colonel Gross (OSD/ISA), and Rear Admiral St. George (DOD/Joint Staff); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The Embassy in Rawalpindi was instructed on September 29 to inform Pakistan about the details of the decision to offer a one-time exception to the existing restrictions on military supply. (Telegram 160449 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, September 30, 1970, 1537Z Ambassador Keating conveyed the decision to allow limited arms sales to Pakistan in a conversation with Acting Foreign Secretary S.K. Banerji. Banerji described the issue as “extremely explosive” and expressed regret at the decision. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a “great deal of unhappiness” in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.) 79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, October 1, 1970, 1005Z Deputy Chief of Mission Sidney Sober reported on his meeting with Foreign Secretary Alvie and Defense Secretary Ahmed to discuss the U.S. offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936) 80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, October 5, 1970, 1110Z Pakistani President Yahya indicated that Pakistan would have difficulty financing the military sales being authorized and asked for alternative purchase plans. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 81. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, October 9, 1970 Sisco summarized the Indian and Pakistani reactions to the decision to authorize limited arms sales to Pakistan. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, DTS–Chrons, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and cleared by Spengler and Van Hollen. 82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Nixon approved a $72 million proposed program of PL–480 commodities for Pakistan for fiscal year 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated. Transmitted under an October 9 covering memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the NSC staff to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger initialed the approval line of the memorandum for Nixon. Attached at Tab A but not published is a September 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President, in which he recommended the proposed PL–480 program on behalf of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Caspar Weinberger, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurred with Johnson’s recommendation in a September 26 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Also attached was an October 20 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot informing the Department of State of the President’s decision and instructing the Department not to inform Pakistan until after Nixon had met with Yahya in Washington on October 25. 83. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya Washington, October 15, 1970 Nixon’s letter conveyed to Yahya the terms of the offer of an arms sale to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, 1969–1970. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Rawalpindi on October 16 to be conveyed to Yahya prior to his trip to New York for the fall session of the UN General Assembly. (Telegram 170588 to Rawalpindi; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 84. Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Rawalpindi, October 16, 1970, 1129Z The initial status report from the Embassy indicated that the “major problem” affecting the U.S. offer to sell arms to Pakistan was the question of whether Pakistan could afford to finance the package of arms being offered. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. 85. National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70 Washington, October 20, 1970 NIE 31/32–70 provided a summary of long-term political and economic prospects for India and Pakistan. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R 01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence R. E. Cushman, Jr. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 20, except for the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.” 86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Nixon approved a recommended $100 million AID program loan to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. An October 22 covering memorandum from Bergsten transmitted the memorandum and attachments to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum that the proposed program loan to Pakistan was “approved on basis of oral instruction by President.” Accordingly, Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on October 28. Attached but not published at Tab A was an undated memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to Nixon recommending authorization for a $100 million program loan to Pakistan. Attached but not published at Tab B was an undated memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, in which Shultz concurred with Irwin’s recommendation. 87. Telegram Secto 52 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State New York, October 22, 1970, 2046Z Secretary of State Rogers and Pakistani President Yahya met in New York during the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Yahya anticipated that it would take 6 months following the establishment of a constituent assembly based on the general election scheduled for December before a constitution could be drafted and martial law replaced with civilian government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also designated USUN 2646. Sent with a request to repeat to Rawalpindi, Cairo, and Amman. 88. Telegram Secto 70 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State New York, October 24, 1970, 1900Z Secretary of State Rogers and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi had a sharp exchange in New York growing out of the Indian reaction to the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Also designated USUN 2711. Sent with a request to repeat to New Delhi and Rawalpindi. In an October 26 letter to Keating, Schneider described the conversation between Gandhi and Rogers as “a very difficult one,” but he felt that the exchange was colored by the fact that both were tired at the end of a stressful day of meetings and speeches. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970) Gandhi set the tone for the meeting by declining an invitation from Nixon to attend a dinner the President was hosting in Washington for heads of state attending the General Assembly. (Telegrams 173630 and 176269 to New Delhi, October 21 and 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA, and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 Jun 71) Jha explained that Gandhi’s decision related to scheduling commitments on her return trip to India, but Keating saw it as a “studied affront related in large part to our decision to sell arms to Pakistan.” (Telegram 12939 from New Delhi, October 19; ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, Box 519, 1966–1972: Lot 71 D 227, CF 469) 89. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 24, 1970, 6:20 p.m. Rogers summarized his conversations with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Foreign Minister Singh for Kissinger. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are as transcribed. For Rogers’ conversation with Singh on the morning of October 24, see Document 92. 90. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 25, 1970, 10:49–11:45 a.m. Presidents Nixon and Yahya discussed relations between the United States and Pakistan and the possibility of Pakistan facilitating secret contacts between the U.S. and China. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, edited in the NSC for distribution to the Department of State, indicates that Kissinger was present and took the notes on which the memorandum was based. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 91. Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, October 26, 1970, 1528Z The Embassy reported on the growing public alarm in India over the prospect of increased shipments of U.S. arms to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA. 92. Telegram 176436 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India and the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 27, 1970, 1357Z In the wake of his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Secretary of State Rogers had a conversation with Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which the irritants affecting relations between the U.S. and India were aired at greater length. Both agreed to try to approach future problems with a clean slate. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on October 26 by Sisco and approved by Eliot. Sent to New Delhi eyes only for Keating and to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Charles W. Yost. 93. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, November 8, 1970, 0535Z In a conversation with Ambassador Farland, Pakistani President Yahya refined the list of weapons he asked to have included among those the U.S. was prepared to supply as part of the package President Nixon had authorized. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Sent with a request to pass to the White House and Secretary of Defense. 94. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 9, 1970, 2:40–3:20 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed what could be done to foster improved relations between the United States and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. 95. Telegram 187199 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, November 15, 1970, 2208Z The telegram transmitted a message from President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya expressing Nixon’s concern over the loss of life and property in East Pakistan as a result of a cyclone. Nixon offered U.S. assistance in responding to the disaster. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Also repeated to the Consulate at Dacca. Drafted by Alexander Fuller and Spengler; cleared by Davies, John F. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Press Relations, David J. Waters, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs, Saunders at the White House, and in AID by Curtis Farrar (AID/NESA), and Stephen R. Tripp (AID/PRI/DRD); and approved by Sisco. A major cyclone followed by a tidal wave struck East Pakistan on November 12. (Telegram 2116 from Dacca, November 16; ibid.) By November 25, 168,000 deaths had been recorded, and over 500,000 deaths were anticipated. (Intelligence note prepared in INR, November 25; ibid.) 96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Kissinger outlined the initial steps taken and those under consideration to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 9 Sept 70–Dec 70. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy of this memorandum in another file indicates that Saunders drafted it on November 16. (Ibid., Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation on the evening of November 16 that he would give him the proposal for relief assistance to Pakistan “the first thing in the morning.” Nixon responded: “I don’t need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) 97. Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, November 18, 1970, 1147Z Ambassador Keating questioned Indian Foreign Minister Singh about Indian allegations of U.S. interference in Indian politics. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. 98. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, November 19, 1970 Kissinger updated Nixon on the U.S. response to the disaster in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, November 20, 1970 Kissinger summarized a “delicate” issue relating to U.S. efforts to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. If the U.S acted on the Embassy’s assessment of the needs of the situation, it could contribute to the impression that the Government of Pakistan was not managing the situation effectively. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) Washington, November 20, 1970 Haldeman argued for immediate U.S. assistance to the victims in East Pakistan. He was not concerned about the political sensitivities of Pakistani President Yahya’s government: “We have to look humanitarian.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A notation on the transcript indicates that the conversation took place in the early afternoon. The omissions are in the original transcription. A transcript of Kissinger’s conversation with Ambassador Hilaly earlier in the day is ibid. 101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, November 27, 1970 Kissinger provided a further update of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan that, he noted, was being described as “the greatest natural disaster in terms of destruction and danger to life of the century and perhaps of recorded history.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 102. Telegram 2417 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, November 30, 1970, 1210Z Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca that relief efforts were proving to be effective in East Pakistan. He added that his information indicated that “few if any of the casualties died as a result of slowness of GOP expeditiously to move relief supplies to disaster victims.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Islamabad. 103. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin Washington, December 3, 1970 Sisco informed Irwin that the Indian Government had apparently decided to damp down its criticism of the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. He added that the Indians seemed inclined to try to repair the damage done to relations between the United States and India in recent months. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17, India 1970, DEF 19, October Decision. Confidential. Drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Van Hollen. Attached but not published was telegram 14902 from New Delhi, November 27. 104. Intelligence Brief INRB–217 From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 8, 1970 Cline summarized the election results in Pakistan and pointed to potential problems growing out of the election. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the intelligence brief. 105. National Security Study Memorandum 109 Washington, December 19, 1970 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger tasked the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and AID to prepare a study of U.S. policy options in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. 106. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 24, 1970 Saunders and Hoskinson summarized discussions with Pakistan and India over the issue of arms supply to South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy. 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 4, 1971 Nixon approved the provision of an additional 150,000 tons of food grains to East Pakistan for disaster relief. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A was a memorandum from Williams to Nixon sent through Kissinger for the President on December 23 under a covering memorandum from Eliot. Attached but not published at Tab B was the proposed press release. Not attached at Tab C was the draft letter. The Pakistan Relief Committee was established on November 26 and chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy. 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, January 14, 1971 Rogers argued against extending credit to Pakistan for the purchase of arms. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. 109. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 1, 1971, 1235Z Pakistani President Yahya addressed the developing movement for independence in East Pakistan and said that he did not intend to preside over the dissolution of Pakistan. Ambassador Farland assured him that it was U.S. policy to respect the unity and integrity of Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Sisco. In telegram 930 from Islamabad, February 1, Farland reported that he had met with President Yahya on January 29 in Yahya’s home to “talk about things in general.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, February 2, 1971 Rogers suggested that Nixon approve the AID program for India proposed for FY 1971 without waiting for the results of the NSSM exercise that was examining U.S. policy options in South Asia. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted on January 26 by Quainton and revised on January 29 in S/S by James L. Carlson. The attached February 2, confidential memorandum from Rogers to Nixon was also dated February 2 and was classified confidential. There is no indication that Nixon approved or disapproved the options on the attached memorandum. 111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 3, 1971 Kissinger informed Rogers that President Nixon had approved the recommendation that the one-time exception military arms sale to Pakistan be conducted on a cash basis. He also instructed that Pakistan’s credit requirements for non-lethal arms sales be sympathetically considered. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Farland was informed of the President’s decisions on February 5 and instructed to convey them to President Yahya. (Telegram 20428 to Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 112. Telegram 21111 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, February 8, 1971, 1742Z The telegram conveyed a letter from Secretary of State Rogers to Indian Foreign Minister Singh in which Rogers took exception to an allegation by Singh that the United States was interfering in election campaigns taking place in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton on January 26; cleared by Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice, and Coerr; and approved by Rogers. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky visited New Delhi January 7–18. 113. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 8, 1971 Pakistani President Yahya requested the U.S. to use its good offices to mediate in a mounting dispute with India over an Indian airliner hijacked in Kashmir. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. The two men who hijacked the plane were members of the National Liberation Front for Jammu and Kashmir. They threatened to blow up the plane unless India released 30 political prisoners held in Kashmir. (Telegram 130 from Lahore, February 1; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) India subsequently demanded that Pakistan pay compensation for the loss of the plane, extradite the hijackers to India, and accept responsibility for the incident. (Aide-mémoire delivered to the Department of State by the Pakistani Embassy, February 12; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK) On February 24 the Embassy in New Delhi reported troop movements on both sides of the border between India and West Pakistan growing out of the hijacking incident. (Telegram 2759 from New Delhi; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) Additional documentation on the incident is ibid. 114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 12, 1971, 0755Z Ambassador Farland argued strongly that unless Pakistan was afforded credit terms to help finance the weapons offered under the one-time excerption, the undertaking would prove to be “an exercise in futility.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. 115. National Security Study Memorandum 118 Washington, February 16, 1971 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, on behalf of the President, instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA to prepare a contingency study examining the options open to the U.S. in the event of a movement toward secession in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 116. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya Washington, February 17, 1971 Nixon responded to Yahya’s request for U.S. mediation in Pakistan’s dispute with India over a hijacking incident. He noted that the U.S. Government had discussed the incident with the Indian and Pakistani Governments but suggested that a multilateral approach to mediation through the International Civil Aviation Organization might prove more fruitful. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). No classification marking. On February 23 Yahya wrote to Nixonagain and, citing the effects of the prohibition of overflights of Indian territory on contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, reiterated his request that Nixon take a personal interest in the dispute. (Ibid.) 117. Telegram 29201 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, February 20, 1971, 2101Z The Department reiterated the reasoning behind the decision that all arms sales to Pakistan be made on a cash basis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 19 by Spengler; cleared by Van Hollen, Schneider, and Senior Regional Adviser James H. Boughton (NEA/RA), PM/MAS, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco. 118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 22, 1971 Kissinger assessed the political tensions in Pakistan that were raising questions about the continued viability of the state, and which were compelling the U.S. to “walk a very narrow tightrope.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon underlined the last sentence of the sixth paragraph from “Counsel General” to the end and added the following handwritten comment in the margin: “Good.” In the following paragraph, he underlined the part of the third sentence that reads: “more neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the United States” and wrote in the margin: “not yet–correct–but not any position which encourages secession.” 119. Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 25, 1971, 1200Z Ambassador Farland reported on Pakistani President Yahya’s concern and pessimism over the political crisis developing in the country. Farland repeated that the U.S. felt it was important to maintain the unity of Pakistan, and Yahya encouraged Farland to go to Dacca and make the same point to Awami leader Mujibur Rahman. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to the Consulate at Dacca. 120. Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 25, 1971, 1226Z Ambassador Farland explained to Pakistani President Yahya that the one-time-exception arms package could not be financed on a credit basis, and he reported that Yahya was “saddened and depressed.” Yahya noted that his Government was without the necessary funds to take full advantage of the offer, but he said that he would find the money to buy the armored personnel carriers. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 121. Telegram 540 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, February 28, 1971, 0824Z Ambassador Farland reported on his meeting with Awami leader Mujibur Rahman in Dacca. Mujib expressed his personal friendship for the U.S. as well as that of the “people of Bangla Desh.” Farland found that Mujib favored a form of confederation rather than the separation of East Pakistan, but he insisted that “his people” be accorded their rights and not be kept in a “colonial status.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. 1. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for President Nixon 1. Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for President Nixon 1 Washington, undated Ayub Khan’s Situation [ text not declassfied ] In the short-run Ayub, backed by the army, should be able to restore order, but these troubles reflect widespread dissatisfaction which could eventually topple his regime. The intelligence community feels that it is more likely that Ayub will survive and that he will win the elections scheduled to begin late this year, but he will have to move carefully to avoid further trouble. There are many reasons for the riots. 1. The worst trouble has been in East Pakistan where most people have long felt the government has discriminated in favor of West Pakistan. Rccent dissatisfaction has given new impetus to the separatist movement, and almost all opposition politicians advocate some degree of autonomy. 2. In West Pakistan there is much the same feeling—although less strong—against the Punjabis and Pathans from the northern part of the province who under Ayub have dominated Pakistani politics. 3. Ayub’s policy towards India is unpopular because he has been unable to make any progress on Kashmir. There is little agreement as to what the policy should be, but many of the opposition tend to be hawkish. 4. There is wide spread feeling that Ayub’s regime is corrupt. Ayub has removed his son—the prime example—from the limelight, but few of those in power have spotless reputations. The Governor of East Pakistan is among those most often criticized. 5. Many Pakistanis—including former Air Force Commander Asghar Khan—feel that only a more democratic government can solve Pakistan’s problems. One of the opposition’s most important tactics is to call for direct elections. Behind all of these is a feeling that more could and should have been done to improve the living standard of the Pakistanis. Pakistan’s progress by macroeconomic measures has been impressive, but it will take more time for these gains to seep down for Pakistan is still a poor country. So far, violent oppositioin has been confined mainly to urban groups—especially the students—with the politicians Ayub threw out in 1958 doing what they can to profit from the situation. To meet this problem, Ayub still has a strong position. 1. The military—despite some grumbling among middle-grade officers and Asghar Khan’s defection to the opposition—is still loyal to Ayub. 2. Many Pakistanis still see Ayub as the only alternative to the same kind of chaos that led him to take over from the politicians in 1958. 3. Despite their attacks on corruption, most opposition politicians have reputations as bad—or worse—than Ayub’s friends. Bhutto—the leftist ex-foreign minister Ayub jailed—is a drunkard. Asghar Khan is an exception, but he is inexperienced in politics. 4. The indirect electoral system works in Ayub’s favor, and he is in a position to control it. 5. The opposition is disunited. They all agree that Ayub must go, but a group which includes those who feel Pakistan should be ruled according to the Koran and those who advocate much closer relations with Peking will have trouble getting together on a program or a candidate. Moreover, the internal regional problems (rivalry between the two provinces and regional rivalry in West Pakistan) which hurt Ayub will also hurt his enemies. One further factor is Ayub’s health. He had a severe lung ailment erupt earlier this year and now seems to have recovered but no one can be sure how long he will be physically able to rule Pakistan. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs. Secret. The memorandum is undated but was sent to the President on January 27 by Kissinger under cover of a briefing memorandum that summarized a number of foreign policy issues. Kissinger indicated that he was forwarding the attached memorandum because of the President’s interest in Khan. Kissinger’s memorandum stated that he had prepared the analysis of the situation in Pakistan, but it was apparently prepared by members of the National Security Council staff. (Ibid.) Kissinger also attached to his memorandum copies of telegrams 284 from Dacca, January 24, 292 from Dacca, and 247 from Karachi, both dated January 25. The telegrams reported on the rioting. (Ibid.) 2. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 2. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, January 29, 1969, 0824Z Subj Local Political Situation 1. Nebulous rumors are floating around that, partly because of pressure from his family, Ayub may be considering making effort at compromise with opposition whereby we would agree either not—rpt not—run again or resign shortly after re-election in return for assurances security persons and property self and family. 2. Difficult to see what assurances could be considered reliable. 3. As such rumors persist and as crescendo student and poltical unrest mounts, I am reminded of two incidents, both of which took place before troubles started, and which did not-rpt not—seem particularly significant at the time, as follows: (A) When Ayub took me to his orange groves, I believe on or about August 25, he remarked that he dreaded the prospects of another political campaign in which he would quote have to travel all over the country quote kissing babies’ asses unquote. (B) In a longhand letter to me dated October 3, 1968 in commenting on President Johnson’s decision not—rpt not—to run for re-election. He wrote quote I came to know of the details some time ago. But even when the President met me on the airport at Karachi last November (sic) he spoke in similar strain. I then formed the imrression that unless he obtained massive open support from the people, he would not—rpt not—run. That is the way of a proud and sensitive man. Unquote. 4. Looking back to that period of tranquility, it now rpt now seems evident that he had little stomach for a campaign and that he was sympathetic to President Johnson’s situation and problems. 5. Most of us, and most third country people here, have felt that Ayub will weather the storm provided: (A) his health does not—rpt not—fail again; (B) he has the will to run; and (C) the military doesn’t—rpt not—decide to quote ask him out end quote. 6. There, is still no—rpt no—evidence that 5 (C) above may take place. 7. I have seen a good deal of Ayub lately at state dinners and on another private trip to his groves on January 12. He gives every evidence of having fully recovered from his illness. 8. Re paragraph 5(B) above, the two incidents referred to in paragraph 3 above would indicate that even before the troubles he may have been contemplating retirement. The rumors referred to in paragraph 1 above, if of any validity, would indicate that the prospect is still very much on his mind. 9. On the other hand, his character, at least prior to his illness, would suggest that we would react adversely to the prospect of withdrawing under fire even if he had been contemplating it previously. 10. The next few days or weeks should indicate whether or not—rpt not—he has the will and the means to carry on. If not—rpt not—after him may come the deluge. Oehlert 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 3. Telegram 1238 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 3. Telegram 1238 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, February 5, 1969, 1100Z Sub: Ayub Administration’s Prospects for Survival Ref: A. Rawalpindi 1218 B. 1219 C. 1220 1. Summary: The Ayub adminstration has failed to cope with the political challenges which faced it during the past three months. Ayub’s fortunes are on the down grade, and his eventual withdrawal from political scene must be considered likely. However, he still has some room for maneuver and will continue efforts to shore up his position. Neither an early resignation nor a resort to martial law is inconceivable, but both have grave disadvantages for Ayub, who is more likely to seek other solution. Reftels are Karachi, Lahore and Dacca responses to Embassy request for views of principal officers on political situation, views taken into account even when not specifically, referred to in this message. 2. Now clear that administration has forfeited a great part of its previous support because of its inadequate responses to new and threatening political challenges of past three months. These responses have been grudging, tardy and inept in West Pakistan and harsh and uncompromising in East Pakistan. As a result President’s supporters among polittically-aware classes have largely lost hope and confidence in regime or have been silenced. Declared opponents have made Ayub and his family a priority target in a campaign which has beneftied by what now appears as strong and widespread dislike of the regime. 3. How Ayub views his own position and prospects very unclear at moment. Reportedly isolated at least until recent past from outside opinion, it is yet difficult to believe that flow of facts to him is not rpt not sufficient to present him with reasonably accurate picture. (Regular reading of Dacca Observer alone would do that.) We are inclined to believe, therefore, that despite all evidence to contrary, President must be considering, and perhaps actively preparing, among other options, steps which would remove him from scene and yet preserve some degree of safety and comfort for himself and family. 4. However, on balance we doubt that President has come to conclusion to take this step, and it seems illogical that he will postpone final decision at least until outcome or “dialogue” with opposition is clear. Content his Feb 1 speech and first reactions to it indicate prospects for dialogue are dim and an impasse would probably throw the issue back to the streets, further deteriorating Ayub’s position. Both Karachi and Dacca have noted that Ayub seems to be losing the support and confidence of even those members of the establishment who benefit from the status quo and who would have been firm supporters of Ayub in the past. Conversations in which prospects for regime are pictured as almost hopeless are increasingly reported by Embassy officers. On the other hand Pak Times editor Suleri (recently reported to have replaced Gauhari as principal confidant of Ayub) in a column today calls for full particiapation of Opposition elements (including Bhutto, Asghar Khan, Mujibun Rahmani and suggests again that direct elections and federal parlimentary system will be topics.) 5. As Lahore noted, Ayub is left with the “apparatus of power.” It is a very formidable apparatus, capable of keeping Ayub in office for a time, if it can be persuaded to lend itself to his purposes. It is probably wrong, however, to consider apparatus, and particularly key military elements, as committed to Ayub as an individual. Their loyalty is more likely directed to their service, and in broader context to environment and state institutions favorable to their personal, family and caste interests. The threat of an internal social revolution, or fear of Indian moves against Pakistan, certainly, and a revival of East Pakistan separatist activity, possibly, would force the apparatus into action. However, none of these threats seem clear enough to reverse the fall of Ayub’s fortunes at this time, although Lahore and Dacca have noted the potentialities for social upheaval and revolutionary moves. Nevertheless, very quiet meeting of Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary (apparently in Rawalpindi last week), and announcement Nur Khan’s term of service as Air Force CINC extended additional two years from July 1969 suggest Ayub actively seeking maintain military support. 6. We must consider that Ayub has given thought to other alternatives. A withdrawal from political life, or resort to very strong measures e.g. some form of martial law, come to mind. Both have great disadvantages. A withdrawal under fire and the presumptive forfeiture of his great place in Pakistan’s history seems contrary to the nature of the man. A resort to martial law, must be equally repugnant as an admission of political failure and has other practical disadvantages. It seems at least questionable that the armed forces would be willing to assume a role that served simply to continue Ayub In power, and quite possible that real power and authority would slip away from the presidential offiice in such a situation. Another option in line with administration’s strategy so far is to simply hold on, try to deal with disturbances by limited applications of force and minor concessions, and hope that Opposition will be worn out. It is conceivable this could work if maintained with sufficient resolution and perseverence, but it seems likely Ayub’s position would deteriorate even more rapidly. 7. However, we believe that aqb [Ayub] probably will seek through more broad-ranging dialogue with Opposition than indicated in his Feb 1 speech to restore political calm. At same time, rumors abound re high-level personnel shifts (principally replacement of Gov. Monem Khan by Sobur Khan and eclipse of Gauhari). Degree of success of this effort difficult to foresee, but its failure obviously would present President and establishment with difficult choice. 8. Conclusion: Even while recognizing that Ayub has options and that there is no comparable national leader in prospect, we conclude he is now more likely to go than hold on to the presidency, although the time frame, and who and what follows is murky at best. Oehlert 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Dacca, Lahore, Peshawar, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE. 4. Intelligence Memorandum No. 612/69 Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 4. Intelligence Memorandum No. 612/69 Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, February 6, 1969 The Situation in Pakistan: III * Summary Antigovernment disturbances, which began last October, continued to plague Pakistan in January with the pace quickening in the latter part of the month. Curfews of varying severity were imposed in many of the urban centers in both wings of the country and the army was called into several of the major cities to restore peace. The Ayub regime appeared to be losing support within various segments of the population, although there were no new reports of disaffection within the critically important armed forces. On 1 February President Ayub announced his willingness to meet with leaders of “responsible” opposition political parties to discuss possible constitutional changes. On 5 February the invitation was modified apparently to include virtually any of his major opponents. His proposal, however, involved far less than the more militant opposition spokesmen and student leaders have been demanding. New and perhaps more violent demonstrations are likely, and the government appears to be approaching a point where it may have to make major concession to its opponents—unlikely as long as Ayub remains in power—or attempt to reimpose stability in the nation by the use of even more stringent repressive measures. Should Ayub choose the latter course, his future will be even more dependent on the unswerving loyalty of the armed forces. The Political Scene 1. The disparate political forces arrayed against Ayub were at least partially successful in submerging their differences and creating a unified command when, on 8 January, spokesmen for eight political parties of the center and right announced formation of the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). Two small but significant opposition parties remained outside the new coalition—the pro-Chinese Communist branch of the National Awami Party of East Pakistan (NAP/L) and the leftist Peoples’ Party of Pakistan (PPP), a largely personal political movement formed in 1968 by the former foreign minister, Z.A. Bhutto, now in jail. 2. The DAC offered an eight-point “minimum program” for the “restoration of democracy” in Pakistan. The program called for a return to a federal parliamentary system of government as opposed to the presidential system currently in operation; the institution of direct universal suffrage as opposed to the present indirect election of legislatures and president via an electoral college of some 120,000 “Basic Democrats”; and the restoration of various civil rights. The DAC leaders also announced a joint decision to boycott the 1969–70 elections if they were held under the present electoral system. The DAC decision to boycott the elections received the enthusiastic support of the leader of the NAP/L, who promised his party’s cooperation in the effort, but was criticized by a spokesman for the PPP. This same spokesman had earlier announced Bhutto’s intention to contest the presidential election; although Bhutto has made no statement himself and another of his lieutenants has denied that the former foreign minister will be a candidate. 3. Meanwhile, three possible but undeclared candidates for the presidency, all of whom have refrained from joining any opposition political party, continued relatively active. Fomer army general and ex-govexnor of East Pakistan Azam Khan was well received on his first political swing through the frontier area of West Pakistan near Peshawar. Former Chief Justice Syed Murshed of East Pakistan was slated to tour West Pakistan during the latter part of January. The most effective opposition spokesman remains former air marshal Asghar Khan, who briefly attended the DAC organizational meeting in Dacca and who received a tumultuous welcome on his arrival in Karachi early in January. His increasingly sharp attacks against the government are beginning to convince the most cynical observers that he is not working behind the scenes with Ayub but has indeed broken his ties with the regime. Moreover, his reputation for incorruptability and his basic conservatism have continued to make him, unlike Bhutto, acceptable to many members of both the political and economic “establishment.” Asghar presumably retains widespread popularity within the military services—particularly within the air force—but the amount of support that he could expect, in a contest for the presidency, especially among senior officers, is not yet known, The Demonstrations 4. The DAC launched its campaign to force concessions from the government with announcement of a province-wide strike, “Demand Day,” in East Pakistan on 17 January. East Pakistan Governor Monem Khan warned opposition leaders that he would use whatever force was necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of recently reimposed regulations forbidding demonstrations or the gathering of more than three people. The DAC leaders capitulated and 17 January passed relatively quietly in Dacca. 5. Over a period of the next several days, however, the students at Dacca University and other schools, apparently infuriated by Monem Khan’s repressive tactics, took to the streets. Clashes with the police and the paramilitary East Pakistan Rifles followed and on 20 January one of the students was killed. As violence rapidly spread throughout the cities of East Pakistan, the students in the West began organizing sympathy demonstrations, 6. Daily disorders throughout Pakistan culminated in a massive general strike on 24 January. On that date and in the days immediately following, pitched battles were fought with the police; pro-government newspaper offices, government buildings, and even the homes of officials were attacked and some were gutted by fire. Eventually the government was forced to impose curfews on most of the nation’s cities, and the army was called in to restore order and enforce the curfew in Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and several smaller communities. 7. By the beginning of February, over 30 deaths were directly attributable to the violence, scores had been injured, and hundreds were under arrest, Although relative calm had been restored, sporadic violence was reported in both East and West Pakistan. What would happen when the army was withdrawn was unclear, but student leaders and some opposition spokesmen, apparently convinced that the government was reeling, indicated they intended to press home the attack at the earliest opportunity. The Government’s Reaction 8. The government in Rawalpindi continues to give the impression that it is either unaware of the widespread nature and determination of the opposition or is incapable of moving quickly and surely to defuse the situation. An example of the government’s poor timing in grudgingly offering concessions to its opposition was the repeal of the restrictive West Pakistan University Ordinance of 1961 on 23 January. The ordinance had long been the target of attack by students and its repeal in October or November would have earned the government good will from a group that has become increasingly receptive to calls for violence. By 23 January, however, riots were erupting all over Pakistan and the conclusion was inescapable that the government was acting, not from a position of strength but from weakness as a result of pressure applied in the streets. 9. Repeatedly throughout January there were reports that Ayub was willing to meet with opposition leaders in an effort to work out a solution to the developing crisis. During the height of the demonstrations in Dacca, presidential adviser Fida Hassan arrived from Rawalpindi to confer with Governor Monem Khan. Rumors circulated that he, and possibly another emissary from Ayub, was also in contact with Nuril Amin, leader of the opposition in the National Assembly 10. On 1 February, in his traditional first-of-the-month speech to the nation, Ayub offered to consult “shortly” with representitives of “responsible parties.” Noting that the 1962 constitution could be amended, he said that he would agree to any settlements “arrived at through mutual dicussions.” A few days later, the President proposed that the meeting take place on 17 February in Rawalpindi. Ayub invited a leading spokesman for the DAC to call “whomever you like” among opposition politicians to the meeting. This blanket invitation apparently could even include Bhutto—one of Ayub’s bitterest opponents. 11. Whether this proposal will be accepted by the DAC, any of its component members, or the parties of the far left remains to be seen. The opposition’s initial reaction was guarded, although one DAC leader in Dacca laid down specific terms to be met prior to any conference, including the ending of the state emergency imposed in 1965 and the release of political prisoners. 12. Spokesmen for the PPP and the NAP/L have confined their comments to reiteration that the demands of the people are not negotiable. Meanwhile, the largest and most active of the student organizations immediatly rejected the conference proposal, and on 2 February new student protest marches erupted in several of Pakistan’s smaller cities. Ayub’s Position 13. During the past month, reports have indicated a steady deterioration of Ayub’s political base. Since his assumption of power in 1958, the President has relied for support primarily on the military, the Civil Service of Pakistan, the business community, the landowning class, the traditional conservative peasantry, and—to a lesser degree—his hand tailored political party, the PML. He has also found support among other classes by first establishing and then maintaining stability in a nation which had been on the verge of political chaos in 1958. Ayub, of course, has also made frequent use of the widespread fear that India will try to reincorporate Pakistan into the Indian Union to justify his highly centralized and at times dictatorial rule. 14. The fear of India remains and it is one of Ayub’s few remaining psychological weapons. After more than three months of disorders which have grown in intensity, however, Ayub finds it more and more difficult to convince his countrymen that he alone can ensure tranquility in the nation’s political life. His repeated warning that without him the nation would revert to the anarchy of 1958 rings increasingly hollow. 15. In the past two months, there have been significant defections away from Ayub from within the highest ranks of the civil service. Others who have not openly resigned, are speaking with unprecedented frankness about the corruption, nepotism, and failures of the regime. There are indications that some civil service workers are dissatisfied with their lot, particularly when comparing their economic gains under the Ayub regime with those of their opposite numbers in the military services, To add fuel to this incipient revolt against Ayub, opposition leaders have begun warning civil servants that excesses committed in support of the present regime will be punished by “people’s courts” to be established in the post Ayub era. During the latter part of January, there were reports indicating that government operations in some smaller towns and rural areas had virtually collapsed. 16. The economic leadership of Pakistan—big businessmen and landowners—probably continues as a group to support Ayub. There is evidence of increased concern, however, over the recurrent disorders and the resultant disruption of economic activities. The press reported that, during the demonstrations of late January, factory production in Karachi fell to 30 percent of normal. In addition, the disorders have re-kindled a form of Bengali separatism—never far below the surface—in East Pakistan which could signal danger for the wealthy West Pakistani entrepreneurs with business interests in that province. One report has indicated that a limited flight of capital from Dacca has already begun. 17. The attitude of landowners in the rural areas is less well known, but many may believe, as [ text not declassified ] that Ayub is on the way out and the time has come to disassociate from the present regime. [ text not declassified ] alleged fear of a “peasant revolt” would appear to be unjustified at this time, although shortages and the violence in the cities have caused stirrings of anti-government activity even in this traditionally apathetic class. 18. Ayub’s political party, the PML—never a particularly effective organization—appears to have virtually collapsed, Counter-demonstrations to those organized against the government are increasingly infrequent, and the houses of leading members of the PML have been the targets of mobs in both Karachi and Dacca. Some PML Basic Democrats—members of the electoral college—have publicly renounced their party affiliation. At Dacca University, and possibly at other schools, the pro-PML and pro-government students within the National Student Federation defected to the opposition—leaving the regime with no support on the campus. 19. This leaves Ayub largely dependent on the continued loyalty of the military services—specifically the officer corps. During the past month, there have been no new reports of coup plotting [ text not declassified ]. Moreover, the army has been strikingly successful in ending disorders and ensuring compliance with curfews. Interestingly, in Karachi during the height of the battle between demonstrators and the police on 25 January, army troops being moved in were cheered by the anti-government mob. Whether such friendly receptions were accorded troops arriving in other cities is not known, but it seems likely that if they were used over an extended period of time to suppress anti-government activity its popularity would be eroded. Whether senior army officers will continue to regard police-type duty as appropriate for their troops also remains a moot question as does their continued willingness to have the army closely identified with an unpopular regime. Up to the present the army has remained loyal to the government, but whether this is primarily a manifestation of loyalty to Ayub or to legitimacy is not certain. Short Term Prospects 20. Ayub’s proposal of 1 February to meet with the opposition probably was a disappointment to most opposition leaders because he proposed even less than the pro-government press had predicted he would. Unless he is willing to offer further concessions, it would appear unlikely that a conference would be very successful in reestablishing domestic tranquility—in the still uncertain event that Ayub can get the attendance of some of his major opponents. 21. It now appears doubtful that an agreement is possible between Ayub and his opposition given the current situation and the lack of trust which characterizes the relations between the two sides. If the demands of the DAC were met in full, Ayub would appear to be abdicating his power, and there seems little chance he will do that willingly. Under the present electoral system, however, Ayub would appear to have the necessary leverage to ensure his re-election via the mechanism of the Basic Democrats. With the possible exception of Bhutto, it seems most unlikely that the opposition will choose to contest an election under such rules. This probability is reinforced by the apparently widespread public support for the opposition and indications that the government is now at bay. If there were any pressure on opposition politicians to reach an accommodation with Ayub, it would appear to be based on fear that continued disorders could lead to growing power for the more radical politicians, such as Bhutto. 22. Meanwhile, and regardless of what the leaders of various political parties decide to do, the students have emerged as a new and potent political force in Pakistan. There is good evidence that many of the demonstations in January were organized and carried out by the students without consultation with opposition political leaders. In general, the leadership of the youthful demonstrators, many of whom are described as frustrated by the likelihood that appropriate jobs will not be available for them upon graduation, is more sympathetic to Bhutto and his “Islamic Socialism” or even to Chinese Communism than to the traditional opposition party programs, 23. Ayub would appear to be drawing close to a momentous decision. He can offer significant concessions to the opposition with the likelihood that he will lose power; he can impose martial law and rule by decree; or he can continue trying to fragment his opposition while making limited concessions and possibly postponing the 1969–70 general elections. The first choice would mean Ayub’s political demise; the second probably could be effectual for a limited period if he retains the support of the armed services; and the last could mean more of the same kind of disorders that have plagued Pakistan since last October. Additionally, Ayub could resign or announce his decision not to run for the presidency again. Although there is reported to be some pressure building up [ text not declassfied ] for this course of action, it would not be in keeping with his character. This step would become much more likely if either Ayub’s health were to deteriorate or he were confronted with a demand from the army to step aside for some form of “government of national unity.” 24. Regardless of Ayub’s decision, the outlook for Pakistan in the weeks ahead is for more strikes, protest marches, clashes with security forces, and increasing political instability, The curfews, backed up by army troops, restored a tense peace in the cities. Some of the curfews have recently been lifted, but army troops remain on alert nearby. In this situation, as in the past, the critical factor in the survivability of Ayub and his government is the loyalty to the regime of the nation’s armed forces. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem * Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services. This memorandum brings up to date two earlier memoranda. The first was published on 2 December 1968 (No. 1583/68) and the second on 30 December 1968 (No. 2259/68). 5. Telegram 19762 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 5. Telegram 19762 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, February 7, 1969, 0126Z SUBJECT: Pakistan Ambassador’s Call on Secretary Rogers 1. After an exchange of preliminary remarks in which both the Secretary and Ambassador Hilaly touched on President Nixon’s keen interest in Pakistan, the Ambassador described Pakistan’s development program. He emphasized the breakthrough in agriculture, Pakistan’s increasing exports, and its achievements in light industry. He added that not only had Pakistan virtually solved its food problem, but that its exports were now 58 per cent manufactured goods and only 42 per cent raw materials. 2. Expressing gratitude for the very large US assistance program in the past, the Ambassador said that this aid had made possible Pakistan’s liberal economic policy. He expressed sharp concern over decreases in recent years in the US aid program, saying that it had dropped from $250 million three years ago to $70 million this year. He said that US commodity loans and IDA were the only sources of “soft” aid of the kind which had made possible Pakistan’s development success. He was not optimistic about getting significant additional funds from IDA and, unless some way could be found to cushion the blow of reduced US aid, the tempo of Pakistan’s development program would be impossible to maintain. He emphasized that Pakistan needed at least $200 million per year in “soft” aid. He asked that Secretary Rogers acquaint the President of Pakistan’s problem. 3. The Ambassador touched briefly on Pakistan’s political problems, saying that President Ayub had fired up the people to a real development effort, but that the Government had perhaps become a bit complacent recently, and it now looked as if some changes would have to be made. He pointed out there had been no foreign policy issues raised in the present agitation in Pakistan and recommended to the Secretary the chapters on foreign policy in President Ayub’s book. He was sure all elements of Pakistani opinion except the extreme fringes were agreed on current foreign policy. He said it was in the US interest to help Asian leaders like Ayub who were moderate and responsible and that our two countries should discuss their problems frankly. 4. The Secretary said that President Nixon and he were very conscious of Pakistan’s problems and they will certainly be studied very carefully. We know that Pakistan’s development program has been doing very well. However, many countries have aid requests and our people and our Congress are questioning aid policy very closely.They are unable to understand why many countries which seek our aid at the same time castigate the US and its policy. He added that a new AID Director had just been appointed and that a group was studying the whole aid problem. 5. As the meeting was ending, Ambassador Hilaly said he wished the Secretary would mention to President Nixon the problem of military supply. Pakistan has a request for five F–104 replacement aircraft pending. It also had been trying for almost two years to get one hundred secondhand tanks, about which there was a promise from President Johnson during a stopover visit to Karachi airport in December, 1967. It appeared that something was moving on one hundred tanks with Turkey now, but the Pakistan Army is getting worried after all these months of waiting. Pakistan also faces the question of decisions for the future as to where it is going to get military equipment in the years ahead. The Secretary indicated he expected to come to grips with these problems soon. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAK–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 6 by James W. Spain (NEA/PAF), cleared by William J. Handley (NEA), and approved for transmission by Spain. The conversation took place on February 6. Rogers reported on the conversation in a memorandum that he sent to the President on February 6. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President’s Daily Briefs, Feb 1–8, 1969) 6. Intelligence Note No. 82 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 6. Intelligence Note No. 82 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 11, 1969 Subject: Ayub Seeks Talks with the Opposition on the Political Crisis After three months of anti-government rioting, the regime of President Ayub Khan, bowing to the inevitable, has moved to open a dialogue with the political opposition in an effort to restore civil calm. Following up the promise in his First-of-the-Month speech, Ayub has invited “responsible” opposition leaders to meet him on February 17 to discuss the political crisis and possible constitutional reforms. The opposition has not replied directly to Ayub’s invitation. Individual opposition leaders, however, have publicly stated their conditions for such a meeting, and Ayub has been receptive to these conditions. The question now seems to be whether or not internal disunity will prevent the opposition from presenting a united front in the talks with Ayub. In any event, rivalries within the opposition are likely to prolong the political crisis, as various factions maneuver for partisan advantage and Ayub seeks to exploit the opposition’s disunity. The opening of the dialogue has had a calming effect on street violence, but the opposition, by scheduling a nation-wide general strike for February 14, has served notice that it has by no means discarded civil disorder as a device to maintain pressure on Ayub. Ayub’s Concessions . Responding to the first indications that Ayub would seek a meeting with the opposition, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, spokesman for the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) the opposition’s overall organization, announced five preconditions for such a meeting: (1) withdrawal of the Army from the cities, (2) lifting of curfews, (3) repeal of the state of emergency and the government’s extraordinary powers, (4) release of political prisoners and students arrested during the riots, (5) restoration of civil rights. Ayub’s actions in the light of the DAC’s conditions clearly indicate that he is determined to do his utmost to bring about the meeting. The invitation to the February 17 meeting was routed through Nasrullah Khan. Army units have been relieved of most police duties and the curfew has been lifted. Schools have been reopened, except in Karachi, and a policy of permissiveness has replaced that of strong police repression. Ayub has promised early repeal of the state of emergency and has implied that persons in custody under the Defense of Pakistan Rules would be released in the near future. Several politicians and over a hundred students were released on February 10. In a surprise move the same day, the West Pakistan High Court stopped proceedings against Ayub’s arch-political foe, former Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, and ordered him transferred from jail to house arrest at his Larkana farm. In support of its action the Court referred to the Government’s intention to repeal the emergency laws, which would vacate the case against Bhutto. Opposition’s Reply Awaited. A public dialogue between the regime and the opposition is continuing, with Ayub thus far making all of the concessions. The DAC Central Committee, which met in Dacca on February 9, adjourned, however, without formulating an answer to Ayub’s invitation. Nasrullah Khan called on Ayub on February 10 to discuss opposition representation at the meeting and to negotiate the release of leaders of two of the DAC coalition parties—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League, under trial in the so-called Agartala Conspiracy Case, and Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the National Awami Party, who was arrested during the rioting last November. The DAC cannot, of course, speak for the two parties outside of the coalition—Bhutto’s Peoples Party (PPP) and Maulana Bhashani’s pro-Peking faction of the NAP. As much as Ayub and the DAC might prefer to exclude the PPP and Bhashani’s NAP, the supporters of these factions would vigorously protest such an arrangement. Another potentially disruptive factor in the Ayub/Opposition negotiations are the university students, particularly those in East Pakistan, who have refused to abide by any compromise reached between the politicians and Ayub in which they do not concur. Other Developments. While the violence has subsided, protest demonstrations are continuing. Bhutto has announced his intention to begin a fast if the state of emergency is not repealed by Friday, February 14. Women in Dacca staged a demonstration on February 10, demanding the immediate release of all students. As of mid-morning February 11 a complete hartal (general strike) was reported in progress in Chittagong, East Pakistan, and a nation-wide general strike has been called by DAC for February 14. Ayub’s own party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which is still in session in Dacca, has dutifully reelected him to another two year term as party president. In an attempt to get at least a foot on the bandwagon, the PML passed a resolution calling for the release of all students arrested during the riots, and a group of thirty-seven East Pakistani PML National Assemblymen have called for the removal of Ayub’s staunch supporter, East Pakistan Governor Abdul Monem Khan. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 7. Telegram 1439 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 7. Telegram 1439 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, February 11, 1969, 1058Z Subj: Military Supply Policy REF: A. STRJ5-UW 00808 (Notal) B. STRJ7-RI 01178 ((95-)) C. Ankara 819 (Notal) Please pass White House 1. As is well known, this mission strongly recommends a liberalization of military supply policy for South Asia to permit case-by-case direct sale lethal end items as recommended reftel (A), and believes such revision ASAP is necessary for the protection of our vital interests in this area. 2. After nearly two years of abortive efforts which have tried everyone’s souls we still have produced not repeat not one single tank or anything else. But we have succeeded in annoying India repeatedly embarrassing Germany, Italy, Belgium and now repeat now Turkey: offending Iran: and estranging Pakistan. 3. Reftel (B) once again points up bankruptcy of present third country sale policy. 4. If, as stated reftel (B), it will in fact take quote approximately 15 months after GOP and GOT reach a firm agreement before the first M47’s arrive at a Pakistan port unquote then the mountain has labored to bring forth a mouse. 5. Questions: A. How do we know that GOP and GOT will ever reach an agreement firm enough for us? Certainly the GOT shows marked signs of being reluctant about this. B. Why should it take 120 days to collect 60 tanks? C. Why should no repeat no shipment be made until 60 have been assembled? D. Why could not repeat not a token shipment be made as an evidence of good faith? E. Why must collection of M48’s await paper work on MAP order amendment? See reftel (C). F. How many more unforeseen slips between the cup and the lip may there be before any tanks arrive in Pakistan? G. Can GOP be reasonably expected to proceed if it knew of 15 months estimate for arrival first tanks? H. Why should we spend millions of dollars to get GOP 100 old tanks when we have plenty we could sell and realize some dollars for ourselves? 6. Longer range questions: A. If first 100 tanks do materialize where do next 100 come from? B. Where do the needed F–104S come from? C. Down the road, where do other needed items come from? 7. If we are ever going to bite the bullet it seems clear it must be now repeat now. 8. If paragraphs 5 and 6 of reftel (A) are correct, and we strongly maintain that they are, then we must take positive action and the hour is late indeed. 9. If paragraphs 5 and 6 of reftel (A) are not repeat not correct, and I know of no repeat no responsible USG official who maintains that they are not repeat not, then why do we continue to invest, in this area, so much scarce economic aid sorely needed in other areas of admittedly vital importance? 10. By every word at my command I urge a prompt liberalization of policy in the interests not repeat not of Pakistan or South Asia but rather in the interests of the United States of America. Oehlert 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, New Delhi, Laird, JCS, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. 8. Telegram 2308 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State and the White House 8. Telegram 2308 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State and the White House 1 New Delhi, February 19, 1969, 1114Z For Secretary Rogers, Under Secy Richardson and Kissinger, White House, from Amb Bowles Ref: Rawalpindi 1439 1. This mission strongly disagrees with reftel proposal urging additional lethal military equipment for pakistan. under the most favorable circumstances any action to bolster pakistan’s military capability against india would further escalate an already costly arms build-up. to do so at the very moment when an unstable and unpredictable Pak Govt is teetering on the verge of collapse would be folly. However, it is the long-term impact of our military assistance program and the opportunities open to the new administration on which I would like to comment in this message. 2. The assertion by the USG in congressional hearings and elsewhere that the US sells massive quantities of lethal equipment abroad to quote foster world peace and encourage economic development unquote is regarded by our friends as naive and by our critics as downright dishonest. In the early 1950’s when our military assistance programs were first launched in Asia our rationale was the containment of China and the USSR and in several key situations our assistance no doubt made a significant contribution. However, in later years the justification for these programs has become increasingly political and partly as a consequence they have proliferated in areas irrelevant to the original objective. In actual practice many of our military assistance programs have increased tensions, raised the military budgets of developing countries, identified the US with unpopular dictators and juntas and convinced people who should be our friends that the USG is more interested in peddling arms at a profit or shoring up reactionary status quo regimes than in fostering the cause of peace. 3. In the Indo-Pak case, the mistrust generated in India by our military aid to Pakistan, which started in 1954, has been compounded by our revamped arms policy announced in April 1967. This policy has led us to abstain from direct lethal weapons supply while making ill-concealed efforts to persuade allies such as the Germans, Italians, Belgians and now the Turks to bear the brunt of India’s reaction by supplying semi-obsolete US-licensed equipment to Pakistan for which it is assumed we later provide Turkey with more modern replacements. 4. I elaborated my personal view of our Indo-Pak military supply policy in my memorandum of December 26, 1968 to Secretary Rogers and April 25, 1968 to Secretary Rusk. In more general terms I believe that we should refuse to sell or give lethal military equipment to any nation which may choose to use these weapons against non-communist neighbors with whom we are friends. Only when the communist thrust is clear and immediate such as in Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam should we underwrite a military program. At the same time we should make whatever effort may be appropriate to help those non-communist countries which are less immediate targets for overt action by the USSR and/or, China, to become self sufficient in military equipment and supplies. 5. The new administration has a relatively clean sheet of paper on which to write a fresh searching and comprehensive examination of the record will, I believe, establish the fact-that our military supply policies except in a few situations have not served our national interest. In the meantime I recommend that we hold up on all ad hoc lethal military supply actions until the study has been completed. Right now the GOI is anxiously awaiting a final decision on the proposed sale of tanks by Turkey to Pakistan as an indicator of the new administration’s approach to the complex problems of the subcontinent. Bowles 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis 9. Intelligence Note No. 117 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 9. Intelligence Note No. 117 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 20, 1969 Subject: Pakistan on the Brink The situation in Pakistan is one of chaos, in many places approaching anarchy. The increasing vehemence of rioting, especially in East Pakistan where mobs have engaged in arson and attacked government offices, plus the collapse of the round-table conference between Ayub and the opposition which had been scheduled for February 19, reflect a situation in which political demands are rapidly reaching a level which can no longer be contained within the political system. Whatever grass-roots support Ayub may possess in West Pakistan—possibly in some rural areas—is inaudible and too remote to bear on the political struggle, which is being fought in the cities. In East Pakistan, opposition to Ayub has taken on strong overtones of anti-West Pakistani sentiment to the point that secession can no longer be ruled out as a possible consequence of the political convulsion. The Deteriorating Situation . In retrospect, it is clear that Ayub incorrectly assumed that the real challenge to his regime would come from the traditional opposition politicians—whom he has regarded and treated with contempt. It is this conservative and moderate coalition, represented by the Democratic Action Committee (DAC), with which Ayub belatedly has sought to reach political compromise as a means to stem the political crisis. Ayub mistakenly discounted the ability of the new militant leaders to catalyze mass urban and East Pakistani hatred of his regime. Politically isolated over the years by Ayub and overtaken by extremists, the moderates have been at least temporarily neutralized. Events in Pakistan are being forced by mobs in the streets—comprised largely of students and the urban discontented. It is to the uncompromising leadership of Z.A. Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani of the left wing of the National Awami Party, and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of the Six-Point Awami League (who articulates East Pakistan’s demand for autonomy) that the mobs respond. By word and action Bhutto, Bhashani, and Mujib have clearly indicated that the time for compromise with the regime is past–Ayub must meet their demands in full. But these demands are escalating rapidly and may already imply strains which would break Pakistan’s present political system. Among the most difficult is Mujib’s categorical requirement that the government quash the Agartala conspiracy trial—viewed by East Pakistanis as the symbol of West Pakistan’s domination over them. Since many of the accused are military personnel, however, it is doubtful that the Army—which is still a vital support to any political structure—would permit the case to be dropped. Beyond this runs Bhutto’s demand, now voiced loudly in the streets that Ayub and his system must go. The Outlook . Events have now reached the point that a change in government in Pakistan is likely in the near future. Two principal alternatives emerge: One, the declaration of martial law is a strong possibility, but even if Ayub declares it the dominant voice will no longer be his. At the level of present turmoil, it is also doubtful that the Army would have the stomach for the violence that would seem necessary to restore order. Two, also possible is the creation of a national-front caretaker cabinet. Ayub’s role—if any—would probably be minor except insofar as he articulated the Army’s requirements. The underlying difficulty will be to accommodate the interests of the disparate elements of the opposition. At a minimum, East Pakistani sentiment must be mollified and an understanding reached with Sheikh Mujib. Bhutto may present a special problem. Unacceptable to the rest of the opposition, and probably to the Army as well, it may be necessary to exclude Bhutto from the eventual political settlement. Bhutto’s exclusion presumably would prolong civil disorder in West Pakistan and would require the full support of the Army. Bhashani may pose a similar problem in East Pakistan. Whatever the outcome, Pakistan is confronted at best with a difficult and probably prolonged period of adjustment. Even should the militant leaders come to power, they may find it difficult to assert their authority. The failure of Ayub to build a solidly-based political system has come home to roost; the country will be fortunate if it emerges from this period of stress as a single entity, sufficiently unified to cope with the still pressing problems of economic development and the virtually untouched problem of creating a viable national political structure. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Telegraphic reports of riots and demonstrations are ibid. Student supporters of former Foreign Minister Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto rioted in Karachi on February 17 following his release from prison. (Telegram 512 from Karachi, February 18; ibid.) The release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from prison on February 22 had the effect of calming passions in East Pakistan and opened the prospect of reviving the round table conference. (Telegram 697 from Dacca, February 22; ibid., POL 29 PAK) President Ayub Khan’s announcement on February 21 that he would not be a candidate in the next election also facilitated the revival of negotiations with his political opponents. (Telegram 1832 from Rawalpindi, February 21; ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) The round table conference convened in Rawalpindi on February 26, and Ayub accepted demands for direct elections and a parliamentary system, but negotiations collapsed on March 13 following the withdrawal of Mujibur Rahman over the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan. Telegraphic reports on the round table conference are ibid., POL 12 PAK and POL 23–8 PAK. 10. National Security Study Memorandum 26 10. National Security Study Memorandum 26 1 Washington, February 21, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator of AID The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Military Supply Policy in South Asia The President has directed a thorough review of our military supply policy in South Asia. He has directed the preparation of a study for NSC discussion of the full range of policy options with regard to military supply. As a background for NSC consideration of these options, he has requested a paper discussing (1) the principal problems we face in developing a coherent policy in South Asia, (2) alternative views of U.S. interests in the subcontinent and (3) alternative strategies for pursuing those interests. The President has directed that this study be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. These papers should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 24. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 1–42. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture, and to the Chairman of the JCS. 11. Intelligence Note No. 190 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 11. Intelligence Note No. 190 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 19, 1969 Subject: East Pakistan: Food Shortage Looms Rice prices have soared in East Pakistan and will probably move even higher in the next three months. Hunger and hardship, along with a further rending of the social fabric of East Pakistan may result. Yet the Central Government, either unconvinced due to contradictory reports or unwilling to admit that there is a genuine shortfall in production in the East, is not undertaking the kind of logistic planning that would be necessary to transfer enough of West Pakistan’s food surplus to avoid a crisis. If independent observers are correct about the magnitude of the food shortage that is likely to develop, the government may have to consider a request to the United States for logistic or other assistance. Rising Prices . Owing to the seasonal pattern of harvesting, rice prices in East Pakistan normally start rising during the winter, may slow their rise somewhat in late spring, but only begin to decline in July. This year, prices started rising earlier than usual and have risen faster to unprecedented level. Lower income groups in urban areas and inhabitants of certain rural districts are already facing severe hardship. Prices are expected to rise further through June: hunger—or perhaps [omission in the original]—and an even more angry, disruptive public mood are likely consequences. Hoarding and the disruption of grain movements owing to the virtual anarchy which prevails in East Pakistan account in part for local shortages and higher prices. East Pakistani political leaders, including the pre-eminent Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, have warned hoarders and black marketeers against profiteering in the current grave situation. But there is sufficient evidence pointing to a genuine shortfall in production to warrant considerable concern. The abnormal price rise began before the virtual collapse of government in East Pakistan suggesting that the political disorders are a contributing factor but probably not the major cause for current price levels. Moreover, heavy floods this winter caused severe damage to crops—more than the Government of East Pakistan has been willing to admit for political reasons. Government Slow to Act . Because of its political commitment to a high estimate of food productions and perhaps even more because of its complete demoralization, the Government of East Pakistan has been laggard in bringing to the attention of the Central Government the magnitude of the problem which may be developing. There is evidence now, however, that some officials of the Central Government are beginning to consider the situation and its possible consequences. Thus far the Central Government does not appear to be convinced of the necessity for large scale grain transfers from West to East, nor is it effectively organized to perform such a task. In West Pakistan both wheat and rice are now in surplus; there is enough available to supply—in theory—a major part if not all of the additional imports that may be required to keep the East’s food distribution system from breaking down. However, logistic bottlenecks—internal transport and storage in West Pakistan, port capacity and availability of shipping space—appear to preclude shipping a sufficient volume in good time if shortages are as severe as some independent observers now predict. In that case, the Central Government will have to consider seriously an appeal for foreign assistance, quite possibly from the United States. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 15 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. 12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 20, 1969 SUBJECT: Economic Policy Toward India In line with our planned new procedure to give you a chance to review our economic aid policy in major aid-receiving countries once a year, we have set in motion papers on aid to India to come to you in April. This will be shortly after the NSC discussion of general aid policy. However, a food aid program for India is in the works that should go ahead before that date. It involves sale of $30 million worth of rice and vegetable oil and $25 million worth of sorghum. The reasons for letting these move ahead at their normal pace are: 1. The Department of Agriculture wants to move rice as quickly as possible. The US heavily overproduced last year to meet Vietnam requirements which did not turn out to be nearly so high as expected. Agriculture wants to avoid the cost of buying and storing the surplus. 2. The Indians are anxious to get the sorghum. While the issue is not starvation this year, this low-price grain sold through their fair price shops helps keep urban food prices down. Both these programs are follow-ons to an ongoing FY 1969 food aid program ($170 million). The programs you will review next month will include a $150 million new wheat and cotton program, the entire development lending program for FY 1970 and a few cleanup loans for FY 1969. I would be inclined to stand aside and let Agriculture and AID go ahead with these programs in their normal way. However, I do not want to tell them they are free to do so if you would prefer to review them in detail. Recommendation : That you approve the scenario outlined above-wallowing the on-going sales to proceed and planning an over-all review of the next year’s Indian aid program in April. Approve I’d like to see them Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. 13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 25, 1969 SUBJECT: Ayub Khan Resignation Ayub Khan resigned today after proclaiming martial law and appointing General Yahya Khan—the Army commander—Martial Law Administrator. Ayub said, “I cannot preside over the destruction of my country.” The principal question is whether or not this and the declaration of martial law which followed will be accepted by the mass of the people in East Pakistan. If it is, law and order is likely to be restored rapidly. The new military regime would then presumably pick up the negotiations which Ayub has been carrying on with the opposition leaders to try to work out a new political structure for the country. If East Pakistan reacts violently to what it may consider a virtual coup by the West Pakistani establishment which has long dominated the country, the situation in the East Wing would be very dangerous. Internal disturbances would probably be even greater than before and the opportunities for foreign meddling, especially by the Communist Chinese, would be increased. It is impossible at this moment to tell which way things will go. However, there have been recent reports of military movements from West to East Pakistan and Ayub and the army probably feel that the military will be able to cope with the situation or they would not have undertaken their actions at this time. The possibility that the army moved at its own initiative and forced Ayub’s resignation cannot be excluded but initially at least it appears more likely that the move was mutually agreed upon. Ambassador Oehlert has standby authority to evacuate the 1100 Americans in East Pakistan and the 3,000 Americans in West Pakistan should this become necessary. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it and that a copy was sent to Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council staff. Ayub’s resignation and the establishment of martial law were reported from Rawalpindi on March 25 in telegrams 2954, 2956, 2957 and 2958. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) 14. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers 14. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 27, 1969 Dear Mr. Secretary, General A.M. Yahya Khan, Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, has asked me to convey the following personal message to President Richard M. Nixon: BEGINS “Excellency On March 24th President Mohammad Ayub Khan addressed to me a letter, explaining that since the civil administration and constitutional authority in Pakistan had become ineffective, he had no option but to step aside and let the defence forces of Pakistan, as only remaining effective and legal instrument, to take over full control of the country’s affairs. On March 25th he announced his decision to relinquish office of the President of Pakistan and called upon me, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to fulfill my constitutional responsibilities to defend the country not only against external aggression but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos. 2. Consequently, I have placed the country under Martial Law and assumed all powers as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. 3. It will be my earnest endeavour to restore as soon as possible normal conditions in the country as a preliminary to early restoration of democratic rule and a civilian Government elected on the basis of adult franchise. 4. In this difficult hour Pakistan needs goodwill, understanding and support of all its friends. I am confident that existing friendly relations between Pakistan and your great country will not only be maintained but would continue to grow. On my part I can assure you that there will be no change in Pakistan’s policy which seeks friendship with all countries. 5. I take this opportunity to extend to you my warmest regards and best wishes. Please accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. General A.M. Yahya Khan” ENDS May I request you to be kind enough to transmit the above to the President. With my warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, A. Hilaly 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential. Sent to the White House on March 29 under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger. Nixon returned a reply to Yahya on April 22 in which he wrote: “I wish you well in your efforts as President to restore normal conditions.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69) 15. Telegram 50241 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 15. Telegram 50241 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, April 2, 1969, 2250Z SUBJECT: Admiral Ahsan’s Call on the Under Secretary 1. At beginning hour’s conversation with Under Secretary April 1, Admiral Ahsan expressed his Government’s condolences on death former President Eisenhower. He then proceeded emphasize martial law regime’s determination return as quickly as possible to civilian government. 2. Under Secretary inquired into what extent proclamation martial law brought on by breakdown law and order. Ahsan replied martial law was direct result situation in which labor out of hand with widespread strikes and disturbances and police incapable of handling situation. He pointed out political parties not banned and political leaders not arrested. In response Under Secretary’s question as to what conditions he thought necessary for restoration normal political processes Admiral Ahsan said he thought it enough for political leaders to agree on constitution and direct elections. He said military had not previously thought much about political problems and no firm timetable existed. 3. Under Secretary said he realized there many problems but he was interested what could be hoped for. Ahsan responded it might be naive but he saw no reason for not holding to election dates set by Ayub; he confirmed his statement to press March 31 that he thought elections might take place in January. He added, however, military services cannot return to barracks and leave vacuum; they must provide environment for moderates to come to power. He said situation especially difficult in East Pakistan. Military regime realizes lower level development achievements there and accepts responsibility for doing something about them. 4. Under Secretary said US view of problems sometimes result of reaction, or even over-reaction, to earlier lessons. Experience with Hitler and Mussolini have left unfavorable image authoritarian regimes. He believed US understood fact that sometimes military regimes necessary and constructive; but how to judge when constructive, and having judged, how to communicate judgment, is difficult. Public and Congressional opinion this subject must be taken into account, e.g., Reuss Amendment which limits foreign military sales when sales would have affect of arming military dictators who are denying social progress to their own people. 5. Ambassador Hilaly asked if there was any chance people would try apply the Reuss Amendment to Pakistan. Response was that this could not be excluded. Under Secretary indicated that in all cases it important Congress understand what the situation is in particular countries and that those countries understand conditions and opinions here. He stressed the importance of the direction in which a given government was going, e.g., the plans and approaches it was undertaking for returning to normal government. He pointed out the value both to other countries and to the US of defining criteria and setting time for return to normal constitutional government. 6. Ambassador Hilaly indicted Admiral interested in our arms policy review and inquired about its present status. Under Secretary said it actively underway. Ambassador Oehlert had been here recently and given us benefit his views. Impossible now forecast exactly when process would be finished and what result would be, but likely another month or two would be needed. 7. He went on explain variety of sometimes contradictory views held by many Americans this subject, e.g., we shouldn’t be in arms business; we shouldn’t interfere in other countries affairs; but we shouldn’t give aid to countries which spend their resources for arms. It was agreed that distinction should be made some of these regards between military aid and military sales. 8. Admiral warned it dangerous for US, by withholding arms, to force country get involved with others who inimical to US interests or to spend own resource it could not afford for expensive purchases in Western Europe. Said it also necessary for military leaders’ who wished be constructive have enough weapons maintain internal security and keep their troops from becoming disgruntled. Emphasized that now was psychologically important time in Pakistan when US forthcomingness would pay long term dividends. 9. Conversation followed brief meeting with Secretary and short tete-a-tete with President at White House reception March 31. Ahsan has made variety DOD contacts and expects see CNO April 2. Has also seen Senator Sparkman and Congressman Sykes. Tentatively plans depart April 3. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 PAK–US. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Drafted by Spain; cleared by Howard B. Schaffer (NEA/INC) and Joseph Sisco (NEA); and approved by Richardson. Vice Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Navy and one of three Deputy Martial Law Administrators appointed by General Yahya Khan, was Pakistan’s representative at the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. A memorandum of Ahsan’s conversation with Nixon on March 31, during which Ahsan offered the assurance that the Pakistani military forces had no desire to perpetuate themselves in power, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 1, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 30, 1969. Ahsan subsequently told Spain that he “got the message” that while the U.S. might understand the necessity for martial law in Pakistan, future actions of the martial law administration in governing the country and establishing a timetable for a return to representative government would determine how helpful the United States could be to Pakistan. (Telegram 50354 to Rawalpindi, April 2; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK) 16. Telegram 4797 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 16. Telegram 4797 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, April 10, 1969, 1049Z Subject: Indian-American Foundation For Secretary Rogers from Ambassador Bowles 1. For the past several years there has been under consideration in both Delhi and Washington a plan to devote a substantial portion of our holdings of surplus Indian rupees to a new binational foundation whose purpose would be to support mutually-agreed educational, scientific and cultural activities. 2. The organization and operations of the foundation have been the subject of many serious and constructive discussions with the Indian Government, and agreement now seems possible on the main outline of the foundations structure and purposes. The necessary U.S. waivers and clearances were obtained under the Johnson administration for this use of our funds. 3. To review briefly the creation of the foundation was first proposed in 1964 as means for advancing American programs by using our excess rupees. Our government now owns 5 billion US-uses rupees, equivalent in value to almost $700 million. Accretions in this holding from loan repayments and additional sales of PL 480 commodities place the size of our current and future rupee hoard far above what we can possibly use. 4. Despite successful negotiations by the Embassy and an advisory group headed by former Indiana University President Herman Wells, final agreement evaded our grasp after the plan had been announced because of political problems during the last Indian general elections. The GOI found it necessary to suspend negotiations until 1968 when the proposal was revived. 5. The advantages of this type of foundation are both numerous and important. First of all it would segregate and devote to useful purposes substantial portion of the mounting accumulation of Indian rupees in USG hands which constitutes a growing political and economical problem between the two governments. 6. These rupees represent a potential claim on Indian resources far beyond what India can afford in the foreseeable future. No country can accept with equanimity the ownership of about one-tenth of its total currency circulation by a foreign government. 7. Every expenditure we make from these rupees for U.S. purposes requires a budgetary allocation by the Indian Government, this weighing on their fiscal situation and raising political questions particularly by those unfriendly to us. Many Indian leaders and particularly Finance Ministry officials, have expressed concern about the future of these rupees and their hope that some acceptable way can be found to shift the funds from the current category of a serious burden on Indian relations into accomplishment for our mutual interests. 8. The proposed binational foundation would support activities in the fields of education, science and culture desirable to both Indians and Americans and would play an innovative role unfettered by bureaucracy much as do our major foundations in the U.S. Its board of directors, on which Indians and Americans would have an equal voice would ensure acceptability of the foundation’s activities to both governments but with freedom from control by either government. It would provide a beneficial channel of contact between the Indian and American educators and public figures who would participate. 9. Two major problems have held up the foundation: One is the bogey of “U.S. intellectual imperialism” raised by certain left-wing and anti-US sources, and the second is the reluctance of the Indian Finance Ministry to engage the government in an open-ended commitment to maintain the foundation indefinitely on the interest which the GOI would pay on the foundation’s basic endowment fund. 10. The first problem is one which I think can be faced squarely and overcome. There are those in India who will scream imperialism whatever we do. And, given the support of the Indian Government (which we have) and a carefully planned campaign of public preparation, I think we can overcome the vociferations of the small number of professional US-haters and pro-communists and clear up the confusion of others. 11. The Indian Finance Ministry has proposed the solution to the second problem. It has suggested that the contribution of rupees to the foundation should not be in the form of a fixed endowment fund which would draw interest indefinitely but that the fund should be amortized over a period of 10 to 15 years by the drawdown both of interest and principal alike. In my view this is an eminently practicable and realistic way out of the difficulty. 12. In December 1968 after the GOI Ministry of Finance proposed this approach, I made an urgent appeal to the former administration to move as quickly as possible for an agreement under congressional committee approvals which had been granted. Dean Rusk, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, had intense interest in this undertaking. He replied December 10 that he was much taken with the approach, which he described as ingenious and thought it offered real hope of breaking the logjam. However, he thought he should not then push the undertaking but rather leave for the next administration’s decision. 13. You your colleagues in Washington are in a better we here to judge that steps must be taken to revalidate earlier clearances inside our government. 14. I strongly urge that whatever steps are needed be taken as soon as possible and that we be authorized here to approach the Indian authorities again on this subject, representing this initiative as an earnest indication of the new administration’s interest in India and dedication to the cause of Indo-American cooperation. Such authorization should include permission to agree to the self-liquidating feature suggested by the Indian Ministry of Finance, since this will be critical in the GOI’s response. 15. The inauguration of this new foundation would set Indo-US relations under our new administration off to a very good start. Its timing in this Gandhi centennial year would be most felicitous, especially if we could devise a name for the foundation which would associate it with the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi. The Gandhi Centennial Fund has been suggested. 16. I am convinced that the successful conclusion of the long negotiations for this foundation can be an important step forward in our relationship with the Government of India and particularly with the academic and intellectual groups which will play an important role in India’s future. Bowles 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, enacted July 10, 1954, as amended. (68 Stat. 454) PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. 17. Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 17. Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, April 16, 1969, 1050Z Subj: Miilitary Supply Policy for South Asia A. Where we are and how we got here. 1. The agreement of Russia to supply some lethal equipment to Pakistan and the imposition of martial law in Pakistan represent two new dimensions to this problem. They will be discussed later on in this message, but first it might be well to review where we are and how we got here. 2. During the Eisenhower-Nixon administration Pakistan was sometimes called “the most allied of our allies.” (A) SEATO (B) CENTO (C) UNCURK (D) U–2 staging privileges (E) Peshawar 3. Today: (A) Inactive in SEATO (B) Inactive in CENTO except for economic affairs (C) Inactive in UNCURK (D) U–2 privileges long departed. (E) Peshawar being phased out (F) Close ties with both USSR and ChiComs (G) Furthermore, for reasons not associated with US, the Ayub government has fallen and martial law has been imposed because of chaos, anarachy, and threats both to strong central government and of extreme leftist-oriented dominations of east wing where radical elements were in ascendancy. 4. How did this transformation take place in a few years? Obviously there was considerable fault on the part of the Paks, but let us consider our fault as it appears to their eyes in spite of the support we have given them in several ways especially economic aid: (A) In 1962, contrary to our pledged word, we furnished lethal military equipment to India without prior consultation with Pakistan; (B) In the spring of 1965 we rudely and abruptly called off a scheduled trip to the US by President Ayub; (C) In the fall of 1965, the Paks believe contrary to our written assurances, we failed to come to Pakistan’s aid when it was quote attacked unquote by India. (On November 5, 1962 Ambassador McConaughy had delivered to the GOP a secret aide memoire stating: “The Government of the United States of America reaffirms its previous assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan.”) There is no repeat no doubt that India did commit aggression against Pakistan in September of 1965. The principal justification for it and for our subsequent actions was that Pakistan, among other things, had been infiltrating arms and men into Indian-held Kashmir. There is no repeat no doubt that this was true. But where does one stop unwinding the ball of cord of the past? It is also equally true that India had reneged on several promises to hold Kashmir plebiscite, which had also been called for by UN resolutions. (D) We not repeat not only failed to come to Pakistan’s aid at the time of the 1965 war, but we suspended economic aid, cancelled the military supply program which was then uncompleted, and cancelled all spare parts programs. While we did the same to India, the effects on Pakistan were much more serious than on India because all of Pakistan’s equipment was American while very little of India’s was; (E) China came to Pakistan’s aid by massing troops on the Indian border issuing ultimatums to India, and later furnishing Pakistan with substantial quantities of tanks, aircraft and other equipment, and started economic aid to Pakistan. (F) All of this had the following results: I. Pakistanis at all levels felt that its ally, the United States, had stabbed it in the back; II. Pakistanis at all levels were grateful to China and believed that in all the world China was the only dependable friend they had; III. China’s military and economic aid brought to Pakistan Chinese experts, technicians, military personnel and workers; IIII. Those Chinese brought with them the Red Book, Mao badges and slogans and all of the other trappings of Chinese propaganda and subversion. 5. In April of 1967 we informed the Paks that we were now repeat now resuming the sale of spare parts and would henceforth approve third country sales, on a case-by-case basis, of lethal end-items controlled by the United States. (A) Efforts to obtain tanks from Germany, Italy, and Belgium all aborted despite our President’s promise of over a year ago to President Ayub that 100 would be furnished “now” and 100 “later”. (B) A possible Turkish transaction has been in the works for months, but has hit many snags and may not rpt not be consummated. If it is consummated, deliveries would appear to be 15 months away. (C) Meanwhile, Iran has been clamoring to furnish the tanks, but we have consistently refused. Apparently our “third country policy” means any third country except Iran—or any other country which is ready, able, and willing to perform. 6. As a result of the above abortive efforts we have succeeed only in: (A) Annoying India repeatedly; (B) Embarrassing Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Turkey; (C) Upsetting Greece (which objects to the upgrading of Turkish tanks which the Pak deal envisages); (D) Offending Iran; and (E) Estranging Pakistan which is becoming convinced that we never repeat never did mean to help it but have only been engaged in leading it down a primrose path. 7. Meanwhiile, India has had major aid from Russia, and has created indigenous capacity to produce tanks, jet aircraft and other equipment. 8. The Paks want American equipment for logistics, training, financial and ideological reasons. They do not repeat not want to be dependent upon the communists for all off the same reasons but what choice have they? 9. It is evident that, in desperation, they are again turning to the communists for their principal supplies. It is not repeat not too late to arrest this. 10. In the recent political turmoil in Pakistan the imperatives had become even more acute. (A) Pro-Chicom Bhashani and radical opporitunist Bhutto were flirting with each other and might well have joined forces. (B) The military foresaw a radaicalization of the East Pakistan segment of this strategicaly located nation of 125,000,000 people—the fifth largest in the world. 11. Despite its inclinations and preferences, how effective an anti-communist instrument can a military be which is dependent upon the communists for its equipment? Despite our treaty obligations, we can not rpt not permit ourselves to be dragged into another Vietnam in East Pakistan, and the best way to avoid it is to sell the limited equipment needed while making it perfectly clear that they must defend themselves. Certainly we do not repeat not want this bulwark to go into hock to the communists by default. 12. (A) Our present policy is based partly on the premises that it will prevent a dangerous arms build-up and will discourage diversion of resources from economic development to military hardware. Both premises have been proved false both in india and pakistan. therefore, the policy has failed. (B) The other premise for our present policy is that we should not repeat not furnish lethal equipment to either India or Pakistan because in 1965 they used our equipment to fight each other. This has a hollow ring when we are now rpt now furnishing equipment to both Jordan and Israel, who fought a war with each other in 1967 and who are still shooting at each other. It is true that, although we did not rpt not prevent the 1965 war our military supply policy leverage, especially with Pakistan, did help end it quickly. 13. Direct (but limited) US sales would: (A) Give US an element of leverage instead of the communists; (B) Hold military expenditures within reason because of: I. that element of leverage; and II. the cheaper price and greater value of our equipment. (C) Benefit our balance of payments situation along with other economic benefits. If the 100 Turkish tank sale does take place it will cost up to $4,000,000, whereas we would profit from a direct sale. (D) Remove the hypocrisy, ineffectiveness and embarrassing third country elements of our present policy. (E) The supplying of arms to both India and Pakistan would increase our ability to influence them toward an ultimate rapprochement. (F) Give US more leverage to work toward USG-USSR cooperation in the subcontinent. 14. It is said that change in policy would offend India: (A) India is offended by our present policy; (B) India has recently indicated that it too would like to purchase lethal equipment from US; (C) What would India do if offended? It is already opposed to US on almost all international issues. It is already closely oriented toward Russia. It already has communists governing in a number of states. (D) A liberalization of military supply policy for the subcontinent would not rpt not represent a choosing of Pakistan over India no rpt no such choice is necessary either way. (E) India would of course feel called upon to object, for the record, but the Indians are sophisticated enough to realize that Pakistan would get the arms it needs somewhere, and it should not rpt not be too difficult a feat of diplomacy to convince them that it is in their own interests that it comes from US rather than from China or even Russia. B. Russian military supply to Pakistan. 1. We have excellent reason to believe that agreement has been reached between the GOP and the Soviets concerning supply of limited number of tanks (but less than previously supposed) and artillery and that the Soviets are willing to supply SU-7 and MIG–21 aircraft. We also have reason to believe that exchanges of delegations, assigning Pak personnel to Soviet military colleges and academies, visits of Soviet naval ships to Pak harbors for refitting, etc., cultural exchanges between the armed forces and observation of military exercises, are under consideration. 2. To my mind the fact that Russian military supply has commenced, as we feared for two years it would, is no rpt no reason not rpt not to liberalize our policy. On the contrary, it emphasizes the urgency of a prompt liberalization. (A) The quantity of materiel so far agreed on is not rpt not very significant. A small number of Soviet tanks plus 100 from Turkey fifteen months from now (if they materialized) still leaves Pakistan behind the schedule of “100 now and 100 later” which we promised as of March 1, 1968, and far behind our original MAAG and MAP programs. (B) The fact that the door to Russia is now rpt now open and more can be expected in the future, along with training, maneuver and other personal relations, indicates that unless we do step in promptly it will be too late; (C) With a powerful Russian fleet in the mediterranean, and Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and intermitently in the Persian Gulf, the threats and pressures on Iran, Saudi Arabia, the trucial states, other friendly Arabs and Turkey are increasing. A Pakistan oriented to Russia and/or China would add to those pressures and threats we know that these nations are concerned, especially the Shah who has been anxious to help, or to see us help, Pakistan militarily, and Saudi Arabia, as recently confirmed by Jidda 1167 of April 9, 1969. C. Martial law 1. It recognized that the existence of martial law may make the congressional problem greater (Reuss Amendment) but one should not rpt not shrink from a proper decision because it will encounter some opposition. If the executive will act only with unanimous or even near unanimous congressional approval then it will be paralyzed, for nearly all policies, programs and decisions meet with at least some degree of congressional opposition. The Reuss Amendment does not repeat not express the sense of Congress that sales should not rpt not be made to military governments but rather only not repeat not to military “dictators” who “are denying social progress to their own people.” (A) There is no rpt no evidence that Yahya is a military dictator; (B) There is no rpt no evidence that the martial law regime is denying social progress to the people of Pakistan; (C) On the contrary, in its three weeks of power the regime has refrained from press censorship, has not rpt not outlawed political parties, has moved to increase food availability in East Pakistan and to reduce food prices, has raised salaries of lower paid government employees, has taken liberal steps in the field of labor relations has reopened the schools, colleges and universities, has met the just student demands including lower fees and installment payments, has set up machinery to attack the problem of corruption in government and has eliminated the requirement that Pakistanis obtain exit permits to visit India. It has announced its intentions to hold elections and to return to constitutional civilian government as soon as possible, and I for one believe they meant it. It has maintained a very low profile, intruded as little as possible into civil affairs leaving administration to the civil service, made little or no repeat no show of force, and made only scattered arrests not rpt not including any prominent political leaders. It has not rpt not yet shown its hand in very sensttive areas of east wing autonomy, increased allocation of resources to east, except food grains, power of central government versus provinces, and provincial representation in national assembly, etc. But it is too soon to expect it to do so. (D) For all of the above reasons, the Reuss Amendment is not rpt not applicable certainly at this time; (E) Even if it were applicable, the President has the right to wave it; (F) While I have not rpt not recommended it, it should be noted that the Reuss Amendment apparently would not rpt not apply to grant aid. 2. Although I have had no rpt no opportunity to visit with congressional leaders since the installation of martial law, I can state that in my conversations with them in June of 1968 and March of 1969 I found the greater majority of those to whom I talked (including members of the appropriations foreign relations, and armed services committees of both houses) to be in favor of a liberalization. In fact no rpt no single one expressed himself to me as being opposed to it. In Senator Symington’s letter to me on March 14, 1969 (copies to Under Secretary Richardson and Assistant Secretary Sisco) he states that “...if the Secretary of State writes that he would have no rpt no objection to the selling of arms to Pakistan, and that he believes such sales would be in the interest of the United States, I personally would have no repeat no objection.” 3. We have had, and are having, arms transactions with other military governments. 4. Recent developments make it clear that for some time to come the Pakistani military will be the principal determinant of both internal and external policy. It is engaged, in its view, in preserving the country from chaos and from communist influence at home and from abroad. It is pro-American oriented. We should keep it that way. We can not rpt not expect it to stay that way if we force it to be dependent on the communists for its vital equipment. Both its hardware and its morale are at stake, and its requirements are modest, both in terms of quantities and degree of sophistication. it does not rpt not seek substantial expansion of numbers of equipment or (at this time) an increased level of modernity but basically only replacement. 5. The GOP military command sees its equipment requirements as necessary both to meet external threats and to preserve internal law and order. The most urgent requirements will be used to maintain its general position of strength relative to India. But intelligence reports in recent months indicated growing activity of revolutionary-minded, pro-Peking domestic elements, and the military must face this contingency as well. We even have one unconfirmed report of the training of guerrillas in North Vietnam. A pro-Peking take-over in East Pakistan would be as dangerous to India as it would be to our own national interests. 6. Most important of all, a liberalization of policy would give us leverage to persuade the martial law government to continue to work for social justice, to effect an early return to constitutional civilian government, and to provide for a better deal for East Pakistan. The greater the percentage of their hardware which is American, the more important are our spare parts and training programs, among other considerations. The thrust of the communists will be to influence the GOP toward the retention of an authoritarian government and against the private sector of the economy. We must not rpt not leave the most important leverage to influence the present and future course of this and successor governments to the communists, and time is of the essence. D. Recommendations. 1. It is recommended that our arms policy toward both India and Pakistan be liberalized to permit direct sales of lethal equipment on a case-by-case basis. In effectuating such a policy we would be selective and deliberate, and we could impose inhibiting conditions on acquisitions elsewhere as we have with respect to third country sales. The Conte and Symington Amendments could be more effectively implemented if we were in the supply picture. 2. It is recommended that such a decision be reached ASAP. 3. At some appropriate occasion, either upon advising Yahya of a decision on military supply and/or in connection with economic assistance. We should discuss with him our line of thinking about the restoration of political life, East-West relations, etc., and inform him that in our view our assistance must be related to these. 4. It should be noted that a change in policy not rpt not mean instant delivery of hardware. There would of necessity be a substantial lead-time between a decision and agreement on items and conditions and their delivery this would enable us to work for the conditions we want here and to reconsider if the situation should deteriorate. 5. The huge economic effort we have made in India and Pakistan has brought us far less goodwill than the Russians have obtained by arming India and than the Chinese and in the future the Russians have obtained by supplying arms to Pakistan. 6. Pakistan per se means nothing rpt nothing to me. The United States of America does. I’m proud of the fact that I’m still square enough to believe in the boy scout oath. When I abandoned my own career to come here for two years it was in the hope of being able to help restore some of America’s lost prestige and influence. I did not rpt not come to preside over the funeral of the last vestiges of that prestige and influence. I hope that history has not rpt not cast me in that unwilling role. 7. Above all this is no rpt no time for further procrastination. A failure to make and announce a decision now rpt now will unquestionably be interpreted by the GOP as one more effort at delay and deception. Although I would consider it a grievous error from the viewpoint of US interests, I would prefer to tell them frankly that we will not rpt not liberalize our policy in the foreseeable future rather than to say that we must consider the matter further. At least we would preserve some self-respect for our government and for this mission. They need our help now rpt now. They need it desperately. A friend is a person who helps you when you need it. Let’s move boldly and courageously, and not rpt not slink in the shadows of indecision. Oehlert. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House, Department of Defense, the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, JCS, and CINCSTRIKE. 18. Telegram 4169 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 18. Telegram 4169 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, April 25, 1969, 0845Z Subj: US Policy Options in Pakistan Ref: Rawalpindi 3204 A. Summary: We believe principal reasons for imposition martial law in Pakistan March 25 were to maintain intact strong central government, to prevent East Pakistan in power structure in West Pakistan and to prevent East Pakistan from obtaining national political power proportionate to population. Although we assume Yahya administration will seek to eliminate many causes for complaint against previous regime (and in fact this process already begun) its longer range political objectives, particularly with regard to East Pakistan and, its probable success in attaining these, are obscure. (Probably some degree of flexibility exists among all parties.) US dilemma is how closely to support government which may or may not win support of populace and may or may not become repressive force striving preserve present social and interwing inequalities our conclusion is that we should support Yahya but should seek to expand leverage of our assistance to increase chances of satisfactory political solution. In economic field we should expand our particular attention to East Pakistan (witnessed by recent East Pak strategy paper bearing in mind political as well as economic impact of our inputs. In military assistance we should reach policy decision to supply directly certain types of lethal equipment. We should inform GOP of these decisions, but should make clear US cannot continue support in sense indicated regime which becomes alienated from populace and that we see possibility of such situation developing, particularly in East Pakistan. End summary B. Background and policy problems: 1. Our general line of interpretation of reasons for March 25 resignation of President Ayub and imposition martial law remains essentially as described reftel, i.e., that while number of factors contributed (including physical problem of law and order) major objectives probably were to maintain intact strong central government, to protect existing power structure in West Pakistan and to prevent East Pakistan from obtaining national political power proportionate to population. All of these were under severe threat in last days Ayub administration and regime had no assurance it could control assembly session where they would in large measure be decided intent of Mujibur Rahman to submit competing bill which was seen as serious threat to all three objectives may well have brought Ayub and military finally to martial law decision. 2. This conclusion does not rpt not mean that MLA does not intend and will not rpt not seek to remove or reduce injustices under Ayub administration, to hasten progress toward better income distribution (within as well as between wings), and to seek power distribution between wings which will preserve nation in present form. Energy imagination and efficiency with which MLA will address each of these areas and likely public reaction are major unknowns for future. Problems facing MLA in economic and social fields are immense and intractable and even with best of will, talent and fortune are susceptible to little more than imperceptible improvement in short time frame. Equally cloudy is timing and path by which MLA eventually will pass power to political parties, and indeed, we cannot be assured that MLA in fact will find or create political party structure in foreseeable time frame which it will consider satisfactory for this purpose. (We do not rpt not doubt, however, that efforts will be made in this direction, and in fact Yahya has already begun discussions with political leaders, but outcome of these cannot be judged for some time.) 3. We assume, however, that MLA itself and particularly Yahya could not rpt not enunciate very precisely at this time its ultimate political and economic goals and how it intends to grope with these and particularly could not rpt not outline future interwing relations acceptable to it which would at once preserve nation, satisfy public and permit political system to operate freely. We assume this is equally true of political forces in both wings i.e., that pre-martial law demands and positions are not rpt not inflexible and that position on both sides will be subject to readjustments as time passes. Thus goal of MLA probably will be to create conditions conducive to such readjustments and if this can be achieved, thereafter to replace itself with political government which would not rpt not fundamentally endanger basic objectives. 4. At this time, we do not rpt not know priority of MLA’s ultimate goals and most important, priority attached (either by MLA or by public in both wings) to maintaining nation in present form. Would present power structure see separation of two wings before it would accept political supremacy of east? How much prospective political power would Bengalis forego rather than choose separate path? What options for both wings does weaker center and increased autonomy provide? How will economic improvement (or lack of same) particularly in east, affect situation? 5. One factor which may redound to our favor is that new MLA heads personally probably are more Pro-US than previous leadership. We should not rpt not over-emphasize significance of this fact (if true), however, because we consider one basic constant of GOP foreign policy—its balancing act between US, USSR and China—will remain subject largely to same external imperatives as before and therefore is unlikely to change greatly. Moreover, Pakistan, so long as its antagonism with India continues, finds a natural ally in China, rather than in the US or USSR. 6. Present situation presents us with serious danger and perhaps with some opportunity. If MLA fails to seek satisfactory way out of present dilemmas, or is unsuccessful in such effort and becomes repressive force striving preserve present social and interwing inequalities, US support and close association would succeed only in alienating US from populace in both wings. If, on other hand, MLA seeks to satisfy some measure of basic demands for reduction of inequalities (in West Pakistan but particularly in eastern wing) and within time span permitting particularly Bengalis to become aware their demands are being met before irrevocable adverse reaction develops, our association with and assistance to new administration is clearly in our best interests. [Portion of cable missing in the source text.] tion of course is not rpt not solely of MLA’s intentions or choice of course to be followed. Implementation of most favorable intentions will be difficult indeed and full success can not rpt not be assured. Furthermore, US can hardly remove itself from scene and wait idly until nature, intent and success of MLA is clear and indisputable. US has been and remains closely involved in many sensitive areas and our actions and attitudes, though they will not be determining in the largest issues, will significantly affect future development here. 7. In preparing this message we assume that continuation of unitary Pakistan of two wings joined as definitely more to US interest than separation. Latter possibility presents to us image of weak, chaotic leftist state in east, easily subject to influence from West Bengal and from China, which could even develop into battleground for predominant influence between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communist elements. Largely autonomous arrangement with weak center but with direction in some areas and perhaps some continuing administrative and personnel input from west to east presents problems but appears as much more to our interests than complete breakup. C. Early indications MLA policy directions 8. We would define MLA moves and signals thus far as satisfactory on many peripheral and some significant problems, questionable on a few, but as not rpt not having reached as yet into most sensitive areas. Such actions as reduction wheat support price, conditional maintenance of recently granted wage increases (which may bring difficulties later for GOP), reactivation of study group to review means of tapping agricultural income and resumption of schools and elimination of fees for period schools were closed, all show commendable intent to increase proportion of benefits from economic progress reaching lower income groups. Other moves also show efforts to humanize and make more efficient GOP bureaucracy. MLA Deputy Nur Khan has shown marked interest and sympathy for student and labor problems. Statements on corruption, control of government employees assets etc. are commendable enough but we are skeptical that Pakistani mores can be changed overnight. 9. None of these, however, have touched on questions of east wing autonomy, increased allocation of resources to east, power of central government versus provinces, provincial representation in National Assembly, etc., etc. As stated above, probably no one today in MLA could speak authoritatively on these points. Based on statements made at and shortly after martial law declaration, however, we assume that present leadership will seek even at great cost to (a) maintain strong center, (b) protect existing power structure (including one unit) in West Pakistan while providing increased benefits to urban labor and to rural low-income sectors and (c) to prevent “excessive” (and thus far undefined) transfer of political power to east wing. D. US policy options 10. In these circumstances, what are policy options open to US, on assumption that future developments in Pakistan will unfold rather slowly, and in fact may depend in part upon way in which we play our role? Apparent choices might seem to be (a) to continue present policies largely unchanged, i.e., transferring our support from Ayub to Yahya: (b) to withdraw or to limit economic and military assistance and certainly new commitments until MLA’s intentions toward establishment political framework become clear: and (c) expanded leverage, by using what influence we can to frame assistance efforts to persuade and assist MLA in directions we favor. 11. Continuity option. This choice, if made purposefully, assumes a judgment that MLA (despite its disadvantages) is most likely assure immediate stabilization and equally unlikely be replaced by regime more favorable to US. It either overlooks east wing reaction or assumes that MLA can find satisfactory political solution for its own replacement. Under it, we would continue both military supply and economic assistance programs as before, using them as we have been for limited leverage (i.e., principally in field of economic policy). We would of course observe MLA’s policies and progress as they develop, but we would seek no major impact on interwing relations. Major problem in this choice is that for East Pakistan we are clearly and openly supporting “colonial” power with no assurance that it will become more acceptable in east wing. 12. Withdrawal or limiting option. This choice implies judgment that conciliation between two wings is unlikely of itself and that we can bring MLA to modify its policies by negative pressure, pressure which would be stinging and public. It suggests also that MLA’s intentions toward reestablishment political frame work may become clear with reasonable promptness. None of these appears as likely prospects. Certainly a withdrawal of assistance already offered and even withholding new but implied commitments (i.e. to cancel Turkish tank deal or to refuse attend consortium meeting) would damage our position in West Pakistan significantly, would not rpt not achieve objectives. 13. Expanded leverage option. This course we see as complex, difficult and uncertain, but offering best possibility of eventual achievement of US objectives. In summary, under it we would (a) offer ourselves as certain supply source for limited but negotiable quantities of certain types of military (lethal) equipment (b) continue economic assistance within limits of overall appropriations but with increased attention to East Pakistan, and (c) accompany (a) and (b) by subtle but explicit relating of assistance to certain objectives which we would spell out in general terms. In economic field, East Pak strategy paper now under study in Washington is beginning in this direction. We would in effect through this and other proposals (such as locating certain Pak financial institutions in Dacca) make stepped up effort to increase center’s attention to east wing. In political field, Reuss Amendment on military sales to military dictators gives us excuses, and prospect of increased military supply gives us opportunity, to maintain pressure, discreetly and carefully but explicitly for movement toward political viability. E. Recommendations 14. We recommend that US make conscious choice of using means available to us to press for movement by martial law administration toward objectives we believe imperative. This choice would be for undefined time period not rpt not to be unlimited. Our views should be made known clearly but discreetly to GOP, and a review of GOP developments continued. Specifically: (A) At early opportunity and acting under instructions (and paralleling similar approach in Washington to ambassador Hilaly), Ambassador should request from Yahya MLA’s intentions concerning restoration political rule and particularly toward East Pakistan. He should tell Yahya that US has decided to continue its economic assistance program and has decided to liberalize military supply program but that US is gravely concerned lest in event of greater alienation between two wings US finds itself effectively supporting one wing against the other. Therefore we feel required to relate both economic assistance and military supply to future developments in Pakistan. Ambassador would outline for Yahya problems of political restoration as we see them, as well as our overall intentions re economic and military assistance, to be drawn from paras (B) and (C) below. He should inform Yahya that in event US should come to visualize itself as supporting one wing to detriment of other our policies toward GOP would have to be reviewed. We should not rpt not set ourselves up as arbiter of what is acceptable in terms of political progress: this must be determined by Pakistani people themselves (however, Ambassador probably should provide [omission in source text] (B) In economic assistance, we should continue and expand our particular attention to East Pakistan, results so far of which are found in East Pakistan paper. Consortium meeting provides logical opportunity for GOP to provide thinking and plans for selected modifications in economic development program to help meet major problems of East Pakistan. (In any event we plan suggest to GOP that it do this.) Our own thinking should particularly take into account not only political as well as economic impact of current inputs, but also popular knowledge and acceptance of own activities. Does East Pak strategy paper go far enough? We recognize that GOP policy and inputs outweigh ours by far, and that our effort is to induce a change on its part but nevertheless our own political position in East Pakistan results in part from our economic programs there. We also recognize that there may be strong economic arguments which have prevailed in the past against certain revisions of policy. (e.g. consistently more attractive development opportunities in West Pakistan.) These arguments remain and have to be met. However the political pressures to overcome them we see as now much stronger than in the past. (C) In military assistance, we should reach policy decision to supply certain type of equipment, subject to negotiation and should so inform GOP. We should emphasize this is not wide-open door and that we will need to work out carefully with GOP best method of assessing needs, as well as how we can handle restrictions under Conte and Symington Amendments. We should make clear our policy is subcontinental one and we consider Indian and Pak military spending levels as related to entire question under discussion. (D) Most important element of our position, however, would be to emphasize that above policies could be maintained only so long as progress toward political settlement continued. If this changed, and particularly if relations between wings deteriorated, US policy would have to be reviewed. It should be made very clear to GOP that US cannot support in sense outlined above administration which becomes alienated from populace, and that we can see possibility of such situation developing, particularly in East Pakistan. F. Indian reaction to US policy in Pakistan 15. Seems to us that events in Pakistan since last November have increasingly demonstrated compatibility of basic US and Indian interests in preservation of a united Pakistan in which East Bengalis resonably satisfied, governed by an administration adequately responsive to the revolution of rising expectations in both wings. Given this fundamental congruence of interests, thoughtful GOI leaders might well be persuaded that policy option recommended above is also in India’s best interests. Oehlert 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, DIA, Ankara, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Moscow, Peshawar, Tehran, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Kabul, and Kathmandu. 19. Telegram 4275 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 19. Telegram 4275 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, April 29, 1969, 0832Z Subject: Peshawar Ref: A. Paragraph 17, Rawalpindi 5405 (31 May 1968) B. Paragraphs 11 through 16, Rawalpindi 6039 (9 July 1968) 1. At his request I called on the Defense Secretary at 0900 hours this morning. 2. He reminded me that before I had left for consultation in Washington in June 1968 then President Ayub had given me a message for President Johnson to the effect that it might be possible to work out some continuation of the Peshawar operation if it could be done quote on a smaller and less visible basis, in a different location, under complete Pakistan control unquote. He also reminded me that upon my return from that consultation trip I had informed him that President Johnson had been interested in the suggestion and had requested me to explore that possibility fully. Comment: You will recall that when I conveyed President Johnson’s message to President Ayub the then new Foreign Minister, Arshad Hussain, remarked that while he had not repeat not been present at the prior meeting he had studied the record very carefully and that Ayub had not repeat not stated the matter as I had suggested. You will recall further that Ayub promptly and vigorously contradicted the Minister saying that I had quoted him precisely but that in the intervening weeks there had been developments, namely that the Russians had stated that they would expect us to try this gambit and that they wanted the Pakistanis to know that if they undertook it, it would be detected, and therefore Ayub was no repeat no longer in a position to pursue that possibility. 3. The Secretary then said that President Yahya would be writing to talk to me about the possibility of making some arrangement such as Ayub had previously suggested. 4. Would appreciate instructions ASAP as to: A. What attitude I should take if Yahya does surface this possibility in the near future: and B. Should I raise the matter with him if he does not repeat not do so shortly? Oehlert 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. The Department responded on April 30 that Oehlert should not take the initiative in discussing continuation of the operations at Peshawar, and if Yahya raised the issue, Oehlert was instructed to take a non-committal attitude and report to Washington. (Telegram 66922 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 20. Memorandum of Conversation 20. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 16, 1969 PARTICIPANTS: M.M. Ahmad, Chief, Economic Planning Commission in Pakistan Agha Hilaly, Ambassador of Pakistan Henry A. Kissinger Harold H. Saunders Dr. Kissinger opened the 20-minute conversation by saying that he had the warmest recollections of his 1962 visit, and the guests exchanged jocular remarks over the treatment that Dr. Kissinger had received by the Pakistani press. Mr. Ahmad said that the President of Pakistan had wanted him to come to Washington and have the full range of contacts in AID, the World Bank, and the White House. Dr. Kissinger responded that we want to maintain the closest of contact with the Pakistanis. Mr. Ahmad went on to say that the Government of Pakistan had drawn three conclusions as a result of the recent troubles there: 1. Aid does work and continued foreign support for Pakistan’s economic development is justified. 2. High economic growth rates are not by themselves enough. Pakistan has maintained high rates of growth, but that alone has not staved off the acute demands for social reform articulated in the recent disturbances. 3. The disturbances have demonstrated that a substantial rate of economic growth has been “institutionalized.” Even with the disturbances, a substantial measure of economic progress continues. Mr. Ahmad noted that, while the martial law administration has not solved Pakistan’s problems, it has bought a breathing spell during which they might be solved. For one thing, he said that the Pakistani Government had now realized that it would have to sacrifice some of its economic growth rate for the sake of social reform and of meeting the problem of disparity in the allocation of resources between East and West Pakistan. He hoped that Pakistan could continue to count on substantial outside support in this effort. The meeting of the World Bank aid consortium in Paris would, for that reason, be extremely important. Although he did not assess any blame, he stated that the sharp drop in the availability of aid in the past year had caused a pinch in the allocation of resources within Pakistan which had had a very direct relationship to the coming of the recent troubles. Dr. Kissinger said that the President has a very warm spot in his heart for former President Ayub Khan and for Pakistan. How that concern translates into dollars and cents is a matter that involves a wide range of issues, both domestic and foreign. But it does assure a deep concern for Pakistan’s interests and responsiveness to Pakistan’s requirements. When Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Saunders whether there were any other substantive issues which would be coming to the President’s attention soon, Mr. Saunders noted that the President would in due course be reviewing the economic, aid program for the next year in Pakistan. Ambassador Hilaly noted quickly that there was also the question of military aid, and Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that that is under current review. He said, with a smile, that we would not be “doctrinaire” in making up our minds. In response to a question from Mr. Saunders, Mr. Ahmad noted that the military aid decision had also had budgetary implications since Pakistan had had to cut back resources devoted to the development budget in order to finance the procurement of military equipment when it was no longer provided on a grant basis by the United States. In closing, Dr. Kissinger reassured Mr. Ahmad and the Ambassador that we wanted to maintain close contact and that this Administration would continue to be concerned with developments in Pakistan. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Harold Saunders, and approved in S/S on June 1. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “version sent State.” 21. Telegram 7466 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 21. Telegram 7466 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 21, 1969, 1750Z Subject: Pakistan Consortium Meeting-Summary 1. Annual consortium meeting Paris 19–20 generally went very well. Problem of declining net aid transfers fully explored in context need for increased resources for expansion social sector while maintaining growth. Pakistan impressed by members with necessity for better mobilization of domestic resources, particularly through progressive taxation. Donors showed understanding bank proposal for softer terms and larger portion of commodity aid. Growing debt servicing problem to be subject of further study and then separate meeting. 2. Against $500 million request, members (except Belgium, France, Italy and US) indicated about $250 million would be forthcoming. Belgium, France and Italy will participate subject to governmental approvals and in case Italy and France movement of prior year funds. US delegate referred to request of 140 million to Congress. Germany and Netherlands disclosed softening of terms their aid. Germany to new DAC 30 year level, Netherlands fully to old DAC with agreement in principle to move to new. 3. Main speech by US delegate underscored challenge of tax problem, reduction in defense of expenditures to assist in investment, East Pakistan development, rural works program, family planning, “second generation” food grain problems. Presentation was warmly commended by Paks, who requested text for use their own struggles in bureaucracy. Transcript being hand carried to Rawalpindi and Washington. 4. Full report of session follows in separate cables on a) opening statements, b) delegates response, c) debt servicing problem, d) aid contributions, e) closing remarks and f) press statement. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 PAK. Limited Official Use. Joint State/AID message. Sent also to Rawalpindi. Repeated to New Delhi for Spain. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to Pakistan met in Paris, May 19–20, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund also sent observers. 22. Telegram 7699 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Secretary of State Rogers in New Delhi 22. Telegram 7699 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Secretary of State Rogers in New Delhi 1 Paris, May 23, 1969, 1922Z Subject: India Consortium: Summary 1. Summary of consortium meeting for use as appropriate by Secretary. Detailed reports follow septels: 2. Tone of meeting constructive with much laudatory comment on recent improvements in Indian economy and constructive exchange on need for improved Indian performance industrial efficiency, long-term export promotion, decision making re investments, and family planning. Agreement reached for meeting on this subject when UN study complete, purpose to coordinate consortium country efforts with Indian needs. 3. AID plans IFY 1969–70: Most countries were not in a position to make firm commitments, but expressed intentions (subject in most cases including US to legislation) appeared to come fairly close to IBRD-recommended level of $1 billion including debt relief. US indicated budget request for India in US FY 1970 AID bill was $385 million. Japanese and Italians remain reluctant to undertake commitments, latter expressing interest in whether Bank would agree that supplier credits are in some cases appropriate substitute for aid. Germany expressly agreed to ease aid terms and Netherlands and Belgium noted possibility similar action. 4. Debt relief: Agreement reached for IFY 1969–70 debt rescheduling in some cases, including US, subject to reference to capitols, and for principle that similar relief should be given in 1970–71. A. Amount to comprise at least $300 million over course of three years meaning countries with shortfall in 1968–69 will attempt make full share. Japan to report its contribution in two months: other members indicated compliance. B. Some improvement in terms of rescheduling by Germany while France, Japan and Italy still unable to meet desired terms although latter two will come up to quantitative quota. C. Pressed on subject Sov bloc debt, GOI asserted that it now repeat now has trade deficit with “rupee area” and that it continues apply pressure on USSR for increased net flow resources in form larger non-project imports, with some success. E. India pressed hard by several delegations, including US, to limit use supplier credits. 5. Indian del highly pleased with results consortium meeting and tell us they are so reporting to Delhi. Brown 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Priority. Joint State/AID message. Repeated to the Department of State. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to India met in Paris, May 22–23, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund sent observers. 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 Tehran, May 26, 1969, 0950Z Subject: Secretary’s Lahore Meeting With President Yahya 1. Summary: Tone of visit throughout was frank and cordial with President Yahya and Secretary Yusuf emphasizing theme quote we are glad you have come to see us as we are unquote. In ninety minute discussion May 24 with Secretary Rogers and party, President Yahya and colleagues discussed Pak internal situation forthrightly and at some length made pitch for continued economic aid and for direct military sales and sent friendly message to Afghan King. Secretary and party described U.S. efforts in Middle East and Southeast Asia and reviewed longer term relations with USSR. Secretary suggested U.S. would continue econ aid to Pakistan and was noncommittal on military sales. End summary. 2. Pakistan internal situation. In lengthy discussion with frequent questions from Secretary, Yahya attributed administrative collapse basically to (a) lack of sense of political participation by intellectuals, poorer classes and others, (b) imbalance between quote social sector unquote and development, i.e., inadequate improvement in current living standards, (c) neglect of East Pakistan, and (d) corruption and nepotism. Said martial law put out quote flame but not fire unquote. He moving as quickly as possible toward restoration normal democratic processes but timing depended on quote conditions and circumstances unquote. Yahya said parliamentary form of government and maximum regional autonomy were widespread demands: he would insure free elections but not impose specific constitutional forms. Yahya described present situation as not one of military repression forced on people but one which was welcomed by relieved populace as saving country from chaos. Stressed his own desire to go back to being a soldier ASAP. 3. Economic assistance. Yahya, assisted by Deputy Chairman Planning Commission M.M. Ahmad, made effective presentation on econ development results. Yahya said Pak development success was as much vindication of U.S. philosophy of assistance as proof of Pakistan’s ability to help itself. Recent crisis, according Ahmad, showed growth alone not enough and must be blended with social justice. This requirement made Pak assistance needs more urgent than ever and pointed to (a) need for restoration of funds to earlier levels, (b) importance of early IDA contribution, (c) Pak need for PL–480 grain assistance to East Pakistan without quote normal restrictions unquote and (d) East Pak requirements for flood control and water development. Secretary said he understood Pak point of view but present situation (MLA) presented problems for some in U.S. He indicated we had asked Congress for $140 million commodity loan FY 1970 and said he would look into latter two points. 4. Military supply. Yahya made brief but emphatic reference along expected lines to need purchase U.S. arms to ensure Pakistan’s safety. Secretary questioned Yahya’s claim that Pakistan’s safety was threatened but assured Yahya matter was being carefully considered. In private conversation, Yahya re-emphasized seriousness of Pak arms supply situation and Pak request to U.S., saying Pak would have to have some source of supply. 5. Southeast Asia. Secretary said U.S. had no desire impose any particular political system in South Vietnam: so long as outcome reflected will of people. U.S. objectives would be satisfied if NVN not prepared to negotiate seriously. U.S. would continue efforts to strengthen South Vietnam that it could assume larger share of responsibility. Secretary emphasized that simple U.S. pullout of Vietnam would be followed in short time by Chinese control of entire area and that this feared by countries of area. He indicated U.S. willing aid economically both North and South Vietnam following satisfactory settlement. He expressed uncertainty about Soviet assistance in arriving at settlement, but pointed to Soviets’ great concern now over china. Secretary said U.S. wants no land bases or other special privileges in Vietnam: we desire only that China not take over. He asked Yahya if Pakistan could be of assistance. Yahya described Pakistan’s objectives in area as similar and promised to be responsive to any specific request for help, mentioning particularly Pak dialogue with China. 6. Middle East. Asst. Secty Sisco, without discussing specifics of possible settlement, told Yahya U.S. had been seeking define common ground with USSR in bilaterals, which could be passed to both sides through jarring. Similar dialogue underway in Four Power talks. Hardening of positions between parties on both sides plus deteriorating situation in area made this most difficult. Yahya made no substantive comment but seemed to applaud U.S. efforts. 7. CENTO. FonSec Yusuf gave eloquent description of Pak position toward CENTO, asking how Pakistan could be active in military aspects of CENTO when USSR now a source of military supply. He pointed out, however, that Pak position on CENTO, with two Ambassadors and MFA Director at Tehran, was not as mere observer. Secretary said U.S. had sought better relations with USSR and with China but Czechoslovakia and Brezhnev Doctrine showed how little USSR had changed. Assured Yahya he understood his position and had no intent pressure him on CENTO. Separately Gen. Pirazada indicated Paks had no intention of leaving either SEATO or CENTO. 8. Afghanistan. Yahya, in brief discussion of Pak-Afghan problems, said he wanted to improve relations and asked Secretary to convey this assurance to King. Secretary agreed to do so. 9. Indo-Pak relations. Yahya did not devote large amount time to Indo-Pak troubles but took fairly hard line on Indian intransigence re Kashmir and Farraka. Said it was almost useless talk to people who would not admit problem existed. Indicated he was willing go on trying, however, and did not suggest GOP contemplated any new tactics in near future. Asked if Secretary would be willing help in dialogue with India. Secretary responded U.S. could not assume responsibility for solution to problem but if both sides wanted, we would be willing try be helpful in any way possible. 10. ENDC. Yusuf expressed hope we would not agree to Sov proposal to accept Japanese-Mongolian candidacies for enlargement of ENDC, since this reduced Pakistan’s chances of membership. Pedersen later gave him U.S. statement accepting this formula pointing out specific U.S.-Sov agreement enlargement could not stop there. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Sent as Secto 111/2059. Repeated to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Saigon, Bangkok, London, and the mission at Geneva. Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25. 24. Telegram Secto 143 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 24. Telegram Secto 143 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 May 29, 1969, 2237Z Department of State pass to Embassy New Delhi for info. Secretary-Indira Ghandi Meeting 1. Following meeting with Dineshi Singh Secretary met with Prime Minister Indira Ghandi for about half an hour. 2. Prime Minister opened meeting with expression of congratulations on Apollo 10 mission. 3. Secretary then reviewed situation in Vietnam urging time had come for NLF to talk to Saigon. Reviewed our ideas for fair, supervised elections, indicating there seemed to be opinion NLF strength was 15–20 percent of population; if so this would be represented in elections. Question was whether NLF was prepared to participate. PM said she regarded President’s speech and our latest moves as step forward. 4. Said she attached “greatest importance to relations with US.” Felt there was political, economic and social understanding between our two countries. Hoped relationship would have a “new dimension” with the new administration. 5. PM inquired about Conte Amendment and how it might affect India. Secretary said it not likely to cause difficulties for India and that, without commitment, we were seriously considering use of escape clause. PM said India had significant defense needs. There was an existing threat on its borders, but more than that, every country had to be able to defend itself. 6. PM Inquired about status of US/Sov relations. Secretary said they were enigmatic. Relations were starting with them in friendly way, and they were observing the amenities. We were working more closely with them and believed this was reciprocated. We were actively engaged with them in number of areas. In ME Sisco and Dobrynin were conferring frequently and Secty had talked to Dobrynin four or five temes. PM said Sov’s hold the U.S. at fault for lack of settlement because we would not speak to Israel strongly enough. She said situation getting more and more explosive. Secty replied we might say Sov’s at fault and noted Israelis challenged whether situation really getting worse. Re Sov relations Secty continued that we were both anxious to engage in SALT discussions and hoped to do so within next few months, and that consular relations were expanding. 7. On vietnam Secty said Sov’s had been helpful on procedural matters, but we did not know whether they would be helpful on substance or not. We hoped they would assist and thought it was to Sov advantage (vis-à-vis China) to see a settlement, but they seemed to fear Chinese would exploit any help they might give. Noted about 70 percent of combat strength in SVN was now regular NVN forces, so Sov effort with Hanoi could be helpful. PM said most Sov policy now seemed to be governed by their concern about Chinese. Agreed solution should be beneficial to Sov’s and said she thought NVN would be bulwark against China. In days when India was closer to China, Ho Chi Minh used to warn them against Chinese expansionism. 8. Secty then reviewed our ideas for troop replacement, with SVN taking over more and more of responsibility, in case NVN not interested in negotiations. Asked PM if she thought US ought to pull out all together. After moments hesitation, PM said withhdrawl would help but way it is done was important. Secty said he thought if we just withdrew it would lead to Chinese effectively taking over in SE Asia-Vietnam, Laos, and even Chinese efforts in Thailand. 9. PM said she understood we were seeking to talk to Chinese. Secty said we were tryng to do so, as were Thais and others. Also Canadians and Italians without much success. PM noted Chinese-West German trade was rather high. Said India saw no point in breaking relations with China and hoped Chinese would change some day. Had indicated to Chinese Indian positions were not rigid, but there had been no reaction. Said Chinese were helping some of India’s hostile tribes with arms and training. In india Chinese had support from some political and anti-social elements. Pro-Chinese communist group believed in violence and even opposed existing communist state govt’s in India. They were small but needed watching. 10. At outset meeting Secretary had presented letter from President which PM briefly read, and at conclusion PM asked Secretary to convey her best wishes to President. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent as Secto 143/WH 90729 with an instruction to repeat to New Delhi. Rogers sent the telegram from his plane while crossing the Atlantic Ocean from London en route to the United States. The meeting between Gandhi and Rogers took place on the morning on May 24. A copy of Nixon’s letter to Gandhi, which commended Rogers to her and emphasized the importance of India and its economic development to his administration, can be found ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 366. The Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister Singh was reported to the Department on May 24 in telegram 7246. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S) 25. Telegram 6484 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 25. Telegram 6484 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, July 2, 1969, 1100Z Subj: Military Supply Policy Ref: A. State 147357, April 16, 1968 Joint State-AID-Defense 1. Summary: Country Team has reviewed Indo/Pak military supply question and concluded anew that early adjustment April 1967 policy would be in our best interests. Specifically, we strongly recommend providing USG with additional option of selling limited quantities lethal end-items directly to India and Pakistan, on case-by-case basis, while we recognize this likely create problems for us in our relations with India, we see course as the lesser evil to placing Pakistan in a position where it will increasingly feel need to turn to communist China as ts major source of military equipment. We therefore urge approval of suggested modification of April 1967 policy. President Nixon hopefully would be able to inform President Yahya of decision when they meet in Lahore August 1. 2. At risk of repetition, we wish avoid any possible misunderstanding of what proponents of revision of 1967 policy specifically have in mind. We in this Embassy never contemplated “liberalization” in sense of allowing massive sales of sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan. We are fully confident this was and remains Ambassador Oehlert’s view. What we and he advocate in effect is rendering operative the intention of the restrained 1967 policy, which contemplated selective sales. Now apparent that we can accomplish purposes intended in 1967 only if we drop our condition that lethal end-items sales must necessarily be consummated via a third country route. To date, that route has secured six Hawker-Hunters for India and nothing for Pakistan. 3. Direct sales modification would still leave us with highly restrictive but more flexible policy in practice with sales keyed to our perception of how best to influence South Asian developments in face of Soviet and ChiCom machinations. Such a semantic adjustment, away from “liberalization” concept, would ease our supposed congressional problem and perhaps even the Indian’s psychological problem. 4. Moreover, modification need not preclude modest US private assistance in development of indigenous defense production facilities in both countries, in which process India would probably gain relatively more than Pakistan. Lastly, we continue to urge significant increase in our grant military training programs for both countries. 5. In concrete terms, modified policy would permit us to sell directly (assuming the Turkish tank deal is successfully negotiated) the second tranche of 100 obsolescent M–47 tanks which Presidents Johnson and Ayub discussed in Karachi December 23, 1967. Such tank sales would, of course, be conditioned on satisfactory GOP assurances re scrapping similar equipment on one-for-one basis and restrictions on additional acquisitions from other sources. Further sales would be dependent upon case-by-case decisions, measured against our appreciation of valid defense deterrent requirements and of pertinent political and economic considerations. In any event, we continue favor early approval sale six F–104s which possible under existing policy as replacement for accident losses (see State 174467, April 14, 1967). 6. We do not need in this message recapitulate all the arguments for policy modification outlined in reftels. Some key considerations merit reiterated stress. 7. Given apparent intractability Indo/Pak political impasse, USG (and GOP) believes Pakistan’s major potential for positive foreign policy role in near and middle future lies in region immediately to west e.g., in cooperation with moderate Moslem countries such as Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey. Possibility of Pakistan’s playing constructive role in Persian Gulf and elsewhere in Near and Middle East would be reduced if we force Paks to turn wholly to ChinComs and/or Soviets for weapons which are not compatible with hardware held by our area friends. (ref B.) Similarly prospects Paks can play role in post-Vietnam Southeast Asia settlement likely to be reduced if their military supply orientation shifts wholly to communists. B. Imperative of GOP’s resource/demand ratio are such that it simply cannot afford to purchase minimal arms it needs at commercial rates in Western Europe. Thus, US is only practicable non-communist source of hardware which Paks will in any event procure. In wake of anti-Ayub upheaval martial law administration (MLA) and successor GOP should greatly increase expenditures in social sector and especially in East Pakistan. Moreover, as US equipment is rapidly losing operational effectiveness, GOP may soon be faced with necessity of standardizing of equipment from different sources, leading to very rapid increase in defense expenditures. We cannot believe rational elements in GOI would, considering all relevant factors, including importance of preserving unified Pakistan, wish to deny Paks a non-communist arms supply option. C. In addition to such important gains as (1) strengthening our ties with military (which will inevitably be a key group here for considerable time, and younger officers of which are increasingly oriented towards China) and (2) enhancement of your ability to repress excessive defense spending, to permit selective direct sales would materially improve our leverage in encouraging MLA to do those things we deem necessary to insure adequate progress towards real stability. For instance timely, decisive moves to restore civilian rule under representative government and better deal for East Bengalis. D. While Indian factor places inhibitions on extent to which Soviets can provide arms to Pakistan, ChiComs suffer no such inhibitions. Moreover, it apparent that Soviets can go further than they have in supplying hardware to Paks without incurring unacceptable setback in their relations with India. In absence of US option as source of supply, GOP would perforce have to be more amenable to communist “advice” than it is or wants to be. Implications for Pakistan’s long-range political and economic development are evident. 7. Recommendation. We urge decision to modify April 1967 policy so as to allow limited direct sales of lethal end-items India and Pakistan, on case-by-case basis. If decision taken, in time, the President could inform Yahya, at least in general terms, to this effect when they meet in Lahore August 1. President Nixon could stipulate, inter alia, that we would of course expect the GOP’s firm commitment not to employ US arms in an offensive operation against India over Kashmir or any other issue, and that reasonable approach would have to be worked out for measuring Pakistan’s defensive requirements. In context this presentation, President could refer to our large economic aid program here, to our hope for gradual improvement in Indo-Pak relations and to our anticipation that Pakistan will move in timely fashion toward restoration of responsible civil administration with broader political participation. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and New Delhi. On July 8 the Embassy in New Delhi commented on the recommendations advanced in telegram 6484 from Rawalpindi as follows: “We must emphasize that any policy change permitting direct sales to Pakistan of lethal end items—even on a severely limited basis—would evoke sharp GOI reaction and severely damage our position in India.” (Telegram 9574 from New Delhi; ibid.) 26. Memorandum of Conversation 26. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 10, 1969, 4:37–5:15 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: The President Dinesh Singh, Foreign Minister of India Ali Yavar Jung, Ambassador of India K. B. Lall, Secretary of Commerce of India Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Clement E. Conger, Department of State After the President had welcomed him, the Foreign Minister said that he brought greetings from the President and Prime Minister of India, who are looking forward to the President’s visit. They regret that it will be so short. The President agreed that his stay in India would be too short, but he felt that a short visit was better than none at all. He had every intention of making it as full as possible substantively. He hoped there would be ample opportunity for long substantive talks in which a lot of ground could be covered. He expected there would be a minimum of protocol type activities. With a smile, he said, “We can do that later; we hope to come back.” He intimated that when he returned next time he would hope to be able to get outside the cities into the countryside as he had done in 1953 because he felt that it is impossible to know a country just from its cities. The Foreign Minister said that the President’s visit would provide an opportunity to see the changes that have taken place in India. The President replied that when he had last visited in 1967 it was just at the end of the two years of draught. He recalled how he was told by everyone then that, if India could just have a couple of years of good weather, it would make a great difference. Now this has happened, and Dr. Hannah had told him of the results it has produced. Mr. Lall noted that extensive technological changes in agriculture had enabled India to produce more last year even though the monsoon was somewhat less than normal. The President said that he hoped to get a little feel for this progress on his coming trip but hoped to see more on a later visit. “There will be another time.” Turning to a broader framework, the President said that he has traveled more in Asia than any other U.S. President, both as Vice President and as a private citizen. As he had noted in his article in Foreign Affairs a couple of years ago, Asia is “where the action is.” There is more change in Asia; there are more people; that is where a great deal of the excitement will be in the last third of the century. The President said that one purpose of his trip is to emphasize to Americans that we have an Asian role to play far beyond Vietnam. Our objective is not to dominate Asia but to play an important cooperative role. The Foreign Minister agreed that Asia is hurrying to catch up. It has succeeded in arousing new expectations among its people. A much greater effort is now needed to bridge the gap between expectations and their realization. The President agreed that expectations create new problems, and the Foreign Minister went on to reiterate that Asia would have to make a great effort to keep up with them. Asia would have to combine development of its own resources with help from outside to meet this challenge. The President said that when he looked back to his 1953 visit, he could not help but be deeply impressed by the enormous changes that had taken place since then, despite the remaining problems. It is this historical perspective that enables us to remain optimistic despite the great problems that remain. Mr. Lall interjected that one important aspect of this change is that the large masses of people are now responding to it. The President said that he would like to see this at work in the villages of India. He had visited them in 1953 and expected that great changes had taken place since then. Mr. Lall replied that now there are new pressures on the government to provide seeds, fertilizers, pesticides. Mr. Singh noted that wherever Federal officials go there are heavy pressures on them to provide these things. He noted that the Indian farmer feels that, because they represent the Federal rather than the State governments, they can do more than State government officials. The President smiled and said, “I know.” The President noted that, while we are concerned about the forces of change, it would be worse if there were apathy. “Your people care.” What is important are the people on the land, he said. Mr. Lall noted that there are still 76% of the people in India on the land. Mr. Lall went on to note that as agricultural progress goes on, new problems are created in the cities. He mentioned Calcutta, and Mr. Singh agreed that there are very few cities in the world where there is such abject poverty. Changing the focus, Mr. Singh said that India is working for the beginnings of Asian cooperation in economic development. The establishment of ECAFE and its Council of Ministers has been a major step forward in creating an Asian effort to this end. In addition, India is alsa trying to work out a series of arrangements for bilateral cooperation—not necessarily trade promotion but cooperative arrangements developed from an examination of the relative resources and needs of the parties involved. India has, for example, moved toward a very close and deep cooperation with Iran for the joint exploitation of Iranian natural gas and the production of ammonia for fertilizer. With Ceylon, India is working in the joint sales promotion, processing and packaging of tea. India is working in similar ways with Afghanistan and Malaysia. The Indians feel that this kind of cooperation is real economic cooperation and not just trade promotion for India’s own benefit. This kind of cooperation is being stimulated and aided by the ECAFE ministers. The Minister then said he should be grateful to understand how the President envisaged future Asian cooperation. The President responded as follows: First, he had always supported our economic development programs in Asia. He would be less than candid if he did not say that we have grave problems with our Congress when it comes to appropriating funds for these programs. When Congress gets in a mood to economize, the first things it cuts are the projects far from home. But the President said he saw it as vital to the U.S. and to other cooperating countries that these programs continue. Second, looking to the future, he saw a great need for the kind of cooperation which the Foreign Minister described—first bilaterally and then hopefully multilaterally and finally “on an all-Asian basis.” The President felt that we had reached the time when people agree that Asians must solve Asian problems. We want to help, but they must provide the leadership. He would prefer that the leadership come from them rather than flow from the fact of the United States’ great economic power. Third, complicating this process will be the great power rivalries in the area. He was sure that the Foreign Minister had noted the Brezhnev proposal for Asian collective security, “whatever that means.” India had also had its own difficult experiences with China. The President said that he had a view of the posture we in the free world should take toward China which may differ somewhat from that usually expressed in the United States. He saw danger in playing the Soviet game if that game were arranged to isolate China. China is a great force in the world, and the Chinese are a strong people like the Indian people. The President felt that we should not play so much to one side that we isolate the other. He noted that Prime Minister Gandhi in 1967 had seemed to share this view. There is a school of thought, he said, that the way to solve the China problem is to “gang up” on China. The President said he had no illusions about China and was making no apology for China. But as we looked down the road at the great Asian area, he felt that all Asia must eventually move forward together. Of course, he said we have to strengthen non-Communist Asia and its ability to defend itself. But he felt that we must go forward without isolating what will one day be one billion people. The Foreign Minister said that he shared that view and knew that Prime Minister Gandhi is still of the same view. We cannot ignore China. We must try to bring China into the world community. The President asked, “Can it be done?” He answered his own question by saying that it will depend on the leaders and we know so little about the younger leaders there. The Foreign Minister noted that at the last Communist party congress in China the leaders still emphasized their revolutionary motives which meant interference in the internal affairs of others. This may change. Their experiments have not stabilized China. Some change is bound to come because it is impossible to contain an energetic people indefinitely. India is maintaining its contact with China. The President noted that there is one important aspect of India’s relation to these developments in China. India is a parliamentary democracy and China has a different kind of system. If India does not make the grade, the example for the rest of the world will be profound. The Foreign Minister felt India could demonstrate a great deal of success in this respect. Its democratic institutions have survived and progressed over a number of years, despite great problems. National integration is a difficult problem for India to handle with its great size and limited resources. Despite that, it had so far kept those problems under control without revolution. The Communists so far are working within the framework of the Constitution. As for the Brezhnev proposal, he is talking about something that Asians have talked about for sometime. In this connection, India hopes for U.S. support in the efforts of Asians to cooperate. India is not, in this respect, necessarily asking for more aid, but he hoped that some of the aid we give might go to multilateral institutions to help build confidence in Asian cooperation. The Foreign Minister explained the rationale for this economic cooperation as being a way for creating common interests among the Asians—first the cooperation in common economic concerns and then an evolving interest in the stability and security of the cooperating nations. He saw this as being done without mutual security pacts. He felt this kind of cooperation would create power to resist aggression because it would increase Asian commitment to defend what they themselves would have built. The capacity must be created through economic development to defend themselves but this will also lead to a commitment to protect the progress and institutions which they have built. The President said that he wanted to note one serious problem that would affect our ability to cooperate—the Vietnam war. “Speaking quite candidly,” he felt that Asian nations ultimately have a great stake in how that war ended. If the mass of Americans are disillusioned with the costs of the war and what it will have achieved, they will be unlikely to support extensive American cooperation with Asians in the future. If it ends in a way that enables Americans to feel that they have helped achieve something, then Americans will feel that their actions have helped create some chance for the people in that area to choose their own way of life and to improve it. So it is important for us in trying to work our way out of that war to do so in a way that will enable Americans to play a future role in Asia. This is “a great agony for us.” The Foreign Minister said that India did not wish to see frustration or defeat on either side. The President felt that constructive proposals had been made on our side, and he informed the Foreign Minister that President Thieu of South Vietnam would be making an important statement that evening. He urged the Minister to read this carefully. This had been discussed at Midway and, the President felt, would represent significant progress. The press was invited in for picture, and the conversation turned briefly to a lighter comment about the President’s trip before the Foreign Minister’s departure. As they were walking out the side door to the covered veranda, the President pointed out the cleat marks made on the floor just inside the door by President Eisenhower’s golf shoes. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on July 12. The meeting was held in the Oval Office of the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Singh was visiting the United States in response to an invitation extended by Rogers in New Delhi on May 24. A summary of Singh’s conversations with Rogers on July 10 and 11 was sent to New Delhi on July 11 in telegram 115492. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69) Singh also met with Kissinger on July 10. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 16, 1969 SUBJECT: Indian Political Crisis India’s ruling Congress party is in the midst of a sudden crisis, which some feel could even lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Gandhi. Although it is difficult to characterize the division within the party—which has existed since before independence—it is essentially between the old guard party politicians and Mrs. Gandhi’s governmental wing of the party. Two powerful figures who usually act independently—Home Minister Chavan and Deputy Prime Minister Desai—have joined the Old Guard. Background The trouble began at a party meeting last week in Bangalore where the two main issues were a proposal to nationalize the banks and the selection of a presidential candidate for the August 16 election. Mrs. Gandhi won on the bank question, but in doing so may have lost the support of its opponents— led by Desai—without guaranteeing the backing of those favoring nationalization. (She may have hoped the issue would split Chavan and Desai, but the effect was the opposite. ) On Sunday, both Chavan and Desai apparently supported Sanjiva Reddy—the speaker of the lower house of parliament and a member of the Old Guard—against Mrs. Gandhi’s candidate, Acting President Giri. After Reddy’s selection, Giri announced that he would run as an independent, and Mrs. Gandhi began moves—so far unproductive—to reverse the choice. Since that time, Giri has announced he will resign as President—although he clearly intends to stay in the race. The completely non-political Chief Justice Mohammed Hidayatullah would succeed him. The Indian presidency has been a largely ceremonial office, but this has been due primarily to the stability of twenty years of large Congress Party majorities. Instability in some state governments and the loss of others to the opposition have already made the position more important— constitutionally, the President, not the Prime Minister, has the power of intervention—and with the prospect of a coalition government in New Delhi in 1972, it has become even more important for Mrs. Gandhi to have a friend in the office. Today, Desai resigned from the cabinet, although it is not yet clear why. Presumably his opposition to Mrs. Gandhi’s nationalization scheme played some part in his resignation or dismissal as Finance Minister—his substantive cabinet post—and with this gone he saw no point in continuing in the functionless office of Deputy Prime Minister. There may well be much broader implications to his resignation, although it is not clear whether this signals a move to oust Mrs. Gandhi. At last report, Chavan was still in the cabinet. Relation to the Trip Our advance man in New Delhi (Walker) has cabled: “With President Giri resigning and the possibility of the Prime Minister being forced to resign, I cannot see us continuing to make plans for the stop in Delhi.” His main problem is that he is having trouble getting firm answers to his questions on your schedule because the top leadership is preoccupied with the political crisis. I believe, above all, that any decision to cancel your visit would have to come from the Indians. Therefore, we are cabling Walker to go ahead with his planning until the Indians broach the subject of cancellation. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The Embassy in New Delhi reported on the political crisis on July 15 in telegram 10025, and on July 16 in telegram 10082 (both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 INDIA) On July 19 Gandhi’s government issued an ordinance nationalizing 14 of the country’s largest banks. The Embassy commented: “By boldness and swiftness of her move on July 19 to nationalize leading banks, Prime Minister Gandhi has achieved leadership of Congress Party and confounded her powerful opponents within that party.” (Telegram 10333 from New Delhi, July 21; ibid.) 28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 18, 1969 SUBJECT: Economic Aid for India Issue You have asked for information on what alternative aid steps we could take toward India in the near future. Two such steps are available immediately: 1. AID is ready to go ahead with two major loans using FY 1970 money under their Continuing Resolution authority. The only issue is how to publicize the loans: through normal channels at once, through normal channels just prior to your trip, or by you personally on the trip. 2. The relevant agencies have recommended that you approve an FY 1970 PL 480 program of up to $300 million for India. There are two issues: (a) Should you approve the whole FY 1970 program now or simply approve part of it, holding the rest until November when it could be considered along with the total AID program for FY 1970? (b) Whatever the answer to (a), how should we inform the Indians of our decision to maximize the impact for the trip? New AID Loans The $35 million in AID loans are for highly desirable activities—a fertilizer plant involving Indian and U.S. cooperatives, U.S. private firms and U.S. banks; and a program loan for general imports to help stimulate the Indian private sector. All relevant agencies agree to these loans, (There is a more detailed description of them on Pages 5 and 6 of Secretary Rogers’ memorandum, attached at Tab B.) On the question of publicity, it is my view that it would set an unfortunate precedent for you to personally announce new aid commitments when you visit foreign countries. You would obviously come under great pressure to do so everywhere, which is impossible. On the other hand, we should try to maximize the favorable impact on your trip of the announcement of the projects. RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize me to instruct AID to notify the Indians on these loans just prior to your departure, with the exact timing to be worked out in connection with the overall trip scenario. Approve Disapprove, prefer to notify Indians yourself on the trip PL 480 AID and Agriculture seek your approval to work out with India a sale under PL 480 of up to $300 million in agricultural commodities (3.5 million tons of grain, edible vegetable oil, tallow and cotton). The rationale for a large part of this program is to help India build up its buffer stocks. This in turn will permit them to break down inefficient price and distribution mechanisms, which they have been trying to do for several years to build incentives for their agricultural revolution. The Agriculture Department reports that our wheat stocks are well above last year’s and that other major producers have record stocks, so we will continue to face sharp competition in the commercial market. Announcement of these sales would thus help Agriculture domestically. Bob Mayo concurs with the proposal and promises to keep the program within budget ceilings although the details for doing so have not yet been worked out. The main problem with the proposal is procedural. NSDM 10 directed submission to you of each major country aid program once a year so that you could address each in its entirety and choose among various options both substantively and tactically. One specific reason for this approach is to coordinate the AID and PL 480 components of our aid programs. The proposed package, however, is for PL 480 alone. AID feels that they cannot meaningfully propose the overall economic program until the FY 1970 appropriation is decided, which will not be until fall. There is no discussion in the State/AID paper (Tab B) of the relationship between PL 480 and AID in this our largest aid program. And since most of the wheat is for buffer stock purposes, it is not needed with great urgency. Mayo’s memorandum (Tab A) thus presents an alternative to the proposal of the agencies: to authorize now only whatever PL 480 is needed to keep the program moving until the overall India aid review in the fall. He recommends against this alternative, however, because (a) it is desirable to maintain a steady shipping schedule on these large amounts of grain and to complete them before the monsoons begin in the spring, (b) a short-term package might imply to India that you were reverting to the Johnson policy of keeping them on a short leash, (c) there is in practice little if any tradeoff between AID and PL 480 in India, and (d) events between now and November are unlikely to change the outcome. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the recommendation of the agencies to approve the full $300 million PL 480 package for India for FY 1970. This course would create an exceptionally good tone for the Indian part of your trip because of the marked contrast with the Johnson “short leash” approach. Approve Disapprove, prefer to approve only enough PL 480 at this time to keep the program running smoothly until the overall India aid package is ready for your consideration in November. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations. Attached but not published at Tab A was a July 3 memorandum to Nixon from Robert P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, entitled “Proposed P.L. 480 Program for India.” Attached but not published at Tab B was a June 23 memorandum to the President from Rogers, entitled “Economic Assistance to India.” 29. Memorandum of Conversations 29. Memorandum of Conversations 1 New Delhi, July 31, 1969, 3–4:45 p.m. and August 1, 1969, 8:30–10 a.m. Participants: Americans Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State Maurice Williams, Assistant Administrator, A.I.D. Ronald Ziegler, Special Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff William Weathersby, Deputy Chief of Mission Herbert Spivak, Political Counsellor, U.S. Embassy, New Delhi Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Indians T.N. Kaul—Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh—Secretary (I), Ministry of External Affairs V.H. Coelho—Secretary (II), Ministry of External Affairs P.N. Haksar— Secretary to the Prime Minister K.B. Lall— Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply I.G. Patel—Special Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance H.C. Sarin—Secretary, Ministry of Defence SUBJECT: New Delhi Advisers Meeting The President and Prime Minister Gandhi joined with Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh about 9:45 a. m. on August 1 Thursday, July 31—3:00–4:45 p.m. Kaul: Welcome and introductions. Keating: Thanks and introductions. President’s trip to show U.S. interest in this part of the world and importance of changes taking place here. Suggested agenda: 1. Future of Asia 2. Indo-Pakistan relations 3. Middle East Kaul: Invited Kissinger to lead off, perhaps telling some impressions of trip so far. Kissinger: We have not come to press our views but to hear yours. It is clear that postwar era is at an end when U.S. disproportionately strong and disproportionately responsible. The post-Vietnam period may be the point of change. Three wars in this generation have started in Asia, so peace in Asia and peace in the world are inseparable. But we cannot be in a position for developing all schemes for peace and progress. Nor is the defense of Asian countries more important to us than to them. We do not want to impose any patterns. We want to hear how you view the near term future. In the near term, economic and political development are important. We are not on this trip to ask support for any policies. But each nation has an interest in how war turns out. Each nation will make a judgment on the intrinsic merits of Vietnam, but we can make the judgment of the impact of the war’s outcome on our future role in Asia. Our message has been that we consider our role to be resistance of aggression across boundaries. Subversion is an internal matter. But the real challenge of subversion is to prevent it, and that is a matter of economic development on which we will help. Kaul: We hope your visit will lead to greater understanding and cooperation between us. It is our assessment that Asian countries should be left to solve their own problems in their own way. We too are concerned about Vietnam. We have great hopes in peace talks, disappointment in lack of progress. India will make known its assessments through diplomatic channels. Asian nations are suffering great internal problems. Answer to that is not military alliance but a shift from the military to the social side. We have watched with great interest the growth of sub regional organizations, especially under ECAFE. We would appreciate US support for ECAFE Council of Ministers formed December 1968. We would be interested in your assessment of (1) China, (2) the Sino-Soviet rift, (3) relations of great powers where they meet in Asia, (4) US views of great power guarantee (political rather than military) of the integrity of the smaller countries of the area. With regard to Indo-Pakistan relations, I must express our concern over resumption of US military aid to Pakistan. India has put a number of propositions to Pakistan including no-war pact—with little serious response. Kissinger: We have some views on China but, “on the basis of propinquity,” perhaps you might give your views first. Kaul: Ninth Congress in China continued talking about national liberation movements. We see small straws in wind that they may be returning gradually to normal diplomatic relations to a number of countries. On the other hand, they continue to support Pakistan and dissident elements in India. Large numbers of troops concentrated on India’s borders. We do not see any probability of change in foreseeable future. They seem to lump together imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries. India may have gone from enemy #2 to enemy #3. Concern about two Chinese roads through Pakistani-occupied Kashmir. Threat to India more, not less. Though threat to smaller nations now subversion. India’s democratic experiment an obstacle to China’s path to supremacy. Kissinger: Many of your points with which we would agree. In Communist China traditional Chinese isolationism and ideology make it difficult for China to relate to other countries. You are best judge of China’s military threat to India but would agree that main threat to smaller countries is subversion. Sino-Soviet dispute: Two centers of orthodoxy—battles among heretics more bitter than conflicts of national interests. A border with 700 million on one side and 300 million on the other. On US relationship to dispute, we will consult our own interests in relation to each. President has said we will negotiate with USSR but not for negotiations’ sake. We will not tie ourselves to support one Communist country against another. We have recently made some minor symbolic moves toward China. In short, our relations will depend on their policies. President has said that a major military move by any other major power would be looked on with disfavor by us. Keating: Add a word about our small step toward Communist China. Kissinger: We would permit tourists to purchase Chicom goods—a small breach in our total embargo. Released travel restrictions for some US groups. Has been no response on travel restrictions but too early. But we do not expect spectacular results. Kaul: What about China’s relations to Pakistan? Kissinger: To say that we are open to contacts is not to say that we look with equanimity on anything it does. Sisco: Some systematic efforts are being made to develop closer Chicom-Pakistan relations. We can’t say much more than that. We have impression that Chicom leadership is trying to reimpose control after the Cultural Revolution. We assume army is strong center. What are Indian views? Kaul: From composition of new politbureau, we judge army in control. Creates apprehension that Chinese militarism will reassert itself. Japanese and Soviet assessment is that India will be main target. Sonnenfeldt: We are interested Indian assessment of Sino-Soviet border tension. Hard to tell whether either side wants to settle border problems. We see no interest in Sino-Soviet hostilities because tension affects poise with which they deal with other problems. Kaul: In what direction is ChiCom nuclear capability going? ABM’s? Kissinger: A small force. One reason why we are developing ABM’s. We see our ability to stay well ahead of Chinese. Kaul: What would be effect of China’s nuclear power on non-nuclear countries? Kissinger: Main threat is from conventional forces. For China to use nuclear weapons would involve major problem for other nuclear powers. They have interest in not letting nuclear blackmail become pattern of international behavior. No question that nuclear attack would present serious problems. We can’t specify our response in advance. A major country being attacked by Communist China would raise problems for stability of Asia. Sisco: Distinguish conventional from nuclear attacks. Kissinger: President has said that a significant military attack on major country would be regarded seriously. Sisco: We not prepared disregard UN charter, despite American popular phrase “no more Vietnams.” Kissinger: President has made distinction between conventional cross-border attack and subversion. Sisco: What is your attitude toward Brezhnev proposal? Kaul: We were surprised. All we can tell is that Soviet idea is not military alliance but general cooperation. India not for military alliance. Kissinger: If a non-aggression treaty, hard to know what practical meaning would be. Kaul: They want dissolution of pacts and substitute something else. Sisco: This came up peripherally in Moscow. I have impression Russians busy staffing. Kaul: Let’s talk about Pakistan. Kewal Singh: We have hardly any contacts—trade, exchanges, although India has lifted ban on trade. Pakistan does not respond; now selling Indian property. Every time Pak reply: no normalization unless basic issues are resolved. Gandhi’s renewed no-war proposal met no response. Keating: Rann of Kutch a model? K. Singh: That was special. Other issues not subject to arbitration. Two basic issues: (1) Kashmir and (2) Farakka—Eastern waters. We not prepared negotiate Kashmir. Kaul: Distinction between Kutch and Kashmir. Latter is not just territory but self-determination. Keating: I only meant Kutch settlement bore out K. Singh’s thesis—small agreements first. K. Singh: Farakka: India agrees to cooperative approach. Pak demands too high. Kaul: East Pakistani problem is inundation, not irrigation. Political problem. Kissinger: If they don’t take your offer, they get nothing? K. Singh: They get regeneration of the waters below the barrage. Sisco: Genuine compromises possible. Genuine concern on both sides what future needs might be. We value good India-Pak relations. We past habit of trying to come up with new Kashmir solution every year. We think India has acted well during Pakistan’s recent troubles. On arms: We want to avoid an arms race and avoid diversion of resources to military uses. Recognize legitimate defense needs. Welcome India’s desire to become self-sufficient. Arms policy under review. Sarin: On defense production, ordnance factory from St. Louis only working 20% of capacity. Supplies have stopped coming. [Long complaint about US performance.] On Pakistan, forces have increased from 6–11 divisions, 11 medium and 3 light regiments to 19 and 3, etc. In sum, Pakistan has roughly doubled military strength since 1965. Kaul: Each side has military needs, but India facing China. What is the threat to Pakistan? We hope US will exercise influence on Pak thinking. Only helping China. Kissinger: We have no interest in an India-Pak conflict. Confronts US with choices we prefer not to have to make. We hope you succeed in normalizing relations. Don’t want to aggravate. Kaul: If you don’t want to choose, don’t aggravate. Don’t repeat mistake of 1954. Soviet supply to Pakistan has hurt USSR here. Patel: Pakistan gets more economic aid than Pakistan [sic. India] relatively—advantage to defense. Kissinger: No decisions on this trip on military supply policy. Hear views. One criterion—that stability and progress of South Asia depends on stability and progress of India. No desire be in an arms race. Before decision, full opportunity to talk again. Patel: Ponder that economic aid to Pakistan helps defense; India not. Williams: Only point—India less dependent on imports. Jung: We will meet again in October. Kissinger: While under review, no decision. Kaul: Hold decision until October talks. Friday, August 1—8:30–10:00 a.m. Kaul: Appreciation for yesterday. Patel to lead off on economic relations. Patel: Indian economic conditions : Last year conditions favorable—exports good—agricultural production good despite less than average monsoon—some inflation but prices now easing off a bit. Bilateral relations with US : Some issues of January now settled—passing of IDA replenishment—easing of “additionality” requirements—PL 480 now on yearly basis rather than short-term—good AID presentation to Congress. In sum, pleased with new Administration. Problems: 1. Prices on things like oil seeds; hope tallow can be included to help hold price line. Confidence building; would hate to see it breached. $8–9 million in tallow—could be included in any financial ceiling. 2. On additionality , US position not clear about application of new policy to India—how many restrictions will be removed. 3. Hope for high AID appropriation —need $385 million in non-project loans to meet Consortium targets. India recognizes Congress may cut but hopes Administration will press. 4. Multilateral agencies : Trends emerging which India does not like: —Resistance to high proportion of IDA and IBRD funds going to India and Pakistan. Want Latin America to have aid but this position often taken to extreme. Problem is that India now getting 40%—not of what is planned but of what is available. India gets full support from AID but not from US representatives on IBRD board. —IMF. Problem arising from proposed revision of quotas. Don’t want to see board representation become “rich men’s club”. Ideal is mutual consultation. Urge complete study of constitutional composition of board. —Asian Development Bank. Proper principle is disbursement by merit. Has been departed from in tied contributions, e.g., funds tied to procurement in Japan. This changes character of multilateral aid. US contribution and its terms will set the pace. Growth of this principle will compromise nature of multilateral aid. Step by step we are leading these institutions along wrong course. Keating: “Helpful for your usual brilliance to be reflected in this report”. Don’t want to throw gloom into this meeting. But I had talk with President last evening. He told of “very great difficulty” the Administration is having with the Congress—“worse than ever this year regarding India.” Bank nationalization has had a very serious impact on the Congress. They do not understand it. It has seriously impaired the Indian aid appropriation. The additionality problem which forcefully raised in Rockefeller visit to Latin America is a good step—doesn’t go as far as Indians or Latin Americans would like. Congress has to chew on this awhile before it can digest. Sisco: Since last meeting in Washington (Dinesh Singh) both Mr. Williams and I have testified before Congress on Aid Bill. There is realization that India and the U.S. cooperating well together. But my feeling is that we would be doing well if we came out with as high an appropriation as last year. The whole rupee problem is of increasing concern to both Executive Branch and of the Congress. Williams: The Congress is conducting a searching and intense review of the entire aid program. I agree we probably will do little better than last year. I agree with Mr. Patel that more must be done in the multi-lateral framework. As debt payments rise it may turn out that the US will be the only net donor of aid. On rupee problem, we have just signed Rural Electrification agreement, and we happy to pursue similar measures to put them quietly to work. Kaul: We unreservedly express our appreciation for past aid. But per capita it is perhaps the lowest in the world. Hope you will impress on your Congress that aid is a “vital necessity.” Both “we and you” should work to remove misunderstandings in US Congress. We encouraged by President’s encouragement for multi-lateral cooperation and understanding that India has mixed economy. Keating: President takes sympathetic attitude toward India’s mixed economy—“and indeed even toward nationalization.” Lall: India’s effort—in Commerce Department—is to increase commercial content of relationship. If you are planning inter-planetary commerce, I hope you will not forget commerce with three-quarters of the globe. [Laughter] US is now in first place among India’s trading partners. Possibility of increasing exports to USSR but Indian capacity to absorb Soviet exports is limited, “and the USSR believes in bilateralism.” Many reasons for limits on expansion of US-Indian trade—some Indian weaknesses some US policies. Even some change in US attitudes valuable. In relation to Asia, heartened by recent shifts in US attitudes. President has defined in broad terms but need to be defined in commercial terms. 6–7% growth rates possible in Asia. Improved security against external aggression a bi-product of economic growth. Asian Council of Ministers. Will be easier for them to take 1970 decisions if they knew US capacity to help. Asian Development Bank. Suggest a payments mechanism to help trade. Suggests US offshore procurement to make US dollars do double duty. Reiterate importance of definition of US policy. Sisco: Payments arrangement warrants study. We will give consideration. Williams: Trade exceedingly important. Commend India on last year’s successes in improving exports. Kaul: In regional economic cooperation, we want to complement, not compete with Japan. We hope Asian Council of Ministers will help. Pakistan has blocked Afghanistan’s initiative on subregional commercial cooperation. Lall: Could you give us general impression from countries you visited? Sub-regional cooperation has much to offer—RCD if expanded, for instance. Kaul: This not a Soviet idea. Afghanistan initiated four years ago. Van Hollen: We have supported regional cooperation in principle. Problem is how to make this truly attractive to Pakistan—politically as well as economically. Kaul: Our view is that economic progress leads to political progress. Van Hollen: We are examining. Paks would feel anything done on purely economic side would erode their political position. Sisco: All of us will be interested to hear when we go to Pakistan. Lall: Other Asian attitudes? Kissinger: We made clear at every stop that we favor regional cooperation—believe future evolution of Asia depends on how Asians relate to each other. Everyone agreed in principle but then raised particular problems. Some feared tackling some problems to exclusion of others. Some feared Japanese dominance. If Asians come up with schemes—regional or sub-regional—we will consider. Kaul: Sisco’s visit to Moscow. Sisco: Basic US-Soviet recognition that it would be foolish if we let Arab-Israeli issues degrade relations between us. We have parallel interests in preventing hostilities. US interests would be served by stable peace. In Moscow: 1. Intensive exchange on conditions in area itself. Share concern over pattern of violence. But Soviets did not seem to feel renewal of general hostilities imminent. 2. Arms control. Soviet position remains that political settlement must precede. 3. Principal discussion on framework for settlement. We trying to develop a common document to be transmitted to parties through Jarring. Well out of starting gate but quite short of finish line. Bilateral exchanges will press ahead, especially between now and opening of UNGA. We gave Soviets some countersuggestions. We seeking explicit commitment to peace. Soviets want stable peace—not renewed armistice. We see direct negotiations necessary at some point. Withdrawal necessary. Refugee settlement necessary—principle of choice while meeting Israeli concerns. No reason to be either optimistic or pessimistic. No conflict between bilateral and four-power tracks. [The President and Prime Minister joined at this point.] Keating: Described piece of sculpture to be passed on to the astronauts. Prime Minister: Say again how happy you have stopped. Talks have helped us know you better—that the main purpose. We at no time have wanted to create difficulties for US. Our history conditions our views. But we don’t want US to do anything to damage its efforts. President: The Prime Minister and I have met before. But rare opportunity this time for three hours of good talk. We tried on broad level to see political problems in each of our countries and then to put them in perspective. I can summarize my views: Moon landing has broadened our thinking. In U.S. Cabinet, a briefing recently on population—population of world would double by 2000 A.D. This perspective causes us to think about what the world would be like by 2000 if statesmen fail. Could have two superpowers with enough to destroy the world with a third—China—isolated. Exploding population—exploding, impatient generation. Here is what we are about: 1. We have the immediate problem of Vietnam. We try to conclude. This must be a conclusion we can defend as one that would help people of South Vietnam. How Vietnam comes out will have tremendous effect on future US role in the world. If US pulled out, there would be quick sense of relief, but US would probably not play a significant role in the world after that because of US frustration. We have made significant offers—but no response from other side. I believe US should play a role in the world. 2. US-USSR. We will talk about arms control, Mid-East, trade—anything to reduce tension. We will not join any anti-Chinese condominium. Good short range but disastrous long range policy. We want as good relations as possible. 3. India. I have voted for every aid bill for India since I came to Congress—not because of any desire to build a sphere of influence. But with India choosing the democratic way—the hard way, if India failed—I don’t believe it will—the impact on the rest of Asia would be great. It is essential that India succeed. We want India to succeed by itself and in any multilateral role it chooses. We have some very difficult and budget problems in US through 1970. You should not be discouraged. We ought to understand that we both have problems. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on August 1. The combined conversations were apparently typed from notes taken by Saunders that were not refined into finished memoranda of conversation. The conversations recorded in this memorandum were also reported to the Department on August 2 in telegram 11040 from New Delhi. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 383) The conversations were held in the Panel Room of the President’s Palace in New Delhi during Nixon’s visit to India July 31–August 1. Nixon was on a round-the-world trip that began on July 23 with the observation of the splashdown and recovery of the Apollo 11 spacecraft from the deck of the USS Hornet, followed by an overnight stop in Guam. He then embarked on a series of official visits to meet with chiefs of state and heads of government of the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The President also made an unannounced visit to the Republic of Vietnam, an official visit to Romania, and a brief stopover at Mildenhall Air Force Base in England to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The President returned to the United States on August 3. 30. Memorandum of Conversation 30. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New Delhi, August 1, 1969, 7:45–8:30 a.m. Participants: T.N. Kaul, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India P.N. Haksar, Secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Mr. Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff At the request of Secretary Kaul, he and Mr. Haksar called on Mr. Kissinger for 45 minutes before the beginning of the Second Advisory Meeting for a private discussion. The following subjects were covered: Bilateral Relations: Mr. Haksar opened the conversation by expressing Prime Minister Gandhi’s deep concern that Indo-U.S. relations be put on a stable basis. He stated that this had been her goal ever since her first visit to Washington as Prime Minister in 1966. He asked whether Mr. Kissinger felt there were any outstanding differences in the bilateral relationship at this point. Mr. Kissinger replied seriously that he could not think of one. Then he added with a smile, “None now that you are giving US less public advice on how to conduct our policy in Vietnam.” Pakistan: The Indians then came to what seemed to be the main point on their minds—preparing us for our visit to Pakistan. They began by reviewing their position that the best way to improve Indian/Pakistani relations is to “outflank” the most difficult issues of Kashmir and the distribution of eastern waters. They felt it might be possible at least to get back to the level of 1965 relations in terms of personnel and commercial exchanges. When Mr. Kissinger asked what our role in this might be, Mr. Kaul suggested that we tell the Pakistanis that the Indian approach is sensible. When the Indians urged us similarly not to renew military sales to Pakistan, Mr. Kissinger asked them whether India had an interest in driving Pakistan into the hands of Communist China. Mr. Haksar responded that that question was sort of like asking someone when he had stopped beating his wife. With all due respect, he felt it was the wrong question. Obviously Pakistan would get its military equipment wherever it had to, but it had no interest in becoming totally dependent on China. Russia: Mr. Kissinger asked Mr. Kaul’s assessment of Russia. Kaul felt the Russians are obsessed with China. Mr. Kissinger said he saw little U.S. interest in lining up with Russia against China. Vietnam: A further discussion of US/Soviet relations led to a discussion of Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger noted that it would be very difficult for Soviet/US relations to improve a great deal until there is progress toward a Vietnam settlement. They would like to end the war but they are not willing to pay the price. The North Vietnamese are trying to wear the U.S. down, and that is something we cannot tolerate. It would be unhealthy for our political system if two Presidents were to founder over this issue. Mr. Kaul said India’s information is that the USSR is trying. Mr. Kissinger realized that they could not do this openly, and we have no interest in their delivering half the Communist parties of the world to Communist China. The Indians returned then to US/Indian relations. After a period of initial understanding after World War II, the U.S. in 1954 in its alliance with Pakistan, had upset that. Mr. Haksar felt the US had seen the subcontinent through British eyes. The US had seen India and Pakistan as equals—and treated them in balance. Mr. Kissinger noted that the strong feeling of many Americans for India had been as much a hindrance to a sound US/Indian policy as a help because American liberals had over-sold Indian democracy and people had become disillusioned with it when they saw its reality and such actions as the takeover of Goa. Mr. Haksar reiterated the need not to equate India and Pakistan. He even intimated that some Americans wanted a weak India and then argued that a strong India would help some of the Southeast Asian nations. He thought Indonesia would welcome this. Mr. Kissinger assured Mr. Haksar “categorically” that the U.S. had no interest in a weak India—“Not that (with a smile) a strong India will be any joy to deal with.” 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. No classification marking. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Presidential Palace. 31. Memorandum of Conversation 31. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lahore, August 1, 1969, 2:30–4:30 p.m. Participants: Americans Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State Maurice Williams, Assistant Administrator, A.I.D. Ronald Ziegler, Special Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James W. Spain, Charge d’Affaires ad interim Jordan T. Rogers, Deputy Chief of Mission Pakistanis S.M. Yusuf, Foreign Secretary Major General S.G.M.M. Peerzada, Principal Military Staff Officer to the President Syud Ahmed, Secretary of Information M.M. Ahmed, Secretary of Information A.A. Fareeq, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs G.W. Choudhurt, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Agha Hilaly, Ambassador to the United States SUBJECT: Lahore Advisers Meeting The group joined President Nixon and President Yahya for the last fifteen minutes of the meeting. Yusuf: Welcome. Kissinger: Thanks. President has special feeling for Pakistan, and we approach these talks in same spirit. We taking this trip not to press any detailed scheme. Perhaps useful just to sum up our approach at other steps—why thought this the right time to take this trip. Press has speculated about a new U.S. Asian policy. Better way to say it is that conditions have changed. We were predominant. Many new independent nations. Then most of the schemes for security were developed in Washington, and we gave the impression that we had a greater interest in the security of some areas than they themselves. Now we seek more permanent arrangements. The U.S. can not be asked to assume total responsibility. Our theme is not that we are withdrawing from Asia but that in order for us to stay in a meaningful way we must have a new relationship. President has emphasized that we remain determined to keep our commitments and nothing in the new approach should be interpreted otherwise. Internal subversion best handled by programs of development. Where it occurs, American manpower should not be deployed—we can give technical assistance. We have to look at these underlying aid programs. No nation in this area can exist in complete isolation—regional and sub-regional cooperation necessary. Not at American initiative, however. Larger context of international relations. —Sino-Soviet rivalry a combination of ideological and geopolitical rivalry. These are existing realties—we take no special encouragement from this dispute but we will not commit ourselves in advance to be permanent enemies of anyone. We are always ready to negotiate, but negotiations have to be specific—not sentimental. —Do not know what Brezhnev had in mind. We will not participate in a U.S.–USSR condominium against China. If Asians organize on their own we will look on this with favor. —Vietnam. We are not on this trip to ask support for our policy on Vietnam. We do say that the kind of future commitments we can make in Asia will depend on how the Vietnam war ends—American frustration would make future involvement difficult. We feel we have put forward the best proposition we can make: simultaneous withdrawal—have not even required other side to admit they have forces there; put future of Vietnam to test of supervised elections. We cannot and should not make additional proposals. We not putting this on a take it or leave it basis because negotiations would produce give and take. Is not an unlimited amount of time. We have said exactly same thing at each stop. Yusuf: We know that your policy still in process of maturation. We recognize you are a Pacific power. The question is what that form should be. We understand you want Asians to take initiative. What sort of initiative are you looking for? Would U.S. be in favor of organizing a collective security arrangement by yourself? Kissinger: No. Yusuf: Your assessment of threat of Chinese expansionism? Are you going to leave countries to organize against that or are you just talking about meeting insurgency? Communism can come in two ways—conquest or subversion. Days of conquest seem to be over. But subversion always possible. Not so easy to export Communism. Highlights need for economic aid, though every country needs some military. Kissinger: We want to hear your assessment of the Chinese threat because you are so much closer. President has said (1) we would keep all our existing commitments and (2) a major military aggression—even where we have no commitments—involves the possibility of reaction by other major powers. We have obligations under UN charter—especially true that we have interest in opposing any effort to make nuclear blackmail an established international tool. Your assessment of China? Yusuf: China-Pakistan. Have to take account of the existence of China. A collective security arrangement might increase tensions. China as a strong power might not increase tension. We have found China to be a very good neighbor. Pak experience may be unique—no Chinese minority as in Southeast Asia. China has made no attempt to subvert Pakistan. We think we can coexist. China has assured Pakistan it would like to see Pakistan remain united— Chinese interest in strong Pakistan as counter to India. China a good friend—economic and military aid. Never said Pakistan should take aid only from China. Pakistan does not believe in over-commitment. Survival better served by broader relationships. Same policy toward USSR. Pakistan not interested in Brezhnev proposal. Doubt border tension will lead to Sino-Soviet war. Chinese contend USSR wants maintain benefit of Czarist conquests. We believe strong China need not lead to increase in tensions. You should continue your economic aid. This one way of stopping Communism, which is abhorrent to Pakistan. We beholden to U.S. for aid and have made good use of it. Our recent changes here partly because we have not given “social sector” the attention it deserves. Last consortium meeting useful. U.S. played helpful role. Hope Nixon administration will press aid bill. This is a crucial period for Pakistan. Stop of U.S. arms supply in 1965 hurt Pakistan. Indian factories produce own weapons. Pakistan has no sinister design—just want minimum deterrent. Kissinger: President has made no public reference to India-Pak settlement [this in response to statement by Yusuf]. Yusuf: If strong power wants status quo and nobody has interest in negotiation, then smaller power has to rest with status quo. Friends should press for negotiation. When we try to buy arms, India raises hue and cry and friends [read U.S.] are sensitive to this. Pakistan wants minimum deterrent—chance to buy and manufacture equipment. Need help with defenses so as not to bleed social sector. Letter from Mrs. Gandhi—nothing new. If commission proposed is going to make sense, should be time limit on talk and then move to next stage of mediation, arbitration, adjudication. Indian government does not want this. Small agreements on normalization do not require special machinery. Resolution of these does not mean basic disputes will be resolved. Unless some workable machinery not going to get anywhere. Just want weapons U.S. judges obsolete. M.M. Ahmad: You suggested leaving Asian system to Asian initiative. If they don’t what will you do? Kissinger: We want to avoid arms race. We are looking at military supply policy and will attempt to be sympathetic. Sisco: Third-country military sales have come under Congressional scrutiny. M.M. Ahmad: You suggested U.S. will rely on Asian initiative. If they don’t will you let the situation be or try to some new approach. You are a global power. Kissinger: In next period, other countries will not be able to persuade us that, if they are occupied by powerful neighbor, it was worse for us than for them. At some point, world balance could be affected by expansionism. We would have to act in our own interests. I have not been impressed by fact that U.S. zeal has not produced regional cooperation in Europe, draw same lesson for Asia. Sisco: We’d be faced with difficult situation. We would carry out our obligations. Just because we not seeking be world policeman doesn’t mean we unconcerned about aggression. We probably would have to respond if change in balance of power threatened. Spain: RCD is regional organization which has had most success—local initiative. Kissinger: Any change in power balance would be regarded seriously. M.M. Ahmad: Model of development in Pakistan should qualify for special support. On economic side, few countries of Pakistan’s size that have performed as well—5.5% per annum; 8% growth in export for last 10 years; in agriculture, West Pakistan nearly self-sufficient. For every dollar of aid we raise three. Pakistan’s model qualifies for special support—liberal policies, private sector, avoided nationalization, good use of aid. We have shown that aid does work. Recent disturbances have led to review of policy—some difficult choices. U.S. aid falling off. Special problem this year. $140 million aid appropriation this year should be protected if there are sharp Congressional cuts. [The group joined the Presidents at this point.] M.M. Ahmad: Quoted President Nixon to effect that aid of great significance for developing countries. President Nixon: We’ve had a good talk on India-Pak relations, Asia, broader perspectives. One of the things I’ve learned: Two words important—frankness and trust. There have been some strains. Mutual trust diminished. We cannot resolve problems in this meeting. We can establish basis for new approach—will be on up-and-up with each other. We won’t criticize or take responsiblity for the past but build for future. Going beyond that, our policy is to try to work toward better relationship. Pakistan’s relations with other countries is a matter for Pakistan to work out. We want to know the areas where we can help. Sisco: We covered a number of these questions. We have begun a constructive exchange. President Nixon: How the situation has changed since 1953, especially the usefulness of CENTO and SEATO. Our commitments remain, but threats of a different character now. President Yahya: We have “traveled all over the world” in our talks. Have to have a new look at relationships many nations in this part of the world. India-Pak. I have explained tragedy that two major powers of South Asia cannot work together. We have not forgotten our close relationship with U.S. We understand why we are not “the most allied ally now.” But we are still allies. What we have achieved in these two hours relieves our minds. President Nixon: I’m convinced that in the last third of this century that part of the world which has the greatest potential for either growth or destruction is Asia. Here is where the action is going to be. I know this area better than any President in this century. We have not discussed Vietnam, but the way that the war ends will determine the role the U.S. will play in the future. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is similar to the memoranda prepared by Saunders of the conversations in New Delhi on July 31 and August 1. This memorandum was apparently also prepared from the unrefined notes Saunders took during the meeting. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore during Nixon’s visit from August 1–2. According to another record of the meeting between Nixon and Yahya, relations with China were discussed at some length. Nixon said that in any discussion of Asia’s future, China could not be ignored. He said that he recognized the need for a dialogue to bring China into the community of nations, but it would take time before the U.S. public accepted that point of view. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 2, 1969; ibid., Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I (1970)) According to Kissinger, who was present at that part of the meeting, Nixon also told Yahya that the United States would not be party to any arrangement to isolate China and asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180–181) Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who was traveling with the President, recorded in his diary on August 2 that Yahya had made a strong impression on Nixon “as a real leader–very intelligent—and with great insight into Russia-China relations.” He added that Nixon felt that “Yahya can be valuable channel to China esp.–but also USSR.” (Ibid., Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, H.R. Haldeman Journal, Trips I, February 23, 1969–September 1970) 32. Memorandum of Conversation 32. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lahore, August 1, 1969 SUBJECT: China, Indo-Pak Relations; Military Supply PARTICIPANTS: Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Air Marshal Nur Khan Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs James W. Spain, Charge d’Affaires ad interim Harold Saunders, National Security Council Staff The post-dinner conversation at Governor’s House turned promptly to Communist China. Referring to the fact that he had returned the previous week from China, Nur said great things were still going on there. He spoke admiringly of the Peking regime’s success in mobilizing the people for national efforts, likening the current Chinese experience to the advent of Christianity and Islam. He added he was convinced that Communist China is not expansionist but emphasized that because of the fact that they are Muslims and because of other human values which they prize, the Pakistanis cannot accept Chinese Communist ideology or a Chinese Communist approach to organization of the state. In response to a query he said that while he thought Chinese Communist ideology was in its present stage immutable, he believed that Chinese foreign policy was capable of flexibility. Dr. Kissinger told Nur Khan that Prague Radio had broadcast a story that Chou En-Lai had said the Chicoms were prepared to negotiate with the United States if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger did not indicate to whom Chou had reportedly made this statement but asked Nur if he believed it. The Air Marshal answered promptly that he thought the statement was true, but when asked if Chou had said anything like that to him, he replied in the negative. Queried whether Chou had said anything else about the United States, Nur indicated Chou had said very little about the U.S. in the course of the six hours of conversation he had had with him but had spent a great deal of time on Chicom fear and distrust of the Soviets. According to the Air Marshal, Chou said the Soviets were deliberately provoking Peking by trying to extend their territory beyond recognized boundaries. The Chinese Communists were even prepared to accept the Thalweg border provided in the “unequal treaties” of Tsarist days. However, they would not tolerate further extensions which the Soviets were now trying to achieve. The Chinese Communists did not intend to attack the Soviets but feared the Soviets might try a pre-emptive attack on China. If this happened the Chinese knew they would be vastly out-weighed in technology and materiel but were prepared to respond in a war that “would know no boundaries.” Turning to Indo-Pak problems, the Air Marshal said that Pakistan realizes it cannot take Kashmir by force. However as long as the will of the people for self-determination remains alive, there is no reason for Pakistan to cease its support—which, he added, is now limited to propaganda. Nur Khan said he could see why the United States and the other great powers would want a settlement of the Kashmir problem, but he could see no reason why Pakistan would benefit from such a settlement. In the present situation Pakistan obviously is not going to get what it wanted. A settlement, then, could grow only out of appeasement of India. This would formally declare Pakistan’s second class status in the subcontinent. He saw no purpose in this. Nur volunteered that Pakistan considered it much more in its interest to try to reduce tension in the area to the west. Iran and Turkey were true friends of Pakistan. Jordan and Saudi Arabia had a number of common interests with Pakistan. The building of friendship and cooperation among these states was a much more important goal than the relief of Indo-Pak tensions. Nur insisted that one of the most useful points of contact between Pakistan and the states to the west was the military. His Air Force, he said, had been helpful to all four countries. This had been possible because the Pakistani, Turkish, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Jordanian Air Forces all had American equipment and their officers all had a common link in their training in the United States or knowledge of American military doctrine. On the subject of arms, the Air Marshal said that Pakistan does not want or expect much from the USSR. The Pakistan Army has gotten some equipment; he thought the Navy would probably get some; but the Air Force was not very interested in Soviet aircraft. MIG–19s and MIG–21s were already obsolete. Besides, the Air Force would suffer most from the ability of a foreign supplier to turn off the tap on spare parts. While he did not make a direct pitch for the sale of U.S. aircraft, it was clear throughout the conversation that Nur felt that this would be what would best serve his requirements. Throughout the 45-minute discussion (which ended when Dr. Kissinger was called by President Nixon) the Air Marshal was unusually voluble. If somewhat disjointed, his conversation was relaxed and stimulating. After the meeting was over, he said privately to the Charge that he thought “a spark had been struck” in his first meeting with Dr. Kissinger in New York last November and he felt that the present conversation indicated they continued to understand each other very well. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted on August 7 by Spain. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore. 33. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of India, Nepal, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) 33. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of India, Nepal, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) 1 Washington, August 15, 1969 SUBJECT: Indian Government Crisis A bitter confrontation over the contest for the Presidency of India has developed between Prime Minister Gandhi’s faction in the Congress Party and party chieftains opposed to her leadership. Embassy New Delhi reports that the fate of the Gandhi Government and the Prime Minister’s own political future hang in the balance. The situation should become clearer on Saturday, when voting by MPs and state legislators in the indirect presidential election takes place. The results will be announced next Wednesday, August 20. Although Mrs. Gandhi’s stunning victory over her opponents in mid-July had aroused their enmity and had strengthened their determination to oust her, a further confrontation this early had not seemed likely. The Prime Minister herself seemed to be in a strong position. She had skillfully made use of the bank nationalization issue to win broad popular support within and outside party ranks. She had also protected herself against charges of disloyalty by announcing her support for the Congress Party’s Presidential candidate whose selection, over her own opposition, had been regarded by the Prime Minister as a challenge to her leadership and had sparked the July encounter. There was no reason to think that she or her followers would deliberately seek a confrontation, either on the Presidential issue or any other, Yet Mrs. Gandhi has now reneged on her support for the Congress nominee (an inveterate foe, Lower House Speaker Sanjiva Reddy), has let it be known that his victory would not be acceptable to her, and is apparently encouraging her supporters to vote for an independent candidate who had been her own choice for the party nomination and would be loyal to her if elected. Mrs. Gandhi’s opponents, for their part, were also expected to lay low until their man was safely installed in the Presidency on August 24. Only then would they begin the search for a plausible issue on which they could confront the Prime Minister. Given her frequently demonstrated skill in avoiding such confrontations, the expected search did not seem an easy one. The confrontation has nonetheless occurred. The Prime Minister’s followers blame it on the anti-Gandhi Congress Party President, who they claim has connived with right-wing parties, allegedly to put together a coalition government to replace her. This seems far fetched and has been angrily denied, but Mrs. Gandhi’s friends may either believe it or see the Party President’s meetings with the rightists as preparation for an eventual move against her. In any event, it seems more likely that it is they and not the Prime Minister’s foes who are responsible for bringing about the present confrontation. Emboldened by their success in the earlier crisis, they may well believe that the time has come to smash the power of their opponents before a Reddy victory gives the anti-Gandhi forces an important new weapon to train on the Prime Minister. Their confidence that a progressive tide is running in the country following the bank nationalization move may have led them to conclude that the Prime Minister, who has taken the progressive cause as her own, is in an unusually good position to consolidate her recent gains. Embassy New Delhi reports that in the midst of all the strife over the Presidential contest a mood of gloom and uncertainty is growing on all the sides as the realization becomes widespread that regardless of/result of the poll in terms of the candidates and the fate of their supporters, the major ultimate casualty of the conflict is likely to be the Congress Party itself. Should the party split in two, and events are moving in that direction, no one can correctly foresee what kind of Indian Government will emerge. The party is an amorphous mass, and its members’ loyalty is dictated by caste, regional, group, and personal considerations which have little or nothing to do with the ideological standards opposing forces within it often raise. Thus the very lines of a split are uncertain. The only real certainty is that should it occur, prospects will be unpromising for a continuation in New Delhi of political stability similar to that India has enjoyed since it won its independence in 1947. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer. 34. Telegram 140939 From the Department of State to the White House 34. Telegram 140939 From the Department of State to the White House 1 Washington, August 20, 1969, 2348Z Subject: Indian Presidential Election White House please pass to San Francisco for Secretary Rogers and San Clemente for Dr. Kissinger 1. Prime Minister Gandhi has scored a spectacular victory with the election of her candidate, V.V. Giri, to the Presidency of India. Giri, whose candidacy had been rejected by the Congress Party leadership over Mrs. Gandhi’s objections, ran as an Independent and had the backing of the leftist parties, including the Communists. He won sufficient votes from the Prime Minister’s supporters in Congress Party ranks to defeat the official party designee, former Lower House Speaker Sanjiva Reddy, in the indirect election. 2. Although the office of the President has in the past been a largely ceremonial one, it has important latent powers and the contest for it had developed into an unprecedented trial of strength between Mrs. Gandhi and her party rivals. The Prime Minister’s daring and successful gamble in defying the party organization to back the 75-year old former Vice President has put her in the most powerful position she has enjoyed since she took office in January 1966. Although she is likely to make conciliatory-gestures to her foes in an effort to paper over the bitter divisions which had threatened to split the party in two, she is almost certain to interpret the Giri victory as an endorsement of the “progressive” cause she has championed since her dramatic nationalization of the major Indian banks a month ago. 3. Ironically, Mrs. Gandhi’s unorthodox exercise in political brinksmanship should improve prospects for political stability in India. Giri’s defeat might well have led to an effort by her party opponents to unseat her on grounds of disloyalty and thus produced a split in party ranks. As it is, she seems likely to carry on as Prime Minister until the next election in 1972. Moreover, the progressive image which she seems determined to give to the party before then is likely to improve its prospects in that race, thus heading off the bogey of unstable coalition government which had seemed to loom for the post-1972 period. However, the policies she adopts in her efforts to project such an image may well include many which will not go down well with potential foreign investors. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell, and approved by Schneider. Sent with an instruction to pass to San Francisco for Rogers and to San Clemente for Kissinger. 35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, September 12, 1969 2 pages of source text not declassified. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. [2 pages of source text not declassified.] 36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, September 15, 1969 2 pages of source text not declassified. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. [2 pages of source text not declassified.] 37. Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon 37. Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon 1 Rawalpindi, October 1, 1969 Dear Mr. President, I am writing you on a matter of great economic and political urgency to me, my government is getting extremely worried about the deteriorating food and price situation in the province of East Pakistan. The province is threatened with a major food deficit and rice, which is the staple diet of 70 million East Pakistanis, is selling at unprecedently high prices, almost 60 per cent higher than normal. This is causing wide-spread distress and misery. We are making all-out efforts to rush 1.7 million tons of foodgrains to East Pakistan to avoid a serious situation from arising there. On our own, we have already despatched a quarter million tons of wheat from West Pakistan and 350,000 tons of rice is also earmarked for despatch from the Western to Eastern wing. However, to meet the full gap, we need one million tons of wheat but we do not have the cash foreign exchange resources to purchase this quantity. We have, therefore, already made a formal request to your Government for import of one million tons of wheat under US Public Law 480. Mr. M.M. Ahmed, Deputy Chairman of our Planning Commission, will be discussing this request with your officials in Washington next week. We require imports under PL 480 on a priority basis. The timely introduction of PL 480 wheat into East Pakistan (in the next 6 to 8 weeks) can help avoid large scale human misery and hardship and earn a tremendous amount of goodwill for the U.S. I would request you, Mr. President, to give this matter your personal attention so that an act of high statesmanship can replace normal administrative procedures. With best personal regards, Yours Very Sincerely, A.M. Yahya Khan 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. No classification marking. The Consulate General in Dacca underlined the problem of food shortages in East Pakistan on October 10 in telegram 2855 from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 18 PAK ) 38. Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 38. Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, October 6, 1969 SUBJECT: USAF Communications Station, Peshawar SUMMARY IN MEMORIAM USA-60 (“Badaber”) Born: Peshawar, July 17, 1959 Died: Peshawar, July 17, 1969 Interred: Peshawar, February 28, 1970 “Time has laid his hand Upon my heart, gently, not smiting it, But as a harper lays his open palm Upon his harp, to deaden its vibrations.” Longfellow, The Golden Legend . EULOGY “... to bury Caesar, not to praise him.” Shakespeare, Julius Caesar . Now that the time has come to bury Badaber, it is ironically fitting that no effort to reconstruct its life can be made at Rawalpindi. Its early days are beyond the memory of living men in the Embassy. Its middle years have passed into the misty realms of saga. Even the final period is already encrusted with legend. And, the Embassy files were destroyed several months ago during the latest of the series of troubles which have affected the deceased’s beloved Pakistan. Yet, this deficiency is bearable. Countless drawers in Washington and San Antonio crammed with the memorabilia of the day to day life and times of dear departed will ensure Badaber’s place in history. Even more, Badaber will live on in the hearts and minds of all those whose lives were entwined with its own. Well into the Twenty-first Century retired airmen sitting with their children and their children’s children around the glowing barbecue pits of a thousand split levels will begin their tales: “When I first went to Badaber, back in the days when the world was young ...” It is nevertheless appropriate at a time like this to devote a few moments to recalling what each of us remembers most fondly about Badaber. One may recollect that it answered to many names, accurate and inaccurate: Badaber, USA-60, Peshawar Air Station, USAF Peshawar, “the missile site,” “the U–2 base,” simply “that place.” To another its charm will remain its association with the great names of history. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were all involved in its life. Chairman Khrushchev drew a red circle around it on the map. Chou En-Lai, Brezhnev, and Kosygin were not insensitive to its magnetic attraction. Of lesser luminaries, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto cherished it to the end as a beloved enemy. Its charms entranced Selig Harrison through three incarnations ( New Republic , Washington Post , and Brookings Institution.) The Overseas Weekly kept a “death watch” on its final days. To hundreds of anonymous tribesmen its name will ever be mingled in legend with those of Jamrud, Ali Masjid, the Bala Hissar, and the Khyber. “The ever-whirling wheele of Change, the which all mortal things doth sway”—Spenser, The Faerie Queene . Students of history will mark well the great changes that took place during Badaber’s short life. In the fast moving world of the 1960s of which it was so integral a part, it was a unique witness to the coming of age of the Soviet Union and the birth of Communist China as nuclear and missile powers. It survived the U–2 crisis, and watched calmly from afar the Bay of Pigs and Cuban missile confrontation. It saw dozens of satellites of two nationalities pass over its head; and, in its final days, it beheld man’s first landing on the moon. It stood unscathed through the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War when the sound of bombs falling nearby thundered in its sensitive ears. Afterwards it extended its sheltering arms to receive its small relatives, refugees from the war-stricken Punjab. Born of John Foster Dulles’ northern tier alliance forged to contain an aggressive Soviet Union, Badaber flourished on the rising tide of U.S.-Pakistani friendship, floated securely through the troubled seas of Pakistani rapprochement with Communist China and the USSR; rode out the tumultuous waves of U.S. support for India against China, and in its final days saw President Nixon turn down a Soviet overture for an Asian alliance against Peking. In Pakistan, Badaber, aloof and unperturbed, observed the rise—and the fall—of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. Although it itself always preferred the unadorned name of Badaber, it moved daily among the great Khans: Ayub, Yahya Asghar, Nur, Rahim of the PAF; Akbar of the ISID. Its name was familiar also to all the gentry of the country from Iskander Mirza to Zulfikar Bhutto. For many distinguished Americans, too, a meeting with Badaber partook a little of a tryst with destiny. On occasion, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara and John McCone together fought for it; other times they fought each other over it. Richard Helms cherished and nurtured it in a very special way, yet courageously signed its death warrant when its fruitful years had come to an end. Pat Carter, Jack Thomas, Phil Hilbert, Ting Sheldon, Phil Talbot, Luke Battle, and Tom Hughes, together with a score of others burdened with the cares of the world, nevertheless had a special place in their hearts for Badaber; for most of its life they shared its joys and its sorrows. Walter McConaughy and the USIB spent hundreds of hours and millions of dollars on it. Gene Locke came to know the intricacies of its towers and cables as intimately and lovingly as he knew the cacti and derricks of Texas. Ben Oehlert, with skill and delicacy, negotiated its complex obsequies. “The brave man carves out his own future, and every man is the son of his own works.” Cervantes, Don Quixote . It can truly be said of Badaber that it was, above all, a dutiful son. Badaber devoted all of its rich resources to service of its country. Surely the devotion and selflessness of its men, giving their best on a far frontier, often deprived of family and professional solace, matched anything ever displayed in the Victorian age by the Nicolsons, Warburtons and Cavagnaris. At a critical time in history Badaber strained its senses day and night to acquire the knowledge that so directly protected the very existence of its parent. That it did so successfully is beyond doubt. The GAO alone may one day be able to determine how much family treasure and ingenuity were spent one way rather than another because of the fateful information that Badaber brought home. To Pakistan too, Badaber never faltered in filial affection. It gave unstintingly of its resources to its poorer neighbors. Barren scraps of land which would never have known the plow blossomed with ripe maize, for the destruction of which compensation could be claimed whenever a cable was laid or an antenna adjusted. Penurious “brass wallahs” were transformed into prosperous burghers. Yet unborn generations of Hayats (furniture makers) will enjoy the benefits of Oxford and Nice because of the favors Badaber bestowed upon their fathers. Grasping the thorny questions of “participation” and “sharing”, which caused so much anxiety among others of its kind elsewhere in the world, Badaber quickly and smoothly found a solution which left the ISID and the PAF happier, wiser and richer therefor. Even at the end of its days it bequeathed its earthly home with many of the wonders and riches therein to these beloved companions. But, as is so often the case, it is only now after its passing that we can truly appreciate that the many lessons we learned from Badaber may be as important as the precious physical gifts we received from it. “Be bold, be bold, and everywhere be bold.” Spenser, The Faerie Queene . Perhaps the first among these lessons is that at the right time and in the right place the uncertain and the difficult can and should be done. In the mid 1950s it took daring hands to put down an acknowledged U.S. base with a sensitive and secret mission requiring hundreds of politically unsophisticated military personnel and their dependents in a remote area surrounded by millions of volatile tribesmen, to whom the sight of a side of bacon or a bare faced woman was an abomination. It took a gambler’s courage to devise and establish millions of dollars worth of complicated, untried electronic instruments to attempt a task that had never been done before. Even the coolest-minded diplomat might have been forgiven for saying no to a proposal to give so precious and vulnerable a hostage as Badaber to another participant in the game of international politics. Yet it all worked out: ten years without a major local incident; billions of pieces of unique data collected; security, harmony and cooperation to the end. Such a thing was Badaber and the hands that built it can take great satisfaction from their achievement. That we are now commemorating Badaber’s end should in no way detract from this satisfaction. It is appropriate also for us here, still living, to take humble gratification from the things that we did to guide and protect Badaber during its life—and the lessons we learned from so doing. The decision was made early that Badaber should be self-contained, that it should be able to shelter within its own arms the airmen and families that served it and the facilities to make their life tolerable. Many of us who put a premium on people-to-people contact and on living as a part of the country in which we serve had doubts about this. We sneered a bit at the rows of ranch houses, the bowling alley, the theater and the golf course. Better that there should be fewer people, inconspicuous, interested in the country and willing to live off it. Yet this too worked out. The devoted Asian specialists who might have lived off the country would not have known a wave length from a surfboard. The professionals who did and who came to Badaber found the on-base facilities a substitute for the temptations of Peshawar Town. Nonetheless, over the years, many of them made fast friendships; they brought the “new music” to appreciative young Peshawaris; they were invited to feasts and weddings; they gave to charities; they extended medical aid. And the American image was enriched thereby. Most of the decisions that affected Badaber’s life and style were wisely made. The diplomats who saw Badaber as an albatross around their necks, an instrument for blackmail which sharply limited the flexibility of our policies, resisted the temptation to cut away the burden Badaber sometimes seemed to be while its value was still high. The information collectors who saw Badaber as a lifesaver that must be preserved at all costs ultimately accepted the judgment that intelligence collection was not the be-all and end-all of U.S. interests in Pakistan. “Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.” Shakespeare, Macbeth . While it is never as satisfying to take apart as it is to build, the hands which devoted themselves to the task of preparing for Badaber’s end were no less skillful than those which built it. They served U.S.—and Badaber’s own—interests no less well. In the early 1960s, when less than half of Badaber’s life was yet run, questions began to be raised as to its future. Ironically, the plans that made Badaber’s death in ripe old age tolerable began to be laid in its youth when its passing would have been catastrophic. At first reluctantly, conviced that their beloved Badaber would ever be irreplacable, men and machines began to turn their efforts to seeing what life would be like without it. Then, more vigorously, as the sad reality that all things are mortal was more and more accepted, vast realms of sea and air were probed, obscure corners of the earth examined. Friends all over the globe who scarcely even knew Badaber’s name made their sacrifices to prepare for its passing. When the alternatives were put together at last, often sharing the frailties of those who had devised them, they seemed puny and makeshift compared to the gloriously vibrant integrated organism that was Badaber at its best. Yet, suddenly, it became clear that Badaber, even Badaber, was no longer in its prime. It was not so much that it had deteriorated as that the world around it had changed. The lithe tiger began to resemble just a little a dinosaur. The little improvisations, unglamorous but technically sound, seemed perhaps better suited to the world of the future. When the word finally came that Badaber must die, there was subdued anger which trembled on the edge of recriminations, but there was also common sorrow and mutual tolerance. As it turned out, Badaber’s friends and relatives had come to be able to face the prospect of life without it and even to devote themselves to working out the dignified and honorable final rites which Badaber so richly deserved. The dying Badaber and its competing heirs worked out together the distribution of its worldly goods. They mourned together and parted friends, free to cooperate once more in the future, should the world change again and common interests reappear. “The tumult and the shouting dies; the Captains and the Kings depart.” Kipling, Recessional . Badaber is no more. The bowling alleys are silent. The autumn winds from the Khyber hills ruffle the grass where once the little white balls rolled gayly into their holes on the now deserted greens. The great blind dishes ceaselessly turning their sensitive ears to the skies are gone. The drooping wings of the C–141s will cast their shadows no more over the shining antennae farms. Yet the lesson of Badaber’s life is not lost. That free men were able to bring it into being when the world needed it was good but this was not the first time that such a challenge was faced and met. The greater achievement may yet turn out to be that, after it had served, another wide range of skills was brought together to end it peacefully and with honor. The mourners at the graveside and the well-wishers at the christening font have equally important places in the cycle of life. This may be the real lesson from which others of its kind may benefit now and in the future. Badaber is gone. In life and in death it served a noble purpose. Its spirit and memory will live on amidst the music of the spheres, refreshed alike by the soft chords of angelic harps and the harsh cacophony of electronic blips. We shall not look upon its like again. Spain 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 21 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 2, and cleared in draft by General Geary and in the political section by Stephen E. Palmer and Alan D. Wolfe. Repeated to New Delhi, Ankara for Handley, Tehran for Minister Thacher, London for Minister Hughes, the Peshawar Air Station for the Commanding Officer, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, USAFI for Hilbert, CIA for Sheldon, NSA for General Carter, USAFSS, and DOD/ISA. The 10-year agreement governing the communications facility at Peshawar was not renewed by Pakistan and expired on July 17, 1969. A limited number of U.S. personnel remained after July 17 to effect an orderly turnover of the facility to Pakistan. A brief ceremony effected the turnover on January 7, 1970, rather than on February 28 as anticipated by Spain. (Telegram 001 from Peshawar, January 8, 1970; ibid., DEF 15–10 PAK–US) 39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 16, 1969 FROM: Henry A. Kissinger SUBJECT: Proposed PL 480 Loan to Pakistan AID recommends (Tab A) that you approve a one million ton PL 480 wheat agreement with Pakistan for FY 1970. This is the first major commitment of funds to Pakistan in this fiscal year and the decision is politically significant, so the agencies decided to seek your approval. The wheat is required to help Pakistan meet its minimum food needs and bring down prices, which are one of the main causes of political unrest in East Pakistan. President Yahya Khan has written you personally (Tab C), emphasizing the urgency of the need and stressing his desire for the proposed program. State, Agriculture, Treasury, and Budget (Tab B) agree that one million tons of wheat be allocated for shipment to Pakistan, with 800,000 tons to be dispatched now and the last 200,000 tons, if conditions have not improved markedly, by February 1970. An announcement in the next few days would by itself have a helpful effect on prices, which have gone up sharply. This proposal stands on its economic merits alone. On top of that, it can make an immediate and direct contribution to one of Yahya’s principal political problems—avoiding open unrest in East Pakistan which would complicate the already difficult job of working out a new constitutional agreement between East and West Pakistan. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve an FY 1970 PL 480 wheat program of up to one million tons of wheat for Pakistan. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A was an October 10 memorandum from John Hannah to Nixon; attached at Tab B was an October 13 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; neither is published. The October 1 letter from Yahya to Nixon, attached at Tab C, is printed as Document 37 . The President initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 22. On November 13 Nixon sent a letter to Yahya indicating that the United States was prepared to negotiate a PL–480 agreement of 1 million tons of wheat for Pakistan. (Ibid., Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, (1969–1970) ) 40. Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 40. Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, October 16, 1969, 1713Z SUBJ: Indian FonSec’s Call on Secretary, Oct. 14 1. At outset of call on Secretary, Oct. 14, FonSec Kaul said Indian FonMin wished him to find out about U.S. policy in South and Southeast Asia. Secretary replied he thought our bilateral relations were off to good start. Both President and he felt good about their visit to Delhi and there was every prospect for much better relations ahead. We have thus far refrained from providing arms to Pakistan, although this under review. 2. Secretary then reviewed Asian policy, mentioning reduction of U.S. military and civilian presence. Referred to importance of regional cooperative arrangements, explaining that U.S. not thinking of new security arrangements although we intend maintain existing commitments. Stated we do not necessarily expect alignment with us but also do not want alignment against us. U.S. does not intend tie aid to policies of our friends. 3. Secretary continued that prospects for U.S.-Indian relations quite good except for matter he had discussed with FonMin, i.e. Indian proposal establish Embassy in Hanoi. Indian recognition of Hanoi without similar action in South would pollute atmosphere with regard Executive Branch, Congress and American people. Every program USG engages in abroad depends upon support of the Congress which would construe Indian recognition as anti-American move. It would be difficult to assign any other motive to Indian action. Secretary noted India already has representative in Hanoi with personal rank of Ambassador who is available for any desired communications. Indian recognition would be inconsistent with its neutral role in ICC. Secretary pointed to fact that India has, as a matter of policy, avoided diplomatic relations with divided countries. If it recognized Hanoi at time U.S. engaged in military operations, American people could draw only one conclusion: India would be deliberately taking sides at time of war. U.S. reaction would not be temporary. It would have serious and lasting effect. This could not be stressed too strongly. Speaking for President, Secretary said he could report we were just beginning to see way toward very good and close relations with India. Requested Kaul convey his views to PriMin and FonMin. 4. Kaul expressed satisfaction no decision made on arms policy. Stated if policy changed it would have grave repercussions in Indian Parliament. Kaul then stated Indians were worrying about future of Asia, given new U.S. policy of detente with China. Said people were asking if U.S. working up some kind of understanding with Soviet Union and China. Asked what would become of other nations. Secretary replied that U.S. moves were modest attempts improve relationship with Mainland China and had not been reciprocated. Expressed surprise that India would be concerned over our desire improve relations, in view traditional Indian policy. Suggested India might improve its relations with China. Kaul recalled Indian experience in 1962, referred to Mrs. Ghandi’s recent conciliatory statements and said there had been no Chinese response. 5. Reverting to issue of relations with Hanoi, Kaul said decision not yet made. It would be based upon Indian interests, interests of region, and interests of world peace. Initiative was taken by North Vietnamese who wanted Indian friendship to help meet difficulties which would come with peace. Kaul explained Indian impression was Hanoi wanted to limit influence of Soviets and Chinese.GOI wanted representative who could present Indian views and, indeed, U.S. views at highest level. Kaul repeated usual explanation for not elevating representation in South. Expressed hope U.S. Congress would understand Indian recognition of Hanoi would be carried out not to hurt U.S. but to improve prospects for peace and orderly evolution following peace. 6. Secretary questioned that Indians required Embassy in order to communicate with Hanoi. Stated Indian action would destroy all possibility of India’s playing role of peacemaker, since India would have publicly taken sides. Secretary asked that Indians weigh their own interests carefully. Said that Indian recognition would cause tremendous difficulty with American public and Congress. Latter would find no reason for it except that India wished take position in favor of country with which we were at war. This would make improved U.S.-Indian relations, which we hoped for, quite impossible. 7. In reply, Kaul expressed hope U.S.-Indian relations depended upon deeper factors than this. Said Indian effectiveness in Asia depended upon its playing independent role, Secretary agreed but said action with regard to Hanoi would not be “independent” but would be lining up with other side. 8. Also present at the meeting were Mr. Sisco, Mr. Van Hollen and Mr. Schneider on the American side, With FonSec Kaul were Indian Ambassador Jung and Mr. S.K. Lambah. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider on October 14, cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and James D. Rosenthal (EA/VN), and approved by Rogers. Sent also to Saigon, Rawalpindi, and Paris. The telegram sent to Paris was also numbered Todel 3367. Kaul was in Washington as head of the Indian delegation to the Indo-US Bilateral Talks; see Document 42 . The Secretary’s meeting at the United Nations with Foreign Minister Singh on September 29, during which he raised similar objections to the proposed Indian recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, was reported to the Department on October 1 by USUN in telegram 3325. (Ibid,. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70) 41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 27, 1969 Subject: U.S.-India Bilateral Talks Southeast Asia was the principal focus of bilateral talks which Under Secretary Richardson and State Department officials had on October 16–17 with an Indian delegation led by Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul. I saw Kaul before the talks began and told him rather bluntly that Indian recognition of Hanoi would have the most severe effect on U.S.-India relations and would cause a strongly unfavorable reaction within the Executive Branch, on the Hill and among the American people. Kaul saw Congressmen Broomfield, Murphy and others on the Hill, who reinforced my statement regarding how seriously the Congress would react. During the bilateral talks Elliot Richardson, Joe Sisco and Marshall Green supported our position, basing our arguments on detailed analyses of the situation in Southeast Asia. In private conversations, members of the U.S. delegation repeated to the Indians the very harmful effect Indian recognition would have on U.S. relations with the Government of India. Several times during the talks Foreign Secretary Kaul stated that India did not wish to do anything which would damage the U.S. interest or embarrass the U.S., but that the decision regarding recognition of Hanoi was one for India to make. It is hazardous to guess what this means regarding Indian policy because (1) I am not sure just what strategy Kaul is pursuing and (2) I do not know what his influence with Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh and Mrs. Gandhi is. At any rate, Kaul seemed to imply that India would not recognize Hanoi now. We explored with the Indians the possible security and economic shape of Southeast Asia after the war. The Indians were looking for specifics: our reaction to Mrs. Gandhi’s “Eastern Locarno” neutralization proposal and to the Indian proposal for use of the ECAFE Council of Ministers to coordinate Asian economic cooperation. We pointed out to the Indians that there were still too many variables regarding a Vietnam settlement for us to project a plan for the future. We did, however, discuss possible alternatives with them. Our discussion of China revealed that the Indians see even less prospect for a softening of the Chinese attitude toward the outside world than we do, although they thought that Chinese respect for power might cause them to expand communications with the USSR and possibly the US. The Indians repeated their usual recitation about their relations with Pakistan. We strongly urged that they find some way to work out the issue of diversion of the Ganges water supply. On political issues we repeated our general position that improved India-Pakistan relations are important for the security and development of South Asia, but we indicated that we contemplated no third party role concerning these issues. On the economic side the Indians expressed concerns regarding our trade and aid policies. We made realistic presentations which they probably found pessimistic. The Under Secretary accepted the Indian invitation for another round of talks next year in New Delhi. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret. The bilateral talks were the second round in what were anticipated to be annual talks between the United States and India. The initial talks took place in New Delhi from July 26 to 28, 1968. See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, South Asia, vol. XXV, Document 509 . A 69-page record of the talks on October 16–17 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Box 503, Lot 70 D 387, CF 409. The talks were reported to New Delhi in telegrams 177194, 179522, and 180313, dated October 18, October 23, and October 24 respectively. (All ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US) 42. Analytical Summary Prepared For the National Security Council Review Group 42. Analytical Summary Prepared For the National Security Council Review Group 1 Washington, November 22, 1969 MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL U.S. POSTURE THERE Since April 1967, the US has been pursuing a military aid policy toward South Asia that has come to seem unsatisfactory. The purpose of this paper is to state the problem, to put it into the context of broader US relations with South Asia and to summarize the options and arguments which are detailed in the Interdepartmental Group paper. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM A. In September 1965, India and Pakistan fought each other—both using US arms. Partly because of strong Congressional reaction, the Administration halted all arms shipments. In February 1966, it relaxed the ban to permit purchases of “non-lethal” equipment. B. The sharp Congressional reaction to military aid—as provoked by the war among other things—persisted after the war and was gradually articulated in: 1. The Conte-Long amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. These prohibited use of US funds to furnish “sophisticated weapons” to underdeveloped countries and required reduction of US economic aid to such countries by the amount that they used their own resources for such purchases. The President could waive this restriction if he determined that a sale was “important to the national security of the US.” 2. The Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which directed the President to cut off US economic aid to any developing country that excessively diverted its resources to military expenditures. 3. General resistance to military aid and sales bills. C. In April 1967, the Johnson Administration again modified South Asian arms policy by: 1. continuing the embargo on lethal end-items to both India and Pakistan; 2. permitting cash sales of parts for weapons previously supplied by the US (important to US-equipped Pakistan); 3. considering on a case by case basis the purchase of US-controlled weapons from third countries (but only when the US thought the sale would not spur the India-Pak arms race or seriously disrupt the India-Pak power balance); 4. reinstituting small military training programs in the US. 5. At the same time the US officially ended grant military aid and withdrew military missions from both countries. D. The purpose of this policy was to execute the spirit of the law while at the same time staying in the military aid business enough to have a voice in discouraging the Indo-Pakistani arms race and the diversion of resources from development and to provide an alternative for Communist sources of supply. E. That policy is the subject of this review. Present judgment is that: 1. It has succeeded in enabling Pakistan to keep much of its US equipment operable and thereby reduced—but not eliminated—the need for new sources of supply. It has also pleased the Indians by greatly reducing the level of our supply to Pakistan. 2. It has failed in that: a. Supplying arms via third countries just has not worked very well. It has caused problems with friends—Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, Iran— without meeting Pakistan’s needs. (If present plans for sale of 100 Turkish tanks to Pakistan go through, this would be the first such sale to benefit Pakistan.) b. It could lead eventually to the diversion of resources for sophisticated equipment. For example, Pakistan’s F–104 squadron will soon have to be scrapped because of the lack of replacement aircraft, and will probably be replaced by aircraft purchased from France or supplied by Communist China. c. It has provided no alternative to Soviet supply of India and now Pakistan, or to Chinese supply of Pakistan. F. At present, we are confronted—in addition to our own judgment on our policy—with the following positions: 1. The Congress : The Foreign Aid Assistance Act of 1969 is still before the Congress. The House alone has passed the authorization bill; both House and Senate have yet to pass an appropriations bill. It is impossible to say yet exactly how past restrictions may be modified but the House Foreign Affairs Committee report reveals some potentially important new trends: a. The Conte-Long and Symington amendments have been considerably softened. The requirement that the President withhold economic assistance equivalent to the amount spent on sophisticated weapons is removed. Now the President is only directed to take this factor in account when deciding on economic development assistance. Similarly, the President is no longer required to eliminate economic aid if he finds that a country is diverting its resources to unnecessary military expenditures but only to consider military expenditures before deciding on economic aid. b. A new complication has been introduced with a provision saying that assistance “should not be provided” to governments opposing the development of democratic institutions and which deny “fundamental freedoms.” It also says shipment to governments coming to power by non-constitutional means “should” be terminated. If this is intended to apply ex post facto—it is not clear—it would make Pakistan ineligible if the Administration felt it had to respect the sense of Congress.) c. The Committee’s report openly criticized present policy on the grounds that it has caused India and Pakistan to turn to the Communist world for military aid. It recommended that the policy be reviewed and suggested that it may be in our interest to consider “selective shipments” of military equipment and weapons to both countries. 2. The Indians are satisfied with present policy, but would probably prefer an even more restrictive one. They were never dependent on us because they manufacture much of their minor equipment—rifles, ammunition,—and are well supplied by the USSR with most other items. They would see a liberalization of policy toward freer supply as helping Pakistan. 3. Pakistan urges liberalization of our policy to the extent of selling lethal end-items—they have not asked us to resume grant military aid. Despite some supply from China and the USSR and some third country purchases, the Pakistanis want US equipment and would buy a much larger share than India. In addition, they would like to reduce their dependence on Communist sources. G. The choice we face is posed in the following dilemma: We would like to maintain some influence with the governments and military in both India and Pakistan by helping them meet legitimate defense needs. Since they are enemies, however, we are forced in whatever decision we make—even halting arms supply altogether—to choose which government we can better afford to offend. (on top of that, we must take into account the costs of applying whatever restrictions the Congress may write into law.) 1. Continuing the present policy of limited sales would please the Indians and displease the Paks because the one loophole in the policy for new equipment—purchases through third countries—does not work well. Further restricting present policy to eliminate that loophole would displease the Paks even more. 2. Relaxing the ban on direct US sales would please Pakistan and upset India. It is hard to predict what the Indians might do out of spite, but they would talk themselves into seeing this as a return to the pro-Pakistan policy of the 1950s. H. The present inclination of most who have looked at the problem dispassionately is to stick with the present policy but try to do a little more for the Paks—recognizing that we have found no satisfactory way to do this. However, there are also strong advocates of both of the above choice. What follows is a more detailed discussion of the problem in the context of our broader interests in India and Pakistan. II. POSSIBLE US APPROACHES TO SOUTH ASIA A. South Asia in the global context . The argument is less over South Asia’s present role and importance in the world than over how we should react now in view of its potential. There is little argument that: 1. In the short term our interests there seem less important than those in the Atlantic and Pacific areas—particularly Western Europe and Japan. In the immediately foreseeable future, moreover, this area poses no threat to our security. 2. In the longer term, however, it is hard to believe that the 1.9 billion people of Asia—though not a military threat now—will not have a major impact on world stability and hence on our security. Exactly how is hard to say now. Some argue that abject poverty and near starvation among half the world’s people could create a crisis that would dislocate production patterns and economies worldwide. Others see a frustrated and violent reaction of the colored races against the white. Whatever the form, the spectre is real enough not to be ignored. 3. The political direction Asia takes cannot help but be affected by the 700 million in South Asia—one fifth of the world’s population—along with the 400 million or more elsewhere in non-Communist East and Southeast Asia. 4. Whether that fifth of the world’s population continues engaged in constructive political and economic growth or vents its frustration in installing ineffective radical governments hostile to us now looks like a very near thing. The outcome will depend in a large measure on: a. The ability of the governing groups to work out an equitable distribution of political power throughout their societies. b. The ability of governments first to develop and then to allocate effectively their nations’ resources in such a way as to give their people a sense that progress is possible—and that they can share in it. 5. Nevertheless, even though its future depends heavily on internal developments, South Asia is already a major arena in the contest among the world’s two super-powers. It is one area now where the US and USSR meet on a more or less equal footing and where Communist China is also an active competitor. 6. So far the nations of South Asia remain successful counters to expansion of the Soviet or Chinese systems, but their fragility is beginning to show more than at any time since their independence under the stress of socio-economic and political change. All countries in the region are now run by non-Communist governments. But indigenous Communism is a potential threat to the democratic experiment in India. And the Chinese Communists have shown signs of exploiting the discontent in East Pakistan which threatens to split Pakistan as well as of providing support to Indian insurgents. B. Possible US postures toward South Asia . The argument over our approach to South Asia is over what we should do now in the face of South Asia’s acknowledged if uncertain potential. It is easy to rule out the theoretical extremes: we cannot totally disengage because South Asia is too important; and a major effort to win South Asia to our side would seem unrealistic because even if we had the money to spend, we could not expect to change significantly the glacial movement of local forces that have a momentum of their own. That leaves two realistic choices: 1. A posture of moderately active engagement would stem from the view that it would have a serious impact on the world’s future—and our security—if South Asia went the way of Communist China in the 1940s. It would urge that we use all the tools at our disposal to do whatever is in our limited power to prevent this, including most of the following: a. Above all, maximum economic development aid. b. Use by us, the World Bank, the IMF, and other foreign aid donors of aid to press or help the Indian government toward more effective development policies. c. Possible use of aid, particularly by the World Bank, as an inducement for settling one set of India-Pak issues revolving around distribution of the waters of the eastern rivers (much as the Indus basin settlement worked in the west). d. Use of economic aid as a vehicle for trying to persuade both India and Pakistan to bring defense spending within sensible limits. e. Use of military aid as another handle on defense spending. Also as a way of maintaining a political relationship with the Indian and Pakistani military of limiting predominance of Soviet influence with the Indian military, of reducing Pakistani dependence on Communist arms (Chinese and Soviet) and of meeting limited defense needs. 2. A posture of detached engagement would stem from the view that the loss of the South Asian countries to either external or domestic Communists would scarcely weaken us and would not necessarily even have a decisive influence on how those countries evolve over the next few decades. It would hold to the conviction that we cannot seriously influence economic, social or political development in any Asian country—but only support Asian efforts. In short, while we have a humanitarian obligation to help the poorer nations of Asia get on their feet, we should be relaxed about their political and economic evolution even though it might set back our hopes for stability and development. Military aid as a tool should be used only when it may help diminish the possibility of Communist aggression—and not when it arms one Asian nation against another. 3. The two positions outlined above are not meant to represent self-contained and mutually exclusive positions. They are rather points near the opposite ends of a scale. But they do tend to characterize two different approaches— one an active involvement in helping to spur Indian and Pakistani development and the other pretty much sitting back, being satisfied with a modest aid program and following their lead without undue concern over the results. C. The special problem of India-Pak hostility. Whatever might be a rational approach to South Asia as a whole must be modified to take account of the bitter feud between India and Pakistan, our special interests in each of these countries and our possible ways of relating them: 1. India. a. India is four times the size of Pakistan and proportionately has even greater potential as a modern nation. India has the population and the resource base to become, at some distant time, one of the leading powers in Asia, the Southern Hemisphere and perhaps even in the world. It has developed the substantial beginnings of heavy industry and has the capacity—almost completely unforeseen only a few years ago—to achieve foodgrain self-sufficiency in the near future. It has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons and the Indians have carefully left that option open. b. Though India’s international influence is less than in the days of Nehru, it is groping for a serious role in post-Vietnam Asia. It could play a significant role in Southeast Asia. c. India’s military capacity is such that India appears able to defend itself simultaneously against Pakistan and against any attack the Chinese would be capable of mounting either across the Himalayas or through Burma in the foreseeable future. The Indian Army—about 1.1 million men—has the equivalent of about 32 combat divisions deployed with roughly one third facing West Pakistan, one third facing China and one third in reserve for either front. It is the second largest army in the Free World. 2. Pakistan. a. Our relationship with Pakistan has changed sharply over the past seven years. No longer are there the same political reasons for investing disproportionately in Pakistan that we felt at the height of its membership in CENTO and SEATO and our important intelligence relationship at Peshawar (which has just ended). Since the Indo-Chinese border war in October 1962, it has been India that has grown as the opponent to Communist China and Pakistan that has drawn closer to Peiping. b. Despite the overshadowing of its giant neighbors, however, Pakistan is still the world’s fifth largest nation with a substantial capacity—at the worst—to disrupt stability and constructive evolution in the subcontinent and—at best—to continue impressive economic growth under a development program that relies heavily on an energetic private sector. c. Pakistan’s capacity for disruption has increased markedly in the past half-year. A chaotic political situation in West Pakistan, the highly plausible threat of East Pakistan’s secession, the fall of the Ayub government and the reimposition of government by martial law have brought Pakistan to a grave period of transition. Many knowledgeable Pakistanis see the odds rising sharply that Pakistan will split in the next few years; if so, a radically nationalist government in East Pakistan with heavy Chinese Communist influence is a strong possibility. A separate East Pakistan would be a strong magnet drawing the Indian state of West Bengal and other parts of the eastern region towards a secession which could be the first step in the dismemberment of the Indian union. d. For the immediate future, the Pakistani military hold one of the important keys to that future. President Yahya thus far has kept the lid on but has not solved any of the fundamental problems that led to Ayub’s downfall. e. Pakistan’s military capacity is such that, barring the diversion of Indian troops from the China front, Pakistan should be able to defend West Pakistan against the unlikely event of an Indian attack for several weeks, but not indefinitely. All but one of its 14 divisions are in West Pakistan; the other is in East Pakistan to provide internal security. There is no active present threat from any source but India. India—with its internal problems and satisfaction with the status quo vis-à-vis Pakistan—seems unlikely to start a new war unless Pakistan should threaten India again. 3. Options in relating our stance toward the two : a. We could focus on the subcontinent as a whole and seek to promote Indo-Pakistan reconciliation, but this is probably unrealistic. The will to reconciliation simply does not exist in either state, and our influence on issues of this kind is limited: —There are limits to what aid can accomplish, though they are well above zero. Neither our military aid (with agreed restrictions against using US equipment against India) nor our substantial economic aid gave us enough leverage to prevent the 1965 India-Pak war (though it could be argued that withholding aid from Pakistan helped trigger it). However, economic aid did help settle the Indus Waters problem and could be an essential element in any settlement of the current Eastern Waters problem. —Our past political efforts to bring the two together have failed and have only caused friction in our bilateral relations. —It is virtually impossible to build a policy of equal treatment. We cannot please both and would be virtually paralyzed if we tried. b. We could concentrate on India because of its greater potential, though there are limits to this approach too: —Pakistan would be unwilling to accept India’s primacy and could cause a good deal of trouble if we ignored it. —We have invested a good deal in Pakistan’s economic progress. Even though it is jeopardized by current political problems, it makes little sense to walk out on that potential success story. c. We could approach India and Pakistan as countries where we have separate interests and stand clear of their problems with each other . This approach is hard to carry out in practice because—regardless of our desire—they will always partly measure their relationship with us in terms of how we treat the other. But it seems the only sensible approach. It is the one we have tried to follow in the past two years. D. Conclusions: 1. Our interest in South Asia derives much less from any near-term effect it could have on our security than from the political direction it—with the rest of non-Communist Asia—will take over the next five to twenty-five years. Therefore, our main interest is in the political and economic evolution of South Asia and not in the development of its military strength. 2. Our posture toward South Asia will depend mainly on how active a contribution we want to try to make—and have the resources to make—to the political and economic evolution of the nations in the area. 3. Insofar as we must respond to security concerns they are the local concerns of India and Pakistan—India’s need to defend its Himalayan frontier against Chinese attack and to guard against attack from Pakistan and Pakistan’s fear of India. These local concerns parallel ours only in the following ways: a. While major Chinese attack on India does not seem imminent, we have an interest in India’s ability to defend its borders against Asia’s one big Communist power. We also have an interest in India’s not appearing so weak as to tempt another Chinese attack. b. Pakistani feeling that the military balance has turned in favor of India could be disruptive in that (1) Pakistan would turn to whichever of the three major powers (US, USSR, China) would support it against India regardless of the ideological orientation of that power, and (2) Pakistan might even try some sort of limited preemptive attack against India. 4. While this may be an overly crude and debatable judgment, analysis of our relative interests in India and Pakistan suggests that: a. Our main concern lies with the political and economic evolution of India and its ability to defend its Himalayan frontier. b. Our concern with Pakistan is that its political and economic evolution in the near term be constructive enough not to disrupt India’s. An essential element of this is that it meet the needs of its own people, particularly in East Pakistan. c. We cannot escape having India and Pakistan each measure our policy toward it in terms of our policy toward the other because the India-Pak relationship is so central a part of the outlook and policy of each. However, within the limits of realism, it makes a great deal of sense to try to treat each separately in accordance with our interest in each—and to let them know that this is what we are doing. III. THE ROLE OF MILITARY AID A. Given the above general analysis of our interest in South Asia, military aid seems less important there in enhancing the security of the Free World—except for India’s defense against China—than as a political tool in maintaining an actively close relationship with the major governments. B. If we were to adopt a posture of “detached engagement,” then military aid would have very little role to play, unless perhaps it were judged that Indian forces needed further strengthening against China. C. If, however, we were to adopt a posture of moderately active engagement, then we would still have to answer the general question whether military aid could be a constructive tool. 1. Those who believe it can would argue that: a. The South Asian military establishments—especially that in Pakistan—contribute to maintenance of strong national and non-Communist states. A US relationship with those establishments is an important US link with the future of those nations. b. Pakistan’s western-oriented military leaders are a force for short-term stability—so long as this leadership is flexible enough to accommodate to the political, social and economic aspirations of the civilian populations in both wings of the country. c. Military aid in the past enabled us to influence the size and composition of Pakistan’s armed forces. d. US aid permits Pakistan to reduce reliance on Communist China somewhat. e. We were able to help end the 1965 war by cutting off military supply. f. In India, our smaller program enabled us to reach an agreement on a ceiling for defense expenditures designed to protect our heavy economic aid investment. g. Even restricted cash sales give us some influence because both countries really want arms. In Pakistan, the desire for US arms is acute because Pakistan is short on foreign exchange to buy weapons in Europe. India is better off but still wants US equipment; some Indians are concerned about almost exclusive dependence on the USSR. 2. Those who argue that military aid is not worth the problems it creates point out that: a. Even $750 million in grant military aid (plus more in economic aid) to Pakistan could not cement Pakistan’s tie to us when we failed to back it politically against India. b. Our influence from military sales is quite limited. At this stage, even a generous policy would be unlikely to cause Pakistan to liquidate its relationship with Communist China or India to abandon its relationship with the USSR. No amount of military sales will diminish India-Pak rivalry. c. Even the most influence we can buy with military sales is not essential to US security in global terms. D. If one accepts the general proposition that military aid is a marginally useful political tool, then one still has to examine the restrictions on the use of that tool in this particular situation: 1. The very confining past restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act may be softened, though it is not at all clear yet that the softening process will continue in the Senate. Even if they are relaxed, strong Congressional sentiment remains against providing credit for the sale of equipment, and the Foreign Military Sales Act may still reflect this reluctance. 2. A new restriction expressing Congressional opposition to providing military equipment to governments that came to power by extra-constitutional methods means that the Administration would have to disregard a sense of Congress provision in the law to send equipment to Pakistan. 3. We have programmed less than $10 million for India and Pakistan in requesting from the Congress funds for military sales in FY 1970. E. What these restrictions might mean for our military supply policy to India and Pakistan is: 1. If the Senate refuses to dilute the old Conte-Long amendments, we could not sell jet aircraft or other sophisticated weapons without making an equal cut in economic aid. To avoid the aid cut requires a Presidential determination that the sale is “important” to US security. Such a determination would be difficult for India and even harder for Pakistan. We might make a case for a Chinese threat to India; but Pakistan’s only plausible enemy is India. Yet a sale without a determination would penalize the recipient’s development program—our main concern. 2. If the House version of the bill stands, we could allow cash sales provided we could in good conscience judge that they did not unduly divert resources from economic development or contribute to an arms race. 3. At the very least, legal problems aside, we could expect some opposition on the Hill if we made any arms sales to the subcontinent though that opposition seems to be diminishing. IV. OPTIONS ON MILITARY AID POLICY A. Theoretically, we could return to modest grant aid, or, at the other extreme, clamp a total embargo even on the sale of non-lethal items and spares. But the real choice lies among the four possible courses which follow (these are argued in detail on pages 7–14 of the IG paper). B. Option 1: Continue present policy . 1. Pro . The basis for US-Indian cooperation might be strengthened or, at least would not be weakened. Pakistan—while disappointed—would still have a strong economic and political interest in a relationship with us. Pakistan might still buy US equipment from third countries if such deals could be worked out. 2. Con : Indian and Pakistani primary dependence on Communist sources of military supply would be perpetuated though some limits would remain on what Communist China and the USSR could supply Pakistan. 3. Conclusion : We would take a definite but not decisive loss in Pakistan. Our gains in India would be modest and intangible. Moscow and Peiping would be left in competition. Moscow would be stuck trying to arm both sides without undercutting its influence in one or the other. C. Option 2: Adopt a more restrictive policy by eliminating the third country route . 1. Pro : This policy has not worked and has been roundly criticized as a transparent evasion of our own policy. It has now reached the ridiculous point where we are giving the Turks a $2.6 million sweetener to persuade them to sell 100 old tanks to Pakistan so we will not have to do it. 2. Con : This would damage our relationship with Pakistan unnecessarily. Even though the third country route has not been helpful, the Pakistanis at least regard it as a door we have left open. Besides, the Turkish sale of tanks may still go through. 3. Conclusion : While this might make our policy a little more straightforward, it would seem to make more sense to leave the policy on the books, ineffectual as it is, than to offend Pakistan unnecessarily by removing it. D. Option 3: Make some modifications or exceptions to present policy to permit some selective sales to Pakistan . There are several possibilities: a one-time exception to sell Pakistan five F–104s and four B–57s to replace non-combat losses; sale of 100 M–47 tanks if the Turkish sale does not go through; modification to permit continuing sale of replacements for US-supplied lethal equipment with equipment of the same or comparable generation. These could be put together in any combination. 1. Pro : This would help Pakistan keep its US-equipped units going instead of scrapping and buying completely new equipment. It would also help cushion the negative impact of a decision which in essence maintains the framework of existing policy. While the Indians would object, we could tell them that our basic policy will not change. 2. Con : This would benefit the Pakistanis only marginally in military terms and—no matter what we said about not changing basic policy—would anger the Indians. It would not greatly lessen dependence on Communist sources. 3. Conclusion : The Indian reaction might be controlled if we could persuade the Indians that this would not substantially affect Pakistan’s military capability. It would provide a political gesture toward Pakistan—and our interests are mainly political, not military. It would leave Pakistan looking to Communist and costly Western European sources, but there are at the moment limits on how much Communist China can actually provide. E. Option 4: Liberalize present policy to permit limited cash sales . We might, for instance, consider the direct sale of some lethal end-items on a case by case basis under such conditions as: not a sophisticated weapons system; not requiring excessive diversion of resources from economic development; replacement, allowing for reasonable modernization. 1. Pro : This would have a positive political impact in Pakistan. It would offer both countries a means of reducing their military supply relationships with the USSR. 2. Con : India would regard this as a fundamental policy change by the Administration for the purpose of strengthening Pakistan. It might decrease Pakistani dependence on Communist sources but could strengthen Indian sense of political reliance on the USSR. 3. Conclusion : If the US wanted to get back into serious military aid in the subcontinent, it would have to devise some such conditions. The key question, however, is whether going back into full-scale military aid would sufficiently further US interests to outweigh the disadvantages. V. CONCLUSIONS A. In an ideal world, we might reasonably decide to help India and Pakistan to meet their legitimate defense requirements and play for whatever added margin of influence that might give us. B. However, since we can argue only a marginal interest in the military strength of either country and a major interest in economic development, US interests would seem to dictate resuming even selective military shipments only if it could be done at minimal cost. C. The cost of resuming a continuing program of shipments (Option 4) even selectively would be to place increased tension on the US-Indian relationship, which is the primary US concern in the subcontinent, while gaining only a marginal advantage in Pakistan, which would maintain a strong interest in preserving its political relationship with Communist China. D. The choice, therefore, seems to lie between Options 1 (continue present policy) and 3 (one-time exceptions for Pakistan). 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Secret. This summary is of a paper drafted in the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in response to NSSM 26 ( Document 10 ), and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. Sisco, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent the paper on November 14 to Kissinger, the Chairman of the NSC Review Group. The paper, entitled “U.S. Military Supply for South Asia–Response to NSSM 26,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Saunders sent the analytical summary and the paper to Kissinger on November 19 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger’s handwritten note reads: “Hal–The President wants action not study. When are the tanks moving? When will the lawyers decide? Please get me quick answers.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Pakistan Military and Intelligence, 1/20/69–12/31/69) 43. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Review Group 43. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Review Group 1 Washington, November 25, 1969, 3:15–3:55 p.m. Subject: South Asia Military Supply Policy (NSSM 26) Participation: Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger JCS—Lt. Gen. F.T. Unger State—William I. Cargo Donald McHenry Christopher Van Hollen OEP—Haakon Lindjord USIA—Frank Shakespeare Defense—Richard A. Ware NSC Staff—Harold H. Saunders Richard T. Kennedy Jeanne W. Davis CIA—R. Jack Smith SUMMARY OF DECISIONS That the IG paper would be revised by Messrs. Cargo and Van Hollen to include consideration of: 1. Where do we want to put our weight in the sub-continent? 2. Regardless of the answer to the first question, do we want to resume military assistance to Pakistan? 3. The possibility of encouraging and expanding third country sales to Pakistan, with full discussion of the pros and cons; 4. The possibility of replacing material lost by attrition on an item-for-item basis. Mr. Kissinger commented that the IG paper was in good shape but that the issue was complicated by the fact that the President, on the Asian trip, did—or did not—make a commitment to Pakistan President Yahya. Although he had not been present for the discussion with the Pakistanis, he would not be surprised if the Pakistanis thought they would receive more sympathetic treatment from this Administration than from the previous Administration. Mr. Cargo said that State Department knows only what the Pakistan Ambassador has told them with regard to the timing of a decision. He said the Pakistanis expected an answer in September. Mr. Kissinger said this was correct. The Pakistanis had been told the question was under review, that it would be considered some time in September and that they could expect a decision in October. They were also told that our attitude was positive. However, he did not believe this fact should change our conclusions. He asked if the four options presented in the paper exhausted the possibilities for U.S. policy options. General Unger said they could not think of any additional courses. Mr. Lindjord asked what would happen if we did away with the special restrictions on arms sales to India and Pakistan and treated them just as we treat other countries in this matter. Was this accommodated within Option 4? Mr. Cargo agreed that it could be so accommodated by permitting direct sales to India and Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger asked how our present policy toward India and Pakistan differs from that toward other countries with regard to arms sales. Mr. Lindjord replied that there were several statements in the record indicating restrictions on arms sales to India and Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger asked how we handled sales to other countries. Mr. Lindjord replied on a case-by-case basis. All agreed that this could be accommodated within Option 4 under certain conditions. Mr. Kissinger agreed that there was special sensitivity on the question of sales to the subcontinent and asked if we could consider sales in accordance with the normal case-by-case method as a sub-option of Option 4. Mr. Van Hollen thought such sales would have to be conditional, partly because of Congressional sensitivity. Mr. Kissinger asked if it would not be possible to treat India and Pakistan as we treat other nations. He asked, for example, how we handled Burma. Mr. Van Hollen agreed it would be possible. Mr. Cargo commented with regard to Burma that we probably would not agree to sell them sophisticated weapons systems that we did not want them to take on undue economic burdens in order to purchase arms; but that we might consider replacement equipment. General Unger asked if it would be in our interest to treat India and Pakistan as we treat other nations. Mr. Ware said one problem with Option 4 is that cash sales to India and Pakistan would in fact put Pakistan at a disadvantage, since they do not have large amounts of cash. While Option 4 appears to be even-handed, it is not, realistically. He agreed this imbalance was pointed out in the paper. General Unger asked if there might be a sub-option which would call for grants to Pakistan and sales to India. Mr. Ware commented that a policy of equality would give credit to Pakistan and sell for cash to India. Mr. Kissinger asked what is the U.S. interest in selling arms to Pakistan. He noted that the Indians do not want to buy arms from us as long as they can, by denying themselves this opportunity, keep arms from Pakistan. He was aware of no policy issues which require us to sell arms to India and he asked if we have an interest in doing so. General Unger commented that it was in our interest to steer India away from complete reliance on Communist sources for arms. Mr. Kissinger noted that we would not sell arms to India without also selling them to Pakistan and questioned whether the price we would pay in India if we sell to Pakistan would not outweigh our interests in selling to India. He saw no reason to liberalize our policy unless India asks for it. Mr. Cargo agreed that there was no reason vis-a-vis India for liberalizing our policy but that we had to make our policy appear to be even-handed. Mr. Kissinger said the decision then is really whether it is in the U.S. interest to get arms to Pakistan, and whether we are willing to pay the price in India by offering equal treatment, recognizing that there is no real equality. Mr. Cargo said there was some collateral advantage in India’s knowing they could purchase arms from the U.S. if they wished to. He did not, however, consider this an argument for initiating liberalizing measures. Mr. Kissinger asked what are the arguments for resuming military aid to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen replied that the main argument was to make Pakistan less reliant on Communist sources of arms. In addition, it would give the U.S. more influence with the Pakistani military and provide a demonstration of our general good will toward Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger asked what price we would pay in India? Mr. Van Hollen thought at least initially the price would be heavy in terms of public and political reaction. He thought, however, this would be mitigated over time and, if India should become interested in buying from the U.S., they might come around. He noted that the Indian military were already interested in acquiring arms from the U.S. but that it was the civilians who did not wish to. Mr. Kissinger thought we should add to the paper for NSC consideration the arguments for easing our policy toward Pakistan and the price we would pay in India for doing so. Mr. Cargo and Mr. Van Hollen indicated that these were considered in the paper in discussing the advantages and disadvantages of various options. Mr. Kissinger raised the question of Option 2, asking if it were possible to adopt a less restrictive policy by enlarging the third country method. Mr. Van Hollen thought it would be difficult given the lack of success of the third-country route up to now. He cited attempts to conclude third-country deals prior to that with the Turks and noted the irony that India had in fact procured Hawker-Hunter aircraft through the British under this provision and Pakistan had procured nothing, even though this route had been established for Pakistan’s benefit. He referred to two third-country deals now active including the Turkish tanks for Pakistan and the Indian procurement of 12 Canberras through the British. In response to a question by Mr. Kissinger regarding U.S. involvement in the latter, he said the U.S. held licenses on certain elements in the Canberras. Mr. Kissinger asked why third-country sales had been unsatisfactory. Mr. Cargo mentioned Indian pressure on third countries. Mr. Van Hollen added such difficulties as haggling over the price of rehabilitation and whether or not the equipment the Pakistanis wanted really existed in the surplus stocks of other nations. Mr. Shakespeare asked if we urged third countries to sell arms. Mr. Van Hollen replied that the U.S. had been in front in the present Turkish tank deal. We had agreed that, if the Turks would sell 100 M–47s to the Pakistanis, we would supply the Turks with 100 M–48s over and above our already agreed military assistance program. Despite the U.S. interest, however, the deal had dragged on, had become known to the press, and had generated much Congressional interest. Mr. Shakespeare asked what would be the effect of a U.S. position of neutrality on third-country deals. What would happen if we did not press for such deals? Mr. Van Hollen replied that this would make it even harder for the Pakistanis to acquire equipment via this route. He noted that India did not have any trouble in acquiring the Hawker-Hunters. Mr. Kissinger asked if lifting the restrictions on third-country sales by the UK to India would ease Indian outrage if we should send arms to Pakistan? Mr. Van Hollen thought it would help a little. He thought, however, a token gesture toward Pakistan wouldn’t buy us much. We might want to make such a gesture, however, if the President felt he had made a commitment to Yahya, by making a one-time exception for Pakistan. Opening up sales would be seen by both Pakistan and India as a pro-Pakistan move. Mr. Shakespeare asked how the issue might be played in India in the present confused political situation. He asked if it would strengthen or weaken Mrs. Gandhi and how she might be expected to react. Mr. Van Hollen replied Mrs. Gandhi could exploit the situation on an anti-U.S. basis. He agreed that India would be outraged but questioned how long it would last. Mr. Smith doubted that India would be willing to torpedo its economic assistance prospects. General Unger commented that the Indian outcry would be less if we were merely replacing Pakistani equipment that had been attrited. Mr. Kissinger asked if our economic assistance to India did not in fact strengthen the India military by freeing funds to be used for military purposes. He noted that, contrary to India, Pakistan had no arms industry. Mr. Van Hollen replied that, when this had been raised in the Congress, the answer had been that the relationship between U.S. economic assistance funds and arms purchases or production was only indirect. Mr. Kissinger asked if the Indian arms budget did not in fact have some correlation to the aid that they were receiving. Mr. Smith thought it was not an exact correlation. Mr. Kissinger agreed that it was not exact but asked if it did not mean that India could be self-reliant while Pakistan could not. Mr. Smith agreed that this was a valid consideration, but did not think the two were closely connected in India. Mr. Cargo commented that in general India has a bigger economy and thereby has greater capital for arms production. He thought there was a possibility that military assistance to Pakistan could stimulate India to take further steps with the USSR in arms procurement. Mr. Shakespeare asked what we would get if we opened up to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen replied “not much.” He agreed that if we should open up, Pakistan would still seek to retain some relations with the USSR and Communist China in the arms supply field. Mr. Smith asked what we would want from Pakistan. General Unger commented that India was a better counterweight against Communist China than was Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger said that under present circumstances he did not think it would be possible to push India toward Communist China. Mr. Cargo noted India’s grossly unrealistic attitude during the Krishna Menon era before the Communist Chinese attack and the Indian turn-about after the attack. Mr. Van Hollen thought we must consider the political weight that would be placed by a positive decision by this Administration on this issue. He thought we should consider where we wanted to place U.S. weight at this time in terms of U.S. interests. Mr. Kissinger saw two questions to be answered: (1) where do we want to put U.S. weight in the sub-continent; and (2) do we want to resume military assistance to Pakistan? Regardless of the answer to the first question, he thought the second should be considered, with all the reasons for and against military assistance to Pakistan. If the decision is against sales to Pakistan, we would be in Option 1. Since he was certain the President would not be in favor of a more restrictive policy, he thought Option 2 would not be considered. Therefore, the choice would lie between Options 3 and 4. If the answer to the first question is India, he thought the President still owed President Yahya consideration of the resumption of aid to Pakistan. If the decision is made to resume, then we could choose between Options 3 and 4. If it is decided not to resume, we need not go to the options. Mr. Cargo noted that the Turkish deal would still be hanging fire. Mr. Kissinger added that he understood the Shah still wants to sell arms to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen noted the German transfer of 90 F–4s through Iran to Pakistan. While third-country transactions were difficult, we would of course not want to cut them off. Mr. Kissinger asked if we could encourage them. Mr. Van Hollen replied that we did on the Turkish tanks. He agreed that we could ask Pakistan for an indication of its needs and could then try to get other countries to meet them. Mr. Kissinger asked if this would not be better than direct sales. Mr. Van Hollen replied that it would be better politically, if direct sales have a political cost on the Indian side. Mr. Kissinger said if the President decided to resume sales to Pakistan, he has two choices: the third-country route or a one-shot deal. He asked if there was a possibility in between by liberalizing third-country sales even if we were not enthusiastic about them. He asked again why third-country sales had not been workable. Mr. Van Hollen noted three reasons: (1) the political problem of getting countries to sell to Pakistan when India brings such great pressure against such sales; (2) the fact that the U.S. was usually called on to sweeten the deal; and (3) Pakistani inventory needs were not always readily available through third countries. Mr. Saunders added that the third country usually wanted replacements from us of the equipment they sold to Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger agreed that the paper should include such a possibility with all of its unpalatable aspects. Mr. Cargo suggested that instead of a one-time deal that we might loosen up on the sale of lethal end-items as present supplies are attrited. Mr. Kissinger asked how this would differ from Option 4. Mr. Cargo replied that it would involve direct sales but not necessarily tied to the conditions of Option 4. Mr. Van Hollen agreed that we could upgrade arms for Pakistan under Option 4—that we could supply them with a new generation of weapons. Mr. Ware commented that if U.S. military aid policy were changed we could get M 48s in good condition to Pakistan directly from U.S. sources. Mr. Saunders commented that we should not change our policy merely because we have tanks available. Mr. Cargo noted that Pakistan had been completely realistic about third-country sales. They had doubted the workability of this route and so far had been proven correct. Mr. Kissinger asked what the major obstacle was—were there legal problems. Mr. Van Hollen replied that in the Turkish deal there was originally considered to be a constitutional barrier. However, the Turks had now found a way to get around this. The Belgian and German deals had leaked to the press and India had protested loudly. The Italian deal had foundered on the question of rehabilitation costs. Mr. Ware commented that when the Turkish deal had been delayed they had upped the ante. Mr. Van Hollen agreed that the cost of M–48s to replace the M–47s the Turks were willing to provide Pakistan had gone up during the delay. He thought one option short of opening up sales would be the replacement of existing material lost by attrition on a tank-for-tank basis. Mr. Kissinger asked that this be included in a revised paper so as to give the President an option short of unrestricted sales. Mr. Saunders noted that this could be included under Option 3. General Unger asked what we gain by the subterfuge of the third-country route. Mr. Van Hollen replied that the third-country route had been attempted in part to help solve the Congressional problem in April 1967 when memories of the India-Pakistan war were still fresh. It was agreed that Mr. Cargo and Mr. Van Hollen would revise the paper to cover the issues in the manner discussed at the table, asking: (1) where do we want to put our weight in the subcontinent and; (2) regardless of the answer to the first question, do we wish to resume military assistance to Pakistan. It was agreed that this issues paper would be cleared with DOD/ISA and JCS before coming forward as a paper for NSC consideration. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meeting, Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For a summary of the paper prepared in response to NSSM 26, see Document 42 . 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 29, 1969 SUBJECT: Turkish Tank Sale to Pakistan Since you have an ongoing interest in military shipments to Pakistan, I wanted to bring you up to date on a recent development. The new government in Turkey has unexpectedly informed us that it is ready to complete the sale of 100 M–47 tanks to Pakistan if we can still replace those with M–48s through our military aid program. You may recall that this transaction has been hanging since late last year because of some technicalities in Turkish and US law governing the transfer of money and equipment provided under military assistance. This kind of third-country transaction is in line with our present military supply policy which you will be reviewing in the NSC on December 10. The latest Turkish proposal meets our legal requirements and the tanks are available for shipment within 3–6 months, but the following problems remain to be resolved if we want the sale to go through: 1. Funds would have, to be drawn from other military aid programs. The net cost to us would be about $3.7 million, up about a million dollars since this proposal was initiated about a year ago. We have told the Turks that this would not come out of their military aid ceiling. 2. We have to find out whether the Pakistanis still want to go through with the sale. We have heard nothing from them on this in recent months and suspect that they may at this point prefer to hold off until after we finish our review of our South Asian arms policy. There are two options: 1. Wait until after the NSC discussion of South Asian arms supply policy on December 10. The argument for doing so is that this decision could then be placed in the context of whatever decisions you make at that meeting. 2. Tell the bureaucracy to go ahead with this sale, since it can be done without further delay within present policy. RECOMMENDATION: Since you have already made yourself abundantly clear on this issue, I recommend that we move ahead now without further delays in an already drawn out exercise. Approve Go ahead now Disapprove 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 6. 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 21, 1969 SUBJECT: Turkish Tanks for Pakistan Before sending instructions giving our approval of the Turkish sale of U.S. tanks to Pakistan, Secretary Rogers has asked that you be made aware of his strong recommendation that we not proceed with this transaction now but consider it during the NSC discussion of the broader policy question (memo attached). His reasons are: —We would get relatively little out of this in Pakistan compared with “disproportionate” damage in India which are more important. The Indians would regard this as a pro-Pakistani move. It might revive the Hanoi recognition question. —There would be criticism on the Hill, especially in the Senate. This might be intensified when it becomes known that Pakistan is sending an anti-aircraft battalion of 600 men to Jordan with 40 mm. guns (non-US). —Our relations with Pakistan have changed since this tank sale was originally discussed: (1) US intelligence facilities in Pakistan have closed; (2) 200 Soviet tanks are scheduled to be delivered by the end of 1970. If you wish to go ahead, this can be done legally at a cost of $3.7 million in military aid to Turkey. The Turks and Pakistanis would be notified of our approval, and they would then have to complete the details of the sale between them. When this kind of sale was originally discussed with the Pakistanis in 1968; the US asked that the Paks scrap obsolete tanks as they received these newer ones. The purpose of this was to try to avoid contributing to an India-Pak arms race. The only new argument raised in this memo is the possibility of reaction to the fact that Pakistan is sending an anti-aircraft battalion to Jordan. I regard that less as a fundamental argument than as one of several arguments that will be used by those who oppose this sale. I do not believe it adds significantly to the argument as you have already heard it and feel that you could ask the Departments to go ahead with the sale. As I see it, this decision will carry with it the unpleasant aspects the Secretary mentions whenever we do it; it will not be any easier next month, and a refusal to go ahead would be hard to explain to President Yahya, particularly after your talk in Lahore. The Paks have been promised tanks by two American Presidents. In addition, the sale would be an elegant way to allow you to defer harder decisions on the larger issues which will come up in the NSC meeting, should you wish to do so. RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize me to inform the Secretary that you have considered these issues and would still like to have the sale proceed as quickly as possible. Approve Disapprove Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, December 18, 1969 Subject: Turkish Tanks for Pakistan I have reviewed the Turkey-Pakistan tank transaction on the basis of word from Ankara that Turkey would be willing to go ahead if we approved a request for the sale. As you will recall, this transaction originated with a personal commitment from former President Johnson to former President Ayub in December 1967 under which President Johnson undertook to help obtain tanks for Pakistan via a third country. As the proposal now stands, we would approve the sale by Turkey to Pakistan of 100 M–47 tanks and would provide Turkey with an equal number of renovated M–48 tanks at a cost to the United States of $3.7 million. This arrangement could be approved under our present arms policy. It could also be interpreted as a political gesture to President Yahya and as a follow-up to your visit to Pakistan. If we disapproved the sale, Pakistan might consider that we had reneged on a commitment of the previous Administration and had not taken advantage of an opportunity to assist Pakistan in buying from non-Communist sources. Despite these considerations, I recommend that we not proceed with the tank transaction because: 1. We would get relatively little out of the transaction in Pakistan compared with the disproportionate damage to our relations with India—which are relatively more important. 2. India would regard the tank transaction as a significant step by this Administration in favor of Pakistan. In the current charged political atmosphere in India, this might generate pressures on the Indian Government to revive the Hanoi recognition question. 3. The tank transaction would stimulate criticism on the Hill, especially on the Senate side. Aside from Congressional opposition on political-military grounds, we would also be criticized for our active efforts “to make the deal work,” including our willingness to facilitate the sale by underwriting—for $3.7 million—the additional cost for the more modern M–48 tanks which we would supply Turkey. 4. The Pakistan Ambassador in Amman confirmed to us this month that Pakistan is planning to send an anti-aircraft battalion of 600 men to Jordan equipped with 40 mm. guns. (We have decided not to intervene with the Pakistanis because King Hussain would strongly resent our action since we have been unable to meet his anti-aircraft requirements and he presumably is accepting Pakistani guns in preference to Soviet offers). Although the Pakistani 40 mm. guns are not United States supplied and will be used for defensive purposes, there is likely to be sharp criticism in the Congress and the press when the public learns that Pakistan has introduced the first non-Arab military forces into Jordan. This criticism will be intensified if the United States about the same time announces it is approving the sale of United States-controlled Turkish tanks to Pakistan. 5. Finally, two aspects of our relationship with Pakistan have changed since this transaction was initially discussed two years ago: —At that time, we still had intelligence facilities in Pakistan but subsequently Pakistan terminated the agreement for those facilities. —Pakistan later arranged with the USSR to obtain two hundred Soviet tanks, which reportedly will be delivered by the end of 1970. Because of the foregoing factors I suggest that the tank question be considered in the context of our overall review of South Asia military supply policy which is scheduled for NSC discussion within the next week or two. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for action. The attached memorandum is dated December 18. Nixon did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but wrote on the memorandum as follows: “K Discuss with me.” On December 23, David Schneider, Country Director for India, sent a letter to Keating about the memorandum that Rogers sent to Nixon. He wrote of Rogers: “We met with him to discuss the proposal and he was quite emphatic in his opposition to it.” He added, however, “the recurrent theme one hears from the NSC staff is that the President ‘wants to do something for Pakistan.’” (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence 1969/1970) 46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 31, 1970 SUBJECT : Reply from President Yahya Khan President Yahya has sent the attached reply to your general letter. His response is in the same spirit of a general exchange of views as your letter to him. In brief, he covers these points: 1. Pakistan’s vital concern in Asian stability. 2. His wish for success in U.S. efforts to develop a meaningful dialogue with China. 3. Pakistan’s encouragement for our efforts for peace in the Mid-East, opposition to use of force to gain territory and belief that a lasting settlement must take into account the interests of the Palestinian Arabs. 4. Pleasure in U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relations and appreciation for your prompt action on food shipments. 5. Need to press urgently toward a decision on military supply policy. 6. Appreciation for your November 3 speech. No reply now is necessary, but I shall keep my eyes open for a natural opportunity to continue this exchange. The military supply question is ready for NSC discussion at the next opportunity. Attachment Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon Rawalpindi, January 19, 1970 Dear Mr. President, Thank you very much for your letter of the 20th December in which you have reviewed developments in Asia and the Middle East since we had the pleasure of welcoming you in our midst last summer. I am glad that the process of personal exchange of views started in Lahore is being kept up through correspondence. As you very well know, Mr. President, in our situation and because also of the imperatives of our ideology, we cannot but be vitally concerned in the peace, stability and progress of Asia. We welcome all developments and initiatives which hold promise of promoting these objectives, and are heartened by your own and your great country’s continuing interest in them. It is our belief that a meaningful dialogue between the United States and China could help reduce tensions and serve the cause of peace. We wish you success in your efforts in this direction. We have watched with great interest your Administration’s efforts to break the deadlock in the Middle East and to bring lasting peace and stability to this deeply troubled area. Pakistan’s strong opposition to the use of force to gain territory is well-known. So is its unstinted support for the exercise of the right of self-determination by all peoples. We hope, Mr. President, that your great country will be able to exercise its tremendous influence to bring about a lasting settlement in the region which conforms to the principles of the United Nations Charter and is consistent with the dignity and honour of the Arab people. It is our belief that, judging by the experience of the last 22 years, any settlement which fails to take into account the interests and wishes of the Palistinian Arabs will at best prove ephemeral and illusory. The Security Council resolution of November 1967, provides a basis acceptable to the Governments of the UAR and Jordan on which a settlement can be worked out. It is not inconsistent with the considerations I have set forth above. I very much hope that the efforts made by your Government in that direction will meet with success. Happily relations between our two countries are, as you said, going well. We are grateful for your personal interest which led to a smooth arrangement for PL–480 foodgrains supplies. The uncertainty regarding the foreign aid legislation is causing some anxiety to our planners, but we are hoping that any cuts in new appropriations will not be reflected pro-rata in our allocation which will be as near as possible to the figure indicated to us last summer during your and Secretary Rogers’ visits. You have referred, Mr. President, to the delays in reviewing your military supply policy. I feel that there is need to press ahead urgently with this matter. For a decade Pakistan had depended on the United States as its major, rather sole, supplier of defence equipment. The ban imposed more than four years ago has operated greatly to Pakistan’s disadvantage. As I explained to you, we have neither the desire not the capacity for an arms race with India, but unless we have a minimum, credible deterrent, peace and stability in the region are likely to be in jeopardy. It was nice of you to send me a copy of your address of the 3rd November on the Pursuit of Peace. This gave me an opportunity to read it again in the background of the highly favourable impact it has had on your countrymen. There is a golf course here in Rawalpindi next to my house, but it is not often that I can get to play a round. At this rate, I am in danger of soon becoming an ‘elder statesman’ of the game! Yours sincerely, Yahya Khan 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1969–1970). Secret. Sent for information. The attached letter from President Yahya to President Nixon is dated January 19. The December 20 letter to which Yahya responded can be found ibid. The reference to a speech on November 3, 1969, is to Nixon’s address to the nation on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon , 1969, pp. 901–909. Nixon underlined the last seven words of point 5 and added the following handwritten instructions in the margin: “1 Let’s give them spare parts immediately as basis of keeping the US word. 2 I lean to the Turkish tanks unless it raises too much hell with Congress. I don’t care about Indian reaction.” He also wrote on the memorandum: “K–doesn’t this show advantage of our letter idea? Let’s continue the practice on a selective basis.” 47. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 47. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 10, 1970 Subject: South Asia Military Supply Policy As I see it, we have three basic choices in reaching a decision on the South Asian military supply question. We can: (1) retain the embargo on United States arms sales to India and Pakistan; (2) lift the embargo and permit sales to both countries; or (3) make one-time exceptions or modifications of policy in favor of Pakistan. These choices are fully set forth and analyzed in the paper entitled “U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia” (NSCIG/NEA 69–39). You will recall that before your Asian trip last July the Secretary gave you his tentative view that “having gotten out of the arms business in South Asia, we would do well to stay out”. Since your Asian trip, there have been several developments which relate directly or indirectly to the arms supply issue, including India’s flirtation on the Hanoi recognition issue and the revival of the Turk-Pakistan tank proposal (Enclosure 1). Recommendation: I do not believe that any of the recent developments materially change the situation. If anything, we are more convinced than before that we should retain the embargo on United States sales of lethal weapons to India and Pakistan—for the following reasons: —We do not have overriding political or security interests in South Asia which require us to get back into the arms business. Our relations with both India and Pakistan are generally good, despite the recent Indian flirtations with Hanoi and the disappearance of our former “special relationship” with Pakistan and our intelligence facilities in that country. The Indian military force, rebuilt after the 1962 Chinese incursion, seems capable of withstanding any potential Chinese attack and the prospects of Indo-Pakistan hostilities seem remote at present. —India is relatively more important to our interests than Pakistan. India will react sharply to any United States policy change. If we can please only one of the two countries, we should lean toward India, the larger and more influential power. —Pakistan’s unhappiness will be containable. It will continue to maintain good relations with us as a political offset to its relations with the USSR and Communist China and because we are Pakistan’s largest aid donor ($100 million in United States economic aid to Pakistan for FY 1969 vs. $200 million for India—although India has a 4 to 1 population advantage.) —Even if we were ready to resume arms sales on a large scale basis—which is unlikely in any event—we could not significantly affect the policies of India and Pakistan. These policies are set by geopolitical factors and matters of basic national interest which could not be significantly influenced by our arms policy. —At present neither the USSR nor Communist China seems likely to make major additional political inroads in South Asia via the military supply route. Both India and Pakistan can be counted upon to follow essentially non-aligned foreign policies and their military establishments will not succumb to Communist influence. However, we will wish to watch the effect of our arms policy on Soviet and Chinese influence in Pakistan as Pakistan evolves toward new political institutions. —There are some members of Congress who believe we should not remain out of the South Asian arms picture but a more vocal and influential group, especially in the Senate, would criticize United States reinvolvement in South Asian military supply. We obviously should change the policy despite anticipated Congressional criticism if our political and security interests dictate. However, as previously noted, our interests do not require a change of policy in this instance. If you agree to uphold the present embargo, I think we should convey the word to India and Pakistan in terms of a decision to keep the military supply question under continuing review. Such a formula might-be slightly better from the Pakistan viewpoint and, by keeping the issue somewhat open, might give us certain political advantages in future dealings with India. While recommending that we maintain the status quo, I realize that you may feel some obligation to President Yahya. This might take the form of providing some military equipment or some economic development related help of particular value to Pakistan. The pros and cons of various alternatives are enclosed (Enclosure 2). If you consider military equipment is required, we would hope that you would make a gesture toward Pakistan which would not depart markedly from our present policy. Our first preference would be to make a one-time exception to present policy and agree to sell Pakistan about six F–104 fighter aircraft which Pakistan has asked to buy from us. We continue to believe that we should not approve the proposed Turk-Pakistan tank transaction for the reasons set forth in the Secretary’s December 18 memorandum to you (Enclosure 3). If despite the foregoing considerations you feel disposed to change the policy to permit sales to India and Pakistan, or to make a major military gesture toward Pakistan, the Secretary would appreciate an opportunity to talk further with you after he returns from Africa. Elliot Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 6, and cleared by Sisco. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “OBE. See S/S 8019. RLBrown 6/10/70.” For a citation to the paper entitled “U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia,” see Document 42 . The enclosures to the memorandum are not printed. In the order in which they are cited, the enclosures are an undated memorandum entitled “Recent Developments Affecting South Asia Military Supply Policy Issue,” another undated memorandum entitled “Possible Gestures Toward Pakistan,” and the December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, printed as an attachment to Document 45 . 48. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 48. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 20, 1970 SUBJECT: Pakistani Views on Our South Asian Arms Supply Policy Recent indications suggest that Pakistan is increasingly concerned over the timing and nature of our long awaited decision on military supply to South Asia. Ambassador Hilaly recently approached Assistant Secretary Sisco on this matter and now has asked to see you (on this as well as to deliver a message from Yahya on China). Ambassador Farland is also coming under increasing pressure from President Yahya on down and has sent in a long cable (attached) presenting the Pakistani case for the special attention of you, Acting Secretary Richardson, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Secretary Laird. Views of our Ambassadors : There is a long history of our ambassadors to India and Pakistan strongly advocating changes in our arms policy favorable to the countries to which they are accredited. In the last Administration this contributed substantially to a paralysis of decision-making on this contentious issue. Thus far the Nixon Administration, with new teams in New Delhi and Rawalpindi, has been largely spared from this counter-productive exercise and Ambassadors Keating and Farland have stated their opposing positions only infrequently and with restraint. Ambassador Farland has now broken his “self-imposed moratorium” on arguing the Pakistani case to advocate strongly the resumption of “limited and selected” sales of military equipment. [This is essentially the second of the main options in the memo I have given you to send to the President on this decision.] As a “fallback” position, he recommends going through with the Turkish tank deal, and supplying some aircraft as an interim measure pending a “basic decision” which could then be delayed until a more politically propitious time for Pakistan. [This is very close to sub-options 1 and 2 in your memo to the President.] He makes the following points to back his recommendation: —President Yahya’s personal prestige and his ability to carry through on his liberal political program will suffer if he is rebuffed by us on the arms supply issue. This could contribute to the breakup of the country. —He doubts the thesis that any resumption of U.S. sales of “lethal” equipment to India and Pakistan would by itself stimulate an arms race on the subcontinent. —Yahya is expected to visit the USSR, and Chou En-Lai is to visit Pakistan this spring and military supply will rank high on the agenda. Persistent pressure from the military could force Yahya to increase his purchases from the Soviets and especially the Chinese if he has not had some positive signal from us by then. —Willingness to consider selling some arms to India and Pakistan within carefully controlled limits would appear consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. —Should we decide to sell more aircraft to Israel while denying lethal end items to Muslim Pakistan, negative Pakistani reaction would be “intense.” The Pakistanis could even get more deeply involved in the Arab cause against Israel. Ambassador Keating may cable a counter argument to that presented by Ambassador Farland. Past reporting indicates that he feels we should maintain our current restrictive arms policy (a view shared by Secretary Rogers) without substantial change. According to this line of reasoning, any modification of our arms policy runs the serious risk of marring bilateral relations with India, the larger and more important country in terms of U.S. interests in Asia. Conclusion : Ambassador Farland’s argumentation is overstated but his recommendations approximate one of the options we have identified for the President (Option 4—Permit continued sale of replacements for Pakistan) and his fallback position is very close to what I have suggested you recommend to the President, except that I have envisaged it as a basic decision rather than as a delaying tactic. As the memo to the President points out, the main problem with restarting a sales program is that it contains the seeds of future tension since we would constantly be in the position of fending off Pakistani requests. Moreover, Ambassador Keating is probably right that this policy would raise serious problems with India that are inconsistent with our interests in South Asia. On balance, I still think that the recommendation I suggested is the best. It splits the difference by giving the Pakistanis something of real value without at the same time re-involving us on a continuing basis in Indo-Pakistani hostility. The Pakistanis would not be entirely happy, but I seriously doubt that this would jeopardize President Yahya’s democratization program (our arms policy is only one small element at best) or force him into the arms of the Soviets and Chinese (there are built-in limitations as to how far these relationships can go). Moreover, the fact is that—however much India may irritate us—India is the larger and potentially more influential power in the Asian context. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. The attached cable is telegram 1333 from Rawalpindi, February 18. (Ibid.) It can also be found ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Ambassador Keating sent a telegram from New Delhi on February 20 making the anticipated arguments against revising the existing arms policy for the subcontinent. (Telegram 1961 from New Delhi; ibid.) Kissinger’s handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “We must move this.” He added: “Let me see my memo.” The memorandum is marked in an unknown hand to indicate that Saunders had the action responsibility to respond to Kissinger’s instructions. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred was sent to the President on March 16 and is printed as Document 54 . 49. Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 49. Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, February 27, 1970, 2153Z Please deliver following written message from Secretary to FonMin Dinesh Singh: Quote—Dear Mr. Foreign Minister: During the past year I believe we have developed a relationship which permits us to discuss issues between our governments with utmost candor. It is in this spirit that I raise a question which is giving me serious concern. This relates to the decision of the Government of India without any prior consultation to request the closure of certain US cultural centers, a decision which I regret. I read today of statements by your government that this decision had been based upon an investigation of activities at the centers which was “not favorable”; and that certain centers had been engaged in “political and other undesirable activities”. I should much appreciate any clarification you can provide me regarding the meaning of these statements. Do they refer to US activities? To my knowledge the Government of India has never informed the US of any activities by US cultural centers which might be considered improper. These centers have functioned openly with the full knowledge and approval of the Government of India. As Elliot Richardson told your Charge today, at no time to our knowledge have US cultural centers in India been engaged in any improper activity. I am prepared to examine evidence, and its source, that your government may have to the contrary. I know you will understand that matters such as this can have an effect upon the climate of the relations between our countries. It has already attracted public notice in this country. I raise these questions knowing that we both desire to avoid unnecessary frictions in our relationship. Sincerely yours, William P. Rogers—End quote. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Richardson, and in USIA by Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia David Nalle; and approved by Rogers. The decision by India on February 10 to close five USIS cultural centers was triggered by a Soviet request on December 3, 1969, to open a cultural center in Trivandrum. The Soviet request led to a review of all foreign cultural centers operating in India and a decision to close the U.S. centers in Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Chandigarh, Ranchi, and Varauasi. These were the only such centers operating in cities without diplomatic or consular representation, and they operated on the basis of an understanding reached by former Ambassador Chester Bowles and Prime Minister Nehru. The Soviet Union sought to establish a cultural center in Trivandrum on the same basis. 50. Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 50. Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, March 3, 1970, 1532Z Subject: Cultural Centers Refs: State 29571: New Delhi 2239 1. During my March 3 meeting with Prime Minister Gandhi, I raised the “not so pleasant” issue of impending closure of five American cultural centers. 2. Since it evident she did not have complete background, I explained briefly but thoroughly the nature of case, and history of GOI prior approval and subsequent reassurances concerning centers. I expressed great concern at adverse political effects in India and U.S., noted unfavorable interpretation in US and Indian press, and cited action as serious irritant in bilateral relations. I noted these effects were exacerbated by allegations of impropriety on U.S. side broached in press and Parliament in manner uncustomary between friendly governments. I quoted Lok Sabha member, S.K. Tapuriah (Swatantra), statement in Parliament February 26 during discussion on cultural centers, qte this would probably teach the Americans and the American Ambassador here a lesson that they should not go all out to support the Prime Minister and her colleagues the way they have been doing and that all that they would get for it is a kick in their pants. It is very right that it is given to them. Unqte. 3. While Mrs. Gandhi smiled nervously, I told her Secretary Rogers and I had asked Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh for chapter and verse concerning any evidence of improper activity by American cultural centers. I said had talked to Foreign Minister, who, while not defending methods, did defend closure action. I said I find this difficult to square with assertion he does not wish to curtail cultural activities. I offered Mrs. Gandhi a copy of Secretary Rogers’ message to Dinesh Singh (State 29569) which she took and read. 4. I told Mrs. Gandhi that Dinesh had stated that after receipt of Embassy response (delivered March 3) to MEA note of February 10, GOI cultural people would be in touch with us. I added we are not wedded to any one form but still hope something can be worked out, perhaps along lines of British Council. I cited my visits to three cultural centers and personal assurance of their non-propagandistic and constructive activities. 5. Mrs. Gandhi said she quite honestly not in touch with cultural center issue. She noted, however, that some pattern must be evolved, and that this much had been raised with her and she had agreed. There is a problem, she said, of one country being allowed to do something and another not, and in this regard cited USSR without clarification. When I said the Trivandrum episode appeared the origin of current developments, she agreed to extent it had focussed public attention on issue. 6. In conclusion, I said we wished to commence private discussions between our two governments, looking to explore constructive alternatives for the cultural centers that would meet GOI and US requirements. I added that 73 days remaining under 90-day closure deadline stipulated by MEA would hardly be sufficient time to evolve constructive alternative. Accordingly we would take it as a good sign if that deadline were set aside or relaxed. Other hand, I added that we could, of course, effect closure within the stipulated period. She noted that she unable to say much at this juncture and wished to consult with her Minister. 7. While leaving, I noted there some editorial comment in Indian press to effect all foreign cultural activities should be banished. Mrs. Gandhi reacted that she didn’t think that would be right. Seeming to agree with my observation that more, not less, cultural exchange is desirable, she noted that takes many forms, including five American students of Indian culture with whom she had evidently met that morning. 7. Comment: My impression is Ministry of External Affairs received endorsement of Prime Minister’s secretariat to revamped cultural center policy with only very general involvement of Prime Minister. Subsequently, Ministry has been caught up in substantively uncompromising and procedurally arbitrary bureaucratic over-reaction. Prime Minister seemed sensitive to appearance of balanced posture (implicitly between U.S. and USSR), aware of ground swell of Indian press commentary generally favorable to American centers, personally well disposed toward international cultural exchange, and impressed by Secretary Rogers and my comments about the approach taken by the Ministry. 8. I expect the Foreign Minister will be hearing from Mrs. Gandhi at least about Ministry’s methods. Whether this will suffice to moderate GOI line sufficiently to permit discussion along the lines suggested by me remains to be seen. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 51. Letter From the Indian Chargé d’Affaires (Rasgotra) to Secretary of State Rogers 51. Letter From the Indian Chargé d’Affaires (Rasgotra) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 5, 1970 Excellency, Mr. Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs in the Government of India, has asked me to transmit to Your Excellency the following message from him : “4th March, 1970. Dear Mr. Secretary of State, Ambassador Keating has delivered to me your letter of 27th February, 1970. I am happy that you have written to me in a frank manner about the decision of Government of India relating to the functioning of Libraries, Information and Cultural Centres run by foreign Governments in India. I am replying in the same spirit of frankness. 2. I should like to assure you that it is not our desire to weaken our cultural relations but to continue to strengthen them and to promote better understanding between our two countries. Any impression that may have been given to you to the contrary is not correct. 3. As you may know we are seeking to introduce uniformity in the functioning of Information and Cultural Centres of foreign Missions in India. Our recent decision applies to all countries having Missions in India. It is not directed against the USIS or the Cultural/Information Centres of any particular country. The idea is not to curb cultural relations with friendly foreign countries but to put them on a regular and uniform basis. It is our belief that this effort will enable US to have more meaningful cultural contacts with friendly Governments than has been possible so far. 4. You have referred to “political and other undesirable activities” mentioned by me and my colleague the Deputy Minister in the course of the discussions in our Parliament on 26th February. We did not have any specific Mission or country in mind. We were referring in general to Cultural Centres performing functions which would be beyond the scope of purely cultural activities. I hope this will remove any misunderstanding on this score. 5. I have already informed Ambassador Keating that we shall be glad to discuss the manner and means whereby we can work more effectively for the objective of strengthening our cultural relations. Yours sincerely, Dinesh Singh.” Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest esteem. M. Rasgotra Charge d’Affaires ad interim of India. Attachment Telegram 2505 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, March 5, 1970, 1357Z. Subj: Cultural Centers Ref: State 029569 There follows full text of copy of letters from Foreign Minister to Secretary dated March 4 and passed informally to us March 5 by MEA Joint Secretary Muthammas: “Ambassador Keating has delivered to me your letter of February 27, 1970. I am happy that you have written to me in a frank manner about the decision of Government of India relating to the functioning of libraries, information and cultural centres run by foreign governments in India. I am replying in the same spirit of frankness. “I would like to assure you that it is not our desire to weaken our cultural relations but to continue to strengthen them and to promote better understanding between our two countries. Any impression that may have been given to you to the contrary is not correct. “As you may know, we are seeking to introduce uniformity in the functioning of information and cultural centres of foreign missions in India. Our recent decision applies to all countries having missions India. It is not directed against the USIS of the cultural/information centres of any particular country. The idea is not to curb cultural relations with friendly foreign countries, but to put them on a regular and uniform basis. It is our belief that this effort will enable us to have more meaningful cultural contacts with friendly governments than has been possible so far. “You have referred to ‘political and other undesirable activities’ mentioned by me and my colleague, the Deputy Minister, in the course of the discussions in our Parliament on 26th February. We did not have any specific mission or country in mind. We were referring in general to cultural centers performing functions which would be beyond the scope of purely cultural activities. I hope this will remove any misunderstanding on this score. “I have already informed Ambassador Keating that we shall be glad to discuss the manner and means whereby we can work more effectively for the objective of strengthening our cultural relations.” Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377, India 1970, US Cultural Centers. No classification marking. The text of the letter was also conveyed to the Department from New Delhi on March 5 in telegram 2505. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70) 52. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 52. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 7, 1970 The President wrote the following in the margin of your daily brief reporting Ambassador Keating’s conversation with Prime Minister Gandhi on the closing of the four USIS cultural centers in India: “Tell Sisco I’d like to take a stronger line on this. Not to object to closing—but to accept it and close some other facilities which may ‘irritate’ them (e.g., let’s cut some AID program a bit).” Saunders has talked with Sisco who will send you a fuller memo next week on exactly what can be done. In the meantime, in case this subject is raised with you from some other quarter like Frank Shakespeare, following is a report on actions taken and possible further actions to choose from. Actions in process : (1) A telegram was sent Friday night to Ambassador Keating instructing him to proceed to close the centers in question and not to try to negotiate alternative arrangements as he had proposed. (2) A message from Secretary Rogers for Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh is on the Secretary’s desk awaiting approval. It would deal with the question of the charges levied against the centers by telling the Foreign Minister that he still has not adequately answered the Secretary’s request that he produce evidence or retract the charges. Since the Indian press is beginning to attack Singh for his handling of this affair, it would suggest that we might publish the exchange of letters. Possible further actions . The following represent the kinds of actions that might be taken in response to the President’s instruction. The list will be completed and sent to us in memo Monday: 1. The US could engage in a general slowdown on forthcoming Indian requests. For instance, right now India has asked for US support on an Indian candidate for the Narcotics Control Commission. India has been talking about the date for the next round of bilateral discussions. On requests like these for Indian programs or diplomatic moves, we could delay or refuse support. There may be other such possibilities which would provide means for measured retaliation. 2. There are small requests within the overall PL 480 agreement that might be denied. For instance, India has asked for 100,000 more bales of cotton and some additional fats and oils, both in order to help them stabilize prices. India has also asked for a larger component of grants in rupees under the last agreement. Any of these could be denied, though whenever we get into programs that affect people or prices we risk touching innocent Indians rather than those officials who are responsible for closing the cultural centers. 3. India has some travel offices in the US. It is not clear to us yet under what law these are chartered or whether they would be easily closed without breach of agreement. 4. We are still searching for possibilities in the scientific support field. Since the President suggested cutting “some programs... a bit,” we have assumed that the kinds of actions wanted are those which would avoid blowing up a major storm in US-Indian relations, avoid playing into the hands of the Soviets and their friends who would like to eliminate US influence in India and yet show Indian officials that this has cost them something. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. Haig and Saunders sent the memorandum through David Young of the NSC staff for Kissinger. Attached is a copy of the page of the briefing memorandum with the President’s comments. 53. Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 53. Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, March 9, 1970, 2152Z Reference: New Delhi 2505. For Ambassador Keating from Secretary. 1. Please see Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh at earliest convenience and deliver following oral message from me: (A) I appreciate ForMin’s sending me the Government of India’s rationale for closing down cultural centers. (B) Unfortunately, I did not find his letter persuasive on the point which most concerned me, i.e. statements in Parliament alleging that cultural centers were engaging in “political and other undesirable activities”. Placing such allegations on the record at a time when the only cultural centers being closed (the Soviet center had been closed several months previously) were American centers was bound to lead to the inevitable concluson that our centers were the sole object of this most unfortunate reference. This conclusion, it should be noted, was reached by the press in both India and the United States and undoubtedly remains in the Indian public mind as well. Therefore, I find it difficult to explain this occurrence as a “misunderstanding”. He would have been pleased to remove any basis for misunderstanding on his part regarding our cultural centers, but were precluded from doing so by lack of prior consultation before their closure was ordered. (C) As long as such allegations remain on record, I am concerned that doubts will remain in the Indian public mind—doubts which will cast suspicions on our other USIS operations in India and could cast a cloud in other areas as well. (D) Consequently, I would hope ForMin would be willing to issue public statement absolving us of “any political or other undesirable activiies” in US cultural centers. (FYI—If he demurs on this suggestion, as fallback position, you might suggest that our exchange of corespondence be made public. End FYI) Such public statement would help considerably to clear the record and remove the impression that the statements in the Indian Parliament were directed at US cultural centers. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Van Hollen; revised in S by Herbert S. Okun and Rogers; cleared by Sisco, and Alan Carter, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia (USIA); and approved by Rogers. 54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 16, 1970 SUBJECT: Decision on South Asian Arms Supply The pressures on the NSC agenda have several times delayed consideration of our military supply policy toward India and Pakistan. Rather than let it slip further, you may wish to make your decision apart from the NSC. The options have come up through the NSC system and have been considered in the Review Group. A paper is attached (Tab A) detailing the background and argument presented in those deliberations. Secretary Rogers has also sent you his own recommendations (Tab B), and the Defense position is stated below. The Problem . Present policy embargoes the sale of lethal equipment to India and Pakistan but permits sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment and of secondhand U.S. equipment by third countries. Whether this embargo continues is of greater concern to Pakistan than to India because (1) Pakistan’s US-equipped units increasingly require re-supply and (2) Pakistan with its less-developed arms industry depends more heavily on foreign sources. President Yahya has been pressing for a decision to tell his military what they can plan on. The key question in the decision is : Given the fact that any decision will be regarded as either pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani, does provision of some military assistance to Pakistan further U.S. interests sufficiently to justify re-injecting the U.S. into the India-Pakistan balance? There is no question that the U.S. has an interest in doing whatever it can to help maintain a pro-Western and independent Pakistan. This means that the U.S. has an interest in maintaining a political relationship with Pakistan and—to the limited extent that U.S. action will limit the situation—in contributing to its economic and political stability. The U.S. today, however, has little direct interest in the military capability of Pakistani forces per se. If Pakistan fought anyone, it would fight India, probably with the cooperation of Communist China. The main arguments for any move in Pakistan’s direction , therefore, are to maintain a U.S. relationship with President Yahya and, in an effort to help keep a pro-Western government in power, to provide whatever limited help the U.S. can in helping him to meet the needs of his military who provide his political base. Local political forces will determine the outcome of his effort to re-stabilize Pakistan’s politics, but some would argue that a little more U.S. military help would at least strengthen his hand with his own supporters. In any event, the military will either remain directly involved in politics or be hovering in the background prepared to intervene against excesses, and there is some U.S. interest in maintaining a relationship. There is also the argument for keeping a U.S. hand in while the USSR and China are competing for position in Pakistan. The main argument against relaxing the present embargo is that it injects the U.S. again into Indo-Pakistani animosity without enhancing U.S. capacity to bring India and Pakistan closer over the long run. This argument is often put in terms of adverse Indian reaction, but the real argument is that for the past four years the U.S.—rightly or wrongly—has tried to disengage from the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and to deal with each country on the basis of mutual bilateral interests. Each side will inevitably judge U.S. decisions in terms of that rivalry, but the U.S. can maintain some distance if it tries. These arguments are detailed in relation to each option in the paper at Tab A. But in short, there are three main choices : —retain the embargo; —lift the embargo to permit sales on a case-by-case basis; —make one-time exceptions or slight changes in the policy to favor Pakistan. Secretary Rogers recommends (Tab B) retaining the embargo essentially on the grounds stated above. Defense, on balance, has stated its view in the Review Group that the embargo should be lifted. If a gesture toward Pakistan without changing basic policy seemed consistent with U.S. interests, there are these specific possibilities: Option 1. One-time sale of aircraft to Pakistan . Pakistan has asked for six F–104 fighters and four B–57 bombers to fill out existing squadrons. The disadvantage in the B–57s is that they are offensive weapons. Option 2. Approve the Turkish-Pakistani tank transaction . This would cost $3.7 million in military assistance to replace the tanks in Turkey. It could be done within the scope of present policy. Option 3. Sell 100 M–47 tanks directly as a one-time exception to present policy. This would avoid Congressional criticism of a “contrived” third-country sale and be cheaper. Option 4. Permit continued sale of replacements for Pakistan . This would permit the sale on a continuing basis of equipment to replace that previously supplied by the U.S. but lost through normal attrition. The same kinds of tanks and planes as above would be included, but this would open the question of supplying the next generation of equipment where older items had become obsolete, e.g. F–5 aircraft to replace F–86s. In addition to these military moves, there are several possibilities oh the economic side: (1) increased use of US-owned Pakistani currency in East Pakistan’s rural works program, (2) additional PL 480 assistance for East Pakistan and (3) perhaps some additional development lending (although this would have to come from already low aid allocations to other key countries like Turkey and Korea). It is my feeling that these economic possibilities should not be treated as alternatives—that the maximum feasible should be done in this area whatever is decided on the military side. It is in the economic area that the U.S. can continue to have the most impact on Pakistan’s chances for stability. The most rational approach to the military supply problem itself would be Option 4—allowing Pakistan (and India) to buy replacement equipment as well spare parts. This would permit Pakistan at least to delay completely re-equipping its units but at the same time not significantly affect the military balance. This is the only one among the options presented that would be significant enough in Pakistani eyes to look like more than a gesture. But it also contains the seeds of future tension since the U.S. would constantly be in a position of fending off Pakistani requests to upgrade their equipment under the guise of replacement. The complications of going back into the regular supply business are such, however, that on balance it seems more consistent with U.S. interests to minimize our military relationship. The forces at work in Pakistan are such that U.S. military assistance is not likely to affect their balance significantly one way or another. Recommendation : That present policy be reconfirmed but that—to meet your desire to make some gesture toward Pakistan—one-time exceptions for Pakistan be approved to permit the following: —sale of six F–104s and 4 B–57s; —Turkish tank sale 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A but not published is a January 7 paper, apparently prepared by the NSC staff, entitled, “Issues For Decision.” Attached at Tab B but not published is Secretary Rogers’ February 10 memorandum to the President. Both are ibid. Rather than approving or disapproving the recommendation put forward in the memorandum, Nixon responded with handwritten comments in the margins. The thrust of his comments was that he preferred the course of action outlined as option 4. He highlighted the second paragraph of the discussion of option 4 and wrote “OK” next to it. He underscored the first sentence of the following paragraph and wrote next to it, “I agree we do this by all means.” He began his comments under the approval line as follows: “I believe option 4 is less provocative politically in the U.S.–& for that matter in India.” He considered that option 4 plus an increased economic package constituted a substantial gesture in support of Pakistan that he could more easily support politically than the other options detailed in the memorandum. In a handwritten comment in the margin, Kissinger concurred with the President’s response: “I think option 4 gives Paks most.” He added an instruction to Haig: “Al–Get note from Hal [Saunders] what it means.” He was apparently referring to a more complete discussion of the implications of adopting option 4 as policy. 55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 27, 1970 SUBJECT: Closure of USIS Cultural Centers in India You will recall having instructed that State not argue further with the Indians about closure of four of our cultural centers. Secretary Rogers has passed this instruction to Ambassador Keating. You also asked that we look into ways of cutting back a bit on something the Indians want. Secretary Rogers has sent you the attached memorandum reporting on his canvass of possible actions. He says he will make a further recommendation. The Secretary’s Analysis : Secretary Rogers describes possible “countermeasures” as follows: —Among the lower key measures are refusal to support Indian candidates for elections to positions in international organizations (one is pending); delay in granting permission if the Indians ask to open a tourist office in Los Angeles; rejection of some current smaller requests under the PL 480 agreement, delay in scheduling the next round of the annual Indo-US bilateral talks (due in the fall). —The more far-reaching measures considered included: reduction of aid levels, unilateral expenditure of some of our rupee holdings, a cutback in the cultural exchange program and moves in the military supply field. The Secretary points out that moves in either of these categories face us with “something of a dilemma.” None of the more limited measures is quite comparable to what the Indians have done, so none would convey the desired political message at a reciprocal level. The more far-reaching measures could disproportionately escalate our differences. In addition to the problem of finding the right kind of move, the Secretary describes the pitfalls in the current Indian political situation. The wrong move might open us to charges of pettiness; offer the Soviets an issue; give Foreign Minister Singh an issue to exploit in strengthening his political position when he is under heavy fire; risk loss of the support of those Indian political figures and newspapers who have attacked government handling of this problem and affect economic programs in our interest as well as innocent individual Indians, without hurting those responsible. The Secretary concludes that “most of the retaliatory actions we have reviewed are unlikely to achieve their desired results.” He does, however, say he will consider delay on the Indian tourist office request—if they make it—and on setting a date for the next round of bilateral talks scheduled to be held in New Delhi this fall. What Can Be Done : The real question is whether doing nothing is better than doing too little, especially now that Singh is already in difficulty. The problem is to do something that will affect the right target without at the same time damaging our own interests or unnecessarily hurting innocent bystanders. The source of this Indian action—just as with the Hanoi recognition issue last fall—is the top level of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. As a result of his arbitrary and rather devious handling of this affair, Foreign Minister Singh has come under intense pressure in Parliament, been heavily criticized in the press and may be in hot water with Mrs. Gandhi. In part we are responsible for this since we made clear, while going ahead to close our centers, that Singh had violated the understanding that US-Indian relations should be conducted on the basis of consultation and openly challenged the Ministry to produce evidence to support the implication that our centers were involved in improper activities. It may be that what is most suitable is more of the same. Singh is certainly the right target. It might be best to lie low for the moment to avoid playing into Singh’s hands by giving him an issue to use against us and then to suggest quietly that Ambassador Keating look for subtle ways to renew the pressure. Recommendation : As an interim move, that Secretary Rogers—now that he has ordered closing the centers without additional complaint—write to Ambassador Keating privately and tell him of your desire to find ways of denying Singh and his colleagues something they want and then report back to you the opportunities the Ambassador may see. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached draft of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Saunders and revised by Kissinger. The President initialed the approval line on April 2. Not published is the attached March 17 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. 56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: FY 1970 Aid Program for Pakistan State (Tab A) requests your approval of a $102.5 million economic assistance program in Pakistan for FY 1970. Added to the $90 million in PL 480 assistance, which you approved in November, this would bring the total FY 1970 U.S. assistance level to $192.5 million. The amount requested is within your budget and within the Foreign Assistance appropriation approved by Congress. The proposed program of $102.5 million represents a drop in our level of non-PL 480 assistance from $140 million in FY 1969 and $158 million in FY 1968. This low level is the result of budgetary constraints. It is quite possible, however, that an extra $20—$30 million will become available later in the year and the Pakistan program has a top priority claim on these funds. The $87 million loan component represents about 25 percent of the international consortium total of $370 million, a drop from former years when we supplied about 40 percent of the consortium’s total. The major component in the proposed program is $83 million to permit Pakistan to increase its general imports, especially of fertilizer and industrial raw materials, to support growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors. It complements Pakistan’s own efforts to liberalize its exchange system, increase agricultural production, and build a buoyant private sector. Our technical assistance program of $8 million, and most of our PL 480 commodities and currency generated by them, assist President Yahya in raising agricultural productivity and the standard of living in depressed and politically troublesome East Pakistan. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve State’s proposed $102.5 million economic assistance program in Pakistan. Treasury, Agriculture, and Budget (Tab B) concur. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated April 6. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. Attached at Tab A but not published is Rogers’ March 12 memorandum to Nixon on the economic assistance program. Mayo summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in a March 24 memorandum to the President; attached at Tab B but not published. 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 13, 1970 SUBJECT: Decision on South Asian Arms Supply I have your comments on your first consideration of the South Asian arms policy issue. Since my memo may have been unclear, I want to be sure I understand your decision before issuing instructions. Perhaps because my memo was misleading you selected an option which would relax the present embargo on the sale of lethal equipment to allow the sale of replacement tanks, planes and other lethal equipment on a regular basis as long as it could be described as replacing previously supplied U.S. equipment lost through normal attrition. At the same time, I understood from your other comments your desire for a package which would not only (1) constitute a “substantial gesture” for Pakistan but also (2) be as politically unprovocative as possible in the U.S. For this reason, I had suggested a one-time sale of a limited number of tanks and planes without changing the basic policy. This move would be more limited. Given the wish you have expressed, the choice is between these two courses: 1. Retaining the general embargo on the regular sale of lethal equipment but making a one-time exception to sell Pakistan a few items they especially want. This would be a friendly gesture toward Pakistan, though it would not provide the continuing flow of equipment the Pakistanis would prefer. Spare parts for all U.S. equipment would go on being sold on a continuing basis as they are now under present policy; they are not prohibited under the present embargo. [You would have the choice of selling directly some or all of the following: six F–104 fighters and/or B–57 bombers to fill out existing squadrons, 100 M–47 tanks.] Some domestic critics and the Indians would object to any move that seems to be broadening military programs, especially (as far as the Indians are concerned) in Pakistanis favor. Such a move would be defended on grounds that (a) we do not wish to re-enter the military supply business on a regular basis but (b) it makes sense as a complement to economic aid to provide a few replacement items on a one-time basis that will save Pakistan from having to buy all new equipment for whole units whose U.S. equipment is aging. 2. Relaxing the embargo to allow the continuing sale of replacements . This would permit the sale of tanks, planes and other lethal equipment on a regular basis as long as it could be described as replacing previously supplied U.S. equipment lost through normal attrition. The Pakistanis would regard this as an important move, although they would prefer to see the embargo removed altogether. Critics in the U.S. would charge that, having successfully extricated ourselves from the India-Pakistan rivalry, the U.S. was now re-involving itself. The next step, they would say, would be replacing worn-out F–86 aircraft or older tanks with F–104 or F–5 aircraft and tanks of a later generation. The Indians would charge that the U.S. was rejuvenating its alliance with Pakistan. This move would have to be defended on grounds of keeping non-Communist sources of arms open to Pakistan and helping a moderate government meet—per the Nixon doctrine—its legitimate needs. In short, the first option above is a more limited move than the second. Approve #1—one-time sale Approve #2—continuing sale of replacements 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. For the previous memorandum dealing with the supply of arms to South Asia to which Kissinger refers, see Document 54 . Nixon checked the first option to indicate his approval of a one-time sale to Pakistan. He added the following handwritten instruction: “Hold until we see whether the Indians will be in a control commission.” Nixon’s instruction raised questions as to which control commission he meant, and what he hoped to achieve with regard to India’s participation in a control commission by delaying a decision on arms supply to South Asia. Saunders posed these questions in a memorandum he sent to Haig on April 27. Saunders assumed the President was referring to one of the control commissions in Southeast Asia. Haig did not answer the questions but responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: “Hal–Pres is inclined to move but wants to wait at least until next week.” (Ibid.) 58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 15, 1970 Subject: Closure of Five U.S. Cultural Centers in India I reported in a May 6 memorandum to you that the Indians had taken several initiatives which might have permitted the five affected U.S. cultural centers to function in some alternate form but to continue their operations much as before. Despite these signs, the Government of India has insisted upon conditions which we would not wish to meet. For example, we have been told that there could be no resident American Director of cultural centers, that foreign cultural centers might be subject in the future to the directives of an all-Indian board. These conditions would clearly be incompatible with the concept of an American cultural center. We have instructed Ambassador Keating to inform Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul that we are closing the five affected centers in accordance with the request of the Government of India. The closure will take place on Saturday, May 16, the end of the work week. This is two days prior to the Indian deadline of May 18. In order to keep the record straight, the Ambassador will leave with Kaul an aide memoire which demonstrates clearly that the Indians have been responsible for the closure of the centers and that we have been entirely reasonable in our response to their action. We will report further on this matter next week after the centers have closed. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. The May 6 memorandum cited by Eliot is ibid. 59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: FY 1970 Assistance Program for India Secretary Rogers (Tab A) requests your approval for a $193 million AID package for India, which would bring our total aid to India this year to $408 million. This is about the same as last year’s level and one-half of the level of 1968 and 1967. We should announce our pledge at the May 26 meeting of the aid-India consortium sponsored by the World Bank. The World Bank has estimated that India will need about $1.2 billion of new aid to complement her $2 billion in export earnings this year. The aid is aimed at supporting India’s long-term economic development, by financing an increase in imports of industrial goods and fertilizer, and helping India meet her foreign debt service requirement. The U.S. share of development loan assistance to India represents about 29 percent of the consortium total, a drop from the 40 percent figure of past years due to increases in the aid of other consortium donors and decreases in our own contribution. The new aid commitments proposed for India this year include: $193 million new AID funds $35 million AID loans approved earlier $180 million PL 480 sales agreement approved earlier $408 million total U.S. aid $350 million from other consortium countries $300 million from IDA and World Bank $1,058 million total world aid The new $193 million would consist of: —About $50–$90 million in loans for imports of fertilizer and other agricultural imports to support a vigorous government program to increase food grain production. —About $70–$110 million in loans to provide raw materials and equipment for the private sector which accounts for close to 90 percent of Indian industrial production and is a vital element in its economic development, though it continues to be hampered by an extensive system of controls. —$8 million in Technical Assistance grants, primarily for agriculture and family planning. —$25 million in grants for population programs to supplement India’s own program, for which it has increased expenditures from $2 million in 1963/64 to a budgeted $56 million in 1969/70. Although heavily dependent on foreign aid as a source of foreign exchange, India has taken steps to increase export earnings, re-schedule her large debt repayment load, and mobilize domestic resources to a greater extent. Progress has been good and, whereas foreign aid a few years ago financed 53 percent of India’s foreign exchange needs, it now finances only 40 percent. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve State’s request for a new $193 million economic assistance program for India. Budget (Tab B), Agriculture, and Treasury concur. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum itself is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated May 19. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. The Rogers to Nixon memorandum, attached at Tab A but not published, is dated March 20. James R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in an April 30 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid. 60. Memorandum of Conversation 60. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:30–3 p.m. SUBJECT: Discussion with Ambassador Joseph S. Farland Participants: Department of Defense Secretary of Defense—Melvin R. Laird Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter ISA Assistant for South Asia—Colonel Seymour Kravitz Department of State U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan—Mr. Joseph S. Farland Country Director for Pakistan—William Spengler 1. US/Pakistani Relations Ambassador Farland gave a brief resume of US/Pak relations. He summed up by stating that the lack of decision on the U.S. military supply policy has caused the Paks to turn increasingly to the Chinese and Russians. He stated that the Paks considered that President Johnson had made a commitment to get them tanks and that President Nixon had indicated sympathy toward that commitment. The Ambassador estimated that US/PAK relations had taken a marked turn for the worse since the end of February. 2. Military Supply Policy Ambassador Farland recounted a recent meeting during which the Chief of the Pak Army Staff said that they had to be prepared to defend Pakistan and would secure the necessary equipment where they could, despite higher cost. The Chief of Staff said his main worry was not the added costs of purchasing from “other” sources, but the commitment that goes with the purchase. Following a discussion of how much equipment the Chinese have already provided to Pakistan, Mr. Laird questioned whether Pakistan was not already committed to China. Mr. Farland opined there is still some leeway but that time is growing short and the Pak feeling of disenchantment with the U.S. is growing. As an example, he cited his attempts since March to get an appointment to present to President Yahya Khan from President Nixon, the moon rock and Pak flag which had been carried to the moon by U.S. astronauts. He has been denied an audience and at the same time has been politely informed of the need for the U.S. to sell lethal end items to Pakistan. The Ambassador also told how much better reception in the Pak press the Chinese enjoy as contrasted to the U.S. Their small moves are given greater and more favorable play than much larger U.S. activities in Pakistan. Mr. Laird stated that the Ambassador’s report was so pessimistic that perhaps it was too late to do anything. The Ambassador assured him we still have time but that our options are being reduced rapidly. 3. Pak Commitments to the USSR and Communist China Mr. Laird asked Mr. Farland what the Chinese Communists and Soviet Union hoped to get for their favors to Pakistan. The Ambassador said that possibly China is seeking increased Communist control of the states between China and the Bay of Bengal. If Burma, Assam and East Pakistan were under Communist control, China would effectively outflank Southeast Asia and if communists gained control of Pakistan, China could outflank India as well. He added that the Russians are probably seeking more influence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and looked for help from Pakistan in this regard. 4. Tanks for Pakistan Ambassador Farland stressed the need to provide some tanks for Pakistan. A discussion ensued as to whether the third country route remains feasible. There was general agreement that it will not be as easy to do now as it would have been some months ago. The question of proposed Congressional amendments to the Foreign Military Sales bill was considered and Congressional attitudes discussed. The Ambassador said that he has talked to many people on the Hill and has a feeling that a change is in the wind. The Secretary expressed a hope that the Ambassador is right and he and Mr. Nutter assured Mr. Farland that DOD is working along the same lines as he is. 5. Conclusion After an exchange of courtesies, the meeting ended. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 22, Pakistan 1970, 000.1–100. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz and approved by Nutter on May 26. The conversation was held in Laird’s office. 61. Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (Schneider) to the Chargé d’ Affaires in India (Stone) 61. Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (Schneider) to the Chargé d’ Affaires in India (Stone) 1 Washington, May 26, 1970 Dear Galen: The military supply issue has become very active and some decision regarding sales to Pakistan is likely to be made fairly soon. Although hard to believe, the CENTO meeting in Washington was the cause of the renewed interest. Ambassador Hilaly, the Pakistani representative at the meeting, joined the CENTO Ministers at a meeting with the President. Apparently each Minister and finally Hilaly made a brief statement to the President. Hilaly made a pitch that Pakistan could not contribute to the stability of the area and pull its weight in CENTO unless Pakistan were strong militarily. Therefore, Pakistan needed military assistance from its allies. The President passed Joe Sisco a note at the meeting saying that he thought the U.S. should provide some aid to Pakistan for the reasons cited by Hilaly. As a result, a great new exercise is in midstream. A memorandum for the President indicating what we might sell to Pakistan and also indicating all of the pitfalls which we might encounter because of such sales is under preparation. This will be the first item of business we will take up with the Ambassador when he arrives here at about 11:30 tomorrow morning. Grant and I will lunch with him trying to fill in all of the background, and thereafter he has appointments with Chris, Joe, and Secretary Laird. It is unfortunate that we have to put this much burden on him at the outset, but the time pressures are mounting. I will try to keep you informed on what goes on on this issue and others during the Ambassador’s visit. I have little else to convey now, but I wanted you to hear from me that the issue which has taken so much of our time for so long is again burning. With best regards, Sincerely yours, David T. Schneider 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. Published from a copy that bears Schneider’s typed signature. 62. Memorandum of Conversation 62. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 27, 1970, 3:30–4 p.m. SUBJECT: Discussion with Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating Participants: Department of Defense Secretary of Defense—Melvin R. Laird Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Robert J. Pranger ISA Assistant for South Asia—Colonel Seymour Kravitz Department of State U.S. Ambassador to India—Kenneth B. Keating Country Director for India—David T. Schneider 1. Military Supply Policy After greetings were completed, Ambassador Keating said that his views on the U.S. military supply policy for South Asia were expressed in a cable he had sent in earlier and that those views have not changed. He added that it would be hard to describe adequately the intensity of feeling and the obsession of the Indians with the Paks and vice versa. Mr. Keating stressed the unfavorable publicity given in India to the possibility of a transfer of U.S. tanks from Turkey to Pakistan and added that even those newspapers normally friendly to the U.S. editorialized against the transfer. The Ambassador expressed concern at the fact that in countries like India and Pakistan, which receive military and economic aid from Russia and Communist China, the younger officers train on and are conversant only with communist equipment. He felt that giving a little U.S. aid would make no sense but if the U.S. decided to give large amounts of equipment to Pakistan and to provide much military aid to India it might be useful. He caveated this by saying it was not feasible in the present Congressional climate. It is the Ambassador’s opinion that even if the U.S. Government should adopt a compromise position which entails making some military supply gesture to the Paks accompanied by a promise to consider their additional needs in the future, the effects in India would be devastating and the results would strain Indo-US relations to the utmost. Mr. Keating recommended that the present status, keeping the policy under review, is a correct stance for the President of the U.S. He said the Administration would be castigated in the Indian and U.S. newspapers if we do something for Pakistan and that he does not believe that this is a good time to have to fight this issue. 2. Tanks for Pakistan Mr. Laird said that President Johnson had made a commitment to provide some tanks to Pakistan and that he can see no change in this. The Secretary asked Mr. Keating how he would handle the tank matter in view of the U.S. commitment. Ambassador Keating opined that the new Administration ought to be able to change the commitment. He considers that the tenuous political situation in Pakistan should facilitate changing the commitment since there is a good possibility that after the elections the government will be leftist with a communist as Secretary of Defense. If this should occur the new Pak government will permit speeches in its parliament which will pillory and attack the U.S. much worse than we are treated in the Indian parliament now. Ambassador Keating reflected on his own pique at the method used by the Indians to close our cultural centers but added that we should not take any action merely to get even with the Indians. He summed up by saying that anything the U.S. did in this regard for the Paks would have devastating results in India. 3. India and North Vietnam Mr. Laird questioned Mr. Keating about India helping the U.S. on the POW issue. The Ambassador replied that Mrs. Gandhi had met with the POW wives in New Delhi and her government has made representations three times in Hanoi on this issue. It is his opinion that the Indians believe North Vietnam will be victorious and will become the major power in Southeast Asia. For this reason, their Foreign Minister is pushing to raise Indian representation in Hanoi to embassy status. Mr. Laird asked why India had been unwilling to attend the recent Indonesian Conference. The Ambassador said that they believed that since only non-communist nations will attend, the Indians could not go and keep their non-aligned status. They would go to such a conference only if both sides were represented. The Ambassador then said that convincing the Government of India to hold off raising the status of their representation in Hanoi had been a minor success for the U.S. He believes that unless the U.S. does something to change their conviction in ultimate North Vietnamese victory eventually they will open an embassy in Hanoi. 4. Reaction to Cambodia Mr. Laird asked if the Indians had given the U.S. a hard time over Cambodia. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative but said that it was not as bad as had been expected. Mrs. Gandhi and the Foreign Minister had publicly regretted the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and called for withdrawal of all foreign forces. When asked if this meant the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese also, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Kaul refused to answer. While no one in the Indian Parliament defended the U.S. move the Indian Government refused to condemn it and left it at “regret” only. 5. Conclusion The discussion ended with the Ambassador offering his assistance in any way he could be helpful. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 19, India 1970, 000.1–334. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz, and approved on June 1 by Nutter and on June 5 in Laird’s office. The conversation was held in Laird’s office. 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 11, 1970 SUBJECT : Arms Supply Policy for South Asia When our Cambodian decision-making was at its height, you made a decision on the South Asian arms supply question but asked us to hold it. Then during your meeting with the CENTO foreign ministers you asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to take another look at what we might do for Pakistan. His memo is attached, and this will give you an opportunity for making a final decision. (Tab A) To refresh your memory, the present policy bans the sale of lethal equipment but does allow sale of spare parts and non-lethal equipment as well as the sale of U.S.-made equipment now in the hands of third countries like Turkey. On this last point, you should be aware that one of the restrictions being proposed for inclusion in the Foreign Military Sales Act would prohibit third-country sales of this kind. You will recall that the most realistic choice is between: —relaxing the ban to permit sale of equipment to replace worn out equipment formerly provided by the U.S. and —not changing policy, keeping it under review but making a one-time sale to provide Pakistan with some equipment it most urgently needs. In your earlier consideration of this problem, you approved the second—the one-time exception—but asked that the decision be held. The two sides of the case are well known to you: 1. Ambassador Farland—like Ambassador Hilaly at your meeting with the CENTO ministers—argues strongly that Pakistan is at a political crossroads, that President Yahya needs support in his effort to keep Pakistan from going radical and that re-opening of regular U.S. military supply can help him in his argument with his officers that Pakistan must keep its lines open to the U.S. He points out that Yahya is going on long-delayed trip to Moscow June 22 and that a U.S. answer before then is necessary so that Yahya will know what he can expect from the U.S. Farland concludes by describing the potential effects for U.S. interests if Yahya fails in his efforts to keep Pakistan out of radical hands—much greater Chinese influence in East Pakistan and even the commitment of Pakistani troops beside Arab forces against Israel. 2. Ambassador Keating argues the desirability of not reinserting ourselves in the middle of the India-Pakistan rivalry by going back into the regular military aid business. He also argues that the sharp Indian reaction is not worth what must be the marginal U.S. influence on the Pakistani political scene. Secretary Rogers concurs in your earlier judgment not to remove the arms embargo altogether. That leaves us, he feels, with only the choice of making a one-time exception to that embargo to permit one direct sale to Pakistan. While this has the obvious advantages of doing something for Pakistan, he points out that it will not meet Pakistan’s desire for a basic change in policy. He feels that even a one-time sale would create “major” problems with those in the Congress who feel that we should not after almost five years re-involve ourselves in a dispute where we do not have direct security interests. If you wish to go ahead, the Secretary recommends a package consisting of: —6 replacement F–104 fighter-interceptors or 12 F–5’s or F–104’s of a different model; —300 armored personnel carriers; —4 anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Other possibilities for a package include: —7 B–57 bombers —100 M–48 tanks The Secretary would exclude these because of adverse Congressional and Indian reaction. He feels that the controversy on the Hill over the Turkish tank deal alone could end the prospect of doing anything significant for Pakistan at this time. He rules out the B–57s because they are a more obviously offensive weapon. If you decide to proceed with the arms offer to Pakistan as recommended by Secretary Rogers, he suggests the following scenario: 1. Early consultations with Congress. 2. A letter from you to President Yahya containing our arms offer. 3. Informing the Indian Government simultaneously through our embassy in New Delhi. 4. Asking both the Indians and the Pakistanis to treat our decision as confidential, but when leaks almost inevitably occur emphasize that the arms offer to Pakistan is a special exception. Recommendation : That you approve Secretary Rogers’ recommendation for carrying out your decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan and that you approve transmittal of the decision to President Yahya before he goes to Moscow June 22. Approve Add tanks Add B–57’s Add tanks and B–57’s Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers. 64. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 64. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, June 12, 1970, 11:30 a.m. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] S: Now, Pakistan. K: I wanted to discuss with you. He feels morally obligated to do something. We have seen your package. He would like to add seven B–57’s bombers to it and the tanks. S: If you add those it changes the package to a defensive replacement package which is more offensive. Tanks have almost the imagery of the Phantom. It will increase your difficulty in selling it on the Hill and will have more effect in India. We feel we can get away with adding 6 B–57’s and justify it being old bombers and replacement. But the tanks if we cut it to 50 it has unfortunate psychological effect. K: Our worry is that this package is so small they will consider it an insult. S: If we are going to take the heat, why do it for so little? K: Exactly. S: Let me see if something can be added to the defensive package without adding offensively. I will call you back in a couple of hours. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 65. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 65. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, June 12, 1970, 4:40 p.m. S: I have reviewed that Pakistan package and I have an idea but I will give it to you personally from me to you. You will get it tonight or tomorrow morning. K: How can we order it? S: You can send back a one page decision. I can get together with Hal Saunders and you can write me marching orders next week. We will talk on Monday. K: What is it? S: You leave the tanks out and add 57’s and instead of half a dozen you give them 12 interceptors which they have wanted and which are strictly defensive and more advanced level thing. It may be more attractive to the Pakistanis and more to the ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? K: Will the Secretary go through the roof? S: I haven’t talked to him. K: Where did we get the figure 12? S: We worked it out here. K: Can we say the President wanted to do more? S: And after consultation we said this would be better. Do more and keep it within the confines— K: The President wanted to do 100 (?). S: You know about the Zeigler statement. We had them put out a denial. It could effect— K: I don’t like the extremely strong denial. We should have said it wasn’t true. It came out ok. [The conversation concludes with a reference by Sisco to personal plans.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. 66. Memorandum of Conversation 66. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Agha Hilaly, Ambassador of Pakistan Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Dr. Kissinger said: The President had asked him to see the Ambassador on a personal basis. We have been going on and on with the question of military supply to Pakistan. The Pakistani Government would receive official word of the President’s decision in a very few days. [In later conversation, it was clarified that Ambassador Farland would be receiving instructions to communicate this same message in Rawalpindi.] The President wanted President Yahya on a personal basis before he goes to Moscow [June 21] to have in mind President Nixon’s decision. At this point, there can be no publicity because we have to talk to the Congress, and delicate matters there will affect the timing of those consultations. Dr. Kissinger described the President’s decision in the following terms: 1. Given Congressional opinion at this point, the present embargo as such can not be removed. 2. However, the President is prepared to make a significant one-time exception to this policy now in order to sell a substantial amount of equipment that Pakistan has requested: A 12-aircraft squadron of tactical fighter aircraft (F–104G’s or F–5’s) or six replacement F–104A’s. [In conversation it was clarified that our intent was to enable Pakistan to reactivate its F–104A squadron, either by replacing planes lost and bringing it up to strength or by trading in the old planes and re-establishing the squadron with new aircraft.] 300 armored personnel carriers. Four advanced design naval patrol anti-submarine aircraft. Seven B–57 bombers (to replace B–57’s previously supplied by U.S. but lost through attrition). Dr. Kissinger continued that the President wanted President Yahya to know that this has been done on the basis of his personal intervention and personal interest based on the President’s desire to help Pakistan meet its most acute equipment needs as economically as possible. Dr. Kissinger said that, while this is a one-time exception, it does not preclude future discussion of other such one-time exceptions. Ambassador Hilaly asked when this might be possible. Dr. Kissinger replied he did not want to hold out specific hopes on when or whether this might be done. However, he did say that it could conceivably be possible when public and Senatorial pressures have lessened. He reiterated that, at this moment, all he can say is that we are making a one-time exception which does not preclude other one-time exceptions. Dr. Kissinger said that the President has asked that this be kept quiet until we can inform Congress. This is extremely important. When Ambassador Hilaly asked when this might be done, Dr. Kissinger indicated that we had to get past the immediate debate over the Foreign Military Sales Act. Ambassador Hilaly noted the word “sell.” He asked whether credit could be discussed. He was told that the U.S. had been working on the assumption of a cash sale and that contemplating credit would introduce an additional complication by getting us into the range of activity covered by the controversial Foreign Military Sales Act. The Ambassador then noted that there were no tanks on the list. Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to tell the Ambassador informally that we tried to introduce tanks into the package. The judgment was, however, that this could wreck the whole arrangement. The judgment was that the furor that would arise in the Congress might produce another amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act or the later appropriations act that would make any kind of arrangement impossible. It was our judgment that the more important task for the moment was to get this principle established and then to work from there. Ambassador Hilaly asked whether these were all items that the Pakistani military had asked for. He was told that these were the most significant of the requests that had been put to us over a period of time. In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger said that he could assure the Ambassador that without the constant personal intervention of the President this could not have happened. Ambassador Hilaly asked what Dr. Kissinger meant, since he understood everybody was for doing something for Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger said that he was referring to the pressures from other governments and noted that it is the tendency of a bureaucracy not to create any disturbance when things are relatively quiet. After leaving Dr. Kissinger, the Ambassador checked his list of equipment with Mr. Saunders. His notes were accurate. Mr. Saunders emphasized the great importance of keeping knowledge of this action restricted to the smallest circle possible since it put us in a very delicate position with the Congress. The Ambassador showed his understanding. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 67. Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, June 18, 1970, 2220Z SUBJECT: Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan For Ambassador Farland 1. You should seek appointment ASAP with President Yahya (or with Foreign Secretary if Yahya unavailable) and deliver following oral message: QUOTE: President Nixon has very much appreciated patience President Yahya has shown in connection with protracted review our military supply policy. Our deliberations have taken longer than anticipated and have involved number of difficult considerations, including current situation within US Congress. Despite these problems, President has tried to be as responsive as possible to Pakistan’s needs in keeping with his assurance to President Yahya in Lahore that he would see what could be done to be helpful. We are now pleased to be able to inform GOP that, within framework of our existing policy but on special exception basis, US will be prepared to sell Pakistan certain military items which Pakistani military authorities have requested from us. Before conveying this information formally by letter to President Yahya, we consider it necessary to consult with the Congress. However, because of very difficult situation in Congress at present, we believe it prudent defer formal consultation until after conclusion of current debate on Cooper-Church amendment and Foreign Military Sales Bill. In addition to offer of sale of items in US “lethal weapons” category, US military authorities have been asked to act promptly on Pakistan’s recent requests to purchase variety of non-lethal items such as helicopters, light aircraft, transport aircraft, jeeps and trucks. We believe we will be able to move quickly on these items. END QUOTE. 2. You should then say that USG prepared sell following military equipment which Pakistani military authorities have requested from us: (a) six F–104A replacement fighter interceptor aircraft or, as alternative, 12 interceptor aircraft of different model (e.g., F–104G’s or F–5’s) on understanding Pakistan will transfer its present six F–104A’s; (b) three hundred armored personnel carriers; (c) four maritime patrol aircraft; (d) seven B–57 replacement bombers. 3. After conveying arms package offer, you should avoid getting into detailed discussion of military equipment and instead say that, following Congressional consultation, further details can be worked out between Pakistani and US military representatives. However, during conversation you should explicitly convey following points: A. US offer represents one-time exception to present policy. This point could be made by calling attention to portion of oral message stating that current sales offer is “within framework of our existing policy but on a special exception basis”. B. We would anticipate that items offered for sale would be paid for on usual cash basis. C. It is essential that GOP treat information re US arms offer with utmost secrecy. Any premature leaks could seriously jeopardize our Congressional consultations, and ability to proceed. D. At later date, we will wish to inform Indian Government in general terms of our decision offer to sell certain arms to Pakistan on special exception basis, asking GOI not to divulge information publicly. 4. If asked about Pakistani tank request, you should say that tanks were carefully considered. However, proposed Turkey-Pakistan transaction has stirred up considerable controversy in Congress leading to recent introduction of Mansfield amendment which would prevent third country sales. Because of adverse Congressional sentiment on general issue of tanks, it was not considered feasible to offer Pakistan direct sale of tanks. 5. We cannot emphasize too strongly importance of urging Yahya to hold this information with utmost secrecy within GOP and avoid any leaks which might endanger project. For this reason, we would prefer you try to see Yahya alone. 6. Immediately following message contains background information FYI. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 68. Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 68. Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, June 21, 1970, 1353Z Subject: Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan Ref: State 9623G 1. Discussion of long awaited message on our review of military supply policy occupied major portion of my 70-minute meeting with Prs. Yahya at President’s house in Karachi on June 20. I had requested specifically meeting with Yahya, but FonSec Sultan Khan (who will be accompanying Yahya on visit to USSR incoming week) was also present. No one else attended. Atmosphere throughout was relaxed and thoroughly friendly. 2. As soon as I turned to arms issue, Yahya interjected that he had had intimation from Amb. Hilaly of some positive US decision and had been looking forward to our meeting. 3. I led off by reading text of quoted message in reftel. Then I made the additional explanatory points following precisely the guidance in reftel. 4. Yahya immediately exclaimed that he was deeply pleased and appreciative of President’s action. He knew what a difficult problem this had presented for us and the pressures against any positive step. Continuing, Yahya said the President’s decision is not only a gesture of friendship, but also evidence that the US understands Pakistan’s problems and difficulties. This step, he added, gives effect to the sympathetic concern and interest the President had indicated to him at Lahore last year. Although Pakistan and US are not closely aligned as they were, Yahya stated he considered this a concrete example that our two countries can nevertheless continue to work together. 5. As to executing the President’s decision, Yahya said the details can be worked out in due time by our military representatives. On the question of cash sales, he commented ruefully that quote Pakistan is broke and everyone knows it ... you better than anyone else unquote, but he did not lean on this point and he stressed that he did not mean to leave any negative impression. Yahya did not comment specifically on any of weaponry which I mentioned as instructed reftel, other than on tanks. He made it clear that he valued above all the friendship and support which President Nixon’s decision evidenced. He noted, however, that Pak Army badly needed to replenish its tank inventory and would have to continue seek supplies. He did not express particular current interest in M47’s offered by Turkey, commenting that they were apparently in even worse condition than Pakistan’s own tanks. But Yahya left me in no doubt that he was sorry we had been unable accommodate Pakistan on tanks, to which they obviously attach great importance. 6. In course of discussion of problems in Washington related to current arms decision, conversation turned briefly to Cambodian situation. I said Pres. Nixon had had to anticipate heavy flak on domestic front in sending US troops into limited action in Cambodia. Yahya responded that as military man he understood reasons involved in Cambodian action. He realized that Cambodian situation had compounded President’s problems in coming to his decision on arms for Pakistan, and this added to his appreciation. 7. I came down heavily on need for utmost secrecy concerning our arms offer, especially prior to completion of our congressional consultations. Said there were only two officers on my staff who were informed. Both Yahya and FonSec expressed full recognition of need for highest secrecy. FonSec noted that whereas three officials of American Embassy were in the know, on Pak side there were only President and himself. 8. Yahya said he wished to express at once his personal appreciation to Pres. Nixon of latter’s action, and that he should do so by message through Amb. Hilaly. Although I felt concern over spread of information and reiterated that highest secrecy was essential, I did not consider that I could veto Yahya’s proposal to communicate with his own Ambassador in Washington. Assume Department and White House will underscore secrecy requirement with Hilaly as needed. 9. We agreed that for purposes of publicity, my delivery of moon surface particles and of Pres. Nixon’s reply to Izmir letter would be given out as reason for my call on Yahya. Local press June 21 prominently reported my call that way. 10. Comment: I believe this has been a valuable exercise and I wish to express my personal pleasure and appreciation for decision taken by President. 11. A [garble] benefit of President’s action is psychological. seems only prudent to note teat even such benefit still subject to possible difficulties in pursuing action to its conclusion. We shall have to see, for example, how our offer of some F–104’s, as well as APC’s and few maritime patrol aircraft, can be worked out in practice given certain possible complications in meeting precise Pak requirements and cash payment capability. Obviously Pakistan will have to continue to look elsewhere for bulk of its armament. But in any event President’s decision has already given us an important boost as reflected in Yahya’s very positive reaction and it augurs well for our future relationship with Pakistan. GOP will see it as proof that we have not opted entirely against Pakistan on matter which, whatever our own view, has assumed great importance among the governments in the subcontinent. I believe our decision on this matter has been sound and will promote US interest. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 69. Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 69. Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, July 16, 1970, 1615Z Subject: Military Supply Policy 1. During my call on Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh, July 16, he inquired about the status of the U.S. military supply policy to South Asia. 2. I cited the Secretary’s statement that the policy is “under active consideration” and noting this has been the case for some time stated that the matter is now before the highest U.S. Government levels for decision which has not been imparted to me. 3. Swaran Singh referring to the issue as an emotionally very difficult one in India, and said there is universal concern here about furnishing arms to Pakistan. Moreover, any such supply has economic and military implications, necessitating Indian arms increases to counter an increased Pakistani threat and diverting Indian resources from its economic development. As a recent former Defense Minister, he said, he could attest to the seriousness with which this issue is viewed. He then launched into a lengthy commentary on Pakistan’s obtaining arms from the USSR and China. He asserted that Pakistan has a military alliance with China and when I queried him he reiterated that this is unquestionably the fact. The Sino-Pakistan alliance, he said, is not a general one against all comers, but a specific alliance against India. In event of Indian trouble with China, Pakistan would surely be on China’s side against India. India is bordered on two fronts by Pakistan and while it does not fear direct attack by Pakistan alone, if there were any difficulties, Pakistan would under its military alliance come to China’s aid and vice-versa. “You can rely on it completely,” he said, “that such a Sino-Pakistan alliance exists.” Therefore, the issue of military supply policy to Pakistan is one of deep military as well as economic and emotional concern to India. 4. I said the military supply matter has long been under USG consideration with obviously some differences of opinion, which in the final analysis would have to be resolved by the President. I recognized that the reaction to any U.S. supply or third country supply with U.S. approval would have significant repercussions in India. I reminded the Minister that since the restrictive U.S. policy was established in 1967 there had been only one exception and that was in favor of India and has never been divulged by the U.S. to Pakistan. Currently, there is a pending exception again in favor of India but I do not know the outcome at this point. The Minister indicated a familiarity with both exceptions. 5. I told the Minister I would think that Indian feelings concerning any military supply decision would depend to some degree upon whether that decision constituted a change of policy or a single exception similar to the two previously mentioned whether it constituted a net addition or mere replacement of materiel, and whether the items concerned were essentially offensive or defensive in character. 6. Swaran Singh replied that I cannot understand why Pakistan needs any additional weapons, defensive or not. Pakistan says that India is its only enemy and has the alliance with China. He said he, himself, has privately and publicly asserted that India will never cross the ceasefire line in Kashmir or Indo-Pak borders forcefully. India will resist but never invade. What India wants is better relations with Pakistan, and no one favors an aggressive policy against Pakistan. However, most military equipment that Pakistan has been getting and seeking is useful for offensive purposes. He added that one reason India would never invade Pakistan is that this would add tremendously to India’s communal problems and that is the last thing India wants. 7. I told the Minister that iI had been assured that before any action was taken on any U.S. arms sale to Pakistan I would be informed about it in order to be able to advise the GOI authoritatively so that they would not read about it first in newspapers. 8. Swaran Singh who earlier in our discussion had stressed his sincere desire to have better and more cordial relations with me and the U.S. and to spare no effort in that regard then said that any military supply to Pakistan decision would greatly impair what he as Minister of External Affairs is bent on doing; namely, improving Indo-American relations. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. 70. Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating) 70. Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating) 1 Washington, July 17, 1970 Dear Ken, I am sorry that I missed you while you were here. It would have been good to talk with you about the decision on military supply policy, and also to have chatted about the general situation. In making the military supply decision, I thought long and hard about the arguments you have presented so moderately yet forcefully. This is why, in the end, I felt that I could not change our basic policy even though in terms of Pakistan’s needs there was a strong argument for supplying replacement items on a continuing basis. I just did not see, however, how I could avoid providing at least one package of equipment that President Yahya could point to as a sign of U.S. support at this critical stage in his political effort and as a means of avoiding some rather substantial expense that he would have had to incur in completely equipping units with new weapons. As the first anniversary of my visit to New Delhi nears, I think again of that as one of the important milestones so far in this Administration. All the best. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Secret; Eyes Only. 71. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to India (Keating) 71. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to India (Keating) 1 Washington, July 19, 1970, 2:18 p.m. Reference [ text not declassified ] the President is very grateful for your assessment contained in reference b and earlier messages. Concerning Pakistan arms issue, as you know, the President has decided to make a one-time exception on this issue and we are now considering timing and modalities for proceeding. I understand your views have been sought by State 112500 of July 14. The President has just dispatched letter to you outlining reasons for this action. Timing for Congressional consultations and notifications will depend upon number of factors. President has, however, asked me to bring to your attention that recognition of Hanoi by Indian Government will unquestionably result in Congressional furor here which could further conlplicate U.S. relations with India. The imminence of recognition will, of course, also be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package. Again, thank you for your prompt and helpful responses. I too shall consider this channel closed barring no notable significant new developments. Best regards. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Haig for Kissinger. The message is undated, but an attached note indicates that it was sent on the date and at the time given. Telegram 112500 to New Delhi is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. 72. Memorandum of Conversation 72. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 22, 1970 Participants: L.K. Jha, Ambassador of India Henry A Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff The Ambassador came in at his request to “get acquainted.” He began the discussion by saying that Prime Minister Gandhi wants to improve relations with the United States. Dr. Kissinger said that we share that sentiment. There can be room for improvement. Ambassador Jha said that, for this to happen, both sides have to make an effort. Despite wide areas of agreement, there is a range of irritants on each side which are magnified by the press and by questions in parliament. The Prime Minister had told the Ambassador before he left New Delhi that India would have to work to minimize these irritants, but India needs support from the Washington end. Dr. Kissinger said that in principle we share this sentiment but, he asked, what sort of support did the Ambassador mean? Ambassador Jha explained that for the first time India is working with a minority government. The Prime Minister has to lean on the leftist parties. Government statements on issues of international concern have to have a tinge that sometimes seems in the U.S. not friendly enough. The government in responding to Parliamentry inquiries has to phrase its responses in debating context. Take an issue like the whole Indo-China, the Ambassador continued. Basically he thought that the U.S. and India agreed on fundamental objectives—the independence of each country there, each country’s freedom to shape its own future and a desire to keep Chinese influence at a minimum. Dr. Kissinger nodded assent to each of the first two. Ambassador Jha continued, saying that if Indian statements seem like criticism of the U.S. position it is not because India has a pro-Chinese or a pro-Soviet view but because India’s honest view is that the use of force may strengthen Chinese influence in the area. The use of force may drive these nations toward China. India desires them to look in a direction other than to China. Even apart from India’s responsibility for the International Control Commission, India feels the importance of keeping the lines of communication open from these nations to non-communist nations. In Parliament, statements are often made in a limited context and without reference to the broader points of agreement on fundamental objectives between the U.S. and India. On the other side, the Ambassador continued, there is what has historically been a factor that has helped anti-U.S. lobbies—the feeling that the U.S. has taken a pro-Pakistan stance. There was the question of arms supply to Pakistan in the 1950’s and the assurance that U.S. weapons would not be used against India, and then they were used. Today, the Ambassador continued, some parties on the political right are in opposition to the government. The extreme right is communal in outlook—it exploits Hindu sympathies against the Moslems. The Prime Minister has identified herself against this element. She has emphasized that it is important that India not turn Fascistic or non-secular. These rightist political elements argue that India has two main enemies—Pakistan and China—and they are now in alliance. They criticize the government of India for not building stronger armed forces and for not building nuclear weapons since China has them. They also criticize the Indian government for not being tough enough on the Moslems. Therefore a decision to send arms to Pakistan will create a difficult domestic situation in which the right joins left in opposition to the government. The Ambassador concluded by saying that the political situation in India is in a delicate state. The economy is in good shape. Dr. Kissinger suggested that, since he might be called to the President’s office at any moment, he give a quick general reaction to the Ambassador’s remarks: 1. India is one of the great nations of the world and a potential power. The U.S. has an interest in good relations with India. 2. The U.S. believes in economic development. The U.S. has demonstrated its support for India’s development. The U.S. will continue within the limits of its ability. 3. The Administration recognizes that India has special problems. The U.S. has no interest in seeing India either lose its domestic cohesion or its position in Southeast Asia. Our fundamental objectives are the same there. 4. There are the makings of an understanding relationship between the U.S. and India. 5. There are however some drawbacks: —The U.S. has to understand India’s problems, but some Indians give the impression that they intend to take a free ride up to a point in criticizing the United States. The closing of the cultural centers was perhaps an example of this. We do not regard those centers as foreign policy tools but as instruments for improving understanding. —There are also some problems growing out of past history. The Ambassador had mentioned the U.S.- Pakistani arms deals of the 1950’s. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought when he was a professor that we were naive in the 1950’s to enter such a close relationship with Pakistan. He emphasized that this was his private view as a professor but noted that he had expressed it during a 1962 visit to South Asia. Dr. Kissinger summarized by saying that the problem now is as follows: 1. We have to deal with some vestiges of the past. 2. The U.S. is not going to move again into a permanent arms supply relationship with Pakistan. The U.S. has no interest in fueling an arms race in South Asia. 3. We have made no final decision on the arms supply issue. We will talk with the Indians before we do so. 4. The question before US is not whether we resume a total arms relationship with Pakistan but whether we consider a one-time exception to fulfill past commitments. 5. If we were to make that decision, India would have two choices: (a) India could wage a big campaign to discredit the U.S. in India or (b) India could recognize the spirit in which the U.S. decision had been made and recognize that it establishes a line limiting the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. If we were back in 1962 and we had to rethink our position in Southeast Asia, Dr. Kissinger said he did not know exactly what he would suggest doing. He recalled his January 1962 discussion with the Indian Foreign Secretary and reflected that perhaps his analysis of the situation in Southeast Asia had been more acute than the U.S. analysis. That water is over the dam, however. The U.S. domestic situation and the U.S. international position now depend on how—not whether—we end the war in South Vietnam. In this connection, Dr. Kissinger emphasized that Indian recognition of Hanoi would be “taken very ill” here. The President had just a couple of days ago sent Dr. Kissinger a hand-written note on that subject. Dr. Kissinger said that if the war ends U.S. and Indian objectives will be parallel. The U.S. poses no threat to Hanoi. But if Hanoi exhausts itself fighting us, then it will not be in a position to deal with its traditional enemies. Dr. Kissinger concluded by saying that he knows U.S.-Indian relations will have their ups and downs. But this Administration recognizes India as one of the potential powers of the world and wants good relations. We would like to establish relations in which we can talk frankly. He said, “I would be amazed if we did things which we knew would be offensive to India.” This is the spirit in which this Administration approaches Indian-U.S. relations. Dr. Kissinger concluded that he had spoken very generally and that it would be desirable for him and the Ambassador to continue their conversation in greater detail at some later time, perhaps in about three weeks after he had returned from California. Ambassador Jha said he knew that Dr. Kissinger had to go to see the President but wanted to make two specific points: 1. On the question of arms supply, he said, “For myself, I believe we have to be adult enough to recognize that there cannot be a total and permanent ban on the sale of arms to Pakistan.” He emphasized that that is a purely personal position. Having said that, he had to emphasize that public opinion in India had to be dealt with. He said he hoped that the U.S. could talk to the Indians first before doing anything. He also recommended postponing any move until after the Pakistani elections. He explained this in terms of “giving me a reasonable period of time in which to lay the groundwork.” 2. On the question of recognizing Hanoi, this had been badly handled on the Indian side. There was Soviet pressure during Firyubin’s visit. After Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador parted, the Ambassador said that he would very much like to resume his discussion with Dr. Kissinger. He thought perhaps that the discussion might be more relaxed over a meal. He extended a general standing invitation to Dr. Kissinger to be his guest for a lunch or dinner. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. A copy was sent to David Young. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. The time of meeting is not indicated on the memorandum. 73. Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 73. Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, July 29, 1970, 2210Z Subj: Swaran Singh Letter to the Secretary Indian Embassy July 28 delivered following letter to Secretary from Foreign Minister, acknowledgment of which is being prepared. QTE My dear Secretary of State, Thank you very much for your kind message sent through your Embassy in Delhi congratulating me on my appointment as Minister for External Affairs. May I reciprocate your sentiments and express the hope that we shall work together in developing further the friendly relations which so happily exist between our two countries in a spirit of mutual understanding and frankness. Your Ambassador, Mr. Kenneth B. Keating, saw me recently and I was glad to discuss briefly with him ways and means of further improvement of our relations. Although this is my very first letter to you, I should like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts in this regard. It seems to me that there is no conflict in our aims and objectives of mainaining peace and progress in the world and particularly in our region. Our methods may be different; there may also be some difference in emphasis on certain issues but I am convinced that with more frequent contacts at various levels, we can remove some of the irritants that seem to spoil our relations at times and further strengthen the more permanent bonds that unite our two countries and peoples. I can assure you that we shall always give the highest consideration to your feelings and sentiments and take you into confidence in matters that are of mutual concern. I am confident that you on your part would do the same. It is in this spirit of mutual understanding and frankness that I wish to mention some disturbing reports that we have recently heard about the proposed resumption of sale of arms by your country to Pakistan. I need not mention the various reasons why we have opposed such a move. But, I would be less than frank if I did not emphasise the fact that such a move will have very grave and serious repercussions in our country and on the peace and stability of this sub-continent. I hope that you will give full consideration to our views which we have conveyed to your Ambassador and through our Ambassador to you before you take any final decision in the matter. I wish you every success in your efforts to promote peace in the world and strengthen friendship with all countries including our own. The world is passing through difficult times and your country has a special responsibility in preserving peace and stability. We on our part are fully conscious of our own responsibilities and we hope that through mutual cooperation and understanding, we shall be able to work together to achieve our common goals and objectives. I look forward to the pleasure of meeting you when I attend the UN General Assembly Session and having frank and friendly talks with you on various matters which are of concern to both our countries. With all good wishes, Yours sincerely, Swaran Singh. UNQTE END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Limdis. Drafted on July 28 by R. Grant Smith (NEA/INC), cleared by M. Gordon Tiger (NEA/INC) and by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Rawalpindi. 74. Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 74. Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, August 17, 1970, 0624Z For Secretary and Sisco from Ambassador 1. Severe floods are causing considerable damage and suffering in East Pakistan. Details have been given in our recent reporting. President Yahya has just concluded 12-day visit to East Pakistan during which he toured affected areas and inspected relief operations. On August 15 he announced decision to postpone until December 7 the national elections he had previously set for October 5, citing the flood effects which would make it infeasible to hold elections in October in east wing. 2. GOP has requested US and other foreign governments to provide relief assistance. I have already delivered check for rupees 100,000 (about dols 21,000) to President’s East Pakistan relief fund. USG has also agreed to permit Pakistan to begin purchases now of 300,000 tons of wheat against PL 480 agreement still to be negotiated for current year. We are continuing to study relief needs and will recommend any other additional measures we believe called for. I am now in East Pakistan for first-hand look at situation. 3. Realizing that following suggestion carries with it obligation for timely relief commitment, nevertheless, I believe a personal message from President Nixon to Yahya at this juncture would be timely and would be much appreciated. Recommend Presidential message along following lines: “Ambassador Farland, after personal observation, has informed me of the serious flood situation in East Pakistan. I am grieved to learn of the damage which has caused grievous suffering to millions of your compatriots. The American people join with me in extending to them our compassionate and sympathetic understanding. We hope that the situation in the flood-stricken areas will soon improve and that Pakistan can again devote its full resources to the course of national progress which your government and people have charted.” Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The telegram, signed by Consul General Blood, was sent by Farland. Nixon followed Farland’s advice. On August 18 Farland was authorized to deliver a letter from Nixon to Yahya that was virtually identical to the letter proposed by Farland. (Telegram 134524 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 75. Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 75. Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, September 10, 1970, 1125Z Subject: President Yahya on Pakistan Political Situation Ref: Karachi 1692 1. During Ambassador’s conversation with President Yahya here September 8, Yahya said he had been greatly upset by need for his decision to postpone general elections from October 5 until December 7. He said a number of factors had led to his decision. He mentioned specifically the inability of existing bureaucratic machinery to cope simultaneously with flood relief requirements and election preparations in East Pakistan. Yahya noted that Paks were completely out of practice on election procedures. 2. Yahya said he hoped no one would get idea he was waiverng in any way in his determination to restore civilian government and get back to barracks. 3. Yahya went on to voice disappointment over course of political campaign to date. He said he was appalled at lack of leadership and programs offered by the politicians, many of whom were acting like spoiled kids. He had failed see emergence of any statesman-like leadership. When he became discouraged, Yahya said, he had to remind himself there had been no democracy in Pakistan and the politicians had little conception of rules and requirements of a democratic system. In response to query about problem of leadership, Ambassador commented that fractionalization of parties, such as various Muslim leagues, seemed to add to problem. Yahya agreed but did not expand. (There has been considerable speculation here recently to effect that Martial Law Administration (mla) would like to see the Muslim leagues merge.) 4. Yahya said Muuib (East Pak Awami league leader) had taken on self-developed cloak of mysticism. He was concerened over Muuib’s promises because they would be extremely difficulty to fulfill. Yahya added that Muuib neverthless represented the real strength in East Pakistan and as such he had to be taken into account. 5. Yahya dismissed Maulana Bhashani, East Pak leader of NAP (left), as too old and no longer an important political factor. 6. Bhutto (Pak People’s Party leader) was characterized by Yahya as a young, bright demagogue. Yahya described Bhutto’s ostensible role of a people’s socialist as farce. In Yahya’s opinion, Bhutto is power-crazy and fascist at heart. Yahya referred to Bhutto’s statement in recent press conference that Yahya’s postponement of elections was caused by US/Soviet pressure. That statement had created some trouble for Yahya within MLA and he had to explain that statement was totally false. He assumend Bhutto had issued statement deliberately so as to create friction within MLA. Yahya then asked that we not see Bhutto again until after elections. He referred to Pakistan as “closed society” and commented that things tend easily to be misread here. 7. Comment: Ambassador found Yahya obviously discouraged. President seemed to be harboring doubts on prospects for formation of viable new government to replace MLA. Yahya seemed more uncertain on this subject than Ambassador had found him in last previous conversation in June. Yahya appeared determined to proceed with elections although he is probably keeping options open. Positive factor is Yahya’s acknowledgement that Muuib was major force in East Pakistan. Inference is that Yahya at least willing conceive dealing with Muuib in post-election period. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–PAK. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore. 76. Memorandum for the Record 76. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, September 24, 1970 SUBJECT: Conversation with the President, September 24, 1970—MILITARY SUPPLY I referred to my conversation with President Yahya on September 8 and gave the gist of my cable reporting on the military supply aspect. I conveyed to the President Yahya’s deep appreciation for the message I had delivered to him on June 20, which according to Yahya had strengthened his resolve to avoid asking the Soviets for any further arms. Further, I noted Yahya’s comment to me that he does not “cherish the communist embrace.” I then explained to the President the reasons why the intended consultation with Congress has not yet been undertaken. The President thereupon asked Dr. Kissinger where the action stood and Dr. Kissinger said that it was still in the Department of State. The President then directed Dr. Kissinger to tell Mr. Sisco to move ahead on this at once, adding that he had made a decision, wanted it implemented promptly, and that politically this was the right time. I then recalled that Yahya had told the President in Lahore last year of his problems in financing arms purchases, adding that Yahya had mentioned to me on September 8 that he greatly appreciated the package offer of which we had informed him tentatively in June, but that he might lack the money to follow through. Yahya had not specifically asked for credit as such but had expressed the hope that some arrangement could be worked out to help him purchase the arms we were prepared to sell. The President said he had made a decision and we should attempt to find a way to make it effective, otherwise the decision would have no meaning. The President asked Dr. Kissinger to look into this aspect and Dr. Kissinger said he would see what could be worked out. 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98, Military Supply–PAK Requests. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Farland. For the message delivered by Farland to Yahya on June 20, see Document 67 77. Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 77. Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, September 29, 1970, 1809Z REF: STATE 159015 SUBJ: Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan Deliver: opening of business, September 30. 1. As you are aware (State 96504, June 18), the President decided, after prolonged and careful review, to make a limited cash sale of arms to Pakistan as a one-time exception to our military supply policy. This decision concluded our review of South Asian military supply policy. Our basic policy remains unchanged for the present, but we intend to keep open future policy options. 2. Pakistani leaders have repeatedly told us of their desire improve relations with US and their dislike of being excessively dependent upon Soviet Union and China for their arms supplies. This point was made to President Nixon during his visit to Lahore last year and has been repeated often to Ambassador Farland. In considering Pak requests, we have kept in mind Pakistan’s desire pursue a balanced “three-cornered” foreign policy, including good relations with US, and its difficulty in doing so if it is largely dependent upon China and Soviet Union for arms. We have also kept our relations with India very much in mind and the effects of any sale to Pakistan upon those relations. As indicated below, we have selected items for which Pakistan has real need, while avoiding sales of military items, such as tanks, which have special political-psychological significance for India and for balance of military power in South Asia. We do not believe that package as whole or individual items will in any significant way affect arms balance or contribute to arms race in South Asia. 3. There are several reasons for our decision proceed now. First is necessity to follow through with offer already communicated informally to President Yahya. Paks have been understandably concerned over long delay in completion of military supply review, and we do not wish risk further misunderstandings which might offset political benefit derived from sales offer. We are also concerned over possible misunderstanding with Indians if we permit GOI to proceed with efforts improve climate of relations with US while we delay informing GOI of our sales offer. In informing GOI we want to make clear that basic decision in principle was made some time ago, permitting Indians to note that decision preceded appointment Swaran Singh as FonMin and Indian initiatives improve relations, but was not implemented pending consultation with Congress. Finally, there are Congressional considerations. Senator Fulbright has pressed us to consult on reported sales offer to Pakistan and Department is on record as agreeing to inform Fulbright in case of significant third country sales. 4. Primary purpose of our discussions with Indians should be to assure them that our action not directed against India or designed to bring about military escalation in Subcontinent, and that India’s views have been fully taken into account. It is also our hope that presentation outlined below will make clear to Indians that we have resisted pressures for more basic change in policy and that pressures could build if Indians over-react. At same time we intend to exercise great care in not conveying information, which, if Indians leaked to press or used in Parliament, could undermine President’s desire to make meaningful gesture to Pakistan. Specifically, we do not intend reveal specific models or quantities of material being offered Pakistan and wish to avoid any publicity re two third country sales to India. 5. FYI: We hope Indians will contrast limited nature of what we will supply Pakistan with extensive Soviet and French commitments of offensive equipment, much of which remains to be delivered. According to our intelligence (details NOFORN), Soviets have delivered only 60 of 200 of T–54 and T–55 tanks and 60 of 112 130mm guns they agreed in 1968 provide Pakistan. We do not know what Soviets told Yahya in Moscow, but it appears GOI is accepting Soviet assurances about future commitments and turning blind eye to what has been and is yet to be supplied under 1968 agreement. We would hope GOI could take low-key attitude to our decision as it did to recent French sale of 30 supersonic Mirage 5’s to Pakistan END FYI. 6. Against this background, you should make following points to Acting Foreign Secretary. While we believe it inadvisable leave any written paper with GOI, all points should be conveyed to Indians. Under Secretary Johnson will make similar presentation here. A. As GOI aware, arms embargo on direct US sale of lethal end-items to India and Pakistan has been in effect since 1965; since that time, USG has sold no lethal end-items to either country. However, in 1967 under third country provision of our arms policy US did approve sale to India by UK of 12 US-controlled Hawker Hunter to fighters and we have recently approved British sale to India of 12 US-controlled Canberras. These have been only third-country sales to either India or Pakistan approved by USG. B. Asst. Secretary Sisco informed Ambassador Jha on June 23 that the USG had made certain judgments in principle on military supply for Pakistan but we wished discuss conclusions with Congressional leaders (State 099529, June 24). Secretary Rogers wrote to Swaran Singh August 6, that we had reached certain tentative conclusions regarding military supply policy and told FonMin Ambassador Keating would be discussing them with him (State 127322). Congressional consultations have been delayed because of other matters which we have discussed with Congress, such as Greek arms issue, on which consultations completed last week. However, Congressional leaders have been informed this week of our conclusions and, as we told Ambassador Jha and FonMin, we now wish inform GOI. C. After prolonged and very careful review of our military supply policy, we have decided to offer to sell to Pakistan selective and limited supply of military equipment, which it has requested, as a one-time exception to our military supply policy. D. This sale would not be in any sense a revival of previous US major supply relationship with Pakistan. Our basic policy remains unchanged. E. Military equipment being offered to Pakistan consists of a few aircraft, largely replacements for previously supplied US aircraft, and some armored transport vehicles. F. USG has not rpt not decided to sell tanks to Pakistan. G. We are selling these items to Pakistan in recognition that each country has legitimate need to fill its perceived military defense requirements and, in case of Pakistan, that its indigenous defense production capability is limited. We wish to be responsive in a limited way to Pakistan’s need for replacement and other equipment so that Pakistan will not feel excessively dependent upon China and the Soviet Union for military items. H. GOI should recognize that USG, in deciding upon this limited sale, has carefully taken into consideration views which have been expressed on this subject by GOI. What we have decided to sell to Pakistan will not significantly improve the capabilities of the Pakistani armed forces and, therefore, should not increase the security concerns of the GOI. Arms offer to Pakistan is consistent with our policy of (a) seeking to limit excessive diversion of resources from economic development to military purposes; and (b) seeking to prevent escalatory arms race. I. We hope GOI will recognize that USG has resisted pressures for an overall revision of our arms supply policy or for a more substantial one-time sale. Because of this we hope GOI will not permit this limited one-time sale to have an adverse effect upon our relations, which we hope can continue to improve. J. We will continue to consider Indian requests to purchase from third countries US-controlled arms in accordance with our military supply policy. FYI: While FMS bill, including Mansfield Amendment, does not now seem likely pass Congress, this type of amendment could be tacked on some other legislation and therefore at some later date affect this aspect of our policy END FYI. K. This information is being passed to the GOI on strictly confidential basis. We believe it is in interest of both US and India to withhold publicity on this matter and consequently we plan no announcement. If press leaks should occur, we hope to consult with GOI regarding press handling. FYI: If you are consulted by GOI following any press leak, you should urge that official comment be limited to fact that USG has informed GOI of certain decisions which it has taken with respect to the sale of arms to Pakistan, that these discussions are confidential, and that USG has assured GOI that its views were fully taken into account in decision which has been reached END FYI. 7. If you are pressed by GOI on whether US action completes long-standing review of military supply policy, you should limit yourself to saying that this sale is one-time special exception to policy; basic policy remains unchanged, and you would not wish to speculate about future courses of action. END 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton and Schneider on September 28; revised and cleared by Van Hollen; cleared by Spengler, Chapman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice (H), Saunders, Colonel Gross (OSD/ISA), and Rear Admiral St. George (DOD/Joint Staff); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The Embassy in Rawalpindi was instructed on September 29 to inform Pakistan about the details of the decision to offer a one-time exception to the existing restrictions on military supply. (Telegram 160449 to Rawalpindi; ibid.) 78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 78. Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, September 30, 1970, 1537Z Subject: Military Supply: Arms for Pakistan Refs: A. State 159970 and B. State 160165 1. In accordance reftel A I called on acting Foreign Secretary S.K. Banerji at 5:00 p.m. Sept 30 to carry out instructions contained reftel B. Banerji was alone. 2. I adhered closely to the script contained in para 6 reftel B. I subsequently emphasized fact we were now making a one-time exception to policy but that 1967 military supply policy had been retained as India desired. I added that in my judgment our decision to retain 1967 policy reflected importance U.S. attaches to good relations with India and our desire to avoid an arms race, at least to the extent that we are able to effect such a development. 3. I then again mentioned our desire to maintain good relations with Pakistan and our wish to avoid a situation where Pakistan would feel excessively dependent on the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. I noted that the Government of India had accepted Soviet assurances that they would not do anything to injure Indian interests and I expressed the hope that the GOI would accept similar assurances on our part. 4. Finally I said that my government fully accepted the desire expressed by the Foreign Minister for a steady improvement in our relations and expressed the opinion that the limited sale to Pakistan should not reasonably detract from such an improvement. 5. After initially expressing appreciation at being informed regarding our policy, Banerji asked what effect this “one-time sale” would have on future third country sales. It was pointed out that part of our 1967 policy which we were continuing provided that we would give consideration on a case-by-case basis to the sale by third countries of U.S. controlled or licensed lethal end items and that we would presumably continue to be prepared to consider such sales. 6. Banerji then asked me if what was involved were complete military items or only parts. I replied that they are complete items. Banerji then said that he felt he must express “our regret” at decision. He said he need hardly reiterate that it was under 1954 agreement with Pakistan that arms race had begun. This was not something of Indian choosing. At that time India had expressed very grave doubts as to where U.S. decision would lead, doubts that had unfortunately been realized. Any supply of military equipment to Pakistan was bound to reraise the same doubts. 7. At this point I said that I presumed he did not regret the omission of tanks from the list of items included in the one-time exception. Banerji replied that his regret would be much greater in that case. He then again referred to the possibility of a third country sale of tanks to Pakistan and said such a development would move the clock back to the same upsetting situation that had existed before. He then said GOI was prepared accept policy of non-supply to either country. The possibility of third country supply was a matter of grave concern to India. At the moment, he said he would not like to express any other reactions. 8. I told him that I hoped it would be the conclusion of his government that this development would not interfere with good relations between our two countries any more than India’s relations with the USSR and France had been affected by the delivery of the far more substantial amounts of equipment obtained by Pakistan from those two countries. At this point Banerji said he wanted to talk quite personally and frankly and off the record. He emphasized that this was an “extremely explosive issue. It is one that has bedeviled our relations.” He mentioned how he had enjoyed his earlier tour of duty in the United States and admired the American people, but the Indian people felt that the 1954 agreement had endangered the security of their country. 9. He said he had personally regretted this development because Indo-U.S. relations had gotten off to such a fine start due to the contribution the United States had made to the achievement of Indian independence. The first major shock to these good relations was the U.S. decision to provide arms to Pakistan, a decision allegedly to permit Pakistan to defend itself against the communist powers but “we knew it was directed against us”. 10. Banerji then said to me that I must know, having lived in his country, that under the Indian political system it was just not possible “for us to be on the agressive”. Therefore, it was just not possible to equate India and Pakistan “in this regard. Some could say that this was an inherent weakness of the democratic system. India could not use its arms to attack any country. They could only use them for defensive purposes”. 11. Again mentioning that his remarks were personal and off the record, he said that China was playing a game with Pakistan and any accretion to Pakistani military strength meant an accretion to Sino-Pak military strength. He added that it was sad for him to see the relations between our two countries which had started in such a promising way had gone down to what they now were. 12. I told him I had difficulty in understanding why he should feel so strongly, given the fact that Russia was supplying so much more to Pakistan. Banerji replied that American arms had actually been used against India in 1965. “It was because the F–86’s and tanks were used against us that there is so much more emotion involved in the Indian reaction.” 13. I mentioned the resurgence of friendship that had occurred between our two countries following our prompt response to India’s request for assistance at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962 and again in 1965–66 when hundreds of thousands of Indian lives had been saved. Banerji nodded assent but said we must positively work to improve relations. He said it was no part of India’s policy to be unfriendly to such a great country as the United States which had done so much to help India in the past. 14. Before leaving I told the acting Foreign Secretary that Ambassador Jha would be informed about our policy by Under Secretary Johnson and asked to convey the substance to Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in New York. 15. Comment: I regret that the Department was unable to comply with my recommendations contained in New Delhi 9936, para. 4A and authorize me to provide in greater detail the equipment comprising the one-time exception. I had been encouraged by State 135650 to believe my recommendations in this regard would be largely accepted. 16. Banerji is obviously concerned that we have only lifted some but not all of the veils surrounding our policy. I presume we have concluded as part of our review that we do not intend to approve any third country sale of tanks to Pakistan. If i am correct in this assumption I most strongly recommend that I be authorized to so inform the Indians. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a “great deal of unhappiness” in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.) 79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, October 1, 1970, 1005Z Subj: Military Supply-GOP Informed Ref: State 160440 1. I called at 1000 hours local time October 1 on additional Foreign Secretary M.A. Alvie and Defense Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed to convey message reftel. I had decided seek meeting with Alvie (senior MFA officer present) upon learning that Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan would not be back in town for couple more days. In accordance my provisional understanding with Sultan before he left for Nepal: I had informed Alvie that matter to be discussed was also of interest to DefSec. Alvie thereupon asked me meet him at DefsSc’s office. Meeting was shifted to DefSec’s home as result closing GOP offices October 1 out of respect for Nasser. 2. I apologized for asking for meeting when GOP offices closed down. Said I knew they had been waiting for word to proceed on our military supply decision. We had notified GOI last night (local time here) and wished to insure that first word reached GOP from us directly and officially. 3. I said Executive Branch had informed Congress on Sept. 29 of President Nixon’s decision to offer sell certain items of military equipment on cash basis to Pakistan, as one-time exception to present policy. This was first practicable opportunity to inform Congress this subject in view of numerous difficult problems involving the Congress of which GOP was aware. We had been deeply appreciative of importance GOP attached to getting on with implementation of President Nixon’s decision as conveyed by Ambassador Farland to President Yahya on June 20. 4. Yesterday, I said, we had informed the GOI on President’s decision in general terms, as Ambassador Farland had told Yahya we would. 5. On return from his present trip to Europe, I said President Nixon intends convey sales offer formally by letter to Yahya. Letter will be presented by Ambassador Farland on his return to Pakistan in latter part of October. Meanwhile, I said, in the interest of moving ahead expeditiously with planning, we were prepared to begin confidential discussion with appropriate persons in GOP. Discussion would concern details of sales offer such as type and quantities of materiel and alternatives available (e.g. type of fighter aircraft and maritime patrol sources of APCs), specifications, cost estimates and terms of sales. US Defense rep will have primary responsibility on US side under my guidance (and Ambassador’s guidance after his return) for working out procurement arrangements with Pak counterparts. I said we desired strongly to avoid publicity of any kind on this subject. We urged GOP to maintain confidence in interest of military security as well as for political reasons. I added that, if leaks should nevertheless occur, we would wish consult immediately with GOP regarding press handling. 6. After quietly absorbing above and expressing immediate pleasure, Alvie and DefSec said they would not be surprised if the info were leaked by GOI, to be followed by strong Indian press reaction. Both agreed that GOP understood our interest in keeping matter secret and did not anticipate any serious problem with Pakistani press. If there should be Indian press leak, GOP would keep silent, neither confirm nor deny, and consult with us. I said we had also urged on GOI the need to withhold publicity and our desire to consult with it on handling if matter should become public knowledge. 7. DefSec asked what we had told Indians about nature of our decision. I said GOI had been told that equipment being offered to Pakistan consists of a few aircraft, largely replacements for previously supplied US aircraft and some armored transport vehicles. DefSec said he had no problem with that message to GOI. 8. DefSec said GOP had financial problems and would need some accommodation regarding qte terms of sales unqte. He asked whether these sales would fall under limited credit facilities which Pakistan has enjoyed for certain types of (non-lethal) equipment. I replied that our present offer of sale, as Ambassador had told Yahya last June, was on cash basis. DefSec wondered whether terms would be similar to those now available for “cash” purchases of lethal spares. I replied that would have to be determined in course discussions between our military reps on details of sales offer. 9. Defsec asked whether Conte-Long provisions would apply to current sales offer. I said it was my understanding that future of Conte-Long was uncertain. I understood provision had been eliminated from version of appropriations bill passed by one house but that action still required by second house. Said I could not predict what final action would be, but appreciated Pak concern and we would be consulting with them as situation clarified. 10. In interest of rapid action DefSec said he would be talking in next couple days with Army Chief Hamid, Air CINC Rahim and Navy CINC Muzaffar Hasan about our offer. He will ask them to nominate representatives who, together with major general Inamul Haq (MinDef Director General of Defense Procurement), will form Pak team for discussion with US Def rep. He asked that latter call him early next week to arrange first meeting with Pak military reps. 11. As meeting closed, both Alvie and DefSec reiteriated pleasure that we had now found it possible move forward on President’s decision conveyed to GOP last June. I said I shared their hope that we could make rapid progress in working out details. (In latter connection we would appreciate early receipt of separate messages concerning various items in package as referred to in para. 2D reftel). Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936) 80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, October 5, 1970, 1110Z Subj: Arms for Pakistan Ref: Rawalpindi 7789 1. During my meeting with him October 5 on his plans to attend UN commemorative session (septel), President Yahya Khan said he had been briefed on my discussions on arms issue with GOP reps in last several days. He said particularly he had been given report by FonSec of my discussion with latter October 4 (reftel). Yahya said he was pleased that our military reps could now get down to specific discussions. 2. He then immediately recalled concern he had expressed to Ambassador Farland last June and again in September over problem Pakistan faces in paying for any items it wishes purchase. He said again that USG knows better than he how difficult Pakistan’s financial situation is. Yahya said he hoped most sincerely that USG would find ways to make proposed sales feasible even within cash-payment framework. He agreed that financing problem would be largely affected by Pakistan’s choice of alternatives, e.g., for used as against new equipment. He remarked that US had large “surplus” stocks and that we should be able provide substantial concessions on prices therefor. He expressed hope that our negotiators will also be given authority to come up with concessions on timing of payments. 3. Yahya said he and his government would face very difficult situation if it turns out that Pakistan is unable to pay for US equipment which it requires and desires and which USG has offered to sell. He affirmed GOP’s interest in maintaining secrecy on our sales offer, adding that it was particularly important at least until it was clear whether actual sales would be worked out. 4. I assured Yahya that Ambassador had reported Yahya’s concern over financial problem, and that USG was indeed aware of this problem. I said I would again report Yahya’s concern. Discussion this subject concluded as we agreed our military reps should get on promptly with their discussions. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 81. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 81. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, October 9, 1970 SUBJECT: U.S. Sale of Military Equipment to Pakistan The Indians have now protested our decision to sell a limited quantity of military equipment to Pakistan, both in New Delhi and in Washington. They have also issued a very starchy public statement indicating their dissatisfaction with our explanations for the sale, The Pakistanis are pleased that we have brought this matter to a conclusion and are cooperating with us closely and discreetly in handling it. President Yahya has publicly announced his plans to dine at the White House October 24 and have a bilateral meeting with the President in Washington. In formal oral presentations in New Delhi and Washington October 7 and 8, the Indians conveyed their “strong protest and serious misgivings about our decision.” They were careful to say, however, that they meant this in a “friendly spirit.” The Indian spokesmen (Acting Foreign Secretary in Delhi—Indian Minister in Washington) warned of “the most adverse and violent reaction of Indian public opinion” and expressed concern about the political pressures which our decision would place on Mrs. Gandhi’s Government. They expressed fear that our sale might seriously affect India-Pakistan negotiations which have been showing some signs of progress. They took serious exception to the rationale for our sale which had been previously conveyed to them. They explained that Pakistan was arming only against India. Therefore, they said the GOI must take an extremely serious view of any addition to Pakistan’s armed strength. They claimed that India had expressed similar views with the same force to the Soviet Union about its supply to Pakistan and that the Soviet Union had reacted positively to this warning. On October 8, the Indians issued a press statement announcing their protest and indicating that they were not satisfied with U.S. explanations for the sale. The statement alleged that our decision was against the interest of peace in South Asia. It said “the resumption of inflow of arms” to Pakistan, which has committed aggression against India three times, is of grave concern; Pakistan is armed only against India. The statement said that Pakistan used U.S. arms against India in 1965 despite U.S. assurances, and the new U.S. special supply “is not even subject to any such assurances.” While we recognize that because of internal political requirements the GOI had to publicly criticize our sale, we believe their statement goes far beyond what was necessary. They have failed to take into consideration: (1) the limited nature of the sale; (2) that the sale was a one-time exception to our embargo which remains in effect; (3) that we are selling primarily replacements or unsophisticated equipment; (4) that we are not selling tanks. To the contrary, this statement incorrectly refers to the “resumption of inflow of arms” and is likely to provoke additional public reaction rather than control it. Furthermore, the Government of India has reacted much more strenuously to our sale offer than it did to the decisions of the Soviets and the French to supply much larger quantities of military equipment to Pakistan. We have told the Indians here of our views on their statement and instructed Embassy Delhi to express similar serious concern about it. Meanwhile, we are proceeding to discuss with the Pakistanis arrangements for carrying out our sales offer, a subject which President Yahya will probably raise in general terms with President Nixon during their bilateral talks. 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, DTS–Chrons, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and cleared by Spengler and Van Hollen. 82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: FY 1971 PL 480 Program for Pakistan Acting Secretary Johnson (Tab A) requests your approval of a $72 million PL 480 Program for Pakistan for FY 1971. 800,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of edible oil would be provided under the proposed agreement. As a result of budget limitations, the amount is less than the Pakistan request and less than the $87 million we provided last year. State, therefore, proposes to sign a smaller PL 480 agreement ($15–20 million) in the latter part of FY 71 to provide deliveries in the first quarter of FY 1972, Pakistan’s most critical supply period. This would assure Pakistan of our continuing support. Nearly all the commodities provided will go to East Pakistan which, although having made some progress in its agricultural sector in the previous year, has had poor results with miracle rice and continues to be an area of extreme poverty. A large portion of the receipts generated under the program will be utilized for rural development projects to support East Pakistan’s agriculture. Our AID mission has made a major effort to develop around this program a broad-based attack on some of East Pakistan’s fundamental economic and social problems ranging from family planning to community organization and education. The proposed amount is within your FY 71 budget. OMB (Tab B), Treasury and Agriculture concur in State’s request. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the proposed $72 million PL 480 program for Pakistan for FY 1971. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated. Transmitted under an October 9 covering memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the NSC staff to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger initialed the approval line of the memorandum for Nixon. Attached at Tab A but not published is a September 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President, in which he recommended the proposed PL–480 program on behalf of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Caspar Weinberger, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurred with Johnson’s recommendation in a September 26 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Also attached was an October 20 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot informing the Department of State of the President’s decision and instructing the Department not to inform Pakistan until after Nixon had met with Yahya in Washington on October 25. 83. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya 83. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya 1 Washington, October 15, 1970 Dear Mr. President: The patience you have shown in connection with the protracted review of our military supply policy has been very much appreciated. Our deliberations have taken even longer than anticipated and have involved a number of difficult considerations. One of the problems, as I have explained before, has been the current mood of our Congress toward military assistance and involvement abroad. Despite these problems, I have tried to be as responsive as possible to Pakistan’s requests, in keeping with my assurance to you in Lahore that I would see what could be done to be helpful. I was pleased that Ambassador Farland was able to discuss these matters with you informally on June 20 and again last month before returning home on leave, and I had a good talk with him while he was here. Since then the necessary Congressional consultations have been completed and we are now able to move ahead. In specific terms, I am pleased to confirm that we are prepared to sell Pakistan on this one occasion the following items which your military authorities have requested from us: six replacement fighter interceptor aircraft or, as an alternative, twelve interceptor aircraft of a different model if Pakistan transfers the remaining aircraft in the squadron concerned; seven replacement medium bomber aircraft; 300 armored personnel carriers; and four maritime patrol aircraft. Our diplomatic mission in Pakistan is prepared to discuss this offer in greater detail with you or your associates, and our respective military representatives can proceed with arrangements. In addition to the aforementioned items, which are in the “lethal” category, I have asked our people to move as promptly and sympathetically as possible on pending requests by your military authorities to purchase various non-lethal items such as light aircraft, transport aircraft, jeeps and trucks. We are doing our best to be responsive on such items. I recognize that the equipment to be provided does not cover some of your requests but I hope you will consider this offer as reflecting my sincere desire to be of assistance to Pakistan. As you know from our talk in Lahore, I have had a long personal association with your country and am anxious to ensure that our relations remain on a close and cordial basis. In closing, let me express my admiration for the great skill you have shown in leading Pakistan through a difficult transition period. In your determination to see Pakistan safely and peacefully through this transition, you have demonstrated statesmanship, courage and sensitivity to the special conditions facing your country and the aspirations of your people. You have my warm good wishes in your great endeavor. I am now looking forward with great pleasure to our meeting here in Washington and wish you a safe and comfortable journey. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, 1969–1970. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Rawalpindi on October 16 to be conveyed to Yahya prior to his trip to New York for the fall session of the UN General Assembly. (Telegram 170588 to Rawalpindi; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 84. Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 84. Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Rawalpindi, October 16, 1970, 1129Z Subj: Arms Sales to Pakistan: Initial Status Report 1. One week has passed since surfacing of our one-time exception to policy in limited sales offer to Pakistan. Discussions have begun here between US and Pak mil reps on specifics of our offer. Following is assessment of where we stand at this moment. B/G Collins (DRP) concurs. 2. Pres. Yahya, FonSec, DefSec and all military service chiefs are pleased that we are now going ahead on offer to meet some of Pakistan’s long-standing arms requests. They have made their pleasure clear in contacts with us. They seem to have adequate appreciation of political importance of decision as indicating our sympathy for Pakistan’s situation and desire improve our relations even at cost of taking inevitable flak from India. The senior leaders understand very well limits of our offer as now reiterated in pres. Nixon’s letter to Yahya (State 170588). Pres. Yahya may nevertheless with take occasion of meeting with Pres. Nixon on October 25 to sound out possibilities of procuring additional items. We have discouraged such approach but cannot prevent it. 3. Pakistani press has given prominent but only limited coverage of subject. Department spokesman’s statement of Oct. 8 carried fairly straight and, in accordance our previous understanding, GOP has refrained from elaborating on that statement and has discouraged speculation. Pak press has reported Indian displeasure, critical editorials in US press, criticism by US Senators, and exchange in UN between Indian and Pak reps this subject. While various elements of Pak press have evinced some pleasure from recent development, there has been noticeable absence of crowing. This is attributable in part to limited knowledge of specifics of our offer but also reflects persistent suspicion of US intentions vis-à-vis Pakistan dating back at least to 1965. 4. How issue will unfold will be determined in course of further discussions on our offer. Paks will be disappointed if they persist in thinking we might be persuaded provide lethal end-items beyond limits of our current offer. But we have been leveling with them and should be able retain control on this point. 5. The major problem is not repeat not one of expanded procurement but rather whether and to what extent sales can actually take place under our existing offer, all senior Pak leaders with whom we have been in discussion, notably including Pres. Yahya himself, have stressed Pakistan’s very difficult financial situation and its need for some kind of accommodation on payments. They are perfectly aware that our offer is for “cash” but they revert to problem on each occasion and point out that Pakistan must have some accommodation. It is fact that Pak Treasury is strapped to meet country’s existing needs for imports and external payment obligations.GOP is being hard-pressed by IBRD and other consortium members to carry out early exchange rate reform and import liberalization which will require substantial additional foreign exchange resources as backup. Pakistan is now getting credit for its purchases of military end-items from non-US sources. Dimensions of financial problem under our sales offer will become clearer as our discussions progress. Would appear, meanwhile, that realization of offer is in jeopardy without some catalytic element, such as substantial concessions in pricing. If our offer should fall through for financial reasons, there would be serious setback for us here even though we could defend ourselves by saying we remained ready carry out our side of offer as communicated to GOP Pres. Yahya has already expressed his concern that GOP would have very hard time in explaining inability take advantage of US arms offer after public expectations generated by announcement of our offer. 6. We have constantly warned Paks that our offer cannot be expanded or altered, and have sought avoid any firm decisions by GOP on components of our offer pending fuller information on availability, price, etc. Case in point is B–57’s where first Pak reaction has been that they do not want the seven aircraft we have offered to sell. They have indicated, on other hand, interest in buying one full “squadron” of F–5’s, involving more than the 12 fighter aircraft we have said we might sell if Pak Air Force willing give up its remaining six F–104’s. When I alluded to this in recent discussion with DefSec, he confirmed that Pak Air Force would like F–5’s instead of F–104’s and remarked interestingly that Paks would also be willing renounce their B–57’s in return for adequate number of F–5’s. We do not know full implications of that remark but it could mean that Paks would be willing forego capability to bomb well into Indian territory, for example, in exchange for enhanced short-range capability which they would get from introducing relatively unsophisticated F–5’s. There remains also open question regarding four maritime patrol aircraft we have offered to sell, inasmuch as GOP still has to face shock of learning cost of P-3C’s which they would like to have. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. 85. National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70 85. National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70 1 Washington, October 20, 1970 LONG-TERM PROSPECTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN SUMMARY A. Depite vigorous official efforts by India and Pakistan to reduce the rate of growth, their population of 700 million is increasing at an annual rate of between 2.5 and 3 percent The present population will grow to about 900 million by 1980 and will double within 30 years. This population growth will absorb much of the economic advance in both countries. B. The “green revolution” has brought about an impressive rise in wheat production in West Pakistan and in northwestern India. But the output of rice has increased only slowly, and the outlook for a breakthrough in rice production—especially important to East Pakistan and India—is uncertain. C. Whether foodgrain production in India will in fact be increased to a point approaching self-sufficiency in the course of the next decade is a matter of debate among economic analysts. The State Department assessment puts the chances of doing so higher than the CIA analysis.The differences regarding agricultural prospects and the consequent differences for overall economic growth in India are discussed in paragraphs 9–12 and 43. D. Pakistan as a whole is likely to enjoy a somewhat higher rate of economic growth than India. But this reflects the comparative prosperity of West Pakistan, which shows impressive rates of advance, offsetting the poverty and stagnation of East Pakistan. E. The growth and level of operation of the modern industrial sectors of India and Pakistan have been dependent on continuing fairly high levels of foreign aid. But future aid levels are uncertain, and neither country will be able to resolve its shortage of foreign exchange solely by increased exports. In these circumstances, India and Pakistan may seek negotiated debt relief and will press for concessional trade terms. Unilateral defaults, however, appear unlikely over the next few years. In any event, neither country is likely to have the foreign currency or external assistance it feels necessary for economic development at planned rates. F. Rising population pressure on the land will continue to force large numbers of people to move to the already crowded, restless cities. Volatile urban masses led by disaffected groups of the educated unemployed will be a growing threat to the existing political order in both countries. G. Pakistan’s domestic political prospects are clouded. A Constituent Assembly to be chosen in December 1970 may lead to a new, elected government. But such a regime’s life expectancy is open to question. Over time, East and West Pakistan seem more likely than not to become separate nations. Partition would hurt both economies, but the west wing would soon recover, while the east would stagnate. H. India too is an era of political transition. New parliamentary elections must be held by early 1972 and may come sooner. Their results cannot be forecast, but the chances are at least even that no single party, including Mrs. Gandhi’s wing of the Congress, will win a majority. This might lead to the first national coalition government in Indian history. I. The odds are that India will hold together. But the Indian military might find itself forced to play a more direct role in part or even all of the country in a period of stress or emergency. J. Both India and Pakistan will probably be too immersed in their domestic problems to play much of a role in international affairs. No basic Indo-Pakistani rapprochement is in sight. While neither now wishes another round of hostilities, neither is willing to compromise enough on basic issues to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust. K. Indian and Pakistani foreign policies are fairly static. What shifts do occur are likely to come about either as a result of drastic domestic changes, such as a breakup of a united Pakistan, or as the result of developments outside the area, such as a post-Mao government in China modifying Chinese hostility towards India,or a Sino-Soviet detente which led the Soviets to reduce their support and military assistance to India. L. India and Pakistan will take leading roles in demands on the developed world, particularly the US, for a more equitable share of the world’s wealth. However, they are likely to find the developed world less interested than before in competing for political gains in India and Pakistan through extensive economic assistance. DISCUSSION I. INTRODUCTION 1. Pakistan and India have been pursuing highly publicized programs of economic development for over 40 years. Despite numerous disappointments, they have built up substantial infrastructures and some large industrial establishments. Though each has several large and often turbulent cities, they remain predominantly agricultural countries; per capita income in both is among the lowest in the world. The two countries contain approximately 700 million people 3 —about equal in number to the total inhabitants of the 60 or so states of the Middle East, Africa, and South America put together. Given these huge numbers, it is not surprising that both India and Pakistan display sharp caste, class, linguistic, regional, and other disparities. 2. The two nations have had their ups and downs since independence. Under Nehru’s leadership the the 1950s and early 1960s, India enjoyed periods of relative political tranquility, some economic advance, and an enhanced international stature. Pakistan floundered politically and stagnated economically during much of this period but it made dramatic economic progress and enjoyed considerable political stability after Ayub’s takeover in 1958. Since the departure of these two leaden (Nehru in 1964, Ayub 1969) the two countries have experienced a considerable degree of Political and economic uncertainty; both are now in a transitional era as they seek new solutions to their problems. 3. In these circumstances, the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi will face a host of challenges in the next decade. The principal ones are: a. To increase food production while instituting checks on population growth. b. To provide employment for a large and growing labor force. c. To To rectify serious foreign exchange shortages. d. To stimulate industrial expansion and economic growth. e. To mitigate or at least contain strong regional and class antagonisms and respond adequately to a wide range of public wants. f. To maintain tolerable relations with each other, with their other neighbors, and with the great powers. These objectives, however, are not all complementary, and in some cases they will involve conflict and compromise. The following estimate explores these problems. II. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES A. Food and Population Problems 4. Some 80 percent of the residents of India and Pakistan live in the country-side; the great bulk of these are subsistence farmers—owners of miniscule plots, tenants, sharecroppers, and landless laborers. Agriculture, which provides nearly 50 percent of the gross national product (GNP) of the subcontinent, thus remains the most important single aspect of these nations’ social and economic systems; it will continue to do so for many decades. At best, industrial expansion will be unable to absorb more than an additional fraction even of the present unemployed, to say nothing of future increases in population. 5. The food-population problem on the subcontinent has been, with the possible exception of Communist China, the most serious in the world. In spite of considerable and increasing efforts to deal with various elements of this problem, it still raises serious concerns for the future. While there have been some dramatic recent achievements in agricultural production, it is still true that the area as a whole is not self-sufficient in food and has not been since independence. Since that time, the long-term trend in food production has done little more than keep pace with population growth, and dietary levels are still sub-standard. The specter of famine, which appeared quite threatening in the mid-1960s, has been averted for the time being by the breakthrough in wheat production and by several drought-free years. But with a rapidly growing population, the food-population problem will remain a matter of serious concern. 6. The population of the subcontinent is increasing by at least 2.5 percent (the officially claimed rate) and probably closer to 3 percent per year. This growth rate will continue well into the 1970s and is unlikely to be reduced significantly even by 1980. A continuation of the present population growth—even at the 2.5 percent rate—would lead to a doubling of the population by the turn of the century. 7. The major forces contributing to the high growth rate are similar to those observed in other developing countries of the world. Health and sanitation programs have greatly reduced the death rate, particularly among children and childbearing women. This had led to a rapid increase in the proportion of the population in childbearing ages. But fertility patterns have not changed. Traditional cultural preferences for many births to offset anticipated deaths continue to prevail, and birth rates continue to exceed death rates by a considerable margin. 8. Both countries have greatly expanded their population control programs, but only a small percentage of the people appear to have been affected in terms of fertility behavior. Overall, growth rates have not dropped and indeed may have increased. However, this is due to the changing demographic structure (e.g., changing age structure, lower infant mortality, etc.) and growth rates would be still higher if it were not for these programs. We cannot rule out the effects of scientific breakthroughs in the birth control field, and experimental work is indeed going on. Even if successful, however, this is not likely to have much impact on growth rates in the next 10 years. 9. In recent years, both India and Pakistan have been intensifying efforts to increase food output. The rapid expansion in the use of new high-yielding varieties (HYV) of grain, chemical fertilizers, irrigation, and related technical innovations have increased land productivity considerably in West Pakistan and in northwest India. Most of the gains have been in wheat, however, and the rate of growth of that cop will likely slow down. Experience with the new rice varieties has been far less spectacular; those currently being used are not fully adapted to the conditions existing in much of the rice growing areas of South Asia, and they are sensitive to water depth, thus requiring sophisticated water control devices and techniques which are lacking in much of the monsoonal flooded areas. However, newer varieties such as IR-20 and others only now being introduced appear to be promising for areas where water depth control is a problem. Nevertheless, increases In rice production, even with important technological advances, are apt to be less dramatic than the recent one in wheat. 10. It is hazardous to estimate the likely average annual growth of food output in India and Pakistan over the next decade. Uncertainties of weather, plant disease, and whether there will be a breakthrough in rice comparable to that in wheat all make it difficult to project single figures with confidence. Nevertheless, past experience and current programs can give US some rough guides. Within certain limits, government policy with respect to agricultural support policies can do much to determine how much food is produced, although the responsiveness of private farmers is also critical. The highest projections of India’s potential—even without a rice breakthrough—are that annual increases of five percent or more could be achieved, but these are based on a series of specific assumptions including: a. Greater fertilizer consumption, particularly a continuing, substantial increase in the average fertilizer application rate on HYV acreage. b. Pest control measures. c. Expended and improved education on new agronomic practices. d. Access by farmers to the right kinds and amounts of inputs (fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, water, and the like) and of credit to purchase them. e. Normal weather. 11. Though there Is little dispute over the potential for Indian agriculture, there an substantial differences of opinion amongst experts as to what is in actuality likely to be accomplished over the next 10 years. Some see an annual average rate of growth of 3 percent or close to it. Others believe a higher rate is more likely—even in optimum circumstances 5 percent or more. The implications of one judgment as opposed to the other are substantial. An average growth rate of 5 percent over a decade would make India self-sufficient in foodgrains, allow it to build up enough stockpiles of grain to tide the country over during a monsoon failure, and permit a rise in food consumption levels. In addition, with agriculture comprising roughly half of GNP, this higher rate would give a major boost to overall development programs. At a lower growth rate, particularly one of 3 percent, India would have to continue to import substantial amounts of foodgrains regularly, and even a single crop failure would impose additional requirements. Concurrently the pace of economic development would lag. 12. It is the CIA’s view that the average annual rate of growth of Indian foodgrain production in the the 1970s is likely to be between 3 and 4 percent, with the lower figure, or one close to it, the more probably one. The Department of State on the other hand believes that India will see a growth rate of roughly 4 percent, and under certain optimum conditions, 5. The differences between the two estimates rests in large part on differing judgments of the Indian Government’s willingness and ability to sustain programs and policies which would realize India’s agricultural potential. The Department of State Position The State estimate of 4 to 5 percent agricultural growth rests on an assumed continuity of a range of government policies now supporting more rapid growth in that sector: incentive price supports, governmental procurement, allocation of foreign exchange for fertilizer imports, expansion of the banking system to rural areas, and public sector expenditures on research, extension, irrigation, and so on. Achievement of at least 4 percent growth seems assured through continuation of these policies as well as a steady increase in small-scale irrigation and other responses by private investors. A rice breakthrough, and/or major long-term irrigation and drainage projects, could well raise growth closer to 5 percent. There are several factors which will maintain pressure on the Indian Government to give agriculture a continuing high priority, including the political importance of farm policies and of the price of foodgrains and the government’s public commitment to an early end of concessional foodgrain imports. The commitment since 1965 to policies favorable to agricultural growth promises to remain in effect nothwithstanding fluctuations in fiscal policy. Furthermore, Indian Government direct agricultural expenditures are augmented by state government budgets, private resources, and foreign assistance for agriculture, all of which have been increasing. Increased development plan allocations to agriculture during the 1960s demonstrate the government’s current commitment to agricultural growth. The share of public sector outlays devoted to agriculture and irrigation has grown from 20.5 percent actually spent in the Third Five Year Plan period (fiscal 1961–1965) 4 to 24 percent planned in the most recently revised version of the current Fourth Five Year Plan (fiscal 1969–1973). After a 6 percent reduction in agricultural expenditures in fiscal 1969 resulting from fiscal and inflationary pressures, the government increased the agricultural allocation for fiscal 1970 by 17 percent, even though a record harvest had been achieved the year before. Moreover, when it increased Fourth Five Year Plan outlays by 10 percent in March 1970, the allocations to agriculture were raised by 20 percent, thus substantially raising the share of that sector. Although the government’s tax on fertilizer may have retarded the rate of growth of fertilizer usage, it is judged that the actual rate of increase has nevertheless exceeded that necessary to achieve planned goals; moreover, the tax has also provided the only politically feasible means of tapping increased agricultural income for development purposes. Increased government programs have led cultivators, themselves, to accelerate their expansion of tubewells (up from 49,000 In 1961 to 200,000 in 1968) and to adopt more rapidly the new high-yielding seed varieties. The CIA Position Government programs in agriculture are likely to fluctuate, much as they have in the past, and will probably continue to be subordinated to programs for industrialization. For example, in the Indian fiscal year 1969 when total government spending fell, industrial outlays increased, while agricultural expenditures were reduced and the government imposed a tax on fertilizer which contributed to a slowdown in the growth of fertilizer consumption. The shifts were consistent with past practices and reflected political and economic pressures on the government in sectors other than agriculture. The increase in expenditures planned for fiscal 1970 is illustrative of India’s ambivalence toward agriculture and is not judged to be conclusive evidence of a reversal of India’s long-term policies. In fact, the increased allocations to agriculture under the latest revision of the Fourth Plan only provide it with roughly the same share of funds that agriculture actually received during fiscal 1966–1969. In addition, there are major technological barriers to successful government exploitation of a rice breakthrough. Such exploitation entails not merely developing new seeds, but also effecting major expensive and long-term changes in irrigation projects and water control practices in many rice growing areas. That the Indian Government can overcome these formidable technological obstacles remains in doubt. Success in such efforts would lead to a growth rate of foodgrain output apporaching 4 percent, but a laggard performance—which is more likely—would lead to one closer to 3 percent. Moreover, a sustained growth rate of even 3 percent throughout the 1970s would represent a marked improvement over the average of about two and a quarter percent attained in the 1960s. 13. Whatever the case may be, throughout the 1970s India’s food import requirements will vary, perhaps considerably, from year to year. With a 5 percent rate of increase, the nation might even become a net exporter of foodgrains.On the other hand, with a rate of increase in food production in the range of 3 or 4 percent, import requirements would probably remain at about the current level of 4 million tons or so a year. At the higher rate of increase, consumption would probably rise by roughly an equivalent amount At the lower rate, demand would grow more slowly and present consumption levels would be maintained. In years of monsoon failure, which must be expected from time to time, import needs would rise sharply, as they would if there were a widespread epidemic of some plant disease. How high they would go would depend on the extent, severity, and duration of the crisis, and on the size of domestic stockpiles of food. For example, were India to suffer, as it did in the 1960s, from two widespread and consecutive monsoon failures, annual import needs could rise to 10 million tons or more. 14. West Pakistan’s foodgrain output has grown 60 percent since 1966 and the area—formerly a food deficit one-has become a net exporter of food. 5 It should remain so for the next decade. The region has well developed water resources, no present population pressure on the land, and grows mainly wheat.East Pakistan is a different matter. There, some 70 million or so people are packed into an area about the state of Florida. Its rice eating population has not seen the green revolution and is unlikely to benefit on the sale of the wheat revolution during this decade. It continues to rely on the monsoons and is periodically afflicted both by drought and flooding. At best, East Pakistan can hope to see foodgrain production increase at the rate of 3 percent or so (less in bad years) and must continue to rely on large imports of foodgrain both from the west wing and elsewhere. Pakistan as a whole will probably see an average rate of agricultural growth of 4 to 5 percent a year. 15. Though India’s regional disparities are no so conspicuous, it too breaks down into a number of relatively prosperous areas side by side with poverty striken ones. The Indian state of West Bengal shares many of the problems of neighboring Bengali-speaking East Pakistan and has, as well, a sizable, impoverished, and militant industrial labor force susceptible to extremist political influences. The heavily overpopulated state of Kerala in southwest India suffers from the potentially explosive combination of great economic backwardness and a relatively high level of literacy and general education. The great “Hindi heartland” or Gangetic plain presents a mixed picture: the states of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh and the eastern portion of Uttar Pradesh are stagnating regions, conspicuous for poverty, low yields of food, static living standards, and resistance of the residents to change from traditional ways of life; in some regions of the latter two states, however, cultivators are responding to incentives for use of water, fertilizer, and high-yielding grain varieties, and traditional approaches are slowly changing. These backward or slowly changing regions stand in marked contrast to such areas as Punjab, Gujarat, western Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu, where relative prosperity and advance are evident. While both India and Pakistan are pursuing various policies designed to moderate these regional disparities,they are not likely to abate significantly during the coming decade. 16. In the past it was always the impoverished areas of India and Pakistan that suffered most critically from natural calamities. At times of monsoon failure, foodgrain surplus areas have been reluctant to help their less fortunate neighbors on a sustained basis. In India, foodgrain surplus states, in time of scarcity, held back shipment of food outside their borders to maintain low local urban prices, while Individual farmers managed to sell across borders through the black market. 17. During the droughts of the mid-1960s, the Indian Government attempted with mixed success to force the surplus states to deliver grain to it for distribution to deficit areas at controlled prices. Procurement for goverment stocks in India has been facilitated by the establishment in 1964 of the Food Corporation of India which has helped accumulate some five million tons of foodgrains, as compared to about one million tons held In the 1960s. But domestic procurement still remains less than that needed for public distribution—the shortfalls being made up by imports—and would not be enough to meet emergency grain distribution needs in times of drought. In Pakistan, the government is now shipping foodgrains from the west wing to alleviate shortages in the east and will remain under pressure to continue this policy. 18. Some parts of the subcontinent are likely to suffer serious food shortages from time to time over the next decade. Under circumstances like those in the Indian state of Bihar in 1966–1967, the US and other and other food exporters would again be pressed for emergency relief supplies. As was demonstrated in the Bihar crisis, the Indian Government has developed considerable skill in dealing with food distribution under conditions of scarcity if imported food is available. Moreover, the Pakistani Government, because of its compelling political interest in providing for the welfare of backward areas (principally East Pakistan) would probably also devote considerable energies to this task. Although famine conditions could occur, the two governments are in certain respects better equipped to cope with them than in the past. B. Providing Employment Opportunities 19. “Unemployment” as the terms is used in Western economies is practically nonexistent in South Asia except in the relatively small modern sectors. There is extensive underutilization of labor and sharing of jobs. There is no unemployment compensation, no dole, and very little in the way of charitable enterprises. In many parts of the area the number of hours and days in which villagers and farmers actively pursue their labors is relatively small and always has been, but this situation has been observed to change very quickly in some parts of South Asia where effective economic incentives were provided. Overstaffing, slow pace, and general inefficiency of employees in government and many industries are readily observable. 20. On the other hand, there are some government agencies and some state governments which are well run and dynamic, and many industrial firms in both countries are up to world standards. Typically, ministries in India and Pakistan are run by a cadre of competent, hard-working officials at the top, but the quality of the lower ranking staff is poorer. Labor productivity will improve only slowly over time, although, the new agricultural technology has opened up prospects for relatively rapid increased in agricultural productivity in areas able to adopt the new seeds and practices. 21. Economic distress will continue to have an impact on social and political life in various ways. On the one hand, overcrowding and depressed conditions in much of the countryside are causing many villagers to move to the already large cities. This trend is going to continue even if the green revolution results in a decrease in this movement. Only a few find positions in industrial enterprises—which remain relatively small in proportion to the number of the job seekers; most go into service trades. At least initially, they may find their lot somewhat improved, but removed from the traditional village social or political restraints, and confronted for the first time with urban affluence, growing numbers of them are becoming responsive to calls for radical change. 22. These calls generally come from a smaller but quite disruptive group: the educated unemployed or underemployed, drawn in large measure from an increasingly alienated middle class. Both India and Pakistan have given a high priority to education, but with mixed results. The two countries have produced a host of university graduates, poorly educated or trained in skills not relevant to employment opportunities and development needs and unable to find posts commensurate with with what they feel their training and status entitle them to. Forced accept menial or low paying jobs, bitterly resentful of the “haves”, the “almost haves” have already provided the stimulus and leadership for outbursts in most of the area’s big cities. 23. They share no single ideology beyond a growing resentment of the status quo and an inclination to strike out at those interests which they feel have wronged them. Thus in Pakistan, the west wing saw its critics wracked for months in late 1968 and early 1969 by mobs of students and laborers, led or inspired by discontented lawyers, clerks, and intellectuals protesting the uneven distribution of benefits under the oligarchic and conservative rule of President Ayub. East wingers were, at the same time, protesting against West Pakistani dominance and exploitation. In India, West Bengal and Kerala have seen a militant communist party (the Communist Party Marxist) emerge as one of the strongest forces, as well as a small underground terrorist movement (the Naxalites); Calcutta is chronically plagued by terrorism, mob violence and crippling strikes. Bombay, on the other hand, has seen the emergence of a xenophobic, proto-Fascist group (the Shiv Sena) demanding, and occasionally forcibly trying to effect, the major cities will pose serious challenges to the local and state governments in power and will probably require more central intervention. 24. There is no resolution of this problem in sight Indeed, it Is likely to get worse as both the cities and the class of “almost haves” continue to grow rapidly. Competition for urban employment will become more intense. Violence in the major cities will pose serious challenges to the local and state governments in power and will probably require more central intervention. C. Economic Growth, Industrialization, and Foreign Exchange Shortages 25. India and Pakistan have both made economic development a matter of high priority but they started from different positions have have taken different routes. India had a fairly substantial manufacturing sector at the time of independence and has since expanded it considerably. Industrial production now accounts for about 17 percent of India’s national income and has been growing at a rate of 5 to 6 percent since 1950. India is now a large industrial power, tenth in the world in steel production (5 to 7 million tons annually). It plans to expand that capacity substantially over the next several years. It has large capital goods industries, and it is active in the manufacture of chemicals, fertilizers, aluminum, synthetic rubber, and comparable basic items. It has a highly sophisticated nuclear energy program, so far directed only to peaceful uses. India also manufactures or assembles a wide variety of finished goods including aircraft, railway equipment, motor vehicles, and virtually all the consumer items used by the Indian public. Pakistan started with almost no industrial base but has developed a fairly large consumer goods industrial complex of its own. Though it has been active in the manufacture of such products as fertilizers and light engineering goods, it has not as yet acquired a heavy industrial complex or begun the manufacture of capital goods. Despite its achievement, Pakistan has yet to reach the stage of development that characterized India 20 years ago, at Ieast in the realm of heavy industry. Industrial production accounts for about 10 percent of Pakistan’s national income. INDIA AND PAKISTAN ESTIMATED NATIONAL INCOME BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN: 1950 and 1969 (in percent) 1950 1969 Sector India Pakistan India Pakistan Agriculture and Allied Activities... 57 60 44 45 Mining neg. neg. 1 neg. Large-Scale Manufacturing 5 1 10 3 Small-Scale Manufacturing 6 4 6 3 Other 31 34 36 43 26. Both countries have long accepted the principle of state economic planning, but overall official policies have been quite different. India accepted Nehru’s goals of creating a major heavy industrial plant, much of it owned and operated by the government, and of establishing rigorous state control over the private sector. The ultimate aim was to attain a high degree of industrial output, full and productive employment, a more equitable distribution of income, and the creation of a society both democratic and socialist. Pakistan’s approach was quite different, especially after Ayub’s 1958 takeover: The government generally preferred to stay out of direct ownership and operation of industries and gave wide freedom of activity to the nation’s private entrepreneurs. A few of the latter (the so-called “twenty families”) were quite successful and acquired considerable wealth, influence, and notoriety, though they did help move industrial development forward. 27. Both India and Pakistan have shown economic spurts and lags. India’s first two Five Year Plans (1951–1955, 6 1956–1960) were moderately successful; GNP grew by about 4 percent a year in that period. But the economy began to slow down in the early 1960s, and the extremely ambitious 1961–1965 Third Five Year Plan failed by wide margins to achieve its aims; at most GNP growth averaged 3 percent during the 1960s. This was the result of a number of factors: a pervasive central bureaucratic control of the economy, political uncertainties, depressed agricultural output, increased military spending, and a tight foreign exchange situation. 7 28. Pakistan’s first decade, generally a period of political uncertainty, saw a growth rate of perhaps less than 3 percent a year, despite some industrial development. Since 1958, however, thanks to heavy investments in major dams, irrigation projects, and other inputes (nearly all in the west wing), agricultural output has risen dramatically. At the same time, industry grew rapidly. Overall the economy grew at a rate of some 5.5 percent a year in the 1960s but most of the benefits accrued to West Pakistan. Per capita income in the latter area has increased by some 50 percent since 1950, while it has remained virtually unchanged in the east wing. 29. Since independence, neither India nor Pakistan has proved attractive to foreign private investors. Considerable interest in investment possibilities has been evident from time to time, but prospective investors have ben deterred, partly by unsettling conditions as political unrest, tax uncertainties, recent droughts and threats of famine, and the 1965 India-Pakistan War, but even more by government policies and “red tape”. The Indian Government, acting from ideological and internal political considerations, has adopted policies and procedures which have discouraged many potential foreign investors by putting many delays and obstacles in their way. The Pakistani Government has presented fewer such obstacles, but lower echelon bureaucratic difficulties and the political uncertainties before and since Ayub have kept foreign private investment at low levels. 30. The international economic relations of India and Pakistan have been characterized by chronic trade deficits and a heavy dependence on official foreign aid to help finance imports needed for economic development and to meet food requirements. As a result, both India and Pakistan have incurred very heavy foreign indebtedness. Except for foodgrain imports, which have sharply declined since the drought years, virtually all civilian imports 8 have been fertilizers and items including petroleum, machinery, non-ferrous metals, and other materials needed not only for investment in both nations’ agricultural and industrial sectors but to keep them operating at present levels. The ability to increase imports is thus a matter of particular importance to both countries in their efforts to operate and expand their large-scale modern industrial sectors. 9 Since both debts and import demands will increase, India and Pakistan must face the problem of how to obtain their future foreign exchange requirements. INDIA: FOREIGN AID BY COUNTRY 1951-SEPTEMBER 30, 1969 (billion US dollars) Authorized Drawings Free World Consortium US PL 480 4.32 4.05 Other US 4.30 3.79 Other Consortium 6.36 5.33 Total Consortium 14.96 13.18 Other Free World .15 .13 USSR and Eastern Europe 1.97 1.00 Total 17.10 14.31 BY TYPE OF AID * Loans 11.72 9.24 Grants 1.06 1.01 PL 480 4.32 4.06 Total 17.10 14.31 PAKISTAN: FOREIGN AID BY COUNTRY a 1948–1969 (billion US dollars) Authorized Drawings Free World Consortium b US PL 480 1.36 1.36 Other US 2.54 2.11 Other Consortium 2.46 1.90 Total Consortium 6.36 5.37 Other Free World .28 .23 USSR and Eastern Europe .33 .06 Total 7.06 5.72 INDIA: FOREIGN AID DRAWINGS AND DEBT REPAYMENT a 1961–1969 (million US dollars) Fiscal Year b Foreign Aid Drawings Of Which Food Aid c Debt Repayment Net Aid Net Non-Food Aid 1961 718 181 224 494 313 1962 947 255 235 712 457 1963 1,191 352 261 930 578 1964 1,473 482 322 1,151 669 1965 1,567 526 368 1,199 673 1966 1,507 480 387 1,120 640 1967 1,499 391 473 1,026 635 1968 1,135 210 491 644 434 1969 1,301 200 549 752 552 PAKISTAN: FOREIGN AID DRAWINGS AND DEBT REPAYMENT a 1961–1969 (million US dollars) Fiscal Year b Foreign Aid Drawings Of Which Food Aid c Debt Repayment Net Aid Net Non-Food Aid 1961 314 106 21 293 187 1962 329 66 25 304 236 1963 501 145 39 462 317 1964 652 174 51 601 427 1965 660 158 73 587 429 1966 602 120 85 516 396 1967 674 100 106 566 466 1968 705 165 126 579 414 1969 656 70 141 515 445 31. For both countries, but particularly for India, with it extensive industrial base, import substitution supported by import restrictions has reduced import requirements over what they otherwise would have been. In India the import content of industrial production and of investment declined by about half in the decade of the 1960s; however, much of this import substitution has been at high cost. In recent years, imports have also been held down by lagging demand, due partly to cautious Indian Government economic policies. India clearly places high priority on avoiding another foreign exchange crisis and is prepared to pay the price (in growth) of holding imports down to foreign exchange availabilities. But slow growth raises other risks—in the short run for the continued political success of the party in power, and in the long run for basic political stability. 32. India and Pakistan have five principal means, employable separately or in concert, of coping with future foreign exchange problems: (a) to keep-or even increase—the levels of foreign aid now being received, (b) to get substantial boosts in foreign private investment, (c) to increase exports, (d) to renegegotiate repayments of earlier debts, (e) to default, at least de facto, on debt repayments. 33. At present, the outlook for the volume of economic assistance is particularly uncertain. Levels of US assistance, which formerly provided about 40 percent of the Consortium’s funds to India and Pakistan, have gone down. Aid from the other Consortium members has risen somewhat, but this has been due almost entirely to debt relief. Proposals for increased replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) could materially increase assistance levels if sums provided under bilateral programs remain stable. But if the developed countries-including the US-should reduce bilateral aid as a consequence of increasing support to IDA, levels of aid might diminish or stay about the same. 34. On the other hand, India and Pakistan may be able to use aid more effectively as a result of current moves to untie aid. Dropping the requirement that aid be spent for goods of the donor country would permit both countries to spend the aid received for imports from the cheapest eligible source. The same change of arrangements may also make it possible for India to increase its sales of capital goods to other aid-receiving countries. 35. In any case, it will remain critically important for India and Pakistan to boost export earnings substantially if they are to ameliorate their foreign exchange problems. Prospects for doing this are uncertain. Most export growth will continue to come from agriculture and manufacturing in the short run, although India has major mineral export possibilities yet to be more fully exploited. Barring a major rice breakthrough, East Pakistan and many Indian states are likely to be too deficient in agricultural performance in relation to domestic demand to enable either country to become an important food exporter (beyond the food items now exported in some quantity, e.g., Basmati rice). Earnings from the two nations’ “traditional” exports-tea, raw and processed jute, cotton, and cotton textiles which up to now have accounted for the bulk of their export income-are likely to increase only slowly, because of increased competition front other countries, slowly rising world demand, and substitution by synthetics. “Non-traditional” exports have not done badly, however, and these now provide India with roughly 30 percent of its export earnings. 36. Both countries have adopted measures to boost industrial exports and have enjoyed some successes, but they face formidable obstacles in the future. Belatedefforts have been made in recent years by India to increase exports by providing exporters preferential treatment, lowering export duties, relaxing restrictions on industrial licensing, import controls and monopolies controls, and by raising subsidies somewhat. These incentives aim at offsetting the specific cost disadvantages of each industry and are essentially an extension of the country’s import substitution policy with producers, particularly in the new manufacturing sector, encouraged to do their share of exporting. But the subsidized export of a fraction of small-scale high-cost production, although it may be necessary to gain entry into a new market, is not a sound basis for substantial, continuing export growth. 37. The Indian policy of giving manufacturers a monopoly on the large home market has removed many incentives for increased productivity, lower costs, and quality control. The situation has been made more difficult by the high costs, poor management, and inefficient operation of the important large public sector projects, notably the capital goods and steel industries. As a result, the products of many domestic manufacturers are simply not competitive on the world market. Pakistan suffers from similar problems in its import substitution industries, even though the government has done more to encourage exports-with some success-than has India. Probably the best that can be achieved, at least for the next few years, is a continuation of recent annual increases in export earnings-about 7 percent for Pakistan and 4 to 5 percent for India. 10 In sum, we believe that neither country will be able to resolve its exchange difficulties solely by exporting. 38. Both India and Pakistan are concerned about the current decline in net aid as service on past debt, particularly from countries whose assistance has been on harder terms, grows. New Delhi has been discouraged by the recent three-year debt-relief granted by the Consortium to India, which for the most part substituted for gross aid which India would otherwise have received. While there may be future debt-relief arrangements, they are unlikely to involve significant amounts of additional assistance. While a negotiated or de facto moratorium on at least some repayments cannot be ruled out entirely over the long term, both countries are concerned about the economic and political consequences of default of payments and have sufficient availabilities from exchange reserves, export earnings and aid in the pipeline to make such a default unlikely in the next few years. 39. In sum, while both India and Pakistan appear to recognize the limited prospects for official foreign aid in the coming years, these states will still be pressing Western countries-particularly the US-for the best possible aid quantities and terms and for other facilities to ease their foreign exchange squeeze. In particular, demands for concessional treatment for their products in West European and North American markets will be made with increasing frequency and persistence by the Indians and Pakistanis. 40. There is no formula to determine what levels of foreign aid, from whatever source, would assure sustained economic growth in any underdeveloped country. Aid is but one of many factors which determine how well suchnations’ economies will operate. Minor changes, up or down, from present availabilities would probably not make much difference. Abrupt, major cuts in foreign aid would cause painful dislocations in the two countries’ modern sectors. In any case, neither India nor Pakistan is likely to have available-from any combination of sources-the foreign currency or other external assistance each feels is necessary for the rate of economic advance being planned. D. Overall Economic Prospects 41. The modest economic growth of India and Pakistan over the past twodecades reflects not only the constraints imposed by limited resources but also those implicit in each nation’s development strategy. Progress during the 1970s will be limited by a number of factors, including (a) conflicts between certain economic growth and social and welfare goals pursued by the respective governments, (b) the continuing predominance of the agricultural sector, in which production will grow more slowly than the industrial sector, (c) limited investment funds for industrial development, (d) limited markets for traditional exports and hence a shortage of foreign exchange with which to finance needed imports, (e) overall political trends and decisions. Except where noted, the following judgments are predicated on the two countries being able to maintain some reasonable degree of order and cohesion. They also assume no drastic change in arms expenditures. These assumptions cannot of course be taken for granted; indeed a breakup of the Pakistani union could occur sometime during the next decade, and India will probably experience serious political strains.Thus these judgments will remain subject to revision in the light of new developments. 42. Within certain limits, government policy will largely determine the extent of progress. The Indian agricultural sector, accounting for one-half of GNP, will require major government investments in irrigation projects, research, for future growth, and public policies favoring private farmers seeking to increase output. The Indian Government is not likely to exacerbate urban unemployment by abandoning its policies of promoting small-scale, labor-intensive industries and of tolerating labor redundancies in its publicly-owned plants. Outside agrculture, where little room exists for choices between labor-intensive or capital-intensive technologies, there may often be conflicts between employment and efficiency. 43. The Indian Government is not likely to attract much private foreign investment or to relax its control over private industry sufficiently to accelerate industrial growth. It will be up to the government to provide increased funds for economic development, and taxes are already high. Domestic savings are not adequate for the job; public enterprises, which control a still small but growing part of the modern industrial sector, more often than not lose money, and farm savings fluctuate widely from year to year. On balance, in view of the limits imposed by domestic resources and government policy, our best estimate is that the modem manufacturing sector will continue to grow at its’ recent rate of from 6 to 8 percent. If the agricultural sector grows at from 3 to 4 percent, the overall rate of growth of the Indian economy would be from 3.5 to 4.5 percent. If the agricultural sector grows at 4 to 5 percent, the overall rate would average out between 4.5 percent and 5.5 percent annually during the 1970s. 44. Development policies in Pakistan are also subject to conflicting needs which will affect the course and speed of economlc progress. Continuing increases in government spending for infrastructure in the east wing, for example, which may be politically necessary would nonetheless divert resources that might otherwise be used for industrial expansion in the west, which could provide a more immediate return. Similarly, the government’s announced intention to increase spending on social service measures will necessarily slow the growth of investment save in those instances such as rural public works where they aid development. Pakistan’s domestic consumer goods industry, whose buildup has been a major stimulant of industrial expansion, will not grow as rapidly as in the past and the rate of industrial growth is likely to decline somewhat. 45. Further industrial expansion in Pakistan will depend heavily on capital goods industries with their more sophisticated input requirements and on export-oriented industries with their more demanding markets. Although rapid agricultural growth is likely to continue in West Pakistan, the east wing cannot—without huge water-control efforts—accelerate its productivity. In these circumstances Pakistan’s aggregate economic growth appears Iikely to average about 5 percent over the next decade. This is predicated on an annual increase in agricultural production of 4 to 5 percent and in industrial growth of about 7 percent. In the event the two wings should separate, West Pakistan would be likely to recover fairly quickly. By contrast, even massive amounts of development aid would only begin to increase East Pakistan’s productive capacity in the period of this estimate. III. DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES 46. The political implications of economic trends in the subcontinent are difficult to assess. Experience has shown that there is no consistent correlation between political and economic developments there. Economic factors work in conjunction with many others; e.g., linguistic, historical, and religious ones, and often are not the most important of many interacting factors in determining political events. But this is not to say that they are without effect. The conspicuous economic disparity between East and West Pakistan has contributed to the political tension between them. The widespread urban unrest in India was directly abetted by the food shortages and price increase of the mid- and late 1960s. Growing violence and public unrest in India’s West Bengal (particularly in Calcutta) have led a number of industries and businesses to move to other parts of the country, leaving behind worsening economic conditions-and more political disruption. But in general one cannot assume a direct relationship between economic progress or stagnation on the one hand, and political stability or turmoil on the other. 47. Both India and Pakistan are in transitional political eras; in neither case can I we precisely estimate political development over any extended period, though some general trends appear discernible. Pakistan, ruled by General (now President) Yahya Khan’s martial law regime is scheduled to elect a Constituent Assembly in December 1970. The Assembly’s job is to write a constitution, a task it must complete within 120 days or be dissolved. If such a document is produced, it must be approved by President Yahya. The writing of a constitution acceptable to both wings will be a formidable task. A majority of the Assembly will be from East Pakistan; most of these Bengalis will probably be members of the Awami League (AL) led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The AL has demanded virtual autonomy within a weak central federation, and even reparations for past grievances. While the AL’s demands as now formulated are probably greater than most West Pakistanis will be willing to accept, the Bengalis may make concessions in the interests of gaining a share of power in a new govenment system. 48. Even a constitution is promulgated, the maintenance over the long run of a stable government acceptable to both the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis will be extremely difficult and perhaps impossible. The economic and political interests of East and West Pakistan will remain hard to reconcile over the next decade. The West Pakistani troops in the east wing could not hold the lid on indefinitely against concerted resistance. Separation seems more likely than not in the next decade, even though the time and manner of such a breakup cannot be forecast. It might come because of Bengali resentment against what they feel to be economic neglect of political repression, or it might come because of West Pakistani refusal to pay unacceptably high costs for the maintenance of the union. 49. In the event of a separation, both parties would suffer, at least initially, from the disruption of the free flow of goods, services, and capital. The economically viable West, however, would soon recover. The Pakistani Army, made up chiefly of West Pakistanis, could maintain law and security there and would continue to be an important force whatever form of government is ultimately adopted. The east wing would face a highly uncertain future. While much would depend on how the break came, an independent East Pakistan would be one of the principal pockets of poverty in the world, and—sooner or later—one of the most troubled politically. 50. In India the death of Nehru in 1964, the sharp Congress Party losses in the state and national elections of 1967, and the split— which appears likely to last at least through the next elections—of the Congress Party in 1969 have greatly changed the political scene. The breakup of the Congress appears to have been brought on more by personal enmities than clear-cut ideological disputes. Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi’s supporters come much more from the left than from the right, and she has had some success in putting over the image of a populist reformer battling entrenched privilege. Her position seems secure, at least for the moment, as several smaller leftist parties and most independent members refuse to join in any effort to bring her down. 51. National parliamentary elections must be held by early 1972 and may come sooner. Their results are presently unpredictable, but there is at least an even chance that no party, including Mrs. Gandhi’s wing of the Congress, will win a majority of parliamentary seats. The old united Congress always refused to enter into coalitions with rival parties, either in electoral alliances or in coalition governments. Both Congress groups have now abandoned this policy, and the nature of the electoral alliances they can work out will be a principal factor in determining the composition of the next parliament. Mrs. Gandhi might well win enough seats to form a minority government like that she now heads. If she does not, the next government will be a coalition—the first in India’s history. The record of Indian states with coalition regimes gives US few clues as to what might be expected of it. Some state coalitions have been stable and relatively effective, most have not. 52. In any case, future regimes in New Delhi will face difficult challenges. Regional antagonisms will be exacerbated by a number of state governments ruled by parties antagonistic to those in charge at the center. Most state political leaders will seek to enhance their powers and may succeed in weakening the center. The northeastern area of India is likely to remain troubled. Such rebellions as those by the Nagas and the Mizos will flare up periodically in the tribal areas. In West Bengal, parties of the extreme and irresponsible left will remain powerful and will encourage mass disorders in Calcutta and in the countryside. But West Bengal will be the only one of many worries. The major cities of India will remain uneasy. Extremist movements, both of the left and the right, are likely to grow. A small but potentially significant Maoist terrorist movement will continue to foment unrest. Communal antagonisms will also remain major problems with explosive potential. Parts of India will also face food shortages, laggard growth rates, and inadequate employment opportunities. 53. If overall conditions do worsen, the future of India’s political system and of the union itself are likely to be increasingly questioned. The breakup of India cannot be ruled out, but we believe it highly unlikely over the next decade. The country’s great bulk, inertia, and the growing economic interdependence of its several regions will militate against such drastic change. Despite continuing regionalism, a sense of common nationality has developed, with effective institutions to maintain it, e.g., the military and civil services. Indeed, the Indian Army may, in the 1970s, come to play an increasingly important role. Thus were India threatened with a widespread breakdown of public order, the armed forces would probably be able to contain it. Similarly it would be able to suppress, as it has in the case of the Naga and Mizo rebels, a secessionist attempt by any dissident Indian group. 54. The future of India’s present political system over any extended period of time is more difficult to estimate. It appears to have struck fairly deep roots and is but little threatened at present. But it will face serious challenges. These will come, not merely from the various Communist and leftist insurrectionary groups, but from forces of the right as well. These could become quite serious if widespread dissatisfaction and polarization develops in Indian society. In such circumstances, the central government would be forced to rely heavily on the civil and military services to maintain itself against extremist opponents. The leaders of the armed forces are not themselves likely to challenge civilian rule, unless conditions become considerably more serious than we think likely. IV. SOUTH ASIA AND OUTISDE POWERS A. The Current Scene 55. The principle features of India’s and Pakistan’s international relationships appear, at the present time, to be well established and not subject to precipitous change. These include intense suspicion and hostility towards each other—rooted in age-old Hindu-Muslim antagonisms and recent armed conflicts. Neither now wishes a renewal of hostilities. Yet, except for some recent progress towards sharing of the Ganges waters, neither shows itself willing to compromise its basic position on major outstanding issues enough to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust. Prospects for increased cooperation might improve if Bengalis came to enjoy a greater voice in the government of Pakistan. 56. India remains fearful of and hostile toward China. The latter’s developing nuclear capability, its occupation of territory claimed by India, and the possibility that China might combine with Pakistan in an assault on India are matters of extremely serious concern in New Delhi. The present Pakistani rulers, by contrast, see China as a valuable source of arms and of political (and perhaps military) support against a future Indian threat. 57. Both India and Pakistan have cultivated increasingly good relations with the USSR politically and in terms of trade and aid. The USSR shows a great interest in the subcontinent, less for ideological reasons, we believe, than because of such Soviet state interests as the desire for harmonious relations with its near neighbors in the south, the concern to counter China, and the servicing of a gradually expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Since the 1950s, the Soviets have granted substantial economic assistance to India, and beginning in the 1960s large amounts of military supplies. In the last two or three years they have cultivated Pakistan, 11 trying to reduce Chinese influence there and to enhance Soviet leverage. Since at least 1965, Moscow has actively sought to reduce Indo-Pakistani tensions, chiefly to prevent crises which Peking could exploit. 58. Moscow has had some success in its efforts. This is particularly true in the case of India, which now regards its ties with Russia as vital to its defense against China and considers its relationship with the USSR as a special one. At the same time, New Delhi has always insisted on retaining its independence and freedom of action. Thus it has publicly denounced the increasing presence of “foreign”—including Soviet—navies in the Indian Ocean, and has also opposed granting base rights to anyone. Pakistan has similarly shown itself unwilling to act as the Russians wish; while accepting Soviet military and economic assistance, it has not drawn back from its good relations with China. 59. Both India and Pakistan display considerable interest in the Afro-Asian world—India as a prominent nation among the non-aligned and Pakistan as the largest of the Muslim countries. Neither country has, however, substantial bilateral relations with the states of the Afro-Asian world except with such immediate neighbors as Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon. Despite India’s renewed efforts to take a more active part in foreign affairs, it—like Pakistan—is too constrained by limited financial resources and domestic preoccupations to play more than a marginal role in most disputes and issues pertaining to the Afro-Asian world. These limitations are unlikely to be overcome in the near future. In the event of a settlement in Southeast Asia which involved some international peace keeping system, India would expect to participate. Any larger role for India in Southeast Asia would probably require the support of the US and the Soviet Union. Pakistan has little or no interest in Southeast Asia; rather, its concerns within the Afro-Asian world lie westward. 60. India and Pakistan no longer have any special military or political relationships with any of the major non-Communist powers. Pakistan’s ties with SEATO and CENTO are, in effect, dead, and India continues its non-aligned posture. On the other hand the two South Asian powers of course see Western Europe, Japan, and the US as near essential sources of economic assistance for development via continued foreign aid, debt relief, expanded export markets, and large supplies of foodgrains. Beyond this, India and Pakistan still see the US as one of the world’s superpowers and value it as a counter to the influence of the USSR and China in the subcontinent. These considerations, of course, have not assured any great degree of political harmony in US relations with India and Pakistan. B. Prospects for Change 61. The overall foreign relationships of India and Pakistan are at present in a static condition. Neither seeks any major changes in its relations with the great powers or with its immediate neighbors. And there are no readily discernible outside forces or trends which promise to alter this situation, but over the long run there is enough potential for change in both countries to make an enduring static situation unlikely. 62. Thus in Pakistan the emergence of an independent East Bengal would alter relations throughout the area. The effects of an independent East Bengal would depend in large part on how it became independent, the nature of its leadership, and the postures of the great powers toward it. The possibility of an extremist regime emerging there cannot be ruled out; the Indian Government has already shown apprehension that it would become a radical country under Chinese influence. If such a development appeared to be in the offing, New Delhi would move vigorously to counter it and might even use military force. On the other hand, a more moderate East Bengali regime would probably welcome closer ties with India, particularly in the economic field, than would be likely under a united Pakistan dominated by west wingers. 63. Developments in India, too, could bring on major changes. Were the present Congress government to be succeeded by one in which right wing elements were influential, India would adopt a more intransigent attitude towards Indian Muslims and towards Pakistan. Tensions with China would also increase and the Indians would view all major foreign powers, including the US and the USSR, with greater wariness and suspicion than now. Over time, such a government would work to end its dependence on the Soviets for military supplies by building up the country’s already substantial armaments industry; it would also seek to reduce or even to end its reliance on Western financial assistance—though in all these cases such actions would be tempered by its recognition of India’s need for continued external assistance. 64. A right wing Indian government would also be more inclined to manufacture nuclear weapons than would the present one. So far, the Indian Government has rejected this option, though its nuclear program does keep the option open. India now has enough plutonium to manufacture a few low-yield nuclear weapons, and it could probably test a device within a year of a decision to do so. With the completion of a large unsafeguarded reactor in the mid-1970s, the added output of plutonium would make it possible to produce a good many more. But if India were seeking a deterrent against China, it would have to produce nuclear warheads and missiles to deliver them. Given the country’s still fairly limited technical capabilities, it would take India at least 10 years from the time of decision to begin producing an effective advanced weapons system. There is considerable support in India for following such a course. One major inhibition against doing so would be the cost, which would impose a very heavy burden on the economy. Thus, if any Indian government should decide to pursue this course it would have to be at the considerable sacrifice of welfare and development expenditures. 65. Relations of both South Asian states with China could be altered rather quickly. On the one hand, the current cold war standoff between India and China could heat up, say if the buffer states of Nepal or Bhutan experienced revolutionary or chaotic conditions and India, China, or both felt compelled to intervene militarily. On the other, a post-Mao government in Peking might go far in dropping its militant hostility to India. But if such a government also entered into friendlier relations with the Soviets, India would fear a reduction in Soviet support and Soviet military assistance to the Indian Armed Forces. Even if a Sino-Soviet détente appeared in prospect, India would of course seek to retain its ties with Moscow while at the same time trying to take out insurance in the form of further aid and support from the US and other Western states. India also will remain sensitive to any indications of an improvement in US-Chinese relations, fearing that it would lead to a lessening of US support for India. 66. Political and military ties with the West—particularly Pakistan’s but also India’s—have been loosened and there is little prospect of a resumption of the relationships which existed in the 1960s. Western economic aid has been dropping. But South Asian economic needs and expectations are not likely to decline; both countries will thus continue to take leading roles in organizing pressures on the developed world, particularly the US for a more equitable share of the world’s wealth. At the same time, they are likely to find the developed world less interested than before in competing for political gains in India and Pakistan through extensive economic assistance. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R 01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence R. E. Cushman, Jr. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 20, except for the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.” 3 At present Pakistan claims a population of 130 million, India 550 million. Many knowledgeable observers believe the number in both countries is substantially higher. It should be noted that Indian and Pakistani statistics on population and economic performance are none too reliable and should be used only as rough guides. 4 Indian fiscal years beginning 1 April of year stated. 5 It should be noted that neither West Pakistan nor the prospering wheat growing areas of India can feel with any certainty that their problems are solved for good. The disease resistance of their “miracle seeds” is far from established and their output in any given year could be sharply cut by an attack of, say, wheat rust. 6 Indian Fiscal years beginning 1 April of the year cited. 7 The caveats noted earlier respecting aggregate food and population problems apply also to those of economic development. The Karachi district and West Punjab in Pakistan and a number of Indian states, e.g., Gujerat, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu, have made impressive strides in expanding both their industrial and agricultural spheres. The statistics given should be read with the same understanding that they paint a picture that is too gloomy for some regions of South Asia, too bright for others. 8 India spends abroad about $250 million for military purposes each year; $60 million of this is repayment on military credits from the USSR in the form of Indian exports of goods and services. Pakistan spends abroad some $100 million for military purposes. There is little prospect for reductions in these expenditures in the next several years. 9 From fiscal 1967 to fiscal 1969, India’s trade deficit dropped from $1.2 billion to about $300 million. This reduction of the grade gap resulted from increased exports (from $1.6 billion in fiscal 1967 to $1.9 billion in fiscal 1969) and from a dramatic fall in imports (from $2.8 billion to $2.2 billion in the same period). The decline in imports was due partly to reduced food import needs and partly to government efforts to limit development spending to avoid inflation and to conserve foreign exchange. Increased development spending in fiscal 1970 is expected to cause industrial imports to rise, however. a Military aid excluded b In addition, Free World countries also provided about $700 million in foreign exchange for the Indus Basin Scheme in West Pakistan. a From all sources; military aid excluded. India now has about $3 billion either in exchange reserves or pledged sums in the aid pipeline. About $800 million of the latter are pledges of Soviet aid. New authorizations of foreign assistance are declining at rates considerably faster than drawdowns. Thus in 1969 the Western Aid-to-India Consortium pledged some $600–700 million in new non-food aid, the USSR nothing. b Fiscal year begins 1 April of stated year. c Some 80 percent to 85 percent of which are PL 480 imports from the US. a From all sources; military aid excluded. Pakistan now has about $1 billion either in exchange reserves or pledged sums in the aid pipeline. About $100 million of the latter are pledges of Soviet aid. New pledges of foreign assistance are declining. b /b/ Fiscal year ends 1 July of stated year. c PL 480. 10 These figures assumed a continued increase in non-traditional exports. 11 Soviet military assistance to India (1961-present) amounts to over $700 million; to Pakistan (1968-present) to some $50 million. 86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: FY 1971 AID Program Loan for Pakistan State (Tab A) recommends that you approve a $100 million FY 1971 AID program loan to Pakistan and be the first to inform President Yahya when you see him on October 25. Background Under Yahya, Pakistan has performed well economically in the face of severe droughts, decreasing foreign aid, and serious political problems. However, a complicated foreign exchange system has resulted in extensive controls on trade and investment which have led to under-utilized industrial capacity and inefficiency in the industrial sector. Pakistan, consulting with the IMF and World Bank, has now decided to reform its foreign exchange system to provide for greater reliance on market forces to determine the allocation of scarce foreign exchange. This should increase the use of existing plant capacity and improve the efficiency of the industrial sector. This has not been an easy decision for President Yahya to make. He had initially felt he had to postpone it until after elections, which were originally scheduled for September. Despite postponement of the elections until December, he has apparently decided to go ahead with the devaluation next month if details can be worked out. Details of the reform are still being negotiated with the IMF, which has tentatively agreed to provide a standby agreement of $125 million. These funds would be used in support of Pakistan’s currency during the initial stages of the reform when reserves may be drawn down by the initial surge in demand for imports under the liberalized scheme, and confidence in Pakistan’s currency may be low. The United Kingdom and Canada have indicated they would provide additional program loans in order to supply Pakistan with additional foreign exchange for the same purpose. Given U.S. budgetary restraints and the probability that some aid funds will have to be re-allocated to Cambodia, State proposes a program loan of $100 million (last year’s program loan was $103 million, plus a $13 million project loan.) Had the exchange reform not materialized, AID would have recommended $80 million for Pakistan to be provided next February or March, after the Congressional appropriation was passed and apportioned. To support the exchange reform, however, AID has (1) added $20 million and (2) proposed commitment of the full $100 million now as an indication of support for Yahya in a difficult move just before elections and as an inducement to other consortium members to follow suit. Although we would be pledging funds before the AID appropriation was passed, this would be possible under continuing resolution authority. There is some risk in commiting funds before we learn the appropriation figure and before we can take into account the amount which will be needed for Cambodia. If the appropriation figure were lower than expected, or contingencies higher, we might have to significantly cut other programs. However, Yahya’s reform is of such potential economic significance in Pakistan that there is general agreement that the risk is manageable for this purpose. If you approve this loan, you might indicate to Yahya, at your meeting with him on Sunday, that we are pleased that Pakistan appears to be on the verge of success in working out an effective exchange reform program and that— assuming successful completion of negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank and the Consortium—the United States will support it by signing a $100 million FY-71 AID program loan at that time, several months earlier than we would normally do so. A more cautious approach would be to provide an initial tranche of $50 million, leaving the full year’s total to be decided later. This, however, might be regarded by Pakistan as lack of support for their reform program which we have long advocated. RECOMMENDATION That you approve State’s recommendation of a $100 million FY-71 AID program loan to Pakistan, assuming successful completion of the reform negotiations. (Treasury, OMB—Tab B—and Bill Timmons concur.) Approve Disapprove, prefer that we provide an initial tranche of $50 million, leaving the full year’s total to be decided later. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. An October 22 covering memorandum from Bergsten transmitted the memorandum and attachments to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum that the proposed program loan to Pakistan was “approved on basis of oral instruction by President.” Accordingly, Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on October 28. Attached but not published at Tab A was an undated memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to Nixon recommending authorization for a $100 million program loan to Pakistan. Attached but not published at Tab B was an undated memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, in which Shultz concurred with Irwin’s recommendation. 87. Telegram Secto 52 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 87. Telegram Secto 52 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 New York, October 22, 1970, 2046Z Subj: Sec Visit UNGA: Secretary’s Conversation With Pakistan President Yahya Summary: Yahya expressed pleasure with removal of U.S arms embargo. Regarding Pakistan elections he envisaged six months period after Constituent Assembly established before constitution could be drafted and new government established. If things do not go as planned Yahya did not know what would happen—perhaps a plebescite. Secretary advised that a new PL 480 program was nearing completion and President Nixon would have more to say on this subject. Considerable discussion about me with Yahya stating that result his meetings in Cairo he believed Sadat would follow Nasser policy but could go no further re peace. He felt UAR keen on settlement but needs help—otherwise UAR will be in “desperate straits”. Secretary pointed out dangers if GA debate should result in undermining Res. 242. End summary. 1. Conversation took place in room 35A of Waldorf at 10:15 a.m. October 21. US participants were Secretary, Asst. Secy Sisco, and Slator Blackiston. Pakistani participants were President Yahya; Foreign Secretary Khan; Ambassador to U.S Agha Hilaly; Ambassador Agha Shahi; PermRep; Mr. Nayek; Director UN Affairs in Foreign Ministry; and Mr. Zahir Fahooqi, Minister, Pakistan Embassy, Washington. 2. Secretary expressed pleasure that President Yahya was in U.S., said President Nixon was looking forward to their meeting. Secretary believed that relations between our two countries have improved. President agreed. “Your decision (re arms) has been most welcome in Pakistan”. 3. Secretary said we always have problem with Soviets but when we indicate desire to get along in a reasonable way some people think this means the US is getting soft or may be losing interest. He felt the Russians now understand that our desire to get along does not mean a weakening of resolve. President said that U.S. has been brought into a position where it must shoulder world problems. He believed U.S. posture of moderation was appreciated by both Russians and Communist Chinese even though this not stated publicly. Secretary noted that USSR had closed our air corridor to Berlin on eve of 4-power meeting during certain hours when we normally do not use the corridor. We had accordingly sent aircraft into Berlin at precisely the time the Russians had closed it. When Gromyko came here Secretary asked him what this was all about since the Soviet Union had professed a desire for better relations. Gromyko blamed it all on a subordinate’s decision. Secretary had said that this was a little hard to take but if this is what Gromyko wanted to say he would accept it. 4. Secretary asked about elections in Pakistan. Yahya said some of “his” politicians had made the charge that the elections had been postponed because of U.S. arm twisting. President said he could find no connection between two elements. With Ramadan coming politicians should cool off. After elections and the formation of the Constituent Assembly next step is drafting of a new constitution. Pakistan already has had three constitutions and the constitituions of most countries are all about the same. Just a few changes here and there to suit the particular situation. For pakistan it is a matter of allocation of powers between the federal government and the provinces. “If they cannot draft a constitution in 120 days they will never do so.” Secretary observed that the separation of powers between the federal government and the states is not precise in the U.S. Constitution. We owe much to the interpretations handed down by John Marshall. President believed that in “first stage” there would be a coalition government. He (Yahya) would appoint a Prime Minister and then a President would be elected. When this took place Yahya would lift martial law. All of this should take about six months. Secretary said this sounds good and we will watch with interest as it develops. President remarked that holding of elections was difficult but the later stages would be even more so. If a constitution is not drafted “I don’t know what will happen—perhaps a plebescite. The biggest mistake made by previous administration was that it considered the country one unit which it is most [ not ?]. 5. Secretary said a new PL 480 agreement is in the final stages. He thought the President would have some more to say on this subject. Mr. Sisco said that we were looking at various projects for flood relief and control in East Pakistan. 6. President observed that repayment of loans to aid donors is costing almost as much as new aid received. Ambassador Hilaly said the American record is very good as our aid terms are the best. He hoped USG could speak to other donor countries whose terms are more onerous. Secretary observed that many countries are approaching us not with complaints about our actions but asking us to use our influence with other countries. This is not always easy. 7. Secretary referred to the case of President Kaunda of Zambia. Secretary explained how the President had tried to readjust his schedule to meet Kaunda and had offered October 19 at 9:30 a.m. We were told by the Zamiban Mission this was satisfactory even though meant Kaunda speech had to be rescheduled. We made public announcement of meeting. We have told Kaunda that if President Nixon intended to snub him he would know it. [Omitted here is a concluding discussion of the Middle East.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also designated USUN 2646. Sent with a request to repeat to Rawalpindi, Cairo, and Amman. 88. Telegram Secto 70 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 88. Telegram Secto 70 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 New York, October 24, 1970, 1900Z Subj: Secretary’s Visit to UN: Call on Prime Minister Gandhi. 1. Summary. Secretary raised US arms sale to Pakistan and expressed hope Indian reactions would be kept in perspective. Prime Minister made clear that GOI was agitated over issue and expressed belief reaction would become even more extreme when Parliament convenes in November. She claimed arms given to Pakistan could only be used against India. At request Foreign Minister, Secretary agreed US to consider making clearer publicly that arms package was one-time exception. Secretary pointed out that many actions of GOI appeared unbalanced against US and contrary to India’s expressed policy of non-alignment. Foreign Minister claimed India makes its own policy and not result Soviet pressure. Secretary pointed out difficulty USG had with members of Congress, particularly House Appropriations Committee, who felt India not pursuing a balanced approach. Prime Minister made oblique and unspecific accusations that US interfering in Indian internal affairs. Efforts of Secretary and Sisco to elicit specific charges were unavailing. A meeting was arranged between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Singh for Saturday, October 24, to discuss Indian accusations further. 2. Place: Carlyle Hotel, Mrs. Gandhi’s suite. Participants: Secretary Sisco, Schneider and Blackiston. Indians: Prime Minister Gandhi, Foreign Minister Sawarn Singh; Foreign Secretary T.K. Kaul; Ambassador to US Jha; Mr. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister. 3. As conversations opened, Secretary expressed hope that FonMin Singh could stay on and see him in Washington after sign indicated his plan to return with Prime Minister. 4. Secretary indicated pleasure at opportunity to talk with Mrs. Gandhi. Raising subject US offer of military equipment to Pakistan, Secretary said he had been authorized to say on behalf of the President that this was one-time decision. It does not at all involve going any further. It does not represent the beginning of a new policy or any change in policy. Secretary explained we appreciated views of GOI on US offer and hoped Indian reaction was under control and in perspective. 5. Mrs. Gandhi replied that reaction in press and among political parties would become more sharp when Parliament convenes. When Secretary indicated US accustomed to criticism, Mrs. Ghadhi replies this was not unfair criticism. Just at point when it seemed there could be better relations the spiral starts again. Secretary inquired if our decision had effect on Indo-Pak relations. Prime Minister replied this has hurt relations between US and India. Pakistan will step up its propaganda. “They cannot use arms against anyone but us.” “We do not think china is going to attack us but we cannot withdraw our forces from the frontiers.” Pak does not have this problem. “Reaction in India is very sharp.” 6. Secretary said we think we have done the right thing. He expressed surprise that Indians have not reacted similarly against Russia and France for their arms supply to Pakistan. Prime Minister indicated same objections prevail to Russian arms supply. Pakistan, she said, has already used US arms against us despite pledges previously made. When a country starts collecting arms sooner or later it will use them. Secretary replied we are just not in a position to cut off our relations with Pakistan. We have done a great deal economically for both India and Pakistan. Prime Minister expressed view that US relations with Pakistan would not suffer even if no arms given. Secretary said we considered our position to be balanced between India and Pakistan. However, we have not always felt India’s non-aligned policy balanced. Secretary repeated his authorization by President to state that Pakistan arms deal was one-time affair. He expressed desire for good relations and said USG does not wish to do things to hurt India but we do have to take into consideration US national interest. We wish to cooperate with India, but feel US has been unfairly criticized by GOI. Prime Minister said India has had much in common with US but “some things affect us deeply.” 7. Secretary responded that “some matters affect us deeply.” He noted US casualties of over 40,000 Americans killed in Vietnam. Regarding Vietnam we have done everything we have been asked to do. We have unanimity of US public opinion regarding this issue and many non-aligned countries near hostilities agree with us. Prime Minister expressed belief US desired to stop spread of communism and contain China. We don’t think it has done this. Secretary said policy has succeeded with countries on periphery of China. They have done very well economically and they are appreciative of our efforts. The farther you get from the scene, the less appreciation there is. Prime Minister said time will tell. Secretary noted that in Cambodia the population supports Lon Nol government. Foreign Minister noted that India is the closest to China having mutual frontier. Secretary inquired whether India did not have concern over China. Foreign Minister said “yes, we do.” Prime Minister said Pakistan has very close relations with China. Sisco noted that this is why US thinks that we should have good relations with Pakistan Government; more influence US has in Pakistan better it is for Indian American parallel interests. 8. Kaul said Pakistan will get more arms from China and Soviets used same argument regarding supply of arms to Pakistan that US does. Sisco expressed hope current situation would not be blown out of all proportions. The arms agreement with Pakistan was a one-time exception. Foreign Minister said it was difficult for GOI to state in Parliament that it was “one time” unless USG had said this in public. Secretary responded that “we can think about this.” Schneider noted that Ambassador Keating has already told press in New Delhi it was one-time exception. Kaul raised question of whether it was “limited” exception or “one time” exception. Secretary and Sisco said USG will consider making clearer publicly that this was a one-time exception. 9. Secretary observed that US and India have had good relations and it would not be desirable to let this situation get out of hand. US Congress does not think India appreciates what we have done for it. Congress believes India’s non-aligned policy is aligned against us and this is attitude of many people on the House Appropriations Committee. We appreciate Prime Minister views but we have reaction in our own country. Prime Ministry said “this is because they don’t understand what India stands for. We are fighting for our survival.” She stated that if she approved a policy contrary to that which she was following, she would be “wiped out.” “I have been fighting for this all my life.” The people know I am trying to take the country in a direction they want it to go. Indian people will not have a dictatorship. “They are too politically conscious.” India has never done something just because the USSR wants it. Our decisions are our own. However, the USSR generally follows policies of the Afro-Asian countries. 10. Secretary noted US has fought wars for freedom. US does not expect everyone to agree with us but we do not like unjustified criticism. We have done a lot for many countries. Every American in this room has fought not only for our freedom but for that of other countries as well. Prime Minister said she does not personally care who criticized her either inside or out of the country. She did whatever was necessary “even if it cost her her life.” 11. Prime Minister said that since we are speaking frankly “there is a great deal of interference in our internal affairs.” Secretary asked for explanation and details. What was the Prime Minister referring to? He noted that former FonMin Denesh Singh had made similar accusations about our cultural centers. Prime Minister said “it is very difficult to say. It is support to people who are against us.” “In my father’s time it was to those people who opposed him.” Secretary said if there was anything Prime Minister could point to, we will certainly stop it. He said he was very unhappy about the previous Foreign Minister’s comments about our cultural centers. “I wrote him and asked him what he meant.” He replied that he didn’t mean us but then only our centers were closed. Secretary said he would like Foreign Minister to think about what had been said and let him know the specifics. Sisco commented that we did not know what Prime Minister meant when she referred in recent speech to economic pressured. He said that when US gives india millions of dollars of aid it is for common purposes and not with political strings. We do not understand such references to pressures. Secretary said we have no desire to pressure you. The easiest thing for the US is to become isolationist. 12. Secretary and Sisco will meet privately with Foreign Minister Singh and Ambassador Jha in follow-up meeting Saturday, October 24. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Also designated USUN 2711. Sent with a request to repeat to New Delhi and Rawalpindi. In an October 26 letter to Keating, Schneider described the conversation between Gandhi and Rogers as “a very difficult one,” but he felt that the exchange was colored by the fact that both were tired at the end of a stressful day of meetings and speeches. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970) Gandhi set the tone for the meeting by declining an invitation from Nixon to attend a dinner the President was hosting in Washington for heads of state attending the General Assembly. (Telegrams 173630 and 176269 to New Delhi, October 21 and 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA, and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 Jun 71) Jha explained that Gandhi’s decision related to scheduling commitments on her return trip to India, but Keating saw it as a “studied affront related in large part to our decision to sell arms to Pakistan.” (Telegram 12939 from New Delhi, October 19; ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, Box 519, 1966–1972: Lot 71 D 227, CF 469) 89. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 89. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 24, 1970, 6:20 p.m. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] R: I had two interesting talks with the Indians. It was like lancing a boil. K: Because of Pakistan? R: Yes, she really let her hair down. She said we were against her father and her. She said she resented our pressure and our activities. I said just tell us what you have in mind and we’ll stop it. I said it’s a little difficult for us; we’ve been in office only 20 months and you are holding against us a paranoia going back to John Foster Dulles. K: That’s good. It’s interesting considering her father was the darling of the American intellectuals. R: When it was over I said to the Foreign Minister let’s continue this. So he came over to my apartment this morning. He told me how they feel about out aid. I told him we are not interested in having them indebted to us. I said all we want is a little friendship; everything we get from them is almost acrimonious. K: I think this will help. They are just probing until they meet a little resistance. They have a terrible paranoia. R: I said do you think we are doing something? I said I don’t think Keating has done it—he’s a pretty acute person. It was a very interesting discussion. It may get a little bit better now. K: Once they know where they stand and with whom they are dealing it may get a lot better. I think you’ll have a better time with them now. R: I said give us a list of specifics. I said if we are faced only with suspicions and animosities from years gone by there’s nothing we can do. He said our aid mission should be reduced. I said we’ve reduced it considerably from what it was; don’t you know that? He said yes. I said then why don’t you thank us instead of just complaining more. K: I think it is paranoia. They are suffering because they were the leading non-aligned country and now they’re just another undeveloped one. R: I gave her a going over on Vietnam. She spoke against us at the UN. She got dramatic and said “I would give my life for freedom.” I said we are giving our lives for it. We’ve lost ____ Americans and ____ more casualties and we don’t like it at all when you are so critical about what we’ve done. I also gave them a going over about cultural centers. I said you accused us publicly, you had no evidence, you didn’t even speak to us privately before you made your public charge. I said it’s false and we resent it. K: I think your relations with them are going to improve. If you watch them dealing with each other ... outside they play this moral game, but inside they are tough as hell. I don’t know what more we could have done for them. They get 40 percent of our aid budget. We penalized Pakistan with an arms embargo. R: We’ve done everything we could. I went there; the President went there. If things done to her father bug her and she doesn’t trust us ... K: Kennedy practically slobbered over her. R: I know. I just thought you’d be interested. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are as transcribed. For Rogers’ conversation with Singh on the morning of October 24, see Document 92 . 90. Memorandum of Conversation 90. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 25, 1970, 10:49–11:45 a.m. SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and Pakistan President Yahya President Yahya was in the United States on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. Yahya is tough, direct, and with a good sense of humor. He talks in a very clipped way, is a splendid product of Sandhurst and affects a sort of social naivete but is probably much more complicated than this. The President began the conversation by saying that we have had difficult times in our relationships with our allies produced by Congressional opposition, but that we will stick by our friends. And we consider Pakistan our friend. He mentioned the hundred million dollar program loan of AID. President Yahya thanked the President for the Military Assistance Program, particularly for the release of some B–57s and the equipment. The President said, “There is a psychosis in this country about India; we will keep our word with Pakistan however; we will work with you; we will try to be as helpful as we can.” Yahya said, “We appreciate this; our friendship is not new. We were surrounded by enemies when we became friends. We are no longer surrounded by enemies but we will still remain friends. We are a sentimental people and we will never do anything to embarrass you, and I will try to be helpful to you on our visit to Moscow.” He said it would be unthinkable that in Pakistan people would deliver a broken alarm clock to Keating, to an American Ambassador because he overslept when he should have seen the Indian Prime Minister off at the airport. (This referred to the fact that Keating overslept when Madame Ghandi left for the United States and, contrary to diplomatic custom, was not at the airport.) The President said, “Your people are too proud to do a thing like that.” Yahya said, “We will never put you in an embarrassing position. Your gesture to give us military assistance against all advice is appreciated by our people. I hope your consortium can make a major contribution. Sato has told us he would be willing to help if you make a significant contribution.” The President asked me to comment on this. I said that the hundred million dollar program loan comprised 80 million dollars of economic aid and 20 million dollars to help with devaluation, and it was a larger program than of the previous year. We were doing what we could and we hoped that this would be enough to elicit a substantial Japanese contribution. The President turned to me and ordered me to do what I could to encourage assistance to Pakistan. Yahya then said elections are set for December 7. He had been accused by Bhutto of delaying so that he could deal with Mrs. Ghandi in New York and sell out Pakistan. It was absurd the levels to which political opponents would stoop. The President said, “I hope you keep a strong Presidency as in France.” Yahya said, “Without it Pakistan would disintegrate. Our people like the Parliamentary system only because they have been ruled by Britain for so many centuries, but they cannot make it work and they do not have the basic prerequisite, namely a two-party system; we have about 35 parties.” The President said, “I understand you are going to Peking.” Yahya explained how it came about. He said Chou En-Lai had originally been slated to go to Pakistan and had said he would make no other foreign visit until he had visited Pakistan. However, he had had to go to North Korea for a ceremonial visit and had communicated with Yahya before leaving, telling him that he was aware of his promise and apologizing for not keeping it. He had, however, hoped that Yahya would pay him a visit and therefore was going to Peking. The President said “It is essential that we open negotiations with China. Whatever our relations with the USSR or what announcements are made I want you to know the following: (1) we will make no condominium against China and we want them to know it whatever may be put out; (2) we will be glad to send Murphy or Dewey to Peking and to establish links secretly.” Yahya said he had once been told to establish secret links and had communicated it to the Chinese who had replied whether this meant that the United States was thinking of a hot line to Peking similar to the one that existed to Moscow. The President said, no, that wasn’t what he meant; he was willing to send ambassadors. I interrupted to say when we talked about secret links we meant a form of communication less visible than Warsaw. One more susceptible to enabling the parties to say what was really on their minds and yet have absolute discretion. If we could find some mutually convenient capital such as, for example, Rawalpindi or conceivably Paris, the President might consider sending a senior person. The President said he would be prepared to send me, or since I was too busy he might send somebody else, but at any rate he was prepared to establish a high-level contact. Yahya said he would explain this to the Chinese. He continued, “The Chinese are going to change with affluence. Mao talked to me on my previous visit to Peking of permanent revolution; he had said ‘Americans hope we will die out, but no, I will teach every child from the day he is born to be a revolutionary.’ And I must say he kept his word in the cultural revolution.” Yahya said he had been fascinated when he was in China, but when he left Canton he said, “Thank God.” It was an oppressive experience. Yahya then turned to the Middle East and said, “They will have a shaky period to get over the settling down.” He had had a chance to meet Sadat. He’s no Nasser. He’s more reasonable and not as strong. Nasser had taken a bold step in recognizing the Rogers plan; Sadat cannot possibly go beyond what Nasser did. Why don’t we go on with the talks. We can go on only with what Nasser had promised to do. The President said, “What is needed is a face-saving device for both sides. Israel can’t accept breach of promise; Sadat can’t accept going beyond Nasser. What is needed is time to bring Israel around.” The meeting ended with the President again assuring Yahya of his friendship. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, edited in the NSC for distribution to the Department of State, indicates that Kissinger was present and took the notes on which the memorandum was based. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 91. Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 91. Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, October 26, 1970, 1528Z Subject: US Arms for Pakistan 1. Persistently critical Indian press and other comment on arms decision reached new heights of volume and intensity in recent days stimulated by headlined reports from New York October 25–26 that Mrs. Gandhi had told Secretary Rogers privately, and US people on “Meet the Press,” that US arms will harden Pakistan’s attitude toward India. Ambassador’s inadvertent non-appearance at airport and non-acceptance by Mrs. Gandhi of President’s dinner invitation were also exploited to symbolize deep chill in Indo-American relations evoked by arms decision. As consequence, average attentive Indian’s interest on arms issue was heightened and public manifestation of popular displeasure increased. 2. Major themes in criticism/commentary on arms decision in large number editorials and “analyses” October 24–26 (texts USINFO) were: (A) US shoring up pro-American elements in West Pakistan establishment prior to election, although these elements have always had vested interest in being anti-Indian (National Herald (NH) October 26.) (B) It apparent to all, including us, that Pakistan arming self against India. In lengthy article October 26, “US Arms supply to Pakistan—the why and what of it,” NH noted, “unlike the fifties, there is no pretense in America this time that Pakistan requires American arms for defense against communists. American officials know full well why Pakistan wants these ... Pakistan has openly said its arms build-up is aimed against India.” Edit in October 26 Patriot also played this theme. (C) With each promise of arms Pakistan becomes more bellicose toward India. Hindustan Times, in reporting October 25–26, Mrs. Gandhi’s talks in New York, cited Yahya Khan’s comments on Kashmir during UN speech as evidence Pak intransigence growing. NH edit October 24 hit same chord: “Every time there is fresh spurt of US military aid to Pakistan her leaders have assumed aggressive attitudes, and their first step is to raise matter at UN.” (D) US decision contributes to arms race which will bleed India economically and perhaps drive country toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. Statesman of October 24, and NH October 26 wrote that most recent discussions of India’s numerical military superiority over Pakistan failed take into account length of India’s borders, country threatened by two putative enemies, and Pakistan’s military better-equipped than India’s (sic). According to analysis, “spurt given to armament race in subcontinent by US is bound generate pressures in this country ... for more arms and larger defense allocations creating new strains on our finances. Second, extremist elements in country will step up activities to undermine democratic institutions and orderly way of life ... One development, not taken into consideration by American administration, is that public opinion in India may now compel government to go nuclear and make dreaded ‘bomb’. This will not only escalate armament race between various countries of world, but will also encourage proliferation of nuclear armament.” (E) Ironic that US has decided try wean Pakistan from China through arms supply at time when USSR has concluded it cannot or should not do so. (In reporting GOI talks with Secretary Rogers, Hindu wrote, “there have been reports Soviet Union has actually slowed down its arms deliveries to Pakistan.) NH edit on “Indo-US Relations,” October 26, said, “... Soviet arms supply, also meant to wean her (Pakistan) from US and China, disturbed Indian people much, and it was made known. While Soviet Union has withdrawn from race, US has resumed Dulles policy, and this has disturbed even traditional Indian friends of US. Soviet Union has, besides, had the achievement of the Tashkent declaration ... when India wants nothing but peace at home and abroad and when her main attention devoted to development, no big power which disturbs political and economic progress in region can be considered friendly ... US administration doing grave harm and American people not yet returning to normalcies of peaceful society. Till that normalcy achieved, Indo-US relations cannot be normal.” 3. Indian press reports on Yahya Khan’s comings and goings in US have alleged that if Yahya were to see President in private session as rumored, Yahya would ask that arms package include tanks and more planes. 4. In report from New York October 24, Indian Express’ Parasuram reported that only unequivocal statement from President Nixon that there will not be further exceptions to restrictive arms policy in favor Pakistan likely allay Indian fears of long-term US intentions. This same comment frequently made privately to EmbOffs by working level GOI officials, media leaders and other intelligentsia. 5. L.N. Mishra, Minister of State for Foreign Trade, and previously Minister of State Defense Production, reportedly told newsmen in Patna October 23, that present US decision “discriminates” against India. Mishra said that although America had promised in wake of 1962 Indo-China war to modernize Indian ordnance factories, US, consistent with its decision suspend arms aid to India and Pakistan at time Indo-Pak war, had, in September, 1965, understandably ordered six ships carrying materiel to turn around, though near Indian shores. US had explained it did not wish contribute to tension. According Mishra, India cannot feel safe with new prospect of American “bombers” arriving soon in Pakistan. (All major papers except Patriot reported Mishra’s remarks as above. According Patriot, Mishra also said that US and Soviet arms to Pakistan cannot be equated, since Soviets and socialist bloc have stood by India at times of stress and helped with arms, whereas US and UK always let India down in hour of need. Patriot alleges Mishra said Soviet Union and other socialist countries have always made military supply deliveries ahead of schedule, while US and UK never supplied on time.) 6. Weekend brought further demonstrations and visitors to USIS and Embassy. New Delhi 13279 reported forward bloc demonstration at USIS. M.L. Sondhi, Jana Sangh MP, brought few of Delhi’s “common people” to see DCM October 24 to protest arms decision. Ruling Congress representatives from party committee in Delhi suburb left at Embassy October 25 memorandum to President calling arms decision “unfriendly ... fatal to peace in Asia,” and certain to lead to greater Indian arms expenditures. October 26 at Kanpur, Ambassador’s car surrounded and his convocation speech interrupted by jeering students. 7. October 26, K.L. Gupta, Jana Sangh MP, told EmbOff arms supply will be main issue in next session parliament. He alleged ruling Congress already in touch with Jana Sangh to work out common line. Gupta lamented that Mrs. Gandhi has played issue so cleverly (including declining President’s dinner) that Jana Sangh will have to toe her line. He said most Jana Sangh (and, by implication, Mrs. Gandhi’s other opponents) can do is contrast GOI reaction to American arms with its reaction to Soviet arms to Pakistan. As footnote, he said that in long run Jana Sangh (ultra nationalist) will benefit from “anti-Indian” decision of US, an estimate which many thinking Indians have made to EmbOffs past three weeks. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA. 92. Telegram 176436 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India and the Mission to the United Nations 92. Telegram 176436 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India and the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 27, 1970, 1357Z 1. Secretary and Foreign Minister Singh had hour-and-fifteen minute talk Saturday, October 24, with only Ambasaador Jha and Sisco present as follow up to briefer meeting held previously with Prime Minister Gandhi. Meeting revealed very deep suspicion which GOI has re US policy, primarily emanating from what they consider to be past difficulties. Meeting provided opportunity for frank exchange of concerns which both sides have with respect to each other’s policy. Secretary stressed that our approach to assistance has not been to create indebtedness but to create friendship between US in fact and in tone. Meeting concluded with both Secretary and Singh agreeing to try to approach future problems with a USUN clean slate. 2. In what appeared to be a defensive tone, Singh started conversation by saying that PM Gandhi’s remarks on previous evening should be taken in spirit of candor and friendship. Secretary accepted this but reiterated that if India has any complaints regarding what we are doing then it is necessary for them to state them clearly and specifically rather than to base any charges on vague suspicions, past and present. After long exchange in which Singh time and again reflected Indian suspicion of US policy going back to 1954, Foreign Minister complaints boiled down to following: That we have too many AID personnel in India; that there are examples of US officials trying to affect the direction of Indian economic policy on basis of our own favored ideology; that Embassy has more contacts with opposition groups, and in particular one party, than with Indian governmental officials; and that all US invitations to Indian state officials and political leaders should be checked out with Foreiqn Ministry or at least Ministry should be kept informed. 3. Exchange became direct and sharp at times. Secretary stressed strongly the following points: We want friendly relations with India and will continue to work to this end though we believe that India’s policy of non-alignment has been much more critical of US than of other side. We feel in this regard India has been unbalanced in its approach; we are speaking primarily of what this administration has but done though we are prepared to justify the past, but not on vague and unsubstantiated charges going back 10 or 15 years. We feel that India has been unfair in its public criticism of the US. (We agreed to give them a catalogue of such Indian statements.) We have substantially reduced our AID personnel since the new Administration has taken over and we are prepared to look at this again in concert with Ambassador Keating; Our Embassy in Delhi, like all our embassies all over the world, is under instructions to have broad contacts with all strata of society, just as the Indian Embassy has such broad and diverse contacts in US to which we offer absolutely no objection; that inevitably in two big democracies bankers see bankers, industrial leaders see industrial leaders, etc. There is no US policy of working against present government. We continue to be prepared to examine anything specific which the Government of India brings to us indicating we are interfering in its affairs. Secretary said we are not interested in in being where we are not wanted. Our problem is this: to convince the Congress that the amount of money we provide India is worth it in light of the unfair criticism of US by India; that in the UN, for example, India has time and again taken positions that in our judgment do not reflect impartiality between the two sides. 4. Secretary said he glad conversation had taken place since he detected great deal of narrow-minded suspicion based on things that may have happened in past. He stressed that our purpose is not to create indebtedness but to develop friendly relations, both in content and in tone. He elaborated in considerable detail the unwarranted behavior of India in closing the cultural centers saying this was politically motivated, that it was done because some politicians thought it was politically advantageous to be critical of US. Secretary did not accept Singh’s contention that such actions were not politically motivated. Secretary several times repeated we will consider any charges made that are specific and would take appropriate action if any charges made were found to have content. 5. Singh then turned to importance which India attaches to US not closing options for India. He maintained that India wants to treat USSR and US on par. We indicated this would be satisfactory but we do not have impression that we are being so treated. Singh said India does not want to put all of its to eggs into one basket. He contended that India turned to Soviets for arms only after it was unable to get them from US and UK. He insisted that their public statements were based on their own assessments as to what is realistic, not to curry favor with Soviets. Equally, Secretary insisted that a number of these statements were made by Indian officials because they felt it was politically beneficial to attack the US. As for our decision on PAK arms, we made it principally for reason mentioned by Singh: we do not want to leave PAKS to mercy of only ChiComs and Soviets. Secretary also made clear that he not only objected to content of public Indian statements but also fact that they were voiced in an unfriendly manner. He said we feel that India tends to brush off our assistance. He stressed that public utterances should be directed at creating friendship with US not suspicion. We are not trying to create a situation where Indians feel indebted to us. 6. Conversation then focussed briefly on discussion of Vietnam and Middle East. Talk concluded on positive note that US and India could approach future difficulties from a clean slate. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on October 26 by Sisco and approved by Eliot. Sent to New Delhi eyes only for Keating and to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Charles W. Yost. 93. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 93. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, November 8, 1970, 0535Z Subj: Arms Supply to Pakistan Ref: Rawalpindi 8682 1. The primary purpose of my call on President Yahya Nov 6 was to deliver to him the original of President Nixon’s letter to President Yahya dated October 15, 1970 setting forth in specific terms the arms package for Pakistan. This led to an extended discussion on the subject, expanded to include the adverse reprecussions which the US is experiencing in india. President Yahya said that he viewed these developments with real regret because he realized that the U.S., with justification, was attempting to maintain good relations with the GOI and that he regretted the agitation which had developed in India over what was meaningful, but in reality, a token gesture to Pakistan. 2. During the conversation on the specifics involved in the package, I alluded to the fact that Pakistan’s F–104s were of special manufacture and that the only similar ones presently flying were those which had been provided to King Hussein. I added that to modify other F–104 models to make them compatible with the F–104s which Pakistan had, the financial cost was going to be, I felt, not only exorbitant but out of proportion to the worth of the plane itself. Quite surprisingly, President Yahya suggested that, as a means of helping King Hussein and GOP, a constructive step might be taken by delivery of Pakistan’s F–104s to King Hussein and by their replacement with a full squadron of F–5s. I said that this was an idea that appeared to be worth exploring and that I would ascertain what my government’s reaction would be to it. It is to be recalled that I posed this possibility to Secretary Rogers during my discussion with him on September 25, and strongly recommended that this as an option should be explored, both for economic and political reasons. FYI: It is understood that Jordan desires six F–104-As and one F–104-B which would cost with appropriate modifications approximately 1.6 million dollars. 3. President Yahya explained his interest in the F–5s as compared to the F–104s was based upon both his belief that the F–104s were becoming outmoded, and that Pakistan’s defense required short-range highly maneuverable interceptors as opposed to more sophisticated long-range fighters. At this juncture I mentioned that Air Marshal Rahim had indicated to Gen. Collins a certain degree of disinterest in the B–57s and I asked him for his comment. With reference to the B–57s he said that his thinking on this type of aircraft was in keeping with the obsolescence concept of the F–104s and that GOP needed interceptors rather than medium-range bombers of this class. He added that his remarks should not be considered a turn-down of the B–57s. 4. President Yahya stated that he personally was extremely pleased with President Nixon’s offer which he recognized as a gesture of sincere friendship, knowing full well that the US also recognized the fact that Pakistan’s military requirement was much greater than the proposed package. President Yahya said that he had no intention of embarassing President Nixon by asking for any other categories of weapons or attempting to use President Nixon’s decision as an opening wedge to present a shopping list or to complicate United States’ posture in its foreign policy. 5. Yahya noted that his armed forces were greatly in need of 300 armored personnel carriers which were part of the package and that he had directed his Defense Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed to begin negotiations at once, adding that he was presently carrying on conversations with Air Marshal Rahim and other high-ranking oficials in the air force regarding the US offer of various aircraft. 6. President Yahya said that he was meeting with Air Marshal Rahim tommorow, Nov. 7, and asked that I meet with them also for a general discussion. I agreed to do so. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Sent with a request to pass to the White House and Secretary of Defense. 94. Memorandum of Conversation 94. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 9, 1970, 2:40–3:20 p.m. Participants: L. K. Jha, Ambassador of India Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff The Ambassador had asked to call on Dr. Kissinger to discuss the present state of U.S.-Indian relations. Dr. Kissinger said that he had read reports of “many stormy conversations” [referring to those on October 23 between Secretary Rogers and Prime Minister Gandhi and on October 24 between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Singh]. The Ambassador asked what Dr. Kissinger’s reaction had been. Dr. Kissinger said he had heard only one side of the story. He was astonished, however, that anyone could feel that there has been a concerted campaign either against Prime Minister Nehru or his daughter. He said that, in the circles with which he is familiar, the reverse would seem to have been true—that there was a strong feeling of interest and support in Indian parliamentary democracy and its leadership. If the U.S. embassy in New Delhi is operating in ways not in the interests of the Indian government, this is not on instructions from Washington. Ambassador Jha said that he was not prepared for the Prime Minister to raise this issue frontally with Secretary Rogers. When he had driven with the Prime Minister from the airport in New York, he was surprised to hear her say that she had seen signs of the U.S. embassy “cultivating or helping or whatever” the people most critical of the present government of India. She had said that those signs were of concern to her. She had spoken in a relatively low key then but, to the Ambassador’s surprise, she had raised the matter in a direct way with Secretary Rogers. The constructive side of her doing so was that he, for the first time, felt that there was a dialogue on our bilateral problems. Dr. Kissinger said that this was not bad. Whether or not the Prime Minister is right, if there is a cause of concern to her it is better that she bring it out in the open rather than keeping it to herself. The Ambassador said that was his view too. If this is a mental stumbling block in good relations, then it is better to get the facts out on the table. If the Prime Minister of India believes this, then it is a fact that we have to deal with, and it is better to eradicate the impression if it is erroneous. Dr. Kissinger agreed that if the Prime Minister of India believes this, it is a fact to be dealt with whether right or wrong. Ambassador Jha noted that the Secretary of State had tried to explore the causes of her concern. Having been with the Prime Minister when this problem first arose—after her visit to the U.S. in 1966—the Ambassador said he has tried to figure out what was in her mind. She had gone back to India at that time with the warmest feelings for the U.S. Before she had become Prime Minister, she had been in the U.S. privately lecturing and had also “got on very well.” When she visited the U.S. in 1966, the Ambassador continued, President Johnson and the Prime Minister had had a private tete-a-tete. The President had said to a larger group after that meeting that if the Prime Minister were able to work out a reasonable economic program with the World Bank then she would have the fullest support from the U.S. One outstanding issue with the Bank at that time was devaluation of the rupee. Those advisors who heard the President’s comment took it to mean that the President was referring to the necessity of devaluation and of U.S. support for it if that measure were taken, although to be sure it was not clear from what he actually said that this was precisely what he had in mind. The Prime Minister had gone back to India and devalued the rupee. This created a political storm because her opponents charged her with bowing to U.S. pressure. She defended her position, saying that her own economic advisers said it was desirable and necessary. But this did cause the first break with party leader Kamaraj, which led to a final rupture later. Her moments of regret, however, came after that. During the Indian drought, it became known that every ship going to India was regulated by President Johnson. The impression was created in India that this was done to bring pressure on India on the issue of Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger said he had not been here then and asked Mr. Saunders whether he had been present at that time. Mr. Saunders replied that he had. He said that it was true that the U.S. grain shipments to India were closely regulated by President Johnson. But there was a wide range of issues on the President’s mind—the need to persuade European countries to assume a greater share of the aid burden, the need to encourage India to take the final steps in its own agricultural revolution, the need to win greater Congressional support for economic assistance in general—and Vietnam did not seem to be a major issue, although lack of Indian support on Vietnam did complicate the President’s efforts to win Congressional support for economic assistance to India. Dr. Kissinger said that “our people” think it is important for them to run everybody’s problems, so it would not surprise him if some bureaucrat had tried to use the grain shipments to try to change India’s agricultural methods. But “we don’t do things that way in this administration. This is a matter of style. If we were doing something of this kind, I would tell you.” But “we don’t like to do that kind of thing.” Ambassador Jha said that this kind of thing does still go on. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi recently went to the Foreign Office and made a presentation on India’s nationalization of banks, implying that if India took certain steps to include foreign banks it would have an adverse effect on the U.S. aid program. The Government of India had already decided not to nationalize foreign banks, and the Supreme Court had struck down its legislation on nationalization of Indian banks. But still the Deputy Chief of Mission in New Delhi came to the office of Jha’s successor and said that if India nationalized foreign banks there will be certain effects. The style of talking down to the Government of India is inexcusable. If news of this U.S. advice leaked out, the Government would have to do just the reverse of what the U.S. requested. Dr. Kissinger agreed that this kind of pressure was inexcusable. He recognized that the sensitivity in India toward foreign pressures is enormous. India has to be the best judge of its own interests. The intent of this administration is “less hectoring.” Whether we can carry out our intentions at all times is less certain. Dr. Kissinger continued by assuring the Ambassador that the administration recognizes that India is one of the great countries of the world. We recognize it will play an important role. We do not consciously intervene in Indian domestic political affairs. He said he was astonished at the Prime Minister’s charges—though he would not charge her with being wrong. He felt it was better to speak candidly rather than in some sort of litany. The Ambassador said the Prime Minister was concerned about certain M.P.s and U.S. embassy personnel, not at the top. The M.P.s are some outside the Congress Party known to be working for the Prime Minister’s downfall—S.K. Patil is one name and others are in the Jan Sangh party. Dr. Kissinger noted that if the Ambassador went out to dinner with Senator Fulbright, the Administration could not object. If, on the other hand, the Ambassador fed Senator Fulbright with material critical of the Administration, the Administration would object. The work of the people in the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi is political reporting, but if they encourage or give support to opposition parties then that would be unacceptable. Ambassador Jha said that the information on which the Prime Minister was operating was from Mr. Haksar, Assistant to the Prime Minister. There are two or three members of parliament who just do not have the resources to carry on the kind of campaigns that they are carrying on. Therefore, the evidence is no more than circumstantial. Dr. Kissinger said it seemed to him inconceivable that the U.S. would be financing political opponents of the Prime Minister. He said he would look into the matter. Ambassador Jha said he did not feel that the Embassy in New Delhi was assessing the Indian situation with sufficient depth in the following regard: If the Embassy is reporting that it suits the present government to take a pro-Soviet line, it does not understand the situation. The government, not having a majority of its own, must rely on other parties. Quite often necessary support comes from parties of the left. In style and presentation, there is a toning down of anti-Soviet issues and a sharpening of anti-Western issues. Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh had played to that gallery. However, if one looks at the strategy and tactics of the coming elections, it will be clear that a pro-Soviet position would be counter-productive. [The implication was that the Prime Minister would be seeking broad middle-of-the-road support and votes that would be cast for the more conservative wing of the Congress Party.] If this assessment is not available to the U.S., then something is lacking “in your policy planning.” In this context, the Ambassador continued, who is pressuring whom becomes relevant. If anything is done to please the Americans, then that is suspect. It is necessary that the Administration accept India as important. Assuming that this is the U.S. view, then the Ambassador felt a great deal more could be done to foster cooperation. Dr. Kissinger said there is no problem about the proposition that India is important. “The President, the Secretary of State and I all believe this.” There is no question that we should get on a more elevated plane. We realize that U.S. lecturing can sometimes be grating. Sometimes it is important to respect India’s technical neutrality. We encourage India to take its own positions. Dr. Kissinger said he felt we should try to get into a serious dialogue. We will understand that India cannot always go along with the U.S. Dr. Kissinger then said that he would be prepared to arrange with the Ambassador that if the Prime Minister wants to bring something to the President’s own attention the Ambassador would have direct access to Dr. Kissinger without going through the regular bureaucratic machinery. Dr. Kissinger said that he would say that one problem is that the intellectual community in the United States has had a love affair with an India that exists only at the London School of Economics. He said that what he liked about India was its tough holding to a position that over the years had absorbed everyone. Indian students abroad reveal only the mystical side of India and not this tough side. The Ambassador said he wondered whether the U.S. was considering some other alternative to India. Dr. Kissinger said that if the Ambassador were referring to our recent arms decision, India must realize that Pakistan is a special problem—not an alternative to India. Indonesia was really not an alternative. There is no alternative to five hundred million people. If we can’t work with India, we will have to find others to work with but that would always be with a sense of loss. The Ambassador said he could not take a categorical position against the sale of some arms to Pakistan and Prime Minister Gandhi is relaxed about it. Dr. Kissinger said that the Ambassador’s advice had had a lot of influence. We held up our decision as long as we possibly could. The Ambassador said that part of the Prime Minister’s personal unhappiness is that she knew every party in her opposition would combine against her on this issue. But she has personally made an effort to put this in perspective. When she was asked on her return to New Delhi about what Secretary Rogers had said on this issue, her answer was, “The same as the USSR said when it gave arms to Pakistan.” Dr. Kissinger said that it really had been a very modest decision. By no stretch of the imagination would it affect the balance of power in South Asia. The Ambassador said he agreed. In a purely military sense it was not significant. The Ambassador continued that he knew Dr. Kissinger was not saying that Pakistan is more important than India and he asked Dr. Kissinger’s advice on how to maintain a sound U.S.-Indian relationship. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought that the Rogers-Gandhi conversation could be a positive point of departure. We should all talk about things that concern us and about issues on which our interests are parallel. He said he would be glad to see the Ambassador on any problems which concern him and he would feel free to call the Ambassador in when he saw something of concern. He said he could assure the Ambassador that there is good will here. We have many problems in common, Many of the issues that cause friction—like Vietnam—are passing. Dr. Kissinger said he thought that in a few years Vietnam would be more an issue for India than for the U.S. “You will be asking for our help.” The Ambassador asked whether there was anything the President was worried about in terms of the U.S.-Indian relationship. Dr. Kissinger replied that there was not any one thing. But there is a vague feeling that India is not one of those countries from which we receive kind words very often. But when Indian interests parallel U.S. interests, if the Indian Prime Minister could offer a few gratuitous kind words it would be well received in the U.S. But now there is no particular irritation with India. There is no particular effort to downgrade India’s importance. We want an understanding relationship with India. We recognize India will pursue its own policies. The U.S. would not want to have India as a stooge, even if that were possible. However, when our policies run parallel, the U.S. would consider India’s support valuable. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. 95. Telegram 187199 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 95. Telegram 187199 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, November 15, 1970, 2208Z SUBJECT: Presidential Message on Cyclone Disaster in East Pakistan REFERENCE: 187185 1. Please convey following message from President Nixon to President Yahya Khan: QUOTE I have been deeply shocked and grieved to learn of the catastrophic cyclonic storm which has caused such grave loss of life and property in the coastal areas of East Pakistan. Please convey to your countrymen, and especially to those of the storm-affected area, the profound sympathy of the government and people of the United States for the tragic losses and human suffering wrought by this calamity. As in the past, the United States stands ready to render whatever assistance it can in helping to bring relief to the disaster area. UNQUOTE. We do not plan to release text to press but would have no objection if GOP desires to do so. However, please provide advance notice of public release. 2. FYI: The President desires to be as helpful as possible in providing relief assistance in this disaster and to make most generous combined offer of help justified by the circumstances, within limit our resources, rather than responding piecemeal. (This should not deter your making appropriate initial monetary grant of up to $25,000 under existing authority per reftel.) Request Mission’s best assessment of consolidated needs from USG as soon as practicable, based on GOP information. 3. You should bear in mind that because of Southeast Asian requirements and unusually high incidence of disasters this fiscal year, contingency and supporting assistance funds are extremely scarce and will remain so unless replenished by supplemental appropriation which has not yet been presented to Congress. PL–480 resources, which are probably those most needed in this case, are also quite tight. Nevertheless, you should report requirements as you see them per para 2 above. End FYI. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Also repeated to the Consulate at Dacca. Drafted by Alexander Fuller and Spengler; cleared by Davies, John F. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Press Relations, David J. Waters, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs, Saunders at the White House, and in AID by Curtis Farrar (AID/NESA), and Stephen R. Tripp (AID/PRI/DRD); and approved by Sisco. A major cyclone followed by a tidal wave struck East Pakistan on November 12. (Telegram 2116 from Dacca, November 16; ibid.) By November 25, 168,000 deaths had been recorded, and over 500,000 deaths were anticipated. (Intelligence note prepared in INR, November 25; ibid.) 96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Groundwork for East Pakistan Relief Ambassador Farland has delivered your message to Yahya, and a chartered plane with an initial shipment of 1,000 tents and 10,000 blankets is on its way to Dacca. Ambassador Farland has received normal authority to use $25,000 in AID contingency funds and $100,000 in US-owned Pakistani rupees for immediate needs. An interagency task force is in operation under Deputy AID Administrator Maurice Williams, and it is coordinating resources of private agencies. As a former AID Mission Director in Pakistan, he is our top economic assistance expert on that area. Ambassador Farland has asked the Pakistani Government for the earliest possible indication of what assistance is needed. AID today has inventoried the resources available to the U.S. Government as follows: 1. Up to $4.7 million equivalent in Pakistani currency for non-food expenditures. [This would leave no other local currency resources available for other emergencies this fiscal year.] 2. About $35 million in Pakistani currency for development works. This would be for basic reconstruction rather than for purely relief activities. 3. Approximately $10 million remains formally uncommitted for non-food relief goods under the AID Contingency Fund. But this amount has been tentatively earmarked for short-run Cambodian needs. Up to $5 million could be made available, however. 4. The PL 480 budget ceiling would have to be raised to respond to Pakistan’s requests for food aid. This could be done on the basis of executive decision to meet Pakistan’s initial request for 50,000 tons of wheat. Since you have just approved a $72 million PL 480 agreement, it should be possible to speed up shipments under that agreement and replace what is drawn for emergency shipments later. Against the background of these availabilities, AID is thinking about an initial commitment of up to $10 million in dollars, food and local currency for immediate relief and for assistance in restoring lands to productive use. Until we have a Pakistani request, we do not know how this compares with their assessment of the needs. Also, it does not take account of private contributions (an effort will be made to bring the Center for Voluntary Action into their coordination). There are two choices on the next move: One would be to ask President Yahya whether he would regard it as helpful for Maury Williams to go to Pakistan to assess possible U.S. contributions to relief and rehabilitation. The other would be to await the Pakistani Government’s assessment over the next few days. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 9 Sept 70–Dec 70. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy of this memorandum in another file indicates that Saunders drafted it on November 16. (Ibid., Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation on the evening of November 16 that he would give him the proposal for relief assistance to Pakistan “the first thing in the morning.” Nixon responded: “I don’t need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) 97. Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 97. Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, November 18, 1970, 1147Z Subject: Discussion With Foreign Minister Swaran Singh 1. I met Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on November 17 at my request for a “quiet tete-a-tete” pursuant to Sisco’s letter of November 4. I refrained from taking anyone with me, but Swaran Singh had Foreign Secretary Kaul and Joint Secretary (Americas Division) Menon to take notes. 2. I told the Foreign Minister I was acting under instructions to seek specifics on allegations made by Prime Minister Gandhi and himself to Secretary Rogers. I said several of these allegations reflected on my conduct of the American Mission, and I was most anxious to rectify any legitimate complaints which he and GOI might have. That set Swaran Singh off on a long-winded explanation of how much he and other GOI officials thought of me and none of the statements he had made were intended to reflect upon me. After about fifteen minutes of this monologue, I was able to refer specifically to Mrs. Gandhi’s statement that “there is a great deal of interference in our internal affairs ... it is support to people who are against us ... in my father’s time it was to those people who opposed him.” (State 175720) This launched Swaran Singh into another monologue. (He is very talkative, and it is difficult to get him to marshal his thoughts or to confine himself to specific point at hand.) He dealt at some length with assertations that GOI had substantive evidence that prior to Prime Minister Nehru’s death, several of his political opponents were financed by American funds, if not from USG then from American friends supporting his opponents. When he stopped for breath, I tried to narrow the focus by saying I had no knowledge about those days. But since Mrs. Gandhi made her statements in the present tense, I was particularly interested in any current interference in internal affairs of India, and would want to put a stop to it. Swaran Singh replied he had given some specific points to the Secretary, and he then repeated the allegation “that Embassy has more contacts with opposition groups, and in particular one party, that with Indian Government officials.” (State 176436) 3. In connection with alleged financing of opposition candidates or parties, I asked if he had information since Mr. Nehru’s death or, more specifically, in year and half since I have been in India. He said yes but not in form that would stand up in court. He added it was more in nature of suspicion, and many stories had come to GOI concerning help to political activities of opponents of government. I told him that I and other members of mission had had several direct or indirect approaches along this line and we were adamant that we would not contribute in any way to any political parties or to any candidates in a foreign country. So far as I knew, that position had been adhered to scrupulously. I said that if he knew of any cases where this did not happen, I thought in fairness he should so advise me. Swaran Singh again resorted to evasion and said there was really no point in bringing up specific cases because he wanted to create a better climate for our relations, and there nothing to be gained by going into specific details. (I am convinced, however, that he has nothing in recent years which would stand up either in court or before any unbiased tribunal. But these rumors continue, no doubt inspired in part by communists.) 4. I told Swaran Singh that when we refused to contribute, the response we got was that the USSR was pouring in money. As he probably knew, the Russian method was to sell goods through middle-men at inflated prices with a certain part of the money to be turned over by the middle-man for political purposes in India. Swaran Singh said he could assure me that the ruling Congress Party of Mrs. Gandhi had not received one raise in that way. The ruling congress raised all funds directly but, of course, he could not say what some other parties (meaning CPI) might do in this regard. I thanked him for his assurances and said that probably many unfounded rumors were brought to both of us. 5. I explained on the social level, from my experience in Congress, how nearly all Embassies in Washington had one or two members of either the Senate or the House from each party at formal dinners, and that I had endeavored to do much the same in entertaining at my residence, but with singular lack of success in getting opposition members of Parliament to accept my invitations. I cited for example that I had invited Mr. M.R. Masani, head of the Swatantra Party, five or six times and he had never crossed my threshold; and that I had invited Dr. Ram Surhag Singh, leader of the opposition, but he had never accepted. I had had many more members of the ruling Congress Party as guests than all the opposition parties put together. Swaran Singh then launched again into a long dissertation on how he knew I had tried to be very friendly with the members of the ruling congress and that his complaint was more about members of my staff. I told him that when a member of Parliament sought to make an office call one me, I almost invariably acquiesced, whatever his party affiliation, but again there were more such callers from the ruling congress than any other group. 6. I told him I had given instructions to my political staff to have contacts with MP’s of all parties, which I felt desirable and necessary to strike a proper balance. Swaran Singh agreed that was exactly the way to handle such matters, but said members of my staff had been visiting often at houses of opposition members of Parliament, much more than at houses of ruling congress members, and also much more than they should, in his opinion. I told him I would look into this and certainly try to correct any imbalance which existed in social contacts on the part of my political staff. I asked him what the “one party” was with which he thought the Embassy had excessive contacts. It developed he meant the opposition congress, Swatantra and Jana Sangh. (In other words, the rough coalition which the opposition is trying to establish at the center without much success to date.) I am asking my political officers to give me a list of social contacts at the homes of Congress or Parliament members or at their own homes, and, depending upon the result, may take the subject up again with the Foreign Minister.) 7. Swaran Singh volunteered that the GOI has a fine intelligence service which keeps close tabs on what the communists are doing in India, since the latter’s purposes are suspect. On the other hand, he said, the GOI has never and doesn’t now feel it necessary to have such observation of Americans, since we share the same basic aspirations, forms of government, and political processes. In other words, he said, the GOI does not anticipate the Americans are doing anything which is necessary for the intelligence service to observe. 8. Swaran Singh then brought up the subject he had dealt with in his talk with the Secretary to effect that “all U.S. invitations to Indian state officials and political leaders should be checked out with the Foreign Minister, or at least the ministry should be kept informed.” (State 176436) I told him I thought we were now informing the Ministry and my understanding was that no travel grant could be made without prior permission of the GOI. The Foreign Secretary broke in to say that we were advising MEA now of any invitations extended to Indians to visit the U.S. under governmental programs and that when I signed a letter of invitation, a copy of it was sent to MEA. The Foreign Minister said he had in mind something much more than that. He did not think we should be extending invitations to various state officials and other political figures, and it should be handled by advising MEA of type and number of visitors we would like to have and then letting the GOI make selections. For example, we should say during next year we would like to have three chief Ministers from the states, one Minister of Irrigation, two Ministers of Education, two Ministers of Housing, three Ministers from the central government, five Vice Chancellors of universities, etc. I told him I would, of course, pass along this suggestion to my government, but I doubted very much it would go along with that type of program. (Obviously, GOI wants to claim credit with invitees for procuring invitations and does not want us to enter in. This is a procedure I would not recommend.) 9. Swaran Singh said that as I knew, GOI covers international travel expense in such cases, although invitees are still permitted to accept per diem for travel in foreign countries. He said there was strong feeling in GOI that foreign per diem also should de stopped and that it was undesirable to have invitees in any way financially beholden to country inviting them. He said many felt (and I gathered this was his own opinion) that entire expense of any such visitor should be borne by the Government of India. (That would, of course, cut down or eliminate whole program, and I gathered we may shortly expect such a regulation to be promulgated.) I asked Swaran Singh if this would apply to all countries and he assured me it would. 10. We then got into Swaran Singh’s allegation “that we have too many AID personnel in India.” (State 176436) his complaint seemed to be mostly that AID personnel were interfering at the state level and trying to have voice in policy matters. (It was very hard to pin him down on just what he was getting at.) I said I assumed AID officials, for instance, interested in family planning or in irrigation projects or any AID program were trying to be helpful in working out myriad details. (What I think he is getting at is that GOI does not want anything except developmental loans where they can have complete say as to how money is spent. GOI evidently fears that in the states the U.S. may get credit for its aid if our personnel circulate around and meet with government officials at working level.) Swaran Singh said there was altogether too much moving around in India by AID personnel. I told him I was sympathetic to idea of reducing number of AID personnel, and he said Secretary Rogers had told him that. I called to his attention that there were 297 AID personnel in India when I arrived and 256 today, for a net reduction of 41. I asked if he had the same feeling and reservations about the more than 2400 Soviet military and AID personnel in India. He said he did not know there was anything like that number and would look into it. He just could not believe there were that many, and if there were, they were there temporarily and devoted to some specific project. I said I recognized a large number of them were there with specific projects, but he might be surprised to find the number. He said he would look into it, that the GOI felt the same way about having government personnel of any country moving around in India. 11. By then, one and one-half hours had elapsed, of which Swaran Singh had consumed about an hour and 20 minutes and I about ten minutes. He said he had to appear on the floor of Parliament, but realized that we were not finished. I agreed and said I still had some inquiries which I had been asked to make. He said he would call me next week concerning another appointment. He added it was very helpful to have constant contacts, and we should talk once fortnightly about matters of mutual interest. 12. We ended on a very friendly note, but I felt, as I so often do in talking with Swaran Singh, that he had substituted surplus verbiage as a device to avoid coming to grips with specifics. He is a master in that field, if no other. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. 98. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 98. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 19, 1970 SUBJECT: Pakistan Relief Effort U.S. Response The initial requests for emergency assistance from the provincial government of East Pakistan have been met, and contingency plans are now being made to meet what would seem to be the longer range needs. The following is a status report on what we have done in meeting the first requests: —The first air shipment of AID-financed blankets (10,000) and tents (1,000) is due to arrive in Dacca today. A second air shipment is being planned which will include contributions from voluntary agencies and especially in such items as clothing where they are best prepared to help. This was in response to an urgent request for 10–30,000 blankets, an unspecified number of tents and as much warm clothing as possible (Other contributing governments have accounted for the difference.) —In response to an urgent need for helicopters to ferry relief into the disaster area, four U.S. military Huey helicopters have been dispatched by the U.S. Strike Command from Pope Air Force Base: They should be operational over the disaster area tomorrow. In addition, two reconnaissance helicopters, under AID contract in Nepal, are being prepared for relief operations and also reach Dacca by tomorrow. [We received Pakistani clearance to use military helicopters and crews Tuesday morning, and the aircraft took off at 1:00 a.m. Wednesday (flight time 27 hours, assembly time 19 hours).] —The East Pakistanis also requested 50,000 tons of wheat and some $21 million in rupees for the local purchase of building materials and the repairing of coastal embankments. The 50,000 tons of wheat have already been approved under the PL–480 program but it will take about a month to ship it. This does not raise a problem, however, since from all indications there are sufficient food stocks in East Pakistan for now, in part because of earlier PL–480 shipments. This additional wheat should arrive in time to replenish those stocks before they are drawn down too far. The major problem in the food relief effort is not an overall shortage but distributing what is already there in the disaster area. This is the job of our helicopters. On the local currency requirements, Ambassador Farland has provided $52,000 from his emergency fund for immediate needs and there is some $35 million in Pakistani rupees available for reconstruction. We still do not have a specific assessment of reconstruction requirements. AID estimates that perhaps $10 million could be spent over the next year because of the undeveloped state of the economy. Whatever we provide on this front would be in addition to the $10 million that you have already authorized. Voluntary Agencies, Private Organizations, and Other Governments The Working Group is in close touch with all of the major voluntary agencies in an effort to coordinate and maximize our public and private response. This includes CARE, Catholic Relief and other organizations with valuable experience in operating in East Pakistan. An organization called Pakistan Relief Fund, Inc. has been formed by a group including Robert Murphy, and other prominent Americans. They hope eventually to have about 50 prominent citizens as members and will raise funds to be channeled through U.S. voluntary agencies that are assisting in the relief effort. Several other governments including India, Iran, Morocco, Great Britain, France and West Germany are contributing to the emergency relief effort. These sources, for instance, are complementing our shipments of blankets and medical supplies to meet initial requirements. We are keeping in touch with this effort so that duplication can be avoided. Problems Ahead The central problem at the moment, as noted above, is one of distribution rather than of supply. In view of a possible request for additional helicopters, contingency preparations are being made for further airlift. These would probably either have to be diverted from Southeast Asia or sent directly from the U.S., which is expensive and takes at least three days before they are operational in the area. The central government in Islamabad has still not produced a formal list of requirements. It is unclear what is holding up this necessary evaluation, although bureaucratic confusion and the fact that President Yahya has been in Dacca may be part of the problem. AID is attempting to make an independent judgment, but we can not go much further in the relief effort until we have a thorough evaluation from the scene. Ambassador Farland has now flown to Dacca, and Maurice Williams, the Deputy Administrator of AID and the head of our inter-departmental Working Group, is prepared to go to the scene if coordination remains a problem and we do not soon get the necessary response from the central government. If additional food proves necessary when the assessment of need is complete, the current worldwide ceiling on PL–480 expenditures would probably have to be raised. This would require White House decision, but it is too early to know now. Public Handling The Working Group today has primed the State and AID press officers to background the press on the situation in East Pakistan and on what the U.S. has done. Criticism of the Pakistani government’s handling is increasing in the East Pakistan press. As you know, there is normally deep antagonism in East Pakistan for the central government in the West, and this has been exacerbated by the current election campaign as well as by the present tragedy. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 20, 1970 SUBJECT: Pakistan Relief—Situation as of 10:30 a.m. November 20 Latest Actions Since my situation report to you yesterday afternoon, there have been the following developments: —The Pakistani Government has accepted the U.S. offer of 50 16-foot motor launches each with a carrying capacity of two tons. These will be sent from a California depot today with a transit time of two days. —Two more chartered planes (Pan Am and Seaboard World Airways) left JFK Airport in the past 12 hours carrying packaged food. —The Pakistani Government informed our mission in Islamabad this morning that with 17 plus foreign helicopters in East Pakistan by early next week there is no present requirement for more helicopters. The Government was told that four more U.S. helicopters have been prepared for momentary departure from the U.S. and will remain on standby. Six U.S. helicopters will be operational in East Pakistan today. The British, at President Yahya’s request, are moving three naval ships from Singapore which will provide 7 helicopters, some small boats and a water distillation plant. Remaining Requirements It is Ambassador Farland’s assessment from Dacca that the urgent need is transport to move supplies now in Dacca out into the disaster areas. Hence the concentration on the helicopters and cargo boats. The principal issue is whether to remain in our present posture of telling the Pakistanis what we can do to help meet each of their needs (e. g. the offers of helicopters and boats) and responding fully to each Pakistani request, as has been done so far. This is a combination of quietly injecting our assessments of need by making specific offers yet of deferring to the Pakistani Government’s definition of requirements, taking into account other contributions it is receiving. The argument for asserting a firmer U.S. influence is that the Pakistanis so far have not projected an image of effectively managing this situation. This may improve as the helicopters and other transport become increasingly active over the next 3–4 days. On the other hand, a certain amount of inefficiency is likely to continue in the face of such massive need. The argument for maintaining our present posture is that the east-west issue within Pakistan is an extremely delicate one for President Yahya, especially in this election period. While we want to provide whatever help he needs, he is the ultimate judge of how to manage this issue politically. A highly visible appearance that the U.S. was injecting its independent management would carry the implication that President Yahya’s government in West Pakistan could not or would not effectively manage this situation in East Pakistan. Press Treatment The State Department spokesman and head of the AID Disaster Relief office briefed the press extensively yesterday on what the U.S. has done. A telegram was sent to Ambassador Farland in Dacca last night instructing him to try to inject into the reporting from East Pakistan increased coverage of the U.S. contribution. The beginning of U.S. helicopter operations today and the arrival of two more supply flights will provide occasion for some coverage, although gruesome pictures from the disaster area will probably continue to dominate. Press treatment will continue to be affected by the fact that the East Pakistani press and politicians are exploiting the natural antagonism in East Pakistan for the central government in West Pakistan. The planned election, as you know, is two weeks off. Talking points will be provided separately this morning to Messrs. Klein, Zeigler and Timmons for their respective briefing needs. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) 100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) 1 Washington, November 20, 1970 K: I called for two reasons. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] K: I have two problems about the Pakistanis. I called the Pakistan Ambassador. He is satisfied. I asked about sending a delegation. They are probably not eager to have a delegation. H: We don’t care. Its to avoid the negative. We have to look humanitarian. K: We can’t hurt relations with them. You can’t send a delegation into a country that doesn’t want it. H: I just blasted people working on this because they only have a re-type of the Peru plan. Maybe we should drop food but we have to think of something. K: Second, we will have the WH involved with a loser. Hundreds of thousands will starve there. H: But we should do something. K: We have a man who can step into the Zeigler briefing this afternoon. H: I won’t do it because we have done nothing. K: 10,000 blankets, ____ tents, ____ lbs. of wheat. Just waiting to know where to send it. H: What about concentrated food stuffs. K: I haven’t the detailed program. H: What good can they do with wheat. We are treating it as a bureaucratic thing. K: That’s not true. We have sent three cables a day. H: Does any one in Iowa care about 3 cables a day to the Pakistanis? They watch thousands of people dying and we should be doing something. K: And we are doing what can be done at this moment. If there’s a new idea of course we will implement it. H: We need something that has dramatic fact. [The conversation concluded with a discussion unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A notation on the transcript indicates that the conversation took place in the early afternoon. The omissions are in the original transcription. A transcript of Kissinger’s conversation with Ambassador Hilaly earlier in the day is ibid. 101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 27, 1970 SUBJECT: Pakistan Disaster Relief Latest Developments The following are the major new developments on the Pakistan relief effort: —Our medical survey team in East Pakistan reports that there is no need for the U.S. to move hospitals to the disaster area for surgical or medical patients since the Pakistanis have this situation under control. A further assessment in the next day or so will reveal if aid stations are needed to replace the demolished rural health centers, although the team so far reports they are not necessary. Shot teams to give immunizations should also be assessed over a little longer period, but the evaluation so far is that cholera and other diseases are not on the increase. The team concludes that the main emphasis for now should remain on getting rice into the areas where all of the food supply has been destroyed. An Army Preventive Medicine unit is still being held on alert in case this picture suddenly changes. —The main focus continues to be on the food distribution effort, especially to those areas where all food supplies have been wiped out. A total of over 30 helicopters (10 U.S.) are now operational in the relief effort. The Pakistani authorities seem satisfied that this is an adequate airlift, but because they have not always been as alert to the needs as might be hoped, instructions have been sent to our people in the field to immediately assess the situation on their own. We are prepared to send as many helicopters to the disaster area as are requested. —President Yahya has returned to East Pakistan to personally supervise relief operations after coming under heavy criticism from the East Pakistanis, foreign press and opposition politicians. Our embassy in Islamabad reports that, for a variety of reasons, the central government has been especially slow in mounting an effective relief operation. In part this is because of bureaucratic inadequacies but there is also a certain amount of apathy in West Pakistan about the plight of the East Pakistanis. Hopefully Yahya will be able to jolt his Administration into increased action. —The Pope reportedly will stop in East Pakistan this weekend during his Asian Trip to dramatize his concern. —Maurice Williams, the head of the Interdepartmental Working Group, is considering making a special trip to East Pakistan next week. He would be primarily concerned with getting a better feel for the longer range requirements for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Conclusions The immediate emergency relief effort seems to be gradually reaching a peak, although there is much more to be done. The international pipeline of relief supplies is full and new requirements are generally being met on a timely basis. The major problem at this point is keeping the Pakistani bureaucracy up to speed with the foreign relief effort. President Yahya’s presence on the scene should help but we may have to nudge them a bit if, for instance, it became clear that more helicopters are needed. As the magnitude of the disaster becomes more clear, it is becoming increasingly evident that the emergency relief phase is going to stretch out longer than was initially expected. By most accounts this is the greatest natural disaster in terms of destruction and danger to human life of the century and perhaps of recorded history. As such there may be an extended period of transition between emergency relief and the longer term reconstruction phase, when we will simply be sustaining the victims. During this period the Administration will remain exposed to criticism from those who fail to realize the magnitude of both the disaster and the problems of coping with it. So far, however, I think we have a solid record to stand on. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 102. Telegram 2417 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 102. Telegram 2417 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, November 30, 1970, 1210Z Subject: East Pakistan Disaster Relief Ref: State 193149 1. Williams arrived at 11:15 today (November 30) and I took him, together with Wheeler and Griffel, at once aboard the attache plane for a comprehensive flight over devastated area. The route followed was Dacca, Barisal, Patuakhali; thence a sweep of the lower island crossing over to Bhola Island; followed up the east coast and across to Bhola Cits. From Bhola we transited part of Hatiya; thence to Noakhali, crossing over our U.S. helio port at Maujdi Court and thereafter returning to Dacca. Williams expressed considerable satisfaction over having first hand comprehensive view of area and its problems. Flight covered many miles of coastal embankments and extent of their destruction of particular importance to him. 2. What I observed today fully substantiates all aspects our latest reporting. At Barisal, Iaukhali and Bhola observed extensive relief depots and relief apparatus operation. Where no country boats or large powered river vessels observed on Saturday, November 21, today noticed several hundred river boats in operation and substantial number of large motorized river vessels. River boats have pentrated deep into the inland canals. Consequently, it would appear that water transportation system rapidly being restored. During flight, saw five food distribution centers fully activated. At one point below Patuakhali boats from Chittagong were seen unloading bamboo for reconstruction purposes. Everywhere observed fact that people were constructing temporary shelters or rebuilding homes. Few cadavers seen although considerable number dead cattle still unburied. It was obvious that life in this rural area was overcoming the ravages of the cyclone and tidal wave and rebuilding had begun. The striking differences of what I observed between my first flight over the area last Saturday, and the flight today were both encouraging and reassuring. Though the amount of damage is staggering and the extent of it is awesome, the rehabilitation effort is underway. 3. For Department’s general information believe following three observations highly pertinent: A) It is now obvious that the politicians and newspapers were vying with each other to exaggerate death toll. In my estimation the death toll will not greatly exceed 300,000, if indeed it reaches that number. While brutal in its magnitute it is none the less far short of a million and a half as had been predicted by one prominent newspaper. B) All of my available sources, a numebr of whom have transited vairous sections of the devastated areas and conversed with the inhabitants, have concluded that few if any of the casualties died as a result of slowness of GOP expeditiously to move relief supplies to the disaster victims. Virtually all of the dead were killed by cyclone and tidal wave and not from starvation or exposure; have not received one report to the contrary. C) The Pakistan disaster relief operation is now definitely moving into the early stages of rehabilitation. ConGen has begun preliminary planning for the future pullout of our military contingent though no date as yet is firm. On this subject, ConGen Blood has been informed by Deputy British High Commissioner, Dacca, that entire British relief team expects to depart East Pakistan by December 12. These last two items will be covered in septels. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Islamabad. 103. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin 103. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin 1 Washington, December 3, 1970 SUBJECT: India Keeps the Lid on the Arms Debate—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM The Government of India has apparently decided to keep the lid on its criticism of our arms decision for Pakistan and to prevent it from escalating into a major crisis in our relations. Although Indian officials continue to be privately critical of our decision and skeptical about the rationale behind it, they have not attempted to stir up public controversy beyond that generated in the Parliamentary debate early in November. We had expected that the Parliamentary session, which began on November 9, would generate a certain amount of hysterical criticism of the United States from all shades in the Indian political spectrum. In the event, although there were debates in both houses of Parliament, criticism was relatively muted, and considerable attention was also given to Soviet arms sales to Pakistan. The Embassy has reported that the arms issue is unlikely to surface in Parliament again unless there is a general foreign policy debate, which is not now expected. Discussion of the decision continues in the press but mainly in analytical pieces questioning our explanations of our decision. Journalists and officials alike remain skeptical that we can achieve our stated purposes through such a limited sale. The Indians now seem disposed to accept the assurances which the Secretary gave to Mrs. Gandhi of our desire not to let this issue affect the basic nature of our relations. They remain skeptical, however, that we will in fact limit ourselves to a single sale. Increasingly the Indians are looking towards the bilateral talks as a way of repairing the damage done to our relations in recent months. The attached telegram from New Delhi reports some of the recent signs of the Indian desire to put our relations back on the rails again. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17, India 1970, DEF 19, October Decision. Confidential. Drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Van Hollen. Attached but not published was telegram 14902 from New Delhi, November 27. 104. Intelligence Brief INRB–217 From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers 104. Intelligence Brief INRB–217 From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 8, 1970 Subject: Pakistan: Election Results Suggest Fresh Problems With almost complete results reported, the returns from the December 7 elections in Pakistan reveal an overwhelming victory in East Pakistan for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League and the apparent capture of a majority of seats in West Pakistan by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by former Foreign Minister and frequent US-baiter, Z.A. Bhutto. Chief casualties in West Pakistan have been the parties of the right and center; in East Pakistan all other parties have been totally eclipsed. Domestic Consequences . The Awami League’s sweep, which may give it an absolute majority in the forthcoming Constituent Assembly, and the surprising victory of the PPP have called into question almost all of the speculations about the post-election period which preceded December 7. These speculations had anticipated a combination between the Awami League and West Pakistani centrists which would make possible the needed accommodation between Pakistan’s two wings on the key issue of provincial autonomy. While accommodation is still possible, it has become more problematical. With an absolute majority, the Awami League may be tempted to press too hard for more autonomy than the West Pakistanis are prepared to accept. Even if Sheikh Mujib recognizes the dangers inherent in such a course, efforts on his part to restrain his followers may risk his position—and majority. The emergence of Bhutto as a figure of substantial prominence complicates the situation. His radical appeals are anathema to the present establishment, and thus may raise fresh doubts in the minds of the regime as to the value of popular government. With reference to the constitutional issue, while he has not criticized openly the autonomist demands of the Awami League, his proclivities suggest that he would prefer a strong center. Unlikely to join forces with Sheikh Mujib on this issue, which could in any event diminish his newly-achieved position in West Pakistan, his opposition to anything more than token provincial autonomy would leave the Awami League dependent on the few scattered West Pakistani centrists as it seeks true autonomy. The key to any resolution of the autonomy issue will be President Yahya. He is assumed to have accepted the need to work with Sheikh Mujib, but this decision was doubtless predicated on a belief that the present West Pakistani ruling elite would be well-represented by Centrists who could work with and control the Awami League leader and thus protect West Pakistani interests. This belief Bhutto has destroyed. Since the Constituent Assembly must complete its work on a constitution in 120 days, a task made more difficult by the Assembly’s composition, and since Yahya must approve any proposed constitution, the ending of martial law and the establishment of popular civilian government presently appear less certain. But if a constitution embodying what the Awami League deems to be adequate autonomy cannot be framed or is rejected, the Bengali reaction could well be secession. Foreign Affairs Implications : Both the PPP and the Awami League favor the continuation of Pakistan’s “balanced” foreign policy in which the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China are dealt with equally, at least in theory. Both also call for Pakistan’s withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. Bhutto, however, has made much of Pakistan’s relations with China and there is every reason to conclude that, private disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding, he would favor China at the expense of the United States. Insofar as the sub-continent is concerned, the views of the Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto are divergent. The Awami League leader favors a lessening of tension and resumption of trade with India; Bhutto, reflecting both his own xenophobia and popular West Pakistani sentiment (including that of the military), urges a hard-line toward India, frequently couched in inflammatory and irresponsible language. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the intelligence brief. 105. National Security Study Memorandum 109 105. National Security Study Memorandum 109 1 Washington, December 19, 1970 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Policy Study on South Asia The President has directed that a planning study be prepared analyzing major U.S. policy options toward South Asia. The principal objective of the study will be to evaluate the status of our relations with India and Pakistan today and, more important, to recommend general policy lines which should be pursued in the 1970s. This study should reflect alternate views where they exist and be based on analyses in the following major areas: —The United States’ interests and objectives in South Asia, particularly as they relate to broader U.S. interests in Asia, likely changes in U.S. interests arising from the evolution of the domestic political and economic situations in India and Pakistan and changes in the relationships between the U.S., the USSR and Communist China. —The interests and objectives of the USSR and Communist China in South Asia and the interplay among these interests. —The interests and objectives of India and Pakistan in their relations with the major world powers and with their Asian neighbors and the prospects for those relations. —The most likely major political, economic, social and military trends in India and Pakistan. —In the context of U.S. interests and objectives and those of the Soviet Union and Communist China, alternate U.S. policies toward South Asia including U.S. policies as to trade and investment, bilateral economic assistance, educational and cultural exchange, and military assistance. The purpose of this analysis is to pose the fundamental policy choices in setting a U.S. posture toward this area in the 1970s. This study should recommend courses of action with particular regard to the role of India and Pakistan in Southeast Asia, the overall U.S. presence in South Asia, the United States’ economic, political, security and technological relations in the area, and the U.S. attitude towards the national unity of India and Pakistan and towards various forms of regional and subregional cooperation. It is recognized that the analysis and conclusions with respect to Pakistan will be tentative in view of Pakistan’s constitution-making process and may have to be revised in the light of later developments. The study should be carried out under the direction of the Chairman, NSC IG/NEA and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by March 15, 1971. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. 106. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 106. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 24, 1970 SUBJECT: South Asian Arms Policy This requires no action, but I want you to be aware of the present state of the U.S.-Pakistani discussions of the arms package. President Yahya is continuing to press for changes in our initial arms offer and it is possible that the Indian’s may also formally ask us for what would amount to an exception for them to our “restrictive” policy. The following its some background on both of these issues, including the bureaucratic state of play. Pakistani and Indian positions Pakistan . As you know, President Yahya has gone out of his way to express his thanks for our decision to make a meaningful one-time exception to our restrictive South Asian arms policy. At the same time, he has made it increasingly clear that he would like very much to change the terms of the original package on two points to include: 1. a different mix of aircraft (we offered 6 replacement F–104s or the scrapping of his entire F–104 squadron in exchange for a new squadron of similar aircraft plus 7 replacement B–57s; and 2. credit for the entire package (we offered “usual cash basis.”) President Yahya recently defined his position to Ambassador Farland as being that he had decided against asking us for Phantoms, since they are too expensive, but that he is still very much interested in the Freedom Fighter (F–5) as a substitution for the F–104a and B–57s we had originally offered. (At a lower level, the Pakistanis have even talked about replacing the rest of their B–57s with fighters.) Yahya was more concerned, however, about obtaining credit for the entire package, saying that he simply does not have the financial means to pay cash. He specifically asked that this matter be brought to the attention of the President. The Indian problem is less complicated but could have even broader ramifications for our posture in South Asia. You may recall that the Indians have informally indicated that they might like to purchase Skyhawks (probably at least 24) to replace the aging aircraft they now have on their aircraft carrier. After all the fuss they have made over the one-time exception for Pakistan and given the fact that they have an assured source of copious military supply in the Soviets, this interest in Skyhawks seems a bit out of tune. The fact is, however, that the Indians are starting to build up their navy and the Soviets do not have a suitable aircraft for their carrier. U.S. Positions State and Defense are both working up positions on the above issues. Our interest is in assuring that the spirit and scope of the President’s original decision are maintained. State and Defense prefer not to extend credit to Pakistan for this package. State argues that this would unnecessarily call Ambassador Keating’s word into question since he has said—according to the original terms of the arrangement—that this would simply be a commercial “cash sale.” Defense agrees and points out that even if we wanted to the funds are simply not available. This, of course, has to be weighed against what I take to be the President’s inclination in favor of extending some credit and indication to Yahya that, at a minimum, we would give the subject sympathetic consideration. The main point is that there are apparently ways of lowering prices or improving terms on the non-lethal equipment Pakistan is also buying to help them transfer some funds to this package. State and Defense are divided on the Pakistani aircraft issue. Both State and Defense are in apparent agreement that the F–5 is a suitable aircraft to replace the squadron of F–104s and that it would still be within the scope and intent of the President’s decision to also substitute F–5s for the originally offered seven replacement B–57s. The F–5 is essentially a defensive aircraft developed for export purposes and it is argued that selling it rather than the B–57s would reduce Pakistani strategic capability against India and should therefore be more acceptable to New Delhi. Defense, however, would carry this logic one step further and agree to replace all of Pakistan’s B–57s with F–5s (a total of some 38 aircraft). State draws the line at 19 F–5s (12 replacing the F–104s plus 7 replacing B–57s) arguing that anything more goes beyond the original purchase both in terms of cost and in spirit and as such, risks inserting us further into the South Asian arms race and straining relations with India. State believes, and we agree, that the replacement of all of Pakistan’s B–57s would require another Presidential decision, while the straight replacement of 19 would not since this was recommended to the President in the context of his October meeting with Yahya. Both State and Defense have not yet really faced up to what our response would be if the Indians formally ask to purchase Skyhawks. The bureaucratic response so far has been largely limited to instructing Ambassador Keating to be careful not to stimulate or give any encouragement to such a request. The fact is, that an Indian request for Skyhawks would put us on a difficult spot. On one hand, we would be open to being accused of favoring Pakistan if we were not forthcoming. On the other hand, this would really thrust us back into the arms business in South Asia. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy. 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 4, 1971 SUBJECT: East Pakistan Disaster Relief Attached at Tab A is a memo from Maurice Williams, the Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief, on the status of U.S. assistance to the disaster area and needs which remain. Mr. Williams reports that: —The United States has provided about $9 million in emergency relief assistance. —U.S. military helicopters have air-lifted over 1 million pounds of supplies directly into the disaster area. —Ambassador Farland and other Americans in the field have done a “magnificent job”. —For all practical purposes, the short-term emergency relief requirements have now been met. The relief efforts may be entering a more difficult period since there is a danger that international interest and support will decline. —The most critical need remaining is for’ food grain. At least 400,000 metric tons will probably be needed in the disaster area until another crop can be harvested a year from now. Recommendations: 1. In order to maintain the momentum of relief efforts, it is recommended that you approve a press release (Tab B) enumerating steps taken thus far and —Announcing a grant contribution of 150,000 tons of food grain (valued at about $16 million) —Expressing the hope that other countries, especially those in a position to provide rice, will join in the effort to feed the survivors —Calling attention to the campaign of the Pakistan Relief Committee over the next few weeks to raise funds for use in Pakistan by U.S. voluntary agencies. (Mrs. Nixon is honorary chairman of this committee of prominent Americans and Mr. Finch’s office which is overseeing the operation strongly concurs in the statement.) 2. Since the initial emergency relief effort has been completed and our aid will now be processed through normal channels, it is recommended that you sign the letter to Mr. Williams (Tab C) commending him and his committee for their effective handling of the disaster relief effort. Ray Price concurs. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A was a memorandum from Williams to Nixon sent through Kissinger for the President on December 23 under a covering memorandum from Eliot. Attached but not published at Tab B was the proposed press release. Not attached at Tab C was the draft letter. The Pakistan Relief Committee was established on November 26 and chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy. 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 14, 1971 Subject: Military Sales Credit for Pakistan We have looked into various ways to respond to the Pakistani request for credit to finance your recent arms offer, as requested in a January 5 memorandum from General Haig to Mr. Eliot. The package you approved—which included interceptor and bomber aircraft, armored personnel carriers and maritime patrol aircraft—stipulated cash payment. It could cost Pakistan $40 million or more, depending on the models of equipment chosen. We have explained the decision to Congress and the Indians in terms of cash sales which rendered it less objectionable to them. We believe it essential to hold the line on cash payment for these arms rather than allow credit financing. To do otherwise would undermine our credibility with the Indians and the Congress and our objective of continuing a restrictive military supply policy for South Asia. Among the other alternatives we have examined are concessional prices, increased economic assistance and debt relief. We could not ask commercial manufacturers to offer concessional prices, and to sell defense materiel from inventories at less than its actual value would be prohibited by law. We advocate maintaining the highest level of economic assistance for Pakistan possible within available resources and justified by normal criteria. However, we would recommend against any additional economic aid or debt relief in order to enable Pakistan to purchase arms as this would contravene the essential purposes of such assistance. The most practical alternative for partially easing the financial burden on Pakistan is to raise the level of its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit for purchases of non-lethal defense equipment. We propose to increase that level from $5 million to $10 million for the current fiscal year. We are looking at the possibility of doing the same for 1972, but this will depend on other priorities which cannot be weighed effectively at present. (Pakistan purchases from us an average of $20 million in defense materiel annually.) We would also plan to encourage the Pakistanis to stretch out the procurement of arms to reduce the burden of their cash payments in any one year. While this approach will only partially meet Pakistan’s need, by doubling our FMS credit for fiscal year 1971 we will be able to assure the Pakistanis that we have made a positive effort to be helpful. This reply has been, coordinated with the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. 109. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 109. Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 1, 1971, 1235Z Subj: Possibility of East/West Pakistan Split—China’s Role Ref: Islamabad 930 1. During my lengthy conversation with President Yahya (reftel) he worried aloud about the possibility of a split-up of the two wings. He said that such an action, to him, was the most disturbing element in the current formulation of the constitution, and in the political processes which might adversely flow there-from. He said that he had no intention of giving his official sanction to a constitution which had inherent within it factors which would bring about dissolution of Pakistan; a united country was a national goal which he cherished. Paraphrasing the words of Ayub Khan, he said he did not intend to preside over the dissolution of Pakistan. 2. I recalled that I had carefully explained to him during our first meeting that it was the policy of the United States to respect the unity and integrity of Pakistan, and that I had publicly reiterated this policy on every occasion. Further, I said that propaganda to the contrary had been spread by those whose interests were inimical to the interests of the United States; that the United States was covertly attempting to divide the two wings was not only false and fallacious but that it was contrary to the most elementary political or military judgements. Further, to believe that the United States sought or desired another underdeveloped country in Southeast Asia could be deemed ludicrous were it not for the fact that such a posture had been given credence in the press and unfortunately was believed in many places of high political importance. 3. Yahya said that he most certainly appreciated reaffirmation of my government’s policy since the GOP at times had heard reports to the contrary which had been of concern in high councils. He said he intended to continue to do everything possible to hold the wings together because, otherwise, he said the dangers to West Pakistan as it would then exist, to India, and generally speaking, to Southeast Asia, would be acutely magnified. 4. In response to my request that he explain precisely what dangers he foresaw, Yahya said the major danger which should be obvious to anybody who had read a map, or studied military strategems, or knew anything whatsoever of the aspirations of the Chinese leadership, should realize that a militarily insecure, independent, and geographically separated East Pakistan would represent a target of the highest priority. Given an independent East Pakistan (East Bengali) as a starting nucleus, Yahya opined that it would be one of the easiest political moves envisionable for the Chinese to pull into its adjacent areas, specifically West Bengal and Assam. Even now, he said, Bhashani’s followers would be grateful for such an opportunity. 5. Yahya highlighted his comments by saying that this would give the “damned Chinese precisely what they’ve wanted for years—a port on the Bay of Bengal and an outlet to the Indian Ocean.” Yahya went on to say that this would also give China the opportunity of outflanking all of Southeast Asia in which even Burma would fall “like an over-ripe mango” and Thailand, under increasing pressures, would be looking for means of accommodation. Yahya concluded by saying “if you think you’ve had a mess in Vietnam, just think of what will happen if China dominates the whole area.” 6. I expressed my appreciation to Yahya for his frank and candid assessment of the developments which might possibly ensue from a split-up of the two wings. I, too, had observed the opportunities which an “independent” new nation would afford to China. However, I added that I was not particularly knowledgeable of the thinking which was going on in Peking and hence was particularly appreciative of his observations. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Sisco. In telegram 930 from Islamabad, February 1, Farland reported that he had met with President Yahya on January 29 in Yahya’s home to “talk about things in general.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 2, 1971 Subject: FY 1971 Aid Program for India India presents one of the greatest problems in relating our aid to US national interests and objectives. Recognizing this difficulty, I asked for a special study of our India program last September. I have satisfied myself, as a result of this study, that I should recommend to you for this year an aid program for India at the levels set out in the attached memorandum. However, in view of the constraints on our resources, our policy objectives world wide and our interests in India, there are still important questions to be answered about aid policy for India. We are currently carrying out a NSSM study on our overall policy in South Asia which will address the inter-relationship of our aid and our interests in the area. The study will present you with various options for courses of action in future years and I will provide my own recommendations at that time. Without prejudging the conclusions of the study, I believe that India has an importance to us in terms of the Nixon Doctrine as a country which can contribute to a stable order in Asia. Our aid to India has supported an independent India which has been able to resist communist subversion and the threat of Chinese expansion. I do not believe we should defer approval of FY 1971, aid levels until you have had a chance to examine the NSSM’s options for future years. The PL 480 and development loan pipelines are already depleted; further delay could cause harmful economic effects and lead to speculation during the current Indian election campaign that we are withholding aid for political purposes. I doubt that the results of the elections will change our assessment of India’s importance to us, though we will be able to readjust our programs should a hostile government come to power. William P. Rogers Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, February 2, 1971 Subject: FY 1971 A.I.D. Program for India Recommendation: That you authorize us to proceed with an FY 1971 program for India of up to $225 million in development loans, $150 million in Title I PL 480 concessional sales of surplus agricultural commodities, and $10. 8 million in technical assistance. Background: We and the other eleven nations in the India Consortium have extended aid to India not primarily for security reasons, but rather to help meet the resource needs of the free world’s largest development effort. At the same time, we have been well served by the relative stability of India, compared to other major areas of Asia. There has been no need for direct outside involvement in India even in face of the localized and brief conflicts with China and Pakistan. With its huge population, central location in Asia, long Indian Ocean shoreline, broad industrial base, military capability for deterring conventional Chinese pressure, established democratic government and national unity, and interest in regional stability and in trade expansion, India is an important element in long-run Asian stability and self-reliance. Economic development, with resulting increases in food supplies and job opportunities, is essential to India’s achieving such long-run stability. Our past aid to India, while much less in per capita terms than aid for other major recipients, has contributed in decisive ways to the survival and development of the country. Our financial and technical assistance has played a major role in India’s “Green Revolution” and in the growth of its private industrial sector; it has supported the development of some of India’s leading educational facilities, and promoted a rich intellectual exchange between U.S. and Indian educational and scientific communities; and through our participation in the India Consortium, it has contributed to significant improvements in both policy and implementation in agriculture, foreign trade, and family planning. Development Loan Assistance The World Bank has recommended that the Consortium provide $1. 1 billion gross, excluding food aid, in loans to India in FY 1971. We share the Bank’s judgment that this level of lending is desirable to accelerate growth and employment and facilitate policy improvements in the trade and industry sectors. But the likely U.S. share of $1. 1 billion exceeds what other priorities will allow us to program for India. Taking these priorities into account, we have programmed up to $225 million for the FY 1971 India program. Other donors will provide about $675 million, which would put the U.S. share of the total at about 26%. In the mid-1960’s, the U.S. share of Consortium loan assistance was around 40%. In FY 1967, when the Consortium negotiated the economic policy package still in effect, the U.S. provided 42% of the Consortium assistance, and other donors together provided 58%. In the past few years the other donors have increased their contributions to the Consortium, but U.S. contributions have declined, so that the U.S. share fell to about 25% ($194 million in AID loans) in FY 1970. The goals of our FY 1971 assistance are, in general, to support the economic development and political stability objectives discussed above, and, more specifically, to provide the imports to support moderately expansionist fiscal and monetary policies and to encourage the maintenance and possible extension of existing market-oriented economic policies. Our assistance will be in the form of a non-project loan, to finance raw materials, industrial intermediate goods and spare parts, commodities essential for the preservation of the momentum of recent agricultural and industrial growth in India. India is now in a very good position for growth. The agricultural policy reforms begun in 1966 have been maintained, and even expanded, and while achievement of the 5% agricultural growth target is far from guaranteed, growth prospects from, the new agricultural technology remain encouraging. India’s family planning program has undergone an important expansion, assisted in part by a $20 million U.S. grant which has been the spearhead of a Consortium initiative on family planning. Exports have been given high priority, and a number of measures have been taken over the past few years to encourage their expansion. On balance economic policy decisions since the 1969 split of the Congress Party have veered far less in the direction called for by leftist Young Turks than some feared. Although India is often said to be a socialist country, over 85% of industry and virtually all of agriculture are in the private sector. As is evidenced by a 20% increase in the past year in equity values of the Indian stock market, private sector industry has been reassured and encouraged by the moderate import and industrial licensing policies the GOI recently announced and by the resumption in FY 1971 of an expansionary fiscal policy. We will continue to keep Indian growth and policy performance under review and, through the Consortium, to urge improvements in major problem areas. The World Bank has not yet taken a decision whether to ask the Consortium to participate in a debt relief exercise, beyond the current three-year arrangement which runs out in FY 1971. In the event that the Bank and the GOI do make such a request, we would expect to participate, if other donors agreed that their relief would be on appropriate concessional terms. Population Assistance There will be a review in February of progress under last year’s $20 million family planning grant. If progress by then justifies further support, we would anticipate a grant of $15—$20 million, out of Title X funds earmarked by Congress for population assistance. PL 480 Assistance The other major constraint on India’s fiscal and monetary policy, apart from foreign exchange, is the availability and price of food-grains and edible oils. Our Title I foodgrain target for FY 1971 shipments to India is 1,500,000 metric tons, to consist of 770,000 tons to be negotiated in a new sales agreement this year, plus 730,000 tons carried over from the FY 1970 agreement you approved last year. This figure is somewhat below our estimate of the desirable level required for price stability, but we believe it will be adequate to satisfy minimum consumption requirements. Edible oils are programmed at 75,000 tons and cotton at 200,000 bales. In addition, in order to provide for continuity of wheat shipments, we propose to include in this year’s agreement a carry-over of wheat for shipment during FY 1972 in an amount comparable to the 730,000 tons from the FY 1970 agreement carried over for shipment this year. The Indian Government has publicly stated that on the basis of its improved agricultural situation, it will cease concessional imports of foodgrains after December 1971. Our projections indicate that India’s ability to do without concessional shipments is still a couple of years off, and we anticipate PL 480 wheat shipments to India over this period, but the Indian Government’s political commitment does raise some uncertainty about FY 1972 and FY 1973 programs. We tentatively propose to sign an additional agreement early in FY 1972 to provide about an additional 700,000 tons, bringing the total for FY 1972 shipments to approximately 1. 5 million tons, the same level as for this year. The total values of this year’s agreement and of this year’s shipments are both estimated at about $150 million. This compares to last year’s level of $191.5 million in agreements and $197 million in shipments. Technical Assistance For FY 1971 we propose a technical assistance program of about $10.8 million, with continuing concentration on increasing agricultural productivity, improving India’s agricultural universities, and assisting the improvement and expansion of India’s considerable efforts in family planning and nutrition. During FY 1971 a personnel cut is being implemented reducing the number of AID direct-hire positions in India. The Departments of Treasury and Agriculture concur in the recommendation contained in this memorandum. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted on January 26 by Quainton and revised on January 29 in S/S by James L. Carlson. The attached February 2, confidential memorandum from Rogers to Nixon was also dated February 2 and was classified confidential. There is no indication that Nixon approved or disapproved the options on the attached memorandum. 111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 3, 1971 SUBJECT: Military Sales Credit for Pakistan In response to your memo of January 14, “Military Sales Credit for Pakistan,” the President has made the following decisions: 1. The recommendation that the one-time-exception pack-age remain a cash sale is approved. 2. The President would prefer that $13 million in credit be offered for FY 1971. 3. The President has instructed that Pakistan’s credit requirements be very sympathetically considered in consolidating the FY 1972 program. 4. In connection with the above, the following is approved as a position to take with the Government of Pakistan: As President Nixon told President Yahya on October 25, the U.S. will continue to be as helpful as it can in assisting in meeting Pakistan’s financial needs. As President Yahya knows, U.S. assistance programs are limited in appropriations and subject to various restrictions. Indeed, when President Yahya last visited the U.S. the future of the entire military credit program was still being vigorously contested in the Congress. President Nixon’s remarks at that time, there-fore, were a general statement of intention to be helpful and were not intended to address specific elements of the new arms package. Given the problems the U.S. must cope with, it is necessary to adhere to the original financial terms of the special offer that was made last June. However, in order to be as helpful as possible, the U.S. will increase the credit available for other Pakistani purchases in the U.S. to $13 million in U.S. FY 1971. The U.S. will similarly be as sympathetic as possible to Pakistani financial needs in the next fiscal year. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Farland was informed of the President’s decisions on February 5 and instructed to convey them to President Yahya. (Telegram 20428 to Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK) 112. Telegram 21111 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 112. Telegram 21111 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, February 8, 1971, 1742Z SUBJECT: Secretary’s Letter to Foreign Minister Swaran Singh REF: NEW DELHI 1159 1. Ambassador should seek early opportunity to present following letter from Secretary to Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. QUOTE Dear Mr. Minister: Ambassador Keating has told me of your frank and detailed discussion with Senator Cooper on the subject of Indo-American relations. I was extremely gratified that Senator Cooper as a former Ambassador and friend of India and an influential member of our Congress was able to go into these matters with you. I was, however, deeply disturbed at one portion of your conversation which seemed to imply that the United States Government was interfering in the Indian elections, either directly or through the American business community in India. There is absolutely no basis to these allegations. The United States Government is in no way attempting to influence the outcome of the current elections. I have asked Ambassador Keating to initiate a prompt and careful investigation, making use of US representatives in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras as well as New Delhi, to determine whether American private firms operating in India may have made campaign contributions, and to caution them against any involvement in the elections. All the United States businessmen which the Embassy and our Consulates General have been able to contact have said that they are aware that it would not only be wrong but imprudent and foolhardy for them to interfere in India’s domestic political process. There are a very large number of Indian citizens who have close business associations with American firms. Some of these head businesses which have received Export-Import Bank dollar loans or Cooley Loans of PL 480 rupees. These loans are strictly monitored to insure that they are used only for the trade and economic development purposes for which they are lent. I should also like to assure you that the contacts which our Embassy personnel are maintaining with politicians of all parties during the election period are solely with the view of keeping informed about developments in India and are consistent with the policy we follow in other countries. These contacts have no ulterior motive and do not in any way indicate a United States Government preference for one party or another. In fact they are comparable with the contacts your Embassy properly maintains with leaders of the various political parties and groups in the United States. I hope that these comments will dispel any misunderstanding that may exist about this Administration’s attitude toward India. We look with admiration on your country’s dedication to democracy which provides an important example to all the countries of Asia. It is, I firmly believe, in our interest as it is in yours that the electoral process which gives Indian democracy such vitality be carried on without external interference from any quarter. I have asked Ambassador Keating, to whom I look to manage all aspects of US relations with India, to deliver this letter personally so that he may discuss its contents with you as you desire. With best wishes, Sincerely, William P. Rogers UNQUOTE 2. Ambassador should advise Foreign Minister that we would appreciate receiving any specific allegations about contributions which we would then be able to investigate at once. 3. In discussing this letter Ambassador should deal with specific allegation about contributions to Jana Sangh, pointing out USG would have no reason for wishing to support this particular party. Ambassador should acknowledge that Embassy officers have talked with Jana Sangh leaders, but should point out this has no more sinister implications than talks which Indian Embassy officers have had with prominent Democratic Senators and Congressmen. 4. You should also discuss with Foreign Minister the dangers implicit in allegations of US interference becoming public during election campaign. Such allegations whether directed against USG directly or implying connection with business funding would be damaging to our relations and our mutual interests. As Secretary’s letter makes clear we categorically repudiate the charges leveled against us. End Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton on January 26; cleared by Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice, and Coerr; and approved by Rogers. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky visited New Delhi January 7–18. 113. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers 113. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 8, 1971 Dear Mr. Secretary, I have received the following message from my President for immediate communication to President Nixon: MESSAGE BEGINS: Your Excellency, I must tell you of my serious concern over the turn of events which has resulted in a rapid escalation of tension in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. This has been brought about by what appears to US to be India’s deliberate over reaction to an incident for which Pakistan could not be held responsible. Two young men from Indian occupied Kashmir hijacked an Indian plane flying from Srinagar to Jammu on 30th January and landed at Lahore. My Government took prompt steps to fulfil its obligations under international conventions and arranged repatriation of passengers and crew of the hijacked plane to India at the earliest opportunity. We also employed every means to have the plane released from the hijackers. Despite our sustained efforts, this object could not be achieved and the hijackers destroyed the plane on 2nd February. Although the hijacking was the result of repressive measures adopted by the Government of India in occupied Kashmir, my Government deplored the action of the hijackers. Instead of appreciating our helpful attitude, the Government of India for its own reasons used the incident to intensify tension between the two countries. Highly provocative statements have been made by responsible Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister, blaming Pakistan for the incident and threatening retaliatory action. The Indian authorities have also been allowing massive and violent demonstrations against the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi which has resulted in damage to property and injuries to personnel of the High Commission. On 4th February the Indian Government took the extraordinary step of banning flights of all Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory. By taking this arbitrary measure of stopping direct flights between the two wings of Pakistan, India has committed a serious breach of its international and bilateral commitments which has resulted in heightening tensions. A situation has thus been created that could lead to developments which we in Pakistan very much wish to avoid. Considering the degree of interest which your Government has taken in preservation of peace and tranquility in the sub-continent, I felt you would be interested in using your good offices with the Government of India for preventing a further deterioration of the situation and for bringing it back to normal. I and my Government would highly appreciate any effort that Your Excellency might make in this direction. With kind regards. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. MESSAGE ENDS. I will be grateful if you could kindly transmit it to its high destination. With my best personal regards. Yours sincerely, A. Hilaly 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. The two men who hijacked the plane were members of the National Liberation Front for Jammu and Kashmir. They threatened to blow up the plane unless India released 30 political prisoners held in Kashmir. (Telegram 130 from Lahore, February 1; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) India subsequently demanded that Pakistan pay compensation for the loss of the plane, extradite the hijackers to India, and accept responsibility for the incident. (Aide-mémoire delivered to the Department of State by the Pakistani Embassy, February 12; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK) On February 24 the Embassy in New Delhi reported troop movements on both sides of the border between India and West Pakistan growing out of the hijacking incident. (Telegram 2759 from New Delhi; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) Additional documentation on the incident is ibid. 114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 12, 1971, 0755Z Subj: Arms for Pakistan Financial Aspects Ref: State 02028 1. I would be less than candid if I did not express my disappointment regarding the information conveyed in the referenced telegram and my concern for its implications as much as I regret it, it is my feeling that the effort to effect an exception to our 1967 policy, which effort was undertaken in US self-interest, is turning out to be an exercise in futility. 2. All and sundry are aware of the tensions and stresses which existed in US-Pak relations when I presented my credentials about a year and a half ago. The official GOP posture was critically cool and a large segment of the Pak press was openly antagonistic. Today there is a marked difference in US-Pak relations particularly in the higher echelons of GOP officialdom. It is patent that, to a major extent, the reason for this change stems directly from the limited arms offer to Pakistan and hence requires no amplification a that this improved climate is subject to a precipitous reversal is equally obvious. 3. I must recall that Pres. Yahya himself has emphasized from the very beginning pakistan’s weak financial position and its need for some accommodation that it can benefit from President Nixon’s one-time arms sale offer. As Yahya told me in our meeting on June 20 last year when I first informed him of Prs. Nixon’s decision, “Pakistan is broke and everyone knows it—you better than anyone else.” Various messages from this Embassy since that time have repeated the concern of the GOP leadership on this question. Yahya has raised the matter with me on most occasions when we have met. He has stressed that the GOP would face a very difficult situation if it turns out that Pakistan is unable to pay for the equipment which the USG has offered to sell. We are now close to that point. 4. Washington’s effort to ease Pakistan’s disappointment and financial burden in the credit turndown, by offering $13 million in FMS credit this year and promising sympathetic consideration on FMS credit for FY 72, is appreciated by me. I fear, however, that benefit to Pakistan through this route has been overestimated. GOP has thus far made purchases this fiscal year totaling $4.6 million which would qualify for FMS credit: sole major item is one C–130 aircraft which cost $3.7 million. Elements of Pak military have expressed interest in various additional purchases of non-lethal equipment which could conceivably use up all of $13 million FMS credit this year. Such additional equipment could include another C–130 aircraft, 10 t 37 aircraft, couple of helicopters and some jeeps. I wish stress, however, that these additional purchases are uncertain and unless we should wish to press GOP to “buy up” there will be a shortfall in utilization of the $13 million earmarked for this year similar situation may well apply next year. As Embassy has previously reported, GOP interest in procuring US equipment centers at this time on our one-time exceptional offer. 5. I have one last suggestion to offer before I throw in the towel: it is a matter of interpretation. Someone somewhere along the line, sometime back, decided that an APC was a lethal weapon. An APC can be the mount for a gun or recoiless rifle, but so can a jeep. An APC can carry armed troops, but so can a school bus. An APC can be used in combat, but so can a bulldozer. I strongly urge and soonest that the lethal designation be removed from this particular item of our one-time exception package in order to give substance to the $13 million in FMS credit for the purchase of non-lethal defense equipment. 6. At a high level it was once acknowledged that there was need to make this offer “meaningful”. I submit that the need continues, and urge that serious consideration be given to this one last suggestion, which I respectfully make before the hatches are again battened down. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. 115. National Security Study Memorandum 118 115. National Security Study Memorandum 118 1 Washington, February 16, 1971 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence. SUBJECT: Contingency Study on Pakistan—Addendum to NSSM 109 The President has directed that an immediate contingency study be made of the alternative U.S. postures toward a possible move in East Pakistan toward secession. The emphasis in this study should be on contingency planning in preparation for possible decisions that might be necessary in the near future. Longer range U.S. policy toward Pakistan should continue to be considered within the framework of NSSM 109 (Policy Study on South Asia). This contingency study should be fully compatible with the study being prepared in response to NSSM 109 and should be designed to become an annex to it if it is not needed sooner. The study should be done under the direction of the Chairman NSC IG/NEA and forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by February 26, 1971. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 116. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya 116. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya 1 Washington, February 17, 1971 Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your message informing me of the situation resulting from the hijacking of an Indian commercial aircraft to Pakistan on January 30. I have also carefully considered your suggestion that our government use its good offices with the Government of India for the purpose of preventing further deterioration of the situation and seeking to restore it to normalcy. These developments are of great concern to me, and I can assure you that I want very much to see this problem resolved and the resultant tension between Pakistan and India reduced. First, I would emphasize our strong opposition to aircraft hijacking in any form and our desire to curb it through all practical means. I note with satisfaction that your government also deplores the action of the hijackers in this case. With respect to the use of good offices, we have been discussing this case with the Government of India as we have with representatives of your government. We firmly believe that airline safety requires that all countries of the international community cooperate to strengthen international law and multilateral procedures for deterring aircraft hijacking, a problem which can be effectively dealt with only through a universal international approach. We have put this position to the Government of India, and have advised it as well as your government of the importance of acting in accordance with established international procedures regarding airline safety in seeking solutions to various aspects of this problem. We feel that a multilateral approach offers the best means of moving toward such solutions. Specifically, I would encourage your government to avail itself of the good offices procedures recently adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization. We have already urged the Government of India to adopt this approach and we believe it would provide a practicable means of resolving these difficulties. Our government stands ready to cooperate in appropriate ways with the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India, and with other nations, in addressing this problem through such a multilateral procedure in the hope of overcoming this point of tension in the Subcontinent. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). No classification marking. On February 23 Yahya wrote to Nixonagain and, citing the effects of the prohibition of overflights of Indian territory on contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, reiterated his request that Nixon take a personal interest in the dispute. (Ibid.) 117. Telegram 29201 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 117. Telegram 29201 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, February 20, 1971, 2101Z SUBJ: Arms for Pakistan—Financial Aspects REFS: (A) Islamabad 1291, (B) State 20428 1. Appreciate your frank reiteration of views (reftel A) regarding our position in response to Pakistani requests for credit or other financial easement in purchasing items under arms package. Wish to assure you again that subject has been most carefully considered from all conceivable angles, resulting in decision conveyed reftel (B). 2. We have also considered your assessment and new points raised in reftel. Like you, we would be disappointed if our effort to do something for Pakistan in military supply field, for political reasons determined last June, were to founder over questions of financing. But in terms of our overall policy toward Subcontinent we see no reasonable or viable alternative to taking such risk now, especially in view seriously strained current state of Indo-Pakistan relations. Any loosening of terms or conditions of one-time exception arms offer—for example under guise of ex post facto finding APC’s to be non-lethal and thus eligible for FMS credit—would surely generate strongly adverse reaction and misunderstanding in India as well as U.S. Congress. 3. In reviewing overall problem of credit and financing we determined that increased FMS credit for non-lethal purchases offered most practical means of extending GOP some financial relief. This judgment was based on (1) fact that Pakistan’s military materiel purchases in recent years have always considerably exceeded amount of FMS credit allowed (average of about $20 million purchases annually last four years against maximum of $5 million credit); (2) no FMS credit extended in FY 70 and level of purchases relatively low; and (3) knowledge of substantial level of orders already placed or serious interest expressed by GOP in defense purchases for FY 71, including one and possibly two C–130 aircraft, T-37 aircraft, helicopters, jeeps and trucks. GOP orders for or interest in most of latter items now confirmed by DRP-104 Feb 71, with estimated total $12 million for items already eligible for FY 71 FMS credit. 4. While we would not wish encourage Pakistanis through credit offer to purchase military supplies they had not intended order this FY, we see basis for believing they can use as much as $13 million credit in normal course this year. Important, however, inform GOP of this FMS credit level soonest per reftel (B) not only to permit early planning for utilization by GOP but also as an earnest of our endeavor be as helpful as possible in this way. 5. Regarding lethality of APC’s, as armored combat assault vehicle this item is considered in lethal category by both State and Defense. In any event, we could not agree for political reasons (para 2 above) to remove item from lethal category in order qualify it for FMS credit for Pakistan; to do so at this stage could seriously damage our credibility with both Congress and Indians. 6. While recognizing current delicate political situation in Pakistan, suggest you seek opportunity soonest to convey to Yahya position contained State 20428. Your conversation with him should help clarify protracted misunderstanding over financing of arms package and permit resumption of normal discussions with GOP regarding procurement of items under alternatives offered. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 19 by Spengler; cleared by Van Hollen, Schneider, and Senior Regional Adviser James H. Boughton (NEA/RA), PM/MAS, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco. 118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 22, 1971 SUBJECT: Situation in Pakistan The chances seem to be increasing that we might before long be faced with an internal crisis in Pakistan that could over time have far-reaching implications for our interests in South Asia. I have ordered some contingency planning and want to describe the situation as it now stands. The immediate potential for trouble arises from the hard negotiations that are about to begin over writing a new constitution for Pakistan. As you know, the main issue is the power relationship between East and West Pakistan. The dominant political leaders in East (Mujibur Rahman) and West (Zulfikar Bhutto) Pakistan have failed so far to forge even the beginning of an informal consensus on the new constitution. President Yahya remains committed to turning his military government over to the civilian politicians, but maintains that he will not preside over the splitting of Pakistan. The constituent assembly is now scheduled to meet March 3, after which it will have 120 days to draft a constitution subject to the President’s approval. The odds, however, seem to be increasing against the constituent assembly’s being able to come up with a constitution acceptable to each of the major parties—Rahman, Bhutto and Yahya. Rahman is now planning to stick with his demands for the virtual autonomy of East Pakistan and if he does not get his way—which is very likely—to declare East Pakistan’s independence. This may be a negotiating ploy on his part, but strong and growing provincial nationalism limits Rahman’s flexibility and he has considerable organizational momentum behind his maximum demands. Further evidence of his intentions can be seen in recent approaches he has made to U.S. and other diplomats to play a peacemaking role to avoid an East-West civil war if he does not get his way and makes a unilateral declaration of independence. The highly uncertain internal situation in Pakistan has forced US to walk a very narrow tightrope. We are not the controlling factor by any means, but our influence and support is sought by the major political leaders. We do have some important interests, and our posture at this juncture is critical to how these interests will be protected in the future. The U.S. position has been that we support the unity of Pakistan. This has not been gratuitous. Some Pakistani politicians have charged—for their own purposes—that the U.S. is plotting East Pakistani secession, and we have taken the obvious position in denying these charges. Thus, our Counsul General in Dacca has urged Rahman to seek a constitutional decision and has scrupulously avoided any implication of U.S. intervention if Rahman opts out of a unified Pakistan. However, we could before long be faced with a declaration of East Pakistani independence. Although there is a large negotiating element in current threats of secession, we may face that situation. That raises the issue of whether or not we should be adopting amore neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the U.S., as a hedge against the day when we might have, to deal with an independent East Pakistan. A realistic assessment would seem to recognize that there is very little material left in the fabric of the unity of Pakistan. This would argue for adjusting our posture, but against that is the fact that the division of Pakistan would not serve U.S. interests. At a minimum, it would seem imperative that, in the face of the growing possibility that East and West Pakistan will split, we draw together our contingency planning on how best to protect U.S. interests. In the context of a larger study of South Asia policy already underway, I have ordered a special contingency plan so that we will have something on hand if we need it. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon underlined the last sentence of the sixth paragraph from “Counsel General” to the end and added the following handwritten comment in the margin: “Good.” In the following paragraph, he underlined the part of the third sentence that reads: “more neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the United States” and wrote in the margin: “not yet–correct–but not any position which encourages secession.” 119. Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 119. Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 25, 1971, 1200Z Subj: My Feb. Session With Yahya, Internal Political Crisis 1. Having arranged meeting with President Yahya on military supply matters (septel), I first presented him with President Nixon’s signed photograph which was much appreciated. Conversation subsequently turned to domestic political crisis. 2. For first time in my experience with him, Yahya was clearly worried about next steps on difficult road towards representative government. He seemed disheartened by impasse between Mujib and Bhutto regarding constitution. He recalled all the various hard things he had done to bring political process along this far. His remarks indicated that while his regard for Bhutto was still low, he thought Bhutto did have a point in insisting on some give by Mujib re six points. Yahya said he had twice invited Mujib to confer with him here, and Mujib had twice declined. Now President was proceeding to Karachi this afternoon (Feb. 25) to have another talk with Bhutto. He confided that, in event Bhutto-Mujib impasse was not somehow resolved before March 3, he was considering deferral “for week or two” or later than that if need be of his own appearance at national assembly in Dacca (which Yahya implied would delay opening of Assembly). Yahya did not indicate what he thought might happen if impasse not broken fairly soon, but he spoke in a tone of despair of “blood and chaos” which might ensue. 3. I re-affirmed our respect for all that Yahya had done thus far towards transferring power to represntatives of the people. I stressed that U.S. policy re integrity of Pakistan remained precisely as I had previously confirmed to him as well as to Bhutto. I said I had been considering going to Dacca very soon to see Mujib, whom I had not encountered during the last year, and making sure that he also comprehended our concern about Pakistan’s future. However, on balance I had decided that my seeing Mujib at this particularly sensitive juncture would likely be subject to considerable public misunderstanding. Yahya acknowledged that there was widespread suspicion that U.S. favored separation of East and West Pakistan. He said reports continued to reach him that ConGen and USAID officials in Dacca were giving Awami League contacts impression that USG favored separation, and latter were spreading the word. It had further been reported to Yahya that when I was last in Dacca on my return from U.S. (in January) I had seen Mujib. I assured him I had not. Yahya said that he himself was convinced that U.S. policy in support of unity of Pakistan remained as I had enunciated it to him previously. He would not rpt not misunderstand my seeing Mujib during next few days. On contrary, President urged me to go to dacca tomorrow, Feb. 26, and see Mujib as soon as possible. 4. I am now scheduled depart Islamabad at noon Feb. 26 for Dacca and have requested our Consul General seek early meeting with Mujib. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to the Consulate at Dacca. 120. Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 120. Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 25, 1971, 1226Z Subj: Conversation With President Yahya re Credit for One-Time Exception Arms Package and APC Contract Implementation Ref: State 20428 and 29201 1. At least 30 minutes of the hour-long conversation which I had with President Yahya Feb. 25, beginning at noon, were devoted to the subject of the one-time arms exception package for Pakistan and the matter of credit, or, lack thereof, as applicable thereto. 2. I began by reviewing the history of the package offer, noting that in the first conversation on June 20, 1970, and, subsequently, in all other related conversations, the offer specifically called for cash. I recalled also that on June 20th President Yahya had indicated that the financial condition of the GOP made some form credit necessary if the offer was to be meaningful. I also recalled that on a number of other occasions he had specifically mentioned the need for credit. I stated that during those conversations I had repeatedly reiterated I had no authority to go beyond the offer as made but that I would bring to my government’s attention his concern and his request for credit as applicable to the lethal end items in the package. 3. After the foregoing review, I again carefully spelled out the specific terms of the package offer and emphasized the cash requirement. I explained that, on a number of occasions both by telegraphic correspondence and in person while I was in Washington last, I had emphasized Yahya’s expressed hope that credit could be extended. Further I informed him that concern for the subject of credit had been noted in high places in my government and that a careful examination of the questions had been undertaken in Washington. I then enunciated the result of this investigation, read the statement which I was requested to quote, and explained the meaning and utility of the 13 million dollar FMS credit. 4. Yahya said he was saddened and depressed and that there was no use in indicating his feelings to be otherwise. He indicated that he had hoped apparently, without justification that the United States, in evidence of its friendship to Pakistan, would make credit available in order that the lethal end items offered could be purchased. He said that it seemed to him that, with the knowledge of the GOP’s financial condition, the offer would have little meaning without a credit clause and that he had assumed that the offer was both meaningful and of substance. He added that what he was saying in no way detracted from his feelings of goodwill towards President Nixon who he knew had sincere attachment for Pakistan, but he wished the decision could have been otherwise. Most particularly, he said, the negative decision, which if affirmative would have meant so much to him, came on a day that was critical to Pakistan’s future, and, consequently, was “harder to take” than under normal circumstances. In a sense he felt as if “everything is falling down around my head.” He suggested that we discuss this general subject at a later date but of particular concern to him at the moment was the matter of the APCs. 5. On the subject of the APC purchase President Yahya said that there had been so much going on politically and so much of his time had been preoccupied with his effort to get together the divergent points of view of Sheikh Mujibur and Bhutto that he had not had time to focus on the critical matter of the purchase of APCs. He avowed that, in his opinion, for a number of reasons his government needed to consummate this purchase order. He said that, as far as he was concerned, his government was committed to the purchase and that he would have his Defense Secretary get in touch with me this afternoon, and although he (Yahya) did not know where the money would come from, nonetheless it would be forthcoming soonest. He concluded by saying that while he understood from me the contract had been terminated as of midnight last night most assuredly he hoped that in this instance my government would not use “a matter of hours” to preclude his government from proceeding affirmatively with this order in accordance with its terms as offered. 6. I told Yahya that I could give him no assurance except to again inform him that my government was most sympathetic of his efforts to move his country back into a truly democratic regime and, viewed in the climate, it was reasonable to expect the the USG would do all that appropriately could be done under the circumstances. 7. Comment: Since so much turns on so little, I, too, most assuredly hope that a favorable response on the APC offer will be forthcoming. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 121. Telegram 540 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 121. Telegram 540 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, February 28, 1971, 0824Z Subject: Conversation With Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 1. At 0900 this morning, February 28, I called upon Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at his Dacca residence. The Sheikh met me at my car and escorted me into his home. It was obvious that he was particularly pleased to see me and welcomed me with great cordiality. At same time he seemed somewhat nervous and slightly apprehensive as to what the conversation might generate. After a few preliminary social comments which included his reflection that “our meeting comes at a most critical juncture in Pakistan history,” he precipitously barged into substantive discussions by asking me “what did I think about the situation?” I told him, as an interested observer, I was concerned about the political impasse between East and West Pakistan which all segments of the press had been reporting and suggested that since he, as Chairman of Awami League, was in a better position than I to interpret current developments, it was more appropriate for me to request his observations. 2. The Sheikh said that in his opinion the political impasse which was facing Pakistan was not due solely to the machinations of Mr. Bhutto, but represented a situation which had been brought about by “those very people who had supported Ayub.” He said that Bhutto could not possibly have acted on his own since he had less than an organized political party. Without the help and leadership of certain West Pakistani military officers, Bhutto’s position would be untenable. It was precisely because of this situation that Bhutto favors excessive expenditures on military preparedness. 3. In reply to my question as to whether or not he thought Bhutto would attend the National Assembly, he said he thought that, because Awami League had “now boxed him in,” Bhutto’s appearance could be expected. However, he said he anticipated that Bhutto, whom he characterized as a “callous cow, would subsequently corral his mnas and take off for the west wing. At this moment the life struggle of Bangla Desh would begin. 4. I then asked him to tell me just how far apart were the positions taken by PPP and the AL. He said that positions were so far apart that he anticipated little or no chance of securing a consensus. More specifically, he said that Awami League and he as its “chosen leader” could not and would not compromise on six point program which “he had made a part of life of East Pakistan for a period of now some ten years.” He said that it was Bhutto’s objective to become the Foreign Minister and be given the right to select Pakistan’s president. The Sheikh commented on Bhutto’s foreign policies which he said are abhorrent to him, citing Bhutto’s love for communist China and his intransigent position vis-à-vis India. The Sheikh reflected at length upon his anti-communist position and the dangers that China portended to the area. As to India, it was imperative that Bangla Desh re-establish good relations and reopen the historic. trade routes in the area. He opined that differences between what Bhutto wanted and what the people of Bangla Desh demanded appeared to be insurmountable. 5. With the concept as point of departure, Sheikh indulged in a 10-minute speech which could have been a part of his political oratory, saying that the people of “his country,” were behind him to a man, that he had the small hard core of communists very much on the run as was evidenced by Bhashani’s present political disarray. He said that the communists had killed three of his leaders and that he in turn had promised the communists that for every Awami League killed, he would kill three of theirs and that “this we have done.” After noting the time he had spent in prison at hands of West Pakistani leadership, he said that he had no fear whatsoever of “facing the bullet” if unity could not be maintained. He dramatically pointed out that he was unafraid of being jailed or “hacked to pieces,” and that he would not deviate from the mandate which had been the will of his people. He culminated this monologue by saying that he did not want separation but rather he wanted a form of confederation in which the people of Bangla Desh would get their just and rightful share of foreign aid, and not a mere “20 percent as heretofore. With 60 percent of foreign exchange coming from my country, how can Islamabad justify the crumbs which they have thrown us?” the Sheikh rhetorically asked. 6. Moving to the subject of foreign aid, the Sheikh said that currently Pakistan was in a dangerous financial condition with its foreign exchange reserves virtually exhausted. He said that in a sense this was a blessing in disguise for Bangla Desh since West Pakistan did not have the financial power, to subjugate his party. He said, however, that presently West Pakistan was begging Japan for substantial financial support and that if this was received, “then they will bang us.” It was then that the Sheikh pointedly asked me if the U.S. and the consortium would support the re-building of Bangla Desh. I told him that as a political leader he should recognize the fact that U.S. had been and continues to be interested in the economic well being of the sub-continent. I pointed out, however, that there were two limitations to our economic assistance program as well as to the program of the consortium: (1) the amount of funds available for economic assistance was today much more limited than in the past: (2) aid receiving projects of necessity had to be more carefully evaluated and developed: this required more indigenous technicians and public servants knowledgeable not only in the projects themselves but skilled in the utilization of funds and project administration. I noted my concern that there had been less than full utilization of resources made currently available in East Pakistan for rural, development and the paucity of trained people. 7. The Sheikh then described at length what he considered to be East Pakistan’s chances of becoming a viable area, pointing out the great reserves of gas available not only for local consumption by a petrochemical industry but also for export to India. He said that under his leadership Bangla Desh would be self-sufficient in food within two years, the boro crop being one of his primary interests. When I pointed out to him the almost unbelievable birthrate in East Pakistan, the Sheikh said that birth control would be one of his main objectives saying that he could lead the people in their effort to decrease the size of individual families whereas they could not be pushed as was the effort today. 8. Speaking in a thoroughly serious mood, the Sheikh said that though he hesitated to do so. He felt he should point out that the U.S. had a reputation for deserting their friends when disagreeable problems arose he said that in his opinion disagreeable problems were going to arise in this part of world which again would put the United States to test. I suggested to the Sheikh that I felt that his opinion was entirely too pat and I would be happy to discuss the American role in support of its friends at another time. I added that I felt some credence should be given to the fact that the U.S. financially assisted Pakistan to the tune of something in excess of four and a half billion dollars. The Sheikh’s retort was that “if the U.S. would give me one billion dollars, I would make a prosperous Bangla Desh a bulwark for democracy.” 9. All these comments were but background to the key question which the Sheikh wished to ask, i.e., what is the policy of the U.S. toward Pakistan? With the utmost care I delineated the U.S. policy, precisely in accordance with the policy guidance position set forth in State 35534, and I in no way conveyed a sense of concern re Pakistan’s future in such a manner as to suggest unalterable U.S. opposition to Bengali aspirations. I did, however point, out as aforesaid that foreign aid was no longer a cornucopia from which flowed an unending stream of financial support for use in solving the ills of the world. Without putting it in a form of a question the Sheikh then said that it behooved all the friends of Bangla Desh to exert maximum influence on “those who would use the force of arms to keep my people in a colonial status.” He said that he had been a student of world affairs long enough to know the United States and other aid-contributing countries could exert this type of influence if they desired to do so. Since no question was posed, the necessity for an answer was obviated, but it may require an answer sooner than we expect, and hence should be given some serious thought. I had anticipated the possibility that the Sheikh would raise the matter of recognition since he had evidenced interest in this subject as heretofore reported. However, he did not do so. 10. I expressed the hope that I would have an opportunity of talking to him again after the next few weeks had passed, since many of the current variables or unknown quantities would then be known and clarified. He said that he had pleasantly anticipated this meeting today and would look forward with the greatest of pleasure to meeting with me at any time. Further, he wished to assure me not only of his own personal friendship, but that of the people of Bangla Desh for the people of the United States. 11. The conversation which extended for a period of little over one hour was concluded on this most amicable vein and the Sheikh escorted me to by automobile through a line of his ardent supporters. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971 India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971 122. Editorial Note 123. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) Washington, March 3, 1971 Davis circulated to members of the Senior Review Group the response to NSSM 118, a contingency study that examined the policy options available to the United States in the event of a move by East Pakistan to secede. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–053, SRG Meeting, Pakistan, 3/6/71. Secret; Exdis. Keith Guthrie signed for Davis. Also sent to Irwin, JCS Chairman Moorer, and CIA Director Helms. A copy of the contingency study in the Department of State files indicates that it was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and forwarded to Kissinger on March 2 by Sisco, who was serving as chairman of the group. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US) The Senior Review Group meeting scheduled for March 3 was held on March 6. 124. Telegram 697 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 10, 1971, 1205Z Awami leader Mujibur Rahman sent a message to the Consulate General to ask if the U.S. would be willing to indicate to Pakistani President Yahya its preference for a political solution to the crisis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and priority Bangkok for Farland. 125. Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 28, 1971, 0540Z The Consulate General in Dacca began its report on the crisis on March 28 as follows: “Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to London, Bangkok, New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC, and MAC. 126. Telegram 978 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 29, 1971, 1130Z The Consulate General reported on the continuing “crackdown” in Dacca by Pakistani army units, which seemed targeted in particular upon Hindus. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, New Delhi, London, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC. 127. Telegram 986 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 30, 1971, 0905Z The Consulate General’s report on the crisis on March 30 described the killing of students and faculty at Dacca University. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC. 128. Telegram 2954 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, March 31, 1971, 1245Z The Embassy analyzed the crisis in East Pakistan for historical perspective and concluded: “deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, and New Delhi. 129. Telegram 58039 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca Washington, April 7, 1971, 0014Z This telegram, drafted by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco and cleared by the senior leadership of the Department of State, USIA, and AID, responded to the charge made by the staff of the Consulate General that the U.S. had failed to condemn what it viewed as atrocities in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 6 by Sisco; cleared by Irwin, U. Alexis Johnson, Eliot, Macomber, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director Henry Loomis (USIA), and Maurice Williams (AID); and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. 130. Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, April 10, 1971, 1508Z The staff of the Consulate General expanded on their objections to the U.S. response to the crisis in East Pakistan first outlined on April 6 in telegram 1138 from Dacca. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Islamabad. 131. Special National Intelligence Estimate 32–71 Washington, April 12, 1971 SNIE 32–71 assessed prospects for Pakistan in light of the emerging civil war. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. 132. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council’s Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia for the Senior Review Group Washington, undated The paper assessed the crisis in East Pakistan and its impact on U.S. relations with Pakistan. It also weighed U.S. interests in South Asia and outlined policy options for dealing with the crisis. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–054, SRG Meeting, Pakistan and Ceylon, 4/19/71. Secret. On April 16 Sisco sent this paper under a covering memorandum to Kissinger in his capacity as chairman of the NSC Review Group for use by the Senior Review Group at its April 19 meeting. (Ibid.) 133. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 25, 1971 Eliot conveyed to Kissinger, for circulation to the members of the WSAG, a contingency study prepared in the Department of State assessing the policy options for dealing with the escalating crisis in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret. This memorandum and, apparently, the attached study, were drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Sisco. 134. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 26, 1971 Hoskinson summarized Indian policy toward the crisis in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, India-Pakistan, 5/26/71. Secret; Exdis. 135. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed a letter that had been received from Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and another to be sent to Pakistani President Yahya. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 505–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed Ambassador Keating and his view of India and the building crisis in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating) Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13–5:40 p.m. Keating gave Nixon and Kissinger his appreciation of the developing crisis in South Asia in the course of briefing them on their impending meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Singh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Keating, Oval Office, Conversation No. 521–13. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58–3:41 p.m. In a discussion of mounting tensions on the subcontinent, Singh sought to emphasize the “tremendous problem” created for India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. Nixon counseled patience while the U.S. provided additional funds to deal with the refugees and used quiet diplomacy to try to mediate a settlement in Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Singh, Kissinger, and Sisco, Oval Office, Conversation No. 523–2. No classification marking. Ambassadors Keating and Jha were also present. 139. Memorandum of Conversation New Delhi, July 7, 1971 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram discussed Ram’s perception of the threat posed by China to India. Kissinger said that the U.S. would take a “grave view” of any Chinese move against India. The conversation concluded with a discussion of what might be done to improve relations between the U.S. and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on July 12. Published from an unsigned copy. The meeting was held in Ram’s office. Kissinger left Washington on July 2 for what was publicly described as a fact-finding trip to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The trip included secreta secret visit to China, undertaken during Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan, following his stop in India. He returned to Washington on July 11. 140. Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 133 Washington, July 10, 1971 In response to NSSM 133, the study assessed U.S. policy options in South Asia in light of the crisis in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/23/71. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton. A cover sheet bears the date July 9, but drafting information indicates that it was drafted on July 10. The study was drafted for the Senior Review Group and approved by a State/Defense/CIA ad hoc committee. The cover sheet and a table of contents are not published. 141. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21–4:54 p.m. Farland briefed Nixon and Kissinger on the developing crisis in Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Farland, Oval Office, Conversation No. 549–25. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 142. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group Washington, July 29, 1971 This “Scenario For Action In Indo-Pak Crisis” was prepared in the Department of State in response to an instruction from the Senior Review Group. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/30/71. Secret; Exdis. This scenario was prepared in response to an instruction to the Department from the Senior Review Group on July 23 to draft a paper outlining what the U.S. perceived as a desirable outcome to the crisis developing in East Pakistan. The instruction called for a paper that could serve as “a scenario for discussions with the Pakistanis, the Indians and possibly the Russians.” (Ibid., Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971) Drafted by Quainton and used by the Senior Review Group at their meeting on July 30. Because of a typographical error, the drafting date on the paper is given as June 29. The attached paper on humanitarian relief, cited in the scenario, is not published. 143. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, September 3, 1971 Williams reported to Rogers on his trip to Pakistan and offered his recommendations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Secret. Rogers transmitted the memorandum to Nixon on September 13 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Tabs A–D are not published. 144. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, September 22, 1971 The memorandum assessed the first 6 months of the crisis in South Asia and suggested possible outcomes. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak Crisis, South Asia, 1/1/71–9/30/71. Secret. SNIE 32–71 is Document 131. The May 28 memorandum cited in footnote 2 has not been found. 145. Telegram 9833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, September 28, 1971, 1039Z Ambassador Farland made the case that the U.S. policy of seeking to maintain leverage with the Government of Pakistan had helped to “defuse or ameliorate the crisis.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi, Dacca, and Lahore. Sent with a request to repeat to other posts as desired. 146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, and the British Ambassador to the United States (Cromer) Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10–5:31 p.m. Nixon, Kissinger, and Douglas-Home shared their assessments of developments on the subcontinent and agreed to maintain close contacts in dealing with Prime Minister Gandhi concerning the crisis. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Douglas-Home, and Cromer, Oval Office, Conversation 582–9. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 147. Telegram 10043 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, October 4, 1971, 1230Z The Embassy reported that the combined efforts of the Government in Islamabad and the army in East Pakistan had “failed to halt anarchy in the countryside, to undercut support to Mukti Bahini, or to restore East Pakistan government to its pre-March level of muddling-through incompetency.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, Lahore, London, Madras, New Delhi, Tehran, USUN, and the US Mission in Geneva. 148. Telegram 186578 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, October 12, 1971, 1837Z Secretary of State Rogers commended Ambassador Farland on his assessment of the developing crisis in Pakistan. Rogers suggested that Farland continue to stress to Pakistani President Yahya the importance of dealing leniently with Mujib. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted on September 29 by Laingen; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and Irwin; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Dacca, Lahore, and Karachi. 149. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 4, 1971 Advisers to President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the building crisis in South Asia while Nixon and Gandhi met Assistant Secretary of State Sisco said Yahya Khan had accepted the idea of a unilateral military withdrawal and was prepared under certain conditions to open a dialogue with Bangla Desh representatives. T.N. Kaul responded skeptically to both suggestions. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 919, VIP Visits, India, PM Indira Gandhi Visit, Nov. 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Saunders initialed for himself and Hoskinson. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. 150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 a.m. Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman discussed Nixon’s conversation the previous day with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and agreed on the approach to take in the meeting he was scheduled to have with her later in the day. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation 615–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 151. Memorandum for the President’s File Washington, November 5, 1971, 11:20 a.m. President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed international developments but not the crisis in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 2, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 31, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at 11:20 a.m. 152. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, November 5, 1971 Williams reported to Rogers on his recent trip to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Nodis. Sent through S/S and initialed by Eliot. A stamped notation on a copy of this memorandum in White House files indicates the President saw it. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VIII, Nov–Dec 71) 153. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff Washington, November 11, 1971 Summary of a contingency paper drafted in the Department of State that outlined options open to the United States in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. The summary was prepared for use by the Washington Special Actions Group. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/12/71. Secret; Exdis. The summary was attached to and summarized an undated paper that outlined contingency planning in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. Neither the contingency paper nor the analytical summary have drafting information, but the former was apparently drafted in the Department of State and the summary was prepared by the NSC staff. Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy probably drafted the summary, which they forwarded with the contingency paper to Kissinger on November 11 under a covering memorandum for use by the Washington Special Actions Group at their November 12 meeting. (Ibid) 154. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan Washington, November 15, 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m. Nixon briefed Sultan Khan on his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, assured him of U.S. sympathy and support for Pakistan, and discussed U.S. efforts to try to prevent a war. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Sultan Khan, Oval Office, Conversation No. 617–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 23, 1971, 10:55 a.m. Kissinger and Rogers expressed some differences over the U.S. response to the escalation of fighting in East Pakistan. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 15–23 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. The announcements referred to in the conversation are apparently the projected announcements of Nixon’s scheduled meetings in December with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, French President Georges Pompidou, and British Prime Minister Edward Heath. The cable referenced in the conversation is apparently telegram 212549 to Islamabad, November 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK) 156. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers Washington, November 24, 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m. Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers discussed the implications of the crisis in South Asia and the approach to be taken in dealing with India and Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers, Oval Office, Conversation No. 624–21. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 157. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 26, 1971, 10:42 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the fighting in East Pakistan. Nixon said he “would like the Indians to be embarrassed.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 24–30 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. 158. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:45 p.m. Kissinger and Rogers discussed whether to place the blame for the conflict on India. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking. 159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 5, 1971 Kissinger and Connally agreed that the fighting between India and Pakistan had developed as a result of collusion between India and the Soviet Union. They further agreed that it was necessary to oppose India in the conflict. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, December 1971. No classification marking. 160. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (Vorontsov) Washington, December 5, 1971, 4:55 p.m. Kissinger called Vorontsov to confirm that President Nixon felt that the crisis in South Asia had created a watershed in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking. 161. Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 6, 1971, 9:19–9:24 a.m. Nixon and Rogers discussed the crisis in South Asia and the bleak prospects facing the Pakistani Government. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 162. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 6, 1971, 6:14–6:38 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the crisis in South Asia, focusing on the approach to take with the Soviet Union and China, and the best way to deal with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 630–20. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 163. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the President’s Assistant and Press Secretary (Ziegler) Washington, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:29 p.m. Following a report to Nixon by Stans on his trip to the Soviet Union, Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler discussed a background briefing Kissinger intended to give the press concerning the crisis in South Asia. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) Washington, December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m. Kissinger suggested that Pakistan invoke its mutual security treaty with the United States. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6–10 Dec 1971. No classification marking. No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger’s reference to a mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action “as may be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that the United States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIX, page 372, footnote 6) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962, however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote 7) 165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:20–5:01 p.m. During the course of a discussion of the crisis in South Asia, Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell weighed the possibilities of increasing pressure on India. Nixon instructed Kissinger to contact China to urge the Chinese to initiate military moves toward the Indian border, and he authorized the movement of a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 307–27. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 166. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03–8:12 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger weighed whether to cancel the Moscow summit if the Soviet Union did not restrain India. Nixon reiterated his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–64. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 167. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 9, 1971, 6:59 a.m. General Colin Hamilton responded to an Indian allegation of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Miscellaneous–SOA 1971. Secret; Limdis. Prepared by Brigadier General Colin C. Hamilton, USAF. 168. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger again weighed the moves they could make to prevent India from dismembering West Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 633–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 169. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires (Vorontsov) Washington, December 9, 1971, 4:00–4:41 p.m. Nixon reviewed progress toward détente and asked Maskevich to inform Chairman Brezhnev that such progress would be seriously jeopardized if the Soviet Union did not act to restrain India from attacking West Pakistan. If India were to attack West Pakistan, Nixon warned there would be a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Matskevich, and Vorontsov, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–12. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Butterfield also attended the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The comments by Matskevich were translated by an interpreter. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 170. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 9, 1971 Intelligence assessment of the implications of an Indian victory over Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–083, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 12/9/71. Secret. Prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group. 171. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 9, 1971, 5:57–6:34 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger concluded that, while East Pakistan could not be saved, they would have “accomplished a lot” if they managed to “save a strong West Pakistan.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–19. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 172. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51–11:12 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the measures that could serve to preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. Nixon ordered a program of economic support for West Pakistan and a public relations campaign to fix the blame for the crisis on India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 173. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 10, 1971, 12:47–1:01 p.m. Kissinger reported to Nixon on his meeting with Soviet Chargé Vorontsov. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 174. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 11, 1971 Cargo assessed U.S. interests in the South Asian crisis and stressed the importance of brokering a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Looking beyond the conflict, Cargo suggested the U.S. objective should be to establish a normal and positive relationship with the new Government of Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Sisco. 175. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan (Bhutto), the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) December 11, 1971, 7:28 p.m. Bhutto asked to meet with Nixon, and he and Raza pressed Kissinger for a firm public statement warning India to cease intervention in Pakistan. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 11–15 Dec 1971. No classification marking. Haig was also on the telephone. Kissinger and Haig were in Washington; Bhutto and Raza were in New York City. 176. Telegram 12414 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, December 12, 1971, 0825Z Ambassador Farland asked Pakistani President Yahya to clarify Pakistan’s position with respect to a cease-fire. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN. 177. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m. In the course of discussing the public opinion aspects of the crisis, a UN resolution to condemn India as an aggressor, and a hotline message to Moscow, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig were confronted with the implications of having offered to protect China from the Soviet Union if China intervened in the conflict between India and Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger and Haig, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–3. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 178. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 12, 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger reacted to the news that India had offered an assurance that it would not attack West Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–6. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 179. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:04–11:14 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger completed drafting the hotline message to the Soviet Union. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 180. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Washington, December 12, 1971 The contingency paper, prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group, examined the refugee problem created by the conflict in East Pakistan from humanitarian, political, economic and managerial perspectives, but assumed the “overriding importance” of humanitarian considerations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on December 10 by Thomas P. Thornton (S/PC). Thornton also apparently drafted the attached study. Cleared in S/P by Deputy Director Joseph Neubert and Cargo; in NEA by Van Hollen, Quainton, and Constable; and in S/R, IO/UNP, INR/RNA, and AID/NESA. 181. Telegram 223704 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington December 12, 1971, 2250Z Indian Ambassador Jha responded to a U.S. request to outline India’s war aims. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent immediate as Tosec 9 to the White House with a request to pass it to Secretary Rogers on Air Force One. Repeated to Dacca, Islamabad, London, Moscow, and USUN. Drafted by Quainton and approved by Irwin 182. Telegram 11295 from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State December 13, 1971, 0211Z Ambassador Annenberg met with British Prime Minister Heath and Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home to discuss Britain’s position in the United Nations on the fighting in South Asia. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent flash to the Department with a request to pass to the White House for the President and Secretary Rogers. Repeated flash to USUN. 183. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/13308–71 Washington, December 13, 1971 A report on Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s briefing at which India’s war aims were discussed in light of the United Nations cease-fire resolution. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Distribution. Sent to the White House and distributed within the Departments of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the JCS, and NSA. 184. Telegram 5627 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, December 14, 1971, 0408Z Consul General Spivack met with Governor Malik and General Farman Ali to discuss the possibility of a cease-fire to avoid the danger of a “bloodbath” in East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Flash to Islamabad and New Delhi. 185. Telegram 5628 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, December 14, 1971, 0441Z Governor Malik informed Consul General Spivack that the question of a cease-fire was being handled through Ambassador Farland in Islamabad and that it would be unnecessary to put forward proposals from Dacca. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Flash to Islamabad and New Delhi. 186. Telegram 12542 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, December 14, 1971, 1420Z In light of the impending collapse of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan, the Embassy assessed Pakistan’s options. It concluded that Pakistan would concede East Pakistan to Bangladesh if peace “with honor” could be negotiated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated priority to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and USUN. 187. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS–315/07612–71 Washington, December 15, 1971 Report on the Soviet response to an Indian request that the Soviet Union recognize and sign a defense treaty with Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissemination. Sent to the White House, and distributed within the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, the JCS, and NSA. Also sent to Islamabad for the Ambassador, the DCM, the political counselor, and the defense attaché. Sent to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras for principal officers only, and to CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, AND CINCARPAC. 188. Telegram 19243 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, December 15, 1971, 0738Z Ambassador Keating asked for the rationale behind the decision to deploy the U.S. carrier task force into the Indian Ocean. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-PAK War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House. 189. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 15, 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the implications of the Soviet assurance that India would not press an attack on West Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Haldeman, and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 638–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 190. Telegram 11410 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, December 15, 1971, 1656Z Ambassador Annenberg reported on a conversation with Stanley Tomlinson, British Deputy Under Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which Tomlinson discussed U.S.–UK differences of perspective on the crisis in South Asia. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 191. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 16, 1971, 10:40 a.m. Nixon and Kissinger reacted to India’s declaration of a cease-fire in the west. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription. 192. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 16, 1971, 12:15 p.m Nixon told Kissinger he intended to continue to take a hard line on economic assistance to India. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription. 193. Telegram 227784 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, December 18, 1971, 2222Z Secretary Rogers met with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister-designate Bhutto, who expressed appreciation for U.S. support for Pakistan during the crisis. He said he was returning to Pakistan in anticipation of assuming the reins of political power. He was prepared to seek reconciliation with India and asked the U.S. not to act hastily in recognizing Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and approved by Van Hollen. Laingen initialed for Van Hollen. Repeated to New Delhi, USUN, London, Moscow, Tehran, Paris, Dacca, and Calcutta. Sent with an instruction to deliver at the opening of business on December 19. 194. Telegram 19600 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, December 23, 1971, 1035Z The Embassy reported on an interview Indian Prime Minister Gandhi gave to a journalist in which she said U.S.-Indian relations could return to normal if the U.S. was prepared to recognize India’s predominant position on the subcontinent. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-PAK War, South Asia, 12/17/71–12/31/71. Confidential; Limdis. 195. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 23, 1971, 8 p.m Rogers and Kissinger differed over the nature of the U.S. assurance to Pakistan. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–23 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The excision was in accordance with the donor’s deed of gift. 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, December 30, 1971 Nutter’s memorandum to Laird assessed, from the perspective of the Department of Defense, U.S.-South Asia policy in the wake of the crisis on the subcontinent. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 76–0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Aug–Dec) 1971. Secret; Sensitive. 197. Telegram 232870 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 30, 1971, 0016Z The Department’s initial decision was that U.S. humanitarian assistance to the successor state in East Pakistan would be channeled through the United Nations Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and C. Herbert Rees, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (AID/NESA) on December 23; cleared in AID/NESA by Williams and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Calcutta. 122. Editorial Note 122. Editorial Note The political crisis in Pakistan, which escalated into civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971, ultimately led to armed conflict between India and Pakistan and convulsed the subcontinent of South Asia through the end of the year. Most of the important documents bearing on the United States response to that crisis are in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, South Asia Crisis, 1971. The documents in this electronic publication for that period supplement, and should be read in conjunction with, the printed volume. 123. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 123. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 1 Washington, March 3, 1971 SUBJECT: Response to NSSM 118 on Pakistan Attached is the contingency study on Pakistan which has been prepared in response to NSSM 118. A preliminary discussion of this paper is planned at the Senior Review Group meeting scheduled for Wednesday, March 3 at 3:00 p.m. Jeanne W. Davis Attachment Paper Washington, undated CONTINGENCY STUDY ON PAKISTAN—EAST PAKISTAN SECESSION (NSSM-118) Part I of this study traces the immediate background of the current political crisis in Pakistan, discusses U.S. interests in Pakistan’s unity and current limitations on U.S. policy, and assesses the outlook for East and West Pakistan if they become two independent states. Part II considers alternative U.S. postures toward a possible move by East Pakistan to secede. Part III outlines decisions and actions we might have to take in the event such. a separation occurs. Longer range implications of this problem will be considered in NSSM-109, “Policy Study on South Asia”. PART I THE CURRENT CRISIS: BACKGROUND AND U.S. INTERESTS Background The possibility of imminent separation of the two wings of Pakistan stems from the outcome of the December 1970 elections to choose a National Assembly to frame a constitution. The elections resulted in a nearly complete polarization of political forces in Pakistan. In the east wing, the Awami League, campaigning on a Six Point Program calling for full provincial autonomy, won virtually all the seats and secured a small but absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Awami League favors a policy of reconciliation with India. In the west wing, a substantial majority of the seats was won by the leftist People’s Party, which advocates a Central Government with substantial powers and a policy of continuing confrontation toward India. The leaders of the two parties have conferred but have in effect agreed only to oppose each other’s constitutional program. President Yahya, whose power to arbitrate was greatly diminished by the decisive outcome of the elections, had summoned the National Assembly to convene in Dacca on March 3. However, confronted with the political impasse, he announced on March 1 that he was postponing the Assembly indefinitely to give political leaders more time to resolve their differences. Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman had asserted that he intended to use his absolute majority to enact a constitution based on his party’s autonomist program. People’s Party leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had declared his intention to absent himself and his party from the session unless Mujib modified his constitutional proposals on at least some of the Awami League’s Six Points. A number of other West Pakistan members from smaller parties joined Bhutto in boycotting the Assembly session. Because of his landslide mandate Mujib has little flexibility in modifying his program, although he and his party are believed to prefer to remain in a unified federal state of Pakistan with maximum provincial autonomy rather than secede. Bhutto and his followers, on the other hand, may have tacitly concluded that they would be prepared to let the East Pakistanis secede—leaving themselves to govern a residual state in West Pakistan—rather than accept a weak federal system based on the Awami League program. As a result of Yahya’s postponement of the Assembly, the crisis has reached a critical juncture. Unless a compromise formula can be devised, secession by the Bengalis or separation of the two wings of Pakistan by mutual consent have become real possibilities. U.S. Interests and U.S. Policy Limitations Our consistent position has been that U.S. interests are better served by a unified Pakistan than by its separation into two independent states—West Pakistan with a population of about 61 million and East Pakistan with about 76 million. We have concluded that an independent East Pakistan would be more vulnerable to internal instability, economic stagnation and external subversion than an East Pakistan affiliated with West Pakistan. We have also concluded that the East Pakistanis provide a moderating influence over West Pakistani hostility toward India. Finally, we have recognized hostility that we have had no realistic alternative but to support Pakistan’s unity if we were to maintain satisfactory relations with the government in Islamabad. We also recognize that as a practical matter our ability to influence the course of these events is very limited. The special relationship which we maintained with the Government of Pakistan until the late 1960’s has ended, and with it the sort of leverage, as well as interest, we might once have had in influencing political developments in Pakistan. In the present circumstances, we could perhaps affect the timetable or modalities of East Pakistani secession through our posture toward Mujib and his followers, or perhaps influence the West Pakistani response to it. However, we could not deter a move for independence if the East Pakistanis should make the ultimate decision to establish their own country. Nor could we dissuade dominant political forces in West Pakistan, notably Bhutto and his followers, from pursuing a course of obstruction which would result in driving East Pakistan into secession if they should choose to do so. All evidence points to the fact that President Yahya is doing his utmost to effect an accommodation between the two contending forces in his country in order to preserve a unified state, and we see little we could effectively do to help him except to maintain our general posture of cooperation with his government and to encourage him in his efforts as long as they stand a reasonable chance of success. The alternative U.S. postures in Part II, below, have been framed in the context of these judgments regarding the limitations on our policy options. We should also recognize that, while we have regarded our interests as better served by a unified Pakistan, we should be able to adjust to the emergence of two separate states and to maintain satisfactory relations with them without serious damage to our interests. It is unlikely that either state will in the foreseeable future significantly change its external orientation from the dominant attitudes toward foreign affairs now prevailing in East and West Pakistan, respectively. Both will want to maintain viable ties with the U.S. as an offset to their relations with other major external powers: India, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Both will keenly desire continuation of U.S. economic assistance and will seek our support on various political issues. Both may also desire military and public safety assistance from us, at least in training and the sale of equipment. In short, both states will want friendly and cooperative relations with the U.S.—a desire which it will be in our interest to reciprocate, and to support within the capability of our resource and in the light of our interests in the South Asian region as a whole. Outlook for Separate States An independent state in East Pakistan would undoubtedly face formidable problems, especially in the economic sphere and eventually in the political. However, these are problems which would inevitably arise whether East Pakistan were independent or merely autonomous within a federated Pakistan. Politically, the Awami League under Mujibur Rahman would restore democratic government in the new state and enjoy wide popular support from the start, judging from the overwhelming size of its mandate in the recent elections. It would move to establish cooperative relations with its major neighbor, India, for reasons of external security as well as trade. At the same time it would cultivate good relations with many other countries in order to avoid excessive dependence on any one power and to tap the resources of as many aid donors as possible. The Awami League emerged from the recent elections as more of a nationalist mass movement than a tight political organization. As time passes, it will be hard pressed to fulfill its program and satisfy the aspirations of the impoverished masses of East Pakistan. It is likely to face defections from its own ranks and mounting opposition from radical leftist elements outside. The long-term outlook therefore suggests increasing radicalization and political instability in East Pakistan. Economically, an independent East Pakistan might be able to maintain its present low rate of economic growth for some years after separation, assuming improved mobilization of local resources (e.g., it would enjoy exclusive benefit of the foreign exchange earnings from its jute industry which have been shared in the past with West Pakistan), development of trade with India to supplement or supplant its present inter-wing commerce with West Pakistan, and infusion of substantial levels of foreign aid. Its economy is bound to suffer in the long run, however, as the result of its burdensome population increase—by about 50% in the next 15 years, from the present 76 million to around 118 million according to official U.S. estimates. It is difficult to see how the state can in the long run meet its basic needs, let alone improve its economy, even with sizeable external aid. A new state in West Pakistan would most likely be organized around a left-trending populist type of government dominated by Bhutto and his People’s Party, supported by the military which will remain an important element in the political equation. An authoritarian regime headed by Bhutto and backed by the armed forces, with or without martial law, is a conceivable variant if the disparate and loosely structured People’s Party should disintegrate. Given the influence of the military and the more favorable economic outlook in West Pakistan, the chances for stability would appear somewhat better in the western state than in the eastern one. However, even though the military may provide short-term stability, its ability to exercise power over the long run, either directly or indirectly, may be subject to rising political and public challenges. Externally a new state in West Pakistan would continue a policy of confrontation with India which could spell trouble for its security as well as its economic progress due to excessive defense expenditures. The state might draw closer to China while trying to maintain viable relations with the U.S., correct ones with the U.S.S.R. and close ties with Iran and Turkey. The economic prospects of an independent West Pakistan are brighter than those of East Pakistan. With a larger territory and stronger resource base, lower population and respectable level of economic growth in recent years, the new state should be able with continuing foreign assistance to maintain its forward movement for some years to come, assuming stable and effective government, rational planning and a peaceful environment. But it, too, faces a potentially serious population problem which could badly retard its economic progress in the long run. PART II ALTERNATE U.S. POSTURES TOWARD POSSIBLE EAST PAKISTAN SECESSION A. U.S. Posture Toward Pakistan Unity While East Pakistan Separation is Uncertain This is essentially the current situation. Awami League leaders have already sounded out American officials on the posture we would take should East Pakistan separate from West Pakistan. Even if separation is not certain, they can be expected to approach us with increasing frequency and directness asking for political support, assistance against possible West Pakistani forceful resistance, and assurances of continued economic assistance if East Pakistan should become independent. At the same time, West Pakistani leaders, including President Yahya, can be expected to continue to probe our position with respect to unity and to watch for any indication of a shift in it toward support for East Pakistan separation. Under these present circumstances, we see three alternative postures: Alternative U.S. Postures: 1. We can maintain our present official position in response to Pakistani inquires along the following line: “Our policy has been and continues to be to support the independence, unity and integrity of Pakistan. However, this is your country and how you organize and deal with its problems is your business”. 2. We could be more forthcoming toward the Bengalis by indicating to them that, while the U.S. continues to favor Pakistani unity, we recognize that there is a rising sense of nationalism in East Pakistan, and that we would be prepared to adjust our policies to the evolving situation and to work out a satisfactory modus vivendi with whatever new governmental arrangements result. 3. We could, while maintaining our present public position, privately urge President Yahya to make every effort to reach an accommodation with Mujibur Rahman which would enable a single Pakistan to continue, even though its federal power were limited to defense and foreign affairs, and even though Bhutto’s party refused to cooperate in the process of government. Proposed U.S. Posture: Unless and until separation is certain, any shift in our position, would be against our continuing interest in seeing Pakistan remain unified. Any softening on our part, as in Alternative Posture 2, would contribute to the process of disintegration. Furthermore, it is likely that any suggestion of U.S. encouragement of East Pakistan separatism would quickly get back to West Pakistan. This would reinforce existing suspicions among some West Pakistanis that the U.S. is working to split the country. It would thereby prejudice our relations with the present West Pakistanis as well as our future relations with a possible independent state in West Pakistan. We therefore prefer at this stage to continue to maintain a balanced posture between West and East Pakistanis along lines of Alternative 1. It serves to reassure those with whom we have to continue to deal in West Pakistan while leaving the impression with East Pakistanis that we are not inflexible, although we would prefer (as Mujib presently seems to) a mutually agreeable constitutional system within a unified state. We do not consider Alternative 3 to be necessary or desirable, President Yahya knows well our position favoring unity and is already doing all he can on his own initiative to bring about an acceptable compromise between Mujib and Bhutto which is his stated reason for postponing the Assembly session. He does not need any urging from us in this matter and we can realistically offer little or nothing that will materially affect the situation. Moreover, an effort by us to urge compromise could be resented as unwarranted interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. CIA disagrees with the approach to Alternative Posture 3 in the preceding paragraph and advocates adopting that posture for the following reasons: (a) As a consequence of the clear cut election results Pakistan must move rapidly toward: (i) repressive military rule, (ii) a split into two nations with the smaller but stronger dominated by an anti-west demagogue, or (iii) a constitutional government founded on the Awami League’s loose confederation platform; the third choice is most clearly consistent with our interests in South Asia and we should support it. (b) In a confederation reserving foreign policy and defense to the central government, Bhutto’s strongly pro-Chinese and anti-Indian policies would be checked and he would not control the Pakistan Army and Air Force as he has an excellent chance of doing if the country splits. (c) There is evidence that some leaders of the Pakistan military establishment are increasingly apprehensive about the prospects of left-wing rule in a separate West Pakistan and see new virtue in a united country, even with maximum regional autonomy; the Bengali leadership is openly seeking reassurance from the United States; in this situation our counsel and assurance can have substantial influence and we should weigh in on the side of the only possible course giving some hope of leading to a constitutional government with a moderate foreign policy. B. U.S. Posture if East Pakistan Separation Appears Imminent The point at which East Pakistan separation seems imminent could rapidly be reached and we should be prepared to adjust our posture quickly to take account of this eventuality. Much will hinge on East Pakistani reactions to Yahya’s decision to postpone the convening of the Assembly. If we judge separation to be imminent, but East Pakistan has not declared its independence, the following U.S. postures could be considered: Alternative U.S. Postures: 1. We could continue to adhere to the formulation set forth in Posture A-1, above, reaffirming that while we support the independence, unity and integrity of Pakistan, we recognize that Pakistanis must decide their future for themselves. 2. We could let East Pakistan leaders know that we would be prepared to recognize an independent state in East Pakistan and to conduct normal diplomatic relations with its government. At the same time, we would keep in close touch with West Pakistani leaders and, as appropriate, inform them that we were watching the evolving situation closely and were prepared to adapt to it. 3. Depending upon circumstances, we could also acknowledge that we would consider sympathetically requests for economic assistance from the new government in East Pakistan. Proposed U.S. Posture: If separation becomes imminent, but before it is announced, we should adopt Posture 2 and let East Pakistani leaders know privately that, should East Pakistan become independent, we would recognize the new state and be prepared to conduct normal relations with its government. To adhere to Alternative Posture 1 at this stage would unnecessarily alienate Bengali leaders with whom we would want to be on good terms in the future. Adopting Posture 2 should afford us substantial psychological gains with East Pakistanis, with limited risk in West Pakistan if separation were imminent. Posture 3 would be premature until we can better determine the character of the new government and our relationship with it. If East Pakistan leaders, prior to a formal declaration of independence, should request U.S. intercession or intervention to forestall anticipated West Pakistan military action, we should decline on the grounds that we do not consider West Pakistani military intervention likely (assuming this to be the case at the time). We should firmly reject any suggestion of U.S. military involvement. If East Pakistan publicly declares its independence and requests our recognition, we should grant it in the context of the contingencies set forth in Part III-A below. C. U.S. Posture if East Pakistan Declares Independence and West Pakistan Intervenes Militarily We think it very unlikely that West Pakistan would intervene militarily to attempt to preserve the unity of Pakistan by force. Given the anticipated vehemence of the Bengali response, the limited strength of West Pakistani forces now in the East (one Army division and a few aircraft), and the difficulties of reinforcement from the West, the risks of military intervention would appear to be excessively high. Moreover, there would probably be a general lack of public and political interest in West Pakistan in preventing Bengali secession. Rather than undertake military action, most of them would prefer to let East Pakistan go its way. The West Pakistanis would also have to weigh the possibility that the Indians would take measures to assist East Pakistan. (We believe India considers that a unified Pakistan is in its interest, but if separation appears imminent, India would prefer an independent state in the East to a united Pakistan dominated by the West Wing.) Should the Pakistanis intervene, India would probably continue the ban on Pakistani overflights or reimpose it if it had been lifted. It might also take steps such as: attempting to interdict West Pakistani supplies and reinforcements coming by sea and air via other routes than over India; providing emergency supplies to East Pakistan; and mounting a psychological diversion, perhaps in Kashmir, against West Pakistan. It is doubtful that India would send troops into East Pakistan since West Pakistan forces there are so weak as to make it unnecessary to take that rather great risk of escalation. Despite the unlikelihood of military intervention, we nonetheless should plan for it on a contingency basis on the theory that an irrational action is always possible. If the West Pakistan military should intervene, the following alternative U.S. postures could be considered: Alternative U.S. Postures: 1. We could take no action (other than to protect American personnel and interests) on the grounds that no U.S. interest demands our doing so, that we could not significantly influence the situation, and that our attempted involvement would only antagonize West Pakistan. 2. We could urge West Pakistani leaders to cease military action on the grounds that a military solution is futile in the face of East Pakistan’s determination to go its own way, that West Pakistani action could provoke Indian intervention and thus lead to Indo-Pakistan hostilities, and that needless loss of life should-be avoided. 3. We could consult with the Indian Government regarding our mutual interests concerning the situation in East Pakistan. We would say that those interests indicate that we should avoid any sort of military intervention in East Pakistan, even in response to an East Pakistan request, since it would be unlikely that West Pakistan’s military forces could prevail in any case. In the unlikely event that India nonetheless appeared to be on the point of intervening with ground forces in East Pakistan, we should urge the Government of India to avoid such action on the additional grounds that it could provoke an India-West Pakistan conflict and could be exploited by the Chinese. 4. If West Pakistani—and possibly Indian—military intervention should occur, we would not make any military moves ourselves. However, in concert with the British and other interested external powers we should be prepared to use the threat of sanctions, including cessation of economic aid and military supply, if hostile actions should occur or continue. 5. We believe Chinese military intervention would be even more unlikely than a West Pakistan request for it. Apart from their strong disinclination to indulge in high risk, low benefit adventures across their borders, the Chinese realize that their forces would have to cross undisputed Indian territory, which would provoke a major Sino-Indian conflict. (A seaborne effort or a 400-mile march through Burma would have the advantage of avoiding Indian territory. However, the PRC’s capabilities for such efforts are so limited as to appear to exclude these possibilities.) In the extremely unlikely event that the Chinese intervene militarily across Indian (and/or Burmese) territory, we should render the Indians (and/or the Burmese) political and possibly material support in seeking to vacate the aggression. However, we should avoid direct military involvement, recognizing that the area is not a vital security interest to the U.S. 6. If any type of hostilities involving outside forces should occur, we should support all appropriate international efforts, including actions within the United Nations, to bring about an early ceasefire. Proposed U.S. Posture: If West Pakistan intervention becomes imminent or actually occurs, we would have an interest in doing what we could to avoid bloodshed and restore peace, and to prevent the conflict from escalating beyond a purely East-West Pakistan clash. We should be willing to risk irritating the West Pakistanis in the face of such a rash act on their part, and the threat of stopping aid should give us considerable leverage. We would therefore rule out Alternative Posture 1. Instead, we should initially follow Alternatives 2 and 3, urging the West Pakistanis to desist from military action and consulting appropriately with the Indians. If these efforts should fail, we should then consider Alternatives 4, 5, and 6 as the situation would demand. PART III CONTINGENCIES AND ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF SEPARATION Definitions The resultant state in the West Wing would be expected to be considered the “successor state” for most purposes (e.g., except for certain legal relationships relating solely to the East Wing), retaining the name, capital and, at least provisionally, President Yahya as chief of state/ head of government. It will herein be designated Pakistan, the word itself being an acronym for areas now contained in, or claimed by, the West Wing. The resultant new state in the East Wing will be called Bangla Desh, the term proposed by Bengali political leaders for renaming their present province which presumably would be utilized as well for an independent state. A. Recognition Requests to the international community for diplomatic recognition could take one of several forms depending upon the nature of the separation of East and West Pakistan, and our response would vary, as follows: Contingency 1: Bangla Desh makes a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) which is accepted by Pakistan. Pakistan itself recognizes Bangla Desh and agrees to establish diplomatic relations with its government . Proposed U.S. Action: We should recognize Bangla Desh promptly. Pakistan (i.e., the West Wing) as the successor state would not require new recognition, and diplomatic relations would continue. Contingency 2: Pakistan rejects Bangla Desh’s UDI but does not attempt to resist it by force. Proposed U.S. Action: We should delay slightly in deference to our continuing relations with Pakistan, but should be among the earlier states to recognize Bangla Desh. We should coordinate timing and form of recognition with the United Kingdom. India may well jump in ahead to recognize Bangla Desh. We would not want to appear to Pakistan to be acting in concert with India, and would not coordinate our action with India, although we could inform the Indians just before we recognize. Contingency 3: Pakistan rejects Bangla Desh’s UDI and attempts to put down secession by force. As explained in Part II-C, above, we do not consider this a likely possibility, but if it should occur we would not expect Pakistan to be able to maintain its armed intervention for long. Proposed U.S. Action: We would recognize Bangla Desh as soon as it becomes clear that the new government is in effective control and that its independence is an established fact. To do so earlier would complicate our relations with Pakistan while we are endeavoring to persuade it to stop its intervention. To wait too long would get our new relationship with Bangla Desh off to a bad start. Contingency 4: Pakistan and Bangla Desh separate by mutual agreement. Proposed U.S. Action: We should recognize Bangla Desh promptly. Pakistan, as the successor state, would not need to be recognized anew. B. Form of Recognition Contingency 1: In case of agreed separation. Proposed U.S. Action: The President should send personal messages to the chiefs of state of the two states extending his best wishes to the new regimes and their people. The messages should be substantially the same and phrased according to the then prevailing circumstances, except that the message to Bangla Desh could express our agreement to establish diplomatic relations. A message should not be sent to one and not the other. Contingency 2: In case of contested separation. Proposed U.S. Action: Presidential communications should not be sent at the time of the separation. Recognition of Bangla Desh would be accorded by a public announcement or act of establishing diplomatic relations. Our relations with Pakistan would continue. C. U.S. Representation in Pakistan and Bangla Desh Proposed U.S. Action: Our Ambassador in present Pakistan would become Ambassador to the successor state of Pakistan. As soon as we recognize the state of Bangla Desh, we would propose to the new government that our Consul General in Dacca be designated Charge d’Affaires pending the appointment of an Ambassador; an Ambassador should be appointed as soon as possible, although recognition will be more important to Bengalis than the physical presence of an accredited Ambassador. D. Pakistan and Bangla Desh Representation in the U.S. Contingency 1: In case of an agreed separation . We can assume that Ambassador Hilaly would continue to represent Pakistan in the United States. However, we cannot assume that the Bangla Desh regime would ask the present DCM, a Bengali, to look after its interests; it would, however, name or send someone. Proposed U.S. Action: We should continue to conduct business with the Ambassador of Pakistan relating to that successor state, and should begin to do so with the designated representative of Bangla Desh as soon as we recognize it. In the interim, we should deal informally with whomever, if anyone, is designated by Bangla Desh. Contingency 2: In case of a contested separation . Proposed U.S. Action: Our actions would have to be more cautious. We should continue to deal with Ambassador Hilaly as the representative of (united) Pakistan until we recognize Bangla Desh as a sovereign state. At the same time, we should keep channels of communication informally open with any designated representative of Bangla Desh. We should stay clear of any disputes concerning the use and ownership of (united) Pakistani property here, emphasizing that this would be a question for settlement between the two states. E. United Nations and Other International Bodies Bangla Desh would probably move quickly to attain membership in the United Nations and other international bodies. Contingency 1: Agreed separation . It is possible that Pakistan would sponsor the application of Bangla Desh. Proposed U.S. Action: Following U.S. recognition of Bangla Desh’s sovereignty, we should promptly support its membership in the UN, and such other international bodies as it wishes to join. Contingency 2: Contested separation . Under contested conditions, Pakistan might oppose Bangla Desh’s application for UN membership. Proposed U.S. Action: As soon as we accord recognition to Bangla Desh, we should also support its membership in the UN and such other international bodies as it wishes to join. F. Emergency and Evacuation Law and order situations in either or both of the resultant states could be such that we would want to consider evacuation of dependents and some or all staff. Contingency 1: In Pakistan—if separation is contested, but possibly even if agreed . Some political parties and other public elements are likely to accuse the United States of having engineered the separation, provoking demonstrations and acts of violence against American installations. Under what is likely to be a confused situation, with the principal political party in Pakistan already anti-American, the authorities might not be able to maintain control. Proposed U.S. Action: If there is any prospect of disturbances, we should affirm to the Government our expectation that it will provide full protection for U.S. citizens and U.S. property. We would also be prepared to put into operation emergency and evacuation plans at whatever time required. Our posts in Pakistan have just reviewed their E&E plans and updated them where necessary. Contingency 2: In Bangla Desh . In the event of an agreed separation, law and order in Bangla Desh should not break down, particularly in the city of Dacca. The Awami League Government would enjoy wide popularity and cooperation. Conceivably, if it appeared that the U.S. was opposed to separation, the situation could become tense for us, but appropriate timing of recognition should forestall any serious problem. However, if Pakistan attempted to resist secession by military force, the situation throughout the province, and especially in the cities, could go out of control. Clashes would be between Bengali nationalists and the army, but Americans could easily become caught in the middle. Proposed U.S. Action: We would notify the local Bangla Desh (or Pakistan) authorities that we expect them to protect U.S. citizens and property, but we would be ready to evacuate families and reduce staff as necessary. G. Negotiations in Progress Contingency : At the time of separation, we will probably have under negotiation or discussion with the Government of Pakistan such actions as a PL–480 agreement, program and project loan agreements, local currency utilization, military sales and a Fulbright educational exchange agreement which would apply to the East Wing as well as the West. Proposed U.S. Action: On separation of the two wings, we should temporarily discontinue such negotiations and consider revisions necessitated by the changed circumstances. In order to avoid causing hardship or ill will in either Pakistan or Bangla Desh, we should be prepared to move quickly to adapt such proposals to the needs of, and our interests in, the resultant states and to resume negotiations promptly with both on revised bases. Negotiations with Pakistan could be resumed as soon as practicable and initiated with Bangla Desh as soon as diplomatic relations are established. H. Programs in Progress Contingency : There are also a number of official U.S. Government economic, military and other programs and projects in progress in West and East Pakistan which we would have to decide whether to continue or suspend in the event of separation of the two wings. We should be able to continue most ongoing economic aid programs and projects in both Pakistan and Bangla Desh, although some programs will have to be renegotiated. We would also want to reconsider military shipments and orders carefully. Proposed U.S. Actions: Economic aid programs and projects with both new states should either be continued without interruption, pending our determination of whether they should be retained for the longer term in the context of our relations with the two new states, or renegotiated. Ongoing technical assistance programs and loan projects would not be substantially affected since these activities are already clearly divided between the two regions because of their physical separation. Existing agreements would eventually have to be renegotiated with Bangla Desh because all agreements are now with the Government of Pakistan. Current AID program loans, however, are less clearly defined geographically; and in the event of a separation of the two, wings, such loans would have to be divided between the two new states. Commodities shipped under PL–480 are usually designated for either East or West Pakistan, and if the two wings separated, existing agreements should be cancelled and new agreements made, honoring the intent of the original agreements. We would have to consider urgently the disposition of shipments in transit. We would also have to extend a moratorium on Debt repayments until the two wings and the U.S. could work out a mutually satisfactory redistribution of the debt. Other U.S. programs should be reviewed immediately and decisions made on a case by case basis as to whether to continue, suspend or terminate, 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–053, SRG Meeting, Pakistan, 3/6/71. Secret; Exdis. Keith Guthrie signed for Davis. Also sent to Irwin, JCS Chairman Moorer, and CIA Director Helms. A copy of the contingency study in the Department of State files indicates that it was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and forwarded to Kissinger on March 2 by Sisco, who was serving as chairman of the group. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US) The Senior Review Group meeting scheduled for March 3 was held on March 6. 124. Telegram 697 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 124. Telegram 697 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 10, 1971, 1205Z Subject: Pak Political Crisis Ref: Islamabad 1975, 1976 1) Alamgir Rahman (protect) came to see me this morning with what he said was message from Mujib. According Alamgir, Mujib had wanted Yahya to come to Dacca for talks and I was greatly relieved at news that Yahya was in fact coming. Mujib wanted very much to work out with Yahya some political settlement that would avoid bloodshed, satisfy Bengali aspirations, and preserve some vestige of link with Pakistan. Alamgir opined that it’s now too late to talk in terms of six-point constitution but perhaps some solution can be found along lines of confederation, with separate constitutions for East and West Pakistan, and one army and one Foreign Ministry. 2) Mujib’s question, said Alamgir, was “does the United States want to see military confrontation with the prospect of eventual communist domination of Bengal or would it prefer a political solution to the current crisis?” I told Alamgir that Mujib’s question, put that way, was easy to answer. We naturally hoped for a peaceful political solution in lieu of bloodshed: we were gratified to learn that Mujib is also thinking in these terms, and we interpret Yahya’s willingness to come to Dacca as evidence he too is desirous of achieving a peaceful solution. We hope both sides would approach talks in the spirit of compromise. 3) Alamgir then said Mujib wanted to know if United States would be willing to indicate to Yahya our hopes for political solution to current crisis. I said I did not know if this thought had been conveyed to Yahya in Islamabad but I would undertake to suggest to Charge that, if appropriate occasion presented itself before Yahya’s departure he might note to Yahya our hopes for political solution to problems facing Pakistan. 4) Comment: I recognize, of course, that expression of hope for “political solution” as distinct from “peaceful” solution carries implication that we would not be happy about military repression as MLA solution to crisis. Nonetheless, given urgency of situation I would hope we could be somewhat more positive in this regard. 5) Our analysis of prospects for political compromise solution will follow by septel. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and priority Bangkok for Farland. 125. Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 125. Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 28, 1971, 0540Z Subject: Selective Genocide 1. Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down. 2. Among those marked for extinction in addition to A.L. hierarchy, are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman, head of applied physics department, Professor Dev, head of philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of department of history, have been killed. Razzak of political science department is rumored dead. Also on list are bulk of MNA’s elect and number of MPA’s. 3. Moreover, with support of Pak military, non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. Streets of Dacca are aflood with Hindus and others seeking to get out of Dacca. Many Bengalis have sought refuge in homes of Americans, most of whom are extending shelter. 4. Tightning of curfew today (it is being reimposed at noon) seems designed to facilitate Pak military search and destroy operations. There is no rpt no resistance being offered in Dacca to military. 5. Full horror of Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner or later. I, therefore, question continued advisability of present USG posture of pretending to believe GOP false assertions and denying, for understood reasons, that this office is communicating detailed account of events in East Pakistan. We should be expressing our shock, at least privately to GOP, at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military. I, of course, would have to be identified as source of information and presumably GOP would ask me to leave. I do not believe safety of American community would be threatened as a consequence, but our communication capability would be compromised. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to London, Bangkok, New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC, and MAC. 126. Telegram 978 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 126. Telegram 978 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 29, 1971, 1130Z Subj: Pak Military Crackdown: Listing of Military Versus Civilian Incidents Ref: A. Dacca 959 B. Islamabad 2792 (NOTAL) 1. Item: American priests (protect) in old Dacca report Army acted with no provocation on part of Bengals except barricade erection. Army exclusively responsible for all fires. Technique was to set houses afire and then gun down people as they left their homes. Unwilling estimate number of casualties but advised that must be very high. Believe Hindus particular focus of campaign, although areas including non-Hindus also burned out. Stated Army looking Awami Leaguers but really more indiscriminate than selective in approach. Most Army destruction nights of March 25 and 26: lesser on March 27 and 28. Also reported what termed reliable account family of eleven all killed nite of 25th. 2. Item: Recurrent reports many university professors killed. Although circumstances vague, many say attempt underway wipe out all source potential intellectual ferment. British say six confirmed dead, including two deans and ex-governor Dr. M.N. Huda, econ dept head. Indians claim at least six dead (five names same as British list, with addition of Dr. D.C. Dev of philosphy department, who recently returned from US visit and who according numerous reports is dead. Well-connected Bengali previously noted for previous reliability provided names of five professors reportedly killed. When tallied, total of those reliably reported dead is ten: (Comment: Unsubstantiated whether killed in cross-fire when student halls attacked or whether selectively shot. Also still unclear whether all shot at time when Army occupied campus or whether some killed subsequently). 3. Item: Same Bengali cited above opined violence random in nature. As evidence, claimed he was eye-witness to one family with no government or Awami League connections being wiped out by Army. Claimed house of three or four senior civil servants entered by Army and inhabitants killed. 4. Item: We have received widespread and we believe reliable reports of troops engaged in looting homes (beating those who object, including middle level government officials) and shaking down refuges. 5. Item: Military reportedly is standing by while non-Bengalis loot Bengali dwellings, thereby abetting criminal tensions. Bengali-non-Bengali tensions very high (ConGen officers this morning (March 29) witnessed butchering of one civilian by another in area of Bengali-non-Bengali discord, although incident possibly of other origin). Bengalis reportedly biding time to retaliate. 6. Item: Bengali intellectuals in scared but surprisingly sober mood told ConGen officer of witnessing unprovoked Army firing on neighboring shanty-town. Reason they ascertained was that these people were type who build barricades, etc. Six bodies seen. Although Muslim, they contended Army going after Hindus with vengeance, citing destruction of predominantly Hindu areas in old Dacca. Stated police simply executed in Mohammepur (Dacca suburb) and elsewhere because Army considered them potential threat. Hearsay has it 1800 police killed in surprise attacks, they noted. Possibly more reliable, although estimates still subject to question, they commented, was report from survivor of Army attack on East Pak Rifles (EPR) camp at Peelkhana. Of approximately thousand EPRs present at time, 700 killed, 200 “overpowered”, and 100 escaped. They also reported house-to-house searches underway, with “Fouji men” (ex-Bengali servicemen) being special targets and being shot on site whenever found. 7. Item: USAID Public Safety Chief reports police apparently no longer effective as force, with communication facilities gone and Razarbagh police lines razed. Special Branch building practically demolished and appears abandoned. Senior police officals on duty at office at Eden building awaiting orders from MLA. non-committal about situation, but one implored “pray for us.” No police seen anywhere in Dacca. 8. Item: USAID Provincial Director eyewitness to what appeared to be unprovoked firing by military on children and fisherman afternoon March 28. No curfew in effect and no explanation for firing. Approximately 20 to 30 shots fired, but seemingly no one hit. Affair witnessed by many persons, mostly Americans. 9. Comment: As details of horror stories of varying reliability filter in it appears Army seeking (a) terrorize population in general and thereby crush will to resist (although resistance in Dacca ended several days ago), and (b) eliminate all elements of society that pose potential threat to consolidation and maintenance of martial law authority. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, New Delhi, London, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC. 127. Telegram 986 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 127. Telegram 986 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 30, 1971, 0905Z Subject: Killings References: A. Dacca 9591 B. Islamabad 2792 (NOTAL) C. Dacca 9641 D. Dacca 978 1. American serving with FAO in East Pakistan visited ConGen March 30 to report on tour of Dacca University March 27. Was told weapons students had at Iqbal Hall served only to infuriate army. Students either shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups. Saw tightly packed pile of approximately twenty five corpses. Was told this was last batch of bodies remaining, others having been disposed of by army. While there, empty army truck arrived to remove bodies. Major atrocity recounted to him took place at Kokeya girls’ hall where building set ablaze and girls machine-gunned as they fled building. USIS local who lives nearby confirms girls gunned down. Girls had no weapons. Forty killed. Attack aimed at eliminating female student leadership, since army apparently told girl student activists resided there. Estimated 1,000 persons, mostly students, but including faculty members resident in dorms, killed. He claimed university contacts who conducted him on tour had been noted for their reliability for information in past. Told all university files burned by army in what appeared be purposeful move. 2. We have confirmed report one faculty member shot in own residence. 3. Casualty total at university subject of considerable debate. On one hand fact school officially closed and many if not most students gone undoubtedly reduced casualties. On other hand, university halls had become Dacca base for student activity in Awami League “movement,” and thus not inconceivable young people might have flocked there at first indication of trouble night of March 25–26. At least two mass graves on campus, one near Iqbal Hall, other near Roeya Hall. Rain night March 29 exposed some bodies. Stench terrible. 4. Reports vary re status of top student leaders. Some say army took no prisoners and killed all present in dorms. Hence if student leaders there, they too killed. Other university contacts say game plan if army moved in force was for top leaders to escape to countryside to organize resistance. Most apparently succeeded in getting out of Dacca environs. Army radio broadcast monitored here suggests some students escaped. 5. Comment: Question of whether university professors subject of pre-planned purge still unanswered although actively being looked into. Academics met since military crackdown fearful for safety and in hiding. They believe they subject to elimination. Systematic destruction of academic records at university suggests campaign underway to erase all traces current “trouble making” generation at Dacca University. Figure of thousand dead at university nonetheless strikes us as exaggerated, although nothing these days is inconceivable. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC. 128. Telegram 2954 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 128. Telegram 2954 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, March 31, 1971, 1245Z Subj: Reaction to East Pak Events 1. Actions by Pak military, beginning with night March 25–26, to clamp full control over East Pakistan presents USG with significant problems for both short and longer terms. We have been and are now dealing with some to [ of ] the immediate operational problems, such as evacuation planning, security of our communications with Dacca, and the Department spokesman’s handling of press questions. We are studying and will be sending recommendations separately on current economic assistance issues such as the special PL–480 loan for post-cyclone relief and the pending FY-1971 program loan. Longer-term issues such as the future of our political relationship with the GOP, our stance toward East Pakistan, and our various operational programs here will also have to be reviewed. Purpose of this message is to provide some preliminary reactions. 2. Motivations behind current military actions in East Pakistan can be traced to events at least as far back as the creation of Pakistan in 1947. History of diversity in interests and social patterns between East and West Wings is well known. So too is unequal share between East and West Wings as regards division of available resources and related East Pak grievances against West Pak domination. There was very considerable justification for efforts by East Pakistanis to seek greater share of this pie commensurate with their having majority of country’s population. Principle of a better deal for East Wing had won increasing acceptance in West Pakistan, even among hardliners (such as military leadership) for whom “integrity” of Pakistan was the summum bonum. This was reflected in Yahya’s protracted efforts to achieve acceptable political basis for transfer of power. 3. It has been this embassy’s consistent opinion that Yahya was sincere in his efforts to bring about a political solution under a system recognizing the population majority of East Pakistan. He never left any doubt, however, that the system would have to be consistent with the concept of one Pakistan rather than two (or more). It will be disputed whether Yahya and the military came down to final stages of the political parleys in Dacca in March with true desire to work out differences, or whether they were merely stalling for time while bringing in military reinforcements. The truth may be mixture of the two. We believe that Yahya continued to prefer a political solution acceptable to all the major parties: on the other hand, it was doubtless considered at least prudent to beef up the military presence in East Wing as contingency measure. 4. Yahya’s use of mllitary force in East Pakistan on March 25–26—precisely two years after he replaced Ayub as President—came after a period of several weeks during which Mujib and his Awami League had in effect been ruling East Pakistan through a parallel government. The orders promulgated and enforced by the AL amounted to a rebellion against the established government. The destruction of Pak flags and their replacement by Bengala best standards, and impediments placed in the way of GOP civil and military activities in East Pakistan, could have been described as acts of insurrection. 5. We can hold no brief for what seems to have been the brutal, ruthless and excessive use of force by Pak military not only in putting down limited resistance but in seeking out and destroying presumed opponents in East Pakistan. Incidents involving wanton military force which ConGen Dacca and others have reported arouse our indignation and we can appreciate the sense of horror felt by witnesses at the scene. Since we are not only human beings but also government servants, however, righteous indignation is not of itself an adequate basis for our reaction to the events now occurring in East Pakistan. The constituted government is using force against citizens accused of flouting its authority. The struggle is between Pakistani and Pakistani. (Fortunately, no Americans have been injured and no American premises have been damaged, to our knowledge: nor do we have reason to complain, so far as we are aware, of inadequate protection for our people and property.) 6. At earlier stages in the present crisis, but before March 25–26, USG decided it should not intervene in effort to influence GOP decision-making or actions in matter deemed to be essentially of internal nature. Crisis has changed course and heightened then, but problems remain essentially internal to Pakistan. 7. In this Embassy’s view, deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue. (So far as we know, only India has sought to move current Pak problem in the international arena.) Various governments including our own will have to take account of new facts presented by new events here in dealing with Pakistan, as alluded to in para one above. While we are not prepared at this moment to make specific recommendations regarding our programs here, we believe firmly that we should keep our options open so as to be able to promote our interests as events continue to unfold. 8. The above philosophy has guided us in our suggestions re caution in handling press queries (Islamabad 2793) and in my own guidance to American employees in Pakistan on exercising restraint in commenting on recent developments here (Islamabad 2813 and 2814). Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, and New Delhi. 129. Telegram 58039 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 129. Telegram 58039 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 1 Washington, April 7, 1971, 0014Z REF: Dacca’s 1138 1. Appreciate fully depth of feeling expressed by your associates in REFTEL. As we have reviewed their statement it makes two principal points on which Department wishes to comment: (a) that we have failed to denounce the actions taken by the Pakistan Government in East Pakistan which, in their judgment, includes suppression of democracy, atrocities, etc., while placating West Pak dominated government; and (b) that our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens. 2. In connection with point (a) above, we have been restrained in our public utterances for several reasons: (1) We have been particularly mindful that the cooperation of safety of Americans in both East and West Pakistan and the GOP is necessary in order to assure orderly and safe evacuation of Americans from East Pakistan (2) We view situation in East Pakistan as primarily an internal matter of the Pakistan Government and most other governments have same view; and (3) Reports have been conflicting: media in US has been carrying stories of atrocities on both sides although we do not, of course, equate the two. However, we have not been silent. Over the past two weeks following points made by the Department’s spokesman: A. On the first day following reports of developments in East Pakistan (March 26), Department spokesman said: QUOTE We are watching developments closely, with concern. UNQUOTE. Department spokesman revealed QUOTE American personnel who reached Consul General this morning have reported the presence of Army troops throughout a the city and extensive firing, including, I understand, the use of tanks ... I know that Ambassador Farland called at the MFA in West Pakistan this morning and made a strong request that the GOP insure all possible protection for Americans in the East. UNQUOTE. B. On March 30, based on Dacca’s reports, Department spokesman stated situation remained quiet in Dacca and that we did not have reliable information re elsewhere in East Pakistan. We also made clear in response to inquiries that while military supply agreement does not prohibit use of weapons supplied for internal security purposes, no weapons have been supplied to Pakistan since 1965 and none have gone as result of one-time exception decision. C. On March 31 Department spokesman confirmed Consul General Dacca’s recommendation on evacuation. He also made statement critical of Pakistan Government saying: QUOTE We felt that legitimate news gathering functions of American journalists had been unduly restricted. UNQUOTE. Based on continuing conflicting reports, he made no explicit comment on further developments stressing our responsibility at this point is for safety of Americans who are there. D. On April 2 Department spokesman made full-blown statement stressing our concern over developments and giving explicit support to SYG humanitarian initiative. He said: 1. QUOTE. We are naturally concerned at the reported loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan. What is impossible for us to establish at this time is any reliable set of facts regarding the recent events in the area or their foreseeable consequences. 2. QUOTE. Now, in this respect we have noted the statement yesterday by the UN Secretary General and in this connection we would, of course, give sympathetic consideration to any humanitarian efforts to assist that might be requested by the Government of Pakistan in line with the Secretary General’s statement. UNQUOTE. 3. He also said the following re use of American arms: QUOTE ... It is a matter of concern to the USG when its weapons are used. UNQUOTE. E. On April 5 the Department spokesman reiterated April 2 statement and added: QUOTE It is our hope that peaceful conditions can be reestablished. UNQUOTE. 3. We will keep under a active review question of further public statements in light of any further reports more clearly establishing facts and when the withdrawal of Americans is further along. 4. The second charge is far more serious. Their statement states that our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens. We would appreciate supporting evidence to this effect; we do not have such evidence. On March 30, you recommended and Ambassador Farland concurred that you be given authority to evacuate Americans. While reaffirming your discretionary authority, Department raised question as to whether thinning out could be accomplished by withdrawing non-official Americans in first instance and dependents of officials. We also asked for your views re retention satisfactory official presence in Dacca and civilian or military aircraft. Upon receipt your firm recommendation for military airlift (DACCA 1027), Department approved recommendation three hours later, transmitting approval at 3:51 AM EST (STATE 54549/ April 1) starting preparations for airlift. This matter subsequently taken up by Ambassador Farland with GOP which declined approve US military airlift and offered alternative means now in train. Department concurred in Ambassador Farland’s recommendation that we proceed on the basis of the means insisted upon by the Paks. Dacca informed Department it would proceed on basis GOP plan (DACCA 1098). Thinning out process is proceeding in orderly manner, and we are not aware of any confirmed reports of any Americans (other than young man you reported prior to airlift) either being injured or killed. 5. As to the longer range implications of current developments, Task Force has this matter under active review and views of Amembassy Islamabad, New Delhi and ConGen Dacca have been requested by the Department. We welcome your colleagues’ policy proposals and will of course expect your own comments on them. Obviously, if USG concludes, as your message does, that the most likely outcome of present civil war is a Bengali victory and consequent establishment of an independent Bangla Desh then this has implications which we will have to take into account in our policy review. 6. We welcome expression of strongly held views as well as recommendations on policy. We are sure, however, that you wish these be forwarded privately and directly to principal officers, while at the same time not receiving such wide-spread dissemination as to increase likelihood of leak to press. Hence this message is NODIS and future messages in this series should be NODIS. However, we assume you will share this message with your colleagues. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 6 by Sisco; cleared by Irwin, U. Alexis Johnson, Eliot, Macomber, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director Henry Loomis (USIA), and Maurice Williams (AID); and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. 130. Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 130. Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, April 10, 1971, 1508Z Subject: Specific Areas of Dissent With Current U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan 1. As promised reftel A. this message conveys FYI our specific areas of dissent with current U.S. policy toward East Pakistan. We note NSCIG/ NEA 71–9 dated March 2 suggests in Section II, Part C, a proposed U.S. posture in contingency West Pak military intervention imminent or actually occurs to squash independence move on part of Bengalis. “If West Pakistan intervention becomes imminent or actually occurs, we would have an interest in doing what we could avoid bloodshed and restore peace, and to prevent the conflict from escalating beyond a purely East-West Pakistan clash. We should be willing to risk irritating the West Pakistanis in the face of such a rash act on their part, and the threat of stopping aid should give us considerable leverage.” We concur with this proposal but are concerned that it seemingly has been ignored. 2. Our dissent with current policy stems largely from disagreement with our colleagues’ analysis of the current situation such as set forth in Islamabad 2954. Our reactions to President Yahya Khan’s March 26 speech were made explicit in Dacca 1019. We question Yahya’s bonafides in seeking political solution that would incorporate minimal Bengali demands. Yahya’s March 1 postponement of National Assembly session for indefinite period was taken here as vindication of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s contention voiced at January 3 rally that “politics in Pakistan has been politics on conspiracy.” Even Daultana considered Yahya’s moves in post-March 1 period a charade (Lahore 515). In Dacca 1067 we outlined our prognostication that military repression of moderates would radicalize them and force them to ally with extreme left. 3. Although we appreciate “in-house” expressions of concern about ruthless and excessive use of force by Pak military, etc., we take exception with line that holds that “since we are not only human beings but government servants, however, righteous indignation is not of itself an adequate basis for our reaction to events now occurring in East Pakistan.” In a country wherein our primary interests defined as humanitarian rather than strategic, moral principles indeed are relevant to issue. Horror and flouting of democratic norms we have reported is objective reality and not emotionally contrived (see Dacca 0959, Dacca 0975, and others). It inconceivable that world can mount magnificent relief effort to save victims of last November’s cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace. 4. We also disagree with view that current situation should be viewed simply as “constituted” government using force against citizens accused of flouting its authority. Although existing as de facto government, at least in West Pakistan, extra-constitutional martial law regime of President Yahya Khan is of dubious legitimacy (how many votes did Yahya obtain?). MLA in turn however describes freely elected representatives of approximately 73 percent of the voters of East Pakistan as “miscreants”. Ironically, as pointed out in Dacca 1052, most of the countryside of East Pakistan apparently still in hands of these “miscreants”. 5. We do not see issue as distinctly internal one. Aside from international moral obligations to condemn genocide (of Pakistani Hindus, although by Websters definition term likewise seems applicable to Awami League followers who being hunted down with vengeance), geographical realities also enter equation. Conflict has definite colonial versus anti-colonial aspects. Previous examples of people of one region fighting for freedom from domination by people of another physically discontiguous territory historically have been glorified as revolutions, wars of national liberation, anti-colonial wars, etc. In defiance of geography, as well as ethnic and linguistic differences inveighing against unity of Pakistan, we continue to be blinded to reality of situation: people of East Pakistan want to live as free people of free country, preferably within Pakistan, but, if given no other choice, outside it. They want to participate in deciding their own destiny. Even our forefathers fought for similar ideals. Thus we find the view that “deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international issue,” is woefully inadequate reaction to events. This contrasts sharply with more decisive reaction of Russians, who for own reasons went on public record with message to which many of us could subscribe on grounds both national interest and morality. To us, an independent “Bangla Desh” is now inevitable. 6. Our concern over evacuation procedures (i.e., that “our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them”), centers on the decision, made without consulting ConGen Dacca to accept “with appreciation” the GOP’s counter-proposal to use PIA as a method of evacuation action rather than U.S. aircraft. Other countries had been allowed previously to evacuate their citizens via own chartered flights, both military and civilian. Our previous experience with the Pak Air Force, who had taken over PIA operations in Dacca, would have led us to predict the confusion, delays and indignities which were in fact experienced. Our knowledge of the virtually unanimous repugnance of U.S. citizens over the indiscriminate killing indulged in by the Pak military in East Pakistan would have led us to predict the adverse reaction on the part of many Americans to underwriting half of the costs of bringing more troops to East Pakistan to continue the military action. Troops were unloaded and marched onto trucks in front of Americans waiting to depart on the same plane. To many americans, whose close friends had been killed, were missing, or in hiding, this situation made it impossible to leave East Pakistan with even the semblance of self-respect. 7. It is, in our opinion, a minor miracle that no American was killed or injured by trigger-happy Pak troops fresh from killing and looting during the delay caused by our acceptance of GOP arrangements. 8. From here, it appears that we have peen placed in the position of “bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan dominated government” at the expense of the safety of U.S. citizens. Our reading of State’s 52912, 52817, 54324, 55686 and Islamabad’s 2931, 2930, 2967 and the failure, at an extremely crucial point, to consult with ConGen Dacca, leads us to believe that decisions were made for reasons other than the interests of U.S. citizens. On the contrary, on March 30, we were cautioned (State 52912) that we must “avoid the appearance that we were panicky” and that we might be placed in a bad light if practically all Americans were evacuated in circumstances where a number of other foreign communities stayed, including Russians and Chinese.” Our Consul General, once he had made the decision to evacuate, was subjected to second guessing (Islamabad 2930; 2931; state 54324). The very choice of words “thinning out” to disguise an evacuation we feel represents an over-concern with the GOP’s international public relations problem. That the GOP Lied to us and delayed our evacuation while it sought a convenient way out is a fact (Islamabad 3011, 3020, 3022, 3056, 3076). That we accept “watery thin” excuses for this action without protest is a sad commentary on our desire to protect US citizens. 9. These views are subscribed to by all signatories of reftel A who remain behind in Dacca. FYI Donald C. Horan’s name was omitted from original list. Due to pressures of time we have not cited areas of disagreement which we consider subsidiary to the fundamental points raised above. 10. Principal officer’s comments: I wish to note that the above comments were written at the same time as Reftel A. To some extent they thus have become historical and academic, particularly since we sense that Washington, Islamabad and Dacca are now talking on approximately the same wave length. I would urge that there be no rebuttal from Washington and Islamabad to this rebuttal. These are matters which can best be discussed over a drink with friends and colleagues when the opportunity next presents itself. 11. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the motivation of the dissenters has been not to cavil at stances assumed by the Department and the Embassy but to try to influence changes in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. To this end we are preparing a series of policy recommendations. These recommendations do not seem from any dissenting group but rather are the fully staffed out recommendations of the USG agencies in East Pakistan. Accordingly, I propose to dispense herewith with the Nodis channel and to forward these recommendations in the normal way, restricting them as appropriate according to their sensitivity. Blood 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Islamabad. 131. Special National Intelligence Estimate 32–71 131. Special National Intelligence Estimate 32–71 1 Washington, April 12, 1971 Subject: SNIE 32–17: Prospects for Pakistan NOTE This estimate assesses the present and prospective state of the Pakistani civil war, the role of India and other powers, and the outlook for Pakistan’s two components—if the Bengali uprising should be put down, and if it should succeed. THE ESTIMATE I. THE CONFLICT IN BENGAL 1. When they launched their campaign on 25 March, the West Pakistani military leaders probably expected—or at least hoped—to destroy the Awami League (AL) and regain effective control of East Bengal in a matter of days, if not hours. They clearly miscalculated; most of the top AL leaders have been arrested, but lower level party leaders continue to be active throughout much of the countryside. While no precise figures are available, substantial elements of the 13,000-man East Pakistani Rifles (the provincial paramilitary force) remain in being, as do a few of the Bengali units of the Pakistani Army. Although beset by serious logistic and leadership problems, these armed cadres continue to resist the West Pakistani units in East Bengal; they are able to move fairly easily through most of the countryside. 2. Islamabad’s forces are in command of the two principal cities, Dacca and Chittagong, and a few of the lesser ones. Even there, the Army’s hold is maintained by severely repressive measures and rigid curfews. Most economic activity has halted; the ports are virtually closed and most transport is disrupted. A number of bridges have been destroyed, ferry boats sunk, and rail lines (including that between Dacca and Chittagong) cut. Nonetheless, regular army forces can move through the region at will, except where inhibited by transport difficulties. 3. The prospects are poor that the 30,000-odd West Pakistani troops can substantially improve their position, much less reassert control over 75 million rebellious Bengalis. This is likely to be the case even if the expeditionary forces is augmented. For most of East Pakistan’s residents, the time has come for a separate Bengali nation. Many years of economic discrimination and political repression by the west wing had made an autonomous Bangla Desh the choice of over 75 percent of Bengali voters in the December 1970 elections. The refusal of Pakistan’s military leaders to honor that choice and their attempt to terrorize the Bengalis into submission have almost certainly ended any general desire in East Bengal to see the Pakistani union continue. 4. Whether the army is to face widespread non-cooperation or continued active resistance will depend in part on how much help India gives the Bengalis. All but a few miles of East Bengal’s land frontiers are with India, and the movement of arms and guerrillas across these very extensive borders cannot be prevented. There is considerable evidence that some arms shipments have already taken place. * The Indian Government’s support for the Bengali’s will be determined by a mix of response to domestic popular pressures—which are quite strong—and of an assessment of India’s own national interests. Statements of support in parliament and the press have been very strong. West Pakistan, with its military forcess, has long been a principal enemy of India. A successful Bengali insurgency would serve to weaken and discredit West Pakistan. The East Wing, basically uninterested in the Kashmir dispute and never the scene of major Indo-Pakistani fighting, poses no military threat to New Delhi. To the contrary, its leaders—particularly Mujibur Rahman of the AL—have advocated cordial relations with India. Hence, we estimate that India will continue and increase its arms aid to the Bengalis and this will enable them to develop at a minimum the kind of insurgency capability which the army cannot entirely supress. In so doing, India is accepting the risk that some of its arms may fall into extremist hands. In the time the Bengalis may prove more than a match for the army except where the latter is consentrated in a few strong points. 5. New Delhi has an additional incentive to aid the Bengalis—and sooner rather then later. It is probably concerned that a rebellion lasting for a considerable period could throw up a new, extremist leadership (as opposed to the relatively moderate AL one) which would eventually take over the new country. The advent of a radical regime in East Bengal would create very severe problems for India, especially in the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal. The latter, a very important industrial center, is badly troubled in its own right. Several extremist Communist groups are major political parties there. Social and economic conditions in its capital of Calcutta are exceptionally grim, and its residents would be quite susceptible to disruptive or even secessionist appeals from a radical East Bengal regime. Accordingly, the Indians are likely not merely to work for the liberation of Bengla Desh from West Pakistan, but also to seek to assure the advent there of a new government satisfactory to them. 6. India would prefer to aid the Bengalis by more or less clandestine means—e.g. non-official “advisors”, covert arms support, and sanctuaries. It could also undertake various forms of pressure, including troop movements towards either of its frontiers with Pakistan. If a rebellion dragged on or if India saw significant chance of a radical leadership emerging, it would probably give more direct support. These actions could lead to deeper and deeper Indian involvement and to armed clashes with Pakistani forces; even open military intervention by India could not be ruled out. India has sufficient forces to defeat Pakistani forces in East Bengal without drawing down heavily on its troops on its other frontiers. 7. India of course runs the risk in supporting or intervening in a Bengali rebellion. To do so could provoke Islamabad into launching an attack on Western India. However, in the 1965 war the Indian military showed itself more then a match for the Pakistanis. The Indians are now much better equipped than in 1965, and face forces weakened by transfer of Pakistani units to East Bengal. 8. In addition to clandestine support, India has been applying diplomatic pressure in aid of Bengla Desh. It has urged the UN and major powers to express humanitarian concern and has pressured Ceylon—with only limited resources—to withdraw landing rights for Pakistani military flights to East Pakistan. In addition, India would probably extend diplomatic recognition to a government of Bengla Desh if and when one satisfactory to India could demonstrate effective control of even a moderate portion of East Bengal. 9. Whatever the extent of Indian support to the Bengalis, the West Pakistanis will face increasingly serious difficulties in East Bengal. The area is principally riverine. With the advent of the monsoon in late May or early June, there will be extensive flooding which will further isolate the Pakistani Army in a few urban strong-points. Given the army’s lack of complete control of water transport, it will probably be forced to abandon a number of bases in the region, and limit its presence to those half dozen or so places which can be reached by air (helicopters are scarce) and those which can be reached by sea—principally Chittagong. Even supplying these will not be easy. Transport of troops and supplies would be made more difficult if Ceylon terminated the landing rights it is now extending to Pakistani aircraft. The bulk of the arms and ammunition must be transported by sea from the west wing at a pace likely to strain Pakistani shipping capacities, and may result in the shortage of such items in the expeditionary force. Nonetheless, West Pakistani forces could probably, if they so chose, hang on to these selected bases for some time and conduct occasional forays into nearby areas. But if the Bengalis acquire greater military capabilities and develop something approaching a new national political leadership, the West Pakistanis’ days in Bengal would be numbered, though the date and manner of their departure cannot now be forecast. 10. A good deal would probably depend on outside pressures, particularly by the great powers, and on developments in the west wing itself. In West Pakistan, the army’s move against the Bengalis appears to have been generally popular at first. Support is likely to dwindle, however, if the cause appears to be a losing one and as adverse economic consequences become apparent. Further, however much they wish to keep the east wing, the westerners know they would pay a very high price if they alienated the US, the USSR, and the West European countries. All these powers figure importantly, one way or another, in assuring a continued flow of trade and foreign aid necessary to the west wing’s economy, in getting acceptance in the international community, and—ultimately—in helping provide protection against the threat believed to be posed by its large and hostile Indian neighbor. 11. So far, with the qualified exception of China, none of the major powers have shown any support for the central government’s efforts in Bengal. Moscow has put itself firmly on the record in opposition to the West Pakistani military suppression of East Pakistani; its choice was no doubt heavily influenced by the Indian attitude. It has called for a political settlement, and probably does not believe Soviet interests would be served by prolongation of the conflict. The Soviets have probably concluded that the odds favor a separatist solution or at least that Islamabad has little chance of imposing its will on East Bengal in any lasting and effective way. 12. Communist China, circumspect at first in its reactions to Pakistani developments, has recently sent a note to the Indian Government accusing it of interfering in Pakistani affairs. Peking, particularly if strongly urged to do so by the Islamabad government, will probably undertake other measures to assist. These may include an increase in deliveries of military equipment to West Pakistan, sharper threatening words to the Indians, and even a maneuvering of Chinese troops near the Indian border. Chinese military intervention in support of the West Pakistanis does not now seem likely. Further, the Indians, pleased with Soviet condemnations of Islamabad’s repression of the Bengalis, probably see Moscow serving as a strong inhibition on Chinese moves in the subcontinent. Such an assessment is probably correct; the Chinese leadership is not likely to risk a major conflagration in an effort to bail out beleaguered West Pakistanis trying to repress a popular uprising. The Chinese may in time face a dilemma should an extremist group come to the fore in East Bengal and seek Peking’s support. 13. Stories of atrocities in Dacca and elsewhere have been widely circulated in the Western world, and West Pakistani actions have been condemned by a number of private citizens and groups. No single Western country has much influence on the situation, but general Western disapproval may make the government in Islamabad less certain of the wisdom of present policies and more amenable to pressures for change. II. PROSPECTS FOR EAST BENGAL A. As a Part of a United Pakistan 14. In the unlikely event that the West Pakistanis did succeed in reasserting military control over the Bengalis, they would almost certainly find it impossible to develop a new political system based on anything approaching a consensus of opinion in the two wings. In the December 1970 elections, the Bengalis gave an overwhelming mandate for political and economic autonomy: opinions have since hardened. The best the West Pakistanis could hope to achieve would be something like a restoration of conditions which existed under Ayub (and which were ended by mass public uprisings in 1968–1969). Routine and low-level administrative duties would be in the hands of Bengalis loyal to Islamabad (and such individuals do remain, though they are in a minority); ultimate authority would continue to be in the hands of West Pakistani authorities, and the army would remain the final arbiter of power. The two areas would remain one economic unit, and the central government would make some effort to cope with the formidable economic problems of East Bengal. But a substantial majority of the population would continue to be strongly disaffected, probably tot he point of launching sporadic uprisings. The Pakistani Government’s talk about enlisting loyalist Bengalis in any significant numbers is wishful thinking. B. As an Independent Nation 15. The political complexion and outlook of an independent Bangla Desh are extremely difficult to forecast. If it came into being rather soon, and if Mujib and the principal AL leaders were still alive and permitted to return, they would quickly take over. Mujib’s political and economic philosophies are essentially moderate ones; he wishes to develop good relations with India and adopt a generally balanced and neutralist international posture. In domestic affairs he advocates a mild type of socialism, emphasizing an improvement in the living standards of the Bengali people and a concerted attack on the many economic problems of the area. On the other hand, the longer the fighting goes on, the more the prospects for a takeover by an extremist and radical leadership could be enhanced. We know almost nothing about such radicals; in recent years the politics of East Bengali protest have focused almost exclusively on the issue of autonomy. Nonetheless, given the large number of Bengali extremists in India and the ease of interchange of ideas and people between the two regions, radical movements could develop extremely rapidly. 16. Whatever its government, an independent Bangla Desh would, in the short term, have some things going for it. Relatively speaking for an underdeveloped country, its balance of payments problems would not be bad, thanks to its large current exports of jute. It would almost certainly repudiate the large debts to West Pakistan and the outside world incurred in its name. Able to trade freely with India, as it has not been in the past, it could buy many goods more cheaply. 17. But Bangla Desh would face serious problems both in the short and long term. The floods and cyclone of 1970 raised import requirements to about 3 million tons of food grains for the period until June 1971. Some, though almost certainly not all, of this has already been met by shipments of PL 480 and West Pakistani food grains. But Bengali ports have been closed since 25 March, and ships carrying food have been diverted. The internal transportation network has been disrupted. We have no information about food conditions throughout East Bengal now, but severe food shortages are almost certain and famines in certain areas not out of the question. Beyond this, the basic economic problems in that region are as severe as those faced by any country in the world, and they appear unlikely to improve much in the next several years. 18. Indeed the formidable and probably insoluble nature of these problems will make East Bengal—be it East Pakistan or Bangla Desh—an object of concern to its people, its neighbors, and the world in general for the foreseeable future. With 70 to 80 million people packed into an area the size of Florida, unable to grow enough food to feed itself, almost devoid of natural resources, facing a decline in the sale of jute (its principle export), periodically subjected to floods and cyclones, East Bengal will be plagued by economic privation and political crisis. Were the moderate Mujib to come to power, it is questionable whether he could do much to improve the lot of his people. If he did not, the euphoria of independence would likely disappear within a comparatively short period of time, and there would be an increased interest in and susceptibility to the radical and extremist ideas and groups which now exist in West Bengal. Its government, lacking well-organized security services, might have difficulties coping with such challenges. 19. This would of course make Bangla Desh a continuing object of concern to the Indian Government. East Bengal—weak but potentially dangerous—is likely to be under constant Indian scrutiny. It will probably, in the name of national security, be an object of manipulation and even of open interference on New Delhi’s part. Indeed, an independent Bangla Desh is likely to remain very much in the Indian orbit so long as that country has a government strong and decisive enough to seek to exercise its influence. * III. PROSPECTS FOR A SEPARATE WEST PAKISTAN 20. The successful secession of the east wing would produce a severe psychological shock in West Pakistan. Indeed, President Yahya may well either resign or be ousted before the issue is decided in the east. Separation would also bring on painful economic difficulties, e.g., lower foreign exchange earnings, the loss of a protected market for its industry, higher per capita expenses for its armed forces, among others. The region might experience so severe a crisis that West Pakistan could itself split into as many as four separate nations, though this contingency now appears unlikely. Its relatively large and indigenous army, embittered by the loss of the east wing, could probably stifle any secessionist or insurgent efforts in the west. Unlike East Bengal, West Pakistan’s longer term economic prospects are fairly promising, though it remains a poor country. It is a net food exporter, has a modest but growing industrial base, and experiences no severe population pressures on the land 21. The army is likely to remain a principal political factor in West Pakistan, though it might eventually turn over formal political power to some civilian groups whose views are compatible with those of the military establishment. Whoever takes charge is likely to suffer from the diminished prestige and stature that comes with being the spokesman of 55 million people as opposed to 130 million. But over time this is likely to appear less serious. The loss of East Pakistan, which would probably have become an increasing economic and political burden, could prove to be a blessing in the long run. 22. The West Pakistani military machine’s capabilities would remain—the army would see to that. West Pakistan would be likely to pursue the same foreign policies it now does: maintaining an antagonistic posture towards India; seeking close ties with China, particularly in the field of military supply; and at the same time trying to achieve the best possible relations with the US, West Europe, Japan, and the USSR with the object of aiding its economic development programs and enhancing its international stature. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. * The evidence for this includes observation of weapons being trucked into East Bengal from the Indian border [ text not declassified ] * The Indians have the capability both in terms of contiguity of territory and numbers of troops to maintain control of both East and West Bengal, however difficult or unpleasant the task would be. 132. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council’s Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia for the Senior Review Group 132. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council’s Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia for the Senior Review Group 1 Washington, undated PAKISTAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS /**/ A REASSESSMENT BACKGROUND The developments leading up to and flowing from the military take-over of East Pakistan on the night of March 25–26 may represent a watershed in the history of South Asia and of Pakistani-American relations as significant as that which resulted from the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The Government of Pakistan’s decision to resort to force to suppress a popularly elected movement has fundamentally altered the political, economic, and psychological situation there. The following paper analyzes the situation which now prevails, assesses U.S. and other external interests in South Asia and indicates the major policy strategies which the United States might pursue in these changed circumstances. I. THE CURRENT SITUATION * A. Military : After three weeks of military operations against the Bengali separatists, a civil war continues in East Pakistan. Although the Bengalis are seriously disadvantaged by a lack of arms, there is little indication that they have acquiesced in the military takeover despite the bombing of several cities, raids against selected villages, and arrests of the separatist leadership. The separatists are, however, largely unorganized, and their only significant source of arms is India. The Provisional Government announced on April 14 controls no major population centers. If the GOP continues to reinforce its military units and solves the complicated problems arising from dangerously extended supply lines which will soon be aggravated by monsoon conditions, the army will have a capability to hold the province in subjugation for an extended period. The separatists, however, will retain a significant sabotage and civil disobedience capability. Only the Indians have an existing capability in the area to intervene decisively on the side of the separatists, and they now seem reluctant to take a step which could lead to a major escalation of the war in South Asia with the attendant danger of direct Chinese involvement. Without this intervention, a prolonged period of inconclusive military activity may occur. While the army may be able to maintain an uneasy control over the major population centers in East Pakistan for months and conceivably years, political and economic pressures may be such as to force a change in strategy by the military leadership. B. Political : From all evidence available to us, the vast majority of Bengalis now reject the concept of a united Pakistan ruled by West Pakistanis. The Bengalis made this clear in the overwhelming vote of confidence which they gave to the Awami League in the December election. This support was reiterated in massive demonstrations of public loyalty to Mujibur Rahman during the period of his negotiations with President Yahya for an autonomist or confederal solution to the constitutional problem. The military’s subsequent actions against the Awami League leadership has apparently converted what was once only autonomist sentiment into a widespread demand for independence. Those killed on the days following March 25 are already viewed as martyrs to that demand. Psychologically the concept of a united Pakistan is dead in Bengal. We see no way in which President Yahya can establish a civilian government based on any significant degree of popular support. There are, however, signs that some of the non-Awami League political leaders in East Pakistan, motivated either by fear or hatred of India, concern for the suffering of the Bengali people or by personal ambition, will come forward to re-establish a civilian administration in cooperation with President Yahya. They may be joined by some Awami Leaguers who are unwilling to adopt a revolutionary posture. The GOP will probably attempt to transfer some power to them to give the military administration a facade of legitimacy. It may even concede most of the Awami League’s six point autonomist program. Eventually in its search for legitimacy, the GOP might hold controlled elections or perhaps a constitutional referendum in East Pakistan under a franchise excluding Hindus and dissident groups. The only alternative would seem to be direct negotiations with the Award League leadership. Such negotiations would in present circumstances probably have only one issue to resolve—the terms of independence, though a solution such as confederation remains an outside possibility. For the present, negotiations seem unlikely and, because of the bitterness and mistrust engendered by the civil wars, could probably only take place if Yahya himself were to offer to step down. The Pakistan Government will not only have to maintain itself in power by force in the East but will have to deal with complicated constitutional problems in the West. The four regions of West Pakistan have also been seeking enhanced autonomy. Pressures for constitutional change from the constituent units, notably the Northwest Frontier and the Sind, are likely to increase. These may place added strains on the political viability of the Yahya government. While we do not anticipate demands for independence from the units of West Pakistan, there will be growing demands for a transfer of power to elected representatives. In the case of the Punjab and Sind, the radical and militantly anti-Indian People’s Party of Z.A. Bhutto would be the immediate beneficiary of a return to parliamentary government. If these pressures are not met, there could be violence and disturbances of the severity which brought down the Ayub goverment in 1969. In both East and West Pakistan, but particularly in Bengal, a failure to reach a political accommodation is likely to result in a radicalization of political activity in which extreme leftist parties and policies gain in influence and violent methods replace the relatively moderate methods of the past. In East Pakistan this could well be the extreme Maoist/Naxalite form which has appeared in West Bengal. The development of such a movement with substantial popular support could lead to a virtually permanent destabilization of East Pakistan and of the adjacent regions of India. C. Economic : The economic costs of a civil war are high. Pakistan’s limited shipping and commercial air facilities are already diverted to the supplying of the army. In East Pakistan much of the communications infrastructure has been destroyed; goods will get to market with difficulty, and development works will be set back. There will be significant losses of foreign exchange for the central government because of the disruption of jute exports. Pakistan’s foreign exchange resources were declining before the crisis. Taking into account the losses in foreign exchange earnings from the current suspension of East Pakistan’s exports and a falling off in private remittances, these resources could be exhausted within a few months unless international relief is forthcoming or imports are sharply cut back. The latter step would contribute to a downward economic spiral, to an industrial slowdown, and potentially to large-scale unemployment, which in turn could create serious political pressures, particularly in West Pakistan. Nonetheless, the economy can probably survive these pressures for longer than the actual foreign exchange balances would suggest. Almost irrespective of the political outcome, Pakistan’s overall development effort has been severely set back in west as well as in East Pakistan. The momentum in both wings can only be recovered with substantial external resource inputs. D. Conclusion : The Government of Pakistan will be faced in the future with numerous problems arising from a continuing insurgency situation, the political alienation of the mass of the population in East Pakistan, and deteriorating economic conditions. All of these factors will produce growing pressures on Islamabad for a political accommodation with the Bengalis. Nonetheless, even in the absence of an accommodation, the military can undoubtedly maintain its control over the cities for an extended period unless India should invade East Pakistan with regular forces. The ferocity with which it has already fought to preserve a united Pakistan suggests that it will not give in over the short term barring a coup in Islamabad, greater separatist military successes or a major economic crisis. None of these are immediately likely, and we must be prepared to face a situation in which the present stalemate lasts for many months. In this period, while the political situation is sorting itself out, our actions or inaction will affect, to a limited degree, the outcome and the timing of that outcome. If the stalemate continues over a much longer term, the West Pakistanis will become increasingly dependent on the U.S. and other Western nations for economic aid and military equipment, and how we aid our friends in the consortium will have an important impact on the hard political and economic decisions which the Government of Pakistan will have to take. II. EXTERNAL INTERESTS A. U.S. Interests : The United States has no vital security interest in South Asia as a whole. We do, however, have important interests involving: (a) The peace and stability of the region; (b) The prevention of either the Soviet Union or China from becoming dominant in the region or in any country of the region; (c) The prevention of the development of radical or militantly nationalistic regimes inimical to the United States; (d) Effective use of economic assistance Hinds and the development of economically self-reliant states; (e) The protection of U.S. citizens and of U.S. commercial and investment interests. These interests apply for India as well as Pakistan, but our ability to support them in Pakistan has materially diminished as a result of recent developments: (a) The relative peace and stability of the pre-March 25 period has given way to civil war and political instability; (b) The prestige and influence of the Soviet Union in India and of China in Pakistan may have increased, at least in the short run; (c) The prospects for a democratic political system in East Pakistan have receded; (d) Conditions in which economic development can take place in East Pakistan have for the present largely disappeared; (e) We have been able to protect our citizens in East Pakistan, but many citizens in West Pakistan remain vulnerable to popular xenophobia. The prospects for our investment and trade are uncertain. These developments in East Pakistan have reinforced the relative priority of our interests in India which was already apparent by virtue of India’s greater size, resources, and political, strategic, and economic potential. In contrast to the deteriorating situation in Pakistan, India seems to be moving into a period of new political stability with enhanced prospects for economic development and with a renewed willingness to develop a cooperative relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, our concern for regional stability and equilibrium makes it incumbent on us to work for a viable relationship with either a united or divided Pakistan. Historically we have assumed that our interest in regional stability was best served by a united Pakistan. That assumption now requires reexamination. If there is a possibility that through a loose confederation the political aspirations of the Bengalis could be met and the beneficial features of a united country preserved, it would seem to be in our interest to support such a solution. However, on the basis of our analysis of the situation in Pakistan, we have concluded it can remain united only through military force with dwindling development prospects and continued potential for growing political radicalization and instability. A Pakistan divided into two viable and politically stable states would be almost as acceptable from the point of view of U.S. interests. An independent East Pakistan in which moderate Bengali forces were in control would be less vulnerable to radical internal pressures, would be more likely to work for an accommodation with India and for regional cooperation, and would have a political mandate within which development activity could be resumed. There is no assurance, of course, that our choice is simply between a Pakistan united only at gun point and one divided into two viable and politically stable states. One or both of the new states might well be non-viable, politically unstable, and/or controlled by an extreme left-wing leadership, in which case— over the medium term at least—even a militarily unified Pakistan might serve some of our interests in the area. B. Indian Interests : India has traditionally perceived a united Pakistan to be in its interests. It has always hoped that the Bengali majority would ultimately become dominant and would moderate the traditional West Pakistani hostility toward India. It has feared that an independent East Pakistan would come increasingly under radical Chinese domination and, by offering a focus for West Bengal’s dissatisfaction, would undermine India’s own national unity. India’s perception of its interests, however, has changed in recent weeks. It now appears to believe that the Bengalis would never be allowed to control Pakistan and that the only way to preserve a moderate Bengali orientation towards India is by supporting the aspirations of the Awami League. India has consequently publicly announced its sympathy, solidarity, and support for the Bengali separatists. It has provided material assistance including arms. To date, Indian support has stopped short of direct military intervention, which the Indians recognize could lead to war with Pakistan, perhaps on two fronts, and Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan. The limited assistance given by India is, in effect, an investment made in the hope that, if the Awami League comes to power, it will be repaid in a cooperative, mutually beneficial Indo-Bengali relationship. C. Soviet Interests : For geo-political reasons alone, the Soviet Union has a greater interest in South Asia than the United States. The Soviet Union has a primary interest in limiting Chinese influence in the area and has concluded that India represents a significant political, military, and economic counterweight to China. Having given fundamental priority to its interests in India, the USSR does not wish to disassociate itself from the Indian position with respect to Pakistan. The Podgorny message to President Yahya not only serves to support the Indian position but also contributes to the other major Soviet interest in South Asia that it be an area of relative peace and stability. The Soviets see their interest, as at the time of Tashkent, in bringing hostilities to an end and in creating political conditions which contribute to regional stability and minimize Chinese involvement. They are likely to continue to work in this direction. Because of fears of a radicalization of East Pakistan, the USSR has also concluded that it must adopt a positive attitude towards Bengali aspirations, while keeping open its options should Yahya succeed in keeping the country united. The Soviet Union would see it in its interest to have good relations with both successor states in order to counter potential Chinese and U.S. influence, and it would not lightly throw away the influence it has obtained through its limited past military and economic assistance to West Pakistan. It also probably assumes that West Pakistan will continue to need the Soviet Union, and its assumption may have been reinforced by President Yahya’s relatively restrained response to President Podgorny’s message. D. Chinese Interests : China’s major interest in South Asia is that there be no major military threat on its borders. It also has an interest that India not emerge independently or in combination with any other country as a threat to China’s position in Asia. The Chinese have, therefore, worked to keep India weak, divided, and politically unstable and have supported Pakistan as India’s principal enemy and rival in South Asia. China still regards Pakistan as the most effective counterforce to India and apparently does not wish to see that force reduced by the break-up of Pakistan. It probably also believes that ultimately the instability which the civil war creates will radicalize the East Pakistan masses and provide opportunities for Maoist-oriented indigenous revolutionaries. China probably does not want to take any risks which could lead to war with India, particularly in view of the Indo-Soviet relationship; and China is, therefore, not likely to pursue its interests to the point of military involvement unless the crisis escalates, and West Pakistan is faced with the prospect of total defeat by the Indians. III. U.S. INVOLVEMENT Since the events of March 25, the United States Government has taken the position that the crisis is essentially an internal affair of Pakistan. We have tried to avoid any direct involvement in the events in East Pakistan except as required to bring about the thinning out of our dependents and personnel. Nonetheless, because of our many on-going programs and the political discussions which have taken place, a degree of involvement has been and will be inevitable. A. Political: 1. Although our thin-out was fundamentally a measure to protect our citizens, it has obvious political ramifications since it implied a degree of skepticism that conditions could be returned to normal as quickly as the martial law authorities asserted. 2. All foreign newsmen were expelled from East Pakistan, and their film and notebooks were confiscated. We protested this action to the Government in Islamabad. 3. In our public statements in Washington, we have expressed concern for the loss of life, damage, and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan and have called for an end to the conflict and a peaceful accommodation. 4. In private we have reiterated these concerns and indicated our added concern that American arms were used. 5. We have responded negatively to Indian efforts to stimulate UN Security Council discussion of the issue. 6. We have continued to broadcast extensively on VOA, particularly on medium wave to East Bengal, information about the crisis and U.S. policy towards it. B. Economic: 1. We have indicated our willingness to participate in an international relief effort if asked by the Government of Pakistan and, as conditions permit the distribution of relief throughout the province, and have urged the GOP to accept international offers of assistance. 2. We have delayed signature of a PL–480 agreement for 150,000 tons of food grains for the cyclone affected areas of East Pakistan and have delayed shipment of another 150,000 tons of PL–480 food grains. 3. We have postponed consideration of the FY–1971 $70 million program loan. 4. We have questioned the GOP about the equitable nationwide use of U.S. program funds already committed but not yet allocated. 5. We have diverted one of several grain ships in Chittagong to Korea. We have concurred in a GOP request to divert to Karachi a number of other grain ships in Chittagong which have been unable to discharge their cargoes. C. Military: 1. Arms supplied under our pre-1965 MAP have been used extensively by the army in East Pakistan. These include Chafee M–24 tanks and F–86 fighters. 2. We have not responded to a Pakistani request for an extension of the letter of offer for maritime patrol air-craft under the 1970 one-time exception. 3. We have expressed concern to the GOP about the use of arms. In almost all of these situations we have taken interim decisions which will require formal reaffirmation. To date our actions have signaled to the GOP and to the world at large that we are concerned about the welfare of our own people, the use of our arms in East Pakistan, and the sufferings and hardships of the East Pakistanis. We have indicated that we do not intend to interfere directly to affect the outcome of the civil war. Although we hope for an early peaceful accommodation, our public and private statements that current programs are under review have indicated to the GOP that we are not prepared to carry on exactly as before as long as our programs can not operate, our disaster relief can not be provided, and resource transfers can not take place on the equitable basis we had originally assumed in making our loans to the Government of Pakistan. IV. PAKISTAN’S INTERESTS AND U.S. LEVERAGE Over the years since 1952, Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. assistance. In FY–1968 Pakistan received $357.6 million in loans, grants, and PL–480 assistance. In FY–1970, despite a substantial reduction in PL–480, the total was $215 million. These inputs have been a vital ingredient of the Pakistani development program representing about 1870 of Pakistan’s annual imports of goods and services. For the coming year, the Pakistanis have been expecting at least $70 million in new loan commitments. About $120 million is in the pipeline from previous loans, and a substantial portion of the $87 million November 1970 PL–480 Title I Agreement has not yet been shipped. In the military assistance field, the one-time exception of armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, and fighter and bomber aircraft remains in abeyance. The total value of this equipment and of spare parts on previously supplied equipment which Pakistan needs could amount to as much as $70 million if the sales go through. These unfulfilled agreements and Pakistan’s desire for continued political ties indicate a substantial Pakistani interest in its relations with the U.S. They may not provide us with the leverage to achieve a major reorientation of Pakistani policy. But if used with discretion, they can probably affect the course, direction, and pace of political negotiations. The importance of U.S. economic assistance and thus the potential U.S. leverage at this time are enhanced in view of Pakistan’s currently low level of foreign exchange reserves. We have preliminary indications that the IBRD and the IMF may be reluctant to provide fresh assistance to the GOP in the present circumstances, and what we do will obviously affect the whole tenor of consortium decisions. (We have little specific information on likely reactions of other consortium members although the preliminary position of Britain and Germany is not to provide new aid at this time.) Total external aid excluding Chinese assistance amounts to about $500 million annually or about 50 percent of Pakistan’s merchandise imports. West Pakistan also needs the Soviet Union for the $200 million Karachi steel mill which the Soviets are committed to construct. The Chinese for their part are also committed to $200 million of aid, much of which was to have gone for East Pakistan, including the proposed Brahmaputra bridge. No one external power can fully make up the gaps if the others were to withdraw and Pakistan continues to remain dependent on the maintenance of its triangular tightrope foreign policy to obtain the resources, both military and economic, which it requires. In considering alternate strategies, we should, therefore, keep in mind that Pakistan needs us more than we need it. While the Chinese could replace in part assistance withheld by the U.S. and other donors, they do not have the capability and probably not the willingness to assume full responsibility for the defense and development of Pakistan. In addition, because of the Indo-Soviet relationship, Pakistan is unlikely to turn to the USSR to meet gaps and will, therefore, continue to look to us for help even in the event we adopt a more positive attitude towards Bengali aspirations. VI. POLICY STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS A. The Dilemma : Although it is our assessment that Pakistan as a unitary state cannot survive, it is possible that the military may be able to hang on in East Pakistan for months and conceivably for years. We face the problem of what policy to adopt over the short and medium term until the ultimate denouement takes place, and how to maintain a constructive relationship with Islamabad which will survive the break-up of Pakistan and which will simultaneously make it possible for us to work cooperatively with the Bengalis. Our dilemma is increased by press and Congressional criticism of our past policy, particularly the use of American tanks and aircraft in the military operations in Bengal. We also face the continuing dilemma of how to support our relatively greater interest in India while maintaining a relationship with Pakistan which, if it remains united for years rather than months, will continue to be a major Asian nation with important development potential. We are already faced with the further problem of how to deal with a provisional East Bengali government, which controls a portion of East Pakistan and enjoys the support, though not the formal recognition, of India. Such a government will actively seek bilateral and UN support. The resolution of these dilemmas is particularly difficult in this period of transition when emotions are running high throughout South Asia. B. U.S. Objectives : Subsidiary to our general concern for the peace and stability of South Asia, there are several specific objectives which we are pursuing: (a) the prevention of the escalation of the civil war into an international conflict. (b) the creation of conditions which would reduce political instability and permit economic development to proceed. (c) the preservation of a relationship with both East and West Pakistan in circumstances either of a united or divided Pakistan. (d) the prevention of any major external power from achieving a decisive advantage in South Asia as a result of the crisis. As the statement of our involvement makes clear, we have already gone beyond the point where we can adopt a posture of inaction. The sections which follow address the broad strategies we might pursue and the specific policy decisions which we must take under present circumstances. An additional section indicates steps we might have to take if the situation were to get out of control and lead to a major conflict between India and Pakistan and China. Although, as indicated in Section I above, the Pakistan Government may be able to maintain a degree of military control over the major population centers in East Pakistan for some time to come, the policies we adopt in support of our objectives have an important time factor because it is likely that the longer the conflict continues: (a) the more the dangers of escalation through direct Indian and/or Chinese involvement increase. (b) the more extremists in both East and West Pakistan are likely to gain in popular support. (c) the greater the likelihood of a major food distribution problem in East Pakistan perhaps leading to famine conditions. (d) the greater the probability of accelerating economic decline in both wings. (e) the greater the stress on West Pakistan’s political structure and unity. C. Policy Strategies : Taking into account the dilemmas which we face and the objectives we are pursuing, there are three basic strategies which we might adopt in present circumstances: 1. Relative Hands-off Policy which would seek to continue existing programs as far as possible given Congressional objections and the situation in East Pakistan. Advantages —Would support our objective of maintaining a constructive political relationship with the Government of Pakistan. —Would slow the deterioration of the West Pakistani economic situation and permit continuation to a limited extent of a coordinated development effort. —Would keep the Chinese from significantly increasing their influence in Pakistan. Disadvantages —Would adversely affect our relations with India and would allow the Soviet Union to strengthen its relationship with India. —Would create no immediate basis for a constructive relationship with the Bengalis. —Could lead to a prolongation of the conflict and to a long-term deterioration of the political and economic situation in the country as a whole. 2. The Use of Selective Influence combining support for programs which are consonant with our development objectives, but holding off from programs which would contribute directly to a prolongation of the civil war. We would maintain a degree of public disassociation from West Pakistan in order to facilitate a relationship with the East Bengalis at a later date. Advantages —Would create a degree of public distance between ourselves and the policies of the Government of Pakistan, while keeping open a relationship with it which would be required either if GOP rule in the East is more protracted than we now anticipate or in the event that Pakistan splits. —Would minimize Chinese and Soviet ability to capitalize on the crisis. —Would be consistent with the policy being adopted by other consortium members and the USSR. Disadvantages —Would give us limited influence over the outcome of the civil war and hence would risk the further radicalization of East Pakistan, and some continued economic deterioration. —Would be seen in India and in East Pakistan as only a partial commitment to self-determination for the people of East Pakistan. 3. All out effort to bring an early end to hostilities, by using our available leverage to prevent escalation and to achieve a peaceful political settlement. Advantages . —Would give relative priority to our interest in relations with East Pakistan. —Would reduce the prospects for a protracted war and the consequent dangers of escalation and of success for Maoist-oriented groups. —Would lay the foundation for a relationship with Bangla Desh and would contribute positively to our relationship with India. Disadvantages —Would be deeply resented in West Pakistan, and might lead to a fundamental change in our relations with Islamabad. —Would accelerate the deterioration of the West Pakistani economic situation. —Would run counter to established policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of others. —Would lead to increased Chinese influence in West Pakistan and enhance the prospects for a radical military takeover in Islamabad. D. Policy Decisions Within the framework of these broad strategies there are various specific policy decisions which cannot be delayed. These include decisions on (1) a response to President Yahya’s letter to President Nixon, (2) our public posture and the posture of the Voice of America in its broadcasts to South Asia, (3) contacts with the Provisional Government of Bangla Desh and at an appropriate time the recognition of it, (4) the implementation of our one-time exception to our military supply policy announced in October 1970, (5) shipments of ammunition and spare parts under the basic 1967 arms policy, (6) PL–480, (7) the program loan for 1971, (8) relief activities, (9) on-going economic assistance, and (10) anticipated request by the GOP for suspension of debt owed to us in the next three to six months. As a first step and a precursor to any decisions made with regard to our economic assistance program, we need to consider re-establishing regular channels of communications at all levels of the GOP and with other international aid donors, including a full exploration of current factual information on Pakistan’s economic development situation and program. The people in West Pakistan are not informed of the situation in East Pakistan, and President Yahya may not fully understand the seriousness of the country’s current economic conditions. It is important to work closely with other donors in developing an economic assistance policy toward Pakistan since the US contribution—although significant in itself—is only a portion (about 25 percent) of total external aid. Unless donor actions are coordinated the effects of US action could be neutralized. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the other consortium donors could seek a full review of Pakistan’s development situation, plans, and prospects. On the basis of information currently available, the World Bank and IMF do not believe there is now a basis for proceeding with economic support and development assistance. It is therefore important for the consortium and the IMP to seek a basis for proceeding with development activities in Pakistan. The burden for making a case for development rests, of course, with the Government of Pakistan. 1. Relative Hands-Off Policy . If we choose a hands off policy we would (1) Letter to Yahya —respond acknowledging his description of the sequence of events leading up to the crisis—express our sympathy for the sufferings in East Pakistan and our hope for an early resumption of our development activities and a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Undertake to raise the issue of Indian intervention with the GOI. (2) Public Statement —maintenance of our current public posture of concern and sympathy—avoidance of suggesting that delays in implementation of policies are anything more than routine—limit our coverage of Pakistani events on VOA. (3) Contacts and Recognition —avoid contact with Bangla Desh representatives—defer any decision on recognition until the Government of Pakistan had accepted the division of the country. (4) One-Time Exception —continue action to implement the one-time exception including extension of the date for the letter of offer for maritime patrol aircraft. (5) Ammunition and Spare Parts —take no overt action to suspend sales of ammunition and spares for lethal end items permitted under the 1967 policy—delay deliveries of ammunition until situation in East Pakistan clarifies. (6) PL–480 —Sign the 150,000 MT cyclone disaster agreement and as soon as the Government of Pakistan requests, proceed with shipments from the US of the 150,000 MT cyclone food grain and the 150,000 MT under an earlier agreement waiting to be loaded—defer completely to the GOP as to the proper disposition of PL–480 food grain shipments. (7) New Development Loans —Indicate we would like to proceed with the FY 1971 program loan for up to $70 million; however, before proceeding, we will need information on Pakistan’s future development plans and seek assurances from the GOP that it will be able to implement and achieve the objectives of its development program and not divert to military purposes resources intended for economic development—proceed with the outstanding project loan for West Pakistan ($5 million) and tell the GOP we are prepared to proceed with a consulting services loan for East Pakistan as soon as conditions permit. (8) Relief Activities —Inform the GOP again that we would participate in an international relief effort and would provide assistance as soon as Pakistan’s requirements can be identified and we have assurances that commodities can be delivered. (9) On-going Economic Assistance —Continue all on-going assistance activities, making only changes that are necessitated by the physical obstacles to implementation in East Pakistan. (10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of U.S. Debt — Inform the GOP that the U.S. is prepared for a limited period of time to suspend U.S. debt service 2. Selective Influence . A policy of selective influence would seek to keep open our options with regard to the two parts of Pakistan, to use a degree of leverage to shorten the conflict and encourage a political settlement and to encourage other countries to play a constructive role. Specifically it would include: (1) Letter to Yahya —emphasize our sympathy for the sufferings of the people of Pakistan—point out that we have been unable to carry on our development activities and look forward to a resumption of normal economic activity on the basis of our established develop-mental criteria—express our hope that to avoid famine steps be taken as soon as possible to restore internal communications—encourage the GOP to accept an international relief effort and indicate our willingness to participate in it. Point out the growing public and Congressional concern at the use of American arms in East Pakistan and the need for an early political accommodation. (2) Public Statements —increasingly emphasize our hopes for an early restoration of peaceful conditions and the resumption of a political dialogue with the elected representatives of East Pakistan—stress this theme in VOA broadcasts to all of Pakistan, possibly adding concern over the use of US arms. (3) Contacts and Recognition —Refrain from extending any de facto or de jure recognition until the Bengali separatists have effective control over virtually all of East Bengal—maintain discreet informal contacts by U.S. officials with Bangla Desh representatives in Calcutta or elsewhere as appropriate. (4) One-Time Exception —continue to defer effective implementation of the one-time exception sales offer. Instruct the Department of Defense not to conclude a firm agreement with the Government of Pakistan on the sale of 300 armored personnel carriers, and to suspend, or cancel if necessary, the DOD contract with the manufacturer for these items. (5) Ammunition and Spare Parts —defer all deliveries of ammunition and spare parts under FMS and commercial sales for lethal equipment, particularly F–86 Sabre Jets and M–24 tank which have been used or might be used in East Pakistan. Permit the continued sale of non-lethal equipment and non-lethal spare parts reviewing each decision on a case-by-case basis. (6) PL–480 —having assured ourselves that steps are being taken to resume food distribution in the disaster area, sign the 150,000 MT cyclone disaster agreement, and indicate that grain shipments will be held until there is evidence the food can be unloaded and distributed. Inform the GOP that we will ship the 150,000 MT (authorized under an earlier agreement and now at US ports waiting to be loaded) as soon as there is evidence the food can be unloaded and equitably distributed in East Pakistan. Continue to urge the GOP to do everything possible to unload and distribute the US food grain now waiting offshore East Pakistan, and to take steps to prepare for the PL–480 vessels enroute to East Pakistan to handle local food shortages as they arise. (7) New Development Loans —defer new development loans, which in the past have been designed for both wings of Pakistan—examine closely with other consortium members, as well as the GOP, the developmental case on which Pakistan’s future economic assistance would be based, and accordingly ask the World Bank to call a consortium meeting as soon as possible to review Pakistan’s revised development programs. (8) Relief Activities —encourage the GOP to accept international relief assistance, expressing US willingness to participate in such an effort as soon as conditions permit the extension of relief through-out East Pakistan. (9) On-Going Economic Assistance —maintain on-going technical assistance and loan activities (which total $120 million) that we can now justify as consistent with our overall developmental objectives, and which can be implemented, including, for example, all current loan activities in West Pakistan. (10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of US Debt —be prepared to participate in a limited debt exercise on condition there would be full participation by other consortium donors. 3. All-Out Effort . An all out effort to use our leverage in Pakistan to achieve an early end to the civil war and a political settlement would involve the following: (1) Letter to Yahya —send a letter to President Yahya at least as strong as that from Prime Minister Reath and Soviet President Podgorny—tell Yahya that his present course is tantamount to national suicide and urge him to resume the political dialogue with popularly elected representatives as soon as possible—urge the release of Mujibur Rahman and indicate our unwillingness to proceed with discussions on our political and military assistance programs until political negotiations had been resumed and the fighting stopped—indicate our willingness to be generous once a stable political solution had been achieved. (2) Public Statements —bluntly criticize the actions of the martial law regime and acknowledge that we were suspending economic assistance programs—inform Congress of our decision not to go ahead with any lethal military supply including the one-time exception—encourage the VOA to feature these decisions in its news coverage to East Pakistan in particular. (3) Contacts and Recognition —recognize the Government of Bangla Desh once it achieved control over a substantial portion of East Bengal and once it had been recognized by other countries including India. (4) One-time Exception —inform the Government of Pakistan that the one-time exception is cancelled. (5) Ammunition and Spare Parts —permit no sales of spare parts for lethal end-items or ammunition. (6) PL–480 —continue to defer signature of the 150,000 MT disaster agreement and shipment of the additional 150,000 MT already authorized until there is evidence the food can be unloaded and appropriately distributed in East Pakistan—Refuse to acquiesce in the diversion of further PL–480 grain vessels from Chittagong to Karachi—stress to the GOP our concern at pending food shortages and the urgent need to take whatever steps necessary to offload and distribute US food assistance. (7),(8) New Development Loans/On-going Economic Assistance —Inform the GOP that we are postponing discussions on new US aid commitments and suspending all unobligated economic assistance until the MLA modifies its policy toward East Pakistan—be prepared to implement on-going assistance once negotiations are under way and to sign new loan agreements as progress is made. (9) Relief Assistance —Urge appropriate international organizations to mount an international humanitarian relief effort specifically addressing the needs of the Bengali people. (10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of U.S. Debt —inform the GOP that even if others are prepared to do so, we do not believe it appropriate at this time to participate in a debt relief exercise. E. Contingency Decisions Despite the formation of a provisional Bangla Desh Government and more precise Chinese statements of support for the Government of Pakistan, there now seems somewhat less likelihood that the civil war will escalate into a major conflict. The Soviet Union is actively engaged in urging restraint on both sides and the Indians continue to follow an extremely cautious policy with regard to direct military support for the separatists. We should, however, be prepared for the possibility that a border incident might escalate or that Pakistani military reverses might lead to a desperate pre-emptive stance from West Pakistan against India. To prevent an escalation we should: —include in our public statements explicit appeals for restraint and an early cessation of hostilities. —hold private discussions with the Indians encouraging them to adhere to their present policy of not providing military support to the separatists. —follow up with the Soviets the March 26 Rogers/Dobrynin conversation, indicating our intention not to intervene and urging the Soviets to counsel restraint in New Delhi. Should an escalation take place we should be prepared to engage the United Nations’ attention to the dispute promptly looking to the early creation of a UN peace keeping operation. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–054, SRG Meeting, Pakistan and Ceylon, 4/19/71. Secret. On April 16 Sisco sent this paper under a covering memorandum to Kissinger in his capacity as chairman of the NSC Review Group for use by the Senior Review Group at its April 19 meeting. (Ibid.) * A further analysis of the situation is contained in SNIE 32–71 entitled Prospects for Pakistan , of April 12, 1971. 133. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 133. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 25, 1971 Subject: Contingency Study for Indo-Pakistan Hostilities There is attached a draft contingency paper on the prospects for Indo-Pakistan hostilities. I would appreciate your distributing this paper to members of the Washington Special Action Group for consideration at its meeting on Wednesday May 26. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Contingency Paper Prepared for the Washington Special Action Group Washington, undated Contingency Study for Indo-Pakistani Hostilities I. Introduction The civil war in East Pakistan has now continued for two months. The Pakistan Army has advanced to the Indian borders and has control over all of the major population centers in East Pakistan. Despite this apparent military success, the prospects for political and military stability are poor and the danger that the situation will escalate into an international conflict is growing. Thus the situation is moving from a level at which our interests were only secondarily involved to one that could pose a direct threat to the bases of U.S. policy in South Asia. This paper assesses the contingencies under which an escalation might take place and suggests steps which the US should take either to prevent escalation or to terminate it once war has broken out. II. Danger Signals In the last ten days we have received clandestine reports of military movements by Indian forces near the East and West Pakistan borders, and signs of Indian contingency planning for war. The Indian Government has reinforced Border Security Force (BSF) units and has moved regular Indian Army units to within three kilometers of the border. Tanks have been seen moving to forward cantonments in the Punjab. These developments reflect the growing Indian concern at the flood of Hindu refugees pouring out of East Pakistan at a rate in excess of 100,000 per day. Over 3.4 million have crossed into India. The Indian Government faces strong public and Parliamentary pressure to stop the refugee inflow and to support the Bengalis. The GOI fears that if there is not a cessation of the refugee flow, the states of Eastern India could be inundated under as many as 8 million refugees. In Indian eyes this would pose an intolerable burden on the social and economic structure of the area. In addition to its concern about the refugee problem, the GOI has been taking steps to support the Bengali struggle for independence in the face of the military successes of the Pakistan Army. The BSF has established camps at which 10,000 Bengalis are reportedly receiving training in guerrilla and sabotage tactics. Limited quantities of arms and ammunition continue to be provided to the Bengali separatists and some Indian forces have infiltrated into East Bengal to provide assistance and training to the separatists. There have been several border incidents involving Indian and Pakistani border units and at least one violation of Indian air space by Pakistani aircraft. While India probably still does not seek a war with Pakistan, it may come to believe that its national interest requires a preemptive strike against Pakistan. The Pakistanis, for their part, probably believe that it is only Indian political and military support that will keep the insurgency alive. They may therefore decide to strike directly against guerrilla training camps within India in order to relieve the pressure. Over the longer term there is also the danger that the Pakistanis will provoke a conflict in order to distract international attention than the internal situation in East Pakistan and in order to convince the East Pakistani people that there is a threat from India sufficiently great to justify the continued unity of Pakistan and the West Pakistani military presence in the East. There are still strong negative factors working against escalation. Both Governments, with the experience of 1965 in mind, are aware that a decisive victory cannot be won and the costs of war are extremely high. On the Indian side, there is added a fear of China and the recognition that an Indo-Pakistani conflict could result in direct Chinese involvement. Given the highly emotional context in which decisions are being made in India and Pakistan, however, one cannot assume that rational arguments militating against escalation will overrule the more immediate needs to respond to specific incidents or provocations. III. Scenarios for Escalation There are a variety of circumstances in which escalation might take place: (1) The Indians, faced with something approaching genocide of the Hindus in East Pakistan and inundated with an unmanageable Hindu refugee inflow, might decide to move in to stop the killing, end this refugee flow and establish a moderate Awami League Government in Dacca. (2) The Pakistanis might take action against BSF guerrilla training camps in India or might fire upon Indian border units while pursuing retreating Bengali separatist infiltrators. (3) Other types of border incidents might in themselves provoke escalation. For example, the Indians might shoot down a Pakistani aircraft violating Indian air space. (4) The Pakistanis might engage in a diversionary maneuver in Kashmir to distract Indian and world attention from the Bengal situation. In extremis the Pakistanis might attack India in the Punjab. (5) The GOI in the Parliamentary session beginning May 24 will come under increased pressure to recognize the Bangla Desh Government. Should it do so, a break in relations with Islamabad would probably result. An Indian decision to recognize Bangla Desh would also probably be followed by more overt Indian support for the separatists, which in turn would increase the likelihood of an open conflict. Of these scenarios the one most likely to lead to escalation at this time is the one deriving from the refugee problem and its impact in India. However, if an effective insurgency gains momentum as a result of Indian involvement, the Pakistanis also will come under increasing pressure to take action against India. In both cases, as long as there is no fundamental solution to the underlying political problem, the danger of war will remain. IV. Secondary Escalation Escalation would in the first instance involve only a direct confrontation between India and Pakistan. However, we have learned from intelligence sources that China may have given a conditional promise to assist Pakistan in the event hostilities break out with India. The Chinese may have also given assurances that they will initiate military action “along the Tibetan border” if Indian troops deliberately cross the Pakistani frontier in force. Should the Chinese become directly involved, it is likely that the Soviet Union will openly support India and will presumably provide such military assistance as is required. V. Steps to Prevent Escalation Although US influence in India and Pakistan is limited in the present circumstances, there are various actions which we might take to promote our interest in preventing the crisis from escalating. As indicated above, the dangers of escalation will remain as long as there is no resolution of the basic political issues in East Pakistan. If a peaceful accommodation between the East and West can be achieved resting on genuine popular support in East Pakistan, there is little doubt that the refugee flow would stop and that India would accept the political accommodation and back away from its support for any residual Bengali separatist movement. In view of the bloodshed of recent weeks, a political accommodation will be extremely difficult to achieve, but it is in our interest to accelerate efforts to achieve it. We might therefore: —Continue to stress to the Government of Pakistan the urgent need for political accommodation and indicate that our ability to assist Pakistan depends on progress toward such an accommodation. —Consider a more active use of the leverage of our military and economic assistance programs to induce Pakistan to begin political negotiations with the Bengalis. (The merits of this was discussed in the SRG paper reassessing US Relations with Pakistan.) —Continue to stress in both Islamabad and New Delhi the importance of restraint and our hope that neither side will over-react to border incidents or provocations. Warn the Indians of the dangers of Chinese intervention in the event of escalation, and tell them that they cannot automatically count on our support in this event. —Continue to emphasize a) to the Indians our willingness to assist them in alleviating the burdens created by the refugee flaw, particularly by providing increased US financial assistance, and b) to the Pakistanis the importance of creating conditions in which the refugee flaw will stop and be reversed. —Emphasize to the Indians the desirability of conducting India’s relations with representatives of East Bengal so as to minimize tensions with Islamabad. As long as the Indians withhold recognition of Bangla Desh, they are less likely to go beyond the modest levels of military support that they are now providing. —Consider approaching the Chinese to urge them to continue to exercise restraint in the present situation. It might be possible to persuade the British, the Canadians, or the French to express the need for restraint through their missions in Peking. —Confidentially discuss with the USSR the steps which we might take to prevent the outbreak of war. —Support and encourage third country offers of assistance as mediators. (The Swiss are already engaged in facilitating the repatriation of Indian and Pakistani diplomats from Calcutta and Dacca.) Additional countries at a later stage might take on a mediatory role. Canada, with good relations in Islamabad, Delhi and Peking, might be encouraged to do so. —Consider encouraging the UN Secretary General to adopt a more open political role, going beyond his present efforts to achieve an international relief effort, perhaps including a public appeal for a political settlement or an offer to travel to the area to seek the views of South Asian leaders. —Consider supporting the Indian proposal for a UN Security Council meeting to consider the international security aspects of the refugee. problem. —Consider using our economic leverage with India to achieve restraint. VI. Actions in the Event of Escalation Should the crisis escalate into an open war between India and Pakistan, we will be faced as in 1965 with many difficult decisions. The situation will be significantly more complex than in 1965 since it is possible that the conflict will be joined on both India’s eastern and western borders and will involve the Chinese and the Soviets to some degree or other. Except in the unlikely event of a major Chinese attack against India, no US military commitment would be involved. In the event of escalation, we will need to act swiftly to halt the conflict. We should be prepared to take the following actions: —Immediately call the United Nations Security Council into session and strongly support any UN action designed to terminate hostilities. —Formally and publicly suspend all military programs to India and Pakistan. —Immediately send Presidential messages to President Yahya and Prime Minister Gandhi calling for an end to hostilities. —Coordinate closely with the USSR and the UK on steps which we might take jointly with the GOP and the GOI. —Depending upon the circumstances in which the fighting had broken out, consider suspending our economic assistance to Pakistan and/or India until peace is restored. —If there is an unprovoked Chinese attack on India in support of Pakistan going beyond border incidents: (a) consider whether and what kinds of military assistance to India could be resumed. (b) initiate consultations with the Indians as provided in the 1964 Air Defense Agreement. —Withdraw the four C–130s which may be in the area of conflict carrying out a refugee airlift. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret. This memorandum and, apparently, the attached study, were drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Sisco. 134. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 134. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 26, 1971 SUBJECT: [ text not declassified ] Indian Government Decisions on Pakistan Crisis [ text not declassified ] 1. Refugee Situation : The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs reported that: —The refugee situation along the East Pak border was becoming “desperate”—the mid May figure was over 2.5 million. —The financial responsibility for the refugees would place an impossible burden on the Indian economy and infrastructure. —They recommended the Indian Government take every step to force the GOP to cease pressuring East Pakistanis to flee and to force the GOP to repatriate refugees. 2. Bangla Desh Government in Exile in Calcutta : External Affairs reported that: —Recognition of Bangla Desh must be considered only in light of the specific material help that India was prepared to make available to the East Pakistan liberation front. —Bangla Desh should only be recognized when India made the decision to risk military action against Pakistan for the liberation of the East. —The External Affairs report stressed the extremely negative reaction of the third countries (especially Muslim nations) to the East Pakistan situation and the “wait and see” attitude of the major powers, notably the U.S. and USSR. 3. Military Situation in East Pakistan and Possible Indian Military Action : The report from the Defense Ministry, while stressing the preparedness of Indian armed forces and the weakness of Pakistani armed forces, recommended against unilateral Indian military action for the following reasons: a. Inability to determine at what point the Chinese would become involved. b. Willingness of some Muslim countries (Turkey and Iran) to help Pakistan. c. Indian inability to assure continuing military supply from third countries (notably USSR) if India initiated what could be a long war. d. An invasion to achieve the liberation of the East would involve India in a two-front war which could create a requirement for the military occupation of all of Pakistan. 4. The following decisions were made : a. Defer recognition of Bangla Dash for the immediate future. b. Maintain constant military readiness . c. Take every diplomatic step to force the major powers to take action to force the GOP to stop the refugee flow and to repatriate those who have crossed into India, including hints that India might take unilateral military action . d. Seek financial aid from all sources to temporarily support the refugees. They also decided to release off-the-record press comments that India is reaching the point where some sort of action, possibly military, was possible if there is not immediate relief for the refugee problem. In a follow-up meeting with opposition leaders, Mrs. Gandhi reaffirmed India’s priority of putting all possible diplomatic pressure on the major powers to pressure Pakistan to change its policies. Stressing the gravity of the current crisis, she pleaded for broad support of current Indian policy “regardless of where it led.” [When queried about possible unilateral Indian actions, she avoided using the words “military action.” The source reports that opposition—left to right—took a tough line demanding some sort of military action there were no resolution to the refugee problem in the immediate future.] Comment : As you can see, the Indians are engaged in a fairly sophisticated diplomatic and public relations campaign. More importitntly, their decision-making has not reached yet the stage of war or peace. This report would indicate that Mrs. Gandhi is still moving with considerable restraint, given the circumstances, and that there is scope for us to reinforce this. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, India-Pakistan, 5/26/71. Secret; Exdis. 135. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 135. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m. Kissinger: Indira Gandhi has written you a letter. Nixon: I know about— Kissinger: Well, no. We should answer it. Let me say one other thing. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Well you can tell her—you can use it to bring pressure on her not to take military action. Also, I talked to the Pakistan Ambassador. He said that Yahya might appreciate a letter, which would give him an excuse to answer all the things by saying, listing all the things he’s doing because he can’t get any publicity here. Nixon: No. Kissinger: And conversely, Indira Gandhi, I checked with the Indian Ambassador, they’re getting so devious now— Nixon: She wants— Kissinger: She would like to be able to say that one result of her letter was— Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger:—that you’ve written to Yahya. So everybody’s happy. The Pakistanis— Nixon: But we don’t say anything against Yahya? Kissinger: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be able to go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you that’s exactly what he wants. I’ve got it all arranged with the— Nixon: Good. Go ahead. Kissinger:—Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indians to pipe down— Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: And we’ll keep Yahya happy. Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a— Kissinger: They’re such bastards. Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren’t going to get that. We’re going to feed them—a new kind of wheat. But if they’re not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war [unclear]. Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there. Nixon: The Indians? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Sure. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 505–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m. Nixon: I told Keating that I would see him—he was there last night at this little party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think we’ll just have him for a half hour and then have him— Kissinger: I saw him leaving. Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be sure we don’t get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or another, so forth and so on. Kissinger: He’s almost fanatical on this issue. Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it? Kissinger: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out of— Nixon: Push—I don’t want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with me. Kissinger: Mr. President, actually we’ve got to keep Yahya, we have to keep Yahya [unclear] public executions for the next month. Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn’t do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the— Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It’s going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia— Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: No resources. They’re going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then they’re going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind. Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating) 137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating) 1 Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13–5:40 p.m. Nixon: Like all of our other Indian ambassadors, he’s been brainwashed. Completely throw in [unclear]. Anti-Pakistan. Keating: All right, now let me— Nixon: Where are your sandals? Keating: Give me— Nixon: [unclear] Keating: Give me 5 minutes. Nixon: I hope you haven’t turned the Embassy over to those hippies like your predecessor. [unclear exchange] Keating: Let me have 5 minutes to— Nixon: Go ahead. Keating:—just give you a little background. Then you want to ask me some questions about the Foreign Minister. Nixon: Go ahead. No, I—he should meet with the Foreign Minister, don’t you think so? Kissinger: Yeah. Are you going to leave— Keating: Yes, I’ll be— Nixon: I think he ought to come in with him. [unclear] Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: The point is, the point is it’s best to get you with the Foreign Minister. If he wants to talk to us, talk to the Ambassador. We don’t normally have ambassadors in. I’d get some iced tea? Would you like iced tea? Keating: No, no. Nixon: Booze? Keating: No, nothing. Nixon: Coffee? Kissinger: Coffee. Nixon: Maybe coffee. Keating: Now in all seriousness— Nixon: India thinks that they’re [unclear], you’re a good Ambassador, I know. Keating: They are difficult. Nixon: I listen to it all the time. Keating: The Indians are— Nixon: [unclear exchange] Keating: Let me say personally, I’m delighted that you’re starting off that way because— Nixon: I’m not [unclear]. Keating: Don’t let any of these bastards get you down. And you’re not, that’s great. That—I don’t mean any. Nixon: Yeah. Keating: The Indians are difficult, and time after time I’ve had to talk to them, to have stood up to them on Vietnam and many other things. Since this election, and that tremendous majority she got—350 out of 520 members—the next party to her is 27, which is the left-wing Communists. The next party is the right-wing Communists, 25. Because you expect India to— Nixon: Yeah. Keating: But the rightist parties were completely wiped out. And since that time there has been evidence of greater stability and a better relationship with us. Nixon: That’s good. Keating: Let me give you chapter and verse of two things. Remington Rand and Union Carbide have big interests there. Union Carbide very big. They’ve been trying for several years to get a license to extend their activities. All bureaucrat stuff from one ministry to another. Three weeks after the election they were called in and said we’re going to approve your license. Get going. We need employment. Have as much of your product as possible, export oriented, but get going and there will be no delay. And the presidents of the Indian companies of those two concerns came in to see me. And we’ve been trying to help. Just delightful, and they are. I went to call on the new Minister of Industrial Development, Choudhury [Moinul Haq], who succeeded my friend Mr. Dinesh Singh, the son-of-a-bitch, and he is a top notch. Just top notch. And I had a conversation with him that I have never had since I’ve been in India. He said, now Mr. Ambassador, we have a list, as you know, of things in the public sector. We have things in the private sector. We have a big list of things that can be either public or private sector. And, by the way, he said with a smile, “I might point out to you that the percentage of our gross national product in the public sector is about half of what yours is in America.” I said, “I’m aware of that.” And he said, “in this 146 items, which are in the private sector, there are some that we can’t possibly fix, where we need foreign investment. The impression has gotten abroad that we don’t want foreign investment. I want to disabuse your mind of that. We want, and let me say something else to you, if you have a business group from America come in there and they want to, there is something that isn’t on that list, you come and see me and we’ll work it out.” Now, I have never had a conversation like that with any Indian since I’ve been there. He’s top notch. He wants to work with us. Next, Mrs. Gandhi. Our relations have always been pleasant. She has never turned me down when I wanted an appointment. But since then, they’re more cordial since her election. Now part of it is because she’s got this weight off her mind. She was trying to run a government with a minority party. And now she can, if she has the will, can do the things that she thinks ought to be done. I escorted her to a concert that Mahalia Jackson gave her; if I had the time I’d tell you about it, it was the most fantastic performance and she just loved it. And she couldn’t be nicer in her dealings with me. So that I consider that there is a change in the situation. And I sent two cables to the Department. Henry, the numbers are 5311—New Delhi 5311—and 6031. Nixon: [unclear] Keating: One was sent shortly after the Army went in and started the killing in East Pakistan. Kissinger: Yeah, I’ve read it. Keating: You know, it was the result of a lot of talk. It represents my— Kissinger: The basic principle is that [unclear]. Keating: Yes. [unclear exchange]The main thing is to... I’m convinced there is a change in the subcontinent. And that India should not be equated with Pakistan. India is a strong, stable power now while Pakistan is having all this difficulty. The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid program and my recommendations as to what should be done about aid. And both of those I stand on as my recommendations, which— Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: No, I didn’t see that. Nixon: Is it something to act on now? Keating: No, no. They represent in further form my views, and they’re the consensus of my staff that is super. I have a wonderful staff, I think, and they’re so loyal, and they’re just great. Nixon: That’s good. Keating: Now, I presume you’re interested in knowing what the Foreign Minister is going to say to you. And I can only guess, but I have talked— Nixon: What does he want? Does he want to talk about—I suppose he wants to talk about Pakistan. Keating: Yes, that’s it. Because— Nixon: What do they want US to do? Keating: Well this— Nixon: Break up Pakistan? Keating: No. No. In the beginning they were, just as we were, for a single Pakistan after that election, because this sheik, Mujibur Rahman, was Pro-Indian and Pro-American. He was—they envisioned a different picture in that they were going to be friends with Pakistan. And then when the army walked in and knocked out the elections of course they were upset. There were two reasons they were upset. That was one. The other was that there are Bengalis on both sides of the border and they have family ties and all that. Now I went to see him to tell him about the aid we’re to give him. And it’s greater now. And I think he’ll express his appreciation for that, he should. I believe he will. Nixon: What are we up to now? Keating: Seventeen and a half million. Kissinger: Yes. Keating: And— Nixon: The first one was two and a half million. Keating: Yes, it was two and a half million when I went in. Kissinger: The C–130s. Keating: And the C–130s. That’s all a new—we’re doing quite a little. And he should be, I believe will be grateful. He’s a very nice fellow; I don’t know that you’ve met him. Nixon: No. Keating: Very kind fellow. Now, beyond that, he will say, as he did to me: “This aid is great. We appreciate it very much.” But he said the basic problem is to try to get these refugees back into Pakistan. We cannot stand this drain on India, which, if it lasted for a year with the present numbers would cost $400 million— Nixon: What is it, 300,000? Kissinger: No, it’s about— Keating: Five million. And add that it’s in a crowded part of India. Nixon: Sorry, it was 300,000 we were feeding. Keating: That’s right. That’s correct. About five million, and of that about three of them— Nixon: Why don’t they shoot them? Keating: About three of them are in Calcutta. Calcutta is the size of New York. It’d be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta is in much worse shape than New York. Not too much, but it’s worse. And it’s a horrible problem. Now, he said they’re still coming at that time at 100,000 a day—the latest I heard was 150,000 a day—because they’re killing the Hindus. And the thing that, in the beginning, these refugees were about in the proportion to the population—85 percent Muslim, 15 percent Hindus. Because when they started the killing it was indiscriminate. Now, having gotten control of the large centers, it is almost entirely a matter of genocide killing the Hindus. And the intellectual leaders, the leaders in the country that they want to get rid of, primarily these Awami League people, they’ve killed them. They’ve outlawed the Awami League that got 98 percent of the polls, elected 167 out of the 169 members of Parliament. And they arrested him as a traitor, Mujib, and they have outlawed the Awami League. Now what he is going to plead for, I have heard that even since I have left, they have come to the conclusion that because of this horrible refugee problem, this is since I’ve talked to you, they are for a political settlement of any kind in East Pakistan which will get the people back. Now the Hindus, I don’t think, will go back. But a lot of the Muslims would go back if there was some kind of a political settlement. And I think he will probably urge a political settlement there. The thing that—two things: he wants to stop the refugees coming, which means stop the killing. And two, get the refugees flowing the other way back into Pakistan. Nixon: What does he think, Ken, we should do? What would we recommend? Keating: He thinks—I think he thinks— Nixon: We should pressure Yahya? Keating: Yes. I think he feels that—what he said is Russia and the United States are the only ones that can influence Yahya to stop the killing. And he said in my judgment the United States has more leverage with him than Russia has. And the only way is an economic way. Of course, I understand that there’s no plan to just go on as business as usual in economics. After this consortium meeting, the Bank and the—this informal meeting that takes place next week—the [World] Bank and the International Monetary Fund sent this Peter Cargill [Director of the South Asia Division of the World Bank] up there. And he is going to make a report to them on what he has found and what he feels should be done. And the next thing they’re going to consider it back here and take it up at that time. No commitments, I believe, are going to be made at this Paris meeting. But I suspect he will find that the situation in East Pakistan, which Yahya says is normal, or practically normal, is far from normal and won’t be normal in a year. And what the political settlement is that he can bring about, that I’m not able to get in my head because this Amin was the biggest leader next to Mujib, he got one or two members of Parliament, and they tried to get, Yahya tried to get him to head it up and he wouldn’t touch it because he’d get his throat slit. Now they had a few, I’m told, a few members of the Awami League, about nine, who are ready to help form a government. But the bitterness is so great that I believe, and indeed Joe Farland does, that the old Pakistan is through. There will be—they cannot catch this together. Joe has said that in his cable, and I feel it very strongly. And there’s got to be a new pressure. Now, I am conscious of the special relationship that you have with Yahya. And I respect it and I don’t to want to— Nixon: [unclear] Keating: Personal relationship. Nixon: Not only just that, but there are some other major considerations. Keating: Well— Nixon: Well, let me say this, when do we see Singh? Tomorrow? Kissinger: Thursday, Mr. President. Nixon: Thursday, fine. [Thursday was June 17. The meeting took place on June 16.] Keating: There has been some suggestion that it will be possible for you to, I don’t think this has come to you yet, but it’s something we’ve talked about in the Department— Nixon: Yeah. Keating: It will be so long before aid to Pakistan, in the way of developmental aid, will be possible that a diversion, a certain amount of that, to help India with its refugee problem. It might be possible for you to suggest that to him in this meeting. That paper I don’t know whether that’s reached you yet or not. But— Kissinger: No, no. I know about the—Connally told me about it. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: That’s a scheme they thought up of taking $25 million out of— Nixon: The Pakistan aid— Kissinger: The Pakistan AID and give it to India. Nixon: I think we just better find the money to give to India. Keating: I don’t think any, I don’t think any—I think they had about $80 million for Pakistan. And it will be some time before they— Kissinger: Well they want to take—there’s $70 million for Pakistan—well, there are two issues here. One is whether they could use it, whether the Pakistanis could use it if we gave it to them. The second is how Pakistan will react if we take money from their budget for India. [Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia] Nixon: Let me say this, I don’t want to give you the wrong impression about India. There are 400 million Indians. Keating: 550. Nixon: 550? [unclear] Keating: There are. Nixon: I don’t know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country but they do. But nevertheless, I know that country is trying to make it [unclear] basically with some semblance of democracy—private enterprise, call it whatever you want. And I know that looming over from the north are the Chinese [unclear]. It’s, therefore, very much in our interest to see that India, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we want them to do well. And they always hate US [unclear]internationally, we know that. Keating: Not always. Nixon: Not always. But that’s irrelevant. I mean [unclear] but what I’m getting at is here, right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly game with the Indians. Particularly in view of the fact that the Government is more stable, that is good, and you can take a more rational line on things like Kashmir. But the other thing is that, I think we have to realize too, that it would not be in our interest, maybe there is going to be a Pakistan collapse, depends on what happens in the next 6 months. It may never be in our interest. But it certainly is not now for reasons we can’t go into. Under those circumstances, what we have to do, Ken, is to find a way to be just as generous as we can to the Indians, but also we do not want to do something that is an open breech with Yahya—an open breech, an embarrassing situation. And that’s really the problem. You can reassure Mrs. Gandhi, [unclear] we want to help here in every way we can [unclear]. Keating: Yes. Nixon: And let me say, the openness as far as the Congress is concerned, there really isn’t anything in it. [unclear] Not one goddamn bit. It’s not a popular country in this Congress. Keating: No, I know that. I served there. I know that. Nixon: But that is even less popular today because foreign aid is less popular. Keating: That’s right. Nixon: But nevertheless— Keating: But in the Congress there’s a strong feeling on this Pakistan—India— Nixon: I understand that, I understand that. [unclear] Hell, they had us involved in a civil war in Biafra, and now they want us out of Pakistan. But nevertheless, we’ve got to take up here for reasons that go far beyond India-Pakistan relations another position. So we will be very, very conciliatory with the Foreign Minister. But we must not do it in a way, I hope our Embassy has our position on this [unclear] refugees in both Pakistan and India wherever they are. But, on the other hand, not to allow the refugee problem to get us involved in the internal political problems. You see that’s our policy too. He might, if he asks me about it [unclear]. Keating: And we also must avoid—if possible—any conflict, armed conflict, between the two. Nixon: Oh, God. Keating: And the Indians, they’re pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard, and Parliament is now in session, the politicians are— Nixon: Yeah. Keating: And up to date I must say she’s been a [unclear]. They’re pressing her very hard that we can’t stand this refugee thing. We’ll just go in and take a little piece out of Pakistan where you can put these refugees. We can’t hold them here, so that means war. And he will probably bring that up. [Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia. Nixon and Kissinger continued their discussion after Keating left.] Nixon: I don’t know what the Christ we are up to. Kissinger: The most insulting way we can— Nixon: You have to go now? Kissinger: I have an appointment with Rush but he can wait. Nixon: [unclear] My God, does Farland, is he sending memoranda that he thinks Pakistan is finished also? Kissinger: Baloney. He’s got this maniac in Dacca, the Consul General who is in rebellion; the point is, Mr. President, first of all, I’ve talked to the Indian Ambassador as I’ve said to you, I said you want to have a direct communication through him with Mrs. Gandhi. That we need 3 or 4 months to work it out. We will find them some money, we will gradually move into a position to be helpful, but we’ve got to do it our way. Just to shut them up. Nixon: Right. Right. You told him that? Kissinger: I told him all of that. Nixon: We don’t tell the Foreign Minister that? Kissinger: No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that above all. But in front of Keating he’ll blab it all over. Yeah, I’d say we have great sympathy, but they must be restrained. And we’ll try to find some money but we cannot take it out of the Pakistan budget. Nixon: Well the Ambassador will tell the Foreign Minister that. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: But Keating will go blab it over to the State Department. What Keating had [unclear] Pakistan—they’re out of their goddamn minds. Of course we’re not going to take it out. That would bring down the Pakistan Government. Kissinger: Well it would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole deal would be off. Nixon: I don’t know what the Christ he’s talking about. Kissinger: I will, when I’m talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channel so that we’re not so vulnerable. I mean we can’t be that— Nixon: Of course, I don’t know, Henry, it just may be that the poor son-of-a-bitch can’t survive. Five million? Is it that bad really or are they exaggerating? Kissinger: Of course, I don’t know how many of them they generate? Nixon: Yeah. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Keating, Oval Office, Conversation No. 521–13. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58–3:41 p.m. Kissinger: Now on the Indian who’s waiting; the basic problem is to give him a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home with—to Mrs. Gandhi and— Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger:—and great firmness. Now I have, in addition to what you will say, but with Sisco there you won’t have much of a chance to. I’ve told Yahya that he had a personal channel through me to you. I’m just trying to keep them [the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you are directing, that $60 million be made available for refugee support after July 1. Nixon: Do they know that yet? Kissinger: No. This is why it would be very helpful. Nixon: Does Sisco know? Kissinger: No, but it’s based on a recommendation from the State Department. Nixon: That’s all right. Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. They’ll be delighted. Nixon: Fifty thousand? Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 million from other programs this month. Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan. I stopped that. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia and pay it back to them after July 1st. But if you could give those two figures, then you’ll get the credit for it and— Nixon: And that we are concerned. Kissinger: Well, he’ll have a story. And that we cannot—that you think that overt pressure on Pakistan would have a counter-productive effect, and that you are working with Yahya in your own way. It’s a little duplicitous, but these bastards understand that. Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with Keating. I think he’s just gone overboard. Now I must say maybe there’s a hell of a problem on which the TV is starting to pick it up now. Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem. [Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: I don’t want to see [unclear, them start war?] just now. Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from Pakistan. Nixon: I know, but I don’t want to see it more. You see? I just, they’re wasting my time. I just [unclear]. Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them from attacking for our own reasons. [Pleasantries were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Ambassadors Jha and Keating, and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco entered the Oval Office. The White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.] Singh: Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. She greatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear]conveyed in that and she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear]. Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by her great political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that she needs now. It’s much, much better to look after a very successful election like that. [unclear] There’s a lot more to this. She has more confidence than previously. Singh: Yes [unclear]— Nixon: Things are going well from what Ambassador Keating tells me. Singh: Yes, she has always had confidence, but now she also has strength to— Nixon: That’s right. Singh:—put them on [unclear]— Nixon: Oh, I know. I know. Singh: And, in fact, she was looking for a period when, as a result of this victory— Nixon: Yeah. Singh:—she’d have both peace and opportunity to implement the socio-economic content of the program on the basis of which she won. Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh: But suddenly she’s confronted with a— Nixon: Yeah. Singh:—type of situation not of her making. Nixon: Oh. Yes. Singh: Not to place blame here... Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh:... [unclear] being subjected at this present moment. Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh: [unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, the latest situation, as the present one has no [unclear]and we are coming and that every second [unclear, refugees they come?] Nixon: Every second? Singh: Every second. So this is the type of situation that we face. And this has caused a tremendous problem to us, because they come in an area that traditionally is very dependent, both politically and economically. Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee? Singh: Thank you very much. Nixon: [aside] Ken? Singh: I’m all right. Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some tea perhaps, please. Thank you. Singh: [unclear] Nixon: No, I can’t. Singh: Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people are ready to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the [unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have created. [unclear] We’ve reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that we seek your advice how we should achieve that objective. But perhaps most important thing in that situation [unclear] will use this movement of refugees which always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear [unclear, signal?]. We [unclear] the objective will be [unclear]. In this situation where we [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel it’s their own problem. It ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension [unclear]. And it’s the best end right now that we’ve got. Support for this approach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believe that if the building of the [unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds. [unclear]can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear]. Nixon: Hmmm. Singh: And secondly, then, the condition that they are to be restored should enable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we must perhaps create this. [unclear] And for this, obviously some political settlement is needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime Minister you are engaged in this task in your quiet manner and tried to impress on them what you have done. We believe that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actions of trying to solve a situation [unclear]. Apparently those people who have now demonstrated [unclear] that they enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear]. In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situation in which [unclear]. Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think is the benefit of [unclear] being able to—East Pakistan will to have to become independent, or what happens in the long run? This does not mean that your personal view, I know—that’s not what I meant. How do you see the historical process working down there? Singh: I have a feeling, Mr. President, that showing, telling the United Nations that there’s a very good chance of saving Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear] maintain central authority in an area of confrontation of the [unclear] can they handle central authority? Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: [unclear] There’s a very good chance to have. Even the course of the negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear]more than contained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] without direction of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it could be saved. The Council has become most angered because they [unclear]. The confidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan can still bring back the country themselves, those for the present moment who find themselves in the [unclear]. Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: [unclear] Then it appears that they’re pushing them more and more into the point of, the position of the point of no return. And it appears [unclear]. They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; it’s developed between the central authority of Pakistan and the leaders. So that [unclear] anything that we want to. They do not realize that from our point of view is when they separate from [unclear]. But we are bothered by the continuance of conditions of instability. Continuation of the conditions there you will find [unclear]; continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almost united will of [unclear] people. [unclear] We’ll do that to maintain control of the situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear]from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even from your point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to that. That your country and ours, we can work together, work in a [unclear] manner. To that extent [unclear] stability, so much in common. We should not. Nixon: You don’t, you don’t have a feeling that the situation would be to your interest to have a, to have an independent country? What would be in India’s best interest? To have it independent or under the central government, for example—? Singh: No, we have—we have no fixed position on that. Nixon: That’s up to them, isn’t it? Singh: On this matter we leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of the Awami League to decide about their future in any manner they like. We will not press one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it. We are interested in observing the neutrality in [unclear] considering the situation. Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: That being our fixed position. Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Singh: [unclear] silent spectators all [unclear] agreeing with what, to our arrangement to [unclear] the people and until then, it seems to me, there will be unstable conditions, at least. Nixon: Yes. Singh: And we are conscious of our responsibility and even when we were facing this big trouble in the end with these people when we [unclear] did our best. [unclear] All provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear] extra-constitutional means. [unclear] Nixon: Sure. First let me say that we, that you couldn’t have a man more [unclear] in so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your own Ambassador here. He’s talked to our people and he’s a very persuasive man and has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he has—we have great respect for him. And on our part we couldn’t have a person who is more vigorous in presenting this point of view which you have described. Of course, you would describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can in your position. It’s obvious that Ambassador Keating, of course you know an old friend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talk yesterday. We went over all these matters. Singh: [unclear] Nixon: He is, he is just—he is concerned as your Ambassador, and of course we’re aware of this. So I am keenly aware of the problem. I’m aware, too, of the enormous agony that must be caused—I have not been, Rogers has been only once. [unclear] I have not been to Dacca, but I know that part of the subcontinent, that the problems of poverty are serious, very serious. And added to it is this instability. However simple their homes may be, they are their homes. And pouring into an already overcrowded city. This must be a terrible agony for a country to go through. We’re aware of this thing. Also imposed upon your country, big as it is, 600 million people. Nevertheless, five million people is a lot of people, because ... Singh: We count six, Mr. President. Nixon: Six million. Yeah, that’s right. [unclear exchange] Nixon: One every second, that’s 60 every minute. Singh: [unclear]? Nixon: [unclear] That’s over 600 an hour. Singh: [unclear] Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, the—I am sure you realize, too, that what we can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. We have the deepest sympathy and we will try to do as much as we can. We don’t want to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what we want, you know. Naturally, our—with regard to the Government of Pakistan, we of course have our contacts with them, our relations with them, with the President, of course. It’s terrible. The question is how we can discuss this matter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring about action that would lead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, or—and avoiding [unclear, the woodshed?] might set up, as often is the case when such things are done too publicly, which would set up an antagonistic attitude. I’m not speaking personally from the standpoint of those who would look for something to be antagonistic about. That might just upset it all. We, I would like to say this: that we, I think that under best course of action—I’d like to talk first of all what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do with the meeting situation—the best course of action we think as a Government is for us to, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to the Prime Minister, on a completely off-the-record basis. Discussions that are publicly talked about would have exactly the opposite effect on that. You’ve got to, you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of the problem. I am deeply concerned about the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I am concerned about it for its foreign policy implications, for all this could erupt into some armed conflict. We know that. Now—therefore, we, I will use all the persuasive methods that I can, but I must use them in the way that I think is the most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a way that any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so forth. But I am aware of the problem, I shall try to use my influence as effectively as possible at least if effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. And I [unclear] such and such is, had been. Not only has our concern been expressed but that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we have that we have to do it this way. And that has to be answered. The second thing is, of course, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds; the Ambassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have an immediate problem between now and July 1st, and it’s just for here [unclear, ’til then?] And, but on the other hand, but because, you know, we’ve run out of money because it’s all been spent with only 15 days left. On the other hand we have out of other aid programs that won’t need any [unclear] because that would cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire $20 million that we will, we will find immediately available. And then in addition to that, on the July, on July 1st, we will be able to apply $50 million, so which will give you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aid problem. We’d give you more, but that’s, that’s as much as we can find. You see, we have to take from various other commitments that have been made. So you get $20 million between now and the first of July, $50 million more on the first of July or just as soon as the fiscal year begins. Keating: Yes. Nixon: And that your Government can count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking, or is the 20—? Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece together the $20 million, Mr. President, out of other programs. Nixon: Right. The point is we’ll find the $20 million. You can count on it. The $50 million— Kissinger: That’s right. Sisco: We’ve got that. Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your supplemental appropriations Nixon: Right. And we’ve got to look down towards that, but on the other hand, I’m aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six million people. For how long? Not long. It’ll help. On the other hand, I realize that that does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do we stop this inflow of people? How—maybe you’d start having them turn around, start outflowing them. That’s what we’re getting at. I think you, you first, you brought it to my attention when you met me. The Prime Minister and you heard this conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador Keating. All brought it to my attention and I’m convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I will try to find the methods that I think will be effective. I think it will protect [unclear] can’t do that. [unclear] effective. There may be other ways for this to be effective. But I think we have to, I think it must not be in a way that appears that we’re, that what has happened here is that the United States is inserting itself into basically an internal situation in an open way. That is we have to—we can be most effective by persuading the parties involved to come to a decision of theirs rather than one that’s imposed upon them. That’s at least my [unclear, instinct?] telling the individual players and so forth. That’s the way I see it at this time. And we will—the results will tell us whether we’re right or not. And also after trying that method for a while we’ll have to see the situation, but in the meantime, I think, and to the extent that we can, to keep as cool as possible, in terms of charges and counter-charges and all that sort of thing. We’ll—You can count on our financial assistance to the extent that we are able. And this—we will find this money. [unclear] Second, you will have the, on other side which is far more [unclear, important?] the governmental side. Let us, if you will, let us do that in our way, in the way we think will be more effective. That’s the way I would like to do it. You’re, do you approve or do you think there’s a better way to do it? Singh: We greatly appreciate your sentiment and [unclear] in coming to a concrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an international responsibility. [unclear] We appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourself mentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to stop it, and how to create conditions [unclear]. Nixon: This is the fundamental question now. Singh: This is the fundamental question. [unclear] Nixon: I know. I am aware of that. I am aware of the, I am aware of the fact that the funds, while essential, [deal] with a temporary problem do not handle—I am not suggesting at all, or have any illusions, that if we found $700 million to put into this thing that would simply buy the problem away. The problem is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I am aware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem as you well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly sensitive to how people feel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments may feel about this, how they react. One way the public pressure, another way the private, shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the most effective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well. Singh: That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into two parts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear]. France has agreed to make a statement to that effect. [unclear] in Moscow. And also the necessity of their returning. I agree that that’s a question to how [unclear]. We know what is actually happening. [unclear] Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis. I don’t think anything, however, certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United States putting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want to accomplish our goal. On the other hand, something might be, something might very well be accomplished in other directions. I am aware of that. I would like to try it this way. We will, you can be sure that we’re as totally concerned about it as we can be, not being there. Incidentally, how much did the Germans provide? How much are they providing? Singh: The German money, I honestly— Nixon: How about the French? Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I think the Germans are somewhere around two million, and the French are something a little less than that. Nixon: That’s not enough. Sisco: That’s not enough. Nixon: All right, that’s not enough. The French and Germans have just as great an interest as we have. Here they are making all sorts of big statements and doing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans and their colleagues formally, that clear? The same with the low countries that talk big and don’t help much. I have no sympathy for them. [unclear] made a statement when he was here. The Germans can afford—if we can afford $70 million, the Germans can afford 10, easy—or 15. Kissinger: We’ve already given 17.5. Nixon: That’s right. We’ll, we’ve put in 100 so the Germans should put in 25. That’s the way it ought to be. Because you know, we don’t believe in this office of talking big and doing little. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Singh, Kissinger, and Sisco, Oval Office, Conversation No. 523–2. No classification marking. Ambassadors Keating and Jha were also present. 139. Memorandum of Conversation 139. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New Delhi, July 7, 1971 PARTICIPANTS: Jagjivan Ram, Defense Minister of India K.B. Lail, Defense Secretary Mrs. Rukmini Mvlenon, Chief of Americas Division, Ministry of External Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to India Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by saying he appreciated the opportunity to talk with the Minister. Attempting to divert conversation from the arms shipments to Pakistan, he said that he had talked about immediate problems with the Foreign Minister and would like to ask the Defense Minister a more general question. He then asked how the Minister assessed the Chinese Communist military threat to India. The Minister said that he saw no change in the military balance between India and China. The Chinese have their concentrations of troops at some points and their military exercises. Indian preparedness continues the same as it has been. The Minister said that the Chinese Communists had been training Mizos in East Bengal for commando work on the Northeast Frontier, perhaps 1,000–1,200. Generally, however, the Chinese threat continued the same. They have not increased their forces during the present conflict in East Pakistan. Mr. Lall said that the Chinese had gradually improved their communications, their bunkers and their airports. There are about 100,000 Chinese troops on India’s northern border. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Chinese could fight without reinforcing their troops there, or would the requirement for reinforcement give India advanced warning that the Chinese were preparing some sort of an attack? Mr. Lall felt that India would know because the Chinese would have to build up their supplies there. Dr. Kissinger asked what had happened in 1962. Mr. Lall replied that India was not prepared and that its information was bad. Dr. Kissinger asked how many months it would take the Chinese to build up their supplies to the necessary level. Mr. Lall said 2–3 months. Dr. Kissinger said that the US had made studies in Europe to try to determine what sort of buildup the Communist forces would need before an attack. The Defense Minister said that India had made similar studies. Dr. Kissinger asked whether it was the Indian conclusion that a surprise attack would be difficult. The Minister said that this is true, even from Tibet. Mr. Lall said that, nevertheless, there is a great deal of talk and natural apprehension about what the Chinese might do. He asked Dr. Kissinger whether he thought the Chinese would do anything without some provocation. Dr. Kissinger responded that this seemed unlikely. It was possible, however, that the Chinese would intervene if there were a war with Pakistan. Mr. Lall asked what would be the justification for such an attack. India is not going to go to war with Pakistan. Ambassador Keating said that the Chinese had said they would support Pakistan in a war. Dr. Kissinger said that the US would take a grave view of any Chinese move against India. Dr. Kissinger said that the Chinese have been cautious in their military moves although they have been tough in their talk. The US effort is to promote tranquility and peace. The discussion then turned to the current misunderstanding between the US and India. Mr. Lall said that “our quarrels are like lovers quarrels.” The Defense Minister said that the problems sometimes transcended present disagreements. Dr. Kissinger said that he had been scolded by everyone. Mr. Lall said that the US has persistently said its interest is in a strong and stable India. Now India is under great strain. Dr. Kissinger asked what the Indian problem is on the West. He said he knew what it is on the East. The Minister said there is constant tension on the Western border. Any accretion of military hardware creates difficulties for India. Bangla Desh should be seen in the wider perspective of peace and stability. The US has to judge whether Pakistan can retain Bangla Desh. Will it be in the US interest for Pakistan to stay together? Dr. Kissinger replied that the US is considering that question. “What can the US do?” he asked. The Minister said that the US could do a lot. All of Pakistan has been sustained by the US. He asked whether Dr. Kissinger agreed. Dr. Kissinger replied, “Partially.” The Minister said, “Look at your support for building the army of Pakistan.” The refugee problem is bad enough as an immediate problem. If the people think they are going to stay here in India, then it becomes a problem of great social concern. But even ignoring that, a solution of the Bangla Desh problem has to be found. The Minister said that Pakistan ought to have another election. “I would not mind that.” He said he knew the Bangla Desh leaders from partition days. He said he felt he knew what was going on in Bangla Desh. If Pakistan does not get massive outside aid, he did not feel they could survive. Dr. Kissinger said Pakistan is not now getting “massive aid.” The Minister replied that Pakistan is counting on receiving such aid. Dr. Kissinger said that US policy is to try to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and to have some influence on developments. Mr. Lall said that what is not clear to the Pakistanis is that US policy is directed at encouraging a change in the situation. The Pakistanis do not seem to understand that they cannot go on maintaining a country with an army drawn from six or eight different districts. Dr. Kissinger said that the US is not in favor of secession. We are in favor of a political solution. We don’t want to mislead India. What we want is a situation that will permit the refugees to return. The US has no fixed view on what a solution should be. The Defense Minister said that he understands the situation in East Bengal. The Punjabis do not regard the Bengalis as of the same stock. The Punjabi rulers have not put faith in the Bengalis. Now, there is not even a constabulary in East Pakistan. The Minister continued that Mujibur Rahman never wanted secession. He was a moderating influence. The Indian problem, the Minister continued, is that there are now nearly 7 million refugees in India. All India has stood for is at stake. He said that, without a solution, he feared that the basic principle on which India is based would be in jeopardy. Dr. Kissinger asked how the Minister felt a solution could come about. He said that the Minister seemed to think that the US should produce one, as if the US did not have enough problems of its own! The Minister said that the US could tell President Yahya that he will have to find a solution that responds to the will of the people in East Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger said that he has now seen the intensity of Indian feeling. The actions of the US are not directed toward the balance between India and Pakistan. A strong and stable India is a basic US national interest. The desire of the US is to preserve influence in Pakistan. Our hope is to use that influence to encourage a settlement that will permit the refugees to return. If this policy is not successful, then we shall reexamine it. The Defense Minister described the great pressures on the Government of India. There is a question of national pride and there are political parties and the press pushing the Government to take some kind of action. Pakistan is complaining about Indian intrusions into East Pakistan. There are none. As a matter of fact, at Argatala, there is shelling from Pakistani territory. Dr. Kissinger asked how many Pakistani forces there are in East Pakistan, and the Minister replied that there are about 70,000. Mr. Lall said that there are 4 plus divisions. They are supplied by sea. Dr. Kissinger asked how long they could fight in a major military confrontation. Mr. Lall said, “Not very long.” The Minister said that the logistics problem for the Pakistani military forces is a real one. It would be difficult for them to continue fighting over a prolonged period. The Defense Minister said that India would like the US to retrain its influence in Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger said that the desire to do so explains most of the US actions in recent days. The Minister said that he hoped that the US would use its influence more aggressively than it had in the past. Mr. Lall said that he felt that the US had been using its influence in questionable ways. Mr. Kissinger replied that the amounts of military equipment that Pakistan had received of late were relatively insignificant, though we recognize that the Indian reaction resulted as much from strong emotion as from actual assessment of the impact on the military balance. He again explained the fact that there had been a loophole in US administrative procedures which the top echelons of the government had not been aware of. Mr. Lall said he recognized that nothing capable of offensive use was going to Pakistan, but it must not be ignored that the “bits and pieces” that were being shipped were sufficient to restore weapons to their full use. The Minister said the strong Indian feeling is not about the quantity and the type of equipment but about the intention of the US. Dr. Kissinger replied that we could not expect to quiet a whole nation. However, he felt that it was possible to make clear to the Minister that we did not believe there was any sense in trying to trick the Indian government. The US interest is to help bring about a solution that will permit the refugees to go back. There is no intention of creating a balance of power situation between India and Pakistan. The Defense Minister said he was glad that this is the understanding. If India is weakened, it would affect the stability of the entire world. Dr. Kissinger replied, “That is our profound conviction.” Dr. Kissinger continued that the only balance of power the US is concerned with is the global balance—and the problem of preventing an outside power from dominating South Asia. The local balance within South Asia is not an American concern. The difficult problem we now have between us as nations is to maintain that long-term perspective. Americans and Indians tend to talk with each other in this vein only when things get critical. Dr. Kissinger said that if the Minister came to the US he would certainly wish to see him. The Minister replied that he would reiterate the common objective which the US and India have in peace and stability and in a solution to the present problem that would contribute to those objectives. Dr. Kissinger replied that he would leave India with a new awareness of its problems. His visit had been a very meaningful experience for him. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on July 12. Published from an unsigned copy. The meeting was held in Ram’s office. Kissinger left Washington on July 2 for what was publicly described as a fact-finding trip to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The trip included secreta secret visit to China, undertaken during Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan, following his stop in India. He returned to Washington on July 11. 140. Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 133 140. Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 133 1 Washington, July 10, 1971 CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON SOUTH ASIA INTRODUCTION In the three and a half months since the Pakistan Army moved against the Bengalis the problems facing South Asia have increased in complexity and intractability. Although the Pakistan Army has reestablished general control over East Pakistan, military actions have not completely ceased against separatist elements and minority communities. Guerrilla activity, supported from sanctuaries in India, has developed. A massive flow of refugees engendered by the Pakistan Army’s activities has taken place. According to Indian sources over six million East Pakistanis, mostly Hindu, have sought refuge in India. To date only a few have returned to East Pakistan and those that remain in India pose a massive threat to the political and economic stability of the sensitive eastern regions of India and to peace in the Indian subcontinent. The situation in the last three months has moved from a level in which our interests were only secondarily involved to one that, because of the danger of war, could pose a direct threat to the bases of US policy in South Asia. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES The United States has no vital security interest in the South Asian subcontinent. However, as a global power we are inevitably concerned for the stability and well-being of an area in which one-fifth of mankind resides and which holds a geopolitically significant position between China and the Soviet Union. Our interest is that India and Pakistan succeed in their development efforts, maintain or create politically open societies and withstand political pressures which could lead to the dominance of an external power in the region. Peace is the essential precondition for the maintenance of our interests in South Asia. Hostilities could easily disrupt the economic, social, and political life of the subcontinent, and open the way for outside powers to extend their influence. If, despite our efforts, hostilities did break out it would be our objective to ensure that neither we nor any of the other principal external powers became directly involved. Within South Asia itself both India and Pakistan are important to U.S. interests. Our interests in India, however, are of greater significance. India, the world’s second—most populous country, with strong and stable political institutions, the fourth largest armed forces and ninth highest GNP, is a force in South Asian regional affairs and in the broader context of the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. India aspires to be one of Asia’s major powers in the next decade. Pakistan, although the world’s fifth most populous country, has neither the resources nor the ambition for such a role in world affairs. Its political and economic viability have been seriously weakened by recent developments. Overall, it has a much smaller capability for influencing US global interests. On the other hand, India’s internal problems could in time bring about a situation in which it also could exercise little external influence. In formulating US policy in the region the relative preeminence of our interests in India should be an underlying factor in decisions which we take. Given our interests in South Asia and recognizing that over the long-term the prospects for the continued viability of Pakistan as a united country are doubtful, US objectives have been to maintain a constructively close relationship with India and reasonable relations with Pakistan avoiding any steps which would mortgage excessively our as yet undefined future relationship with East Pakistan. I. Present Strategy Within the overall context of our efforts to pursue constructive bilateral relations with India and Pakistan and in the face of the crisis which has arisen in East Pakistan since March 25 which threatens the peace and stability of South Asia our policy has had three major ingredients: 1. Restraint : Because of the possibility that the situation in East Pakistan and eastern India could escalate dangerously we have counseled restraint on both sides. 2. International Relief : Because of the enormous human problems which have been created in the area we have supported international efforts to provide humanitarian relief assistance to the refugees from East Pakistan in India and to the peoples of East Pakistan who have been affected by civil strife. 3. Political Accommodation : We have emphasized that normalcy can be restored in East Pakistan only within the context of a peaceful political acccmmodation. Such an accommodation is also important in order to create conditions for the return of the refugees in India. In addition to these steps and in order to maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan we have taken several important policy decisions. 1. Economic Assistance : We have decided to attempt to keep our economic assistance to Pakistan separate from political pressure on the Government of Pakistan and have indicated that future assistance would be conditioned primarily on developmental and legislative criteria. 2. Military Assistance : We have since early April (a) put a hold on delivery of Foreign Military Sales items from Department of Defense stocks, (b) instructed the Office of Munitions Control to suspend the issuance of new licenses and the renewal of expired licenses for items on the Munitions List under either FMS or commercial sales, (c) held in abeyance any action on the one time exception arms supply offer announced last October. In addition we have suspended valid licenses issued before March 25 and have not to date stopped shipments of items purchased under these licenses, the total value of which may exceed $25 million. II. Limitations on Present Strategy The three major strands of our policy have met our immediate requirements but they have not provided the basis for a viable long-term resolution of the crisis. India has exercised restraint but the refugee problem, which could be exacerbated by a second wave of refugees later this year fleeing famine conditions in East Pakistan, remains unresolved. International relief assistance has begun to reach the refugees. But the total annual cost, according to the Government of India, of supporting over six million refugees is in excess of $600 million. International contributions have not met even half of this amount. On the Pakistan side, relief and rehabilitation efforts have only begun to get under way. A viable political accommodation with the elected representatives of East Pakistan appears to be only a remote possibility, as President Yahya seems unwilling or unable to negotiate with the Awami League or its leadership. The longer term prognosis is thus uncertain. The ability of the military and civilian authorities in East Pakistan to revive the economy and prevent famine, even with substantial international help, is in serious question. Many refugees may not return and may pose a virtually permanent burden on India; insurgency may gather momentum under Indian guidance and support; viable political accommodation may not be achieved, and American influence in both Islamabad and New Delhi could continue to decline. Although our military supply and economic assistance policies toward Pakistan have succeeded to a degree in maintaining a constructive relationship with Pakistan, they have not resolved the basic underlying political and economic problems. Our decision not to impose a total embargo on shipment of arms has been generally well received in Pakistan. However, when these shipments are completed, pressures to remove our hold on DOD deliveries and the one-time exception will build up. Insistence on developmental criteria for aid has halted new commitments to Pakistan. Given the disruption of the East Pakistan economy, it is unlikely that normal developmental criteria can easily be met soon. On the Indian side, our failure to embargo arms shipments to Pakistan has resulted in bitter criticism of US motives and policies, and has affected our efforts to promote a constructive relationship with India. A resumption of aid or military supply to Pakistan would have a seriously adverse affect in our relations with India. Thus the dilemma which we face is that existing policies will only maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan for a limited period. In the interim our relations with India suffer and our credibility and influence in New Delhi decline. Aid to Pakistan sufficient to restore or maintain our influence would, on the other hand, be seen in India as an endorsement of the repressive policies of the martial law regime, and not as an instrument for future US influence in Islamabad. Under these circumstances, if we are to help preserve the peace in South Asia, to avoid enhanced Chinese and Soviet influence and to support the political and economic development of the area, additional efforts will be required. The following sections review the basic elements of our policy and indicate the steps which we might take to build upon the policies which have been followed since March 25 and to use our limited influence in support of our basic interests. III. Additional Steps . A. Restraint . In the emotionally-charged atmosphere prevailing in the subcontinent after March 25, even though we have counseled restraint, the dangers of war have continued. The two most likely scenarious for escalation assume that (a) India may take unilateral military action designed to bring about political change in East Pakistan which will in turn act to stop the further flow of refugees into India, and (b) that Pakistan will take action against Indian cross-border activities. We have urged restraint and forbearance on both governments through letters from the President to Prime Minister Gandhi and President Yahya, in private discussions with the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors here, and in discussions with the respective governments. These demarches have contributed to some extent to the restraint being exercised on both sides, but tensions continue at a dangerous level. In India cross-border support for separatist guerilla activity continues although it has not reached major proportions, in part because of a lack of Bengali capabilities. The Prime Minister has appealed against political pressures designed to force the Indian government into precipitous action against Pakistan, most recently in a meeting with members of her own party on June 29. Our counsel has reinforced the advice against war which she has received from her military advisors. On the other hand, our intelligence indicates continued contingency planning for an attack against East Pakistan and growing internal pressures for forceful Indian action. Our counsels of restraint in Pakistan have been less successful. Although military action against Hindus has declined, it has not ceased and communal tensions have not been checked. The flow of refugees has been greatly reduced from its high point in excess of 100,000 per day, but it has continued at a rate in excess of 30,000 per day in recent weeks. Nonetheless, Pakistan has responded less sharply than might have been anticipated to Indian cross border activities and has been more forthcoming on questions of admitting a UN presence for refugee rehabilitation. Additional Steps : Our efforts to achieve restraint will need to be continued either as long as conditions in East Pakistan do not return to normal, there is no political accommodation, and the refugees do not return, or until the Indians accept the permanent resettlement in India of most of the refugees. The use of both diplomatic channels and public statements will be needed. Specific actions which we might take include: 1) Public speech or statement by either the Secretary of State or the President outlining US policy towards South Asia. It would include a public call to India and Pakistan and if necessary other external powers to exercise restraint while efforts to deal with the refugee problem and achieve a political solution are being worked out. We would also plan to use such a statement to express for the first time at a high level our humanitarian concern over the East Pakistan refugee situation, and to renew our commitment to humanitarian relief under UN auspices on both sides of the border. Pro —would put the United States more clearly on record than in the past in opposition to conflict in South Asia. —might encourage other countries to join us in support of restraint and of relief and reconstruction efforts. —would demonstrate high level concern for the humanitarian aspects of the situation. Con —would be resented in India, as have past demarches and statements, as an unjust equating of India and Pakistan. —would have only a limited impact on Indian and Pakistani policy makers. —reference to external powers could irritate Peking which has in fact exercised considerable restraint. 2) Consultations with the Soviet Union . Since the single mast-likely cause of hostilities is an Indian attack designed to put an Awami League Government in power in Dacca and since the Soviet Union has both greater credibility and greater influence in New Delhi than the United States at the present time, we may wish to attempt to engage the support of the USSR in counseling restraint by India and Pakistan. Since the 1966 Tashkent Conference the Soviets have consistently identified themselves with peacekeeping efforts in South Asia although their efforts have been designed to support their greater interests in India. A high level approach to the Soviet Union urging its constructive cooperation with us in the maintenance of peace could be undertaken. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin raised the Pakistani crisis with the Secretary on March 26—asking about US plans—so we could easily take up a dialogue, underlining our own policy of restraint and expressing hope for a similar Soviet policy. We might indicate to the USSR that we would continue to counsel restraint in both capitals as well. We might also take this opportunity to seek Soviet acceptance of and support for a larger UN role and presence, not only in the coordination of relief efforts, but also in facilitating on both sides of the border the return of refugees to East Pakistan. Pro —If the Soviets were to act vigorously their action would probably be decisive in achieving Indian restraint. —would lay the basis for cooperation with the USSR in the event hostilities broke out. —would be a positive response to the Soviet discussion of March 26 indicating US willingness to cooperate in strengthening peace and in creating conditions for the return of the refugees. Con —The Soviets might be reluctant to offend the Indians and might see our approach as an effort to obtain their support for the Pakistanis and hence to weaken their influence in New Delhi. —could be seen in Peking and Islamabad as a collusive Soviet-American effort against them. 3) Discuss the Chinese Threat with the Indians . We have some intelligence indicating that the Chinese may have given a conditional undertaking to support Pakistan if India attacks Pakistan. We estimate that China will limit its support to increased military and economic assistance, although we cannot rule out the possibility that it might seek to create increased tension along the Sino-Indian frontier, perhaps by provoking border incidents. We have no indication of imminent Chinese military moves. We would probably not wish to share our assessment of the relatively restrained Chinese position with the Indians as that might convince them that they could engage in hostilities with little risk of Chinese intervention. If more direct evidence of Chinese military intentions were available we might wish to share it. We might, also, with the danger of escalation in mind, pass an alarmist assessment of Chinese intentions to the Indians, and in private and confidential discussions with the Indians indicate that they could not count on our support or on the automatic implementation of the 1964 Air Defense Agreement if China attacked as a result of an Indian attack on Pakistan. Pro —would indicate to the Indians the perils of an attack on Pakistan. —a sharing of intelligence would be seen as a positive collaborative action. Con —reference to the Air Defense Agreement would be seen as a threat by the United States, and would be bitterly resented in India. —if it became public could further undermine our bilateral relationship with India. —any alarmist assessment shared with the Indians would risk undermining our credibility in New Dehli which has independent means of making its awn intelligence assessment. 4) Seek to Encourage Chinese Restraint . The-Chinese in recent years have pursued a restrained policy towards South Asia and probably would be reluctant to involve themselves deeply on Pakistan’s side. If there appeared to be a change in Chinese policy we might, however, wish to discuss with the Canadians, the French or other third powers with missions in Peking, Islamabad and New Dehli the possibility of approaching the Chinese to urge than to act with caution in the present situation. If we made such an effort we might consider informing India of it in confidence. Pro —could lessen the danger of additional third country involvement in the sub-continent. —would be seen as a constructive effort favorable to India. Con —unlikely to be effective in influencing Chinese policy. —if the Chinese were responsive could, in fact, act as an encouragement to Indian military action against Pakistan. —pressure on the Chinese could have an adverse impact on our relations with Pakistan. 5) UN Involvement and Presence in Border Areas . The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has indicated a willingness and interest in placing UN personnel in refugee camps and resettlement centers on both sides of the border. While the primary purpose of such a presence would be to assess relief needs and facilitate refugee return, it might also have a deterrent effect on Indian cross-border activities and military intervention. We are encouraging and should continue to encourage the UNSYG and his representative the UNHCR to proceed with the latter proposal and to seek Indian, Pakistani and Soviet support for such a proposal. Pro —provides an additional measure of restraint on Indian activities. Con —By provoking Indian and/or Soviet opposition could endanger the UNHCR’s broader relief role in India. B. International Assistance . Because the refugee burden represents the most likely proximate cause for escalation, our efforts have concentrated on mitigating the burden which the refugees represent for India. To date we have offered grants of $70.5 million and a $20 million supplemental development loan. We have been instrumental in supporting the international relief effort of the UNSYG through his designated representative the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The more than six million refugees represent an increasing political and economic burden to India and are a serious destabilizing factor. There is no way in which we can directly address the political problem which the refugees pose for India. We can assist and have assisted in easing the economic burden but we should not exaggerate the effect of our aid which leaves untouched the social and political problems. This burden is likely to continue for a long time into the future as many of the refugees, particularly of the Hindus, who constitute perhaps three quarters of the total, may return to East Pakistan only in circumstances in which the government in power is one which they can trust. Such a government would have to be truly secular in outlook. On the Pakistan side we have also actively promoted an international relief effort, both to deal with the immediate relief needs in the area and also to facilitate the return of refugees. Within the framework of this international effort we have signed two $1 million grant agreements to enable the Government of Pakistan to charter foreign vessels to deliver food grains and other essential relief supplies to the cyclone affected areas in East Pakistan and other places where serious food shortages now threaten. Additional steps on which we should focus include (a) the creation of conditions conducive to the refugees’ return, (b) contingency planning for the permanent resettlement of at least some refugees, and (c) the encouragement of a more extensive UN role on both sides of the border. 1) Conditions in Pakistan Conducive to Refugee Return . We have tried to impress on President Yahya the need to create conditions conducive to the refugees’ return. He has responded by indicating publicly his government’s willingness to see the return of all refugees irrespective of religion. He has established reception centers to receive returning refugees and facilitate their return home. Nonetheless, we have intelligence reports that suggest these public statements are designed for international consumption while some action against the Hindus continues. Specific programs have not yet been articulated to assure the refugees that they will in fact get their homes and property back, that they will receive relief until they can reestablish themselves or that they will be compensated for damages caused by the Pakistan Army. Moreover, the threat of famine, continued disruption of transportation and basic government services, and a minimal level of economic activity, persist throughout the province. Only as the conditions in general improve will there be a chance for specific measures to encourage refugee return to be effective. We should therefore persist with our efforts to get the Government of Pakistan to take measures to deal with the basic human problems of the population remaining in East Pakistan, and the creation of an effective international humanitarian program to support those measures. It is not at all clear haw long it will be before some semblance of normal economic life returns. Meanwhile, we should suggest to the Government of Pakistan, and have the UNHCR encourage, various additional steps which need to be taken to facilitate the return of refugees. Specifically these steps should include a program of (a) guarantees of personal security, (b) restoration of or compensation for real and personal property, (c) resettlement allowances, (d) housing reconstruction, (e) food and general relief assistance. Support for such measures could be included in the scope of our humanitarian aid for East Pakistan through the UN. We would keep the Indians fully informed of our efforts. Pro —would be a positive step in encouraging the return of those refugees who are willing to go back without regard to the terms of political settlement. —would encourage the Indians to continue their policy of restraint by holding out hope for a substantial refugee return. Con —would possibly be seen as an overly intrusive attempt to influence Pakistani internal decisions. —could be seen in India as an indication that the international community did not intend to intervene to achieve political accommodation in East Pakistan. It might therefore reinforce the arguments of those in India who argue that India must take unilateral action. 2) Conditions in India Conducive to Return . While the primary problem connected with refugee repatriation is in Pakistan, there are also additional steps which need to be taken in India. At present the Indians are reluctant to agree to an international presence in the refugee camps to facilitate refugee return. They also seem to be taking the position that the refugees should not be encouraged to return unless a friendly government is in power in Dacca. This position takes into account domestic political pressures and the fact that they cannot afford to urge the refugees to return if there is any remaining threat to their lives and security. Finally Indian support for Bengali cross-border operations contributes to the general sense of fear and insecurity in East Pakistan. We should raise these issues with the Indians urging than (a) to agree to a UN presence in the camps, (b) to be flexible in setting political conditions on repatriation, and (c) to curtail their support for cross-border operations. Pro —would, if followed, somewhat enhance on the Indian side the likelihood that the refugees would return. —might make political accomodation easier. Con —would in the present climate in Indo-US relations be resented. —even if agreed to might only marginally increase the chances of a substantial refugee return. 3) Permanent Resettlement Planning . From all evidence available to us a substantial portion of the Hindu refugees may never wish to return to East Pakistan. At present the Government of India is not prepared to consider permanent resettlement which would be an enormously complex and expensive proposition and would imply that political accommodation was impossible. Although for the time being any public acknowledgment on the part of the US Government that it regarded the refugee return as impractical would be of concern to the Government of India and offers of resettlement assistance would be rejected out of hand, we have begun contingency planning for such an eventuality. We should specifically consider (a) financial resources required to transport refugees to other parts of India, (b) USAID initiatives to create labor-intensive projects in West Bengal where most of the refugees remain and where the most urgent need of housing and accommodation will arise, (c) a US initiative with regard to Calcutta redevelopment, (d) a possible UN role as resettlement coordinator. 4) Enhanced Relief Contributions to India . If the economic burden which the refugee problem represents for India is to be truly eased more than the contributions of the US will be required. To date the contributions of other countries have been inadequate. We have already gone to the UNSYG and to the UNHCR to suggest that they appeal directly to potential donors for more substantial contributions. We should again encourage the UNSYG and the UNHCR to launch a more active publicity campaign, and support these efforts through our Embassies. We should simultaneously encourage the Indians to be more active in seeking international assistance. Pro —is essential step if adequate resources are to be mobilized. —would help meet Indian demands for a more adequate international response. Con —could generate pressures for further large US contributions. —would not deal with the political roots of the refugee problem. 5) Relief in East Pakistan . The UN-coordinated relief program in East Pakistan is just getting under way. To date however the only significant bilateral contribution to support the program has been our own. The UN appeal for assistance of June 16 has evoked very little other response, and U Thant is considering a further appeal. We should encourage the UN to develop further support for the relief program and should urge other countries to contribute. We should also press the Pakistan Government to help in this process by gearing up their awn relief organization in East Pakistan and restoring equitable and effective civil administration. Pro —is important to give substance to a program of relief and rehabilitation to strife-torn East Pakistan. —without such a program, conditions conducive to the return of refugees in significant numbers may not evolve. Con —does not deal with the basic political question. —given Bangla Desh guerrilla activity restoration of effective civil administration may be beyond the Government of Pakistan’s capabilities. C. Political Accommodation . The third element in our current strategy is to urge the Government of Pakistan to proceed as expeditiously as possible with political accommodation. Recognizing the complex issues involved and that because of domestic pressures in Pakistan Yahya may have limited political flexibility, we have not endeavored to spell out the details of such an accommodation. We have, however, urged Yahya to deal with representative political leaders. These efforts have had only a limited effect and have not as yet led to a meaningful basis for a political settlement. Yahya has stated he hopes to transfer power to the people in about four months’ time, but has not lifted his ban on the Awami League or shown any predisposition to negotiate with East Pakistan’s outstanding popular leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. While we will need to continue urging Yahya to work toward a political settlement, for our urgings to be effective we may have to be more direct in our suggestions for such a settlement, pointing out to him our concern that failure to achieve a settlement could increase the dangers of war. Specifically, we might suggest the following: 1) Shorter Timetable for Accommodation . The four months which Yahya has referred to would mean that no transfer of power would take place before late October or early November. If by early September Yahya could have promulgated what seems to be a firmly scheduled and otherwise reasonable return to civilian rule, having some democratic basis and a fair degree of regional autonomy, it is possible that conventional Indian military action might be forestalled. Pro —would support our efforts to achieve Indian restraint. —would be the first step towards a longer-term political settlement. Con —would be resented by Yahya as unnecessary interference and be rejected as running counter to his own domestic requirements for a more delayed transfer of power. 2) Lifting the Ban on the Awami League . Although we do not wish to involve ourselves in suggesting the terms of any constitutional settlement, we might indicate to Yahya our view that the Awami League is the only party in East Pakistan with a genuine popular following and that its participation is essential to a viable political settlement in East Pakistan. While it would be desirable if Yahya could be brought to negotiate with Mujibur Rahman directly, it is extremely unlikely that we could bring this about. Even direct negotiation with the Awami League will not be easy to achieve since it may run counter to Yahya’s own assessment that the Bengalis will knuckle under to a less extensive form of political accommodation. Pro —reflects our assessment that a viable political settlement is unlikely without Awami League participation. —if accepted would offer the basis for a lasting political accommodation. Con —such suggestions could well be rejected out of hand by Yahya who has devised his own political timetable and who believes Mujib to be a traitor. —could be resented as interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs and might precipitate Yahya’s overthrow and replacement by a more extreme military government. 3) Indian Flexibility . While we are pursuing a political strategy with Yahya we will want to urge the Indians not to be inflexible in their own position on the terms for a political settlement in East Pakistan. In particular, we might emphasize to the Indians the desirability of continuing to conduct their relations with the representatives of East Bengal now resident in India with circumspection. We should also urge them to continue their policy of not recognizing the Bangla Desh government in exile, and to limit support for it. Pro —would reinforce policies which India is already pursuing. Con —could be resented as gratuitous advice. 4) UNSYG Involvement . Since our leverage in Islamabad is limited we should also consider mobilizing other forms of international opinion on behalf of a political accommodation. This might include encouraging the UN Secretary General to adopt a more open political role, going beyond his present efforts in support of an international relief effort. We might for example encourage him to make a public appeal for a political settlement, or to travel to South Asia to seek the views of representative political leaders in Pakistan, or to offer mediatory assistance. We might urge India and Pakistan to request, or accept, his good offices. Pro —If successful, would bring greater pressure to bear on Yahya—hence add to the chances for an accommodation. —would follow logically from UN relief efforts —would prolong the talking stage between the parties. Con —Might not be welcomed by the UNSYG 5) Third Party Involvement . In addition to the UN Secretary General we may wish to consider approaching other third parties to see if they would be willing to offer their good offices either in dealing with the internal Pakistan political problem or with the Indo-Pakistan problem. Muslim nations such as Iran, Jordan or Turkey, might be useful in the former role. Impartial neutral states such as Ceylon or Malaysia might be used in the latter case. In addition, going beyond the possible role of individual third parties we should consider the possibility of calling an international five-power conference, including the USSR, China, France and the United Kingdom and ourselves to work out a permanent political settlement between India, Pakistan and possibly Bangla Desh. Such a proposal would be premature at this stage, but may be necessary if tensions in the Sub-continent intensify. Pro —Any single or multinational mediation effort, if acceptable to the parties involved would provide a graceful facade behind which difficult compromises might be made. Con —unlikely to commend itself to smaller powers in view of the deepseated and bitter animosities involved. —a five-power approach might be difficult to achieve because of Sino-Soviet differences. 6) UNHCR Facilitative Role . The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has indicated to us his willingness and interest in placing UNHCR representatives on both sides of the border not only to assess relief needs in India, but also to act as a facilitative body in both countries for the return of refugees. The Government of Pakistan has indicated its willingness to allow a UNHCR presence in the reception centers. The Indians, however, have initially balked at a similar presence in the Indian refugee camps. In addition to the obvious facilitative role which such a UN presence would have, it would also have a significant deterrent effect on Indian cross-border activities and perhaps overall on the prospects for escalation. To achieve such a presence we will not only need the acquiescence of the Indians but probably also the support of the Soviet Union which may not be enthusiastic about an expanded UN role, particularly if costs for participating nations looked to be high. (This subject would be suitable for discussion with the Soviets in addition to the general problem of restraint proposed in Section 1 on page 10 above) Pro —an effective UNHCR facilitative role could be important in reassuring refugees that they will not be mistreated on their return. Con —Pressure on the Indians to permit a UN presence could be abrasive in our relations with them. 7) Resort to the Security Council . India at various times since March 25 has threatened to take the East Pakistan issue to the Security Council, but has found no firm grounds on which to do so. We have actively discouraged the Indians from such an initiative pointing to the rhetoric which such a session would probably create. Given the heightened tension in South Asia, however, we may wish to reconsider this position. The objective of UNSC consideration of the problem now would be to achieve an even-handed resolution calling on both parties to reduce tensions and urging all states to promote the peace and stability of the area. Such a use of the Security Council would not be designed as an effort directed against one party but as an even-handed attempt to get both sides to cool their confrontation. Pro —would throw spotlight on situation and may thus help deter the parties. —could demonstrate parallel US-USSR interests in maintaining peace in South Asia. —by having UN in the middle would help preserve US credentials and leverage with both parties —precedent exists for UN involvement in India-Pak problems —could provide logical basis for further UN mediation effort, e.g. SYG or SYG representative Con —Security Council resolution might go uninforced since UN has no enforcement capability —sessions could degenerate into Indian-Pak shouting match with no positive result. —might detract from quiet diplomacy among parties and interested powers —Pakistan may oppose SC consideration, arguing East Pak situation is “internal affair”; this might also have adverse effects on US/PAK relations if we press for, or support UNSC discussion. IV. Military and Economic Programs . In view of our desire to develop cooperative relations with both India and Pakistan, our economic and military assistance programs take on considerable importance. The dilemma inherent in those programs in Pakistan is that while they support our interests in Pakistan they simultaneously damage our interests in India. A. Military Supply . The stability of the Martial Law Administration is heavily dependent on the continued strength and morale of the military. Military sales therefore are of paramount psychological and practical significance to the martial law regime. Our decisions in this area are regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an earnest of our overall policy towards Pakistan. Under our existing policy, only orders for military equipment licensed prior to March 25 are being shipped to Pakistan. Major items of military significance, including those in the 1970 one-time exception, are being held in abeyance. This residual program has been strongly criticized by India which sees any arms to Pakistan as a direct support for the Army’s suppressive actions in East Pakistan. It has damaged our ability to maintain a constructive relationship with India. Our ability to influence India in the direction of restraint has declined, since India believes we are increasingly committed to a policy of support for Pakistan and give only secondary importance to India’s role and importance in South Asia. Pakistan is also likely to became dissatisfied with our policy which denies to it many of the end-items and spare parts which it had hoped to procure in the future. The policy is also highly vulnerable with Congress which strongly opposes any arms shipment to Pakistan. At present the principal requirement of US policy is that there not be any recourse to armed force. This will require the support and cooperation of India. We therefore recommend a suspension of all shipments of arms to Pakistan, including any residual shipments which remain from the pre-March 25 period, in order to restore a degree of credibility to our calls for restraint and to support the relative preeminence of our interests in India. Once peaceful conditions are restored and a satisfactory political settlement achieved, we should then review this suspension. If we wished to stop short of a publicly announced suspension of all further shipments to Pakistan we might state that we had decided to review remaining items in the pipeline, clearly implying that sensitive items, such as lethal spare parts and ammunition would not be permitted to be shipped. Pro —Would support our primary interest in influencing India to act with restraint —would improve relations with India and increase our influence in New Delhi —would remove an abrasive source of dispute with the Congress and thus hopefully would gain us broader support for our policies in South Asia. —would have a positive impact on public opinion in East Pakistan and hence ultimately on any future relations with East Pakistan. Con —would seriously irritate the Government of Pakistan and greatly reduce our influence on it. —would increase Chinese influence in Pakistan as the major arms supplier —might lead to more intransigent Pakistani positions with respect to military action against Bengalis and political accommodation —could encourage India to take military action against Pakistan. B. Economic Assistance Our basic economic assistance strategy has been to condition future development loans, which would provide fungible sources of foreign exchange to the Pakistanis, primarily on developmental and legislative criteria. Political criteria are being minimized and economic aid is not being used directly to put pressure on Pakistan to achieve a political accommodation. This policy is consistent with our worldwide view that aid should not be conditioned on short-term political considerations. In adopting this position we have set ourselves apart from some of the other donor countries, who have specifically set political conditions for resuming aid, but have nevertheless taken a position broadly consistent with that of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium as a group. Aid is an important ingredient in Pakistan’s development, and given the enhanced pressures on the Pakistan economy since March 25, it will be an increasingly important factor in the future economic viability of Pakistan. The prospect of US aid in the future is a carrot which we are holding out before the Pakistanis and which may be important if we are to have an effect in dealing with sensitive political subjects such as political accommodation with Mujib. We recommend that we adhere to our policy of deemphasizing political criteria for aid but insisting on developmental criteria to ensure that our aid will go for purposes of economic development and that the entire country will benefit from our resources. Pro —makes aid the major positive ingredient in our relations with Pakistan —is consistent with worldwide policies —indicates our continuing concern for Pakistan’s developmental prospects and to a degree protects our past inputs. —will somewhat counterbalance Chinese influence in Pakistan. —consistent with approach adopted by other members of Aid to Pakistan Consortium. Con —if the situation in East Pakistan does not improve sharply, application of developmental criteria could lead to provision of very little aid except humanitarian assistance, and to the ultimate erosion of our leverage with the Government of Pakistan. —any aid to Pakistan will be resented by India, although if it was clearly conditioned on developmental terms would not necessarily be a major negative factor in our relations. V. PROSPECTS FOR HOSTILITIES Although there are strong negative factors working against an Indian decision to attack Pakistan, the danger of war remains real. With the experience of 1965 in mind Indian decision-makers are aware that a decisive victory over Pakistan cannot easily be won. The costs of war are high and there is a recognition that an Indo-Pakistan conflict could result in direct Chinese involvement. The policies suggested in the earlier sections of this paper would reinforce the intrinsically countervailing factors in the situation. Nonetheless there is still a significant possibility that India despite these negative factors will in the next three to six months go to war with Pakistan. The Indian decision would be based on domestic political pressures, and an assessment that the influx of refugees is likely to lead to radicalization in Bengal and will ultimately threaten India’s inter-communal cohesion, the political fabric in Bengal, Assam and tribal states of Eastern India, and economic development prospects. These interests India may well consider “vital” and worthy of protection through the “lesser evil” of war. There is probably still an interim period in which the Government of India will wait to see whether international pressures and domestic compulsions in Pakistan will bring about a political accommodation, the restoration of peace and security in East Pakistan and a start to the process of repatriation of the refugees. If no progress is made in these areas by September or October, the chances for hostilities will increase. Our actions, in the event of escalation would be determined in part by the circumstances in which hostilities broke out. It is most likely that war would result from an Indian attack on Pakistan or from a gradual process of escalation involving border incidents on both sides. In the latter case, responsibility might not be clearly laid on one side or the other. In the first instance hostilities are likely to be confined to India and Pakistan alone. It would be in the US interest to see that the hostilities not expand to include third parties, particularly China. It would also be in our interest to see that the hostilities were not protracted since a prolonged war would do profound damage to the political, economic and social fabric of India and Pakistan. Thus, should India attack Pakistan despite our efforts, our interests would be best served by an early end to the conflict and by negotiations among all parties concerned leading to a withdrawal of Indian troops and an overall political settlement. The following sections consider options open to the United States both in the event of war which was localized to India and Pakistan though possibly fought on two fronts, and a war in which external powers, particularly China, would become involved. VI. OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES In the event hostilities break out between India and Pakistan the United States could pursue one of three broad strategies—it could: (a) adopt a passive hands-off role, (b) provide military support to the victim of attack, (c) intervene politically to localize the conflict. A. Passive International Role . We might adopt a relatively passive role indicating our basic neutrality in the dispute. We would seek to avoid being drawn more directly into the dispute on either side. Such a role might be particularly appropriate in circumstances in which the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was unclear or where we judged the likelihood of Chinese involvement to be small. A passive role need not necessarily do irreparable damage to our interests in either India or Pakistan. Both sides might interpret our neutrality as implicit support for their position. This stance might allow us to adopt a mediatory position encouraging a negotiated political settlement when circumstances made such a role possible. Such an approach would only be sustainable if the conflict appeared likely to be of short duration, since a protracted conflict would bring serious long-term damage to the internal cohesion and viability of both India and Pakistan, which would not be conducive to the longer term peace and stability in South Asia which we seek. In pursuing this option we could: —adopt a public posture that we did not intend to become directly involved and would not provide assistance to either side. —support efforts in the Security Council to end the hostilities —suspend all aid and military programs to both sides until the outcome of the hostilities was clear. —offer our good offices in arranging negotiation of a political settlement. Advantages —Limits US involvement —allows US maximum flexibility as events unfold —preserves a relationship with both India and Pakistan Disadvantages —risks serious damage to our interests in South Asia if the conflict were protracted. —could increase Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and Pakistani dependence on China without any gain for the US in either country. B. Military Support . At the other extreme would be a decision to support one side or the other with military assistance. The US has limited commitments to both sides (through CENTO and SEATO with Pakistan, and through the 1964 Air Defense Agreement with India). Although neither set of agreements provides for automatic US involvement in an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Pakistanis or Indians might seek to use them to gain our involvement. If we wished to demonstrate our support for the party which was the victim of attack we might respond positively to these overtures. 1. To Pakistan . Under the most likely scenario for escalation—an Indian attack on Pakistan—the Pakistanis would turn to us as they did in 1965. If we judged it to be in our interest to assert the paramountcy of our interests in Pakistan and in its national unity and integrity we might offer to assist Pakistan’s defense effort through the supply of military equipment, although not with US combat personnel. Such assistance would in the short run not affect the outcome of the conflict, but it would be politically effective in creating a new relationship with Pakistan. Such a course would have a serious negative impact on our interests in India and any future independent Bangla Desh and would destroy the basis for a constructive relationship with India. Specific actions we might take include the follwing: —develop in coordination with the Government of Pakistan an emergency military supply program —actively move to terminate all US programs in India —take the lead in developing international efforts calling on India to end her intervention and return to the status quo ante —support a Security Council Resolution condemning India Advantages —would support our interests in Pakistan and in its national unity —would diminish Chinese influence in Pakistan —would strengthen our relations with Muslim powers of the Middle East Disadvantages —would severely damage US interests in and relations with India —would have little effect on the outcome of the conflict —would lead to increased Soviet influence in India —would leave no basis for a conciliatory role by the United States 2. To India . Military support to India is a less likely strategy in the context of a limited Indo-Pakistan conflict. However, if China were to intervene massively on Pakistan’s side and seemed to threaten India in a major way, e.g. by an attempt to seize the Brahmaputra valley, we would want to consider providing military assistance to India. Such assistance would be politically easier to provide if India were not the initiator of hostilities with Pakistan. Such support of India if clearly offered in the Chinese context would be a positive element supporting our recognition of India’s relatively greater importance to us in Asia. Relations with Pakistan would be strained even though the arms would not be provided for use against Pakistan. It might still be possible to maintain a post-war relationship with Pakistan, particularly if the United States had been actively engaged in simultaneous political efforts (see C below) to achieve a negotiated political settlement. Specific actions we might take include the following: —offer to consult with India under the 1964 Air Defense Agreement —develop, if India desired, an emergency military assistance program —share intelligence with Indians on Chinese military deployments —coordinate with the British and the Soviets on additional assistance measures Advantages —would be consistent with our overall Asian policy of assisting states threatened by China, or the victims of Chinese aggression —would establish a fine basis for a close relationship with India —would counteract the recent growth in Soviet influence in India —could form a part of a cooperative effort with the Soviets Disadvantages —would create severe strains in our relations with both China and Pakistan —would run risks of gradually increasing US involvement escalating into a more extensive commitment, involving direct US confrontation with one or more outside powers. C. Political Intervention . Given our interest in maintaining relations with both India and Pakistan and our desire to prevent Chinese involvement and to limit external influence in the subcontinent, a policy of political intervention would give us considerable flexibility. The principal purpose of our political efforts would be to localize hostilities and end them. We would also wish to work vigorously for a negotiated political settlement which would remove the basic causes of tension. Actions we would wish to take immediately on the outbreak of hostilities would include: —an immediate call for a UN Security Council session to consider the crisis —support for a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and direct negotiations between the two sides on the terms of withdrawal and a political settlement —immediate Presidential messages to President Yahya and/or Prime Minister Gandhi calling for an end to hostilities and/or a negotiated settlement. —immediate discussion with the Soviet Union and with Great Britain on ways to bring the hostilities to an end —privately urge continued restraint on the Chinese directly or through third parties If hostilities have broken out because of an India attack on Pakistan we should: —move to terminate our residual military sales program for India, carefully assessing the likelihood of a Chinese attack on India before taking definitive action —hold up all shipments and licenses of military supplies destined to India —not resume shipment of military assistance to Pakistan pending the outcome of our diplomatic efforts to terminate the hostilities —prepare to hold economic assistance to India in abeyance at least for the duration of the hostilities. (A de facto suspension of assistance would take place in Pakistan since most AID and PL–480 programs would be disrupted as a result of hostilities.) If the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities were thoroughly ambiguous and murkey we should: —announce publicly a temporary suspension of military supply to both parties —consider whether, in order to bring hostilities to an end, to suspend all economic assistance programs to both sides —urge other arms supplying powers, such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and France to suspend arms shipments. Advantages —would provide US maximum flexibility in a complex situation —would maximize use of US programs and leverage to shorten hostilities, and inhibit third party intervention —would make it possible for the US to maintain relations with both India and Pakistan (and perhaps Bangla Desh as well) in the aftermath of hostilities. Disadvantages —since the actual effect of such a policy could be to put pressure on the invading country (probably India in occupation of a portion of East Pakistan) it could lead to strains in our relations with the Government of India. —would be seen in Pakistan as a repetition of 1965 and a failure of the US to fulfill its treaty commitments. ANNEX A—PRE-HOSTILITIES CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Irrespective of the political courses which we decided to pursue to keep the conflict localized or to bring it to an end various American programs would be immediately affected and contingency planning by appropriate US agencies should be undertaken to meet these contingencies: 1) US ships destined to India and Pakistan should be warned not to call at belligerent ports if carrying cargo for both belligerents. As in 1965 it can be assumed that any cargo which arrives in India destined for Pakistan or vice versa will be immediately confiscated. 2) Hostilities could involve bombing of airfields on both sides. MAC and commercial air carriers should have made contingency arrangements for overflying the area without stopping in either India or Pakistan. 3) Evacuation plans may have to be implemented on short notice for all posts in India and Pakistan and they should be reviewed in the context of a possible Indo-Pakistan war involving hostilities in both East and West Pakistan. 4) Intelligence coverage of Chinese intentions and capabilities to intervene in South Asia should be intensified in order to provide maximum possible advance warning of any significant Chinese actions. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/23/71. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton. A cover sheet bears the date July 9, but drafting information indicates that it was drafted on July 10. The study was drafted for the Senior Review Group and approved by a State/Defense/CIA ad hoc committee. The cover sheet and a table of contents are not published. 141. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) 141. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) 1 Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21–4:54 p.m. Nixon: You know, the thing that really concerns us, naturally, as we all know, the miserable campaign, I don’t know what you can do about it while you are here, against Pakistan. Do you think he’s doing—Keating was over here lobbying for the Indians when he was here—do you think he ought to try to say anything good about the Paks while you are here? Could you? Farland: I can... Nixon: Would it be useful? Kissinger: I think it would be useful to put out [unclear]. Farland: I agree, although I was trying to maintain a relatively low profile because I didn’t want to get questions about particulars to the China trip. Nixon: On that you have a perfect thing, you just say I’m not saying anything. [unclear] Farland: I saw Chuck Percy today at a luncheon that Frank Kellogg gave at the State Department. And several Congressmen, and they all wondered why my presence wasn’t known, why could I appear before a committee and I had no comment to make. I said I don’t know. I had a conversation with [unclear] this morning and he was quite hopeful that I could appear before one of the committees. I agreed with Charles Bray over at the State Department to give a backgrounder to the press on Friday afternoon. Nixon: Good. Kissinger: That’s better than testimony [unclear]. Nixon: Good. The press likes backgrounders much better. That’s where it counts. The hell with the damn Congress. Farland: There is another side to this picture, and I can say with complete candor that if we push Yahya to the point where he reacts, the reaction will be such that the entire subcontinent will be [unclear]. I mean he’ll fight. He’ll fight, and he may go [unclear]. If he goes out, and he may go [unclear] it’s going to be [unclear] that ever mankind has seen, in our lifetime. The Chinese will come right down through Assam. [unclear] Furthermore, the Chinese will come across the Mintoka Pass and start guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. And they’ll have everything surrounded. And the vociferous forces in India today [unclear]. That’s a very stark picture but it’s one that’s not overdrawn. Nixon: What do you think our position should be? Farland: I think we are doing what we should. This is a policy that I joined in. I don’t think we can overplay our hand, but I don’t think we are looking for vociferous, positive action. Mr. President, as I was telling you this morning, that as a matter of actual fact this problem goes back to about the year AD 712, when the Muslims first invaded the Sind. There’s been no peace on the subcontinent since that time because the Hindus and the Muslims have nothing in common whatsoever. Every point of their lives is diametrically opposed—economic, political, social, emotional, despite their beliefs. One prays to idols, the other prays to one God. One worships the cow; the other eats it. Simple as that. And last year there were 521 communal riots in India, acknowledged. Nixon: Miserable damn place. Kissinger: And what the Indians are really after, that became clear to me on my trip [unclear]. Their thoughts are about East Pakistan because they think that [unclear] West Pakistan. They think that by, well, if they can undermine East Pakistan then in West Pakistan so many forces would be, will unloosen, will be turned loose that the whole Pakistan issue will disappear. The Indians and West Pakistanis they hate each other— Nixon: Oh sure, that’s what they fear. East Pakistan [unclear]. The thing, the bad thing is you are convinced, though, that Yahya will fight? Farland: Oh, he will. Nixon: He will commit suicide. Kissinger: I agree completely. He will fight. Just as Lincoln would have fought. To him East Pakistan is part of Pakistan. [unclear] Farland: Because of their sense of defeat, the possibility of defeat is a minor consideration as opposed to their sense of national unity. Remember, almost every [unclear] over there recalls the time of partition, back when they had— Nixon: Horrible slaughters? Farland: The acknowledged figure is over half a million. The figure that most people believe is way in excess of a million people. Fifteen million refugees were on the road. Nixon: What is the situation, I really, of course there are always two sides to everything, but with the Indians [unclear]? Terrible stories [unclear] and so forth. Farland: They are past masters of propaganda. The Pakistanis don’t— Nixon: How can you, can you perhaps put a little of that [unclear]. Well anyway, I think if you could, if you could— Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: Yeah. Okay. [Unclear exchange] Farland: This matter of arms to Pakistan. Nixon: Uh, huh. Farland: Since March 25 we have sent over 2,200 rounds of .22 ammunition for survival rifles for down there, that’s all. This part of our arms deal is just, in guns and the story hasn’t properly— Nixon: You tell them that’s good. That’s good. Farland: Forty to fifty percent of what’s in the pipeline is for spare parts for trucks and for communication equipment without which the starving refugees could not be fed. Nixon: Good. Good. Good. Farland: So these are— Nixon: You ought to lay it right out. And also, I guess everybody’s concerned about [unclear]. Let’s not aggravate the problem; let’s try to help on the problem—East Pakistan. And the main thing let’s not stir it up. It’s stirred up too much. Inevitably it will be a bloodbath down there. Farland: It will be. It will be all over the subcontinent. Nixon: We warned the Indians very strongly that if they start anything—and believe me it would be a hell of a pleasure as far as I am concerned—if we just cut off every damn bit of aid we give them, at least for whatever it’s worth. Farland: Yahya told me that they had pinpointed 29 camps within India where guerrillas were being trained. Now I hate to tell you this, Mr. President, but the guerrilla threat is growing by leaps and bounds. They’re averaging 18 Pakistanis a day now; they are averaging two bridges a day. Killing that many. And this is [unclear]. And once the refugees get there, they are being prohibited, are prevented from coming back by Indira’s own statement. Political accommodation in her book means Bangladesh. This is bad. Nixon: Well, I think we just continue on our line. We, as you know, we’re having a hell of a time keeping the State Department bureaucracies hitched on this thing. They’re basically pro-Indian. When I say “they,” not all. But a lot of them. And they want to believe what the American press is writing. And the Indian press, of course, the American press is the same as the Indian press, follows everything they say. Farland: Well, my Consul General over in Dacca— Nixon: He’s no good. Farland: blew the whistle on the whole thing. Nixon: He’s bad, isn’t he? Farland: Well he’s gone. He’s here in the Department now. And the head of the USIS was just as tendentious in his reporting. Got rid of him. Shakespeare got him out. Nixon: Good. Farland: The one remaining, who is a very critical situation, this fellow Eric Griffel, who is the head of AID [Griffel was the associate director in charge of AID operations in Dacca], he will be out in September. I wish he were out now. I don’t think you could pull him out without— Nixon: Repercussions. Farland:—repercussions on the Hill. And my guess is that he has been instrumental in leaking some of this information. Nixon: Sick bastards. You just keep right after it on this thing. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Farland, Oval Office, Conversation No. 549–25. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 142. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group 142. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group 1 Washington, July 29, 1971 SCENARIO FOR ACTION IN INDO-PAKISTAN CRISIS In the present situation our two principal objectives are to prevent famine in East Pakistan and to deter hostilities between India and Pakistan resulting either from the continuing refugee flow or escalation of cross-border activities. Additional subsidary objectives are therefore to: (a) encourage progress toward a political settlement. (b) stop the refugee flow from Pakistan. (c) prevent its re-emergence once stopped by comprehensive and effective relief measures to avert famine. (d) end cross-border activities from India. Beyond this, to achieve a return flow of any magnitude there will be necessary at least: —a return of normal security conditions in East Pakistan. —the elimination of the threat of famine. —assurances of a return of property and jobs. —impartial neutral monitoring and assurances to the refugees of their personal safety. —international participation and monitoring of relief in East Pakistan and India. A full return would probably only take place if there is an agreed political settlement with the Awami League. Our efforts must begin with Pakistan because it is in Pakistan that famine conditions will occur, it is only there that steps can be taken to create conditions conducive to the refugees’ return and it is there that the fundamental problem of political accommodation can be dealt with. The basic requirement for, a durable and viable settlement of the current crisis is the achievement of a political accommodation with the Bengali people. Until such an accommodation is achieved, normal conditions will not be restored, the insurgency will continue and India will only to a limited degree agree to compromise and cooperate in efforts to defuse the situation. There are many specific steps to propose to President Yahya in other areas, particularly with respect to famine relief and the restoration of more normal law and. order conditions. These are outlined below. None of them can hope to be fully effective, however, except in a changed and more constructive political atmosphere. Our basic approach to President Yahya should, therefore, emphasize the necessity for actions to reverse the current negative political trends and to move toward reconciliation. It is recognized that any progress toward political accommodation risks Yahya’s own political position and that direct negotiation with Mujib or other established leaders of the Awami League may not now be politically feasible. Nonetheless, there is still scope for an accelerated timetable of constitutional reform and direct dealing with a substantial percentage of the elected Awami League members. These proposals are also included in the following scenario as are those steps which can be taken with respect to the refugees and famine problems. These problems are critical in the short term if hostilities are to be avoided. Pakistan Refugee Outflow. Because of the inter-relationship between the refugee problem and the dangers of war, our first efforts must be to end the refugee outflow and to prevent its resumption because of famine conditions. Without this there is little prospect that the Indians will agree to other proposals we are making, i.e., an end to cross-border activity and a UN presence on their side of the border. We should, therefore, approach Yahya through a Presidential letter or through Ambassador Farland indicating our concern that a continued refugee flow threatens the peace and security of South Asia and requesting that: (a) his government stop summary military reprisals against predominantly Hindu villages, and indicate that punishment in the future will be meted out through the judicial process. (b) there be a restoration of a civil administration, leaving the maintenance of law and order to the police and provincial para-military forces. (c) mount a massive and effective effort to deal with the threat of famine. (A paper on East Pakistan humanitarian relief making detailed program recommendations is attached.) In suggesting immediate and effective steps to avoid famine,, we should stress the need (1) to work through international humanitarian relief agencies using UN and foreign voluntary agencies to the maximum, and (2) to improve port operations and to restore normal inland distribution of food and other relief supplies. Return Flow. We should also indicate our view that further steps must be taken to facilitate and encourage the return of at least some of the refugees and that in our view this will require that the GOP emphatically make clear through other actions and public announcements that it is prepared to: (a) call for national reconciliation and a common effort to rebuild East Pakistan. (b) announce that because of the need for a period of reconciliation and common effort, the Government is ready to declare a general amnesty for all those inside and outside of East Pakistan, except those engaged in armed resistance or specifically charged with criminal offenses. (c) announce that refugees can return to their homes with full personal security and restoration of their personal and real property. (d) announce that there will be no further allocation to Muslims of Hindu property, and implement the proposal to return property already allocated. (e) develop specific plans for financial assistance on an individual and family basis to compensate refugees for losses as a result of the conflict. Political Accommodation Finally, we should tell Yahya that in our view it is vital that progress be made towards a political settlement which embraces all Awami League representatives, except those specifically charged with heinous crimes or actively engaged in resisting. This proposal could be made to Yahya in the context of his already stated willingness to deal with the elected representatives of the people. Because political accommodation clearly is vital to a long term solution and is perceived as vital in the shorter term by the Indians, we should specifically urge Yahya: (a) to proceed as rapidly as possible with his efforts to achieve a settlement with the elected representatives of the people, on the basis of maximum autonomy for East Pakistan (whether “Six Points” or otherwise). (b) to avoid exacerbating the situation by a trial of Mujibur Rahman, and (c) to appoint a new governor to replace General Tikka Khan, preferably a civilian and a Bengali and to search for new leadership for the martial law administration in East Pakistan perhaps by calling out of retirement prominent West Pakistanis who enjoy a degree of confidence in East Pakistan—General Azam, or Admiral Ahsan. (d) abolish the Peace Committees, which have become symbols of the martial law rule. Phasing (a) We should tell Yahya that we are pressing the Indians to refrain from giving assistance to the insurgent movement and that we anticipate the Indian response will be increasingly affirmative as progress is made on ending the refugee outflow, on developing a province-wide famine prevention effort, and on a political accommodation. (b) in anticipation of a situation in which some of the refugees would be willing to return we plan to press the Indians further to accept a UN presence on their side of the border to facilitate the return flow. This phased scenario with the Pakistanis emphasizes interim measures which are most immediately achievable in the hope and expectation that this will improve the prospects for political accommodation which is essential to any general restoration of the situation in East Pakistan. Economic and Military Assistance. In addition to inter-relating developments in East Pakistan with our proposed demarche in India we will also have to phase our bilateral economic and military programs. Simultaneously, with our urging on the point of province-wide famine relief efforts, we should reiterate our willingness to support Pakistan’s relief plans within the UN framework with additional food and coastal vessels. Direct cash assistance can be added as plans for its use are put forward. If reasonable progress on humanitarian programs is made by fall, it may be possible to work out tacit agreement to a continuation of Pakistan’s unilateral debt moratorium. Our broader development assistance should await the creation of conditions in which development can take place and which we have referred to under the general rubric of developmental criteria. We should indicate to General Yahya that in our view this is closely related to the creation of conditions in which the refugees can return to their homes. Finally, our hold on military shipments, which will have become almost total by mid-August, should not be lifted until there is an end of military activity against the civilian population and until the army is returned to its barracks and effective civilian administration is in operation. We should indicate to General Yahya that this is likely to happen only when there has, in fact, been progress toward a political settlement. India On the Indian side our strategy must be one which seeks: (a) to ease the pressure on India of the existing refugees, (b) to end Indian support for cross border operations, and (c) to remove such obstacles to the refugees’ return as India may be placing in the way. Refugee Burden To meet the immediate burden India faces and to diminish the Indian sense of desperation we should be prepared to make an explicit offer of an additional $100 million for refugee relief for the current fiscal year. (Half of this in food and other PL–480 commodities could be provided at once. The balance in cash would have to await congressional authorization and appropriation. The House version of the Foreign Assistance Act contains authorization of an additional $100 million for relief in India and Pakistan.) In discussions with the Indians we should also indicate our willingness to sign a first tranche FY 1972 $100 million development loan and a new PL–480 agreement. We should indicate in making these loans that our economic assistance programs can only continue in conditions in which economic development can effectively take place. We would, of course, be concerned if Indian military actions were to interfere with India’s development or if India were obdurate under circumstances in which there is marked improvement in the situation in East Pakistan. It might then be difficult for us to continue our development assistance. Refugee Outflow and Return. We should tell the Indians of our efforts with Yahya to end the outflow of refugees both immediately and in the future context of famine. We should say to them that as the flow subsides we would expect them to agree to measures which would facilitate the return process, notably a UN presence at collecting points on their side, for non-peacekeeping purposes, and a de-linking of political accommodation with refugee return. At that point we should also inform the Indians of the steps we have taken and propose to take in Pakistan with respect to the security of returning refugees, the creation of more normal conditions in East Pakistan and movement towards a political settlement. Cross Border Activity Because insurgency and the Pakistani response to it are causes of the refugee outflow we should also urge the Indians to refrain from giving official support to cross border activities, and generally to cut back on training and logistic support and the sending of Indian personnel or units across the border. We should point out to them that sabotage activities against rail and inland water transport facilities contribute to the probability of famine-induced refugee migration and interferes with the distribution of famine relief supplies in East Pakistan. We might also urge them to use their influence with the Mukti Fauj to avoid activities likely to result in reprisals against Hindu villages. We recognize that India is unlikely to accept these suggestions at this time. Agreement on their part would imply acceptance of a West Pakistani victory, an end to Bangla Desh aspirations and the probability of the radicalization of the insurgent movement. None of these are acceptable to the GOI. Even if accepted, it would not result in a complete cessation of insurgent activity since there is now a limited indigenous insurgent capability in East Pakistan. In addition, non-official communist and Naxalite-supported cross-border activities would continue to take place which the GOP would charge was Indian-sponsored. We should indicate that we would take a most serious view of any official Indian involvement in a Mukti Fauj effort to seize territory in East Pakistan and that such an involvement could seriously affect our ability to assist India. We should also continue to pursue our efforts at the United Nations to get a UN presence in place on the Indian side of the border, either through the consensus currently being sought by the President of the Security Council, through a Security Council meeting or through our own bilateral efforts. As Pakistan demonstrates progress toward more normal conditions, attested to by our own people in East Pakistan and by neutral UN observers, we should become more insistent in demanding a complete cessation of Indian support to the guerillas using such influence as our on-going programs in India give us. It would be well to recognize, however, that unless progress and a positive evolution of the situation in East Pakistan can be demonstrated to the Indians, efforts to get them to act with additional restraint or to accept a UN presence will probably be of limited effectiveness In devising a scenario for India we have endeavored to avoid actions which would cut directly across India’s perceptions of its vital national interests and which, in fact, could be presented to the Indians as consistent with the Indian interest in refugee return and a political evolution in East Pakistan. In this regard, a continuing confidential dialogue will be essential to share assessments on such crucial subjects as the food situation in East Pakistan and to keep India abreast of the dangers in the situation, and of the motives for specific actions we may take to alleviate those dangers. Soviet Role A possible moderating influence on the Indians is the USSR. Soviet support for a UN presence would have an impact in New Delhi. India, now feeling itself diplomatically isolated, is increasingly relying on the Soviets, and their influence and counsel are likely to be more effective than ours. For this reason alone it is important for us at an early stage in our scenario to engage in a high-level discussion with the Soviets with a view: (a) to obtaining a Soviet assessment of events in South Asia. (b) to indicate to them our concern about the dangers of famine and war and to ascertain their views about what might be done to avert them. (c) to inform them in general terms of our own thoughts on what needs to be done. (d) to encourage them to counsel restraint in both Islamabad and New Delhi, and (e) to seek their support for UN relief efforts on both sides of the border. British Role Both Britain and the US have significant interests in breaking the vicious cycle into which the South Asian crisis has reduced itself, and in working towards fundamental solutions through a viable political accommodation and an end to the Indian-supported insurgency in East Pakistan. Although British influence in Pakistan is minimal at present, it is still important in New Delhi. We should, therefore, in the near future engage them in high-level consultations preferably in Washington, but also possibly in London. The purpose of these consultations would be: (a) to consider the substance of steps which need to be taken with the Indians and Pakistanis in New Delhi and Islamabad. (b) to consider possible alternative ways of making our respective presentations and to consider other means of getting across to the Indians and Pakistanis the need for a basic reorientation of their policies. This might include (1) a joint effort by the US and UK Ambassadors/High Commissioners in New Delhi and Islamabad; (2) designation of a senior British or Commonwealth official to undertake a special mission (for example, Sir Morrice James, former High Commissioner in both India and Pakistan and negotiator of the Rann of Kutch dispute, or H. Shirley Amerasinghe, Ceylonese Permanent Representative at the UN); (3) support for the five commonwealth nation proposal of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. (c) to consider ways in which the Soviets could be associated with our initiatives either formally or informally. (d) to discuss ways to mobilize UN members and the UN organizations in both refugee and famine relief efforts and in political action. UN Role Concurrently with the working out of our scenario bilaterally in India and Pakistan, we will need to keep in mind the constructive role which the UN may be able to play in the crisis not only in the relief context but also politically. The President of the Security Council is already engaged in the search for a consensus on the UN Secretary General’s proposal for a UN presence on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border. Pressures for a Security Council meeting are growing and Pakistan now seems to favor a meeting. If a Security Council meeting does take place, we should consider ways in which we might use the UN to reinforce the efforts we are making bilaterally, and to give the UN a more effective operating role with respect to relief. We might also seek to support a Security Council or Secretary General-sponsored initiative to send a representative or a team to the area to explore ways of reducing tensions. In any event, we would wish to keep the UN Secretary General informed of the success of the efforts we are making bilaterally with the parties. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/30/71. Secret; Exdis. This scenario was prepared in response to an instruction to the Department from the Senior Review Group on July 23 to draft a paper outlining what the U.S. perceived as a desirable outcome to the crisis developing in East Pakistan. The instruction called for a paper that could serve as “a scenario for discussions with the Pakistanis, the Indians and possibly the Russians.” (Ibid., Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971) Drafted by Quainton and used by the Senior Review Group at their meeting on July 30. Because of a typographical error, the drafting date on the paper is given as June 29. The attached paper on humanitarian relief, cited in the scenario, is not published. 143. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers 143. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, September 3, 1971 SUBJECT: Mission to Pakistan to Review Relief, Refugee and Related Issues As instructed by the President during his meeting with the Senior Review Group August 11, the undersigned officer discussed the food and relief problems of East Pakistan, and related issues, with President Yahya Khan and principal officials of his government in Islamabad and Dacca, August 17–23. (See Tab A for schedule of meetings.) President Yahya Khan placed high importance on receiving President Nixon’s views—both by letter and by his emissary—and sought to accommodate Pakistan’s policies to our point of view. The principal conclusions from the mission follow. A. RELIEF PROBLEMS Priority of Food Relief Effort . President Yahya Khan concurs in our assessment that there will be a serious food shortage in East Pakistan during late September into December unless large imports of food can be effectively distributed. If famine is not avoided, he believes the effect on Pakistan’s political position in the East Wing would be disastrous. Hence, Yahya Khan regards maintenance of food stocks and sustained distribution from government supply depots as a prime strategic objective. There is now only three to four weeks’ food supply at most depots, even at reduced rations—contrasted with more ample stocks at the ocean ports of Chittagong and Khulna. The immediate task is the transport of food from these ocean ports up-country to meet minimum consumption needs through the end of December. Attitude Toward UN Relief Mission . Yahya Khan grudgingly approved the 38 man UN headquarters group for Dacca to help with relief in East Pakistan. He did not believe the UN would perform, stressing that they had done little since he requested their help some ten weeks ago. Also, he resented a UN presence in Pakistan when India had refused. But, because the U.S. recommended that relief be channeled through the UN, Yahya Khan accepted the UN Relief Mission. He will probably accept additional UN field personnel up to a proposed total of 117 men, only if we again urge that he do so. A Bengali Civilian Governor . Discussion of administrative issues affecting the relief effort provided an opportunity to suggest a reduced role for the military in the civil administration of East Pakistan. Again, Yahya Khan was responsive by declaring that his policy was for a “civilian-ization of the Government in East Pakistan. (Prior evidence indicated that military direction of civil affairs had been greatly increasing.) Yahya Khan accepted the suggestion of splitting the civilian functions of the Governor from the security functions of the Martial Law Administrator, and said we had anticipated his decision to appoint Dr. A.M. Malik—a loyal and trusted Bengali as Governor of East Pakistan. Overall Food and Relief Coordinator for East Pakistan . When it was pointed out that eight officials held responsibility for different aspects of food, transport, distribution and relief programs in East Pakistan but that no one was operationally in overall charge, Yahya Khan initially found the criticism puzzling, but then accepted it. He later designated the new Chief Secretary as Food and Relief Coordinator for East Pakistan. Priority Assistance Need is River Transport . Yahya Khan sees transport within East Pakistan as critical to control of the province. A major attempt is being made by the Mukti Bahini forces (armed guerrillas of Bangla Desh) to disrupt rail and road transport from Chittagong north, which historically has carried 75 percent of the internal tonnage (60 percent rail, 15 percent road). “The Battle for the Life” of the province is intensifying with rail and road bridges and locomotives the primary targets of guerrilla activity. As a result rail transportation has been reduced to no more than 20 percent of normal capacity, and maintenance of even this capacity is by no means certain. Consequently, movement of food and relief supplies will have to be by river. Yahya Khan cursed the stupidity which had neglected investment in river transport in favor of road and rail development. He regarded the arrival of some 29 coastal ships—25 of which are being financed by U.S. assistance—as a real contribution to the movement of food from ocean to up-country river ports. Yahya Khan asked that the coastal ships arrive promptly. Additional water transport assistance sought by Pakistan are tugs to pull barges, ferries to bridge river crossings, and military-type landing craft. Food Distribution Beyond River Ports Also Essential . Distribution of food beyond river ports was discussed as an area of weakness in relief operations. It was agreed that every effort should be made to mobilize small local boats and trucks by paying premium rates and that emergency relief works would help in food distribution. We praised the new Chief Secretary as the man who had the best grasp of these problems and, as mentioned above, President Yahya Khan later appointed him overall Food and Relief Coordinator. Need for Relief Works . President Yahya Khan accepted our recommendation for a government-sponsored emergency relief works program in East Pakistan as an important means of stimulating income and providing for the purchase of food. He approved a $20 million allocation for emergency relief work, and accepted a U.S. contribution of $10 million in rupees for this purpose which we offered from U.S.-owned excess rupee holdings. However, implementation of the program may be slow because the government is not fully convinced that a large-scale works program to stimulate purchasing power is absolutely essential. Security and Integrity of Relief Operations . The Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces are gradually stepping up the intensity and sophistication of their operations in the north and south central areas, and particularly along the eastern border—well away from refugee camps near Calcutta which are shown to distinguished visitors. (See Tab B for map of Mukti Bahini major operational areas.) While road and rail transport is the primary target, river ports have been attacked and two Pakistan river boats damaged by sophisticated limpet mines. In these circumstances (a) food and relief shipments transported under UN auspices must not be mixed with general and military cargoes, (b) transport provided for relief must only move relief goods, even if this means that they travel empty on return trips, and (c) Pakistan soldiers should not escort relief shipments. These points had not been accepted prior to our mission. Yahya Khan and his Governor, Tikka Khan, both believed that relief transport, and to some extent relief distribution, should be under military control—points which we firmly resisted. The major function of the UN Mission—and the UN emblem on movement of relief goods—must be to establish that humanitarian relief is neutral and “above the battle”. If this is not accepted by all parties—Pakistan, Mukti Bahini insurgents and India—the UN will fail in its relief mission. Governor Tikka Khan appeared to grudgingly accept this point of view, but believed that the UN would fail to assure the security of relief transport in any case. We affirmed in the strongest terms possible to both Pakistan and UN officials that there should be no mixed relief and non-relief cargoes on relief ships, no carrying of jute on return trips (jute exports are a prime target of the insurgents), and no military control, or escort, for the transport and distribution of relief goods. “Laissez Passez” for Humanitarian Relief Depends on Tacit Indian Cooperation . The Mukti Bahini guerilla forces and the Bangla Desh radio (operating in India) have not yet decided their attitude toward UN sponsored humanitarian food and relief movements in East Pakistan. UN officials in Dacca should be able to assure the integrity of relief operations, but they cannot contact Mukti Bahini “enemy” forces without compromising their position with the Pakistan authorities. Consequently, the UN must gain agreement directly with Mukti Bahini leaders that there will be free passage of relief supplies. We believe the U.S. Government can help by discussions in New Delhi of overall relief needs and problems both in East Pakistan and the refugee camps in India—stressing the link between the two. Leadership of UN Field Operation Critical . The UN relief effort is at a critical stage. Security and coordination of transport problems must be handled swiftly in a sensitive and difficult operational situation. The UN field staff is just arriving, most without prior experience in Pakistan, and leadership of the UN Mission is not resolved. For these reasons we strongly recommended that the UN Secretariat in New York move swiftly to take effective charge of their operation. B. REFUGEE AND RELATED POLITICAL ISSUES Psychological Factors More Important than Economic in Refugee Movement . While a major concern is that famine would probably lead to further large-scale refugee movement into India, psychological factors have been more important than economic in the flight of refugees up to this point. Communal riots in late April, and the resulting fear, fueled the mass exodus to India. Attacked by government forces, the retreating Bangla Desh nationalist groups turned on the Urdu-speaking Bihari communities (earlier refugees from India totalling some two million.) There followed a counter-riot of the Biharis and Urdu-speaking soldiers against Bengali nationalists and Hindus. West Pakistan officials state they are attempting to dampen the communal fires. When asked about exclusion of Hindus from relief assistance in the cyclone disaster area, President Yahya Khan replied that “discrimination against Hindus was contrary to instructions,” and that he “encourages the return of the refugees.” Hindus Not Yet Safe in East Pakistan . American voluntary agency representatives in Dacca told us that it was not safe for Hindus to return to their homes. They cited known cases of returnees who had met with fatal accidents. The Catholic Relief Services Director reported that the presence of foreigners helps to assure the safety of the remaining minority communities. Refugees Probably Still Leaving East Pakistan . While it is difficult to establish facts concerning current refugee movements, the UN Representative for Refugees in East Pakistan estimates that no more than 34,000 refugees had returned from India through reception centers since June, and that East Pakistanis continue to flee to India at a rate of 20,000 to 30,000 a day. President Yahya Khan categorically denied that refugees were leaving East Pakistan. He said his army was on the borders and it had orders to stop East Pakistanis from leaving and infiltrators from entering. Governor Tikka Khan, however, said that the army’s administrative control over many of the border areas was not assured. Without independent verification by impartial observers, it is impossible to sort out accurately the conflicting claims. (India claims over eight million Pakistan refugees in India, and Pakistan claims the number does not exceed two and a half million.) Progress in Political Accommodation . President Yahya Khan has not progressed far in devising a formula for political accommodation. His approach to the Awami League is essentially juridical. Those against whom no criminal charges have been made may return and be assured that they will not be tried. So far only 88 elected Awami League members of the General Assembly and some 94 members of the Provincial Assembly have been cleared of criminal charges. Amnesty for all other Awami League and Bengali refugees—in the sense of freedom from possible criminal charges—is still uncertain. Of the 88 elected members of the General Assembly, Yahya Khan said only 16 were in Dacca protected by his army—and one of these had been killed. When we urged him to lift the illegal ban on the Awami League “cleansed of its former leadership” to encourage others of the 88 to return, Yahya Khan replied he had gone as far as West Pakistan opinion would tolerate in making concessions to Awami League sessionists. Trial of Mujibur Rahman . The juridical approach extends to Mujibur Rahman, who “will have a fair trial since the matter is entirely in the hands of the judiciary”, Yahya Khan said. He described the arrangements for a vigorous and independent defense counsel for Mujib. In his own mind Yahya Khan has no doubt that Mujib is guilty. “It was two assemblies, two this and two that, but when it came to two flags and they tore down the flag of Pakistan, that was too much,” he said. (Comment: If Mujibur Rahman publicly recanted the “two flags”, could he still play a useful role?) We were told by Bengali friends that if Mujib is killed, there would be a further mass exodus of refugees from East Pakistan, an assessment which we conveyed to Yahya Khan, through his principal Minister, M.M. Ahmad. This led us to stress that Mujibur Rahman is more dangerous dead than alive to the unity of Pakistan. Anti-Hindu Feeling in East Pakistan Likely to Increase . As the Mukti Bahini guerrilla attacks increase in intensity, the pressure against the Hindu minority still in East Pakistan also will intensify. General Rahim Khan (charged with civil affairs in the East and recommended to us by Yahya Khan as his “sweet general”) said 200 local leaders had been killed by Mukti Bahini attacks in the struggle which is now beginning for administrative control of rural areas. The government is turning to, and arming as irregulars, the most deeply orthodox Muslims in the rural villages. These tend to be the poorer, opportunistic elements with little or no experience in leadership roles, but with fierce loyalty to Islam and equally fierce anti-Hindu feelings. This polarization of the rural social and administrative structure has not gone far beyond the border area as yet, but it will almost certainly continue in response to mounting Mukti Bahini guerrila attacks. In these circumstances, India’s current support for the Mukti Bahini— through arms, training and a cross border sanctuary—intensifies anti-Hindu feeling in East Pakistan and leads to the further flight of Hindu refugees to India. (The pre-March 25 Hindu population of East Pakistan has been estimated at about eleven million.) General Rahim Khan told us of plans to abolish all traditional village leaders and councils and displace them with thoroughly loyal peace committees—the deeply orthodox Muslims mentioned above. We strongly advised against it on the grounds that the resulting social and administrative disruption would force traditional village leadership into opposition, extend the conflict and—in our judgment—open the way to radicalization of the rural areas. Normally, it would be difficult to imagine a way to completely disrupt a traditional subsistence society and economy like that of East Pakistan. But Pakistani officers are capable of doing it, as they seek to solve an immediate and increasingly urgent military problem. C. FRAMEWORK FOR RELIEF AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE Massive relief to East Pakistan estimated at $315 million, with a proposed U.S. share of $235 million . We estimate that a massive relief program for East Pakistan for FY 1972 could cost up to $315 million to address the following key problems which have been identified: $ Millions -Food Supplies 155 Current PL 480 commitments meet most of anticipated requirements for cereals, oil and high protein food -Transport 25 River boats, coastal vessels, tugs, trucks, spares and contingent airlift of food for possible famine pockets -Direct Relief 10 Child feeding, support of UN and voluntary agency programs, medical supplies -Work Relief (rupees) 20 A government sponsored work relief program to stimulate income and provide employment -Agricultural Inputs 30 Fertilizer, pesticides, pumps, sprayers, parts to prevent drop in local rice production next year -Refugee Resettlement 75 Costs of housing, other necessities for a productive life, reestablishment of community services, assuming 3 million (or all Muslims now in India) return Total $315 A strong effort should continue to be made through the United Nations to obtain contributions from other countries, but realistically we assume the U.S. will probably share about 75 percent of the costs, for a U.S. share of about $235 million—$115 million PL 480, $25 million U.S.-owned excess rupees, and up to $95 million appropriated dollars. (See Tab C for details on the proposed relief program for East Pakistan.) Mending Pakistan’s Consortium Relations . President Yahya Khan and his Economic Advisor, M.M. Ahmad, want to improve relations with the consortium, but they prefer to move slowly in making financial requests to avoid further embarassment to Pakistan in its relations with other governments and the World Bank. We proposed a consortium meeting in the third week in September—at the time of the Bank/Fund Executive Directors Meeting in Washington—to review: (a) immediate relief requirements for East Pakistan and the need for further international help, (b) extension of debt relief by common donor action, and (c) somewhat longer term relief and reconstruction needs, particularly for agriculture. Our initiative in seeking to mend Pakistan consortium relations was appreciated by President Yahya Khan and his Economic Advisor. However, given member country attitudes, they insisted that the next consortium meeting agenda be restricted to debt and relief assistance for East Pakistan. We urged, nonetheless, that the consortium also should consider requirements for agricultural commodity assistance. We are working with the Bank to assure the necessary coordination and staff work. Relief for refugees in India estimated at $830 million with a proposed U.S. share of $ 320 million . Pakistan refugee relief costs in India will total $830 million for FY 1972 ($440 million for food and $390 million for non-food relief) on the basis of 8 million refugees. This staggering refugee burden is about equal to total annual consortium aid to India. PL 480 can help meet requirements for wheat, rice, oil and other commodities. To date we have provided $40 million of food assistance, and PL 480 relief could reach $170 million. A planned 40 percent U.S. share of the refugee burden would mean $150 million in dollars to help with non-food costs, such as shelter, clothing, sanitation, medicine and special food supplements particularly for children. We have contributed $30 million in grants for this purpose to date. Thus, total U.S. assistance for the refugees who are in India could reach $320 million. India also will seek a maximum amount of development loans through the aid donor consortium to minimize the loss of momentum in its development program during this period of extraordinary financial burden. (See Tab D for details on refugee support costs in India.) D. RECOMMENDED FUTURE LINES OF ACTION President Nixon’s initiative in directing massive relief to East Pakistan has: (a) improved the public and moral posture of President Yahya Khan’s government (through its concern for relief to its citizens in the East Wing), (b) reduced the prospects of widespread famine, (c) led to some deemphasis of military control over civil affairs, and (d) brought a Bengali Governor to head the civil administration in East Pakistan. These are important gains which were only possible because of our policy of maintaining a dialogue with Pakistan, as well as with India. We should continue to keep open channels of communication and influence. Carrying forward the relief effort involves us in difficult—but manageable—operational problems of putting starch into the UN organizational structure and using our influence with Pakistan to keep the UN relief effort to the fore. Our approach of providing relief through the UN is essential if we are to avoid U.S. involvement in the “Battle for the Transport Lifeline” when it comes to transport of relief supplies. The critical element for the success of our massive relief policy through the UN is acceptance, or tolerance, by all parties—Pakistan, Mukti Bahini insurgents, and India—that food and humanitarian concern for the people of East Pakistan is “above the battle.” The Indian attitude appears likely to be a governing factor; the Government of India must accept the fact that humanitarian relief cannot be limited by political boundary. Refugees and relief in India and in East Pakistan are integral parts of the same problem. While we have made some progress on relief and reform in East Pakistan, the security situation continues to deteriorate and the Hindu population is still leaving the Province. Whatever the origins of the conflict as an internal Pakistan problem, today India is “fighting” Pakistan by proxy through its support to the Mukti Bahini insurgents and Pakistan, indirectly, is fighting back by pursuing policies which will encourage the entire 11 million Hindu population of East Pakistan to go to India and not return. Neither arrived at this mode of warfare by advance design but both appear to have “innocently” seized the “weapons” at hand. The situation urgently calls for the equivalent of a “cease fire,” or “stand fast.” Elements of an equivalent “cease and stand fast” would appear to be: For Pakistan : A public declaration that protection of all minorities—the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan and the Hindu minorities in East Pakistan—is a sacred trust. The new Bengali Governor, Dr. Malik, has two overwhelming advantages for the job. He is trusted by Yahya Khan and he has an established public record of espousing the cause of Muslim-Hindu harmony. (He showed us clippings from Calcutta newspapers in the early 1950’s which praised his courageous stand on this issue.) We should encourage Yahya Khan to support Dr. Malik in measures to reduce anti-religious passions against Hindus whose home is East Pakistan. (The 80 million Muslims in India are hostage to the success of this policy). For India : The Government of India must face the reality that continuing economic assistance for relief and economic development, both urgently needed, will be supported by the publics in Western countries only if every effort is made to reduce tensions and forestall the headlong plunge to war. India bears responsibility which cannot be ignored for the training, arming and providing cross border sanctuary for Mukti Bahini. We should parallel our approach to Pakistan on relief needs and administration with similar discussions with India at an appropriate level. Our objectives would be to encourage: (a) Indian support for the principle that movement of relief goods for East Pakistan is above political considerations and military interdiction. Some supply of food to East Pakistan might be arranged through India, (b) Indian recognition that intensification of insurgency—however it occurs—increases the flow of refugees to India and reduces the chance of their return, (c) Indian recognition that their objective of avoiding radicalizing Awami League leadership will fail because intensification of the insurgency will radicalize rural East Bengal, with potentially serious political repercussion in Eastern India, (d) A 60-day dampening of insurgent activity, insofar as India can use its good offices to this end, to permit cooling of anti-Hindu passions in East Pakistan and to encourage a calmer process of political negotiation between the Pakistan Government and Bangla Desh representatives, and (e) Acceptance by India that UN observers stationed in East Pakistan can cross into India on valid refugee business. Without making our relief and economic aid directly contingent on Indian performance on the above points, we would want India to understand the link which we see between helping refugees in India and establishing conditions in East Pakistan for the return of all refugees. We should seek to arrive at a mutuality of interest on this linkage. The steps proposed, to be taken separately but on parallel lines, by both India and Pakistan, would require significant changes in the way each now views its vital interests in East Pakistan. If, however, some palpable degree of “cease and stand fast” can be encouraged on both sides, ways may be opened for greater progress toward political accommodation between the leaders of Pakistan and the Awami League/Bangla Desh leadership. Maurice J. Williams Coordinator of U.S. Disaster Relief for East Pakistan 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Secret. Rogers transmitted the memorandum to Nixon on September 13 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Tabs A–D are not published. 144. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency 144. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, September 22, 1971 SUBJECT: The Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Six Months Later 1 NOTE Enough has happened since we last published 2 to warrant another assessment of the situation in South Asia. In the following we discuss the current situation; likely developments with respect to Pakistan, India, and the Bengali insurgents; the roles of the great powers; the contingency of larger hostilities between India and Pakistan; and possible resolutions of the problem. The Insurgency 1. The situation in the subcontinent, and particularly in East Pakistan, has become increasingly tense and volatile. The West Pakistani army and paramilitary security services in East Bengal, now augmented to around 80,000 men, control the cities and parts of the countryside, at least in the daytime. They do have some allies among the populace, notably the 1–2 million non-Bengali Urdu-speaking “Biharis”, and some ardently anti-Hindu Bengalis. Many of their supporters have been organized into officially appointed “Peace Committees” which perform some governmental functions. 2. But the military and its allies have not been able to crush an insurgency movement operating throughout much of East Pakistan. Bengali propaganda, such as that from the outlawed Awami League (AL) leaders now in India, alleges that the resistance forces are formidable. Little is known, however, about the real capabilities of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Fighters, a term frequently used to designate all armed Bengali insurgents, of whatever organization or political persuasion, whether based in East Pakistan or in India). In India there may be as many as 50,000 East Bengalis in some way or another associated with a resistance force. Many if not most of them formerly belonged to the pre-March 1971 Pakistani army and to the paramilitary Bengali security service. Perhaps as many as 15,000 cross the border from time to time and carry out guerrilla operations. 3. The larger group that has so far stayed in India may be planning to seize and hold, against Pakistani military counterattack, a sizable chunk of East Bengali territory in which it could establish a functioning, independent Bangla Desh—a move which would be both highly provocative and of uncertain outcome. Or it may be similar to the Algerian army based in Tunisia until 1962, i.e., intending not to fight immediately but rather to wait and take over the country when the West Pakistanis leave. It is also quite possible that decisions as to the use of this force have yet to be made. In any case, some effort has been made to screen it so as to assure its loyalty to the AL-controlled Bangla Desh government-in-exile in Calcutta. 4. The political orientation of the operational guerrillas themselves, their exact numbers, command structure, etc., are generally unknown. But Bengalis are traditionally individualistic even anarchic in character. The insurgents probably include a number of disparate, even conflicting groups of individuals and bands who operate independently of one another. Those loyal to the AL may make up the largest number, but at least some of the insurgents are hard line extremists similar to the urban guerrillas in India’s state of West Bengal. 5. The Mukti Bahini have shown an increasing degree of sophistication and effectiveness against the Pakistanis, though not so much as they claim. By blowing up bridges, sabotaging ships and boats, mining roads, and derailing trains, they have badly disrupted the area’s transportation system. They have assassinated a number of Peace Committee members. Striking hard at the jute industry, Pakistan’s principal export earner, the Mukti Bahini’s acts of sabotage and intimidation have helped to reduce output of jute products to about a quarter of the former level. Casualties have been inflicted on the Pakistani army, but we have no reliable information on how many. Our Consulate in Dacca has reported a number of explosions in that city; at one time or another the city’s power system and gas supplies have been put out of action, and the lobby of the most prominent hotel destroyed by a bomb. School attendance, particularly in the universities, is virtually at an end. “Pacification” remains unrealized, though Islamabad continues to claim the situation is in hand. 6. The relationship between the Mukti Bahini and the Indian government remains a subject of controversy. Islamabad claims that only active Indian backing and collaboration have permitted the “miscreants” to operate; that peaceful conditions and the end of the refugee flow would have been achieved if only India had closed the border, disarmed the insurgents fleeing to India, and severely restricted their activities. New Delhi replies with denials of such support, and with arguments that the 2,500 mile Indian-East Pakistani border is so long and the terrain so difficult as to make control of it impossible. New Delhi further claims that neither it nor anyone else can tell whether Bengalis in the area are from East Pakistan or from West Bengal, that the insurgency is a mass popular uprising inside East Bengal itself, and that it is unable to monitor, much less stop, the aid given the Mukti Bahini by sympathizers in India. 7. There is some truth in both sets of claims, but Indian involvement with the Mukti Bahini is clearly greater than New Delhi publicly admits. [ text not declassified ] reports and direct observation by such outsiders as Western newsmen indicate that the Indian military and the paramilitary services are arming, equipping, and training—as well as providing sanctuary to—East Bengalis in considerable numbers. Numerous artillery duels and open border skirmishes between regular Indian and Pakistani military forces on the border also point to direct Indian support of border crossers. While some private aid to the insurgents in India has taken place, neither the conventional nor the guerrilla units of the Mukti Bahini could have acquired arms and munitions in any quantity except from the Indian military. 8. There are a number of reasons why New Delhi is pursuing this policy. The Mukti Bahini’s cause is enormously popular in India; repressive measures against them would generate major political backlash. In terms of realpolitik, India considers its self-interest served by any weakening of its traditional foe. The Indians may think effective opposition to Islamabad’s rule is greater than it actually is, and probably downgrade the actual strength of the West Pakistanis’ military power in East Bengal. At each stage, they have been willing to arm more guerrillas and to abet more border crossings in the hope that this would finally begin the toppling of Punjabi military rule there. 9. In helping the insurgents, New Delhi also seeks to maintain some degree of control over them. India’s state of West Bengal has long been a hotbed of some of the most virulent and extreme political movements in the world, ones which have already inflicted considerable damage on that state’s (and India’s) urban industrial economy. Heavy repressive measures have so far kept these movements under control. The Bengalis of East Pakistan are equally susceptible to such views; if such radicals ever took over control of an independent Bangla Desh, they would pose a formidable threat to Indian security. Indeed, India is worried about the political fallout in West Bengal even now. New Delhi is probably not merely giving support to East Bengalis it regards favorably, but also is trying to check the extremists. The Refugees 10. The violent acts of both the Pakistani forces and the Mukti Bahini, the reprisals and counter-reprisals have inflicted grave damage on East Bengal and its people. Economic activity is now some 30–35 percent of what it was prior to March 1971, if that. Estimates (really guesses) say that some 200,000 or more residents of the area have been killed, and the area has seen one of the largest and most rapid population transfers in modern times. Since March 1971, over 8 million of the 76 million East Pakistanis have fled to India, and this movement continues. * The tide ebbs and flows; since its peak rate in June when it averaged 100,000 daily, it has rarely fallen below 20,000–30,000 a day. 11. Probably 80–90 percent of those fleeing have been Hindus. It may be that the refugee flow into India will stop only when nearly all the Hindus have finally crossed the border. Some 6 million plus have already left Pakistan; the remaining 3–4 million may not be far behind. Depending on events in the area, this could occur even by the end of the year. Moreover, if East Pakistan suffers severe food shortages in the next few months, the Hindus may be joined by additional millions of Muslims. 12. Why this incredible movement of people? There are a number of reasons, but many if not most of the Hindus fled for fear of their lives. At the beginning of the civil war, General Tikka Khan—then the Governor and Martial Law Administrator—apparently calculated that he could intimidate his recalcitrant province into quick submission. Troops mostly from the West Pakistani Punjab (an area now almost 100 percent Muslim and strongly communal in outlook) appear to have made Hindus, darkly suspected anyway of being Indian spies and secessionists, their special targets. In this virulent atmosphere, [ text not declassified ] and resident collaborators have become accustomed to mistreating the Hindu religious minority. The top leaders in Islamabad have since tried to stop these practices, but their efforts have sometimes been unavailing. 13. The Indians have accepted the refugees and have provided them with the rudiments of subsistence. They seem prepared to continue doing so, at least for the moment. From early on, they hoped that most of the heavy costs would be borne by the wealthier outside powers. To date, these hopes have been mostly unavailing; extensions of foreign assistance for the refugees have so far amounted to some $200 million (actual deliveries have been much smaller); the total cost to India through the next six months or so may come to five times that amount. India’s comparatively charitable response probably results less from altruism than from lack of alternatives. To forcibly drive the millions of refugees back across the border might result in the death of many if not most of them. If India permitted retaliatory actions against Muslims in India, including expelling them into Pakistan, it would risk making its 60 million Muslims fair game for Hindu fanatics (of whom there are many). Were such to happen and get out of hand, as it probably would, the present woes of East Bengal would seem small-scale. 14. In many respects the refugee problem is the principal threat to peace in the subcontinent. The sheer numbers of refugees may burden India beyond its capacity. New Delhi might then conclude that it had no choice but to invade East Pakistan either to install a government that would let the refugees return, or to seize enough Pakistani territory to resettle them. This kind of reasoning is attractive to many Indians, and pressures for an invasion will grow if the exodus continues. But this move would probably only make a bad situation worse—and at least some prominent Indian leaders are probably aware of this. An attack on East Pakistan, with accompanying heavy fighting, movements of large armed forces, etc., would create still another group of refugees, further disrupt transport, and destroy crops and stored food in an area where the latter is already in short supply. Similarly the seizure of a Bengali area large enough to resettle several million people could achieve its purpose only if many present residents were expelled and made homeless themselves. 15. Most Hindu refugees now in India would probably not want to return to East Bengal under any conditions—though India is reluctant to acknowledge this. Hindu properties have been parceled out to others, memories of atrocities remain fresh, and Hindu-Muslim antagonisms— although now muted amongst Bengalis by common grievances against the West Pakistanis—remain strong. * But whether these negative factors will continue to be recognized by the Indian government is another matter. Famine in East Bengal? 16. This is still uncertain. There is still too little hard information, too few means of finding out exactly how much food, transport—or even how many consumers—there will be in the next few months in East Pakistan. Taking into account war conditions, flight of farmers, neglect of cultivation, and earlier natural disasters (severe floods in August 1970, the cyclone of November of that year) the production of rice, the area’s principal food, will of course be down, though by how much is unknown. But with the flight of 10 percent of the population, and the probable availability of emergency food shipments from abroad, the situation may not assume critical proportions. 17. This may not be the case, however, for individual families, villages, or larger food deficit areas. East Pakistan’s internal transportation network has been crippled, and movement of food from ports and surplus areas will be very difficult, often impossible. Much of the former local administrative and distributive apparatus has disappeared. In addition there will be continuing obstacles of political origin. Food distribution is viewed by each side as something to be used for its own advantage, or at least as something to be denied to the enemy. Thus there are reports of some members of the Pakistani army and the Peace Committees deliberately withholding food from Hindus. Some Mukti Bahini leaders for their part have threatened to attack and sabotage emergency food distribution efforts, including those of the UN, because such will be ultimately run by and for their West Pakistani oppressors. In any event, the food situation in East Bengal is likely to remain uncertain, with the potential for a disaster of major magnitude. Attitudes of New Delhi and Islamabad 18. The two governments continue to be hostile, self-righteous, and emotional with respect to one another. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who got a sweeping electoral mandate last spring, is clearly in charge in New Delhi. Elected on a platform promising a major effort to reduce unemployment and to raise living standards, she has been compelled instead to preoccupy herself with the Pakistani crisis. On the whole, she has been a force for moderation, resisting demands for all-out war from the xenophobic Jan Sangh party and other extremists. Her policies have so far received general public support. 19. The Pakistani military continues to rule all sections of the country through its strict Martial Law Administration (MLA). Whether President Yahya Khan is absolute boss or simply one of a number of generals ruling collectively cannot be established. In any event Yahya and the MLA show almost no signs of partisan disagreements or lack of resolve. Z.A. Bhutto, the politician who got most of the West Pakistani votes in the December 1970 elections, has so far not been permitted to take office. In his frustration he frequently lashes out at the MLA in private (and occasionally in public), but he will remain powerless so long as the military continues to rule. And in the present crisis atmosphere, there are few signs that the MLA will in fact renounce its authority. * 20. The Indians say that the West Pakistanis’ acts in the east wing are not only wrong—in that they are trying to negate through military acts the AL’s electoral mandate—but also doomed to failure. They probably see the degree of Bengali resistance as too great for Islamabad ever to stifle; in any event, they feel morally obligated to support it, even though this policy entails obvious risks. They calculate that mounting costs and continuing failures—much of it resulting from the activities of the Indian-supported Mukti Bahini—will eventually force the West Pakistanis to grant autonomy to the east wing and probably to abandon it entirely. The Indians also seem to feel, or hope, that these objectives may be achieved sooner rather than later, and without a full-scale Indo-Pakistani war. 21. Besides aiding the insurgents, India has also given asylum to many civilian AL leaders who were able to flee East Bengal, and has extended considerable aid to the Bangla Desh government-in-exile which these leaders set up in Calcutta some months ago. Most of them have proved to be uninspiring figures, with little stature or popularity in their own right. None can claim, as could Mujibur Rahman, to speak for the Bengali people. Mrs. Gandhi has so far resisted domestic political pressures to extend formal diplomatic recognition to this shadow regime. Such an act would almost certainly lead to a break in relations with Pakistan and possibly to serious hostilities as well. Were the latter to erupt anyway, or the insurgency to continue for an extended period, however, the odds favoring recognition would grow. 22. For his part, Yahya sincerely believes that Pakistan is the aggrieved party, that it is only suppressing a treasonable, secessionist movement in order to maintain the integrity of the country. Because the Indians support the Bengali insurgents, Islamabad asserts that they are the aggressors and are responsible for the suffering, bloodshed, and refugees. Even so, there are occasional rumors of a possible accommodation being reached between President Yahya and the AL. But this would probably require such major (and at the moment unlikely) concessions by Yahya—particularly the release of Mujibur Rahman —as to make it improbable. Rather, the MLA is likely to remain morally and emotionally committed to its present course. 23. That course implies more than just continued military rule. President Yahya has recently declared an amnesty for most Bengalis, removed the harsh General Tikka Khan from East Pakistan, and appointed a Bengali civilian as governor there. But the new governor is an old man not noted for skill, decisiveness, or popular appeal. He has chosen a cabinet of civilians, but his province continues under martial law and thus under army control. About 40 percent of the AL members elected in December 1970 to provincial and national assemblies have been officially cleared to take their seats when and if those bodies meet; elections to replace those proscribed are promised by the end af 1971. But the Mukti Bahini will inhibit many if not most of those who have been cleared from serving, and will also probably disrupt any new elections which might be held. On balance, we expect that Yahya’s military regime will continue to seek ways of bringing on civilian constitutional rule in all parts of Pakistan, but will find the obstacles formidable, and the goal probably unattainable. Any civilian government established in East Pakistan under the army’s aegis is likely to be more shadow than substance. 24. West Pakistan itself has experienced some difficulties in the past six months. Military spending is cutting into development and social services; stock market prices are the lowest in six years; private investment is nearly non-existent; and there are some press reports that prices are rising. Even so, West Pakistan has so far not felt the severe economic pinch and consequent political difficulties which some experts thought would result from the troubles in the east wing. Urban unemployment has not seriously increased. More than 70 percent of its workers are farmers who would not be much affected by developments in the urban, industrial sector. Except for occasional complaints by the frustrated Bhutto and some of his associates, there has not been much public unrest or dissatisfaction with the government and its policies in the west wing. Yahya’s moves have so far been well accepted and probably popular there. This, like the economic situation, may change, but it does not seem likely at any time soon. 25. West Pakistan’s foreign exchange position has remained considerably better than expected. Soon after the crisis broke, Islamabad unilaterally declared a six months moratorium on its foreign debt payments, saving itself $60 million in foreign exchange. Its fairly large textile industry has lost much of its captive market in the east wing, but it apparently has been able to export its products elsewhere. At the same time, consumer imports have been cut sharply. Development spending in the east, of course, has been greatly curtailed if not ended entirely. Thanks to these steps, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen only from $254 million a year ago to $217 million. Western powers have made no significant new extensions of foreign aid since March 1971, but there is still enough aid in the pipeline to last several more months, possibly longer. Pakistan’s moratorium on foreign debt repayments expires in October and the government is seeking more liberal repayment terms from its creditors. If such are not forthcoming, Islamabad could then declare another moratorium and continue as before— though this would further antagonize at least some of its foreign creditors. South Asia and the Outside Powers 26. Since March 1971, both India and Pakistan have, of course, sought outside backing for their respective positions, and have shown considerable concern with foreign responses to their moves. Neither country has taken its case to the UN in this dispute, probably in part because neither would be likely to get the strong endorsement of any significant group of nations there. In some cases foreign support, or lack of it, has had only marginal impact. India has been disappointed, though hardly damaged, by the support given the Pakistanis by the Arabs whom New Delhi has so long cultivated and endorsed in their dispute with Israel. Of far greater consequence has been India’s failure to get all Pakistan’s principal sources of economic aid to suspend their assistance pending a political solution in East Bengal. But the two South Asian countries have concentrated most of their efforts in seeking the backing, variously, of the US, the USSR, and China. a. China 27. Peking has not involved itself much in the current South Asian crisis, at least not openly and directly. Early on, it did send a nasty, if somewhat equivocal, note to the Indian government telling the latter not to interfere in the affairs of others, but it has since been generally silent on the civil war in East Bengal. So far as we know, ties with the Islamabad government remain cordial, and China’s substantial economic and military aid programs with Pakistan appear to continue as before. Well before March 1971, Peking had begun to mute its normally harsh anti-Indian posture. During the past year or so it has made no polemical attacks on Mrs. Gandhi, and has apparently ceased its propaganda support of the small tribal insurgencies in northeastern India. Indeed, there are numerous rumors in India that major moves in the direction of a detente with Peking are in the offing. 28. In any case, China remains an important factor in both Islamabad and New Delhi; the contingency of a joint Pakistani-Chinese attack on it remains a principal Indian bugaboo. This has been even more the case since the Indians learned of Mr. Kissinger’s trip from Pakistan to Peking and of President Nixon’s impending trip to China. Ever suspicious and prone to fear the worst, many in India surmise that they face not merely the coordinated hostility of their two traditional enemies, but fear that both will have the backing of the US. We continue to estimate that the Chinese probably would not join in an Indo- Pakistani conflict—though in certain circumstances they might engage in such threatening gestures as maneuvering troops near the Chinese-Indian border. We also believe that the Indians themselves probably do not consider the Chinese to be an actual imminent threat. Nonetheless, they are uneasy, and continue to seek ways both of strengthening themselves militarily and of finding supporters against a putative US-China-Pakistan coalition against them. b. The USSR 29. These fears have been a major factor in India’s development of even closer ties with the USSR. Moscow has not backed India consistently and uncritically since the Bengali crisis erupted. It has continued deliveries under its economic aid program to Pakistan, and [ text not declassified ] But more than any of the other great powers, the USSR has lined up with India since March 1971; in New Delhi’s eyes it remains a bastion against any threat, real or imagined, to an India isolated from or hostile to the other principal powers. The Friendship Treaty of August 1971 further cements and formalizes Indo-Soviet ties. It reaffirms mutual friendship, incorporates promises not to assist one another’s enemies in case of an attack by a third party, and agrees to mutual “consultation” in the event of such an attack or a threat of one. How much enhanced influence or “control”, if any—say through secret understandings—this treaty actually gives the Russians over the Indians in foreign policy matters is still unclear. At the very least it provides some satisfaction to the Soviets in formalizing their present satisfactory position in India. It appears likely that they approve and support the present lines of Indian policy, and that they will continue their efforts to prevent New Delhi from heating up the situation and particularly from launching an all-out war. 30. The treaty has already had a considerable impact on both the Indians and the Pakistanis. In what can be construed as the first fruits of “consultation”, India affirmed, in a joint statement of the Indian and Soviet Foreign Ministers a few days after the treaty was signed, that “there can be no military solution and considered that urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for achievement of a political solution. . .”. Whether this implies a permanent renunciation of Indian use of force in East Bengal as well as a condemnation of Pakistan’s acts there remains to be established. However, a later reference in the joint statement to the settling of international problems by peaceful negotiations does point in that direction. * 31. At least up to now, the treaty has served as a stabilizing factor, muting the militancy which had previously raised its voice throughout much of India. Hawks have found it more difficult to get the government to listen to their demands for forceful action against Pakistan, or to attract much of a popular following. Over time, the treaty may have wider ranging consequences in other areas. It is still too early to tell, however, whether the treaty might lead to greater Indo-Soviet cooperation in military or other matters. 32. For their part, the Pakistani leaders will probably find this new formalized relationship an inhibition against launching an attack on India, and against assuming they will get very much assistance from the Chinese in the event of a war. Soviet efforts to promote restraint and avoid an Indo-Pakistani war will probably continue, and may contribute to keeping the situation under control. But the USSR’s leverage, like those of all the great powers with respect to South Asia, is not limitless, and developments could bring on major hostilities despite all attempts to forestall them. c. The United States 33. Efforts to be even-handed with respect to these two moralistic South Asian antagonists have always been difficult at best. India has been greatly angered by US policies since Pakistan’s troubles began, and leaders in New Delhi claim that relations between the two countries are now worse than at any time in the past. US decisions, which have had more symbolic than substantive impact on developments—particularly the continued shipments of small quantities of military equipment—have roused extremely strong Indian ire. The Pakistani government has, of course, been pleased by such acts, and it has been accommodating and helpful to the US in a number of ways. Nonetheless there is probably wariness in Islamabad over the future course of US South Asian policies (particularly in light of Congressional and press criticisms of them), and concern to maintain independence in basic decision making. 34. Overall, it is likely that the leaders of both India and Pakistan consider that the US, in the last analysis, will play a comparatively limited role with respect to the subcontinent, whatever the psychological impact of US policies. US military involvement in the area seems to them out of the question. US military aid programs, quite large and important until 1965, have been almost completely terminated. Nor are India and Pakistan as critically dependent as they were a few years ago on US and other Western financial aid for economic health and development. * This is not to say that either has become prosperous, or that the permanence of this independence is assured. 35. But especially in the case of India, those grievous trade deficits which had to be closed by generous outside financial aid have been rectified, at least temporarily. Thus, in 1967 India had a trade gap of over a billion dollars (imports of $2 billion and exports only half of that). This gap as covered by foreign aid, about half from the US, which assured what economic development there was. But in the most recent Indian fiscal year, exports and imports were nearly in balance. India, of course, still receives foreign non-food aid, but uses more than half of what it gets merely to repay the debts incurred from previous external assistance programs. * Were India now to be faced with the threat of denial of further aid from the US or other Western powers, it would, of course, be seriously concerned. It could, in extremis, declare a temporary moratorium or even default on debts previously incurred, and would probably be able to get along without suffering major calamity, though additional hardships would be felt by some sectors of the population. 36. In some ways the Pakistanis are already going through this process. As noted above, Pakistan, with no important new extensions of economic assistance since March 1971, has declared a moratorium on repayments of foreign debts and is drawing on aid already in the pipeline. The economy of West Pakistan is not doing badly even with the shambles in the east wing. Particularly with a diminished foreign debt burden, it could probably continue to survive, albeit considerably less comfortably, without major outside help for some time. Accordingly, it, like India, would probably be able to resist such specific pressures as threats to terminate aid programs. 37. This is not to say that either India or Pakistan has lost interest in seeking US assistance, economic or political. They, of course, do need it, do value it highly, and will continue to seek not only economic aid but as much political support from the US as they can get. They will also remain quite concerned about the possibility of US aid programs—military, economic, or whatever—which might be provided to the other. But at the same time, US influence over both states has diminished over the past several years. This is not to say that, in certain circumstances, India and Pakistan might not be receptive to the idea of mediation by the US as the great power least committed to one side or the other. 38. To date the factors working to restrain the two powers from fighting one another have been stronger than those impelling them into a major conflict. Whether and how long this will continue is basically unpredictable. A war could erupt, perhaps with little or no warning. [ text not declassified ] Local army commanders in East Pakistan have already sought (and have been denied) permission to attack and destroy nearby guerrilla bases in India. Were some field commanders to disobey orders and cross the border in force, a big explosion might become unavoidable. 39. [ text not declassfied ] In any event, delusions held by the two hostile parties encourage dangerous risk-taking, and moves taken by either—either accidentally or by design—could set off major fighting: a. Accident . Perhaps “stumbling into war” or “inadvertent escalation” are more appropriate terms. Miscalculation and self-deception might play a role here, but so would the vagaries of chance. With relations as volatile as they are, such incidents as infiltration of guerrillas into Kashmir by the Pakistanis, or of fairly large Mukti Bahini conventional military units into East Bengal by the Indians could snowball into all-out hostilities—though neither party intended this when it began the operation. b. Specific Decision . There is also the danger that the top leaders of either India or Pakistan will decide that the situation had so deteriorated that a full-scale war is the preferable alternative, particularly if begun with a pre-emptive strike. A decision to do so would, of course, be secretly arrived at and, given the high state of preparedness and readiness of both parties, either one might be able to achieve a tactical surprise in the event of an initial attack. 40. For example, either side might come to believe an attack by the other was imminent, and decide to anticipate it. Or Islamabad might, after a considerable period of time, find itself bogged down in an endless, costly, unwinnable guerrilla war. The prideful, honor-conscious generals in charge of Pakistan, faced with the humiliation of defeat, might then decide to mount a sudden assault on India. They would probably realize that the odds were against victory, but might simply hope for luck and perhaps—if worst came to worst—for great power intervention to provide a face-saving means of extrication. 41. If either decides deliberately to initiate hostilities, it is somewhat more likely to be New Delhi which might convince itself that a war would be preferable to letting the situation drift. The immediate danger of an attack by India seems to have receded for the moment, but tensions are likely to arise again, as will the opportunities for an Indian assault. Indian military movements into East Bengal would be facilitated after the end of the monsoon season in October or November; New Delhi’s fear of moves by the Chinese would be lessened by the heavy snows in the Himalayan mountain passes from January until June. 42. How long a war would last and which side, if either, would win it, would depend on many unknown factors including luck and outside diplomatic, political, and military intervention.The heaviest fighting would probably, as in 1965, be on the border areas between West Pakistan and India, though this time the Indians would attempt to seize part or all of East Pakistan as well. Barring extreme incompetence or some very bad breaks, the Indians by sheer weight of numbers would continue to be heavy favorites in any war fought to a final conclusion with Pakistan alone. * But decisive victory in any such all-out conflict would likely take weeks or months to achieve if it were achieved at all, and the aftermath for both parties in human and economic terms would be fearsome. Denouement? 43. The Indo-Pakistani crisis shows no signs of going away, much less of being settled. Its resolution—perhaps far in the distance—might be accomplished in one of several ways including: a. A war, with India expelling the West Pakistanis from Bengal and setting up an independent, but Indian-influenced Bangla Desh. This might be accompanied by a return of most refugees, or by an agreed population transfer wherein several million West Bengal Muslims go to the new state to compensate for the Hindus who had come to India. b. A war on both fronts which no one wins, followed by a cease-fire with Indian and Pakistani forces—along with UN observers—occupying parts of East Bengal as well as areas on the Western front. This might be followed by some kind of temporary solution facilitated by one or more of the great powers, say working through the UN. c. A slow defusing and de-escalation following the success of conciliatory West Pakistani efforts in East Bengal. The East and West Pakistanis come to some kind of mutual accomnodation. The insurgency stops as does the refugee flow. Some of those who fled to India (principally the Muslims) go home and India grudgingly accepts the remainder, though at heavy cost. d. The insurgency continues, possibly for years. The West Pakistanis become increasingly war weary and economically hard-pressed, and eventually depart. e. The insurgency continues, but the Bengalis lose heart and West Pakistani hegemony is restored. 44. There are, of course, other possible scenarios. If war is avoided, we believe the outcome described in subparagraph d. above would be most likely, though the manner and timing of West Pakistan’s departure and the establishment of an independent Bangla Desh cannot now be forecast. In any case, the lot of the Bengali people, already bad enough, is likely to deteriorate even more. The odds are against any outcome which would soon alleviate the hardships and sufferings which have been and are yet to be inflicted on them. Rather, Bengal will remain a serious problem for India, Pakistan and the world at large. Gravely overcrowded, devoid of natural resources, wracked with violence, its people will probably become even more prone to extremism and acts of desperation than they now are—and this in turn will call forth more repressive measures by the governments in charge. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak Crisis, South Asia, 1/1/71–9/30/71. Secret. SNIE 32–71 is Document 131 . The May 28 memorandum cited in footnote 2 has not been found. 1 This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with in CIA. 2 SNIE 32–71, 12 April 1971, Prospects for Pakistan ; and Memorandum, 28 May 1971, Indo-Pakistani Tensions . The principal judgments in both remain valid. * These are Indian statistics, but they are generally corroborated by outside observers, including those from the UN. In addition, the Indian government has appropriated funds to take care of this number. The Pakistanis on the other hand claim the figures are highly exaggerated, and say the total is closer to 2 million. In the following, we assume, on the basis of the best evidence now available, that the Indian figures are more likely the correct ones. * Some 5 million Hindu Bengalis left East Pakistan in the 23-year period between independence and early 1971. * The other principal Pakistani political leader, the AL’s Mujibur Rahman, remains in prison. Islamabad has announced that he is being tried in camera for treason, but has not disclosed the verdict or sentence. Even so he remains overwhelmingly the most popular politician in East Bengal. * Conversely it can be argued that Mrs. Gandhi might feel that with open Soviet backing she can now adopt far more risky policies than she has in the past. To date, nothing in the behavior of the Indian government tends to confirm such a view, even though its leaders insist that their freedom of action has been limited not at all by the treaty. * Both still need and receive US food aid in substantial quantities. With war conditions in East Pakistan and millions of refugees throughout Bengal, these needs will increase substantially. But this is generally referred to as “humanitarian” and not generally believed likely to be cut off in any circmstances. US economic and military aid programs were stopped during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, but food shipments continued. * These debts are now very large for both India and Pakistan, as are the annual debt servicing payments. In 1969, India’s indebtedness to Western economic aid donors was over $9 billion, and debt servicing was over $500 million. In Pakistan’s case the figures were $4 billion and $150 million, respectively. All have since risen. * The Indian army has some 1,100,000 soldiers, Pakistan about 300,000. Our knowledge of current deployment of the Indian army is less than complete, but there are almost certainly enough troops in position to cope with the situation in all likely areas of fighting. 145. Telegram 9833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 145. Telegram 9833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, September 28, 1971, 1039Z Subj: U.S. Leverage in Current East Pakistan Crisis U.S. Policy Ref Islamabad 9113 1. For some time I have been concerned, as I know you are, about the problem of explaining USG policy toward Pakistan. It is a real problem which Dave Abshire and I talked over at some length during his visit here earlier this month. This cable is, to a marked extent, an outgrowth of that conversation. 2. The central element of our strategy in Pakistan, as noted in reftel, has been the maintenance of sufficient leverage with the GOP to encourage actions on its part designed to lessen the danger of an Indo-Pak war, hasten the return of displaced persons and enhance prospects for the restoration of normality and stability in East Pakistan. These have been the major purposes of the generally sympathetic, non-reprehending attitude we have maintained toward Pakistan. This we have expressed in such ways as refusing to join in the worldwide chorus of public condemnation of GOP actions in East Pak, citing economic rather than political factors when suspending new development aid commitments, and tempering our cut-off of military sales by permitting already-licensed shipments to go forward. 3. In judging how successful this strategy has been, the yard stick is not the application of leverage as such but rather the effectiveness in using it to bring about desired changes in GOP policy and practices. Measured by this standard, I believe US strategy has been reasonably successful. As more so than generally realized within the USG, and most certainly immeasurably more than understood by the press. We have used our position to urge a number of specific suggestions on the GOP and the GOP has adopted a surprisingly large proportion of them. We are under no illusion that their adoption has brought the East Pak crisis to the verge of solution: there is no question that the situation there remains tense and perilous for all concerned and the coda thereon is yet to be written. The weight of evidence suggests, however, that measures taken at our prodding have had a beneficial effect on developments and have forestalled what otherwise would have been an even more grim situation. In short, a convincing case can be made that our strategy has “worked” in that we have probably accomplished as much as any outside entity could reasonably expect to achieve in this complex, altogether tragic situation once the GOP committed itself to the course of military action begun on March 25–26. 4. The problem in presenting this case lies in the fact that an essential aspect of US strategy is its confidential nature. Our advice has been acceptable to GOP leaders largely because it has been given in a manner designed not to humilitate them, i.e., informally in private meetings with President Yahya and his top advisers. (For example I have met with Yahya for private substantive conversations 11 times in the past four months.) The need to preserve this confidence makes the defense of our strategy before congressional and other critics an especially difficult question, for which there is probably no fully satisfactory answer. 5. It occurs to me, however, that it might be helpful to you and to those others charged with explaining our Pakistan policy if you and they had for background use a brief compilation of specific examples of how leverage has been used to help defuse or ameliorate the crisis. Some examples are mentioned in the text of reftel. The following list is intended as a supplement to reftel. It is by no means a comprehensive list of our activities in this regard, since we have been working with (and on) the GOP at multiple levels, but it does provide eleven specific examples of the applications of our leverage to bring about desired results: (1) Civilian governor for East Pak: I first suggested the need for return to civilian rule in East Pak during my May 22 meeting with Yahya. In a later meeting on July 15 I broadened this suggestion into a specific proposal that he consider naming a Bengali civilian as governor of EP, and noted Dr. A.M. Malik as a likely candidate. When I called on him with Maury Williams on Aug 19, Yahya told me he had decided to follow our advice and appoint Dr. Malik as East Pak governor. The appointment was announced Sept. 1. (2) Transfer Tikka Khan. From East Pak: In conjunction with my suggestion to appoint an EP civilian governor, on several occasions I conveyed the thought that it would be advisable to transfer General Tikka Khan (who had become a symbol of army repression) out of East Pakistan. When Yahya acted on the Malik appointment, he announced simultaneously Tikka Khan’s transfer to West Pak. This was done over the objection of army field commanders and, according to Yahya, was predicated on my demarche. (3) Appeal for return of refugees: At our May 22 meeting I first raised with Yahya our concern over the continuing refugee flow into India, suggesting he issue a public statement assuring the refugees that the GOP would welecome their return home. Yahya agreed to consider the suggestion and as a result, he issued a public statement on May 24 inviting the refugees to return home without fear. (4) Assurances for Hindu refugees: At our June 5 meeting, I conveyed to Yahya USG satisfaction over his May 24 statement on refugees but suggested he issue a further statement specifically assuring Hindu refugees that their return would be welcome. Yahya agreed to do so and included such an assurance in his June 28 nationwide radio broadcast. (5) Treatment of Hindus in East Pak: Starting with our May 22 meeting I have regularly raised with Yahya the question of repressive army treatment of the Hindu populace in East Pak. He has been especially sensitive to criticism in this field and has reacted rather briskly on occasion, but has several times agreed to do what he could to insure equitable treatment. While the actual situation on the ground in east remains far from satisfactory in this regard and reports of incidents continue to be received, we have information to confirm that troops in EP have been given a series of increasingly firm orders instructing them to refrain from repressive and discriminatory acts. (6) General amnesty: In the course of my talks with Yahya on the question of refugees, on several occassions I broached the subject of a general amnesty to help create conditions conducive to their return. Yahya expressed interest in this topic. On Sept 5 he ordered a general amnesty covering all persons in east Pak not already charged with specific criminal acts. (7) GOP acceptance UNHCR presence in East Pak: At the time of our May 22 meeting, I stressed the importance of involving the UN in a humanitarian relief effort and urged Yahya to submit a formal request to the UN for assistance in coordinating the aid effort through the UNHCR. Yahya replied that a written request to the UN was being issued that same day. (8) GOP acceptance UN-staffed field relief operations in EP: During various meetings with GOP leaders in June and July, other EmbOffs and I pressed strongly for an adequate UN field staff in East Pak to assist the relief effort. The initial GOP reaction was decidedly hesitant, but Yahya “bought” the idea and, in so doing, overrode his advisers. At my most recent meeting with Yahya on Sept 21, he once again offered full cooperation in UN staffing. (9) Improvements in GOP administration of relief effort: One major subject in my talks with Yahya since June has been the inadequate performance of the Pak civil administration in carryng out and coordinating the East Pak relief effort. I have urged specific measures to improve GOP and GOEP performance and other EmbOffs have done the same at other levels. A number of them have been adopted. As examples in our June meeting I expressed concern over poor coordination in food relief and suggested the need for a “food czar” to act as coordinator. Yahya responded several days later by appointing an over-all “food czar”. At a later meeting in August, AID Deputy Administrator Williams and I cited the need for a single GOP officer to coordinate transport and other aspects of the relief effort. On the spot Yahya agreed to give the East Pak Chief Secretary this assignment. (10) Better utilization of, and foreign crews for, coasters: A key problem in mounting the East Pak relief effort has been the need for small coastal vessels to move food up country from deepwater ports. As early as our June 5 meeting I prodded Yahya on the GOP failure to mobilize coasters already on hand for food transport, gaining his agreement to do so, the major effort on coasters came later, however, when we succeeded in persuading Yahya to accept foreign crews on coasters supplied by foreign countries in order reassure donors against their misuse. (11) Trial and sentencing of Mujib: This issue offers an example of both use and limitations of our leverage, and the final story has not yet been written. I have raised the question of Mujib with Yahya at almost every meeting since May, and it is also one of the few issues in which we have also exerted public presure on the GOP. The results have been as much as could have been hoped for realistically. Mujib has been brought to trial on charges that could lead to the death penalty. On the other hand the trial is not being conducted in a summary manner: Mujib has been allowed an outstanding defense lawyer: and we have received personal assurances that he will not be executed. 6. In conclusion, in any attempt to evaluate our current strategy towards the GOP with particular reference to its application in East Pakistan, U Thant’s precept voiced on September 20 should not be overlooked. Said U Thant: “In tragic circumstances such as these, it is all too easy to make moral judgements. It is far more difficult to face up to the political and human fralities of the situation and to help the people find a way out of their difficulties. It is the latter course which in my view, the United Nations must follow.” Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi, Dacca, and Lahore. Sent with a request to repeat to other posts as desired. 146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, and the British Ambassador to the United States (Cromer) 146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, and the British Ambassador to the United States (Cromer) 1 Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10–5:31 p.m. Douglas-Home: This India thing we have here is really very serious, indeed. The guerrilla warfare we have now is really operating in a very wide area of the countryside in East Pakistan, and it is [unclear] refugees out of East Pakistan, which is still not prepared for 4,000 a week, or even more than that. They’ll take [unclear] to run through there. In the last 3 weeks or so, 11 trips taking food and supplies to East Pakistan have helped a lot so far. And one of our shipping lines is now refusing to take any more stuff to East Pakistan and Chittagong. And, third, this is all going through that particular situation where I don’t know [unclear] however much the United Nations wants to rebuild communications to help all that. It’s not going to be possible with this guerrilla stuff going on. Nixon: Hmmm. Douglas-Home: We’ve done what we can, and then what you’ll do what you can to get Yahya Khan to move that quickly, on a visible front. And I just don’t know if he can make contact with the Bangladesh people in Bengal. And if he could, I think he will get more substantial people to cooperate than he is able to get now because the Indians have them, and the people he’s talking to in the civil administration now are people of no consequence. And they will all still be. Now this entire notion—but I suspect— Kissinger: [unclear] Douglas-Home: Yes. Kissinger: Speaking here in this room with the [unclear] for you [unclear]. We have been in touch with Bangladesh people in Calcutta. And we were trying to set up a meeting between the Bangladesh people and the West Pakistanis outside of India. And we had Yahya’s agreement to that. And the Indians have now totally thwarted it. They made it impossible for these people to deal with us; they’re forcing them to check everything with them, they are padding demands, which are totally incapable of fulfillment. Douglas-Home: [unclear] Nixon: Yeah. [overlapping conversation] Nixon: We’ve really got a crisis. [unclear] They’re so—smug is the word, and— Kissinger: It’s really hard to believe. Even I could get relief in there. Douglas-Home: That’s very bad news. Kissinger: They’ve cut, they’ve cut the supply lines into the food deficit areas you pointed out. We have offered them guarantees that the convoys or ships that go in there will not carry troops out, which is really a tremendous invasion of sovereignty, just to make sure there will be no additional refugees produced by another [unclear]. They refuse to cooperate with that. Douglas-Home: [unclear] Nixon: The Indians did insist there’s this, and, you know, they’re hypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now there’s no question that Yahya has handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expect in [with?] all the military backing. He’s a very decent man, but it’s just been handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as it’s inevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indians are playing—I’m afraid from all reports, they’re playing a game here that I think is wrong. I think they’re deliberately trying to make it insoluble. And if it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India, which can’t even digest what they already have, probably—how the hell are they going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, and there is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decide to have a fight. Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir? Nixon: Certainly. Kissinger: We’ve had an intelligence report today—I don’t know that [unclear]—Well, that they’re thinking of going into Kashmir because this situation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable. Nixon: What can we do? What can be done? [unclear exchange] Kissinger: Well, we haven’t totally failed with the Indians because the Bangladesh people, as you correctly point out, are actually quite eager to talk. Douglas-Home: Yeah. Nixon: They are? Kissinger: Yeah, but they—At first, they were willing to settle for autonomy, and as we all know autonomy would produce independence, there is no other way it can go. Kissinger: Now the Indians have escalated their demand into total independence immediately. Well, that Yahya will never agree to. There has to be a face-saving formula and a transition period. Douglas-Home: That’s right, and I think it will. I think two [unclear]with regard to everything. You’ve got to have it. Kissinger: We told the Indians that if they could separate the political process and if they could give a little more time to that and to the relief process we think everyone could achieve this objective. Douglas-Home: Mrs. Gandhi is coming to see US quite soon, and if you could— Nixon: She’s seeing you? Douglas-Home: She did stop by in London. She’s coming back. Nixon: [unclear] and after that comes here, doesn’t she? Kissinger: She’s coming in November [unclear]— Douglas-Home: Well, if you could tell us, if you could, you know, keep US informed before she comes, we can all [unclear]— Nixon: So that she doesn’t come in here and, frankly, pull our legs. I mean, let’s be sure we’re in contact on this thing. Can you tell US too? Douglas-Home: And we’ll tell you [unclear] Nixon: Now I raised this subject with Gromyko. And I was very tough with him. I said, “Now if there’s a war”—I said “We just can’t have a war. You can’t encourage the Indians because then Pakistan might—” He said, “Oh, we don’t want a war, and it’s what we’re, we have—” And he said they had told her that in Moscow. Right? Kissinger: Yeah, but– Nixon: I don’t know whether he was telling the truth or not. Kissinger: But what the Indians are doing now is the, are equipping these guerrillas with really very advanced weapons and wanting them to [unclear–advance to this area?] Douglas-Home: The only thing apparent in my mind as a part of this thing, is he is ranting about this thing. He can’t see any sense— Nixon: You remember when he came in to see us. I told you that I didn’t like the way he handled himself. Douglas-Home: [unclear] what can we do? Kissinger: Well, I think that if we could shock the Indians we would—because our judgment is that Chinese almost certainly come in at the Indians— Nixon: That’s the other thing. Kissinger: And whether the Soviets then will forgo the opportunity to settle scores with the Chinese is ultimately—I think if the Indians could be shocked into being reasonable, if that’s possible the problem is soluble. But if they’re really concerned about East Bengal that problem is soluble. If they’re concerned with using East Bengal to disintegrate all of Pakistan, to say it never should have existed then that, I think, is in the back of this complicated Indian mind. Douglas-Home: What I wanted to say, to maintain [unclear] above all things, is that they ought to be encouraging Yahya Khan in his political moves. [unclear] Kissinger: That’s right. Douglas-Home: Political realism. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: And my judgment, I had a long talk with Yahya when I was on the way to China. And he’s really [unclear]. He’s not very bright, but he has tried. Nixon: He’s a decent man, an honorable man. Kissinger: He needs some face-saving formula to go to autonomy. Douglas-Home: That’s right. Kissinger: Given the difference in culture and in public leaning, autonomy must be the answer. There’s no other way it can go. Douglas-Home: No. Nixon: Now let’s—this could be one, this could be a parable. This could be [unclear]. Wouldn’t that be something to have a [unclear] in that visible place? All that I can say is that I think the British got out too soon. Really, you know? Douglas-Home: Uh-huh. Nixon: I’ve been down that area, you know, the—I was there, I forget the last—but, and I know it’s inevitable. But when you think of India and Pakistan they just aren’t ready. They just aren’t ready, that’s all. [Omitted here is concluding conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Douglas-Home, and Cromer, Oval Office, Conversation 582–9. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 147. Telegram 10043 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 147. Telegram 10043 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, October 4, 1971, 1230Z Subj: Pakistan Internal Situation—September 1. Introduction: There follows assessment of internal political situtation based on reports from ConGens Dacca, Karachi and Lahore and Consulate Peshawar. Texts of reports from ConGens transmitted to Department by airgram. 2. Summary: GOP’s reactive measures directed at reducing secessionist pressures in East Pakistan have failed to halt anarchy in countryside, to undercut support to Mukti Bahini (BM) or to restore East Pakistan Government to its pre-March level of muddling-through incompetency. Such positive actions of GOP as appointment of civil administration and transfer of symbol of West Pak repression, Gen. Tikka Khan, have been undermined by continued collective reprisals by Pak Army against population and by non-convincing governmental performance on some steps such as general amnesty proclamation. Mukti Bahini gradually increasing scale of activity with further intensification expected in few months. Security continues to deteriorate in rural areas although Dacca city relatively undisturbed during month. 3. Yahya moved ahead on transfer by scheduling elections in east in December and January and assumption is assemblies will be called shortly after elections, with constitution being issued in interim period regime’s strategy to build counterweight to people’s party through merged Muslim League factions has apparently collapsed in West Pakistan although merger still remains very possible in east. Pre-election scramble has begun in Dacca although it unclear at this point what extent GOP will permit free elections or degree to which Mukti Bahini will disrupt election process. End summary 4. In East Pakistan, military conflict continued in now relatively established pattern, but without any clear direction. In countryside, MB has succeeded in snarling ground transport to large extent and has conducted sophisticated and costly attacks on ocean-going shipping at both East Pakistani ports. Terrorist activities included unsuccessful assassination attempts on one East Pak minister and on son of East Pak convention Muslim League leader. 5. ConGen Dacca reports that MB continues initiate numerous actions into those districts previously reported (Dacca, Noakhali, Comllla, Faridpur, Mymensingh—Sylhet district unknown) with intensification of activity in Dacca rural areas. ConGen also reports that fighting occurred in Jesore and Dinajpur while certain areas of Khulna and Rangpur are under MB control. Lower-level MB actions have taken place in southeast districts of Chittagong, Barisal and Patuakhali. On other hand, Dacca city relatively free from incidents during month. 6. Despite orders from MLA Chief Niaz, burning of villages and bazaars by Pak military as reprisals for MB activity still taking place. These retaliatory actions are apparently indiscriminate. Dacca states that ConGen receiving scattered reports, mainly from Mymensingh, that army pursues persecution of Hindus. GOP claims to have intercepted several sizeable groups of MB near border areas and inflicted heavy losses. Along border, frequent shellings are reported by GOP. 7. Although we anticipate further step-up in MB activity in East Pakistan, we would expect large scale MB “offensive” rumored for October when MB recruits in Indian training camps expected to be “unleashed” to perhaps slip into November and December when monsoon flood waters have receded. Dry season also will provide greater mobility to Pak Army. MLA in west fully cognizant probable intensification MB activity in next few months as training in Indian camps completed, but we have seen no signs of large-scale buildup of existing forces in east to meet this threat. Pak military forces in west tied down in forward positions in face present Indo-Pak tensions. 8. ConGen Dacca observes that some evidence emerged on two key aspects of present insurgency: whether population will continue support MB despite difficulties and reprisals and whether MB will have ability to develop organizational infrastructure. 9. Dacca has impression that urban bourgeoisie (origin of much of Awami League leadership) beginning show signs of weariness and desire for end to present uncertainties although their hatred for West Pakistan unabated. However, in countryside, peasants willingly share their limited food and shelter to ever-increasing MB forces. Dacca concludes Mukti Bahini sustaining general popular support. 10. On second question, there appears to be civil Bangladesh structure parallel to Mukti Bahini in areas of Faridpur district. (Reports have also been received of Maoist civil organization in those areas of Noakhali where pro-Peking Toaha communist groups active.) It is probable that similar BD governmental apparatuses have been installed in other isolated areas where Pak Army has neither troop resources nor strategic interest to occupy. (BD/MB) organizational activities and difficulties in India have been reported in detail by ConGen, Calcutta.) 11. On civil side, ConGen reports that GOP appointment civilian governor with multi-party cabinet proclamation of general amnesty, announcement of by-elections and Yahya’s agreement to submit constitution to amendment process have not cured malaise of GOEP officaldom, halted abuses by army and police, or mollified disaffected East Pak population. With minor exceptions, GOEP has yet to reach pre-March levels of normal administrative incompetency. Bengalis skeptical over amnesty as arrests continue and few persons of known prominence have been released. Malik and unimpressive Cabinet generally believed to be subservient to East Pak MLA. Prospects for political role through by-elections, has, however, galvanized those politicians defeated in 1970 elections. (See succeeding paras). 12. Perhaps closest analogy to situation prevailing within East Pakistan after six months of unrest is that also existing in West Bengal. Short run indicators point to increasing deterioration in security and economic activity. 13. In West Pakistan, support for regime remains almost universal according to ConGens Karachi and Lahore. Usual tensions and discontents in rural Sind and Baluchistan and urban Punjab remain but they have not escalated. Concerns over possible war with India markedly increased in Lahore while in Karachi prevailing fatalistic view over last several months that Indo-Pak war inevitable unaffected by any attitudinal shifts. 14. Steps by regime cited previously relating to East Pakistan, partial lifting censorship, Yahya visit to Iran, de-linking rupee from sterling, etc., continuing trend of August gave GOP image of assertiveness and enhanced Yahya’s personal reputation of strength combined with tolerance. 15. On national basis, regime’s grand strategy of resurrecting unified Muslim League (ML) as counter-balance to Bhutto People’s Party (PPP) has floundered on those traditional and destructive Pakistani political characteristics—ambition and personal animosities. Momentum appears to have subsided in merger efforts in West Pakistan. 16. Regime has, nonetheless, other weapons remaining in its arsenal to use on Bhutto. Modification political parties act to permit change in party affiliations together with governmental pressure could lead to defections from Bhutto’s camp of conservative elements. And above all, game is yet to be played out in East Pakistan both in by-elections and ultimate political alignment those 88 cleared members elected to Assembly who choose to participate. Presumption is that Assemblies will be convened in January. However, further slippage in GOP’s schedule and in above commonly held presumption always remains possiblity if regime believes resumption parliamentary process against its interests. Although Bhutto, who has most to lose would threaten should this occur, Indian “bogey” argument would probably keep him off streets. 17. ML merger talk continues in East Pakistan Muslim League leader Qaiyum, scheduled to visit Dacca to push merger under his leadership—which he failed to do in west. “United front” to include other parties, such as Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), cannot be ruled out if GOP presses hard enough. However, as in west, personal enmities run deep in east and we believe it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for GOP, to put together election coalition uniting most rightist parties. PDP and Jamaat may believe that they would make decent showing in relatively fair elections and therefore would not desire giving discredited Muslim League factions and Nizam share of power as result of pre-election understandings. In any case, at present PDP, and Jamaat, have announced along with PPP that they will contest elections. 18. From Bhutto’s public comments, his aides private claims that PPP guaranteed 35 East Pak seats by Yahya, and reports from Dacca, it appears that Bhutto has Yahya’s assurance that, at minimum, MLA will not freeze out PPP in by-elections. Former national Awami party (Bhashani) leader Masihur Rahman is reportedly prepared to turnover remnants of once-powerful NAP (L) structure in east to PPP. There are also reports that Awami League cleared MNA’s prepared to negotiate as bloc with PPP. However, as indicated earlier we have no evidence to suggest that MLA has abandoned hopes of cutting Bhutto down to size. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, Lahore, London, Madras, New Delhi, Tehran, USUN, and the US Mission in Geneva. 148. Telegram 186578 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 148. Telegram 186578 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, October 12, 1971, 1837Z REF: Islamabad 9833 Subject: US Leverage in Current Pakistan Crisis: US Policy NOTE: Secretary signed following cable on September 29 before departing for New York. Regret delay in despatch. 1. We much appreciate the evaluation you have given us in reftel of extent to which our strategy in Pakistan has produced results in specific actions by GOP to date directed at political settlement. No one can appreciate better than you and your colleagues on the spot in Pakistan the complexity of our current Pakistan relationship and the difficulty of moving GOP toward effective actions in the political domain. We concur in your view that the record to date suggests that our strategy has moved situation a good way from the grim days in March, granted also that only a beginning has been made in the key task of getting GOP actions that will contribute to reducing violence and getting started on political settlement. In this connection we have noted with much interest that Yahya did not react adversely in your most recent conversation with him on Mujib to your references to potential that Mujib offers as “trump card” for political settlement. We have also noted recent Pak press speculation on possible leniency in Mujib case. As we see it, the way Yahya handles Mujib is clearly key both to current psychological atmosphere and to substantive progress toward political settlement and we hope you can continue find ways get this across. 2. Your review of specific USG efforts and GOP actions particularly timely because of upcoming Congressional hearings in which we have important task of making sure record is fully clear and understood on these points. This includes Kennedy Subcommittee sessions scheduled October 4. 3. We would add two items to list you have compiled and that is your own imaginative and resourceful initiatives in number of areas, including handling of Mujib and treatment of Hindus and successful way in which you have preserved an atmosphere of personal confidence and frankness with President Yahya and his top associates. We appreciate how difficult this is in context of constant suggestions and advice we are directing at GOP in an area which they naturally regard as a matter of primarily internal GOP concern and we want you to know how much we appreciate this. You have earned the brief leave and medical checkup you are about to take. Enjoy your leave. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted on September 29 by Laingen; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and Irwin; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Dacca, Lahore, and Karachi. 149. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 149. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 4, 1971 SUBJECT: Gandhi Visit—Advisors’ Meeting in Cabinet Room The Advisors’ Meeting in the Cabinet Room while you were with the President and Mrs. Gandhi covered the full range of issues concerning the current situation in South Asia. Joe Sisco did most of the talking on the US side and T.N. Kaul for the Indians. The general tone was friendly but firm on the issues. Much of the time was spent by Kaul explaining at length the standard Indian positions. Beyond those, the major operational points to emerge were: —Sisco described Yahya’s favorable response to the idea that he open a dialogue with certain Awami League or Bangla Desh representatives, perhaps speaking on behalf of Mujib, and urged India to react positively to such ideas for getting a political process started. He told Kaul it seems to us asking the impossible to insist that the process start with Mujib. Kaul’s “tentative” response was that under any conditions this probably would be a non-starter since the Bengalis are bent on independence and only Mujib would have a chance of settling for less, and even he might not now. Kaul did concede—in response to an idea presented by Ambassador Keating—that it might be “worth trying” to have someone talk to Mujib in jail if Yahya would go along with it. The general thrust of his response, however, was skeptical and negative. Mujib, he felt, had been out of touch and it might not be very meaningful to involve him unless he were out of jail and free to re-establish himself with his colleagues. —Sisco also described Yahya’s acceptance of the idea of a unilateral Pakistani military withdrawal. Kaul’s response was tentative but negative, saying that India could not afford to take security risks until the political problem in East Pakistan was resolved. He added that India had no territorial designs and was not trying to dictate the terms of a settlement between East and West Pakistan but if attacked, India was determined that it would be a “decisive war with decisive results.” —Kaul stressed that it was putting the “cart before the horse” to suggest Indo-Pak talks or the exercise of good offices between India and Pakistan. This was a problem between West and East Pakistan and could only be settled by them. Moreover, India has little influence. —Kaul stressed that “all” the refugees, irrespective of their religion, “must” return. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 919, VIP Visits, India, PM Indira Gandhi Visit, Nov. 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Saunders initialed for himself and Hoskinson. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. 150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) 150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman) 1 Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 a.m. Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch. Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. It’s—to them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan. Nixon: I think I’ll make the meeting today a rather brief—cool. [unclear] I don’t mean by that cool in terms of not trying to bring up [unclear] I’ll talk to her a little about Vietnam, and– Kissinger: I’d let her talk a little more, maybe today— Nixon: Yeah? Kissinger:—to be a little less forthcoming. But basically, Mr. President— Nixon: So I was trying to give her no excuses. Now I’ve talked to her, told her everything we’re going to do. Now it’s up to her. Kissinger: While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. You very subtly—I mean, she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception and therefore, in despair, she’s got to go to war. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: So her objective—she has a right to be a little sore because you thwarted her objective. She would rather have had you give her a cool reception— Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger:—so that she could say that she was really put upon. Nixon: Oh, we really— Kissinger: And— Nixon: We really slobbered over the old witch. Kissinger: How you slobbered over her in things that did not matter, but in the things that did matter— Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger:—you didn’t give her an inch. So that she’s— Nixon: She knows. Kissinger: She knows she isn’t coming out of here with any—she can’t go home and say, “The president promised to do the following for me,” and then when you don’t do it— Nixon: Did you get across with that clown yesterday afternoon at 5:00? You went on the, that as far as the, as she was concerned that she would consider letting him— Kissinger: Yep. Nixon:—consult with regard to the designation. We want to be sure he understood that was the situation. Kissinger: Right, and I fixed it in the memorandum of conversation which I’m giving him in such a way that it—just a little. I’ve made it a little more explicit. Nixon: Now you’ve covered Rogers for long enough— Kissinger: Oh yeah, Rogers is in good shape. Nixon: He’s prepared to be told this? Kissinger: Oh yes. They’ve apparently treated him personally in a way that he doesn’t like, so he’s very— Nixon: Ha! Kissinger: No, no. He’ll be very tough with them. Nixon: Yeah, he’s likely to be sharper with them than I was, you know. He can do that [unclear]. Kissinger: Well, he will be personally sharper but he doesn’t like her. In substance he won’t be as tough as you— Nixon: He’s likely [unclear]. Kissinger:—because he doesn’t know the subject so well. I mean the skill— Nixon: You should have heard, Bob, the way we worked her around. I dropped stilettos all over her. It’s like, you know— Kissinger: She didn’t know [unclear exchange] about the guerrillas in East Pakistan. [unclear]. One thing that really struck me, the blown up [unclear] and that takes a lot of technical training. I wonder where they got that. Nixon: She [unclear] so fast. Kissinger: She said the East Bengal rifles [unclear–used to?]. That’s where it came from. Nixon: That’s right. We also stuck it to her on that book—Henry’s book about India-Pakistan. Kissinger: She said she studied a lot about the problems—how these conflicts started. Read a book by Maxwell, called India-China War, which is a book that in effect proves that India started the ‘62 War. It was done with an enormous politeness and courtesy and warmth. Nixon: Well I acted as if I didn’t know what the hell had happened— Haldeman: Yeah. Nixon:—so she couldn’t say anything. But she knew goddamn well that I knew what happened, don’t you think? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. You stuck it to her about the press. Nixon: On that I hit it hard. Kissinger: And I told— Nixon: I raised my voice a little. Kissinger: And I told her assistant—I told my opposite number that the thing that is really striking to us is that last year Mrs. Gandhi, during her election campaign, made official protests that we were intervening when we weren’t. And she never produced any proof. And yet every opposition candidate gets a royal reception, tremendous publicity, personal meetings. And then after you do all of this you come over here and ask us to solve all your problems. Nixon: You told him that? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: Good for you. Kissinger: I said look at the record the last 3 months. You’ve had a press campaign against us. You put out the word that our relations are the worst ever. You get Kennedy over. You get that Congressman Gallagher over. You make a treaty with the Russians. And then you come here and say we have to solve your problems for you. Nixon: Well if it was any— Kissinger: But, Mr. President, even though she was a bitch, we shouldn’t overlook the fact that we got what we wanted, which was we kept her from going out of here saying that the United States kicked her in the teeth. We’ve got the film clip of this; you’ve got the toast. You’ve got the general warmth that you generated in the personal meeting. Nixon: I do think at dinner tonight [unclear]. Kissinger: You didn’t give her a goddamn thing. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: If you would have put on a Johnson performance, it would have been emotionally more satisfying but it would have hurt us. Because—I mean if you had been rough with her— Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger:—then she’d be crying, going back crying to India. So I think even though she is a bitch, I’d be a shade cooler today, but— Nixon: No, no. I mean, “cool” in terms of, like yesterday, as you noted, I tried to carry the conversation. Kissinger: No, I’d let her carry it. Nixon: And was sort of saying, “look, we’re being as good as we can in dealing with Pakistan. What else can we do?” Today, I’m just going to say [unclear]. Kissinger: That’s what I would do. Except for Vietnam, I’d give her 5 minutes of the Tito talk because it will go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese. Nixon: Will it? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia. They leak everything right back to them. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation 615–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 151. Memorandum for the President’s File 151. Memorandum for the President’s File 1 Washington, November 5, 1971, 11:20 a.m. PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Mr. Parmeshwar Narain Haksar Dr. Henry A. Kissinger President Nixon opened the meeting by discussing the purpose and objectives of his trip to Peking. The President emphasized that he had long sought to terminate the period of non-communication between the United States and the 750 million people in the People’s Republic of China. He explained that his approach was pragmatic and that communication could only serve to improve the overall environment in Asia and to ease tensions by alleviating the frustrations generated by isolation. However, he did not foresee fundamental changes in the differences which now divided the peoples of entirely different systems. On the other hand, the very act of discussing differences could not but contribute to the easing of tensions. It was obvious that extremists on both sides would attempt to complicate, if not prevent, the opening of channels between the United States and mainland China. Nonetheless, it was the President’s responsibility to attempt to improve communications despite the difficulties. The Prime Minister expressed support for the President’s decision to visit Peking and noted that opposition within her own country frequently worked to prevent initiatives dictated in the overall interest of peace. Had she reacted incorrectly, it would have tended to unite the opposition. She had managed to keep the opposition divided and therefore less effective. The Prime Minister then asked about the situation in Southeast Asia. President Nixon replied by explaining that the negotiating track was still open and remained the preferred course for the United States. On the other hand, with each passing day the chances of a negotiated solution appeared less possible. If the other side maintained a position of intransigence, then the United States Government would have no other choice but to proceed with other actions. This would involve whatever steps were necessary to obtain the release of U.S. prisoners. The President emphasized that Hanoi should understand by now that the United States was prepared to withdraw totally from Vietnam but not at the price of overthrowing Thieu. If Hanoi remained dedicated to the proposition that the United States must withdraw totally and at the same time remove Thieu, then the alternative left to the United States was clear. He noted that if Hanoi were supported by only one of the larger powers then the problem would be greatly reduced. However, with both Peking and Moscow competing with each other in Hanoi the situation was more complex. Mr. Haksar then asked the President about U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China. The President reiterated that no one should expect the immediate normalization of relations with Mainland China but merely the initiation of a process. The trip to Moscow, on the other hand, was being undertaken on the basis of solid achievements in a number of areas. The Berlin Agreement was a significant breakthrough which made the Moscow Summit a logical step in a deliberate and careful U.S.-Soviet dialogue. In the case of our relations with Moscow which involved the full range of European problems the stakes were much higher. The situation in Asia today represented a lesser order of criticality. Furthermore, U.S. and Soviet interests were more complex. The Soviets were interested in trade, as was the United States. The Soviets needed U.S. technology since their economy was somewhat flat. If the right conditions developed, there might be some value in exploring the ramifications of a European Security Conference. Before doing so, however, the U.S. expected agreement on the Berlin settlement by the two Germanys. Then, the United States would be willing to consider the agenda for such a conference. This was separate and distinct from the mutual balance of forces question. The President commented that with respect to both of these issues there was probably little chance for substantial movement before the Moscow summit. Prime Minister Gandhi then asked the President to discuss the Middle East. The President stated that the United States wished to be as helpful as possible in maintaining the ceasefire and preventing the resumption of hostilities. At the same time, there had been little or no progress. The Soviet Union for their part could assist by urging the Egyptians toward restraint. The level of Soviet arms shipments constituted an essential ingredient. It could hardly be in the Soviets’ interests if fighting were to be resumed. Nevertheless, the situation might be approaching a critical point once again. The President then summarized the world scene in hopeful terms. He noted that while there were many volatile danger spots, the overall outlook has been greatly improved through the opening of a dialogue with Peking and an improvement of relationships with the Soviet Union. In such an environment and with restraint and wisdom, the world could be viewed with a greater measure of hope. Prime Minister Gandhi expressed her appreciation for the reception she and her party had received in the United States and indicated her great admiration for the accomplishments achieved under President Nixon’s leadership. The Prime Minister indicated a willingness to provide Indian good offices in solving future problems and to undertake whatever courses of action would be most helpful in stabilizing the world situation. President Nixon expressed gratitude to the Prime Minister for her generous words and concluded the meeting by commenting that his principal focus of interest continued to be world affairs. He attempted to view the world from historical perspective rather than in tactical terms. One should look at things in terms of decades rather than years. Only in such a context could the issue of world peace receive the kind of enlightened consideration that it must have. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 2, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 31, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at 11:20 a.m. 152. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers 152. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, November 5, 1971 SUBJECT: A.I.D. Deputy Administrator’s Report on Pakistan A. PRESIDENT YAHYA KHAN’S CONTROL IN EAST PAKISTAN IS INCREASINGLY LIMITED Growing Isolation of President Yahya Khan . In Islamabad October 27, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary to the Cabinet, told me that President Yahya Khan was increasingly isolated from events in East Pakistan. He believed the Army’s reporting from East Pakistan had been misleading the President about recent developments. The same points, concerning President Yahya Khan’s growing isolation and misleading reporting from East Pakistan, were made by M.M. Ahmad, Economic Advisor to the President. Autonomous Army Control in East Pakistan . The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan has achieved nearly autonomous control of the province, in many respects independent of the policies and direction of President Yahya Khan in Islamabad. Only foreign affairs affecting East Pakistan is firmly in the hands of Islamabad. The relative isolation of President Yahya Khan is probably the result of many factors. Indications of this isolation are that: (a) Army commanders in the East pursue independent military operations, (b) the Army governs the province behind the facade of the puppet civilian Governor Malik and his cabinet—who are completely dependent on the Army for their personal security—with limited reference to Islamabad, (c) little but Pakistani successes and India’s perfidy is reported from Dacca to Islamabad, and (d) President Yahya Khan lacks independent means of observation, reporting and verification of events in the East. Myth and Reality on Civilian Support in East Pakistan . President Yahya Khan told us October 28 that “civilianization” of government in East Pakistan, under Governor Malik and his Cabinet, is succeeding in stabilizing the political situation. According to Yahya Khan, when elections have filled the vacated Awami League Assembly seats, “political accommodation” for a loyal provincial government will have been completed. Although the Army openly runs these elections, Yahya Khan believes the political stability after elections will assure that India’s strategy of supporting insurrection will have been defeated—and that Mrs. Gandhi will then have nothing in hand to achieve her objectives except recourse to war. The myth of growing political stability in East Pakistan is almost certainly fed to Yahya Khan by reports from his civilian Governor and his Army commanders. The reality is that Army policies and operations—behind the facade of a civilian government—are progressively and seriously alienating the Bengali population in East Pakistan, and that the seeds of rebellion are not only those sown by India. The wide gap between the myth of growing stability as seen by Yahya Khan, and the reality of political deterioration was most striking from comparing my recent visit to East Pakistan, October 21—26, to observations made during the earlier August 19—25 trip. B. PAKISTAN ARMY POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN EAST PAKISTAN Civil Affairs Run by the Military Advisor to the Governor . Major General Rao Farman Ali Khan is the Army’s civil affairs specialist with ten years service in the East. As Military Advisor, he sits in the Governor’s House and runs the Province on behalf of the Governor. My call on General Farman Ali Khan October 25th interrupted a meeting with some ten of his military colleagues. They were, he said, selecting the men who would be elected in the next Provincial elections. Army Policy is Selective Terror and Reprisal . General Farman Ali Khan described the level of Mukti guerrilla insurgency as somewhat intensified but manageable because the newly trained Bengali guerrillas entering from India feared to take action. Over 1,400 guerrillas had entered Dacca district in the last 30 days but only a few had chosen to fight. He acknowledged, off-the-record, that this was due to the terroristic reprisal policy. He also acknowledged that terror and reprisal had an “unfortunate effect on Bengali attitudes.” But he said, “all Army commanders had concluded that insurgency was more of a problem in areas where the Army had been too lenient and had not demonstrated clean-up operations.” The Pakistan Army is one of the best disciplined and professional infantry forces in the world. Despite orders from Islamabad that the Army not engage in terrorist operations against the civilian population—and repeated assurances to U.S. officials to this effect—Pakistan Army commanders continue to carry out terror raids against the population and villages, even within the environs of Dacca and in sight of its large foreign community. Increasing Chaos in Rural East Pakistan . General Farman Ali Khan said the Army sought to leave the fighting of the Mukti guerrillas to the newly armed Bengali “Rasikars”, who now numbered 60,000. He acknowledged that “Rasikars”—raised as village levies for guard duty with only ten days training, and without NCOs or officers—did not constitute a disciplined force. However, the “Rasikars” are a destabilizing element—living off the land, able to make life and death decisions by denouncing collaborators and openly pillaging and terrorizing villagers without apparent restraint from the Army. With villagers caught between the Rasikars and Mukti guerrillas, law and order is breaking down rapidly in rural East Pakistan. Hence, the rural population is moving either to the cities which are now over populated or going to India. The flow of Muslum refugees to India has recently increased—many of them small land-holders and farmers who are normally the more stable political elements. Army Policy to Clear East Pakistan of Hindus . The Pakistan Army is ideologically anti-Hindu and their historic experience in West Pakistan, from the time of partition, has been that Hindus should go to India. Hence, reprisal operations naturally continue to focus against Hindus. Without law or order, except that sanctioned by the Army, Hindu lives and property are not safe in East Pakistan today. General Farman Ali Khan accepted the estimate that at least 80 percent of the Hindus had left East Pakistan. He, off-the-record, spoke of about six million refugees who had gone to India and he anticipated that a further 1,500,000 refugees would probably go to India “before the situation settles down.” (1,500,000 is a reasonable estimate of the number of Hindus still in East Pakistan.) C. FORM AND CONTENT OF YAHYA KHAN’S DIPLOMACY With the Army’s autonomous control in East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan’s role affecting the Eastern Province appears to be primarily in foreign affairs, including the managing of the U.S. relationship. All official American suggestions are immediately taken seriously and lead to major policy statements by President Yahya Khan in Islamabad. The result is “public relations diplomacy”, but it is important not to confuse the form with the substance of policy. Elections, political accommodation, welcoming the return of all refugees, amnesty—these are fine policy pronouncements, but their implementation is in the hands of the Army commanders who govern the Eastern Province, and these Army commanders do not as yet appear subject to foreign influences. Maurice J. Williams 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Nodis. Sent through S/S and initialed by Eliot. A stamped notation on a copy of this memorandum in White House files indicates the President saw it. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VIII, Nov–Dec 71) 153. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 153. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, November 11, 1971 ANALYTICAL SUMMARY Contingency Paper—Indo-Pakistan Hostilities The following summarizes and reviews the current state of our contingency planning for the possible outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. I. The Prospects (pp. 1–2) U.S. actions in the event of another Indo-Pak war would in part be conditioned by the circumstances in which the hostilities broke out. The most likely scenarios are : —An Indian military attack on Pakistan or direct Indian support for a major insurgent effort to seize and hold a portion of East Pakistan. —A gradual process of escalation involving incidents along the East Pakistan-India border with confusion as to who is most at fault. —Conceivably but less likely, the Pakistanis initiate hostilities by attacking guerrilla sanctuaries in India and/or Indian military support bases. [—West Pakistanis, either to divert Indian attention or to demonstrate Indian vulnerability, attempt to stir up trouble in India-held Kashmir and/or along the Kashmir cease-fire line. As in 1965, the situation rapidly escalates to full scale hostilities. The State paper does not include this possibility but it seems real enough to be considered since from a Pak point of view Kashmir is India’s most vulnerable point.] Hostilities would probably initially involve only India and Pakistan. However, there is real danger that (1) China would get involved by provoking border incidents along the Indian Himalayan frontier in order to ease pressure on Pakistan; and (2) the Soviet Union would aid India, short of direct military intervention. II. U.S. Interests (p. 3) Should war break out between India and Pakistan it would be in the U.S. interest that: —the hostilities not expand to include third parties, particularly China (and the Soviets). —to see that hostilities are not protracted since a prolonged war could do profound damage to the political, economic and social fabric of India and Pakistan. Thus, the paper concludes, U.S. interests would be best served by an early end to the conflict and by negotiations among all parties leading to a withdrawal of Indian troops and an overall political settlement . III. Options in the Event of Hostilities (pp. 3–16) The U.S., according to the paper, could pursue one of the following three broad strategies in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan: A. Passive International Role (pp. 4–6) : The U.S. would assume a “relatively passive” (or inactive) posture indicating our basic neutrality. Such a role might be particularly appropriate in circumstances where (a) responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was unclear, (b) the likelihood of Chinese involvement was judged to be small and (c) the conflict appeared likely to be of short duration. In pursuance of this strategy, we would: —adopt a public position that we did not intend to become directly involved and would not provide assistance to either side; —support but not initiate efforts in the Security Council to end hostilities and achieve a negotiated settlement; —suspension of all economic and military aid to both sides; —offer good offices to both Yahya and Mrs. Gandhi to arrange negotiations for a political settlement; —consult closely with Soviets and British; —caution the Chinese and Soviets against involvement (presumably only if they seemed to be heading in that direction). The argument for is that U.S. involvement would be at a minimum and we would maintain maximum flexibility as events unfolded. Also, an interim relationship with both India and Pakistan would be preserved. (As long as the Chinese stayed out and refrained from adopting a menacing posture toward India, there would be a hope for maintaining our own relationship with them.) The arguments against are that (1) we would risk serious damage to our interests if the conflict were protracted. Indian dependence on the Soviets and Pakistani dependence on the Chinese could be increased without any significant gain for the U.S.; (2) Cautioning the Chinese could damage Sino-American relations; and (3) neutrality in general could appear as de facto US opposition to the aggrieved party. B. Military Support (pp. 6–10) : At the other extreme would be a decision to support one side with military assistance. We have limited commitments to both which they might seek to invoke (through SEATO and CENTO with Pakistan and through the 1963 Air Defense Agreement with India)—although there are no provisions for automatic U.S. involvement and these are, practically speaking, dead letters. 1. To Pakistan . (pp. 6–8) In the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan, the Paks might well turn to us as they did in 1965. Short of providing U.S. combat personnel, we could: —develop an emergency military supply program; —terminate all U.S. programs in India; —take the lead in mobilizing international pressure on India to halt its intervention; —support a Security Council resolution condemning India. The argument for is we would be supporting Pakistan’s national unity, diminishing Chinese influence (and marginally improve Sino-American ties), and strengthening our position elsewhere in the Muslim world. The argument against is that U.S. interests in and relations with India would be damaged and the Soviets would gain ground there. Moreover, our actions would probably have little effect on the military outcome of the conflict and there would be no basis left for a conciliatory U.S. role. 2. To India . (pp. 8–10) If India were not the initiator of hostilities, this contingency could arise. If China were to intervene massively on Pakistan’s side and seemed to threaten India in a major way we might want to consider providing military assistance to India. Short of providing combat personnel the U.S. might: —offer to consult with India under the 1963 Air Defense Agreement; —develop an emergency military assistance program focussed primarily on meeting the Chinese threat; —share intelligence on Chinese military deployments; —coordinate with the British and the Soviets on additional assistance measures. The argument for is that it would be consistent with our overall Asian policy of assisting states threatened by external aggression and would at the expense of the Soviets create a firm basis for a future close relationship with India and with the possible future state of Bangla Desh. The argument against is that very severe strains would be created in our relations with Pakistan and, more importantly, with China. There would also be the risk of creeping involvement leading to a more extensive commitment involving a direct U.S. confrontation with outside powers (China). C. Political Intervention (pp. 10–16): Going beyond assuming a relatively neutral political posture (Option A) and short of intervening with military assistance to one side (Option B), we could intervene politically. The main purpose of an activist political role would be to first localize the hostilities and then work for a settlement which would remove the basic causes of the fighting. Immediately upon the outbreak of war we could : —call for a UN Security Council meeting and support a demand for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations between the parties; —support any UN direct initiative in Delhi and Islamabad; —support UN peace-keeping efforts; —send Presidential messages to Yahya and Mrs. Gandhi calling for an end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement; notify the parties of aid suspension; —engage in immediate talks with the Soviets and British on ways to end the hostilities; —privately and publicly urge restraint on the Chinese (and if possible engage them also in the peace-making effort); —explore the possibilities for an international conference to bring about (and guarantee) a political and military settlement; —limit other countries’ involvement by discouraging transfer of US equipment to Pakistan by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, etc; [We would not pursue this if India initiated hostilities and we decided to reopen the pipeline to Pakistan.] If hostilities have broken out because of an Indian attack or because of Indian support to the Bengali insurgents we should also : —after carefully assessing the likelihood on a Chinese attack on India, move to terminate our residual military sales program for India; —hold up on all shipments and licenses of military supplies destined for India; —hold economic assistance to India in abeyance at least for the duration of the hostilities. If the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities were thoroughly ambiguous then we should also : —publicly suspend military supply to both countries; —consider suspending economic assistance to both sides; —urge other major arms supplying countries (Soviets, Chinese, British and French) to suspend arms shipments to both sides. —take action in the India and Pak consortia to urge international economic pressure on both. The arguments for include: —would provide maximum U.S. flexibility in a complex situation and maximize the use of international organizations and multi-lateral diplomacy; —would maximize use of U.S. programs and influence to shorten hostilities and inhibit external military intervention; —would contribute directly to a realistic political settlement; —would increase chances for U.S. to maintain relations with both India and Pakistan (and perhaps even Bangla Desh) in the aftermath of hostilities; —might create conditions in which the US and USSR (and possibly China) could cooperate fully in a common political and peace-making role. The arguments against include: —since the real effect of this policy would be felt on the invader (probably India), a heavy, perhaps unbearable, strain would be placed on our relations with India; —at the same time the Paks could also feel sold out; —might not succeed in shortening hostilities and could strain our relations with others whose involvement we are trying to discourage. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/12/71. Secret; Exdis. The summary was attached to and summarized an undated paper that outlined contingency planning in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. Neither the contingency paper nor the analytical summary have drafting information, but the former was apparently drafted in the Department of State and the summary was prepared by the NSC staff. Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy probably drafted the summary, which they forwarded with the contingency paper to Kissinger on November 11 under a covering memorandum for use by the Washington Special Actions Group at their November 12 meeting. (Ibid) 154. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan 154. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan 1 Washington, November 15, 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m. Nixon: Our sentiments I expressed to your previous ambassador who—before he left, a fine man. And we talked very directly to Mrs. Gandhi. Believe me. Publicly we did all those things. But very directly, and I speak straight from the shoulder. And Kissinger, Henry, can tell you what I said. And I think you have it, do you not? So did Rogers. Rogers was very tough on it. Now, Rogers told me he saw you Monday. Now the thing we, the thing we can do is that—what we are trying desperately to do is not to allow this terrible tragedy, the agony that you’re going through, [to] be a pretext to start a war. We just aren’t going to allow that if we can help it. We’re also talking with our Soviet friends. [unclear exchange] Nixon: At my suggestion— Kissinger: To explain that. Nixon:—we’ve done that. Now, yet, I hear every morning, as Henry will tell you, I’m on the phone with him Sunday; I was on the phone with you Saturday. I was, you know, every morning we worry about these things. But what we can do from here remains to be seen. There was one unfortunate thing, that announcement to the effect that the arms were [unclear] gave the impression [unclear–that it was done?] because she was here. It had nothing to do with that at all. Khan: This I can assure you, the President— Nixon: He knows that. Khan:—he knows fully— Nixon: You know I was the one who put them back in, and—but I didn’t want you to be embarrassed by that. Khan: [unclear] Democratic pundits and all that. He fully appreciates that it could not have been your intention to embarrass him in any way, and we just took it in stride that it will show that. He asked me, he asked me in that way, a very sincere position. He knows the concern you have, sir, for Pakistan [unclear]. Nixon: I have indeed. Let me say that the President is a good friend to me. He is a good friend to Kissinger. I—let me be quite candid with you. As I told your former ambassador, and as the President knows, there’s a huge public relations campaign here. Many of our friends in the other party, and including, I must say, some of the nuts in our own party—soft heads–have jumped on it, have completely bought the Indian line. And India has a very great propaganda line. And if you read our press, I mean, you get the whole impression that India’s completely right. Now that’s shifting a little. India may have overplayed its hand a bit. I’m talking with great candor with you, and this is just for your ears and the President’s. The important thing is we know—I know—that this is one of those terrible problems that, frankly, must be solved by a political solution; it must not be solved by force. And we simply want to play a role which will be helpful and won’t harm you. We will try to restrain to the extent that we have any influence [on] the Indians. We will do everything we can to try to help you in your cause. That’s where we stand here. How, what we can do—what we can do, of course, is limited by the circumstances. We don’t control the Indians. That’s accurate. The fact that, if you, if there’s any more—I’d like, I would, I’d like to give you more encouragement than this, but I’d like to be totally honest. Khan: [Unclear] We realize that the Indians are not [unclear]. Nixon: Yeah. Khan: [unclear] And I’m grateful you anticipated our desire and have [unclear—been in contact with the Russians?] on this. Because, if you can [unclear—bring the Russians?]with you on the need for maintaining peace on the subcontinent, it just might turn the tide. Nixon: I hope so. Well, the Russians should have some influence. What reaction did we get from our—well he doesn’t know. Kissinger: Well, he claims that they are not sending much military equipment, and that they are warning the Indians against precipitous action. But I’m seeing him again later this week. Nixon: Good. Kissinger: And this will be one of the high items on my agenda. Nixon: For what effect it has, the Indians are aware that this must stop. Or they can count us out. Do you see what I mean? Khan: I do, sir. Nixon: That’s the way it’s going to be. Kissinger: I’ve also told the Foreign Secretary that in their contacts with the Chinese they can emphasize to them that we are prepared to discuss joint tactics with them in the UN, for example. Nixon: Yes, yes. Now the UN thing is very, we can, of course, I don’t want our State Department people talking to the Chinese at the UN at this point. That can be your job, right? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: On the other hand, we should do this [unclear—same thing?]. The difficulty with the UN thing, as I would see it, is if you get it in to the UN, and you may want to go there, but on the other hand, you don’t want to get it in there and then get that General Assembly—you just don’t know how the votes are going to come out. Now, of course, the Chinese are in the Security Council. So, what we want to do— Kissinger: It’s a bad line up. Nixon: Huh? Kissinger: Bad line up. Nixon: It doesn’t impress me as being a very good show. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Sultan Khan, Oval Office, Conversation No. 617–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 23, 1971, 10:55 a.m. K: I just wanted to tell you we had a call here from Brandt to the President which we thought concerned the meeting. But the President doesn’t want to talk because doesn’t want to get involved in scheduling of announcements. But it was about India/Pakistan. He asked what the attitude would be. I will send you a memo. I said we will ask for restraint. He asked about the UN and I said if it went to the UN we would urge lend of military operations and opportunity for refugees to return. Drawn from the cable. R: Can’t beat that. What is he going to do? K: He agreed with that. I said it wouldn’t hurt that if people who are friendly with India said that military action would be hard to understand and he said he would and that they would urge restraint on Pakistan. R: If it continues to build and I think it will then exhortations will not help and the UN is the only way out. K: Let’s not kid ourselves—that means Pakistan will get raped. R: They will if the fighting doesn’t stop. K: India is outrageous. R: I think in the UN Pakistan will come out better then India and Pakistan has no other way out. K: I am in favor of going to the UN if it continues another day. R: We don’t do it. K: No someone else. R: I think we have positioned ourselves well. We have asked restraint on both sides and humanitarian assistance. Yahya’s position is more tenable then Mrs. Gandhi. She doesn’t want UN or observers or a representative group. Yahya does. So he has quite an advantage and I see no way out for him but that. K: It’s part of the Soviet strategy to humiliate the country that helped the UN and China. R: And it looks like they will succeed. K: I think we should cut off military pipe line. R: It’s not substantial. The principle reason it continues is the intelligence facilities we thought it was important. ? ? ? ? ? ? over a period of time. If we decide it’s of no consequence we will break ties with India. No military significance. If we do it it will get attention. On ammunition and such we should but our radar equipment I think we should wait. K: I don’t have a staff paper. Could we get recommendations? R: It’s so small it doesn’t have significance except symbolic. I think we should be sure to stay out of it. Get someone else to stop fighting and its going on in 3 places now and fairly substantial. Brandt going to talk with the President? K: No. I think he did it as a grandstand play. I wasn’t prepared for this subject. I thought he would bitch about the separate announcement. R: Have you talked with the German Ambassador? K: No. R: Maybe I should call him in and say Brandt called the President and touch base with him. K: I think there’s a shade of difference between State’s and the President’s view. He would like to tilt towards Pakistan and not India and your people go the other way. R: I don’t see that. I don’t think it’s right. Does he think that? K: No because I didn’t go into it with him. He wants tough cables to go out. I haven’t gone into that because it’s not my job to make difficulties. But he told them in a WSAG meeting 3 months ago what he thought. R: We all favor Peking but we have to be realistic and Pakistan will be leaked unless big powers go in. K: Question all along we are lax if we tell India we will give anything which or if we give humanitarian or they want military things. R: They don’t rely on us for military things. K: No but ? ? ? ?. R: Is that what the President wants? K: No, not for a couple of days. R: I don’t think it serves the President well. I don’t think we should say the President wants us to kick India. K: If one is asked what to do then one says release Mujib. That’s what India wants. R: Who said that? Did we? K: I don’t want to go into it. It’s a speech that was made yesterday. R: It’s not what we have urged. K: I thought this morning we were together. No disagreement this morning. R: I think we should talk with the President about it. If there’s any difference of opinion then he should know about it but I don’t think so. K: I think we are substantially in accord. It’s a question of nuance and if ? ? ? its telling India to go ahead. R: I don’t think we should try to settle it politically or militarjly. We can cut off economic assistance to India but at the moment I don’t think so. Perhaps next week. K: It shouldn’t be done until after the extent of fighting is known. R: I think perhaps we should get together with the President so he knows what my position is. I will call the President. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 15–23 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. The announcements referred to in the conversation are apparently the projected announcements of Nixon’s scheduled meetings in December with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, French President Georges Pompidou, and British Prime Minister Edward Heath. The cable referenced in the conversation is apparently telegram 212549 to Islamabad, November 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK) 156. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers 156. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, November 24, 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m. Rogers : I don’t believe there’s any difference of views on anything. I would just like to express some of my own thoughts on that. First, it seems to me we should engage in the maximum diplomatic efforts to do everything we can to caution restraint on both sides at the highest level always so that everyone can look at the record and see that we have done everything we can diplomatically. Secondly, I think that our relations with Yahya are good and should continue to be good and we should continue to keep very close to him. Three, I don’t think we should try to mastermind a political solution. I never thought so. I don’t think it’s possible, and I think he is coming to the conclusion that something has to be done politically. Nixon : Yahya do it on his own? Rogers : He is going to have to do it on his own. Nixon : Do you agree with that? Kissinger : Completely. Rogers : Now, he is— Nixon : As a matter of fact, when the foreign minister was in here, he seemed to me, I didn’t get too specific, but he seemed to be awfully reasonable on that subject. Rogers : Well let me say that I think he’s going to be forced to do something, either that or he’s going to get out. There is a possibility he would turn over to Bhutto, which would not be a good development. Nixon : Bhutto! Kissinger : But he’s planning that anyway. [unclear] Nixon : Turn over to Bhutto? Rogers : Well, he says he is, but I’m not so sure. I have a feeling that if he can pull this out that he may stay in some capacity. But in any event, I think that the thing we have to face up to, and not make any decisions, so this is not to ask you to decide anything, but I think, I want to express my view that I think that it’s probably going to get worse. I don’t see any solution for—so that I think that our principal objective should be to do what we can to prevent fighting from breaking out. Nixon : Let me ask this, just 1 minute to bring me up to date. I saw the morning papers and the morning report. To what extent are they fighting now? They had a jet fight, I understand. That doesn’t mean that there’s a damn war going on. Rogers : Well— Nixon : Are there—do the Indians deny still that they had divisions in there? Rogers : Yes, yes. And I think maybe that they don’t have divisions but they certainly have brigades. And they’ve got people in there— Nixon : It’s like North Vietnam still denying they are in South Vietnam. Rogers : And it’s true there is one building, a major penetration. And in two other areas it looks as though there is penetration. No one is exactly sure. But I have no knowledge. It’s tough to tell them apart, of course, because they’re with the guerrillas. Now— Kissinger : The guerrillas, the guerrillas have been operating with brigade strength with artillery support and air support and tanks. So even if they’re technically—I mean, this doesn’t just happen [unclear exchange]. Rogers : The question really is how, how much are they involved and how [unclear] will they say, and so forth. My own judgment is that they are going to get more involved. Secondly, I think that we have to face the fact that Yahya’s position militarily is extremely weak. He’s got 60–80,000 men in East Pakistan. He has a whole lot of trouble— Nixon : He’ll be demolished there. Rogers : Yeah, and that’s, of course, where the fighting is going on. And it’s a 2,500-mile flight around the edge of the land. So that the logistics, you know, are impossible from that standpoint. And the, as I say, my own judgment is that probably it will get worse, and probably we have to face up to the fact that it will get worse. Nixon : [unclear] avoid getting too much blood [unclear]. We’re not really responsible for every war. Rogers : Oh, we’re not getting the blame so far. Nixon : What is our [unclear] so far? Rogers : No. Nixon : You’re responsible even more than we were, very much for this, don’t you think so, Henry? [unclear exchange] Rogers : I think that’s what we should continue to try to do since [unclear]. I think the other thing that I want to stress [unclear]. Our ability to affect the course of events is quite limited. We don’t have much leverage. We have a few things we can do. We are still providing some military equipment and spare parts, and it’s not lethal weapons, but it’s very, very insignificant. Our aid program is pretty well committed. Theoretically, we could turn some of it off, but it would create all kinds of legal problems. Hell of a problem with banks and companies that [unclear] equipment. And it wouldn’t have any effect on the military situation at the moment. Whether we should take some actions that would be symbolic or not I think is something you won’t [will?] decide. We could take some action. For example, I already have told my people administratively not to grant any export licenses. Not just say that [unclear] process them. Kissinger : To whom? Nixon : India? Rogers : To diminish the total. Kissinger : [unclear] Rogers : Oh, no, no, no. Just said to the processing officer to slow down the processing. As of yesterday but don’t grant them until we decide, until the President decides what he wants to do. Secondly, I have told our AID people that there’s another, there is about $11 million not committed. I said “let’s don’t commit it till we see what develops.” Nixon : Where is this [unclear]? Rogers : But the fact of the matter, without going into all the details, that I have gone over very carefully [unclear] some of which we don’t know, some of these things are done by the Congress, and some are done by the [unclear], you know all that, but still the leverage we have on India is very minimal. If we take some action against them, which you might decide to do, it would be symbolic rather than substantive. Now the other point I want to refer to briefly is the United Nations. I do not think, and have never thought, that we should take any action to take it to the United Nations. On the other hand, I think the United Nations will be a very useful organization if things get worse, because, and I have a feeling that Pakistan will come to this conclusion itself— Nixon : Will they [unclear] beyond the UN? [unclear] Rogers : That’s why India has just written, why Mrs. Gandhi has just written us a letter in which she urges us not to do anything, not to take it to the UN. Obviously, the Indians are worried about it. Nixon : Huh. Rogers : You see she doesn’t— Nixon : Do they have the votes? Hell, they can get all the Russian votes. They got the African— Kissinger : This is the Security Council. Nixon : Oh. Rogers : You see what would happen in the Security [Council]— Nixon : I see. This wouldn’t be a General Assembly thing? Rogers : No, no. Kissinger : By Thursday. Rogers : No, it wouldn’t be. The reason that India doesn’t want it is because she doesn’t want any United Nations presence. She doesn’t want any observers there. Pakistan’s position is much more reasonable than India’s. That’s why India doesn’t want—she’s made an appeal to keep it out of the Security Council. Nixon : Well, what—we probably [unclear–have not?] got much control. I think that’s your view, isn’t Henry? The United Nations, we are not going to take it to the United Nations? Kissinger : No. Rogers : Well, I think what we ought to keep in mind, though, is I think on balance it will be the only alternative that Yahya has and it will be helpful to him. He wants to get through December because he’s got his plans made for this new, for this Constitution to go into effect at the end of December, first of January. If he can keep peace there for a couple of months then he may feel that he’s on the road to a political solution. What will happen in the United Nations, in the Security Council, is that they will, among other things, they will say why don’t we send a United Nations observer team to the area and make a report and so forth. Now she’ll resist that. She’s already resisted it. She said she doesn’t want the United Nations there. She doesn’t want anybody to look at what they’re doing. Yahya has the United Nations people in East Pakistan. He’s perfectly prepared for that. He also is prepared to withdraw his troops from the border if India will do likewise. So that the things that the Security Council would recommend in the way of military action and observers and so forth I think would all benefit Yahya. Now the risk, of course, is that India will also bring into the Security Council political questions. But I think that those are manageable. Of course, India will be tremendously embarrassed if it goes to the Security Council. Now I say these things, not with the thought that we should take action, but with the thought that we should resist fighting Pakistan who will move in this direction. Yahya’s told US that this is his only alternative, really. Nixon : At this time? Has he said it recently? Rogers : I don’t know. When I say recently I know it’s less than— Nixon : Yeah, what I mean is since the trouble started. Rogers : Yeah, I think this is one of the things that they are considering. And, of course, in the Security Council we would be China, Pakistan, and the United States all on one side, so we’ve got some pretty good leverage. And what we would do is emphasize keeping the peace. And we would say, “We urge both sides to exercise extreme restraint.” We would urge United Nations to send observers there to find out what the conditions are. We would urge a mutual withdrawal. We would urge the very thing that Yahya has offered. That’s why she resists this. That’s why her very strong letter to you, in order to keep it out of the Security Council. Nixon : [unclear exchange] Rogers : It wasn’t yesterday. Nixon : Since the trouble started? Kissinger : No, no. Rogers : Oh, I guess probably I didn’t notice the date. Nixon : That’s all right. Kissinger : It came in on Friday. Rogers : What’s the date today? Kissinger : Twenty-fourth. Nixon : Twenty-fourth. [unclear exchange] Rogers : [unclear] Very strong plea to keep it out of the Security Council. So I think what I would like to— Nixon : She must have made that plea—what I’m just, the date is important. She made that plea knowing that she was going to order this attack on Pakistan. Rogers : That’s right. Nixon : I think. That’s my guess. She can’t, she can’t, [unclear] as you know, [unclear] without doing some directing it, without a hell of a lot of planning. So she must have known. Rogers : [unclear] Nixon : You know, the thing I would say, the main point I would like to do [unclear], the only thing about the symbolism, Bill, that concerns me, is that I implied when I met her, and you also talked to her about the fact that the Congress [unclear]. And I talked to her and said [unclear]. We know India has lots of friends, but I said there’s no way that Congress [unclear] with Vietnam and everything. I said there’s one thing that’s happened in this country, and it doesn’t make any difference where it is, whether it’s Nigeria, or South Asia, or anywhere else. The American Senate is [inclined] to [keep] hands off any situation where fighting breaks out. That’s their attitude. And I was very strong on that. Now I know it can be said that it won’t do any good, and we don’t have any leverage, and it’s only symbolic and the rest. But on the other hand, I want you to look into what we could do that is symbolic because I think we need some symbolism. The other thing is, which I think is very important, looking at the balance there, the Indians are going to win. And they are going to lose too. But they are going to win without any question. Pakistan eventually will disintegrate. East Pakistan [unclear] a little down the road. So it is very much in our interest to get the damn thing cooled if we can. In other words, just on the merits India doesn’t want to cool it. They want Pakistan to disintegrate. Despite what she says that’s what she wants, there’s no question about that. Now under those circumstances, it seems to me that, clearly apart from the fact that Yahya has been more decent to US than she has, clearly apart from that, I think that our policy wherever we can should definitely be tilted toward Pakistan, and not toward India. I think India is more at fault. Let me put it this way, if we could get, if the Congress could get all excited about cutting off AID to Pakistan when it involved an internal Pakistan problem— Rogers : Yeah. Nixon :—it seems to me that Congress should get twice as excited when it involves cutting off aid to India when India is engaged in a violent, across the border operation. Now my view is that very strongly, I mean, I didn’t frankly feel that Congress should cut off aid to Pakistan. I mean, when the country has internal problems [unclear]. Is the British thing worked out? Is that [unclear exchange]. Let’s support them on that. Rogers : Oh, sure. Nixon : Home should know that we will back him. Kissinger : Well we— Nixon : [unclear] Rogers : Oh, yeah. Nixon : Well I want you to know that you could let—be sure Home knows it. I told him when he was here that they had made a deal [unclear]. Now, so having said that, it seems to me that our whole game has got to be played—if you could find something symbolic to do I think it really has to be... Rogers : Well, we can. Nixon : She knows, she knows that we didn’t shoot blanks when she was here. Maybe it doesn’t mean anything. Second, in terms of the merits of the situation, to the extent we can tilt it toward Pakistan, I would prefer to play that. That’s where the UN game comes in. Now I would say there that if Yahya, he feels it’s in his interest, if he pushed the UN game, that’s one thing. But I couldn’t agree more with the proposition that we shouldn’t push the UN game if there’s any feeling that it might be to the detriment of Pakistan. Now you feel it’s the other way. Rogers : You know we haven’t done any [unclear]. Nixon : I understand. Well, I know we haven’t done anything yet. But the point is what do we do now. They’re going to ask are we prepared to go to the United Nations and all that. Joe [unclear–Sisco?] talked about that today. Rogers : Well there are two things about the United Nations that I think we should keep in mind. One, I think on balance that Pakistan will come off better than India. Nixon : In the UN? Rogers : In the UN—in the Security Council. Because there’s nothing you can do by way of—we can try to work out a political accommodation. That’s something that has to be done inside Pakistan. There are many things you can do to counsel military restraint. You can send people there. I’ve talked to all the UN people who’ve been out there and they’ve all been very upset about the lack of cooperation on Mrs. Gandhi’s part. She’s made, I think, a very bad impression in this country by saying that she didn’t want the United Nations presence and so forth. So I think on balance, I think they would benefit by the Security Council action. There would be some fallout that would be critical of Yahya, even Mujib, but I think that would be less important than the action that the UN would take to have a presence in India. That’s what she doesn’t want. She doesn’t want to get caught at it. She’s denying that these troops are invading Pakistan. She’s denying that they are training guerrillas and all these other things. Now if you had a presence of the United Nations, there you’d have a good answer. She will resist it. She will resist it strongly. She’s very strongly opposed to it. So I think on balance it would be helpful to Pakistan. I’ll let that be your own judgment. But where does that lead me? It just leads me to this conclusion: that we shouldn’t do anything to discourage it. I don’t think we should carry the lead. And I don’t think we should counsel [unclear] if we’re asked. I think it would be beneficial to Pakistan. And I think most people that have studied it will come to that conclusion. Secondly, I agree fully with the idea that we ought to tilt toward Pakistan. We have. My problem is I dislike the Indians so goddamn much. I had trouble even being reasonable with them. Nixon : Right. Well, in tilting toward them for 25 years, it has only gotten US a kick in the pants. Rogers : So, really now when you say you’re [unclear]. Nixon : How do we do it? Rogers : Oh I [unclear] bring over here this afternoon, which you can take with you, which will suggest several ways we can take action. One would be right now we’d just announce that we’re not going to grant any more export licenses in their sales act. And that would be perfectly consistent with what we did in the case of Pakistan. It doesn’t have any, it doesn’t have any real meaning to it. But the symbolism. Nixon : Small arms. Rogers : That’s right. Nixon : Spare parts. That could be done. Rogers : That can be done. We actually could embargo everything in the pipeline. We’ve got maybe, well we may have $10 or $15 million worth in the pipeline. Nixon : Military? Rogers : Military equipment. But most, a lot of it is communications equipment. Some of it is tools for manufacturing ammunitions. Nixon : Yeah. They got arms? Rogers : We could do that. That’s quite a job if we embargoed everything. That would really be passing judgment. We did not do that in the case of Pakistan. If you remember we did not grant any new licenses. [unclear exchange] Now, we just close the pipeline off. We could, we could say that we’re not going to permit economic assistance [to be] committed, it’s about $11 million worth. It’s insignificant. I think that would be probably not a wise thing to do because we’re going to have to provide help for them for the refugees anyway. We got a lot of money, $250 million, for food and that sort of thing. Nixon : What at the present time, though, are we doing for Pakistan? Have we got nothing going there? Rogers : Oh, yes. Yeah, we have— Nixon : Still, some economic stuff. Rogers : Yeah. Oh, yes. We’ve got about, what is the total, Henry, 200 [unclear exchange]. Nixon : I guess, any action on Pakistan. Kissinger : Well, the astounding thing [unclear] Mr. President, where the argument is made that economic assistance isn’t effective. Cutting it off isn’t effective. It’s almost the best argument against economic assistance. [unclear] Rogers : Well, Henry, all I’ve got to say is [unclear] that it’s committed. In other words, economic assistance to India, $300 and some odd million is done in irrevocable letters and credit, so we can’t get out of that. Now on some of these contracts we had a lot of— Nixon : At least let me see, let me see what the operative [unclear]. You know we just, I just may want to take a hard line on that. Kissinger : We had 11 million, as Bill says, in obligated total funds [unclear]. And then we have 107 [unclear]. And then from then on it gets more difficult. Rogers : Yeah, 380 million. The bulk of it is committed. We just can’t dicker with it. Kissinger : In addition to that, there’s an appeal for an aid agreement that’s ready to be signed if we can drag out these arms. Rogers : Oh, [unclear] that’s no problem. Kissinger : And then there’s another $100 million item. Nixon : Well I just want to see that. [unclear] It may be— Kissinger : One point I would like to make, Mr. President, for your consideration, I agree on the UN. I’m in total agreement with Bill. I think we should [unclear] absolutely right. And it’s going to go that way. We should take then initiative if it comes that way. Nixon : Now let’s, just on the UN thing, because I won’t be exposed to any questioning on this till Monday or Tuesday, till Tuesday of next week. Rogers : Your press conference is on Tuesday? Nixon : I may have it Tuesday. But it depends on how much of this in the Cabinet. You may be exposed to questions and Ziegler may. Now what do we want to say about this in your opinion? Rogers : My opinion— Nixon : See, I don’t think you can sort of take the idea that... I don’t think you can take the idea that well the UN—a very delicate thing. A lot of people are, why the Christ aren’t we for the UN getting in? What do you think? Kissinger : Well, we haven’t said we’re against the UN. Nixon : I know. Well, that’s the point. What should Bill say? The same thing. What I meant is I think we’ve got to do nothing about getting in the UN. But it sort of appears that, well that’s—what do you think? Rogers : I— Nixon : What can you say? Rogers : Well, I think the ideal— Nixon : You may be put to that very soon. Rogers : I think our position should be for the moment we’re watching developments, we’re actively engaged in diplomatic activity. Nixon : That’s right. Rogers : I’m going to talk, in fact, to the Indian Chargé, he’s trying to see me with some special message now. And I’ll try to see the Paks so we can say we’ve talked to everybody. And we’ve talked to the Russians. So that we can say that we’ve done all this and that kind of activity. Now, we’ve gotten a good deal of credit for that already. Nixon : I think so. Rogers : We’ve been very active, and we aren’t committed necessarily to either side. Secondly, on the, it seems to me we can say we’re doing this, we’re watching the situation carefully, we’re consulting with all the parties concerned. That we haven’t—that there’s no judgment on that yet. We have no decision. That we would assume that that’s something that each nation will want to consider itself, leaving the impression that that really helps Pakistan. Pakistan makes the first move and India resists, they’ll gain a good deal. Nixon : Yeah. Rogers : Because people will say that India must be responsible. India [unclear] the United Nations. And I think that they— Nixon : That’s the thing that I can’t understand Bill, that Mrs. Gandhi, that she’s reading the P.R. wrong there, don’t you agree, Henry? Because they’ve resisted the UN on refugees and everything else. Pakistan has invited them in. Kissinger : Well, their crimes are not in P.R. [unclear exchange] Well, Mr. President, it’s not inconceivable that the Indians are trying this one on because they don’t seem irrevocably committed to go in deep. They’re sort of [unclear] in nearly division strength. So, if we show at this point, not yet [unclear] irrevocable strength, I think it would be wrong to cut away now. But if we— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : We could do a number of things that warn them that something is coming. And if it escalates— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : All we would have done is a very mild démarche to [unclear]. Nixon : There’s another reason that it just, I feel that it might have an effect. Bill, you know, I called on her after you met with her. You told her, “Now look here, you’re going to catch hell on this.” I think, I feel that we must not shoot blanks. Because I also told, well even Tito when he was here. I said [unclear] I told him much more directly when we were talking at dinner [unclear]. He was on the Indian side of course. I said, well let’s just understand one thing. I said I don’t know what’s going to happen. But if there’s a breakout of war, you can forget United States aid to India. And I feel that we ought to do something symbolic, I really feel it. Rogers : Yeah, there’s no problem there. Nixon : That I think something symbolic might have an effect, might have an effect, on restraining India. That—I don’t know. Many people think it won’t? Rogers : Well, we haven’t gotten the reports back from the telegrams we sent out. I’ll see this fellow when I get back to the office. But I think what, Mr. President, maybe— Nixon : Keating’s a traitor. Kissinger : [unclear] Rogers : I think what we might do is wait until Friday, this announcement on Friday that we have suspended the, issuing any further export licenses. Now that’s what we did last time. Nixon : Let me suggest this, I think it would be helpful, Henry—Bill it’s on the list here today for Ziegler to say that this was the subject of the discussion, is that all right? Kissinger : I think that would be very— Nixon : We had an hour discussion on India–Pakistan and then I think we will continue to meet on Friday. In other words, we will have a whole new conversation and so forth. But that gives US time to think about it. I want to read the paper, could you have something by five o’clock? Rogers : Oh, yeah. Nixon : I mean that these alternatives—things are options that we can do. I won’t, as you know [unclear–do?] anything that is useless or anything. Rogers : We don’t want to seem petulant. Nixon : But on the other hand, very firm. That we want to be helpful. But I think, I think in anything that we say there should be a very positive statement that the United States commitment to help refugees, to help hungry people, et cetera remains. And that’s where, Henry, you can continue with this potential PL–480 to both Pakistan and India, granted so that we are feeding people there. Right? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : On the other hand, military stuff. Boy, we could be awfully tough. Rogers : I wish we had. [unclear] Nixon : One thing, I mention this [unclear] with SALT. I’ve mentioned this to Henry, this multilateral aid thing, we have got to get some stroke. I think that’s a study for the next 2 or 3 months. Rogers : I couldn’t agree more. Nixon : I just, every time we turn around and we try to fight the UN; Bill, we haven’t got any stroke with anybody. [unclear exchange] Nixon : World Bank Kissinger : I don’t think they would lightly go into a confrontation with us, if we catch them early enough. Nixon : Who? Kissinger : The Indians. Nixon : Now, the interesting thing is how do you both read the Russian thing? You read the Russian thing totally that they’re acting in a restraining way on India? Do you believe that? Rogers : I do. Nixon : Do you? Kissinger : I think they are trying to restrain them but not very hard. Rogers : Why? Kissinger : Why, because there is some advantage to have [unclear] the Chinese presence. Nixon : They want to screw the Chinese. Kissinger : Humiliate them. Nixon : On the other hand, well, on the other hand, it’s going to cost Russia a hell of a lot of money. I mean by a lot a great deal because they’ve got to support India in this war. And that they’re not for, are they? That’s why they ended the other one—the India-Pakistan [unclear–war?] Russia didn’t do that. Kissinger : Well, I think the Indians are such, my reading of the Indians is that any rational assessment should indicate that there is only one way a political revolution can go [unclear]. So they know they’ve got that. But what they are pressing for is so traumatic a settlement on the East Pakistan situation that the West Pakistan situation starts unraveling also. And what they want is to reduce West Pakistan to something like Afghanistan status. And that they are the only significant country. They want to turn East Pakistan into a sort of Bhutan. And after that, I’m willing to predict [unclear]. Because East Pakistan suffers from neglect from West Pakistan. I think the Indians have a vested interest in keeping them down. Rogers : Yeah. Kissinger : Because if East Bengal becomes even nominally [unclear] then West Bengal is going to be attractive. Nixon : It’s already a horrible place. Kissinger : So they want to make sure that East Bengal is worse off than West Bengal [unclear]. Nixon : That’s right. Rogers : I’m not sure—I think that Henry’s right. I suppose there’s a lot of that thinking. But also a lot of it is just hatred—they hate. Just sheer hate. Kissinger : No that’s [unclear exchange]. Nixon : I think actually that both Pakistan and India hate each other so much that they are totally irrational about [unclear]. They really are. You talk to a Pakistani and get his take. Rogers : Just like a man and wife. They hate each other and they are too jealous to care about the welfare of the children. They just hate each other. Nixon : I don’t think Yahya’s that far. Rogers : No, he isn’t. Nixon : But Bhutto. Now what—really what he did is disgusting. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Good God. What am I thinking? Rogers : Not helpful. He’s supposed to be, he’s more leftish than— Nixon : Oh, he’s leftish. I know. But which way? Is he anti-India? Anti-US? Kissinger : Violently anti-Indian. Pro-Chinese. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : But in a way we gain a lot if he comes in. Nixon : Right. Kissinger :—we have less obligations to— Nixon : Bhutto might make a deal with the other fellow. Would he make a deal with this Mujib guy? Rogers : No. Nixon : No. Rogers : That’s, of course, part of the trouble. The reason that— Nixon : You ever met Bhutto? Rogers : No. No. Nixon : More important, have you ever met his wife? Boy, she is one of the most beautiful women in the world. Kissinger : It depends, Mr. President. [unclear exchange] Kissinger : If Mujib is, if they’re thinking of a united Pakistan then Bhutto would never deal with Mujib. Because he’s afraid that Mujib will aim for the prime ministership. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : If, however, to [unclear] Bengal, then Bhutto is in a better position to present himself than Yahya. Yahya is a better man for reconciliation. Bhutto is— Nixon : Yahya is a thoroughly decent and reasonable man. Not always smart politically, but he’s a decent man. Rogers : Quick note on what Henry said, and that is—if Yahya steps out of the picture,which is quite possible. That means that he’s given up on East Pakistan. Cause Bhutto can’t— Nixon : Yeah, yeah. Bhutto basically has been—he hasn’t changed. My last report is one of my basic [unclear] in ’67 when I was there, is that the son-of-a-bitch is a total demagogue. And therefore Ayub Khan gave me a rundown on him, and he’s a pretty good judge of men, and he said this fellow is just bad news. Rogers : Let me say, Mr. President, when you asked me what I thought the Russians were doing, I think they would like to have a major war avoided. But I agree that they are not restraining the Indians too much. In other words, they want the Indians to do much as they are doing. I think they hope a major war can be avoided. I think to that extent they help. I wouldn’t be surprised if they pull back a while on it. I wouldn’t be surprised if next week or so it cools off a little bit. But I don’t think it’s going to cool off— Nixon : Well, let me talk to one other subject, which I think also relates to this—relates to what you, we decided on Friday. I don’t want us to get caught in this—we of course are interested in results—but I don’t want to get caught in the business where we take the heat for a miserable war that we had nothing do with. Rogers : No. Nixon : I think it’s very important that we do enough, that we appear to be—but I think we just got to get it across to the American people that we cannot be responsible for every goddamn war in the world. Now we weren’t responsible for the Nigerian war. We are not responsible for this war. The idea that this thing, and the refugees, and Pakistan and the rest, we couldn’t avoid that, could we? Rogers : As a matter of fact, that’s another advantage of having the thing in the Security Council, because then it does put the heat on the United Nations, and distinguishes it from us. There’s very little we can do. Nixon : Do you have any thought there as to how we—I think we got to, I sense these political things developing. You know, we’re doing well in several fields. But I just don’t want this thing to muddy the water. I mean, how can we avoid getting caught in the [unclear]. Now the United States—why didn’t we avoid the war with India-Pakistan? Kissinger : The truth of the matter is, if anything produced the war, not saying we did it, was the Indians [who] see the Pakistanis in a uniquely weak position, with the world opinion turned against them. And basically there’s an opportunity they’ll never get again for at least [unclear]. So if any mistake was made it was being too hard on Pakistan. [unclear]Secondly, I think, we have a very aggressive record. Of one we haven’t backed down, first for the refugees, secondly for relief in East Pakistan, and thirdly in moving things concretely towards the political evolution. We’re the only ones that pass that test. Rogers : Yeah. Kissinger : We got the military governor replaced with a civilian governor. We got them to admit UN observers. We got them to permit UN peace [unclear]. [unclear exchange] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers, Oval Office, Conversation No. 624–21. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 157. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 157. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 26, 1971, 10:42 a.m. Mr. Kissinger/The President K: Mr. President. P: Henry anything going on today? [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] P: I noticed with interest the Pakistanis claim they are doing pretty well and I would like the Indians to be embarrassed. K: The Indians have pulled off on this one but they are going to have to come back . . . Keating finally delivered the message and they are all over him. What we should do with the arms is wait until they make another military move. P: Pakistan provocation . . . I saw that they admitted it they were in there... K: Oh yes, they admitted it. The New York Times wrote a scorcher against India. P: Did you talk to the Times and tell them that was the case? K: Yes I talked to _______(?) I said if anyone is to blame for the war it is by following your advice. Cutting off aid to Pakistan. . . P: Well and the thing is novel—it is the point I have been making and I hope you pushed it on Pakistan that we cut off their aid because of their internal conduct not for their external conduct. So we cut off aid and India busts into Pakistan and that is worse. Was it a strong editorial? K: Oh yes, Mrs. Gandhi has betrayed her father. P: Of course her father was just as bad as she is. What she said was so unconscionable and the Pakistanis were so prefabricated. Oh the Pakistan thing you feel no action on the arms thing should be taken. K: I think as soon as military action starts again we should cut off aid. P: I still want Connally, State and Hannah to say nothing is being moved into the economic aid pipeline into India. Are they riding herd on this? They will get the message. K: Oh no question. We are just not saying anything. We are not signing the PL 480 and we won’t say what the reason is for. The Chinese—I told them you can’t just say you are against the Indians and you better tell the Pakistanis what you are going to do. Do it independently and show them the resolution you are putting forth... We are going pretty far in condemning India. . . You talked with Heath. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 24–30 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. 158. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 158. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:45 p.m. R: On Pakistan Ambassador. Has no instructions but thought a good idea. Communications slow from here to his government so working out an arrangement for him to send through our channels. He feels sure they wil not oppose. They feel same thing in UN. K: I think we should wait until we hear from them. We can wait until tomorrow morning. R: There’s a lot of criticism on why we don’t do something. Ambassador had a press conference today and a lot of press critizing us for not taking action. Otherwise if we don’t do it someone else will. K: As soon as we hear from the [?]. If we can get an answer tonight, sure. R: Sooner we have the monkey off our back so the President can say he has acted. K: The President does want to act. Wants to take a line to condemn the Indians. R: It’s not a matter of condemning or blaming. It’s trying to stop it. If we blame India a general war will break out. K: In the subcontinent. R: We are short-sighted if we think our general approach is castigating India. It’s to bring a ceasefire. K: And withdrawal. R: If we say let’s condemn India, what does that do? We are trying to bring about ceasefire. K: That’s what we want to do but in order to get that we have to make clear who started action. R: That’s in the Security Council. If we don’t take lead for in the security council in for action then first we have lost the opportunity because someone else will and no advantage for railing against India now if we have Security Council— K: I mean before the Security Council. R: Right. K: I think we should get the Security Council in a way that’s not offensive to Pakistan if it can be done. So what if the Belgians go to the Security Council? R: The President said don’t let them blame me and people will. Church saying we are not doing a thing. K: We should hit back. R: How can we? K: We have done a lot. Neglect India on refugee thing. He will hit at us no matter what we do. R: If war breaks out and we do not move quickly to bring it to the Security Council in conjunction with others, the President will be blamed for inaction. K: As soon as we know they don’t object. R: This fellow doesn’t and getting in touch with ambassador in NY who has been in touch with his government. I don’t think we should wait until tomorrow. K: Let’s talk again in a couple of hours. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking. 159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 5, 1971 K: John, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assemble a group of the NSC tomorrow at 1:30 about the India-Pakistan situation so if you don’t mind, why don’t we have our lunch at the White House. C: That’s fine; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to. You’ll be busy as hell; why don’t we just cancel it? K: Well, because you will be over there anyway. No, I’ll have 45 minutes or so. C: All right or we can do it anytime. I’ll be at the White House anyway so hell that makes more sense; I’m going to be there till 12:15 or so. So when I leave the President’s office, I’ll just come right to your office. K: Good, but in case I don’t—in case something happens that does make— cause either of us to cancel it. C: Just don’t worry about it. K: Well, let me tell you what the issues are. C: All right. K: And where the President tends to be leaning but that’s not in any way to prejudice your judgment. The basic problem is now that the Indians have launched a full-scale attack into East Pakistan, how we should tilt. Now the argument that State is making is doesn’t make any difference anyway, it’s too late. Secondly, we will just drive the Indians into the Soviet arms if we get tough. C: ..... them I’d like to. Go ahead. K: (laughter) Well, you’re talking my language. The thing that concerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly, we have a situation where one of the motives that the Chinese may have had in leaning towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might happen to them. C: Yep. K: So that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for some principles is important for that policy. Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war. C: Yep. K: So our—what the President’s tentative view is is to start throttling the economic aid program to India. We don’t get a hell of a lot; what do we get from them? We’ve put $10 billion into it. C: We don’t get a goddamn thing. K: And when people say that we’re driving them into Soviet arms, what does that mean operationally? C: That’s right. K: What more can they do than what they are doing? C: That’s right. K: And I think we have to show that it’s too risky to kick us in the teeth. C: You know I’ll agree with that position. K: Well, you’ve been so soft in the last few weeks— C: (laughter) K:—that I’ve just wanted to check around. of course C: Well, of course you know it’s a very practical matter. It seems to me that India as an ally is an enormous liability under any circumstances— political and economic and military liability. K: Yeah, yeah. C: By what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the better off we are, regardless of where they go. K: That’s right. Well, then where the hell are they going go. They have their reasons to be independent. There is as good a chance that they will try to win their way back into our favor as there is— C: I agree with that. K: Because if we—now, no matter what we do, we can’t do as much for them as the Soviets have already done on the thing that interests them which is to rape Pakistan. C: Yep, yep. K: So that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up that way but that’s at any rate where the President is leaning at this moment. And he wanted me just to explain why we have done the things we have. C: All right. K: And, of course, you will hear the rest of it there. C: Good. K: But let’s try to get together for lunch. I’d like to hear what happened in Europe. C: All right, fine. K: Good, John. C: Thank you, Henry. K: Bye. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, December 1971. No classification marking. 160. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (Vorontsov) 160. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (Vorontsov) 1 Washington, December 5, 1971, 4:55 p.m. V: Hello. K: I am sorry to call you on a Sunday, but I was just talking to the President to report our conversation and I mentioned that at the end of our conversation you said that in a week or so it will be over and he said that he would like you to report to Moscow that in a week or so it may be ended but it won’t be over as far as we are concerned if it continues to take the present trend. V: Yes. H: He wants it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relation-ship if it continues to go on this way. V: I understand. H: We cannot accept that any country would take unilateral actions like that. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking. 161. Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers 161. Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 6, 1971, 9:19–9:24 a.m. Nixon : Hello. Rogers : Good morning, Mr. President. Nixon : We’ve got this set now. It will be 1:30 and we’ll meet in the EOB. Rogers : Uh-huh. Nixon : Because some other meetings will be taking place here. Rogers : Uh-huh. Nixon : And at—just get a general rundown on the situation and then if you also could, I think give those—give the Senators a call and tell them you can come up. Rogers : Yeah, I’ve done that already. Nixon : This afternoon. Rogers : I’ve done it. Nixon : I don’t know how broadly that should be done, but I think it’s a very good idea for at least the record to be out with regard to what we’ve done on refugees— Rogers : Uh-huh. Nixon : Why we’ve taken it to the UN. We are staying out of this thing in terms of both—in terms of our military assistance—the fact that we have cut off the military assistance to India, etc. Because even though we read it all time and are quite familiar with it, some of them are not familiar as they might be with this. Rogers : I see. Nixon : You remember Church made this statement— Rogers : Yeah. Nixon :—To effect that we are do absolutely nothing on refugees. And I told Mansfield about it this morning, I said: “I can’t understand that. Because you know we’ve given 250 million dollars.” Mike was aware of it. So I think it’s just one of those things— Rogers : I don’t think we can keep Church quiet, though. I heard him on television last night. He’s going to make—he’s going to make a political attack. And all we can do is try to dull the attack. I think that—I don’t believe we’re going to have much criticism because I think what the American people want is for us to stay out of it. And I think they want us to do everything we can to bring about a peaceful settlement, which we are trying to do, and to help in a humanitarian way. I think we have a very good record. Nixon : Well, I think the record’s good. But let’s just don’t assume that the record is known. Rogers : Oh, no. Nixon : Keep putting it out. Rogers : Oh, no. We’ve got to keep putting it out. Nixon : There are apparently quite a few of these fellows that heard some of the UN debate on television. They said the Russian-Chinese exchange was rather bitter. Rogers : But it’s—you know it’s wonderful. Nixon : Yeah. Rogers : I tell you, the Russians—the Chinese call the Russians “Social Imperialists,” and the Russians call the Chinese “Social Traitors.” Nixon : Boy. Yeah. Yeah. Rogers : It’s pretty, pretty acrimonious. Nixon : Right. Right. Rogers : And it leaves us in a pretty good position because we haven’t had to get involved in the middle. Nixon : Right. Right. Rogers : Do you think—would you suggest that maybe I see a lot of Senators or just—I wondered about whether– Nixon : No. Rogers : I thought I’d just talk to the— Nixon : I would get—I think that if you do too many, it builds it up. But I think just doing a few due to the fact that they must be aware of the fact that we’re informing them, that’s all. No, but I think, you know— Rogers : Mike [Mansfield] suggested, he said that they’re having a vote and he could get a lot of Senators, and I said: “No I don’t think that’s a good idea. That will make it seem like a crisis.” Nixon : Well also, it will also give it a crisis, but it also gives a lot of the demagogues a chance to get up and make speeches about things. That isn’t what you want. Rogers : That’s right. Nixon : I think that—just tell Mike to have a few in their office. Rogers : I thought have Mike and Hugh [Scott] and, unfortunately, Bill [Fulbright] and George Aiken. Nixon : Naturally. Rogers : And Stennis and somebody else. Nixon : That’s right. Armed Services. Foreign Affairs. Maybe—that ought to do it. Rogers : That ought to do it. Nixon : That ought to do it. Because if you go beyond that, it’s simply going to be a miniature UN debate, which is not going to be very useful. Rogers : Right. And I also thought I’d tell them at the end that I’d continue to come up periodically to fill them in so we’d keep them fully advised about the crisis. Nixon : Right. Right. Right. Rogers : I’m scheduled to go to this NATO meeting. I had planned to go to Iceland; I think I’ll skip that. But I think I probably should go to the NATO meeting. Nixon : What time is the NATO meeting? Rogers : Well I could leave, I could leave Wednesday. [December 8] It’s really Thursday and Friday, but there is a dinner Wednesday night— Nixon : Yeah. Rogers :—Of the Big Four. I think I probably better go to that. Nixon : I think by that time there won’t be anything you can do. Rogers : When I leave—I’ll probably leave Wednesday morning and get back Friday night. Nixon : I think you should go. I mean, the world has to go forward. This conflict is, was one that was apparently inevitable, at some time or other. It’s just unfortunate that it had to come for this cause and at this time. Rogers : That’s right. Of course, militarily, it looks really looks pretty, pretty bleak. Nixon : Oh my. Yes. No way. Rogers : No way. Nixon : Except, I certainly wouldn’t want to be in the position of the Indians trying to take West Pakistan. Rogers : No. No. Nixon : That’s going to be real rough going up through those mountains. Rogers : No. And I rather hope that the West Paks can do some good up in Kashmir. Maybe they can make some offsetting gains up in there. Nixon : That’s right. Rogers : Of course, geographically it would make a lot more sense if they could have the Kashmir and— Nixon : That’s right. That’d be a good trade. Rogers : That’s right. Nixon : That’d be a good trade. Good trade. Rogers : But that’s tough going up in that mountain area. Nixon : Yeah. Incidentally, is Bush there with you? Rogers : No. Nixon : No, he isn’t? Rogers : He’s in New York. I alerted him to the fact that you may call him. Nixon : Yeah, I might give him a call. Fine. Good. Rogers : Yes. Nixon : All right, see you at 1:30. Rogers : Fine. Bye. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 162. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 162. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 6, 1971, 6:14–6:38 p.m. Nixon : I had a thought or two on India-Pakistan. First, Stans wants to report to me. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : I thought we’d have him report to the Cabinet. I don’t think it’s a good idea. I’ll tell you what I had in mind. I think he should report to you, Henry, I’ll tell you why. I think we ought to cool it with the Russians. Kissinger : I couldn’t, Mr. President— Nixon : [unclear] Stans will want to have a press conference and tell them about all the progress he’s made on this thing. And we have got to cool it. And I’d just simply tell him [unclear] let’s get a damn signal across on that. Now Maury’s going to be hard to handle. Maybe you could get it a little reversed. Kissinger : I’ll get a hold of it. I’ll do it. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : No, I’ll do it. Maury will be hard to handle, but he’s a great team player. And he sees now that we deliver. This is the sort of signal the Russians understand. Nixon : If there’s anything that’s outstanding now, in the way of, let me tell you, in the way of licenses, or anything with the Russians, just drag our feet. Kissinger : You’ll be better off, Mr. President, 6 months from now. If they lose respect for us now, they’ll put it to us the way it’s never been— [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : What I was going to say, Henry, what I’m concerned about, I really worry about, is whether or not I was too easy on the goddamn woman when she was here. Kissinger : Well— Nixon : Think I was? Maybe I was. Now I don’t know, maybe it wouldn’t have helped. Kissinger : Well— Nixon : I think, I think she was out on a course to do this without any– Kissinger : I have sought out– Nixon : [unclear] She suckered us at that. Suckered us. Kissinger : Well, Mr. President, I wonder now in retrospect— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger :—now that you put the question—well, you followed your recommendations we all made to you. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : So if anyone is to blame— Nixon : If anything, if anything, I was a little tougher on her than the talking paper, you know what I mean? Kissinger : Oh, yes. Nixon : I was not soft on her on this thing. I told her that— Kissinger : No, but our advice to you was not to give her a pretext. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. Kissinger : And you even said to me—I remember when you went out— Nixon : Gracious remarks, I went “boom!” Kissinger : But on the other hand, well, the public thing had to be gracious. But when I look back on it now could we have recommended to you to brutalize her privately? To say now I want you to know— Nixon : I should have. I should have. Kissinger :—You do this and you will wreck your relations with us for 5 years and we will look for every opportunity to damage you. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. Kissinger : I just want you to know that. That’s probably what we should have done. Nixon : Yeah. And another weakness we’ve got is Keating there as Ambassador. Kissinger : Oh, he’s a bastard. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Of course, we don’t— Nixon : [unclear], soft, son-of-a-bitch. Kissinger : But she was playing us. Nixon : She was playing us. And you know the cold way she was the next day—she didn’t [unclear]. And this woman suckered us. But let me tell you, she’s going to pay. She’s going to pay. Now I mean on this aid side, I am not— Kissinger : And let’s fight it in the campaign. The Democrats will make issue— Nixon : They’ll probably say we’re losing India forever. All right, who’s going to care about losing India forever? Kissinger : I think, Mr. President, if we go to the American public and say what we’ve done and what they did, by that time there will have been a massacre in East Pakistan under their aegis. We’ve got to keep the heat on them now. They have to know they paid a price. Hell, if we could reestablish relations with Communist China, we can always get the Indians back whenever we want to later—a year or two from now. Nixon : Would you check to see what the hell that letter from Suharto was that his ambassador brought in. I want to be sure to follow up with Suharto [unclear]. The Indians are following up. Kissinger : But it’s precisely with people like him that we have to show that we’re going to be tough. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : So that he doesn’t get swallowed—get ideas— Nixon : Now, I want—we’ll sleep, Henry, on my proposition with regard to the Chinese– Kissinger : I haven’t done anything yet— Nixon : But I feel strongly that we should do it. I think we’ve got to tell them that some movement on their part we think toward the Indian border could be very significant. And that as far as we’re concerned that we have sent—just say that we have sent a very tough note to the Russians and that we are cooling our relations. That is anything you can—I don’t know how to put that. But the President is [unclear]—you know what I mean? Kissinger : We’ve gotten—the way we could put it, Mr. President, is to say—we shouldn’t urge them to do it because they’ll get too suspicious. If we could say, we have, if you consider it necessary to take certain actions we want you to know that you should not be deterred by the fear of standing alone against the powers that may intervene. Nixon : Right. Right. That’s right. And then say, “We have done this and this and this ourselves and we have done it first.” And then say, “It is apparent that it appears frankly now that the only thing that on the briefing, the confidential briefing that we have had, it appears the only thing the Indians fear is the possibility of [unclear–sanctions?].” You know? I don’t know if you want to be that specific or not. I don’t know. But damnit, I am convinced that if the Chinese start moving the Indians will be petrified. They will be petrified. Kissinger : Except the weather is against them. Nixon : I don’t give a damn. That’s more incentive if they can get through that pass. Kissinger : I’ll look into it. Nixon : Henry, be sure—be sure to move on that point. You know what I mean? The Chinese, you know, when they came across the Yalu, we thought they were a bunch of goddamn fools in the heart of the winter, but they did it. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : I’m not so sure. We know what the Paks can do. Kissinger : Because what’s going to happen is after this is over, the fact is they have to get a friendly government over into West Pakistan. This has been a great operation for the Indians. Because this is—it’s going to lead to the overthrow of Yahya, for sure. And to—but— Nixon : It’s such a shame. So sad. So sad. Tomorrow we’re going to have a meeting on Vietnam. [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.] Nixon : Coming back to this summit—I mean this India-Pakistan— Kissinger : One mistake we made—it wasn’t your mistake but it was—it took us 2 weeks to get the bureaucracy. If we could have got the bureaucracy on the first day of the Indian attack on East Pakistan to do the things they finally did today, that might have given them enough of a shot to blow them up. That might have given the Russians enough of a shot. Nixon : You know, Mrs. Gandhi she’s in her parliament and they’re thumping their desks with their fists [unclear]— Kissinger : But she would have snubbed them [unclear]. By that time she had crossed the rubicon. The time to [unclear]— Nixon : [unclear] She attacks us, so forth and so on. Kissinger : But she’s been pretty cautious about attacking us. And she’s not the only one. She’s never mentioned us by name. Nixon : We’re not—that’s one of the reasons why I shouldn’t get out on a press conference. Because I’ll have to take her on and I’m not going to do it. I don’t want to be in a position of attacking. I’ve got to stay out of that. Kissinger : I think so. Nixon : Or do you—you agree? Kissinger : No, I think you ought to stay out of it. You definitely ought to stay out of it. You don’t want to get into an argument with her, particularly as for a brief period it will look as if she’s winning. No. Absolutely not. Nixon : The main thing is we must not lose or be blamed for this goddamned thing. We’ll get blamed. Kissinger : No, no. Nixon : Church. Teddy Kennedy. Kissinger : No, I went to Joe Alsop’s house the other night and Teddy Kennedy was there. Of course, he’s such a jerk. He started mumbling that we didn’t do enough. And I just jumped all over him. I said, “We did this and this and this. What would you have done, Teddy? What more would you have done?” He said, “I would have shown more sympathy.” I said, “We gave them 250 million dollars. Do you really think sympathy—” Well, he pulled way off. He said he’d like to meet me and talk about it a little more. Nixon : Yeah. Incidentally, that Helms report [ 3 seconds not declassified ] Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Give me a copy of that. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : I’m going to put it out to the press. Put the whole goddamn thing out. Now who would be a good one who would like to have such a nice week? Kissinger : I think that Scali and Colson would be better judges of that. Nixon : Oh, I [unclear]. But I’ve got to— Kissinger : Joe Alsop would [unclear] it up. Nixon : Well, would Joe use it? I don’t know. What side is he on in this? Kissinger : Oh, he’s on ours. Oh, God. Nixon : Okay. Let me ask you to do this. Is there a way—can you get it into Joe’s hands? I want that report of Helms put into the hands of a columnist who will print the whole thing. Now I want you to get it out. Now this is a smart thing to do, Henry. I know. You know what I mean? You just happened to get a [ 2 seconds not declassified ] report [ 3 seconds not declassified ]; it will make her look bad. I know that’s their tragedy. Now that’s the way they play it. That’s the way we got to play it. You don’t agree? Kissinger : Yes, I do agree. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : Another thing— Nixon : Who would you give it to? Would you give it to— Kissinger : I, my—I shouldn’t do it. I’ve never played— Nixon : Give it to Scali. Kissinger : I’d give it to Scali and let him. Nixon : And tell him to get it out? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Tell him that this is gospel. You can give it to anyone you want, but don’t get caught. Don’t give it to Colson ’cause he’s— Kissinger : He’d disrupt this. Nixon : Scali will know how. Okay? Kissinger : I’ll do that. Nixon : Just say that this report came out. And, but just be sure to get it yards away from the White House. Kissinger : Right. I’ll get that done today. Nixon : Okay. Boy-oh-boy. It’s interesting. We’re done with the Russians. Kissinger : Well, we couldn’t—Brezhnev is in Warsaw. And we only sent a message last night. Today we sent a letter. Nixon : The Russians, they’ve just said hands-off to us. Kissinger : Well, we wrote them a pretty tough one. Nixon : What did we say? Kissinger : Well, we said this threatens the whole climate of confidence we’ve tried so hard to establish. I told him yesterday that [unclear]it’s exactly the opposite of what they should want. They’re driving us into aligning ourselves with countries that we have no particular parallel interest in on the sub-continent. And I said, “How can you talk to us about Security Council guarantees if you thwart the Security Council?” And I threatened them that we would not carry out the Middle East negotiations. And they seem—I haven’t talked to you about this—and we can’t do it. But they have been bugging me to come to Moscow. I don’t want to [do?] it. I’ve just tried to use it because of the Rogers problem. But they’ve sent me a formal invitation now. I don’t want to do it, but he raised it again yesterday. And I said, “under these conditions there’d be no chance at all talking about it.” Nixon : That’s correct. Kissinger : To put it on the basis because they have turned it off. We can just cancel this visit, which I never had any intention of [unclear-going on?] in the first place. Nixon : But let’s cool it on the Stans thing. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : We’ll meet tomorrow. I’ve only got 5 minutes for whatever they want to do. [unclear]— Kissinger : Then I would suggest also, Mr. President, the Indian Ambassador must not be seen under any level higher than the country desk officer. [unclear] Nixon : Did you put that out? Kissinger : No. Nixon : We’ll put that out. [unclear] the Indian Ambassador. I want it as an instruction on my part: “The President instructs the Indian Ambassador to not be seen at any level other than the country desk level.” Also, I want you to send a message to Keating. He is to be totally cold in his relations. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Put that out. From me. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 630–20. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 163. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the President’s Assistant and Press Secretary (Ziegler) 163. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the President’s Assistant and Press Secretary (Ziegler) 1 Washington, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:29 p.m. Stans : And what you said before I left was that this could be a watershed in our relations. And Kosygin opened up the meetings saying, “Mr. Secretary, we have high hopes for your mission.” And so the thinking was parallel all the way through. [Omitted here is discussion of an 11-day trip to the Soviet Union just completed by Secretary Stans.] Nixon : I was wondering, Henry, what questions Ron would [unclear]. Kissinger : Let me tell you first— Nixon : Don’t you think you ought to cover— Kissinger : What I thought I would do is to take a very— Nixon : Do you think we ought to postpone? Ziegler : No, no. Backgrounder. Nixon : No, I didn’t mean—the whole corps. The whole corps. Kissinger : Well, what I thought, Mr. President, I do— Nixon : [unclear] Ziegler : Actually— Nixon : But this isn’t too bad. This isn’t too hard. Ziegler : [unclear] Nixon : Forty people, perhaps. Or do you expect more? Ziegler : No. Nixon : Well, that’s good. Then you can have an intelligent conversation. Go ahead, Henry. Kissinger : What I thought I would do is to first, say a lot of nice things about the Indians. As, you know, of our concern for the Indians, how we consider them one of the key countries in the world. And that what we have been forced to say the last few days has been done with enormous reluctance. I think we ought to parse it this way. Then to say— Nixon : You might even say this: The President, our concern is, why don’t you put it—be a little bit stronger. First of all, I visited India in 1953, and I visited there on two other occasions, but for a considerable time in 1967 and, of course, briefly as President. I have great interest, as I’ve said there, and I said when she was here, expressed our views that it is the policy of the United States to help the largest nation of the world—free nation—succeed because [unclear] very important that they succeed. That’s why we’re one of the strongest supporters in terms of [unclear]. I think that’s not a bad idea. If there is a problem, and you think there’s a problem [unclear]. I don’t know how or when. [unclear] Ziegler : [unclear] Nixon : Oh my God, when I was in India in 1967, I was there 3 days, and I saw Mrs. Gandhi, the President, the Vice President, every goddamn Indian [unclear]. Kissinger : Yeah. I don’t really think I ought to— Nixon : Who said it? Ziegler : Bob. Nixon : I think it was Hal. Kissinger : I don’t think— Nixon : Utterly ridiculous. Kissinger : I don’t really— Nixon : If it comes up, [unclear] you know what the [unclear] she said quite the contrary [unclear]. Kissinger : But then I thought I would simply summarize everything we had done—on both sides. And I can make in a very low key way an enormously damning case against the Indians. Nixon : What are you going to do? Well, what is our purpose? Kissinger : Our purpose is to say— Nixon : [unclear] Let me just get—as I understand, Teddy has attacked on what ground? That we should have expressed concern about Pakistan’s rape of East Pakistan? Did we—did we express concern about that? Kissinger : We cut off— Nixon : Jesus Christ— Kissinger :—No, what I would— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : What I will say to that is that our actions spoke for us. That we cut the economic assistance. We cut all military supplies except some licenses. Nixon : Those that were in the pipeline. Kissinger : And not even all of—and even some of those. Nixon : Right. And we used our influence to create [unclear]. Kissinger : That when I was in India, at your request, I told the Indians that we thought we should maintain some equity with the Pakistanis, and they said they understood this. So they weren’t asking us to make any condemnation. Nixon : The question was to condemn and have no influence or to continue relations and have some. Kissinger : Let’s find out how much military aid we cut off. [Unclear exchange of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Ziegler] Ziegler : I think the overriding— Nixon : What do they need to hear? Ziegler : I think the overriding advantage of Henry, the way he knows how to do these things, will be without even referring directly to Kennedy, which I don’t want to do, for sure. He will put it in perspective that will put Kennedy out here in left field and not really relating to realities. And I think the documentation on India at the time of the East Pakistani blow up, and how it all evolved to the point where we can say that India has led to the crisis. Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : It’s what we need at this time. Ziegler : It’s a prospectus. Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : He wants to see my schedule. Ziegler : l called him on that. Nixon : I also said yes to [unclear]. Ziegler : And I also talked to him about the fact, I said, if you have any question at all, Marvin, I said if you have any question at all about the humanitarian concerns we have expressed both the last months about East Pakistan and Pakistan, number one, you know damn well how much money we put in there. I said, number two, I can refer you to transcript after transcript where we have referred to the President’s concern [unclear]. Nixon : [unclear exchange] But Marvin Kalb, the fact that he’s on it shows the Russians are helping. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. The Russians have an outrageous [unclear]. And you know they just—We have an intelligence report today that they told the Indians we were [unclear-providing?] arms to Pakistan. [Omitted here is a portion of the conversation not related to South Asia] Nixon : You want—you’re going to try and make the point that we have maintained our influence with Pakistan. That influence, as a result of it, they have accepted all the various conditions we have laid down and were prepared to accept others. Right? And if we had not maintained our influence they would have done nothing. Kissinger : Well, I— Nixon : The UN observers, the military civilian government, the—you know, good God. Kissinger : And I can show a real pattern of Indian deceit. For example, on November 19, I saw the Indian Ambassador. On November 15 I saw the Pakistan Foreign Secretary. And I told him we needed a maximum program because it would be very difficult to prevent hostilities from breaking out. He said he would let me know after he came back on the 22nd. Nixon : Well, is this— Kissinger : And on the 19th I told this to the Indian Ambassador. And he said, “Well let me know as soon as you know when will that be.” I said around the 28th. On the 22nd they attacked. So— Nixon : Henry, what do you want to have come out of it? Kissinger : Well, I what I want to have come out of this, for your sake Mr. President, is to show first of all, that in action we showed enormous concern. Nixon : For the refugees? Kissinger : For the refugees. That in practice we’ve made major efforts to bring about a political settlement. In fact, the only political movement that has occurred has been at our urging. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : Thirdly, that we were in the process of negotiating with the Pakistanis to move them even further. That we told this to the Indians— [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : So the purpose is to show that we’ve done the best we can. We have no influence—we have no responsibility for either. It’s not our job. The Russians have an interest in India. The Chinese have a hell of an interest in Pakistan. We only have an interest in peace. We’re not anti-Indian; we’re not anti-Pakistan. We are anti-aggression, as a means of solving an internal, a very difficult internal problem. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) 164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) 1 Washington, December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m. R: I thought you were angry with me. K: Due to the incompetence of my staff you were not notified. I was expecting you at 2:45. R: No one told me. K: It was because it was someone I wanted to see. R: I am going to the State Dept. I rang Gen. Haig 3 times. K: They didn’t notify me. R: The President has sent another message direct by Farland. About the whole situation. One or two suggestions—my trouble is that they keep saying see you. K: Two things. One, tell your people to stop all cable traffic with respect to help on ammunition and so forth. We are doing what we can and we will send a coded message. It’s getting too dangerous for you to send it. I will keep you informed. R: I am going to State now to keep the record straight. K: Tell them you would like to invoke mutual security treaty. A formal request— R: An aide memoire. Unsigned. K: The secret clauses also? R: “The bilateral U.S. /Pakistan agreement ? ? ? ? ? and independence of Pakistan ? ? ? ? ? ? ? gravest to Pakistan ? ? ? ? extend material help to us.” K: Say they should use clarifications used in subsequent years. R: Are you very busy today? K: I will see you first thing tomorrow. We wax are here to support you. R: You don’t have to say that. Things are getting late. K: I can give you news that we are getting something out of the Shah for ammunition. You can send a cypher through me. R: I have not sent a cable. Only through you. Are your cables different from the State Dept.? K: Yes. R: So you will give me a time tomorrow. K: You can count on it. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6–10 Dec 1971. No classification marking. No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger’s reference to a mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action “as may be mutually agreed upon” to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by “any country controlled by international communism” so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that the United States would come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volume XIX, page 372, footnote 6 ) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962, however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take “immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote 7) 165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell 165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell 1 Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:20–5:01 p.m. Nixon : But Nelson [Rockefeller], how did he feel about the media on the India-Pakistan? Mitchell : Oh, he thinks it’s disgraceful. Nixon : Incidentally, before I say—I called Newton, while you were there. I called just beforehand because I heard he had a press conference [unclear]. I said you’ve done a hell of a job. And I repeated some of the lines. He said he was sitting there reading your backgrounder—I don’t know whether you got any press out of it. But I said, made this point. I said—and he raised a point of morality. He went through a very interesting exercise. He said Charlie Bartlett was in to see him. The difficulty, he said, was the press is like the Kennedys were because the Kennedys were obsessed with the idea of the Indian mystery and all of the God-like qualities and so forth of the Indians. He said those of us who work with the Indians up here know that they are the [unclear—most?]devious, trickiest sons-of-bitches there are. And he went on to say, I went on to tell him, I said how come we got so many votes. He said, “yeah, we got all the votes except India’s, the Russian satellites.” And we even got Rumania. He said, “well first of all, you know a lot of Mid-Eastern votes were with us.” [unclear] They were sort of reflecting the Israeli thing. I can see that, you know, on withdrawal, they can’t be against withdrawal. But then he said there are countries like Namibia and a lot jackass places like that [unclear]. He said they also—this idea, you see this is where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they said that if aggression is engaged in by a democracy it’s all right. But where it’s engaged in by a dictatorship, it’s wrong. They forget that most of the countries in the world are dictatorships, including all these little countries. Second point, the point that I made to him which I [unclear], now look there’s a totally moral attitude of our critics here. First they say, they make the point that because there’s 600 million Indians and only 60 million in West Pakistan, we’re on the wrong side. We should be with the 600 million Indians. I said since when do we determine the morality of our policy on the basis of how many people a country has? I said the second reason that they’re wrong, then they say but India is a democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian country, a dictatorship, and therefore India—we shouldn’t be on the side of a dictatorship but on the side of the democratic country. I said if aggression is engaged in by any country, it’s wrong. And in a sense it’s even more wrong for a democratic country to engage in it because democratic countries are held in a higher degree of morality. And I said international morality will be finished—the United Nations will be finished—if you adopt the principle that because a country is democratic and big it can do what the hell it pleases. I really think that puts the issue to these sons-of-bitches. Kissinger : I found something, Mr. President, which you can use against Teddy Kennedy. I knew there was a secret deal that Kennedy made with Pakistan. State denied it. I said— Nixon : Ayub told me there was one. Kissinger : I knew there was one. Nixon : He told me there was one and I didn’t—when I was there. The Ambassador, the Ambassador denied it to me. I said that Ayub told me that. The Ambassador told me no there wasn’t. He knew nothing about it. Kissinger : [ 3 seconds not declassified ] I said it must have gone backchannel. Mitchell : Was that when Jackie got the horses? Nixon : See McConaughy was not Ambassador when I was there. This was a later Ambassador. Mitchell : Was that when Jackie got the horses? Nixon : Jesus Christ. Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : Election day 1962. Mitchell: I heard [unclear]. Nixon : Ayub was [unclear]. Kissinger : [unclear] They even had a legal obligation. But at any rate— Mitchell : Well what [unclear] the Pakistani Government has? Nixon : They have. Kissinger : They have. Nixon : Not on the basis of that but on the basis of their treaty. [unclear] The treaty I understand— Kissinger : We have a bilateral treaty. Nixon : Gives us an out, doesn’t it on India? Kissinger : Well— Nixon : Well, I mean I understand it could. But this doesn’t. This meant with India. The deal. Kissinger : The treaty gives us a slight out. But it [unclear—doesn’t cite?] to India by name. And we’ve got the UN defining them as aggressors. Nixon : So how can we play this Henry? Kissinger : Well, the next time they say we’re anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani, and that you have a liking for— [Nixon took a brief phone call unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger : I think at the right moment when they say you have a liking for these military dictators. [unclear] You could certainly say that to the contrary you were carrying out a commitment made in two administrations. Both [unclear] and previously in the Eisenhower administration. But that they were general in nature. And that the specific one made by President Kennedy to General Ayub which applies here, particularly to the case of India. What we will maintain— Nixon : Have you told John about what we’re doing? Kissinger : Well this is what I want to discuss with you, Mr. President. Nixon : Incidentally, I don’t want that to go any further. Kissinger : There’s no way it can be done. I got a message to you from the Shah, in which he says he can send ammunition—he is doing it now. He cannot send—he cannot send airplanes a) because the Pakistanis can’t fly the airplanes anyway because— Nixon : They cannot read. Kissinger : But most importantly because the Soviet-Indian treaty makes them vulnerable to the Soviets. He’s proposing that the Jordanians send their planes to Pakistan, because the Pakistanis can fly the Jordanian planes. And then he sends his planes to Jordan with Iranian pilots to cover Jordan while they are engaged in Pakistan. Nixon : I should think—I could think we could get a commitment from Israel on the Jordanians. Kissinger : Oh, no problem. Nixon : The Israelis sure are on our side on this one, aren’t they? Kissinger : I see Golda Meir on Friday. [December 10] Nixon : Well when you talk to her, you tell her, Henry, that this is a goddamn Russian ploy. That’s what she’s got to understand. Kissinger : Well, what we are betting on, Mr. President, [unclear], as long as the war with East Pakistan [unclear]. But the Indian plan is now clear. They’re going to move their forces from East Pakistan to the west. They will then smash the Pakistan land forces and air forces, annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan and then call it off. After that has happened—and then you have another [unclear] message from the Shah saying this section of West Pakistan now would be a mortal threat to the security of Iran. When this has happened, the centrifugal forces in West Pakistan would be liberated. Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier [unclear—Province?] will celebrate. West Pakistan would become a sort of intricate Afghanistan [unclear—of five states?]. Nixon : Yeah, yeah, yeah. Kissinger : East Pakistan would become a Bhutan. All of this would have been achieved by Soviet support, Soviet arms, and Indian military force. The impact of this on many countries threatened by the Soviet Union or by Soviet clients [unclear]. I talked to Helms this morning—I wanted to check my judgment; I didn’t have an advisor. He thinks it will have a catastrophic impact on the Middle East. No one could [unclear] guarantee or give up any territory that they have because they won’t believe it. The Arabs will think if they can get the same cover from the Soviets that the Indians got, they could try another round and maybe more. The Chinese, now this part is my judgment, up to a certain point being aggressive [unclear]. But if it turns out that we end up with the complete dismemberment of Pakistan, then they will conclude, “All right. We played it decently but we’re just too weak.” And that they have to break their encirclement, not by dealing with us, but by moving either [unclear] or drop the whole idea. So I think this, unfortunately, has turned into a big watershed, which is going to affect our chances in the situation in South Asia. Now I don’t mind our saying publicly [unclear]— Nixon : Oh, I know. Kissinger : But the fact of the matter is that unfortunately we are confronted with a tough situation. Nixon : Hmm. Kissinger : And it seems to me what we have to do now, or what I would recommend, is where we went wrong before is not to try to scare off the Indians. Nixon : But how could we scare them? Kissinger : If we had designed—if we had understood. I understood it, but I thought I could maneuver it instead of hitting it head on. Nixon : I don’t know what would have affected them. Kissinger : Well what would have affected them is if we said, on Mrs. Gandhi’s visit— Nixon : Right. Kissinger : We—you did exactly what all your advisors recommended. But if we had recommended to you to be brutal to her rather than to be nice to her, and if you had said, “Now I just want you to know”— Nixon : Our whole plan was to— Kissinger : Exactly. I mean you did exactly what we all recommended to you. Nixon : As a matter of fact, Rogers, if anything, on this was tougher than I was. No, I inferred that it would be—well at dinner I told her that there, any war would be very, very unacceptable. And then Rogers said he told her that the corollary— Kissinger : Well we didn’t—we told—our feeling was we shouldn’t give her a pretext to come back home— Nixon : Exactly. Kissinger : And then say— Nixon : And then say she has no friends that she can— Kissinger : She has no friends [unclear]. Nixon : Well that was a mistake. Kissinger : The mistake was that we should have understood that she was not looking for pretext—that she was determined to go. And secondly, we should have been much tougher with the Russians. Nixon : Well, what could we have done? How? Kissinger : We should have told them what we finally told them last Sunday—that this would mark a watershed in our relationship, that there could be no Middle East negotiations if this thing would grow. We would have had to play it tough. And thirdly, we should have, once the cat was among the pigeons, when they moved on November 22, we had cut off, as you wanted, but we couldn’t get the bureaucracy to do. We could have cut off economic aid the first or second day, plus all of arms instead of waiting ten days and diddling around. Nixon : We’ve done all that. But I ordered all that as you recall. Kissinger : I’m not blaming. Nixon : We just couldn’t get it done, okay. Kissinger : The mistake was that in every other crisis, Mr. President, what I have done is I’ve—I blame myself. When I have analyzed properly. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : In every other crisis, our basic attitude was the hell with the State Department; let them screw around with the little ones. But I forgot that in the other crisis we had all the elements of positioning. Even though it was late when we moved, since nothing could happen until we moved, we didn’t pay for the delay. In this situation, we got in a fast moving situation that we could not hold up, so that the delay accelerated the situation—we were always a little bit too late. We always did the right thing. You ordered it at the right moment. But we maneuvered it wrong. [unclear] Mitchell : [unclear] Kissinger : No, we couldn’t touch the Russians. Nixon : I wonder. I wonder. Kissinger : At any rate, we’ve got the same problem in the West now. Nixon : Now what do we do? Kissinger : We have two choices now. Keating—I told Alex Johnson a few minutes ago that I hope he will [unclear]. Nixon : Well, forget what he’s doing. Kissinger : Well the trouble is we have to convince the Indians now. We’ve got to scare them off an attack on West Pakistan as much as we possibly can. And therefore we’ve got to get another tough warning to the Russians. I mean—but you pay a price because you are risking the summit. On the other hand, the summit may not be worth a damn if they lose, if they kick you around. We’ve got to warn the Russians about some kind of attack on West Pakistan. I would encourage the Jordanians to move their squadrons into West Pakistan and the Iranians to move their squadrons into— Nixon : Now tell me, about the moving the squadrons, what effect will that have? Kissinger : Enough. Militarily in Pakistan we have only one hope now. To convince the Indians that the thing is going to escalate. And to convince the Russians that they’re going to pay an enormous price. It may not work, Mr. President. We’ve gone pretty far and we can’t make up six years of military imbalance. Nixon : We should have never let it get out of balance. We didn’t. Kissinger : Again, if they— Nixon : Frankly, Johnson, to his great discredit— Kissinger : But again, this is an example where the bureaucracy got us. You promised Yahya on your first visit to send some arms there. Nixon : We did. Kissinger : Well, it took us a year to get the bureaucracy to fulfill your promise. And the arms were just starting to move when the Bengalis attacked. [unclear]. So it isn’t— Nixon : I know. Kissinger : We are not to blame. We didn’t know there was going to be a war in ‘71, but it took a year to get your promise to Yahya worked out. Nixon : Now let’s see, first with regard to the planes, what’s the purpose of [unclear]? Kissinger : The purpose of the planes is—I think where we’re in trouble— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : I think the best—or we could play tough. Nixon : I agree. Kissinger : If we did this, we could give a note to the Chinese and say, “If you are ever going to move this is the time.” Nixon : All right, that’s what we’ll do. Mitchell : All they have to do is put their forces on the border. Kissinger : Yeah but the Russians I am afraid—but I must warn you, Mr. President, if our bluff is called, we’ll be in trouble. Nixon : How? Kissinger : Well, we’ll lose. But if our bluff isn’t, if we don’t move, we’ll certainly lose. Mitchell : You think we’ll lose the [unclear] with the Russians? Kissinger : But they will lose [unclear]. Nixon : What we have to do, Henry, is to get it out, calmly and cold-bloodedly make the decision. That’s all there is to it. Kissinger : But we’ve got to make it within 36 hours. Nixon : Oh, I know. That’s what I mean. No, I think what we need to see here, and I’ve got, I’m not going to have a meeting. No more goddamn meetings to decide this. Kissinger : Well I’ve got a WSAG scheduled for tomorrow morning. Nixon : I’m not going to have a meeting. Kissinger : While Rogers is out of town. Nixon : What the hell good is Irwin going to be if there’s a meeting? Or do you want a meeting? Kissinger : It wouldn’t work—let me do this. We’ll have a WSAG meeting in the morning. I will then present you what your choices are. Nixon : What I would rather do, I think the WSAG meeting is fine, why don’t you figure out now what these two choices are. In other words, I see the choices—in other words, take the line. Do one of two things. First, we can let the goddamn thing just deteriorate. Kissinger : Which is to say, it’s not our war. Nixon : It’s not our war. Which is basically the State line. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Or has been the State line. Mitchell : [unclear] Nixon : He already has, John. Mitchell : He has? The Shah? Nixon : No, Yahya. He’s already asked for help. Kissinger : He’s already asked for help. Mitchell : What’s he going to say about it? Nixon : He won’t say that. He won’t embarrass the Chinese. But, what I’m getting at Henry is we’ve got to look at our options here. All right, now if we let it go, your fear is that it will certainly screw up the South Asian area. All right, that’s screwed up. The other—your greater fear, however, is that it will, it will encourage—it will, may get the Chinese stirred up so that they do something else. Kissinger : No, I would— Nixon : And they’ll move towards India, or towards Russia, or both. And it will encourage the Russians to do the same thing someplace else. That’s the dangers on the one side. Kissinger : In the Middle East. And because, it will affect countries like Iran and Indonesia. Confronted either with a Soviet threat or a Soviet client threat. If Iran were to be confronted by both, with deciding that we’re just not steady enough. I mean—with all our good intentions, we have just too many [unclear]. Nixon : Yeah. All right, fine. That’s one side. Then we go on, we’ll go through with the summit and all that crap. The other possibility is to do these things. You understand? I’m for doing anything if there’s a chance that we’re— Kissinger : Let me play this scenario a little further. If the Chinese should draw the conclusion—up to now we’ve improved our situation with the Chinese. Nixon : How? Kissinger : Well, we’ve played a tough line at the UN. Nixon : Have they gotten anything for that? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Do they think the UN is worth shit? Kissinger : No, no. But they thought that we might be in collusion with the Indians and the Russians to sucker them into war. Nixon : They thought so? Kissinger : I think so. Nixon : Jesus Christ. Kissinger : So I think up to now we’ve helped ourselves. But the second problem is our people say we haven’t—the Chinese haven’t done any more than we. That’s true. But their problem is they haven’t got the forces to do a hell of a lot more. Mitchell : They also have a problem with their military. Kissinger : And they have a massive problem with their military. But they made them decide on— Mitchell : [unclear] in the leadership of their military. Nixon : They’re afraid of them. Kissinger : They may decide we’ve done the right thing. But we haven’t got the punch to make it effective. Nixon : Yeah, but you know we can’t do this without the Chinese helping us. As I look at this thing, the Chinese have got to move to that damn border. The Indians have got to get a little scared. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : All right. Now I wonder— Mitchell : The other side, the other side— Nixon : I wonder if there’s a way, do you—we’ll get a message to the Chinese. Kissinger : They won’t give us a prior commitment. The problem with the Jordanian planes—actually, Mr. President, I think we won’t have any real choice because the Jordanians, in my view, are going to send their planes anyway. [unclear exchange] Nixon : Let me say this, in view of the, in view of this—so do we have to make, we don’t make any announcement about the Jordanian letter or anything like that. What do we have to do in order to get the Jordanian thing? A prior commitment from the Shah? Kissinger : No, we just had— Nixon : I’ve already done that. Kissinger : All you have to do is tell the Jordanians— Nixon : All right. Kissinger :—that we don’t accept it. Nixon : All right. But you—they have to be told that immediately. That’s the least we can do. Kissinger : Right. I think, Mr. President, we can wait 24 hours to— Nixon : Why? Kissinger : Well, because I think I should present you calmly what everyone else says—our military— Nixon : Henry, if you raise this thing at the WSAG meeting— Kissinger : It isn’t a WSAG meeting because— Nixon : About the Jordanians? Kissinger : Yes, because— Nixon : Then the whole damn thing will get out in the papers. Kissinger : Because it came in the open channels, there was no way I could hold it. Nixon : Then it will be out in the papers. Kissinger : Well, if you move two squadrons of planes it will be in the papers. Nixon : I know, but they moved them. But my point is— Kissinger : Well it’s illegal for them to move them without [unclear]. Mitchell : [unclear] Kissinger : No, we can get it done. Nixon : And try, Henry, to see what we, what really we can do to affect the outcome. Kissinger : There are two things to consider. One is, the Jordanian move without our support, which we can probably engineer, is possible, but won’t be a deterrent on the Indians unless the Indians feel we are behind it. Nixon : I’d like to make sure that the Indians know we are behind it one way or another. Kissinger : I believe— Nixon : I think it will be in the papers. Kissinger : [unclear] No we can—I got a message to the Jordanians today— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger :—[ 2 seconds not declassified ]. They had to press these goddamn [unclear] for two days—well they told us there was a message, but they also said the King was hoping that we wouldn’t answer it because he didn’t want to give his [unclear] for the opposite to be true. I got a message [ 3 seconds not declassified ] to the King today telling him we were not yet ready to give the permission but we understood the problem, and that he shouldn’t construe our silence as a lack of [unclear]. He knows [unclear]. He didn’t commit us to anything. I mean, it isn’t any one move we’ve got to make, Mr. President. If we do it, we’ve got to go all out or we shouldn’t do it at all. We should then—the thing that worked so well in the Middle East was— Nixon : Jordan? Kissinger : In Jordan we suddenly just started pouring things in there. Now I have a little task force working on all the measures you could take if you wanted to go tough. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : Well that’s what I’m working on. [unclear] we’ll take an aircraft carrier from Vietnam into the Bay of Bengal for the evacuation of American civilians that are in the area. We don’t say they’re there to—it would be a mistake. We just say we’re moving them in, in order to evacuate American civilians. That shouldn’t [unclear]. Nixon : We certainly used that as a pretext, a pretext in the Jordan crisis. Kissinger : That’s right. Now all—I’m sure all hell will break loose here, but they will pay us off on success. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : I mean after all [unclear]— Nixon : Would you, John, move the aircraft carrier? I’d do it immediately. I wouldn’t wait 24 hours. Mitchell : The goddamn Indians have [unclear]. Kissinger : We’ve had arrangements made to get airplanes into Dacca. Mitchell : The only way we can get the [unclear] is by helicopter. Nixon : The aircraft carrier is easy. Now what else? Kissinger : Well the aircraft carrier, according to the Indians, would have to be delivered here because Keating will have a heart attack— Nixon : What the Christ is Keating doing? Fucking around again? Kissinger : Sort of. Keating has— Nixon : Did you tell Rockefeller? Kissinger : No, no. Nixon : You want to put Keating on the goddamn [unclear]. Kissinger : I told, I told Alex Johnson. Keating—the Indians had the nerve to call in Keating, and said that their recognition of Bangladesh proves their peaceful intent because it meant that they had no annexationist desires, it meant that they were going to leave Bangladesh on its own for a period. And Keating said he agreed with them. So they feed him this line that—the Indian foreign minister said— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger :—”You shouldn’t call me an aggressor” he said. “I wouldn’t have used this term. I would have said what you were doing was an offensive-defense.” You know [unclear]— Nixon : Now there’s one thing, there’s one other thing, Henry, that, you know, [unclear]Bush has done at the UN [unclear] and it plays balls out. I may just have to go on in a press conference, to [meet] the press on this subject, and say they are aggressors. And, you see what I mean? Now that’s another—it brings the whole right— Kissinger : I think if we’re going to play it at all, we’ve got to do it fast and hard. The worst thing could be to wait for every little thing to develop as we have done on the East Pakistan crisis. Nixon : Now, what about Indian aid? Is there anything more that we can do there? Kissinger : We can assess—the only other— Nixon : Remember, on this I was for doing it more openly. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : And all we’ve done—remember the whole line was, “Well let’s do it but not say anything.” Well, we’ve done that and it hasn’t worked. Right? Kissinger : God no. We did all— Nixon : On the economic side, you know— Kissinger : On the economic side— Nixon : Do you remember two weeks ago I got Connally in before he left and he said, “Now you cut off everything that you can.” We told him everything, Henry, here. Kissinger : Yeah, but Connally—the difference was you told both Connally and Rogers. Connally moved the same afternoon to cut off Ex-Im— Nixon : Right. Kissinger :—and he’s been holding up loans at the World Bank. State blew 2 weeks to prepare position papers. The day we announced our munitions cutoff, partial munitions cutoff, they did it in the form of a release that said what we would continue to ship. So we didn’t give the Indians the real shock effect when they still were only—when they—at first the Indians were not claiming they were invading. First they said they were Bengalis. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : But that is water over the dam. Mitchell : What were the Russians going to do about [unclear—Bangladesh?] Kissinger : They haven’t decided yet. Mitchell : Are they going to? Kissinger : Probably. Nixon : Well, we won’t—ever. Kissinger : But what we should do, Mr. President, and we have another 24 hours to make the decision, I don’t want to talk you into it now, because we should do all these things simultaneously. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : We should get a note to the Chinese. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : We should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon : I agree with that. Go ahead. Kissinger : We should— Nixon : Let’s, let’s talk about the things I mean. One, I’d agree with him. Second, with regard to an announcement, with regard to the aid thing, I mean just cut it off. All aid to India, period. Kissinger : Well, it’s practically all cut off now. Nixon : Economic? Kissinger : Except for the $124 million worth of goods that— Nixon : Well, how about saying it will not be included in our next budget. We can announce the budget, see. Aid to India will not be included. Kissinger : That we can do. And I’d let the—I’d let the Jordanians move— Nixon : Put that to them [unclear exchange]. Kissinger :—another squadron to Pakistan simply to show them some exclamation and let the Iranians move their two squadrons to Jordan if they want to. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : Thirdly, I will get a stem-winder of a note to the Russians to tell them that it will shoot everything, it will clearly jeopardize everything we have— Nixon : One of the real problems we have here is that Dobrynin is not here. You can fill him in. I can bring him in and tell him; it would have a hell of a lot more effect. Kissinger : And you could tell the Chinese what you’re doing and tell them of the advantage for them to move some troops to the frontier. Now, some of these things I defend. Pakistan [sic.—India] is, in my view, going to move East. The Jordanians are going to move their two squadrons anyways. There are already Pakistani pilots. That is hardly [really?] necessary, so that countries like Iran don’t forget to [unclear—be impressed?]—what in God’s name did Yahya do for us? When we get in trouble, this is what all these countries are going to do for us. Nixon : You say it’s illegal for US to do, also for the Jordanians. Kissinger : Well, the way we can make it legal is to resume arms sales through—if we, if you announce that Pakistan is now eligible for the purchase of arms. See, one thing these guys never told us when they cut off licenses to Pakistan— Nixon : That would be tough, Henry, to go that way. Did they say that Pakistan now can get arms? You’d have one hell of a— Kissinger : I’m getting to the legal provision. Nixon : Oh yeah. Kissinger : If we had not closed the pipeline to Pakistan then Jordan could transfer its arms to Pakistan legally. Because the law says that any country which is receiving or eligible for American arms aid can receive American arms from other countries. Mitchell : Well, that’s all [unclear] Kissinger : But the way you get the Jordanian planes in there is to tell the King we cannot give you legal permission. On the other hand, we’d have to figure out a message, which says, “We’ll just close our eyes. Get the goddamned planes in there.” Nixon : Can we send a special emissary to him? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : We’d have to do it that way. We cannot authorize it. Nixon : How would we do it? Through some embassy or is that? Kissinger : No, no, no. We’d have to use either, we’d have to use— Nixon : Helms? Helms could do it, couldn’t he? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : All right. Let’s get that one down. Kissinger : We might even be able to get the Israelis to get someone in there. Nixon : Talk to the Israelis and see if you can do something on that, will you? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Well, at least tell the Jordanians, too. We’ll hold them harmless against the Israelis. See? I mean, we—If they found out that we’re talking with the Israelis, I think that’s something we could leak— Kissinger : We cannot leak it. Legally it is not possible for Jordan to get our [unclear-permission?]. The way to do it is the way we’ve had to deal with Iran. But the Shah of Iran doesn’t dare do it anymore unless he gets a formal commitment from us, not because of the Congress but because of the Russians. This is the same. If the situation is— Nixon : Now, what’s the formal position? [unclear] Kissinger : Well, either way, unless we make a formal declaration, the Russians may jump ship. Mitchell : [unclear] Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : Can we do that through a private communication? Do we have to do it in public? Kissinger : Well, his planes have an additional problem, Mr. President. That they would have to be flown by Iranian pilots. Nixon : Oh, I know. Kissinger : The better arrangement is for the Iranian planes to go to Jordan, and the Jordanian— Nixon : Yeah, I know. I know. All right. We can work that proposition out. But it’s difficult for the Russians. I don’t know what we can say that you have not already said. Kissinger : A stiff note. Right now, I haven’t replied to the note they gave us on Monday. And I think we should just say nothing until we’ve done something because we’ve got nothing left to say. Mitchell : By the time your note gets through that Russian bureaucracy they’ll be so far down the line. Kissinger : No, we’d give [unclear]— Nixon : To Brezhnev. Kissinger : It goes directly to Brezhnev. Nixon : Yeah, we have a way. Kissinger : If State did it, they would just sit on it. [unclear exchange] Kissinger : After you’ve—because we haven’t got enough to tell them yet. After you’ve made the final decision on the Jordan thing. And after we’ve moved—we shouldn’t move the carrier until you’ve decided on the—I think if we do anything we should do it all together. Nixon : Well, it seems to me that [unclear] very much. But we move the carrier, the Jordanians move their planes— Kissinger : [unclear exchange] The Chinese move their forces. Nixon : Well, the way we do that is you get a message through Walters? Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : Just go to New York and say, I have a message from the President to Chou En-lai. Put it on that basis. I wouldn’t fool around. Mitchell : What’s the prospect of the Chinese moving? Nixon : None. Well, that’s what I mean. If there’s a chance, you told me none, Henry, yesterday. Remember? Kissinger : No, but that was when they thought they were completely wrong. I’m not so sure there’s none, Mr. President. Because they know that this is a dress rehearsal of what may happen to them. Nixon : What I would like to do in the note to the Chinese is to state exactly that, that I consider this to be a dress rehearsal and I think their move, some move toward the border would restrain India. And that as far as we’re concerned we hold them harmless. The Russians aren’t going to dump the Chinese. Not now. Kissinger : My feeling, Mr. President, is that the Russians are not likely going to give up the trade, the Middle East negotiations, and the SALT negotiations— Nixon : Incidentally, a small thing, but did Haig work out something for Stans? [unclear] I told him, don’t give anything away. But don’t worry about it. Stans got his message. Let Haig handle it. Kissinger : They are still afraid that you’re too bright. [unclear] And I think that their whole governmental system was geared towards relaxation with us. Nixon : I know. Kissinger : This is a godsend that President Nixon comes their way, [unclear] and therefore I don’t think [unclear]. Nixon : What is it then? Kissinger : Well, then the Pakistanis are going to lose. But even then we are not that directly, that much involved. The carrier— Nixon : Well, my point is they’re going to lose anyway. At least we make an effort, and there is a chance to save it. If they lose anyway, we’re no worse off than if we didn’t try. That’s the way I look at it. Don’t you agree, John? Mitchell : Yes, and I know there are time factors here that people aren’t taking into consideration. That the Pakistanis in East Pakistan are going to keep the Indians busy for quite a while before they can move west. Kissinger : I think, if I had a guess, I think that it is not inconceivable to me that the Chinese will start a little diversion—not a huge one—but enough to keep the Indians from moving too many troops west. Nixon : [unclear]. But do you think we could encourage them that way? Kissinger : Well, it would certainly take a load off their minds. But the advantage is if we communicate all this stuff with Haig to the Chinese, and they see that we meant business. Secondly, we told the Shah of Iran, and the Jordanians, and other friends that you do everything you can. And you would do more if it were not for this goddamn Senate. I think it’s better [unclear]. They were sending cables to the King of Jordan lecturing him about the immorality of getting involved in a war 500 miles away. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger : Mr. President, if anyone had predicted five years ago that Pakistan could be dismembered with Russian assistance, without anyone doing something, they would have thought that was insane. Nixon : I think we’re setting this up as a public relations campaign, both at the UN and [unclear]. It’s very helpful. That’s one of the few good things that’s happened. [unclear exchange] Nixon : I’m not concerned about the Teddy Kennedy [unclear]. Are you? Mitchell : Not at all. Kissinger : I think they’re all on the wrong side of the issue, because in 6 months it will be apparent that Indian oppression of Bengal is much worse than Pakistani oppression. Mitchell : That stupid Kennedy. At the same time that he’s got India on the table, he’s attacking the British. [unclear] [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : In what you discuss at your meeting, I just strongly urge—don’t let, keep as much of it under the hat as you can. What I mean is let’s do the carrier thing. Let’s get assurances to the Jordanians. Let’s send a message to the Chinese. Let’s send a message to the Russians. And I would tell the people in the State Department not a goddamn thing they don’t need to know. Right, John? Mitchell : I would hope so. Kissinger : Except that they have to know of the movement of the Jordanian planes. And I would rather— Mitchell : Well, you’ve got to give them the party line on that or all a sudden the Secretary of State will say that’s illegal. Kissinger : I’d rather just have— Nixon : All right. Kissinger : Let Johnson in on it now. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : To say that if they move them against our law, they are not to have [unclear—sanctions?]. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : I mean, I’ve got to tell them that much. Nixon : All right, that’s an order. You’re goddamn right. Kissinger : OK. Nixon : Is it really so much against our law? Kissinger : What’s against our law is not what they do, but our giving them permission. Nixon : Henry, we give the permission privately. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Hell, we’ve done worse. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 307–27. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 166. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 166. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03–8:12 p.m. Nixon : What I was thinking of with regard to the options, and I want you to know that I’m supposed to be working on them now— Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Maybe we have to really put it to the Russians and say that we feel that under the circumstances that we have to cancel the summit. Kissinger : No, I wouldn’t do that yet. Nixon : No? Kissinger : That’s too drastic. Nixon : Well— Kissinger : I think, Mr. President— Nixon : I want you to know that I’m prepared. Kissinger : Well, I know— Nixon : Because if these people are—we’ve got to look at down the road. You got a minute now? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : The things that we’ve got to consider are these: 1) the cost of letting this go down the drain. All right, that will be great. And then doing the other things. Then, on the other hand, we’ve got to figure if we play this out the fact [is] that we may not be around after the election. We have to just figure as simply as that. And it’s a tough goddamn decision. Yet on the other hand, being around after the election, if everything is down the drain, [it] doesn’t make any difference. Kissinger : Exactly. Mr. President, if we play it out toughly it’s my conviction—this may go down the drain, but if we play it out toughly we will get some compensation somewhere, and you can go to Moscow with your head up. If you just let it go down the drain, the Moscow summit may not be worth having. That’s the reluctant view. I mean, after all the anguish we’ve gone through setting this thing up, nobody wants to jeopardize it either. Nixon : We might say this, for example, and I’m going to—I’ll do the note taking and refresh myself; my thought is to say I was very pleased with Secretary Stans’ conversations. I was very pleased with the conversations we’ve had with regard to the Mid-East; I’m pleased with the progress on SALT. It’s hard for me to understand that all of this could be jeopardized by this area of the world, but it is being jeopardized. And that under the circumstances, I think we have to take a look at it—we have to choose as to what we can do here. Kissinger : That’s what we’ve already set reservations on. Nixon : I know. Kissinger : I don’t believe, Mr. President—the major problem now is that the Russians retain their respect for you. If they’re going to play it into an absolute showdown then the summit wasn’t worth having anyway. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : If they want a relaxation with us, we can give them plenty of ways out. Nixon : Now, with regard to the ways out, though, the missing thing here is what we want as a way out. In other words, what do we say to them—what is the method of settlement? We can’t say go back to the status quo ante. We can say, “Well, get the hell out of West Pakistan. Leave it alone, etc., etc., etc.” Kissinger : At this stage we have to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : That is the matrix. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan, but that’s something that will get watered down as they [unclear] at the conference. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : But we have to prevent West Pakistan from getting [unclear]. Nixon : We’ve got to say that that is—we have a treaty, wouldn’t you say? Kissinger : It’s a little premature yet to make a move towards the Russians. They still owe you an answer to your previous note. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : And therefore we have to hold it up a bit. But I think—I believe, Mr. President, we can come out of this with—if they maintain their respect for us even if you lose, we still will come out all right. Nixon : You mean, moving the carrier and letting the few planes go in and that sort of thing. Well, maybe. Kissinger : Well— Nixon : That helps, I give you. Kissinger : It’s not a good hand, Mr. President. But doing absolutely nothing—right now we’re in the position where we are telling allies not to assist another ally that is in mortal danger and to which we have a legal obligation. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : We’re in the position where a Soviet stooge, supported with Soviet arms, is overrunning a country that is an American ally of the United States— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : Keep it to a minimum. Nixon : Hmm, hmm. Kissinger : And I think we will preserve a little bit of our honor. Nixon : Yeah. The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the hole there. That, goddamn, if they’d just move a little—I just think they might move a little if they thought we were going to play. Kissinger : But I think if we do absolutely nothing it will trigger the Soviets into really a tough attitude. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : And if we can, if we can still scare somebody else, which is not excluded, I give it less than fifty-fifty, it may open the Middle East solution. Nixon : Hmm, hmm. Kissinger : If this thing blows, the Middle East—we won’t— Nixon : Right. Kissinger :—be able to talk to anybody. Nixon : Well, don’t underestimate the fact that if, by good chance, the Congress gets out this week and, if we smack North Vietnam pretty strongly, that’ll be somewhat of a message to these people. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Huh? Kissinger : That’s right. Although, we ought to time it—if we send a message to the Chinese to leave a little integral between the message and package it so that they don’t think we used it as a pretext to get at Vietnam. Nixon : Yeah. I think the message to the Soviets— Kissinger : Is more important now. Nixon : At the moment isn’t it? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : It’s a little risky [unclear]. Kissinger : That’s right. Absolutely. Nixon : We can’t assume [unclear]. Although, they must be agonizing over this now. Kissinger : But they’re so weak. Their trouble is that they’ve just had a semi-revolt in the military. Nixon : Have they really? Kissinger : Yeah. And they’ve had a million people—they have a million Russians on their border [unclear]. Nixon : Boy, I tell you a movement of even some Chinese toward that border could scare those goddamn Indians to death. Kissinger : No question about it. As soon as we have made the decision here, we can then talk to the Chinese. I would rather do that on Friday. [unclear] Nixon : Yeah. Well, if we could enlist them some way that’d be something. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–64. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 167. Memorandum for the Record 167. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 9, 1971, 6:59 a.m. Subject: Alleged US Military Assistance to Pakistan 1. The US Ambassador to India reports that on 8 December General Manokshaw, the Indian Chief of Staff, advised the US Defense Attache that a US Air Force C–141 aircraft had landed at Karachi, Pakistan at 290500Z November 1971 and had offloaded a number of crates onto Pakistani military vehicles. General Manokshaw commented that the cargo was “obviously a rush drop, bringing military equipment urgently required by Pakistani forces.” He went on to describe the source of his information as unimpeachable. 2. The US Ambassador has requested a complete report on General Manokshaw’s allegation, and guidance on what information may be furnished him in reply. 3. Preliminary information from the Military Airlift Command confirms that one US Air Force C–141 aircraft did arrive at Karachi on that date. The aircraft which was making the normal east-bound Embassy flight arrived in Karachi at 290930Z November and departed 291030Z November. The aircraft offloaded eight passengers and 539 pounds of cargo consisting of personal baggage and Embassy mail. No passengers or cargo were onloaded. The aircraft then proceeded to New Delhi, arriving at 291130Z and offloaded four passengers and 1,800 pounds of Embassy cargo. The C–141 departed New Delhi at 300415Z for Bangkok, Thailand. The above information has been provided to the Department of State. Colin C. Hamilton Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC) 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Miscellaneous–SOA 1971. Secret; Limdis. Prepared by Brigadier General Colin C. Hamilton, USAF. 168. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 168. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m. Kissinger : Muskie came mumbling up to me about India-Pakistan. Nixon : What did you do? Kissinger : I said— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Actually, what he said wasn’t all that bad. He said he’s for ceasefire-withdrawal and what he said publicly. I said, “Look Senator, we will be able to demonstrate that the Indians deliberately provoked this war. In the 10 minutes we’ve got here I can’t go into any details but I just want to tell you that we will be able to demonstrate this.” [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger : Now, to get back to the Pakistan issue. We have this letter from Brezhnev. It’s a pretty rough deal for us. What he’s proposing is a ceasefire in return for negotiations between Yahya and the Awami League. Nixon : Which means? Kissinger : Which means— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : I suppose—well, if they don’t spell it out. Our problem is 1) to prevent an attack by the Indians on West Pakistan. Nixon : They are already attacking. Kissinger : Well not at full force yet. Right now the West Pakistanis are still attacking them more than the other way around. The danger is that if nothing happens between now—if the war continues India will wind up with a Bhutan in the east and Nepal in the west. And the consequences of this, the rape of the sovereign country and one that has an alliance with the United States, including a secret commitment, particularly applicable to this situation, I think would be severe in Iran, in Indonesia and in the Middle East, at least. And Dick Helms agrees with this. I had him make an independent assessment. Now, there is no good deal possible anymore at this stage. And if the Russians want to press it to a brutal conclusion, we’re going to lose. On the other hand, the letter is in a very conciliatory form and we have a number of answers: One, they want the Middle East— Nixon : Has the letter from the Agricultural Minister arrived? Kissinger : No. The letter is a reply to the letter we sent him on Monday, which was very tough. One, they want a Middle East settlement. Two— Nixon : They put that in the letter? Kissinger : No. But we know it. Two, they want a European Security conference. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : Three— Nixon : Three, they want trade. Kissinger : They want trade. And four, they want you there, and they’re afraid they’ll drive you completely towards Peking. So we have, we are not without assets. The State Department position, as I understand it, is to do nothing—is to say we shouldn’t get involved and at the right moment urge Yahya to vacate that part of Kashmir that his forces have occupied in return for a ceasefire and forget about East Pakistan. Now the Russians have made us a better offer than that. The Russians—now one advantage of accepting— Nixon : Of course the Russians have indicated that they’re interested in negotiations. Kissinger : Between West and East Pakistan. Nixon : But when will the Russians believe [unclear]? Kissinger : Well, what this would do is keep the Russians from recognizing Bangladesh. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Yes. But they might. My recommendation would be this: First, to warn the Russians and the Indians if this continues, we could leak out or in some way make clear that Kennedy made a commitment to Pakistan against aggression from India. This will shut up some of the liberals. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : I told them— Nixon : [unclear] know that commitment? Kissinger : Yeah. Yeah. That sure doesn’t mean anything. Nixon : Oh, it doesn’t? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Why not? Kissinger : Because it was just a note from the Ambassador. Nixon : Let’s put it out. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Let’s put it out. What do you think? Kissinger : We should put it out as part of a general plan. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : Secondly, we should move the helicopter ship. I’m not so much in favor of moving the carrier. We’d have to do a helicopter ship and some escorts into the Bay of Bengal. And claim that they’re for evacuation. Thirdly, on the Jordanian— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Well, it shows we are—not on the Indians but on the Russians— Nixon : Why the carrier? Kissinger : Well because I think once the news of that hits there’ll be so many people screaming we’re [there] for intervention. And then we have to explain what we will never do. Nixon : [unclear] we did—you know that we did the whole damn Turkey thing [unclear] for the purposes of being able to evacuate Americans. You remember? Kissinger : Yeah, but in— Nixon : Can’t play this game here. Is that correct? Kissinger : I would be reluctant—you know you should [unclear—consider?] both courses. From the Chinese angle I’d like to move the carrier. From the public opinion angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up there I— Nixon : What, why—can’t the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation? Kissinger : Yeah, but against whom are we going to use the planes? Against whom are we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in? Nixon : So what do we move? Move a little helicopter ship in there? What good does that do? And why do it? Kissinger : Well it’s a token that something else will come afterward. Gets our presence established there. Nixon : All right. That way— Kissinger : And the Jordanians— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : I’d let the Jordanians move some of their planes in. And I’d get the Indian Ambassador in and demand assurances that India doesn’t want to annex territory. Nixon : Now what part of this does State take action? Kissinger : Well, Mr. President, I know it—it is embarrassing to hear India complaining constantly about the bureaucracy. Nixon : All right. [unclear] Kissinger : You have— Nixon : I just want to know what we have to get across. Kissinger : Well, State objects. Every time we ask State “what do you do now,” they have a telegram to Yahya asking him to do something. The choice is between adopting a generally threatening posture and indicating State’s policy is noninvolvement—don’t get any arms in, don’t move anything. Nixon : Non-involved? Meaning? Kissinger : Rape of Pakistan. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : That’s right. And they would propose a ceasefire in the west in return for in effect our recognition of Bangladesh, which is a total collapse, it would hurt us with the Chinese. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : No. But he may not feel— Nixon : Now let’s look at this from the standpoint, really look at what the realities are. You know you can handle these people [unclear]. When you look at the realities there— Kissinger : The realities— Nixon : The partition of Pakistan is a fact. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : We know that. Kissinger : Of course. Nixon : You see those people welcoming the Indian troops when they come in. [unclear]. Now the point is, why is then, Henry, are we going through all this agony? Kissinger : We’re going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed. Secondly, to maintain our Chinese arm. Thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world’s psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not so insignificant country without anybody doing anything. Now the purpose of the [unclear—course?]that I’m suggesting is whether we can put enough chips into the pot to get the Russians for their own reasons, for the other considerations, to call a halt to it. It may not work, after which— Nixon : What are we going to ask the Russians to do? Kissinger : Ceasefire, negotiation, and subsequent withdrawal. But we’d have to clear it with Yahya first before we did it. But before we ask the Russians— Nixon : Ceasefire and negotiation on what basis? Kissinger : Between East, between— Nixon : Bangladesh? Kissinger : No, between the Awami League. The word Bangladesh wouldn’t be mentioned. Between the Awami League and Islamabad on the basis of the December 1970 election, which is what they’ve proposed here, which is, but within the framework of a united Pakistan. So the West Pakistanis would give by recognizing the Awami League, and the Awami League would give by not insisting on it as a precondition on Bangladesh. And the Russians would disassociate themselves from India on Bangladesh. Nixon : And then we’d have a ceasefire and withdrawal would not occur though? Kissinger : Withdrawal would occur after the settlement. Nixon : Yeah. After the settlement? But there will be no settlement though? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Then what happens? There’s no withdrawal? Correct? Kissinger : But then West Pakistan would be preserved. Nixon : Why? Because there’s not enough Indians there yet for withdrawal to matter? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : [unclear] to see what’s at the end of the road. Kissinger : No, because right now the Indians do not yet hold much of West Pakistan and the West Pakistanis hold a little bit of Indian territory, so that comes out a wash. The major problem there is that the Pakistan army is not yet defeated in the west. They’ll run out in ammunition and POL in two weeks. Nixon : So they’re going to [unclear] including the Russians? Kissinger : I’m not sure. But at least then we’ll have separated them. Nixon : What can we do down the road about the Indians? Kissinger : I’d cut— Nixon : We could call in the Ambassador and tell him why. Kissinger : Demanding assurances. I would keep open the possibility that we’ll pour in arms into Pakistan. I don’t understand the psychology by which the Russians can pour arms into India but we cannot give arms to Pakistan. I don’t understand the theory of non-involvement. I don’t see where we will be as a country. I have to tell you honestly, I consider this our Rhineland. But politically it won’t affect us through next year because our opponents are so far to the left— Nixon : Yeah, of course, we will be all right. [unclear] Kissinger : Well but— Nixon : I guess you have to determine, Henry, now what is the political [unclear]— Kissinger : Well but— Nixon : The Jordanians— Kissinger : It will make both your trips to— Nixon : It may well be that we just have to say that [unclear—we’ve done?] the best we can. We will lose public opinion [unclear] Chou En-Lai, but that’s all right. We lose public opinion. [unclear]Understand we’re not risking— Kissinger : Yeah, but we could come out with a settlement too. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : On our present course we’ll come out with a rape. Nixon : Yeah, yeah. I understand. I’ve tried to put, though—we’ve got to look at the options in their worse form. It’s very possible that we come out without a settlement. It will appear that we intervened and failed. The Russians—the American public opinion, [unclear] you see by becoming involved then you get into the whole dialogue about defeat or victory. You see? We’re not in that now. We’re not at all. It isn’t quite [unclear]. We know, you and I— Kissinger : And it will be obvious after— Nixon : We know. And it will be obvious after time. I hear you, I hear you. I agree. We, but I’m speaking now— Kissinger : But other things— Nixon : Now on this point we have to bear in mind that—and that’s why actually we have to look clear down the road. We probably ought to risk, if we’re going to go we ought to risk the summit with the Russians. Kissinger : Yeah, but we’re risking it either way because if the Russians come out of it totally cocky, we may have a Middle East war in the spring. And which is—and Peking may be a problem because what the hell is Peking getting out of us then? We’re not going to give them Formosa; we’re not strong enough to give them any other assurances. But you are right, that is the other side of the story. Nixon : What should we tell the Russians? Kissinger : I would tell the Russians if, I’d say you recognize that good relations with the Soviet Union you’ve always believed are the cornerstone of peace that presupposes that neither side will take unilateral advantage of situations. Now, just when we were getting a settlement, just when we were beginning to move on the Middle East, the Soviet Union is encouraging a total change in the situation and the Indians have counted on them. You have to tell them that this will affect our relationship. And it’s bound to affect our relationship if they don’t cooperate in bringing it to a close. Nixon : We told them that already in a letter. You think telling them in person is also a good idea. Kissinger : Yeah, because then he’d have heard it from you. We’ve got Butz saying something like that in his toast today at lunch. I think we are better—well, but that’s what I always think, so it’s my advice that doing nothing is the State Department’s advice. Nixon : Well I’m all for doing something, but just— Kissinger : You are jeopardizing— Nixon : We have to know what we’re jeopardizing and know that once we go balls out we never look back. Kissinger : That’s right. You are jeopardizing your relationship with the Soviets but that’s also your card, your willingness to jeopardize it. If you don’t do it, they come out of this completely ahead. Now I don’t know— Nixon : I suppose State’s objections and those who would oppose this [unclear]. Deep down they don’t want to jeopardize their relations with India. Kissinger : That’s their principal objection. [unclear exchange] Nixon : Second, they do not want to jeopardize our relations with the Congress in terms of non-involvement because Congress is for non-involvement around the world. And third, State [unclear]. Kissinger : But they know [unclear—the end?] That’s right. Nixon : Is that about the way [unclear]? Kissinger : That is right. That is right. Nixon : So they say, “Why try?” They always say that things aren’t going to work. And that, of course, is always, sometimes, an excuse— Kissinger : That is right. That is right. Now, of course, in our relations with the Indians we, no matter what happens— Nixon : But just think, I am going to raise [unclear—the ante?] in the goddamn thing, except for [unclear]. Kissinger : Again you could argue that it will help us in the long-term with the Indians. Nixon : I don’t give a damn about the Indians. I don’t think it makes a damn bit of difference whether what the relations— Kissinger : But you see we don’t have to do a hell of overt things. You know the Jordanian airplanes; we’re talking only about less than twenty. It’s only a symbol that things are getting out of hand. Once the Indians have launched their attack I would oppose— Nixon : The Jordanian airplane thing—I mean did you raise that in your Russian meetings? Kissinger : Uh, yeah, but they’re so opposed to it. What they’d say if we— Nixon : Why have they [unclear]? I don’t, I don’t believe—I don’t want them to be able to know. We need a news conference for it. They went out having a luncheon meeting there and I don’t know who that [unclear]probably put out that story to that effect. Who else there could have put out the story to the effect that I directly ordered it, or any of us were involved? Huh? Kissinger : I have no idea. I don’t know. Nixon : Who could do it? Kissinger : I have no idea. I really don’t know. [At] the UN, they sit in these meetings, Mr. President, on total sabotage without guts. They’re sitting there. They never volunteer anything, sullenly dragging things out of them. They procrastinate on everything. I can’t run in to you three times a day. We’ve gone through hell for three weeks. But, that’s my job so I can’t do anything but bitching about the—but this is the first time we haven’t succeeded in getting done what needed to be done, because on Cambodia and Laos, on all these things, we held the cards. And even if we waited a week or two longer than we needed to, nothing wrong was being done. This one, they’ve just screwed it up 10 percent each day. Nixon : What’s Packard think? Kissinger : He’s on your side, but again none of them have the real strategic conception. Nixon : But at least he’s on our side, though. Kissinger : No, no. Packard, Helms and the others are. Nixon : They’re [unclear]. Kissinger : I explained. I discussed the situation with Connally. I mean, not the bureaucratic one, I didn’t. Nixon : What’s Connally feel? Or has [unclear] put it off again? Kissinger : No, I gave him the pros and cons but probably in an unfair way. Nixon : All right. What did he say? Kissinger : He would do everything that I recommend, except moving the carrier because he thinks it might be a political liability. He’d move the helicopters there. Nixon : Why does he think the carrier is a political liability? Kissinger : Because he thinks people will then ask, “Are we going to intervene militarily?” And that, he thinks, is not feasible. Nixon : I know, but we’re not going to intervene. What does it mean? Kissinger : And then you’ll have— Nixon : We cannot have stories about how we [unclear], but on the other hand, I happen to know damn well they’re lying. Kissinger : It’s a close decision. I go back and forth on it myself. Nixon : Are there a lot of Americans in that area? Are there? Kissinger : There are 300 in West Pakistan and 200 in East Pakistan, something like that. It’s on the order of 500. I don’t know how many there are. Nixon : Could we put the carrier in safely? Kissinger : I told them all to give me their views by two o’clock. Nixon : What did they say? Kissinger : I haven’t let—I didn’t let them express any of it. Nixon : You asked for clearance moving carriers mainly for the purpose of evacuation? Kissinger : Oh yeah. Nixon : Don’t, don’t tell them. We’ll let them know when they’re engaged. Kissinger : Oh, no. Nixon : Don’t let them in on the [unclear], on all our [unclear]. You understand? Just lie low. Kissinger : Hmm. Nixon : Right? Kissinger : Right. But if you want to be— Nixon : On Jordan, let me say, on Jordan, I’m just thinking of this thing. Listen, I really think we need more carriers involved in this thing. I think moving the carrier [unclear] why would that pose a problem? Goddamn it, I’ve got a responsibility to protect American lives. I’m going to do it. I’ll just phrase it right out. Now, what’s the argument against it? Kissinger : Uh... Nixon : Why is that [unclear]? Kissinger : Nobody will believe it. Nixon : Huh? Kissinger : The Indians will scream we’re threatening them. Nixon : Why are we doing it anyway? Aren’t we going in for the purpose of strength? Well, what do we want them [unclear] for? Kissinger : Well I—hell, I’d move the carriers so that we can tell the Chinese tomorrow to move their forces to the frontier, and then if the Russians intervene— Nixon : Well, all right. Now, will the Chinese intervene if we don’t move the carriers? We may just move the helicopters in. Kissinger : It’d be better to have the carrier. But we’d have to do a lot of things, and we’d have to do them toughly. Nixon : I understand. I think we ought to get started on it— Kissinger : I mean we’d have to get the Indian Ambassador called in and demand assurances against annexation. We’d have to leak at that moment that secret understanding to protect the Indians [Pakistanis] against aggression. Nixon : I understand. I get the whole plan. We’ll get the whole thing together. Quite to, with regard to the, with regard to the Jordanians, how do we wield that now? Kissinger : The way we would do that is to [ 2 seconds not declassified ] tell the King to move his planes and inform us that he’s done it. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : And then we would tell State to shut up. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : If he—we would have to tell him it’s illegal, but if he does it we’ll keep things under control. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. All right, that’s the way we play that. And then State, the only thing they’ve ever done—well, we need Congress to be gone for the weekend any way. That’s another good thing, though. You realize that it’s coming at a good time. Kissinger : What we should do, though, is tell—the reason I suggested getting these guys together, Mr. President— Nixon : I know it. Kissinger :—is to stop their [unclear], to tell them you want to overawe— Nixon : I understand. When do we do it? [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : And then we go to the line. And tell him that we’re going to move the carrier. Do I tell him that? I don’t know. I’m perfectly willing to tell him everything. [unclear]. Are we going to tell them that I’m going to approve the Jordanian thing, or not? [unclear] tell them to sit down— Kissinger : Let me— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Let me think about it— Nixon : [unclear] so don’t worry. I’ll, I’ll— Kissinger : I think— Nixon : I’ll put it to him Monday— Kissinger :—for our game plan—If you’ve decided to do this game plan, I think it’s more important that you see the Russian today because his cable would go back. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : And we could get the others in first thing in the morning because they can’t, won’t do a damn thing about it anyway. Nixon : See the Russian? Hmm. I think they do. [unclear] Let me ask you this: Why didn’t we decide on a game plan now? Kissinger : I didn’t find it— Nixon : We decide the plan now. Figure it out. Kissinger : Right, but I— Nixon : Ok? Now the way I look at the plan it leads on to the question of the carrier. Doesn’t that bother you that much? Kissinger : It won’t get there for 6 days anyway. Congress will be out of session. Nixon : And Congress is going to be out, so people will say “The carrier’s there.” And I’ll say it’s for the purpose of getting our people out. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : In case something happens. But when it starts to move, is that, will that get out? You get that? See, I don’t want [unclear]. Kissinger : The carrier movement may get out. Nixon : The carrier will arrive. Kissinger : Uh, yeah. I’d like to talk to Moorer to see whether we can keep the carrier back of the Bay of Bengal. Nixon : All right. And then can we move the other helicopter thing in on the other hand? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Fine. Ok, we’ll move on that. Second, with regard to the Jordanians, no sweat. That should be on your [unclear]. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : And [ 1 second not declassified ] will inform them. Kissinger : All right. Nixon : We’ll get him going on that. Third, with regard to the talk with the Russian, I’ll make it today. Fourth, I [want to] know that the Chinese know we’re going to do that. Kissinger : I’ll deliver that tomorrow. Nixon : Fifth, leak out the Kennedy thing. That ought to be done. So they know that we are concerned about the fact that we do have a deal with Pakistan. Kissinger : We’ll let State do that. When they call Jha in they will inform him of the commitment. Nixon : You’re going to have them call Jha in, or should I do it? Kissinger : No, No. That’s their baby. Let them have it for assurances there’s no annexations. And while they’re there inform them that we have these commitments. [unclear] And that the Indians [unclear—understand?] that there were commitments by Kennedy. Let them put it out. Nixon : All right. That’s what I told [unclear]. Kissinger : If you could give them advance guidance. What you need—within 10 minutes say gentlemen it’s my decision to over—to try to deter an Indian attack on West Pakistan. I want the Indians warned. I want [unclear] movement supported. And I want the bureaucracies’ [support] for evacuation purposes. I wouldn’t say anything about Jordan. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : And I want—it is your responsibility to line up your bureaucracies to perform this with enthusiasm. And to stop the leaking. And to come up with ideas now how we can get this accomplished. Ten minutes and I’d walk out. I wouldn’t have a discussion with them. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : We have Irwin, and Johnson, and Packard, and Moorer, and Helms. Everyone will be on your side except Irwin and Johnson. [unclear exchange] Kissinger : I’ll get a talking paper for both the Russian— Nixon : Now, [unclear] on the issue of the Russian. [Nixon and Kissinger closed the conversation by discussing when to schedule a meeting with the Soviet Minister of Agriculture and another with the officials from State, Defense, the JCS, and the CIA.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 633–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 169. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires (Vorontsov) 169. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires (Vorontsov) 1 Washington, December 9, 1971, 4:00–4:41 p.m. Nixon : I look forward, of course, to my meeting with the Chairman. And, of course, meeting him when I am there. I believe that this meeting could be—could be—the most important meeting to take place between heads of representatives of major governments in this century. First, speaking in personal terms, you can assure the Chairman that I approach the meeting with the same feeling in the heart that he has. As the head of, each of us leading the two most powerful countries in the world, we hold in our hands the future of all the world. If we fail, it will be damaging to our people, to the Russian people, but to the people of the whole world. We approach this in a positive spirit. One problem, however, that is a current problem, I would like to discuss very frankly with the Minister and our friend Mr. Vorontsov is the—it is a problem that greatly concerns us as it concerns, I’m sure, Chairman Brezhnev—the problem of India-Pakistan. I don’t want the, or expect the Secretary for Agriculture—Minister for Agriculture—to comment or, because, as you know, we are in correspondence with Mr. Brezhnev. But I believe that you as one who is very close to the Chairman, and, of course, you as our top ranking representative of the Embassy at this time in Washington, I want you to know how strongly I feel personally about this issue. And it may be that as a result of this conversation you could convey to Chairman Brezhnev a sense of urgency that may lead to a settlement. Let me begin first with the positive side. In the past 3 years since I have been in this office, great progress has been made. And I don’t think that 3 years ago that anybody would have predicted that Soviet-American relations would have made as much progress as they’ve made. Speaking quite candidly, most people said,”Nixon is a strong anti-communist. The Russian leaders don’t like Nixon. They can’t get along with him.” But on the other hand, I am a very direct man. And I believe in negotiation. But as I said to Mr. Gromyko when he was here that when you have two powers each—we are equal today; we were not when we met before when that picture was taken. Then the secret for success for relations between those powers is total respect between the two. I respect the Soviet leaders, and consequently it’s in that spirit that I want to convey my views on our relations at this point. First, we have made progress on SALT. We have made progress on a historic Berlin agreement, in our view. We have agreed to a meeting of the highest level [unclear—in Moscow?]. We also have discussed the possibility of working out in the future a European Security conference, and of very, very great importance to both sides, we have begun through our special channel—between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Dobrynin—at Mr. Brezhnev’s suggestion discussions on the Mid-East. As I see it right now, we have an opportunity for a totally new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. We won’t agree on everything, but if we can agree on Berlin, on limitation of armaments, on the Mid-East, on a European security conference, and then finally, as I say, if we can make progress in the field of trade—where Secretary Stans received a very warm welcome and I’m most grateful for it—this will mean that the United States and the Soviet Union will be as close together as we were during the great war. That’s what we want. I believe it’s possible for two nations with differences between governments—two nations with different, which we must recognize, different objectives in the world; your objective in the Mid-East is different than ours. But I think it’s possible for us to live in peace and to find areas of cooperation. And that’s what I think our meeting in May is going to accomplish. But now speaking very frankly, a great cloud hangs over it. It’s the problem in the subcontinent. In the United Nations we have disagreements. The Soviet Union on one side; the United States on another side. As far as the outcome of the present conflict is concerned, the Soviet Union is going to win. The client of the Soviet Union is India. India has 600 million people, and 600 million people are going to win over 60 million people. And if events go forward as they seem to be moving at the present time Pakistan, which lined up with China, will be cut in half. And, so consequently, looking at it in the short-range, this whole series of events on the subcontinent is dangerous for the Soviet Union; it’s a game for India; it’s a tragedy for Pakistan; and it’s been interpreted, of course, as being a setback for China because they back Pakistan, the loser. What concerns me, Mr. Minister, is that it is certain that what is happening on the subcontinent will be a tragedy for Pakistan. But what would be far worse from the standpoint of the future of the world is that if we continue on a different course—the Soviet Union going one way, the United States going another way on the subcontinent—it could poison this whole new relationship, which has so much promise. It could be a disaster for it. So what I would like to suggest is that I do not believe that the gains that the Soviet Union may get from India winning or the dismemberment of Pakistan, gains which are probably certain, are worth jeopardizing the relationship with the United States. I do not say this to make trouble in any sense. But I think there is a better way. A better way is for the Soviet Union and the United States to find a method where we can work together for peace in that area. Now the first requirement is that there be a ceasefire. The second requirement is that, and this is imperative, that the Indians, who already have pretty much overcome the resistance in East Pakistan, the Indians desist in their attacks on West Pakistan. If they do not, the Indians after wiping out East Pakistan, if they then move their forces against West Pakistan, then the United States cannot stand by. Now—so the best way is the ceasefire and then maybe since the Soviet Union is open to the idea of withdrawal—the Chairman has suggested that there be political negotiations—I would say a ceasefire and then negotiations within a Pakistan framework in which Yahya will negotiate with the Awami League. And then bring [unclear] negotiations to withdrawal. Now this we think is a fair settlement, recognizing the interests of everybody concerned. The key to the settlement, however, is in the hands of the Soviet Union. They can restrain the Indians. If the Soviet Union does not restrain the Indians, the United States will not be able to exert any influence with Yahya to negotiate a political settlement with the Awami League. Now having said all these things, right now is the critical point. The critical point is that if the Indians continue to wipe out resistance in East Pakistan and then move against West Pakistan, we then, inevitably, look to a confrontation. Because you see the Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan. And in summary, it seems to me that it’s very shortsighted for either of us to allow what happens in South Asia to interfere with these great new relations that now have so much promise. What I would like to simply to suggest to—that you convey to the Chairman my concern—my very reasonable—but it is important that he recognize the urgency of restraining the Indians at this point and moving toward a ceasefire and a political settlement. Having said that, may I say that I know there are lots of arguments that can be made—at the United Nations Mr. [unclear] has suggested it, Mr. Brezhnev covered some of these. But my purpose is not to argue those, make debating points. My purpose is to say, look, we have a difference here, but we must not allow the differences there and the opportunity for one or the other to gain, to endanger and jeopardize the relations that are far more important. In the view of Arms Control, the Mid-East, which is far more dangerous to each of us than anything that happens in India-Pakistan, and not to mention what I think it also terribly important over the long haul, trade and the future of Europe. So there’s the message I would like to [unclear—convey?]. I’m sorry that on a visit that I know is in another field that we have this current crisis. But I know my Russian friends always like candor, and I speak that way in that spirit. Matskevich : I am grateful for your very candid approach. Unfortunately, I was with Mr. Brezhnev [unclear]so that’s why I didn’t talk to it. We talked now with Brezhnev about four problems: the Middle East, Europe, SALT talks, and we talk trade. And I have [unclear] three proposals [unclear] and I’m looking forward to meeting you. [unclear] appeal to you and Mr. Brezhnev to have some kind of agreement on agricultural matters when you meet in Moscow. And, of course, for you to decide on what night we are going to sign that kind of agreement on agricultural matters. This is why when I talk with Brezhnev [unclear] and I was not prepared— Nixon : Oh, I know. No, I wouldn’t want the Minister to comment on it, and I wouldn’t want you, Mr. Chargé, to comment on it, because you haven’t had a chance to get instructions from your government. But this is moving so fast that I want particularly the Chairman’s good friend and you to know that we see it as a crucial test of our relations. And so we feel that now is the time to move, to settle this thing before it blows up into a major confrontation. Matskevich : When I see Brezhnev, I’ll convey the spirit and letter of what you said. [unclear] in the preliminary discussion, that the main thrust of the talk [unclear]. And actually I know that the President personally took many steps to avert the war between India and Pakistan, and appeal to them. Now as he [Brezhnev] understands the situation, of course, the war on the [unclear] and the root of the problem should be eliminated, which gave rise to [unclear]. He says the Pakistan leaders should be more flexible. Kissinger : We will have a formal reply for you tomorrow. Nixon : In the meantime—I wish—I would like the Minister to convey, before he returns to Moscow, our feeling about this. Vorontsov : Mr. President, I’ll— Nixon : Because you see, Mr. Chargé, it’s so critical. I want him to read my reply in the context of what I said to his good friend, the Minister. Vorontsov : I will report it today, and Secretary Brezhnev will have it today. Nixon : Well, I look forward—I hope we meet again in May. [At this point in the conversation, Matskevich and Vorontsov left the Oval Office. Nixon and Kissinger continued with their conversation]. Kissinger : I think, Mr. President, that— Nixon : I think it will help. Kissinger : It will help. They’re not serious. That will help. Now I’m going to send that over to State. [unclear]. I’m going to say this is what you said to the Russian Minister [unclear]. I thought— Nixon : See, I really stuck it to him. Kissinger : Well, but you did it so beautifully. Nixon : When I said, “What happens to Pakistan would be tragic, but what happens to Russian-American relations could be disastrous to the world.” And you know I said, “You go in. You’re going to win. India’s going to win. You’re going to embarrass the Chinese. But you’re going to poison relations with the United States. [unclear]. But the point is, what can we do— Kissinger : I think— Nixon : What do we have to do? Kissinger : Well, you told him what they should do. I’ll have the Pakistan Ambassador in, because we don’t want to do it behind their backs. Nixon : What is he—is he willing to do anything? Kissinger : I think what you outlined—ceasefire, promise of withdrawal— Nixon : [Speaking to Alexander Butterfield] Send that Ambassador, send this to Vorontsov, pictures [unclear]. Kissinger : I think our friend, in fact, our friend isn’t the right word. This is one of the—I think we will lose 70 percent of this enterprise. The question is if we can save 30 percent; that’s 30 percent more than the situation permits. And we will come out with some dignity. And— Nixon : Well, what did you tell the Pakistani Ambassador? Kissinger : Well, I told the PAK Ambassador—I read him a few paragraphs from the Brezhnev letter. I said, here we are. And then I said my personal view, as a friend is, and then gave him, more or less, your program. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : I said it will give you time. It will stop the Indians. It will change world opinion. If there is another war, it will be a clear war of aggression. It’s— Nixon : An agreement. All that you’re asking them to do is to agree to negotiate with the Awami League, is that it? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : They have no choice, hell. Kissinger : Well, they could totally be obstinate and say it’s their country and they’re not going to discuss it. But— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Right. Kissinger : [Speaking to Alexander Butterfield] Listen, get Haig to bring the paper in. I think, Mr. President, it’s one of these situations again. I think we’re going to have, if Yahya gives us a positive reply. Nixon : He won’t. Kissinger : Well, then we may have to do it without him. I just hate to do it without him because of the Chinese. That’s the big problem. But then we may have to let him get raped. See then we can just, you know— Nixon : Throw up our hands. Kissinger : Then we can just say, “All right, we did what we could.” And then he’s just going to lose. Nixon : You know, I used the word complication with us in this thing. I said, “We have a treaty with Pakistan; you’ve got one with India.” There’s a lot of hard language in this. Kissinger : It will end now. It will end. We’ll lose 70 percent. But that’s a hell of a lot better. We were losing 110 percent yesterday. Nixon : I don’t know. I don’t know what they’ll do. But at least they’ll stop the goddamn Indians from going to the west. Do you think they will or not? Kissinger : Yes. Nixon : You think they would? Kissinger : Yep. That’s my judgment. Nixon : Will you have another talk with Vorontsov—he says, of course he’ll convey this message right away, won’t he? Kissinger : Mr. President, the thing—the things I have learned in my association, that if you push chips into the pot, you might as well push a lot in. You’re not going to lose— Nixon : Yeah. I agree. Kissinger : I think this will end. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Matskevich, and Vorontsov, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–12. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Butterfield also attended the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The comments by Matskevich were translated by an interpreter. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 170. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 170. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, December 9, 1971 SUBJECT: Implications of an Indian Victory over Pakistan 1. An intelligence report [ text not declassified ] dated 7 December 1971, from a reliable source, says that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has indicated that India’s war objectives are: A. Liberation of Bangla Desh B. The incorporation into India of the southern area of Azad (Pakistani-held) Kashmir C. The destruction of Pakistani armored and air force strength so that Pakistan can never again threaten India. In the following we assume that these objectives have been achieved, and discuss their implications in the subcontinent and for other powers. The General Postwar Situation in the Subcontinent 2. India would, of course, be the dominant power in South Asia. But its formidable economic problems would have been aggravated by the war and its need for outside economic assistance increased. Further, though the military power of Pakistan would be destroyed, both the former east and west wings of that country would emerge gravely troubled from the war and their difficulties are likely to spill over, sooner or later, into India itself. 3. Bangla Desh would probably emerge under a kind of Indian tutelage. India will be in a position to exert paramount influence, but it does not desire and could not maintain outright control. Already impoverished and overcrowded, Bangla Desh’s economy and social structure have been badly damaged by civil war and by Indo-Pakistani hostilities. The Bengali propensity for extremism, radicalism, and violence, already apparent in the Hindu Indian state of West Bengal, is likely to manifest itself in Muslim Bangla Desh in fairly short order. And the troubles in that new country and in West Bengal are likely to reinforce and stimulate on another. We do not, however, believe that a new Bengali nationalism (working for the secession of West Bengal from India and its incorporation into Bangla Desh) is likely to be an effective forced for the foreseeable future; Hindu-Muslim antagonisms remain too intense, and Indian military power too great to permit such a contingency. But the two Bengals will create considerable trouble and consume much of New Delhi’s efforts and resources. 4. What is now termed West Pakistan will also face an uncertain future. Though the Indian military would have withdrawn after its victory, the area would also probably have suffered considerable damage during the fighting. Much would depend on the extent of damage to such important and expensive Indus valley hydroelectric and irrigation projects as the Tarbela and Mangla dams and on the industrial plant, centered mostly in Karachi. 5. Beyond this, West Pakistan might fall apart politically. The area suffers from regional antagonisms and hostilities; a major defeat could permit the emergence of centrifugal forces which could shatter West Pakistan into as many as three or four separate countries, successors to the four states which now make up most of that nation. * Of the four Punjab has traditionally dominated the army and the government of Pakistan, so far without major challenge. But if this army is not just defeated, but disintegrates, at least some of its often disaffected fellow nationals might seek to break away—each in its own individual fashion. These possibilities are discussed in more detail in an annex. 6. It should be noted that the possible breakup of Pakistan is based on the assumption that the Pakistani army is not simply defeated but virtually ceases to exist in the West as well as in the East. Despite Mrs. Gandhi’s defined objectives, it is doubtful that India will (or that it can) impose such a total defeat on Pakistan. In other words, the Pakistani army in the West will still probably be in being when the cease-fire sounds and, as such, more likely than not able to contain or deter any breakaway tendencies in the West. Yahya and his associates would probably be so discredited by the defeat that someone else would head the government, but except in the very worst case, the army could probably be counted on to hold West Pakistan together. Nonetheless, such a government would be under heavy pressure from radical political forces, long at odds with the military establishment, seeking access to power. Outside Powers 7. Moscow has apparently been convinced for some time that a close relationship with India is central to its long-term interests in South Asia. The USSR supported diplomatically and materially New Delhi’s “policy of pressure” on Pakistan prior to the outbreak of hostilities and has backed it vigorously in the UN. The USSR stands to emerge, therefore, as even more influential in South Asia after the fighting stops than it has been. It will, as a consequence, continue to have large and growing demands in terms of economic and military aid to India and also to Bangla Desh. Even if it were able and willing to meet such demands, the USSR could not be sure of getting all it wants in the area as a result of its prestigious position. India, no longer faced by a strong and hostile Pakistani military machine, would feel less beholden to the Soviets than today, less amenable to Soviet requests which offend its sense of dignity or sovereignty. Indian gratitude is not a very enduring matter. 8. Whether Soviet-Indian relations are characterized by intimacy and (on the Indian side) dependence in future will be determined largely by how China and the US define their attitudes toward Delhi. If Indian-American relations are not repaired and economic aid is cut back, India will place greater reliance on the USSR. If China’s current hostility to India is sustained, the same would be true. In this case, Moscow would have greater leverage in Delhi and could drive hard bargains, for example, for naval facilities. But if China eventually accepts the new situation in South Asia and moves to normalize its relations with Delhi, the latter would probably welcome the chance to diminish its dependence on the USSR. 9. India’s achievement of its objectives would be a matter of serious concern to China. Peking would fear some loss of face internationally simply because it had failed to take effective action to support a friend of long standing. More serious from Peking’s point of view would be the implications of this event for its contest with the USSR. 10. In its statements at the UN and on Radio Peking, China has stressed two major propositions: that the USSR is shielding and supporting India’s “armed aggression” against Pakistan and attempting thereby to control the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean; and that there is no guarantee for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of various countries if India, with Soviet support, is permitted to sue the “pretext” of self-defense to commit “armed aggression” against Pakistan. 11. Both of these propositions are designed to embarass the USSR and to gain credit for China as a “principled” defender of Third World interests against the machinations of the Great Powers. But they almost certainly reflect a genuine and deep-seated concern that the USSR will make an important advance in position and influence in the subcontinent, adding to the “encirclement” of China, and providing in the longer run a military and political base for further expansion of Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. 12. If China accepts the Indian fait accompli, its concern will still remain and it will have to devise longer range and more sophisticated means for limiting or undermining Soviet/India collaboration. Basically, its alternatives would be to try gradually to strengthen West Pakistan and to weaken India via subversion or in time compete for influence in New Delhi with the Soviets. This latter course may eventually appear attractive; Delhi may not relish too close an embrace with the USSR and thus might be disposed to welcome Chinese overtures. 13. But the Chinese may be in no hurry to shift the focus of their efforts in the subcontinent. They will not wish to appear as “fair-weather” friends, they have gone on the record with very strong condemnations of India, and they don’t like Indians particularly. India is potentially a big power rival and the Chinese may have serious doubts that any Sino-Indian rapprochement would serve any purpose other than permitting India to gain more aid from all sides and hasten the growth of its economic and military power. For these reasons, we believe that Sino-Indian relations will remain tense for some time. 14. Of the regional powers, Iran much more than Afghanistan has involved itself in Pakistan’s struggle with India. The Shah would probably provide a defeated West Pakistan with oil, some money, and some military equipement. He might even see Iran’s interests served by moving to exert deeper influence in Pakistan’s affairs, but, at least initially, we doubt that he would devote much of his real resources to such a project. More generally, however, the defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan would clearly enhance Iran’s importance in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. As a result, other governments may eventually come to take Iran at something closer to the Shah’s view that he must rely on himself as far as possible to gain his foreign policy objectives. Wider Implications 15. As indicated, the successful achievement of India’s political-military objectives would alter power relations in the subcontinent in a highly visible way. Because the USSR would have helped to bring about this result by overt diplomatic, propaganda, and material support to India, an impression would be left in many quarters that Soviet power and policy were effective and had served the USSR’s ally well. Since US policy would have suffered a reverse and since US power and influence tend to be measured relative to that of the USSR, some in other states might think that they should take into account in their own calculations some revised judgment of the US-USSR power equation. 16. Such impressions and calculations are often transitory in effect, though in this case a widely held impression that Soviet weight in the world is growing would no doubt be reinforced in some degree. It is another thing, however, for states involved in confrontation situations in other areas, say the Middle East or Southeast Asia, to draw concrete inferences and to act in different ways than they are now acting. It is unlikely that Egypt would conclude that the USSR would be willing to take greater risks on its behalf; if it did so, Moscow would be quick to disabuse Cairo of the notion. The states in Southeast Asia which are concerned about US disengagement from that area would find new reason for concern and perhaps would lend a readier ear to Soviet efforts to build influence there, but they would be most unlikely to undertake any sharp turn of policy. 17. The key factor determining wider effects of the current events in South Asia would be what the Soviets think these events mean. In a general sense Moscow would be encouraged to think that its power and influence were growing and that it could entertain the idea of playing a stronger hand in some other contexts. But the Soviets are unlikely to abandon the careful calculation of risks they customarily bring to particularly situations. Moreover, they would not wish to compromise the general line of their current foreign policy which, vis-à-vis the West, operates under slogans of detente, negotiations, etc. This would be especially the case if the current developments in South Asia, as seems likely, deepened their quarrel with China. ANNEX Possible Breakaway Elements in West Pakistan 1. The eight million Sindhis, residents of the southern part of West Pakistan and centered around the cities of the Hyderbad and Karachi, often hostile to the Punjabis, could declare their independence. Indeed, West Pakistan’s principal civilian political figure, Z.A. Bhutto is a Sindhi, and though the recipient of a heavy electoral mandate in December 1970, has never been permitted to take office by the Punjabi military. Undoubtedly resentful, he could in extreme circumstances seize the initiative and secede, preferring the leadership of a small, weak, comparatively unimportant country to remaining out of power. 2. The predominantly tribal residents of the NWFP have long been objects of international contention. They have close ties with Pushtu speakers in eastern Afghanistan. Kabul has long believed that the Pushtuns belong together, and that the present Afghan-Pakistan frontier is a line arbitrarily and unfairly drawn by the British raj. Their claims on this area have led them in the past to quite serious confrontations with the Pakistanis. Indeed, were Pakistan to begin to fall apart, the Afghans would probably help the process along by moving to detach the NWFP and bringing it under their protection. 3. Baluchistan, primitive, frequently lawless, and isolated, is not likely to be able to assume the status of an independent state. It could thus remain attached to the Punjab, though it is conceivable that it would be absorbed by either Afghanistan (giving that landlocked country an outlet to the sea) or by Iran. Both these countries already have Baluchi speaking residents. 4. The Muslim Punjab, with its capital in Lahore, would remain a not inconsiderable country of over 30 million people. Provided it had not been too badly damaged, it would probably recover economically fairly rapidly. It would remain the focus of bitterly intractable anti-Hindu, anti-Indian sentiments. But if Mrs. Gandhi’s objectives above are met, the Punjab—either as the dominant figure in a still united West Pakistan or as a separate country—would no longer pose a threat to India. Nor would it have the international stature previously enjoyed by a united Pakistan. Rather it would probably be viewed by most powers as a state on the order of Afghanistan: remote and of no great consequence. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–083, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 12/9/71. Secret. Prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group. * The four are the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the predominantly Pushtu speaking Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Of West Pakistan’s roughly 55 million people, some 66 percent are Punjabis, 13 percent are Sindis, 10 percent Pushtuns, and 3 percent Baluchis. The remainder are principally Urdu-speaking refugees from India. 171. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 171. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 9, 1971, 5:57–6:34 p.m. Kissinger : Well, Mr. President, this thing is beginning to shape up. [ 5 seconds not declassified ] Bhutto is coming over here. The Pakistan Ambassador. Not the Ambassador, the Pakistan Representative at the UN. Nixon : Bhutto? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : That son-of-bitch? Kissinger : Yeah. But we understand that his instructions are to offer a settlement very close to what we have. What we are putting to them. Nixon : I noticed, I read that in the news summary, I mean in this morning’s briefing. Kissinger : That he’s coming? Nixon : Yeah, that he’s coming, and that Yahya may be setting him up to make a sell out in order to [unclear]. He’s a bad man. Bhutto’s a terrible bastard. Kissinger : But the point is if we get this, you see, if we get this offer, if we get Yahya to agree with this proposition, then we can go back to the Russians and settle this thing. And we’ll be in good graces with the Chinese because we’ve got the summit with Yahya’s concurrence. We’ll have squared the circle. Then after we settle it, we put the bastards here to the torch by saying that we were playing this game [unclear]. I think we’re going to pull it off. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Well, they will lose East Pakistan. There’s nothing to be done about that. Nixon : We all know that. Kissinger : But the question is how they lose it. Nixon : And West Pakistan, they think they’re going to lose it anyway, don’t you think so? Kissinger : Well, they may be so demented that, well, yes by now they have to think it. Nixon : Well, for Christ sakes. Well, how will it be done then? It’ll be done through, they’ll make an offer for a political settlement with East Pakistan? But that’s, beyond that point, the Indians will never accept that. Neither will the Russians. Kissinger : No, but that wouldn’t be, no, the Russians will. That’s the interesting thing in the Brezhnev letter. The Brezhnev letter says the negotiations should start at the point at which they were interrupted on March 25, 1970. At that point, East Pakistan was part of Pakistan. And if we could get the Soviets to state that as their idea of a settlement. If we make a choice— Nixon : They have. They have stated that. Kissinger : No. Nixon : In the letters. Kissinger : In the letter. Now if we, if you and Brezhnev, could make a joint declaration. The way I see this thing evolving, if we get Yahya aboard by tomorrow morning, and the time factor works for us— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : It could be a joint appeal by you and Brezhnev along these three lines. If the Indians reject it, then we go to the United Nations Security Council and get—this time the Soviets have to support us in the Security Council because it’s a joint— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : So then we’ve got the Indians at a disadvantage. And we’ll have separated the Soviets from the Indians to some extent. Nixon : Um, hmh. Kissinger : If the Indians accept it, then what will happen, first of all, it will then save West Pakistan— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger :—for the time being. And if the Indians— Nixon : The Indians will stop, and there’ll be a cease-fire. But the Indians will stay in East Pakistan. Kissinger : Well, what will happen then is a negotiation between the East Pakistan leaders and the West Pakistan leaders, which if one, which will probably lead to the independence of Bangladesh anyway. But it will then be done not by us selling out but by Yahya agreeing to it. Nixon : All right. Now— Kissinger : You know, it’s a lousy outcome, but we are now talking, Mr. President, of— Nixon : Well, it was sort of inevitable. East Pakistan in my opinion could never be saved. In my opinion it could never be saved with the way it was going. Kissinger : I mean, when it’s all done it will— Nixon : They were too clumsy, the West Paks, to have saved the damned thing. Kissinger : When it’s all, if we come out of it that way, Mr. President— Nixon : If we can save a strong West Pakistan we’ll have accomplished a lot. Kissinger : We’ll have accomplished a lot, and all the bleeders about India will again have been proved wrong, because after that— Nixon : Well, if we ever get the Russians to go with us on this, that could be a watershed in the relations between the two countries. That’s why I wish Dobrynin was here so you could tell him exactly that. Kissinger : I know. But it’s better with this guy because he’s got to report it. Dobrynin would have argued with you and tried to pitch. Nixon : Did you notice we stopped him? We didn’t have arguments. Kissinger : Yeah, well it would have been harder for Dobrynin, to stop Dobrynin. So actually I think, I told Haig I thought this was one of your finest hours here because anybody else that I know would have said the hell with it. We have no chance. It’s a long shot. Why jeopardize the summit? And I think you’ll have strengthened the summit when it’s all over. Nixon : The Russians could come back with a hard-nosed message. Kissinger : No. Nixon : I don’t see how they can. Kissinger : No. Nixon : You know, when you really put it in terms of basically a lawyer arguing a case, I made such a strong case of how much was on the plate, how much they were going to risk at such a cheap small game that they just can’t. I don’t see how they could possibly turn it down. If they do, they aren’t worth dealing with. Huh? Kissinger : Every instinct I have tells me they won’t turn it down. Nixon : Well, Vorontsov, you know, made notes for [unclear]. Kissinger Every instinct—because basically it accepts their framework. We should get a letter to them tomorrow sort of summarizing what you said as a formal reply. Nixon : Well, could you get something done, prepared? Kissinger : Yeah, I’ll have it for you first thing tomorrow. Nixon : I think we ought to get it off right away to Brezhnev. Kissinger : Tomorrow morning. Now because— Nixon : You know, it’s an interesting thing how these people are the same. This fellow here, who is incidentally, he is a nice guy, and he hasn’t changed. Just think 12 years ago. He comes in and says I haven’t changed, but boy you should see him. He hasn’t changed one bit. Still got the [unclear]. But this fellow went through the same line that Gromyko did about how Brezhnev was a warmhearted man, a good man, and so forth and so on. Kissinger : Brezhnev has a hell of a lot at stake in this meeting with you, Mr. President. Nixon : He wants it to succeed, you think? Kissinger : Yeah. The sons-of-bitches in this country can piss on you as much as they want. Nixon : They do. Kissinger : Outside this country you are the world leader right now. I mean, why the hell would Trudeau, who dislikes everything you stand for, who in his style, in his baggy style, is as different from you as two human beings can be. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : How, why does he say it was a fantastic revolutionary concept? First, because it was, of course, well put. But also because he feels he wants to be identified with the leader of the, at least the non-communist world. Nixon : He was hurting with his identification with Kosygin, and he wanted to be identified as American. Kissinger : Yeah, but he didn’t say this about Kosygin. And he couldn’t have because his domestic opinion wouldn’t— Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : If he had said Kosygin made a revolutionary— Nixon : Well, that vote at the UN wasn’t too bad too. That had some reflection of this. Kissinger : That’s right. I mean, our liberal establishment is intellectually, it’s morally corrupt, but it’s also intellectually so totally corrupt. What they’re telling you is, in effect, to preside over the rape of an ally, to which Kennedy has a commitment. What you are almost certainly going to achieve is the preservation of West Pakistan which is, it’s a tragedy but— Nixon : Well, it was done before. Kissinger : But we didn’t urge him to go into East Pakistan the way he did. Nixon : I know. Kissinger : And we can’t be given the impossible. Nixon : One thing I want you to do, Connally mentioned to staff. I want you to take, this is an order, $25 million, take it out of the Indian money and go to the Indonesians in need of it. Now by God that is to be done. I want the Indonesians to be, a Muslim country to know that we’re their friends. I think that will have repercussions right away. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Agreed? Kissinger : Absolutely. Nixon : All right. Can you issue that order? Kissinger : I’ll get it done this minute. Nixon : Put it out. What I meant is, Henry, put it under my name if necessary. Kissinger : Oh, no, no, no. Nixon : I’m not going to have any screwing around. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : You think State will call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that? Kissinger : Well, Irwin was so shaken he hardly knew what to say. Nixon : Well, give him instructions. Give him a talking paper and the rest. Will he do that? Or what? What are you going to do? I don’t know what the hell they’re— Kissinger : Oh no, no. He’ll now carry it out. Nixon : Well goddamnit, it must be, it would be very easy for me, for anybody to tell the Indian Ambassador we will not tolerate acquisition of territory, right? Well, for Christ sakes, you’ve got to say that much. Kissinger : No, no. We’re in. Nixon : What else they do, I don’t know. Kissinger : We’re getting it. Nixon : I’ll tell you one thing, the— Kissinger : I think we’ll be over it by this time next week. Nixon : [unclear] He’s going to feel, they’re going to think twice over there before they allow any inspired leaks, piss on the White House for a couple of days. Oh, they’ll still come, but they can’t help but know, that whole establishment over there, how I feel about it. I mean, I know what they’re doing. I read the damn papers. Kissinger : I think we’re over the hump. My instinct tells me that this is not going to build into a confrontation. These Russians are slobbering all over you. Nixon : You think we’ve got the bureaucracy lined up [unclear]? Kissinger : I thought it was essential. We’ll have a well-behaved WSAG meeting tomorrow, I hope. First time in 4 weeks. Nixon : For the first time in 4 weeks you say? Kissinger : Yeah. The others aren’t so bad, I mean, Packard is fine. Moorer is fine, Packard is fine, Helms is fine. Nixon : Well, they got that Moorer knows about moving that ship. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Oh, no, we’re doing everything that can be done now. Nixon : We’re right to move the carrier. If you’re going to make a move, Christ, move the carrier. Kissinger : In fact, even if there is a settlement, we should move the force in there just to show we can do it and take it out again. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : Then no one can accuse us of anything. Nixon : That’s right. We move the carrier. Get the planes over. Call in the Indian Ambassador. I thought it was good to report to this group that I’ve just told the Russian minister, and you’re going to tell him anyway. Kissinger : No, but this way I don’t have to tell him. Nixon : Good. Kissinger : This is even better. This way I don’t— Nixon : [unclear] told the Russian. Kissinger : This way I don’t have to do— Nixon : Without poisoning our relations. Also, I thought it was, nobody that was there was taking it down, but, you know, it’s too bad— Kissinger : No, Haig was taking it down. Nixon : The point that I made that, I said I know the usual line here is the same as what’s— Kissinger : I know. Nixon : The diplomatic line is to let the dust settle until you no longer see the grave. And I said that’s not my policy. Kissinger : I thought that was powerful. Haig said this was the most powerful statement he’s heard you make in WSAG. It was really strong. You know, if it works it will look inevitable. [Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule.] Nixon : I’ll bet you that wire to Moscow is humming right at this moment. Kissinger : We’ll have an answer to that tomorrow. Saturday morning at the latest. Nixon : Well, I was conciliatory though, Henry. I did say, I said as far as this deal is concerned, all that we ask is restrain the Indians, let’s have a ceasefire, they must have a political settlement. As a matter of fact, it was his deal that we were talking about. Kissinger : Well, there were a few hookers in there the way you put it. You said, “Talk to the Awami League.” Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : And the way they put it was, it has to start where it stopped on March 25, which really means freeing Mujib. Nixon : I see. Kissinger : On the other, but— Nixon : That’s negotiable too. Kissinger : But I would figure, Mr. President, that’s not what we get into in the first phase. In the first phase, we should state a few general principles. The major thing is to defang the Indians now. The Pakistanis have lost 80 percent of their POL. They bombed Karachi completely. The Pakistanis are going to collapse in 2 weeks, incidentally. If we can save West Pakistan it will be— Nixon : Thirty percent? Kissinger : An extraordinary achievement, which is not warranted by the situation. Nixon : Because the Indians are ready to gobble it up? Kissinger : Because if State played its usual game, it will send a message to [New] Delhi, it will send a message to Islamabad, all of which plays into the Indian hands just as our strategy the first week of the operation did. They then take 5 days to reply. The reply will be inconclusive. Nixon : You know another point that State needs to get pounded into its goddamned head is that we do not determine our policy around here solely on the basis of how many people are on one side. Kissinger : Yeah. Yeah. Well, you made that point. Nixon : And how many, and whether a country is a democracy or whether it is not a democracy. Kissinger : That’s another point you made. Nixon : By God, we just don’t do it that way. I mean, it doesn’t make, an evil deed is not made good by the form of government that executes the deed, Henry. I mean, as I’ve often said, the most horrible wars in history have been fought between the Christian nations of Western Europe. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Right? Does that make them right? Kissinger : Absolutely. Nixon. No, sir. No, sir. Kissinger : And between, the governments prior to World War I were all more or less the same, with the exception of the Czar. I mean, that German emperor wasn’t all that powerful. Nixon : Well, he was a Christian monarch. Kissinger : I mean, they had a pretty democratic government. He sort of strutted around and made it look as if he were powerful. Nixon : Well, I don’t know. I hope it works. I hope it works from the Russian standpoint. I just can’t believe Brezhnev can hear this being said. And I must, I think your hunch is right, saying it to this guy was, it was just an accident. But saying it to him was very important. He could see that I was fair, I was conciliatory, but tough as hell. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : And he saw that too. And I said there’d be a confrontation. Kissinger : And you listed all the things you were willing to do. It was a masterpiece. It was the subtlety, and then you were expecting—you want to jeopardize European Security, Middle East, SALT, all of that, for what? And you said there’d be a confrontation. Nixon : Also pointing out that we had a treaty with Pakistan, just as they had one with India. [unclear] And he just assumes we might do something. Kissinger : Mr. President, if this were a key country to them they might challenge you. But why should they run this risk to back you down? First of all, no one knows you’ve threatened. Nixon : No. I told him, you know. I said, “I am not threatening anything.” Kissinger : And besides, you can do a lot of things. I mean, if the principle gets established that the stronger country can prevail with the backing of another country, we could unleash the Israelis and kill the Egyptians. Nixon : We might do that. Kissinger : I mean we won’t do it but— Nixon : Who knows? Kissinger : But I mean, just looking at it from their point of view. Nixon : Who knows? Who knows? Kissinger : Every time we’ve played them this way it’s come out all right. And they know, they said you’ve just done too many unpredictable things. No, I think this was a great day. Nixon : We shall see. We shall see. Kissinger : We may lose on it. We were certain— Nixon : Well at least we tried. Kissinger : We were certain to lose the other way. We may win this way. Nixon : Well, we tried. Some people, the Russians cannot ignore this. They just can’t let the— Kissinger : Oh, no. Oh, no. You’ll get an answer within, by Sunday morning. Nixon : The Russians, I think, the real question is whether they will just lean on the Indians now. Kissinger : That’s what it amounts to. And anything we get in this connection is money in the bank a) in the sense of defeating, of protecting Pakistan. But even more importantly, it will teach the Indians that there are bigger games than, the Indians know they’ve got the Pakistanis where they’ve wanted them. Nixon : Sure. Kissinger : So if we can stop an Indian onslaught on West Pakistan now, the Indians will consider that being thwarted. Nixon : You think so? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : Well, they’re going to be thwarted in another way. Now, I will not listen to any suggestions that that aid be restored. Kissinger : No matter what happens, Mr. President. Nixon : No, sir. Kissinger : That is what we have to be— Nixon : I will not listen to it. Now these bastards have asked for it, and they’re not going to get it. Now I think we’re going to have to play that game. They chose Russia. Let Russia aid them. Correct? Kissinger : Absolutely. What I would do with the Indians, Mr. President, is keep them in the deep freeze until after your election. After you’re elected they’ll come to you hat in hand. Nixon : Well, we don’t want— Kissinger : No, no. But then, I don’t think Indian animosity can hurt you if there’s no war. I don’t know which American likes India. Nixon : Nobody. Kissinger : Except those intellectuals who are against you. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Yeah, but they’re against you anyway. [The brief conclusion of the conversation is unclear.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–19. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 172. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 172. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51–11:12 a.m. Kissinger : Today, I want to tell you what I have done, tentatively, subject to your approval. Nixon : Let’s go ahead. Kissinger : They’ve got this East Pakistan—they’ve got the offer of the commander of the Pakistan forces in East Pakistan to get a ceasefire and so forth. They were going to run to the Security Council and get that done. We don’t want to be in a position where we push the Pakistanis over the cliff. Nixon : No. Kissinger : So I told them to link the ceasefire in the east with the ceasefire in the west. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger : The ceasefire in the west is down the drain. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : I mean the east is down the drain. The major problem now has to be to protect the west. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : So I’ve told them that they should link any discussion of ceasefire in the east with ceasefire in the west. And to use this to wrap the whole business up. I’ve got Vorontsov coming in at 11:30 and I’m going to tell him what the Pakistanis did in the east— Nixon : was a result of our— Kissinger :—was as a result of what we did. Which is true. I’m going to show him the Kennedy understanding. I’m going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say, “this is it now, let’s settle the—let’s get a cease fire now.” That’s the best that can be done now. They’ll lose half of their country, but at least they preserve the other half. The east is gone. Nixon : What is it the east in effect offered? Kissinger : Well, the east—the commander in the east has offered—it’s a little bit confused. He’s asked the United Nations to arrange an immediate, honorable repatriation of his forces. In other words, turn over to civilian authority. Nixon : Right. And? Kissinger : And that’s, in effect, all. And a promise that the Indians would eventually withdraw too. But that’s going to happen anyway. I mean, to participate in that is a nice humanitarian effort, but it does not solve the overwhelming problem of the war in the west. Nixon : Does State understand that? Kissinger : No. Well they understand it now, believe me. Nixon : Yeah. See the point is, our desire is to save West Pakistan. That’s all. Kissinger : That’s right. That is exactly right. Nixon : All right. Fine. What is State up to now? We’re still getting, you’re still getting those—keep those carriers moving now. Kissinger : The carriers—everything is moving. Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan, 22 more are coming. We’re talking to the Saudis, the Turks we’ve now found are willing to give five. So we’re going to keep that moving until there’s a settlement. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : When are you going to see the Chinese? This afternoon? Kissinger : 5:30. Nixon : What are you going to tell them? Kissinger : I’m going to tell them everything we did, and I’m going to tell them that we, I’m going to tell them what forces we’re moving. Nixon : Could you say that it would be very helpful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces? Kissinger : Absolutely. Nixon : They’ve got to threaten or they’ve got to move, one of the two. You know what I mean? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that’s what they must do. Now goddamn it, we’re playing our role and that will restrain India. And also tell them that this will help us get the ceasefire. We don’t want to make a deal with the Russians [that] the Chinese will piss on. Kissinger : Absolutely. Oh, God. That’s why— Nixon : The Chinese at the present time are kicking the hell out of the Russians about this, you know. The Russians are kicking the Chinese saying that the Chinese are playing with the Paks and the Paks—you know what I mean? This is a Russian-Chinese conflict. Kissinger : Mr. President, if we stay strong, even if it comes out badly, we’ll have come out well with the Chinese, which is important. Nixon : How about getting the French to sell some planes to the Paks? Kissinger : Yeah. They’re already doing it. Nixon : All right, why not? I mean, if they need some supplies, why not the French? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Now the French are just—they’ll sell to anybody. Kissinger : Yeah, they are selling them now. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Pakistan.] Nixon : Let me say this on the French thing, can you talk with the French? And, is there any way we can get them—I mean we talk about the United States helping, furnishing arms to Pakistan, how about getting the French to sell them in some instances? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : It’s a question of sales, isn’t it really? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Yeah. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : Now coming back to this India-Pakistan thing, have we got anything else we can do? Kissinger : No. I think we’re going to crack it now. Nixon : Then I hope that the Indians will be warned by the Chinese, right? Kissinger : Well, I’ll have to find out tonight. Nixon : You do your best, Henry. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : This should have been done long ago. The Chinese have not warned the Indians. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : They haven’t warned them that they’re going to come in. And that’s the point. They’ve got to warn them—it’s just— Kissinger : Uh, huh. Nixon : All they’ve got to do is move something. Move their, move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act. We’re not doing a goddamn thing, Henry, you know that. We’re just moving things around, aren’t we? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : But these Indians are cowards. Right? Kissinger : Right. But with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them. The Russians have played a miserable game. Nixon : So we’ll do the same thing, right? Kissinger : Exactly. Nixon : Threatening them with what? If they come in and what? Kissinger : They’ll do something. They haven’t said what they’ll do. But they’ll settle now. After your conversation with Matskevich yesterday, they’re going to settle. Nixon : What basis [unclear]? Kissinger : The ceasefire in the west is all that’s left. Nixon : The ceasefire in the west. And what, though, on East Pakistan? What do we do about that? Are we going to just say that— Kissinger : No, we— Nixon : Indian occupation or Bangladesh? Or what? Kissinger : What we— Nixon : Are we going to oppose Bangladesh recognition? What’s our position? Kissinger : The best would be— Nixon : Is anybody involved on these things? Kissinger : Yes, yes. The best not [unclear], but the best would be if— Nixon : See, how are we, if we cannot tell those people how we want it to come out, we can’t have a decent plan. That’s what we haven’t had at this point. Kissinger : That’s right. Well, we’ve had—after the Brezhnev letter came yesterday we sent a copy of it to Yahya. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : We’ve told him the pros and cons of accepting it. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : And now Yahya has come back with a proposal saying ceasefire, negotiations for mutual withdrawal, and negotiations to settle the political future of— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : And then what will happen on the Bangladesh, Mr. President, is that whatever West Pakistan and these people work out, we will accept. But we will not be in the fore—in the front. If we can get— Nixon : Whatever West Pakistan works out with whom? Kissinger : With—the negotiations on East Pakistan. Nixon : India has not even—but India will not agree to negotiations on East Pakistan. Kissinger : Yeah, but the Russians have already agreed to it. So what will happen, let’s be realistic, what will happen is that the representatives of East Pakistan will demand independence. And in practice I think that is what West Pakistan will then agree to. But then it won’t be us who’ve done it. This will solve the problem of do we recognize Bangladesh against the wishes of the Pakistan Government. Nixon : That’s right. We must never recognize Bangladesh. That’s why no answer’s the right thing, until West Pakistan— Kissinger : Well, that’s the point. Nixon : Gives us the go-ahead. Bhutto will do it. Now, I want a program of aid to West Pakistan formulated immediately. Have some sort of a program, you know, after they’re there. We cannot let them hang out there by themselves. I don’t think we can do much from a military standpoint, but let’s find a way to let others do it. That’s one suggestion. On the French thing, I want you to talk to the French cold turkey. We’d like to find a way to help to work with the French, can we? You got any arms in there? Kissinger : I will do my best. Nixon : Can you think of anything else? Kissinger : No, I think— Nixon : I don’t think we can get—frankly Henry, I don’t think we can get through the Congress arms sales to West Pakistan. That’s what I mean. Do you? Kissinger : No. Nixon : All right. Then what was our answer? Give them a hell of a lot of economic assistance, correct? Kissinger : I can let them convert it into— Nixon : And let them convert into—well that’s their, that’s their, we don’t ask the Indians, we’ve given the Indians all this economic assistance, and we didn’t ask any questions when they made a treaty with the Russians and bought Russians arms. Did we raise any questions about that? Kissinger : And the point you made yesterday, we have to continue to squeeze the Indians even when this thing is settled. They can’t get—these 84 million dollars are down the drain. Nixon : That’s right. That’s gone. And incidentally we’ve already spent 25 million of it on the crap that—take another 25 million and give it to the Paks. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : We’ve got to for rehabilitation. I mean, Jesus Christ, they’ve bombed—I want all the war damage; I want to help Pakistan on the war damage in Karachi and other areas, see? Kissinger : See the reason—I’m getting Vorontsov in, Mr. President, at 11:30— Nixon : Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger : I’m going to put before him, I’m going to show him that Kennedy— Nixon : Yeah. And say, “This is what the President’s talking about.” Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Now, and say now listen, we didn’t [unclear] and we just want to say we’re not—don’t get, just say the President is, as you know, you must never misjudge this man. He doesn’t pound on the table, and he doesn’t shout. But when he talks the way he does—I’ve walked with him for 3 years, this is the way he means it. It’s just cold fact. I’d put it that way. I think you’ve got to be [unclear—personable?] Kissinger : Mr. President, I don’t have, this was, if this thing comes up, between you and me we know that West Pakistan is lost. If you can save West Pakistan it will be an unbelievable achievement because West Pakistan has had all its oil supplies destroyed. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : They’ve had no spare parts from us for months. Their army is ground down. And 2 more weeks of war and they’re finished in the west as much as they are in the east. So if we can save West Pakistan, it would still be a defeat, but we would have done it. And the Chinese will know that. And the Russians will know it. And the Indians will not be happy with it. Nixon : I don’t want the Indians to be happy. I want the Indians—I want also, put this down, and get Scali in. Use him more. I want a public relations program developed to piss on the Indians. I mean, that atrocity of the [unclear], for example. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : I want to piss on them for their responsibility. Get a white paper out. Put down, White paper. White paper. Understand that? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : I don’t mean for just your reading. But a white paper on this— Kissinger : No, no. I know. Nixon : I want the Indians blamed for this, you know what I mean? We can’t let these goddamn, sanctimonious Indians get away with this. They’ve pissed on us on Vietnam for 5 years, Henry. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : And what do we do? Here they are raping and murdering, and they talk about West Pakistan, these Indians are pretty vicious in there, aren’t they? Kissinger : Absolutely. Nixon : Aren’t they killing a lot of these people? Kissinger : Well, we don’t know the facts yet. But I’m sure [unclear] that they’re not as stupid as the West Pakistanis—they don’t let the press in. The idiot Paks have the press all over their place. Nixon : Well, the Indians did, oh yes. They brought them in, had pictures of spare tanks and all the rest. Brilliant. Brilliant public relations. Kissinger : Yeah, but they don’t let them in where the civilians are. Nixon : Oh, I know. But they let them in to take the good shots. The poor, damn Paks don’t let them in at all. Kissinger : Or into the wrong places. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : The Paks just don’t have the subtlety of the Indians. Nixon : Well, they don’t lie. The Indians lie. Incidentally, did Irwin carry out my order to call in the Indian Ambassador? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Yeah. Nixon : He did? Kissinger : Within an hour. Nixon : And he told him he would not accept a—what they, well it came out fortuitously, didn’t it? The right thing to say at this time. Kissinger : It could not have worked better. It’s all working together. Nixon : Because we said to them that the acquisition of territory will not be accepted, correct? Kissinger : Right. Nixon : And that we had to have their assurance. What did the Ambassador say on [to] these instructions? Kissinger : Well, he said, “How can you even suspect this?” and “What gave you this idea?” Nixon : That’s what you expected him to say. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 173. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 173. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 10, 1971, 12:47–1:01 p.m. Kissinger : Well, I saw Vorontsov and I, and he said, “It was totally unnecessary. We got the message from the President loud and clear yesterday.” And he said, “I can tell you informally, if they’re not working through the night in Moscow now they’re not doing their duty.” Nixon : He said that? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Was he not unfriendly? Kissinger : Oh, no. We’re going to get it. Nixon : Well, I think that was the way to treat this fellow. I mean they—it was good to have Vorontsov and Brezhnev’s friend Matskevich to see me in operation. Because they only have it from the other fellow. They’ve had it from Gromyko. Now Gromyko’s seen it. But with Gromyko, I was unable—that was an occasion where I had to lay anything out for him. Kissinger : Dobrynin— Nixon : Dobrynin has seen it. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : He’s seen a little—they’ve got to know, Henry. Kissinger : Vorontsov said, he couldn’t have been stronger. I showed him the secret treaty. I said, “Now, I hope you understand the significance of this. This isn’t just an obligation. It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own President.” So I said, “When the President yesterday spoke of an obligation, he was speaking of a Kennedy obligation.” Nixon : What’d he say? Did he look at it? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. And he wrote. And he said within an hour this will be on Mr. Brezhnev’s desk. And I told him we’re moving some military forces, but it will not be visible until Sunday night, so you have till; in effect it was giving him sort of a veiled ultimatum. And— Nixon : Well, the other, if Brezhnev does not have the good judgment not to push us to the wall on this miserable issue— Kissinger : He’ll do it on something else. Nixon : We just may as well forget the summit. That’s the way it is. Kissinger : Well, now something that I have to do, Mr. President, I have to give State a brief summary of these exchanges otherwise they’ll go crazy at the UN with this immediate tactical situation. And I can do it with Alex Johnson, and he’ll keep it quiet. Nixon : Well, what do they want to do with it? Kissinger : Well— Nixon : What is the situation now? Where do, you’re going to what, you’re going to urge the Chinese to take action. Kissinger : Right. What I think is that by Sunday we’re going to have the ceasefire. Sunday night or Monday. Nixon : And the Indians will agree? Kissinger : Yeah, I think that the Russians would agree with us to call for one. Nixon : Well if the Russians, the ideal situation is if the Russians agree with us. But I don’t, but don’t leave the Chinese out in left field. Kissinger : No, I’m seeing them tonight. Nixon : Then you’ve got to sell them on the idea so that they don’t attack US for joining with the Russians— Kissinger : No, because we got Yahya, what we are proposing to the Russians Yahya gave us. See I got in touch with Yahya yesterday after you had talked to Matskevich. I sent an extract from the Brezhnev letter. I said, “Now, here are the pros and cons. We know what the Russians are after. On the other hand, the basic problem now is to preserve your army. This may be a way of doing it. We are saying this as a friend. We are not pressing you or urging it. What do you want?” Now he came back with a formulation— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : Which is very close to ours. And which is very close to what we can live with. And I’ve now given that to the Russians. Verbatim, the way he gave it, saying we’re willing to support that. I didn’t say it came from Pakistan. I said, “That’s ours.” It’s very close to what you said to this fellow yesterday. Of course, if I had said it came from—I said, “We’ll support this with Pakistan.” Now the question is what they’re going to do. Nixon : Now the main thing is to keep State the hell out of the act now in the UN, right? Kissinger : Yeah, but that’s the only way I get that done is to tell Johnson, “Now just cool it.” Nixon : And you’re going to tell them we’re talking to the Russians? Kissinger : Yes. Nixon : That’s what you’re going to tell them? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Are you going to tell them you are going to talk to the Chinese? Kissinger : No. Nixon : Fine. We’re talking to the Russians and that I had this—okay, fine. And we want to handle it on that basis. Now Rogers is going to get back tonight. Kissinger : He’s going to raise hell, but that’s going to be too late. Nixon : Would raise hell why? On what grounds? Kissinger : Well— Nixon : What’s happening that he could raise hell about? Kissinger : No, nothing. And it’s great that it all happened while he was gone. Nixon : Well, that was good. That was the point. That’s the reason I’ve been pressing to get it done. I don’t want to have to explain it all to him. Kissinger : We can put it all on the basis that he was gone and we didn’t trust anyone else to know. And I got Alex Johnson in just enough so that he could control the situation while Rogers was gone. So I think this will work well. Nixon : [unclear] Can’t you do it in the UN at this point? Because then— Kissinger : We need the Russian reply. Nixon : Will be able to embarrass. If we don’t want to have the Russians say no at the UN. And then the UN would be impotent. Kissinger : Well, I don’t mind having the Russians say no after they’ve had a chance to consider it. But we don’t want to get them to say no before. Now I’ve talked to the Ambassador here, to the Pak, and told him now to just cool it now for 24 hours until we get the Russian reply. He’s getting his man in New York under control. It’s going to work out, Mr. President, unless the Indians, you put well: if the Russians are determined to humiliate us somewhere, they can now do it. Except it’s a cheap area to do it and we are not that closely tied into it. It’s not our obligation, we’ve never—but then we might as well know it. But it’s a hard lesson for them to learn because we might just let the Israelis do to the Egyptians what, you know, this is going to be the ballgame. In the Middle East, our ally is stronger than theirs. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 174. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers 174. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 11, 1971 The Indo-Pakistan Conflict—East and West The East It is not a new truth to note that the massive use of military force by Pakistanis against the people of East Pakistan, begun on March 25, was a colossal blunder and miscalculation. The disastrous effect of this initial blunder was compounded by the unwillingness or inability of the Yahya government to move rapidly to political reconciliation with the East Pakistan leaders. The drastic weakening in Pakistan’s real power position vis-à-vis India implicit in these events provided India an opportunity unequaled in the continuing confrontation of these two countries. Given the deep-seated suspicion, fear, and hostility that has dominated the relations of India and Pakistan, it may have been inevitable that, despite our best efforts, India would conclude that military operations against Pakistan were an acceptable or welcome means of exploiting the significant shift in the Indo-Pakistan power balance brought about by Pakistan’s inept policies in the East. Thus the Indian resort to war in East Pakistan was almost certainly dictated by Indian concerns that Pakistan might, by 11th hour political accommodation, escape the worst consequences of its initial blunder. However that may be, it is clear that India, which from the beginning had trained, equipped, and supported the Mukhti Bahini forces, slammed the door on future peaceful prospects of settlement by undertaking full-scale war in East Pakistan—a war designed to destroy the Pakistani forces in the East and to establish a state of Bangla Desh. Major military operations in East Pakistan are likely to be completed by India in a time frame of a few days to two or three weeks, the principal variable being the durability of a will to resist on the part of West Pakistani forces whose position is hopeless from a military point of view. Mrs. Ghandi has made clear that the UN ceasefire effort will not affect the course of these events in East Pakistan. Nor are other external forces likely to do so. As long as the Indians maintain their determination to pursue the war in the East to total defeat or surrender of the opposing forces, the West Pakistanis can do nothing to retrieve the situation and the Chinese seem unlikely to make a move with respect to East Pakistan. We will thus be shortly confronted with the reality of a new State of Bangla Desh in East Pakistan and the complete elimination of West Pakistani power and influence there. The enormous humanitarian problems arising from these developments are being urgently addressed. On the political side, our purpose should be to establish a normal and positive relationship with the Bangla Desh Government. The nature and timing of specific steps, including recognition, will have to be related to military and political developments and to the problem of assuring the fullest protection possible to persons and property. On the latter point, Indian troops will have to accept some considerable responsibility initially. The UN formula of ceasefire and withdrawal is no longer valid in the East. As the Indian troops complete their military campaign,their continued presence in East Pakistan for a period of time will probably be important in the general interest of public order and personal security. The West Still more serious problems, in terms of US interests, lie ahead in the West. Here, the Pakistani forces, unwisely in my opinion, initiated offensive air operations and, more significantly, have occupied some territory in Indian-held Kashmir and in the approaches to Kashmir. This posture by the Pakistanis will afford the Indians added opportunities and justifications for doing what intelligence evidence now suggests the Indians wish to do—to move effectively to cripple Pakistan’s armed forces. Destruction of Pakistan’s air and armor are likely to be prime objectives. The Indian purpose is not likely to be long-term occupation of West Pakistan or even of large portions of it, although some Indian leaders would like, in my opinion, to take over Azad Kashmir, held by Pakistan since partition, and to achieve some other “line straightening”, as the Indians call it, along the borders. Such a neutralization of Pakistan’s military capability would offer a high ground position to India for further steps to fragment or otherwise weaken or destroy Pakistan as a political entity and a significant power element in South Asia. There is little question that such a course of events in West Pakistan would be contrary to important, although not vital, US interests. An argument can be made that India is the dominant power in South Asia, that it would be “natural” for Indian power to exclude any other power center from the Indian subcontinent, and that we should fall in line with this natural evolution. Natural or not, total Indian dominance of the subcontinent, I believe, is likely to be harmful to our interests. We have a positive interest in the continuation of a power balance in the Indian subcontinent which, although not power equivalence between India and Pakistan, will include a significant deterrent capability on the part of Pakistan. The effective elimination of Pakistan as any kind of countervailing force to India, and the emergence of India, with the support of the Soviet Union, as the totally dominant power in the subcontinent would set the stage for Indian and Soviet exploitation of this situation. An enhanced Soviet position in India and the Indian Ocean; Indian pressures on her smaller neighbors—Ceylon, Nepal, Burma, and Thailand; added pressures on Iran for accommodation with the Soviet Union; more vigorous and effective Indian diplomacy directed against US policy efforts; greatly enlarged Chinese influence in Pakistan—could be some of the results. If the War in the West is pressed by India, what are the prospects that Pakistan could avert major defeat? While a professional military judgment of this is required, my own view is that these prospects are not at all bright. This is for a variety of reasons including India’s larger air and ground forces; India’s great manpower advantage for military and war-related purposes; India’s higher industrialization, including an overwhelming advantage in military production and resupply; the losses already sustained by Pakistan, including fuel stores; and the uncertainties of fuel resupply. Thus, full-scale war in the West risks gross weakening or destruction of Pakistan’s armed forces. How might this prospect be affected by the support or intervention of outside powers? Here there are great areas of uncertainty for Pakistan. Would needed supplies and equipment be forthcoming? And if so, could they be received in Pakistan and be moved to battle areas in a timely fashion? Would assistance to Pakistan be offset or more than offset by Soviet assistance to India? These and other such largely unanswerable questions, taken together with Pakistan’s weak position in the West at the present time, suggest that Pakistan should strongly opt for a ceasefire in the West and a mutual withdrawal to previous borders and lines. The risks of continued hostilities against India in the West should be considered unacceptable by Pakistan if the ceasefire and mutual withdrawal alternative can be made operable. If a ceasefire is to be achieved in the West, it will be essential for Pakistan to be ready to accept mutual withdrawal in the West to previous borders and lines. The critical area here is Kashmir, where Pakistan has made advances and controls territory in the Indian parts of Kashmir. The Indians are highly emotional about Kashmir and would like to take over the areas of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) held by Pakistan since the initial conflict over Kashmir. While the Indians might be deflected from pursuing this expansionist effort, I can not imagine they will cease hostilities in the West without specific agreement that Pakistan forces will completely withdraw from the Kashmir areas and other Indian territory they have recently occupied. Pakistani operations in Kashmir are an incentive and an excuse for India to escalate the level of hostilities in the West. An early ceasefire and mutual withdrawal in the West is also the course most responsive to American interests. Assuming as appears likely an early conclusion of the War in the East, an early ceasefire in the West will best permit the United States to maintain, establish, or re-establish productive relations with all three entities in the subcontinent: Pakistan, Bangla Desh, and India. With economic and military assistance by the United States and China, Pakistan should be able to maintain a defense posture which, while not a threat to India, will be a credible deterrent to India, and thus a factor for stability in the subcontinent. The Chinese, assessing their own power relationships with the USSR and India, can be expected to provide major assistance to Pakistan in the post ceasefire years. If ceasefire efforts in the West fail, and all-out war is prosecuted by India, we will be faced with the grave issue of whether to provide major military support for Pakistan. Among the large boulders on this rocky road are: the uncertain requirements and uncertain success of such an effort, the doubtful political support in the United States, the risks of Soviet confrontation and the fall-out of this on SALT and other major efforts in our Soviet policy, and the certainty of long-term alienation of India. My own feeling is that these costs are likely to be excessive in relation to the U.S. interests designed to be protected. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Sisco. 175. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan (Bhutto), the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 175. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan (Bhutto), the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 December 11, 1971, 7:28 p.m. R: We have talked to the Chinese. They say, ‘We are trying to do something. So far the Americans have not come out with anything except behind the scenes. First it came out that the Americans said it was unjustified. They say they are talking to the Russians. But the Russians have taken no notice of it. If we do come in, we might be left high and dry.’ That is their main worry. I am telling you this briefly. K: Where are you now? R: Here in the room of the Deputy Prime Minister. K: I think a meeting between the deputy Prime Minister and the President would be unwise. It has nothing to do with assurances. I will find out and get you assurances. It would create a tremendous amount of excitement for the Deputy Prime Minister to come here before we find out what we will do jointly. R: The Chinese say they will not support the Resolution for a ceasefire alone. They must insist on a ceasefire and withdrawal. K: Will they vote against it? R: They won’t vote against it—they will abstain. K: What do you want them to do? R: I have to convey something of your reaction—whether you will come out with something so the world and the Russians know you are serious. They say the Russians are the biggest bluffers, and also the biggest cowards. They want to make use of others to fight their war. If they are openly challenged then they will come down. May I have the Deputy Prime Meister speak to you? K: Please. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister? B: Dr. Kissinger, how are you? I appreciate the fact that I am conveying our thoughts to you for conveying to the President himself. It is the political implication that we have talked to him and it will perhaps affect the Indian thinking on this. K: Let me talk to the President B: Otherwise, I am satisfied with our discussions. K: Let me talk to him and see. B: The other people are reluctant about the final position we spoke about. Five days ago they took a position in the General Assembly, insisting on two elements in the Resolution. K: What do you want? B: They bailed us out before. We can’t tell them offhand ‘no, we don’t agree.’ We have to discuss it further with you and then go and talk finally to them. Time is running out. K: What is there to discuss? B: They say the final position is not according to their position—that presents the complication. The first two elements—try and succeed on that. If we fail on that... K: They don’t even want to raise the second point? B: They want to raise it in the sense of what they told me. They first thought we wouldn’t be so hesitant. They seem to be firm. They said something about your own position—‘we don’t know whether the U.S. has effectively and firmly told the other people.’ K: Tell the other people firmly what? B: ‘You cannot intervene and you must stop intervening and if you intervene, then we have obligations to Pakistan.’ K: We have done that. B: I told him that. He said, ‘we have to be satisfied also.’ I told him we were stuck in the middle. They said it is essential that we reconcile the American and China points of view. Both have staked their own prestige on it. They said, ‘we would like to see further agreement between the two of you.’ These are the developments since we met—we had discussions. Furthermore, in view of what I suggest... K: I think it will be very difficult and I don’t think very wise. The President is in Camp David. If we get you there, there will be a great sensation and immediately we have to announce a lot of things which I don’t know whether will do much good. I will raise it with the President. B: This might have at least that effect on the Soviets as well the initiative. K: I understand. I will raise it with him. B: Ambassador Raza wants to talk with you again. R: If I come straight away... K: I am going out for dinner now and you are still in New York. I will see you if it is urgent. What would we discuss? R: The point is that I should assure the Chinese as to exactly how you consider coming out with something strong instead of just writing a letter. They quoted the example of Cuba. The Russians tried to blast through; when they were face down by the U.S., they backed off. The same thing in the Middle East. They also brought up the point—‘you tell us these things but Bush is meeting with Bangla Desh people; and the State Department is hobnobbing with the Bangla Desh.’ K: But you know we are not talking to the Bangla Desh. R: They say they have information Bush is meeting people. K: He received somebody he didn’t know was Bangla Desh. R: This is not my view. I am telling you what they said. B: These people are concerned the U.S. doesn’t mean to do anything seriously and are marking time. I didn’t want to raise all these things on the phone. My main point is we don’t want to bypass you or them. They would like complete, substantial agreement in your thinking. K: Let me call you in an hour. B: Thank you. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 11–15 Dec 1971. No classification marking. Haig was also on the telephone. Kissinger and Haig were in Washington; Bhutto and Raza were in New York City. 176. Telegram 12414 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 176. Telegram 12414 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, December 12, 1971, 0825Z Subj: Meeting With Pres. Yahya December 12 Ref: State 2227031: State 223266 1. I met with Pres. Yahya Khan in his residence at 10:30 hrs local December 12. The Foreign Secretary, Sultan Khan, was present during the entire meeting. The President appeared tired and somewhat strained, but exhibited more morale than I would have anticipated. 2. The conversation began with a general discussion of the military situation in both East and West Pakistan. The President said that Pakistani troops had been forced back toward and into Dacca, where, unless a ceasefire was agreed upon, they would have to stage a last-ditch defense. In West Pakistan, he said, the general situation, was static. Although they had experienced several limited successes in Kashmir. He added that the air force continued to quote serve magnificently unquote. 3. Moving to the subject of a ceasefire, I then referred to State reftel 223266 (also reported Islamabad 12355), and asked Yahya if he could give me an explianation why General Faman Ali’s ceasefire offer had been replaced by less comprehensive offer from Governor Malik. The President, after looking hard at the Foreign Secretary, said that there had been a breakdown of communications and apparently some qte general misunderstandings unqte. He added that the Foreign Secretary was rectifying this situation. (This matter had obviously flapped and further inquires seemed inappropriate.) 4. Also on the matter of a ceasefire, I asked Yahya if he would care to give me his view thereon. Yahya said that he was prepared to do qte anything reasonable under the circumstances unqte. He went on to say that today’s Pakistan Times carried a Foreign Office spokesman’s statement qte that Pakistan had accepted the General Assembly resolution in its totality unqte. He added that, in view of the fact that 104 nations had supported the General Assembly resolution, presumably this position should be considered a reasonable one. 5. Conversation concluded with my statements that we would like to be helpful vis-a-vis the UN with communications, and otherwise to do what we can to bring about an end to the conflict and to preserve Pakistan territorial integrity and armed forces in the west. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN. 177. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) 177. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m. Kissinger : As you know on Friday, Yahya somewhat at our pressure had agreed in effect to accept a Brezhnev proposal. But then on further thought— Nixon : He decided not to. Kissinger : He decided not to, and the Chinese carried on. I think, frankly, in that case, rather than accept the Brezhnev proposal, we’d be just as well off letting nature take its course. And let them get raped. If they want to accept it, yes. But I think we should stay off it then. I think if we can—a simple ceasefire is really the best we can, at this moment, get out of it. I think if this thing emerges with the United States joining with the Soviet Union in a proposal that you disapprove, then it was made 3 days after it was made just because of the military defeat, we would suffer a very severe setback. Nixon : Oh yeah. Kissinger : No, no. I was the one who pressed it, in fact. What you said to the Agricultural Minister and to, what we said to his— Nixon : Yeah, yeah. Helms’ report and he examined [unclear]. Kissinger : Uh. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Uh, yes. [ 10 seconds not declassified ] Nixon : I, I’m referring to— Kissinger : I know. Nixon :—the Helms report— Kissinger : I know the one. Nixon :—where, which would be very helpful here. Kissinger : I’ve told him to do it. Nixon : I think we to [need] make more use of our own PR people to get across our side. [unclear]I think we have to realize [unclear]. Get across our point of view. [unclear] Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : We can’t do that. We’ve got to use the elements here. Kissinger : And the departments. Nixon : Well, the departments are not very useful. We’ve got to use them where we can. But what I meant is within the White House. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : That is when we can get the departments to take on, to carry the lead on something, they ought to carry it, that’s for damn sure. And they ought to do more. But I meant on the PR side of getting it across, as you well know. It’s an awfully weak reed to say well, you put this out. Now Bush, you can use Bush, for example. Sometimes the department fellow will do very well, as we know. But I think that here in the White House [unclear]. But our point of view is—the Indians have been just loading wires and so forth, what their view is, making US look bad. Now the report on Mrs. Gandhi’s Cabinet meeting where she said that, she said deliberately that they were going to try to conquer West Pakistan, they were going to move their forces from the East to the West, should have got out. The report, for example, with regard to the Soviet men, the naval vessels found off the, the Pakistan submarine, should have gotten out. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Haig looks at this and says it’s, it’s very interesting how much Soviet [unclear—initiative?] but there hasn’t been any column. Kissinger : No. Nixon : I say that should get out. You can’t do it, Henry, you’re—it’s just hard talking about— Kissinger : Well, Roland Evans has a column today with [unclear]. But still it’s, you’re right. There’s not enough— Nixon : [unclear] have gotten out? Kissinger : It shouldn’t have to be— Nixon : I think here you’re, you’ve just got to get Scali here. Just call him in. He likes to talk. Just tell him, and let him go over the place. He’s a White House horse. He—and I want him now. I don’t think—and that isn’t the most important of the game, but it does affect certain things for reasons that we’re aware. It’s rather interesting to note that Mrs. Gandhi said that, speaking to an Indian youth group, that they have not rejected the UN General Assembly. They—you probably didn’t see that. Kissinger : No. Nixon : It’s in the other summary. she says, she said yesterday: “We did not reject the UN General Assembly, but we have it under very serious consideration.” Now why did she say that? She said it for obvious reasons that she thought that there was some world opinion building against her. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Now we’re being goddamn fools to not build that [unclear] thing against the Indians. See what I mean? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : [unclear] So, I’d like to see the Soviet presence get out. [unclear] Kissinger : I’ve had last night put a paper together— Nixon : Helms report— Kissinger :—of how much— Nixon :—[unclear]. The world opinion thing is going to affect the Indians. We’ve just got to get, it’s got to get out the fact that they’ve been condemned in the press and that they rejected a majority vote. That’s got to be said. Get the word to State and everybody in every statement that India has rejected an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly. That has to be said. Kissinger : I pulled together what the Soviets received. What the Communist world sent to India in the last 6 years: 739 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, 329 carriers— Nixon : Fine. Let’s put it out through a European source. Kissinger : No, that is— Nixon : Just have Scali put it out to the whole press corp. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : That’s the way to do it. Or somebody. You’ve got to get it out. You see, [unclear] others as well. The reason is we’re really not using people. We’re not bringing them in and telling them enough about it. So I would bring them in. That’s a very good statement to get out. That’s a very good statement to get out. It must seem more than a column. Kissinger : Well, now we have Yahya’s complete concurrence to our game plan, which is to drop the political tract, to go in with a— Nixon : Yeah. Ceasefire. Kissinger : To go—first to go in with ceasefire and withdrawal. I called Bhutto yesterday evening after we talked just for the record, and I said I don’t want to hear one more word from the Chinese. We are the ones who have been operating against our public opinion, against our bureaucracy, at the very edge of legality— Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : And if they want to talk they should move some troops. Until they’ve done it, we don’t want to hear one more word. I really let him have it. Nixon : [unclear] the Chinese sit there and bullyrag us. They’ve got to learn, damn right. Henry, you’re so right about the Chinese and the Soviets, each for reasons that transcend India and Pakistan. They have to have their meetings with us. You know that. That’s their goddamn problem. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : That doesn’t mean that you [we] can just thumb our noses at them all the time. Kissinger : Actually, strangely enough, I think the Chinese is (sic.) more precarious than the Soviets because— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : For the Chinese—I mean these idiots who say we are doing things to—Braden has an article today blasting you and me. Of course they’ve got the bureaucracy. It’s like Cambodia again, nicely out of it again. Blasting you and me that we are sacrificing India so that you can take a China trip. Nixon : Hmm. Kissinger : The trip as such is a symbol of a policy. If the Chinese feel we are nice people, well-meaning, but totally irrelevant to their part of the world, they lose whatever slight, whatever incentives they have for that opening to us. The opening to us got the Soviets under control. This is the— Nixon : Well, then lying about sacrificing the trip is [unclear]. Kissinger : Besides— Nixon : That’s going to be— Kissinger : Roy Jenkins, I saw Roy Jenkins last night and he mumbled something like it. I said, India put itself on the Soviet side. We didn’t drive them there. Nixon : Is he British? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Is he over here? Kissinger : Yeah. He’s a good man. He said, after he talked to me, he said, “We made one great mistake and that was not to put it out 3 weeks earlier.” He says he completely sees the point now. And he’s an honest guy. Because he didn’t—he opposed his own party on the Common Market. Nixon : I’m not concerned about Braden and the rest mumbling around about who’s responsible for jeopardizing the China trip. What matters there is the fact. It isn’t necessary, it doesn’t make a difference what they all said about it. Don’t worry about it. Kissinger : I don’t worry. Nixon : Those bastards are going to do that. Kissinger : No, I take it as a symptom. Nixon : That message is very juvenile, kind of [unclear] because they don’t like the idea of the trip, we know that. Kissinger : Braden has no brain. Nixon : Yeah, but he’s taking that from somebody else. Kissinger : Exactly, that’s why it’s significant. That’s the only significance it has. Nixon : The question is whether now I should call in, because I think we got to start playing a better, more effective game here, the Indian Ambassador this morning. Now, before knocking out such a tough ploy, to call him in and say, “Look here. We want to be very understanding. We noted with interest your rather savage press campaign. I have no objections to that. I understand you’ve got to play [unclear—this thing out?] But let’s get one thing very clear. Now, that East Pakistan thing is practically resolved, that if—incidentally we’re going to make certain diplomatic moves. I don’t know what they are, but if this Indian action against the West continues against the overwhelming weight of the world public opinion, then I will have to make a public statement labeling India as the aggressor, as a naked aggressor. Now that’s one way. Another way to do it is just do it. Do it right now. You see the thing I feel is that the Indians are susceptible to this world public opinion crap. They’re susceptible to it because they have lived on it for so long. And they got accused here, and the reason there’s very, very little, very, very little of anything we can say. Well, maybe Rolly Evans has got it. As far as the general news is concerned, there’s been damn little pointing out that India either has Soviet support or is continuing this operation far beyond the reason they say brought them in in the first place. That they are now continuing with efforts at India’s [unclear—behest?]. There’s been hardly anything, believe me, in the press to the effect that the vote in the UN was one that India defied. Now that’s our fault, Henry. We haven’t gotten it across. Kissinger : I agree. Nixon : That’s my point. Another point is we’ve got, I think, we’ve got to get it across. It’s got to be said. It’s got to be said. I mean you had a backgrounder and that’s a little blip. Kissinger : Well, it should have been— Nixon : It’s the opposite from the way that you intended. Kissinger : Well the Post, that was just a deliberate lie. Nixon : That’s what’s right here. Kissinger : I know. Nobody else played it that way. Every other leading paper in the country had it on its front page whether I made—but the fact is to do this sort of operation— Nixon : Now look, we can talk all about the past. Kissinger : No, no. I mean— Nixon : Right now we’ve got to go to— Kissinger : No, no. But it should have been pumped out, day in and day out, from every spokesman in the Government. Nixon : I know. I understand. It should have been. But we know we have a tough problem Henry. We’ve known that for a long time. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : We went through this time after time before, and we’re going through it again. But right now— Kissinger : We’ll use Scali. Nixon : Now, picking up the pieces and doing the best we can. The question is what do we do. Kissinger : Mr. President— Nixon : Do we get out [unclear] and check out the [unclear] put the heat on India’s back? Kissinger : I am a little reluctant to shoot the big gun. To have you call India and have them kick you— Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : To have the Indian Ambassador in. To give that bitch the satisfaction. If we had the assets there, Mr. President, if this— Nixon : Instead of a phone call, let’s make a statement. Kissinger : If this were a serious situation like ’57, or ’70, I’d be in favor of brutalizing the son-of-a-bitch. But why let him go around and say that he looked you in the eye and, you know, this is the problem. Nixon : What I’m trying to get at is this: it’s my intention to make a public statement labeling India as an aggressor. Now the point is, will it do any good? Would it, might serve the purpose of letting him know in advance. You see, we’ve got to get across the fact that—your conversation with Bhutto and the Chinese was correct in one sense—where they said we started out strong, and then got the impression, a plague on both of your houses, which, of course, is unfortunate. But incidentally, to an extent, because Pakistan mishandled the refugee situation in the beginning. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : It is a plague on both of your houses, but that’s true only of East Pakistan. It is crystal clear that if the military action continues after East Pakistan is wrapped up, that that is naked aggression. Now that needs to be said. As indeed, as you said, a lot of gobbly-gook. Now we— Kissinger : The Indian Foreign Minister has refused to give an assurance. That they don’t have any territorial— Nixon : Ambitions? Kissinger : Ambitions. He said “minor rectifications.” Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : That means South Kashmir. Nixon : Yeah. All that you suggest this morning that we just wait and see what we hear from the Soviet— Kissinger : No, my recommendation is— Nixon : Or did you tell Vorontsov last night? No, you’re going to let him know at noon. Kissinger : No, I called Vorontsov last night and said that if we don’t hear from them this morning, we will go back to the Security Council. Nixon : All right. Kissinger : And I have some suggestions of what you might do this morning: issue a press statement from the White House. We’d have to, we’ll have to change it because— Nixon : We’ll what—give me the general tone. Kissinger : The general tone is that in view of India’s refusal to accept the terms of the General Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 104–10 calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of armed forces, the United States has now decided again to take this grave issue to the Security Council. Nixon : All right, fine. Now have you checked that with State? Kissinger : No. Nixon : Before that? Kissinger : No. I’m meeting them at 11:00. Nixon : Not till then? Kissinger : Well, I’ll check it earlier. Nixon : The bastards, all right get them up early. Get them up at 9:00. Kissinger : Then we would say, “Having occupied all of East Pakistan”— Nixon : Have they occupied it all? Kissinger : Virtually all. Nixon : Did you call Bob? Kissinger : Not yet. But— Nixon : “Having occupied”— Kissinger : “Virtually all of East Pakistan, India’s continued military action, action by India can only be viewed as an armed attack on Pakistan as a whole, and increasingly takes on the character”— Nixon : All right. Add one sentence. “If India defies,” put it this way, “If India should defy the overwhelming weight, defies, should continue to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by a blankety blank vote in the UN General Assembly.” After you add that sentence— Kissinger : Yes. Nixon : “India’s continued defiance after the fact, that India will stand before the whole world as a naked aggressor.” Now I think you have to get the naked aggression in there. That it’s got to be hit in there hard and tough. I feel, put it this way, look, we’re taking just as much heat, just as much heat, for using soft words as we do if we use hard words. Everybody says we’re kicking the goddamn Indians around. Right? Kissinger : Absolutely. Now— Nixon : Now it is naked aggression, right? If they defy, that’s the point, put on that basis, see then you’re getting across two points. That the General Assembly has overwhelmingly voted to ask for—all right put it this way. You don’t want another thing in there which sounds like it was written by some State Department pawn. For example, I would add in the sentence, “The General Assembly on blank, by a vote of blank, now the Security council by a vote of 11–2 called on [for] ceasefire and withdrawal.” Kissinger : That’s not binding. Nixon : I know. Nothing is binding. “The General Assembly by a vote of blank to blank.” Kissinger : Right. Nixon : “Called on so and so and so and so. Pakistan has accepted. India has refused.” Kissinger : That’s it. Nixon : Now, “Pakistan has accepted. India has refused. India, supported the Soviet Union”— Kissinger : That was the next question I wanted to put to you. Nixon : “India, supported by the Soviet Union, has refused”—now we are going. Kissinger : Supported only by the Soviet Union. Nixon : Supported only by the Soviet Union. Well, some other Communist countries. Kissinger : Supported by the Soviet Union. Nixon : Supported by the Soviet Union. Can we say other Communist countries? Use the word Communist for a change. And, well that throws in the Chinese and the Romanians. All right, supported by, at any rate, supported by the Soviet Union. That’s enough. Now, then say that if now that East Pakistan is virtually gone, India continues to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by the vote of the General Assembly, you see, as reflected by the vote of the General Assembly, India will stand before the world as an aggressor. See? Now that is really what we need to say. This is contrary to every tradition for which India has stood since its birth as a nation. And we call upon the Government of India to join with the Government of Pakistan in having, in following the, no, in adhering to the overwhelming expression of world opinion to have a ceasefire. You see what I mean, or something like that. That’s the kind of language you need in this thing to get the goddamn point across. Kissinger : You’re absolutely—let me do this immediately. Nixon : Well, we’re going to, you see what I’m getting at? Kissinger : I know exactly what you’re getting at and you are quite right. I asked somebody to draft it last night. Nixon : It isn’t bad. Kissinger : It isn’t good. Nixon : But it doesn’t, it isn’t that bad either. What I meant is, it’s what you would expect them to draft in view of what we’ve been saying about everything else. [unclear] Your backgrounder was excellent. And I, incidentally when I met with those leaders that morning somebody got the impression that I told the leaders that we were going to [unclear]. Hell, when I met with those leaders in the morning I was saying we were going to cut off aid to India. Kissinger : You were– Nixon : No, no. You weren’t there at the leaders meeting. But I said, “We’re going to cut off aid to India.” I said, “You know we’ve already cut off aid to Pakistan. We’re going to cut off aid to India. Do you have any objections?” They said, “Hell no.” Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : But anyway, what I’m getting at is, now, having said all this, what purpose does this serve to put out something labeling India as—the purpose as I see it, it serves, well it serves three purposes. It helps with our Chinese friends. Second, it puts a little bit of heat on the Russians. Third, it puts some heat on the goddamn Indians. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : World opinion. Fourth, it helps us with our own domestic situation here at home, only to the extent that we’re taking a beating. I’m not concerned about it. I guess that isn’t getting through to people. The sad thing is it isn’t getting through to people for the wrong reasons. People don’t give a shit whether we’re to blame—not to blame—because they don’t care if the whole goddamn thing goes down the cesspool. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : That’s too bad. But nevertheless, it isn’t hurting us, I can assure you. Nobody—when you think about this as a great goal for our foreign policy. Bull. It’s not in the minds of the American people. It is in substance, but not in propaganda. Kissinger : I agree completely. Nixon : But the propaganda is important for the four reasons I’ve just given you. See— Kissinger : I agree. Nixon : And we’ve got to start— Kissinger : Another thing you can do which is just a little— Nixon : So we won’t call in the Indian Ambassador? [unclear] Why not Rogers? Put him out there. [unclear] All right, is that what you have in mind? Or do we have Rogers try to put it out? Let’s think. Let’s think. Kissinger : I wouldn’t mind having Rogers put it out. Nixon : Fine. Kissinger : It wipes out our attack. It has more punch if you put it. But the advantage of Rogers is they are sticking it all on you. In fact they’re even, they’re sort of oscillating whether to get me involved or to keep me out. I mean they either think—there’s two lines of arguments being made. One is you love Yahya Khan, and that it’s a personal pique at Mrs. Gandhi. Nixon : Yeah, shit. Kissinger : The other one is that you and I were plotting this in order to preserve the China trip. Those two are going to merge because I’ve put myself so much [unclear]. Nixon : Sure. Kissinger : Conviction on your side. Nixon : Oh, everybody knows it. Kissinger : I mean it’s ridiculous. Nixon : They already knew we had [unclear]. But they, they’re not going to touch us with this thing. Kissinger : No. Nixon : Because, by God, the country doesn’t give a shit. That’s the point. That’s what they forget. Vacate it. But the country doesn’t care about it, Henry. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : About India and Pakistan. Kissinger : That is correct. Nixon : All right, what’d you have in mind? Kissinger : Well, you could put something on the hotline to Brezhnev. Nixon : All right. Let’s start with the hotline, the hotline to Brezhnev. [unclear] What about the British? I think the British, do you want to put a message to them? Kissinger : They’re too—yeah. I would say we do a hotline to Brezhnev, which I would like to— Nixon : You want to work on that? Kissinger : Work on it a little more. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : In which we say we are now going back to the Security Council. We hope to do it jointly with you. There is still time to do it jointly. Because this thing may become public. And that should sound conciliatory. Nixon : Yes. Kissinger : So it should have a few hookers in there. Nixon : Well, I would say, if I could suggest, I would say, “Mr. Chairman, we have not—” Kissinger : His correct title is General Secretary. Nixon : Mr. Secretary. Kissinger : General is my word. Nixon : Yes. “Mr. Secretary, General Secretary, since we have not a response on our message to you on so and so, I am sending you this message under urgent conditions. That we, we are going to take it to the Security Council again. If you should determine again to veto it, then we urge you, or whatever you want to do then.” See what I mean? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : I’d put it that way, right? Kissinger : Right. I wouldn’t say that we are ready to go for ceasefire, because if they publish that we’d— Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : We’d say, “We’re willing to proceed along the course outlined to you”— Nixon : Yeah. “However we’re willing to proceed.” That’s very good, along the course outlined. But we need to hear. Now what’s the disadvantage of going to the hotline? It appears that we appear to be so anxious that maybe they’re about ready to accept it and they say, ah we won’t do it, and tell us to go to hell. Kissinger : No. Nixon : Why? What’s the advantage of the hotline? It makes it more urgent to them? Kissinger : It gives us a public record. Nixon : The public record doesn’t bother me a bit. If it makes it more urgent to them, it’s good. Kissinger : It makes it more urgent. Nixon : Has State been talking about a hotline at all? Kissinger : No. Also, we can let State in on that. Nixon : Huh? Kissinger : We can let State in on that. Nixon : Oh, sure. Kissinger : Now with the British, Mr. President, I think I should talk to Cromer— Nixon : This morning? Kissinger : Rather than you talk to Eden. I should get Cromer in and say, “Now listen— Nixon : All right, do it this morning. Kissinger : Yeah. “You’re blowing the whole bloody relationship. You’re going back to the Security Council,”— Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : And we just— Nixon : Talk to Cromer and say, “Look, that we, that the President wants to have some really good talks with them. [unclear] Now look, Cromer, the President recalls that Heath on one occasion—and Alec Home at great length—talked about their concern about Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.” I say, “Now you’ll have noted the greater Soviet presence in India here. The chips are now down. If we continue to let this thing drift, it will mean an enormous Soviet presence in the subcontinent—the subcontinent is going to the Soviets. Now, do you want to play that game or do we want to join together and try to keep them from playing this,” in other words, the idea that we’re really [unclear]. Britain has expressed great concern about the Soviet presence. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. I’ll tell him from me that I just want to [unclear]. Nixon : I would put it in terms of, look, you know the French are going to play their games. The President wants to work with Britain in Asia. We support you on Singapore. We support you on the Indian Ocean. But right now the whole goddamn house of cards is going to go tumbling down, unless we save what’s left of Pakistan. The only way we can do it is for us to join together at this point in stopping the goddamn—I think Cromer would hear that. Kissinger : I wanted to get this message drafted. Nixon : Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger : And then I’ll come right back. Nixon : Yeah. Now let’s go over again what we’re doing in the message. I want to be sure we are doing the right thing. We have in mind a hotline message. Kissinger : The thing is, we’d instruct State to go back to the Security Council. Nixon : Instruct State to go back to the Security Council. Kissinger : And to do it with a ceasefire and withdrawal. To implement the General Assembly thing. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : Get it vetoed if necessary. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : Then be prepared to get the Pakistanis to move toward a simple ceasefire. Nixon : Fine. Kissinger : It won’t happen till tomorrow. But we’ve got that all lined up. Nixon : The Assembly won’t meet today? Kissinger : No. It will take through today and probably— Nixon : All right. Fine. Kissinger : Then we will get the ceasefire, we have about a week before this thing plays out because they can’t ship their armies that fast. Nixon : Well, the Paks will last for 2 weeks. Kissinger : Two weeks. That’s right. Nixon : So you got 10 days. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Because they could make it exciting if they collapse before then. Go ahead. Kissinger : Then we ask for a, then we try to get the ceasefire resolution through as a next step. Nixon : Right. Right. I got all that. Kissinger : Now what do we do about the public statement. The public statement is first, the public statement along the lines you indicated. Nixon : All right, now what is the purpose of the public statement? The four purposes I mentioned? Do you think well of the public statement, or am I talking you into a public statement? Kissinger : I thought I talked you into a public statement. Nixon : Fine. Kissinger : We have to do— [unclear exchange] Kissinger : We have to do a public statement to impress the Russians, to scare the Indians, to take a position with the Chinese. Nixon : Chinese. That’s the main thing. Kissinger : Mostly with the Chinese. Nixon : I think that’s first—I’d put—but that’s all right. Kissinger : That’s number one. Nixon : Because after what they said to you, you’d better do something. Kissinger : That’s right. What they said to me. What they said to Bhutto. Nixon : All right. I think we need it. Kissinger : And— Nixon : And then to clear up American public opinion. Kissinger : And to clear up— Nixon : Well, at least, taking the heat, the argument of American public opinion. Take it for a good reason. Kissinger : We won’t take any more now. Nixon : Put the heat on the Indians who are the aggressors. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : All right. Let’s let our opponents side with India at this time, with this aggression. People don’t like war. They don’t like it. They’ll turn against it. All right, so you believe a public statement’s in order. Now, are you going to try and get Rogers to make a statement? Or are you going to say the other thing? Is it worth trying to get Rogers to do it? Kissinger : Frankly it isn’t worth it. Nixon : It isn’t worth it because he’ll try to water it down too much. Kissinger : By the time he gets through explaining it— Nixon : Yeah. All right— Kissinger : I mean we’re again at the Cambodian situation. We’ve got to go through the goddamn thing on our own. With whatever, with keeping the logistics to a minimum. And take care of the basic situation. Nixon : All right. Fine. I agree. You call Cromer in later. Kissinger : I’ll call Cromer in. We’re leaving at 1:00, so I’ve got to do it well before we— Nixon : Yeah. What about the reason for calling Cromer in? I had the idea that there’s good reason to bluff him. Maybe we can wait on it. Kissinger : I’ll call him. You shouldn’t talk to him. Nixon : I understand that. I know. Is it worth it? Is it worth your doing it? I think it is. Let’s get the British on salvo. Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : I have other reasons. Even if the British say no, we’re talking to the British about things that are very, very important. Kissinger : Plus I—I’m just going to tell him— Nixon : This is a chance for the U.S. and America to be, and England, to be together. The French aren’t going to go along. We’re going to raise it with them, but we wanted to raise the problem with you first. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : That’s a very clever thing to do, right? Kissinger : Yeah. I’ve just— Nixon : Use their influence. Kissinger : I’d just put it to him very hard. And if I do it very hard it has the added advantage that they may figure it out. Nixon : Yeah. Fine. Now then the hotline. Kissinger : The hotline. Nixon : We’re going to roll that. Are we being over anxious on the hotline? No we’re not. Basically all we’re doing is asking for a reply. We’re not letting the Russians diddle us along. Point one. Second, all we’re doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agricultural Minister and what you said to Vorontsov. Right? Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Does that sound like a good plan to you? Kissinger : It’s a typical Nixon plan. I mean it’s bold. You’re putting your chips into the pot again. But my view is that if we do nothing, there’s a certainty of a disaster. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : This way there’s a high possibility of one, but at least we’re coming off like men. And that’s helps us with the Chinese. Nixon : Well, that’s right. That’s right. That’s right. And if it goes down the tube now, we’ll have done the best we can. Kissinger : We’ll have blamed it on the world. Nixon : What? Kissinger : If it goes down the tube [it will be] because we can’t get anyone to support us. Nixon : Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger : By tomorrow, our fleet will be in the Indian Ocean and— Nixon : Yeah. Did you see all those Russian tanks, and the Russian ships, and all the rest lining up with the Indians and not one liberal newspaperman— Kissinger : [unclear] A people of 500 million people. We are to blame for driving 500 million people. Why are we to blame? Because we aren’t letting 500 million people rape 100 million people. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. Kissinger : That’s the way to keep if— Nixon : Everybody worried about Danzig and Czechoslovakia and all those other places. Kissinger : If South Africa gobbled up Basutoland and we said, “Well, there are 7 million South Africans...”— Nixon : We’re on the wrong side. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : You know, Henry, the liberals have let themselves be totally exposed here. They’re only interested in who’s going to win. Kissinger : And if these bastards with this high-sounding morality leak—we don’t even pretend high-sounding morality on some of these issues, except in the deepest sense of the— [Omitted here is a portion of the conversation that relates to Vietnam. Haig entered at the end of the discussion of Vietnam with a message from the Chinese.] Kissinger : Oh. The Chinese want to meet on an urgent basis. Nixon : With you? Kissinger : Well, of course I can’t— Nixon : In New York? Kissinger : No, they want to meet Haig. Nixon : Oh. This is the Chinese? Haig: Huang Hua. Kissinger : That’s totally unprecedented. They’re going to move. No question, they’re going to move. I had that impression. They’re not, to them, the Indians going to the border— Nixon : Well, this may change our plans a bit. No, it doesn’t change our plans at all. It makes the hotline more urgent, to get the hotline thing on. Kissinger : Well, you’ve [Haig] got to go down there. Nixon : Or go to New York. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Haig, the reason they sent that to you is that you had told them, Henry, that you’d be out of town, to see Haig [unclear]. Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : I understand. But my point is they said they wanted to see Al rather than you. Kissinger : Because they said, in view of my departure, Huang Hua wants to meet Haig. I told him I’m leaving for the Azores. Nixon : All right, fine. Get up there. Kissinger : This afternoon. Wait until noon. I think we ought to trigger this anyway. This gives them more [unclear]. Nixon : Trigger what? Kissinger : What we discussed, the press release. Nixon : Haig, Al, do you really think this means they’re going to move? What else could it be? Kissinger : No question. Haig: No I think [unclear]. Nixon : We may not be able to do it, but we’ve got to guarantee it. Shit, they lie to us, we lie to them. Kissinger : Well, but we have to think that through. If the Soviets move against them, and then we don’t do anything, we’ll be finished. Nixon : So what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, is that what you mean? Kissinger : Well, if the Soviets move against them in these conditions and succeed, that will be the final showdown. We have to—and if they succeed, we’ll be finished. We’ll be through. Because no one then will be— Nixon : Well— Kissinger : Then we better call them off. I think we can’t call them off, frankly. Haig: I think that you call them off if you don’t give them some assurances. But the price you pay for that [is] almost as bad as if you— Kissinger : The thing is, if we call them off, I think our China initiative is pretty well down the drain. Nixon : Sure. That’s what I think. And our China initiative is down the drain. And also our stroke with the Russians is very, very seriously jeopardized. Kissinger : If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese, and if the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis, what we are now having is the final, we may be looking right down the gun barrel. Haig: It’s the Chinese view that the Soviets won’t— Kissinger : It’s the Chinese view, which they expressed to Bhutto yesterday that the Soviets will back off. I think the Soviets will back off if we face them. Nixon : Well, that’s the point. The reason that I suggested that the Chinese move is they talked about the Soviet divisions on their border and all that sort of thing. You know that the Soviets at this point aren’t about to go ripping into that damn mess, having in mind the fact of their gains from the Indian thing. Kissinger : Well, we’ve got to trigger this quickly, so that we are positioned and not at the tail of the Chinese. Nixon : Sure. Kissinger : Otherwise, we have no moral basis whatsoever for supporting the Chinese. Nixon : Basically, Bhutto asked the Chinese to move too, didn’t he? Kissinger : They’re not doing it because of us. Nixon : That’s what I mean. Let me just get that straight right away. Why are the Chinese moving? Kissinger : The Chinese— Nixon : I think it’s a good idea. Kissinger : The Chinese, well, we asked, but that’s not the reason they’re doing it. Nixon : The way you put it, Henry, the way you put it is very different as I understand. You said, look, we’re doing all these things, why don’t you threaten them. Remember I said, threaten, move a couple of people. Kissinger : Well, and I said if you— Nixon : Look, we have to scare these bastards. Kissinger : And I said— Nixon : We can’t scare them, can we? Kissigner: I said, you’d be, and I said we will prevent pressures on you from other countries. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : But it’s immaterial who made them do it. We didn’t make them do it. They are acting for the same reason they jumped us when we approached the Chinese border in Korea. Nixon : In Korea. Kissinger : It’s exactly, to them— Nixon : Is that what you think, Al? Haig: Yes, sir. Kissinger : It’s exactly the same situation. But leaving aside whether we made them do it or not, we did not make them do it, my feeling would be the same, Mr. President, if I had not talked to them on Friday. They don’t move that fast. This has been— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Oh, yeah. This has been building up. My feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely aside what we said, if the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India, China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union, it will be a change in the world balance of power of such magnitude— Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : That the security of the United States may be forever, certainly for decades—we will have a ghastly war in the Middle East. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : We will have Indonesia— Nixon : Now, we can really get into the numbers game. What do you have? You’ve got the Soviet Union with 800 million Chinese, 600 million Indians, the balance of Southeast Asia terrorized, the Japanese immobile, the Europeans, of course, will suck after them, and the United States the only one, we have maybe parts of Latin America and who knows. Kissinger : [unclear] Nixon : Isn’t that the story? Kissinger : This is why, Mr. President, you’ll be alone. And we’ll— Nixon : That’s fine. We’ve been alone before. The point is, Christ almighty, as you remember we sat around here and talked about the [unclear] the goddamn television programs [unclear]. And even Laos even more. Kissinger : That’s what we might consider. Nixon : All right, we’ll do it. Kissinger : Mr. President, I should stay here and skip the Azores. Nixon : Huh? Yeah. Kissinger : Given what’s coming up it wouldn’t be better for me to stay here. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : What do you think, Al? Nixon : Well, let’s think a bit. I don’t know. I don’t know. I think the communiqués are so good. I mean I’ll end up making the decision. Al is totally capable of doing all this. And also there is something else that is important. It’s just as well for us not to appear in such an urgent crisis and all that sort of thing. And the fact that when something occurs, you can’t leave Washington but I can. You see my point? Now that wouldn’t do. Kissinger : Yeah, I’ve got to be with you. No question. Nixon : But look at [unclear]. Kissinger : I know that. The right answer is you have to make the decision. Nixon : Yeah. Kissigner: And nobody else. Nixon : But Al, you have an idea— Kissinger : Al was present— Nixon : And I trust you to make [unclear] before the end of the day anyway. Kissinger : Al was present at the other meeting. No you better, you call them back. Set it for what, 4:00? Nixon : Well, why make it 4:00? I’d go sooner. Kissinger : Well it should be after these [unclear]. I want Al to be here while we’re doing that. We’ve got to get this triggered quickly so that we are positioned. I mean, this leaves no doubt now what we’ve got to do. Nixon : Right. Now let’s come back to this general thing. You say they want to see Al. Tell him they are going to move. Kissinger : That’s what I’ve been— Nixon : What they want in the way of assurances, they maybe want something more direct. Well, let me see, the Kennedy memorandum of November 5, 1962, [unclear] and that’s what they’ll think. Kissinger : They’ll believe you. Nixon : The point is, the fact of the matter is I’d put [it] in more Armageddon terms than reserves when I say that the Chinese move and the Soviets threaten and then we start lobbing nuclear weapons. That isn’t what happens. That isn’t what happens. What happens is we then do have a hotline to the Soviets and we finally just say now what goes on here? Kissinger : We don’t have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go on alert. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : We have to put forces in. We may have to give them bombing assistance. I mean— Nixon : One thing we can do which you forgot, we clean up Vietnam at about that point. Kissinger : We clean up Vietnam. I mean, at that point, we give an ultimatum to Hanoi. Blockade Haiphong. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : We’ll blockade Haiphong. Now that will hurt China too, but we can’t worry about that at that point. Nixon : Well, we’ll say it’s for the purpose of protecting Americans, and there is great pursuit of a power struggle. Kissinger : But above all we have to give the Chinese the sense that if the Russians threaten them—the worst thing, we cannot desert them then move against Haiphong, because that would then say the U.S. and China—we’ll pick up North Vietnam in the process of that. I mean, North Vietnam will be finished then. If Russia and China are at war we can pick it up at any time. Nixon : Well, we’re talking about a lot of ifs. Russia and China aren’t going to go to war. Kissinger : I wouldn’t bet on that, Mr. President. Nixon : Well, let me put it this way. I have always felt that India and Pakistan, inevitably, would have a war. And there can always be a war in the Mideast. As far as Russia and China is [are] concerned there are other factors too overwhelming at this particular point for them to go at each other. Kissinger : Well, Mr. President, the Russians, first of all, are not rational on China. Secondly, if they can get a pretext to wipe out China then your trip and everything else is an incident. Your trip in their minds was an incident on the road— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : Your trip to them was an incident on the road where they would isolate China and could then turn against China in ’73–’74. Now that works fine with us because it puts China over on our side and we could play. But if they see an— Nixon : Well, what are you trying to suggest here? Are you trying to get to the point that maybe we tell the Chinese we won’t back them? Kissinger : No, I think we have to tell them we will back them. Nixon : What do you think, Al? You think we should tell them we won’t back them and discourage them? Haig: I think they may premise action on three things. One is they said the Soviets are cowards. The United States stood the Soviets down recently in Cuba and in the Middle East. Nixon : Do they know that? You told them that, is that right? Kissinger : No, they said that to Bhutto. Nixon : If you think they believe that, then they got the message where nobody else did. Kissinger : The Chinese respect you. Nixon : How the hell do they know we stood them down in Cuba, for example? You must have told them that? Oh, everybody knows about Cienfuegos. Kissinger : Yeah, I told them that. Nixon : How about the Middle East? How would they know we stood them down there? Kissinger : Well, because they see what happened. They are tough customers. When all is said and done, they know that Syrian tanks pulled back unconditionally. Nixon : Fine. Now— Haig: That’s the assumption they’re moving on. So they feel they know that if the United States moves on the Soviets that will provide the cover they need to invade India. And we’ve got to neutralize the Soviet Union. Nixon : So, the way to do this, let me hear how you Henry [unclear]. Haig: Well, precisely the same way. We have a terrible domestic problem in the sense that no one can conceive of the seriousness of this thing. It hasn’t been postured. Nixon : No. Haig: We’ve got to ease into that, we can’t just go in— Kissinger : Plus, you’ve got to do this. Haig: We have to tell the Soviets today the direction in which we are moving, and it’s going to up the ante of concern. [unclear] Nixon : We up the ante of concern and what else do we do? Then suppose the Chinese move and the Soviets threaten, then what do we do? Haig: Well, we’ve got to move, I think, beforehand with the Soviets. Nixon : [unclear] Haig: That a war would be unacceptable. Kissinger : As soon as the Chinese move we have to tell them that. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : We can’t tell them before the Chinese move because it would look like collusion. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. Okay. All right, the message should get off. I think the message is the right tone, but if you don’t like the tone, tone it down some. Kissinger : No, now I think we have to strengthen it to Brezhnev. Nixon : Yeah, Yeah. Oh, the message to Brezhnev. I mean the public statement. Kissinger : No, let me write it and come right back with it. Nixon : Fine. Anything you want. [The brief conclusion of the conversation is unclear.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger and Haig, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–3. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 178. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 178. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 12, 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m. Kissinger : I got the answer from the Russians. They are giving us a full reply later. The interim reply is that they have an assurance from Mrs. Gandhi that she will not attack West Pakistan, that— Nixon : Sure it’s from Mrs. Gandhi? Kissinger : And that they will work out—they are working with her now to work out a ceasefire. And goddamn it, we made it and we didn’t deserve it. And— Nixon : Maybe we made it except, except that [unclear] overturned by this crew. You realize the danger, we must not be in a position where the Russians and we settle the son-of-a-bitch and leave the Chinese out. Kissinger : Exactly. This is why we had to go on the other route too. I’ll just call Vorontsov back and say it’s too late. As I told you last night we’re going back to the Security Council. So far we have no formal assurance of anything, if they want to— Nixon : Did you get that message? Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Tell me again, now, as to what the Russians, this interim reply— Kissinger : The interim reply you are—Mr. President, I was just talking to Haig, you know, on these your perception of this is, well, you’re right [unclear]. Nixon : It’s not that I [unclear]. Kissinger : No. What you did this morning, Mr. President, was a heroic act. Nixon : I had to do it. Kissinger : Yes. But I know no other man in the country, no other man who would have done what you did. You did it not knowing any— Nixon : You know, if we put it up to State I can just see what would have happened. I don’t mean Bill. I mean the whole— Kissinger : Including Bill. Nixon : What? Kissinger : Including Bill. Nixon : No. What I meant is I’m not, it’s the whole attitude, the whole government, the whole American establishment would say, well, don’t start any trouble. It’s all going to work out. Nothing ever works out unless you do something about it. That’s the trouble with the world. That is what caused World War I, we know that was just a clumsy bunch of bastards. But World War II, Henry, was a direct result, a direct result—I mean we can talk all we want to about Hitler doing in the Jews and all that. Sure, it caused all that. But it was a direct result of the Allies backing the pusillanimous [unclear—leading wave]. Right? Kissinger : No question. Nixon : That’s what— Kissinger : Mr. President— Nixon : That’s why the biggest mistake we made was our decision last— Kissinger : EC–121. Nixon : The EC–121. The biggest, and the biggest error frankly that has—it was a hell of an error on Korea for us to [unclear] wouldn’t go across the Yalu. Macarthur was right. Right as hell. And now [unclear]to this point. I don’t know whether [unclear]. We’ve got to say we’re not doing it. Kissinger : Now, Mr. President, the next question is [unclear]. My—now that we’ve played it this far this is—I mean, we’ve broken the back of it. Nixon : Well, don’t be too sure. Why have we broken the back of it? Kissinger : Because we have— Nixon : Does Haig agree? Kissinger : State doesn’t know— Nixon : Does Haig agree? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : Why does he think we have broken the back of this? [unclear] Kissinger : Because, Mr. President, when we showed, when I showed Vorontsov the Kennedy treaty, they knew they were looking down the gun barrel. Nixon : Did he react? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Nixon : He did make— Kissinger : Oh, man. Nixon : He did? Kissinger : Oh, yeah. Now that— Nixon : You told him that at that time that that’s what the President was talking about when he talked to the editor. Kissinger : Yes. But now the problem is, Mr. President, we have to go through. The big problem is as you, first of all, we have to turn the screw another half turn because if we let off the pressure too much and show any relief we’ve had it. Nixon : I know. Kissinger : Therefore, my strong recommendation is we trigger this UN thing as quickly as we possibly can because it’s the only way we can go on record now of condemning India. Nixon : That’s right. Kissinger : Second— Nixon : Second the White House statement still goes. Kissinger : That’s what I meant. The White House statement triggers it. Nixon : Right. Kissinger : It’s essential now that it’s a White House statement. Nixon : I know. Kissinger : Because we now have to play it to the— Nixon : Do the Russians—you don’t have it prepared yet? Kissinger : I’ve got it here. Nixon : I need to see it. [unclear] Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Ha. Now you got it. Now we’ve got it. It’s better than what I had. Kissinger : Okay. Nixon : It isn’t, the rhetoric isn’t as strong. But it’s better. Kissinger : Okay, now this has to go by 11:30. Nixon : Why not now? Kissinger : Well, because no one in the bureaucracy knows of it. Nixon : You mention foreign people? Yes you do. Kissinger : Yeah. I don’t want them to read it on the ticker. Nixon : Yeah. All right, go on. Now, there’s no—tell them the President dictated this. Kissinger : What I would like to do in the message is to say, now these are the orders, we can’t horse around now. Nixon : You can say this. The President has been in the office since 8:00 this morning. Why don’t you just say this? Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Or do you want to say this? Kissinger : I want to say— Nixon : You say, “The President dictated this thing. This is it gentlemen.” Kissinger : “We cannot afford to blink.” Nixon : We cannot, we cannot, and this is the way it is. And tell them that I will not—that I have worked, tell them I have worked out every word, every comma is mine, and that there’s frankly no appeal to this. Kissinger : That’s right. Nixon : Now I’m not going to have a call. I don’t want any. Nobody is going to call me. Kissinger : No, I’m just going to tell them this is going to be released at 11:30. Nixon : Right. Right. Okay. Point two. Hotline? Kissinger : Point two, yes. Hotline. “Thank you for the interim message. It arrived after the decisions had been made and they were irreversible. We are still prepared to proceed with you on the basis of my letter of so and so and so and so.” Nixon : Right. Kissinger : “And we will stay in close communications.” Nixon : Right. Kissinger : That definitely kicks them in the teeth. Nixon : Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, the Russians have said—now let’s be sure that they are prepared to what? To go, that Mrs. Gandhi—they have assurances that she will what? Kissinger : Mrs. Gandhi has assured—I haven’t got the exact text here because my idiot girl who took it down froze when she heard it. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : But they’re sending it over there. Prime Minister Gandhi has assured Minister Kuznetsov, who will send [was sent?] as a result of the President’s appeal— Nixon : Minister Kuznetsov? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : That ceasefire—no military action against— Nixon : West Pakistan. Kissinger : Against West Pakistan. In addition, within the spirit of the President’s thing, we’re trying to work out a comprehensive proposal including ceasefire, complete guarantees for the integrity of West Pakistan and repatriation of Pakistan. Nixon : That’s in there? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Good. Well add— Kissinger : Gromyko is coming back—oh, we got them. But the big problem now is, Mr. President, not to give the, is to—if we play this well, we’ll come out ahead with both the Chinese and the Russians. Hell, we are doing this, Mr. President, with no cards whatsoever. Nixon : Well, we have one card. Kissinger : Well, you— Nixon : The Russians want something from us and we didn’t, we didn’t lecture. You know, not to talk about it, but even my friend good old Morefield was panting to go out and give the goddamn trade away. Morey, you can’t give the trade away. Wasn’t he? Important thing to do? Kissinger : Mr. President, your behavior in the last 2 weeks has been heroic in this. Nixon : Well. Kissinger : No. You were shooting—your whole goddamn political future for next year, you were doing— Nixon : Whole summer. Kissinger : Against your bureaucracy. Against your, against the Congress, against public opinion. All alone, like everything else. Without flinching, and I must say, I may yell and scream but this hour this morning is worth 4 years here. Nixon : It wasn’t easy [unclear]. Well, the reason for that, and the reason the hour this morning was that I had a chance to reflect a little and to see where it was going. The world is just going down the goddamn drain. It may do it; it may do it. Kissinger : Mr. President– Nixon : As I told you on the phone last night, I don’t know whether the United States has a viable foreign policy. Kissinger : No. Nixon : I seriously doubt it. Kissinger : The United States has not a viable foreign policy; it luckily has a viable President. You were here. Nelson, as much as I love him, would never have been able to do this. And he’s the only one who could even have conceived it. Nixon : Well, Agnew would have done it. Kissinger : Agnew, Mr. President, would have done it so stupidly. Nixon : Connally would have done it. There’s one. Kissinger : Yeah. Connally is the only man. Nixon : Although he might have been a little [unclear]. Kissinger : He lacks your subtlety. Connally, if you watch Connally—I said the other day to Haldeman—after all, Connally was an undistinguished Governor, why is he a great Secretary of the Treasury? Because of you. Nobody ever thought of Connally as an outstanding man until you— Nixon : No, they thought he was a good Governor. Kissinger : I beg your pardon? Nixon : They thought he was a good Governor. Kissinger : A good Governor. But not a great one. Nixon : No governors are great. Kissinger : Well. But I’ve watched Connally at these meetings, and I don’t fear the interrogation of him because he is the one I like by far. Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : He waits, his first instinct is often wrong, like when he said to cut off aid to both Pakistan and India. Then when I, and even more you, quarreled with it then he went the other way. I better get this done. Nixon : Yeah. You’re really encouraged by the Russians? Kissinger : I think we’ve got it now. The thing is to play it in such a way— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger :—that the Chinese, and we may have—now we may have them, Mr. President. This is the complication. The Chinese may come anyway, and we’ll have to face the Russians down anyway. Nixon : Yeah, but if the Russians and the Chinese come now they will, they will come [unclear]. The Russians want to settle it with us. If this means anything; if this means something. Now there’s one great problem. I may be wrong but Communists generally use negotiations for the purpose of screwing, not for the purpose of settling. Now it may, with the Russians there’s no, maybe for the purpose of—just like they screwed us on Vietnam. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : For 3 years. Kissinger : They’re too scared. Nixon : [unclear] Do you agree? Kissinger : They’re too scared. Nixon : Huh? Kissinger : They’re too scared. Nixon : Scared of what? That we will not— Kissinger : Mr. President, Rogers can say what he wants, no one believes him. But when I showed him [Vorontsov] the Kennedy letter, he knew you mean business. And they don’t—in ’73 ’74 they may have you; they’re not ready yet. Now the big problem is— Nixon : Yeah. All right. All right. Kissinger : We have to tell the Chinese what the message is. We mustn’t fool them. Nixon : The Russian message? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : That the Russians are—that as a result of the President’s ultimatum— Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : I’d put it that way. The Russians have now— Kissinger : I showed them the message, to tell you the truth. Nixon : Yeah. Yeah. This message? Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : Or at least read a summary of it. Nixon : That’s right. That’s right. Okay. Nixon : And that we’re going forward, Henry. Kissinger : And we’re going forward. And that, let’s ask, see what they want. If they are threatened we will consider it— Nixon : The Chinese know what my letter, what my conversations or letter, and letter to Brezhnev was. Kissinger : I let them— Nixon : They didn’t go along with it. But they said they would abstain on that position. Kissinger : Not to me. They said it to Bhutto. But we’ve got to get this machinery figured— Nixon : If they say this to Bhutto too, are you going to tell him about this? Kissinger : No. Nixon : He’s an elitist son-of-a-bitch. Tell the Chinese that. Tell them that this afternoon. Kissinger : Yep. Nixon : And now you’ll send the hotline off to Brezhnev. Kissinger : Yep. Nixon : But the tone will be more—don’t, no more conciliatory. Kissinger : No. Nixon : Say— Kissinger : We’re just changing it a little, saying, “since your message arrived too late we were already in the machinery”— Nixon : “The President had already directed the Secretary General, I mean the Ambassador Bush to take this to the Security Council. We had already directed. However, the offer is still open.” Is that what you’re going to say? Kissinger : Exactly. Nixon : But time is of the essence. Kissinger : But I think we’re in business now. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–6. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 179. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 179. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:04–11:14 a.m. Kissinger : I just wanted to read over what we got from the Russians. It isn’t as much as he told me earlier, but we’re getting it. “The first contacts with the Government of India—Please convey to President Nixon: The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime Minister Gandhi...” [unclear] [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon : Go ahead now. Kissinger : “The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime Minster Gandhi on the question which was raised by President Nixon testified to the fact that the government of India has no intention to take any military action against West Pakistan. The Soviet leaders agreed that this makes the situation easier, and hope that the Government of Pakistan will draw from this the appropriate conclusions. As far as other questions”— Nixon : [unclear] Kissinger : “As far as other questions— Nixon : Coffee, please. Kissinger :—raised by the President are concerned, the answers will be given in the shortest of time.” Nixon : Hmmm. Well, that doesn’t go as far as he said. Kissinger : No. Nixon : Except it does, well— Kissinger : It’s—there won’t be military action. It’s just a question of how to wrap it up now. Nixon : At least they’ve indicated they’re not going to take action against India. Kissinger : Against West— Nixon : I mean Pakistan. Kissinger : Yeah. Of course, it depends how they define West Pakistan— Nixon : Don’t kid ourselves into about, you know— Kissinger : We’ve got to turn it another— Nixon : Now, now your thought is to, is going forward with the 11:30 statement, right? Kissinger : Yeah. In fact, I’ve got to get to the bureaucracy. Nixon : Fine, you’re going to do that. This second you’re going to send a hotline thing to Brezhnev. Kissinger : I’ve got that here. “I’ve just received your interim message concerning the grave situation in the Indian subcontinent. However, after delaying 72 hours in anticipation of your reply to my conversation with Minister Matskevich and Counselor Vorontsov, I have set in train certain moves in the United Nations Security Council at the time mentioned to Counselor Vorontsov. These cannot now be reversed. I’m still prepared to proceed along the lines set forth in my letter of December 10, as well as in the conversation with your charge d’affairs in my talk with your Agricultural Minister. In view of the seriousness of the situation and that we’ve both considered action, I propose that we continue closer consultations through established confidential channels.” Nixon : I don’t know if you’ve gotten out the fact that I cannot emphasize too strongly that I consider the need for immediate action to be—rather than seriousness, the—get me, get me a stronger word. There’s just [unclear] You see what I mean? I think you’ve got to get something out. You know, this is—what have you got—in view of what? [unclear] I cannot emphasize too strongly that time is of the essence. That time is of the essence. Failure to act, no, failure—that time is of the essence. Just put it that way, that time is of the essence. That, I think that failure to pursue, failure to workout a peaceful settlement, could set in motion— Kissinger : I think time— Nixon :—undesirable consequences beyond our control. Kissinger : Well, the danger is then they’ll think we’ve colluded with the Chinese, so we’d better not do that. Nixon : [unclear] Time is of the essence to avoid—and to avoid—to avoid undesirable consequences, or whatever. The—well, you get what I mean? I don’t think that message sounds tough, strong enough in terms of the urgency. Kissinger : Yeah. Nixon : And you? Kissinger : Well, I’ve actually—I’ve tried to have this one a little softer because we’re kicking them in the teeth at the Security Council, publicly. Nixon : Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger : Why don’t we just say, “In view of the urgency of the situation”— Nixon : In view of the—let’s see. I think there’s a better word than the ones you have. But maybe that’s where, what I’m trying to get at. Where you say “the serious situation in the subcontinent.” Let’s cut that one down, instead of “serious.” What do you think? Kissinger : How about “urgency”? Nixon : Ah, the—in terms of the problem we face. It’s something in the [unclear]. Kissinger : I’ll make sure he doesn’t inform the press before we have some assurances. Nixon : We will. Oh, this press thing is fine Kissinger : Yeah, but I’d like to [unclear] you first. Nixon : Oh, I see. All right. Nixon : Well, I guess that—all right. Making some [unclear] urgency in the— Kissinger : Well, we—why not just say, “I cannot emphasize too strongly that time is of the essence”? Nixon : “That time is of the essence to avoid, to...” Kissinger : To prevent, not to run away with us. Nixon : Yeah. “To avoid—to avoid—to avoid frightening consequences that neither of US want.” Or something like that. Or, it’s too strong? Kissinger : Yeah. To avoid— Nixon : To avoid— Kissinger :—events running away with our capacity to shape them, or something like that. Nixon : They won’t know what that means. Events— Kissinger : To avoid consequences— Nixon : To avoid consequences that neither of us want. Kissinger :—that neither of us want. Consequences neither of us— Nixon : Neither of us want. Kissinger :—neither of us want. That is clear. Nixon : To avoid consequences that neither of us want. That’ll be, that’ll, that understates it a bit and gets it across. Kissinger : Good. Nixon : Good. Now basically by this we’re putting the Russians on the spot. Want to realize that we’re putting, by our public statement we’re putting it to the Indians. Kissinger : Right. Nixon : Now by putting it to the Indians we have to do that for the four reasons that you mentioned. The argument against putting it to the Indians is, as you know, that, well if you put it to the Indians then they will sit on their backs and say screw you. Kissinger : They won’t. Nixon : Well, my view is that, is that, well understand I’m just, I’m running it through this drill. We’ve talked to the bureaucracy about [unclear]. My answer there is that, well what do you do about the Chinese? What do you do about the Russians? What do you do [unclear]. But also as far as the Indians are concerned, they’ve got to know that, they seem to be affected by world opinion. To the extent they are, goddamnit, we’re going to get it across that world opinion is against them. Their play, do you agree? Kissinger : Completely agree. Nixon : But how, how are you going to change— Kissinger : Mr. President, I’ll tell you the truth. I’m not going to answer any arguments. I’m going to tell them for 72 hours they’re going to play the President’s game and we’ll stand and fall on our game. This is the strategy, this is what you gentlemen are going to do. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : Anyone who wants to protest can do it after the events. But this is it now. We have 15 minutes, I haven’t got time for an argument. Nixon : That’s right. Just say the President dictated this. Fine. Kissinger : So I’m— Nixon : Also, you’re going to tell them about the hotline? Kissinger : I’ll tell Johnson. Nixon : Tell Johnson. Say, I’m doing it. In other words, we have this. Johnson knows about the conversation we had with Vorontsov and Matskevich. Kissinger : I’m showing, going to show Johnson this message. Nixon : Yeah. Kissinger : And tell him what the game is so he understands. Nixon : Okay, fine. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 180. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 180. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 1 Washington, December 12, 1971 Subject: India-Pakistan: Refugee Problems The attached contingency study on refugee and resettlement problems in the context of the Indo-Pakistan fighting is forwarded. in response to the request made at the December 6 WASAG meeting. Except where indicated otherwise, the planning assumption is complete Indian/ Bangla Desh control of East Pakistan, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment Contingency Study Washington, undated INDIA-PAKISTAN: REFUGEE PROBLEMS THE PROBLEM The actual and potential refugee problem in South Asia must be viewed from various points—humanitarian, political, economic and managerial. This paper assumes the overriding importance of the humanitarian aspect; it does not need to be greatly elaborated. The economic and managerial aspects are technical questions that we raise but cannot answer fully; we lack too much information and our view of the future is too cloudy. Some of these are being addressed in more detail by other papers under preparation in response to the WASAG request. We attempt, however, to flag the most important kinds of problems that we will face. The political aspect presents problems about which we can make better guesses and which are perhaps more amenable to immediate action. Thus the principal thrust of the paper is in the political area. There are four classes of refugees/displaced persons who will probably require assistance on an international basis following the termination of hostilities. 1. Up to 10 million refugees from East Pakistan who are now in India. 2. Over 600,000 non-Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan who may want to move to West Pakistan, as well as West Pakistani government officials and military in the East. 3. Some 50–100,000 Bengalis living in West Pakistan, most of whom will almost certainly wish to return to East Pakistan. 4. An undetermined number of persons who are being displaced by the fighting within East Pakistan. The Refugees in India Nearly ten million * refugees fled from East Pakistan to India in the period since last March. Of these, nearly 3 million are outside refugee camps; an undetermined number of them have merged into the Indian economy and society and may never be heard of again. Of the remainder, who are in camps, about two million are Muslims, the rest Hindus. The Bengali refugees are both an effect and a cause of the present situation. India found the burden of refugees economically and politically intolerable and has made their return to Pakistan a sine qua non of a settlement. Yet even with a settlement, the problem will persist on two levels: —repatriating and rehabilitating the returnees, and —dealing with refugees who do not want to or are not allowed to return. Some of the refugees have reportedly already begun to return. We assume that nearly all the approximately two million Muslims will return to Bangla Desh. Resettlement will cause some problems but should be of manageable proportions. A number of the Hindu refugees will also want to return—we cannot estimate the proportion. Even assuming that the Bangla Desh government is willing to accept them, they will pose more difficult resettlement problems than will the Muslims. They are less likely to have friends or family to receive them (whole villages have tended to flee en masse). Many Hindus, however, will not want to return—this will be particularly true of those with skills and education but also for many at the bottom of the social scale. This will pose a major problem for the Indian government. New Delhi wants desperately to get rid of these refugees and has built much of its international position on this. At the same time, however, the GOI may be loath to repatriate them forcefully for both domestic and international political reasons. The Bangla Desh government will presumably welcome returning Muslims. They may be less enthusiastic about the Hindus. Should the Bangla Desh government resist full repatriation, New Delhi will doubtless feel compelled to bring strong pressure to bear. The problem may not be as bleak as suggested above. Much will depend on the circumstances in East Pakistan when fighting stops and the incentives to return that can be offered. A Bangla Desh spokesman has said that his government will welcome all returnees. Should Bangla Desh prove reluctant, India has various levers it can use ranging from economic negotiations to foot—dragging in withdrawing its troops. Still, we must bear in mind that the return of the refugees could create major problems of international concern. Dealing with those Hindus who remain in India and are accepted by the Indian government will be primarily an economic problem but also one with political import. Much depends on the numbers involved. If only a few hundred thousand have to be absorbed, the problem will not be great. Should, however, India be faced with many millions of permanent refugees the adjustment will be hard. Keeping these people in camps is distasteful to all concerned but integration into the Indian economy and society will be most difficult. Many refugees have no marketable skill, land is not available, settlement. outside of Bengali-speaking areas of India will be undesirable on cultural grounds, and there will be strong resistance from the Indian public. Lacking any idea of the dimensions of the problem we are not able to foresee how it can be dealt with. If the numbers involved are large, India will convincingly argue that it should not hear the entire cost of resettlement. The international community will want to avoid another Palestine-type situation. The role that we will want or be able to play in helping will be affected by the state of our relations with India if and when the problem becomes acute. Sympathetic concern with India’s problems could, however, be of some help in rebuilding our relationship with India. In summary, then, problems can arise: (1) Resettling those refugees who return and are accepted; this is manageable but will obviously increase in difficulty and cost as numbers increase. (2) Persuading unwilling Hindus to return to East. Bengal. This will cause problems for India and could be of international concern, since the Indians may be fairly forceful in “persuading” the refugees to return. (3) Persuading the Bangla Desh government to accept the Hindu refugees. Although this will be primarily a problem between Dacca and New Delhi, it, too, may have international ramifications. (4) Resettling such refugees as remain in India. This will become primarily an Indian responsibility, but the international community will be expected to help. The Biharis * The Bihari community has never been completely at ease in East Pakistan and has tended to identify with the West Pakistani government. In the recent unrest, a number of Biharis have sided with Islamabad and participated in actions against the Bengali population. Even if this participation was in fact small, many Bengalis are no doubt thirsting for revenge (and have often loosed violence against Biharis when the opportunity arose.) Much of the entrepreneurial skill in East Pakistan is in the non-Bengali community. Bangla Desh will need these people’s skills but many of them will not want to stay. We cannot at this time estimate with confidence whether an anti-Bihari program will be launched in West Bengal, nor how many Biharis and other non-Bengalis would want to leave. Thus far, Biharis in areas conquered by Indian/Muslim forces have reportedly fared well. In prudence, however, we must plan for a situation in which bloodshed could be widespread and several hundred thousand people would have to be evacuated quickly and under pressure. Aside from the difficulty of finding adequate shipping, it may be extremely difficult to get potential evacuees to ports and into ships. Both transportation and law and order in the countryside may be chaotic and make it difficult to get evacuees to assembly points (although we understand that the Biharis and others likely to leave are generally located in the towns and cities). The withdrawing units of the Pakistani army may not be able to protect them enroute or even once they are gathered at embarkation points. Even if the Indian Army elements in East Pakistan cooperate in protecting the Biharis, as they have said they will, their capability to do so will be limited. Furthermore, the port facilities may be so badly damaged that expeditious loading will be impossible. A final problem would arise if the evacuation were to take place while the Indians still maintained their blockade of West Pakistan and refused to allow the refugee ships to enter Karachi. It is not at all certain where the 600,000 Biharis can go. They would not be welcome in India (where they lived before 1947) and their welcome in West Pakistan would be questionable. Given these facts in addition to the tremendous logistic problem involved in moving the Biharis, it is clearly desirable that they remain in East Bengal if that is at all possible. Calming anti-Bihari sentiment in Bengal and providing assurances that will be credible to the Biharis will be extremely difficult but must be attempted. In this regard, even while planning for the worst contingencies and keeping-the paramount humanitarian concern at the fore, we will want to avoid creating either in South Asia or at the UN an atmosphere that will stimulate Bihari expectations of evacuation or international expectations that this is inevitable. The problems arising are these: (1) Reducing the chances of a mass slaughter of Biharis, thus reducing the need for immediate evacuation. (2) If hasty evacuation is required, protecting the lives of those awaiting evacuation and moving them to West Pakistan as quickly as possible. In practical terms this will mostly have to be done by sea; the numbers will be too large for air evacuation and movement by land across India is problematical. Special problems may arise because of damage to or inaccessibility of port facilities. (A Related Problem: The Pakistani Army and Officials in East Bengal) Some 70,000 West Pakistani military were in East Pakistan as of early December. In addition there were some thousands of West Pakistani officials. Many of both categories had families with them in the East. These will all clearly have to be evacuated and will present somewhat similar problems to that posed by a Bihari evacuation. These would be better organized, however, and more centrally located, assuming that the army is able to fall back in an orderly manner to a port area. Also, the Pakistan government will exert greater effort to extricate them. Above all, the army will be better able to establish a perimeter and defend. itself while awaiting withdrawal, if not protected by a formal cease-fire. Evacuation will be a problem, however, and. the Pakistani Government might make a special effort to have the US assist. Bengalis in West Pakistan The bulk of the 60,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan will probably want to return to Bang la Desh. Most of them have roots in the East; will have families there to receive them; and for the most part have needed skills. Most will probably not be welcome in West Pakistan. Significant difficulties may arise, however, in the event of anti-Bengali bitterness among the West Pakistan population that could lead to killings of Bengalis. Also, the Islamabad government might see the Bengalis as hostages for the safety of its forces and supporters in the East. The problems are thus: (1) Ensuring the safety of the Bengalis in West (2) Transporting them back to Bangla Desh; this could be done in part by sea and in part by land across India, which will regard the Bengalis benevolently (in contrast to the Biharis). Displaced Persons in the East We have no way of knowing how many people will be displaced from their homes by the fighting and will need to be resettled. In general, though, we expect that these ‘. battle refugees will not have fled far from their homes and will return on their own when the fighting passes them by. There will certainly be major requirements for rehabilitation because of destruction caused by the fighting. There is no significant reabsorption or political problem for this group of people, but the economic costs could be substantial. The problem therefore is (1) Getting the people back to their homes where necessary and rehabilitating them—which is part of the large rehabilitation problem that the new government will face throughout its country. The Humanitarian Problem During the Fighting There is an additional related problem—the protection of civilian lives and prisoners of war during the fighting. Innocent people inevitably get killed during the fighting; there are poorly. disciplined armed bands, on both sides of the conflict that have been guilty of atrocities; and soldiers on both sides have real fears of reprisal if they are taken prisoner. There is thus a need to (1) Limit: unnecessary killing by all parties concerned by dampening the atmosphere of hatred and revenge even while fighting is going on, and (2) Encourage adherence by all parties to the Geneva Convention. THE US INTEREST The United States has several interests in the refugee problem: —Prevention of loss of life and facilitation of repatriation and resettlement. —Using its assistance in dealing with the refugee question to further its basic goals of (a) reestablishing peace and security in South Asia and (b) building good relations with the governments involved—India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh. —Preventing the institutionalization of a South Asia refugee problem on the Palestinian model. —Not becoming saddled with a disproportionate share of the expense and effort involved in moving and resettling refugees. RESPONSES The refugee problem will have to be dealt with at three levels: —by the governments directly involved—India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh; —by the international community; primarily the. UN but also perhaps the Red Cross and international voluntary agencies; —by the United States and other countries unilaterally. We regard this list: as one of descending responsibility; i.e., the governments involved should bear the bulk of the responsibility; only the residual should be handled by the internationil community; and a still much smaller residual unilaterally, with special concern for delimiting our own participation. Nonetheless, the US has certain unique capabilities that will have to be brought into play directly; there may be specific political gains that we can make through direct involvement; and our history of entanglement in South Asia means that we cannot readily opt out of direct action. What Needs to be Done (1) Getting Information —We lack a clear picture of the magnitude and nature of the problem with regard to the Biharis in East Bengal and Bengalis in West Pakistan. We do not know for certain how many may have to. be moved, where they are, or how great the danger to them is. We have been in contact with the field on these points. —We do not know how many of the refugees in India will want to return. We are also not certain what the attitudes of the Indian government will be towards unwilling returnees and of the Bangla Desh government towards Hindu returnees. We will probably only be able to gain such information with the passage of time. —We have no good picture of how great the rehabilitation needs will be of all displaced persons and refugees. This is part of the overall rehabilitation of East Pakistan and cannot be determined until the shooting stops. (2) Political/Psychological Actions During the Fighting —All parties concerned should be encouraged to ensure adherence to the Geneva Conventions. India has already pledged this. —Restraint needs to be placed on paramilitary forces operating on both sides in East Pakistan. We should urge New Delhi, Islamabad, and the Bangla Desh government to do this: we must recognize, however, the limitations in this regard of the Pakistan and Bangla Desh governments which lack full control of their partisans in East Pakistan. —The climate of hatred and revenge must be defused. The GOP should be urged to eschew anti-Bengali propaganda to lessen the threat to Bengalis in the West. The Bangla Desh government should follow a propaganda line that stresses the brotherhood of all living in East Pakistan, whether Bengali or Bihari, Hindu or Muslim. The Indian government should support this line. —Our ability to bring these objectives to reality is quite limited. International opinion should be mobilized to lend what support it can. We should encourage special bilateral approaches to India and Pakistan by France, China, the UK, the USSR as appropriate. Prominent world leaders with humanitarian credentials (the Pope, the head of the Red Cross) as well as the Secretary General and UNHCR should be urged to speak out on these matters. Where necessary, we could brief the individuals concerned on the dimensions of the problem. (We have already been in contact with the UNHCR who shares our concerns over the post-hostilities situation. The UNHCR discussed this matter with the SYG, who made a humanitarian appeal for the safety of civilian population on December 7.) (3) Contingency Planning —We should inventory the availability of food grains should there be a need for famine relief, although at present it appears that neither availability nor distribution will be a critical problem. On a short term basis, food is available in East Bengal, as well as India and other nearby states. If required, we could undertake to replace stocks sent by these countries to Bangla Desh. Over the longer term we will probably be called upon to supply food direct. High-protein food and medicine could be a more critical short-term requirement. We will need to keep our estimates of requirements and availability in all categories especially current during the critical months that will follow the fighting. —We should plan for a massive sealift of population between East and West Pakistan, possibly on a crash basis, under international auspices. Sea transport will be the crucial element; US assets, military and civilian, would almost certainly be required, preferably under an international umbrella. —We should urge the UNHCR to develop and publicize resettlement plans for the refugees in India that would encourage the return of a maximum number of refugees, lest India and the world be confronted with the problem of caring for a permanently unassimilated group of refugees. —We should encourage appropriate UN organs to make a study of the extent of assistance that will be required for refugees once the fighting stops. We can be of assistance to the UN in the preparation of such a study. Other Actions —We should point out to the Indians, Pakistanis and Bengalis that our ability to assist them in the after-math of the war will be conditioned. in part by their per-formance in averting and dealing effectively with humanitarian problems. We, for our part, should look for ways of using assistance to further humanitarian ends. —We should discuss problems of refugee movement and evacuation with the Indians and urge them to exercise restraint in-destroying port facilities and other infra-structure that may be needed for rapid movement. We should also urge them to plan for and be cooperative in facilitating evacuation of Pakistani forces and, if necessary, the Biharis. —We could point out to the GOP that there is only one Bengali leader who might be able to stem an outbreak of violent anti-Bihari sentiment, and that is Mujib. The Pakistanis should take this into consideration in deter-mining when or whether to allow Mujib to return to the East. —We should informally raise with the Indians and, if possible, the Bangla Deshis our hope that they will hold to a minimum or preferably forego “war crimes” proceedings. Crimes were committed on both sides and a healthy tempering of justice with mercy will be the most states-manlike approach to bringing stability to South Asia. —Our international posture on the entire South. Asia problem should focus on humanitarian rather than political concerns. We are stressing this point in our pronouncements at the UN. —Stress broad international responsibility for the post-hostilities refugee rehabilitation problem: begin to organize post-hostilities planning on an international basis. The India and Pakistan consortia should. be called together for a planning session. UN Problems —We will want to consider very carefully the extent and manner that the UN should become involved in the refugee problem. Clearly we want an international umbrella and the UN is the logical choice. On the other hand, a massive repatriation and rehabilitation program could involve the UN in something at least as large as the Congo operation and the lion’s share of the financial burden could fall on us. —The UN should make it clear to the governments of India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh that UN resources—financial and otherwise—are limited. It should attempt to work out with the parties concerned arrangements that would restrict the UN financial role and direct it towards supervisory, technical and. observer responsibilities. The matter of cost would for the most part have to be settled between the three governments on the one hand and individual or multilateral donors on the other. —At present the role of the UNHCR is limited to that of the “focal point” for assistance to the refugees in India from and through the UN system. The UN East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO) is in East Pakistan at the request of the GOP to render emergency assistance to the victims of last year’s cyclone and this year’s civil strife. It is virtually unable to function at present.UNHCR and UNEPRO could perhaps cope with refugee matters if all went well. Any massive programs, however, would require a vote of the General Assembly to enlarge the organizations’ mandates as well as the consent of the governing authorities in control of East Bengal. UNEPRO’s capabilities in a truce observer or similar mission would be limited unless qualified personnel were assigned. Any such mission would require a mandate from the Security Council. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on December 10 by Thomas P. Thornton (S/PC). Thornton also apparently drafted the attached study. Cleared in S/P by Deputy Director Joseph Neubert and Cargo; in NEA by Van Hollen, Quainton, and Constable; and in S/R, IO/UNP, INR/RNA, and AID/NESA. * These are Indian figures. Pakistan claims only two million. * Technically, “Biharis” are non-Bengali Muslims who fled to East Pakistan from present—day India (especially the state of Bihar) following partition in 1947. There are an estimated 600,000 of these in East Bengal now. The term is also used in a broader sense to include all non-Bengali Muslims in East Bengal—an additional 1–1.5 million. Of these a fairly small number has close ties to West Pakistan. The remainder are reasonablv well intetergrated into East Bengal. 181. Telegram 223704 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 181. Telegram 223704 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington December 12, 1971, 2250Z SUBJ: Indian Policy in South Asia Crisis REF: State 1. Indian Ambassador Jha called at his request to respond to the Under Secretary’s demarche on Indian war aims (reftel). Jha accompanied by Rasgotra and Verma, Quainton and Schneider present from NEA. 2. Jha began by saying he had discussed this subject—in New York with Fon Min Swaran Singh, India, he said, had no war aims; it did not want war and did not start it. India clearly did not and does not covet any part of Pakistan’s territory, In Bangla Desh, GOIs first first action had been to hand over civil administration to BD officials in order to avoid having to take law into own hands. Jha said he could say categorically that GOI was anxious to see BD remain completely independent of India, 3. In West, India’s position was the same, i.e., it does not covet any Pakistan territory. GOI, however, felt concern about giving USG assurances on this kind of issue without knowing whether USG had received comparable assurances from Pakistan. India did not wish to create situation in which Pakistan could wage war with nothing to lose. GOI anxious not to make bilateral commitment to US if it might have adverse impact on PAK policy. What he had said was not for conveying as an assurance to Paks. Jha said he could not predict what would be GOI policy if there were prolonged war. From beginning and as of now GOI did not want to take any part of Pakistan, 4. Jha noted that Under Secretary had earlier raised question about Azad Kashmir. He noted Kashmir had been subject of discussion on more than one occasion. Kashmir belongs to India and any part which Pakistan holds is illegally held. GOI position has been not to seek change of situation/ through force. All evidence we have of Pakistan strategy is that GOP wishes to grab more territory. Therefore GOl would like to know whether USG has assurance from Pakistan that it will not try to get further territory in Kashmir. He said it would be unfair if the GOP keeps its options open and GOI does not, 5. Under Secretary replied that Pakistan on various occasions has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal to status quo ante. He said he wished to make clear USG would find unacceptable any attempt by GOI to alter or rectify its borders between India and Pakistan in Azad Kashmir. 6. Jha asked whether USG would take same view if Pakistan sought to alter borders? Under Secretary said he had been speaking to existing situation and did not wish to speak on basis of hypothetical proposition. Generally speaking, we have urged a return to status quo ante and would like to see both sides withdraw. Jha asked whether we would regard it as more legitimate and defensible for Pakistan to hold on to a portion of Kashmir than India. Under Secretary reiterated we ‘wanted both countries to return to their own borders. We do not want either country to hold any portion of other. Jha said he hoped Under Secretary understood that his question was no more hypothetical than one which had been put to India. He hoped USG did not have categoric view on how it would react if India held portion of Pak territory but not if Pakistan held portion of Indian territory. Under those circumstances it would be difficult for India to be categoric in its assurances, Under Secretary asked about question of India’s future control over East Pakistan. Jha said this was a new question to which he could not give a firm answer. Later in the conversation, however, Jha said that one way of insuring that BD not be controlled by India was for it to come into the United Nations as a member in its own right. India does not want BD to become an Indian protectorate and is anxious not to have control over it. 7. Under Secretary noted that evacuation of Dacca had been completed successfully. Approximately 20 Americans remain and presumably will stay right through. USG will provide names of those remaining to UN, GOI and GOP. We look to GOI and BD authorities to do all in their power to protect safety of those Americans as well as other third country nationals. 8. Under Secretary also noted that ICRC has written agreement with the GOP for protection of foreigners in Dacca in neutral zones. There is no similar agreement with GOI, and he urged GOI to consider signing an agreement for protection of foreigners. Jha said he would forward suggestion but commented that it would be preferable to take this matter up in New Delhi as they more familiar with matter. GOI was anxious to insure complete safety of lives of foreign nationals, and it would be very cooperative and responsible in thrashing out any problems there might be. 9. Finally, Under Secretary said he wished to raise a matter about which we had no independent verification. Pakistan Embassy had telephoned us with message from Islamabad indicating that one Pakistani officer who had been taken prisoner by Indians had been sent back to Comilla fortress by besieging Indian forces. He took back message to effect that if all did not surrender they would be handed over for butchery by Mukti Bahini, Pak Embassy brought this to our attention as violation of Geneva Convention. Jha said he could assure us report was “complete and total fabrication.” Chief of Indian Army Staff had made public appeal assuring Pak Army of humane treatment under Geneva Convention. Yesterday in New York, Foreign Minister had spoken with leader of BD delegation suggesting that BDG should announce its adherence to principles of Geneva Convention. Under Secretary said he recognized and accepted India’s declared position but urged that all possible efforts be made to insure that there were no exceptions even in heat of battle. End Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent immediate as Tosec 9 to the White House with a request to pass it to Secretary Rogers on Air Force One. Repeated to Dacca, Islamabad, London, Moscow, and USUN. Drafted by Quainton and approved by Irwin 182. Telegram 11295 from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 182. Telegram 11295 from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 December 13, 1971, 0211Z Subject: Indo-Pak in Security Council Ref: State 223700 1. I have just had an extensive discussion with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary who were already meeting at 10 Downing Street on India-Pakistan when I received instructions in reftel. Since Security Council meeting was imminent, I joined Prime Minister and Fon Sec without waiting for text of draft resolution which we received a short time ago (State 223705) and have now made available to them. 2. I told the Prime Minister that the US was calling for an immediate meeting of the Security Council with the aim of halting further fighting in East Pakistan and to prevent the spread of fighting in the west. I said that the US intended to introduce a resolution to this end and explained US views as outlined in reftel. I asked that the UKG support the US resolution. 3. The Prime Minister observed that he and the Foreign Secretary had been discussing the situation for some time. He noted that the UK was deeply conscious of the fact that both India and Pakistan were members of the Commonwealth. Ever since the situation worsened, the British Government had endeavored to do what it could to get both countries to exercise restraint. The Prime Minister believed that such a course held out more hope than taking positions which attempted formally to fix the blame on one country or the other for the present situation. For this reason, the UK had not thought it right to vote for the resolutions in the Security Council, but rather to assume a position which hopefully would allow HMG to retain the possibility of acting directly vis-a-vis both governments both now and in future. 4. Both heath and Douglas-Home thought that as a practical matter there was little possibility of stopping the Indian Army short of Dacca in the east. The Prime Minister said he thought that the immediate problem was to try to bring about a cease fire and prevent the massacre of the remainder of the Pakistan Army in the east, as well as millions of Biharis. 5. As the discussion developed, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary made clear their view that any resolution calling for withdrawal of Indian troops from East Pakistan would be unrealistic and, in any event, would be vetoed by the Soviet Union. Comment: Agree that to expect withdrawal of Indian forces in the east at this juncture seems unrealistic and believe a Soviet veto would be inevitable. 6. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary indicated that they had hoped for consultation with the USG before further action in the UN. They believed that the US call for an immediate urgent meeting of the security council was premature and asked that I urgently request that the introduction of the US resolution be delayed to allow for consultation. 7. Heath and Douglas-Home then said they thought it might be possible to devise a resolution which might be acceptable in the SC. They outlined terms along the following lines: ceasefire in the west; the Governments of India and Pakistan to instruct their miltary commanders in the east to enter into contact to arrange a cease fire; take all possible steps to avert further loss of life; the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter negotiations to reach a political solution for East Pakistan. 8. The Prime Minister gave instructions to send messages embodying instructions along the above lines to British representatives in Washington in New York and to relay the UK views to the President and the Secretary in the Azores. 9. Comment: It seems clear to me that if the US resolution in its present form is introduced and voted on in the SC, the UK will abstain as it has previously and the Soviet Union will veto. If, however, the USG is prepared to consider a resolution which does not call for withdrawal of Indian troops, there is the possibility of working out something which the British would support and which they consider might have a reasonable chance of adoption in SC. 10. The British present assessment is that India is not seeking territorial gains either in the east or west, although both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary did not seem to me to be fully persuaded that India would not take advantage of the situation to try to force some territorial adjustments. Sir Denis Greenhill, who was also present noted that before hostilities began and an Indian Minister had indicated to him that if war came, India would make the most of the situation to settle the Pakistan problem once and for all. All three reiterated, however, that the British Government had in recent days sought and received assurances from the Indian Government that it did not seek territorial gains. Annenberg 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent flash to the Department with a request to pass to the White House for the President and Secretary Rogers. Repeated flash to USUN. 183. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/13308–71 183. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/13308–71 1 Washington, December 13, 1971 Subject: Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Briefing [ text not declassified ] on the Indo-Pakistan War ACQ: [ text not declassified ] Source: [ text not declassified ] He is a reliable source. [ text not declassified ] 1. On 10 December 1971 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told [ text not declassified ] that acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire resolution after the liberation of Bangladesh might make it possible to avoid further complications with the United States and might also rule out the current possibility of Chinese intervention in Ladakh. Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and certain military leaders, however, are opposed to accepting the resolution before certain unspecified areas in southern Azad Kashmir are liberated and before the war mechanism of Pakistan is destroyed. Mrs. Gandhi added that for the moment India would not categorically reject the UN ceasefire proposal; it will accept the proposal after the Awami League regime is installed in Dacca. [ text not declassified ] 2. The Soviet Union is of the view that Indian should accept the ceasefire as soon as Bangladesh is liberated. According to the Prime Minister the Soviets are concerned about the possibility of Chinese intervention. If the Chinese were to become directly involved in the conflict, Mrs. Gandhi said, the Chinese know that the Soviet Union would act in the Sinkiang region. Soviet air support may be made available to India at that time. Mrs. Gandhi noted that despite Pakistani efforts to embroil the Chinese in the sub-continent, Peking has refrained from taking part in the conflict to date. P.N. Dhar, Chairman of the Policy Planning Commission, is currently in Moscow to discuss future strategy with Soviet leaders and to assure the Soviet Union that India has no plans to annex any West Pakistani territory. 3. After the liberation of Bangladesh, the Prime Minister said, Pakistan might not accept the ceasefire resolution but might decide to continue the war in the west to avenge the loss of Bangladesh. Pakistani strategy might be to break through the Chhamb area, with Chinese support in the Ladakh region, in a bid to cut off the Kashmir valley. 4. Mrs. Gandhi said that in that case the Soviet Union would attempt to convince the United States to accept Bangladesh as a “fait accompli” in the hope that the United States will prevail upon Pakistan to accept a ceasefire with an independent Bangladesh. The Prime Minister added that it is even possible that, in spite of its anti-India stance, China may advise Pakistan to acknowledge the reality of Bangladesh. 5. The Prime Minister concluded her briefing by saying that India will emerge from the war as the dominant power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China will respect India and may even decide to improve relations with India. On the other hand, Pakistan will lose its economic power without which it will not be able to support a large military complex. The current Pakistani military leadership will not be able to survive the military defeat. Mrs. Gandhi said she expects China and the United States to lose interest in Pakistan. She also noted that she forsees greater pressure for autonomy in Pakistan’s northwest frontier, Baluchistan and Sind. She expressed the hope that a new democratic Pakistan, based on autonomous republics, will emerge and that it will desire to have friendly relations with India. 6. [ text not declassified ] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Distribution. Sent to the White House and distributed within the Departments of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the JCS, and NSA. 184. Telegram 5627 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 184. Telegram 5627 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 14, 1971, 0408Z Subject: Possible Cease-fire in East 1. This morning, at Governor Malik’s request, I met with him and Major General Rao Farman Ali, to discuss possibility of cease-fire in east and some form of arrangement with Indian Army and Mukti Bahini to avoid “bloodbath”. 2. Farman Ali stated that Pak Army in east outnumbered and cut off, and while it might hold out for three or four days had no hope beyond that. He said that he saw no real possibility for help from any outside source and he had come to conclusion that most important thing in present circumstances was to avoid indiscriminate killing. He agreed with my suggestion that if such an attempt were to be made, it was better to make it before street-by-street fighting began in Dacca. 3. Farman asked whether I was in a position to communicate speedily with Washington, Islamabad and Calcutta. I assured him I was. He and Governor thereupon said that they would present to me within next few hours specific proposals for cease-fire which they wished me to put forward through USG to Indians. I told them that I was available at any time. 4. Comment: From nature of general conversation it appears to me that they are leaning toward idea in first instance, of regrouping of all Pak forces at places in EP specified by Indians under agreement that those forces would engage in no military operations during discussion of more permanent cease fire arrangements. Farman Ali is still reluctant to face up to word “surender”, and he hopes that Pak forces will be able retain their arms, even though they may have to turn over all ammunition to Indians. 5. I specified to the General and the Governor that any message they asked me to send must be authoritatively signed. They assured me there would be no question about that: message would bear their two signatures as well as that of General Niazi and would be approved by President Yahya before it reached me. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Flash to Islamabad and New Delhi. 185. Telegram 5628 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 185. Telegram 5628 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 14, 1971, 0441Z Subject: Possible Cease-fire in East Ref: Dacca 5627 1. Governor Malik has just telephoned to say that General Niazi has stated that negotiations are taking place in Islamabad between central government and Ambassador Farland and that there is no need for me to convey any proposals. 2. Comment: From foregoing, there still appears to be strong difference of opinion betwee Niazi and Farman with Governor oscillating feebly between. Farman obviously desires to initiate some kind of action on basis his appreciation of what he considers desperate local situation. Niazi, whether on instructions from Islamabad or in line with his own romantic view of himself as dedicated soldier, is opposed. In effect, question boils down to whether Pak Army in east is to be sacrificed, together with uncounted thousands of civilians in East Pakistan in order to retain some bargaining position in west. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Flash to Islamabad and New Delhi. 186. Telegram 12542 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 186. Telegram 12542 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, December 14, 1971, 1420Z Subject: Pakistan’s Options and US Policy Summary: Collapse of Pak Army in East Pakistan appears imminent. GOP will soon be faced with decision whether to cut its losses and concede East Pakistan to Bangla Desh or to pursue fighting against increasing odds along western frontiers. We believe Paks would opt former course of action if peace with honor can be obtained. With UN action ineffective at present we believe uncommitted UK and France can play useful role with Indians seeking limitation of fighting in West. We foresee eventual retirement of Yahya and rise to real power of Bhutto in aftermath of present conflict. Bhutto may lend himself to constructive role when peace comes. Soviets will probably have very limited role in future West Pak while we anticipate Chinese will retain position of major ally in eyes of West Paks. End summary 2. GOP is preparing West Pakistan populace for loss of East Pakistan and approximately one fourth of Pakistan’s armed forces. December 12 and 13 communiques describes situation in east as “grim” although GOP still refuses to concede publicly loss of any sizable East Pakistan town. With the likelihood that East Pakistan will for all practical purposes be beyond control of GOP in very near future, next stage in present conflict will shift to west. 3. With this in mind, Embassy sets forth below some preliminary thinking regarding future prospects. Given very fluid situation with fighting continuing, these thoughts must be speculative. Septel contains Embassy’s further recommendations re Bangladesh. 4. Yahya, in our view, after loss of east, will have two options: (A) To continue fighting in west, utilizing all Pakistan’s capabilities in hope of achieving significant gains in Kashmir, enabling Pakistan to enter into negotiations with India. Having something to bargain with and at same time helping to salve wounds of defeat in East Pakistan. Pakistan’s national and army honor favor such course of action. Major drawback is fact Paks will be heavily outnumbered in west as India brings additional forces (air, etc,) to bear after termination of hostilities in east. This strategy runs grave risk of having Pak armed forces badly mauled in west with implications for future stability in west including army’s ability to hold principal leadership position there, collapse of Pak army could conceivably lead to what Pak establishment fear most—confrontation of have-nots versus haves in West Pakistan and rise of Baluch, Pushtoon and even Sindhi separatist movements. (B) To accept loss of East Pakistan and to seek way to halt further fighting in west, such strategy would be difficult to swallow, but would preserve Pak Army qte to fight another day unqte and would enable Pak Army to retain to some extent its privileged position. Control of media and propensity of Paks to accept their own propaganda might ease pain of ignominious defeat in east without compensating gains in west. Pak propaganda of last few days suggesting that Indian successes only possible because of Soviet assistance might be line Paks could use domestically to preserve their honor. 5. Although there are probably strong emotional and real pressures on Yahya to opt to continue fighting, we are inclined to believe that Paks would prefer to cut their losses if some honor can be retained in extrication process. We are less sure of Indian intentions, having in mind talk of strategic rectifications along lower Kashmlr cease-fire line. We strongly believe in USG’s interest that fighting on West Pak front be limited and that fighting end without territorial gains by either party—gains which would sow seeds of Indo/Pak clash in future. 6. Although immediate recourse to UN again not likely to be effective, we believe that outsiders, specifically UK and France, still have opportunity to undertake diplomatic initiatives. Both have remained uncommitted in present conflict as matter of policy, thereby enabling them to play mediation effort. We should urge both to weigh in at approprtate time to make following points to Indians: Pak Army, if destroyed as effective entity in current fighting, will be reformed at later date. New army likely would be more radical both in domestic and external policy than present one grounded in Indian colonial tradition. Collapse of Pak Army, one of institutional mainstays in West Pakistan, could lead to chaos in West Pakistan which conceivably could spill over into other sectors of subcontinent. And finally, destruction of army would probably guarantee that revanchisme becomes major policy objective of future Pak leaders. Indians know their neighbor much better than we. But in flush of victory, Indians might well mortgage future chances of live-and-let-live relationship with Paks for short-term objectives 7. We will be telling Paks, who have stumbled from miscalculation in March to misadventure in December, that tossing good money after bad in taking on India in west is short-sighted folly. Perhaps Chinese, Iran and friendly Arab states could be brought into this exercise. 8. Whether we and others can intervene effectively on either side is debatable given high emotional content both parties. But when opportunity arises, we believe we should attempt to do so. 9. In aftermath of limited fighting, with army exhausted but intact as institution, we foresee period of bitter recriminations within establishment and among general public in West Pakistan. We consider it probable that Yahya will be gently eased out of retirement. Military will again choose new leader probably skipping over Yahya’s intimate friend and Deputy General Hamid to another general. However, with public confidence in army probably shaken and faced with loss of self-confidence, in its own ability to govern, army may lean on Bhutto to shoulder major responsibility. He likely to do so on his own terms—that he is given share of real power rather than trappings only. We believe he is likely be given large measure of power by army. 10. USG enjoys exceptional access to GOP during present situation. We would anticipate that such access to GOP leaders including Bhutto will continue for foreseeable future as result of USG posture during UN debates and general USG position in recent months. However, we should not confuse access with leverage with regard to what West Pakistan sees as its national interests. Nonetheless, in bewilderment likely to follow defeat in east, USG may have opportunity to play key role in preventing West Pakistan from embarking on course of extremes, either to left or right politically. 11. Optimum for USG is to focus Paks on overdue internal social and economic reforms. This will not end hostility towards India nor desire for revenge, but might over time lessen confrontation policy which has characterized Pak approach to subcontinent since partition with such disastrous consequences. Bhutto might lend himself to this direction. 12. Re other powers, Soviet Union has burned its bridges in West Pakistan. While there is healthy respect for USSR, Soviet role and influence in West Pakistan will probably be very limited for next few years. It probable that Soviets will push pro-Soviet Bengalis towards positions of authority within Bangla Desh (such leaders as Mufazzar Ahmed). This will conflict directly with middle-class Awami League leaders. Whatever Mujib’s fate, it impossible to predict how expected power struggle in Bangla Desh will end. We assume that Soviets (and Indians) will be as concerned that pro-Chinese Bengalis such as Mohammad Toaha are contained as in seeking to install pro-Soviet Bengalis in BDG. 13. West Pakistan will continue to regard China as a major ally although there may be some recriminations directed at Chinese for probable failure to intervene militarily. We believe Chinese will seek to exploit probable chaos in Bangla Desh during early stages to lay groundwork for future pro-Chinese political/guerrilla movement, to limit Soviet influence, and to embarrass Indians. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated priority to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and USUN. 187. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS–315/07612–71 187. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS–315/07612–71 1 Washington, December 15, 1971 Subject: High-level Indian Government Official’s Comments on the Visit to India of Vasily Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Country: India, Pakistan, USSR, China DOI: 15 December 1971 ACQ: [ text not declassified ] Source: [ text not declassified ] His information is reliable and accurate. [ text not declassified ] 1. On 15 December 1971 the high-level government official described above stated that Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recognition of Bangladesh by the Soviet Union. The Indian Government official said that the Government of India had asked the Soviet Union to grant political recognition to Bangladesh and immediately thereafter to sign a defense treaty with the newly-installed government. Kuznetsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to recognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian Army successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces. Kuznetsov added that, if the USSR is to retain whatever small influence it still has in Pakistan, it cannot recognize Bangladesh until these conditions are met. 2. According to the Indian official, the Soviet Union is impatient with the Indian armed forces for their inability to liberate Bangladesh within the ten-day time frame mentioned before the outbreak of hostilities. Kuznetsov has told the Indians that the Soviet position in the Security Council of opposing a cease-fire become more untenable the longer the war goes on in the east. Which Kuznetsov said the Soviet Union will continue to use its veto to stall any efforts to bring about a cease-fire for the present, he stressed the importance of quick and decisive Indian action in liberating Bangladesh in the shortest time possible. 3. Kuznetsov delayed his scheduled return to Moscow because he is awaiting special instructions for Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, regarding India’s request that the Soviet Union sign a defense agreement with the Bangladesh Government after Soviet recognition of Bangladesh. According to Kuznetsov, Brezhnev was not in Moscow when Kuznetsov sent him the request for guidance. 4. Kuznetsov also discussed with Indian leaders the threat of Chinese intervention. The Indian Government official said both the Indian officials and Kuznetsov agreed it is possible that the Chinese may decide to launch an attack throgh Sikkim. They estimated that, after accomplishing the limited objective of overwhelming Indian defensive position in the Siliguri area, the Chinese would withdraw back across the border as they did in 1962 to the embarassment of the Indian Government. 5. [ text not declassified ] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissemination. Sent to the White House, and distributed within the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, the JCS, and NSA. Also sent to Islamabad for the Ambassador, the DCM, the political counselor, and the defense attaché. Sent to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras for principal officers only, and to CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, AND CINCARPAC. 188. Telegram 19243 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 188. Telegram 19243 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, December 15, 1971, 0738Z Subject: Deployment Carrier Task Force in Indian Ocean 1. Up until last few days I have felt able to defend U.S. policy on the basis of our over-riding concern to bring a halt to hostilities. I am now troubled by fact a number of my diplomatic colleagues view deployment of carrier task force as military escalation by U.S. 2. This was forcefully brought to my attention by Canadian High Commissioner George who believes that our decision to deploy carrier task force at this time has served as encouragement to President Yahya to continue Pak military effort. In this regard George believes that Yahya’s disavowal of initial Farman Ali message and subsequent message from Governor Malik was directly related to word of carrier task force deployment. 3. Furthermore, George views deployment as direct injection super power involvement which bound to increase nervousness of both Soviets and Chinese and likely prompt or serve as screen for their increased involvement. 4. George has indicated that he is sending strong message along these lines to his Prime Minister, recommending that Trudeau in turn contact President. 5. In order to place me in a position to defend this development I would welcome fullest possible rationale to respond to foregoing arguments advanced by my colleagues here. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-PAK War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House. 189. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 189. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 15, 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m. Nixon: How about India at the present time? Kissinger: Look, what we got yesterday— Nixon: [unclear] about the same as last night? Kissinger: Yeah. Except that I think we are moving towards an acceptance of the British resolution. But actually now—I haven’t told Bob yet—the Russians came in yesterday giving us their own guarantee that there would be no attack on West Pakistan. Nixon: A letter from Brezhnev. Kissinger: An addition—an explanation of the letter to—of Brezhnev saying, “They,” the Soviet Union, “guarantees there will be no military action against West Pakistan.” So we are home, now it’s done. It’s just a question what legal way we choose. Nixon: Well, what the UN does is really irrelevant. Kissinger: Well, it’d be—the bastards, of course, have broken promises before. It’d be better to have it on public record. We might be able to do it in an exchange of letters between Brezhnev and you. That is made public, in which you say you express your concern, and he says he wants to assure you. Nixon: Well, what does that do now to the Chinese? Kissinger: Oh, the Chinese would be thrilled if West Pakistan were guaranteed. Nixon: [unclear] Did you get the—you got that, the concern about the summit thing cooled off? That—you get that? Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, that it was unintentional that it blew in to such a fantastic thing. And if you read the full report, you’ll see that they— Nixon: Well, it isn’t that big, actually. It’s a still, still a secondary story. Kissinger: But I think— Haldeman: Only CBS carried it as a big story. They termed it—nobody else really— Kissinger: I think it has this advantage, Mr. President. First of all, since we now know there will be a settlement, you will get a major credit for it. Second, it shows that you are not a politician; that you were willing to put the summit on the line when the peace was at stake. Third, it [unclear] to the Russians. Fourth, it helps with the, with the— Nixon: Indians. Kissinger: With the Indians. Nixon: With the Chinese. Kissinger: With the Chinese. Hell, that fellow Vorontsov came babbling in here, said “Can’t you give me some reassurance. I know Brezhnev is terribly concerned when he reads that we need some words of reassurance.” And I’m a great believer in selling something you’ve already done. So I turned to Haig, I said, “Tell Ziegler to calm it down a little bit.” But you people should understand, by that time Ziegler had already agreed to calm down. And I told him,”Brezhnev has to understand, you cannot play such a game with the President.” So I—and that’s when he said “well, I just had a cable to tell the President we give him, that this letter means that the Soviet Government gives him the guarantee that there will be no attack on West Pakistan. No annexation of West Pakistan.” Nixon: Vorontsov talking now? Kissinger: Yeah. He said no annexation of West Pakistan territory as of now. Don’t play any legalistic games with me. We consider the dividing line the existing dividing line, and also that disputed territory cannot be taken. He said yes, that’s the guarantee. So now it’s just a question of how to formalize it. Nixon: How do you do it? Kissinger: It’s a miracle— Nixon: How do you get the formalization of letters between Brezhnev and me [unclear]. Kissinger: It’s an absolute miracle, Mr. President. Nixon: Did you try to work that out? That we—I’d like to do it in a certain way that pisses on the Indians without, you know what I mean? I mean, we can’t [unclear] we have an understanding, an understanding with West Pakistan. Well, I don’t know. If you think it’s a good idea. I—don’t ask me. Kissinger: No, I think it’s a good idea. But we have—I have this whole file of intelligence reports, which makes it unmistakably clear that the Indian strategy was— Nixon: To knock—oh, sure. Kissinger:—to knock over West Pakistan. Nixon: Over the line of control here. Most people were ready to stand by and let her do it, bombing Calcutta [sic.] and all. Kissinger: They really are bastards. Nixon: The son-of-a-bitch [unclear]— Kissinger: Now, after this is over we ought to do something about that goddamned Indian Ambassador here going on television every day— Nixon: He’s really something. Kissinger:—attacking American policy. And— Nixon: Why haven’t we done something already? Kissinger: And I—I’d like to call State to call him in. He says he has unmistakable proof that we are planning a landing on the Bay of Bengal. Well, that’s okay with me. Nixon: Yeah, that scares them. Kissinger: That carrier move is good. That— Nixon: Why, hell yes. That never bothers me. I mean it’s a, the point about the carrier move, we just say fine, we had a majority. And we’ve got to be there for the purpose of their moving there. Look, these people are savages. Kissinger: Mr. President, an aggregate— Nixon: I want a word, put a word to give to Scali to use that we—that the—we cannot, the United Nations cannot survive and we cannot have a stable world if we allow one member of the United Nations to cannibalize another. Cannibalize, that’s the word. I should have thought of it earlier. You see, that really puts it to the Indians. It has, the connotation is savages. To cannibalize— Kissinger: Mr. President— Nixon:—and that’s what the sons-of-bitches are up to— Kissinger: One, one other thing we have done, if I may say, rather well. We’ve put the Chinese in the position where they’re more eager to yield than we are. We can’t be accused. [Omitted here is conversation largely unrelated to South Asia except for a brief discussion of the strategy to be adopted in discussing the crisis with the press.] Kissinger: And now, Mr. President, what I wanted to check with you just to make sure you approved, I’m having Vorontsov in at 11:30. And I propose to tell him the following: Look, the Security Council thing can go on forever. Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger: What you and we had in mind, what you and we can do is, the President was very impressed by [unclear]. Nixon: And by the letter of Brezhnev. Kissinger: Well, that I told him already we weren’t impressed with, Mr. President. I told him that was just words. What we need is something complete. Nixon: Yeah, fine. All right. Kissinger: He was very impressed with these assurances. That we could make peace formal. That the President writes you a letter and you respond. Or that you write us a letter and we respond. It doesn’t make much difference who takes the first step, in which you’d say that you know that no military action [is] planned against West Pakistan. Nixon: All right. Just put it in the letter. Kissinger: And the territorial integrity, that we both publish these letters then we can symbolize— Nixon: Soviet-American— Kissinger: Soviet-American concern for peace. Nixon: Good, good, good. Kissinger: And the beauty is— Nixon: But tell him the beauty, it would only be beautiful if we do it fast. Kissinger: Yeah. We can then go to the Chinese and say, look— Nixon: Gotcha. Kissinger: I mean, we got out of this with the Chinese— Nixon: I dislike the idea of Soviet-America, our [unclear]—we’ve laid it up too, set it up by threatening them. Now let’s go right to— Kissinger: Now one of two things is going to happen today, Mr. President: either they will both vote for the British resolution in the Security Council, in which case they will take credit for it, or they will not vote for the British resolution and exchange these letters. Nixon: Yeah. But we do tell them that the exchange of letters can be good, even if they vote for it. Exchange of letters–—tell them that the President believes that it would be [?] very salutary to our relations if we have an exchange of letters. Kissinger: Yeah. Well, we have always the worry about [unclear] in Peking. Nixon: Well, I know, but we tell them, you know what you tell them. You tell the Peking guys, the President he didn’t care what the [UN]Security Council did. He wanted to have it directly from the Russians. He’s fortunate. Kissinger: Well, what if the Russians vote with us at the Security Council? We are fine. Nixon: Well, ok. Kissinger: Because, really, the Chinese thing is almost marvelous, that we brought it to this point without them blowing up. Nixon: Yeah, ok. Kissinger: I think it would be too much collusion if we add an exchange of letters after there has already been a vote. [Omitted here is discussion of attempts to manage the news.] Kissinger: But actually, if the game plan works out, it has the advantage of giving you credit. Where on the previous game plan all that would have happened was that the British put forward a resolution, everybody votes for it, and then they say— Nixon: Stupid Americans. Kissinger: The Americans were saved by the goddamn British. Now we can make, now no one will doubt— Nixon: We’re in the game. Yeah. I would say this, we were just lucky. We probably wouldn’t have intended to have this kind of a play. But I think we may get it done. And I don’t—you know something? Kissinger: But the trip was intentional. Nixon: Henry, we mustn’t get too upset by what we call flak, or something like that. Things are not perfect. Sometimes those things that turned out to be accidents are damned good for us. In any event, you can’t change it. [unclear] That’s exactly what I told the Russian. That also happens to be totally true. Kissinger: Right now it helps US with the Chinese; it puts a little more scare into the Indians; it helps us with the Paks; and if we turn it into a positive, it will help with the Russians. Nixon: I’ll tell you, it helps us with our U.S. conservatives too. Kissinger: It helps you— [unclear exchange] Kissinger: And it helps with the people who say you are taking it only for political reasons. Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger: Because you put it right on the line. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Haldeman, and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 638–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. 190. Telegram 11410 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 190. Telegram 11410 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, December 15, 1971, 1656Z Subject: UK Views on India/Pakistan 1) Sir Stanley Tomlinson, Deputy Under Secretary, FCO, summoned us late December 14 to discuss US and UK policies on India-Pakistan. Making clear that he was expressing views of UK Govt, Tomlinson led off by observing that he had been privileged during his career to play an active part in US-UK relationship and it had been a rewarding and satisfying experience to him personally that the two govts had been able to act in concert and share a high degree of mutual confidence on major issues over a long period. It was a cause for disappointment and concern, therefore, to British Ministers and officials that in recent times there had been marked differences between US and UK policies on some important problems. 2) Sir Stanley said the India-Pakistan situation had raised questions within the UKG as to whether the two governments were proceeding on the basis of different intelligence information and political assessments. Further, the UK felt that it really did not know the basis for US thinking and the objectives we were pursuing. He said he would like to indicate some specific aspects of US policy which were puzzling or disturbing to the UK. 3) Suspension of economic aid to india. Tomlinson said the UK regretted that the USG had thought it necessary to take that step. He gathered that the rationale behind US action was that provision of economic aid which might be used to sustain the war effort was contrary to principles of the aid program. While not wishing to argue the point, the UK had decided not to suspend its aid to India and had hoped that this aspect of the problem would not be carried further. The UK believed that aid policy should continue to be handled through the consortium, and HMG had not attempted to press its point of view on other consortium members. The UK was disappointed, therefore, to learn that the US had used its influence to persuade some other governments, specifically Japan and Germany, to adopt similar positions on aid to India. 4) Bangla Desh attitudes. Tomlinson said he did not know the extent of US contacts or information vis-à-vis Bangla Desh representatives. Based on information available to them, UK officials were convinced that Bangladesh leaders would not settle for anything less than complete independence. Tomlinson observed that the UKG was not itself advocating Bangla Desh independence and that a confederal arrangement or any other solution which might be worked out between West and East Pakistan would be acceptable to the UK, but stark reality led the UK to conclude that independence was inevitable. If the US assessed the situation differently, the UK would like very much to know. 5) US views on the possibilities of earlier negotiations between Pakistan and Bangla Desh representatives. Tomlinson noted that UK officials had been puzzled by earlier statements by high US official to the effect that the US believed negotiations which the US had been trying to facilitate between Pakistan and Bangla Desh representatives could have led to positive political results. The UK wondered whether the US had information other than what had been available to the UK at that time, because the view of UK officials had been that even if such talks could have been arranged they held out little if any hope for progress. 6) Withdrawal of Indian forces from East Pakistan. Tomlinson said the UK would be grateful to learn the background of US thinking on this proposal. In UK view, main objective now is to prevent massacres of Pakistani forces and Biharis in east, and UK believes only organized force in east capable of preventing such horrors is Indian Army. UK has sought and received assurances from Indian Govt that Indian forces would conduct themselves in manner to minimize loss of life and ensure humane treatment. In circumstances, UK believes it would be serious mistake to insist that Indian forces withdraw immediately, even if that were realistic possibility. 7) Indian intentions re territorial gain. Tomlinson reiterated what Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary said previously (London 11295), i.e., UK assessment is that India does not have objective of territorial gains. He acknowledged that there had been some equivocation on Azad Kashmir but believed that statements by PriMin Gandhi and Swaran Singh could be taken at face value. UK wondered whether US assessment differed. 8) Security Council. Tomlinson went over same ground as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary (London 11295) but noted that information just received indicated possibility that US may now be willing to accept language along lines proposed by UK for SC resolution. 9) Comment: In view conversation with Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary December 12 and subsequent remarks to us by FCO Junior Minister Royle expressing concern about US-UK cooperation on India-Pakistan situation, we were not surprised that Tomlinson called us in for candid talk. There was no note of censure in what he said, but rather hope and desire that the US and UK Govts could find ways to share their thinking more fully and work in closer harmony. Annenberg 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 191. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 191. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 16, 1971, 10:40 a.m. K: The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West. We have make it. P: What’s it mean? K: Ordered forces to stop fighting. P: What’s territory? From what you said yesterday—taken Kashmir? K: In West have some desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir. Major is to stop defeat of Pakistan army. P: What’s the source? K : Official announcement. P : It’s the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out. K: Already a call from State. Until this morning we were running the UN thing. Now they are and say they will go over resolution. They are pulling off the British Resolution. You pulled it through and should take credit. I will give a backgrounder tomorrow afternoon. P: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines. K: Can’t do it today. We have to clean it up. P: Any other thing—in view of Time Man of the Year thing get Schechter in. He will understand it. Or who at Time would know more about this subject? K: I will start with Schechter. He has been decent. P: Time might write best analysis of crisis. You really feel that they mean—let me come back to it. You were bearish last night. K: I felt nothing would happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet because Indians took longer on taking Dacca then they figured. So this morning I said next 24 hours will tell. P: If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on an arms-length deal. K: We have to get straight what they did. P: What they did in ’67 June war. K: 60% instead of 100%. P: June war. K: Except they lost. P: They got credit for bringing peace to the M. E. Agreed to peace after defeat of their army. And they were responsible for the war. Not a public statement but internal relations with Soviets. You handle that. ? ? ? ? You agree? they K: Absolutely. So far they have not done anything. Indians did official doing. But I am sure its Soviets that produced it. P: On the unilateral ceasefire or what? K: UN resolution making it official. When in for weeks they want to come out and mastermind it. We have agreed to the British. Chinese are set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done. P: The President is committed to it. We have told the British and Chinese. Will the Russians accept it? K: Probably. P: Might not. If they do it’s done. K: One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State is trying to scavenge on your agony. Put it together mix with a UN resolution. P: The average person doesn’t understand about this. Pick the real movers and shakers. Ask Scali and let him sit in. Ask him and Ziegler who and Make it small enough to be powerful. I don’t care if they are friends or enemies Maybe Kraft. It’s very important to do Time people and maybe a couple of network people. K: Chancellor. P: Anybody. You sit down there. Work it out. Get hold of Scali. A cold blooded deal. On other levels let Scali carry the line nd Ziegler. K: That would be good. P: It’s good to hear. K: The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way this morning. P: I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are putting the summit on the line. K: India would have taken Kashmir and P: Shastri got India’s victory wings. Only 30% of them. K: 30% more then we expected. P: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us. K: For us they would have done it (? ). P: I want strictest—President makes own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers. I don’t want Indian aid to leak out but I will decide it. Shultz to examine budget and no Indian aid in it. K: $300 million for S. Asia. $200 million to Pakistan and rest we will hold. P: Give it to Ceylon. K: Then we don’t get argument we are cutting it. We can give agricultural stuff to India for economic relief. P: They have to pay for aid. K: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan. P: Go off to other. No backgrounder until tomorrow. K: As soon as it’s cleaned up. I will get on it. P: Don’t do it pre-maturely. K: Get Sunday papers. P: Time and networks. K: Congratulations! 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription. 192. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 192. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 16, 1971, 12:15 p.m P: I thought you should know. I called Mitchell on a couple of things. He was in a drug meeting with Rogers at the WH. I got Bill on the phone and told him that I x wanted Sisco and whoever at State to take a hardline on economic assistance thing. He said fine. I will do it myself. So he is on Salvo. Don’t do it publicly. That’s the line, don’t you agree? K: Exactly. P: On your background that’s the way I would play it. Don’t bust India publicly. It’s where we want to have effect. K: She’s written a let to you asking where she went wrong. The policy is working. P: You work with Sisco on conciliatory attitude. Vis a vis State. Let them be tough instead of us. K: I agree. P: No reason for you to talk with the Indian Ambassador. K: No trouble with State now that it’s over. We are trying to get the British to ? ? ? ? ?. We have her text so it’s genuine offer. Trying to formalize it because she can renege at any time. Talked with Bhutto and having Raza in. He thinks and extremely grateful to President. He has Chinese aboard to. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription. 193. Telegram 227784 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 193. Telegram 227784 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, December 18, 1971, 2222Z SUBJECT: Secretary’s Conversation with Bhutto 1. Following is uncleared Memcon, FYI, and subject to revision upon review. 2. Pak Deputy PM-designate, Z.A. Bhutto, called on Secretary December 18 prior to call on President. Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador Raza. Sisco and Laingen sat in. Bhutto expressed deep appreciation that US had stood by Pakistan in defense QUOTE basic principles international law and civilized society UNQUOTE, indicated strong concern over Soviet policies in achieving QUOTE reversal of Cubas at Pakistan’s cost UNQUOTE, and pledged determination seek reconciliation with India. Essential, however, that Indian forces leave East Pakistan promptly; said he thought it still possible preserve Pak unity on basis very loose confederation. In any event effort must be made and he was returning to Pakistan forthwith not to rock boat but to do what he could in context transfer of political power which now vital and urgent. Secretary stressed strong USG support for Pakistan, understanding for severe problems ahead, and intention continue be as helpful as possible. Assured Bhutto we would consult closely before any action re Bangla Desh but noted likelihood we would need and wish to support international humanitarian relief that area. (Continued next page) 3. Secretary gave Bhutto warm welcome, emphasizing our understanding that this was sad time in history Pakistan and that we very pleased to get Bhutto’s views directly regarding future and what we can do together to be helpful. Noted we have tried to do what we could to help in current crisis and that president particularly was understanding and sympathetic on basis certain basic principles and was looking forward to meeting Bhutto later in day. 4. Bhutto said he wanted to make clear at outset that although sometimes referred to as “Yankee-baiting Former Foreign Minister,” he was determined to open new chapter in history Pakistan-US relations. Pakistan deeply grateful to USG for standing by basic principles of international law and civilized society as these had emerged after World War II. US actions and statements in current crisis were important in demonstrating that World War II had not been fought in vain. 5. Bhutto said he wished to make two fundamental points: First, that the whole picture of international law had been disrupted by Soviet behavior in the South Asian crisis and second, that he, Bhutto, was prepared for reconciliation with India. On first point, Bhutto noted that Soviets had reportedly gone even to point of providing Soviet personnel on Indian warships and that they had otherwise equiped Indian vessels and aircraft with latest missiles and technology. He did not know if this true or not but what was true Paks had fought India before but never the Soviet Union. Later was that “Soviets had defeated us.” had now reversed their defeat in Cuba at Pakistan’s cost. Their objective was to show China that not they but rather the Soviets were the leaders of the Third World. 6. Second fundamental point was that he and Pakistani people were. prepared for reconciliation with India. India now has glorious opportunity either to seek reconciliation with Pakistan or become enemy of Pakistan, for all time on scale like Carthage and Rome. If India missed present opportunity, there would be hatred for all time, utter chaos and terrible massacre. He shuddered to think what this could mean for Muslims in Bengal. Moreover, this hatred would spread to whole subcontinent: India must act with magnanimity. Honorable adjustments between two countries could be made but these could not be made in vacuum and would require time. 7. To that end, Bhutto said he was being called home by Yahya and understood special plane was meeting him tomorrow in Rome. He was anxious to get back “to see how land lies.” He would tell President that either there would now be immediate transfer of political power so that he could grapple with enormous problems facing Pakistan or he would go back to his “small ranch in Sind.” He was not going back to rock the boat or to challenge authority. He had done that before in Ayub period but country was in too much of mess now to do this. (In some contradiction to this line, he made point elsewhere during conversation he hoped people of Pakistan would not have to fight another war to achieve political transfer of power in West Pakistan.) 8. Bhutto said that much of tragedy since March could have been avoided had there not been inordinate delay in transfer of power. Military action on 25 March was inevitable but what happened thereafter was not justified and could have been avoided by transfer of power. If government could not carry the people with it, then everyone in government would be pygmies and Pakistan would go from one difficulty to another. 9. However, Indians and others must understand that he, Bhutto, would need a month or more to prepare public opinion for what has taken place. He understood there were already reports of demonstrations and other trouble in West Pakistan over cease-fire agreement. India must act in humility; if it had demands on Pakistan, it should make them through diplomatic channels. Unhappily Indians lack vision and he could not be confident of Indian response. 10. Bhutto said he must ask USG kindly not to act in haste in recognition of so-called Bangla Desh. He was convinced that sentiment still overwhelmingly pro Pakistan in both wings. This clearly demonstrated by fact India had to use military forces to achieve its ends in East Pakistan. Recognition could wait; there were certain preconditions normal to such action in any event in international law which must be met, and Pakistan would hope USG would keep in close touch with Pakistan before acting. 11. Secretary took note of Bhutto’s hope India would act with magnanimity but noted that despite capacity of Indians often to appear magnanimous publicly and on the record, they could be very sanctimonious and self-righteous and act quite differently privately. Bhutto concurred and said it most Important for this reason that USG not lose current political initiative. US should make clear to India that it had treaty relationship with Pakistan and that it was not going to fold up its carpets and leave.” India should also be made to understand from US that latter giving serious consideration to massive economic assistance and considering military assistance in order to restore strategic balance in South Asia. Indians must understand from US that it has major global interests that have been adversely affected by recent Soviet action South Asia and that it would take these into account in seeking long-term permanent settlement. Indians should also hear from US that they could not do one thing in East Pakistan and something else in Kashmir. Indians had used force in East Pakistan but what of Kashmir? 12. These were things that USG should now be telling. India. Whether USG could in fact provide military and economic aid now was not so important. (He aware of public opinion trends in US.) USG and GOP could talk about such things later; important thing was that India should have clear understanding that we considering such action. Secretary commented that India should also understand that accomplishing secession of a neighboring state by force was dangerous principle with widespread consequences. Bhutto agreed,saying this was dangerous Pandora’s box. 13. Secretary observed that he hoped that Bhutto understood that USG would be under strong pressure public opinion to continue involve itself actively in humanitarian relief actions in Bangla Desh. Bhutto said he understood this but hoped it would be done in way that would not imply recognition and would not complicate GOP’s negotiating stance on future of East Pakistan. 14. In response questions by Secretary and Sisco re future evolution East-West Pakistan relations, Bhutto said Pakistan ready and willing negotiate new arrangement. It was important, however, that this be done by people of Pakistan and that there must be withdrawal Indian forces. Mujib was important element but public opinion must first be prepared for his reinvolvement in picture and he did not in any event believe Mujib would remain influential political figure beyond three months’ time. Mujib was good speaker but “very blank in the head.” He could have had all he wanted in March. Only history would be able to say, however, who the real culprit was in March, i.e., “Mujib, Yahya, or me.” In response, questions,’Bhutto declined name others in AL leadership who might assume leading role. Said there were others but they were not men of vision. Unfortunately, East Pakistan had suffered politically during 13 years of military, regime and only Suhrawardy had ever achieved prominence. Bhutto observed that Soviets undoubtedly now actively pushing their own kind of people to the fore in Bangla Desh leadership. 15. Secretary asked what basic stance Bhutto thought USG should take toward East Pakistan. Bhutto’s response was that US could not be unfriendly to 70 million people These people would be heavily dependent on USG since India could obviously do little to help them and only US could promise “hope.” In response specific query from Secretary, Bhutto said he convinced that confederation on “very loose basis” would have been possible in past between East and West Pakistan; he could not say with certainty whether this now possible but it was important that people of Pakistan be allowed to make an effort to accomplish, this. Tragically, what had now happened had set back development in East Pakistan by fifty years. India could do nothing to help in this respect. 16. Bhutto said Mrs. Gandhi now faced dangerous situation. She had laid basis for “Bangla Deshes all over Subcontinent.” (At separate point, referred to “bug of secession” that could spread very fast in West Pakistan if previous balance between East and West not present.) Said Mrs. Gandhi would rue the day she had “gone to bed with Soviet bear.” Soviets had no humanitarian instincts at all. 17. In concluding exchange, Bhutto emphasized again his intention to seek as close a relationship as possible with US. Stressed however that he was “slave of geography” and therefore convinced Pakistan must have balance in its foreign policy. He convinced, for example, that experiences of recent past had demonstrated that this balance important for-US as well. If there had not been that balance, with China playing important role, USG would have faced “terrible liability” in terms need provide military equipment for Pakistan. Secretary concluded by saying that we fully appreciative of very tough job facing Pakistani leadership; USG would be watching and helping as much as it could and in every way possible in ways that would not complicate Pakistan’s difficulties or suggest that we second-guessing their decisions in any way. We would, of course, be under strong compulsion act in humanitarian relief Bangla Desh but again, he wanted Bhutto to know we would do this only in ways that would not complicate Pakistan’s problems. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and approved by Van Hollen. Laingen initialed for Van Hollen. Repeated to New Delhi, USUN, London, Moscow, Tehran, Paris, Dacca, and Calcutta. Sent with an instruction to deliver at the opening of business on December 19. 194. Telegram 19600 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 194. Telegram 19600 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, December 23, 1971, 1035Z Subj: Prime Minister Gandhi on Indo-US Relations We are advised on strictly confidential basis that Mrs. Gandhi told Newsman in exclusive interview Dec 22 that: (A) Indo-American relations can get back to normal today if US wants. Insofar as I’m concerned, they are perfectly normal. I have nothing against us. I’m deeply grateful to people of US. I can’t tell you how many hundreds and hundreds of letters I have received from eminent people in different fields of activity in US right down to school children in third, fourth, fifth and sixth grades. I’ve been very greatly touched by their sentiments. (B) As to misunderstanding by President Nixon of India’s case. It’s not just a question of India’s case insofar as Bangla Desh is concerned. It’s a question of recognizing what India is, what India stands for and what India wants to do. We have never accepted theory of balance of power, and we have no intention doing it now. (C) There is fantastic nonsense being talked about in US about our having received promises from the Soviet Union (i.e., concerning Soviet intervention against 7th Fleet and against China). I assure you that these matters were not talked over with Soviets and if after all this US refuses to recognize what sort of person I am and what sort of country India is, then, I’m afraid, I can’t say what will happen and what sort of relationship we will have. You must be able to judge a person and know what they’re like. (D) As to the economic consequences of war, we’ll have some hardship but we are used to it and can bear it. We are also determined to cut down on all foreign aid, no matter what consequences will be. This regard, we want to be as self reliant as possible, from all sources, insofar as possible. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-PAK War, South Asia, 12/17/71–12/31/71. Confidential; Limdis. 195. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 195. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 23, 1971, 8 p.m K: I have just read your press conference and in connection with this commitment to Pakistan, you should know that the President told Matskevich that there was a commitment and if there was an attack on West Pakistan there would be a confrontation. I also showed this to Vorontsov the next day. I told Alex Johnson. He also made me show it to the British Ambassador to explain... Haldeman was in his office when he asked me to do it. I have been seeing these stories coming out of State... R: Has the President said there is a commitment? K: The quote is if there is an attack on West Pakistan there will be a confrontation. He showed the aide memorie of Kennedy’s—in case of aggression by India against Pakistan the U.S. would come to the assistance of Pakistan. R: It doesn’t say military. I don’t think there is any problem. The Aide Memorie of Kennedy’s does not commit the U.S. to go to war in the event that Pakistan is attacked by India and we should not say that. On the other hand, I pointed out that the discussions we have had with Pakistan indicated we would provide assistance and that can be in whatever form we want. You can’t say Aide Memorie commits U.S. to go to war. You can’t circumvent the Constitution... K: I am not trying to circumvent the Constitution. I am trying to maintain a minimum of credibility which is almost impossible in the light of this niggling. R: Oh, come on. There is no niggling or haggling. I have only said we have no treaty commitment to go to war in the event there is an attack on Pakistan. But, we have no legal obligation. If we suggested we had it would be a catastrophe. None of our treaties provide that we have a commitment to take military action. K: That’s not the point. That document was used to justify some of our actions. R: What document? K: The Aide Memoire. R: No one has said there was no document. K: But it was said that it was washed out in 1965... R: [ text not declassified ] I did not even know about the damn thing. I am convinced U.S. has no legal obligation to go to war. If the President has told people this might lead into a confrontation—fine. I don’t think I said anything that is contradictory. K: What we have said... R: Listen we could always go to war if we want to. K: That’s not the point. R: Nothing I said undermines or undercuts the President... K: But the document was used as a basis of justifying his actions in this and he did use it and he did ask it to be shown to people so he attached some importance to it. R: That’s alright. There is nothing that I said that detracts from it. What I am saying is whether we have a commitment to come to the defense of Pakistan in a military way in the event of a military attack. The answer is no. We can do it as a matter of discretion. We certainly don’t want to tell the American people that we are committed to go to war. See what the newspapers say in the morning and talk to me about it again. K: I am not worried about the newspapers. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–23 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The excision was in accordance with the donor’s deed of gift. 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 196. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, December 30, 1971 SUBJECT: Goals and Objectives of U.S. South Asia Policy You recently asked for ISA’s opinion on what goals we should be seeking for our policies toward South Asia in the wake of the recent crisis. Given the still unsettled state of affairs, this preliminary response is adapted to the fact that the recent crisis has upset prevailing relationships within the area and between it and the great powers so profoundly that they are in a state of flux. India has emerged as the unchallenged power on the subcontinent. In addition, Mrs. Gandhi’s political position has been greatly enhanced internally by the country’s military successes in the east. The tide of popular euphoria upon which her fortunes are currently cresting will fade, however, as the hard realities of economic restoration, return of the refugees, and emergence of an independent but helpless Bangla Desh become evident. The replacement of the Yahya government in Pakistan has ushered in a period of great uncertainty where the perception of what Bhutto may accomplish is mixed. Brilliant and ambitious, he is the sole apparent charismatic leader capable of reordering West Pakistani national priorities. Contradictions in his approach will complicate our relations with him. He is independently wealthy but espouses hard-line socialist aims. He has repeatedly condemned U.S. South Asia policy publicly while showing balance and charm in his private contacts with our diplomats. His announced transfer of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali leader, from prison to house arrest is a positive step toward reconciliation with the east, and thus with India, but his statements concerning subcontinental relations continue to be bellicose. The situation in Bangla Desh is far too murky to permit even preliminary judgments. Indian actions, however, appear to be aimed at removing both the Pakistani military and the non-Bengali population from harm’s way. New Delhi also seems to be working toward solidifying the position of the moderate, elected Awami League leadership to head off a power grab by extremist elements. India’s resort to war has underscored the ineffectiveness of the UN in preventing or resolving major crises. It is all the more evident that we need a less public and more time-sensitive medium through which regional participants can be pressed to address their own problems by larger power leverage. With these facts in mind, we may discern the broad outlines of a useful policy over the near term. We must take a hand in the restoration of stability and balance in the region, recognizing that South Asia will remain only a secondary area of international interest to us. At the same time, profiting from our experiences in the Middle East, we should avoid commitments to one side or the other that would foreclose freedom of maneuver in the face of significant political change. In that regard, our current stance with military supply lines closed to all participants is, I believe, the proper one for the immediate future. Comparison of South Asia with the Middle East should not be carried too far. In South Asia, Moscow has backed the indisputably dominant power. In the Mideast, on the other hand, the Kremlin has no illusions that the Arabs could overpower Israel without its direct intervention. Continuing Israeli capacity for major destructive action in Egypt threatens Soviet political and economic investment in the Middle East. South Asia Goals The principal U.S. goal in South Asia is achievement of a stability that will preclude conflicts likely to attract big power involvement. Expressed negatively, the U.S. must work to reduce the polarization that is now in evidence on the subcontinent. Implementation Economic restoration and development for both Pakistan and Bangla Desh are obvious prerequisites for achieving stability. From the Defense standpoint, however, our most pressing requirement will be to recommend adequate security arrangements for Pakistan. A defenseless Pakistan would tempt India as well as Afghanistan. On the other hand, a Pakistan committed to achieving military “parity” with India, or to regaining its “lost territory,” could keep South Asia in precarious turmoil, assuming that outside powers were willing to finance and equip such a posture. Development of a U.S. military supply policy for Pakistan hopefully (1) will move in some kind of concert with Chinese actions; (2) be contingent upon the resumption by Pakistan of sound economic programs; and (3) be accompanied by a cooperative security program with Islamic Middle East countries. Pakistan will need tangible as well as diplomatic support from the Middle East if she is to attain self-confidence and break out from her current diplomatic isolation. Both Pakistan and the U.S. can capitalize on the strong anti-Soviet fallout in North Africa and the Middle East which has resulted from Soviet association with India’s actions. The U.S. could resume shipment of spares and could provide some attrition replacements to Pakistan, following full political settlement with lndia and Bangla Desh. As a next step, we could provide unmistakably defensive military hardware, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, followed possibly by interceptor aircraft. The question of a military supply policy towards India is a very different matter. Militarily, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan, India does not need our lethal hardware. Within a decade or less, it will probably not need Soviet offensive equipment either. In the interim, New Delhi will be seeking to keep an independence of action against the day that indigenous production fully assures its national security. The USSR, on the other hand, will seek to increase its influence in India, pressing toward the day when New Delhi, still short of achieving domestic production independence, must grant Soviet base rights. Unlike the Pakistani case, a U.S. policy reversion to the April 1967 dictum, or even the 1966 approach under which we permitted sales of nonlethal items only, is capable of providing a necessary symbolic alternative to Soviet dominance. As mentioned above, a better approach than any of the foregoing that treat India and Pakistan in traditional isolation from one another, is an effort to achieve detente—a microcosm of what we seek to establish in our own dealings with Moscow and Peking. An unequivocal military success and a stable governmental position creates in India a certain disposition towards magnanimity on this score. Mrs. Gandhi has already indicated a willingness to negotiate all issues with Pakistan. Our policy approach should hold her feet to the fire. The end of 13 years of military rule in Pakistan with the old order in eclipse lays the groundwork for Islamabad’s susceptibility to new solutions. Overall, we should be cautious in interpreting recent South Asian events as a smashing Soviet “victory” achieved partly at U.S. expense. India is not apt to become a docile or easy ally for the Soviets. India inevitably will wish to improve relations with both Washington and Peking as a balance to the Soviet presence. China, in turn, will eventually resume what has been until recently a clear effort to improve relations with India. In pursuit of South Asian stability, therefore, we need a U.S. policy that is flexibly assigned to support all the countries of the area. We need to move decisively toward humanitarian efforts on behalf particularly of Pakistan and Bangla Desh. None of the countries of the area could afford the luxury of a constant state of hostility toward its neighbors. Resumption of our larger-scale economic or military relationships therefore should be keyed to each country’s preparedness for detente and for can count. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 76–0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Aug–Dec) 1971. Secret; Sensitive. 197. Telegram 232870 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 197. Telegram 232870 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 30, 1971, 0016Z SUBJECT: UN Humanitarian Assistance for the East 1. We have reviewed the question of humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the war and in context of the present situation that exists in the East. In discussing this matter with Bhutto on Saturday, latter indicated to Secretary that he understood why US would wish to provide humanitarian assistance in East, but he expressed hope that it be done in such a way that there be no implication of recognition of Bangla Desh. 2. UN seems to be regrouping itself, and there is hope that they will get on with task of humanitarian relief in East in a reasonably effective way as many of refugees start back. We will want to continue to support humanitarian relief effort in the East, but timing and amounts of our support will have to be carefully reviewed in light of developments in South Asia. We do not want assumption made, either by international community or by Indians, that US will more or less automatically pick up a substantial part of tab. 3. Whatever we do at least in foreseeable future, will want be through UN, in kind rather than dollars, and to assure that our assistance goes to East directly and not to or through India. In this connection, for example, there is considerable amount of US grain already in pipeline ready for distribution in East as soon as UN can take hold and get it to refugees and others in need. There are also certain administrative costs which UN has and will in future incur. We will not want to make any commitments at this time on such costs, pending results of any appeal which UN makes to UN membership generally to provide help in East. In addition to mandate which UN High Commissioner for Refugees has resulting from Third Committee action, there is also resolution adopted by Security Council on Tuesday evening which calls for international assistance and gives SYG a specific role in dealing with such humanitarian problems. 4. There are definite policy advantages for US to be both positive and helpful with respect to humanitarian assistance in East. However, in view of changed situation in Subcontinent resulting from war, we believe that others should be required to contribute very substantially. We will want to do enough to demonstrate our deep concern and concrete desire to relieve suffering by substantial material support of a UN relief assistance program, but we do not want UN or others to make assumption that they can more or less automatically expect that US is going to share a disproportionate part of the burden. 5. We already have a case in point before us. UN has made an informal request for US to finance coastal vessels. We understand that UN wishes grant to cover costs of chartering ten minibulkers to carry food and other relief supplies into interior of East Bengal. We are fully prepared to participate in internationally supported effort of UN as is evidenced by fact that there is a substantial amount of American grain in pipeline which UN should utilize as needed. We find it noteworthy that UN automatically has come to US unilaterally, to finance such things as minibulkers or provide UN with funds to take care of administrative costs, (our assumption is that in early January UN will need such money). We do not want to respond overeagerly; whether and what we contribute in this regard will depend on how generous others are willing to be in response to an appeal from UN for assistance. 6. In short, UN should understand that US will be willing to share in international effort generally but they should not assume more or less automatically that we intend to play a leading role in this regard and assume preponderant share of costs. END Johnson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and C. Herbert Rees, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (AID/NESA) on December 23; cleared in AID/NESA by Williams and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Calcutta. U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972 U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972 198. Editorial Note 199. Telegram 22 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State Karachi, January 3, 1972, 1014Z Ambassador Farland met with Pakistani President Bhutto who was planning to announce that day that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would be released from prison. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad. 200. Telegram 26 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State Karachi, January 3, 1972, 1154Z In response to Pakistani President Bhutto’s request to President Nixon for economic assistance to help Pakistan recover from the effects of the war with India, Ambassador Farland said that he was authorized by Nixon to begin negotiations for a new PL–480 agreement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore. The text of Bhutto’s letter to Nixon on December 21, 1971, transmitted to Islamabad on December 30 in telegram 233015, is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 330 201. Telegram 300 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, January 9, 1972, 0427Z Ambassador Keating argued in the Embassy’s policy assessment for 1971 for efforts to improve U.S. relations with the predominant power on the subcontinent. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras with a request that the Department repeat as desired. On January 13 Sisco responded to Keating’s overview of U.S. relations with India with a personal telegram to Keating in which he said that Keating’s analysis was of great value but added: “Many of the policy issues you raise involve a complex series of decisions and it is unlikely that we shall be able to give you a comprehensive reply.” (Telegram 6586 to New Delhi; ibid.) 202. Telegram 364 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, January 12, 1972, 1130Z Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Bhutto had reacted skeptically to Mujibur Rahman’s statement that there would be no ties between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Secret; Nodis. 203. Backchannel Message from the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Islamabad, January 13, 1972, 0949Z Farland assessed the situation in Pakistan and concluded that Pakistani President Bhutto faced serious difficulties in virtually every area of national activity. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Middle East, Farland, Amb. (Pakistan). Secret. Kissinger’s and Nixon’s initials were written on the message in what appears to be Haig’s handwriting, suggesting it was forwarded to both of them. Farland was responding to a request from Nixon, sent to him backchannel on January 2, for an assessment of the situation in Pakistan. (Backchannel message WH 20010 from Kissinger to Farland; ibid., Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1972, Amb. Farland, Pakistan) 204. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 16, 1972, 1 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger looked toward improved relations with India, but not until mid-year. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan-Apr 1972. No classification marking. The omission is in the original transcription. 205. Telegram 642 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, January 16, 1972, 0711Z Ambassador Keating reported that Foreign Secretary Kaul told him that his Government felt the time had come to improve relations between India and the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, London, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, and Bangkok for Nelson Gross, the Secretary’s Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs. 206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, January 17, 1972 Rogers submitted to Nixon a paper prepared in the Department of State outlining policy objectives in South Asia with the suggestion that it be circulated to the members of the NSC as a basis for discussion. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. The attached paper was Secret; Exdis. Rogers’ memorandum and the attached paper, drafted on January 15, were circulated on January 17 by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the CIA. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) An earlier draft of the paper, submitted on January 7 by Sisco to Rogers, indicates it was drafted in NEA/INC by Quainton with the concurrence of Schneider and Van Hollen. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF1–1 ASIA SE) 207. Analytical Summary Prepared by Members of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 17, 1972 The summary analyzed the papers dealing with postwar issues in South Asia which were prepared for the Senior Review Group in anticipation of its meeting on January 19. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders and Kennedy transmitted the summary to Kissinger in a January 17 memorandum. (Ibid.) The reference in the summary to a Department of State options paper is to Document 206. The remainder of the papers cited in the study can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72, and ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). The paper dealing with Bangladesh and the letters from Prime Ministers Heath and McMahon are included in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume. See documents 376, 386, and 387. 208. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to President Nixon Washington, January 18, 1972 Raza conveyed a letter from Pakistani President Bhutto to Nixon in which Bhutto expressed appreciation for the support the U.S. gave to Pakistan during the conflict with India, and asked for continuing U.S. support as Pakistan attempted to negotiate a peace settlement and recover from the impact of the conflict. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. The text of Bhutto’s letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 28 in telegram 16271. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 209. Telegram 774 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, January 19, 1972, 1110Z Ambassador Keating asked for authorization to reciprocate the interest in improved relations expressed by Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul on January 15. Keating recognized that a policy review was in process in Washington but felt that neither country should delay the process of improving bilateral relations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, Madras, and priority to Saigon for Nelson Gross. Telegram 300 and 642 are Documents 201 and 205. 210. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting Washington, January 19, 1972, 3:04–4:25 p.m. The Senior Review Group reviewed South Asia policy and decided to recommend that recognition of Bangladesh be postponed, the restoration of improved relations with India take place slowly, and restrictions on trade with Pakistan be removed. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Secret; Nodis. The January 19 attachment is Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For the Departments of State and Defense documents cited by Kissinger see Documents 206 and 207. 211. Airgram A–20 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, January 21, 1972 The Embassy offered an assessment of India’s nuclear intentions. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–8 INDIA. Secret; Exdis; Noforn; dissem/controlled, dissem/no dissem abroad. For background use only. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Drafted on January 17 by political officer Harmon Kirby and approved by DCM Galen Stone. 212. Telegram 11838 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, January 21, 1972, 1406Z Ambassador Jha met with Under Secretary of State Irwin to reiterate India’s interest in improved relations with the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on January 20 by Quainton, cleared by Van Hollen, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Kathmandu, Dacca, Islamabad, Saigon, and Moscow. 213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 22, 1972 The Department of Defense recommended renewal of military supplies to Pakistan, conditioned upon the political climate in the U.S. and the impact of such supplies on prospects for a settlement between Pakistan and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Sensitive. 214. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, January 24, 1972 Raza transmitted a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Bhutto in which Bhutto asked the United States to underwrite the sale of rice by Pakistan to what he continued to refer to as East Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Most Immediate. The attached letter is undated and bears an unsigned typed signature. Kissinger’s handwritten notation on Raza’s letter reads: “Al–Make sure this receives urgent attention.” Haig, in turn, wrote on the letter: “Saunders Rush.” The text of Bhutto’s letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 29 in telegram 16993. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–RICE 17 BANGLA DESH–US) 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 25, 1972 The memorandum transmitted the joint State-AID recommendations for economic policy for Pakistan and India, put forward in response to a tasking from the Senior Review Group, which included PL–480 agreements with both countries and debt deferral for Pakistan. From the perspective of State and AID, the resumption of economic assistance to India should depend upon “Indian intentions.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Tiger and Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); revised by Irwin; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Sisco, and by Rees and Williams. Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot. 216. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 26, 1972 The Department recommended continued suspension of the sale or delivery of lethal military equipment and spare parts to India and Pakistan “until the situation is further clarified.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed for Eliot. 217. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 28, 1972 In a memorandum prepared for Kissinger and the Senior Review Group, the Department outlined alternate strategies for U.S. policy in South Asia. One strategy called for no major modifications of policy while the situation on the subcontinent was still in flux. The other envisioned taking advantage of the fluid situation to move toward more normal relations with India and to recognize and establish relations with Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed the memorandum for Eliot. 218. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, January 28, 1972 Raza informed Sisco that Pakistan intended to call upon the UN Security Council to post UN observers along the border between India and Pakistan to report on Indian violations of the cease-fire. Pakistan requested U.S. support for this initiative. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK/UN. No classification marking. 219. Analytical Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 28, 1972 In a summary prepared for Kissinger, Saunders and Kennedy analyzed issues concerning South Asia that the Senior Review Group was scheduled to discuss on February 1. Drawing on papers prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, AID, and the NSC staff, they summarized issues relating to strategy, humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, military supply, and cease-fire and withdrawal. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret. A January 28 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger indicates that they drafted the summary. (Ibid.) Of the papers cited in the summary, the January 28 Department of State paper dealing with alternate strategies is Document 217 and the January 25 paper on economic assistance for India and Pakistan is Document 215. Two of the papers dealing with military supply, dated January 22 and January 26, are Documents 213 and 216. The third, “Commerce Licenses for India and Pakistan,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. On January 28 the NSC staff prepared an assessment of a Department of State paper dealing with the issues of ceasefire and withdrawal that was sent to the NSC on December 22. The paper and assessment can be found ibid. A January 26 paper dealing with humanitarian assistance is in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume as Document 389. The discussion in the summary of the possibility of the U.S adopting a more independent position vis-à-vis the three major powers of the area, in the paragraph which outlines Strategy II, prompted Kissinger to ask a question in the margin: “When?” 220. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting Washington, February 1, 1972, 2:35–3:57 p.m. The Senior Review Group discussed several policy issues relating to South Asia that were pending decision. Much of the discussion dealt with humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. 221. Memorandum for the President’s File Washington, February 3, 1972 In a conversation with Ambassador Keating, President Nixon told him to tell the Indian Government that “India has a friend in the White House.” The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger added: “But we must move at a measured pace.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 30, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger. 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, February 4, 1972 In the light of reports indicating that India might test a nuclear weapon in the near future, Nutter pointed up the dangerous implications of such a development. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 77–0094, India 471.61, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on February 5. A handwritten note in an unknown hand, beneath Nutter’s signature, reads: “L&N–We might pressure USSR to control Indian nuclear ventures.” 223. Memorandum for the President’s File Washington, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20 p.m. President Nixon and World Bank President Robert McNamara discussed restoration of U.S. economic assistance to India. Nixon questioned the value of such assistance for the U.S. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 6, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the President’s office in the Old Executive Office Building. Connally also attended the meeting. The conversation was also tape-recorded. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, and McNamara, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 320–328) 224. Telegram 1770 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, February 10, 1972, 1500Z Ambassador Keating reported that he and Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul had discussed steps that could be taken to improve relations between the United States and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent by Keating with an instruction to deliver to Sisco at the opening of business on February 10. 225. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 11, 1972, 1 p.m. The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed the possibility of establishing a “realistic” relationship between the United States and India. Kissinger reviewed the controversy over whether he had offered an assurance, during his trip to India in July 1971, that the U.S. would come to India’s assistance if India was attacked by China. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India, Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 226. Telegram 1581 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 17, 1972, 1330Z Chargé Sober reported on indications that Pakistan was interested in a closer security relationship with the U.S. and would welcome the lifting of the arms embargo. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Nodis. Sent to the Department for the attention of Van Hollen. 227. Telegram 1622 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 18, 1972, 1800Z The Embassy transmitted a message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon in which Bhutto reviewed Pakistan’s grievances and concerns regarding India in the hope that they would factor into Nixon’s discussions with Chinese leaders during Nixon’s impending visit to China. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, February 23, 1972 Cline sent to Helms INR’s assessment of the possibility that India was developing a nuclear weapon. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 1, Folder 59, India. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The attached secret report was drafted on February 10 by William D. Howells (INR/DRR/RNA) and Lawrence E. Finch, Chief of the Strategic Affairs Division (INR/DRR/RSG). 229. Telegram 1833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 25, 1972, 1050Z Chargé Sober reported that Pakistani President Bhutto was prepared to meet with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in New Delhi to discuss a comprehensive peace settlement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore. 230. Telegram 1834 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 25, 1972, 1117Z In a conversation with Chargé Sober, Pakistani President Bhutto indicated that he was interested in pursuing a closer security relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 231. Editorial Note 232. Telegram 2922 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, March 8, 1972, 1624Z The Embassy reported that criticism of the United States was a constant theme during a 3-week campaign tour of India by Prime Minister Gandhi. Her anti-U.S. tone was only partially mitigated by occasional acknowledgement of a desire to improve Indo-U.S. relations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, Dacca, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and CINCPAC. 233. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 10, 1972, 4 p.m. The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the U.S. and India in the wake of President Nixon’s trip to China. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. 234. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 10, 1972 Saunders and Hoskinson outlined for Kissinger “where we stand on the economic aid front for Pakistan and where we seem to be heading.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. 235. Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, March 10, 1972, 0725Z Pakistan offered to make military facilities available in Pakistan for U.S. use as part of a program of closer military collaboration between the two countries. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis. 236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 17, 1972 Rogers conveyed to Nixon an assessment of the Pakistani proposals for closer military collaboration and policy recommendations based on the assessment. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. 237. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 18, 1972 Sisco reported on a meeting of the Senior Review Group on March 17. The SRG discussed the major pending policy issues related to South Asia, including the recognition of Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on March 17 and sent through Irwin. This is the only record of this meeting of the Senior Review Group that has been found. 238. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto Washington, March 22, 1972 Nixon discussed his trip to China. He also offered Bhutto the assurance that “We will continue to demonstrate our concern for the well-being and the security of the people of Pakistan and help you through this extremely difficult post-war period.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. A copy of Bhutto’s March 1 letter to Nixon, in which he discussed his impending trips to New Delhi and Moscow, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Nixon’s letter to Bhutto was transmitted to Islamabad on March 23 in telegram 49845. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 239. Telegram 49598 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, March 23, 1972, 0219Z The Department transmitted to the Embassy a summary of an extensive request for military assistance and sales conveyed to Assistant Secretary Sisco on March 20 by Pakistani Ambassador Raza. The request included 100 tanks, 4 submarines, and 3 squadrons of planes. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Peter Constable (NEA/PAF) on March 21; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Alan Ford, Deputy Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales (PM/MAS); and approved by Sisco. Sent for information to DOD/ISA/NESA for Colonel Gross. Raza’s letter to Sisco can be found ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. 240. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 23, 1972 Rogers informed Nixon about his conversation on March 22 with Aziz Ahmed, Secretary General of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ahmed pressed for a decision on Pakistan’s request for military sales and assistance and for an assessment of the future role of the U.S. in South Asia. Rogers assured Ahmed of continuing U.S. support for Pakistan and added that the issue of military supply was under review. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Irwin signed for Rogers. 241. Telegram 3666 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, March 23, 1972, 1550Z Ambassador Keating expressed his opposition to any increase in U.S. military collaboration with Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis. 242. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 29, 1972, 11:30 a.m. Rogers told Kissinger that when he met with Secretary General Ahmed, Ahmed would press for a decision to renew the supply of military equipment to Pakistan. Kissinger responded: “That’s not on.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 243. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 29, 1972, 12:15 p.m. Secretary General Ahmed discussed Pakistan’s security concerns with President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger. He urged the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in South Asia. Nixon responded that his administration would provide all the help that it could to Pakistan, but most of it would be economic assistance. He said it would be difficult to consider military assistance until after the election in November. He added that he intended to recognize Bangladesh within the week. Nixon and Kissinger assured Ahmed of U.S. support for Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 26, 1972. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that Saunders prepared it for the President’s file. 244. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 31, 1972 The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger emphasized to Indian Ambassador Jha the need for India to exercise restraint in dealing with Pakistan. If it did not, and if it used threats of military action, Kissinger said U.S. “restraint would be more difficult to maintain.” He added that the U.S. would oppose any attempt to force territorial changes in Kashmir. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The luncheon meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. The attached clipping is page 17 from the March 27 edition of Newsweek magazine. The Anderson papers were copies of columns written by Jack Anderson for The Washington Post based upon records of WSAG meetings during the December crisis. 245. Telegram 2923 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, April 4, 1972, 0708Z Chargé Sober questioned Pakistani President Bhutto about the request for arms put forward in Washington by Secretary General Ahmed. Bhutto said he did not expect a reply on the bulk of the request until after the U.S. presidential election, but added that the need for spare parts to keep old equipment operational was pressing. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. 246. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, April 6, 1972 Raza detailed the efforts his Government was making to initiate negotiations with India and alleged that India had established preconditions for negotiations designed to delay an agreement to settle the crisis. Pakistan called on the U.S. to impress on India the need for an early settlement of the problems of the subcontinent. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. 247. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, April 13, 1972 With the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s approval, Haig authorized a presentation to Congress on economic assistance for South Asia for the fiscal year that called for $90 million for India, $75 million for Pakistan, and $135 million in an unallocated reserve. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger’s handwritten comment on the first page of the attached memorandum reads: “There is no chance of giving $200 million to India.” There is a note in the margin of that document in a hand that is apparently Saunders’ that reads: “75–75.” Haig wrote “OK” on the Use 90/75 option, and added: “Hal I’ve checked W/ HAK.” Saunders noted on the memorandum that he notified AID and OMB on April 13 of the revised decision. 248. Telegram 65190 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, April 14, 1972, 2358Z Ambassador Farland was instructed upon his return to Islamabad to conduct with Pakistani President Bhutto a full review of U.S.-Pakistani relations and of prospects for peace on the subcontinent. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Sisco; also cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Williams, and at the White House by Haig; and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN. 249. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting Washington, April 17, 1972, 3:05–4:04 p.m. The Senior Review Group discussed U.S. policy objectives in South Asia and the issues bearing on the possibility of improving relations with India. Members agreed that, to the extent possible, U.S. humanitarian and economic assistance to Bangladesh should be provided on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The brief from which Helms spoke in assessing the situation in South Asia can be found ibid. The draft telegram cited in the minutes, containing instructions for opening a dialogue with India on a number of contentious issues, was not sent to New Delhi. After discussion by the Senior Review Group, the telegram was revised in the Department of State and returned to Kissinger for approval on April 19. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK) The revised telegram was not sent because of continuing criticism by the Gandhi Government of the U.S. role in Vietnam. See Document 252. 250. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 18, 1972 Kissinger approved a telegram to Ambassador Keating instructing him to explain to the Indian Government the presentation being made to Congress on the proposed “provisional” assistance program for India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71–July 1972. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent to Kissinger through Haig. Kissinger initialed the approval line. Saunders added a handwritten note in the margin that reads: “with addition conveyed orally by Kennedy.” The addition is not marked on the attached draft telegram. A comparison of the draft text with the telegram as sent on April 19 reveals that Kissinger added the penultimate sentence before approving the telegram. That sentence contained an important qualification: “Decisions on allocation will depend on the results of that review and on the circumstances at the time, and you should make clear that no inference should be drawn one way or the other regarding what amounts, if any, might be made available.” See Document 253. 251. Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon Rawalpindi, April 18, 1972 Bhutto wrote to request that the U.S. intervene on behalf of the Pakistani prisoners of war being held he alleged as bargaining chips by India and under threat of prosecution by Bangladesh for war crimes. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Secret. The letter was delivered to the Department of State on April 25, under cover of a transmittal letter from Charge M. Akram Zaki. The letter was forwarded to the White House on the same day. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 25; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK-US) The text of the letter was transmitted to Islamabad on April 26 in telegram 72027. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 252. Telegram 67415 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, April 19, 1972, 1650Z Ambassador Keating was instructed to lodge a strong objection to the statement made by the Indian Foreign Minister in Parliament on April 17 concerning Vietnam. The U.S. considered the statement to be “a further unfriendly act on part of GOI,” and Keating was instructed to minimize his contacts with Indian officials for 2 weeks. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared in NEA by Davies, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary William H. Sullivan, and in the White House by Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Irwin. 253. Telegram 67420 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, April 19, 1972, 1650Z The Embassy was instructed to use the details of the proposed economic assistance program for South Asia provided in telegram 67420 to brief the Indian Government on the provisional nature of the $90 million allocation for India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad and Dacca. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared by Laingen and Van Hollen, MacDonald (AID), and Saunders (White House); and approved by Irwin. 254. Telegram 4957 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, April 20, 1972, 1426Z Ambassador Keating questioned whether the instruction to register a stiff protest with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh over his statement about Vietnam might have the effect of attaching more importance to the incident than the U.S. intended. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. 255. Telegram 69080 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, April 21, 1972, 0126Z The Department agreed that Ambassador Keating should tone down his objection to Indian Foreign Minister Singh’s statement somewhat when he met with the Foreign Minister. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 20 by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Davies, and Haig (White House); and approved by Rogers. 256. Telegram 5044 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, April 21, 1972, 1450Z Ambassador Keating registered with Indian Foreign Minister Singh an objection to his “unbalanced” statement about the U.S. bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Singh denied that his statement was biased and argued that it was an “objective judgment” on the situation as he saw it. He felt the issue should not prejudice progress toward improved relations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 257. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 24, 1972 Saunders and Hoskinson summarized for Kissinger a CIA assessment of India’s foreign policy in the wake of the war with Pakistan. They also drew policy implications from the assessment. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The 25-page Office of National Estimates memorandum summarized by Saunders and Hoskinson, entitled “India’s Postwar Foreign Policy,” April 5, is ibid. 258. Telegram 5254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, April 27, 1972, 1705Z Ambassador Keating called for Washington to begin the process of trying to reverse what he saw as the “continued downward spiral” of relations between the U.S. and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Nodis. 259. National Intelligence Estimate 32–72 Washington, May 5, 1972 NIE 32–72 assessed Pakistan’s difficult situation and uncertain future. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. An initial cover sheet and table of contents are not published. 260. Telegram 5704 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, May 8, 1972, 1445Z In light of the qualified nature of proposed U.S. economic assistance for India, and the failure to restore the assistance embargoed during the crisis, the Indian Foreign Ministry concluded that the U.S. was no longer interested in the economic development of India and stipulated that “all Americans working on economic aid” should leave India within a month. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Nodis. Eyes only for Sisco and Hannah. 261. Telegram 83263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, May 11, 1972, 2350Z Ambassador Keating was instructed to propose consultations to produce a mutually agreed reduction of U.S. AID staff members in India, taking into account U.S. and Indian priorities for various programs. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes only for Ambassador from Hannah and Sisco. Drafted by Schneider and by Williams and Hannah; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Williams, and Hannah; and approved by Irwin. 262. Telegram 5892 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, May 12, 1972, 0835Z The Embassy submitted to the Department of External Affairs a list of AID personnel working in India with an indication of those leaving by September who would not be replaced. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Sisco and Hannah. 263. Telegram 85263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, May 16, 1972, 0035Z The Department reiterated that the Indian Government should be made aware that the request to reduce AID staff in India was carefully considered in Washington, and that the U.S. concurred. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on May 15 by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen and Williams, and approved by Sisco. 264. Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, May 31, 1972, 1430Z The question of eliminating the U.S. technical assistance program was considered at “the highest levels,” and it was decided that India would continue to request technical assistance in areas where U.S. technical superiority was obvious. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Hannah and Sisco. Additional documentation on the further reduction of U.S. economic and technical assistance programs in India can be found ibid. 265. Telegram 7113 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, June 9, 1972, 1525Z Ambassador Keating viewed the impending visit of outgoing Secretary of the Treasury Connally as an opportunity to take a step in the direction of repairing relations between the U.S. and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 12, 1972 Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. participate with other members of the India consortium in rescheduling India’s debt. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. The President initialed the approval line. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers on June 12 informing him of the President’s decision. (Ibid.) The decision relating to the India consortium came in the wake of the meeting of the Pakistan consortium in Paris on May 26. The United States agreed at that meeting to assume responsibility for $50 million of the $108 million of Pakistan’s long-term debt that was rescheduled and also pledged $60 million of commodity assistance to Pakistan. (Telegram 4900 from Islamabad, June 5; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID 9 PAK) 267. Memorandum of Conversation Peking, June 20, 1972, 2:05–6:05 p.m. In a conversation with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reviewed the cooperation between the United States and China during the crisis in South Asia. Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1971-Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in the Great Hall of the People. 268. Memorandum of Conversation Peking, June 22, 1972, 3:58–6:35 p.m. The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai shared their concern about Soviet influence in South Asia and their opposition to the development of Indian hegemony over the subcontinent. Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia Chronological File, July 1971-Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in a guest house. 269. Telegram 5434 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, June 22, 1972, 1138Z Pakistani President Bhutto indicated that he was prepared to be as flexible as possible during his forthcoming summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. He added that if Awami League President Mujibur Rahman was prepared to meet without requiring prior recognition of his government and dropped the threat to try Pakistani prisoners as war criminals, he anticipated that he could propose recognition of Bangaladesh following a meeting with Mujib in July. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, London, Karachi, and Lahore. 270. Telegram WH 22043 From the White House to the Embassy in New Zealand Washington, June 22, 1972, 2349Z Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig cabled former Treasury Secretary Connally on President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s instructions to suggest that when he met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in New Delhi he inform her that a continuing stream of public criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam on the part of her and members of her Government would not form a basis for the dialogue to improve India’s relations with the U.S. that they indicated they wanted to initiate. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971-Dec 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. The telegram was sent from Haig to Connally and marked for the attention of Hoskinson who was traveling with Connally. 271. Backchannel Message WH22059 From President Nixon to John Connally in New Zealand Washington, June 24, 1972 Nixon referred to the previous telegram from Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig to Connally regarding his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and added the following instruction: “I would like to emphasize that it is essential that you take the strongest stand on this issue and would like to reemphasize the importance I attach to your maintaining the toughest and most aloof demeanor during your Indian leg in the face of these Indian attacks.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig signed the telegram for Nixon. 272. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, July 3, 1972 The note assesses the agreement signed by Pakistani President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi at Simla, India on July 3. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-PAK. Limited Official Use. Drafted in INR/DRR/RNA by David McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis Jones. The Embassy in Pakistan forwarded the text of the Simla agreement to the Department on July 3 in telegram 5737 from Islamabad. (Ibid.) In analyzing the agreement, the Embassy concluded that it set the stage for further negotiations on the central issue of Kashmir. (Telegram 5748 from Islamabad, July 3; ibid) The Department was encouraged by the “clear and repeated affirmation on the part of both India and Pakistan of their desire to put an end to conflict and confrontation in South Asia and of their desire to work towards durable peace.” (Telegram 120269 to New Delhi, July 3; ibid.) 273. Telegram 8245 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 4, 1972, 1921Z The Embassy reported that former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh reviewed the state of U.S.-Indian relations. The focus was on prospects for improved relations, but the exchange became sharp on the issues of U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan and Indian criticism of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated Conto 220. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Athens for Secretary Rogers, the White House for Jeanne Davis, and Treasury for Leonard S. Dixon, Director of the Office of Administration. Connally’s stops in South Asia included Dacca, July 3 and 4, New Delhi, July 4 and 5, Islamabad, July 5–7, and Kabul, July 7. A number of the issues discussed by Connally and Singh on July 4 were explored at greater length with Foreign Secretary Kaul on July 5 by Van Hollen, DCM Galen Stone, and John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. The conversation was reported to the Department on July 6 in Telegram 5874 from Islamabad. (Ibid.) 274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 5, 1972 Kissinger provided an assessment of the Simla agreement. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. 275. National Security Study Memorandum 156 Washington, July 5, 1972 On behalf of the President, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed that an analysis of the implications for U.S. policy of a nuclear test by India be prepared. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), Nos. 104–206. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 276. Telegram 5868 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, July 6, 1972, 1222Z The cable reported on former Treasury Secretary Connally’s exchange with Indian Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan on July 4. The conversation dealt with international monetary and trade reform and with India’s perception that the rules governing economic assistance were inequitable and worked to the disadvantage of third world countries. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated CONTO 240. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Bombay, Madras, Caltigta, Belgrade for Rogers, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 277. Telegram 4075 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2117Z In the first of seven telegrams reporting on his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in Simla on July 5, former Treasury Secretary Connally said that he opened the conversation by summarizing the results of President Nixon’s trips to Peking and Moscow. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated CONTO 254. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 278. Telegram 4076 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2120Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the Simla agreement. Connally raised the issue of U.S. assistance to India and Bangladesh and expressed concern that U.S. motives were being misconstrued. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 255. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 279. Telegram 4077 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2125Z In the course of discussing the possibility of improved relations between the U.S. and India, former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the contentious issues of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan and Indian criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 256. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. Telegrams 4077 through 4080 from Iran, which reported on various aspects of Connally’s conversation with Gandhi, Documents 279–282, were misdated as July 8. 280. Telegram 4078 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2130Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed economic and monetary issues. Gandhi indicated that although her Government had nationalized a number of insurance companies operating in India, she still welcomed foreign investment in sectors such as banking, where India needed foreign investment and expertise. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 257. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 281. Telegram 4079 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2130Z In a discussion of the capability of the new Government of Bangladesh to function effectively, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi reiterated that the return of Bengalis from West Pakistan was important. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 258. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 282. Telegram 4080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2135Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally commented on the U.S. Presidential campaign, expressing confidence in President Nixon’s reelection, and he and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the political situation in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 259. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 283. Telegram 4081 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2135Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi’s attitude was pleasant and courteous throughout the conversation, even when the exchanges became rather frank. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 260. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 284. Telegram 4085 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0940Z In the first of a seven part report on his conversation with Pakistani President Bhutto in Rawalpindi on July 6, Former Treasury Secretary Connally noted that he opened the conversation by indicating that President Nixon had instructed him to inform Bhutto about his trips to Peking and Moscow, and to discuss other issues of mutual interest. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 263. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 285. Telegram 4086 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1000Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed the U.S. Presidential campaign. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 264. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 286. Telegram 4087 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1030Z Pakistani President Bhutto outlined the trying circumstances in Pakistan he had to deal with since becoming president. He discussed the difficulties of reaching an understanding with Awami League President Rahman that would enable him to recognize Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 265. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 287. Telegram 4088 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1130Z Pakistani President Bhutto offered a pessimistic assessment of the Simla conference and the prospects for future dealings with India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 266. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 288. Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1215Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed President Nixon’s trips to China and the Soviet Union. Bhutto pointed to the growing Soviet presence in South Asia and stressed the importance of an offsetting U.S. presence in the area. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 267. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 289. Telegram 4090 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1250Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded the conversation by offering suggestions on how to promote foreign investment in Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 268. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 290. Telegram 4091 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0645Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded from his conversation with Pakistani President Bhutto that while Bhutto was “enormously upset” with India, he was intelligent and pragmatic enough to move beyond the crisis and rebuild his country without letting bitterness blind him. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 269. The time given for the transmission of the telegram is apparently wrong. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 14, 1972 Kissinger summarized reports from India that indicated Indian concerns about the outcome of the Moscow summit and provided evidence of a generally positive Indian reaction to former Treasury Secretary Connally’s visit to India. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jul 1972-Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy. 292. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) San Clemente, California, July 14, 1972, 9 a.m. Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported to President Nixon on his trip. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning July 9, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s Office in the Western White House. 293. Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 24, 1972, 1815Z Ambassador Keating reported a disturbing farewell conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and drew the conclusion that “at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Exdis. Keating subsequently discussed this conversation with Singh. Singh put the best possible light on the exchange between Gandhi and Keating and concluded that it marked the beginning of a dialogue between India and the United States. (Telegram 9256 from New Delhi, July 25; ibid.) 294. Telegram 9254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 25, 1972, 1745Z Ambassador Keating reported on his farewell calls on Indian President Giri, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and Indian Foreign Minister Singh. Keating was given what he described as “the Indian treatment”: “I was first warmed and relaxed by the affable Giri, then rudely pummeled and goaded by the madam, and finally brain-washed by the great rationalizer Swaran Singh.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Confidential; Exdis. Keating left his post on July 26. The post remained vacant until Daniel Patrick Moynihan was appointed on February 8, 1973. 295. Telegram 9293 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, July 26, 1972, 1100Z The Embassy concluded that India had no current plans to develop nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 72. Secret; Exdis. 296. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 1, 1972 Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Assistant Secretary Sisco, and other interested Department of State officials discussed how best to dissuade India from developing nuclear weapons. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 387, Working File’Indian Nuclear Intentions. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted in NEA/INC on August 2 by Dennis Kux. The 42-page draft response to NSSM 156, prepared in NEA/INC on August 4, is ibid. For NSSM 156, see Document 275. 297. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 2, 1972 Acting Secretary of State Irwin and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed the possibility of developing a dialogue to improve relations between the United States and India. Jha sought to explain the negative comments made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi during Ambassador Keating’s farewell call and argued that if a constructive dialogue were not initiated soon, increasing anti-American sentiment in India might make it difficult to do so. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on August 7 by Kux and cleared in draft by Irwin. 298. Special National Intelligence Estimate 31–72 Washington, August 3, 1972 SNIE 31–72 analyzed Indian nuclear developments and their likely implications. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. 299. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 30, 1972, 11:10–11:30 a.m. During his initial call on Secretary of Defense Laird, Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Mohammed Khan brought up the issue of military supplies for Pakistan and the “one-time exception” sale offer of October 1970. Laird indicated that the U.S. was prepared to consider Pakistan’s request but not until later in the year. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 75–0125, Pakistan 1972. Confidential. Drafted on September 5 by Lieutenant Colonel Gross and approved by Nutter. The conversation was held in Secretary Laird’s office. 300. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156 Washington, September 1, 1972 In response to NSSM 156, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia assessed India’s nuclear capabilities and intentions and U.S. options for influencing India on the issue. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77–0094, India, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The paper was circulated on September 26 to the CIA, the JCS, and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury by Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary of the NSC, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the paper would be considered by the Senior Review Group at a time to be determined. Copies were also sent to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Ibid) The paper was prepared by an ad hoc group representing State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and ACDA, headed by Sisco, as chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The annexes cited in the paper were attached but are not published. The footnotes in the paper occur in the source text. For NSSM 156, see Document 275. 301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, September 8, 1972 Nixon approved Kissinger’s recommendation that he defer a decision on a Pakistani request for the release of a limited amount of military equipment owned by Pakistan but still in the U.S. as a result of the embargo on military shipments to India and Pakistan. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1972–Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that Caspar Weinberger and William Timmons, the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations, endorsed Kissinger’s recommendation. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. 302. Telegram 7547 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, September 8, 1972, 1314Z Pakistani President Bhutto explained to Chargé Sober why Pakistan had not recognized Bangladesh by August as had been anticipated in the Simla agreement. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and Lahore. 303. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 22, 1972, 4:20–4:55 p.m. The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha agreed that it was time to begin taking measures to normalize relations between the U.S. and India but recognized that not much of consequence could be done until after the presidential election in November. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971–21 Dec 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. I. G. Patel was the Special Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance. 304. Telegram 3739 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State New York, October 6, 1972, 2300Z In a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Singh at the UN, Secretary Rogers took sharp exception to allegations reportedly made by Prime Minister Gandhi that the CIA was interfering in India’s internal affairs. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Also designated as Secto 70. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Dacca. The allegations made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to which Rogers referred were reported on October 3 in telegram 1577 from Calcutta. In a speech before Congress Party workers, Gandhi stated that she had information that the CIA had become active in India and she asked party workers to be vigilant and counteract its activities. (Ibid., POL INDIA–US) 305. Telegram 8436 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, October 12, 1972, 1229Z Chargé Sober recommended approval of a Pakistani request for 400,000 tons of wheat under PL—480 to offset the effects of a drought. Sober noted Pakistani President Bhutto’s urgent interest in the request. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Pakistan made the case for additional PL–480 supplies in an aide-mémoire submitted to the U.S. Embassy on October 3. According to the aide-mémoire, the wheat harvest in Pakistan had suffered from drought and unless the requested supplies were provided by the United States, the Government would be confronted with sharp rises in politically sensitive wheat prices. (Telegram 8317 from Islamabad, October 6; ibid.) 306. Telegram 8648 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, October 23, 1972, 1053Z Chargé Sober reported that Pakistani President Bhutto urgently repeated his request for 400,000 tons of PL–480 wheat. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Sent with instructions to pass to Agriculture, AID, the Treasury, and the White House. 307. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 27, 1972, noon–12:45 p.m. Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Iftikhar Ali to discuss Pakistan’s intentions with regard to Bangladesh and the state of Pakistan’s relations with India. National Security Council staff member Harold Saunders, who attended the meeting, explained the basis for the pending U.S. response to Pakistan’s request for wheat. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. The memorandum bears Saunders’ typed signature. The meeting was held in Haig’s office in the White House. 308. Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (Schneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, October 30, 1972 At Sisco’s request, Schneider listed U.S. programs in India that had been curtailed by the Indian Government since December 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/INC by Donald W. Born. Sent through Armin H. Meyer, who was assigned to NEA as a special consultant after returning to the Department following 3 years as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. He had previously been Ambassador to Lebanon and Iran. 309. Telegram 13259 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, November 3, 1972, 1335Z The Embassy reported on continuing allegations of CIA activities in India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USIS message. Repeated to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Moscow, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 310. Telegram 201141 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, November 4, 1972, 0022Z The U.S. agreed to participate with the other members of the India Consortium in restructuring India’s foreign debt. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 9 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted on November 3 by Schneider; cleared in the Office of International Finance and Development of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs by John Gervers, and in the Office of Planning and Development of AID’s Bureau for Asia by Alfred D. White; and approved by Meyer. 311. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 8, 1972 In apparent response to what he found to be a disappointing decision by the U.S. on his request for PL–480 wheat, Pakistani President Bhutto decided to recognize the Governments of North Korea and North Vietnam, and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. He also withdrew Pakistan from SEATO. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. Hoskinson initialed for Saunders. Telegram 9038 from Islamabad, November 8, reported that Pakistan had recognized North Korea and North Vietnam and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. (Ibid.) Kissinger checked the approval line. A handwritten notation in the margin next to the approval line, in Richard Kennedy’s hand, reads: “Kennedy to call in Amb Khan per telcon with HAK 11/9/72.” 312. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 9, 1972, 4:30 p.m. NSC staff members Kennedy and Saunders called in Pakistani Ambassador Khan to discuss Pakistan’s decision to recognize North Vietnam and North Korea. Kennedy said the decision came at a sensitive time in U.S. negotiations with North Vietnam and might create problems with the Congress in seeking support for renewed arms supplies for Pakistan. He asked that U.S. interests be taken into account in the decision to recognize the Sihanouk Government. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 313. Telegram 207769 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India Washington, November 15, 1972, 1609Z Deputy Secretary Irwin and Indian Foreign Secretary-designate Kewal Singh discussed prospects for improved relations between the U.S. and India. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kux on November 13, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, USUN, Bonn, Kathmandu, and Colombo. 314. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon New Delhi, November 28, 1972 Gandhi responded in kind to a letter from Nixon expressing his desire for improved relations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Gandhi sent Nixon a message of congratulations following his reelection. Nixon responded on November 19 with a letter to Gandhi in which he looked toward improved relations between the U.S. and India: “I hope our two countries can develop a sounder relationship based on understanding and respect for mutual interests.” (Ibid., Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, India (1972)) Gandhi’s letter of November 28 was delivered to the White House by the Indian Embassy on December 5. The text was transmitted to New Delhi on December 6 in telegram 220565. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US) 315. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 29, 1972 Saunders assessed the state of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger highlighted the first of the paragraphs dealing with arms supply and underlined the first three sentences of the paragraph. 316. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 29, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan reviewed a number of issues bearing on relations between the United States and Pakistan. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, 13 Sept 1971–7 Mar 1973. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Tabs A–C were attached but not published. 317. Telegram 217378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, November 30, 1972, 2242Z Guidance from the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh stipulated that negotiations relating to a peace settlement in South Asia should be left to the countries directly involved, without U.S. mediation. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Schneider and Meyer, and in IO/UNP by John Kimball; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to New Delhi and Dacca. Repeated to London, Kabul, Tehran, Ankara, Colombo, and USUN. 318. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 1, 1972 Saunders proposed responses to the issues that Pakistani Ambassador Khan had raised with Kissinger. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action with Kennedy’s concurrence. Kissinger initialed his approval of each of Saunders’ recommendations, with one exception. He did not respond to recommendation b of the second section relating to military supply. Approval of recommendation b for dealing with the issue of military supply was implied in Kissinger’s delegation to Saunders of the responsibility for providing a response to Khan on the issue and in the handwritten note Kissinger added in the margin in approving recommendation a: “But move fast & give Pakistan a break”. As for the recommendation in section 4, Kissinger authorized a letter to be sent to Pakistani President Bhutto rather than an oral response. The memorandum did not have a section 5. In section 6, Kissinger approved of Saunders meeting with Ambassador Khan to discuss the issues dealt with in the memorandum. The draft letter at Tab A and the memorandum dealing with Pakistan’s request for landing rights at Tab B were attached but not published. 319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 2, 1972 The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs concluded that a statement made in the Indian Parliament by Foreign Minister Singh constituted “a strong signal that India now desires better relations.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Unclassified with confidential attachment. Deputy Executive Secretary Harry Barnes signed the transmittal memorandum for Eliot. Foreign Minister Singh made the statement on November 30 in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian Parliament. The text of the statement was transmitted to the Department on December 1 in telegram 14364 from New Delhi. (Ibid.) 320. Memorandum From Douglas M. Cochran of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, December 8, 1972 Cochran’s memorandum detailed what he described as Pakistan’s “growing nervousness” over the state of its relations with the United States. Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 52, PAK/Indian Negotiations July–Dec 1972. Confidential. Cleared by Meyer and sent through Laingen. The December 4 meeting between Rogers and Tridev Roy, head of Pakistan’s delegation to the UN General Assembly, was reported to Islamabad on December 5 in telegram 220229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PAK) 321. Telegram 9952 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, December 12, 1972, 0600Z Chargé Sober reported that Pakistan and India had reached agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. He speculated that further progress on implementing the Simla accord could be anticipated and he recommended a congratulatory letter from President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was announced in Pakistan on December 11. Mutual troop withdrawals to the border between the two countries were scheduled to begin the following day. (Telegram 9965 from Islamabad, December 12; ibid., POL 31–1 INDIA–PAK) The troop withdrawals were completed by December 20. (Telegram 10226 from Islamabad, December 21; ibid.) 322. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 14, 1972 Saunders and Hoskinson reviewed U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and proposed a scenario involving a gradual improvement of relations with India, based to some extent on economic assistance, and a positive response to Pakistan’s requests for economic assistance and limited military supplies. Kissinger approved and sent to the President the proposed memorandum dealing with military supplies for Pakistan but did not act on the larger proposed scenario. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). Secret. Sent for action. The documents cited at Tabs A and C were attached but not published. Kissinger initialed the memorandum at Tab B and sent it to Nixon on December 23. (See Document 323) He apparently did not send to the President the memorandum attached at Tab A, which would have advanced the three phase proposals put forward by Saunders and Hoskinson. Under Phase I.a., Kissinger put a check mark in the margin to indicate he wished to discuss the President’s letter to Jha. Under Phase I.b., Kissinger wrote “No” in the margin next to the suggestion that Connally should be sent back to India. Under the same heading, Kissinger asked in the margin about an informal agenda to be discussed with the Indians: “What’s the agenda[?]” And under Phase II.a., Kissinger wrote in the margin next to the first item: “What is that? Expand.” 323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 23, 1972 Kissinger reviewed for the President the options relating to the question of renewing the flow of military supplies to Pakistan. Nixon approved a recommendation calling a “clean-up exercise” involving the release to Pakistan and India of military supplies that were caught in the embargo imposed during the crisis. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations. Kissinger then added a handwritten note for Saunders: “Hal–Do what is necessary.” 198. Editorial Note 198. Editorial Note Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, January 1, 1972, 11:00–11:19 a.m., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 17125. President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed the aftermath of the crisis in South Asia in a telephone conversation on January 1, 1972. In the course of a general discussion of the impact of the crisis, Kissinger made the point that India needed to re establish better relations with the United States. He felt that the Gandhi Government would be concerned to offset the embrace of the Soviet Union and the concomitant growth of the Communist party and Communist influence in India. Discussion then turned to the question of the recognition of Bangladesh. Nixon said it was premature to consider such recognition. Kissinger pointed out that only India and Bhutan had recognized Bangladesh at that point. 199. Telegram 22 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 199. Telegram 22 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 1 Karachi, January 3, 1972, 1014Z Subject: Discussion With President Bhutto January 3 Release of Sheikh Mujib Rehman Ref: Karachi 010 and Islamabad 0002 1. Summary: Bhutto advised me he planned to announce today unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who presently in Rawalpindi. Modalities of actual release to be worked out. Reported that Sheikh’s incarceration had been in same prison and same cell as that in which he (Bhutto) had been detained. Sheikh release being undertaken without commitments or pre-conditions. Voiced approval U.S. diplomatic efforts during past months and believes same would have been fruitful had additional time been available. Bhutto believed efforts doomed by Indian sub-continent objectives. China and Russia view release of Mujib with favor. Bhutto plans to visit China around end this month. 2. I met with President Bhutto in his Karachi residence at 1100 hours local time. The conversation which ensued lasted for approximately 45 minutes. Among other matters discussed was the aforesaid subject. Septels follow. 3. The President introduced the conversation after appropriate social amenities by saying that he had called me to Karachi in accordance with our heretofore agreed policy of keeping USG fully informed on major developments as they unfurled. Today he said he wanted USG to be knowledgeable aforehand of his determination, albeit the same contained certain politcal risks to his new administration, of publicly announcing, during the speech which he planned to deliver in Karachi today at 1500 hours local time, the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujib Rehman who is now with certain members of his family and with Kamal Hossain in Rawalpindi. In answer to my question concerning the procedure he contemplated in effecting the actual release, the mode of travel, etc., Bhutto said that he was not prepared to discuss these aspects since the modalities thereof would be worked out between him and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and desires of the Sheikh would have primacy. He advised me however that he would keep me throughly informed as plans develop. 4. In response to my inquiries concerning the Sheikh’s incarceration, Bhutto advised me that ironically, the Sheikh had been held in the same prison and the same cell in which he heretofore had been detained. As soon as he assumed powers Bhutto said that he had the Sheikh removed from his cell and taken first to a guest house where he stayed one night en route to Rawalpindi. Bhutto commented that as far as he was concerned and in accordance with what he had told Mujibur, He (Mujib) was a “free man” upon his arrival in Rawalpindi: further, he could leave his Pindi residence forthwith if he so desired. However, he went on to point out to Mujib that circumstances mitigated against his public exposure prematurely, to which Mujib agreed wholeheartedly. 5. Bhutto’s report of his conversations with Mujib are most interesting and not unexpected. He said that Mujib had been virutally cut off from all outside sources of information while he (Mujib) assumed that a war of some major proprotion had gone on, and that “perhaps a part of East Pakistan had been occupied by india, “he had no idea of the magnitude of the “tragic defeat” which Pakistan had suffered. Bhutto then went on to note that he had briefed Mujib as fully as possible during their conversation and had made available to him newspapers, radio and a TV. The President reported that during the conversation he in no way made any demands upon Mujib, neither did he ask for any commitments on Mujib’s part, nor did he establish pre-conditions for the Sheikh’s return to the political arena. Further, he noted that Mujib seemed “almost stunned” by the changed circumstances in which he found himself, and appeared highly despondent to learn that Indian troops occupied all of the east. Bhutto also noted that during his conversation the Sheikh, referring to Indian occupation and domination, repeated time and time again that he would not be one to accept alms. 6. In a general discussion of U.S. policy during the crisis period beginning March 25, Bhutto not only expressed satisfaction thereof but opined that GOP needed the continuing goodwill and support of the United States. He then went on to say in regard to U.S. policy, that as early as April. He, too, had been working towards a political accommodation between the East West Wing through the constitution of a political government which would come into being by a transfer of power. Qte the use by India of its armed might was unnecessary and unjustified, unqte he said. The efforts of the United States to move Yahya in the direction of political accommodation was not only laudatory but would long be remembered. He added that given time the U.S. effort would have been fruitful since a civilian government would have taken over on December 27 and Mujib’s release would have been effected therewith and negotiations could have been instituted. He added that his effort however was doomed by the fact that “India never recognized the partition of the sub-continent in 1947.” 7. Penultimately, Bhutto said that he had sounded out both China and Russia regarding their views as to the release of Mujib and had found both in accord. Also, having noted USG’s position and its hope for a form of political accommodation as the ultimate object, referring to his discussion with Secretary Rogers, Bhutto said that should the occasion arise during his speech today he might make reference to the posture of both Russia and China re Mujib and USG’s “laudatory” role. 8. As the conversation drifted off on the way to the door. Bhutto informed me that given a continuing degree of stability in Pakistan, it was his hope to expect an invitation from Chou En-Lai to visit China around the end of this month. Luppi 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad. 200. Telegram 26 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 200. Telegram 26 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 1 Karachi, January 3, 1972, 1154Z Subject: January 3 Conversation With President Bhutto re His Letter to President Ref: State 233015 1. I met with President Bhutto in his Karachi residence at 1100 hours local time. The conversation which ensued lasted for approximately 45 minutes. Among other matters discussed was the aforesaid subject. Septels follow. 2. With all the care befitting the matter, I enunciated the various subjects and points made in paras 2, 3 and 4 of reftel. President Bhutto expressed his full appreciation for the points made and indicated complete understanding. His one additional substantive comment outside the context of that to which we were speaking, was his expression of hope that the United States would use all of its influence in every possible area “to help get our men back from East Pakistan.” I told him I would advise my government not only of his request but of his great concern for the welfare of his countrymen. 3. Pertaining to paragraph 5 of reftel, I told President Bhutto that the President had authorized negotiations to begin with the GOP for a new PL–480 Title I agreement, and spelled out that which was involved both in food and in value. I went on to state that this action was tangible evidence of USG’s awareness of the food requirements now of moment to West Pakistan, and also a concrete indication of USG’s desire to assist GOP on its road back to recovery from the tragic events recently transpired. President, Bhutto expressed his sincere and deep appreciation for this actions, indicating that it reflected precisely not only what I had said, but in addition indicated a major step toward the return to normalcy. She added that as he had heretofore informed me and as he had publicly announced, he was looking toward a “new era in US-Pak relationship.” 4. Saying that the importance of my comments was such that the Foreign Office should be made aware thereof he asked that the DCM in Islamabad contact the Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan and convey the gist of this message to him also. DCM telephonically advised to do so. Luppi 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore. The text of Bhutto’s letter to Nixon on December 21, 1971, transmitted to Islamabad on December 30 in telegram 233015, is in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 330 201. Telegram 300 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 201. Telegram 300 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, January 9, 1972, 0427Z Subj: Policy Assessment India 1971 Department please repeat as desired A. Summary and conclusions 1. Overviews Nixon doctrine posits that world order and US security interests are best served by US cooperation with predominant regional powers. India already is such in South Asia and has potential beyond. For foreseeable future, however, US interests, opportunities and responsibilities are likely to be modest and manageable at measured levels sufficient to mitigate Soviet primacy and to retain American options for possibly more active involvement later. 2. US policy prrspectives There are three broad perspectives on India with differing implications for US policy: (A) India is a politically/socially/and economically viable democracy dominant in South Asia and with increasing significance in broader Asian context. Ergo, US has substantial interest in access, influence and inhibition of Soviet domination: or (B) India is an oversized political conglomerate lacking cohesion, with massive economic and social problems threatening democratic viability, precluding effective regional power, entailing endless external assistance. Ergo, US has little interest other than humanitarian and could stand back and seek to hang USSR with a subcontinental albatross: or (C) India is a mix of optimistic and pessimistic prospects, with, however, a net dynamic toward viability and power, evidenced by an efficient million-man armed force, demonstrated capacity for strategic planning and crisis management, threshold nuclear capability, effective democratic government, national consensus and self-confidence, substantial human and natural resources, and impluse toward self-reliance. Ergo, US has general interest in involving realistic basis for potentially important relationship. I believe (C) is most likely in any event, India is not going down the drain: there is too much accomplishment and potential for that. 3. Indian political prospects Indian democratic practices and cultural orientation count in US political assessment as bedrock of shared values between otherwise widely differing societies and as basic western advantage vis-à-vis USSR and China. (1) Internal prospects which turn on Indian capacity to manage massive change are: (1) Democratic viability—the actual political condition based on established institutions, elite commitment and vested interest, popular expectations and usage, national diversity and federalism: or (2) Populist diversion—should the Indira cult of personality run unchecked by her and by currently vitiated countervailing forces: or (3) Authoritarian reaction—following prolonged failure to cope effectively with politically salient social and economic demands, given violence and repression, Asian social autocracy, Indian bureaucratic mania and London School economics. I believe India’s democratic system responded well to internal and external stress in 1971 and promises to remain viable and durable throughout the 1970’s despite socio-economic pressures and Indira Gandhi’s towering presence. (B) External prospects which are function of Indian capacity to manage own regional power predominance maturely and to limit and balance non-regional power influences are: (1) Indian chauvinism—emerging from India’s very strong national independence commitment, size and diversity, conservative society and traditional values: or (2) Soviet hegemony—given complementary internal and external factors increasing scope for pro-Soviet communist influence within India, e.g. (a) Mrs. Gandhi’s leftist tilt and strategy of using the pro-Soviet CPI against the indigenous CPM: (b) disparate Indo-US and Indo-USSR equations and adroit USSR handling of Indo-Soviet relations: (c) Indian economic and military supply stringencies: however, India is no Eastern European state without scope for national self-determination and controllable by geography, guns and agents (the parallel with China is more valid): or (3) Indian outreach—extension and assertion of Indian strategic/diplomatic presence in South and South East Asia with range and degree dependent upon Indian national development and extent of Indo-Sino/Sov/US collaboration/opposition. I believe Indian chauvinism in greater or lesser degree is the dominant foreseeable trend, Indian cohesiveness, intransigence and anti-colonial hypersensitivity will probably limit the Soviet role to one if special relationship rather than hegomony. This regard, continuing US involvement would provide a significant balance to major Soviet presence. 4. US policy choices US faces number of choices in short term which will shape, and which should be conditioned by, longer term policy designs in short term we can opt for: (a) disengagement by continued suspension, reduction, termination of established programs with general and early effect: (b) business as usual: unilateral revival of status quo ante across board pending basic review: (c) selective involvement: ongoing process of differentiated and negotiated maintenance and lapse of programs. Disengagement in short-term time-frame is bound to be disruptive, considered punitive and likely to generate unintended further deterioration. Business as usual approach would pass short term initiative and onus to GOI. Selective involvement would facilitate early beginning of restructuring of relationship. Assuming, as I do, that US over medium term will wish neither to continue nor increase recent levels of involvements. I favor a selective phasing down and restructuring of our involvement that will find us within two years with a reduced but significant range of mutally agreeable programs justifiable on their merits and available for building upon in the event that anticipated longer-run realization of Indian potential makes that advisable. Any such US phase-down in India should be orderly to minimize damage to development objectives and non-punitive to obviate needless acrimony. Conversely, continuing US involvement should be based on explicit Indo-American mutuality of interest, responsive to priority US and Indian needs, and based on thorough policy review. 5. Action requested I submit herewith contributions to the current US policy review and several recommendations concerning Indo-American communication, political posture, Bangladesh, military supply, economic aid, rupee holdings, science/technology, contact activities, and US presence. I would apprreciate Department comments and guidance. 6. Immediately following cessation hostilities we instituted mission-wide reconsideration of our policy toward India in present context. This effort culminated in country team meeting with Consuls General in New Delhi, January 6 and 7. This message represents results that effort, and has concurrence country team and ConGens. End summary. B. The policy context 1. India-domestic: Domestically, Prime Minister Gandhi’s success in mid-term parliamentary elections reflected her personal popularity but also represented at least temporary victory of nationalism, social reform and political restructuring over conventional Indian politics of caste, faction and regional interests. Mrs. Gandhi continues to consolidate victory nationally and in states. This process is accompanied by increasingly socialist cast to Indian political rhetoric with increasing carry-over in actual policy decisions. Curtailment of private property already in progress and greater pressure for socialist conformity seems likely. Major trend, however, is increasing concentration of power at center with concomitantly greater capacity for decisive action. Domestic concerns likely will have first priority as Mrs. Gandhi attempts to promote economic development and wealth distribution. Costs of war and Bangladesh refugees have increased GOI budget deficit for FY 1971–72 from US $293 million to US $600 million and have added to inflationary tendencies. In longer run, however, India’s military victory and emergence of Bangladesh probably will at least marginally benefit India economy, strengthen Mrs. Gandhi’s hand, and buy time for directing and shaping Indian socio/economic structure. Extent to which Mrs. Gandhi succeeds in capitalizing on this opportunity will determine longer term viability of strong, essentially democratic central control. 2. Asian power balance: Having emerged from Indo-Pak conflict with undisputed pre-eminence in South Asia, India likely will seek broader Asian role and will have enhanced capability to project its interests in region. India’s influence with smaller states on its periphery will increase, and there will likely be pressure from them for greater US commitment as form of qte mini-containment unqte of India. With ambitions of eventually competing with China and Japan India may attempt to utilize its new relationship with Moscow to enhance its competitive position in South East Asia and Indian Ocean. At minimum, assuming continued domestic stability and economic growth, India probably will over long term attempt to utilize Sino-Soviet and Sino-Japanese rivalries to fashion a swing seat in Asian regional politics. Indian moves into broader Asian regional scene could come to have significant impact on stability of area and US interests. South Asian crisis has heightened Sino-Soviet tensions, and growing Indo-Soviet relationship may add to Chinese unease about balance of power in South East and Central Asia. Conversely, new power configuration in South Asia may add incentive for improved Sino-Indian relations. 3. Indo-Soviet relations: Moscow’s already growing role with GOI was sharply enhanced by its adroit handling of Indo-Pak crisis, particularly given Indian concern about two-front confrontation with Pakistan and China without any US support against China. Indo-Soviet treaty of August 9 offers framework for increasingly close relations in security, economic and cultural fields. I anticipate growing coincidence of Soviet and Indian views in UN and on international relations generally. Growth of Soviet influence in India, however, while likely to be substantial, will eventually encounter limitations imposed by conflicting national, economic and political interests exacerbated by bristling Indian chauvinism. In short, India is unlikely to become a Soviet satellite, and there almost certain to be friction over longer term when Soviet performance in economic and military cooperation fails to match inflated expectations and when India inevitably refuses to pay full price—in terms of political/diplomatic and military support—which Soviets traditionally have expected of nations to which they provide substantial support. Any event, it is debatable how effectively USSR will be able to exploit India to threaten US interests. 4. Indo-US relations: India’s decision to risks and ultimately employ military means to resolve subcontinental crisis, and US response have produced critical strain in Indo-US relations. India’s approach to confrontation with Pakistan was motivated most significantly by desire (a) to resolve within acceptable time massive refugee problem posing economic and security hazards in sensitive eastern region, (b) to position itself advantageously for inevitable emergence of independent Bangladesh, and (c) to exploit opportunity to consolidate Indian regional dominance by elimination of Pakistan as significant rival on subcontinent. Sequence of US policy responses since March 25 including assigning India major responsibility for conflict, statements and tactics in UN, and dispatch of Seventh Fleet to Indian Ocean, reinforced deeply held conviction US sought to counterpose Pakistan against India in South Asian power balance. India emerges from Indo-Pak conflict more united and self-confident that ever. Mrs. Gandhi towers above political scene and for foreseeable future will be decisive influence on Indo-US relations from Indian side. Thus, while continued efforts to influence significant Indian public opinion are required, effective communication of US interests, perceptions, capabilities, and intentions to the Prime Minister and her closest advisors. While unlikely to lead to identity of views, is prerequisite for mutual understanding which should lead to improved Indo-US relations. Throughout traumatic events of 1971, US actions and India’s responses sharpened and emotionalized abrasive elements already inherent in our relationship. Basic causes of Indo-US misunderstanding and malcommunication are likely to remain after resolution of current crisis in Indo-US relations. Although US has useful asset in firmly imbedded Indian democratic institutions and Western-oriented Indian elite, facile references to qte world’s two largest democracies unqte should not obscure basic qte Indianess unqte of this society which is at least as fundamental to our relationship as commonality of institutions. Effectiveness of US policy approach toward India will depend largely on degree to which this is realized. For over a decade Indo-American relations have been plagued by (a) consistent mutual failure to meet each other’s inflated expectations: (b) tendency to place worst possible construction on other’s acts of commission or omission: (c) substantial inattention and dilatory consultation: (d) self-righteous and morally patronizing attitudes and socialism/ free enterprise misconceptions: and (e) sentimental notion that common British cultural and political hertiage should assure effortless unanimity of view. In combination, these factors have been and remain a prescription for emotional rather than pragmatic response. C. Some US interests 1. Political/strategic: Geography, Indian power limitations and reluctance to project military power far afield make it unlikely India will directly threaten any vital US security in foreseeable future. However, India, in combination with other states, has steadily growing capacity to affect power relationships in Asia, particularly if GOI opts for rudimentary nuclear capability in relatively near future. To extent India chooses qte spoiler unqte role to mobilize opinion against US policies, India could frustrate US political interests in South and South East Asia and complicate some US security aims as well. Illustratively, degree of Indian cooperation or obstructionism could affect (a) establishment of Law of Sea regime guaranteeing free passage through and over straits: (b) military/communications facilities US currently enjoys or might subsequently seek in Indian Ocean region: and (c) Soviet expansion around Indian Ocean littoral and in South East Asia via granting naval or other military-related special facilities. (While Indian Ocean likely to constitute long-term irritant in Indo-US relations, this can, hopefully be mitigated by improved communication to GOI re US regional interests and intentions). 2. Indian democracy as factor in regional and international stability: Nixon doctrine posits that world order and US security interests are best served by US cooperation with predominant regional powers. As noted, India claims US attention in 1970’s as country with necessary ingredients for major power status and one of very few functioning democracies in Asia. Practical advantages to having democracy as regional power are: (a) leadership transitions, and after conflict resolution, are smoother within democratic society: (b) timely detection and correction of erroneous policies: (c) greater US access to broad range of public opinion. US aim should be strengthening of moderate forces in India desiring: (a) accommodation with neighboring countries: (b) modulated Indian role in international organizations, unencumbered by ideological cant: (c) economic development, with defense budget limited to essential defense needs and resistant to nuclear weapons program: and (d) democratic process and open society with improved cross cultural Indo-American private and public relations. 3. Commercial: Last three years Indian purchases from US averaged $600 million, of which an average 383 million AID-financed. Pricing and credit policies of suppliers together with Indian foreign exchange shortage make it unlikely india will be significant US marker in foreseeable future. Nonetheless, US suppliers can hold, and perhaps marginally expand, position if Indo-American relations do not deteriorate further. US direct equity investment in Indian currently totals about $300 million. Despite nationalization trend, India will apparently have mixed economy for some time to come. GOI promises to permit small and medium sized private Indian firms in areas not basic to India’s essential economic infrastructure, and may allow some firms servicing infrastructure to remain private. Their participation will be subject, however, to tight import controls, investment licensing and other inhibiting regulations. Investment climate in India is not considered good by US and other potential foreign investors, but where US investor offers sophisticated technology in great demand by India, and willingly accepts minority equity role. Investment prospects are favorable. D. Recommendations I. General: Based on foregoing analysis that India’s internal stability and external policies will affect regional stability and thus impinge on US global interests, following recommendations are designed over short term to ease current strain in relations and in longer term to establish framework for modest, fruitful relationship over early years of new decade. In general, I recommend, US re-cast relations with India on more pragmatic mutual self-interest-basis, shorn of exaggerated expectations and of assumption India more needy than needed. All recommendations require urgent action and several demand continuing action over time. 2. Communications: It will be crucial to communicate accurately and persuasively US views of essential interests and intentions and to avoid talking past GOI for public record. I urge that shortly after completion USG policy review, we undertake Indo-US consultations to explore in depth issues affecting Indian and US interests, and to elaborate outlines of new relationship on both sides. 3. Political posture: US policies toward states on Indian periphery, especially Pakistan, will have major effect on Indo-US relations, and US should eschew qte Indian containment unqte posture by design or inadvertence and should reiterate to GOI that we recognize India’s preeminence in South Asia and significance beyond. Also, US should (a) invite GOI suggestions for avoiding frustrating each other’s purposes in Asia where essential interests do not conflict: (b) note US bilateral relations with South Asian nations are not competitive with India and strive to demonstrate this by consulting with GOI on pending US decisions with regional implications for India: (c) reiterate US not interested in constructing or contributing to South Asian power balance directed against India: (d) assert that US wants good relations with Pakistan but has no treaty or other interests which need complicate Indo-US relations: (e) encourage India to work for pasting political accommodation and end of military confrontation with Pakistan: and (f) acknowledge GOI concerns regarding China. 4. Bangladesh: US should indicate confidentially to GOI that we are establishing pragmatic relations with Bangladesh authorities for practical liaison, and we expect recognize Bangladesh after it has been demonstrated that Bhutto cannot obtain agreement for some loose confederation, and if and when international norms have been met, e.g., firm control of territory formerly known as East Pakistan: and established and functioning government: and withdrawal of foreign troops. Note US interest in seeing new state stand on its own feet and within parameters of aid intentions outlined below, US willingness to participate in international humanitarian effort in Bangladesh, indicate US hope non-regional powers will not exert overriding influence in Bangladesh. Avoid comment on Indo-Bangladesh special relationship since it presently contributes to order within Bangladesh and regional stability. 5. Military supply: Since 1953, most serious continuing burden in Indo-US relations has been US military supply to Pakistan. Pragmatic, fruitful relationship we recommend cannot re established until this central issue resolved. Accordingly, it is crucial that US continue to eschew military grants or sales to Pakistan and India of any kind of lethal military equipment. US should specifically abrogate onetime exception military sales agreement of October, 1970, as earnest of intent and on basis drastically changed circumstances over subsequent year. As a general principle, the US should limit military sales to minimum of spares and non-lethal equipment on a case by case basis. It is essential to the maintenance of US credibility and minimal entree to the Indian military that the following be continued: (A) MAP training at current levels with possible future increase (MAP trainees currently in key positions gives US entree to indian military otherwise unavailable and valuable for future): (B) Financial support for Peace Indigo Communications project for early warning radar system. (Program is defensive in nature with funds partially committed for procurement in US). (C) Commercial sales of spares for C–119 fleet. 6. Economic aid: Major choices face the US which could: (A) Dramatically curtail Indian aid program (excepting humanitarian), regardless of Indian needs or GOI desire, because of general US aid weariness, apparent lack of Indian gratitude and pique at GOI policy on Bangladesh: (B) Indicate willingness resume aid at previous levels, since economically progressing, stable India serves US regional interest, and need for continued substantial outside assistance evident: or (C) Take at face value recent GOI expressions of intention to reduce or eliminate reliance on foreign assistance, and tell GOI we prepared to discuss amicably a non-punitive trimming or phase out of bilateral aid program. I recommend approach (c) because it would, consistent with US interest in development and stability, allow selective paring of aid program, while retaining flexibility to expand subsequently depending on: (a) demonstrated GOI desire for assistance, (b) emerging prospects for broad regional development programs, and (c) availability of US resources. Hence, US should applaud GOI resolve to diminish reliance on foreign assistance, and say frankly such resolve, plus high-level GOI criticism of current aid program, and reduced quantum US resources available suggest need for complete review and appropriate revamping of US aid program in India for next fiscal year, including beginning of general phase-out if GOI desires. Concurrently, to honor commitment made for still valid development reasons and as earnest of non-punitive intentions, US should inform GOI we restoring assistance suspended when Indo-Pak war began, which Indians can use or not. (Prompt action this regard important, and business elements friendly to us already indicating to Embassy that continued suspension adversely affecting them). US should emphasize to GOI importance of bilateral understanding on aid at political level which both parties then would have obligation actively to support, this regard US should: (A) Urge GOI to define limits of assistance from any one source which it considers compatible with political self reliance: (B) Indicate intention to give first priority on aid for subcontinent now and in coming fiscal year to helping meet through UN and voluntary agencies the residual relief and rehabilitation-related needs in eastern India and in Bangladesh: (C) Mention willingness to consider project aid to help finance worthy regional developmental projects, ideally with Indian, foreign and international collaboration, which might emerge from international lending agencies, donor countries, and nations of area: (D) Explain coolness toward continuing predominately non-project aid and preference for sector loans, but be prepared consider Indian arguments for continuation: and (E) Given Indian hesitations about technical assistance, advise that future projects will be approved only upon explicit evidence of political support within GOI and that we would want to move toward greater GOI responsibility for their planning and management, immediate problem is US posture re consortium working party’s Paris sessions scheduled for few weeks hence to discuss debt aid study by World Bank. Unless US views on future aid relationship to India sufficiently clear to permit constructive US participation, US might wish to postpone sessions while sorting out policy. 7. US rupee holdings: Tangential to paring aid program and reducing associated political problems, is encumbrance of US-held rupees on Indo-US relations. We should indicate to GOI willingness to negotiate on appropriate ways to eliminate PL–480 rupee holdings during finite period not exceeding 10 to 15 years. Saulnier report presumable establishes framework within which negotiations could proceed. 8. Science/technology: Growing Indian interest in advanced US technology suggests substantial Indian receptivity including for personnel exchanges in scientific fields. This presents opportunities for dialogue with Indian intelligentsia, and USG and private organizations should be responsive to Indian approaches and programs this regard. Private channels may be more acceptable in present climate and shift away from direct USG sponsorship to university or foundation contact arrangements could be useful. However, USG should decide upon preferred directions for scientific exchanges and related commercial sales and for government agreements on transfers of technology. GOI is interested in acquiring wide range of advanced technology, particularly advanced aerospace and, to lesser extent, nuclear knowhow (both have implications for military capability). GOI is not known to have decided to produce nuclear weapons but there is popular demand and pressures will increase with efforts to establish major power status. US options are: (a) refuse cooperation and technology in sensitive fields, thus foreclosing dialogue with Indian scientists and administrators to encourage peaceful applications: (b) make available unclassified technology and technology with low classification which Indians can acquire elsewhere: or (c) full support to Indian programs so US can be in on ground floor of possible mutually beneficial security/defense relationship if GOI opts for nuclear weapons. I consider option (b) consistent with non-proliferation and with effort to maintain beneficial relationship with Indian nuclear/space establishment. Any case, it important for us to decide on basic comprehensive approach lest piecemeal decisions compromise US interests. 9. Contact activities: Many Indians remain interested in US, although favorable public expression currently muted. Continued contacts with cultural, labor, business and other public opinion leaders will be important factor in maintaining American presence. Confronted with increasing inaccessibility of Indian media, US efforts to influence governmental and nongovernmental indian opinion must increasingly rely on continuing USIS publications and improved VOA programming. Placement of American book collections in significant Indian libraries and contacts by American speakers with university and labor audiences should be continued and, as possible, expanded. US should propose exploratory talks with GOI to examine pros and cons of Indo-US cultural agreement defining nature and level of mutually acceptable educational and cultural exchanges. 10. US presence: Conduct of US relations with India in next period should be low profile and muted, and include substantial reduction in US presence in India, accompanied by tighter mission organizational structure to accomplish essential programs. Early in new year, after receiving Department’s policy response to recommendations contained this message, I expect to recommend, drawing on Department’s management expertise as necessary appropriate personnel and management reforms designed selectively to reduce US personnel. My current thinking favors reduction of 25 to 40 percent over next two years, assuming, in particular, considerable reduction in aid programs as envisaged above. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras with a request that the Department repeat as desired. On January 13 Sisco responded to Keating’s overview of U.S. relations with India with a personal telegram to Keating in which he said that Keating’s analysis was of great value but added: “Many of the policy issues you raise involve a complex series of decisions and it is unlikely that we shall be able to give you a comprehensive reply.” (Telegram 6586 to New Delhi; ibid.) 202. Telegram 364 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 202. Telegram 364 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, January 12, 1972, 1130Z Subject: Meeting With President Bhutto Jan. 1972 Ref: Islamabad 363 1. During my meeting with President Bhutto at the President’s house at 2100 hours local Jan. 11, among other subjects discussed in reftel, Bhutto’s views concerning Mujibur Rahman’s statement upon the latter’s arrival in Dacca were solicited. 2. Turning to Mujibur Rahman’s public declaration that there would be no ties with the West, I made inquiry concerning what steps GOP would now take. Bhutto answered inconclusively but did say that he was a pragmatist and that his course of action would be built on realities of the situation. He went on to add that, contrary to Mujibur Rahman’s public statement, he, the Sheikh, had made qte some promises unqte before his departure for London, promises made in an outburst of tears: qte he was almost hysterical unqte during which episode qte he not only embraced me but threw his head onto my lap and wept. Unqte Bhutto added that the coda in this affair had yet to be written, recalling that it was the Bengalis who had spearheaded the formation of Pakistan because of the repression of the Muslim by the Hindu. He concluded by saying qte when the people of East Pakistan are again controlled by India, the passage of time could bring about substantial changes in their thinking. unqte Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Secret; Nodis. 203. Backchannel Message from the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 203. Backchannel Message from the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Islamabad, January 13, 1972, 0949Z From: Ambassador Farland Islamabad 1114 TO: White House for Dr. Henry Kissinger 1. In accordance with the suggestion contained in your message of Jan. 2, herewith follows a wrap-up of the situation in Pakistan. 2. Bhutto faces difficulties in virtually every area of national activity: political, both international and domestic; economic; military; and social. In the field of foreign affairs, his most immediately pressing problem is the return to Pakistan of the 90,000-odd POW’s and civilian internees from the east. India is unlikely to return them until the state of war is ended and a durable truce replaces the cease-fire. This issue leads directly into that of negotiating with India a settlement to end the state of war in the west; which may include territorial adjustments. This, in turn, is related to the problem of negotiating with Bangla Desh the issues created by secession, including a division of assets and debts, a possible Bihari-Bengali population exchange, etc.; it is also related to the parallel question of recognition of Bangla Desh by third countries and eventually by Pakistan itself. 3. In domestic affairs, Bhutto’s problems fall into four general categories: those stemming from the humiliation of defeat by India, those deriving from the country’s severe economic plight at a time of rising popular expectations, those brought about by regional aspirations, and those involving the restructuring of political power. Specific problems in these areas include (a) containing separatist tendencies in the northwest frontier provinces and Baluchistan; (b) the question of martial law, how long to continue it in the face of growing public opposition; and (c) the related problem of drafting a constitution that will give Bhutto the executive power he will want without too great an affront to those calling for democracy and provincial autonomy. Relations with the army will be an especially difficult issue when the army’s re-equipment needs are balanced against the empty treasury and the cost of the social welfare measures Bhutto has promised. A parallel problem will be the treatment of Yahya in a manner that will quiet public demands for his punishment without antagonizing those in the services who would not want a general—even Yahya—subjected to public humiliation. The broadest of Bhutto’s problems, however, is likely to be that of carrying out the social revolution that he and his Pakistan people’s party supporters have promised the people, involving nationalization of some industries, extensive land reform, guaranteed full employment and a host of welfare measures at a time when popular expectations are high but the resources to finance the revolution are nowhere in sight. 4. To meet these manifold problems, Bhutto has some assets. Domestically, he can rely on his own popularity with the masses; the support of the PPP, the country’s most powerful political party; and the fact that even his enemies can see no alternative to him at present. In the international field his assets are considerably fewer. In the forthcoming crucial negotiations, India will hold most of the trumps: the POW’s and civilian prisoners, military supremacy, occupied border areas in the west, a predominant influence in Dacca, and the active support of the USSR. Bhutto has only the political support of China, some of the Muslim states and (presumably) the US, and a measure of international sympathy as the underdog who has just lost half his country. 5. Of Pakistan’s many economic problems, the most serious are unemployment and absence of investiments. About 18 percent of West Pakistan’s labor force is either unemployed or underemployed. How to create jobs for the unemployed in keeping with his election campaign promises is perhaps the single most important domestic task facing Bhutto. He must in some way alleviate some of the pressure of unemployment if he is to avoid serious strikes and demonstrations if not broad civil strife. 6. The economy, which has stagnated for the last two years if not longer, is unable to finance through traditional growth the social reforms promised by Bhutto, including the challenge of providing fuller employment. Therefore, we can expect Bhutto to turn to state-financed, labor-intensive projects which will provide quick employment for many including the unskilled. Such projects can in the beginning be deficit financed. In order to sustain deficit spending for any prolonged period, the economy must be primed and again set on a course of expansion. If Pakistan’s economy is to be stimulated and expanded, investiments, both privaie and public, must be increased. to date, all of the actions taken by Bhutto in the economic field seem to discourage rather than encourage voluntary investiment. 7. Secondary problems closely associated with these problems are foreign assistance and investment and national resource mobilization. We hear that the GOP would like the consortium countries as well as other creditors to regularize its unilateral debt moratorium which expires Jan. 31, or within the next two or three months be given commodity loan assistance. Such assistance from Pakistan’s creditors would restores its credit rating, help its balance of payments situation, and stimulate its economy. Whether or not Pakistan can persuade its creditors to take this action is not known. For political reasons, there are no plans to develop a budget based on West Pakistan only. Until this is undertaken, there will be no additional efforts made to increase government revenues and Pakistan’s very weak financial situation will continue. 8. I met with Bhutto at his residence on January 11. Nothing startling developed therefrom, but during the course of conversation he again reaffirmed his appreciation of USG support and emphasized GOP need for economic assistance during this crisis. This conversation was reported in Islamabad Exdis 363, and the portion thereof relating to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was reported in Islamabad Nodis 364. In addition you may wish to peruse Islamabad 261, which summarized Bhutto’s fortnight in power. Warm regards. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Middle East, Farland, Amb. (Pakistan). Secret. Kissinger’s and Nixon’s initials were written on the message in what appears to be Haig’s handwriting, suggesting it was forwarded to both of them. Farland was responding to a request from Nixon, sent to him backchannel on January 2, for an assessment of the situation in Pakistan. (Backchannel message WH 20010 from Kissinger to Farland; ibid., Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1972, Amb. Farland, Pakistan) 204. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 204. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 16, 1972, 1 p.m. P: Hello. K: Mr. President. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] K: Incidentally, one thing I wanted to tell you which confirms what our expectation has been. The Indian Foreign Secretary has approached Keating and has said they are interested in an improvement of relations and they are prepared to open talks. So it’s going just the way we thought it would. P: Keating’s probably standing on his doorstep every morning waiting now. K: Well, what we—my recommendation, Mr. President, is we cannot do much now before we go to China because the Chinese are psychopathic. We ought to get Keating back for consultation. It’s a good excuse to do it. He’s had this approach and we just want to have a good talk. P: Yes, in the final analysis, of course, as we get towards election time, we want to improve relations with the Indians for American consumption. K: Mr. President, by July we will have them improved. P: Yes, and we’ll just do that, but don’t do a damn thing now. I couldn’t agree more. The reason is that it isn’t right. I’m just not going to do it from the standpoint of what’s right and wrong. K: Well I predicted that by this time next year we’ll have better relations with them than we had before the crisis and I still maintain it. They need it for their own reasons. By July there’ll be visible progress so I think immediately now the thing to do is get Keating back, which is a conciliatory move and it puts a lid on it until we get back from China. P: You want me to speak to Rogers on this. K: No, we’ll just tell Rogers you want to talk to Keating in the light of reviewing the whole India situation. P: Well, because this message is known, is it? K: Oh yes. P: Just say that I’ve written a note that I’d like to get Keating back to talk to him before we go to China. K: Yes, I think... P: Tell him not this week, I’d like to get him back next week. K: Right. Oh yes, not this week. You don’t want it before the speech. P: That’s right. Next week we’ll say. We’ll have a good talk with him. But low visability, low profile. K: It has another advantage that Keating is going to leak all over the place that the Indians made this approach to us. P: Right, good. K: Which will quiet the press down a bit because it will at least prove that we didn’t drive them toward the Soviets. P: You don’t need to worry about his leaking it. Why don’t we leak it? K: Yes, well, we’ll get it out. P: Let’s leak it here. K: I’ll get it out tomorrow. P: Let John Scali know or someone like that. You know he knows how to get that stuff out. K: Right. K: But I completely agree with what you said. That it would be a great mistake if we rushed toward the Indians now. Let them work their way back slowly. P: That’s the way that Keating would do it though. He’ll say: Gee, isn’t this great. Now I can go in an make an offer of $300 million worth of aid. No sir. He just comes home for consultation. K: You know what was interesting; they said they were willing to improve relations even without aid which. You see, they in a way are in a bad spot now because it was all very well for them to get Soviet aid to go into East Pakistan, but if the Soviets gain a lot of interest in Bangla Desh, that’s going to affect West Bengal. They cannot want the Communist Party in Bengal to be strong. Secondly, they’ll want to keep their army there. Thirdly, the Pakistanis are beginning to move towards the Soviets and the Soviets are not that eager to have the Indians relieved of their worries. So our long term position in the subcontinent curiously enough is better than it’s been in a long time. P: But you say Bhutto, well, of course he moved towards the Soviets. K: Well, partly Mr. President because the fact is our press writes these things as if it had something to do with who likes whom. The fact is that the Soviets have proved in this last crisis that they can deliver military equipment and diplomatic support and while you have done more than was conceiveable it still wasn’t enough. It couldn’t be given an ______ opinion. And that’s a fact to which people have to adjust now in that area. P: Of course. They have to go where the power is. K: They have to go where the reality is. P: Right. Not only where the power is but where the power can be delivered. K: That’s right and that’s one of the handicaps that this constant domestic debate and Congressional restriction is imposing on us. And which in a second term I think you will want to address. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan-Apr 1972. No classification marking. The omission is in the original transcription. 205. Telegram 642 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 205. Telegram 642 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, January 16, 1972, 0711Z Subject: Foreign Secretary’s Approach for Improved Indo-U.S.Relations Begin summary: During January 15 call on Foreign Secretary, he used occasion to make overture for improved Indo-U.S. relations. Approach not motivated by ulterior motives such as desire for U.S. aid, he said, but “on higher plane”. Requested USG to consider and reply to Indian interest on improved relations. Action requested: Please prepare appropriate response to be conveyed to Foreign Secretary. End summary. 1. In characteristic Kaul fashion, Foreign Secretary called me in January 15 ostensibly to discuss situation in Saigon (reported septel), but had other, more important matters on his mind. Kaul opened conversation by saying that time has come to improve Indo-U.S. relations. If there is desire to have better relations on part of Washington, he said, two sides should do something about it. If not, and Washington wanted to allow continued drift, that was another matter. Kaul requested that I convey this message to Washington with hope that it would be considered and reply given. As far as India is concerned, he said, there is desire to improve relations. 2. Kaul said that he felt both sides unduly influenced by press, and cited reports that Ambassador Jha in “deepfreeze” in Washington. He said he had queried Jha on these reports and Jha had informed him that he is not in “deepfreeze” and has access to whomever he wants to see. Kaul said he was gratified at Jha’s report. 3. Kaul said he wanted to make completely clear that this approach not motivated by any desire to see restoration of economic asistance or other “ulterior motives.” Kaul said he was speaking on “much higher plane” and that GOI felt relations between our two countries were too important to be “subverted”. 4. I replied that I was gratified at GOI overture for better relations (Kaul did not balk at my intentional use of “overture”). I said I would, of course, transmit his views to my government and that I hoped it would have some positive suggestions. Nothing would please me more, I said than to see our relations restored. I cautioned Kaul that it might take some time for a substantive reply. 5. I told Kaul I was particularly glad that he felt our two governments should not be unduly influenced by press and noted that recent Indian press reports of alleged sinking of Indian frigate Khukri by U.S. submarine and Defense Minister’s remarks about U.S. support for use of Pak submarine Ghazi to attack Visag naval base were extremely damaging to Indo-U.S. relations. Both Kaul and Joint Secretary Menon hurriedly denied that Defense Minister had made statements attributed to him in press press journal. 6. Regarding Kaul’s statement that approach was on higher plane and did not involve question of economic assistance, I said that I had noted frequent statements by various senior GOI officials, including Prime Minister herself, to effect that India must get away from too much reliance on foreign aid. U.S. felt this attitude commendable, I said, and added that main purpose of U.S. economic assistance had been to enable aided countries to stand on their own feet. Comment: I am gratified at Kauls’s initiative to improve relations and would hope I could be authorized to make a positive response. Specific suggestions in that regard will follow septel. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, London, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, and Bangkok for Nelson Gross, the Secretary’s Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs. 206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 17, 1972 Subject: Suggested NSC Meeting on Indo-Pak Situation I have been conducting with my staff an intensive review of the Indo-Pak situation. These discussions have focussed in large measure on the attached analytical paper. I am transmitting the paper to you not because I agree with everything in it, but because it does focus on some of the principal issues we will face in the coming weeks and months. The paper makes no recommendations but tries to sketch out some of the relevant factors and possible alternatives. This approach is in keeping with your desire to explore fully various points of view and alternatives. I believe it would be desirable if such a paper were circulated to other members of the National Security Council and for a discussion to be held in the Council at some early, convenient date. I do not necessarily foresee that there would be any need for any definitive decisions to be taken as a result of such a National Security Council meeting, but rather it would afford you and others the opportunity to focus on some of the principal factors, and some general guidelines might emerge. William P. Rogers Attachment Analytical Paper US INTERESTS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA I. Introduction—Current Situation The Indo-Pakistan war has altered the political, economic and security environment of South Asia. India has attained a preeminent position. The relative equilibrium between the external powers operating in South Asia—China, the Soviet Union and the United States—has been modified to the point where the Soviet Union has achieved a position of greater influence by having directly identified itself with Indian policies and aspirations. India has had to pay a price for her victory, particularly in terms of increased indebtedness to the Soviet Union, acceptance of Soviet influence in Bangla Desh, and growing fears of Indian dominance among its smaller neighbors. Pakistan as a unitary state has been destroyed, although President Bhutto has not given up hope of some link between East and West. Pakistan has undergone military defeat, the elimination from positions of power of many of its senior military leaders, and the creation of the first civilian government in thirteen years. This new government has modified the Islamic and military focus of Pakistani political life, and it may be moving toward a secular socialistic state which is more preoccupied with domestic reform than with an Indian menace. It faces formidable problems given the bitterness and dissatisfaction engendered by the war and the intractable social, political and economic problems which remain. While the military will continue to be a key factor in the internal power equation, its image is tarnished and its self-esteem damaged. Nonetheless, traditional hostility towards India may reemerge as the controlling factor in Pakistan policy. The Bangla Desh Government also faces extremely complex political and economic problems. Its long-term economic viability and its ability to evolve a political system based on moderate democratic forces remain in doubt, although it is committed to a secular and democratic system. Its problems are aggravated by the communal bitterness engendered in the nine-month struggle which began on March 25, 1971. It will probably have difficulty in establishing its national independence in the face of Indian influence and internal radical pressures. Even when the Indians withdraw there will be strains in the Indo-Bangla Desh relationship, for East Bengal has traditionally feared domination from Calcutta and latent suspicions over Indian policies are likely to increase. The India-Pakistan war has altered the earlier mixture of external forces in which Pakistan was committed to foreign policy triangulation, balancing its relations between Peking, Moscow and Washington, and in which a “non-aligned” India tried to maintain a careful distance in its relations with both Moscow and Washington. These policies reflected basic interests as seen from New Delhi and Islamabad. While Moscow can be expected to seek to take advantage of its increased influence in South Asia and China will try to contain these efforts, India and Pakistan are likely to try to restore more balanced relations with Moscow, Peking and Washington over time. Bhutto has already indicated his intention of basing Pakistan’s foreign policy on “geo-political realities,” and India and Bangla Desh seem to be carefully managing their policies with us to avoid any step which would make impossible a more non-aligned posture between the US and the USSR. Interestingly enough, regardless of developments there remains a substantial reservoir of good will for the US among the Bangla Desh leadership. However, now that Indian military and political superiority over Pakistan has been definitively established, India-China issues are likely to displace the India-Pakistan dispute as the dominant political factor in the Subcontinent. In such circumstances, India and the Soviet Union can be expected to continue to cooperate closely. A further dimension of the present situation is the concern of the minor South Asian powers, particularly Ceylon and Nepal, for their own positions in the face of what they fear may become an increasingly assertive India. Both states, and perhaps others, such as Iran, Afghanistan and Burma, are apprehensive about the implications of India’s power and the Soviet Union’s growing influence. This concern could result in their seeking to balance India’s increased power by closer relations with external powers such as the US and China. Finally, there also seems to be a need psychologically to strengthen our ties with Iran and Turkey, particularly since the latter is going to be under pressure to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR during the Podgorny visit in April. II. Chinese and Soviet Interests Although the Soviet Union will probably continue to focus on its relations with India and Bangla Desh, it may also seek to improve its relations with Pakistan in order to put itself in a position where it can more effectively influence political developments and counteract Chinese influence throughout South Asia. Under such circumstances if we decided to follow a strategy designed to maximize our options in India and the smaller states simultaneously (see Option 3 below), despite a competitiveness of policy a certain degree of parallel approach to the problems of South Asia may replace the present limited confrontation between us. On the other hand, with respect to China, the current parallelism between our policies and those of the PRC are likely to diverge. Having strongly supported Pakistan in the current crisis, Peking now sees a short-run opportunity to consolidate its relationship with West Pakistan even at the expense of an immediate relationship with Bangla Desh. Over the long-term, however, the Chinese probably hope that the politics of Bangla Desh will become increasingly radical and anti-Indian, as the full extent of the new nation’s political and economic dependence on India (and perhaps the Soviet Union) becomes apparent to the Bengalis. PRC media have hinted that the Chinese may be looking ahead to a pan-Bengali movement which would threaten the integrity of Eastern India. The PRC may quietly provide support to separatist movements elsewhere in India, in accord with its presumed long range goal of political fragmentation of the Subcontinent. Thus, although the US and the PRC at present share a common interest in preserving the viability and national integrity of West Pakistan, in the long run our interests will probably diverge, as the PRC looks at India as a long range strategic and political opponent. III. US Interests and Objectives The United States continues to have no vital security interests in South Asia. No country in the area including India has or is likely to have the ability for many years to come to affect American security directly even if backed by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, developments in South Asia could affect our great interest in stability and impinge on other areas where our vital interests are engaged, i.e., the Middle East, Iran and Turkey and potentially in Southeast Asia as well. They also impinge upon our interests in the Indian Ocean area generally. To the degree that the recent war has created a political imbalance in South Asia in which India predominance has been accentuated and in which Soviet influence has increased at China’s and our expense, it is possible that this change will also have destabilizing effects in areas to both the west and east of India by raising fears of a more aggressive Soviet or Indian role. Such concerns have already been expressed to us by the Shah of Iran and the King of Saudi Arabia. Turkey is also concerned that it will be pressured in April by Podgorny to sign a Treaty of Friendship. It, therefore, should be a major US objective to restore an equilibrium among the major external powers concerned with South Asia . This objective is fully consistent with the long-standing US interest as set out in the Nixon Doctrine in preventing any outside power hostile to the United States from gaining a position of predominance. This interest has been adversely affected in India by developments since the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August. Soviet influence in the short run is likely to increase further in view of its support for Bangla Desh. The pursuit of this equilibrium of great power influence, however, does not imply an attempt to create a balance of power within South Asia between India and Pakistan and the other states of the region, comparable to that which existed in the late 1950s. Secondly, the United States continues to have an interest in the economic, social and political development of the countries of the area, since such development contributes directly to our overall interest in peace, stability, and the preservation of the region free from outside domination . It is likely that Bangla Desh will soon have a democratic political system, as India now has, and it is possible that representative government will emerge in West Pakistan. It should be an objective of US policy to support these systems and, if possible, strengthen them against degeneration into radically authoritarian or militantly nationalistic regimes. Similarly it should remain an objective of US policy to encourage self-reliant economic development throughout the area at rates above population growth. Third, the United States also has an interest in free access to the region in pursuit of normal economic, commercial and political-military interests . Our objective in this context should be to keep open as many of those ties with the South Asian states as possible. These include trade, investment opportunities, overflights, fleet visits and intelligence cooperation. Finally, we will have a broad political and humanitarian interest in the welfare of one-fifth of mankind . Over the last nine months we have demonstrated our humanitarian concerns in a variety of ways. The suffering and damage caused by the war will create additional needs, which will require an American response. IV. Alternate Outcomes The situation in South Asia is a fluid one and may evolve in a variety of directions. In the period ahead we will be endeavoring to use our influence and to shape our programs to support outcomes favorable to our interests, recognizing that to a considerable extent events in South Asia will be governed by internal dynamics over which we have little direct influence and by the actions and policies of other external powers. There are essentially two broad alternate outcomes which bear on US interests: (1) a relatively stable system in which a powerful self-confident India is the keystone of such stability, and (2) a system of instability resulting from fragmentation, radicalization or Indian dominance. For a variety of reasons the first outcome would be more consonant with our interests than the second. 1. Stable System . For the creation of stability in South Asia, India will be the single most important factor. It has emerged from the Indo-Pakistan war powerful and self-confident, with enhanced prospects for political development and self-reliant economic growth. It has the capacity and perhaps also the desire to share its resources with its neighbors, particularly Bangla Desh, but also Nepal and Ceylon as well. For the system to be stable, however, it is not sufficient that India alone be viable, but that the other states in the region also develop confidence in their independence and viability. India’s leading role would be acknowledged, without the smaller states having a client relationship with India. 2. Unstable Systems . The emergence of a stable system is by no means assured, and various internal and external pressures will be at work which could lead to other outcomes, many of which are potentially injurious to US interests. The breakup of Pakistan as a result of Indian military actions could reinforce fissiparous tendencies in West Pakistan. Over time these could also adversely affect the unity and viability of India itself. The further fragmentation of the Subcontinent would almost certainly engender new intra-regional disputes and animosities. At the moment the principal South Asian states all have civilian governments committed to parliamentary democracy. Pressures for more radical and perhaps authoritarian systems could develop in the coming years either as a result of economic failure or in response to Indian pressures or efforts to play a dominant role, particularly if backed by Soviet power. Almost certainly any long-term Indian attempt to create a system of satrapies or client relationships would feed existing fears in Ceylon and Nepal, create resentments and ultimately lead to unstable situations in other countries as well. In the past the single most destabilizing feature of the South Asian environment has been the bitter Indo-Pakistan hostility. The recent Indo-Pakistan war may reinforce this hostility, but it may also provide an opportunity for both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences and for Pakistan to become more self-consciously a part of a Middle Eastern system, for Bangla Desh to look to Southeast Asia, and for both to create relations of cooperative inter-dependence with India. All of the policy strategies set out in Section V are designed to support the stable outcome which would appear to be most consonant with our long and short term interests in South Asia, and to minimize the likelihood that disintegration, radicalization or an aggressive India will lead to an unstable future in South Asia. V. Strategy Options Within this framework there are four broad strategies which we might follow to support our geopolitical and other interests. (1) Support West Pakistan in order to circumscribe Soviet and Indian influence in South Asia in more or less tacit parallelism with China. (2) Focus on promoting relations with Pakistan, Bangla Desh, and other smaller regional countries, while relegating relations with India to a secondary level of importance. (3) Pursue in Pakistan, Bangla Desh and India a policy of selective engagement including efforts to find a satisfactory basis for relations with India and to en-courage its neighbors in their sense of independence. (4) Accept and support Indian leader-ship in South Asia while relegating relations with Pakistan and Bangla Desh to secondary importance. 1. Support for West Pakistan . In view of the degree to which India and the Soviet Union have developed common interests in South Asia, we might decide to accept this relationship as a fact of international life over which we have little direct influence. We might, therefore, determine that the only way of affecting the South Asian equilibrium was by direct and public support for the Government of Pakistan. Such a policy would not only attempt to make Pakistan as effective a counter to India as possible but would also seek to limit Soviet influence by close public identification with China on matters affecting South Asia. Such a strategy would not only require large inputs of economic resources but also probably the resumption of a major military supply relationship, and it could lead to a public commitment to support Pakistan comparable to that epitomized in the Indo-Soviet Treaty. We would seek, to the degree possible, to develop relations with China in ways that made clear our view that our interests in Pakistan’s development and integrity and in limiting Soviet influence were complementary. Advantages —A Pakistan, backed by strong commitments from China and the US, might be a partial buffer against Indo-Soviet hegemony in South Asia. —Would make clear to our allies the seriousness with which we intended to move to contain India and the Soviet Union. —Would therefore act as a positive factor in our relations with countries such as Israel, Greece, Turkey and Iran which are concerned about our future intentions in the face of Soviet gains in South Asia. —Would be welcomed by the other smaller states of South Asia such as Nepal and Ceylon and by some of the Muslim countries in the Middle East. Disadvantages —Would minimize our flexibility in dealing with South Asia and leave us dependent upon a Pakistan of uncertain political stability, which could not become anything more than a partial counter to India. —Would be an overtly anti-Indian policy which would accentuate the existing polarization in South Asia, reinforce the Indo-Soviet relationship, and probably lead to a net increase of Soviet influence in the Sub-continent as a whole and hinder the development of cooperative relations with Bangla Desh. —Might have the effect of delaying or discouraging a reorientation of Pakistani policies away from its traditional anti-Indian focus and hence might revive and exacerbate Indo-Pak tensions. —In view of India’s greater strength, it is unlikely, regardless of huge amounts of economic and military aid, that Pakistan could become a comparable balance to India. 2. Focus on West Pakistan and Bangla Desh . Rather than trying to develop a Sino-Pakistani orientation to our policy in order to counter Soviet and Indian influence, we might concentrate on our relations with the two successor states of united Pakistan and with the other smaller countries of the region. Such a strategy would proceed from assumptions that (a) it would be difficult if at all possible to develop a close parallelism of long-term interest with China, and (b) Pakistan itself would accept US efforts to develop relations with Bangla Desh to counteract Indian and Soviet dominance. Under such a strategy we would attempt to support our South Asian interests by providing extensive assistance to Pakistan, while simultaneously developing relations with Bangla Desh. Such a strategy might also involve increased US support for other South Asian powers threatened by the growth of Soviet-backed Indian power such as Nepal and Ceylon. This strategy would probably entail our developing working relationships with Bangla Desh officials at a relatively early date, agreeing to provide first humanitarian relief and later aid, and recognition once significant progress has been made toward (a) establishing an effective government, and (b) Indian troop withdrawal. Any US policy which recognized realities in East Bengal and resulted in significant US inputs to Bangla Desh would be acquiesced in by India, which would, however, be wary of any US effort to lessen Indian influence in Bangla Desh. In our bilateral relations with India we would continue to maintain a degree of distance and would respond only selectively to Indian requests for assistance. Advantages —Would provide somewhat greater flexibility in dealing with various South Asian countries and provide a broader basis for countering Soviet-Indian influence in the area than Option 1. —Would demonstrate our continued support for Pakistan’s integrity and viability. —Would be welcomed by the smaller South Asian countries. —Would create the basis for a cooperative relationship with Bangla Desh. Disadvantages —Would (as in Option 1) involve a considerable commitment to a West Pakistan which can create only a partial counterweight to India. —Would tend to reinforce the polarization of the Sub-continent and leave essentially unaffected the Indo-Soviet relationship. —By seeming to be a policy of active encirclement might make difficult the development of a viable Indo-American relationship. 3. Selective Engagement with India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh . Rather than trying to balance Soviet and Indian influence through relations with Pakistan or with a broader spectrum of South Asian states, we might try to develop a pattern of stable US relations with all three principal entities in the Sub-continent. Such a course would seek to take advantage of the dynamics in South Asia as the situation evolves. For example, as India and Bangla Desh seek to balance their relationship with the Soviet Union we could be ready to be of assistance in meeting specific economic, technical or other needs. We would seek to maintain our present good relations with Pakistan, would provide economic aid to help Pakistan through its present difficult transition, but would limit our military supply relationship to what Pakistan required (beyond that obtained elsewhere) to maintain an adequate defense against India. We would encourage Pakistan to develop and expand its westward relations with Iran and Turkey rather than attempting to maintain a policy of confrontation with India. In regard to India we would move only very slowly and in response to Indian requests for economic assistance and then only when a satisfactory political basis for our aid existed. But we would seek to make clear that we were prepared to help India when this basis existed. In regard to Bangla Desh, we would provide humanitarian assistance primarily through multilateral channels (and perhaps also development aid) in continuing increments at its request and when we were satisfied that a satisfactory basis for such assistance existed. Possible bilateral aid to Bangla Desh would also be considered in light of the fact that the Soviets are taking this route. We would not be in the early group to recognize Bangla Desh, but would look at this problem as relations developed. Advantages —Would provide maximum flexibility in dealing with South Asia and contribute to the regional and external equilibria. —Would provide a basis. for selectively promoting our relations with all the countries of the area without explicit commitment to any one. —Would provide the only comprehensive counter to both Soviet and Chinese influence. —Would provide a viable basis for supporting our humanitarian interests. —Would contribute to a reorientation of Pakistani and Bangla Desh policy away from their Indian preoccupations. Disadvantages —Would not directly reassure other countries outside the Subcontinent of our intention to support our treaty commitments nor dramatically demonstrate our willingness to counter Soviet influence. —Would in the short run only marginally affect Soviet influence in India and Bangla Desh. —Might be seen in Pakistan as a lessening of our recent support. 4. Acceptance of and Support for Indian Leadership in South Asia . India has emerged as the preeminent power in South Asia and is likely to be the most. stable and effective South Asian power over the next generation. It has historically tried to avoid dependence on any one external power and has sought through non-alignment to establish a balance in its external relations. Therefore while India will retain a substantial relationship with the USSR, it will also wish to improve relations with the United States to which we might wish to respond positively. Such a response might include development assistance, though probably not technical assistance which has created strains in our relations in the past, expanded technological relations in the nuclear and space fields and a return to the limited pre-December military sales policy. It would also imply a degree of political support for and recognition of India’s legitimate interests in Asia. Such a return to a substantial Indo-American relationship is not one which we could adopt immediately in view of our strong disapproval of recent Indian military actions. It could, however, be initiated once India had withdrawn from territory occupied in the December war and had removed itself from a position of direct governmental power in Bangla Desh. A corollary of this policy would be the development of an early and economically supportive role in Bangla Desh, beginning with humanitarian assistance but going on to a more substantial development assistance relationship. Such a policy would support rather than try to exploit or diminish close Indo-Bangla Desh relations. While we would seek to maintain good relations with Pakistan, we would have to recognize that we might only be able to do so to a limited degree, depending on the extent Pakistan would wish to maintain a relationship with us to balance dependence on China. Advantages —Would restore United States influence with the largest and most powerful state in the region with which we have had a long-standing and loose relation-ship. —Would offer considerable opportunities for direct limitation of Soviet influence and enable India to resume a non-aligned posture. —Would provide the basis for a close and constructive relationship with Bangla Desh and limitation of Soviet influence there. Disadvantages —Would be strongly opposed in Pakistan. —Would be seen as a direct repudiation of the policies pursued by US in recent months and might be seen by some US allies as a policy of expediency. —Would run risks of forcing Pakistan to turn decisively to China for support. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. The attached paper was Secret; Exdis. Rogers’ memorandum and the attached paper, drafted on January 15, were circulated on January 17 by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the CIA. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) An earlier draft of the paper, submitted on January 7 by Sisco to Rogers, indicates it was drafted in NEA/INC by Quainton with the concurrence of Schneider and Van Hollen. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF1–1 ASIA SE) 207. Analytical Summary Prepared by Members of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 207. Analytical Summary Prepared by Members of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 17, 1972 POSTWAR ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA The purpose of this memo is to address US posture toward South Asia in the wake of the war. It draws on the papers that have been produced in response to assignments made at the last WSAG on the subject, but it also covers in its second half some of the broader issues that must be dealt with in developing a policy framework; working from State’s options. What follows, therefore, is in two main sections . The first , “Summary of the Papers,” is a brief guide to the essence of the papers at the following tabs. The second , “Issues in Establishing a Postwar Posture,” discusses general options and two possible strategies in the present situation. It describes how a choice between two possible postures would affect decisions on the issues dealt with in the papers. This by itself is not intended as a decision document but rather as a framework within which decisions can be handled as they come up. [ Letters from Heath and McMahon —last two tabs—can be answered in light of guidance on this issue.] SUMMARY OF THE PAPERS At tabs following are papers that have been prepared dealing with the principal issues in the wake of the war in South Asia. A. Recognition . This State Department paper, “US Relationship with Bangladesh,” recommends delaying recognition for “at least a month” to give Bhutto a chance to sort out his own relationship and to see how the government in Dacca establishes itself. We would try to maintain our consulate in the meantime. Beyond that period, the paper recommends “relatively early recognition” to offer Bangladesh an alternative to exclusive dependence on the USSR, but it does not address the precise criteria for judging when the moment for recognition has arrived. B. Humanitarian Assistance . US willingness to participate in a UN food relief program has been established by separate memoranda from Maury Williams, from State and from you to the President at this tab. They are included here for the sake of easy reference. Since the US posture is to put any US assistance in the context of an international program under the UN, amounts and timing will still be the subject of continuing discussion. [Bhutto has been informed of this and of our readiness to send an initial shipment of $35 million in PL 480 to West Pakistan.] C. Economic Aid Policy—Pakistan and India . We have informally a paper by Maury Williams. He suggests a two-phased policy. In the first, the short-term , he recommends: — For West Pakistan , a new PL 480 agreement of about $25 million in wheat and $10 million in edible oil. [This is already in process.] — For India , no new development aid until political policy becomes clearer but lift the war-related suspension of prior year pipeline commitments. An alternative step which could be considered would be to conclude the current year PL 480 agreement which was held up before the-war. Williams’ thought in proposing some such move unblocking old aid is to provide some signal “that we have not closed the book regarding a final settlement, that they have an opportunity to seek improved relations and that we wish to see more of their intentions.” This is against a background of reports from Delhi and the Indians are debating among themselves how to deal with US aid programs. State has argued against (presumably to avoid appearing pro-Indian). In the longer term : — For West Pakistan , prospect of new development aid in the context of a new development plan worked out with the World Bank, drawing consortium members back into play. — For India , new aid should not be committed until India’s longer term stance is clearer and then should be skewed toward agricultural development. D. Military Supply . There are two separate problems covered in three papers: 1. Military supply policy . — Defense Department’s options paper reviews arms supply policy since 1965 and presents the following options: — For Pakistan : (1) maintain the present embargo for a time; (2) restore the April 1967 policy allowing the sale of non-lethal end-items as well as lethal and non-lethal spares; (3) renew the one-time exception offer along with the 1967 policy; (4) reinstate a policy of major supply of all military items on either a grant or sales basis. — For India : (1) maintain embargo; (2) permit only the completion of projects under the $17 million loan for troposcatter equipment; (3) return to the 1966 policy permitting the sale of non-lethal end items and spares only; (4) reinstate the April 1967 policy allowing the sale of lethal spares as well as non-lethal items. — For Bangladesh : (1) wait and see; (2) in time offer a small program such as some US training. Defense recommends that we postpone for now any move toward restoration of the military supply pipeline for any South Asian country. In time, a renewed military supply program might aim at modernizing Pakistan’s obsolescent inventory of offensive equipment. [India will regard any such move as a major indicator of basic US policy. In time, a renewed program for India should be limited to the commercial or cash sale of non-lethal material only (C–119 transport spares and troposcatter communications). For Bangladesh, we should postpone any decision indefinitely. A State Department memo recommends holding to present policy for now, while recognizing that in time we will have to come to grips with Pakistan’s replacement problems and with the problem of what size military Pakistan can now afford. 2. Pakistani request . Ambassador Raza has made an oral request for a small amount of military supplies which include (1) several munitions list items and (2) some items not on the munitions list which are covered by Commerce Department licenses. The latter are dealt with in a separate memo to you. The former can be dealt with only in the context of setting postwar supply policy. E. Disengagement . The State paper, “Problems of Disengagement and Withdrawal,” deals with three questions: —How to arrange troop withdrawals to pre-war lines on the western front and whether expansion of the UN military observer group is essential. The paper recommends leaving the issue to India and Pakistan in the first instance, but supporting a Pak request for observers or for a military representative to draw up a timetable and mechanism for withdrawal. It does not deal with the question of how long we should let the ceasefire without withdrawal drag on before becoming more active. — Indian withdrawal from East Bengal is a different problem from disengagement and withdrawal in the west because the Indian army’s presence may be the only alternative to a breakdown in law and order for some time. The army is committed to the protection of minorities. On the other hand, it is desirable over the longer term for East Bengal not to remain an occupied client state. The State paper says only that we should consider an explicit relationship of our aid policies to Indian withdrawal. —Repatriation of West Pakistanis will hopefully proceed with ICRC help, but the question of war crimes may become an issue. ISSUES IN ESTABLISHING A POSTWAR POSTURE It will be desirable to deal with the above decisions within some sort of strategy framework rather than to try to decide them one by one. Presumably, it will be desirable to have a strategy set before the trip to China. The State Department options paper [see tab] discusses four options. Following are: (1) a brief description of State’s four general options; (2) some working assumptions about the present situation and big-power interests in it [drafted by Saunders for discussion purposes]; (3) two possible strategies derived from the most realistic of the general options for near-term guidance in making the operational decisions we face over the next two months or so. [Secretary Rogers in a memo to the President recommends that the State options paper be the centerpiece of an early NSC discussion.] Four Options—State Department Paper For the sake of discussion, the State Department has identified four possible general US postures over the long term in South Asia: 1. Build up a counterweight to Soviet-backed India, mainly by a closer relationship with China and West Pakistan in South Asia . Looking on a broader area, one could think of Pakistan strengthening its relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. In a strange way, even Israel would be part of that picture. Such a combination would begin to look like a new lineup similar to CENTO against the Soviet thrust into the Indian Ocean. It remains to be seen whether Bhutto himself will want to take such a line, since it would be a reversal of his earlier policy of trying to maintain a relationship with the USSR as well as with China and the US. 2. Build South Asian counterweights to India—concentrating on cementing our relationship with Pakistan; providing Bangladesh an alternative to dependence on India and the USSR; letting the parallelism between China’s interests and ours take a natural course rather than actively pressing it . This approach would be based on the assumption that a strategy built principally on West Pakistan would not be a sufficient counter to India and that even China, while seeing major importance in its relationship with West Pakistan as an outlet on the Indian Ocean, would see an important interest in movement by Bangladesh toward greater independence of India and the USSR. It also would assume that US interests elsewhere in the broader Indian Ocean area—e.g. Southern Arabia, Persian Gulf Palestinians, East Africa—are not parallel with China’s and that a parallelism of interests in South Asia should be used for what it is worth but not pushed too far. Presumably Pakistan will have at least an economic interest in relations with Bangladesh. 3. Build a relationship with each of the South Asian entities without seeking a special relationship with any . This would permit full economic assistance to Pakistan but would limit our military supply relationship. Restoration of the Indian economic assistance relation-ship could be gradual, and the nature of the relationship itself could be different from the past; but we would move toward a serious relationship rather than letting the present suspended relationship persist. We would move gradually into some relationship with Bangladesh. 4. Build toward a primary relationship with India on grounds that it is likely to be the most stable and effective South Asian power . This seems only a theoretical possibility at this point. Even if this approach were taken, it could not be done in the immediate future, but it might set the tone for some steps taken now. While this is not a course this Administration is likely to take, it must be discussed if for no other reason than that it reflects the views of many in the US as the alternative to the course the Administration has followed. Working Assumptions about Present Situation Rather than sketch out endless pros and cons on the above options, it seems worth trying. to set down some judgments about the present situation . These are purely Saunders’ and are open to argument, but arguing them tends to narrow the options. —The USSR is engaged in a thrust to establish a strong position in the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas. Wherever possible, the Soviets are extending military assistance and attempting to translate this into political influence in support of their own ends. In India’s case, the Soviets appear motivated by the containment of China as much as anything. Displacement of US influence seems a secondary motive. Corollary to this are the assumptions that it is in the US interest to see this thrust blunted to the extent possible and that China will share this interest, at least in Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean. —As long as India and Pakistan remain actively hostile toward each other, the pressures from the subcontinent will be to line up the global powers to take sides between the two. Pakistan will continue to take advantage of China’s desire to contain India and of the US interest at the moment in not appearing to go back on an ally or to oppose China. Pakistan may in time return to its interest in courting the USSR, but the recent crisis would seem to make that difficult in the immediate future. India will exploit Soviet interest in building on its improved position in the area. India will also presumably continue to have some interest in a reasonable relation-ship with the US as a balance and even in lessening the strain in its relations with China. —Of the three global powers, China seems most inclined toward alignment with Pakistan to contain India because it wants to limit Indian as well as Soviet power throughout Asia. With Bangladesh now independent, China will feel less inhibited in making at least a subversive play for longer-term influence there. It would be important to China to build another counter to India because West Pakistan, even if working with the smaller regional states that fear India, could not offset its power. —US interests are divided. To begin with, the US is the one global power which does not have an immediate military stake in South Asia and which does not seek an exclusive position of its own-anywhere there. The US has an immediate interest for global reasons in blunting the Soviet thrust. In the long run, US interests would be served if neither the USSR nor China gained an exclusive position. The US has an interest in the political evolution of 500 million Indians. Beyond that, the US on the one hand shares with Pakistan and China an interest in curbing India’s power insofar as it is seen as enhancing the global position of the USSR. On the other hand, the US also has an interest in maintaining influence of its own in India. India is an emerging middle level power bent on and capable of playing a pre-dominant regional role and establishing a strongly competitive position throughout Asia. Finally, the new US relationship with China requires that the US not appear to foresake Pakistan or reward India for its recent aggression. —Bangladesh is a reality. Although it will be slow in establishing sound government and will be a major problem in economic development it is most unlikely to submerge its political identity in even a nominal relationship with Pakistan. It will be the eighth largest nation in the world. —Pakistan, while at the moment more viable than East Bengal, still has significant centrifugal forces within it. The long-run cohesiveness of Pakistan is still an open question. If these assumptions stand, they suggest the following judgments [Saunders’] on the four State Department options : — Option 4 , lining up with India, seems out for now at a minimum because the Chinese would question whether such a reversal was the mark of a dependable nation. — Option 1 , lining up with China and Pakistan against India, seems an unnecessarily sharp drawing of lines when neither the US nor China probably wants to leave India and Bangladesh uncontested to the USSR. — Option 2 , lining up Pakistan and Bangladesh to contain India, again seems to write off India unnecessarily and may be based on unrealistic assumptions about the interest of Bangladesh in taking sides against India soon. — Option 3 , a specially tailored relationship with each of the three states, seems the most realistic. If option 3—a specially tailored relationship with each state—describes a general strategy, the State Department paper stops too soon . The real issues begin here: What should be the mixture of pressures and inducements on each state? What limits does timing impose? Two Strategies for the Coming Months Following are two strategies which take into account our basic interests and also reflect the realities of the present situation. Each is developed in terms of the decisions we face over the coming months. Strategy 1 rests on the judgments that: (a) US credibility cannot be maintained if positions taken during the war (e. g. cut-off of economic assistance, close support for West Pakistan) are reversed quickly; (b) the US has an interest in a viable Indo-US relationship but such a relationship cannot develop until the Indians themselves assess the consequences of too close a relationship with the USSR and actively seek a balancing relationship with the US; (c) our relationship with China requires that we not do anything against Bhutto’s wishes. If this strategy were adopted, the following decisions might be made on the concrete issues before us: A. Recognition of Bangladesh would be delayed until after the China trip and Bhutto finally sorted out his own relationship with Dacca. Circumstances could force a decision sooner, but we would delay as long as possible. Such circumstances might be either a Bangladesh ultimatum to recognize or withdraw our consulate or the requirement to vote on UN membership. At some such point when Bangladesh is clearly functioning as a government a technical recognition of practical control probably makes sense. (See E below for relationship to withdrawal of Indian troops.) But by this approach recognition would be at the last moment rather than at an “early” moment (as the State paper at Tab A suggests). B. Humanitarian Assistance in East Bengal would go ahead but with the US (a) leaving the initiative to the UN and (b) providing a minimum respectable share within an international effort. C. Economic Assistance . The maximum application of this strategy would be to leave economic assistance to India right where it is today. Even under this strategy, however, there could be an argument for lifting the suspension on past aid on grounds that this might assist those in Delhi who might argue for rebuilding a relationship with the US. With that step taken, however, considerable time could pass before any new development aid was provided. PL 480 might come first. One might in time couple any resumption with a plan to be worked out with the Indians for a total phase-out of development lending over an agreed period. D. Military Supply . Certainly there would be no resumption of a normal supply relationship with India soon. Supply to Pakistan would be a highly controversial decision—perhaps even politically impossible in Washington—but the emphasis would be to perpetuate the idea of an Indian threat to West Pakistan as long as possible and to go as far as possible—perhaps on a cash-and-carry basis—in letting Pakistan procure here what it needs to modernize its forces. E. Disengagement . Resumption of normal programs in India would at a minimum be contingent on withdrawal of Indian forces on both eastern and western fronts. It might be that withdrawal from East Bengal should be a condition of recognizing Bangladesh since its government might well be considered not in control as long as Indian occupation continues. Strategy 2 rests on the judgment that the US has a sufficient interest in the potential power that India represents not to abandon the field to the USSR. The US should certainly not reverse course as if all were forgotten in the wake of the war, but it should give more attention than under Strategy 1 to signals indicating that it does want a relation-ship with the 600 million people in India and East Bengal. The US would not unnecessarily embarrass the Pakistani government and would be helpful within limits, but it would move toward an independent position, not making Pakistani sensitivities the principal touchstone of its policy. In contrast to Strategy 1 which contains some element of China-US-Pakistan alignment against India and the USSR, Strategy 2 would begin to move the US to a more neutral stance with lines to all three of the major South Asian entities. If this stance were used as the framework, specific decisions might be made more along the following lines: A. Recognition . The US would give Bhutto the thirty days or so that he asked for plus a little more if it seemed needed and then prepare for recognition when a Bangladesh government seemed clearly in control and when a reasonable number of other countries, including some Asians and Africans, have recognized. Under this strategy, the US would be more inclined to encourage Bhutto to make a clean break if he continued to show signs, after a month, of trying to maintain a one-Pakistan fiction which would linger as a source of continuing tension. B. Humanitarian Assistance . The US would start with its present posture of contributing only through the UN and only from the past pipeline. But it would be more likely than under Strategy 1 to consider in February a higher level of financial contribution through the UN and even perhaps some pressure on others to contribute to the international effort. C. Economic Aid . Under this strategy, as under Strategy 1, the US would, of course, move back into development assistance to West Pakistan as soon as practicable. In addition, under this—strategy, the suspension of past aid to India might be lifted fairly soon to signal that the door is still open. Even under this strategy, however, new development assistance could still be slow in coming. D. Military Supply . While the US might consider meeting. Pakistan’s most pressing replacement needs on the basis of a new “one-time exception” or might even allow both sides to buy here on a cash-and-carry basis, the basic approach would be to get out of military assistance altogether until there is either a framework of Indo-Pakistani reconciliation or some international umbrella for assistance not now conceived. E. Disengagement . There would be no difference between Strategies 1 and 2 on the issue of troop withdrawal on the western front. But in East Bengal, the US might be less inclined to insist on withdrawal of Indian troops as a prerequisite to recognition of Bangladesh. Since the US would not be looking for pretexts for delaying recognition, it would be more inclined to recognize the contribution Indian troops might make in (a) protecting minorities and in (b) inhibiting more radical elements from coming to the fore. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders and Kennedy transmitted the summary to Kissinger in a January 17 memorandum. (Ibid.) The reference in the summary to a Department of State options paper is to Document 206 . The remainder of the papers cited in the study can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72, and ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). The paper dealing with Bangladesh and the letters from Prime Ministers Heath and McMahon are included in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume. See documents 376 , 386 , and 387 . 208. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to President Nixon 208. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 18, 1972 My dear Mr. President, I have the honour to convey to you the following message from President Bhutto: BEGINS: I am grateful for your message of congratulations on my assuming the office of President of Pakistan. On behalf of the people of Pakistan and myself, I reciprocate in full measure the warm sentiments you have expressed. At this first opportunity, let me convey our sincere appreciation to you and the American people for the support extended to us in our struggle to preserve our national independence and territorial integrity. The tragedy that has struck the people of Pakistan has few parallels in history. While the world watched, India set about to destroy with predatory cynicism the established frontiers of our homeland. India continues to occupy our territories in spite of the overwhelming verdict of the General Assembly and the demand of the Security Council for the withdrawal of all armed forces to their respective territories and to positions on the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. We seek a durable peace in the sub-continent, a just and honourable peace, but there can be no peace unless the armed forces of India first vacate their occupation of our territories. An uneasy truce prevails with our troops on the borders, and our people face the grim aftermath of war. The task ahead is indeed formidable, but we are determined to succeed. We are determined to rebuild on the debris of the past, a past not of our making. The problems of national reconstruction are massive. We must as early as possible bring a measure of hope and happiness to our people who have endured much suffering. We have no doubt that in all our efforts we will have your continued cooperation, understanding and friendship and that of your great people. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ENDS. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. The text of Bhutto’s letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 28 in telegram 16271. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 209. Telegram 774 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 209. Telegram 774 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, January 19, 1972, 1110Z Subj: FonSec’s Initiative for Improved Indo-US Relations REF: A) New Delhi 0642: B) New Delhi 300 (Notal) 1. Summary. I recommend I be authorized to tell GOI we reciprocate their interest in improved relations and that a policy review is in process in Washington with many current problems in mind. I would also like to make additional point (speaking officially or personally) that neither country can afford to wait for completion of review to take steps, however small, which might improve tone and substance of bilateral relations. Among these are cooperation on international conventions (e.g., narcotics), cessation of officially inspired criticism of other country, removal of bilateral irritants where possible, and discussion of parts of 1971 aid program. When US policy review completed, US would favor early scheduling of bilateral talks as forum best suited to frank review of bilateral relations and problems. (I hope Washington agencies will complete policy review as quickly as possible, including US relations with Bangladesh, with careful consideration in process of recommendations made in New Delhi 300). Action requested: Comment on recommended response to Indian initiative on improved relations. End summary. 2. We remain unsure as to what exactly motivated Foreign Secretary overture at this time to restore Indo-US relations to more normal state. Among possible factors influencing timing of decision are: a) realization of need for US participation in reconstruction Bangla Desh (despite Kaul’s qte higher plans unqte approach): b) desire to demonstrate to Moscow that GOI maintains options with US: and c) concern that US will offer Pakistan substantial new economic credits and possible military assistance to offset losses suffered in 14-day war. Regardless of motivation, however, I feel Indian initiative should be welcomed and we should begin probing to see how far GOI prepared to go in pursuit of improved relations. US national interest, it seems to me, requires that apparent Indian interest in avoiding excessive Soviet influence (New Delhi 630) not be rebuffed by excessive delay in positive US response to this approach. Two courses of action seem possible: a) positive response to expressed Indian desire for improved relations along with specific proposals for first steps to be taken by both countries (see para 3 below: or b) positive general response accompanied by suggestion that specific proposals should come from GOI. 3. I believe minimum response to Indian initiative is to reciprocate their interest in improved relations, while probing realities of this initiative. Recognizing that policy review will necessarily take some time (State 6586), I could discuss (speaking personally or officially as Department desires) certain interim steps to improve tone and substance of Indo-US relations, which would require positive action on part of both governments as earnest of their mutual desire for improvement. Among them are: A) US acceptance of Bangladesh: US action which would bring greatest and most dramatic immediate return would be diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh. However, I recognize this may not be feasible in next few months. Nonetheless, we could tell Indians that we accept reality of Bangladesh and Department could provide some credible explanation why early recognition is not possible. B) Discussion of FY 1971 aid program, GOI sees hold on $87 million program loan as punitive and political and has reacted accordingly. We cannot wisely and with dignty ignore htgh-level Indian statements reflecting adversely on need and effectiveness of US aid, but we can raise with GOI implications of these statements, probe their attitudes on restoration FY-71 loan (which we consider US commitment) and hopefully remove punitive stigma presently attached to our action (Indians remember and repeat the Secretary’s statement to Swaran Singh last summer, apropos of assistance to Pakistan, that US does not use aid for political purposes). We assume that, since US press has now published more precise description scope of aid suspended and fact that bulk of economic assistance to India still flowing, Department will have no objection to our conveying this information to GOI. We should make clear during our discussions that while nature post-FY 71 aid programs will depend upon results of US policy review, US congressional sentiment and subsequent talks with GOI, we are anxious to arrive at mutually satisfactory disposal of qte surplus rupee unqte problem and we believe current technical assistance program must be analyzed carefully to insure that only those projects of mutual interest to both countries are being continued. C) International conventions: Indo-US consultation and cooperation in this area would contribute short and longer term to improved relations. For example, GOI support for or acquiescence in US proposed or supported amendments to single convention on narcotic drugs (Geneva 129) would constitute important earnest of Indian desire for improved bilateral relations. In my discussions here I have made GOI well aware of the high priority which President Nixon attaches to narcotics control and Nelson Gross reemphasized this to the Indians. As they explained to Gross, Indians have some difficulties with the proposed amendments. GOI cooperation at ECOSOC plenipotentiary conference at Geneva March 6–24 or even better support proposed amendments, would give us good beginning in area of top domestic and foreign policy priority for US and serve as important Indian step to improve GOI standing in our eyes. D) Bilateral irritants: As noted in policy assessment (ref B), we need better communications with India. While press of both countries is free, we can avoid officially inspired criticism of one another and should suggest this to GOI. We can make point that reports continue to reach Embassy that MEA spokesman badly slants and distorts US actions, motivations and intenttons. We might also cite American international school problem as one susceptible of early solution (especially in view of congressional consultations to obtain needed surplus rupee funding-State 232610). Removal of such irritants would smooth way for subseouent bilateral talks on wider ranging matters. E) Military sales and MAP training: We should review candidly reasons for US suspension, inform GOI MAP training and east/West highway programs can continue and note that US is considering indian reouest for continuation peace indigo and ammunition projects (State 7234), apart from policy review. 4. Department’s suggestions for additional or alternative steps of specific nature will be welcomed. 5. If, alternatively, Department wishes me to limit response at this time to reciprocating India’s desire for improved relations and soliciting their suggestions, I would still appreciate—to keep dialogue alive—Department’s suggestions as to comments I might make on these or any other points of interest to Washington. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, Madras, and priority to Saigon for Nelson Gross. Telegram 300 and 642 are Documents 201 and 205 . 210. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 210. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, January 19, 1972, 3:04–4:25 p.m. Subject: South Asia Participants: Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger Treasury—Paul Volcker John McGinnis State—John N. Irwin Joseph Sisco Christopher Van Hollen CIA—Richard Helms John Waller Defense—Warren G. Nutter James H. Noyes AID—Maurice Williams JCS—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer NSC Staff—Richard T. Kennedy Harold Saunders Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS It was agreed that: 1) the possibility of an invitation to Turkish Prime Minister Erim to visit the U.S. before April will be reconsidered; 2) we would do nothing on recognition of Bangladesh for the time being; 3) the hold on Commercial list items for Pakistan should be removed immediately and the Paks should be so informed; 4) the State Department would prepare policy papers on: a) military supply for both countries; b) economic assistance for both countries; and c) the issues of humanitarian assistance including the percentage of the U.S. contribution to multilateral efforts. Dr. Kissinger: We have two sets of issues for preliminary discussion today. First, the basic attitude we should take, given the changed circumstances in the area, and second, a series of specific problems on which we will want at least a preliminary statement of alternatives. We have the State Department paper outlining four alternatives. Before we turn to that, Dick (Helms) will you give us a summary of the situation. Then Jack (Irwin) or Joe (Sisco) can outline State’s views and we can consider our basic attitude and how it would apply to some of the specifics. Mr. Helms briefed from the attached text. Dr. Kissinger: Who wants to speak for State? Mr. Irwin: I’ll ask Joe (Sisco) to give you the background of our paper. Mr. Sisco: I think our paper pretty well speaks for itself. We tried, without providing any of the answers because we don’t know the answers, to analyze the situation in terms of the relative balance in the region as well as the balance outside the region between the major powers. I think the paper expresses the alternatives in bolder face type than the reality of the situation would dictate. For example, when you speak Of alternatives of stability or instability, our presumption must be that our interests will be served by whatever will contribute to stability. Also, we must recognize that there has been some change in the balance, and I expect that our objectives should be to restore some equilibrium. We are fortunate that we can go back to the Nixon Doctrine and say that it is not in our interest for any major power to dominate in the area. The paper points outflzat basically, in the last few weeks, US relations with Pakistan have been roughly parallel to those of the Chinese, whereas the Russians have opted more categorically for the Indians. It will be interesting to see to what degree the Soviets move to redress the situation vis-à-vis West Pakistan, and how the Chinese play the situation of a new entity in the East. All of our options are based on a go-slow, watchful-waiting posture. Illustratively, on the recognition of Bangladesh, we need not only to have some dialogue with the West, but we need a better feel as to how the Chinese will play it. This is a question for the President. to explore in Peking in February. We shouldn’t make a decision on recognition without more discussion, including what the Chinese do and how the Russians will play it. These options aren’t mutually exclusive, and I expect what will come out will be an amalgam of the options. Adm. Moorer: (to Sisco) What do you think has been the impact of this on the Soviet position in the Arab world? Mr. Sisco: Recent events have certainly increased the Shah’s concern and also that of Turkey. Podgorny visits Turkey in April and they expect to be pressed very hard to conclude some sort of agreement. That’s why we have tried so hard for an invitation for Erim to visit the US before April. I know the difficulties of the schedule, but he will be pressed very hard by the Soviets during their visit. Dr. Kissinger: It would really be helpful to have the Erim visit before April? Mr. Sisco: Most helpful—it would help them resist the Soviet pressure. Also, we may have to reduce our MAP program for Turkey from $100 million to $60 million. This, plus the Soviet pressure and the situation on the sub-continent makes me very uneasy about both Turkey and Iran. I think we need some special steps to shore up these two good friends. Dr. Kissinger: I’ll re-raise the issue of the Erim visit and see if we can’t get it before April. You know we’ve been kicking around the idea of the President visiting Iran. Mr. Sisco: Yes; the Shah’s nose is really out of joint. Bluntly put, he sees the President going to Moscow and Peking while our better friends are being taking for granted. Our whole Persian Gulf policy is based on the Shah and what he considers to be his special relationship with the President. Dr. Kissinger: The problem is one of timing, and of whether it is a good idea to go to Moscow by way of another country. Mr. Sisco: If the President could just stop in Tehran for a working lunch with the Shah on the way to Moscow, it would be the perfect touch—the best three or four hours he could spend. I’m really worried about the impact of the situation on Iran and Turkey. Not only is the Shah worried about added Soviet influenee in the sub-continent and its impact on the Persian Gulf, but he’s also worried about indications of increasing Soviet influence in Iraq. Of course, the Shah overestimates and exaggerates this as an argument for more military hardware. Mr. Helms: I agree with Joe’s assessment. Iraq is testing the Shah at the moment. Adm. Moorer: I asked the Turkish Chief of Staff what Iran would do about Pakistan a few weeks ago, and he said the Shah would. be very careful because he was worried about Iraq. Also, the F–4s we are sending to Greece are shaking up the Turks. Mr. Sisco: We have taken several decisions recently with regard to the Greeks—homeporting for instance—to which the Turks are sensitive. They are afraid we are making the Greeks our chosen instrument to the derogation of the Turks. Dr. Kissinger: Can’t we compenstate the Turks in some way? Can’t we homeport in Turkey? Mr. Sisco: They don’t want US to. Dr. Kissinger: Then they can’t complain if we do it in Greece. Mr. Sisco: If we are forced to reduce our MAP program for Turkey to the extent indicated, we should consider a request for a supplemental including additional money for the Turks. Erim’s recent letter to the President focussed on his concern over security assistance. Adm. Moorer: It isn’t a question of affecting their modernization program. They will really have to cut forces. Mr. Irwin: The two countries that will have to be cut are Turkey and Korea. Dr. Kissinger: To what extent is Korea being cut? Mr. Nutter: The same as Turkey— about 40%. Dr. Kissinger: And this is being done a year after we made a firm commitment to the Koreans in connection with the reduction of our forces there! Col. Kennedy: That’s the only place the money is. We only have programs in three countries to work with. Dr. Kissinger: This makes the Nixon Doctrine a joke. We pull out our forces and promise increased military assistance to compensate, then we don’t give them the money. Mr. Sisco: I think the argument for a supplemental request is overriding. Dr. Kissinger: I’m more concerned about the effect in Korea if we should decide we want to reduce our forces there still further. Mr. Irwin: We don’t have the flexibility we had—these are tough priority choices. We should talk about this in detail another day. A visit before April for Erim would do a lot to soften the blow—it would be a real shot in the arm. Mr. Nutter: A supplemental will help too. Dr. Kissinger: I’ll raise the question of an earlier visit, although I expect there will be enormous resistance. We’re going to Canada in April too, but you have made a good case for Erim. Mr. Sisco: (to Kissinger) You should really take a good look at the security assistance situation. It’s a discouraging picture. Dr. Kissinger: I don’t like to do what we’re doing to Turkey. And I’m extremely unhappy over Korea. We promised them a five-year program. (to Kennedy) Have we delivered anything yet? Col. Kennedy: Two years worth. Mr. Irwin: The question of a supplemental partially depends on whether the actual appropriations go up as far as the authorization. If the appropriations are cut down, we will have to go back to them. Dr. Kissinger: When will we know? Mr. Irwin: In the next several weeks. Col. Kennedy: The present Continuing Resolution Authority expires February 1. Mr. Nutter: It expires February 22—just before the recess. Mr. Irwin: The problem is Senator Proxmire. Mr. Nutter: He will drag it out as long as he can. Dr. Kissinger: On the options, establishment of a primary relationship in the area with India is not likely to be approved under present circumstances. Options 1 and 2 don’t appear to be mutually exclusive. We could tilt toward West Pakistan and still come out in practical terms close to China without any formal agreement with them. Option 2 really encompasses Option 1. Option 3 called for an ad hoc situation—making our decisions from case to case. Whatever one may think of our longer-term policy, we can’t reverse what’s been done without reaping the disadvantages of every course of action. If we should decide to move in a different direction from that of the last few weeks, the question of timing will be most important. If we assume that the first option is a special case of the second option, the issues fall into two groups. Every option will have to start with the assumption that we want to maintain a close relationship with Pakistan. The question to be considered is our position with regard to Bangladesh and India. The issues then fall into two broad categories: 1) do we let India work its way back slowly, or 2) do we want a more rapid normalization of relations with India. We’re not likely to adopt a policy of permanent hostility toward India a priori, regardless of what the Indians do. Should we treat India and Bangladesh as part of the same phenomenon or is it more in our interest to differentiate between them? Let’s look at the list of items, then after this meeting we can develop a position on each item if we decide to move slowly and if we decide to move quickly toward India, and do the same thing for Bangladesh. We will probably want to have an NSC meeting on this before China so the President has it in mind when he talks to Chou. Mr. Irwin: The advantage of Option 3 is that it gives US time to see whether we want to move quickly or more slowly. We can get through the Peking and Moscow trips, which may give us a different perspective on whether we want to take it easy or move faster in our relations with India. Dr. Kissinger: I agree, but I think it would be interesting to get the judgement of this group and of the NSC on the proposal that India is the preeminent country in the subcontinent and that it is in our interest to have good relations with that country. It’s a question of how best to achieve this objective. Having paid the price of our attitude, it might be better to see what benefits we can get out of it. Kaul’s conversation with Ambassador Keating showed less hysteria than previous conversations we have had when we had good relations with the Indians. Mr. Sisco: I agree. I think we should leave the initiative to the Indians. They have taken a step. If we want to establish a realistic basis for our relations with India, we can’t go back to the pre-war situation. Dr. Kissinger: I agree. This could be one of the benefits of going slowly. Mr. Sisco: A go-slow posture would offer some hope for putting our relations on a more realistic basis. I would guess that analysis will indicate that some differentiation between our policy toward India and Bangladesh may serve our interests. Reports from the field indicate that there is a substantial reservoir of good will toward the US among the more moderate leadership in Bangladesh. They are fairly realistic in realizing that there is no substitute for American economic power in the area, When they talk about multilateral assistance, they know that unless the US plays the game there is no real hope. This gives us some leverage. We should avoid any appearance of being over-anxious. Dr. Kissinger: Can we maintain this posture barring some changes in policy through the NSC? I read press stories that say we are anxious to resume aid. Mr. Irwin: They’re not coming from us. I think we should keep the pressure on India. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s go over some of these individual items. On recognition, we certainly can’t recognize before the President goes to Peking. Is there any disagreement with that? Mr. Sisco: None, unless the Chinese do something unexpected. The British and French will probably go ahead and recognize, but we will have to talk this out with the Chinese. Dr. Kissinger: What should our posture be in the meantime? Mr. Sisco: We can maintain informal contact with the Bangladesh at their initiative. We shouldn’t spurn them, but should maintain a low-level profile in response to their initiatives. We should also keep talking to Bhutto when he wants to talk to us. Dr. Kissinger: I haven’t seen any recent conversations with Bhutto but I’ve been busy on the foreign policy report. Have there been any? Mr. Sisco: Bhutto talked with Ambassador Farland a week or 10 days ago, but nothing since. He said he would understand if the US felt it should do something on humanitarian assistance, but of course he wanted no recognition. Mr. Irwin: He’s not putting us under any pressure. Mr. Sisco: We certainly have no problem with non-recognition prior to February 21. Dr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) How do you see the situation evolving after that? How long should we wait? Mr. Sisco: I think we can wait several months. Mr. Van Hollen: There might be some positive advantages to fairly early recognition after the China trip. We don’t think Bangladesh wants an over-exclusive relationship with India or the Soviets. If we give Mujib a window to the outside world, it might serve our interests in trying to achieve greater stability in the area. Dr. Kissinger: What is Bhutto’s attitude toward Bangladesh? Mr. Sisco: He recognizes the reality of the de facto situation—that they are two separate entities and that the unity is broken. He is maintaining the fiction of unity, however, in the de jure sense. He seems to be fairly relaxed over the relationship, but he is not relaxed over what the U.S. might do on recognition. Mr. Helms: There’s a lot to be said for letting the British and French recognize and see what happens. Mr. Sisco: I assume the Chinese will at some point decide that Bangladesh is a reality. But the US and Chinese objectives in Bangladesh will not necessarily be parallel. Dr. Kissinger: I would think they would be radically different. Mr. Sisco: We will want to strengthen the moderate elements in Bangladesh and the Chinese will play with the more radical elements. Dr. Kissinger: The Chinese will want to use Bangladesh to create maximum turmoil in West Bengal. Mr. Irwin: I agree. Dr. Kissinger: Our interests will not be parallel after recognition, but I want to be sure that a move toward recognition doesn’t jeopardize a larger objective with China. I can’t imagine any moderate leadership that the Chinese would want unless it were anti-Indian. So it is agreed that we do nothing on recognition for the time being. Let’s make sure our people in Dacca behave accordingly. They have a delicate task. Mr. Sisco: After Ambassador Keating has been here, I think we should get Spivak (Consul General in Dacca) back for consultation. Mr. Irwin: We thought of getting him back at the same time as Keating, but your people thought we should wait. Dr. Kissinger: We were afraid that if they were all here together, people would expect some ringing policy declaration to follow. Mr. Sisco: It will only be two weeks later. Dr. Kissinger: What about humanitarian relief. Have we been continuing refugee relief? Mr. Williams: There has been no action on refugee relief for India since October. Dr. Kissinger: Then the news stories are wrong? Mr. Williams: I assume you’re talking about Ben Welles’ story. There were some blankets on the high seas, but there has been no additional assistance. What was in the pipeline flowed on. Dr. Kissinger: How much was in the pipeline? Mr. Williams: About $5 million worth. Dr. Kissinger: Is there any humanitarian program on the sub-continent now? Mr. Williams: Yes. In East Bengal, as distinct from India, the UN force remained during the hostilities. There is no further US assistance planned for India and none has been called for. In East Bengal, the UN mission stayed and has used the assets in hand—food, ships, trucks and contributions—to continue a relief operation under the new circumstances. They have 50 people with administrative expenses of about $1 million a month. There has been no fresh US contribution to that effort since hostilities began. But the grain that was in the ports and the trucks all of these things have been put in motion. Dr. Kissinger: How much is involved? Mr. Williams: About $95 million all told, of which the US contributed about $65 million—about 2/3 of the total. The US contribution was mostly food, while other countries contributed more cash. The UN team is making an assessment of the need now, which will lead to an international call for futher contributions in about two weeks. Their existing resources will carry them another two or three weeks. Mr. Irwin: We are now giving nothing further in East Pakistan. We have 700,000 tons of wheat under PL–480 that we held back, which could be given now if we wanted to. Mr. Sisco: Was that part of the $65 million? Mr. Williams: I have tried to separate what was already out of our control and what we could still stop. Dr. Kissinger: How much is the wheat worth? Mr. Williams: About $70 million. Dr. Kissinger: How do we go about making a decision on this? Mr. Irwin: They are assessing the need out there, and then will ask US for something. Dr. Kissinger: Should we make our decision on the basis of the need or on the basis of policy? We don’t need to wait for an assessment of the need. We know there is a need. Mr. Williams: The UN assessment will lead to a call for help from the international community. Our response to that call will be a policy issue for the President to decide. Dr. Kissinger: Can’t we get some preliminary views? We know what the need is. Should we assume that a humanitarian program which was worked out in one political context should automatically continue in a new political context? Are the requirements the same? Mr. Williams: Yes, in humanitarian terms. Dr. Kissinger: But these requirements are only an expression of need. We need a policy decision as to whether we should continue the humanitarian program at the same scale in the different context. Mr. Williams: We stopped any further contribution at the outbreak of hostilities. We have a commitment for 700,000 tons of food grains but they weren’t shipped. The President had requested $250 million for relief, which the House had reduced to $175 million. Dr. Kissinger: I think we need to take another look at this. Mr. Sisco: You need a policy paper on this and we will do one. If we assume that stability in Bangladesh is in our interest, we have to consider: 1) the attitude of West Pakistan; 2) the attitude of Bangladesh; 3) the attitude of other members of the international community, particularly whether they assume the US will continue to pick up the major portion of the tab; and 4) the domestic aspects. Dr. Kissinger: What percentage of the total was paid by us? Mr. Williams: In the past, two-thirds. Dr. Kissinger: The question is not only whether to continue the humanitarian program. The President has said that we should contribute a maximum of 30% or 40% of the total. That’s not outrageous—that’s not lack of concern for suffering people. Mr. Sisco: I agree. Also, conditions in the pre-recognition period may be different than post-recognition. I think we have to do something, but the UN should not assume that we are prepared to pick up the tab to the same extent as before. The Russians are giving their aid on a bilateral basis. We should move only after a thorough analysis and a judgement on the percentage. Mr. Williams: Of course, this program started on an entirely different basis. Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, Everyone recognizes that we had a strong interest in doing it at that time. No one is questioning that. Mr. Sisco: Our assistance has been given in the multilateral framework and it often gets submerged in that framework. We might look at the idea of bilateral assistance in the post-recognition period. Dr. Kissinger: How much have the Soviets given? Mr. Williams: In East Pakistan, nothing yet. Mr. Van Hollen: We have no specific figures, but Soviet aid personnel are moving into East Pakistan in some numbers. Mr. Williams: Soviet aid to India for refugees was about $20 million. I had understood that the question of our assets in the pipeline, as distinct from further cash contribution, had been considered by the President, and that it had been decided to leave the pipeline intact. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember the telegram. But that was an interim step. Mr. Sisco: We need a policy paper, which we will do. Dr. Kissinger: Can we get it quickly? I have no clear view of how this will come out, but I do think the percentage of the US contribution ought to be a policy consideration. Then we can ask whether it should apply to the pipeline or to new commitments. Mr. Irwin: The pipeline can begin to move after the decision is reached. Dr. Kissinger: Is it in our interests to absorb some of the Soviet resources into the multilateral effort? If our contribution is lower, will this force the Soviets to go into the multilateral framework? Mr. Williams: It wouldn’t force them to. Mr. Sisco: We’re in a helluva dilemma that really bugs me. I think we have to do something, but not as much as before. We should try to pressure others to do more. But the Soviets will play the bilateral game exclusively. Mr. Williams: There is no way to force the Soviets to go multilateral. Mr. Nutter: Unless our lower contribution forces the Soviets to do more. Dr. Kissinger: What will happen to the $175 million the House has approved? Mr. Williams: I recommend we give nothing to India in the first instance. I think we should use it for progressive contributions for relief and rehabilitation in East Bengal. Mr. Sisco: The language was purposely left very general. Mr. Williams: It spoke of relief for South Asia as a whole. We could still get some transfer of population. The Biharis might go to West Pakistan and some of the Bengalis leave West Pakistan. Mr. Irwin: We may not get the $175 million. We’ve spent $27 million already, and have only $148 million to come. Mr. Nutter: What will the global bill be? Mr. Williams: We won’t have a great problem with the Hill on humanitarian assistance. I believe we will get it. I expect a call for relief and rehabilitation of about $500 million for Bangladesh for the first year. I envisage that our $175 million would be contributed toward that. We have already used $27 million under the Continuing Resolution, so we need to have at least that amount appropriated. Dr. Kissinger: $500 million is quite a slug. Mr. Williams: It takes $10 per returning refugee to help him resettle, and about 3 million of the 10 million refugees have returned. Dr. Kissinger: Do we still think there were 10 million? Mr. Helms: 9 million is a safe figure. Mr. Williams: Also, there are an equal number of displaced and homeless in East Pakistan. The railroad and the ports are torn up. $500 million in the first year is fairly conservative. Dr. Kissinger: Our policy decision has to be what part of this we should do. Mr. Irwin: The timing, too, I think we should be cautious initially, but possibly do something else after recognition. Dr. Kissinger: We need an immediate policy decision so as to meet the immediate requests. If we do nothing, we will be expected to continue to contribute at the previous scale—66%. If we want to change our contribution, we had better do it now. We already know the need exists. Mr. Nutter: Did we ever announce that we were contributing two-thirds of the total? Dr. Kissinger: No, it just came about. We gave a figure which turned into a percentage. We also need the same sort of analysis for economic assistance. I understand McNamara and a World Bank team are in South Asia now and are thinking of a consortium meeting at the end of February. Mr. Williams: They plan to meet on February 21 on Pakistan, but it will probably lead to a meeting on India as well, since the same people deal with India. Mr. Helms: McNamara is leaving today. Mr. Williams: Economic assistance for Pakistan is mainly through resolution of the debt and the meeting will address that. The nations, including ourselves, will look at a moritorium and a resumption of aid. Dr. Kissinger: But we don’t have anything now in economic assistance to Pakistan. Mr. Williams: We had $75 million committed; $30 million for commodity assistance; $30 million for projects in West Pakistan; and $15 million for East Pakistan. All but the last were continued. Dr. Kissinger: But we made no new commitments. Mr. Williams: Except for the PL–480. We never suspended the on-going program for Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: If the US ever wanted to cut off aid to a country, how long would it take? That’s a theoretical question. Mr. Sisco: A helluva long time. Dr. Kissinger: We have made no new commitments since March. Mr. Williams: It depends on the nature of the aid. If you are building a fertilizer plant, it could take four years before the final bill came in. Commodity aid can take 18 months or two years. Dr. Kissinger: Did we cut off anything to India? Did they not get something they would have received if we hadn’t taken any action? Mr. Williams: Yes, They did not get those things that were still under our control, that were not on the high seas, and for which irrevocable letters of commitment had not been granted. They did not get about $85 million. Dr. Kissinger: Is it really lost to them? Mr. Williams: No orders are being placed under it. Next year, we will either have to unfreeze the money or de-obligate it. That decision has not yet been taken. Dr. Kissinger: I’m just trying to educate myself for the next crisis. Mr. Williams: We can disburse instantly if we give cash, but the Treasury doesn’t favor that. Dr. Kissinger: So when we cut off aid to a country, that country knows it has a helluva long time in which to reverse our decision before it will be felt. In effect, there is no effect. Mr. Volcker: That’s what happened in Chile. Mr. Nutter: Unless we cancel commitments. Dr. Kissinger: But we were told not to cancel commitments because it would involve endless litigation. Mr. Williams: We didn’t tell you not to—we advised against it. Dr. Kissinger: Is this the only way to do it—to cut off commitments? Mr. Irwin: There are two types of commitments: one to the country and another to the manufacturers or suppliers in this country. Dr. Kissinger: I understand that if the goods are at the dock, we would have to take possession. If they are not at the dock, can we cancel the order? Mr. Irwin: We can, but we may have to buy the goods. Dr. Kissinger: What is needed on a policy toward economic assistance to Pakistan? Mr. Williams: Nothing immediately. Mr. Sisco: We want to be forthcoming at the consortium meeting on February 21. Dr. Kissinger: The President wishes to be forthcoming. How do we do it? (to Irwin) Can State control what happens at the February 21 meeting? Mr. Sisco: If McNamara comes out for large programs, it will put pressure on the US. We want to be forthcoming on Pakistan, but I’m concerned at what they might come up with for India. Mr. Williams: McNamara is trying to be helpful on Pakistan. The Pak proposal will be endorsed by the World Bank. Dr. Kissinger: Does McNamara know what we want? Mr. Williams: Yes. Mr. Van Hollen: In policy terms, there are two questions which will come up on February 21: 1) a policy on the debt and 2) a new commitment for India. Mr. Williams: I don’t think they will-be raised at the same time. Dr. Kissinger: We should discourage McNamara from raising any new commitment to India on February 21. That would be the worst possible time for us to have to face the issue. Mr. Sisco: Can we get at McNamara to give him the thrust of our policy thinking? That we want to be forthcoming on Pakistan and go slow on India? Mr. Volcker: He has the message. Dr. Kissinger: (to Volcker) Could your Secretary talk to him? He would take Connally seriously. Do we need any other policy decision now? The resumption of any aid to India will have to wait until March. Mr. Sisco: I agree. Mr. Volcker: The Eximbank has some commitments to India and wants to know whether they should follow through on them. Dr. Kissinger: Tell them to go slow. Mr. Volcker. They have been going slow, but it’s becoming increasingly awkward. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s wait until a specific case comes closer to arising. On the question of military supply, I assume we can’t resume shipments for India without doing the same for Pakistan. We have the Defense Department paper. Joe (Sisco), would you like to comment? Mr. Sisco: We should move very cautiously. Until there is some realistic progress on withdrawal, we should hold off on restoration of the items on the Military List. There is the commercial side, however, and we probably should look at the requirements where it is commercially important to do so. There are six or eight American companies who are complaining that they are being hurt, and we have a letter from Secretary Stans. Dr. Kissinger: Toward what country? Mr. Sisco: Both. Mr. Irwin: We put a hold on the Military List items on both India and Pakistan, and a hold on some Commercial List items for Pakistan. There was no hold on CL items for India. Dr. Kissinger: If that is true, it was the result of a misunderstanding. That was not made clear to me. Mr. Irwin: I think we should take off the hold on Pakistan on commercial items. Dr. Kissinger: What has India been getting on the commercial list? Mr. Van Hollen: We don’t know exactly how much moved in this channel, but it was probably in the neighborhood of $2 million. Dr. Kissinger: I’m god-damned if I understood anything was moving to India in this fashion, and I’m god-damned sure the President had no inkling of it. Mr. Irwin: There is also a small MAP training program for both countries that we didn’t do anything about. Mr. Van Hollen: There were a small number of students in this country. Mr. Irwin: The whole program to India was only about $5 million. Dr. Kissinger: How much was on both the Commercial and the Military Lists? Mr. Van Hollen: The ML items for India that were cancelled were about $13 million. Mr. Sisco: I think there’s no argument—we must restore CL items for Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: No question about it. How about the other items? Mr. Irwin: I think we should leave the ML items alone. Dr. Kissinger: We need a paper on the issues of restoring some degree of military assistance to Pakistan— for example, restoration of the one-time exemption. This is the second time the President has made a commitment to Pakistan. Why should we be punishing them? But I want to see the pros and cons. Let’s go ahead and restore Commercial List items for Pakistan. Can we tell the Paks they are being restored? Mr. Sisco: Right away. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s do that. Mr. Van Hollen: We sent over a recommendation to the President to that effect on December 30. Dr. Kissinger: Assume it has been done, and notify the PAK Ambassador. Mr. Irwin: Because of the embargo on military shipments to India, some radar equipment was held up. Mr. Van Hollen: We had a project with India for an early-warning radar system. There were contracts of over $8 million with some American firms who complain that they are losing money. Mr. Sisco: These were not CL items—they were Military List items. That’s a different situation—more complicated. Dr. Kissinger: Get a paper on Military List for both countries. Mr. Nutter: There is some question as to whether the one-time exemption applies to Pakistan as it is now constituted. Dr. Kissinger: We need a military supply policy paper for both countries. We also need a policy paper on the issues of humanitarian assistance, and a policy paper on economic assistance for Pakistan and India. Do we need a draft telegram to Heath and MacMahon? Mr. Sisco: We have sent you a draft. Dr. Kissinger: If we can have these papers by the end of the week or early next week, we will have another meeting a week from today. Attachment Briefing Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group Washington, January 19, 1972 INDIA-PAKISTAN I. In Pakistan, President Bhutto has already begun a program of economic and social reforms, but his attempts in this direction are beginning to expose the basic weaknesses of his political position. A. Bhutto is the most popular politician in Pakistan, yet his support is still essentially limited to the relatively small urban working class. B. Opposition to Bhutto among economic and political conservatives has been cowed up to now, but recent reports indicate a gradual stiffening of resistance. C. As yet he has acted only against the unpopular wealthy families whom most Pakistanis blame for the country’s economic problems. D. He wants to expedite land and tax reforms. If these are too sweeping, however, they will provoke serious opposition from the military, the right-wing parties, and even the more conservative members of his own party. E. On the other hand, the strong left wing of his party is already unhappy-with his slow pace and is demanding widespread nationalization and extensive land reforms. II. Bhutto has promised a democratic constitution, and says he will install the national and provincial assemblies, which were elected in December 1970. A. He seems to be stalling, however, probably both because the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan Province would not be controlled by his party, and because he wants to implement his reform program without parliamentary harassment. B. He has skillfully prepared public opinion for an increasingly moderate position on Bangladesh. Nevertheless, he has broken relations with Mongolia, Bulgaria and Poland because they recognized East Pakistan’s independence, but not with Burma or Nepal, where Pakistan has interests. C. The real test, however, will come when major powers recognize the new country. 1. Britain and the EEC countries have decided to accord near-simultaneous recognition to Bangladesh, possibly as early as next week. 2. Soviet recognition may also be imminent. III. Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s return has given Bangladesh a strong psychological boost, enormous problems remain. A. Mujib has moved quickly to take charge. 1. He has personally taken over the prime ministership and the defense, home (internal security), information, and cabinet affairs portfolios. 2. He has downgraded Tajuddin Ahmad, the strongly pro-Indian and pro-Soviet previous prime minister, to finance minister, and may be planning to demote him even further. B. Nevertheless, Mujib will remain heavily dependent on India for some time to come if he is even to make a dent in his country’s awesome problems. 1. The Indians have already agreed to pro-vide Bangladesh with a grant of $34 million in urgently needed commodities, as well as a $25 million grant for aid to returning refugees and a $13 million hard currency loan to meet foreign exchange requirements. 2. With artificial barriers to trade removed, the economy of the new nation will almost inevitably become closely tied to that of neighboring parts of India. 3. The Indian Army is playing a key role in the restoration of roads, bridges, rail facilities, and communications. 4. Bangladesh needs more foreign help than India can provide, however, and—despite some criticism of US aid—Bengali leaders have stated that “aid without strings” would be welcome from Washington or elsewhere. C. The presence of Indian troops—despite some withdrawals, roughly 50,000 are believed to still be in Bangladesh—has been the central factor preventing any serious disruptions to law and order thus far. The Indians are still patrolling the Bihari areas around Dacca, for example. 1. There are 80,000 to 90,000 armed Mukti Bahini guerrillas in the country. The majority of them are not yet under the government’s control. 2. Possibly as many as 40,000 of these irregulars belong to the Mujib Bahini, an armed youth group which could make trouble if the government falls short of their idealistic expectations. 3. Some of the irregulars are believed to be simple bandits, but some are affiliated with left-wing political groups. 4. On January 17 Mujib ordered all irregulars to surrender their arms and ammunition to the government within ten days. Whatever hopes Mujib himself may have for a large turn in, we doubt that he will collect much. There are still too many people who have a real interest in keeping their arms. 5. New Delhi and Dacca have agreed that the rest of the Indian troops will leave whenever Mujib’s government requests their departure. However, there are no indications that this will be happening soon. IV. Within India, Mrs. Gandhi’s prestige has been increased as a result of the war, although its costs have not been felt yet. A. Her next political test comes in March, when she faces important elections for most of the state assemblies. To some degree, these elections may bring Indian politics back toward a more business-as-usual atmosphere. B. Mrs. Gandhi’s Ruling Congress party is expected to do extremely well in most con-tests, but all will not be smooth sailing. 1. In several states her party is divided by infighting among party chieftains and by rivalries between “progressive” leaders who owe their positions to Mrs. Gandhi and “conservative” leaders with independent political bases. C. The future shape of Indo-Soviet relations is not yet clear. Just what forms Indian gratitude for Soviet support may take has not been spelled out. D. New Delhi, however, feels that its military victory has made it less susceptible to pressure from any of the great powers. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Secret; Nodis. The January 19 attachment is Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For the Departments of State and Defense documents cited by Kissinger see Documents 206 and 207 . 211. Airgram A–20 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 211. Airgram A–20 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, January 21, 1972 Subject: India’s Nuclear Intentions. REF : (A) STATE 3088; (B) NEW DELHI 635 In the interests of appropriately reducing telegraphic traffic, the Embassy summarized in ref B the following fuller response to ref A: 1. While GOI holds closely its intentions in nuclear field, on balance Embassy thinks it unlikely India will conduct underground or underwater blast in next few weeks or months, though we do not rule it out in longer term. Straws pointing toward possible underground test sometime in future are: (a) India almost certainly has technical capability to produce explosion; (b) GOI has frequently told Indian Parliament that while it does not want nuclear weapons program, it will continue to refine nuclear knowledge in order keep options open for any necessary response to changing world situation; and (c) GOI has also told Parliament past 18 months that it studying whether safe under-ground tests can be devised which might usefully relate to geological exploration and other Indian economic development needs. Moreover, even in absence of intention to opt for nuclear weapons program, it might be tempting for GOI to try turn aside country’s nuclear hawks by producing underground blast carrying implication India far advanced in nuclear field and could, if necessary, match Chinese and other putative enemies any time it chose. 2. However, militating against imminent test, we think, are: (a) Fairly frequent assertions of GOI officials that underground blasts tricky, require prolonged study, and that not even developed countries have fully mastered technology (e.g. NEW DELHI 10432, dated 6/30/71, and NEW DELHI 15119 dated 12/3/70); (b) Dr. Vikram Sarabhai’s sudden death. He was absolute czar of Indian atomic energy, enjoying complete confidence of PriMin. Probably some indeterminate period required for GOI to sort out succession to Sarabhai and to give successor time to grow in Government’s esteem to point where PriMin would entrust him with major project like test explosion; (c) Indira Gandhi’s sense of timing and priorities. India’s nuclear hawks have been arguing, since Indo-Pak War, that now is the time for India to confirm entry into major power club by choosing nuclear weapons program. PriMin, however, would probably reason, irrespective of her ultimate intentions in nuclear field, that given present wide-spread doubts abroad about India’s purposes and intentions, it is better to let Indo-Bangladesh relationship clarify and memories of late 1971 fade before stirring world community’s uneasiness anew. (We proceed on premise that if GOI held test, it would quickly become known publicly. Indeed, important reason for holding test would be to demonstrate to Indian people India’s nuclear progress.) We note following Q. and A. in PriMin’s December 31st press conference: Q. “Pakistan was supported by America and China, two nuclear power countries. Are you thinking of reviewing your atomic policy and planning to produce atom bombs just as a deterrent against possible threats from those two nuclear powers?” A. “I do not think it necessary. I think we were able to deter people quite sufficiently without.” Also relevant is [ text not declassfied ] that ranking member of PriMin’s secretariat recently said GOI has decided not to invest limited resources in nuclear weapons development program at this time; (d) Other diplomatic missions interested in India’s nuclear intentions (e.g., Canadian), and senior Indian newsmen covering Ministry of Defense and Department of Atomic Energy, whom we circumspectly probed, appear to have received no hint of approaching Indian test. 3. Embassy continues to believe that as on most defense/foreign policy related matters, GOI is not susceptible to pressure from abroad on whether to hold atomic test or to initiate nuclear weapons program. India already has sufficient nuclear know-how, and through previous and present foreign collaboration (e.g. French assistance at Kalpakkam), has or will have enough nuclear materials to give GOI latitude of decision. GOI decisions will be based on: (a) perceived necessity; and (b) cost. Since international community has in past made GOI wholly aware of staggering cost of nuclear weapons program, there seems little scope for further such input. Thus, we see nothing US or international community can presently do to influence GOI policy directions in atomic field. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–8 INDIA. Secret; Exdis; Noforn; dissem/controlled, dissem/no dissem abroad. For background use only. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Drafted on January 17 by political officer Harmon Kirby and approved by DCM Galen Stone. 212. Telegram 11838 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 212. Telegram 11838 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, January 21, 1972, 1406Z SUBJECT: Indo-American Relations REF: (a) New Delhi 642 (b) New Delhi 774 1. At his request, India Ambassador Jha accompanied by Minister Rasgotra and First Secretary Verma called on Under Secretary Irwin January 20. Quainton, NEA/INC, also present. Although Jha clearly wished to explore US views Under Secretary contented himself primarily with listening and asking a few questions. Jha began by noting recent Keating/Kaul meeting (ref A) and discussion of need to mend bilateral relations and get back on more even keel. Jha said he personally strongly believed in need to do this. Problem was how US planned to respond. Perhaps it was premature to expect response. It was important to take cognizance in both countries of fact that there is large public opinion. Indian public opinion very hurt and Utter about recent events and it would therefore be more difficult for GOI to take any initiatives than in this country. Basic fact is that India and US cannot remain aloof and indifferent. It is only a question of time before this is recognized. Jha asked whether it was better to bide our time or do something to hasten long term process. 2. Under Secretary replied that we have been carefully looking at what has happened and at present events. Amb Keating would be here next week, and we would be reviewing with him variety of aspects of our relations. We were interested in Keating/Kaul conversation. We will be looking at these questions over next period, and he hoped that out of that would come a time when, depending on attitudes of each government, we would be able to take new look at each other and develop a new relationship. Unfortunately in past, although India recognized US helpful economically, we seem never to have been politically attuned. We have certainly felt that India has never responded in a politically helpful way to our positions and problems throughout the world. Recent unequal recognition of Hanoi, when India was chairman of ICC, seemed to be continuation of past attitudes and practice. We recognize that India is and has been a power and that it is a great democracy. In time we hope for and look to develop our relations on a new basis. 3. Jha commented that while he recognized that Under Secretary was only citing Hanoi as example, he felt USG did not appreciate that GOI had never consciously taken any decision meaning it to be anti-American. GOI took decision in principle to recognize Hanoi some time back, but deferred out of deference to US sensitivities. Decision did not mean any departure from objectivity in dealing with problems of Indo-China. Recognition was only of North Vietnam and not of any DRV claim to take South by force. 4. Jha added that in context of misunderstandings he wished to touch on question of development of US relations with China. USG had felt that India was against it, and took it for granted that India would oppose. India does not oppose. Thus where USG could have taken Indian support for granted, it assumed opposition. Equally, where, as in case of Hanoi, there was no intention to be hostile, US took Indian actions to be hostile. USG misjudged not only Indian support but also its hostility. Jha asked where fault in communication had been. Speaking personally he thought a lot of trouble and misunderstanding came from reliance of some in US on “custodians of intelligence” and gossip they picked up. He said he believed great deal can be achieved by being frank and by believing each other. Under Secretary agreed these were necessary ingredients for any two countries to develop good relations. If USG sees no prospect of improving relations at this time Jha said it should say so, so that we are at least working with certain degree of mutual understanding and trust. 5. Jha then discussed at length current situation in subcontinent and problem of establishing internal balance and viability. While he had never been admirer Of President Bhutto, he thought Bhutto had recently displayed great deal of realism and critical sense in what he has done and said. Bhutto had told someone in whom Jha said he had trust that he recognized that if Pakistan continued to have running battle with India and kept arming with view to going to war, power of army would have to be maintained and there would never be return to democracy. He had therefore concluded Pakistan must come to terms with India. If true, this could lead to good relations not only between India and Pakistan, but also between Pakistan and Bangladesh. 6. Jha said India wanted Pakistan to prosper just as it wanted Bangladesh to have economic viability which could make difference between an extreme leftist government and dedication to democracy. Nepal, which in no sense takes policy decisions to please India, and which has very good relations with China, Pakistan and US, has seen wisdom of recognizing BD, and of strengthening and supporting process now going on in BD. 7. Under Secretary asked Jha for his assessment of BD’s chances for stability and economic development and about Indian plans for keeping troops in BD for purposes of stability. Jha responded that Indian troops would be out in a few weeks as soon as apparatus for maintenance of law and order built up. India had declined to take responsiblities for linguistic minorities, because it felt it important for new government to accept responsibility. India was determined and anxious to pull out at earliest possible opportunity. Under Secretary noted Mujib’s call for turning in of arms. Jha acknowledged that success uncertain, but fact Mujib had called or it would deny guerrillas who failed to comply with much of their local base and support. 8. Rasgotra then commented on economic complimentarity of East and West Bengal. Before partition East Bengal was granary of West Bengal and much of India, and there was also a natural flow of economic activity. Rasgotra said that, in his view, BD would not be “international basket case” although it would need inputs from and cooperation with India. Jha added that after partition complimentary elements had been suppressed and denied, and such development, as took place, particularly in establishment of jute mills, was competitive with India. However, in future there would be more trade. BD would export fish, poultry and fresh vegetables to India and import cheap coal, steel and textiles. However, India could not afford customs union with BD in view of competitive jute situation. He hoped both sides would have sense to avoid trade war over jute. In addition rice production would go up rapidly in BD and there would be great opportunities for cooperative water management. There would also be considerable transit trade from Assam to Calcutta from which BD would derive revenue. 9. Jha commented that there would also be strong desire in BD to retain separateness and identity. Only Naxalites would want to carve out unified Communist Bengal. Under Secretary said he assumed it was important to India to have stable country on its eastern front, but wondered what would be demands on India to maintain that stability. Jha replied that stability for all India’s neighbors of utmost importance. However, India’s concern with their stability did not give it duty or right to meddle in what goes on in those countries. India cannot subjugate or dominate their political processes. 10. Rasgotra said he had nagging worry about West Pakistan stability. In BD he thought there was good chance of responsible system of government, which would give it stability. However, unless role of army in Pakistan not greatly reduced in West Pakistan, problems would remain. Jha added that BD is homogeneous unit with strong sense of having fought for its freedom. West Pakistan, on other hand, like India consists of diverse groups. Even India had felt disruptive tendencies, but it had handled them politically. In Pakistan this political handling had been lacking and instead there had been reliance on military authority. Rasgotra asked whether we had any estimate of how long Bhutto would rely on martial law. Under Secretary said he could not predict. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on January 20 by Quainton, cleared by Van Hollen, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Kathmandu, Dacca, Islamabad, Saigon, and Moscow. 213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 22, 1972 SUBJECT: Military Supply for Pakistan This transmits the Defense position on the renewal of military supply for Pakistan as requested during the SRG meeting of 19 January 1972. G. Warren Nutter Attachment Paper Washington, undated RENEWAL OF MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN Background The accession to power of the civilian-oriented Bhutto government and the virtual eclipse (for the moment) of the military establishment in Pakistan has cast the role of military supply in new and different terms. Economic realities and discernible propensity on the part of President Bhutto to keep the military on a short leash will curtail the defense budget for some time to come. President Bhutto owes little of his strength to the armed forces and thus need not move with any deliberate speed to lessen their current disarray. In fact, he may find it expedient to “punish” the military over the short run by limiting its budget to reinforce the allegation that it bears the main responsibility for the recent debacle. For whatever the reason, Bhutto appears committed to a reduction in the size of the armed forces. There are reports that at least 30,000 men (ten percent of total strength) are to be trimmed at once. It is unclear whether this figure is over-and-above the 90,000 troops in Indian hands. In terms of Pakistan’s reduced defensive problems and in keeping with Bhutto’s reiterated statement that another round with India is “unthinkable”, such streamlining makes good sense. Beyond this the eventual configuration of Pakistan’s defense forces is an unknown quantity. What is clear is that former programs of military procurement from overseas suppliers will be subjected to considerable scrutiny, old requirements for major items or spares altered or canceled and new needs established over time that may bear little resemblance to what remains in the embargoed pipeline. Early in the recent crisis, we argued that our limited military supply relationship with Pakistan went far beyond its dollar component in intrinsic value to our continued dialogue with the Pakistani government. This argument was based on the extensive and intimate relationship with two successive and successful moderate military administrations. With the old order overturned, military supply— certainly at any level less than the pre-1965 grant aid relationship—will provide significantly diminished leverage when compared to the effect of restored economic aid. This is not to say that a well-planned, long-term program of military sales to Pakistan will be contrary to our interests. A basic objective of our policy toward South Asia remains the restoration of stability in the region. A Pakistan without a meaningful capability to police itself and to deter latent Indian and other revanchist designs on its remaining soil would be a severe potential detriment to the stability we seek. Timing Two factors must be taken into account in orchestrating a renewal of the military supply pipeline. The first is Pakistan’s own reorientation of its priorities as indicated above. It would appear counterproductive to reopen the flow of material under the former ground rules without consideration of Pakistan’s perhaps radically altered requirements. Under those circumstances, Islamabad might feel constrained to buy equipment not suited to its new needs just to restore the pipeline to a reasonable level of flow. A second consideration is progress toward a de jure end to the current state of belligerency now held in abeyance by a ceasefire that happily appears to be holding. While to a great extent, the negotiation ball is in the Indian court, Congressional and other sensitivities must be taken into account in projecting a resumption of military supply to Pakistan. A brouhaha over renewed supply action might seriously jeopardize the establishment of a workable military assistance relationship over the longer haul. Specific Actions Over the short term, our military supply relationship divides itself into four categories left over from the now-suspended programs. First, there is the quantum of material now in Pakistani hands in shippers’ warehouses stalled for lack of export licenses. Second, there is the question of old FMS sales cases on which action was incomplete at the time of the embargo and that have all been canceled. Then there is the problem of Munitions List items procured by Pakistan directly from US commercial suppliers. And last, the “one-time exception” must be addressed. — Warehoused Material Approximately 70 tons of material, mostly spare parts for aircraft and automotive equipment both lethal and nonlethal are concentrated in shippers’ warehouses principally in New York. Value of this material is slightly over $1/2 million. It could be put on its way to Pakistan either through a general relaxation of the prohibition on export license issuance or by granting an exception to this prohibition applying only to these specific items. In either case we would have to “go public” even though we might do so in low key. Over the near term, an exception to policy would have useful symbolism in our relations with Islamabad. It would release for shipment material already paid for and thus without impact on Pakistan’s current fiscal problems. On the other hand, the limited scope of the exception would provide Islamabad a breathing space for reassessment of its defense requirements without the enticement to renew old sales cases just to restore the flow. Such a move would not violate Congressional legal restraints on the subject since legislation on embargoes to Pakistan remains stared on the Hill. A precipitate move to release this material, however, especially in the absence of progress toward an armistice and withdrawal of troops could raise a furor at home and stall the nascent moves on India’s part to begin discussions toward this end. Less likely, hasty clearance of even this symbolic gesture could produce Pakistani resistance to early talks. — Renewal of FMS Cases All previous FMS cases under the April 1967 policy (amounting to an as yet incompletely audited figure in the tens of millions of dollars) have been canceled at no cost to Pakistan. Restoration of sales under the former policy would require administrative action enabling both the issuance of export licenses and the removal of the prohibition against release by Service depots. This action could not be accomplished without drawing significant attention due to the multiplicity of supply points that would be involved. A completely new sales program would be required since material in procurement under the canceled cases has been diverted to other requirements or its manufacture stopped. In certain isolated cases where delivery was imminent and alternate requirements have not been identified, renewed sales cases could result in early delivery to Pakistan. More generally, procurement action would have to start from scratch. Pakistan has not raised the issue of a renewal of the sales program in any concerted way. In point of fact, the repeated calls and visits on the subject by Pakistani military representatives in Washington noted before the hostilities have ceased altogether. Apart from Ambassador Raza’s list provided to State (that requested action substantially confined to the warehoused material already in custody) and General Gul Hassan’s expressed hope that the embargo will not last indefinitely the whole issue appears to have been soft-pedaled. — Commercial Munitions List Sales Unresolved as a result of the embargo has been the plight of a few commercial suppliers who earlier contracted with Pakistan for pro-vision of nonstandard military items covered by Munitions List caveats. In particular, two firms (SWEMCO in New Jersey [$250,000] and Varadyne [800,000]) will find themselves hard-hit if within the next six months or so they are unable to ship. Both these contracts are for nonlethal end-items, specifically infrared detection equipment and sound-ranging gear for the pinpointing of enemy artillery locations. It might be possible without creating serious opposition to grant dispensations to firms thus pressed, to release these consignments once there was discernible movement toward an armistice. — The One-Time Exception Renewed action on the “one-time exception” raises some peculiar problems. Over $13 million is still committed to the purchase of 300 APCs, the only FMS case for Pakistan remaining active at this time. In almost six months of brisk negotiation following announcement of the offer, Islamabad expressed no strong interest in acquiring any of the aircraft proffered due to a combination of factors including price, type and quantities of equipment involved. The offer was made under circumstances vastly altered in the sixteen months since its announcement. A civil war and hostilities with India have occurred. The regime we sought to bolster at the time has passed from the scene. More important, Pakistan’s military requirements have changed drastically. Reinstatement of the offer now might prove difficult for Bhutto to resist, although the financial strain implied by acceptance might prejudice Pakistan’s case for critical Consortium assistance. Recognizing that we have a moral commitment to Pakistan in having made the offer, a reasonable approach toward the reinforcement of our bona fides might be to revive the package in the form of a “rain check”. At an appropriate moment, we could inform Islamabad that in view of its changing military needs and Congressional problems here, a revival of the package in altered form at a later date might be in our mutual best interests. The demarche would hold out the possibility that renewed discussions might center on equipment other than that in the original offer more suited in both type and quantity to Pakistan’s changed circumstances. We might want to caveat the offer with an emphasis on the defensive aspects of any equipment open to discussion in a restructured program. Our initiative in this respect would project both a short- and a long-term benefit to Pakistan. In the short run, it would provide Islamabad a face-saving way to preserve scarce fiscal assets by canceling the purchase of the APCs that may no longer be cogent to its defense needs. Large armored units of the type the APCs were destined to equip were never committed by either side in the recent hostilities. Pakistan presumably lost few, if any, of the hundred plus APCs in its inventory. Over the longer haul, the offer would indicate our firm intention to assist materially in the reequipping of a streamlined Pakistani defense establishment designed for deterrence rather than renewal of hostilities of the sort that have occurred three times in a generation. Recommendations 1. That moves toward renewal of the military supply relationship with Pakistan be sequenced as follows: —Release of the warehoused material. —Selective release of commercial sales items. —Renewal of FMS activities. —Action on the one-time exception. 2. That action on any of the foregoing be held in abeyance at least until the start of negotiations toward an armistice and until we have been able to pulse Chinese intentions for military resupply to Pakistan. 3. That we proceed slowly on major sales of either end-items or spare parts to Pakistan until the policy directions and the stability of the Bhutto government are more clearly discernible. 4. That once measurable progress toward an armistice has become evident, we open discreet discussions with Islamabad on the whole subject of military assistance aimed at rationalizing its military requirements. At this time, we should offer an assured “rain check” on the one-time exception. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Sensitive. 214. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers 214. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, January 24, 1972 I have been commanded by the President of Pakistan to convey the enclosed message to His Excellency the President of the United States of America. It is requested that this message be presented to His Excellency the President. Enclosure Message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon undated BEGINS: Dear Mr. President, For some years the rice shortage in East Pakistan has been met by exports from West Pakistan. This year’s rice crop totalling about 400,000 tons is similarly available for East Pakistan. Unfortunately, because of tragic political and economic situation, which I have inherited, it is beyond my country’s means to send this rice to East Pakistan in the normal manner. I, therefore, proposed to Ambassador Farland just before he proceeded to the United States that if your Government could assist by under-writing the export of this rice to East Pakistan, it would give me an opportunity, which would have very desirable political impact in East Pakistan and would be of great help to me in creating a climate of confidence there for pursuing the larger political objectives with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. At some suitable time in future, I would acknowledge publicly this contribution of the United States in helping Pakistan and for contributing to the restoration of permanent peace in the subcontinent. I appreciate, Mr. President, that there are demands in the Congress to sell US rice abroad and that the United States has not undertaken this kind of economic assistance until now. My reason for approaching you personally is that we are facing an extraordinary situation and if some way can be found to meet my request, it will have electrifying effect on public opinion in East Pakistan. I earnestly hope that some procedural method can be found to meet this request. With kind regards, Yours sincerely, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ENDS 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Most Immediate. The attached letter is undated and bears an unsigned typed signature. Kissinger’s handwritten notation on Raza’s letter reads: “Al–Make sure this receives urgent attention.” Haig, in turn, wrote on the letter: “Saunders Rush.” The text of Bhutto’s letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 29 in telegram 16993. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–RICE 17 BANGLA DESH–US) 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 25, 1972 Subject: Economic Aid Policy for Pakistan and India At the SRG meeting of January 19 we were asked for recommendations on our aid policy for Pakistan and India. Joint State-AID recommendations are as follows (addendum provides background and additional rationale): PAKISTAN Rice Export Follow up as appropriate on our approval of Bhutto’s request for permission to export 300,000 tons of low quality rice which is now surplus in West Pakistan as a result of interruption of normal inter-wing trade. In this connection we have already authorized Embassy Islamabad to offer to assist in meeting foreign exchange costs of moving part of this surplus rice to Bangladesh, providing Bhutto can work out such an arrangement with Bangladesh authorities. (Bhutto has already publicly offered rice to the East; we are suggesting that he follow up with an offer of humanitarian assistance through the UN.) PL–480 Conclude current negotiations for PL–480 agreement of 300,000 tons of wheat and 25,000 tons of edible oil, valued at $27 million. This will help meet the immediate need for food and budgetary help. Debt Deferral Adopt a forthcoming attitude at the February 22 meeting of Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium with regard to the GOP request for further debt deferral. Pakistan’s foreign debt position is sharply deteriorating and relief is required urgently. New Development Aid Indicate to the GOP our readiness to act in concert with the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium in providing resumed financial support for Pakistan’s development effort, as soon as an outline of Pakistan’s revised development plan and strategy is available. The IBRD tentatively envisages a Consortium pledging session in July. However, Pakistan’s financial situation is such that some FY 72 commodity lending may prove necessary for short-term financial support short of preparation of a full development strategy. INDIA Aid Suspension Hold in abeyance for the time being any decision with regard to the suspension of $87 million of the FY 71 pipeline but review the suspension at frequent intervals as Indian intentions become clearer. PL–480 Conclude an agreement with the GOI if, in spite of its initial negative reaction, it finally decides to pick up our outstanding offer to substitute 50,000 tons of vegetable oil to replace some of the wheat under last year’s PL–480 agreement, which we made in order to stabilize the distressed US soybean oil market. If this agreement is reached, consider, in light of US market conditions at the time, whether we wish to proceed with the negotiation for a further 150,000 tons of vegetable oil under a new PL–480 agreement which was pending at the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war. Leave in abeyance for the moment the question of 30,000 bales of cotton which we agreed to permit the Indians to buy under a letter of credit last October in anticipation of (but without formal commitment to) such an amount in a new PL–480 agreement. Trade and Investment Programs Give a go-ahead to USG agencies, administering programs primarily for the benefit of US trade and investment (Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Commodity Credit Corporation). These agencies have held in abeyance programs of loans, guarantees, and credits which US commercial concerns are requesting in order to safeguard Americans’ interests and enhance the US firms’ competitive position in the Indian market. We think they should now be instructed to apply normal commercial criteria to these programs. New Development Aid Consider the extension of new development aid to India at such time as a new relationship with India is worked out. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Paper Washington, undated ECONOMIC AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN Background and Rationale PAKISTAN 1. Pipeline Aid The aid pipeline of undisbursed AID funds for Pakistan is $56.7 million ($29.9 million in commodity aid and $26.8 million in projects). Of this, $35.5 million was earmarked or obligated for East Pakistan lending; $21.2 million for West Pakistan. 2. PL–480 We have authorized our Mission in Islamabad to conclude a PL–480 Title I agreement for Pakistan of wheat and edible oil valued at $27 million. This agreement, the first for West Pakistan since before the fighting in East Pakistan in March 1971, will help meet West Pakistan’s immediate need for food and budgetary assistance. In concluding the agreement we have also authorized a waiver of export limitation, permitting Pakistan to seek export markets for its surplus rice, and we have informed President Bhutto that if arrangements could be made to move part of the rice to former East Pakistan under the UN relief effort, we would be prepared to assist in paying shipping costs of such rice. 3. Consortium Debt The World Bank has called a meeting of heads of delegations of the Consortium on February 21, 1972, primarily to discuss Pakistan’s foreign debt position which is onerous and worsening. Currently Pakistan is committed to repay foreign loans amounting to over 25 percent of its earnings from exports as computed before the East Wing broke away. It is unrealistic, financially and politically, to expect Pakistan to resume its international debt payments in full on February 1 the expiration date of the nine month unilateral moratorium. We should press for recognition of this by Consortium members. In last fall’s Consortium discussion, a $90 million annual debt deferral package was considered and rejected (supported by the US). Pakistan is now seeking a higher level. However, Pakistan is likely to recognize that any request for complete deferral will not be accepted by the Consortium and may settle for loss than the de facto annual rate of $120 million of the current unilateral moratorium. We should help the World Bank lead the Consortium members to an appropriate compromise. Alternatively, since there is a trade-off between the amount of debt relief and the duration of the debt relief timetable, we could seek agreement on a short (2 or 3 month) full extension while the matter of longer term debt rescheduling is being arranged. 4. New Development Aid Mr. Peter Cargill, Chairman of the IBRD Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, has just completed a short visit to Pakistan. He outlined to GOP officials the importance of prompt revision of Pakistan’s national development plan and accompanying report. Bank President McNamara will visit Pakistan beginning January 29 and his visit will serve to reinforce Bank reviews on the need for forthright economic decisions by the GOP (including exchange reform) as a prelude to resumption of development aid to Pakistan by Consortium members. Cargill has suggested to Pakistan that the Consortium could not meet on general aid until Pakistan was able to present its revised development strategy and FY 1973 budget. (This would not be before July.) Pakistan hopes for earlier action on general aid. We believe an earlier date is both possible and desirable. We have suggested to GOP officials that they consider asking for an earlier Consortium meeting (perhaps as early as March) at which they would present a report of economic decisions taken and would outline basic elements of the FY 1973 development strategy (as opposed to a detailed budget which could not be presented for several months). If the GOP agrees to make such a presentation, we should urge the World Bank to call a meeting, and should mobilize support among other nations. At such a proposed meeting we should be prepared to announce a US commodity loan and should urge: (a) others to do the same, including the World Bank, and (b) provision of a standby credit by the IMF: The magnitude of a US commodity loan could be $50 million (this would compare with about $45 million which would have been made available for West Pakistan imports under the loan contemplated but not made in FY 1971Y. INDIA 1. Pipeline Aid $87.6 million in non-project aid that had not been finally committed to suppliers and banks was suspended on December 6 and remains suspended. Not covered by the suspension is $135 million of prior years’ aid, consisting of about $105 million in non-project aid already covered by irrevocable bank and suppliers’ commitments and about $30 million in project aid. 2. Aid Suspension Hold in abeyance for the time being any decision with regard to the suspension of $87 million of the FY 71 pipeline but review the suspension at frequent intervals as Indian intentions become clearer. We must recognize, however, that a decision to continue the suspension could carry certain costs to the US, including: [ 1 page not declassified ] soybean oil market, whether we should proceed with negotiations for an additional sale of 150,000 tons under a new PL–480 agreement, which had been cleared within the US Government and had been discussed in general terms with the Indians before the outbreak of hostilities on the subcontinent. If we do decide it is in our interest to move this additional 150,000 tons of vegetable oil, we will also have to consider what disposition to make of the 30,000 bales of cotton for which we issued a reimbursable letter of credit to the Indians last October in the anticipation that at least this amount of cotton would be included in a new PL–480 agreement. (The Indians have not purchased under this letter of credit and are not likely to do so unless it appears we will include this cotton in a new PL–480 agreement so that the high US price could be compensated by concessional terms.) Since we now have a tight cotton situation, it would probably be in our interest to withdraw last October’s letter of credit for the 30,000 bales. We should for the present, however, hold a decision on this in abeyance as we may wish to include an offer of cotton as inducement to the Indians to take the additional vegetable oil. 4. Trade and Investment Programs ExIm Bank, OPIC, and CCC have held their Indian programs in abeyance since the outbreak of the war, while awaiting positive political guidance from the Department of State. These programs are designed for the short and long term benefit of US commercial interests, and we think it would therefore be against our interest for them to be held up further. Thus we recommend that such agencies be advised henceforth to apply normal commercial criteria in regard to decisions about their India programs. Specific examples of programs involved are: Export-Import Bank —The Bank has recently denied request backed by US commercial interests operating in India, to extend the period of validity of a line of credit for the importation of industrial raw material and components from the United States. Overseas Private Investment Corporation —This agency wishes to go ahead with investment guarantees for potential investors in India and to pursue its programs of lending US-owned rupees, both directly and indirectly (through Indian lending institutions) to US firms operating in India in order to give them some competitive advantage over other firms. Commodity Credit Corporation —This agency has applications from US exporters for medium-term credit to finance commercial sales of wheat to India. USDA would like to approve these applications in order to ensure the US a reasonable share of the Indian commercial market following India’s decision no longer to purchase wheat on concessional terms (PL–480 Title I). Indian imports are a major factor in the economical management of our wheat surplus. CCC credits are our mechanism for providing terms competitive with those offered by India’s other major commercial suppliers of wheat (Australia and Canada). 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Tiger and Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); revised by Irwin; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Sisco, and by Rees and Williams. Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot. 216. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 216. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 26, 1972 Subject: Military Supply Policy for Pakistan and India—Munitions List Items The military situation in South Asia is still fluid. The cease-fire is holding and there is no reason to think it should not continue to do so. However, there is as yet no agreement on withdrawals in the West and apparently no progress on POW’s. In the East the Indians claim to have withdrawn three-quarters of their forces from Bangladesh but a substantial number remain and can be expected to do so, at least until the law and order situation inside Bangladesh can be met by reconstituted Bengali police and paramilitary forces. Military losses sustained by the two sides were considerable but we do not have solid statistics. Bhutto alluded briefly to his country’s need at some point for resumed military supply from the United States when he was here in December, but has not raised it since becoming President. His new military chief, General Gul Hasan, has spoken in general terms of future needs and Ambassador Raza has given us a list of previously held up items on which he has asked action, but it is unclear whether this is part of a considered review of requirements by the GOP in the context of war losses and a reassessment of future budgetary allocations. Bhutto will be going to China late this month and we assume will seek some indication while there of China’s future military supply policy toward Pakistan. In this situation we believe our own policy of holding up on Munitions List items for both India and Pakistan should continue essentially unchanged for the next several weeks. We should defer any decisions until the situation is further clarified, both as to withdrawal and as to our political relationships with each of the countries of South Asia. There is also the factor of their relationships and ours with China and the Soviet Union. The recommendations attached rest on this basic premise and are short-range in nature. As the political outlook becomes more clear, we will need to review which of the following kinds of longer-range policies would further our interests in South Asia: a. Assistance to Pakistan to recover some of its wartime losses in lethal end items, possibly by a revision and expansion of the 1970 One Time Exception for aircraft and APC’s now held in abeyance. b. A reversion to our prewar policy of permitting the cash sale to both India and Pakistan of ammunition, non-lethal end items, and spares for previously supplied equipment. c. A cash and carry policy that would permit the sale to both countries, on a case-by-case basis, of both lethal and non-lethal military equipment and spares. d. Indefinite continuation of the present suspension of the sale or delivery of any Munitions List items to either country. e. A combination of one or more of the foregoing alternatives. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Background Paper Washington, undated MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR PAKISTAN AND INDIA MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS PAKISTAN 1. Decisions Already Taken : —Issuance of Munitions List licenses and renewal of expired licenses were stopped in early April 1971. —On November 8, 1971, all remaining outstanding licenses were cancelled. ($5 million worth of Munitions List items were exported between March 25 and November 8; licenses cancelled on November 8 were valued at about $3.6 million.) 2. Present Status : —Pakistan Ambassador Raza on December 22 requested licenses for those items presently in the possession of Pakistani agents in the U.S. and which could not be shipped earlier because of the expiration or cancellation of Munitions List licenses. Their value is approximately $.5 million. These are almost entirely Foreign Military Sales items and include spares for military aircraft, parts for military vehicles and miscellaneous other spares and equipment. —Ambassador Raza on December 20 and 22 also requested new licenses for an additional $2 million worth of Munitions List items including one application for infra-red target detection equipment worth $1.5 million. The remainder includes parachutes, tank periscopes, and various types of communications equipment. —General Gul Hasan on January 11 expressed the hope to our military representative in Islamabad that the arms embargo would be lifted so that “badly needed APC’s communications gear, vehicles and spares for tanks and equipment” could be procured. —It is not clear whether Ambassador Raza and General Gul Hasan raised the arms issue on their own or on the basis of a high-level political decision by the GOP. Bhutto, for his part, has given no indication of his thoughts on the resumption of arms supplies since becoming President. 3. Recommendations : —That we continue to defer action on Ambassador Raza’s request that we issue licenses for those Munitions List items presently in the physical possession of Pakistan agents in the U.S. (approximately $.5 million worth, mostly spares for military equipment, including aircraft). —However, we should keep this particular request under active review should we wish to take a first step at some early date in reopening Munitions List licensing to Pakistan. Should we take this step our public and Congressional posture on this exception could be that we are permitting this adjustment since the items already belong to the Government of Pakistan, the amount is small, and has little bearing on the overall military position on the Subcontinent. There is no legal bar to such a step, although there may be some criticism in the Congress. —That we also defer action on Ambassador Raza’s requests for licenses for $2.0 million in new Munitions List items but that we assure him this matter remains under continuing review. THE ONE-TIME EXCEPTION 1. Decisions Already Taken : —Contracts were signed in early 1971 for manufacture and delivery of 300 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC’s). The Government of Pakistan made a down-payment of $1.3 million, 10 percent of the total $13 million cost. We still hold the down payment. Talks were underway with the GOP on possible sale of some twenty aircraft under the One-Time Exception, but no agreements had been reached on types, numbers or costs. —In early April 1971, all further action on the One-Time Exception was stopped. 2. Present Status : —Action on the One-Time Exception remains in abeyance. However, the manufacture of the APC’s has continued, with the first 100 scheduled to come off the production line in May or June 1972. (If these are not delivered to Pakistan, we would need to make an effort to find an alternate consignee.) —The GOP has not raised the question of the One-Time Exception at the political level since the termination of hostilities. However, as noted above General Gul Hasan on January 11 described APC’s as the kind of equipment “urgently” needed. 3. Recommendation : —That we continue to keep the One-Time Exception under review until agreed withdrawals have taken place, the present ceasefire has taken on a more permanent character, and until our policies toward the Subcontinent have evolved. At that point we should reassess the situation, in light of political circumstances and what we know of Pakistan’s military needs. INDIA 1. Decisions Already Taken —On December 1, we revoked licenses worth $2 million for ammunition components and ammunition related equipment. On December 3 we revoked all remaining outstanding licenses worth $11.5 million, bringing to $13.5 million the total of embargoed licenses. —We have made only one exception to this embargo. On December 22, we granted Delco an exception to continue normal repair and maintenance on inertial guidance systems for Air India’s 747 aircraft. 2. Present Status —The embargo has generated considerable pressure among American suppliers for modifications in the policy on the grounds of commercial hardship. In many cases American manufacturers had begun production of equipment under valid licenses or under contracts with the Government of India and except in the case of certain types of defense contracts they may be unable to obtain reimbursement. —Several of the cases are fairly substantial, including a request from Delco to export further inertial guidance systems and spare parts to Air India worth $6 million and the $10 million of valid contracts under the U.S.-financed Peace Indigo early warning communications project. —The Government of India has also raised with us several cases including the Peace Indigo project on which it would like an early clarification of our intentions. —Details of these and other cases of hardship which have come to our attention are contained in the annex. 3. Recommendations : —That we take no decision at the present time to modify our Munitions List embargo for India. A reversal of our embargo at this time would be premature given the continuing presence of Indian troops in Bangladesh and the lack of progress on withdrawals in the west. —At a later date, if there is progress on these fronts, or if there is domestic commercial pressure, we may wish to consider some limited exceptions. Of particular urgency is the question of spare parts for Air India’s inertial guidance systems and we may wish to give priority to this question when exceptions are being considered. INDIA MUNITIONS CONTROL CASES 1. DELCO has requested reinstatement of its licenses to export $6 million worth of Carousel inertial guidance systems and spare parts for replacement and repair of the systems on Air India’s 747’s. These items are on the Munitions List because of the technology involved. In the past this has been an important U.S. export to Air India which already has a number of Carousel systems. Because these systems are necessary for the safe operation of the 747 and because they are an integral part of Boeing’s commercial relationship with Air India, we have permitted Delco to perform regular maintenance and servicing of Air India’s Carousel systems. In the near future Air India will have an urgent need for spare parts for its Carousel systems, and Delco is likely to put particular emphasis on this element of its pending license applications. Peace Indigo —The Dynamics Corporation of America, General Telephone and Electronics, Bendix and Philco/Ford together have contracts totalling about $10 million for components of the U.S. financed Peace Indigo early warning communications system to tie together the “Star Sapphire” radar system we supplied India after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. They have approached us individually for exceptions, and the GOI has also asked for some indication of whether we intend to allow this project, which is financed with a $17 million FMS credit, to proceed. DOD reports that its General Counsel believes because of the credit, DOD may have to reimburse the American suppliers for losses as a result of the licensing ban. C–119 Spares —Just before the war, Fairchild and Curtis-Wright finally completed negotiations for a long-term supply of spares for the India Air Force’s C–119 aircraft. Fairchild, whose contract is for about $2 million, has complained to DOD, which was active in helping to arrange the deal. Curtis-Wright, which has also contracts for $2 million worth of spares, has also been in touch with DOD. In addition Steward-Davies, a small company in California, has asked for authorization to ship $50,000 worth of parts which are necessary for the C–119’s to operate at high altitudes; i.e., to re-supply Indian forces facing China in Ladakh. Watkins-Johnson has asked for two exceptions. It has a $3 million order for microwave receiving systems to be used for airborne strategic reconnaissance and surveillance, the munitions control license for which was revoked last month. It claims work on the order will help reduce unemployment in the San Francisco area. It also disputes a decision taken in November 1971, which had nothing to do with the India-Pakistan crisis, to place on the Munitions List some of its other radio receivers, which it now wishes to export to India. Verson All Steel Press —The GOI has recently asked us whether we will permit the export of the second half of a shipment of tooling equipment for production of cartridge cases. The first half was shipped prior to our December 1 ban on ammunition. Verson All Steel Press has not contacted us, but we expect that it will, since the GOI is holding up payment on this $500,000 shipment, which we caught at the docks on December 1. Bendix has requested reinstatement of a license so that it can complete the sale of equipment to modify the Star Sapphire radar systems, which are now used for both military and civilian purposes, to improve their capability for civilian air traffic control in areas close to the radars. Bendix argues that while these modifications will have some military significance, they will be defensive, will not improve India’s capability against low-flying aircraft and are identical to modifications the FAA is making in the U.S. air traffic control system. Bendix wishes to ship the remaining $600,000 of the original $1.5 million order and is also interested in selling the GOI other modifications to improve further the radar’s capability for commercial air traffic control. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed for Eliot. 217. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 217. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 28, 1972 Subject: Alternate Strategies for South Asia Assuming a continuing U.S. interest in all of the countries of South Asia, the immediate problems which we face are ones of timing. We can either maintain our present posture of close cooperation with Pakistan and relative aloofness from India and Bangladesh or we can move at a reasonable measured pace to normalize our relations with India and Bangladesh while attempting to preserve the present relationship with Pakistan. Strategy I —Under this strategy we would make no major policy modifications while Bhutto is working towards negotiations with the East Bengalis and the Indians, while the process of Indian withdrawal in the East is incomplete, and while the Bangladesh government is still establishing itself. Since few immediate decisions are required we would adopt a waiting posture, going forward with programs slowly as events on the ground dictated. Strategy II —As an alternative we might seek to move at a somewhat earlier date to take advantage of the state of flux in the area, not only to build upon the close relations with Pakistan developed over recent months, but also to develop a relationship with Bangladesh before its external ties are set, perhaps to our disadvantage, with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and to respond to Indian initiatives for a normalization of relations. This strategy would begin to move the U.S. to a more independent position vis a vis the three major powers of the area. In the sections which follow decisions are sketched out consistent with each of the above scenarios in the various major areas of policy concern—political, economic and military, including specifically the issues of political dialogue, recognition of Bangladesh, military supply, humanitarian assistance and economic assistance. A. Political Dialogue Strategy I —We would continue close consultation with Bhutto, particularly on questions involving the aftermath of the Indo-Pak War, such as troop repatriation, and withdrawals. We would also consult with Bhutto on recognition and indicate to him that we would take no precipitous action in this area until he had sorted out his own relationship with Dacca. With India we would take no initiatives to normalize relations, beyond indicating to the GOI that we hope to put our relations on a new basis once bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues had moved somewhat closer to settlement. In this process we would take into account Indian policies and actions in other parts of the world and their impact on our interests. We would not plan to give the Indians any special briefing on the Peking visit, whereas we would give President Bhutto a fairly complete briefing. With respect to Bangladesh we would continue to avoid substantive political discussions with the Bangladesh leadership. Strategy II —In addition to continuing close consultation with Bhutto we would encourage the GOP to undertake a dialogue with Bangladesh and India on a range of post-war problems providing as appropriate suggestions for their resolution. With India we would rather more positively indicate our interest in normalizing relations, and without minimizing our differences, seek to discuss various post-hostilities problems and the requirements as we see them for a more satisfactory basis for our relations. We would plan to brief India on the Peking visit. We would informally even in advance of recognition begin to have limited contacts with Bangladesh leaders, in an effort to create the basis for a constructive future relationship. In the case of India, after the completion of the President’s Moscow visit, we might consider holding bilateral talks in New Delhi at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level. Similar talks might also be held with the GOP in Islamabad. B. Recognition of Bangladesh Strategy I —We would delay recognition until Bhutto had sorted out his own relations with Dacca or until circumstances forced a decision, and in any event, not until after the President’s China trip. Such a decision might not be forced upon us for several months when Bangladesh’s application for UN membership had to be considered. Strategy II —We would signal in the near future to Mujib, as part of informal political discussions, our feeling that there might be positive advantages for Bhutto in the USG’s moving toward recognition of Bangladesh. Once Bhutto’s timetable had run its course we would be prepared to recognize Bangladesh, or sooner if Bhutto himself had no problems. We would discreetly encourage Bhutto to face up to the realities in the East, publicly as well as privately, once most other countries including our major allies had recognized. As part of our emerging dialogue with the Indians we would keep them informed of our plans. Under this strategy a tentative target date for recognition might be shortly after the Peking trip. C. Economic Aid Policy Strategy I —In addition to concluding negotiations with Pakistan for a $27 million wheat and edible oil PL–480 agreement we would be as forthcoming as possible in helping Pakistan arrange the export of its rice surplus to Bangladesh. We would defer any decisions relating to aid projects in Bangladesh until there had been some progress in Dacca-Islamabad negotiations. We would be forthcoming on debt rescheduling and willing to provide continuing development support when a revised development plan is available. With India on the other hand we would maintain the suspension of the $87 million FY 1971 pipeline. We might, however, indicate our willingness to go ahead on a vegetable oil agreement which is primarily in the interest of American domestic suppliers. For domestic commercial reasons we would also remove informal restrictions currently in effect on Ex-Im, OPIC and CCC. We would not provide new development aid until we have sorted out our relations with India. Strategy II —As in the first option we would be forthcoming on economic assistance for Pakistan. We might, however, attempt to phase new development commitments so that not all decisions favorable to Pakistan were taken in advance of those for India. With respect to aid for India we would somewhat accelerate our decision to restore the pipeline suspension perhaps as early as the beginning of March. Further steps such as participation in a debt relief exercise for India would be held up until the May consortium meeting. For Bangladesh we would indicate at an early date our willingness to continue to finance existing aid projects and would seek to find ways of continuing high prestige operations such as the Cholera Research Laboratory. D. Humanitarian Relief Strategy I —Our humanitarian efforts would be concentrated primarily in Bangladesh, within the framework of the United Nations appeal. We would seek the broadest possible international support including that of the USSR. We would be prepared to commit portions of the pipeline of 725,000 metric tons of PL–480 foodgrains and perhaps additional resources through the United Nations and, to a lesser degree, voluntary agencies. We would cooperate in but not instigate a UN and IBRD effort to formulate a long-term rehabilitation plan. We would make an initial contribution of about $10 million in commodities to the current UNHCR’s appeal for refugee relief in India. We would not make further major commitments in either Bangladesh or India in the absence of clear evidence of broad international support. U.S. support of the UN relief effort should under current circumstances be in the range of 30 to 35 percent of the total actually made available by all donors. Strategy II —As in the first strategy we would support UN appeals for Bangladesh. We would continue to work closely and actively through the UN in cooperation with the international community and would be prepared to provide up to 30–35 percent of the total actually made available by all donors. We would hold open the option of playing a larger role. In India we would support the UNHCR’s appeal providing an initial $10 million and would be prepared to respond positively up to 30–35 percent of total international contributions. E. Military Supply Strategy I —While in the short run we would make no modification in our current hold on munitions list licenses, we would be prepared to consider meeting Pakistani needs to replace wartime losses if such assistance was requested at the political level. There would be no general resumption of a military supply relations with India. We would only modify our restrictions on our embargo to India to the extent it was necessary to do so for non-military items of significant commercial interest to the United States. For domestic commercial reasons and considering the absence of any equipment of major military significance on the Commerce license list we would no longer continue to apply special restrictions on Commerce licenses for either India or Pakistan. Strategy II —Instead of being prepared to consider meeting Pakistan’s need to replace wartime losses we would defer a decision on any GOP requests for major items of equipment until we had defined our broader policy, taking into account the course of events in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the progress we were making in our relations with India. Among the options we might consider are: (a) a return to the non-lethal sales policy of 1966; (b) the limited lethal spare parts policy of 1967; (c) an open cash and carry sales policy for lethal equipment; (d) a new one-time exception for Pakistan; (e) a combination of several of these options. As in Strategy I, we would remove all special restrictions on Commerce licensing in both Pakistan and India. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed the memorandum for Eliot. 218. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 218. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, January 28, 1972 Further to my letter no. SS/19/5/72, dated January 25, 1972, India continues to viola the ceasefire along the India West Pakistan-occupied Kashmir borders. In view of the grave situation which is developing from these serious violations, the Government of Pakistan feel that UN observers should be posted along the border areas. The UN Secretary-General has confirmed that he could strengthen UN observers on Kashmir ceasefire line but he could not repeat not extend their services to India-Pakistan border. For this purpose, a special group of observers similar to those posted on Kashmir ceasefire line needs to be established. This requires the authority of the Security Council through a formal resolution and not in the form of consensus of the members of the Council. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, decided to call a meeting of the Security Council as early as possible for the induction of observers on the borders of India and West Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan would be grateful if the US would kindly support Pakistan’s move for the Security Council meetinq and a for the Council initiatives to post UN observers on Indo-Pakistan border . 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK/UN. No classification marking. 219. Analytical Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 219. Analytical Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 28, 1972 ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA This analytical summary covers the papers at the following tabs: — Strategy . State Department paper on alternate strategies—one going more slowly with India, the other moving more rapidly. — Humanitarian Assistance . A joint State/AID paper entitled “Humanitarian Assistance Policy for South Asia.” — Economic Aid . A joint State/AID paper entitled “Economic Policy for Pakistan and India.” This and the paper on humanitarian assistance provide the basis for discussing our position at the UN and in the Kennedy hearings . — Ceasefire and Withdrawal . This is essentially an NSC staff paper which deals with broader issues raised in a State Department paper prepared for the last meeting entitled “Problems of Disengagement and Withdrawal.” This covers Pakistan’s request for a UN Security Council meeting . — Military Supply . There are three papers: (a) State Department paper entitled “Commerce Licenses for India and Pakistan”; (b) State Department paper entitled “Military Supply Policy for Pakistan and India—Munitions List Items”; (c) Defense Department paper on options for resuming “Military Supply for Pakistan.” In this analytical summary these are considered under four headings: (a) Strategy; (b) Humanitarian and Economic Aid; (b) Ceasefire and Withdrawal; (c) Military Supply with its separate sub-problems (Commerce and Munitions List items). In order that this may aid you and the SRG in moving our decision-making a step forward, we have used the format below of (a) stating the State/AID recommendations on each issue, (b) discussing the issues and (c) concluding with a possible sentence reflecting a decision. If this approach works, you could come out of the meeting with a series of precise statements which would constitute guidance on the key issues . These are also used in your talking points. Strategy The State Department paper defines two possible strategies: Strategy I—Slower . Under this strategy we would make no major policy modifications while Bhutto is working towards negotiations with the East Bengalis and the Indians, while the process of Indian withdrawal in the East is incomplete, and while the Bangladesh government is still establishing itself. Since few immediate decisions are required we would adopt a waiting posture going forward with programs slowly as events on the ground dictated. With India we would take no initiatives to normalize relations, beyond indicating to the GOI that we hope to put our relations on a new basis once bilateral Indo-Pakistan issues had moved somewhat closer to settlement. With respect to Bangladesh we would continue to avoid substantive political discussions with the Bangladesh leadership. Strategy II—Faster . As an alternative we might seek to move somewhat more rapidly to take advantage of the state of flux in the area, not only to build upon the close relations with Pakistan developed over recent months, but also to develop a relationship with Bangladesh before its external ties are set, perhaps to our disadvantage, with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and to respond to Indian initiatives for a normalization of relations. This strategy would begin to move the US to a more independent position vis a vis the three major powers of the area. With India we would rather more positively indicate interest in normalizing relations. With Bangladesh we would soon signal our intent to recognize, allowing time for Bhutto to run through some reasonable timetable. The issues not addressed in depth here are: (1) Should we move somewhat more quickly with Bangladesh than with India? (2) What are the arguments for relating the pace of bilateral relations to the pace of an overall South Asian peace settlement. It would be possible, for instance, to move ahead in laying the basis for a relationship with Bangladesh while pacing the normalization of our relations with India to an India-Pak settlement. The question of a broader settlement is not dealt with in any of the State papers. It is a major question how deeply we wish to involve ourselves in that process (see “Ceasefire and Withdrawal” below.) NSC recommendation : That we act in terms of a go-slow strategy until the end of February; lay the groundwork during this period for establishment of a relationship with Bangladesh in March; pace normalization of our relationship with India to a broader settlement of the immediate issues growing out of the war. Humanitarian Assistance and Economic Aid The State/AID papers on humanitarian assistance and on economic aid policy are drafted around a series of recommendations. These are listed below with necessary discussion under each. At the conclusion of each discussion paragraph is our more precise recommendation which we suggest you try to reach agreement on at the conclusion of discussion. State/AID recommendation 1: Within the framework of a UN relief program with international support, the US would make available for relief in East Bengal PL 480 foodgrain and oil, utilizing portions of the 725,000 tons (about $75 million) which were committed for relief efforts in East Pakistan last August and September but not shipped . (This would require cancelling old agreements with the government of Pakistan and working out new arrangements with the UN.) The issue is just exactly how much we are committing now if we approve this recommendation. The choice is between (a) deciding now to earmark the total amount to be drawn on in stages and (b) dividing it into several smaller amounts to be committed one a time. The advantages of earmarking now are that it appears more forthcoming and our planners know that they have approval of an overall framework provided certain other criteria are met (for instance, adequate participation by other nations in an international effort). The advantage of slicing this total amount into smaller amounts is that it preserves clear White House control at each step of the way. The further advantage is that we appear more forthcoming to commit a large amount even if we place certain operational restrictions on its disbursement than if we commit only in small amounts. NSC recommendation: Preparations may be made to earmark approximately 725,000 metric tons of PL 480 foodgrain and oil to East Bengal, and planning may proceed on the basis that this amount is available. Disbursements will be in accordance with criteria on what the US share of an international effort should be. State/AID recommendation 2: We should defer any further commitment of US funds—in contrast to commodities—for humanitarian relief until the size of the international response that the UN appeal becomes apparent. The issue is whether we maintain this position or whether we might authorize something like $5 million for Williams to negotiate with provided criteria are met on the US share. The argument for deferring commitment of funds is to reinforce our position that the international community not take our contribution for granted. The argument for a provisional commitment is that, again, US would appear more forthcoming both in New York and before the Congress if it were able to discuss US support in the context of contributions by others. [There is another issue in whether we can now draw on a small amount of money left over from previous commitment, yet undisbursed. It will be resolved in connection with the overall decision on this issue.] NSC recommendation: A sum of $5 million should be authorized as part of US support for the UN effort provided other criteria on the US share are met . State/AID recommendation 3: US support of the short range UN relief and rehabilitation effort should be in the range of 30–35% of the total actually made available by all donors, although we should reserve the option of playing a larger role depending on the trend in general relations. There are two issues here : — Is the range of 30–35% the right share ? This is on the low side, closer to the overall proportion of UN spending that many in the US would like to see us move toward. On the other hand, the US is in a unique position in the world because of its agricultural abundance to provide food support. During the 1965–66 famine years in India, the US said it would “match” contributions by others—accept a 50% share—and even this proved difficult to manage. We faced the issue that the US is going to let people starve because others won’t contribute. Also, it may be one thing to establish a low share for financial contributions but perhaps more appropriate for the US to do a larger share where food is involved. The choice, therefore, would seem to be between the 30–35% range and range around 50%. — What kinds of contributions should be included in the calculation of shares ? Should we include all commodities and cash? Should we just speak of cash? Should we deal with US support for US voluntary agencies apart from the general international effort? There is a very strong argument for not getting too heavily committed to a precise formula because it is too difficult to administer and makes us appear too restrictive. If we are including commodities, we should think in terms of a large total share. If we are thinking in terms exclusively of cash, it may be that the US share should be less than 30%. We would suggest dealing with US support for US voluntary agencies apart from our contributions to the UN effort. NSC recommendation: In financial contributions, the US should provide about 30% of total financial contributions. The US, however, may provide in commodities up to 50% of the total value of the UN effort valued to include all contributions in cash and in kind. US support to private US voluntary agencies and to the international Red Cross shall be apart from the US contribution to the UN effort. We should use these proportions in-house and not become too rigidly committed to them publicly . State/AID recommendation 4: That the US participate in UN and possibly IBRD discussion on longer-range reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh but defer making any commitment until our future political relationship is clear . This would also apply to our presently suspended AID development projects in the former area of East Pakistan. The issue here is whether US participation implies intent to participate in the long run and whether we want to convey such intent. This goes back to the broader question of how we see our political relationship with Bangladesh evolving. If we intend to recognize within the next few months, participation in discussion of this issue would be reasonable both as a signal that could help us buy time and as a move to influence how things evolve. If, on the other hand, we do not intend to provide development assistance to Bangladesh this year, then we should probably go slow in participating. NSC recommendation: US representatives may participate in the discussion of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh, but they will be under strict instructions in no way to imply that the US will make any financial commitment at this time. State/AID recommendation 5: The US should reply to an appeal by the UNHCR for Pakistani refugees in India by contributing 30–35% of the $122 million which India estimates is required and by announcing an initial commodity contribution of $10 million. The basic issue is whether we provide support for any refugees in India or whether we concentrate our assistance on those refugees who return to East Bengal. Even though State and AID recommend commodity rather than cash assistance, this is essentially an exercise in relieving a burden on India. The argument for doing so is that the US has maintained that it was willing to do all possible to offset the burden of the refugees before the war and should continue doing so to bolster the argument that the US is not interested in punishing India. The argument against is that the Indians in effect rejected our solution to the problem and opted for military action and we should not reward it; India now should have to face up to the costs of its action. Also, there is an argument for not making the refugees too comfortable where they are and encouraging them to return to East Bengal. NSC recommendation: That the US pledge a commodity contribution of $10 million and review the situation when it is clear how much others are contributing. [This would be a token.] As a matter of strategy, the US should concentrate its refugee effort in Bangladesh and should deal with the question of refugees in India in the context of broader development assistance to India. State/AID recommendation 6 : Action on this recommendation is already in train, so this is more a matter of checking a course already underway than of approving a new one. Bhutto requested permission to export 300,000 tons of low quality rice from West Pakistan. Normally, under PL 480 regulations, this would not be permissible as long as we are exporting grain to Pakistan. But an exception has been made in this case because of post-war disruption. Bhutto further asked us to make a grant that would permit him to give this rice to Bangladesh. This is not possible under US law but Bhutto has been told the US would help in meeting the foreign exchange costs of transporting some of this surplus rice to Bangladesh if he can make arrangement with the authorities there. It is also true that our PL 480 agreement for wheat is in the nature of a subsidy. NSC recommendation : That this course of action be approved. State/AID recommendation 7: The US should adopt a forthcoming attitude, at the February 22 consortium meeting on further debt deferral for Pakistan and should indicate to Pakistan a readiness to act in concert with other consortium members in resuming development support as soon as a revised development strategy is available . (The World Bank tentatively envisages a consortium pledging session in July, but some FY 1972 program lending may be necessary for short term financial support.) The issues are two: (a) The Treasury Department would like to see us deal with the debt question in a way that would indicate that one more deferral is all we have in mind and that it should be of relatively short duration to permit the Pakistanis to develop an overall framework for debt repayment and renewed development lending. (b) We need to decide whether we intend to be fairly restrictive or fairly forthcoming in resuming normal development assistance. As the State/AID paper indicates, it may be summer before a full development strategy is available, and we should begin to sort ourselves out on whether we would be forthcoming about an interim loan before then. NSC recommendation: That we work with the Pakistanis and the World Bank to establish as forthcoming an arrangement as possible on one more debt referral and that we indicate to Pakistan our willingness to resume development lending as soon as a new development strategy is available. We would not mention to the Pakistanis at this time and would reserve judgment on short term financial support beyond PL 480 and beyond debt relief . State/AID recommendation 8: That we hold in abeyance for now any decision on lifting suspension of the FY 1971 pipeline for India, that this be reviewed at frequent intervals with an eye toward release, that we conclude a PL 480 agreement for vegetable oil if India wants it but hold other PL 480 agreements, that we permit USG agencies like the Ex-Im Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Commodity Credit Corporation to do business as usual because their programs are primarily for the benefit of US trade and investment . The issue is how we plan to deal with the question of future economic assistance to India. The State/AID paper does not come to grips with this issue. Its suggestions on PL 480 are virtually meaningless; the Indians have indicated that they do not want to pick up our offer of vegetable oil and probably will not want to do so until they know what the larger aid context is going to be. The choice is between letting matters drift as State now seems to want to do and setting out for ourselves now some fairly realistic time period within which some kind of development assistance might be resumed so that we would know what kind of dialogue we want to have with the Indians on the question of economic assistance. NSC recommendation: That AID be asked to develop two possible strategies with regard to future development assistance to India . One of these would be based on a gradual resumption of an aid program along the lines of that which existed before the war. The other would pose some new development assistance relationship. It is recognized that any new relationship would have to take off from where we are now and could not be radically different but would go in some revised direction. That US agencies involved in promoting US exports be permitted to proceed on the basis of commercial criteria. Ceasefire and Withdrawal The problem has three general aspects—the western front, Bangladesh, and the status of prisoners and other displaced persons in both East and West. The immediate problem that has to be dealt with is that Pakistan has requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to deal with India’s alleged violations of the ceasefire on the western front. This however immediately gets into questions of how the withdrawals on the western front should be negotiated, and that in turn is linked with the broader questions of Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh and the exchange of persons involved in a final settlement. The position that the US takes in the Security Council could be a relatively passive one or it could press for movement toward a negotiation of these issues. The issues seem to be: (a) Should the US be engaged in forcing and shaping a negotiation or should we simply let the Indians and the Pakistanis work out their own solution? (b) How far the US should go—insofar as our influence has any effect—in letting the Indians use this negotiation to establish a permanent settlement of the Kashmir issue? (c) Should the US push a more active role for the United Nations now? There is an argument for using this moment of postwar trauma for settling the Kashmir issue once and for all, but it would not seem consistent with our December position to reward India in this way. There may be an argument for taking the position that issues arising from the war should be negotiated first and then India and Pakistan should then attempt to normalize relations. At the UN that would suggest letting the Pakistanis have their say about ceasefire violations and using the consultations to stimulate the beginning of negotiations on return to prewar positions on the Western front. Military Supply: Commerce Licenses State/Commerce recommendation: That the pipeline under existing licenses continue to flow as it is now and that the informal hold on new license applications be lifted for both India and Pakistan . [This was never announced, and the change now would not have to be a big thing.] The facts: New license applications worth approximately $800,000 for Pakistan and $900,000 for India are under an informal hold. Under these applications, Pakistan would buy three Bell helicopters for the Defense Ministry and spare parts for Pakistan International Airlines. India would buy aircraft spare parts and electronic equipment for the Indian air force as well as ground-based air navigation equipment. The hold for Pakistan has already been partially lifted to provide several items which Ambassador Raza specifically asked for; this was approved at the last SRG meeting. Shipments under valid licenses outstanding have never stopped flowing to either India or Pakistan according to the State Department paper. The Commerce Department opposes revoking valid licenses on commercial grounds; Commerce licenses have been completely revoked only once before, in the case of China during the Korean war. Commerce points out that revocation would affect the ability of US suppliers to sell abroad because the availability of replacement of spare parts would be called into question. The issue is whether we adopt a general posture that we will turn loose equipment in this category which is of less direct military significance and which is the subject of commercial transactions. The argument for doing this is to leave a door open for US military supply to the subcontinent on a cash-and-carry basis rather than unnecessarily tying our hands. Publicly we have addressed only Munitions List items. If US suppliers still wish to market their goods in Pakistan and India, the buyers must assume that the source of supply is going to be reliable. The argument against this approach is that it is too soon to show any gesture of this kind toward India. This would argue for leaving matters where they stand, honoring Pakistani requests when they come up but continuing to hold off for India. Another way of putting the issue is whether or not we are going to move our arms policy toward a strictly commercial supply operation such as the British have had or whether we are going to incorporate even the commercial aspects of military supply into a political policy. Discussion . In order not to take us out of the military supply business altogether, it does seem desirable to leave our commercial channels open and without impediment. NSC recommendation: That we act now as if there were no hold on application for commerce licenses . Military Supply: Munitions List Items The State Department recommends that our policy of holding up on Munitions List items for both India and Pakistan should continue essentially unchanged for the next several weeks, deferring any decisions until after the situation in South Asia is further clarified. Defense Department argues that this makes sense because Bhutto has said he would reduce the size of the armed forces and there is no basis from which to provide arms until his own defense policy is clear. Defense also points out Congressional reaction will be strong if military supply is resumed without some agreed political framework of peace in South Asia. The facts: For Pakistan , there are four categories of equipment now being held up that could be released in this sequence if desirable: (a) There is materiel being held in warehouses when the freeze was imposed. (b) There is a possibility of releasing a few items which are particularly important to American companies. (c) There is a possibility of renewing all previous FMS cases under the April 1967 policy. (d) Action could be renewed on the one-time exception. Defense would recommend dealing with these items in the sequence indicated if military assistance to Pakistan is renewed but it recommends that all of these be held in abeyance at least until the start of negotiations toward an armistice and until we know what Chinese intentions on military supply to Pakistan are. State Department notes the possibility of a new one-time exception to clear up inequities in the freeze—both inequities to Pakistan and to American suppliers. Generally, State concurs in the notion of holding any major sales until a settlement between India and Pakistan on the issues arising directly from the recent war. For India , State Department recommends that no decisions be made now to modify the Munitions List embargo for India. As in the case of Pakistan, however, there is a list of problems created for American companies whose sales have been interrupted by the freeze. The issue —and maybe it cannot be resolved now—is whether we are going back into the military assistance business in South Asia. This cannot be solved on a short-term basis and it cannot be resolved outside the context of what kind of relationship we wish to have with the three nations in South Asia. It is possible to envision an intermediate step to clean up the inequities both to India and Pakistan and to American suppliers, but it is possible that this would create as many new problems as it resolved. NSC recommendation : It seems reasonable to us that a first step in the military supply field regardless of what our ultimate policy is to be might well be to try to clean up the inequities and imbalances created by the freeze of the last few months. Therefore, we recommend that State and Defense be asked to come up with a separate package each for Pakistan and for India which would in effect clear the books of pending inequitable situations . The purpose would be to clean up inequities to American suppliers and unfair costs to the recipients. The package we put together on a contingency basis without the thought that a decision would be made in the immediate future . 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret. A January 28 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger indicates that they drafted the summary. (Ibid.) Of the papers cited in the summary, the January 28 Department of State paper dealing with alternate strategies is Document 217 and the January 25 paper on economic assistance for India and Pakistan is Document 215 . Two of the papers dealing with military supply, dated January 22 and January 26, are Documents 213 and 216 . The third, “Commerce Licenses for India and Pakistan,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. On January 28 the NSC staff prepared an assessment of a Department of State paper dealing with the issues of ceasefire and withdrawal that was sent to the NSC on December 22. The paper and assessment can be found ibid. A January 26 paper dealing with humanitarian assistance is in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume as Document 389 . The discussion in the summary of the possibility of the U.S adopting a more independent position vis-à-vis the three major powers of the area, in the paragraph which outlines Strategy II, prompted Kissinger to ask a question in the margin: “When?” 220. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 220. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, February 1, 1972, 2:35–3:57 p.m. Subject: South Asia Participants: Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger State: Mr. Joseph Sisco Mr. Christopher Van Hollen Defense: Mr. Warren G. Nutter Mr. James H. Noyes JCS: Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Gen. William C. Burrows CIA: Mr. Richard Helms Mr. John Waller Treasury: Dr. Charles Walker Mr. John McGinnis AID: Mr. Maurice Williams NSC Staff: Mr. Hal Saunders Mr. Mark Wandler SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS It was agreed that: —an effort will be made to schedule an NSC meeting—for information purposes—on South Asia just prior to the President’s visit to China. The NSC staff will work with the State Department to prepare a comprehensive discussion paper for the meeting. The State Department will also prepare a Talking Paper for the President to use in discussions with Chinese leaders. —Dr. Kissinger will try to obtain Presidential decisions on immediately contributing 125,000 tons of food grain to the UN feeding effort in Bangladesh and on future aid commitments. The participants felt the U.S. could give one-third of what other UN donor countries are contributing, going up to a limit of 725,000 tons of food grain. At that point, we would have to take another look at the situation. In the meantime, we should reserve decisions until we have the world-wide call of the UN and until we determine how much other countries are contributing. —Mr. Williams, in his testimony before Congress, could say that the U.S. is prepared to participate in the relief operation. —The question of replying to an appeal by the UNHCR for Pakistani refugees in India will be held in abeyance for the moment. —A decision on our participation in the IBRD reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh will be deferred until after the China trip. —We should have a forthcoming attitude on debt-rescheduling for Pakistan. —AID will prepare a paper on future development assistance to India. The paper should include a glossary of terms, alternative strategies, and percentage comparisons. Concerning the ceasefire, we should be helpful to Pakistan in its efforts at the UN Security Council. We should also try to privately encourage low-key negotiations between India and Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: We have three sets of issues to discuss today. The first is the basic strategy we should follow, the second is humanitarian and economic aid and the third is militarily related issues. In order to determine the basic strategy, I think we need to have an NSC meeting—either immediately before the China trip, or right after it. As I understand the State paper, we have two basic strategies—one for going slowly with India and one for going more rapidly. Just to clarify my understanding of the options, can you tell me what the difference is between the two strategies? It seems to me that one of them calls for going slowly through February, and the other through March. (to Mr. Sisco) Is that right? Mr. Sisco: Yes, that’s basically correct. We should go slow and take another look at the situation after the Peking visit. That’s an oversimplification, of course. The main point is that we should look at everything again after the China trip. Dr. Kissinger: But we have been looking at the situation for a long time. Mr. Helms: I would like to mention one thing right away about recognition. Seventeen countries now recognize Bangladesh, and it looks as though fourteen more are getting ready to do so. I think we must ask ourselves if the U.S. really wants to recognize Bangladesh while Indian troops in effect occupy the country. Dr. Kissinger: In any event, we would not consider recognition before March. Mr. Helms: I think the whole structure of our policy relates to this recognition factor. Dr. Kissinger: I read the State paper, but I don’t think it develops workable choices which can be put before the President. It’s going to be difficult to schedule an NSC meeting before March. Perhaps we can have an information meeting, though, a day or so before we leave for China. In reading the paper, I also noticed a couple of trick phrases. For example, in the “faster” strategy, it says “move the U.S. to a more independent position vis-à-vis the three major powers in the area.” Some people feel that we are already taking a position for an independent Bangladesh. We have an independent position vis-à-vis India right now. So this really means to move away from Pakistan. What are the intentions of the Indians? I wonder if we could express the strategies presented in this paper in terms of meaningful choices. Suppose we want to repair our relations with India. Timing will play a great role. For one thing, we must go to China first in order to determine how we will play the triangular relationship in South Asia. One could argue that we should repair our relations with Bangladesh before we repair our relations with India. On the other hand, one could also make the opposite argument. That’s the sort of choice we have to put before the President—rather than a slow-fast choice. Mr. Sisco: I think it would be valuable to have an NSC meeting—an information meeting—just before the China trip. Unless other people object, I don’t think we have to do anything else other than, just have the NSC meeting. We could do one paper, saying that we looked at the two alternatives, putting forth our posture in the area and recommending that we hold off for the time being at least on recognition of Bangladesh. We could glean whatever is useful from the present papers. This new paper would then be good for a general NSC discussion. Dr. Kissinger: We have to determine where we want to go in the area. Otherwise, we will have a series of operations which will be hard to keep track of. (to Mr. Sisco) You sent over a list of recommendations. We need to know, however, what we wart with Bangladesh and India over a period of time. What can be done to bring about better relations with India? What do we mean when we say “better relations?” We have a unique opportunity now not to slide back into the situation that existed before. If we don’t have a basic strategy, we run the risk of being nickeled and dimed to death by the various bureaucracies which have a vested interest in the programs that existed before. I don’t know. Maybe we should be doing this. But first we should try to develop a basic strategy. Mr. Van Hollen: (to Dr. Kissinger) With this in mind, have you seen the paper under the Secretary a memorandum to the President of January 17? This memo addressed questions of our relationship with Bangladesh, as opposed to India and China. Dr. Kissinger: If I remember correctly, the memo had four options, only one of which was viable. Regardless of the way the paper approaches the problem, however, it may reach the right conclusions. If I could be the devil’s advocate for a moment, let me say that one could make a case for the proposition that we had a common interest with China during the war, but not now. China may want a radical Bangladesh, while we want a moderate Bangladesh. So it may be that we have more of a common interest with India in Bangladesh than we we have with other countries. Mr. Van Hollen: We addressed that problem in the Secretary’s memo. Dr. Kissinger: The point Dick [Helms] made before was a good one. From the foreign policy point of view, it would buy us six more months with China if we hold off recognizing Bangladesh until the Indians leave. Mr. Van Hollen: Mujib is on the record, you know, as saying that the Indian troops are wanted. He also wants us to recognize Bangladesh. Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly the sort of issue that should be surfaced at an NSC meeting. We should be able to discuss our priorities with Pakistan, Bangladesh and India at the meeting. If we want to move with. India, we should discuss how this could be done. Should it be with economic aid? Should we try to get a political dialogue going first? (to Mr. Sisco) Perhaps we can get at all of these issues if you re-work your paper. Then we could send the paper to the President for his review. Mr. Sisco: I agree with you. The question is how do we do this paper? Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we can do the paper over here. We would, of course, show it to you, and it would serve as the basic paper for an NSC discussion. I think we have to make sure the President gets these issues into his head before the China trip. We could have an hour-long NSC meeting to expose these issues. It wouldn’t be necessary to make any decisions at the meeting. Mr. Sisco: Yes, we should do that. I will get together with Hal (Saunders) right away. I might also mention that we are trying our hand at getting a talking paper ready for the President. Dr. Kissinger: We’ve been trying to get a talking paper. Mr. Sisco: We’re working on it. I think it would be helpful for the President. Dr. Kissinger: It’s absolutely essential. Mr. Sisco: We’re doing a talking paper on the Middle East as well. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) I’ll give you a piece of inside information. They [the Chinese] are not in favor of proximity talks. Mr. Sisco: Oh, no. I’m not sure the Egyptians want proximity talks either. Dr. Kissinger: Can we have the talking paper on South Asia by the end of the week? Mr. Sisco: We’ll try. Dr. Kissinger: You should keep in mind the Chinese sensitivities when you do this paper. Mr. Helms: (to Dr. Kissinger) When are you leaving for China? Dr. Kissinger: We’re leaving on the 17th, and we will be back around noon on on the 28th. We arrive in China about the 21st. Mr. Sisco: (to Dr. Kissinger) We’ll get that paper for you. Dr. Kissinger: We should have some discussion now about the series of State/AID recommendations on operational points, some of which are acute. The first of these is whether within the framework of the UN Relief program with international support, the U.S. would make available for relief in East Bengal PL 480 food grain and oil, utilizing portions of the 725,000 tons which were committed for relief efforts in East Pakistan last August and September but not shipped. The question, as I understand it, is do we earmark the whole amount now, or do we respond with smaller amounts a series of requests? Mr. Williams: The UN has now requested a contribution from us of 175,000 tons of grain for the UN feeding effort in Bangladesh. They want an answer as soon as possible. Dr. Kissinger: To whom would the pledge be made? Mr. Williams: To the UN. It was originally in an agreement with Pakistan and would have to be shifted. I might add, too that these 725,000 tons are already in the public domain. The UN has also also asked for $386,000 the remainder of an earlier two-million dollar pledge we had made to cover administrative costs. Both of these requests are on the public record. Dr. Kissinger: These pledges were made under different political circumstances. Mr. Williams: I understand that the UN, however, sees itself as the same body in the area. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think? Mr. Sisco: I make a distinction between these two pledges. The UN says that food is needed now, in advance of a revised aid program. I say that we should respond favorably and that we should earmark 175,000 tons. However, we should make it clear that we are waiting to see what the new aid program will look like. If we do this, it will be tangible evidence that we are doing something in Bangladesh. Bangladesh will see that we are doing something meaningful. On the other matter, I feel that if we can hold off, we should. The British have made a new pledge of $2.5 million, and the Belgians will be pledging $400,000. The UN is not in such dire straits in administrative costs that it will fall apart without the remainder of our original contribution. I say yes to the question of earmarking the 135,000 tons, and I say that we should hold off making a financial commitment. Mr. Williams: That financial request was between the U.S. and the UN. Mr. Sisco: (to Mr. Williams) Yes, Maury, but that was for a different program under different circumstances. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Williams) Are you saying in effect that if Czechoslovakia annexed by the Soviet Union, and if the UN calls for relief efforts, we would have an obligation to the UN? Mr. Williams: I don’t know about that. But I do know that we said we would support the mission in Dacca. After the war began we even asked them to stay at their posts. We talked to U Thant in the middle of the night, and asked him to keep somebody in Dacca. We pledged $2 million to support the administrative costs. Since the amount of money involved now is very small, I think we should go ahead with the pledge. Dr. Kissinger: I would like to take these issues to the President. He is strong on not recognizing Bangladesh, but he is, of course, in favor of humanitarian aid. (to Mr. Helms) Dick, what do you think? Mr. Helms: I frankly am not convinced by the argument that we must follow through with our commitments to the UN. Those commitments were made during an entirely different situation. If we want to make these commitments now, that’s fine, but we shouldn’t be burdened by what we said we would do in the past. It’s time now to make some new decisions. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Does that hold for food commitments, too? Mr. Helms: We simply have to decide now what we want to do. Personally, I think it’s a good idea to send food to Bangladesh. Mr. Sisco: I’m making some assumptions, which I think all of us around this table are also making. Basically, we see stability in Bangladesh to be in our interest. There is a new situation now, but we are under no illusions that a commitment of 115,000 tons of food grain to a new program will bring about new circumstances. This would simply be the beginning of a new program. Dr. Kissinger: What is the value of 175,000 tons of wheat? Mr. Williams: It’s worth about $10 million. Mr. Sisco: That’s not a bad chunk for a signal, you know. Once we make this commitment, we could wait to see how the new situation looks. Dr. Kissinger: We can respond to the UN request by saying that we are reviewing a new situation, or we can pledge 175,000 tons of food grain or we can pledge the whole package. I would like to try this out on the President, just to get his temperature. When will we know what the UN is requesting? Will we know next week? Mr. Williams: Yes, I think so. Adm. Moorer: How far will the 175,000 tons of food grain go? Will it feed about one million people for one month? Mr. Williams: It is about a one month import requirement for Bangladesh. Dr. Kissinger: Then the U.N. will be asking for the same amount every month, won’t it? Mr. Williams: The U.N. will be making a world-wide call. Some people estimate that the annual figure will be about 1.5 million tons. This is a minimal estimate, however. Others say that the figure will be 2.5 million. Adm. Moorer: I would think it would be at least 2.5 million. Mr. Sisco: We will know better when the call is made and when other countries announce their contributions. Mr. Helms: What is the time gap between the decision to commit food and delivery? Mr. Williams: Generally, the food is taken from exisiting stocks in the area. New deliveries are then used to replenish the drawndown stocks. It takes about two months from decision to delivery. Adm. Moorer: I think this should be an entirely new situation, with a new commitment. I assume the 175,000 tons are standing by at the ready. If we give it to them, it would be a new commitment. Mr. Van Hollen: We can try to find out what the other countries are planning to do. We can call New York. Mr. Williams: Yes, we should do that. Canada is contributing $18 million, but it’s hard to know if this contribution was in the works before, or if it is a new program. Mr. Sisco: This is sort of a pilot program for us, a test of what other nations will do. We can take a small step in this new situation without committing ourselves to further actions. Mr. Helms: Let’s say for a moment there is a famine in Bangladesh. If people are fed, there will be less pressure—from Congress, the press, do-gooders and others—put on us to make other decisions. Just remember what happened with Biafra. We have less control over the situation in the long run if we hold back on aid. Dr. Kissinger: That’s a good point. I’m not sure, anyway, that our offer would be a test of the Bangladesh attitude. Why wouldn’t they take 175,000 tons of food grain? Mr. Williams: I think we should wait for the overall assessment need, which will be accompanied by a call for help. Then I think we should give 30–35 percent of that call. This will be a proportionate, reasonable share of the help. Dr. Kissinger: I assume the 175,000 tons would be counted as a part of our share. Mr. Sisco: Yes, it could be. Mr. Williams: That should certainly be communicated to the U.N. The political circumstances have obviously changed, but the same U.N. people are in the field. In the context of our basic policy, as I just stated it, I think we should go ahead with these commitments. Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know what our policy is. Mr. Williams: I said “as I stated it.” Adm. Moorer: What will be the effect of future aid to India on India’s ability to assist Bangladesh? Mr. Williams: What is our aid to India? Adm. Moorer: The Indians have to feed their forces in Bangladesh, and there are starving people in India itself. Where are they going to get the food? Will they transfer some of our aid? Mr. Williams: There are no starving people in India. They’ve had five surplus harvests in a row. Adm. Moorer: But they certainly howled about the refugee situation. Mr. Sisco: If there is a bad wheat harvest, India might be in trouble. But that isn’t the case right now. Dr. Kissinger: What was the economic strain on India? Mr. Williams: There was economic strain in budgetary terms, but, nevertheless, they had a surplus of wheat. Dr. Kissinger: I understand the issue. I will try to get a Presidential answer next week. Mr. Williams: Let me repeat again that I think we should wait for the call. Then I think we should respond in tranches, pledging one-third of what other countries put up. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s move on to some of the related issues now. Concerning the recommendation that our support of the short-range UN relief and rehabilitation effort should be in the range of 30–35 percent of the total actually made available by all donors, how did we hit upon 30–35 percent? Is this our share of the U.N. budget? Mr. Sisco: In the voluntary programs, we’re somewhat over 40 percent. In the UN budget, we contribute just over 30 percent. I would say that the figure of 30–35 percent can be justified because it is roughly our budgetary contribution. In fact, I would say that we should use the exact figure of 33 1/3 percent. Mr. Williams: This 30–35 percent figure is also reinforced by the recent Proxmire report. This report said that our share of the aid to refugees on the sub-continent should be about 30–35 percent of the total from other countries. If we are asked where we got the figure from, we can say that Proxmire recommended it [referring to his forthcoming testimony before the Kennedy subcommittee]. Dr. Kissinger: If you say that, it will make you very popular upstairs. Mr. Sisco: The President should know that Pakistan assumes and agrees that we should be contributing to the UN effort. Raza came in specifically to talk about this. Dr. Kissinger: As I recall, he said that he had two objections to our contributing. Mr. Sisco: Bhutto has also said that he understands why we want to provide aid. He said the important thing is non-recognition of Bangladesh. Mr. Williams: If I am asked about this during my testimony on the Hill, I can say that we are studying the situation. Mr. Sisco: (to Mr. Williams) Maury, why don’t you show the draft testimony that I looked at to Henry? Mr. Williams: This testimony is already in the Committee’s hands. Hal (Saunders) has seen it. Mr. Saunders: It follows our general line. Dr. Kissinger: Just for my information, can I see it? Mr. Williams: Yes, here it is. Dr. Kissinger: Does the 30–35 percent figure include our financial contribution? Mr. Williams: Yes. Dr. Kissinger: What bothers me is that we might be committed to spend the $250 million that the President asked for under different circumstances. Mr. Williams: That’s not correct. We will do what we want to do. Dr. Kissinger: I’m not sure that we aren’t automatically committed to continuing what we were doing before. Mr. Williams: What do you mean? Dr. Kissinger: I’m talking about the $250 million the President asked for. Mr. Williams: That request is still before Congress. Dr. Kissinger: But it was sent up under different circumstances. Mr. Williams: You wouldn’t want to withdraw it, would you? Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree that one-third is the right figure to use with our commodity and financial contributions? All agreed. Mr. Nutter: Isn’t there some question about our overall UN contribution? Mr. Sisco: No. We pay our dues and 30 percent of the general budget, although this has been reduced over the years. After China was admitted, we reduced our contribution to the UN development program. Adm. Moorer: For what it’s worth, we also pay about one-third of the cost for NATO infrastructure. Dr. Kissinger: we can ask the President (a) if he wants to do anything and (b) if so, how much we should contribute. He can say 25 percent or 40 percent. Mr. Williams: Absolutely. You can also be sure that I will say nothing tomorrow that will affect this. Mr. Helms: Won’t we contribute less than we did before the war? Dr. Kissinger: If we say we’re contributing 30–35 percent, won’t this be less than what we were giving before? Mr. Williams: Before the war, we were contributing about 70 percent of the total cost. Dr. Kissinger: It may be possible then that we will be giving a smaller percentage now, but that it will be the same amount. Mr. Williams: That depends on what we finally do. In any case, I don’t think it will be the same amount. Mr. Sisco: There’s one critical issue we have to make a decision on regarding Maury’s testimony. Can he say that the U.S. is prepared to participate in the relief operation? Can he say that we will take some general share? Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Mr. Sisco: He can keep his testimony general and not make any commitments. Mr. Williams: It will be easy to do that because there is no UN assessment yet. Mr. Sisco: This was the important thing to be decided at this meeting. Dr. Kissinger: What about recommendation 5—our reply to an appeal by the UNHCR for Pakistani refugees in India? Mr. Saunders: That’s the recommendation on page 3 of the humanitarian assistance paper. This is like the issue we were just discussing, only it relates to refugees in India. I think we have to wait for a final call from the high commissioner for world-wide funds before we can make any decision. Dr. Kissinger: I am also reluctant to go ahead with it without Presidential approval. This is a totally new situation, and the refugees are allegedly going back. Mr. Sisco: I don’t think we have to give anything to India. (to Mr. Williams) What do you think, Maury? Mr. Williams: I said in this room last week that if we do anything, we should do it in Bangladesh. I asked State to sort this issue out [noting that the State paper recommended $10 million.] Mr. Sisco: Both the Secretary and I feel we should make our effort in East Bengal. Dr. Kissinger: Do we all agree then that we should hold this in abeyance and not put it before the President? Mr. Sisco: Absolutely. Dr. Kissinger: What we will put before the President is the question of whether we will contribute to the UN effort and whether our contribution will be 30–35 percent of the total given by other countries. Mr. Williams: I agree with Joe that we should not make an effort in India. Dr. Kissinger: What about the 725,000 tons of food grain? Should we put that issue before the President? Mr. Williams: I don’t think we need to have a decision on that. Dr. Kissinger: Do we agree we would release 175,000 tons, provided we are in the range of 30–35 percent of the total contribution? After that we would then take another position on what to do with the remaining tonnage. Mr. Williams: We should be prepared to release the 175,000 tons, even if it is ahead of the percentage. The additional tranches, however, would be in the 30–35 percent range. Mr. Sisco: The important thing to remember at this point is that we have no further commitments. Mr. Williams: 725,000 is a meaningless number. It is not an operational figure. Dr. Kissinger: Following through on what you just said, we might end up giving more then 725,000 tons. Mr. Sisco: That’s conceivable. Mr. Nutter: We could use some kind of limitation. For example, we could use the figure of 30 percent, but say no more than a certain absolute sum. Mr. Sisco: I think we can work with the 30 percent figure now. When it is put before the President, he might decide to do more or less. Dr. Kissinger: I assume our contribution of 175,000 tons will be retroactive and will count against the 30 percent figure. Mr. Williams: Yes. After we make that contribution, we could hold back and not take the lead. Dr. Kissinger: How high could the total figure be? Mr. Williams: I don’t know. Dr. Kissinger: Can you try to give us an idea, in addition to the estimate of what other contributions will be? Mr. Williams: Let’s say the total call is $750 million for the first year. One-third of that, our share, would be $250 million. I guess we would have to take a good hard look at that, to see if we want to do it. But first we have to have the call. The only recommendation before us now is for a percentage figure of one-third. Dr. Kissinger: We will give one-third of what other countries contribute. We will go up to 725,000 tons, and then we will take a new look at the situation. Does everyone agree with that? All agreed. Dr. Kissinger: What about our financial contribution for humanitarian relief? Should we give the $386,000 plus whatever else we want to give? There is also the possibility of another $5 million. Mr. Saunders: This refers to the earlier question discussed between Mr. Williams and Secretary Rogers of authorizing a commitment of $5 million for administrative costs. This has been pre-empted, however, by the $386,000 issue. Dr. Kissinger: The next question concerns our participation in the IBRD discussion on longer range reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh. Do we have to make a decision on this before the China trip? Mr. Williams: What does “participation” mean? The IBRD says it will prepare an appeasement report of the situation. There’s no need for us to make a decision on this. Dr. Kissinger: Then we could hold it off until after we return from China. Mr. Williams: Definitely. Dr. Kissinger: Next we have the question of what our attitude should be on debt-rescheduling for Pakistan. Your recommendation is that we be forthcoming. Does anyone oppose that recommendation? No one opposed. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s talk now about the 1971 pipeline for India. You recommend that we should hold this in abeyance for now, and this is okay with us. But we want to have two or three choices with regard to future development assistance to India. Can you get this to us, with all the pros and cons? Can you tell us what the Indians will do? Mr. Williams: We will get that for you. When do you want it? Dr. Kissinger: Can we have it by the middle of next week? Mr. Williams: Okay. We’re planning to take a fresh look at aid for Pakistan in March, we could do the same thing for India at that time. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Williams) You’re not going to come out against it, are you? [restoring the pipeline in March] Mr. Williams: I think I will recommend it, but I want to wait until then. The issue must be looked at, and we can do it when we proceed with the assistance to Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: But we’re talking about India right now. Can we think about what kind of program we would like to set up in the new fiscal year? Mr. Williams: Sure. Mr. Sisco: We held up $80 million, but we let more than $100 million in the pipeline go. Mr. Williams: One problem we will have is that Congress will probably cut the development assistance funds. We will, of course, have to make new decisions. But right now we have no commitments. Dr. Kissinger: Can we find out exactly what is going on? What is the bookkeeping, and what is the real situation? We have to know what the effect on India is so that the President can make decisions. Frankly, I find it bewildering not to know exactly what happened in December. Mr. Williams: In December, we froze U.S.-Indian agreements totaling $87 million. This had an immediate diplomatic effect on our relations with India because the Indians considered this to be a punitive action. The economic effect is a much slower proposition. Dr. Kissinger: The point is that if the pipeline is reopened in March the Indians in effect will not have paid anything. Mr. Williams: I say that we should not give India any new aid this year. Dr. Kissinger: I don’t even know what “pipeline” means. Mr. Helms: (to Mr. Williams) Would it be possible to get some sort of a glossary, so that we all know exactly what you are talking about? What about the $87 million—was it mostly for tanks, oil or other things? Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Maury, I think it would be useful to get that—for us and for the President. Then we could get some idea of what the effect was of what we decided. And any new decisions we make would make sense. I don’t really understand exactly where we are at the moment. Where do we stand with development loan funds? Mr. Williams: Congress is not finished acting on that yet. I’m sure that the development loans will be cut very deeply. We thought that we would have $200 million—like last year. But it will probably be less. Dr. Kissinger: The President wants to make a decision on this. As our relations with India improve, he could decide to do something. This would be a political decision. He could decide to go back to what we were doing before, or he could announce the program has been cut. The cut could even be done for us by the Congress. In any case, we have already paid the price, and now everyone should look at the figures. Maybe the President would decide to do nothing, or just give a little. However, I don’t know what it means to give a little. Mr. Williams: I will put something together for you. Dr. Kissinger: If we talk about giving $200 million in development loans to India this year, how much of a percentage is that of last years figure? That’s the kind of information we have to know. Mr. Williams: I will get all of this for you—a glossary, alternative, strategies, percentages, and other things. Dr. Kissinger: Can we have it next week? Mr. Williams: Yes. Mr. Sisco: We have a strong interest in the PL 480 program because of the vegetable oil problem. As you know, we’ve offered vegetable oil in order to stabilize our soybean oil market. India has refused this offer and does not want to talk about aid on a piecemeal basis. I don’t think we should go back to the Indians and ask them to take the vegetable oil. Mr. Williams: The bottom has fallen out of the U.S. market for soybean oil. Mr. Sisco: India knows this. Agriculture is insisting that we should go back to the Indians. We’re reluctant to do that, though, because we fear that they will say the hell with it. They say they want to talk about the broad aid picture, and we can’t afford to fall into that trap. Dr. Kissinger: Let’s turn now to the ceasefire. Should we encourage negotiations, or should we let nature take its course? Mr. Sisco: Pakistan will be asking for a Security Council meeting after the Security Council meetings in Africa are done. Dr. Kissinger: Will they ask for a observers? Mr. Sisco: Yes. We told them that we would try to be helpful in the Security Council. I think we should be helpful. I think we should also try privately to encourage low-key negotiations. Dr. Kissinger: Are there any objections to that? No objections. Dr. Kissinger: What’s going to happen to the 80,000 prisoners? Mr. Sisco: That’s one reason for having the talks. Mr. Van Hollen: The Indians have most of the prisoners, and most of these are now held in India. Therefore, this is basically an India—Pakistan problem. There’s also the territorial problem on the western front. The prisoners, of course, are a big bargaining counter for the Indians. They could play them off for concessions in the West and Bangladesh. Mr. Helms: India has already said that Pakistan should give up the territory it occupied during the war. Haven’t the Indians made that clear? Mr. Van Hollen: They’ve talked about mutual rectification in the border areas, worked out mutually. India holds approximately 300—500 square miles of Pakistan, while Pakistan has about 40—80 square miles. This is not at all like the situation in 1965. Mr. Sisco: India, in other words has a five-fold advantage in territorial terms. It seems to me that this is a matter we should let Bhutto handle. Mr. Van Hollen: He is trying to internationalize various aspects of this, to improve his poor bargaining position. Dr. Kissinger: What happened to the license military supply situation after the war? Did we or did we not cut off the licenses to India? Mr. Van Hollen: On Commerce Department licenses, the pipeline did not stop. Only new applications were stopped. Mr. Sisco: Perhaps we should begin at the beginning. Mr. Van Hollen: That’s a good idea. Let’s take Pakistan first. For munitions list items, as of November 8, all licenses were stopped. Dr. Kissinger: What about India? Mr. Van Hollen: They [munitions list items] were stopped on December 1 and 3. Dr. Kissinger: As of December 3, then, Pakistan and India were on the same basis. Is that correct? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. We put a hold on new Commerce Department licenses for Pakistan in the fall. The same thing was done for India when the war began. The Pakistani pipeline has been flowing. We proposed to stop the pipeline to India, but Commerce did not do it. There was no hold on the Indian pipeline. Dr. Kissinger: You didn’t let us know that. Are Pakistan and India on the same basis now? Mr. Van Hollen: On both commercial licenses and munitions list items, they are on the same basis. With White House approval, we made two exceptions for India. One was on inertial guidance equipment and the other was on German rockets. Dr. Kissinger: Who approved that [the German rockets]? Mr. Saunders: Haig. Dr. Kissinger: What are the Germans doing launching rockets in South Asia? Are they trying to protect German East Africa? Mr. Van Hollen: I don’t really know what they’re doing. Mr. Saunders: They are launching sounding rockets from the geomagnetic equator. Dr. Kissinger: Just for my information, can you tell me what kind of rockets they are using? Adm. Moorer: The rockets are very much like the ones we send up at Wallops Island. Mr. Helms: It would be a great grab bag to get a list of all the decisions made on India and Pakistan during the last twenty years. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Van Hollen) What are the recommendations? Mr. Van Hollen: On commercial licenses, all holds should be off. Dr. Kissinger: Who would benefit by that action? Mr. Van Hollen: There is an approximate balance—$800,000 for Pakistan and $900,000 for India—in terms of new license applications. Dr. Kissinger: What about the pipelines? Mr. Van Hollen: The monetary advantage would go to India—with two million dollars worth of equipment in the pipeline, compared to $42,000 worth of equipment for Pakistan. Mr. Helms: Henry [Kissinger] has learned to ask the right questions. Dr. Kissinger: But it doesn’t do me any good. Mr. Sisco: We are being pressed hard on this issue by Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: But they don’t have anything in the pipeline. Mr. Van Hollen: Raza is pressing us. Dr. Kissinger: Are you willing to proceed with the new license applications for Pakistan? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. The pipeline has been flowing, but now we’re talking about new license applications for India and Pakistan. Mr. Sisco: Concerning the $800,000 worth of equipment in the pipeline for Pakistan, Raza comes in to see US every ten days or so. We don’t know if Bhutto is involved in this. He never raised the question of military assistance with us. Farland says that Bhutto is putting priority on economic revival. Dr. Kissinger: So the $2 million pipeline will flow to India, while there is a torrent of $42,000 to Pakistan. Mr. Williams: I agree with Joe. There was some indication that Bhutto does not agreee with Raza. I think Raza might be trying to improve his standing by taking this initiative on his own—or by following a suggestion made by the Army. Mr. Nutter: Pakistan has 70 tons of munitions list items in a warehouse right now. These items have been paid for, but delivery has been held up. Mr. Williams: The items were not licensed. Mr. Nutter: But they were paid for. Dr. Kissinger: How was that possible? Mr. Sisco: Some times it is possible to get a license after items have been bought. The licenses are mainly for shipping purposes, anyway. You can get a license before or after you make a purchase. Dr. Kissinger: The only question, then, is whether we should open up commercial applications? Mr. Van Hollen: Commerce feels strongly that we should do this. Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Let me call you. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. 221. Memorandum for the President’s File 221. Memorandum for the President’s File 1 Washington, February 3, 1972 SUBJECT: Your Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, on Thursday, February 3, 1972 PARTICIPANTS: The President Ambassador Keating Dr. Henry A. Kissinger President Nixon: You have been through a tough time. Ambassador Keating: I had a good talk with Dr. Kissinger about it. I am tough. President Nixon: Neither country should be a country. They are too poor, too bloodthirsty. Ambassador Keating: Yes, there should be a regional solution, like the EEC. President Nixon: India shouldn’t waste its substance fighting Pakistan. China is their problem. Ambassador Keating: I agree. President Nixon: Let me give you my view. I’ll tell you what I’ll do. I am afraid they’ll leak it, so of course we can’t announce it. Let me tell you where we went wrong. I was too soft on Mrs. Gandhi. When she was here. I led her on. If we were going to restrain them at all we should have been tougher. I am not mad at Mrs. Gandhi. She has not had a better friend in this office than me. I have taken the line that India should have to compete with the PRC. I have always defended India. Ambassador Keating: They could stop this press campaign against us, if it weren’t for their spokesman, Kaul, a slippery customer. President Nixon: I want to confirm the backchannel arrangements we have. You communicate directly with me. India has a friend in the White House. They should know this. We are going to China for reasons of our own. We took action on India because our law requires it. In reality we are India’s best friend. Right, Henry? Dr. Kissinger: That is true. But we must move at a measured pace. Ambassador Keating: They are going to try to make a political issue out of it. State made me do it. I can’t deny my cables. President Nixon: Put yourself in the position of India. She needs relations with the three great nations, if she wants a viable foreign policy. The United States is the only one that has no design on her. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 30, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger. 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, February 4, 1972 SUBJECT: Strategic Weapons in Near East, South Asia Area Several recent intelligence reports from sources in India and elsewhere indicate that the Indians may plan to explode a nuclear device in the near future. Whether the test is of a weapon or, as has been suggested, under the guise of “peaceful application,” it would set off a chain reaction that would be felt throughout West Asia. India for some time has possessed the capability to produce nuclear weapons within a short period after any decision to move forward on a weapons program. Although we estimate the Indians would not be able to develop sophisticated delivery systems (missiles/high performance aircraft) for some 6–10 years, the military implication of such a program could not be missed by India’s neighbors. The Indian leadership doubtless recognizes that any test would tarnish the country’s image abroad, but it may believe that the advantages of “going nuclear” before the President’s trip to Peking and in conjunction with peace negotiations with Pakistan merit the risk. Implications for the Near East and South Asia would be far reaching. Pakistan might opt to compete, with disastrous consequences for its already strained economy; more important, China might exploit the situation to secure a firm position on the subcontinent and to dabble in the Persian Gulf. The Shah of Iran already has indicated that an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons would leave him no alternative but to follow suit despite his already massive military program. Such a move could cripple Iran’s economic development and further threaten the country’s internal stability. The reaction of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Arab States of the Gulf is predictable. Finally, Israel could regard the Indian test a sufficient justification to surface its own nuclear program, adding a new dimension to the Arab-Israeli question, and opening new avenues for Soviet and Chinese penetration of the Arab world. The consequences of such a move for US interests—economic, military, and political—in the area and globally are incalculable. I see little that we can do at this time to affect this situation. Nevertheless, we are continuing to study the problem and plan to forward to you, if and when India does go nuclear, various proposals for ways to minimize the impact of an Indian weapons program both on the states of the area and on US relations with those states. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 77–0094, India 471.61, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on February 5. A handwritten note in an unknown hand, beneath Nutter’s signature, reads: “L&N–We might pressure USSR to control Indian nuclear ventures.” 223. Memorandum for the President’s File 223. Memorandum for the President’s File 1 Washington, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20 p.m. SUBJECT: President’s Meeting with Robert McNamara and John Connally on Tuesday, February 8, 1972 at 3:15 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: The President John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury Robert McNamara, President, World Bank Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. McNamara: The cartoons here are impressive. The President: I have seen cartoon collections in various Presidential libraries. Cartoons were especially influential before TV. Let me ask you, Bob, about your trip. Mr. McNamara: The situation is bleak. Even Ceylon is highly unstable. 14,000 young people are in prison. [That would be like 235,000 in the U.S. equivalent.] Nepal is completely dependent on India; they currently need $8–10 million in economic aid. The mood in India is bellicose and self-righteous. In Pakistan, Bhutto is the only possible leader. The President: What should we do? Mr. McNamara: Restoring aid won’t reduce the stress, but we must have a serious dialogue with India. The President: We are not offended by India. But Congress is. India hasn’t had a more consistent friend than I have been. In fact a large aid program to India is not necessary. Mr. McNamara: I am having lunch with Jha. We must restore the $87 million aid commitment and work out the debt rescheduling. There will have to be a consortium meeting. The President: Who should be our emissary? I am the best man to sell the Indian program. But let me ask you frankly: Is it worth normalizing our relations? Why should we give the $87 million? The $10 billion we gave them since their independence only gained us contempt and hatred. Mr. McNamara: It would get us into a political dialogue now. It would make a difference. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 6, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the President’s office in the Old Executive Office Building. Connally also attended the meeting. The conversation was also tape-recorded. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, and McNamara, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 320–328) 224. Telegram 1770 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 224. Telegram 1770 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, February 10, 1972, 1500Z Subj: My Session With Foreign Secretary Kaul, February 10 Ref: State 022386 1. Summary: In session with Foreign Secretary Kaul, February 10, I presented positions agreed during my consultations in Washington and added my personal suggestions of steps GOI could take to improve our relations. Kaul welcomed much of what I had to say and generally reacted positively to my personal suggestions. He subsequently reviewed South Asia section of President’s foreign policy report, page by page, taking sharp exception in a number of instances and applauding other passages. These prellminary reactions being reported septel. Action requested: None. End summary. 2. In session lasting one hour and three-quarters with Foreign Secretary Kaul, February 10 I began by referring to our previous talk (New Delhi 6421 and told him that Washington had been pleased, as had I, over his initiative to improve Indo-US relations and there was willingness on Washington’s part to restore amicable relations with india. I then alluded to distortions in Indian press at which point Kaul interjected that Indian press had attempted to contact him but that he had refused to give any comment until after he had met me. Therefore, he assured me, that anything being said in the Indian press was not officially inspired. 3. I told Kaul that we were anxious to continue our dialogue and to try and find out from him what possible suggestions he might have in order to better our relations. I then said that I had several specific points which I had been authorized to make. I told him that: (A) The President recognized the pragmatic situation in this part of the world and that the matter of Bangla Desh was under discussion in Washington. A decision on the juridical status was a matter of time. (B) With regard to arms to Pakistan I had been authorized to state there was no present consideration being given to military sales to Pakistan. (C) We intended to participate in international humanitarian assistance for Bangla Desh. (D) As regards the Indian Ocean I drew on State 019307 and 020302, as amended by State 029081. I told Kaul that I understood the Indian Ocean had come up for discussion in the recent Indo-British bilateral talks and asked if he had anything he could tell me. Kaul explained that he had not been present at the time Indian Ocean had been discussed as he had been involved in his daughter’s wedding. He said he would be glad to inform me in due course and that there was no intention to hide such information. 4. I then alluded to the fact that the recently changed Indian policy requiring a specific statement whether a naval vessel carried nuclear armament had effectively precluded US naval ship visits to India since it was the firm policy of my government neither to confirm or deny the presence of such armament on any US vessel and that India was only country in the world with such a requirement. I explained that because of this policy good will visits of US naval vessels had to go to non-Indian ports. 5. At this point i referred again to matter of aid to Bangla Desh and told Kaul I understood India was now encountering the problems of a donor nation. When he inquired what such problems were I told him I understood that India had given the Government of Bangla Desh (GBD) $30 million equivalent for the express purpose of providing 30 rupees per refugee to assist in their resettlement inside Bangla Desh. I understood none of these rupees had yet found their way to the refugees. FYI I had learned that this morning from focal point Jamieson Kaul appeared to be surprised and proceeded to immediately telephone for information. When he hung up the phone he said he would have to get the details. He then added that the GBD was the best judge of how to distribute funds made available to them. Proposal that funds be turned over to refugees had only been an Indian suggestion. He said qte we cannot dictate to them unqte. The matter was presently under discussion. 6. In response to my question whether he wanted to hear some suggestions from me as to what India might do to improve relations, Kaul urged me to proceed to cite any steps that I thought India could take which would contribute to that objective, I began by referring to the qte fantastic strides unqte about the United States which appeared in the Indian press. I told him I knew that they had a free press, but my concern related to the failure of the government to deny qte outright lies unqte. In response to the Foreign Secretary’s question as to what stories I referred, I cited the claim that: (A) The Ins Khukri had been sunk by a US submarine. (B) That there had been a direct order from President Nixon to bomb Visakhapatnam. (C) That the Seventh Fleet had been dispatched to assist the Pakistani Army either by landing troops or evacuating Pakistani troops from East to West Pakistan, I told Kaul that I thought the Foreign Ministry spokesman who handled daily briefings could help a good deal by knocking down such fantasies. Kaul immediately attempted to telephone the Defense Secretary and the Chief of Naval Staff to inquire whether any contradiction had been issued to the allegation that an American submarine was responsible for sinking the Khukri. After some time he learned there had been no official Indian denial of the story but that the government acknowledged the denial which had been issued by the Embassy. He said the GOI could not be absolutely certain how the Khukri had been sunk. He pointed out that the government had not said that it had been sunk by an American submarine. He thought it best if the matter could be raised by a correspondent in a press conference and a suitable reply would be given. He implied he would find an occasion to make an appropriate statement when he next met with the press. 7. I told Kaul the points I had made were incidental to a general posture that should be taken by the Foreign Ministry spokesman. Kaul assured me that the GOI did not wish to impute anything to the USG which was not true. I told him that I realized it was not his intention but that there were elements in the press that were out to damage Indo-US relations and that believed it was a popular thing to do. From my stand point, when there were allegations as far out as these we would like to see them knocked down promptly. 8. I told Kaul the second suggestion I had I would put to him exactly as it had been put to me by Washington to qte tell them to get off our back on Vietnam unqte. I told him I knew that the GOI disagreed with our Vietnam policy, but that it didn’t help to keep hammering about it. I then referred to Kaul’s request for our intervention in connection with the burning of the Indian flag. Kaul asked me to send a message back to the USG that he had made a specific request to us in a friendly spirit because of our special relationship with the Saigon regime. He said qte if you can’t do it then please say you can’t do it unqte. 9. I then told Kaul that I did not know of any subject in which president Nixon had taken a greater personal interest than in the drug problem. I said that any help that India could give on that matter would be qte very much appreciated unqte. I explained that poppy growers in India received a relatively large income from licit sale of narcotics. I mentioned the situation that had occurred in Turkey where the growers had agreed to convert to other products which would net the farmers more than the poppies they were now growing. I told him I personally believed that the US might be willing to be helpful if India were to move in the direction of reducing the acreage devoted to poppies. 10. Again speaking personally, I told him that I understood that synthetics were beginning to take the place of narcotics and I believed that Indian pharmaceutical companies could produce such synthetics with know-how which it wouldn’t be unreasonable to request of us. I told him that I thought if the GOI said to us that they appreciated our motives, that they needed help from us in converting to other crops, we would probably be responsive. 11. The Foreign Secretary said he did not wish to give an off-the-cuff reply. He emphasized the situation in Turkey was very different from that in India. One method that could be followed would be to raise the price of licit sales so that there would be no incentive to smugglers. He suggested I might pass to him either a formal or unofficial note on the subject. I told him that my purpose was only to convey the idea that any cooperation the GOI could give us in controlling drug abuse would be deeply appriciated. 12. I then mentioned the American School, on which I will report septel, followed by reference to MAP training and we had set aside vacancies for training but that none of these had been utilized since the end of the war. the reason given had been a plausible one, that the forces were still completely deployed on the frontiers and therefore could not be available. i asked if this was in fact valid. Kaul replied that he would like to examine the matter and assured me that there was no policy not to send personnel to the United States. India sent military personnel for training to the Soviet Union, France and various other countries. 13. As for the USAF aircraft (which I said had been grounded) I told him that I presumed that if I asked to fly in it my request would be granted, and that it was my intention to seek to use the aircraft again before the end of the month. Kaul said that the entire matter of the use of foreign aircraft inside India was under discussion. Qte our air force is very touchy about it unqte. If the government decided it was in their national interest not to grant permission for such aircraft to operate, then permission would not be given. The matter was currently under discussion and had not yet been finalized. When I told Kaul I had plans for a visit in the near future to Calcutta he instructed Mrs. Menon to recommend to the air force that any request from me to use the aircraft should be approved. 14. Kaul then referred to the President’s foreign policy report and asked me for my comments based on my recent consultations in Washington. I told him that I found the report qte more conciliatory than I expected unqte. I had read it in the White House and had made minor suggestions which had been incorporated. I felt it was clear statement of recognition of the importance of India in this part of the world. Kaul thereupon said he wished to ask me various points about it and preceded to go through the statement page by page, making his comments. These will be reported septel. 15. Comment: Many of Kaul’s comments on the President’s statement only served to highlight differing views of our respective governments on past history. On these I gave him every bit as much as he gave me, and at times our respective rejoinders were sharp. In general, however, Kaul seemed sympathetic and responsive throughout the conversation, reflecting as apparent genuine desire to continue the dialogue and thereby achieve an improvement in our relations. Dept please repeat as desired. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent by Keating with an instruction to deliver to Sisco at the opening of business on February 10. 225. Memorandum of Conversation 225. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 11, 1972, 1 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Indian Ambassador Jha Dr. Henry A. Kissinger The lunch took place at my invitation and was designed to keep India quiet while we were in China, as well as to explore the possibilities of starting a serious dialogue. I told Jha that the beginning of wisdom in our relations was to mute the debate, and also for him to stop playing to the American press with untruthful stories. Jha asked me what I meant. I said that I noted that he must have spoken to Tom Braden about the claim that if India and Pakistan got to war and China intervened we would not come to the defense of India. I said that Jha knew very well that this was not my view, and indeed I had stated the contrary. Jha said he was under the impression that I had said we would help India only if India were attacked. I said that Jha knew very well that I had said that there were three possibilities: First, if Pakistan attacked India, we would come to the assistance of India if China intervened. The second possibility was that China would invade India, in which case we would help India. The third possibility was Chinese intervention in an India-Pakistan war that India had started; in that case, we would not come to the assistance of India. Jha said there had been a genuine misunderstanding. I doubt it. Secondly, I said, the Indian press should stop its attacks on our policy, and it could prove its good will by taking it easy on the President’s State of the World message. Jha said that he had already received my telephone suggestion to that effect and had taken energetic steps in that direction. I might have noticed that no Indian paper commented on the charge that India had planned to attack West Pakistan even though that was a very sore point in India. I said the main problem now was to look to the future. The President was certainly prepared to establish a realistic relationship. In fact it might appear that recent events had been a blessing, because they enabled our countries to make a new start. India would take the United States less for granted; the United States could give up its sentimentalization of India. Jha said in principle he agreed and he was sure his Government would agree. He then asked me how we would handle economic aid in this context. I said the economic aid question should come later in the dialogue; first we should define where we are going. Jha suggested that the best way for handling economic aid was to agree on a program for phasing it out; perhaps in that context it would be easier to start the aid program again. I told Jha that as our discussions developed I was certainly prepared to look into this. I told Jha that the offer I had made last summer in India that Haksar come over periodically for a frank exchange of views was still open, and maybe this was a good time to give it effect. Jha said he would report to New Delhi and let me know as soon as I returned. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India, Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 226. Telegram 1581 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 226. Telegram 1581 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 17, 1972, 1330Z Subject GOP Soundings on US Bases, Defense Pact and Arms for Pakistan FEBRUARY 17, 1972 FOR DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY VAN HOLLEN/ NEA SUBJECT GOP SOUNDINGS ON US BASES, DEFENSE PACT AND ARMS FOR PAKISTAN 1. You will have noted increasing references by GOP reps to desire for closer military collaboration with USG. Early last Dec, Def Sec suggested Pak willingness to arrange facilities for US naval base (Islamabad 11961). Def Sec casually referred to that proposal again in later meeting with me in Dec. Proposal has resurfaced this week in conversation of ISID liaison officer with our Asst. ArmAtt (USDAO 171140Z Feb 72). Casual hints that GOP would like to have US military presence here have also been dropped by Pak officiers in various other conversations. Our firm policy and practice have been to listen politely on such occasions and to be entirely noncommittal. 2. As you know, Bhutto has raised with me the matter of Pakistan’s future relationship with CENTO. (I responded that is a matter for GOP to decide.) Bhutto suggested to Cy Sulzberger on Feb 7 that he was interested in reviving and strengthening our existing defense agreement—presumably the bilateral of March 1959. This subject has not arisen in any of my talks with Bhutto, but line which Sulzberger reported is consistent with Bhutto’s desire for closer military relations with us. 3. You have informed us of various approaches by Gen. Raza to ease up on existing arms embargo. GOP has refrained from pressing us officially here in arms supply in recent weeks. It is nevertheless matter of live interest. As you know, Bhutto has expressed to at least two American reporters his hope that Pakistan may receive quantities of US arms. Talk along same line came up in my meeting last week with Pak Navy commander in Karachi. In peshawar Feb 15 I was told by senior Pak Air Force officers of their desire obtain a good strike aircraft from us. (When I said I thought they were getting supplies from China, they answered that the MIG–19 cannot do the job and that China does not have another suitable aircraft to offer.) As in case of bases, our firm policy is to be entirely noncommittal here on what decisions may be taken with regard to military supply. 4. I know you have had these various questions under review and have doubtless been discussing them with Amb Farland. We have steadfastly refrained from pressing for status reports on general review or on specific decisions. I thought however that it would be timely to present above summary to you. We are now in a somewhat euphoric stage in US-Pak relations, and I am sure that unwarranted expectations are being built up in some quarters here. 5. We shall continue to listen noncommittally when these subjects come up here unless you have any better guidance for us. 6. Assume you wish share this with Amb. Farland. GP-2 Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Nodis. Sent to the Department for the attention of Van Hollen. 227. Telegram 1622 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 227. Telegram 1622 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 18, 1972, 1800Z Pres. Bhutto has requested that following message be transmttted by urgent means to Pres. Nixon: Mr. President, On the eve of your eventful visit to Peking I send you my personal good wishes for the success of the important mission you are undertaking, a mission which demonstrates your statesmanship and vision. The whole world is watching with hopeful expectation the outcome of your discussions with the Chinese leaders as it may well open a new era in international relations. You have the prayers of all nations who want enduring peace in the world based on recognized principles of international morality in contradiction to the fleeting exigencies of power politics. I would like to take this occasion, Mr. President, to share with you some of my thoughts and those of my countrymen on matters which are of grave concern to us and others in this part of the world. We are, indeed, grateful for the personal efforts made by you and your government to prevent an armed conflict in the sub-continent. That it did break out and that Pakistan was subjected to calculated and ruthless aggression by India with the connivance of a great neighboring power, does not diminish the value of your efforts. The brave posture taken by the United States in defence of the weaker but morally victorious country was vindicated by the support of the overwhelming majority of countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations. During my visit to Peking earlier this month, I found that the Chinese leaders shared our appreciation of your constructive role in the tragedy which struck Pakistan. A most painful consequence of the latest Indian aggression is the large number of Pakistani prisioners of war who are still languishing in Indian prisoner of war camps. Quite independent of other considerations, this, by all civilized standards, is a humanitarian question. Unfortunately, India cynically sees in it an opportunity to exert political pressure on Pakistan, and has disregarded all our efforts to seek their early repatriation. In the same spirit India is procrastinating the withdrawal of her troops from Pakistan’s territories occupied during the conflict. India’s aggression, her indefensible detention of our prisoners of war and the continued presence of her troops on our soil have destroyed the fabric of peace and security in the sub-continent. India’s massive military preparations and the vast arsenal of arms she has managed to collect with the collusion of the Soviet Union have shifted the military balance preponderantly in her favor, and to the detriment of her neighbors, particularly Pakistan. Today, it is not Pakistan alone that stands exposed to danger, but all smaller neighbours of India. If military expansionism is allowed to be pursued as an instrument of contemporary foreign policy, Asia will see no peace, nor will the rest of the world. Before the present crisis, Pakistan was a bulwark against India’s military adventurism in South Asia. Thus Pakistan’s dismemberment is not only a most tragic event for our people but it carries with it far reaching implications far beyond the pale of our borders. Mr. President, I do not have to dilate on these matters as you are fully conscious of the significance of these and other important developments. You have not only raised your powerful voice but mobilized your resources to prevent the chain of crisis which must, inevitably, occur if India, backed by a neighbouring super power, is allowed to go on the rampage from Burma to Iran and from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. The truth of this imminent danger is testified by your report on foreign policy to the Congress. We are confident that you will continue to abide by the principles for which you have taken such a courageous position. In the ultimate analysis the great powers have responsibility to ensure that a lasting peace is established in the sub-continent, on the principle that national territorial integrity is sacrosanct and that the balance of power must not be allowed to tilt preponderantly in favour of a predatory aggressor state. We hope that your discussions in Peking will embrace some of these problems. I wish you success in your discussions with the Chinese leaders, and hope that the talks will be the first positive step in establishing peace in our Asia—a peace which will enshrine the time-honoured principles of justice and equity. With warm personal regards, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan His Excellency Mr. Richard Nixon President of the United States of America Unquote Sober Note by OC/Ts Exdis caption inserted per Mr. Flatin, S/SO. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, February 23, 1972 Subject: Prospects of an Indian Nuclear Test Subject: Prospects of an Indian Nuclear Test At the request of Under Secretary Irwin, we recently took another look at the India nuclear situation. Attached is the report which we prepared on the subject and submitted to Mr. Irwin. In view of the importance of this topic, I would appreciate any comments which you or your staff may have on our paper. Ray S. Cline Attachment Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Washington, February 10, 1972 Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test Summary India probably has undertaken research directly related to the development of nuclear weapons, and may well have fabricated one or more nuclear devices. In this connection, the following points are particularly significant in the short term (i.e., the next several years): 1. The fissionable material employed would almost certainly be plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor at Trombay. India probably has 50–60 kilograms available at present. 2. The Indian government would probably identify the devices, if tested, as peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). 3. Agreements with both the US and Canada limit the use of the CIRUS reactor to peaceful purposes, but : a. neither agreement provides for inspection or verification procedures to determine the uses to which CIRUS-produced plutonium is put; b. the language of the agreements does not specifically preclude “peaceful” nuclear explosions; and c. India has not accepted US and Canadian interpretations of these agreements as precluding all nuclear explosions on the grounds that any such explosion is tantamount to a nuclear weapons test. Regarding the prospects of an Indian decision to proceed with a nuclear test, it is our judgment that such a decision is unlikely during the next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The political and economic restraints would appear—in the near term—to outweigh the international political or military benefits which could flow from becoming the world’s sixth “nuclear power.” Indian leaders and their country’s potential adversaries realize that a nuclear test conducted several years before a viable delivery system can be acquired is of very limited military value. It is true that India might anticipate achieving new status as the result of a nuclear test, and the immediate reaction of the Indian populace could be quite favorable. On the other hand, the long-term costs—in terms of both the diversion of resources from critical domestic programs and the prospective loss of foreign technical assistance—could be very high. Fissionable Materials General . Of the three fissionable materials—plutonium-239, uranium-235, and uranium-233—which can be used in making nuclear weapons, India almost certainly would base a nuclear weapons program on plutonium, at least for the next several years. Facilities for producing uranium-235 probably will not be available during the 1970s. Uranium-233 could be produced in significant quantities in Indian power reactors now in operation and those under construction, but it could be produced much more efficiently in a future generation of reactors—the so-called “fast breeder” reactors—planned for the 1980s. Plutonium, on the other hand, will be readily available during the 1970s and would be the natural choice for weapons use. Plutonium . India has in operation or under construction seven nuclear reactors capable of producing kilogram quantities of plutonium: the CIRUS research reactor at Trombay; two US-type power reactors at Tarapur; two Canadian-type power reactors at Rana Pratap Sagar, Rajasthan; and two other Canadian-type power reactors at Kalpakkam, near Madras. Significant factors relating to each of these power stations are outlined below: 1. CIRUS . This is a 40-megawatt research reactor at the Ehabha Atomic Research Center, Trombay. Fueled with natural uranium and moderated with heavy water, this reactor can produce plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons. In operation since 1963, the CIRUS reactor may have produced as much as 70 kilograms of plutonium, and 50–60 kilograms of this could already have been extracted at the nearby chemical separation plant and available for use in nuclear devices. Agreements with Canada, in connection with supply of the reactor components, and with the US, in connection with supply of the heavy water, preclude use of the reactor for other than peaceful purposes: “The heavy water sold hereunder shall be for use only ... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes...” However, lacking provisions for inspection, these agreements cannot prevent the Indians from using CIRUS-produced plutonium for experiments related to nuclear explosives, provided secrecy is maintained. 2. Tarapur . At Tarapur the Indians have a nuclear power station with two boiling-water type reactors, each generating 190 electrical megawatts (MWe). In operation since 1969, these reactors are fueled with enriched uranium supplied by the US. They cannot be refueled while in operation and are not suitable for producing plutonium for use in Indian nuclear weapons. In connection with US aid in building the Tarapur reactors, India entered into safeguards arrangements with the US: “The Parties to this agreement emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or device made available ... for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station ... shall be used solely for peaceful purposes ...” (Article VI) “No material, equipment or device ... will be used for atomic weapons or for any other military purpose ...” (Article VII) While the Tarapur safeguards—unlike the CIRUS agreements—do provide for inspection rights, they still do not explicitly preclude nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The US position on PNEs (that any nuclear explosion constitutes a nuclear weapon test) was presented to India at a later date. 3. Rajasthan . In this area the Indians have a nuclear power station with two Canadian (CANDU) type power reactors, one scheduled to begin operation a few weeks from now and the other expected to be completed in 1976. Designated RAPP–1 and RAPP–2, each of these reactors will generate 200 MWe. They will use some Canadian uranium initially, but over the long term these reactors presumably will be fueled with indigenously-produced natural uranium from India’s substantial deposits of this nuclear raw material. RAPP–1 will use heavy water supplied by the US. Capable of being refueled while in operation, these reactors would be excellent producers of “clean” plutonium for weapons use. Each reactor could produce some 160 kilograms of plutonium annually. However, both RAPP reactors are under a Canada-India-IAFA Trilateral Safeguards Agreement which provides for control and inspection rights: “The Government of India agrees that the nuclear material used or produced in the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station will be used only for peaceful purposes.” (Article 2) It should be noted that the Indians probably would have no pressing need in any case to use plutonium from the RAPP reactors in nuclear explosives. Plutonium from the CIRUS reactor could support a modest test program until such time as unsafeguarded plutonium became available from the Kalpakkam reactors (see below). It appears unlikely, therefore, that India would see a need to confront the issue of safeguards on the RAPP reactors by involving material from those reactors in a nuclear explosives program, “peaceful” or otherwise. 4. Kalpakkam . The two CANDU-type reactors being built at this site differ from those at the Rajasthan plant in only one major respect: they are being built without foreign assistance and without safeguards. Like the Rajasthan reactors, they are fueled with natural uranium and can be refueled while in operation; as a result, they would be virtually ideal producers of weapons-grade plutonium. Expected to be operational by 1977–78, each reactor will have a plutonium production capacity of about 160 kilograms annually, or 320 kilograms for both reactors. It should be noted, however, that production of “clean” plutonium at this rate would require substantial supplies of uranium, since each reactor would have to be refueled completely about every 60 days. As a result, we would not expect the Indians to utilize the full capability of these reactors for the production of weapons-grade plutonium unless there is a definite requirement for it in the late 1970s. (Note: These CANDU reactors should noc be mistaken for the experimental “fast breeder” reactor project, also at Kalpakkam, which India is undertaking with French assistance.) Uranium-235 . India has no capability at present to produce enriched uranium, either to fuel the Tarapur power reactors or for weapons use. The decision may be made to acquire uranium enrichment facilities to produce fuel for the Tarapur reactors, probably by importing the technology. It is too early to predict whether or when India might have a production-scale uranium enrichment capability, particularly in view of the uncertainties associated with the future spread of gas centrifuge technology, but it is unlikely that India would be in a position to produce kilogram quantities of highly enriched uranium for weapons use before about 1980. Uranium-233 . India has enormous reserves of thorium in its monazite sands, and has shown interest for years in utilizing the thorium in “fast breeder” reactors (FBRs) planned for the 1980s, fueled with plutonium and producing U–233. The U–233 would then be used to fuel the next generation of FBRs. Less than 1 kilogram of U–233 is presently being produced in Indian research reactors each year, and 4 or 5 kilograms of this material may now exist in India. It should be noted also the U–233 presently on hand was produced principally in the CIRUS reactor, and any larger amounts available during the next few years would be produced in nuclear power reactors now in operation or under construction. In all cases, whatever safeguards apply to plutonium produced in those reactors would apply equally to the U–233. As a result, while India probably will begin during the 1980s to produce large quantities of U–233 to fuel future power reactors, this would not be a significant factor in relation to a nuclear weapons program during the 1970s. Ample quantities of plutonium will become available at an earlier date. Delivery Systems . India presently possesses aircraft which could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons—Canberra light jet bombers, and Mystere IV, Hunter, SU–7 FITTER, and MIG–21 FISHBED fighters. In the early stage of a nuclear program, the Indians would have some difficulty developing a nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by the fighter aircraft. While the Canberra, with a 4,000 pound payload, could carry a nuclear bomb, neither it nor any other aircraft currently available to India possesses sufficient range capabilities to constitute a strategic threat to China. A longer range bomber would appear to be the minimum requirement. Indigenous production of such an aircraft is beyond India’s capabilities in the next few years, and it is doubtful whether a suitable bomber could be imported. It appears more likely, therefore, that the Indian objective would be to acquire a strategic missile system—an IRBM with a range of some 2,000 miles. India’s space effort could provide the technological and industrial base for supporting a ballistic missile R&D effort, but in view of the relatively early stage of development of the space program, it is highly unlikely that India could deploy effective IRBMs before 1980. The Political Decision For several years it has been apparent that—in the absence of a major breakthrough in nuclear disarmament—India would sooner or later elect to develop nuclear weapons. We believe that activities specifically related to nuclear weapons development probably have been undertaken. Indeed, if the Indian government has even considered the possibility of embarking on a nuclear weapons program—and we know that it has—it would be surprising if research basic to weapons development had not been authorized. The real uncertainty arises in estimating how far these efforts may have proceeded. While we have no direct evidence to support a judgment on this point, we consider it entirely possible that one or more nuclear devices have actually been fabricated and assembled. If this is the case, a test could be conducted on short notice. We believe that India would abide by the terms of the limited Test Ban Treaty, which requires that any nuclear tests be underground. Several months would be required to prepare a suitable test site, but we cannot exclude the possibility that such a site is being or has already been prepared without our knowledge. It is our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The principal arguments against such a decision are: the high cost of a nuclear weapons program, which would be competing with critical domestic programs, and India’s full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including the USSR) would be jeopardized. It is recognized that there are continuing pro-nuclear pressures, and in the near term the strongest incentive may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power. A decision to proceed with a nuclear weapons program might be viewed as offering short-term domestic political benefits. On balance, however, the factors against testing would seem to outweigh the increased status and the possible inter-national political and military gains which India might hope to achieve by demonstrating a nuclear weapons capability with no delivery system in sight. The restraints outlined above could be over-ridden, of course, by other developments (e.g., a resumption of Sino-Indian tensions coupled with a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations). Barring such developments, we feel that Mrs. Gandhi will resist the pro-nuclear pressures and will not authorize nuclear testing. She will make national decisions according to her own priorities and her own sense of national requirements, and is unlikely to see her own or her country’s interests as being served by a nuclear test. On balance, therefore, we believe an Indian nuclear test during the next few months is unlikely, and the decision to test may be deferred for several years. Nonetheless, in view of reports about the possibility of a test and of Indian nuclear capabilities, we cannot completely rule out such a nuclear test. It would thus be prudent to develop contingency plans in the event of such a possibility. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 1, Folder 59, India. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The attached secret report was drafted on February 10 by William D. Howells (INR/DRR/RNA) and Lawrence E. Finch, Chief of the Strategic Affairs Division (INR/DRR/RSG). 229. Telegram 1833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 229. Telegram 1833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 25, 1972, 1050Z Subj: Conversation With Pres Bhutto: Peace Prospects Ref: Islamabad 1676 (Notal) and 1823 1. Summary: Bhutto is searching for some way to pursue path of peaceful settlement with India. He is willing to go to New Delhi for talks with PriMin Gandhi after Indian troops have left Bangladesh. His initial objective would be to determine whether GOI is committed to a peaceful settlement on terms that would be acceptable to Pakistan. If finding is positive, specific details of settlement could then be worked out. End summary. 2. Recent GOI offer to meet with GOP qte without preconditions unqte to discuss outstanding problems came up during my dinner meeting with Bhutto Feb 24. He said he thought GOI had timed offer to coincide with opening of US/Chinese talks in Peking. He would not reply to it until after Pres Nixon left China. Although he did not seem to have made up his mind just how to react to GOI offer, Bhutto gave impression he wished to go along in some positive way. He said he would like to explore the nature and depth of GOI commitment to a peaceful settlement that would be acceptable to Pakistan. He thought this could best be done by his having personal meeting with PriMin Gandhi. and he was willing to go to New Delhi for that purpose. He saw difficulties in making such visit to Delhi prior to evacuation from Bangladesh of remaining Indian troops, which now set for March 17. (He reiterated earlier statement to me that he remained ready to meet with Mujib at any time if such meeting could be held without preconditions i.e. prior GOP recognition of Bangladesh.) Bhutto said he did not envisage his first meeting with Mrs. Gandhi as going into details of a settlement. If he determined that Indian concept of peace and his own were compatible, details might better be worked out in subsequent meetings. 3. I noted that GOI had been saying to us that it wanted to arrive at a durable peace with Pakistan that would allow both countries to devote themselves increasingly to their important programs of domestic uplift. I said I assumed this was also the goal of Pakistan, and we hoped it would be achieved. Bhutto said it was necessary to have peace and he recalled his emotional statement to me last summer that he no longer considered confrontation with India to be a valid policy. He hoped GOI would recognize many problems he faces as he seeks to move toward durable peace. Acknowledging that GOI may seek both rectifications and internationalization of ceasefire line in Kashmir, he said these will present difficulties for him. He was, however, ready to talk with India regarding a qte line of peace unqte which might, in due time, lead to a resolution of the long standing Kashmir problem. He envisaged that acceptance of such a qte line of peace unqte, could be followed, for example, within fairly short order by the reestablishment of some trade and travel links with India. He referred, meanwhile,to the return of Pak POWS as matter of high priority. 4. I alluded at that point to Bhutto’s latest message to Pres Nixon which I noted had not included any reference to Bhutto’s desire for peaceful coexistence with India such as he had expressed in his meetings in Washington last December. Bhutto remarked that my concern on this point had been brought to his attention. He wanted to assure me that there was no change in his commitment to seek a peaceful settlement with India. He had sent a similar message to Chinese leaders prior to Pres Nixon’s arrival. He would not have wanted to send one kind of message to Chinese and another to Pres Nixon. Concerns he had expressed in message were real but so was his desire for peace. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore. 230. Telegram 1834 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 230. Telegram 1834 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 25, 1972, 1117Z Subj Conversation With Pres Bhutto: Defense Ref: Islamabad 1823 and 1833 1. Summary: Bhutto alluded to, his interest in seeing whether defense relationship between Pakistan and US can be strengthened. Replying noncommittally Charge took occasion to note very difficult policy decisions that GOP must face up to with regard to military budget and supply. End summary. 2. During my dinner meeting with him Feb 24, Pres. Bhutto alluded to his interview by C.L. Sulzberger of NY Times on Feb 7. He said what had come out in print on question of defense relationship with US had been somewhat misleading. He had told Sulzberger that Pakistan already had defense agreement with US (reference was to bilateral of March 1959). That agreement had lain pretty much dormant for a number of years. Now he would be interested in seeing whether there was chance it might be brought back to life. He had added to Sulzberger that he recognized difficulties of reviving the defense agreement during presidential election year. Although Bhutto did not specifically refer to any Pak desire for arms from US, that was implicit in above remarks. 3. I stated that as Bhutto probably knew, various aspects of our policy toward subcontinent were under review in Washington. Various decisions would stem from that review, and I was not in position to anticipate them. I did acknowledge probable validity of his remark concerning special difficulties of election year. I said I would, however, hazard prediction that principal emphasis in our overall policy toward subcontinent would remain on need for peace that would allow countries of the area to devote their fullest resources to programs of economic and social improvement which they wanted for their people. Specific decisions, I thought, would tend to revolve around that central point. 4. I then remarked that it seemed to me that GOP had not yet come to grips with problem of its future military posture. There had been some talk that army would remain same size as prewar. That involved problem of conflicting needs from limited resources, of military budget and of economic programs to which Bhutto and his party were committed. There was also the serious problem of very scarce foreign reserves to be divided between military and nonmilitary needs. I said I knew that GOP, like other countries, would face difficult choices. The best decisions, I speculated, could be made in the framework of efforts to arrive at a durable peace in the subcontinent. Bhutto took all of this in without objection or comment. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 231. Editorial Note 231. Editorial Note Source: Telegrams 2087, 3396, and 3530 from Islamabad, March 6, April 18, and April 21. Telegrams 2087 and 3530 are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Telegram 3396 is ibid., POL 15–5 PAK. In a speech broadcast to the nation on March 6, 1972, President Bhutto announced that the National Assembly of Pakistan would be convened on April 14 to formulate plans for an interim Constitution. He also announced that martial law would be lifted on August 14. The National Assembly approved an interim Constitution on April 18 and Bhutto issued a proclamation suspending martial law on April 20. 232. Telegram 2922 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 232. Telegram 2922 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, March 8, 1972, 1624Z Subj: US Figures Prominently Throughout Mrs. Gandhi’s Electoral Campaign Ref: (A) New Delhi 2549 (B) New Delhi 2703 (C) Bombay 323 (D) Calcutta 410 1. Summary: PriMin Indira Gandhi’s almost daily criticism of US during three-week campaign tour reveals continuing resentment of US support for Pakistan and cutoff of American aid to India. Testy determination make own decisions consistent with national interests, and uneasiness that China and US cooperating in Asia to India’s detriment. Anti-US tone only partially mitigated by occasional acknowledgent of desire improve Indo-US relations. While electoral politics are proximate cause, PriMin’s attacks on US as presumed friend of India’s enemies appears reflect her unesase in fluid South Asian situation, as well as deep suspicion US intentions in region. These attitudes remain formidable psychological obstacle to constructive Indo-US dialogue. Action requested: None. End summary. 2. During just concluding three-week nationwide campaign tour for state assembly elections, PriMin criticized US almost daily, often directly, sometimes with thinly veiled euphemisms. China was generally lumped with US in criticism of major powers alledgedly supporting Pakistan. PriMin stressed big power support for Pakistan demands vigilance. Election finds India at “crossroads” since country “antagonized very powerful forces outside which continue observe India closely.” India’s enhanced international prestige as result Bangladesh crisis “made some big powers feel uncomfortable...they want to create trouble for US.” Indians, must maintain unity of purpose so GOI can continue “independent stand” and maintain vigilance as it faces unpredictable external environment. 3. PriMin said Sino-US friendship welcome as step toward peace, only if not at cost of “enmity for India.” (PriMin commented sourly US “sitting on China’s lap...” and china “extracting...whatever it wants.”) Heightened tension in Asia would result from outmoded concepts of balance of power or spheres of influence. Shanghai communique reference to Kashmir ceasefire line intended as pressure on India and constitutes “downright interference” in India’s internal affairs. “India will not tolerate any interference there.” PriMin wondered sarcastically why powers unconcerned about Bengalis’ sufferings last year now solicitious about Kashmiris, “who happily busy in election campaign.” 4. According PriMin, “some nations still scheming against India and instigating Pakistan “to maintain confrontation. Objective is to keep India and Pakistan quarreling weaken both. Reportedly, powers prepared rearm Pakistan, though difficult understand what Pakistan would do with additonal arms. India wants peace with neighbors, but arms availability has usually led Pakistan to disastrous policy choices. New South Asia war possible because of what “certain countries saying and doing.... we nave to be prepared because we do not know what is going to happen.” US once alleged Pakistan being armed against communist nations, though India knows arms would be used against her. US did not stand by India in 1971 crisis, and now holds this country responsible for sufferings Pakistan inflicted on subcontinent. 5. PriMin found “some powers...failure to take note of march of history in subcontinent” through recognition Bangladesh, contributing to uncertainty about South Asia’s prospects for peace in months ahead. 6. PriMin twitted rival Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties for earlier pressing government “to toe American line in foreign affairs.” Subcontinent crisis revealed where America stands. In light Sino-US dialogue, PriMin ridiculed opposition parties’ prior assertions US involvement Vietnam would “save” India from China. Insisting not Soviet stooge, Mrs. Gandhi favorably contrasted Soviet support with US actions. Defended GOI decision upgrade Hanoi relations as reflection Indian sympathy for “courage” of Vietnamese against “onslaughts and massive attacks,” proving “not wealth or armed strength which makes nation great, but indomitable spirit and unity of people.” 7. PriMin denigrated economic aid and touted self-reliance. “Aid,” usually given in donor’s interest, misnomer since it actually long-term credit burdening recipient’s economy and lulling him into dependency. US attempted keep India dependent and to use aid to pressure GOI “to toe their line of thinking in conducting our internal and foreign policies.” GOI refused because it “inconsistent with our dignity and self-respect. We do not want anyone to tell us what decision we should take. We’re capable of making our own.” India must become wholly self-reliant to command world’s respect. At present stage, “friendly assisstnace” welcome if unaccompanied by strings or pressure: “I am definite and there [is] no compromise [on] this issue.” 8. Only partially offsetting anti-US remarks, PriMin asserted in passing desire improve Indo-US relations. Made clear, however, improvement depends on changed US attitude toward India. 9. Comment: Among reasons PriMin made US a whipping boy thoughout campaign is that in aftermath 1971 crisis, it good politics to hit out at “rich, powerful interest” supporting Pakistan and seemingly growing closer to other putative enemy China. Notable that Mrs. Gandhi reserved some of sharpest anti-US thrusts for constituencies where opposition parities which previously desired closer relations with US are relatively strong. Also, Mrs. Gandhi like most Indians harbors intense resentment over US actions considered prejudicial, and also considerable apprehension about India’s isolation in Asia, this resentment and apprehension helped propel GOI into friendship treaty with Soviets last August, and currently fueled by great powers’ South Asia policies and events in region, could motivate even closer Indo-Soviet relationship. Any case, PriMin’s statements remind of depth of suspicion and doubt about US motives in South Asia to be overcome in Indo-US dialogue. I send this regretfully but believe you should be informed of Prime Minister’s political tactics. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, Dacca, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and CINCPAC. 233. Memorandum of Conversation 233. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 10, 1972, 4 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Ambassador Lakshmi Kant Jha The meeting took place at Ambassador Jha’s request. The Ambassador opened the meeting by saying that he had been fascinated by the communique from Shanghai, which he considered a very subtle document. He had two questions: (1) Why was the phrase “hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region” confined to that area? Did this mean that we were approving hegemonial ambitions in other areas of the world? (2) Why was there a need to include anything about India-Pakistan at all, and why did we not exercise the apparent right we had to discuss and seek some accommodation in each other’s texts? I said that obviously he had been briefed by the Secretary of State. What answers had he received from the State Department? Jha replied that he had received very unsatisfactory answers with respect to the phrase “Asia-Pacific area.” He had been told that the Secretary did not know why that phrase was chosen; it could be something that Prime Minister Chou slipped past Henry Kissinger. With respect to the discussion of India-Pakistan in the communique, he had been told that the Secretary did not know why that had been included. I told Jha that I could answer both questions. The phase “Asia-Pacific region” was chosen in order to avoid an implication that the Chinese and the United States were making pronouncements about Europe. As far as we were concerned, we were opposed to the hegemony of any country over the subcontinent, and our cooperation with the Chinese did not extend to that point. With respect to including India-Pakistan in the communique, I was frank to say that we saw no overwhelming necessity to include it; on the other hand, each side had the right to introduce any topic it wished, and neither side could veto the other side’s introduction of a topic or even its formulation. Therefore, when the Chinese side insisted on saying something about the India-Pakistan problem, we were forced to express our own view. I hoped that it had been noticed in India that the U.S. formulation was much milder than the Chinese formulation. Jha said that this had been very favorably noted. We then turned to U.S.-Indian relations. Jha wanted to know where I thought we stood. I said that the Administration that had managed an opening to its old enemy in Peking should be able to find a basis for dialogue with its old friend in New Delhi. So in principle we were prepared to have serious talks. The question was how to conduct them. Jha replied that Delhi was agreed that they should be conducted between him and me on a very confidential basis. He asked me what bothered us most. I said that what bothered us was primarily the issue of the degree of Soviet influence in India. We recognized that India did not willingly want to become anybody’s satellite. At the same time, with its extraordinary dependence on Soviet arms aid, there was the danger that India could slide against its wish into a position where it had no real policy options left. Jha said this was fully understood, and when Mrs. Gandhi spoke about no country having the right to dictate Indian policy, she never singled out the United States—for very obvious reasons. With respect to the arms, India wanted to be in the position to produce its own arms, and therefore looked on foreign arms only as an interim stop-gap measure. I asked Jha to tell me what India’s concerns were with respect to the United States. He said their primary concern was that we might re-arm Pakistan, and secondarily that we might inject ourselves into the Pakistan-Indian negotiations. I noted that it was very odd for India which was receiving massive infusions of Soviet arms to protest about arms to Pakistan, but I added that we were not actively considering arms supplies to Pakistan at the moment. Jha replied that since India was superior to Pakistan now anyway and had established its superiority, it did not really make any sense to build up Pakistan since it would. never reach equality anyway. Moreover, India had other security problems. Finally, India wanted to return to the task of economic development. I asked him in what way we could give effect to their concern about the Pakistan problem. He said by keeping it out of the U.N. or at any rate not encouraging it, and also by a policy of frankness towards the Indian Government; that was to say, if we did sell arms to Pakistan we were better off telling India ahead of time. I said that if India curtailed its arms purchases in the Soviet Union or eliminated them altogether, we would have no difficulty or much less difficulty on the problem of arms to Pakistan. Jha said he would transmit this to his government. He was frankly not informed about the magnitude of arms deliveries to India from the Soviet Union. We decided that we would meet every two weeks with a particular topic to be picked for each meeting. We agreed that there would be a meeting in the week of March 26 and the topic would be subcontinent relations. I told Jha that I thought in the long term our interests in Bangladesh were more parallel to those of India than to those of any other country. We strenuously opposed the manner in which Bangladesh came into being, but we had no interest in seeing Bangladesh used to upset the situation in West Bengal or to raise the nationality issue all over India. Jha asked me what we meant in the communique in Shanghai when we spoke for self-determination of the peoples of the subcontinent. Was this an indirect way of raising the Kashmir issue? I said no, it was our way primarily to face the fact that Bangladesh had not yet been recognized but we were not opposed to self-determination in principle. However, I noted to Jha that his question indicated the Pandora’s Box that India may have opened. However, we would not take advantage of India’s difficulties since a stable subcontinent was a major American interest. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. 234. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 234. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 10, 1972 SUBJECT: Aid to Pakistan The following is intended to give you an idea of where we stand on the economic aid front for Pakistan and where we seem to be headed. The present game plan has two parts: 1. The Pakistan Consortium meeting earlier this month revealed that wide support has now developed among the donor countries for substantial short term debt relief in support of an economic reform program. A proposal for $234 million in debt relief covering a portion of Pak payments due through the end of June 1973 was tabled and the formal responses of the donor governments are due March 20. AID favors this proposal since, among other things, it is tied to an equitable burden-sharing formula. Our share over the next fiscal year would be about $60 million. 2. The debt rescheduling as now planned hinges on a substantial economic reform program by Bhutto. If agreement is reached by the end of the month on debt relief, the Paks would then—if Bhutto keeps his nerve—initiate a fiscal reform program, including a substantial devaluation in early April . The IMF is satisfied with the proposed Pakistani program and is prepared to support it with a sizable standby loan once the final decision on devaluation is made. It must be kept in mind that Bhutto is worried about the political repercussions of devaluation—rising prices—and it is not at all a foregone conclusion that he will go ahead as planned. If the program goes ahead, the next step would be another Consortium meeting in late April—this time on new commodity assistance and perhaps to give some preliminary indication about what we are prepared to do in FY 1973. They are thinking now about $75 million for Pakistan in FY 1973 with a first tranche of $25 million in July. If Bhutto does not go ahead with his reform, we will have a quite different situation with much less international support. We could provide some support, but there is no point in worrying about how much until the present effort falters. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. 235. Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 235. Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, March 10, 1972, 0725Z Subject: GOP Suggestion for Military Collaboration With U.S., Including Availability of Military Facilities in Pakistan 1. Summary: GOP DefSec, saying he was speaking with full knowledge and at request of Pres Bhutto, said GOP sought closer military collaboration with U.S. Said GOP would be willing to make land and port facilities available for US use. I was entirely noncommital, promising merely to report our conversation. Action requested: Instruction as to any response to be made to DefSec’s presentation. End summary 2. I called on DefSec Ghias Uddin Ahmed March 10 at latter’s request. Ghias said he wished discuss with me, with full knowledge of Pres Bhutto and indeed at his request, question of military collaboration between Pakistan and US. He had wished to talk with me earlier in week, but since I had been out of town he had mentioned subject to Acting DCM(Islamabad 2113). Now he wished to take matter up officially. 3. Ghias immediately suggested that military qte facilities unquote could be made available to US by pakistan if US wished. He said this would include facilities on land or at ports. With regard latter, he mentioned locations along Arabian seacoast including (from west to east) Jiwani, Gwadar, Sonmiani Bay, Karachi and area south and east of Karachi. He thought US might be interested in developing port such as at Gwadar which would be important for economic development of that region of Pakistan. 4. He said GOP was not thinking in terms of having large numbers of American military personnel in Pakistan, but we might find it useful to have access to facilities as needed. Beyond that, Pakistan’s capability for strategic military planning was limited and GOP would welcome collaboration of American planners. 5. Reason for this approach, Ghias said, was that Pakistan now faced entirely new situation after recent war when it had suffered defeat by India with Soviet collaboration. GOP was increasingly concerned over intentions of both Soviets and Indians. Pakistan needed to bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent. Ghias acknowledged that Pakistan was now only a small fraction compared to India in size and strength. He went on that Pakistan could not contemplate attacking India but it needed some assurance about its defense. In this regard, he thought Pakistan would be looking to closer defense collaboration with Iran and Turkey, and seeking to improve its relations with Afghanistan. 6. Ghias referred to close Soviet collaboration with Indians both at port of Visakhapatnam and on Andaman Islands, which he interpreted as providing important naval facilities for USSR. He said he thought USG was interested in expansion of Soviet naval presence in area. 7. In latter part of this presentation Ghias mentioned in passing that Pakistan would need some equipment for defense purposes. He offered no specifics but went on to refer to recent testimony of Secretary Rogers before SFRC, during which Secretary was reported in local press as saying that USG had no plans to resume arms shipments to Pakistan. Ghias acknowledged that this was very sensitive issue in U.S. 8. I listened quietly throughout Ghias presentation, which left me with impression that GOP was, more or less, asking US to write its own ticket if we agreeable to strengthening our defense ties with Pakistan. When he had concluded, I said I appreciated importance of his proposal,which had been mentioned to us as possiblity on various levels in recent months but never before with express concurrence of pres of Pakistan. I was not in position to comment in any material way on specific proposals Ghias had mentioned, I went on, but I would promptly report our conversation. I would inform him of any reaction received from Washington. 9. I then asked how GOP might view connection between proposals Ghias had just made and on-going political activity in aftermath of recent Indo-Pak war. Agreeing with Ghias’ observation that Pakistan could not be military match for India, I said it seemed to me that real hope of durable peace in subcontinent lay in a political settlement satisfactory to both India and Pakistan that would permit both sides to give up any revanchist claims. Ghias said he would agree to that and suggested that the Kashmir problem be submitted to international arbitration by impartial entity. He thought people of Pakistan would agree to arbitration finding whatever it might be including possibility of turning present ceasefire line into international boundry as India apparently has in mind. He acknowledged my comment that GOI has made it very clear that it considered Kashmir as issue between India and Pakistan only. He added that it would be extremely difficult for any government in Pakistan to give up, on its own, existing Pak claims on Indian Kashmir. 10. Noting that Pres Bhutto will be in Moscow next week and hopes to meet PriMin Gandhi not long thereafter, I asked how Pak proposal for closer military collaboration with US might affect in Ghias’ mind, possibility of successful talks with Soviets and Indians. Ghias acknowledged that any airing of proposals he had made to me would damage climate for forthcoming political talks, and remarked that the issue should remain between us. He then said that Peking, however, would not mind closer military collaboration between Pakistan and US. 11. As conversation concluded, I promised once again to report our conversation faithfully. 12. Action requested: I have been totally noncommittal whenever suggestions such as DefSec made officially today have been dropped in my presence, and all personnel of this mission have been instructed to be similarly noncommittal. I mentioned to Defsec that various aspects of our policy toward South Asia were now under review in Washington and said I could not predict when I could give him any reaction. I would appreciate instructions on any comment I may make in response to proposals which Defsec put forward. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis. 236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 17, 1972 Subject: President Bhutto’s Proposals for Closer Military Collaboration President Bhutto of Pakistan has informed our Charge that the GOP seeks closer military collaboration with us and is prepared to make land and port facilities available for our use. This offer is the culmination in a series of representations since the December Indo-Pak war. Bhutto himself indicated in a recent interview with Sulzberger that he would like to strengthen the 1959 U.S./Pak Bilateral Agreement and get American arms, noting at the same time the political problems this would create for us during an election year. Bhutto has also expressed his concerns over the Soviet role in Pakistan’s defeat in the war. We have been informed that Pakistan will become more active in CENTO. Foreign Ministry Secretary General Aziz Ahmed, in telling us of his plans to come here next week, spoke of a desire to get our views on a restored balance of power in South Asia. The following specific proposals are involved: —Pakistan is prepared to make available for our use port and “tracking station” facilities along the Arabian sea coast near Karachi. —The GOP is thinking of “access to facilities as needed” and not of large numbers of American personnel. —Pakistan would also welcome collaboration in strategic military planning. This latest offer spoke also of Pakistan’s need to “bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent”. According to the GOP, Peking “would not mind closer military collaboration between Pakistan and the U.S.” Bhutto’s objectives in all this seem fairly clear. He has already taken steps to strengthen his security relationship with China. He now seeks to add a closer security association with us. He may feel the prospects are fairly good because of our expressed concern over Soviet policy toward India and our developing relations with China. He has been skeptical about Soviet policies toward Pakistan, although doing what he can to rebuild closer relations with the USSR. What is not clear is how these overtures to us relate to Bhutto’s longer range intentions toward India. On the whole, Bhutto’s hardliner past on India has been subdued since he took power and there has been some evidence that he recognizes the need for a basic reorientation of past Pakistani policies toward India. It is clear, given the major change in the South Asian equation after the December war, that we could not and should not seek to build up Pakistan as any kind of strategic counter-weight to India. As we see it our basic policy objective in South Asia should now be to encourage movement toward a broad political settlement which would replace the sharp political-military confrontation that has plagued the Subcontinent for more than 20 years. In Pakistan this would require, in addition to our continued support for its territorial integrity and economic growth, that we encourage Bhutto in every way open to us to move in the direction of a basic settlement with India and that we avoid any action in the military field that would encourage Pakistan again to postpone the difficult decisions it must make if it is to reach a basic accommodation with its stronger neighbor. We would encourage India to recognize that a magnanimous policy toward Pakistan will serve India’s longer term interest by contributing to stability in the region. Against these objectives we believe that in our Pakistan policy in the coming months we should: —Continue strong support for Pakistan’s economic development. —Defer any decisions on resumed military supply until the outlook for Indo-Pak talks is more clear. —Indicate our appreciation of Bhutto’s offer of base facilities but respond that we do not at the present time envisage a need for such facilities. —Remain open to any specific proposals in port expansion and development as a part of our economic development contributions. If you concur, we would begin a dialogue with the Pakistanis along these lines, beginning with the visit here next week of Foreign Ministry Secretary General Aziz Ahmed and continuing with President Bhutto when Ambassador Farland returns to Islamabad in early April. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. 237. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 237. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 18, 1972 SRG Meeting on South Asia-March 17 I have been informed that at the SRG meeting today, attended by the Under Secretary and Chris Van Hollen, the following matters were discussed and actions taken: 1. Bangladesh Recognition The President has under active consideration your memorandum recommending that we recognize Bangladesh about March 25. After a decision has been reached, the White House will give us about one week’s advance notice so that we can inform Bhutto and other interested countries, possibly including the Chinese. Our impression is that some decision will be reached about the end of this month. 2. Bhutto’s offer of military facilities Dr. Kissinger was informed that the White House would be receiving a memorandum on this subject from you to the President. There was some feeling that we should keep our options open and inform Bhutto that we were “studying” his offer. 3. Relief for Bangladesh The key issue revolved around whether the previously agreed 33 1/3% U.S. contribution should be measured against (1) contributions of all other countries, estimated at about $273 million, more than 1/2 of which included the bilateral contributions from India and the USSR or (2) only contributions made to the United Nations, in which case the total amount would be about $60 million. Maury Williams specifically requested $35 million in cash to be contributed to the UN. Mr. Irwin supported this request. Dr. Kissinger said that by next Tuesday he would give us an answer both on the formula for the U.S. contribution as well as on the specific request for $35 million. 4. Contribution for Refugee Return Maury Williams reported that the President’s Advisory Committee had recommended that the United States contribute about $20 million in response to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ appeal to pay for the residual cost of the refugees who previously were in India but who have now returned. Dr. Kissinger said he would try to get an answer from the President on this but he believed the answer would probably be negative. 5. Military Supply Dr. Kissinger agreed with the State recommendation that we continue the arms embargo against both Pakistan and India for the time being. He also agreed to get a decision on our recommendation that we release to India and Pakistan certain items on the Munitions List for non-military use. This would enable us to meet a Pakistan request for $871,000 worth of meteorological equipment and an anticipated Indian request for more than $2 million worth of inertial guidance systems for Boeing 747’s. 6. Commerce Licenses The White House has approved our earlier recommendation that we lift all embargoes on the issuance of Commerce licenses for both India and Pakistan. 7. Lifting the AID Suspension Against the Indians Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that the President would be reluctant to lift the $87.6 million AID suspension against the Indians until we have a better idea of Indian attitudes on issues of interest to the United States. 8. Dialogue with the Indians It was generally agreed that we should move into more of a dialogue with the Indians with a view to probing their intentions. Among the subjects suggested were (a) Indian willingness not to press excessively humiliating claims against Pakistan during the forthcoming Indo-Pakistan talks; (b) Indian attitudes toward the return of the 90,000 POW’s and (c) India’s relationship with the USSR. Mr. Irwin expects to call in Ambassador Jha on Wednesday. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Van Hollen on March 17 and sent through Irwin. This is the only record of this meeting of the Senior Review Group that has been found. 238. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto 238. Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto 1 Washington, March 22, 1972 Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of good wishes which you sent to me on the eve of my departure for Peking and for the generous remarks in your most recent letter of March 1. I want to give you my views on our future bilateral relations as well as to share some of my experiences in China. During my concentration on the China trip in recent weeks, I have kept in mind your many pressing problems. We will continue to demonstrate our concern for the well-being and the security of the people of Pakistan and help you through this extremely difficult post-war period. You have both our sympathy and support as you grapple with the ordeal of rebuilding the policy and economy of your country. In concrete terms, we are prepared to do all that we reasonably can to help you with your economic problems. We will participate in an interim debt settlement within the Consortium in support of your economic reform program and are urging the other donor countries to do the same. Beyond that we are ready to discuss with you what steps we can take to resume our previous substantial support for Pakistan’s development efforts, including new lending and additional food support. I gather from your letter and news reports that you are considering early talks with Mrs. Gandhi. As you move toward peace talks, you can count on our understanding and the assurance that the United States stands ready to help in whatever ways might be possible. We too have a prisoner of war problem and I can well understand your concerns. We are prepared to do whatever might be useful to help you gain freedom for the prisoners, but I fear that our influence on this issue is very limited. In formulating our remarks on South Asia in the joint communique with the Chinese I took full account of your concerns. This reflected above all my staunch support for the principles that the cease-fire must be maintained and that there be a troop withdrawal to the international border and to the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. In my extensive discussions with Chairman Mao Tsetung and Premier Chou En-lai, and in Secretary Rogers’ concurrent talks with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, a new framework of communication between our two governments was established. We have started a process which we hope will gradually bring about a healthier relationship—where interests converge, to act with an increasing measure of cooperation and, where interests differ, to mitigate the consequences of these differences. Given our near total lack of contact with the leaders of the People’s Republic for more than two decades, I consider this, in itself, a major accomplishment. In our conversations with the Chinese leaders, we dealt candidly with several major issues. Where we disagreed, we stated our views openly with no intention of manufacturing artificial compromises, either privately or publicly. Each side stood by its principles—and its friends. I believe these frank exchanges lessened the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding and, thus, strengthened the long term prospects for peace. In addition, we found some common ground and were able to agree upon a number of principles of international conduct. We agreed that international disputes should be settled without resorting to either the use or threat of force. We both wish to reduce the danger of international conflict. We are both opposed to hegemony by any nation or group of nations in the Asia-Pacific region. We will not negotiate on behalf of any third country or enter into agreements or understandings which are directed at other states. We also applied these principles to our own discussions and made no secret agreements. In addition, we decided to take steps to build on this hopeful beginning and to broaden our common ground. The People’s Republic of China and the United States will stay in contact through various means, including talks between our Ambassadors in Paris. In addition, a senior United States representative will visit Peking from time to time to further our exchanges on matters of major importance. Complementing these official contacts will be exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism. And both sides will make efforts to foster the growth of mutually beneficial trade. The Taiwan question was also a major focus of our discussions with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China. The United States will maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. We will stand by our defense commitment to the Republic of China, as well as all our other treaty commitments. We believe that the Taiwan question should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and in the meantime we will reduce our military forces and installations on Taiwan as tensions in the area subside. My abiding hope is that through this mission the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China has been turned from confrontation toward peaceful communication. I believe my visit has shown that, despite deep differences and long isolation, the People’s Republic of China and the United States are prepared to talk about our differences rather than fight about them and to seek broader areas of common ground. As a result of my journey, I am thus encouraged to believe that prospects for a better relationship between our two nations are enhanced, and that we now have a chance for greater peace, stability, and understanding in Asia and in the world. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. A copy of Bhutto’s March 1 letter to Nixon, in which he discussed his impending trips to New Delhi and Moscow, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Nixon’s letter to Bhutto was transmitted to Islamabad on March 23 in telegram 49845. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 239. Telegram 49598 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 239. Telegram 49598 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, March 23, 1972, 0219Z SUBJECT: Pak Requests for Military Supply REF: State 229298, 230881, 021827 1. In letter dated March 20 to Sisco, Ambassador Raza, on instructions, requested: (a) resumption of spares and end items already contracted for (including 300 APCs), and (b) “agreement in principle for release of lethal sophisticated equipment such as artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, aircraft, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, missile-carrying boats, submarines, etc. at reduced price and on deferred payment.” 2. Attachments to letter include: (a) new requests for end items including 100 M–47/48 tanks, 4 submarines, 12 B–57s, 25 F–5s, 1,000 M-601 trucks,some artillery and communications equipment; (b) list of “items already contracted but not yet delivered” which appears to be resume of previous requests reftels from old FMS cases, including 300 APCs; and (c) list of actual losses in December 71 war of U.S. origin equipment (includes 74 tanks, 25 F–86s, 4 B–57s and 3 F–104s. Letter and attachments pouched to Embassy. 3. Itemized requests in attachments do not RPT not contain any missiles mentioned in covering letter from Ambassador. END 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Peter Constable (NEA/PAF) on March 21; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Alan Ford, Deputy Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales (PM/MAS); and approved by Sisco. Sent for information to DOD/ISA/NESA for Colonel Gross. Raza’s letter to Sisco can be found ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. 240. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 240. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 23, 1972 Subject: Pakistan’s Request for Arms I had a good talk yesterday with Aziz Ahmed, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan, who is here to tell us of President Bhutto’s recent visit to Moscow and to sound us out on future U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Ahmed’s visit follows Bhutto’s offer to us of base facilities and his very recent request for substantial grant military aid, including three squadrons of aircraft, 100 tanks, four submarines, and a large amount of other equipment. Ahmed said the Soviets pressed Bhutto on two fronts: first that Pakistan should promptly recognize Bangladesh which Ahmed concludes the Soviets want under their umbrella; second, that Pakistan should make its peace with India. The GOP sees in this a broader Soviet strategic objective of predominance in the entire region, while supporting Indian designs to reduce Pakistan to satellite status. Ahmed told us he believes the Indians in effect are acting as a stalking horse for the Soviets in pressing smaller regional countries like Ceylon and Burma to work out Soviet friendship treaties such as the one signed by the Indians last August. In the context of this strategic assessment and Pakistan’s concern that it cannot go to the negotiating table with India in military weakness, Ahmed is here both to press us for decisions on military supply and to hear our assessment as to how we see our future role in South Asia. I made clear to Ahmed the value we attach to our relationship with Pakistan. I told him we regard Pakistan’s integrity as important to regional stability. I cited the substantial efforts we have already made in the economic field. He is fully conscious of your own regard for Pakistan. As for military supply, I emphasized that no decisions have been made by you and that the matter remained under active review. I stressed our desire to see a situation evolve where there is reasonable stability among all states in South Asia and our intention to do what we could to prevent a situation where any one outside power could exercise predominant influence. I said we had made these points clear in our discussions with both the Chinese and Soviets, that we would continue to do so, and that this will continue to guide our South Asian policy. I pointed out that while we appreciated Pakistan’s concern for its security and had not made any decisions, Pakistan would want to weigh the question whether substantial U.S. military aid might not jeopardize the outlook for Indo-Pak talks. We recognized that the Soviets have been heavily involved with arms supply to India; but U.S. involvement in a similar way with Pakistan could well push the Soviets further down that road with India. It could also cause either the Indians or the Soviets, or both, to take an intransigent position on talks of any kind. I put these points in the form of questions to get the Pakistanis reflecting on whether arms aid from us would not more likely complicate the outlook for peace in South Asia than simply strengthen the Pakistan hand at the bargaining table. I did not want my comments to suggest we had reached any decisions on what obviously was an issue of great importance to Pakistan. I said this matter remained under active review. But I reminded Ahmed of the problems we already face in the Congress and among public opinion in this country on such issues as military assistance abroad and that U.S. supply of arms to Pakistan at this juncture could weaken further congressional support for helping Pakistan in the economic sphere. In this context, and speaking as a friend of Pakistan, I said that any decision on our part to begin a new and large military aid program to Pakistan would be a very difficult one. Our strong hope at this juncture, I indicated, is that some way can be found to get Indo/Pak talks started. This of course would facilitate our entire relationship. I noted our own efforts with the Chinese, the Russians, in the Middle East and elsewhere, to find a basis for peace. Finally, I stressed that our attitude vis-à-vis the Soviets in the last analysis—politically speaking—was the best protection for Pakistan’s territorial integrity. That is where we left the matter, after I had reminded Ahmed again that this and other aspects of our relationships in South Asia will continue under very active review. Ahmed, who knows Washington well from his previous Ambassadorial assignment 1959 to 1963, is seeing a number of people on the Hill, Including Senators Aiken, Fulbright, and Kennedy. He is also seeking an appointment with Dr. Kissinger. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Irwin signed for Rogers. 241. Telegram 3666 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 241. Telegram 3666 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, March 23, 1972, 1550Z Subject: GOP Offer of Military Facilities in Pakistan REF: A) State 49598 B) Islamabad 2213 C) Islamabad 2247 1. Apparent GOP decision to seek replay history of substantial US military supply and collaboration against India strikes me as ominously irrational and, if pursued, certain to prejudice prospects for durable peace in South Asia. 2. I hope this Embassy will re consulted before any serious consideration is given to the proposals contained reftels. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis. 242. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 242. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 29, 1972, 11:30 a.m. R: The Pakistan minister you are going to see later today? K: I don’t know what about. R: He is going to give you a hard sell on renewing supply of military equipment to Pakistan. K: That’s not on. R: He said they have to have arms to negotiate with India. He will give you the hard sell. I told him this was a Presidential decision and under the circumstances it was tough for us to consider such a program. I think encouragement would be harmful. K: I won’t give him any. I have serious doubts that even the President, who is very pro-Pakistan is even thinking about it. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 243. Memorandum of Conversation 243. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 29, 1972, 12:15 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: The President joined the group for about 15 minutes in the middle of the conversation. Aziz Ahmed, Secretary General of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President Nawabzada Raza, Ambassador of Pakistan Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by saying that we in this building feel very close to Pakistan. We “went through tragic days together in December.” Pakistan has our goodwill. Mr. Ahmed said that Pakistan was grateful for the assistance it had received and for the present support of the US. Pakistan is conscious of having a good friend in the United States. The leadership of Pakistan is now trying to put together the pieces left from the tragic crisis of last year. Dr. Kissinger said that we admired the way President Bhutto has conducted himself. Mr. Ahmed noted that the Assembly would be meeting in April and that martial law would be lifted on August 15. President Bhutto is deeply conscious of the need for internal unity, and he has made some progress. Pakistan’s main problems now are external, particularly the relationship with India and the need for the return of the prisoners of war whom India holds. Mr. Ahmed said that Pakistan is militarily very weak. It was weak in December and is weaker now. India knows that. India knows she has 90,000 men that Pakistan needs for maintaining internal security and order. He expected the negotiations to be tough. The Indians are talking about finding a settlement to the Kashmir problem which had eluded settlement for two decades. Mr. Ahmed said that India had started out by demanding recognition of Bangladesh as a precondition for talks. India has now withdrawn that precondition but has put Mujib up to making it a precondition of his. Bhutto’s strategy is to see Mujib first to try to gain his agreement to the return of the prisoners before he sees Mrs. Gandhi. Otherwise, Bhutto feels that Mrs. Gandhi would say that she could not do anything about the prisoners because she would have to check with Mujib first. Mr. Ahmed noted that Bhutto intends to recognize Bangladesh. It is just a matter of time. President Bhutto had come to power with three cards to play. First was the release of Mujib, which he had now given away. Dr. Kissinger said that was a good move. Mr. Ahmed agreed that it was a sensible move, but it was a major card to play and Pakistan has now played it. The second card Pakistan has to play is recognition of Bangladesh. Bhutto hopes to play this in connection with the return of the prisoners of war. The third card he has to play is the 28,000 Bengali soldiers in West Pakistan whom Mujib wants and the 20,000 civil servants whom he also wants. Mr. Ahmed said that President Bhutto is ready to record his intent to recognize if the prisoner issue can be settled. He told this to the Russians in Moscow but had received no response yet. Mr. Ahmed continued that India has moved three divisions to the West Pakistani border. General Manekshaw has gone to Moscow, presumably to seek equipment to replace India’s war losses. India is going ahead—with whatever plans it has—either exerting pressure on Pakistan for the negotiations or for a more serious attack. There has been some thought that the Indians would seize Azad Kashmir. The Chinese, however, felt that an attack on Azad Kashmir would be unlikely until after President Nixon’s visit to Moscow. Dr. Kissinger said that he was inclined to agree with that assessment. Mr. Ahmed said that the Chinese capacity to give sophisticated weapons to Pakistan is very limited. Dr. Kissinger asked whether France could supply them. Mr. Ahmed replied that France could provide some for cash but that Pakistan has no means to pay. He said he had talked with a number of Congressmen while here. Senator Kennedy was sympathetic on general issues, although Ahmed had not specifically broached the question of military assistance to Pakistan. The Senator said that he wanted to have a dialogue with the government of Pakistan. Mr. Ahmed said that his conversation with Senator Kennedy had gotten off to a good start because the Senator had vividly recalled an incident in which the Senator and his father and the Ambassador were involved during the Ambassador’s tour here in Washington. He continued describing his general conversations with Congressmen on the military aid question. He acknowledged that the issue was “tricky,” but he felt that most of those he talked to were not “violently opposed.” On the whole he found sympathy and understanding. Mr. Ahmed said he had explained to the Congressmen that the end of the war with India and the breakup of Pakistan formed the beginning of a new chapter in South Asia in which the Soviets are moving strongly into the subcontinent. He stated as his own opinion that the Soviets would offer a friendship treaty to Pakistan within a year. Dr. Kissinger indicated some surprise and asked whether he did not feel that would hurt the Soviets in India. He wondered what the Indians would get out of it. Mr. Ahmed replied that he felt that the Soviet position would be sufficiently strong there that this would be possible by that time. The Soviets want to demonstrate to all that they—not the US or China—are the providers of security in South Asia. He noted also that the Indians had offered treaties of friendship with India to Ceylon, Nepal and Burma. At this point the President came into Dr. Kissinger’s office and was introduced to the Secretary General. After an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Ahmed picked up the conversation. Mr. Ahmed stated that US and Pakistani interests are “intertwined” in South Asia. Pakistan hoped that the US would maintain a strong presence in the area. The Soviet Union is making a major effort to consolidate its position there. Pakistan was weak militarily before the war and is “very much weaker” since the war. He said he would not be surprised if the Soviet Union offered Pakistan a friendship treaty within a year. The Soviet interest seems to be in showing that it is the USSR and not the US or China who will provide security in the subcontinent. As an example of the role the Soviets are playing, he noted that the Pakistanis had sent messages to Mrs. Gandhi through Ceylon, and the answers had come back through Moscow. It seemed clear that the Soviets intended to keep the peacemaking process very much within their grasp. He noted that the Indians also were making their own effort toward greater control in South Asia. They had offered treaties of their own—similar to the one signed with Bangladesh—to Burma, Ceylon and Nepal. So far these offers have been turned aside. The President asked how Secretary General Ahmed felt that the US should deal with Bangladesh. Mr. Ahmed said that he felt that the US should definitely recognize Bangladesh soon. The President indicated that we would be doing something along those lines next week. Our recognition had been delayed out of deference to President Bhutto. He asked how the Secretary General felt that the US should handle aid to Bangladesh. Mr. Ahmed replied that the US should provide all the aid it could so that Bangladesh would feel that it had an alternative to dependence on the USSR. He noted that the Soviet Union is building “a large mission” in Bangladesh. The President noted that we would be providing our proportionate share of humanitarian assistance through the United Nations. We had begun doing so through the United Nations because we had not recognized. Mr. Ahmed asked whether he might make a comment on the President’s remark. He said he would suggest that the US provide its aid to Bangladesh bilaterally. The President indicated interest in this idea and said he assumed that the Secretary General’s recommendation was based on the assumption that this would give the US “more stroke.” Mr. Ahmed said that was his point. The President asked Dr. Kissinger to consider whether this would be possible. He felt that the UN operation was not an exceptionally good one. The President showed definite interest in the idea of shifting aid to a bilateral basis. He went on to say that if he were in Dacca he would be very much concerned about being “swallowed up” by India and assumed that the Bangladesh leadership would eventually welcome a good relationship with Pakistan. He said he did not know this to be a fact but felt that this would be his position if he were there. He asked the Secretary General what kind of relationship with Bangladesh Pakistan had in mind. The President asked what Pakistan’s intentions to recognize Bangladesh are. Mr. Ahmed responded that Pakistan would recognize Bangladesh but that timing was the only problem. Bhutto wished to use the card of recognition to get back his 90,000 prisoners of war. He said that Pakistan wanted to develop a good relationship with Bangladesh. He did not feel that this was precluded by the Bengali leadership. He agreed with the President that Bangladesh would be concerned by the possibility of Indian domination. The President then turned to the question of our overall posture toward South Asia and how he felt Pakistan might play the situation in the coming months. He repeated that the US would move ahead into a relationship with Bangladesh. He said that we would move ahead correctly with India. We wanted to maintain a relationship there, although we would move slowly. In Pakistan we would provide all the help we could. Most of our help would be in the economic field. Until after the US election in November, it would be very difficult to move ahead with any military assistance. The Congress would make too much of an issue of it. However, on the economic side there would be little opposition; the Administration would do all it could so that Pakistan’s own resources could be free to work out its military arrangements with “other friends.” The US would also take a very hard line in Moscow. He agreed with the Chinese assessment—which the Secretary General had alluded to—that India would not attack Pakistan before the Moscow summit in May. Dr. Kissinger said he also felt that the Soviets would exercise restraint on the Indians in the aftermath of the summit as well. If things went at the summit as we hoped they would, the Soviets would have no interest in creating a confrontation with the US soon. The President, said that the Soviets were quite aware of our strong feelings expressed during the crisis in December. They know very well that if they permitted the Indians to attack Pakistan now, this would have a very high cost in Soviet relations with the US. He felt that the US diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union would be of very great value in reducing the military threat to Pakistan in the coming months. Mr. Ahmed quietly indicated his understanding of the President’s comments. He then described the conversations he had had with members of the Congress during his stay in Washington. He felt that they had been sympathetic, and although he had heard reservations about resuming military assistance to Pakistan, he did not feel that there was sharp opposition among those to whom he had talked. He had even had a conversation with Senator Fulbright in which the Senator had indicated that while there was sharp opposition last year because of the special circumstances, that might not be true now. The President by his facial expressions seemed to indicate a mixture of interest and some skepticism. He said that the Secretary General’s comments were interesting and that it was possible that he “had made a sale where we could not.” He asked Dr. Kissinger to explore this with Senator Fulbright. But he repeated his feeling that probably the US would not be able to do much before the election. We would then examine the issue after the election. The President then asked the Secretary General about Pakistan’s other sources of arms, particularly the French. Mr. Ahmed said that the Chinese were very limited in their capacity to provide what Pakistan needed and the French would sell but would require cash. He noted that Pakistan’s ability to pay for weapons was very limited. The President returning to the more general question of Pakistan’s position in South Asia said that he felt that the Pakistanis should play for a reasonable relationship with Bangladesh and should do what they could to try to make peace with India. The President noted that US and Chinese policy toward South Asia was parallel. The Secretary General could give his warmest regards to President Bhutto and indicate our desire to be helpful as we have tried to be in the past. The President then expressed pleasure at meeting the Secretary General and left. The President before he left asked that the Secretary General keep this conversation entirely confidential. He noted stories in the morning New York Times about Jordanian military assistance to Pakistan during the December crisis. He figured this was just a story to embarrass the King of Jordan who is in town, but in any case it was difficult to keep things out of the newspapers so he would appreciate Pakistani confidence. After the President had left, Dr. Kissinger continued the conversation. He said it was important for Pakistan to get through the next six months. He felt that it was inconceivable that there would be an Indian attack before the summit meeting in Moscow, or even for some time after. Dr. Kissinger continued that the President makes the policy and “we won’t let Pakistan down. If there is another attack, we will react violently.” He noted that we have told the Indian Ambassador that we cannot cut off military aid to Pakistan unless India is prepared to forego Soviet military aid. We have said that we will not restore the $87 million of aid that had been suspended. The US does not believe one country should have the right to impose its will on its neighbors. The President has very warm feelings for Pakistan. He noted that the President does not normally see foreign visitors except for heads of state and that the President’s gesture in meeting with the Secretary General had been an unusual one. He hoped that the Secretary General would convey our “warmest regards” to President Bhutto and that he would not go back upset by what he had been told by other officials of the government, especially at middle levels. Mr. Ahmed noted that in the State Department they had been sympathetic, had explained the problems with military assistance but they had emphasized that no final decision had been made. Dr. Kissinger then spent about three minutes alone with the Secretary General before he left. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 26, 1972. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that Saunders prepared it for the President’s file. 244. Memorandum of Conversation 244. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 31, 1972 PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Jha Henry A. Kissinger I opened the luncheon conversation by telling Jha that we had had some disturbing reports. I showed him the newspaper clipping from Newsweek (attached) according to which the Indian Embassy was circulating copies of the Anderson papers. I told him that we would look at any intervention into our domestic politics with the gravest concern. I recalled to him Mrs. Gandhi’s violent reaction to what she took to be intervention by the U.S. Embassy in the Indian election. Jha said he doubted that it had happened in his Embassy but he would check and let me know. [A little later he called me and said none of their copies were out of the Embassy, which of course left open whether they had been xeroxed or had been sent out before then.] We then turned to the more fundamental issues. I told Jha once again that we considered India a major country; that we recognized that a physical balance of power within the Subcontinent was not attainable, and it would not be sought by us. On the other hand, we were concerned with the balance of power in the world. India could in the long term profit from this concern, since it also protected it against hegemonial claims. At the same time, being a major power gave rise to the need for restraint. We had purposely not started arms shipments to Pakistan because we wanted to leave open the possibility of negotiation. If, however, India continued to insist on settling the issue entirely unilaterally, and if it used threats of military action, then of course our restraint would be more difficult to maintain. Jha asked what our real concerns were. I said, first, India’s relationship with the Soviet Union, which however might be less of a concern as our own relations with the Soviet Union improved; second, India’s use of its military strength on the Subcontinent; and thirdly, India’s general posture towards our foreign policy objectives. Jha said that he thought that it was time to start again a dialogue on economic aid, specifically, the $87 million on which an agreement had already been signed. I said that we first had to get to some fundamental political understanding. Jha asked how we might proceed in this direction. I said that we have now had three lunches and we have never had an offer of even a statement from India of its position. Jha said it was his impression that India wanted to pursue a policy of conciliation with Pakistan. However, the ceasefire line should be rectified in order to be strategically more useful. I asked whether that meant any major changes in territory. He said it might mean some change in essentially unpopulated territory, which might look larger on the map than it really was, in order to give India a strategically more defensible frontier. I said we did not want to get involved in the negotiations directly, but I reiterated that an Indian attempt to exploit its military position could not be looked at with indifference by the United States. Jha then said that with respect to the Soviet Union, India had no intention or desire to be a stooge and was willing and eager to maintain a dialogue with us. With respect to the general balance of power in Asia, it saw its interests very parallel to ours. I told Jha that we would recognize Bangladesh on Tuesday, April 4 and that after that we thought that our interest lay in a stable progressive society in Bangladesh. He asked whether there mightn’t be some possibility of our starting some bilateral aid, since the UN operated very slowly. I said we would look into the matter most carefully. Jha said he would get me an authoritative statement from the Indian Government for our next meeting, which we tentatively set for April 20. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The luncheon meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. The attached clipping is page 17 from the March 27 edition of Newsweek magazine. The Anderson papers were copies of columns written by Jack Anderson for The Washington Post based upon records of WSAG meetings during the December crisis. 245. Telegram 2923 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 245. Telegram 2923 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, April 4, 1972, 0708Z Subj: Bhutto’s Comments on Size of Pak Military and U.S. Military Supply Ref: Islamabad 2707 and 2879; State 56055 1. During my meeting with Pres. Bhutto at his Karachi home on April 3, I referred to recent visit to Washington by MFA Sec Gen Aziz Ahmed. I noted that Ahmed had made rather hardline presentation on Soviet intentions in subcontinent and had expressed urgent need for substantial quantity of U.S. arms on soft terms. I said I had been struck by what seemed to me to be divergence between line taken by Ahmed and emphasis which Bhutto himself had been putting on primary need for breakthrough to peaceful and honorable settlement with India. Referring also to recent request by Amb. Raza for U.S. arms, I asked Bhutto if he could elucidate. 2. Bhutto said that his senior military leaders kept pressing to make good some obvious gaps in defense structure and for acquisition of some “sophisticated” weapons. He was not in position to ignore the military, as I knew, and he had thought it advisable to forward requests for defense equipment from U.S., which was held to be only logical source for some types of equipment. At same time, Bhutto said, he had told his military advisers that he did not think a positive response could be expected from USG until at least after November elections. He did not intend to press us until after elections. On other hand, Bhutto went on, there was real problem in keeping operational the old equipment which Pakistan had received from U.S., and he hoped that we would be able to loosen up soon in supply of spare parts. (Comment: Latter position is identical with that taken with me by GOP FonSec during our last meeting on April 1.) 3. As for Aziz Ahmed, Bhutto said that he had counselled him not to point his finger and admonish people he would be talking to during his current travel abroad. But Ahmed is over 65 and doubtless finds it difficult to change his general approach and method of operations. Bhutto seemed to be implying that we should not take too seriously all of what Ahmed had said to us in Washington. 4. Bhutto reaffirmed his principal aim in relations with India is to achieve honorable political settlement that will open way to an era of peace. He acknowledged clear awareness that GOP cannot meet cumulative claims for maintenance of military budget at about recent levels and also pay for costly domestic reforms and development needs to which he is committed. He wanted to see a reduction in Pak military budget, but it would depend on India, he added, whether such a cut would be possible. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. 246. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 246. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, April 6, 1972 No. SS/11/1/72 My dear Mr. Sisco Pakistan desires to hold early talks with India so that the outstanding problems between the two countries could be resolved through negotiations. 2. The President of Pakistan took the initiative in offering to go to New Delhi and discuss with the Indian Prime Minister all the problems between the two countries. He reiterated this offer in a number of public statements at home and abroad and declared his willingness to enter into bilateral talks with India without pre-conditions. In a broadcast on March 3, 1972, he expressed the hope that he would soon be able to embark upon negotiations with India. The President’s views were communicated to the Indian Government through direct and indirect channels including the Swiss Government which acts as the protecting power on behalf of both countries in each other’s capitals. 3. The Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, also declared in Delhi on March 14 that India was “prepared to have bilateral talks with Pakistan at any time and at any place “without pre-conditions.” The Indian officials were also taking similar lines in discussions with foreign governments. Unfortunately, however, the Indian approach as usual is double faced. While expressing willingness to enter into bilateral negotiations with Pakistan “without pre-conditions”, the Indian leaders are at the same time making demands which tantamount to imposition of pre-conditions. For example, the Indian leaders continue to demand in their public statements the recognition of “Bangladesh” by Pakistan prior to negotiations between the two countries. They have also asked for readjustment of Western borders and re-alignment of ceasefire line [in] Jammu and Kashmir as essential components of an overall settlement which is the objective of bilateral negotiations. 4. The Indian Government also recently suggested that before the negotiations could take place between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, the officials of the two governments should meet and prepare the ground for a summit meeting. We did not reject the Indian proposal but pointed out that past experience of negotiations between the two countries would show that officials would not be able to take any substantive decisions on their own. We, therefore, re-affirmed the desirability of holding a meeting between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India. The Government of Pakistan feels that such a meeting would result in reducing tensions and subduing bitterness between the two countries. It would also enable the two leaders to agree to a broad framework in which their respective officials could concurrently and subsequently work out details of a settlement of specific issues. 5. As on March 25, India had not clarified its final position as to how bilateral negotiations should begin. It was apparent that India was adopting dilatory tactics to avoid an early settlement of problems created by the recent war. The Indian Government’s attitude on the withdrawal of troops and the return of POWs is in total defiance of the Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, tends to confirm the view that India’s offer of negotiations is neither sincere nor unconditional. 6. We are grateful for the help and assistance given by the Government of the United States to the Government of Pakistan in the past. Being aware of the earnest desire of the US Government to see a peaceful and honourable resolution of the problems in South Asia, I would request you to kindly impress upon the Government of India the need for an early settlement of the problems so that a durable peace can be established in the sub-continent. With kindest regards, and Sincerely A.M. Raza 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. 247. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 247. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, April 13, 1972 SUBJECT: Congressional Presentation on South Asian Aid Program You will recall from the attached that Henry approved a Congressional presentation for South Asia which includes $75 million for Pakistan and, on a provisional basis, $75 million for India, with the remainder for South Asia listed as an unallocated reserve. AID has now set itself up to go ahead on this basis. However, after seeing it in print, they have raised one additional item for second thought. I remonstrated that they did not come up with this earlier but I promised to sound you out on it. I hasten to say that their suggestion has all of the wrong atmospherics about it because it immediately looks as if somebody is trying to raise the India program. But let’s put the emotions surrounding that issue aside for just a moment and look at the point that is being made. The point is that if we have the same number for India as for Pakistan, we will provide another point for Indian criticism. The idea that we equate Pakistan and India, as you know, is in Indian eyes an indication that we refuse to recognize the realities of the situation in South Asia. The Indians will criticize us anyway for this Congressional presentation on other grounds and this will just add one more point. But nevertheless it is true that the Indians will react. Against the background of this argument, AID would recommend using a figure of $75 million for Pakistan as planned and $90 million for India. My question to you is whether you feel that the point of having exactly the same numbers for India and Pakistan is important to Henry’s view of this presentation or whether you feel that he was simply anxious to put in a realistically low figure for India as well as a fair picture for Pakistan. If the latter, then do you feel that there is flexibility to put in different figures, or do you feel that we should leave this the way he left it at $75 million and $75 million ? Use 90/75 Leave at 75/75 Attachment Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 7, 1972 SUBJECT: Congressional Presentation on South Asian Aid Program From your response to the attached memo we judge that perhaps our earlier memo was unclear on one point. You will recall that the option that Maury Williams recommended in making the presentation to Congress on the South Asian aid program was simply to list $300 million for South Asia and to indicate no specific figure for India or Pakistan. This was the approach that you and Williams agreed on for the budget last December. The objective of this approach was to stake out a requirement for an appropriation for South Asia so that money would be available if the President wished to have some before July 1, 1973. At the same time, it would in no way commit any money to India at this point. In fact, we are planning a program of around $75 million for Pakistan, which is the current estimate of likely Pak needs. If these needs turn out to be higher over time, the $300 million would give us the capability to move to meet them. We could easily explain privately to the Pakistanis that this money would be available for them to reassure them in the face of the indefiniteness of the Congressional presentation. The principal difficulty will be that Maury Williams will have to explain when he testifies what we have in mind for India. It will not be easy, but he will simply have to say that it has not been possible in the wake of the war to develop concrete programs for the area yet. He will have to stick at that. This was the purpose of Option 1 in the March 31, 1972 memo. It is not intended to reserve funds specifically for an India program but rather to preserve—as you had wanted to do last December—flexibility in South Asia so that the President’s options would be open. This would not commit us to anything for India. Williams is under pressure to get his presentation documents to the Hill early next week to meet the hearing schedules. Accordingly, he has asked that if possible he be given word on how he should proceed by Monday evening (April 10). Recommendation: That Maury Williams be authorized in the presentation to Congress to list $300 million for South Asia and to indicate no specific figure for India or Pakistan. Approve Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger’s handwritten comment on the first page of the attached memorandum reads: “There is no chance of giving $200 million to India.” There is a note in the margin of that document in a hand that is apparently Saunders’ that reads: “75–75.” Haig wrote “OK” on the Use 90/75 option, and added: “Hal I’ve checked W/ HAK.” Saunders noted on the memorandum that he notified AID and OMB on April 13 of the revised decision. 248. Telegram 65190 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 248. Telegram 65190 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, April 14, 1972, 2358Z Subj: Dialogue With Pakistan: Next Steps in South Asia 1. On your return to Islamabad, you should seek early meeting with Bhutto for review where things stand South Asia, particularly of course on how Bhutto sees outlook for talks with Mujib on one hand and Indians on other. In process you will want to inform Bhutto of your consultations here and current USG assessment of South Asian situation, expressing our appreciation for chance begin this dialogue during Aziz Ahmed’s recent visit. 2. Following for your background use is summary how we see our interests in area, followed by more specific talking points for your meeting with Bhutto. Similar talking point cables are being sent Delhi and Dacca for use in what will be continuing process of evolving new relationships with all three major entities South Asia. 3. Principal U.S. interest in Indo-Pak talks is that they lead to stable international environment in South Asia such that danger of war between South Asian states is diminished, no South Asian state poses threat to integrity or well-being of its neighbors, and restraint among external powers is promoted with no one power exercising hegemony. 4. We recognize that prospects for productive negotiations will be complicated by traditional hardline pressures in Pakistan for continued confrontation against India, and what will probably be Indian objective of using present situation to achieve permanent public and total Pakistani recognition of Indian control over Kashmir. Partially offsetting these factors are Bhutto’s own recognition of changed realities in sub-continent, need to get prisoners home, and importance of creating what Bhutto has described as a “border of peace” between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Indian leaders may also recognize necessity of gradual process leading to viable settlement along cease-fire line, without which tension and confrontation in South Asia will be perpetuated, and prospects of great power rivalry at Indian expense enhanced. Nonetheless, we recognize difficulties of achieving any early comprehensive settlement of Kashmir and it may be necessary set this issue aside while lesser obstacles to bilateral ties are addressed. 5. In this situation where Indian and Pakistani vital interests engaged, U.S. influence is likely to be limited. It is not situation in which we can or should play a mediatory role, although our general posture should be to encourage a settlement and there may be opportunities to provide constructive advice. 6. As you know from your consultations here, we have decided to hold for the present to our embargo for both India and Pakistan on military supply. 7. Against background of these general policy considerations, we want to continue process of political dialogue with Bhutto and GOP which has already begun in earlier talks between Charge and Bhutto, and in Washington visit of Secretary General Aziz Ahmed last month. Our overall objective in this dialogue with Pakistan should be, in addition to assuring our support for Pak territorial integrity, to help create an atmosphere in which Bhutto may feel encouraged to move in direction of basic political accommodation with India. Within this context you should speak along the following lines to President Bhutto: A. Recall that President Nixon in his February 10 press conference noted that “we are going to do everything we can to develop new relationship with the countries of the subcontinent that will be pro-Indian, pro Bengali and pro-Pakistan but mostly pro-peace.” It is in this context that we will seek to strengthen our relationship with Pakistan. You can reaffirm to Bhutto what President said in Freeport re Pakistan, i.e., that Pakistan remains a close friend ... (and) ... our concern for the well-being and security of the people of Pakistan does not end with the end of a crisis. B. Indicate our respect for leadership President Bhutto has given Pakistan in aftermath of the war and appreciate difficult decisions he has already taken to meet new realities. We admire President Bhutto’s resoluteness in announcing intention to seek cooperation rather than confrontation with India. We share his belief that in the aftermath of the tragic events of last year there is an urgent need for innovative new aproaches toward a fundamental settlement between India and Pakistan. C. Take note of what President Bhutto and Defense Secretary Ghiashuddin have said to DCM about GOP desire to reduce its military expenditures so that a greater share of its resources can be channeled toward internal development. We understand the need for a climate of peace so that these reductions can be carried out. D. Stress that for our part we will continue full backing of the UNSC resolution of December 21. While we think it inappropriate to involve ourselves directly, we hope Indo-Pak talks can lead to progress on whole range of immediate questions that will begin process of restoring amicable relationship with India. As we see it, major elements in this process will have to include return of POW’s, agreed withdrawal of forces and some understanding on handling of Kashmir issue that would remove this issue from immediate contention. We would hope that dialogue on Kashmir might lead to eventual settlement that takes into account economic and humanitarian interests of Kashmiris on both sides of present cease-fire line. E. With respect military supply, note that we had opportunity for frank discussions on this issue with Aziz Ahmed during his recent visit. As we said to him, military supply question will remain under close review. However, for the time being at least, we will have to let our embargo on military supply for both Pakistan and India stand where it is. You should note, as senior U.S. officials did with Aziz Ahmed, generally critical congressional attitudes on military assistance programs. (FYI: We have noted in Islamabad’s 2923 that Bhutto has told his military advisers he would not expect positive U.S. response until at least after U.S. elections. End FYI) With regard to Bhutto’s offer of jointly developed base facilities in Pakistan, while we appreciate the offer and will continue to examine it, we do not at this time have plans for undertaking such projects. However, we would be prepared, within context economic aid, consider what assistance we might be able provide for improvement of harbor facilities serving development purposes. F. Indicate to Bhutto, if you think appropriate, that we are making clear to Indians that whatever decisions we eventually make on military supply will be in the context of progress towards a settlement of outstanding subcontinental issues. G. Conclude by emphasizing our view that we can most effectively contribute to Pakistan’s future growth and integrity by active support for Pakistan’s economic development effort. By end of current fiscal year we are prepared to have committed about dols 150 million in various forms of economic assistance, including debt relief, PL–480 and a dols 60 million commodity loan (FYI, debt relief and commodity loan contributions are, of course, dependent on parallel consortium action and Pak self help measures. End FYI) In extending our economic assistance we will continue work within general framework of Consortium in what we hope will permit resumption of previously promising development effort in Pakistan. Johnson 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, and Sisco; also cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Williams, and at the White House by Haig; and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN. 249. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 249. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, April 17, 1972, 3:05–4:04 p.m. Subject: South Asia Participants: Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger CIA—Richard Helms William Parmenter State—John N. Irwin II Christopher Van Hollen Treasury—John McGinnis David Schneider William Cargo AID—Donald MacDonald Defense—Kenneth Rush NSC Staff—Harold H. Saunders Armistead Selden Jeanne W. Davis James Noyes JCS—LTG Richard T. Knowles B/Gen. William C. Burrows SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 1. AID will prepare. a paper on ways to transfer as much US aid to Bangladesh as possible to bilateral channels rather than multilateral, and the implications of doing so. 2. The State Department will recast the telegram of instruction of Ambassador Keating in more general terms, as opposed to limiting it to the India-Pakistan context, and will include two alternate versions on the treatment of continuation of the arms embargo, for the President to decide. 3. If the cable of instruction goes out in the next day or two, it will include the FY 73 aid figure for India. If the telegram is delayed, India will be informed in a separate message. Mr. Kissinger: Dick [Helms], will you give us a rundown on where we stand. (Mr. Helms briefed from the attached text.) Mr. Kissinger: I’d like to discuss today the general strategy toward all three countries on the subcontinent over the next month or two. State has drafted a cable of instruction to Ambassador Keating for a talk with the Foreign Minister which is a good summary of State’s views. We also have one other subject which I didn’t warn you about: the President would like to move as much as possible of our aid to Bangladesh from multilateral to bilateral. He wants a proposal on how to do this and the implications of so doing. Of course, I would welcome an expression of your views, but I think that will be the President’s general attitude toward aid to the subcontinent. So far as Bangladesh is concerned, he wants to move to bilateral aid as soon as we can. Mr. MacDonald: We didn’t anticipate that, but as a matter of fact we have been questioning the extent to which we could rely on multilateral instruments for large-scale development assistance. Mr. Kissinger: We’re talking about humanitarian assistance too. Mr. MacDonald: All our assistance in the next year will be under the relief and rehabilitation heading because that is what the appropriation is for. The UN’s facilities have been badly taxed on their food and relief operation but, on balance, they have done an adequate job. But looking beyond that to the need for rebuilding a transportation system and the like, we question whether the UN or even the World Bank will be able to handle the entire job. Some areas of assistance represent an opportunity for us to have a political impact, and we have a proposal coming over on this. Mr. Kissinger: Fine, as long as it is understood that the President wants to move as much bilaterally as possible in order to get some direct credit. Mr. MacDonald: We foresee no less than one-half of all US aid to the area between now and June 30 going bilaterally. Mr. Kissinger: I suspect the Secretary of the Treasury wants 95% to go bilaterally. Mr. MacDonald: We have asked our Mission how far we can go on the bilateral side. Mr. Kissinger: I was kidding about the 95%; I don’t know what the right figure is. But I imagine the President is thinking about more than 50%. Mr. Irwin: It may be more a question of the minimum we can get by with doing through the multilateral agencies if they have a program going, rather than the maximum we can do bilaterally. Mr. Kissinger: Let’s prepare a paper and discuss it here again, then take it to the President. We don’t know what’s involved now. [to Irwin] Jack, would you like to discuss the matter of our general strategy—how we deal with India and Pakistan. Mr. Irwin: I’ll ask Chris [Van Hollen] to outline this for you then I’ll add a word or two. Mr. Van Hollen: It looks as though bilateral talks may get under way between India and Pakistan at least at the emissary level in the next two weeks, which will probably then lead to a summit meeting between Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi. Our proposed stance is to recognize that we probably cannot and should not get in a position of mediation. But to the extent we can develop any effective influence in the three capitals, we should bring our views to bear looking toward a desirable peace and a new set of relationships in South Asia. Our messages to Bangladesh and Islamabad have set the stage in those two capitals to pick up the dialogue there. With India, there may be areas where we can counsel restraint: prisoners of war, Indian support on war crimes, pushing the territorial issue in Kashmir. Our influence in these or any other areas is minimal at present. We think we could say to India that our interests lie in a stable and durable peace; that we don’t want an artificial balance; but that we expect India to act with restraint and magnanimity toward Pakistan in the light of the political problems Bhutto faces. We should make it clear that we still support the UN resolution on withdrawal. On the matter of military supply, if we decide to hold fast on our present position, there would be some advantage in telling the Indians that we don’t intend to change our position on the embargo in the short run, but that it is under close review and that our decision will be governed by the degree of progress in the India-Pakistan talks. That way we would keep our options open. Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Van Hollen) How can the State Department resist playing a mediating role? Joe Sisco must be sick. Mr. Van Hollen: We slipped it through while he was away. Mr. Irwin: After the 1965 war, when there was reasonable parity between India and Pakistan, the Soviets stepped in. Now that India is predominant, although the Soviets will play a key role in New Delhi I don’t think India will permit the Soviet Union or anyone else to get in the middle. Mr. Kissinger: State’s cable assumes that the way to get India to be conciliatory is through exhortation by (Ambassador) Keating on the wisdom of restraint. Is that the way, or should we indicate that if they are not conciliatory we may be driven to strengthening Pakistan to withstand Indian pressure? Or should we strengthen Pakistan anyway? Are we better off if we make Indian pressure on Pakistan more costly to the Indians? Of course, you could argue that, if Pakistan is impotent, India would be more likely to be generous than if we made no effort. Mr. Van Hollen: The tone of our message is not designed to indicate a warm, forthcoming position toward India. Mr. Kissinger: It will be when Keating gets through with it. Mr. Van Hollen: We can strengthen the language if you wish. It’s a question of whether we can establish an effective dialogue. I think we can marginally affect the situation. If we get into a dialogue we can make our weight felt. Mr. Kissinger: The President is not eager to resume arms aid to Pakistan. What is the Indian theory? That they can receive unlimited Soviet aid and can maintain a large domestic arms industry, but that anyone who contributes to Pakistan is undermining peace? How does that work? Mr. Van Hollen: It doesn’t, but that is the standard Indian line. It’s for that reason that the Moscow talks will be interesting. Mr. Kissinger: Will this be discussed at Moscow? Who put this on the agenda? Mr. Van Hollen: The President did, in his Foreign Policy Report to the Congress. Mr. Kissinger: Are we to discuss how to restrain India? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Van Hollen) Are you people preparing briefing papers on this? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. The Indians do take a double position on this. They have their own arms production and they receive aid from the Soviets, but no one should supply Pakistan. Mr. Irwin: They take the same double position on the question of elections in Kashmir. If we want to move toward good relations with all countries in the subcontinent, as the President’s Report indicates, we should over the long term try to move India into a more or less neutral corner with less Soviet bias. Arming Pakistan would put this long-term prospect further off and make it less possible. In the long-term interests of the U.S., I think it would be better not to arm Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger: Because if we keep India happy, it would make India more neutral? Mr. Irwin: Not for certain, of course, but it might. On the other hand, strengthening Pakistan might be in our greater long-term interest. Mr. Kissinger: Would we tell India that unless they become more neutral we will arm Pakistan as a gamble? Mr. Irwin: Chris (Van Hollen) has some language which implies that the way India handles itself will influence our actions toward Pakistan. I also question whether we could carry through, because of Congressional and domestic pressure, on a large-scale arms program for Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger: There’s a difference between a large-scale arms program for Pakistan and fulfilling the one-time-exception commitment. We’re not talking about large-scale rearmament but about fulfilling a promise. Mr. Van Hollen: There’s a question whether any action to arm Pakistan will advance peace hopes. We would have serious problems both domestically and in the sub-continent in any arms supply approach. We’d be better off to try to create a new base in India. We can’t effectively accelerate arms supply to Pakistan in the short run in any way which would have an effect on the current negotiations. In fact, you could argue the other way. In the 1950s India argued that U.S. help to Pakistan justified its reneging on the UN resolution. Mr. Kissinger: India will act in its own self-interest. If it wants to do something it will find an excuse. In the 1950s nothing we could have done would have brought about elections in Kashmir. Mr. Van Hollen: But arms to Pakistan might give India an excuse in this context. Mr. Irwin: In the 1950s we had the possibility of making Pakistan a real force, but we can’t do it now on the basis of the one-time exception: Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) Ken, what do you think? Mr. Rush: We can’t turn Pakistan around quickly into a strong power. India will do what it wants to do. I think we should strengthen Pakistan and, on a low-key basis, open talks with India. India won’t pay very much attention to us on POWs or the other issues, but we can do something with Pakistan. Mr. Selden: We received a request today for training for 120 Pakistan pilots over a two-year period. Mr. Kissinger: What is our policy on that? Mr. Van Hollen: We have small military training programs in the U.S. for both India and Pakistan—about $250,000. Mr. Rush: I think to attempt to interject ourselves in India would be a confession of weakness. I would play it cool with the Indians. Mr. Irwin: I don’t disagree with that. Mr. Helms: Anything we could do for the Pakistanis in the short term doesn’t provide much leverage with the Indians. Mr. Kissinger: What is our problem with India? Mr. Helms: We need a way to get some leverage to influence Indian decisions. We have to think of various ways to get this leverage. Arming Pakistan isn’t one of them. Mr. Irwin: What we would gain by arming Pakistan wouldn’t be enough. Mr. Kissinger: Would what we would gain by not arming Pakistan be enough? Mr. Irwin: It might help us build some influence, but maybe not. Mr. Kissinger: How would we build influence by foregoing doing something we’re not doing? Mr. Van Hollen: We could make it clear that our action depends on on-going Indo-Pak negotiations. We wouldn’t close our options. We would indicate that we would hold off on arms supply in the short run to facilitate a settlement. Mr. Selden: Would this include training? Mr. Van Hollen: No. Mr. Rush: If we do nothing for Pakistan, India will think that their present position of pro-Soviet bias is the way to make hay. It would be counter-productive. I think we should play it cool with India. Mr. Kissinger: No one objects to food aid to Pakistan, do they? Mr. Van Hollen: No. We want to maintain maximum political support for Pakistan and maximum economic assistance plus support for the UN resolution. We’ve got $150 million for this for this Fiscal Year. Mr. Helms: The last thing we need is for Pakistan to break up. We should do what is necessary to keep the country unified with a viable government and economy. But this won’t have much influence on India. Mr. Kissinger: Following through on the one-time exception is not necessarily related to a confrontation with India. Mr. Helms: I agree. We should build up Pakistan. Mr. Rush: I agree. India’s objective is still to dismember Pakistan, and political and economic chaos is an easy way. Mr. Kissinger: It could be done by saying that we are fulfilling an old commitment. Mr. MacDonald: Pakistan won’t necessary fall into economic chaos. They should do nicely in the years ahead. Mr. Rush: But there could be political chaos. Mr. Irwin: You’re more likely to get political chaos if there is economic chaos rather than political chaos without economic chaos. If we don’t help them militarily, it doesn’t necessarily add to their political problems. Mr. Rush: It could contribute to a feeling of despair which would influence their dealings with India. Mr. Irwin: But extension of the one-time package wouldn’t make the difference. Mr. Rush: It could psychologically. Mr. Helms: Bhutto has a tough hand to play. He’s looking for a psychological boost. Remember you only have one or two leaders in these countries. If they go, the country has nothing left. Even if we don’t like the leader, it’s better to have one than not to have one. Mr. Van Hollen: It’s a question of the right tactics to reach our objective. We could continue close political support and go all-out on economic assistance to Pakistan. On the military side, leaving aside the fact. that it would create a helluva stir domestically, it might not help us achieve our objective. Mr. Kissinger: Would it create a helluva stir if we said that India is getting X million in arms from the Soviets and has a domestic arms production of X million and we’re only doing what we said last year we would do? Mr. Van Hollen: Yes. Mr. Kissinger: Who would object? Mr. Van Hollen: Senator Church is already talking about legislation to prevent any military supplies to India or Pakistan or any South Asia country. This would just reinforce his hand. Mr. Kissinger: In order to keep Church from putting in his resolution, do we have to do what his resolution requires? Mr. Van Hollen: Leaving aside the Congressional problems, we think we’d be better off to go the economic and political route. Mr. Kissinger: There’s no question about the political and economic support. The question is whether we should fulfill something that we interrupted at the time of the hostilities. We’re not making a new commitment. Suppose Congress does pass a restriction against it? We would be no worse off. Mr. Van Hollen: But it could limit our ability to go forward on the economic track. Mr. Kissinger: Only if Congress is ready to legislate anti-Pakistan legislation. Mr. Van Hollen: Some elements in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are. Mr. Noyes: Remember that the one-time exception was cash sales. Pakistan may not have the money now. Mr. Van Hollen: Also, these were commitments to the former administration. Mr. MacDonald: Remember that we had also promised $87 million to India. If we loosen up for Pakistan it will create an invidious situation. Mr. Kissinger: Now we’re back to where we were last December. I’ll say it again—the President wants to be invidious. Mr. Irwin: On the question of the $87 million for India, it will be difficult to get into a dialogue on future developments with India until we clear up the past. To the degree we want a dialogue, it will be more difficult without clearing up the $87 million. Mr. Kissinger: We don’t want to pay for having a dialogue. The President is taking this position in Vietnam and elsewhere. We may have parallel interests with India in Bangladesh. Why should we pay to have a dialogue? What is India doing to us now that they weren’t doing when we gave them the $87 million? How much more bothersome have they been this year? Mr. Irwin: On the question of Bangladesh, we have already moved on that. We can’t tell India they’ll have problems with Bangladesh if they don’t talk to us. We’ve already told Bangladesh we’d help them. Mr. Kissinger: We were told that if we didn’t do it the Russians would take over Bangladesh. I should think India would be delighted. Mr. Irwin: Maybe the Chinese would take over. Mr. Kissinger: There are no vital U.S. interests affected if China takes over Bangladesh. But I’m confident this is not the last time we will hear of the $87 million for India. Mr. MacDonald: It looms more important in the Indian view with the passing of time. Mr. Van Hollen: In our message we assumed we would maintain our suspension of the $87 million. Mr. Rush: The best way of getting a dialogue started with India is to have a success in Moscow, to continue the normalization of our relations with China and to have a stable government in Pakistan. Mr. Irwin: I agree. Those things are more important than the $87 million or some arms aid to Pakistan. Mr. Rush: But to have a stable government in Pakistan, we should move to help them psychologically and otherwise, possibly with same small arms supply. India can’t possibly object to that. Mr. Kissinger: How much arms aid is India getting from the Soviets? (Mr. Kissinger was called from the room but returned a few minutes later.) Mr. Cargo: We would have a serious problem of tactics and timing if we should resume arms shipments under the one-time exception now. I agree our commitment should be honored at some time, but the domestic fall-out if we did it now would be serious and could adversely affect some of the other things we have going with the Congress. Also, India would kick up a helluva fuss. Mr. Kissinger: They will anyway. Mr. Cargo: I think it would be better to use the argument the other way around—to tell India that we are keeping the embargo on for now, but Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we make any differentiation between an ongoing program and new programs? Mr. Van Hollen: We don’t say that in our cable. Mr. Kissinger: And we only want India to pursue a moderate posture toward Pakistan? Mr. Van Hollen: We also want to talk to India about relations with the Soviets. Mr. Kissinger: Would we ask them what non-alignment means? That’s not in your cable. Mr. Van Hollen: It is indirectly. Mr. Kissinger: Put it directly. Mr. Van Hollen: It’s done. Mr. Rush: We have $1 1/2 million in spare parts, which have been paid for, in a warehouse for Pakistan. They should go. Mr. Kissinger: What happened to the commercial license restrictions? Mr. Van Hollen: They were lifted on both sides. Mr. Kissinger: I have no violent objection to the India telegram, but I suggest it be recast in more general terms, not only in the India-Pakistan context. Also, I think the tone is a little pleading—as though we are getting more out of it than they are, which isn’t self-evident. Mr. Van Hollen: If that tone is there, it shouldn’t be. Mr. Kissinger: On aid, let’s get an estimate of the relative balance between bilateral and multilateral assistance and what steps we have in mind in Bangladesh over the next year. Mr. MacDonald: All right. Mr. Rush: Why not just let the military supply embargo for India and Pakistan remain as it is; leave it up in the air and let the Indians wonder about it. Mr. Kissinger: Let India raise it. Then (Ambassador) Keating can say it is under active review and the outcome will be influenced by developments in the area. Mr. Van Hollen: The key question is whether we should volunteer the information. We would have some advantage in possible influence on India if we volunteer the information. We will reply that way anyway if asked. Mr. Rush: I think the advantage might be the other way. If India wants something, we should get the credit for it. If we give it voluntarily, the advantage is gone. If asked, we can reply that our policy remains under review. We shouldn’t let India tell Pakistan that we have assured them (India) that the arms embargo will stay in effect. Mr. Kissinger: Do both versions for the telegram and we’ll let the President decide. Mr. Irwin: We have already said, in answer to questions, that for the present we are holding to the embargo. That wouldn’t be a new statement. Mr. Kissinger: But we could pull off it if we wanted to. We should leave it to the President to decide. Mr. Irwin: Are you all aware of the AID FY73 presentation—the treatment of the South Asia figure? Mr. Van Hollen: $90 for India and $75 for Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger: As long as it is clearly understood that you don’t come to the President for any expenditure of the $90 for India. Mr. MacDonald: It’s understood that this is just a planning figure. Mr. Van Hollen: If the cable of instruction to (Ambassador) Keating goes out inthe next day or two, we might include something on the aid figures. If the telegram is delayed, I think we should let the Indians know in a separate message. Mr. Kissinger: I’ll let you know tomorrow. You (State) get over the redone telegram with the two versions on arms supply, and send it to everyone for comment. If we can clear it fast enough we can include the aid figure. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The brief from which Helms spoke in assessing the situation in South Asia can be found ibid. The draft telegram cited in the minutes, containing instructions for opening a dialogue with India on a number of contentious issues, was not sent to New Delhi. After discussion by the Senior Review Group, the telegram was revised in the Department of State and returned to Kissinger for approval on April 19. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK) The revised telegram was not sent because of continuing criticism by the Gandhi Government of the U.S. role in Vietnam. See Document 252 . 250. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 250. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 18, 1972 SUBJECT: Congressional Presentation on Indian Aid Program—Instructions to Keating You will recall that at the Monday SRG on South Asia it was mentioned that a telegram should be sent to New Delhi to put Ambassador Keating in a position to explain the presentation of the Indian aid program to the Congress. As you know, that presentation will carry a “provisional” figure of $90 million for India for FY 1973. This presentation will go to the Congress tomorrow (Wednesday) and we need to give Ambassador Keating an explanation of our procedure that is consistent with our interests. A State Department telegram is in the process of clearance which, after simply quoting the language of the Congressional presentation, would have Keating tell the Minister of Finance that we have “agreed on this provisional allocation for the Indian program and on the unallocated reserve for development lending in Asia in order to keep our options open while our economic assistance relationship is under review.” If asked about the status of our aid program, Keating would be instructed to say that it remains unchanged. The argument for having Keating make this kind of presentation is at least to get our reasoning to the Indian government directly so that it does not have to be filtered through the press. We cannot expect a reasonable reaction in any case and the present atmosphere resulting from their reaction over Vietnam will not make it any more so, but at least we will have put the truth on the record. RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize us to clear this instruction to Keating tonight so as to give the embassy time to make a pre-emptive approach. Approve Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71–July 1972. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent to Kissinger through Haig. Kissinger initialed the approval line. Saunders added a handwritten note in the margin that reads: “with addition conveyed orally by Kennedy.” The addition is not marked on the attached draft telegram. A comparison of the draft text with the telegram as sent on April 19 reveals that Kissinger added the penultimate sentence before approving the telegram. That sentence contained an important qualification: “Decisions on allocation will depend on the results of that review and on the circumstances at the time, and you should make clear that no inference should be drawn one way or the other regarding what amounts, if any, might be made available.” See Document 253 . 251. Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon 251. Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon 1 Rawalpindi, April 18, 1972 No. SS/11/1/72 Dear Mr. Secratory I have the honour to forward herewith the letter dated April 18, 1972 from the President of Pakistan to His Excellency Mr. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America With kind regards, Yours Sincerely, (M. Akram Zaki) Enclosure Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 25, 1972 Subject: Letter to President from President Bhutto The Pakistan Embassy delivered to the Department on April 25 the attached letter to the President from President Bhutto. It acknowledges the President’s letter to Moscow and, noting the President’s forthcoming visit to Moscow, asks his assistance in promoting a rapprochment between all parties concerned in the recent South Asian crisis. The Department will shortly forward a suggested reply to President Bhutto. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon Rawalpindi, April 18, 1972 Dear Mr. President, I thank you for your letter of March 22, which was delivered to me by your Charge d’Affaires in Islamabad. I am grateful to you for your concern for the well-being and security of the people of Pakistan and for the help you have offered my country in rebuilding our war-shattered economy. The assurance of your support at this critical juncture is most heartening. I also thank you for your impressions of your historic visit to China, and for the outline of your talks and their significance. Your visit has not only paved the way to a healthier relationship with China but has considerably improved the prospect for world peace. May I once again take this opportunity to discuss the situation in our sub-continent. I regret that I should have to deal with it at some length, but since you are shortly to visit Moscow I feel you may find this information of use in your discussions there. On the 16th of March I went to Moscow principally to make a first-hand assessment of the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards the sub-continent. I also wanted to assure the Soviet leaders of our desire to live in peace and to seek an honourable settlement of our problems with India. My impression is that in the short term the Soviet Union probably wants to see an early return to peace and the “normalization” of the situation in the sub-continent. The Soviet leaders showed considerable anxiety that we recognise ‘Bangla Desh’ and that I meet Mrs. Gandhi in order to negotiate a settlement of the problems that bedevil our relationship. But their desire for peace may be no more than a move in their efforts to consolidate their position in India and ‘Bangla Desh’. On the issue of prisoners of war, Mr. Kosygin read out from a letter of Mrs. Indira Gandhi her comment that she could not return our prisoners of war to augment Pakistan’s war potential until she was satisfied as to Pakistan’s peaceful intentions. I told both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Brezhnev that I was resolved to work for peace between India and Pakistan and that if I intended otherwise there was no dearth of manpower available to join the armed forces in Pakistan. I also gathered from the talks with Soviet leaders that the prisoners of war would not be returned until ‘Bangla Desh’ had been recognised. I told them quite candidly that ‘Bangla Desh’ had come into existence as a result of direct intervention by Indian armed forces and that it would be unrealistic to expect the people of Pakistan readily to accept the dismemberment of their country in this fashion. The question of recognition arouses deep emotions among our people. It was therefore essential for me to lay the ground-work for such an eventuality. I expressed my willingness at this stage to signify an “intent to recognise” ‘Bangla Dash’ and would like to meet Shaikh Mujibur Rahman to discuss with him this and other matters of mutual concern. I told the Soviet leaders that they could greatly assist in preparing the climate for normalization of conditions and return to peace in the subcontinent by persuading India to release the prisoners of war immediately. I informed that it was wholly inappropriate for India to link the question of the release of prisoners of war with other political issues. They could not be used as hostages in brazen contravention of international conventions to which India was signatory. The Indians are threatening the preservation of the tenuous peace that has been achieved; they have in the last month moved five additional Divisions to the west Pakistan border, and the Indian Chief of Staff has recently visited Moscow to replenish military equipment. Then too the Soviet Union and India have stepped up their subversive activities in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. We have nevertheless responded positively to Mrs. Gandhi’s proposal that the emissaries of both countries should meet to prepare the way for a meeting between the two of us. I have left her to decide the time and place for the emissaries to meet. At the moment it appears that the prospects of any worthwhile negotiations with Shaikh Mujibur Rahman have diminished. The persecution and killing of the helpless Biharis continues—for no other reason than that they are federalists. Many thousands of Bengalis who are opposed to the secession of East Pakistan have been dubbed “collaborators”, consigned to concentration camps. Moreover, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman seems determined, with the cooperation and collaboration of India, to try some 1500 prisoners of war for alleged “war crimes”. This is a most disturbing development. If the Bangladesh authorities went forward with these trials they would indeed have very serious repercussions in Pakistan. There are over 400,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan. We have so far succeeded in ensuring that they are not maltreated in any way. But if the projected trials took place, they would generate such bitterness and resentment among our people that irreparable damage might be done to the prospects of establishing normal relations with India and “Bangla Desh”. Mr. President, the United States may be in a position to use its influence to prevent the Indian and “Bangla Desh” authorities from going forward with the proposed trials. I shall be grateful for any assistance you can give us in this respect and for the influence you can use to promote a rapprochment between all the parties concerned so that a durable peace can be established in the sub-continent. With warm personal regards, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Secret. The letter was delivered to the Department of State on April 25, under cover of a transmittal letter from Charge M. Akram Zaki. The letter was forwarded to the White House on the same day. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 25; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK-US) The text of the letter was transmitted to Islamabad on April 26 in telegram 72027. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/Nixon) 252. Telegram 67415 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 252. Telegram 67415 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, April 19, 1972, 1650Z 1. We take serious exception to Foreign Minister’s April 17 statement in Parliament in regard to Vietnam. We consider this official GOI policy statement is most disturbing indication of Indian attitude regarding matter of great interest to USG. 2. Therefore Ambassador should seek urgent appointment with Foreign Minister to discuss GOI statement. Ambassador should say we consider this particularly unbalanced comment on matter of very great interest to USG. We regard this statement as a further unfriendly act on part of GOI. FonMin’s statement is especially unfortunate in light of earlier USG demarche to Indian Ambassador in Washington. 3. As further indication of seriousness with which USG views Indian Vietnam policy, for next two weeks Ambassador should hold to minimum his contacts with Indian officials and maintain formal stance during such contacts. For this period Ambassador should attend no social events hosted by GOI officials. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared in NEA by Davies, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary William H. Sullivan, and in the White House by Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Irwin. 253. Telegram 67420 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 253. Telegram 67420 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, April 19, 1972, 1650Z Subject: AID Presentation Paper for FY 1973 1. Unclassified AID presentation paper for FY 1973 will be submitted to Congress April 20 and likely to receive press attention soon thereafter. This document will carry figure of dols. 75 million for Pakistan, provisional figure of dols. 90 million for India, and unallocated amount of dols. 110 million to support development programs in eligible Asian countries. Concerning India document will state quote in regard to India, U.S. economic assistance relatios [] relationships are under review. Indian leadership is placing increasing emphasis on self-reliance and seeks to reduce the country’s dependence upon economic aid from foreign nations. The dols. 90 million in development loans provisionally carried for India in the FY 1973 program reflects all these current uncertainties. End quote. In regard to unallocated amount document will state quote the development loan request for FY 1973 includes an unallocated amount of dols. 110 million to support development programs in eligible Asian countries identified here. The fluid situation in South Asia is a major factor in this treatment. The loan proposal for Pakistan could be a minimum considering the economic disruption caused by the war and the loss of East Pakistan. As noted above, U.S. economic assistance for India is under review. There are also claims for development loans by the South Asian neighbors of India and Pakistan, as well as other Asian countries. End quote. Thereafter document lists following countries as possible additional recipients: Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, Korea, Philippines, Indonesia. 2. Because above text likely raise questions regarding U.S. intentions within GOI, Embassy should inform both Ministry External Affairs and Ministry of Finance at Joint Secretary level prior April 20 of planned submittal of AID document to Congress. Embassy should read above quoted sections of AID presentation paper to GOI officials. Embassy should also explain to officials that we have agreed upon this provisional repeat provisional allocation for India and unallocated amount for Asian countries in order to keep options open while economic assistance relationships with India continue under review. Decisions on allocation will depend on results of that review and on circumstances at the time, and you should make clear that no inference should be drawn one way or the other regarding what amounts, if any, might be made available. Should GOI officials inquire regarding present status U.S. aid for India [e.g., dols. 87 million suspension], Embassy should reply situation remains unchanged. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad and Dacca. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared by Laingen and Van Hollen, MacDonald (AID), and Saunders (White House); and approved by Irwin. 254. Telegram 4957 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 254. Telegram 4957 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, April 20, 1972, 1426Z Subj: Department’s Instructions Contained State 067415 1. I have appointment with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh at 1100 hours local April 21 to carry out instructions contained subject telegram and in the absence of any further word from the Department will carry out those instructions to the letter. 2. I feel I owe it to the Department, however, to call to your attention certain aspects which have probably been considered but may possibly have been overlooked. The points I wish to be sure the Department has considered are as follows: A. Implicit in instructions would appear to be assumption that Indian position on Viet-Nam is of considerable if not critical importance to USG. Making demarche as instructed as I see it will only contribute to Indian illussion that this is the case. In fact, I believe GOI position on Viet-Nam is irrelevant to the issue and relatively meaningless in the rest of Asia. I regret seeing it dignified. B. Effect of instructions on GOI in my judgement may again be to push Indians farther in Soviet direction. I question whether this is in our self-interest. C. Lest there be any illusion to the contrary, Department must be aware that given its present frame of mind GOI is not about to alter its position because we ask them to do so. If anything, in present climate they are excessively and proudly independent and wish to proclaim their independence to the world, GOI position will not be altered through my demarche. D. Department’s instructions obviously not conducive to development of a meaningful dialogue directed at improving our relations if that is in fact Department’s desire. There may be reasons of which I am unaware why that is not rpt not desired at this time. 3. If Department nevertheless wishes me to carry out instructions I suggest consideration be given to deleting language qte we regard this statement as a further unfriendly act on part of GOI unqte. Such language in context para 2A above strikes me as being somewhat overdrawn. 4. I want to assure Department that I can fully appreciate irritation caused when a leading GOI official enunciates a policy which is so much at variance with ours on a matter of direct and critical importance to us. My only concern is that our reaction be consummate with our own long-term interest. 5. Should Department wish to modify instructions in any way, I would appreciate their being slugged immediate for delivery at open of business April 21. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. 255. Telegram 69080 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 255. Telegram 69080 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, April 21, 1972, 0126Z Ref: New Delhi 4957 Subject: Ambassador’s Talk With Foreign Minister on Vietnam 1. We have reviewed our instructions in light of your comments reftel and believe some of your arguments are compelling. In particular we agree strong demarche to Indians might contribute to Indian illusion that their position on Vietnam is of great importance to USG. Further, for USG to react to additional unfavorable Indian statement only by terming it as further unfriendly act could be interpreted as sign of weakness on our part. 2. Nevertheless, we do not believe we can permit Swaran Singh April 17 statement to pass without strong US objection. Accordingly, you should keep your appointment with Foreign Minister, inform him we consider his statement particularly unbalanced, and state US case firmly, drawing from Secretary’s testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 3. You should also carry out instructions para 3, State 067415, in regard social and business contacts with Indian officials. 4. We have just noted ticker report that Mrs. Gandhi also has made statement on Vietnam. If appropriate, you should refer to this statement in your meeting with Foreign Minister. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 20 by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Davies, and Haig (White House); and approved by Rogers. 256. Telegram 5044 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 256. Telegram 5044 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, April 21, 1972, 1450Z Subj: Call on Foreign Minister re Viet-Nam April 21 Refs: A. State 067415; B. New Delhi 4957; C. State 069050 1. Summary. I carried out instructions ref A as modified by ref C in meeting with Foreign Minister April 21. Foreign Minister heard me out, then denied his statements were biased, indicating he believed GOI had obligation to describe situation clearly as it sees it. He further alleged GOI position in no way reflected pique but rather was its own objective judgement of situation. On departing, Minister urged that we let bygones by bygones and focus on future improvement in our relations. End summary. 2. In 45-minute meeitng with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh April 21 I carried out Department’s instructions. Joint Secretaries Paranjpe (East Asia Division) and Menon (Americas Division) as well as DCM were present. 3. I told Foreign Minister that I was under instructions to State that USG considered his statement in Lok Sabha April 17, 1972 on Viet-Nam qte particularly unbalanced unqte. I then alluded briefly to Prime Minister’s interview with Blitz in which she is reported as having said that resumption of US bombing in Viet-Nam was a qte deplorable state of affairs, especially when all indications were that the war was coming to an end and that the American forces were going to withdraw unqte. I told him that I did not propose to dignify Blitz by registering an official demarche but hope she had not rpt not been accurately quoted. 4. I then recalled that Under Secretary had met with Ambassador Jha April 6 regarding one of his earlier statements and noted that he had failed to take into account that the origin of the present increased level of fighting in Viet-Nam stemmed from the massive invasion of North Vietnamese forces. I said that the facts of the situation had been fairly well set forth in my article in the column I wrote in the American Reporter (full text transmitted Department via USINFO 171255Z of April 17) and I proceeded to hand him two copies of the article and describe in some detail the history of recent events which began on March 30. 5. I told him that every objective observer in South Viet-Nam had recognized that the origin of the current fighting had stemmed from the north and that it had been in response to this massive invasion from the north that we had resumed our bombing. I then emphasized that the overwhelming composition of the attacking force was North Vietnamese in origin and not VietCong which I said had now been qte virtually eliminated unqte and added that 12 of North Viet-Nam’s 13 or 14 divisions were currently fighting outside their homeland. In South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia the forces of those countries were defending themselves against this North Vietnamese aggression. 6. After hearing me out Foreign Minister made following points in his rejoinder: A. GOI policy from the beginning had been that bombing should stop. B. Disagreed with my observation that for all practical intents and purposes there was no effective VietCong (VC) forces. GOI believe a VC fighting force existed, it was controlled by VC. C. Said qte we are firmly of view unqte that resumption of fighting did not give any right for the resumption of bombing qte particularly in areas like Haiphong and Hanoi which were a long way from the DMZ unqte. He referred to massive attacks on civilian installations by air and sea forces and said qte we are firmly of the opinion there was no justification for this at all unqte. D. GOI was interested in restoration of peace without any outside interference. E. He did not accept that his statement constituted a departure from India’s neutral position. India’s role in the ICC did not enjoin them from saying anything. In his view it meant that the GOI should say things clearly without any bias. What they said might not be liked by any party. Said he wanted to assure us that they qte never made statements with a view to pleasing one party or annoying another unqte. F. Refering to Under Secretary Irwin’s characterization to Ambassador Jha that the Foreign Minister’s earlier statement had been qte an unfriendly act unqte, Foreign Minister said in fact it had been a friendly one since true friendship consisted of letting one’s friends know frankly one’s views. History had been witness to the fact that when one country hid its feelings from a desire to avoid unpleasantness, it often led to great tragedy. He assured me again that his statements had qte not at all been motivated by any unfriendly feelings. We would like to have friendly relations unqte. Foreign Minister asked me to convey on his behalf that the real motivation and spirit behind his statement were to share what GOI believed were the facts in the situation. This was done in the interest of peace and removing any incorrect understanding. Foreign Minister then said that for Under Secretary Irwin to describe his remarks as an qte unfriendly act unqte was itself an unfriendly act. He again assured me that they had not taken their position in any fit of anger. There was no pique in this (he said pick). G. He then referred to the tactical situation in Parliament at the time he made his speech and said that all parties in the house, including Swatantra, Muslim League and all others, had joined in condemning the bombing attack on Hanoi and Haiphong. Never in recent parliamentary history had there been such unanimity on a matter in which India was not directly concerned. In these circumstances he felt the best way to prevent qte eruption of emotion unqte was to state clearly what GOI considered elements in situation and that is what he had done. H. He explained there was a non-official day in Parliament every two weeks which was today and a resolution had been proposed by a CPI member to the effect that this house condemns the recent mounting savage attacks (sic) of US air and naval forces of American imperialism on Vietnam unqte, I pointed out this was even stronger than resolution adopted at time USSR invaded Czechoslovakia and I assumed if it came up it could be amended to use word qte deplore unqte. He agreed that was so. I. He then said that the Government of Viet-Nam was he thought qte very foolishly unqte putting up all manner of problems which served to qte put up the back unqte of the Parliament. GOI position on ICC did not depend on South Vietnam. He said he had no doubt that South Vietnam would be the loser. 7. I told the Foreign Minister that I saw no point in ny debating with him the role of India in ICC. We had already registered our view regarding their diplomatic recognition of DRV. I told him I thought the passage of a resolution that he had read to me would be unfortunate and would have a further qte deleterious unqte effect on relations between our two countries which I would regret to see. There was clearly a difference in our points of view as to who was responsible for the resumption of hostilities. We considered that North Vietnam was responsible. India considered the escalation came from the bombing north of the DMZ. Foreign Minister interjected at this point to say qte very deep to the north unqte. I told him that was the area their supplies were coming from, particularly their petroleum supplies. 8. I reminded the Foreign Minister that some time back Foreign Secretary Kaul had told me there was no desire to see South Vietnam taken over by the North. I asked if that was still the view of the GOI. Foreign Minister first said qte we don’t back the taking over of any territory by force by any party unqte. He then backed away from this statement by saying that the people involved were all Vietnamese and it should be for them to sort their old problems themselves. He believed that a qte strong country like yours unqte should attempt to resolve the issue by negotiations by peaceful means rather than use a qte sledgehammer to kill a fly unqte. I told him that we simply did not understand the position of any country which overlooked the fact of this clear massive invasion from the north. 9. Foreign Minister asked if there were any chances of resuscitating peace talks in paris. I told him we were ready if the North would call off their invasion and get their troops out the way we had. We had been withdrawing our forces at the very time that the North Vietnamese were beefing up theirs. There was a limit to what we could put up with. Foreign Minister asked if these developments were likely to qte come in the way of the President’s statement that he wants to withdraw troops further unqte. I told him I expected no change in our policy with regard to withdrawing our ground forces. We have stated we have no intention of reintroducing additional ground forces and we have no intention to use nuclear weapons. 10. Foreign Minister said with regard to nuclear weapons he had said as much in the Parliament even without having heard it directly from me. 11. As I made a move to break off our discussion the Foreign Minister said he wanted to offer greetings and congratulations on the successful landing of our qte cosmonauts unqte on the moon. He wanted to convey his and the Indian people’s best wishes for the complete success of our mission. 12. As we were leaving the Foreign Minister said that he wanted to see improved relations between us. He called attention to the fact that in response to accusations in Parliament regarding the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal that he had replied that one cannot expect a great power like the US to admit it had been wrong. The thing now was to consider that what was past was past and we should focus on our future relations. 13. Ref para 3 ref A last sentence, compliance easy since for some time I have not rpt not been invited to such social events. 14. Comment: Foreign Minister spoke in his usual calm and measured tones and I believe he is sincere in his desire to see an improvement in our relations despite the fact that the GOI clearly has concluded that the North Vietnamese and their VietCong allies will be the eventual victors in Indo-China. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 257. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 257. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 24, 1972 SUBJECT: India’s Postwar Foreign Policy CIA’s Office of National Estimates has produced a useful snapshot of where India seems headed in the near future both regionally and with the Great Powers (paper attached). This memo summarizes its major points and suggests some policy implications. We see this memo as a backdrop for one we shall send you shortly on the Indo-US dialogue. India’s Postwar Foreign Policy The CIA paper opens by noting that the principal concern of Mrs. Gandhi and her colleagues will continue to be domestic rather than international affairs. On the one hand, she has taken little publicized major steps to tighten control over her party. On the other hand, she is “committed as no Indian government has ever been to an extensive—and expensive—program of social welfare and equity reform measures at home.” Nonetheless, the Indians do have international aspirations which they feel have been brought within their reach by the military triumph over Pakistan. While still faced with significant constraints, it appears that India is em-barking on a more confident and somewhat more assertive foreign policy. The constraints it faces are the inadequacies of its own resource base, its substantial internal problems and the actions of the major powers. Relations with Neighboring States India’s first order of business is to clean up issues arising out of the war: principally to cement ties with Bangladesh and to redefine relations with residual Pakistan. These are not easy matters and will take some time to resolve. —India has consciously lowered its profile and presence in Bangladesh but has no intention of disengaging. Even with all the foreseeable strains that may develop, there is almost no chance that any other power could displace Indian domination over Bangladesh. India’s close transportation links and growing economic ties in addition to cultural and psychological bonds give India a decisive edge. The Indians could be expected to react strongly against efforts by any outside power—even the Soviets—to establish a commanding influence in Bangladesh, which they have every intention of keeping within their own orbit of influence. —Mrs. Gandhi clearly wants to exploit Pakistan’s crushing defeat to resolve problems far beyond those directly connected with the fighting agreement on a Western frontier, settlement of the Kashmir dispute in India’s favor, ending the arms race. She does not, however, appear to be actively seeking the disintegration of Pakistan into its constituent ethnic elements. (Some observers, of course, disagree with this conclusion.) But even if peace talks begin soon, the road to settlement will be long and arduous and Mrs. Gandhi will not be inclined toward magnanimity. —India regards the smaller states around her—Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan—as a “special preserve” and is sensitive to great power actions concerning them. If, for instance, Mrs. Bandaranaike’s regime continues to give the appearance of leaning toward the U.S., New Delhi would be likely to react in some fashion, using tactics ranging from propaganda denunciations to more drastic steps. The same, of course, would be true if Nepal would lean more toward China than in the past. —India’s weight is also likely to be felt more forcefully in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi will continue to decry the presence of great power naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, but will continue to build up its own naval strength which already far out classes that of the other states in the region. It would not even be surprising if naval maneuvers figured increasingly in the Indian style of dealing with smaller nearby littoral states. India and the Great Powers The basic fact is that the Indians are suspicious of all great powers— even the Soviets—and chafe under their dependence on the more developed countries. Mrs. Gandhi’s reaction to our actions during the war has further reinforced her inclination to seek greater independence of action. —India’s relations with the USSR will continue to be close. The Soviets, at a minimum, remain an indispensable source of support against the potential threat from China and a source of sophisticated military equipment, as well as a helpful friend in other respects. India is, therefore, likely to go along with Moscow as long as its vital interests are not involved, although this does not mean that they will accede to every Soviet demand. Despite the closeness of this relationship, New Delhi probably does not consider it has a complete congruence of interests with Moscow. CIA, for instance, does not think that the Indians would—unless both in serious trouble and under very strong pressure from Moscow—agree to grant unrestricted access to port and servicing facilities for Soviet Indian Ocean naval units. India will also view with suspicion Soviet efforts to repair their relations with Pakistan and to build an influential position in Bangladesh. —The war revived India’s fears of China and its deep suspicions that Peking is bent on limiting Indian power in the subcontinent. Despite this situation, the Indians would welcome some improvement in their relations with China. —The Indians do not appear inclined to take the initiative to improve relations with the U.S. for some time to come and will probably not be very responsive to U.S. efforts to improve relations. In general, Mrs. Gandhi thinks that it is up to the U.S. to make peace with her and not the other way around. On the other hand, while willing to see Indo-U.S. relations continue on at their present low state for some time, Mrs. Gandhi does not want to destroy ties to the U.S. completely. —Although India does not need foreign AID as much as in the past, it still cannot afford to go it alone while repaying its outstanding indebtedness. It is possible that rather than ask the U.S. to resume economic assistance, India will attempt a moratorium on interest and debt repayments or even effect default on all or part of foreign debt as Pakistan did. Policy Implications This CIA analysis of the current Indian scene provides a convenient base from which to state several thoughts on our policy toward South Asia now. Briefly these are: 1. The most compelling conclusion is that it may simply be too soon to begin a meaningful Indo-U.S. dialogue. If CIA’s analysis of the Indian attitude is close to correct it is hard to see a real dialogue at this point producing anything other than more strain. Perhaps what is needed first is a more gradual repair job with softer words on both sides and measured actions until we reach the point where the past can really be put behind US and the “dialogue” can focus on the future. 2. There has been no substantial qualitative change in the Indo-Soviet relationship as a result of the war. The so-called “special relationship” is rooted in interests on both sides as are the limitations involved. India has a much greater will and capacity to resist Soviet encroachments on its independence of action than do the Egyptians, for instance. This does not appear to have, been changed significantly by the precipitous decline of our position in India and presumably would not be changed much by a corresponding improvement in Indo-U.S. relations at this point. This would suggest that we have some time to work with and that any counter we might pose to the Soviets will evolve only over time. 3. We seem almost bound to bump into Indian interests in the small peripheral states. There is a new fear of “Indian imperialism” in these states (including Bangladesh) and it is rational for them to look to US as a counter. Given our bilateral difficulties, the Indians will be unusually sensitive to actions we take with respect to Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, in addition to the obvious Pakistan. 4. There is probably little we can do directly with India in the short run to help Pakistan in negotiating a peace settlement beyond providing economic support to help Bhutto hold Pakistan together and whatever we might persuade Moscow to do with India. India has the high cards—territory and POWs—and is most unlikely to listen to what we might have to say on how to play them. In fact, our advice could help to trigger just the, opposite response than we might be seeking. The next few weeks will provide a major test of India’s long-range interest toward the integrity of Pakistan as we see how far the Indians are willing to go in making it politically feasible for Bhutto to come to terms. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The 25-page Office of National Estimates memorandum summarized by Saunders and Hoskinson, entitled “India’s Postwar Foreign Policy,” April 5, is ibid. 258. Telegram 5254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 258. Telegram 5254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, April 27, 1972, 1705Z Subject Next Steps in Indo-US Relations 1. Now that we have moved toward regularization of our relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan, I presume Department and White House are giving thought to Indo-US relations. 2. As I see it, we presently seem to be caught in vicious circle of actions and counteractions which are leading to continue downward spiral in our bilateral relations. As Department is aware, these bilateral relations are the worst they have ever been. 3. Vicious circle most recently exemplified by Prime Minister’s unbalanced and biased view of Vietnam conflict which was enunciated before Communist trade union forum (New Delhi 5097) and inability or unwillingness of GOI to reccognize realities in SEA. I can well imagine that any disposition in Washington to move in direction of improving our relationships has been set back by Prime Minister’s statements and by recent statements in and outside of Parliament of Foreign Minister and other members of Parliament, as well as poisonous tone of Indian press. 4. These statements in turn are reflection of GOI disappointment over US actions of recent past and uncertainty regarding our future intentions, an uncertainty which we may consider it to be in our present interest to maintain. 5. In the present state of limbo and drift we whould recognize that our bilateral relations will probably deteriorate even further. 6. I have no doubt over the long run that Washington desires to see an improvement in Indo-US relations but it may well be that it is Washington’s view that we should take no overt step at this time to seek improvement. 7. On the other hand, if there is indeed a desire to see an early improvement in our bilateral relationships, we must find some way to break out of the vicious circle we are now in. It would be helpful to me to know how Department looks at current situation. Naturally before I leave I would be happy to play a personal role in the attempt to improve relations, but I recognize that is distinctly a secondary consideration. 8. In my view, now that we have recognized Bangladesh, the two issues of principal concern to the GOI are our arms supply policy and aid. Of these our arms supply policy is over-riding as it is seen as an indication of our attitude toward the sub-continent as a whole. There remains concern that by again encouraging Pakistan we may in effect sabotage a meaningful and, in Indian eyes, reasonable Indo-Pak settlement. Our posture on this issue to date seems to be designed to keep the Indians guessing which, from a global policy viewpoint, may be the wise course. We stress that we have qte no present intention unqte to resume arms supply to Pakistan. If indeed there is a desire on our part to see an improvement in our bilateral relations, I believe it is in our interest to alter this formulation in a direction which will give the Indians some assurance that our long-term intentions in the subcontinent do not in fact, as I believe to be the case, run counter to Indian interests. 9. On the aid side, as Department is aware, I continue to feel uncomfortable that we have placed ourselves in a position where we are failing to live up to an explicit agreement. Our continued failure to release the 87 million dollars of non-project loan funds troubles me although I fully appreciate the provocative statements of Indian leaders which are infuriating. Our action is viewed here as being politically punitive. Regardless of whether or not we wish to see an improvement in Indo-US relations at this time, I again recommend that we release these funds so that the slate will be wiped clean. Beyond that, what we do in terms of bilateral aid can be decided on the basis of Indian positions which have yet to be taken and such response thereto as we decide is appropriate. 10. I would much appreciate Department’s comments on foregoing. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Nodis. 259. National Intelligence Estimate 32–72 259. National Intelligence Estimate 32–72 1 Washington, May 5, 1972 PAKISTAN: SHORT-TERM PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS NOTE Assessing the prospects for Pakistan at this point is unusually tricky. The rather complex country has recently seen major and dramatic changes; it is almost certain to experience more. In the following, which is concerned principally with prospects over the next year or so, we make predictive estimates where possible, but we give greater emphasis to the various factors now at work by which future developments are likely to be determined. More specifically, this estimate goes to press only a few weeks before scheduled talks between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto, the outcome of which will be critical to future developments; we are less concerned with short-term predictions about these talks than with the likely implications of alternative outcomes. Principal conclusions are summarized in Section C, Prospects and Contingencies. An Annex is a brief description of Pakistan’s constituent provinces and areas. THE ESTIMATE 1. Defeated in war, beset with unrest, its eastern province lost, ruled by new leaders, Pakistan faces a most uncertain future. Some very difficult but unavoidable decisions by President Bhutto or a successor lie ahead, and will do much to determine the nation’s future. Thus Pakistan’s leaders must, in the next several months, attempt to respond to a variety of challenges including: making peace with India; preventing the breakup of the country; developing a new social and economic consensus; and creating and maintaining new viable political institutions. Success or failure in responding to any of these challenges will have considerable bearing on coping with the others. Further, many developments with respect to Pakistan will be determined by decisions made outside that country and over which it will have little control. A. MAKING PEACE WITH INDIA 2. India decisively beat Pakistan in the December 1971 war. India is militarily the stronger and will remain so; it is unlikely that Pakistan will be able to pose again as a serious rival to India. Objectively, it is clearly in the interest of both parties that this fact be recognized and that a new and more realistic relationship on the basis of it be developed. For Pakistan this will require frank acknowledgement of unpleasant facts. 3. Four months after the fighting ceased, steps have been taken to open negotiations between the two countries. In April, special representatives of Mrs. Gandhi and President Bhutto met in Pakistan and drew up an agenda for a meeting—now scheduled for late May or early June—of the two leaders. Each side will, of course, initially present its most extensive demands. New Delhi will probably demand that Pakistan: (a) Renounce its long-standing policy of confrontation with India, possibly by signing a formal “No-War” pact or by some other concrete act. (b) Reach an accommodation on Kashmir. We cannot predict Mrs. Gandhi’s demands on this issue; the public statements of many of her principal associates have been contradictory on this point. At a maximum, India could demand that Pakistan give up that portion of the old Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir it has held since 1949. At the other extreme, it could offer to go back to the pre-December 1971 situation, with both countries respecting the old ceasefire lines while maintaining their traditional claims to that contested area. Perhaps most likely, Mrs. Gandhi might insist that Pakistan accept the 1949 Kashmir ceasefire line, with some modifications, as an international frontier. 4. In addition, India can be expected to raise some subjects on behalf of its ally, Bangladesh, if Pakistan has not by that time formally recognized Bangladesh. India will proposed that Pakistan: (a) Recognize Bangladesh and accept it as a party to tripartite discussions on matters of interest to all three countries. (b) Agree to discuss separately with Bangladesh representatives matters of concern to Pakistan and Bangladesh, such as the mutual repatriation of each others nationals and the division of prewar Pakistan’s assets and liabilities. 5. As a negotiating tactic, India will probably initially insist that the return of prisoners of war (POWs) and the trials of war criminals are technical matters which can only be discussed in the light of an overall settlement. In return for a settlement, India can offer, inter alia: (a) The return of captured Pakistanis, believed to number 70,000–90,000. (b) An understanding that it will not turn over to Bangladesh all Pakistani prisoners accused of war crimes. (c) Indian withdrawal from approximately 6,000 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Sind and Punjab. (d) Various concessions on diplomatic and commercial relations. 6. Pakistan will probably initially demand that India: (a) Return all of the Pakistani POWs immediately. (b) Withdraw from occupied Pakistani territory. (c) Require Bangladesh to abandon its plans for war crimes and trials of POWs. As a negotiating tactic, Pakistan will probably insist that discussion of a permanent settlement of Kashmir be deferred until issues relating immediately to the war are resolved. How strongly Pakistan is prepared to hold to this position remains to be seen. 7. To obtain a settlement, Pakistan can offer: (a) Some minor rectifications of the Kashmir ceasefire line. (b) Return of the some 600 Indian POWs. (c) Pakistani withdrawal from some 90 square miles of captured Indian territory. (d) Agreement to a “No-War” pact. (e) Diplomatic and trade relations, possibly including an open border in Kashmir. (f) Recognition of Bangladesh. 8. Relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh will inevitably affect the course of Indo-Pakistani negotiations. Bangladesh insist on its right to try at least these Pakistani soldiers against whom a prime facie case has been established. It also insists on its right to approve the return of the POWs to Pakistan. Finally, Sheikh Mujib insists that he will not talk with Bhutto until Pakistan has recognized Bangladesh. Pakistan contends that no recognition is possible until Bhutto and Mujib meet. Pakistan may modify that position in order to obtain an agreement to limit war crime trials, and Sheikh Mujib may compromise in order to obtain the release from Pakistan of some 40,000 Bengalis who have military or civilian skills important to Bangladesh. 9. How far are the antagonists prepared to back down or compromise on their respective demands? Some points could probably be negotiated without too much difficulty, particularly those which have no been longstanding emotional issues either in Pakistan or India. These are, for the most part, ones involving Bangladesh. The fact of the latter’s independence is beyond dispute. The Bengalis have some leverage on the Pakistanis in the form of their threatened war crimes trials, but this is limited by the fact that all Pakistani POWs remain in Indian hands, and the Bengalis cannot take Indian support for their claims for granted. Pakistan’s formal recognition of the Bangladesh and agreement to negotiate on technical matters could probably be arranged. 10. The most intractable issue will probably be Kashmir, about which both countries have intense emotion and have spilled much blood and treasure during the past 25 or so years. With India militarily dominant and holding physical possession of the most valuable part of Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi may feel she must use this opportunity to get a final resolution of the Kashmir issue. She would be particularly inclined to seek this if she thought failure to do so would weaken her newly acquired status as India’s dominant political leader. Indeed, a no-compromise policy would almost certainly receive general public support, and would cost India little. Further, aware of Pakistan’s many and serious internal problems, she may hope that a present or future regime in Islamabad will come under increasingly heavy domestic pressure (if only because of the POW issue or internal troubles) for accommodation closer to Delhi’s terms. 11. On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi may decide that a more conciliatory policy would be more in India’s own self-interest. She knows that concessions on her part would strengthen Bhutto’s domestic political position might encourage him to be more forthcoming in return. She almost certainly still distrusts Bhutto, but probably sees him as preferable to likely alternatives, calculating that a successor military regime would be even more hostile than Bhutto. Nor would the balkanization of Pakistan, with its likely attendant difficulties spreading to and involving neighboring countries necessarily be, in Delhi’s eyes, a favorable development. Thus Mrs. Gandhi might believe that postponing final agreement on Kashmir’s status would be preferable to pushing for immediate Pakistani submission to India’s maximum demands. 12. Bhutto is playing from a much weaker hand and he knows it. He is aware of Pakistan’s military and strategic weakness. He is probably personally prepared (given some negotiated benefits in return) to accede to most Indian and Bengali demands if he thought this would not lead to his own political destruction. Though theoretically he has immense power as President and chosen leader, his position at home is far from assured. His political future may depend on his ability to achieve the repatriation of Pakistani military and civilian POWs in Indian hands, to permit the return of nearly a million refugees at home to their lands now occupied by Indian and Pakistani troops still facing each other, and to end the present economic, political, and military uncertainties. Bhutto has already made some efforts which can be interpreted as preparing the Pakistanis to face the unpleasant realities which must accompany any settlement on such issues as Kashmir. 13. Bhutto has made extensive efforts to get support from the US, China, Arab and other Muslim states, the USSR, and the UN. These efforts have a variety of aims ranging from acquiring military supplies to getting international censure of Indian treatment of Pakistani POWs. He is also seeking to strengthen his weak bargaining position by acquiring as much outside support—military, economic, political, or psychological—as possible. The success of such efforts is problematical, save probably in assuring the continuation of enough foreign financial assistance to keep his economy going. Pakistani prospects in another round of hostilities would be extremely poor, though Pakistani hopes and Indian fears may lead both to self-deception on this point. 14. The Indians, for their part, are not likely to be much affected by the urgings of outside powers. So long as they are assured of strong Soviet support, possible threats by the Chinese will not concern them greatly. Further, Peking itself may be coming to view a defeated and truncated Pakistan as not worth an increase in tangible support, particularly expensive military equipment. It gave Pakistan little more than verbal backing during the December 1971 war. We know of no evidence, e.g., a step up in military supply or new political commitments by the Chinese, that would point in the direction of a more pro-Pakistani posture on their part. However, Peking has committed some $50 million in light weapons and tanks to replace Pakistan’s war losses. This would substantially re-equip two divisions. Past arrangement for purchases of military equipment have no been cancelled and some material is in the process of delivery. 15. Nor is the outlook very bright for Pakistan’s being able to get non-Communist states to influence India to moderate its position. Potentially, India could be badly hurt by a total cutoff or embargo of economic assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and all the wealthy Western Powers. However, while the US suspended uncommitted allocations of financial aid to India in December 1971 ($87 million out of $207 million) and has not lifted that suspension, none of the other aid donors have followed suit. They are not likely to do so, and so long as they do not, India will have an adequate cushion against the loss of American funds. New Delhi’s angry public statements that it is both willing and able to carry on without any further US assistance are probably accurate reflections of the government’s current attitude. Indeed, resentments of the US are so great that India, at least in the near term, would probably view with great suspicion almost any US approach. But with the emergence of new economic needs, and as the negotiating process evolves, this may change. 16. The only outside power with much positive leverage on New Delhi is the USSR, its only important backer immediately before and during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the provider of most of its sophisticated military equipment, and an indispensable source of support against the potential military threat from China. Moscow’s recent cordial reception of Bhutto caused some nervousness in New Delhi. Moscow will probably urge both the Indians and the Pakistanis to be forthcoming with one another at the negotiating table. But its leverage on Islamabad is limited, and the impact of its urgings on Mrs. Gandhi is open to question. For all their gratitude for past Soviet support, the xenophobic Indians remain inherently resistant to pressures by all outside powers. Further, Moscow, for all that it may desire a lessening of tensions in the subcontinent, probably values its good relations with India sufficiently that it would not risk jeopardizing them, say by urging unpalatable concessions on Kashmir. 17. Given the many obstacles, it can hardly be said that prospects for a comprehensive settlement are promising, even though both India and Pakistan are at the moment disposed to accentuate the positive in connection with the preliminary talks. They are probably doing so, each in the hope of improving chances of getting what they want as the negotiating process unfolds. Various Indian officials have voiced different attiudes in recent weeks—some soft, some hard—while Mrs. Gandhi herself has largely avoided comment; she may be content to let this go on until she meets with Bhutto. 18. It should be noted that both Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi have, in the past, taken bold and unexpected initiatives, some of which have entailed considerable risk. Though there is no evidence that such will happen, they might, in their upcoming summit meeting, quickly come to terms and then present the fait accompli to their followers as the best possible solution. If they should reach an accord, they would follow it up with heavy pressures for quick ratification by their respective parliaments before effective opposition had time to develop. 19. Barring such a speedy detente, and if India prove relatively inflexible, the best chance for an agreement would probably lie in Bhutto’s skill and ability to make major concessions, particularly on Kashmir, which would not doom him politically at home. Bhutto’s willingness to make concessions would be conditioned not only by his reading of his domestic strength and the Indian response, but also to some degree by how much hope he has for great power support in the courses he may choose. If he received indications that the Chinese or the US would back him in a stiff stand, he would be encouraged in that posture; conversely, support for him in making concessions would ease his way to do so, though not decisively. 20. A comprehensive settlement might prove impossible to reach. But Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi might come to some kind of interim and partial arrangement, say one which settled some immediate problems such as the POWs while deferring consideration of more basic ones, notably Kashmir. This would substantially ease tensions between the two countries in the short term and raise hopes for further agreements. But it would paper over certain basic differences and leave their ultimate resolution uncertain. 21. If there is no accord, the Pakistanis would be forced to accustom themselves to the present unhappy situation. The present ceasefire lines would become defacto borders with the Indians absorbing some new territory. Over time, specific agreements with the Indians and Bengalis on such matters as mutual repatriation of one another’s nationals might be worked out. But antagonisms would remain and these would create fears and problems in both India and Pakistan. At a minimum, Bhutto’s or a successor regime would use the Indians as a scapegoat for anything that went wrong, or perhaps as an excuse to perpetuate itself in power during emergency conditions. The Pakistanis might even be tempted to prepare seriously for another round of hostilities, by seeking major military aid and by sacrificing domestic programs in order to permit a major rearmament effort. B. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES Preventing a Breakup of the Country 22. Many outside observers (not only Indians) have long described Pakistan as an inherently artificial country. The very name “Pakistan” was coined only the 1930s. The country’s initial raison d’etre was to be a homeland of the Muslims in the former British Indian Empire. But beyond a fear of being ruled by Hindus, “Pakistanis” had little in common. From the beginning, important differences were evident between the inhabitants of the west wing and the Bengalis, and these of course culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh. 23. But at the time of its creation, “West Pakistan” was also a conglomerate of peoples of differing ethnic origins and languages, who had never before been untied into a separate independent country. It consists of four provinces, Punjab, Sind, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan, plus several lesser jurisdictions. * The area has also seen occasional autonomist and separatist movements. None of these has ever been comparable to the movement in East Pakistan, but the success of Bengali secession has given these forces some new hope and strength, particularly in demands for greater local self-government for minority communities. This has led to speculation that Pakistan itself may fall apart. 24. But there are strong forces working to keep it together. Ninety-eight percent of its people are Muslim and generally share fear of Hindu domination. Shorn of Bangladesh, Pakistan enjoys territorial contiguity. It has developed a well knit economic infrastructure; it is bound together by a relatively efficient transportation and communications network; there has been a considerable movement of peoples from one province to another. There has been resentment—sometimes considerable—of the majority Punjabis by the Sindhis, Baluchis, and the Pathans of the NWFP. But the differences and antagonisms between these groups are nowhere near as great as were those between them collectively and the distant Bengalis. Unlike the latter, West Pakistan’s minorities have not come to consider themselves the victim of blatant exploitation and discrimination. The economic and industrial elite includes minorities. Both ex-Presidents Ayub and Yahya are Pathans and surrounded themselves with cronies from their own community; President Bhutto is a Sindhi, though the principal electoral support for his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) did come from the Punjab. The principal autonomist party in West Pakistan, Wali Khan’s National Awami Party (NAP), won only pluralities in its centers of strength in the 1970 elections, in contrast to Mujib’s overwhelming mandate in the east wing. 25. The strongest unifying force in West Pakistan has been its armed forces, particularly the army. Available evidence, not very complete, indicates that the military remains generally cohesive, national in outlook, and unsympathetic to secessionist demands. The Punjabis, being the majority community and a martial one at that, probably make up the larger part of the armed forces, but have never dominated it to the exclusion of other groups in what was formerly West Pakistan. * Though the military is suffering the shock of defeat, some internal dissension, and the stigma of the failures of the regimes of Ayub and Yahya, for internal security purposes it is still a potent force. Provided, of course, it is not shattered in further fighting or inhibited by the threat of Indian military intervention, it probably retains the will and ability to contain, if not crush, any serious secessionist movement. 26. The most likely threat to Pakistan’s geographical unity would be a rebellion in predominantly Pathan (or Pushtu) sections of the NWFP. Such would probably be sparked initially by domestic considerations. For example, there could be an irreparable break between the NAP’s Wali Khan, the NWFP’s principal leader, and Bhutto. Both have so far avoided a break, and Pathan separatism still appears a comparatively weak force. The interim constitution’s promise of substantial local autonomy to the four provincial governments may ease the situation in the NWFP and elsewhere. 27. Nonetheless there will remain the danger of some Pathans coming to the view Bhutto as hopelessly antagonistic to them. If they were to rise in force, their chances for success would depend on whether Pathans now in the armed forces would remain loyal to the central government or join with the rebels. We do not know the percentage of Pathans now in the Pakistani military, nor can their loyalties in such a hypothetical crisis be forecast. If a substantial number both in the NWFP and in the army remain loyal to the central government, an uprising could probably be contained. 28. Outside intervention would change this outlook. In the past, the issue of the Pathans has occasionally troubled relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose ruling elite are Pathans. Previous Afghan governments have denounced the present Afghan-Pakistani border (The Durand Line) as one arbitrarily imposed by the British Raj and unfairly dividing the Pushtu-speaking peoples; they demanded the creation of a separate “Pushtunistan”. A decade or so ago, the dispute over this issue had become so bitter as to lead to a rupture of Afghan-Pakistani relations and a sealing of their border to commercial traffic. But even when relations were most tense, the Afghans were never able to trigger off serious trouble in the NWFP area. And since the mid-1960s, Kabul has put the Pushtunistan issue on a back burner and has sought amicable relations with Islamabad. Thus it did not attempt to stir up serious trouble in the NWFP during either the 1965 or 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars. 29. But the Afghan Government has recently made noises about the Pathans in Pakistan. Its efforts do not appear very serious or effective. Rather the Afghans would now probably prefer to see the NWFP quiet and a part of Pakistan, with the latter serving as a friendly Muslim buffer between Afghanistan and a powerful, potentially domineering Hindu India. But in the (now unlikely) event that the NWFP were to explode into widespread, protracted uprising, Kabul would find it difficult to refrain from giving material support to the insurgents. And were the Indians to overrun much of Pakistan, the Afghans would almost certainly try to take the NWFP, and possibly parts of Baluchistan as well. The prospects of Baluchistan or of the relatively unmarital Sind, on their own, seceding in the face of Pakistani military opposition will remain slight, though local (and particularly tribal) leaders may periodically make trouble. Developing Economic Policies and Social Consensus 30. During the 1960s, the West Pakistani economy registered impressive rates of growth. The “Green Revolution” in agriculture, which resulted in sharp increases in production of food grains, led the way, but industrial development was also rapid. Foreign aid played a very important role in economic progress, but private entrepreneurs provided managerial skills, made substantial investments of their own, and received a very large share of the benefits; dissatisfaction with increasingly uneven distribution of wealth was a major cause of Ayub’s fall. The political uncertainty prevalent since Ayub’s fall, the loss of Bangladesh which had been a captive market for many west wing products, the March 1971 cutoff of new pledges of Western economic aid to Islamabad, and the war with India were painful to the Pakistani economy. Subsequent labor unrest and apprehension about Bhutto’s politics regarding the private sector have further aggravated the economic situation. 31. The prolonged crisis in East Pakistan raised military costs substantially. But because the actual war with India in December 1971 lasted only two weeks, additional spending on that account was probably not very large. The small military aid deliveries from China and the Middle Eastern countries during the war were provided either as outright grants or on easy credit terms. However, replacement costs of the equipment lost will be considerable. Pakistan’s military hardware at the war’s outset probably was worth about $800 million at current prices. As much as $200 million worth of equipment was destroyed, captured, or otherwise expended by 17 December; the Pakistani military inventory in the east wing was a complete loss. India’s blockade of Karachi virtually halted Pakistan’s foreign trade for a short while and Indian bombing damaged Karachi’s petroleum installations, but few other industrial sites apparently were hit. Preliminary estimates by Karachi officials put the repair costs for petroleum facilities at $25 million. Reconstruction of these facilities could take about two years. In general, though, daily economic activity was affected relatively little by the short war. 32. Pakistan does not appear to be facing an imminent economic crisis. It has a sounder economy than many other states in the underdeveloped world. There is much less population pressure on the land in Pakistan than in India and Bangladesh. It is still principally a rural country; 80 percent of its people live on the land and are more or less cushioned from the economic impact of wars, commodity shortages, and sudden unemployment. Further, its agricultural sector is, relative to other South Asian countries, a healthy one. Save in years of usually bad weather, Pakistan is virtually self-sufficient in food grains and is also an exporter of such commodities as cotton for which there is considerable world demand. 33. Balanced against this favorable picture is the fact that export earnings, reduced by the loss of East Pakistan, are insufficient to pay for needed imports of some consumer goods, fertilizers and pesticides for the farmers, and necessary materials for the industrial sector. This trade gap in the past has been mostly covered by large amounts of foreign aid. The latter has helped Pakistan both to raise agricultural yields and to develop a moderately large complex of industries which mostly produce consumer goods. Of these the textile industry is the largest and most important; despite the Bengali crisis and the war, this industry has so far continued to expand its exports. Others, including chemical and drugs, have done less well in the last year. Most industries still depends to a considerable degree on foreign economic assistance for raw materials, machinery, and the like. The uncertainty of future foreign aid along with the loss of East Pakistan has affected some industries adversely, though not to a critical extent. 34. Overall, in an economic sense Pakistan has not suffered greatly from the secession of the east wing or the March 1971 cutoff of new foreign aid commitments. It has weathered the storm by getting some aid disbursements from wealthy Middle Eastern countries, by cutting back on imports, by redirecting and increasing exports which formerly went to the east wing, by unilaterally declaring a moratorium on its large debt to foreign governments, by drawing down somewhat on its foreign exchange reserves, and by using the commodity aid previously committed and in the pipeline. It has also cut back on developmental projects. These measures began during Yahya’s rule, but have been and will be pursued for some time by Bhutto. 35. Bhutto’s government is trying to improve its financial situation by reaching agreement with principal aid donors on an interim debt renegotiation, and by getting new pledges of foreign aid—particularly commodity assistance. Most such AID that was in the pipeline in March 1971 will have been spent in the next year or so. Though some type of exchange reform is a major prerequisite for fresh aid commitments, Bhutto’s success or failure in obtaining aid will depend in large part on decisions beyond his own control. In particularly, the position of the US, long Pakistan’s principal source of foreign aid, will be of major importance in this respect. Bhutto’s achievements in getting further debt moratoria and foreign aid will of course have their impact on Pakistan’s economic prospects, but the effects are likely to be seen only slowly. The consequences of positive or negative decisions on foreign aid will be apparent only in a gradual improvement or a slow deterioration in the overall economic picture. 36. Over time, the Pakistani Government must make some hard domestic economic decisions of its own—and these could precipitate changes in the body politic. It must decide how far and how fast to impose populist reform measures Bhutto promised during the election campaign of 1970. Pursued skillfully and moderately, such measures could result in a great sense of public participation, while permitting the continued use of private managerial and entrepreneurial skills already in existence. To date, Bhutto has acted with considerable caution. He has promulgated a number of measures including government takeover of some industries, a new labor code, arbitrary punishment of some industrialists, and land reform. Most of these have been more cosmetic than real, and were apparently meant to satisfy the expectations of many of his followers without seriously affecting the economy. Nonetheless the possibility will remain that he or a succeeding government will adopt measures of more fundamental consequence, particularly as the demand grows for a more equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. The government could, for example, impose a land reform to sweeping as to cut holdings to inefficient size and grievously reduce agricultural output. 37. The Pakistani Government must also make extremely difficult decisions about how much to allocate to armaments and military purposes on the one hand, and to reform programs on the other. Pakistan cannot afford to increase spending on expensive new armed forces, and simultaneously to embark on such costly programs as expanded medical and education benefits. Yet the pressures to do both remain strong and the conflict must eventually be resolved. The Pakistani armed forces remain a formidable political force. Bhutto was brought in as President and Martial Law Administrator by high-ranking military officers after they had dismissed Yahya. 38. Since then Bhutto has moved to establish civilian pre-eminence over the military. Both he and Pakistan’s Defense Secretary have stated their desire to reduce the excessive military burden on the economy. However, there will still be pressure on the civil government to give priority to military needs, which if unsatisfied could precipitate an attempt at a military coup. A military coup may indeed happen anyway, say if Bhutto were assassinated, if public unrest became endemic as it did in Ayub’s last days, or if relations with India deteriorate. In any event, the guns vs. butter issue will remain one of the most important and difficult that Pakistan will face. China’s continuing willingness to supply at least basic arms at existing levels on a grant or soft loan basis will to some extent help ease this problem. Creating New Viable Political Institutions 39. Pakistan has not enjoyed an enduring political system. Its creator and only really unchallenged leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, died within a year or so of the country’s becoming independent. After years of futile wrangling by civilian politicians, Ayub took over in 1958, ruling first under martial law and then under a presidential system. In 1969, he was forced to give way to a martial law regime under Yahya Khan. But the new ruling regime of Bhutto and the PPP has advantages not enjoyed by its predecessors. They no longer have to cope with the Bengalis, who were not integrated into the political system and who ultimately could not be held in subjection. The new national Parliament, in which the PPP has almost a two-thirds majority, is the first in independent Pakistan’s history to be directly chosen in a free election. This popular mandate has give Bhutto and his government a legitimacy their predecessors always lacked. 40. But the long-term tenure of Bhutto and the PPP is hardly assured, despite its large majority in Parliament. The party itself is new (it was only formed in late 1967) and inexperienced. Its discipline and continued loyalty to Bhutto is open to question. It has virtually no national organization or tradition of united action. It contains many mutually antagonistic interests—ranging from wealthy landlords through middle class bureaucrats businessmen to a variety of reformers and radicals. Many party MPs are independent-minded leaders who were hastily recruited for the campaign on the basis of their own local power and prestige rather than for the allegiance to Bhutto. The PPP members in Parliament are almost certainly split on how far the government should go in carrying out its pledges of drastic social and economic reforms. So long as Bhutto ruled under martial law, these intraparty differences were of lesser movement, but the 21 April termination of martial law brings on a new situation. Indeed, uncertainty about the PPP’s cohesiveness, discipline, and loyalty was probably a principal reason for Bhutto’s creation of a constitutional system allowing him to rule as President endowed with strong powers. 41. In power, Bhutto ahs proven himself more skilled, adroit, and flexible than many he believed he would be. In three or four months, he has successfully weathered a host of crises with considerable ability, and has shown great adeptness in compromise and conciliation. But his troubles are hardly ended. He remains an emotional and erratic individual with a tendency to say one thing one day and another the next. His backers’ loyalty is suspect and his tasks—international and domestic—are enormous. His biggest stumbling block is achievement of a settlement with India that Pakistanis consider honorable. If he succeeds in this, his chances of easing regional dissatisfaction, reforming the social structure, upgrading the country’s financial standing, keeping the army happy, and maintaining control over his own party would probably be improved. 42. There are now no readily apparent civilian alternatives to Bhutto. There is no one else in the PPP who could challenge him or take his place, though this may change over time; a leader of one faction— alone or in cooperation with other parties—might eventually succeed him. Wali Khan aspires to national leadership but so far his strength is only in the NWFP and Baluchistan; to be a viable national leader he would have to win over the support of the left wing of the PPP. The leaders of the fragmented offshoots of Jinnah’s Muslim League have been discredited by the mistakes of the pre-Ayub and Ayub eras; they have a long way to go before they can hope to challenge Bhutto. 43. If Bhutto were to fall—for whatever cause—a military takeover would be probable, eventually if not immediately. Our knowledge of the comparative strengths and differing political attitudes of those in the Pakistani armed forces is scanty. Pakistan might again be ruled by a clique of high-ranking, conservative officers as it was in Ayub’s and Yahya’s days. On the other hand, the takeover might be engineered by more junior officers with outlooks similar to the Nassers and Qadhafis of the Arab world, i.e., nationalist radicals with programs not unlike those of Bhutto himself. Whatever its economic and social policies at home, the chances are that a new military regime would work to strengthen the armed forces, and might take a more uncompromising line against India. C. PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES 44. In sum, while Pakistan must face pressing challenges and now appears unlikely to resolve all of them satisfactorily, it does not necessarily face disaster. The principal stumbling block to a peace settlement will probably be the Kashmir issue; ranking just behind it is the Bangladesh demand that certain Pakistani prisoners be tried for atrocities. Both Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi are capable of decisive action. With a mixture of statesmanship and luck, a comprehensive agreement might be reached, but the odds do not favor it. An interim arrangement on some immediate issues might be reached, however. This would substantially ease tensions in the short term, but would leave the final resolution of basic differences uncertain. Without an accord, the Pakistanis will be forced to endure their present difficult situation. 45. Pakistan’s new civilian political system, with President Bhutto as its dominant figure, would not automatically be threatened by a breakdown of Indo-Pakistani peace talks. Given the many variables, we cannot estimate with any confidence Bhutto’s ability to bring off what is necessary to keep him in power. His future depends on his ability to negotiate with India in a manner which is acceptable to the Pakistani people, and to deal effectively with Pakistan’s social, economic and political problems. It is not yet clear if he will be able to avoid the many pitfalls in his path. If he fails, he will most likely be succeeded, eventually if no immediately, by a regime dominated by military figures. 46. There are certain possible developments which could worsen the prospects suggested above. A renewal of hostilities followed by Indian occupation of large parts of Pakistan would be the most dramatic and decisive threat to that nation’s future. Or Pakistan might find itself grievously weakened by internal strife. Civil war, stemming from ethnic/linguistic antagonisms is not impossible; if this happened, the armed forces might split on such lines and cease to be effective. Another contingency would be a sharp deterioration of economic conditions leading to mounting unemployment and unrest even in rural areas. These developments in turn could lead to the eruption of serious domestic turmoil on class lines, and a failure of central authority. 47. On the other hand, a sequence of favorable developments could conceivably bring Pakistan a brighter future. Two conditions would probably be required for this: an acceptable and amicable settlement with Indian and the achievement of a stable political consensus—which could occur under Bhutto, another civilian, or an effective military regime. For longer term political health, Pakistan, would also have to adopt measures both conducive to economic growth and responsive to public demand for a greater degree of social justice than it has had in the past. [Omitted here is an annex describing the four provinces of Pakistan.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. An initial cover sheet and table of contents are not published. * See Annex for a more detailed breakdown of the peoples and political subdivisions of Pakistan. * For example, the army’s first Punjabi commander was appointed only in March 1972. 260. Telegram 5704 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 260. Telegram 5704 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, May 8, 1972, 1445Z Subject: Meeting With DEA re Economic Aid 1. AID Director Houston was summoned to DEA May 8 for “urgent message”. Joint Secretary S. Krishnaswami advised that with I.G.W Patel in Montreal and M.G. Kaul in Santiago he had been instructed to deliver the following message which would also be given to State/AID by Ambassador Jha. 2. Holding a typewritten paper but scarcely glancing at it, Krishnaswami said the US “economic aid” had been discussed extensively by his Ministry since the calls here and in Washington to advise the GOI of no development loans in FY 72 and “provisional” development loans of dols 90 million for FY 73 in the congressional presentation. 3. Krishnaswami said the Ministry felt that the manner in which the GOI had been advised had been done to put special emphasis on the drastic cut in USAID. This, together with use of the word “provisional” led the Ministry to the conclusion that the “USG is no longer interested in the further economic development of india. Would USAID therefore remove all Americans working on economic aid at the earliest and hopefully within one month?” Houston commented that he did not believe USG disinterest was an accurate conclusion, but Krishnaswami repeated that he “was under instructions to give the message as stated”. 4. Proceeding to details, Krishnaswami said in reply to Houston’s question that “technical assistance personnel were not involved at present. We will make a decision on technical assistance later”. Houston explained that there are almost no people working exclusively on “economic aid” but that we would make a serious attempt to comply with the GOI request. 5. Krishnaswami was asked whether the GOI wished to have the executive and legislative branches of the USG advised widely of the GOI decision. He replied that no information would be released here, and he hoped not in Washington. Houston reminded him that Congress would be interested to know the situation as the AID bills are considered. Krishnaswami was then asked whether the GOI would accept dols 90 million if appropriated and offered. He answered he wanted it to be clear that the GOI was not rpt not rejecting today either dols 90 million or a possible resumption of the dols 87.6 million suspended loan. However, acceptance, if offered, would be considered when the GOI could see what “conditions” there might be. FYI: The GOI are still very sensitive about the unilateral suspension of what they consider to be a firm USG commitment. End FYI. 6. Comment: Joint Secretary Krishnaswami was an Eisenhower Fellow in the U.S. in early 1971. We consider him to be very sympathetic to the U.S., and there can be no doubt he was acting under instructions. Mission proceeding to careful evaluation of personnel involved, and will advise soonest. Exempt from decontrol. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Nodis. Eyes only for Sisco and Hannah. 261. Telegram 83263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 261. Telegram 83263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, May 11, 1972, 2350Z Subject: AID Staff in India Ref: New Delhi 574 1. We are considering the implications of Ministry of Finance request that USAID remove from India all Americans working on economic aid at early date. We do not wish in any way to suggest that we question this request or that we are reluctant to move in the direction suggested. We believe that the best tactics would be to indicate response for phased reduction of AID staff in India in line with mutually agreed priorities. 2. We suggest AID Director return to Ministry of Finance and take following line: A. USG considers Indian request a constructive proposal. USG does not wish maintain staff in any country which is not essential to program. We therefore propose USG-GOI consultations designed to produce mutually agreed reduction of AID staff taking into consideration Indian and US priorities for various programs. B. We suggest staff reductions not necessarily be limited to quote Americans working on economic aid unquote. As Mission Director told Krishnaswami, there are few if any AID personnel exclusively in that category. We propose that we indicate willingness for reduction of all categories AID personnel not fully employed or not essential for mutually agreed program objectives. C. We suggest consultation with Ministry of Finance so that we may take carefully into account Indian and US priorities in regard to technical assistance and other AID activities. D. We are quite flexible in regard to the extent of personnel reductions and would welcome Ministry of Finance views on this subject. E. We note remarks by Krishnaswami regarding possible resumption of suspended or new aid. It should be made clear to GOI that favorable consideration for AID staff reductions carries with it no significance one way or the other in regard to resumption of aid. It is simply recognition of change in current status of ongoing program which we believe meets desires of both countries. F. We agree fully these discussions should be held very closely pending mutual agreement on AID staff reductions and plan limit information in Washington on strictly need-to-know basis. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes only for Ambassador from Hannah and Sisco. Drafted by Schneider and by Williams and Hannah; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Williams, and Hannah; and approved by Irwin. 262. Telegram 5892 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 262. Telegram 5892 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, May 12, 1972, 0835Z Subj: Second Meeting With DEA re American Personnel Working on Economic Aid—May 11, 1972 Ref: New Delhi 5704 1. AID Director Houston, accompanied by Deputy Director, called on DEA Joint Secretary S. Krishnaswami in follow-up of meeting reported reftel. Purpose of meeting was to advise DEA of American personnel directly involved in economic aid and who would be leaving India if GOI elected to proceed along lines of reftel. A list of all repeat all American personnel was left with Krishnaswami with indications of those who work primarily on the development of economic aid proposals including program loans and sector loans. Personnel list was also marked to indicate all other Americans scheduled to depart India between now and September without being replaced. (Total 59). 2. Those indicated as working primarily on the development of economic aid were Clarence Gulick, David Mandel, and the potential replacement for Lester Hook’s position for handling operational aspects of non-project loans. It was explained that the remaining personnel in capital development and economic affairs were needed for other mission requirements such as monitoring existing loans and economic analysis and reporting. Other personnel, although contributing occasionally to economic aid portion of program, work primarily on technical assistance. 3. Krishnaswami stated DEA wished to review the lists submitted and would advise us concerning their views sometime next week. No action was requested of us at this time. 4. Director Houston commented that there also are Indian personnel associated with economic aid and agreed to provide a list of local-hire personnel comparable to list submitted of U.S. personnel. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Sisco and Hannah. 263. Telegram 85263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 263. Telegram 85263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, May 16, 1972, 0035Z Subject: AID Staff in India 1. We believe it is important that Ministry of Finance be aware that Indian request for reduction of US AID staff has been carefully considered by Washington. Therefore AID Director should return promptly to DEA and convey instructions in State 9819, making clear our desire to consider jointly with Ministry of Finance minimum staffing needs in all categories of personnel, including technical assistance, to meet Indian and U.S. priorities for various programs. 2. We note that mission has informed Ministry that fifty-nine Americans on US AID staff will depart by next September without being replaced. Joint review with GOI should therefore focus on remaining staff. We wish to follow course of these discussions carefully. Embassy should therefore report fully discussions with GOI officials. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on May 15 by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen and Williams, and approved by Sisco. 264. Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 264. Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, May 31, 1972, 1430Z Subject: USAID/India Technical Assistance Program Ref: New Delhi 6181 1. Mission Director and Evans, Program Division Chief, have had separate meetings with Krishnaswami and DEA staff during past week. 2. Evans was told that elimination of the U.S. technical assitance program had been discussed at “the highest levels”. DEA argued that U.S. aid, whether bilateral or through multilateral channels, was of great importance to India, so a compromise was reached whereby the GOI would continue to request technical assistance in a few selected areas where U.S. superiority was obvious. 3. Krishnaswami said to Houston that the GOI did not like discussing “bits and pieces” of the aid program. They would prefer to talk about an aid program “in its totality”. Therefore, until such time as this might happen, the GOI will sign no new TA agreements, at least for FY 72 and 73. He carefully pointed out that the GOI would sign proage necessary to continue on-going projects. 4. DEA proposes eliminating the agricultural production and agricultural inputs programs. They plan to take over directly costs involved in Iffco. Within a ceiling of about thirty technicians, they would like to continue agricultural universities development, rice research, soil & water, rural electric coops, science education, and nutritional foods development. Personnel levels in these projects are being negotiated. 5. There was consierable discussion about U.S. and Indian support staff. Houston said the numbers would have to be reduced in line with the size of the program. He pointed out that Indian employees would most likely blame the GOI for what will be substantially number of separations. Krishnaswami seemed quite concerned about the situation. 6. The subject of Nepalese participants in India was discussed. Krishnaswami told Houston that “in view of the present uncertainties the GOI would be unable to approve the program for the current year.” FYI: 164 requests for such training have been held by DEA for two months 271 Nepalese are in India now and we do not believe they will be affected. End FYI. We are advising USAID/Nepal. 7. Trust fund replenishment is a recurrent theme in our discussions. DEA officials seem paralyzed at the thought of asking Parliament for an appropriation to cover locals costs of the U.S. aid program. PL 480 (!) loan funds they consider to be almost as difficult. We intend to keep pressing DEA on this subject in view of the imminent depletion of these funds. 8. Expect another meeting early next week. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Hannah and Sisco. Additional documentation on the further reduction of U.S. economic and technical assistance programs in India can be found ibid. 265. Telegram 7113 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 265. Telegram 7113 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, June 9, 1972, 1525Z Subject: Secretary Connolly’s Visit to India 1. As Department aware, style and substance of Secretary Connolly’s visit will be crucial importance to its success, with style carrying greater importance with unusually-sensitive and xenophobic Indians than probably any other post he will vtsit. On substantive side, as our senior most US representative to visit India since souring our relations with Indo-Pak war and its after-math, GOI will be looking (and hoping) for some indication we are prepared to let bygones be bygones and work toward a new mutually satisfactory and fruitfull relationship. This is true even though they continually rake up old complaints in Parliament and in the press. 2. I will have some specific suggestions for Secretary regarding his dialogue with key Indian leaders which I hope will help set positive tone of this visit. I suggest secret service be reminded that Secretary and party as welcome guests in India will be considered by GOI to be their primary responsibility as regards security and welfare. Obviously, Secret Service will feel only they can effectively assure Secretary’s safety, but I hope they will in turn consider Indian authorities their partners in this effort, and am confident they will receive the excellent and effective cooperation we have always had from Indian services in such instances. 3. On substantive side, I would hope Secretary could include following elements in his presentation: (A) Reiterate assurance we are prepared to let bygones be bygones and believe it in our mutual self-interest to look to future and not past. (B) Assurance that future US role in area, contrary to what others say about us, is one designed to contribute to peace, stability and development of area as a whole, interests we believe are wholly compatible with those of GOI and other countries. (C) Improvement in our relations can only be based on recognition that each of us must take account of vital interests of the other e.g. Viet Nam and not act in such a way as to directly interfere with the vital interests of the other party. (D) For its part, in implementing foregoing, US has no intention in foreseeable future to provide lethal military equipment in any form to Pakistan (Comment: This is the single most irritating bone sticking in the Indian craw. Orally and in the press the impression is conveyed that the freeze on further military aid to Pakistan is only temporary and after election the flow will start to again build up Pakistan military machine. End comment.) We should point out we do not seek to build up Pakistan or any other country as a counterweight to India; we have long contributed to Indian economic development because we wanted to see a democratic India make a success of its development. Our assistance efforts in future will only be in response to clearly expressed requests of GOI. (E) As further earnest of our intentions, we are authorizing release of dols 87.6 million non-project assistance which had been temporarily suspended at outbreak of hositilities last December. (Comment: This so-called “breach of US committment” is second most serious irritant. Although pride may cause GOI officials not to bring up this subject and indeed to react to offer of reinstatement with reserve and possible rejection. End comment.) 4. Needless to say it is extremely important to success of Secretary Connolly’s visit that we take favorable position on Indian debt relief at forthcoming Paris meeting. 5. If it is intention to provide report to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on results of Moscow summit I would hope that new piece of information or insight could be included beyond that which has already been well-covered in public domain. Report similar to that contained in Secretary’s presentation to NAC (Bonn 7563) would be most helpful. 6. By time of visit we should know outlines of results Indo-Pak summit. It would be useful to invite Indian leaders to give their appraisal of summit results. However, it will be important to remember extreme Indian sensitivity to anything smacking of meddling in what GOI insists is bilateral affair. Given present GOI suspicions, Indians will be on quivive for any statement that might imply US coercion or excessive US intervention. 7. I trust Department will find foregoing thoughts helpful in preparing for Secretary’s visit, which I am confident can be important milestone in reversing current atmosphere of recriminations, and set stage for marked improvement in our bilateral relations. 9. Department repeat as desired. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 12, 1972 SUBJECT: India Consortium Meeting—US Position The annual World Bank-sponsored Consortium meeting of economic assistance donors to India is scheduled for June 13 and 14. The normal routine at these affairs is for the donors (1) to make “pledges” of new bilateral assistance and (2) to agree on limited debt rescheduling. Since our position will be a major element in our evolving relationship with India and in the backdrop for Secretary Connally’s talk with Mrs. Gandhi, this requires a brief review of the aid relationship with India. Background You will recall that the elements in the present situation are as follows: —While irrevocably committed aid remained in the pipeline, the $87.6 million in past aid cut off last December is still in suspense. —The US has provided no new development assistance in FY 1972 (about $190 million was initially programmed). —An originally planned $72 million PL 480 agreement for FY 1972 was never signed. —World Bank/IDA loan approvals, for which the US provides 40% of the funding, have increased, although disbursements mostly will not begin until FY 1973 and depend on the US appropriation for IDA replenishment. —While we have plugged a provisional planning figure for an FY 1973 development loan program into the tentative AID program presented to Congress for next year, India has been told that our aid relationship is still under review. There is no need to change the status of any of these points now. They could be reviewed later in the summer in the context of Secretary Connally’s talks and subsequent dialogue with the Indians. In any such review, the first issue to be considered would be removing the suspension of the $87 million because it was committed under past contracts. But that is not the subject of this memorandum. On the question of new aid, we will simply say at the consortium meeting that we are not prepared yet to pledge new assistance for FY 1973. The Present Issue The issue now is posed by the consortium’s annual debt rescheduling exercise. In each of the past four years, the AID donors have provided India with $100 million in debt relief. We have pushed the main burden on to donors other than the US whose lending terms have been much harder than ours; our share last year was only $9 million of the $100 million. The purposes of the rescheduling have been to prevent repayments from eating too heavily into the total flow of AID and to increase the relative contribution of the hard lenders. The Bank this year is proposing $200 million in debt relief instead of last year’s $100 million along with a possible formula which would put a heavier burden on us. No one here favors supporting that approach because we want to keep the pressure on the hard lenders. The issue is whether we should participate in debt relief at a level of $100 million on the basis of a formula designed to keep the pressure on the hard lenders . Our share would be about $12 million. The alternatives are not to participate at all or try to delay, which would in effect amount to non-participation. The arguments for non-participation are: —This would be consistent with our general policy of not taking any positive aid steps for the time being. Debt relief makes additional foreign exchange available to India just as new aid would. —There has not been a sufficient political dialogue yet to provide the context for any such steps. It has not been long since India’s sharp criticism of our recent Vietnam policy. The arguments for participation are: —Non-participation would be a major negative political and economic signal. It would be read in India as the virtual end of an Indo-US relationship in development. —Non-participation would, for the time being, take us out of the further management of the Indian debt and leave it in the hands of those who have loaned on harder terms. We have an interest in repayment of the $3.6 billion owed us. —India could declare a unilateral moratorium on repayment as Pakistan did and recoup the same amount of money, so non-participation would not necessarily deprive India of comparable resources. —Non-participation would damage the consortium approach to aid which has served well in Pakistan, Turkey, Colombia and other countries. While it is tempting not to participate until our political relationship is on a sounder basis, the strategy which would change our present political course least is to participate on last year’s level of $100 million, of which our share Would be about $12 million—not at the new $200 million proposed by the Bank. This would permit us to maintain a strong hand in the debt repayment business and avoid sending a major new negative political signal. At the same time, we would maintain our stance of not providing new aid. In essence, we would be doing the minimum to preserve control over repayment of debt owed us and to close no doors politically. The attached memorandum from Secretary Rogers concurs in this approach. RECOMMENDATION: That US participation the consortium debt rescheduling exercise be authorized at a level and on terms at least as favorable to us as during the past four years (i.e. $100 million per year, US share about 4 million). APPROVE___________ OTHER_____________ Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 5, 1972 Subject: Aid to India; Debt Relief We must make a decision on a World Bank proposal for debt relief for India so that our advice can be conveyed to the Bank’s Aid to India Consortium meeting on June 13–14. Background You will recall that during the India-Pakistan war last December we suspended $87.6 million of general assistance under signed agreements with India which was not already committed to U.S. suppliers by American banks. We also decided to withhold an offer to India of about $72 million of PL–480 assistance in the form of cotton and vegetable oil. On the other hand, we decided that we would face major legal and administrative difficulties unless we continued the aid in the pipeline which had already been committed to American suppliers under irrevocable letters of credit. Also unaffected by the suspension was a $9 million U.S. annual share in a $100 million debt relief agreement with nine other creditor countries. This was a continuation of a debt relief program begun in FY 69. Following the India-Pakistan war, other countries which participate in the Aid to India Consortium have continued their bilateral assistance at roughly the same or higher levels. As earlier planned, the World Bank (IDA), for which the U.S. provides about 40 percent of the funding, has stepped up its loan commitments for India this fiscal year. The Bank has already approved $337 million in loans for FY 72 and has scheduled an additional $75 million for consideration this fiscal year. Disbursements under most of their commitments will not begin before FY 73. We have already informed the Indians that the U.S. will provide no development loans for FY 72. In regard to FY 73, we are keeping our aid policy under review and will not make a decision until we have a better idea of whether India is more willing than at present to conduct its relations with us on a realistic basis which takes account of American interests. However, in order to keep our options open but without any commitment whatsoever, in consultation with the NSC staff we have put into our Congressional request for FY 73 a provisional figure for India. We told the Indians that this provisional request had no significance one way or the other regarding our future aid policy which remains under review. Debt Relief Issue We must now decide what to do about further debt relief for India. In each of the past four years, the Consortium members have provided India with $100 million a year of debt relief under a formula which has the hard lenders, such as the French and Japanese, carry 55 percent of the total relief and also share the 45 percent balance with the soft lenders, including the United States. The Bank has now proposed debt relief of $200 million per year for this year and next, and has reopened the technical question of sharing this relief between countries. For purposes of comparison, total Indian repayments in 1972 are estimated at $626 million, and gross aid flows at $1,123 million. We believe the most we should consider would be to participate in a further Indian debt exercise at the same level and under the same formula as in the past four years. Total debt relief by all creditor countries would be about $100 million or half the level proposed by the Bank. Of this amount, the U.S. share would be about $12 million (about 10 percent of payments due to us annually from India) and would, of course, be much the same as additional economic assistance for India. We would also take the position, as we have previously, that the Indians should seek comparable relief from Soviet and Eastern European aid donors. This issue is not a simple one, since the position we take in India will have an effect on debt rescheduling exercises with other countries. It is important to us to maintain the very advantageous debt relief formula that has been applied to India for its value as a precedent in other cases where we are seeking a similar shift in burden sharing from the soft to the hard lenders. Also, we have a substantial interest in the management of Indian debt, since $3.6 billion of it is owed to the U.S. on notably soft terms. We have basically three options for dealing with the India debt issue: Option 1 . We could refuse to join in a debt relief exercise for India. This would be consistent with our position on additional aid for India. It is possible, however, that other Consortium members, most of whom have endorsed the idea of some continued debt relief, might go ahead without us. If they did, the hard lenders would be strengthened and would almost certainly be able to upset the current burden-sharing formula, which is favorable to the United States (we hold 40 percent of Indian debt, but provide 9–12 percent of India’s debt relief). Also, our absence would undermine the principle of universal participation as well as the concept of multilateral coordination for aid and debt relief exercises for underdeveloped countries generally. Our role as India’s largest creditor would be weakened. Option 2 . We could seek a postponement of further debt relief for India. This would have the advantage of being consistent with our aid policy generally. Since most donor countries and the Indians consider that our relations with India are likely to remain distant for some time, they are likely, however, to see our position as substantially the same as rejection. Therefore, the donors might proceed without us with the same effects as indicated under Option 1. Option 3 . We could indicate our willingness to participate in a rescheduling at a level and on terms at least as favorable to us as during the past four years (i.e., $100 million per year, U.S. share about $12 million). We would confine the agreement to a single year and review Indian performance before considering further debt relief. We would repeat that our own aid program for India remained under review and make clear that our participation in debt relief had no significance one way or the other regarding our future aid policy. This alternative would maintain a debt relief formula very favorable to the United States and support the principle of universality in such exercises. We would thereby preserve our interest as India’s major creditor, and the Indian example would be helpful to us as we seek international agreement on debt relief for other countries. Recommendation On balance, I am inclined to recommend that we support the debt rescheduling proposal included in Option 3 on the grounds of its importance to our position on debt rescheduling generally for the nations of the underdeveloped world. The Department of the Treasury concurs with this recommendation. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. The President initialed the approval line. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers on June 12 informing him of the President’s decision. (Ibid.) The decision relating to the India consortium came in the wake of the meeting of the Pakistan consortium in Paris on May 26. The United States agreed at that meeting to assume responsibility for $50 million of the $108 million of Pakistan’s long-term debt that was rescheduled and also pledged $60 million of commodity assistance to Pakistan. (Telegram 4900 from Islamabad, June 5; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID 9 PAK) 267. Memorandum of Conversation 267. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Peking, June 20, 1972, 2:05–6:05 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Chou En-Lai Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen-Chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (second part only) Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter Chi Chao-chi, Interpreter Two notetakers Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.] Dr. Kissinger: At that time it seemed to us that the Soviet Union was pursuing two policies that were sometimes contradictory at the same time, which we have found is not an unusual phenomenon in Moscow. On the one hand, they wanted to make progress in their bilateral relations with us. On the other hand, they wanted to show, to demonstrate your impotence, and your impotence even combined with us, and therefore they pursued the policy in the Indian Subcontinent. And secondly, they greatly accelerated their arms into Indochina as a result of the first Podgorny visit. This is our analysis—your interpretation may be different. Actually, what happens in Indochina would not demonstrate your impotence, but would create one other Soviet dependent state around your borders. We discussed that previously—I am just summing it up. And we also believe that they would have liked the offensive to start before the visit to Peking because that would have created the maximum amount of complications in our relationship. I am just giving you our assessment. I am sure you do not agree with every last analysis we have made. As you know, we reacted extremely strongly to the situation in South Asia. And on one morning when we received a message that you had a message to deliver to us which was, we thought, that you had sent your troops in, we had decided that if you were attacked by the Soviet Union as a result of it, we would support you and take military measures if necessary to prevent that attack. We received that message in early December—I think it was December 11, our time, in the morning. We received word, and when we picked up that message in the afternoon, it had a different content. We also, as you remember, threatened to.... Prime Minister Chou: By that time East Pakistan was already unable to be saved. Dr. Kissinger: No, no, you made the correct decision. It would have been too late, but I had had a talk with your Ambassador. Prime Minister Chou: Because when they were in the UN at that time they were not clear about that situation. Because Mr. Bhutto himself also was not a military man and Yahya Khan had boasted about the military situation, so I believe Mr. Bhutto arrived on the 11th, and he thought that the military situation in Pakistan at that time was indeed very well. He didn’t know about the coup at home. Dr. Kissinger: I think it was about December 11. Bhutto arrived in New York on Friday the 10th our time, 11th your time. I met Huang Hua on the 10th. I first met Huang Hua the evening of Friday the 10th, then I met Huang Hua the morning of the 11th—no, I met Huang Hua the evening of the 10th and then I met.... and then you sent us a message which we received. You called us the morning of the 12th, and we were going to the meeting with Pompidou so we sent General Haig. But between the time we got the phone call and picked up the message we didn’t know what it was. And since Huang Hua had taken a very tough line, not knowing the situation, I thought your message to us was that you were taking military measures. And since we were going to the Azores before we met with you we had to give instructions. If your message was you were taking military measures, our instructions were that if the Soviet Union moved against you we would move against the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Chou: Why was it that your newspapers later on published the full minutes it seemed, or parts of the minutes, of meetings held by the Washington Special Actions Group? Dr. Kissinger: This part of the decision was never in the Washington Special Actions Group because it was much too sensitive. This sort of decision had been made in a much smaller group. Prime Minister Chou: I know about that. But why did the newspapers publish what had been discussed step by step in the Washington Special Actions Group with respect to the East Pakistan situation? Dr. Kissinger: Well, first the Prime Minister has to understand the Washington Special Actions Group is a group which implements decisions—it does not make decisions. The reason that I had to take such a strong stand in this group was because the vast majority of our bureaucracy was pro-Indian and pro-Soviet. Prime Minister Chou: Pro-Soviet? Dr. Kissinger: More pro-Soviet than pro-Chinese in any event. I came under the most violent attack after I threatened to cancel the Moscow summit. That was when you [to Ch’iao] were there probably, the most violent attack. But what happened was a disloyal member of our bureaucracy gave these documents to the newspapers, and they printed them in order to destroy us, and they came very close. They will not be given a second opportunity. Prime Minister Chou: But after reading the records that were published it seemed to me the members of that group came from quite a lot of quarters. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they were almost unanimously against our policy. Prime Minister Chou: Especially toward India. Dr. Kissinger: They didn’t understand our overall strategy. If they had understood we were getting ready to take on the Soviet Union then what happened was mild compared to what would have happened. The reason we moved our fleet into the Indian Ocean was not because of India primarily—it was as pressure on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union did what I mentioned before. Prime Minister Chou: And they also closely followed you down into the Indian Ocean. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what they had there we could have taken care of very easily. Prime Minister Chou: What they were trying to do was to create more noise in East Bengal. They openly passed through the Tsushima Straits and then through the Malacca Straits. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not with a force that could have fought ours. Prime Minister Chou: But you know they could surface in such a way their support to East Bengal. Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, it was used for that purpose. Actually, the Pakistani army in the east surrendered five days later, so it would have been too late for you to do anything. Prime Minister Chou: Also, Yahya Kahn had already sent his order in preparation for such a measure on the 11th or the 12th. Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: I would like to add a word. On the morning of Friday, the 10th, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, had already informed US that East Pakistan had informed the Secretariat through their personnel in East Pakistan... Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, the Vice Foreign Minister is absolutely correct. Speaking very confidentially, we urged them then not to do this until we had an opportunity to talk to you, and to assess the situation, and I believe your advice was the same. Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: That happened on the day that Mr. Bhutto arrived in New York, and on his arrival we told him about this news. He had originally prepared to meet U Thant, but we had a luncheon engagement with U Thant. So we went, but Mr. Bhutto upon going to the hotel immediately called Yahya Kahn and advised him not to do so. That happened on the day of his arrival in New York. Prime Minister Chou: But we must say that Yahya Kahn made his efforts and contribution toward our countries, and we still mention this when we see him. But he was a general who did not know how to fight a war. He not only was useless in war, but he did things that worsened the situation. This was something we had not expected. We had expected he would not be able to improve the situation, but we didn’t know he could have done things so badly. Because he had four divisions that had not been thrown into battle, but before any fighting they began to crumble. Actually, according to our knowledge, these armed forces were able to fight in battle. Dr. Kissinger: But he scattered them around the frontier—he put too many forces into East Pakistan. They would have done him more good if he had used them in West Pakistan in an offensive. Secondly, he should have ignored the Indians and concentrated on one place, and tried to defeat them somewhere. Prime Minister Chou: On such things Ayub Khan was more capable than Yahya Kahn. Dr. Kissinger: Yahya Kahn was a decent man, but not very intelligent and, it turned out, not a very good general. And we are very grateful to him on our side for having arranged our contacts. I think it was the last joy on his public career—he loved secret missions. He worked on it with great passion. When I visited him just before I came here, he was beside himself with conspiratorial maneuvers. He also gave me great advice on how to deal with the Prime Minister, all of which turned out to be wrong. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) But I didn’t mention it in order to go into details of this, or to discuss the Chinese aspect of the policy, but to explain our general strategy toward the Soviet Union. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1971-Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in the Great Hall of the People. 268. Memorandum of Conversation 268. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Peking, June 22, 1972, 3:58–6:35 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Chou En-Lai Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen-Chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (4:40 p.m. to conclusion) Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter Two Notetakers Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.] Prime Minister Chou: There is another question which I originally planned to discuss—the question of the Subcontinent. We will first go into that. We believe we should do this rather quickly because there is still some more about Vietnam we want to discuss. Dr. Kissinger: All right. Also I want to say a word about Germany to the Prime Minister. Let’s talk about the Subcontinent first. Our assessment is that India is pursuing at the moment a quite aggressive foreign policy. (Prime Minister questions translator’s translation.) And it is in some respects becoming obviously, whatever its own intentions, an extension of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy. For example, the Prime Minister no doubt knows that India has offered to both Indonesia and even to Japan treaties which are word for word the same as its own treaties with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Chou: That is right. Dr. Kissinger: So that if this came to be, it would be in effect an alliance with India which in turn would be linked to the Soviet Union. And I believe also that Indian interests extend as well to Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Chou: That is so. Mrs. Gandhi has taken over the legacy of her father in his work, The Discovery of India. That was the ambition of Nehru—the ambition of discovery. Dr. Kissinger: He did not have the energy to carry it out. He was more theoretical. Prime Minister Chou: Anyway he showed the direction of his ambitions. Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And when we spoke yesterday of a zone of relaxation in Southeast Asia, I want to say to the Prime Minister as far as we are concerned, we would also look with disfavor on an attempt by India to establish hegemony in that area. The Prime Minister may also be aware that when I was asked in Japan about the various proposals for Asian collective security arrangements I stated—not publicly, but since there is no such thing as a private conversation in Japan, I support suppose it became public—that we would join no arrangement which objectively was directed against the PRC. If he is not aware, I am telling him now. I think we agree in our analysis of the situation. The immediate problem is that the ability of India to pursue these policies depends to some extent on its ability to gain freedom of action on the Indian Subcontinent. We believe that the strategy of India is to do to West Pakistan what it has already done to East Pakistan by disintegrating it, by bringing about the succession of to Northwestern frontier and Baluchistan. Indeed, when Mrs. Gandhi was in Washington in November and talked with the President she stressed that she did not even talk much about East Pakistan any more. She talked about the betrayal that was involved in West Pakistan. Therefore the problem is whether it is possible to save West Pakistan and thereby absorb some of India’s energies on the Subcontinent rather than free them all for expansion. I’m saying this cold-bloodedly; it’s our analysis. To preserve West Pakistan there are two aspects—one is economic; the other is military. On the economic side we have been able to do quite a bit. We have given $150 million in direct aid and about $180 million through international institutions—that is, the US share of it. Prime Minister Chou: That is recently—after the war. Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about since the war, and we are somewhat handicapped because we refused to give any economic assistance to India so we have a complicated Congressional problem with which I will not bore the Prime Minister. But we have not given any aid to India. This is not so much of a punishment because India owes us $3.5 billion and, it will simply refuse to repay. (Chou and Ch’iao laugh). Now the big problem is military assistance to the Pakistanis. We have been prevented by the Democratic Congress from giving aid directly. I wanted to tell the Prime Minister in strictest confidence that when we were in Iran we asked the Shah to organize a consortium of Greece, Iran, Turkey, maybe Jordan, to establish military assistance to Pakistan with American weapons. We did some of this illegally during the war, as the Prime Minister knows. To do it legally we will have to start a small arms program to Pakistan because there is a provision in our law that American weapons can be transferred to third countries only if those countries are eligible to receive American weapons directly. (Chou asks Mr. Chi a question. He answers. Miss Tang also speaks.) We think we can solve that in the next few months. Prime Minister Chou: I don’t want at all to interfere in internal affairs. However, I want to make a suggestion. I think it would be best that Jordan does not take part in this. Dr. Kissinger: I agree. That will not happen. Prime Minister Chou: Because Iran and Turkey are somewhat different; there is the question of CENTO. But Jordan is not quite in the Arab world. Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Prime Minister Chou: In December when you went to give them 12 planes by Jordan it was not easy nor did it give any good influence, impression. Dr. Kissinger: But at that time we had to do it because the Soviet Union was bringing so much pressure on Iran. There was a complicated arrangement. We flew Iranian planes to Jordan and Jordan planes to Pakistan. It was an emergency. This won’t happen again. So in this I wanted to tell the Prime Minister our intention, but something depends on what your intentions are, because if you should have come to the conclusion nothing can be done for Pakistan in the military field then it will be very difficult for us to do it all. But we can and we are prepared to give certain types of equipment that you will find it difficult to supply, and to see whether there can be a combination of Iranian and, Turkish tanks and modern airplanes. And we have also encouraged France to sell airplanes to Pakistan, and they are doing it now. Prime Minister Chou: We have not stopped our aid to Pakistan. Our aid to Pakistan is continuing. As for our tanks to Pakistan, they are, of course, light tanks. The planes we supply Pakistan are renovated versions of MIG–19s. In fact, to be very honest with you, the renovated MIG–19s we have been giving Pakistan are greater in numbers than those we have been giving Vietnam. We haven’t been giving so many MIG–19s to Vietnam. So what is there so bad about stopping the war in Indochina? Why must we test our weapons on the Indochina battlefield? Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We don’t want to continue the war in Indochina. Prime Minister Chou: We will discuss it later. And once the war in Vietnam comes to a stop then we can supply Pakistan even more quickly with our weaponry. We have already agreed to give so many things to them, but we are not able to complete their orders to us. Because East Pakistan lost two divisions of equipment without even fighting. Dr. Kissinger: That was a very stupid deployment. Prime Minister Chou: But we said nothing. Because we have made it clear that once we have given those weapons to them they have full freedom to make use of them as they like. We have no right to interfere in their affairs. We have not a single adviser there. We don’t want any such prerogatives of interfering in their sovereignty. Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest in Pakistan except to maintain its independence. We have no other purposes there. Prime Minister Chou: It is not possible for you not to mind yourself about the Subcontinent because the Soviet Union is attempting to exercise hegemony. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is what we are trying to... Prime Minister Chou: Britain is already expressing her dissatisfaction. Dr. Kissinger: But Britain contributed to this in December. Prime Minister Chou: To Secretary Home we say, why do you come to realize these things afterwards? And also Foreign Minister Schumann. Dr. Kissinger: It would be very interesting if you would tell the Europeans about your situation because the Vice Foreign Minister knows last December they made our life very difficult. Prime Minister Chou: Of the 104 votes in the General Assembly Britain and France were not included, and the Vice Minister openly criticized them about that. But only on 20, 21 December at the Security Council meeting they agreed on the rules of ceasefire after Dacca had fallen, but that was too late already. The General Assembly also voted on December 7. Actually if action was taken at that time, then Dacca would have been saved. Mr. Ch’iao: The greatest procrastinations came about in the Security Council on the 11th and 12th. Dr. Kissinger: I was just going to say that. The British were particularly bad, as the Vice Foreign Minister knows. Prime Minister Chou: Then the situation was rather clear to some, but it was already too late. Dr. Kissinger: The art in foreign policy is to be right before it is self-evident. Prime Minister Chou: That is right. You need foresight. Dr. Kissinger: So if I may say so, I think a clear analysis of your point of view to both Schumann, who is less steady, and to the British would be very important when they come here. Because Britain is no better off with India for having tried to curry the favor of India than we for having opposed India (Chou laughs). Prime Minister Chou: The British think they are still in the days of Lord Mountbatten, but those are days long gone. Dr. Kissinger: And they try to substitute maneuver for substance. And that can’t be done. But I believe our government, at least this Administration, believes that the Indian extension of Soviet foreign policy, can be very grave throughout Southeast Asia. In the last five years India received one billion two hundred million dollars of military equipment from the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Chou: So very expensive. Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And produced $1 billion worth of its own. During that same period Pakistan received not quite $500 million, of which most came from you. That includes the domestic production which isn’t great. That explains... Prime Minister Chou: India gets her military aid in the form of loans from the Soviet Union? Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Very low interest loans. I have promised the Vice Chairman to give him some further details, and I will do that if you tell me where I should do it. Prime Minister Chou: You think it will be all right to have it conveyed through Ambassador Huang Hua? Dr. Kissinger: I will do that next week. As you know they have given India—they plan to produce MIG–21s in India. Prime Minister Chou: The characteristics of the MIG–21 actually are not very good. Their maneuverability is even worse than that of the MIG–19 and inferior to planes of the same calibre of your country. Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are speeding up giving Iran more modern planes so that some of their planes can be free to go to Pakistan. They will still be very good. But they are producing some F-14s and F-15s. And we are speeding that up so that they can give some of their F–4s to Pakistan. That is what I wanted to tell you about our attitude on the Subcontinent. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Prime Minister Chou: And Pakistan is still remaining a member of CENTO? Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is still technically a member of CENTO. But the major strategy is to give Pakistan enough strength so that India will not be able to attack it; or that it turns itself into a vassal of India and therefore frees India to move into Southeast Asia or other parts. Prime Minister Chou: Has your diplomatic representative gone to East Pakistan? Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Prime Minister Chou: The situation in East Pakistan is not good. Dr. Kissinger: The situation in East Pakistan is very bad. In the long term I think this will be a cancer for India. Prime Minister Chou: I think so. Dr. Kissinger: Because if the situation remains chaotic, it will absorb Indian resources and if the situation improves it will be a magnet for West Bengal (Chou laughs). But our impression is that the government in Dacca is so incompetent that the effective administration is in the hands of the Indians. Prime Minister Chou: It really has the flavor of a colonial regime. Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Prime Minister Chou: And actually some Indian forces are still remaining in Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: As police. Prime Minister Chou: And officers. Dr. Kissinger: And also it is surrounded by Indian forces. (At this point, 4:40 p.m., Chang enters.) Prime Minister Chou: And so that is about the Subcontinent. As for the Subcontinent we will continue to support the independence of West Pakistan. That is a responsibility that we will continue to carry out. At the same time we shall say West Pakistan is a friendly country to us. And in fact the period of friendship is longer than that with India. But the Pakistanis are rather worried because Mrs. Gandhi has been over the past three months saying everywhere she wants to improve relations with China. Naturally, we haven’t paid any attention to her. As for exchange of Ambassadors with India, we think even that we can wait somewhat. In fact up till now that is the only country with which we have relations but have no Ambassadors. Just petty maneuvers on the part of the Indians. Dr. Kissinger: Their freedom of action is circumscribed by their dependence on Soviet military aid. Prime Minister Chou: The Indians also have tremendous domestic difficulties. As President Nixon said on his visit here, all the loans to India, including those by the World Bank, amount to $10 billion. So India adopts the policy of not repaying. Dr. Kissinger: Not yet, but I am sure that is what she is going to do. (Chou laughs). So far they have only made difficulty about repaying $100 million (Chou laughs). Prime Minister Chou: But don’t you have in your hands some of the rupees—the Indian rupees? Dr. Kissinger: In counterpart funds. Prime Minister Chou: They buy grains from you with Indian rupees. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they do. But we can’t take them out of the country. We can spend them only in India. Prime Minister Chou: I have probably told you about the history of the story about the situation of my visit to India in 1960 for talks with Nehru, my final visit and my last talk with Nehru. Did I tell you that? Dr. Kissinger: I don’t remember. Perhaps the Prime Minister can tell me again. Prime Minister Chou: That is, in 1960 for the last time I went to New Delhi to have negotiations with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border question. After a week of negotiations, towards the end, I just copied principles cited by Nehru at various periods in the past and said, “let’s agree on those principles.” And even this Nehru refused to agree to. Not a single word of agreement was reached. And then after the breakdown of the negotiations I went to Nepal the next day. On the eve of my departure from Delhi I received some foreign correspondents. At that press conference an American correspondent reminded me, “do you not know the Indian Minister of Food is now in Washington.” I said, “Now I know. Thank you for reminding me of that fact.” And then on the next day in Nepal I saw in the papers that an agreement of a loan on food grains to India, in the amount of 15 million tons of food grains, was signed in Washington to supply India two or three times a year, which was to be repayed in rupees. That was the encouragement on your side to Nehru. And on the other side was encouragement given to him by Khrushchev. That is, Khrushchev in order to obtain the so-called Spirit of Camp David—a spirit which you never recognized—Khrushchev tore up in 1959 a treaty he entered into with us on cooperation in the economic field. At that time, in October 1959, the Indians made a military provocation against us at the Natula Pass on the border with India. The Pass is on the top of the plateau. The Indians when they went up to the Pass they had more casualties, and because the Indians suffered more casualties they [the Russians] said it was China which launched the attack against India. And from that time the Indians believed what Khrushchev told them. Afterwards Neville, the British correspondent, made that clear. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia Chronological File, July 1971-Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in a guest house. 269. Telegram 5434 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 269. Telegram 5434 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, June 22, 1972, 1138Z Subj: Bhutto Looks to the Summit 1. Summary: Bhutto seems cautiously hopeful on prospects for his meeting next week with PriMin Gandhi. He believes ground exists for reaching some qte tentative understanding unqte which would be short of what Gandhi might like on various specific issues but would pave way for continuing improvement in Indo-Pak relations. He hopes he can meet Mujib about mid-July and then submit question of Bangladesh recognition for approval by Pak National Assembly in mid-August, Bhutto noted various constraints working on him within Pakistan that limit his freedom of action at forthcoming summit. End summary 2. I had 70-minute meeting with Pres Bhutto evening June 21 at his official residence in Murree Hill Station north of Islamabad. Bhutto had spent past ten days in Murree since returning from Middle East-African tour, mainly preparing for his meeting with PriMin Gandhi next week. He looked fit. Only the two of us were present for initial part of conversation which reported this tel. Bhutto called in FonSec Iftikhar Ali for rest of our meeting which reported septels. 3. I congratulated Bhutto on his effort to instill sense of realism among various elements of population on issues to be faced at his meeting with PriMin Gandhi beginning June 28 (ref Islamabad 5408). He said he thought his series of meetings with leadership elements had gone pretty well. He then quickly added that he was disturbed by signs of resurgent qte chauvinism unqte in various circles. He referred to recent statement by number of opposition political and religious figures in Lahore opposing recognition of Bangladesh and urging hard line on India. He thought political leaders in question were acting mainly on domestic partisan considerations so as to embarrass him. 4. I noted some concern in GOI as reported by our Embassy in Delhi, over what it considered undertone of rigidity in communiques and statements issued during course of Bhutto’s recent Middle East-African trip. I said I had myself noted increasing use of term qte self-determination unqte by Bhutto and GOP spokesman in referring to Kashmir issue. I said I thought qte self-determination unqte had become a term of art in subcontinent (just like qte no war pact unqte) and that its use would be widely interpreted as indicating no change and particularly no softening in GOP policy on Kashmir. Referring to communiques during his recent trip Bhutto said he had not spent time drafting them although he had approved them. In any event, GOP had to show certain firmness in approaching the summit with India so as to avoid impression it was completely defenseless. He accepted my implied chiding on use of qte self-determination unqte without remonstration, but reaffirmed view he has expressed to me on several previous occasions that he is looking for way to defuse Kashmir issue. 5. Bhutto said he still had problems to contend with in his relations with Pak military. He had recently visited army officers mess in Murree and had been dismayed to find officers telling him that Paks had not really absorbed military defeat by India and that they could give very good account of themselves if they really had to fight Bhutto said he had taken the occasion to give them a good lecture aimed at cooling the hotheads. He also told me that military had recently declined his request to make two helicopters available to him (intended use unspecified but presumably to provide logistical support for his stay in Murree). Military had cited qte military requirements unqte as reason helicopters could not be released for President’s use. Army Chief of Staff Tikka Khan had come to see Bhutto and had made point that of course Army meant nothing personal against Bhutto. Bhutto implied that he was not altogether comfortable in his relationship with military leadership. He recalled having gotten rid of Air Marshal Rahim and General Hasan (former Air Force and Army Chiefs) but said that potential for trouble remained. He stated he simply could not afford at this stage to ignore the military. When I asked whether there was possibility of Pak military’s provoking serious trouble on Kashmir ceasefire lines he replied he did not anticipate that. He did not want to leave impression with me, he said, that he had any hesitation in acting to control Pak military on any such major issue. 6. I asked him how he viewed prospects for his meeting with PriMin Gandhi. Bhutto said he hoped she would come to conclusion that he wanted peace and a just settlement and that they could both therefore begin to turn over new page in Indo-Pak relations. He said I knew his own views pretty well. He was ready to make a beginning on major changes that would, at least, contain current issues between the two countries and pave the way for peaceful long-term relationship. He was not, however, a free agent and he had to bring Pak people along with him. He could not agree, for example, to changing Kashmir ceasefire line into international boundary. He did not exclude such development at some undefined future date, but that would depend on time and the course of events. At least both countries could now agree not to fight over the issue. He thought there was now, in any event, sufficient basis for qte tentative understanding unqte between him and PriMin Gandhi on the future course of relations between the two countries. He noted that such qte tentative understanding unqte between governments tends to turn into qte understanding. Unqte 7. I asked him what role he saw for Mujib and the Bangladesh recognition. Bhutto said it seemed that Mujib would not be on hand during the Simla meeting. It was Bhutto’s hope that he could meet Mujib around the middle of July qte if the Indians succeed in getting him to lift the condition on our meeting unqte. (The qte condition unqte refers to Mujib’s demand that GOP recognize BD formally before he agrees to any meeting with Bhutto.) If he can have such a meeting with Mujib, Bhutto said, he would then put the recognition question before the Pak National Assembly when it meets in mid-August, in confident anticipation that Assembly would agree to recognition. Bhutto could justify his taking this question to assembly on grounds that final status of East Wing had to be resolved before new Pak permanent constitution could be formulated. In response my query, he said he had no special reason to believe that GOI would try or could succeed with Mujib on matter of prior recognition, but he thought Delhi might appreciate Bhutto’s problems on this matter. 8. Bhutto said his planning on meeting Mujib and putting recognition issue before National Assembly was predicated on Mujib’s holding off on war-crimes trials. If there was one issue which could upset apple cart, it was this. Recalling his earlier comments on the still sensitive relationship between himself and Pak military, Bhutto predicted there could be qte explosion unqte within army if captured Pak military were handed over by India to BDG and put on trial. 9. This part of conversation concluded with my wishing Bhutto success in his mission to India and expressing our most sincere hopes for fruitful outcome of talks between him and PriMin Gandhi. 10. Comment: Bhutto seemed to me to be cautiously hopeful on prospects for his meeting with PriMin Gandhi next week. He believes he is taking reasonable position on various issues in light of political climate and his own strength in Paktstan. He knows Mrs. Gandhi is likely to want to go further and faster than he is prepared to go or feels he can go on certain questions. His underlying hope, it seems to me, is that Mrs. Gandhi will agree to less than she would like on grounds that it is worth testing Bhutto’s bona fides on continued movement toward Indo-Pak reconciliation. He is anxious to show at least some progress. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, London, Karachi, and Lahore. 270. Telegram WH 22043 From the White House to the Embassy in New Zealand 270. Telegram WH 22043 From the White House to the Embassy in New Zealand 1 Washington, June 22, 1972, 2349Z Dr. Kissinger has asked me to mention to you one important point that will have to be dealt with in your talks with Prime Minister Gandhi in New Delhi. It arises from two related facts: A. Mrs. Gandhi on her current trip in Europe has continued to make harsh statements about our policy in Vietnam. See details below. B. At the same time, the Indians are looking to your trip as the possible beginning of a dialogue which could improve Indian-American relations. The point you will have to make without having it sour all you discussions is that these two facts are incompatible. In a very firm way it will be necessary to get across to the Indians that gratuitous slaps at US policy on an issue which is of great importance to the US will not contribute to an improvement in US-Indian relations. This point has been made to the Indians at all levels here and in New Delhi over the past two months, but Indian officials from the top down continue their criticism. In order that you will be able to speak with specific instances in mind, the following are the more notable examples of Indian comment: A. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on May 10 told the Indian Parliament after describing the President’s decision: “It will serve neither the cause of peace nor achieve the objectives President Nixon has set out in his statement while ordering the latest military action. It is a matter of deep regret that the US Government should have unilaterally broken off the peace talks in Paris which had been resumed only recently. What is even more grave is the growing danger of an escalation of the Vietnam war into a bigger and wider conflict. I am sure this house will join the government in condemning this latest escalation.” Under Secretary Irwin told Indian Ambassador Jha this was an unfriendly act. B. More recently, in her speech to the conference on the environment in Stockholm on June 14, Mrs. Gandhi indirectly referred to Indo-China, saying that there is nothing so destructive and useless as modern warfare and referring in this respect to Swedish Prime Minister Palme’s speech, which had been critical of US policy, as a clear statement of a worldwide concern on this matter. The Indian press reported the critical comment by Mrs. Gandhi and the Swedish Prime Minister regarding US policy in Vietnam, emphasizing the community of interests and views between Sweden and India. C. In accepting an honorary doctorate in Prague on June 19, Mrs. Gandhi confined herself to noting the “struggle of the Vietnamese people” and saying: “we have the greatest sympathy for the agony of the people of Vietnam and admiration for their unparalleled heroism.” But, according to the Czech press, at a predeparture press conference in Prague on June 20 she “sharply condemned American escalation in Vietnam.” The press report did not give the substance of her comments. D. In Budapest on June 20, she said: “It is tragic that Asia is still a theater into which arms are pouring and on which new, devilish weapons are being tested. This policy is undoubtedly based on the supposition that countries exercising overly powerful military and economic force can dictate the march of world history. But events present a different picture. In our complex, interdependent modern world, the power of weapons cannot achieve what it could achieve in colonial times.” E. Throughout her comments both at the Stockholm conference and at some of her other stops is the general theme that the rich countries must not act as a club for exploiting the poor. In Stockholm, she challenged environmentalists who would slow industrial development to curb damage to the environment and urged that the developed nations should not saddle the developing ones with the burdens of environmental control, even though that control is important. This was coupled with reference to the arrogant attitudes of certain countries seeking to dominate smaller states. The question, therefore, is one of an attitude of taking gratuitous swipes at the US, whatever the issues. This obviously is not conducive to improving our relations. And yet Indian Ambassador Jha in a conversation with Secretary Rogers on june 21 (being reported to you separately) talked about how he was encouraged by indications that the US wishes to improve bilateral relations. He expressed optimism that your visit would lead to constructive results. The Indian pressure, while speculating on whether the purpose of your visit is fence mending or something more limited, generally notes that you would be well placed for breaking the ice in a real dialogue between Washington and New Delhi. The point of this telegram is not to suggest that you deal with the problem of India’s position toward Vietnam in such a way as to sour your whole visit in New Delhi. It is to give you the details of a situation which must be dealt with firmly if any kind of reasonable kind of relationship with India is to get off the ground. We have to persuade them that a sound relationship will exist only when they respect our interests, whether they agree with our policies or not. We will be sending you later a telegram wrapping up the latest developments in South Asia and incorporating this point in a broader context. Dr. Kissinger wanted you to have this background separately and in some detail. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971-Dec 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. The telegram was sent from Haig to Connally and marked for the attention of Hoskinson who was traveling with Connally. 271. Backchannel Message WH22059 From President Nixon to John Connally in New Zealand 271. Backchannel Message WH22059 From President Nixon to John Connally in New Zealand 1 Washington, June 24, 1972 I have read the message which General Haig sent to you at Henry’s request concerning the relationship between recent anti-U.S. statements by Prime Minister Gandhi and other Indian officials and the prospects for improving relations between our two Governments. This information was provided for background purposes. I would like to emphasize that it is essential that you take the strongest stand on this issue and would like to reemphasize the importance I attach to your maintaining the toughest and most aloof demeanor during your Indian leg in the face of these Indian attacks. The Indian press is suggesting that your visit to Delhi is associated with an effort by me to admit past mistakes in our policy towards India as part of an apologetic move to reestablish better relations. Thus, it is essential that you not contribute to this impression which can only invite further Indian insolence. It is also essential to our strategy vis-à-vis Hanoi and other countries that we in no way contribute to the impression that we are buttering up a state which has been in the forefront of vitriolic attack against my recent Vietnam decisions. You should make it very clear from the outset that the U.S. cannot accept continuing anti-U.S. attacks whether they involve the conflict in Southeast Asia or some other aspects of U.S. policy. I know I can count on you to ensure that this climate is clearly established during your stay in India. I hope your stay in Australia permitted you and Nellie some rest from what can only be the most arduous journey. I look forward to seeing you in San Clemente upon your return. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig signed the telegram for Nixon. 272. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 272. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, July 3, 1972 INDIA-PAKISTAN: SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT The last-minute settlement reached between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Bhutto, which contains significant points of agreement, attests to the desire of the two leaders for a basic reorientation of their countries’ relations. Each side obtained some of the concessions it wanted, and both have established a precedent and a mechanism for further agreements. The settlement is tentative, however, and will require good will on both sides to carry it out. Crucial to this process will be Bhutto’s ability to win acceptance of the agreement from the Pakistani people. The Agreement . India won three concessions: 1) a “no-war pact” intended to end Pakistan’s traditional policy of “confrontation”; 2) an agreement to resolve outstanding issues bilaterally, which will inhibit any Pakistani attempts to bring the U.N. or other powers into future arguments; and 3) Pakistani agreement to respect the present line of control in Kashmir as the effective ceasefire line. In exchange, Pakistan won Indian withdrawal from as much as 6,000 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Punjab and Sind. Pakistan will also withdraw from about 100 square miles of Indian territory. These withdrawals along the international borders will take place within thirty days of ratification. Both sides compromised on their basic approach. Bhutto modified his “step-by-step” demand by agreeing to an overall declaration of peaceful intentions before the POW issue is settled; India modified its demand for a “package” settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached. Details of the resumption of normal communication, transportation, and trade links are to be worked out by “delegations from the two countries.” Both sides have agreed to a second summit at an unspecified later date, prior to which representatives of the two countries are to “discuss the modalities” of POW repatriation, a final settlement on Kashmir, and resumption of diplomatic relations. The agreement is subject to ratification. The Indians state that no further ratification action is required from their side. Bhutto has promised to refer the agreement to the National Assembly, and he has called a special early session on July 10 for this purpose. Selling the Settlement . In India, initial reaction to the agreement has been generally favorable, and no significant opposition is expected unless the debate in Pakistan raises questions about Pakistani intentions. In Pakistan, Bhutto has a concrete Indian concession—the return of Pakistani territory—as evidence of Indian good intentions, and so should be successful in allaying popular fears. In his first speech on his return, he assured the crowd that he had compromised no principles, he had not been blackmailed on the POW issue, he had made no concessions on Kashmir, and he had won back the territory. The fact that Indian withdrawal is conditional on ratification gives him an effective club to use on the National Assembly. If ratification is accomplished, withdrawal consummated, and the Kashmir ceasefire line maintained, there could be a momentum set up which would be helpful in reaching further agreements. A major question mark in Pakistan will be the military. The renunciation of the threat or use of force, combined with the mutual withdrawal of troops from the border, will tend to deemphasize the Pakistan military and reduce its political influence. Bhutto will have to move very carefully to persuade the generals that the agreement is in their best interest. The continued presence of the opposing forces along the Kashmir ceasefire line gives the Pakistani military a potential opportunity to abort the agreement or obstruct an overall settlement by provoking a frontier incident. Assessment . There is no guarantee that this agreement will have any more lasting effect than the agreements ending the 1949 and 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Resolution of the POW issue will depend on Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh and some kind of agreement on war crimes trials. Resolution of the emotional Kashmir issue will involve painful concessions from both sides, and could cause both leaders serious domestic trouble. Nevertheless, the success of Prime Minister Gandhi and President Bhutto at Simla demonstrates a major effort on both sides to reach an accord. Bhutto made significant concessions of principle, committing himself to future negotiations to resolve these issues bilaterally, and in exchange accepted only a return to the prewar territorial positions along the international border. Mrs. Gandhi gave up actual control of territory in exchange for mere promises. Both sides appear to be determined to resolve the problems of their latest war, and to be looking toward a later, more conclusive negotiation. It was a statesmanlike action on each side, and provides hope that a lasting, comprehensive settlement on the subcontinent can be achieved. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-PAK. Limited Official Use. Drafted in INR/DRR/RNA by David McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis Jones. The Embassy in Pakistan forwarded the text of the Simla agreement to the Department on July 3 in telegram 5737 from Islamabad. (Ibid.) In analyzing the agreement, the Embassy concluded that it set the stage for further negotiations on the central issue of Kashmir. (Telegram 5748 from Islamabad, July 3; ibid) The Department was encouraged by the “clear and repeated affirmation on the part of both India and Pakistan of their desire to put an end to conflict and confrontation in South Asia and of their desire to work towards durable peace.” (Telegram 120269 to New Delhi, July 3; ibid.) 273. Telegram 8245 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 273. Telegram 8245 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, July 4, 1972, 1921Z Subj Secretary Connally’s Meeting With Indian Foreign Minister. July 4, 1972 Summary: In meeting with Foreign Minister, Secretary Connally reviewed areas he has covered in earlier visits. Conversation became franker and sharper as it progressed. We believe it was a healthy exchange. End summary 1. Secretary Connally accompanied by Hennessy, Van Hollen, Donley, Hoskinson, Ambassador and DCM held one hand a half hour meeting with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, July 4. In addition to Foreign Minister, Indian Ambassador to U.S. L.K. Jha, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Haksar, Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, Secretary Finance I.G. Patel and Menon and Arora of Americas Division MEA, also present. 2. After extending “very hearty welcome” to Secretary and after expressing happiness at his visit, Foreign Minister said he would be happier still if relations between our two countries could be brought back to the stage at which they began. Secretary responded by expressing appreciation and explained that he had come at President’s request with no precept for discussions, except in a general way. He was prepared to give details about President’s visits to Peking and Moscow, to talk about changes in the IMF, and international economic and trade matters, as well as the U.S. domestic economic situation. Finally he was prepared to talk about relations between U.S. and India. He sought Indian views on future of relations in South Asian area. 3. At Foreign Minister’s invitation Secretary Connally proceeded to describe most significant aspects of President’s visits to Peking and Moscow, reviewed international monetary developments, growth of protectionism in international trade, and reviewed U.S. domestic economic situation in similar terms to presentations he has made during his previous visits. 4. Foreign Minister responded by welcoming relaxation of tensions between U.S. and China but expressed concern allegedly from some US allies that result might be to upset stabilizing forces in Asian context. He also alluded to Indian dislike of reference to Kashmir in Shanghi communique but added that State Department had clarified that this reference made at Chinese initiative and did not represent any change in US position. 5. With regard President’s Moscow visit GOI had officially been informed by U.S. and also heard from Soviets. Appreciated that results were product of long negotiations and to extent agreements formalized GOI regarded it as positive development. Foreign Minister said agreement on SALT welcome though he felt this represented strenthening of “nuclear club” which was only limited gain for world as a whole since it was seen as real limitation on existing armaments. He added that PRC and France don’t have accepted. This lacuna required resolution if the world to be saved from nuclear devestation. 6. Swaran Singh commented approvingly that more affluent of the world developing greater understanding. Unfortunatly situation in Asia continued to be source of concern. GOI had feeling that Moscow visit implied freeze as a far as a West Asia (Middle East) concerned. Regarding Vietnam he welcomed latest possibility of resumption of talks. 7. With regard to international monetary situation he said GOI “watched with some anxiety” as situation developed. Now that sterling was in trouble they had other anxieties. “They broadly accepted” that the international monetary system should involve developing countries. The development of protectionist attitudes among developed countries was a matter of even greater anxiety to the developed world since latter dependent on developed countries to carry on their economic development. Indian experience had been that cost of development became higher and higher in developing countries in terms of real effort. Advancements in science and technology were not equally shared between developed and developing countries. This he said was “not conducive to peace and good will in the world”. Pattern of economic relations would have to evolve in a suitable climate where cost of development would not become “unconscionable”. 8. Secretary Connally said we would welcome any specific suggestions regarding structures of international monetary system. U.S. had contributed dols 150 billion to economic developments of rest of the world in past quarter century. Foreign Minister claimed American friends had told him that US spent billions to destroy others and then billions to build them back up again. Secretary confirmed that in World Wars I and II we had indeed participated in destruction of tyranny and despotism. US had no territorial claims on anyone and no desire to have a predominent influence in any part of South Asia. He then alluded to press speculation that massive US assistance to Bangladesh intended to pull Bangladesh away from India. Secretary commented that if we hadn’t provided such relief assistance we would have been accused of not doing our share. Foreign Minister rejoined that Bangladesh had tremendous problems and the GOI welcomed relief and rehibilitation assistance from any source. 9. Secretary added US had no sphere of influence and proceeded to compliment Foreign Minister on success of Simla summit, which he said was “very much to your credit”. No one other than the two countries concerned could have done it. The US wanted all countries to pursue their own course in their own way. India had a rich experience in the democratic process which we applauded. Foreign Minister said there was little he could add to these fine sentiments. India’s relations with all its neighbors were very good except for China and Pakistan. Support that Pakistan had received “from certain quarters” did not permit them to see reality of the situation. He said they were keen to forget that chapter and there now “may be possibility” of creating situation with good neighborly relations. In the past “serious sources” had discouraged Pakistan from discussing problems between the two countries bilaterally. At Simla they had impressed on President Bhutto that it was up to the two countries to turn a new leaf. GOI attached great importance to the new agreement. 10. India had given evidence that it had no hostile intentions toward Pakistan by calling for a unilateral ceasefire on December 16, 1971 and by its agreement to an exchange of territory along the international borders. They had made it clear they had no territorial claims against Pakistan without even asking for quid pro quo. In essence Simla Agreement meant India was asking Pakistan nothing more than to recreate norms of good behavior. They had avoided rehashing the past in the hope there would develop a durable peace. 11. Swaran Singh said they respected President Bhutto as a “democratically elected leader” in West Pakistan and the attached great importance to the stabilization of democracy in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. US could make contribution to this process. 12. Foreign Minister said that any support to Pakistan in a military sense would not be a factor for peace. This had been tried and had resulted in conflict. It had not helped either India or Pakistan. This was an area where Indian position was dependent to large extent on the attitude of other countries. If military assistance extended by us, it would retard peace and could deflect Pakistan from new course of which both countries now embarked. 13. Secretary interjected to remind Foreign Minister that US had stopped supplying military equipment to Pakistan in 1965 “and were certainly not doing so now”. He continued that we had to be frank in analyzing this situation. While it was true that Pakistan had received about dols 130 million worth of military equipment from China, India had recieved approximately dols 700 million of equipment from the USSR. However Foreign Minister’s point was well taken. There was no intent on part of US to contribute to disruption. We wanted to contribute to the peaceful process in the area. 14. Foreign Minister said the GOI had heard many times that the US intended to begin an Indo-US dialogue. He asked if this were a fact or merely a phrase. Secretary rejoined that the President did not merely mouth a phrase. The President had said in his report to Congress that he was inviting “a serious dialogue with India” but there had been no response. Foreign Minister said he would appreciate being enlightened on the content of such dialogue. Secretary Connally replied that we wanted to improve the relations between our two countries and we believed it was in the mutual interest of us both to do so. We had invited discussions to this end. He had come with no table of contents but he could assure Foreign Minister we did not stand on ceremony. 15. Secretary continued that so long as Foreign Minister castigated us as he had done before Indian Parliament on May 10, and so long as Prime Minister did the same in various European forums this was not conducive to the establishment of a meaningful dialogue. 16. Foreign Minister asked if he should take it that Indian attitude towards Vietnam had retarded dialogue. He said GOI had never made a secret of its views on Vietnam. Their basic stand had consistenly been that war would not solve the Vietnam problem. The war and the bombing must stop. There had always been a stong reaction to the mining of ports and waterways. He claimed that the government reaction had been much milder than the general feeling that North Vietnam was engaged in an unequal fight. 17. Secretary Connally said that we did not ask that the GOI agree with out policies. It boiled down to a “pure question of degree”. We both have the right to disagree with one another. The question was whether we did it “in a temperate manner or in a vitrolic manner”. Unless we had mutual respect we were not going to have a dialogue nor were we going to have a friendship between our two countries. 18. The Foreign Minister said he agreed that it was important that our disagreements be stated. Bangladesh had been a situation where the US could have exerted its influence to restrain Yahya Khan. The Foreign Minister then recalled that on his return from his successful visit to Washington in June 1971 he was greeted with press reports of a shipment of US arms to Pakistan. Ambassador Keating interjected that the shipment included no planes, guns or ammunition. Rather it was carrying spare parts. 19. Foreign Secretary Kaul spoke up to tell the Secretary that in his opinion there had never been a Foreign Minister of India who was more anxious to be fair in his dealings with others and who was more anxious to develop the closest possible relations with the United States. Ambassador Keating said he had already spoken of the Foreign Minister to the Secretary in similar terms. 20. The Foreign Secretary thought this had been a very useful exchange and he appreciated the frankness with which the Secretary had talked. He said that if the Secretary’s visit succeeded in reversing the present trend in our relations “we would welcome it”. The Secretary replied “so would we”. 21. Comment: While discussion became close to being sharp at times it was never acrimonious. We believe in sum that it was a healthy beginning for the Secretary’s visit and helped to clear the atmosphere at least to some degree. 22. Department repeat further as desired. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated Conto 220. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Athens for Secretary Rogers, the White House for Jeanne Davis, and Treasury for Leonard S. Dixon, Director of the Office of Administration. Connally’s stops in South Asia included Dacca, July 3 and 4, New Delhi, July 4 and 5, Islamabad, July 5–7, and Kabul, July 7. A number of the issues discussed by Connally and Singh on July 4 were explored at greater length with Foreign Secretary Kaul on July 5 by Van Hollen, DCM Galen Stone, and John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. The conversation was reported to the Department on July 6 in Telegram 5874 from Islamabad. (Ibid.) 274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 5, 1972 SUBJECT: India-Pakistan Summit The provisions of the India-Pakistan Agreement on Bilateral Relations reached at the Simla meetings between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Bhutto fall into three categories. First, there is a series of general agreements —The principles of the UN Charter shall govern their relations. —They will settle their differences, including the basic differences of the last 25 years, by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or any other peaceful means they may agree on. Pending final settlement, neither side will alter the situation unilaterally. —The prerequisite to reconciliation is a commitment to peaceful co-existence. —Each will respect the other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality. —They will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. Second, there is agreement on a progression of steps to restore and normalize relations in the following fields. —Resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land and air links. —Promote travel. —Resume trade and economic cooperation as far as possible. —Promote scientific and cultural exchanges. Third, there are steps “to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace”: —Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their respective sides of the international border, i.e., the border south of Jammu and Kashmir. —In Jammu and Kashmir both sides will respect the December 17, 1971, cease-fire line without prejudice to the recognized positions of either side. —The withdrawal will begin as soon as the agreement is ratified and be completed within 30 days. (Bhutto has called a special session of his National Assembly for next Monday, July 10, so the withdrawal could begin soon. ) —Representatives will meet to discuss repatriation of prisoners and civilian internees, resumption of diplomatic relations and a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. —There will be another summit at a mutually convenient time. While Bhutto did not get his prisoners back, he can point to the agreement for withdrawal of Indian troops south of Kashmir. The main Pakistani concession in this document seems to be Bhuttos apparent willingness to settle the Kashmir issue bilaterally rather than with third-party involvement, as has been the traditional Pakistani position. The Indian concession seems to be allowing Bhutto to go home with some movement as a beginning to a longer process. Since the main issues—prisoners, Kashmir, Bangladesh recognition—all involve Mujib, it is not surprising that progress on them would await some sort of understanding with Mujib. Bhutto on returning to Lahore said he was confident the prisoner issue would be settled soon, and he had earlier said he hoped to meet with Mujib before his regular National Assembly Session scheduled to begin August 14. What really came out of the summit will not be clear until we begin to get reports on whatever understanding may have been reached on how each side will approach Mujib and according to what timetable. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. 275. National Security Study Memorandum 156 275. National Security Study Memorandum 156 1 Washington, July 5, 1972 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Developments The President has directed an analysis of the implications for U.S. policy of an Indian nuclear test and an examination of possible positions the U.S. might adopt toward such a development. As background, the study should consider: —the likely impacts of a possible test on the policies and actions of—India’s neighbors in South Asia, of the USSR, of the PRC, and of other key states, both in regard to their political-military policies and in regard to their positions toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Agreement; —the likely political, military, and economic implications for India’s other policies and programs of a possible decision to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems; —an intelligence estimate of the likely time frame of these developments. Based upon this analysis the study should examine the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests and the policy options open to the United States in these circumstances with respect to India, India’s sub-continent neighbors, and other affected states. The President has requested that this study be prepared on a need-to-know basis by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia. It should be submitted for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group by August 18, 1972. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), Nos. 104–206. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 276. Telegram 5868 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 276. Telegram 5868 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, July 6, 1972, 1222Z Subject Secretary Connally’s Meeting With Indian Finance Minister, July 4, 1972 Summary Secretary Connally had frank exchange of views with Indian Finance Minister on international monetary affairs. Similarities as well as differences in positions of USG and GOI were recognized, as was need for participation by both developed and developing countries in working out new international trade and monetary structure. End summary. 1. Secretary Connally, accompanied by Hennessey, Van Hollen, Hoskinson, Ambassador and Economic Counselor held one hour meeting with Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan July 4. In addition to Finance Minister, Indian Ambassador to U.S. L.K. Jha, Finance Secretary I.G. Patel, Finance Additional Secretary M.G. Kaul, Finance Joint Secretary S. Krishnaswani, External Affairs (Americas Division) Joint Secretary Mrs. Rukmtni Menon, and P.N. Dhar Private Secretary to Prime Minister, were present. 2. After Finance Minister’s welcome Secretary Connally indicated that, as in other countries he had visited, he would seek advice of the Finance Minister concerning the rebuilding of the international monetary system and the solution of present world trade problems. While not here to convey specific U.S. conclusions he would pass on certain elements of our present thinking. Specifically the IMF should be structured on a different basis and provide for more flexibility in the monetary system by provision for wider bands and parity changes. The U.S. has agreed to phase out the dollar as the world’s reserve currency but the only suggestion made so far is that it be replaced by SDR’s. Confidence will be needed in SDR’s, or whatever else is used. The U.S. is not opposed to SDR’s, but it will probably take a decade to phase out the pound and the dollar. In addition to more flexibility in the new system will need to have automatic sanctions that will apply some restraints to surplus countries. 3. Referring to the Smithsonian Agreement, Secretary Connally noted that agreement came with difficulty because the representatives there were dealing with the economic lives of their countries. From the outset the U.S. took the initiative in pushing for a bigger group, the G-20, with a wide mandate to cover not only monetary but trade policy, capital, and development matters. The U.S. is convinced that we cannot deal with monetary problems apart from trade problems. 4. Secretary Connally noted that a disturbing factor today was the strong protectionist sentiment running through many nations, both developed and developing, and including the U.S. This sentiment will pose real problems in the forthcoming monetary and trade discussions. The U.S. wants to do all it can to prevent the world breaking up into trading blocs, but it will need help if it is to be successful. He saw five blocs appearing. The first two were the Russians and the mainland Chinese-both would be entering the family of trading nations without accepting the discipline of international rules. The third was Japan which still clung to protective trade devices. The fourth, the European economic community, was expanding and coalescing and was offering preferential trading arrangements to fifty other countries of the world and becoming increasingly inward looking. The fifth group of the U.S., Canada, and the developing nations. The U.S. saw its interests associated with the developing nations and therefore insisted that the G-20 include developing country participation. 5. The Secretary then asked the Finance Minister how he saw the world and its trading arrangements, and particularly his view of the significance of the pound float. 6. The Finance Minister indicated that, after the Smithsonian agreement, it was thought a solution to the monetary crisis had been obtained but with the pound floating, obviously it had not. He noted he had attended IMF meetings twice, that developing countries were left out of the real decision making in the context of the G-10 and otherwise. It was, therefore, hard for him to give any advice. He did, however, certainly welcome the G-20. Continuing, he noted that India suffered when there was exchange rate instability, that its imports and exports were affected by shifting rates. His only suggestion was that we work in the direction in which we are going in these matters. India’s hope was that her interest would be taken into account and her position disturbed as little as possible. 7. Secretary Connally referred to the disappearence of sterling and then of the dollar as dominant world currencies. The important question facing us therefore, he said, was how to negotiate a new system among equals, including the developing countries. He recognized negotiations were going to be tough. The U.S. felt there must be flexibility which permitted nations to float their currencies or change parity more regularly. Any system would fail if it were too rigid. He noted that the pound float is not a major crisis. While it is disturbing, the world must learn to live with that sort of thing. Asked by the Finance Minister if he envisaged that there would be floating all the time, the Secretary indicated that criteria would need to apply, so that floating would not be used as an escape valve for irresponsible economic policies or to get undeserved competitive advantage, but must work under certain agreed circumstances. Both the Finance Minister and the Secretary agreed that no nation would be willing to give up much of its sovereignty to an international organization on this question, yet that there must be some common discipline. 8. Dr. Patel observed that the international agencies qte get excited by the developed countries’ problems but not rpt not the developing countries’ problems unqte. He noted that questions of commodity prices and the permanent funding of development institutions are ones India would like them to focus on-much more important to the world than reform of monetary system, which will be worked out eventually. Dr. Patel then alluded to the link between monetary arrangements and development. Secretary Connally indicated he did not rpt not think that the link between SDR’s and aid would work. The SDR’s must be used as a reserve currency or as an instrument of aid, not rpt not both at the same time. Dr. Patel thought that the world had not worked sufficiently hard on eliminating uncertainty in aid giving which caused even more important crises which world was not yet facing up to. Mr. Hennessy indicated it would be more feasible for the U.S. to provide funding regularly through international agencies such as IDA, if we had a more orderly world system of money and trade. It was agreed that trade, monetary and development matters were all interrelated and would need to be considered together. 9. Dr. Patel said that the qte powerful nations unqte have made completely unequal rules. For example, the fact that aid is tied and must be repaid in free foreign exchange is unfair. He also noted that special interest rates terms and large amounts of financing were given by India’s trade competitors to third countries so they were not able to compete for export sales with some countries who were giving them aid-offsetting the real benefits. He saw India’s balance of payments problem intimately connected with present trade and development rules. India was asking for parity of treatment-no special favors. 10. Secretary Connally indicated that if the rules of the international lending agencies were unsatisfactory, perhaps both IDA and the IBRD should be reviewed to see if they will still be needed. Mr. Patel agreed but indicated that as long as IDA was in existence qte we should assure that it operates with fair rules unqte. 11. Secretary Connally said the main question was whether the world by negotiation could reach an agreement for an improved trade and financial structure. Dr. Patel indicated that this had to be achieved. It was reconfirmed that, in keeping with the precepts of the G-20, all three aspects (monetary, trade and development) would be considered. 12. Secretary Connally, in his concluding remarks noted that the U.S. did not know the specific answers to these problems. He was grateful for this opportunity to discuss them with the Prime Minister. The U.S. was less committed to any specific ideologies on these questions than any nation in the world. India, he continued, had much to contribute, and the U.S. wanted to keep in touch with it on this matter. The viewpoints of the two governments were different on certain points, but if both were reasonable, each would have a contribution to make. For its part the U.S. cannot be completely unselfish, as can no nation, but the U.S. can probably be more so than most nations as it is less committed to any particular concept. 13. The Finance Minister thanked Secretary Connally and Ambassador Keating for this opportunity to exchange views on these questions. 14. Comment: The discussions were cordial, frank and substantive. They brought out clearly the differing positions of the two governments but also the mutual recognition that there was need for a cooperative approach in working out a new international trade and monetary structure. Steps should be taken to ensure a continuing dialogue with the GOI in these matters. End comment. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated CONTO 240. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Bombay, Madras, Caltigta, Belgrade for Rogers, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 277. Telegram 4075 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 277. Telegram 4075 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2117Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Private Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part I of VII: Summit Consultations 1. The meeting started promptly at 9:30 a.m. with no one present but the Prime Minister and myself. I started off by conveying President and Mrs. Nixon’s warm personal regards, having previously just presented the silver coin gift box to her. I told her how very much President and Mrs. Nixon had enjoyed her visit to the United States last year. She thanked me very much and asked me to convey her warmest regards to President and Mrs. Nixon. She recalled that Mrs. Nixon had given her a Boehm bird which she prized very highly and had it prominently displayed at her residence in New Delhi. 2. I told her that the President wanted me to convey to her whatever information she wanted concerning his visits to Peking and Moscow. I very quickly and in a fairly summary fashion went over the same ground that I covered with other heads of government. I made the following major points: A. The President went to Peking and Moscow not for the purpose of entering into any trade arrangements or trying to create any commercial alliances. His purpose was to establish a dialogue with the hope that such communications would result in a lessening of tensions around the world and contribute to the solution of some of our problems and bring about an era of peace and tranquility. B. Although problems relating to third countries were discussed, there was no attempt in any way to negotiate with respect to third countries. C. The President made it clear to Premier Chou En Lai that we anticipated that we would be in Southeast Asia for some years to come. D. The President told the leaders in Moscow that our position in Vietnam was quite well known and quite firm and that we would not permit the North Vietnamese to accomplish a military victory over their neighbors to the south. E. I briefly outlined the fact that we had entered into a number of agreements with Moscow, all of which she was familiar with, so I did not elaborate on this subject. F. It was the President’s earnest hope that these two trips might be the beginning of a dialogue and communication that would end in the resolution of many of the difficult problems facing the world today. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated CONTO 254. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 278. Telegram 4076 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 278. Telegram 4076 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2120Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Private Conversation with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part II of VII: Indo-Pakistani Summit 1. I then said that we also felt that her own summit meeting with President Bhutto had, in our judgment, been a very constructive beginning step towards the resolution of problems in the sub-continent. I would be particularly interested in hearing her reaction to this meeting so that I might relate to the President how she analyzed the situation and what the prospects were for the future. 2. Mrs. Gandhi responded that the situation had not been a good one in the relations between Pakistan and India, since India’s independence and that the situation had been aggravated by personal attacks against her in Pakistan. She felt that India had gone further than it should based upon equity in the conversations with President Bhutto. She was being charged by some newspapers and political opponents in India of giving away too much, but if giving up land and other things to which India was entitled was the price of peace, perhaps it was worth the sacrifice. She added that she understood President Bhutto’s problems. He had a very difficult situation and she recognized the fact, which he had stressed to her, that he would have difficult problems in selling his people on any kind of solution where Pakistan was giving up anything. 3. I asked her if President Bhutto had discussed with her the recognition of Bangladesh. She indicated that he had. She told me in the “strictist confidence” that Bhutto is prepared to recognize Bangladesh and she thought he would do so in August or September if he felt that it was palatable to his people. He had told her that on his recent Middle East trip in every country he visited he was urged to face reality and rev lpize [garble--recognize] Bangladesh. He felt that he had no real choice. 4. I asked her if she discussed with him the matter of permitting the Bengalis to go home and I followed by saying that I would in all confidence tell her of my conversation with Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I told her that Mujib had made it very clear that there could not be any negotiations on any issue until Pakistan recognized Bangladesh and, next, that the most important issue, in my judgment, concerning Bangladesh was the return of the Bengalis from Pakistan. 5. Mrs. Gandhi agreed that this was indeed the most sensitive issue troubling the Bengalis today and that the 40,000 odd still in Pakistan, which included soldiers, businessmen, scholars, and civil servants were possessed of talents sorely needed in Bangladesh after the Pakistanis had barbarously eliminated so many of the trained, skilled people of Bangladesh. She said that she had mentioned the matter of the return of the Bengalis to President Bhutto, but he did not respond and she dropped the matter. She did not pursue it because she did not feel that she should unduly influence him. She went on to say that she had anticipated the need for trying to resolve this issue so she had questioned the Bengalis as to whether or not they would agree to return any of the civilian prisoners which India is now holding. But the Bengalis were unrelenting in their attitude and would not agree at all until the Pakistanis agreed to permit the Bengalis to return to Bangladesh. 6. She went on to say that she did not try to pressure Mujib. She felt it would not be productive. The Bengalis were very grateful for all the assistance they had received from the various countries, but as a new nation she knew how sensitive they would be to outside pressures and influence and felt that India, in spite of all its assistance, was not in a position to influence Bangladesh. 7. At that point I merely restated that I well understood her feelings—that we were thought to influence those countries we assisted but more often than not, the more assistance we gave, the less influence we had. 8. I submitted that in my visit with Mujib I was struck by the intensiveness and emotion with which he recounted the war crimes. She responded that she agreed and that he was an emotional man particularly on this subject. (I didn’t say that he was an emotional man—merely that he was emotional about this issue.) 9. I asked her if she felt that Bangladesh was committed to the trial of the alleged war criminals. She responded that it appeared that their position had hardened on this subject materially in the last couple of months and that they were now to the point that they would insist that some trials would be held. She had nonetheless suggested that they at least release the civilian prisoners as a gesture toward Pakistan. I responded that I had the same impression from talking with Mujib who had talked in terms of trying from 300 to 1000 Pakistanis. 10. Comment: I want to re-emphasize that Mrs. Gandhi told me in the greatest of confidence that she had taken the initiative on these matters. She is quite concerned about the security of this information and she did not mention that fact to President Bhutto because it had been vetoed by Bangladesh. End comment. 11. I again complimented her on the results of the Simla meetings with President Bhutto and expressed the opinion that she had shown high degree of statesmanship and expressed the hope that their continuing meetings could contribute to the political, economical and military stabilization of South Asia. 12. I told her that we were willing to help in any way we reasonably could, but we were rather at a loss because every time we attempted to do anything it appeared that our actions were misunderstood. I reiterated that I had been struck with with complete dismay by all of the stories now circulating in the Indian papers about our motives. I said I knew should [she could] not control what appeared in Indian newspapers anymore than we could in ours, but that I was disturbed that our relief aid to Bangladesh was being interpreted as a move on our part to separate India and Bangladesh. I said tht nothing could be further from the truth. We had given aid to Bangladesh out of a feeling of concern and compassion, just as we gave aid to India to assist them with their problems. 13. I again emphasized that we had given aid to many countries for the relief of such problems as famine, earthquakes, man-made and God-made disasters, and I hoped that if I didn’t have to tell her that our relief assistance to Bangladesh had no such divisive motives. She related that Bangladesh is grateful for U.S. assistance and needs all the help it can get. She did not indicate that she either believed or disbelieved what I had just told her about our motives she merely commented that Bangladesh needed assistance and was quite grateful for it. 14. I continued by saying that we wanted nothing from Bangladesh, nor from India, nor from Pakistan except their friendship and good will. We neither sought nor wanted any particular sphere of influence in any one of the countries on sub-continent where we had given aid. We hoped that other major powers were willing to assist in helping to establish stability in the region without seeking special advange or influence. We frankly were not going to, at this point, initiate any actions of our own to resolve problems here. These problems had to be solved by the countries involved. India could contribute to the solutions as she had started to do. 15. I wanted her to know that far from being aggressive the US was refraining from new initiatives. Sheikh Mujibur for instance, would like us to take the initiative to let Bangladesh into the UN and the Foreign Minister, Samad, had also pursued it. I told her we had assisted Bangladesh in getting into many international organizations such as WHO, IMF, etc. I didn’t see any reason we could not actively support their entry into the UN but we made no commitment to sponsor and push the Bangladesh case. So far from volunteering on these issues, we have been reluctant to assume initiatives in part out of a feeling our actions would be misunderstood. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 255. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 279. Telegram 4077 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 279. Telegram 4077 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2125Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Private Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part III of VII: Improvement of Relations With India 1. I then said that we hoped that out of the unfortunate occurrences of the past few months we might again establish a relationship of warmth, friendship and cooperation which had existed between India and the United States since her independence. Mrs. Gandhi responded by saying that she would be “most happy” to have this happen and asked if I had any suggestions as to what should be done to bring it about. Since the US was so much more powerful than india it would seem to be in a better position to take the initiative. 2. I responded that I had no specific, affirmative suggestions to make, but that I was certain that no actions or words could be productive until the criticisms between us subsided. She responded by saying that the Foreign Minister had told her about my meeting with him and that she would like to comment on two things we had discussed: 3. First, about India’s position on Vietnam. There was nothing new in the Foreign Minister’s position. India had always been against our actions in Vietnam and everyone knew this. Secondly, she wanted to comment on my statements about armaments from Russia. She said that the military equipment India had recovered from the Soviet Union, had been bought and paid for. It was not aid. India attempted to buy military items from different countries, but others like France, require hard currency. It is much easier to trade with the Soviet Union because of this; 4. I responded, Madame Prime Minister, the world indeed does know of your position regarding our actions in Vietnam and this is all the more reason why our President and our leaders considered your Foreign Minister’s speech to your Parliament on May 10 as a “very unfriendly” act. We felt that we did not deserve the vituperative aspects of his remarks. We were equally disturbed, and even the President himself was displeased, with the speeches you made in Stockholm, Prague and Budapest. 5. At this point she noted that she had been criticized in Sweden because she had not supported the Swedish Prime Minister more vociferously. I responded by saying that surely no one could expect her to be as partisan as the Swedes in commenting on U.S. foreign policy. (She did not comment on the Prague or Budapest statements.) She said she was under great pressure from the Indian people and the Parliament on Vietnam. India never before used the word “condemn” but in this case she had to respond to the people’s wishes. She was only reflecting the attitude of the people. In any event, her speeches abroad had not always been unfriendly and at times she had gone out of her way to help the U.S. such as not recognizing East Germany. 6. He said, Madame Prime Minister, in your land, as well as in ours, it has been my experience that the people respond to a marked degree to the utterances of their leaders and they reflect the spoken views of their leaders. She said: “Oh, no. Our people here have a very great interest in international and world affairs and there is a great deal of interest in Parliament. There is a great deal of discussion of these matters all the time.” 7. I did not pursue this any further, but simply responded by saying that we would indeed hope that there could be an end to the vitriolic criticism that flows between us. She agreed that such exchange did not contribute to anything, but resulted in deterring constructive actions. I told her that a classic example was the story she had told me earlier about President Bhutto being restricted in what he can do because of the very sharp criticism in Pakistan directed against her personally. She said that “doesn’t hurt me.” I responded that I knew it did not hurt her, and probably helped her in India. But that it made it much more difficult for Bhutto to work out the problems within his own country. I pointed out that the U.S. is also not immune to such reactions when we get severe criticism which we think is unjustified. But in any event, we did not want to relive the past. I saw nothing to be gained by trying to relive history because frankly we saw things from different vantage points. For instance, India was upset last year because it thought the U.S. sided with Pakistan. In my judgment, however, a true historical perspective our our position was that we actually sided with India in 1965 when we stopped giving military equipment to Pakistan. As of that date, Pakistan’s military position began to deteriorate vis-à-vis India, notwithstanding their acquisition of goods from China. They were not in any sense about to match India’s acquisition of goods from the Soviet Union. 8. At this point, Mrs. Gandhi intervened to say that as long as we were being frank about the 1965 period she wanted to point out that despite our earlier fears about the spread of communism, nothing had happened anywhere. I told her flatly that this analysis was based on an assumption I could not make. Perhaps the U.S. did not roll back communism but there was no question that we did stop its spread in many areas. One could never, of course, prove this case. She responded that the retardation of communism was bound to come about in any event. 9. Mrs. Gandhi then went on to say she was not sure the figure on Soviet military assistance I had mentioned to the Foreign Minister was correct. I replied that I could not guarantee that it was correct but that we believed that it amounted to in the neighborhood of $700 million in the interwar period. That was approximately five times what we believed Pakistan got from China. We never anticipated or sought a military balance between Pakistan and India and we never thought there was such, but in any event when we failed to supply equipment to Pakistan in 1965 that was the end of whatever degree of balance there was. 10. Mrs. Gandhi then noted that she had seen reports in American newspapers about Pakistan getting military equipment and planes from neighboring countries such as Iran. I told her that I was not going to deny this since I could not say that Pakistan was not receiving some military equipment from other nations around the world. All I knew was that our policy was that we had not given Pakistan military assistance or even sold destructive equipment-except for some spare parts since 1965. And now we were selling Pakistan nothing and had no present intention of doing so. She said she also had information as a result of the Simla conference that since the war the Pakistanis had organized two new divisions. Consequently, one of the arguments against the release of the military POWs was that they would merely go back and be re-organized into the Pakistani Army for action against India. 11. When I asked if President Bhutto said this, she said no but that some of his people made these statements to some of her people. I said we were certainly not aware of any intention of President Bhutto to reorganize his army for aggressive purposes. He said he spent 60 percent of his budget for defense and that seemed to be an unreasonable amount considering economic conditions of his country, but it was his country. 12. I then noted that the U.S. had been alleged to have influence with Pakistan when we don’t. India, moreover, may well be in the same position we once were of trying to work out these difficult problems between Bangladesh and Pakistan as well as resolve its own. I told Mrs. Gandhi she might well find herself in the position we often do of being in the middle and being blamed by both sides. The Middle East was a classic example. We did not want territory or trade advantages and only desired peace. We were involved in the Middle East only because no one else could contribute to peace and stability, but we do not endear ourselves to either side because of it. So we are not volunteering for any such role in South Asia. I merely wanted to say that if there is a genuine and sincere desire for the U.S. to play a helpful part we would certainly not reject it out of hand. But we would consider whether we could indeed contribute anything to the peace and stability of this area. 13. I then said I would be glad to take back to the President and to his advisers, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger, her views and her statement of agreement that it is to our mutual interest to re-establish the relations we once had and that perhaps after this exchange a better environment would result which could make possible the reestablishment of such relations. 14. Mrs. Gandhi also made a point of telling me that gnamas [garble--India?] did not want South Asia to become a focal point for the strategic plans of major powers. She said that this was in response to my statement that we sought no advantage and we hoped no other major power did. She hoped that this would remain the case because if one great power comes in, the other will follow to everyone’s detriment. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 256. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. Telegrams 4077 through 4080 from Iran, which reported on various aspects of Connally’s conversation with Gandhi, Documents 279–282, were misdated as July 8. 280. Telegram 4078 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 280. Telegram 4078 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2130Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla, on July 5, 1972: Part IV of VII: Foreign Investment 1. At the end of one hour of private discussions, Ambassador Keating and Mr. Samuel Hoskinson of the NSC staff from our side, and Ambassador Jha and Mr. Haksar from the Indian side joined the discussions for another 40 minutes. This part of the meeting started with a discussion of India’s policies on foreign investments. I had previously told her I thought that much of our time in the next several years would be spent in trying to reshape the monetary fund and international agreements regarding trade. We had not, however, developed this at all in private meeting but had only alluded to complexity of problems. I had said President Nixon had spent a great deal of time on these matters in the last 18 months. I thought these economic and monetary problems would be of concern to world leaders more than before in coming months and years. 2. Against this background, I questioned Mrs. Gandhi concerning foreign investments. I noted first that she was prepared to take over some insurance companies. “We have taken them,” she said. I said, yes. I understood she had and was interested if this meant that India did not welcome foreign investments? Not at all, she said. When we need management or technology or products we cannot produce we will welcome foreign investments. Ambassador Jha added that when India nationalized its banks it did not nationalize foreign banks. Mrs. Gandhi added that she was criticized almost every week in Parliament because of that, too. Ambassador Jha then said that there were many things the Indians were capable of doing, both in terms of financial resources and management abilities and their technological progress, but also many things that they could not do and needed foreign assistance for. He said India would welcome that type of investment and noted that even India invested abroad in Australia, Nigeria, and Malaysia. How, he asked, could India therefore be against foreign investments? But, said Jha, we invest abroad not always under the conditions and in the companies in which we want to, but consistent with the regulations in the country in which we invest. That is what we will permit in India. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 257. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 281. Telegram 4079 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 281. Telegram 4079 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2130Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part V of VII: Expertise in Bangladesh I. The conversation then turned to Bangladesh again. The question was raised as to whether or not Bangladesh had expertise to provide the government with the necessary management skills in the cities and in the villages and necessary administrative and police protection, which would be essential. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out all her people told her that the officials of Bangladesh, with whom they had talked, had been of excellent ability, but frankly she did not know whether or not they had the numbers of people that were going to be needed. Mr. Haksar then elaborated on this to a considerable degree and said that when Sheikh Mujib returned to the country after the war there was absolute chaos. Then within roughly a six month period they had established order and that he thought they had done a “fairly good job.” In talking about availability of skilled people, the point was also made that one of the reasons for the great desire for return of Bengalis from West Pakistan was to have available the talents of the civil servants and the trained government officials. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 258. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 282. Telegram 4080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 282. Telegram 4080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2135Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla, on July 5, 1972: Part VI of VII: US Political Situation 1. I then volunteered to discuss the American domestic political situation if Prime Minister was interested. She clearly was. I went through the rise and fall of many Democratic candidates in the last 18 months and finally came to the conclusion that it now appeared that McGovern would be nominated and that, if this was the case, it would be very decisive event within the Democratic Party. I pointed out that only recently the Credentials Sub-committee had refused to seat Mayor Daley and 55 delegates from Chicago. I thought this was grave and disturbing decision not only in Chicago and Illinois, but throughout the country. I briefly commented that I thought the traditional link with labor and the minorities and South, which put together the Democratic Party, was falling apart. The South had basically departed from its Democratic tradition and labor had become about as conservative politically and socially as any segment of American society. I anticipated President Nixon would get a high percentage, of the labor vote, notwithstanding the fact that a substantial number of labor leaders would be for the Democratic nominee. In conclusion, I thought the outcome would clearly be the re-election of the President. This was why he was trying to do so many things in the diplomatic, economic and monetary fields—so that he might have some momentum in each of them to work with during his second term. 2. I then complimented Mrs. Gandhi on her political success in India and she obviously was pleased. She then went on to say that, despite the success and parliamentary strength of the Congress Party, she still had domestic political problems. There was, for example, some opposition from even within the ranks of her own party and she had to contend with other parties. Political success, in short, carries its own problems. 3. Finally as we walked out the Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmest regards to President Nixon and Mrs. Nixon and expressed her gratitude for the gift I had presented her. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 259. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 283. Telegram 4081 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 283. Telegram 4081 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 7, 1972, 2135Z Subj: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla, July 5, 1972: Part VII of VII: Personal Observations 1. My personal observation about the visit to Simla are as follows: First of all Mrs. Gandhi was very relaxed and looked well, although she said she was very tired, not having had even one day off the past year. During the course of our discussion, she was not sharp or acrimonious in any of her comments. While many of her comments were frank they were not of an offensive or belligerant nature. Nor was there any inflexion in her voice reflecting anger or resentment. On the contrary, her entire attitude was friendly and extremenly courteous even bordering on kindness. When the meetings broke up, the photographers approached her and asked us to take a stroll in the garden. Again she was quite relaxed and easy to talk to. When I asked her if she enjoyed being in Simla and what did she do here, she said she used to ride quite a bit but still walked when in Simla. She didnt like to walk on the plains where the weather “was hell.” I commented on a bed of lupin which looked like the blue bonnet—the Texas state flower. We strolled around the garden for 10 minutes or so in which she commented she loved flowers, but didn’t have a green thumb. She had once enjoyed garderning, but unfortunately she had married a man who was much better at it than she was and he told her to stay out of the garden and arrange the flowers in the house. So her career as a gardener had been short-lived. All in all, it was an extremely amiable meeting in which she was very gracious. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 260. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 284. Telegram 4085 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 284. Telegram 4085 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0940Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part I of VII: Preliminary Greetings. 1. To begin with the atmosphere was exceedingly warm and cordial, which is apparently characteristic of personality of President Bhutto. He started off the conversation, in which we were along throughout, by expressing his great pleasure at my visit at this particular time to Pakistan. 2. After preliminary greetings, in which I conveyed President Nixon’s fondest regards and respect and admiration for the political stability President Bhutto had brought to his country in a relatively short period of time in most adverse circumstances. I told him I was under instructions from the President to fully inform him on the President’s visit to Peking and Moscow; to discuss with him the domestic economic, and political situation in the U.S. and to the extent of his interest, to cover any problems in the international monetary and economic field. I told him I didn’t want to bore him with the monetary and economic matters since we had spent the two previous hours with his Planning and Economic and Finance Minister on these particular subjects. He said he had assumed nearly every portfolio except that of Finance Minister. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 263. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 285. Telegram 4086 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 285. Telegram 4086 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1000Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part II of VII: U.S. Domestic Politicial Situation. 1. He then immediately said the most important thing to us is your domestic political situation. Before I ask you your views, may I express to you my feelings and attitudes as we see things from here? President Nixon has done a truly magnificent job and has displayed a vast familiarity with world problems. His visit to Peking has been of incredible value and I would even say the same for his trip to Moscow. (This was obviously intended to put the visit to Moscow in secondary position.) He said: “What is happening in the U.S.? Surely McGovern does not stand a chance to be elected. If he were it would have disastrous consequences for the world. I am truly unable to understand men like Senator McGovern and Senator Church-who should be going to church.” 2. After my evaluation of the domestic political situation, in which I outlined why I felt McGovern had come to achieve the degree of success he has and predicted that if he was indeed nominated that President Nixon would be reelected, President Bhutto said he could not believe that the American people would cast aside the magnificent contributions the President has made for a man like McGovern. (He was effusive in his praise of the achievements of President Nixon and I am using substantially quotes of his.) 3. After my evaluation of the domestic political situation he immediately related the importance of the elections this fall to the rest of the world. He said that nothing could have a more profound influence that the outcome of our election. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 264. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 286. Telegram 4087 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 286. Telegram 4087 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1030Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part III of VII: The Situation in the Sub-continent. 1. He then took off on an extended discourse of the situation in the sub-continent and reviewed the situation in Pakistan. When he came into power the country was in a state of chaos and disorder from a political, economic and military standpoint. The spirit of the pakistan people had overcome the most severe shock in their history. All this was brought about by an international conspiracy—it was not reasonable to assume that in these times any country could secede, as East Pakistan had seceded, without the assistance of outside intervention and finances. This unquestionably was a deliberate and conspiratorial act on the part of India; also by the Soviet Union. This was well understood by Pakistani people. This made it exceedingly difficult for him to move too much too fast. He said in all frankness he has still to deal with the military power in his country. The military regimes of the past dozen years have been disastrous for his country but notwithstanding that they still have still have enormous influence and power with which he has to reckon and deal. 2. He said sentiment in the country goes far beyond the military. It permeates the whole structure of Pakistan. He went on: My counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rahman know this very well. He and I are old friends and have had many dealings together—among other things I have save his life twice. Not once, but twice. In 1968 when I started the movement against Ayub Khan and created an atmosphere in this country that required Ayub to spare Mujib at that time because he was then charged with conspiracy and treason with India. There was considerable evidence to support the charge, but, as a result of my activities, President Ayub Khan could not move against him. I saved his life again last year. When he came to see me last December 27 and again on January 3 he came to me almost on his knees with tears in his eyes begging for his life and expressing his eternal gratitude for saving his life. At that point I made a great mistake—I did not then extract from him any commitment about his future actions. (Refer to my memo of conversation with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who told an entirely different version. Mujibur said President Bhutto at that point tried to negotiate with him about prisoners of war and so forth and he (Mujibur) told President Bhutto that he could not negotiate anything because he was in jail as a prisoner. Mujibur said on second visit he had with Bhutto, in response to Bhutto’s attempt to extract commitments from him, he responded in same manner: he was in jail as a prisoner.) 4. President Bhutto said that at the time he released Mujib he was severely criticized in his country and citizens and soldiers even asked him what he got for the release. He said he had assumed that his old friend Mujib would be grateful for his life. Although he knew this does not dictate the fortunes of nations, nevertheless he did not think you could separate human equations from the affairs of state—but he had learned differently. Bhutto, said Mujib is now in all his piousness holding forth and demanding that Bhutto recognize him before proceeding with discussions of critical issues such as prisoners of war and trials of some of those prisoners. 5. At this point I told him that I did not want to violate any confidence of my visit to Dacca but that from what I have heard from various members of my party, there would be no attempt to try all the principal prisoners, but rather trials might be limited to something under 300. 6. President Bhutto said if they try five or even two of the principal military leaders he could have such a difficult problem with his military that he did not believe he could withstand their pressure. It is well and good, he said, for other nations to recognize Bangladesh, but the world must understand that Pakistan is in a different position. It had had a secession as a result of conspiracy and it would be as if other nations helped Texas secede from the union-you can image how the rest of the nation would feel. (I did not respond, but I thought in my own mind it might be a welcome move but I didn’t express it.) 7. Bhutto said he was quite critical of the French and British for recognizing Bangladesh when they did and he had begged them not to move precipitously toward recognition. He said he was grateful for the fact that the U.S. did not move in indecent haste to recognize Bangladesh and pleaded with the French and British on the grounds that if U.S. under the circumstances could exercise such restraint surely they could put aside recognition for a time. The problem was that Sheikh Mujib was painting himself into a corner—to the point where he was foreclosing his options and making it impossible to have an orderly and honorable retreat from some of his emotional positions. He said: “He is an emotional man. You as a politician will understand that the last thing a political leader wants to do is to foreclose all options under the circumstances. 8. I then said one of Mujib’s principal problems was going to be not only the trial but the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan. From my conversations this appeared to be a matter of utmost if not paramount importance. He said he well understood this was a major issue but this would have to be determined along with the solution of many problems. He didn’t know how we could begin to solve any of them if Mujibur wouldn’t meet with him prior to recognition. The idea that he can wake up one morning and say, “I can recognize Bangladesh” is wholly unrealistic and without the bounds of reason. He said, with respect to the Bengalis in Pakistan, that the military seriously questioned the patriotism and loyalty of most of the Bengalis serving in the armed forces, so they removed them from their positions. Bhutto said he regretted the decision and told the military leaders he would do it only under the condition that they were treated decently—“as well as our own troops.” Therefore they even moved them into the same quarters and fed them the same food that the Pakistani troops who had been in the trenches were being fed. Their pay and allowances were continued in full. They then found some Bengali civil servants and civilian employees were sorting through files and duplicating files. They were taking them out of offices and taking them to the Russians. They were also storing their gold and wealth with the Russians. So again, they were reluctantly removed from their positions but continued to receive their full pay and allowances. This had been done in the cause of humanity at a cost which Pakistan could ill afford. 9. Bhutto went on to say: “I am going to change this though. I am going to begin to tighten the screws because that is all Mujibur understands—he is at times irrational.” Bhutto explained he had offered Mujib 100 thousand tons of rice to help feed his impoverished and starving people and Pakistan could ill afford to do that, as poor as it was, but Mujib had arrogantly declined the offer. At this point I spoke up and told Bhutto that he should know that there were stories being circulated in both countries in which I recently visited that Pakistan was starving the prisoners in the cantonments and torturing them and that, in some cases, women were incarcerated in camps and being raped and mistreated. He reacted very strongly to this and again repeated that everyone had been treated most civilly and honorably and at great cost to Pakistan. He again repeated he was not going to be cruel to the Bengali soldiers or civilians but was going to begin to tighten down and reduce their salaries to perhaps one-half. This was the only thing Mujib understood-force and pressure—the only thing to which Mujib would react. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 265. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 287. Telegram 4088 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 287. Telegram 4088 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1130Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part IV of VII: The Simla Conference. 1. Bhutto then commented on the Simla conference by saying that he did not in any way assume India was trying to mediate difficulties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan knows the Indians. Pakistan had lived with them. It was obvious from the Simla conference that they were not interested in finding a solution to the prisoners’ return or war trials but rather were using Bangladesh and prisoners as leverage to settle the Kashmir problem. They said that if they could get the boundary dispute settled they might be able to use their influence with Mujibur to return prisoners. Bhutto said he didn’t delude himself for one minute. The Indians were going to try to use every device they could, including duplicity, to solve their problems at Pakistan’s expense. The Indians look upon themselves as great leaders, but they couldn’t lead anything, including their own nation. They didn’t have the capacity or qualities of leadership and he told them that. Foreign Minister Singh asked him what he meant and he told him leadership involved more than geography and numbers of people, it involved character, background, work, climate, and resources. Many things went into developing leadership. He said that India would never supply leadership for Pakistan. On the contrary, the leadership for India has always come from what is now Pakistan or Kashmir, never from what is now India. 2. I said I had heard he had organized two new divisions since the end of the war. He said that was right—he had. He said that India was holding four divisions of Pakistanis now. The idea Pakistan could continue to be vulnerable to the Indians was unthinkable. The Indians had taken and were taking land from Pakistan and would continue to do so unless there was restraint on them. 3. Bhutto went on to say that the Indians have tried to play one nation against another. They think they can establish rapprochement with China but that will be long coming. There will be many years before that happens, because the Chinese knew the Indians as the Pakistanis did. They have dealt with them. The Indians propose to use their friendship and alliance with Russians until they no longer need them. They are introducing the Russian influence into Bangladesh. Bhutto was not at all sure either knew what they were doing, because the Russians are not like Americans or Chinese. The Americans are at times very magnanimous, the Chinese frequently rely on time and their wisdom and take the postion that if a matter will not be settled immediately it will be settled in next 100 years to their interest. The Russians on the other hand want their pound of flesh and last drop of blood now. Both Bangladesh and India will find it more difficult to extricate themselves from the talons of the bear than they now realize. 4. He went on to say that obviously Pakistanis did not know how to put their best foot forward. They were not experts in public relations as the Indians were. For instance, every American Ambassador—Ambassador Galbraith and other (he named no other)—were only in India a short time before they become completely mesmerized. This was true of every American Ambassador. They begin selling the Indian philosophy around the world. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 266. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 288. Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 288. Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1215Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part V of VII: Aid, the Summit Meetings and Implications. 1. Pakistan, Bhutto continued, had many problems. It could live and was grateful for the help of the U.S. It must, however, have more help. He would not ask for help now until after the November elections. (I remained silent.) He said if he could maintain order, if he could continue to make economic gains, he could rebuild the nation. Pakistan has the strength and spirit and could become the West Germany of South Asia. That was what it intended to be. He said Pakistan might have made many mistakes. He had made many mistakes. His views had changed on many issues but a man’s views reflect the times in which he is living when he has those views. Changed conditions and changed positions frequently compel an alteration of attitudes. 2. Bhutto said he kew the President’s visit to Peking was fruitful, because he had been informed by us. In fact, he knew in advance President Nixon would have a productive visit with Chou En Lai. He had told President Kennedy a month before he died that, if he could escape his fears of the Chinese, he felt a dialogue with them could be quite productive. He said the Chinese were always extremely intelligent and gracious in their talks and in their behavior. Most important, they always lived up to their commitments, oral and written. If they did not wish to make a commitment, they would adroitly avoid the subject, but once having given their word they would unquestionably adhere to precisely what they committed themselves to do. “I wish I could say as much for the Russians,” he added. 3. Bhutto recalled he had written to the President prior to his trip to Moscow. I said I knew the President very much appreciated his letter, and then referred to the letter. I explained the Moscow visit had been two years in the making. We entered into a number of agreements which we hoped would provide the basis for greater peace and tranquillity and hoped the Russians would in good faith carry out these agreements to the letter and spirit as we intended to do. He said he was convinced if the President had not gone to Peking the progress in Moscow would not have been so great. It was essential for the U.S. to continue to maintain its presence in Southeast asia and South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. “I don’t mean in a strong military sense or of flexing your muscles, but you must nevertheless maintain a very strong presence, politically, militarily and economically in this area because you are the only nation that can provide the balance between the forces that are now working.” He said the separation and attempted destruction of Pakistan destroyed a balance of power which was critical to South Asia and this could have serious repercussions, even in the Middle East. Pakistan’s only hope for continued stability, until there was more rebuilding during this decade, was the continued interest, presence and influence of the U.S. He said there were many problems: Russians were moving in in great numbers in India and Bangladesh. Pakistan had problems of exports—of developing its resources. It wanted to build a port somewhere in Baluchistan. He said Pakistan very much needed U.S. help to do it. The Russians desperately wanted access to a warm water port. If this port facility was built with American help, it would be a great setback to the Russians. 4. Bhutto expressed deep gratitude for what the President told the Shah of Iran. He did not in any way want to do anything that would embarrass the President prior to the election in November by asking for aid for their needs, even military needs. But, after November they would like the opportunity to make representations about what their needs were going to be. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 267. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 289. Telegram 4090 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 289. Telegram 4090 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1250Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part VI of VII: Foreign Investment 1. At the end of the conversation, I expressed my appreciation for the opportunity to visit with Bhutto and talk with him. I said we had had an excellent meeting with his finance, monetary and production people and that I had raised the issue of investments and diversification within the country. We had made one suggestion to them that I wanted to repeat to him. We did not in any sense want to suggest what type of any economy or economic policy Pakistan should have, but if it wanted diversification and wanted foreign investment capital, I had told his ministers there were three essential ingredients: (1) political stability, (2) economic stability, and (3) a clear signal that Pakistan wanted foreign investments. I told him there was a shortage of capital in the world. Contrary to my avowed intentions not to give any suggestions or advice, but in his interest, I would say that both Singapore and Brazil add political and economic stability and an investment policy which taken together acted as incentives to attract capital. They had been tremendously successful. Whatever the rules following twelve years of military control in Pakistan, the rules should be set forth explicitly so everyone could understand. I said that these rules being understood, I thought he could get help from other sources. 2. Bhutto replied he had tried to make it clear that he wanted investment. It would be safe. They had nationalized some domestic industries and businesses but had not tampered with any foreign investments except in the field of insurance, which frankly he did not class as foreign direct investment. It was a business that fed off domestic economy and was in a different category. He would try to make it even more clear in the future that they wanted all the foreign investments that they could get. This ended the conversation except for a reference to the dinner that evening in which he was going to provide some type of entertainment. He said: “If you don’t like it, stop it and we will go on to the next act.” Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 268. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 290. Telegram 4091 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 290. Telegram 4091 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0645Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part VII of VII: Summary Comment. Comment: I thought the conversation was very frank, very warm and extremely cordial. My assessment is that Bhutto fully understands his diffiuclties. He is enormously upset about the Indians and their attitudes but is both intelligent and pragmatic enough to undertake the rebuilding of his own country without letting bitterness blind him as to what he has to do. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 269. The time given for the transmission of the telegram is apparently wrong. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. 291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 14, 1972 SUBJECT: Indian Views—Your Meeting with Secretary Connally With reference to the South Asian portion of your meeting with Secretary Connally, we have received two interesting and reliable clandestine reports on Indian thinking following the Moscow summit and the Secretary’s visit to Delhi. Read together, they provide an interesting picture of how Indian thinking may have evolved in recent weeks. One is a report on an Indian foreign ministry study of your visit to Moscow which reflects sensitivity to how the summit affects less powerful states. The study judges that the undoubted prospects for improving the inter-national climate are partly offset for India by apprehension that great power accommodation will occur at the expense of third countries. It notes, for instance that assumption of “special responsibility” by the two superpowers for preventing conflicts is “questionable” if one accepts the sovereignty and independence of smaller states. Later it notes that the net impression is of two great powers desiring to stabilize the status quo in a manner meeting their interests. It concludes that, while ruling out “unilateral advantage” is a significant expansion of the concept of peaceful coexistence, as far as third countries go a balance of bilateral advantage is not much better than two superpowers pursuing unilateral advantage. The main point to be seen in this report is the great sensitivity to the idea of the superpowers taking on themselves what is seen as the responsibility for ordering the world. That Indian sensitivities to what happens to small states when large states agree is a useful backdrop to another intelligence report just received in the wake of the Connally visit . According to the source, official India: —realizes it can’t live with the combined hostility of two of the three superpowers (U.S., China) and notes even the USSR is moving towards detente with the US to avoid the same situation; —had partly based its decision to have full ties with North Vietnam and to condemn US bombing and harbor mining on the assumption the Soviets would cancel your visit to Moscow; —was shocked when the visit went through; —thinks in the absence of improved Indo-US relations, the US will improve ties with India’s South Asian neighbors and thereby “surround” India; —recognizes Bangladesh will be a long-term burden which the USSR is not alleviating and what it has done has been at India’s expense; —found the Connally visit a “face-saving” gesture which Mrs. Gandhi appreciated and felt that all such gestures will be “fully reciprocated” by India to help it out of the Soviet clutches; —sees the US as currently “amicable” towards improving relations but if they fail to materialize, India will try something to improve ties with China. Comment : These reports may be self-serving, but the picture that emerges seems worth testing. It is clear that Mrs. Gandhi on her European trip lashed out on several occasions at the tendency of the superpowers to try to arrange the world’s affairs. We have reports that the Soviets reacted sharply to Indian comments in this view which minimized the importance of the summit. It could be that against a backdrop of suspicion about major power accommodation at the expense of third states, India is thinking again about the advisability of relying exclusively on ludo-Soviet solidarity. We do not want to jump at this thesis. I shall send you separately a paper suggesting a strategy for the next six months designed to go slow while giving any such change in Indian thinking a chance to mature. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jul 1972-Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy. 292. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 292. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 San Clemente, California, July 14, 1972, 9 a.m. SUBJECT: Meeting with John B. Connally PARTICIPANTS: The President Secretary Connally Henry A. Kissinger The President welcomed Secretary Connally warmly and congratulated him on the success of his round-the-world trip. [Secretary Connally’s trip, from June 6 to July 11, took him to six Latin American countries, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Iran.] The President told Secretary Connally, “You did a great job,” and asked for a summary of the trip’s highlights. [Omitted here is Connally’s report on the stops he made in Latin America and Southeast Asia.] Turning to South Asia, Secretary Connally thought that Bangladesh “must be the worst place in the world.” But it needed our support and could be a bridge to India. The President observed that the Japanese also could and must do more in the area of economic assistance. Secretary Connally went on to describe Mujib as articulate, smart, a consummate actor and demagogue. There was a question whether Bangladesh could exist. It needed the skilled Bengalis from West Pakistan; otherwise it had no civil servants. But the U.S. can’t undertake a continuing level of support. In India, the Secretary had had very frank talks. Mrs. Gandhi assured him that India had no special animus against the U.S. and that much of what India was saying was only repeating what India had always said. Pakistan’s President Bhutto had changed his views on the U.S. He was very grateful for everything the U.S. had done for Pakistan. Secretary Connally found the quality of Pakistani leadership very high. Our problem was one of public relations. Bhutto denied Pakistani mistreatment of Bengalis. War crimes trials, Bhutto had said, would force Pakistan into war. Pakistan would not sit still at the mercy of the Indians. Bhutto was a smart politician and a smart leader. Afghanistan the Secretary had found a pitiful country. It had no leadership. As a country it was incapable of acting. The Secretary remarked that Afghanistan had lost a lot of planes just trying to fly them on maneuvers during the India-Pakistan war. Ambassador Neumann was an impressive fellow; he deserved a better post. [Omitted here is Connally’s report on his stop in Iran and a discussion of oil policy.] Secretary Connally summed up several strong feelings he had as a result of his trip. For one thing, we were permitting too many countries to malign us, India particularly. He cited the Indian attacks on us on Vietnam. We had to stop this criticism of the U.S. Secondly, it was the Secretary’s impression that most of these countries had more competence than they had ever possessed in the past. Third, it was his conviction that the next battleground in world affairs would be economics. We had to use our economic strength as a weapon. For example, we had to stop the Philippines’ bitching or we would lose our bases. We should threaten removing the bases and abolishing the sugar quota and the Laurel-Langley tariff. The Secretary had observed in the course of summing up that we had dropped in popularity in India. As for Latin America, watch Echeverria, he said. We can’t be all things to all people, Secretary Connally said. We had to be selective as to the friends we sought. We couldn’t do everything for everybody. The Latin Americans wanted a U.S. Latin American policy. We have one, but they didn’t know what it means. In South Asia and East Asia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia were the key countries. As a general principle we had to articulate a firm U.S. point of view. We had to have a clear view of our interest and pursue it vigorously instead of letting others take the initiative all the time. We had to develop a capacity for this type of activity. The President expressed his appreciation for this report and advice. The trouble was that all our ambassadors were worried about was how they were getting along with their hosts. The State guys had the right manners but they minced around and had no clear concept of defending the natural interest. The President also commented that it was a grievous mistake not to sell F–4’s to the Latin American countries that sought them. The meeting ended and Secretary Connally then went outside to speak with the press. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning July 9, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s Office in the Western White House. 293. Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 293. Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, July 24, 1972, 1815Z Subject: Farewell Call on Prime Minister: Indo-American Relations. Ref: New Delhi 9254 1. Summary: I met with Prime Minister Gandhi July 24 for half-hour farewell call which turned out to be a profoundly disturbing reminder that at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations. Among the catalogue of categorical allegations made by the Prime Minister were: (a) qte everything the US does is against India unqte; (b) the US is trying to drive a wedge between India and Bangladeshi; (c) qte the US is working against us in India, too unqte; (d) we have qte proof unqte that the US is cooperating with communist extremists against us; (e) qte I don’t doubt that you probably think so, but you wouldn’t know the facts unqte; (f) qte a lot of American professors have been engaging in improper activities injurious to india unqte; (g) qte it is immaterial to us whether you want to do business with us or not unqte; (h) qte you are against India in the monetary field unqte; (i) qte it doesn’t matter in the least to us what the US does about debt relief or aid. India will survive and progress with or without help from the US unqte. Incredible! My successor has an even tougher task ahead than I anticipated. End summary. 2. Shortly after arrival at the Prime Minister’s outer office, Siddhartha Ray, former Union Minister of Education, now West Bengal Chief Minister, emerged from the Prime Minister’s office with what I perceived as a scowl on his face, but when he observed me, brightened up, greeted me most cordially and said he had missed seeing me for a long time. I expressed my congratulations over improvements in Calcutta since he had taken over as Chief Minister. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Gandhi rang, and I was ushered in. Since it was a farewell courtesy call, I was without a note-taker, but she had her amanuensis on hand, who scribbled furiously during our entire interview. 3. As I entered I observed that she looked tired, unhappy, or preoccupied, but she greeted me with a smile which was reciprocated (the last on either side during the entire interview). Her opening gambit was, qte so, you’re going off to campaign for the President I understand? Qte yes, and you as a genuine campaigner would know my feelings of anticipation unqte. I said that I wanted to pay my respects and to thank her for her many personal courtesies and kindnesses to which she responded that she and her Minister held me underline personally end underline in high regard. Her emphasis caused me to express the wish that this regard could be reflected in her and their feelings for my country, because that was vastly more important to me than their feelings about me, much as I appreciated them. She said it was impossible to forget the anti-Indian stance constantly taken by the US. I said I regretted deeply that Indo-American relations were very bad compared to what they had been during my first year and a half here and to what they should be. I said our differences in perception of, and response to, the South Asian crisis are of course well-known and have had unfortunate psychological and other effects on both sides which will take time, understanding and effort to overcome. 4. I told the Prime Minister that it seemed to me there were no direct conflicts of interest between the US and India, e.g., territorial, commercial, military or even ideological. I pointed out that in the US a majority of the people felt that a competitive free enterprise system was economically the best for us. In India the majority of the people felt that the Indian form of socialism is best. We certainly recognize that each sovereign nation must determine for itself what economic system it will follow and that conditions are different in various countries. In any event, we had good relations with other countries whose economy followed a socialistic pattern of one kind or another, and that should be no bar to our good relations with India. She replied, qte if you can have good relations with China you ought to be able to have good relations with India unqte. 5. Mrs. Gandhi then volunteered the astonishing observation that qte everything the US does is against India unqte. Endeavoring to submerge my indignation at her bald statement, I said I would certainly appreciate it if she would cite chapter and verse to substantiate such a sweeping allegation, adding that it seemed to me that the US action over the years in extending aid to India amounting $10 billion of which 20 percent was in outright grants and the rest in loans on very favorable terms, did not impress me as qte anti-Indian unqte. This was the largest amount of aid we had given to any country and more aid than had been extended to India by all other countries combined. Likewise, US participation in helping India bear the huge burden of caring for refugees pouring into India during the South Asian crisis, with the US contributing the largest amount, except for India, given by any country, could scarcely be called qte anti-Indian unqte. Moreover, our present aid to Bangladesh to help that country get on its feet economically seemed to me to coincide with India’s interest in seeking to assure an economically viable neighbor and one in which extremist elements hostile to India could not flourish, was not qte anti-Indian unqte. I assured her that it was certainly not the policy of my government to be qte anti-Indian unqte, and I regretted deeply that she had any such feeling, her rejoinder was, qte well, that’s the way I feel and I have reasons for my feeling unqte. 6. I told Mrs. Gandhi that I felt that her harsh feelings about the US stemmed from distorted information brought to her by those who preferred to see even further deterioration in Indo-US relations and therefore had a sinister motive. In this connection, I said I had read in certain segments of the Indian press fantastic stories that extensive US aid to Bangladesh was being given in order to alienate Bangladesh from India, and that US agents were active there to drive a wedge between India and Bangladesh. She said “those aren’t fantastic stories at all, they are the truth and what is more, that is just what the leaders in Bangladesh think unqte. My answer to her was, qte Madam Prime Minister, you astound me. What possible motive could the US have for engaging in any such operation? We have no objectives commercial, military, territorial or otherwise in Bangladesh, nor in India for that matter. We seek no gain of any kind except to see stability established, which seems to us desirable for all South Asia, just as stability in India and Pakistan is desirable not only for South Asia but for the entire world, including the US unqte. 7. The Prime Minister replied, qte the US is working against us in India, too unqte. I said I had also read stories in the India press to the effect that we were cooperating with the CPM to undermine her and her party. I asked what could the US possibly have in common with the left extremists who make up the CPM? She replied, qte well, we have proof of that too unqte. I said I would be most appreciative if she would furnish any proof to that effect and I and my government would immediately look into it and put a stop to it if there was any such thing going on which I could not believe was the fact. Then she resorted to generalities in characteristic fashion as she had in a similar conversation with Secretary Rogers in New York in October 1970 (State 175720) saying, qte well, it may not be proof that would stand up in court, but we have ways of knowing what is going on. You cannot prove that is not so unqte. To which I replied, qte it is practically impossible to prove such a negative proposition in court, it is the established practice that those who make some allegations submit some proof in the first instance beyond mere suspicion unqte. To which she replied, qte this is not suspicion; we know what is going on unqte. I said, qte apparently your mind is closed on this subject. I am very sorry you feel the way you do. Just let me say that I and my government recognize you and your party as the undisputed leaders of India. Your opposition on the right has been virtually wiped out, and the US has nothing in common with your opposition on the left. I am afraid you are being tragically misled by talebearers with ulterior designs. All I can say is that I can assure you that the allegations you have made are false unqte. To which she replied, qte I don’t doubt that you probably think so, but you don’t know the facts unqte. My answer, qte I believe I know what my mission and government are doing and have been doing in India unqte. 8. Despite an inclination to walk out, I thought it best to pursue two other subjects. I expressed deep regret over what I perceived to be signs that India wished to reduce or restrict people-to-people contacts with the US and reduce scholarly exchange which had been the product of many years of working together in the intellectual communities of both nations. I pointed out that US professors and scholars, many of them longtime friends of India, now found their visas held up. I inquired if this was a matter of official policy, bureaucratic caution or simply anti-American feeling. She answered, qte a lot of these professors have been engaging in improper activities here injurious to India unqte. There then ensued the same go-around on my part to try to get her to be specific. I pressed her for details as to what she meant, but nothing was forthcoming except the repeated remark, qte I know the facts—we have our sources unqte. 9. I told Mrs. Gandhi that many businessmen in the US and American business in India are concerned that there is some official Indian bias against American investment and US imports. I referred to her remark to Secretary Connally made in my presence that there was no official Indian policy against foreign investment in India. I said I hoped American business could be assured of non-discriminatory treatment. She answered, qte it is immaterial to us whether you want to do business with us or not unqte. I pointed out that the US had set up in the aid mission a special section known as the USAID export promotion program and that its sole function was to help India to increase exports, and that Indian commercial exports to the US are currently at a record high figure. I also called her attention to the fact that just last week the US Export-Import Bank had authorized a $2.7 million grant to Hindustan Aluminum Corporation, which I realized was a private sector company but with only a 26 percent US interest and largely owned and controlled by India interests. I said it seemed to me that these facts and many others could be cited which demonstrated that the US had an interest in the prosperity and wellbeing of India. 10. Mrs. Gandhi said, qte you are against India in the monetary field unqte. I asked what she meant. She said, qte oh, there was some meeting lately where you were the only country against us unqte. Comment: She only had a vague idea of what she was talking about end comment. I inquired whether she was referring to the consortium meeting in Paris on the subject of debt relief and she said, qte yes, that’s it. All countries except the US went along with us. We had people there—I got it straight from them and from other countries that were there unqte. Thereupon, I explained how the US had indicated its willingness to go along just as it had in the past with the same formula for debt relief, with hard lenders like Japan and France taking a larger percetage of the debt extension than soft lenders such as the US. I said it was apparently not possible to arrange with the other countries for an extension beyond $100 million, but that I felt certain the US interest was in the formula which seemed fair rather than in the total amount of debt relief. I said I suspected if India were in position of the US as a soft lender, it would feel the same way. Her answer, qte oh, well, I know what happened—we had our people there, and other countries tell me the same thing which our people told me unqte. Obviously my analysis got nowhere either because she did not understand it or did not want to understand it, or both. 11. Comment: The interview reminded me very much of the talk Secretary Rogers had with the Prime Minister in New York in 1970, although she has become much more acerbic with time. Clearly she has a very big chip on her shoulder. she said, qte it doesn’t matter in the least to us what the US does about debt relief or aid. India will survive and progress with or without help from the US unqte. Throughout, her manner was arrogantly confident, ready to believe the worst about the US, closed to any explanation and thoroughly obnoxious. For example, after initial pleasantries when I started to talk seriously, she commenced the annoying practice of repeatedly putting her glasses on and off, scribbling notes, pressing buttons and talking to the flunkies summoned, and making telephone calls, in Hindi. With each interruption, I paused in conversation, then I continued, repeatedly. I have seen her go through this routine before with others, either to indicate lack of interest in the conversation or to display how busy she is or to set her guest on edge. In the Western world, we would call it rudeness. With considerable difficulty I believe I kept my rise in temper concealed. 12. The Prime Minister said she wished me well personally, again with a strong accent on the last word, we shook hands, and I departed. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Exdis. Keating subsequently discussed this conversation with Singh. Singh put the best possible light on the exchange between Gandhi and Keating and concluded that it marked the beginning of a dialogue between India and the United States. (Telegram 9256 from New Delhi, July 25; ibid.) 294. Telegram 9254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 294. Telegram 9254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, July 25, 1972, 1745Z Subject: Farewell to India 1. I made farewell calls yesterday for over two hours consecutively on President Giri, Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. It was a memorable, at times heartening, but overall profoundly disturbing experience. The calls scheduled at GOI initiative left me with the feeling that I had been given what I can only describe as qte the Indian treatment unqte. Whether by accident or design, I was first warmed and relaxed at the affable Giri, then rudely pummeled and goaded by the Madam, and finally brain-washed by the great rationalizer Swaran Singh. It was quite an experience, and I am reporting each conversation separately in some detail. 2. I had prepared carefully for these calls planning to take the longer and broader view of prospects for Indo-American relations and emphasize the importance of cultural exchange and commercial relations. The President accepted and elaborated on my points exuberantly. I left him in a warm glow buoyed by the evidence that there remains in India a reservoir of good will for the US and staunch friends in positions of influence if not policy control. Little did I realize the hornet’s nest that awaited me in the Prime Minister’s office. 3. The reporting cable of my discussion with Mrs. Gandhi records the litany of vague, emotional and distorted allegations leveled by her against the US, as well as the apparently calculated rudeness of her demeanor. Mere recording, however, does not suffice to explain that fantastic performance, which I am forced to conclude was the real Indira, and to a considerable extent the real India, showing through starkly, but consistent with longstanding and deep-seated attitudes toward white, affluent, foreign, great power, American (and not only American) influence in Asia. Simply put, Indira and India are predisposed for historical and psychological reasons to place the worst possible interpretation upon US policies, to take a conspiratorial view of US activities and to embrace a qte devil theory unqte rationalization for their own inadequacies in the face of admittedly massive problems of economic, social, and political development. Granted, Indira and India believe they have recent cause in US policy responses to the South Asian crisis to suspect the US. It is, however, educative to recall that such suspicions were held and ocassionally expressed well before the eruption of Bangladesh. Thus, while the Prime Minister probably was loaded for my call, by influential advisors unfriendly to the US, she and at least her fellow Indian intellectuals are particularly susceptible to that kind of stuffing. 4. My discussion with the Foreign Minister was of course a welcome contrast to that with Mrs. Gandhi. As always, Swaran Singh was courteous, personally cordial and apparently candid. He readily accepted my proposition that the absence of direct conflicts of interest and easing of third party differences should augur well for Indo-American relations. He also struggled admirably to interpret my encounter with the Prime Minister as the beginning of an essential Indo-American dialogue. I would like to think so, but doubt that castigation such as I was subjected to by the Prime Minister should be dignified as dialogue. Any event, it is mildly reassuring to note that pragmatism and reasonableness, as exemplified by Swaran Singh, are also at work in the perplexing psychology of Indian policy. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Confidential; Exdis. Keating left his post on July 26. The post remained vacant until Daniel Patrick Moynihan was appointed on February 8, 1973. 295. Telegram 9293 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 295. Telegram 9293 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, July 26, 1972, 1100Z Subj: Indian Nuclear Intentions Ref: (A) State 129158; (B) New Delhi A-20; (C) New Delhi 8133 1. Summary. Appropriate elements of country team conclude that while India already has advanced nuclear infrastructure, and will continue to refine its nuclear expertise, GOI currently has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. There is no evidence GOI has decided to stage peaceful test blast. Weapons delivery “capability” is currently limited to capacity of Indian Air Force. Indian expert has noted India has no present or foreseeable capacity to develop missile launch system. End summary. 2. Since transmitting ref B in January, Embassy has seen no evidence of change in GOI policy not to manufacture nuclear weapons; indeed, PriMin and DefMin have publicly reiterated policy (New Delhi 2288 and 5491). Nor do we have reason to amend any other aspect of assessment contained ref B. 3. There continues to be significant popular and elite Indian sentiment in favor of a nuclear weapons program, however as British High Commissioner noted to Pol Counselor July 18, there seems to be awareness of of GOI policy levels of major diversion of economic resource entailed in nuclear weapons development. Moreover, popular pro-bomb sentiment tends to dissipate when the issue is recognized as a choice between butter and blast. British HiCommer, like us, believes India is “miles from crossroads” where hard choice would have to be made to pursue costly military detour from current open options approach. 4. In addition to reservations about prohibitive economic costs, PriMin Gandhi may doubt military utility of nuclear weaponry (New Delhi 2288). Moreover she seems emotionally set against any such development, and, we think, finds present open options posture tactically useful, but has no intention, as matter of principle as well economics, to pursue nuclear weapons development as such at this ttme. 5. Conditions most likely to change Mrs. Gandhi’s public, and presumably private, opposition to nuclear weaponry for India include: (a) Asian proliferation, particularly Pakistan; (b) Chinese bomb waving, including perhaps missile launches in Indian Ocean area; and (c) economic/social/political deterioration in India sufficiently great to tempt leadership towards psychological boost of nuclear explosion. However, none of these conditions currently obtain or appears likely to emerge in near timeframe. 6. Country Team sees no evidence that as part of open opinions approach, GOI is currently preparing “peaceful” test to expand its mastery of nuclear technology. We understand it is generally conceded in international scientific circles, and certainly on diplomatic circuit here, that India has technical know-how, and materials to develop simple nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so. (Productive capacities of India’s present and prospective nuclear stations, grades of plutonium being ppoduced and extent to which are covered by international or bilateral safeguards are well-known to Washington. We are aware from overt and covert sources that within Indian nuclear community, as elsewhere in GOI and among political and popular elites, there is body of opinion arguing that regardless of ultimate GOI decision on weapons manufacture, open options policy, to be purposeful and credible, requires early test to extend India’s range of nuclear knowledge. This opinion also adduces beneficial psychological side-effects in India, and perhaps on potential aggressors abroad. Others in nuclear establishment consider test blast at best diversionary, at most likely to tempt GOI to commit scarce resources in unhealthy direction of weapons development. While we think it possible Indian scientists may have nuclear device, we are unable to determine whether they have assembled device. We recall that in July 12 press conference. Mrs. Gandhi said “there is no truth whatever” to current Japanese reports India will soon stage test blast (New Delhi 8688). 7. For foreseeable future India’s delivery capability lies wholly in limited range aircraft in Indian Air Force inventory—currently squadrons of Canberras (B–58), 8 squadrons of MIG–21 and 6 squadrons of SU-7. Despite lively GOI interest in general field of rocketry and space, as evidenced, e.g., by extensive sounding rocket program undertaken with foreign collaboration, informed Indians seem to recognize they are still beginners. Sciatt notes that in recent call on new Space Chief Dhawan, latter described his first priorities as communication and education, and in discussing reports of an Indian national satellite, hinted that launching will be delayed beyond rumored 1974, because of funding and software complications, and difficulties in importing requisite technology. Also, Professor M.G.K. Menon, Director TATA Institute Fundemental Research, and Head of Indian space program for interim period of about six months following Vikram Sarabhal’s death, told British High Commissioner three months ago India has no present or foreseeable capacity to develop missile launch system, and could not, for example, even theoretically expect to have independent satellite launch capability for 8 to 10 years. Country Team sees no evidence GOI and scientific community are working energetically on problem. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 72. Secret; Exdis. 296. Memorandum for the Record 296. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 1, 1972 SUBJECT: Meeting with the Acting Secretary on NSSM 156, August 1, 1972 ATTENDEES: Joseph J. Sisco; William Cargo, Thomas Thornton (S/PC); Holsey Handyside (PN/AE); James M. Wilson (EA); Leonard Weiss, David Mark, Lawrence Finch (INR); Marvin Humphreys (EUR); Donovan Q. Zook (SCI); David T. Schneider, Dennis Kux (NEA/INC). Sisco summarized the questions posed as follows: —Can the Indians explode a device? Yes. —Will they? We don’t know. The issue is what can we do to avert this, and there seemed to be a few limited things that were feasible. Acting Secretary Irwin said that he felt we should do what we could provided it was something sensible. He was impressed that India’s becoming a sixth nuclear power would have an impact on the other near-nuclears. While we cannot measure how much impact this would be, it was worthwhile trying to prevent this. Mr. Sisco agreed, saying he was impressed with the unsettling impact an Indian nuclear blast would have on South Asia as well as the impact on Japan. Mr. Cargo and Mr. Weiss and others discussed the question of the impact on the Japanese. Cargo thought it would be very grave; Weiss thought it less important. Mr. Wilson said the Japan Desk agreed with the analysis in the issues paper, namely that it would be important but not decisive. Regarding major issues (Page 4, Issues Paper): 1. There was agreement regarding the assessment of Indian capabilities, intentions and the implications for other countries. 2. There was much discussion whether our non-proliferation interests were “overriding.” The consensus was that these were important but not overriding, especially as our influence was limited. 3. A. It was agreed that we should proceed with efforts to strengthen the position internationally of our view regarding the indistinguishability of PNE’s and military explosions. It was also agreed that it would be useful to stimulate a further discussion in India regarding the costs of developing a nuclear weapons and missile delivery system. On the questions of PNE’s, it was agreed that such an offer would give us a platform for acting against the Indians if they explode a device, especially if, as seems likely, they would turn downt he offer. On the other hand, it was admitted that there were substantial internal USG difficulties with making such an offer. There was also the question of when to offer the services and what rationale we might provide. The conclusion was that the PNE idea seemed of doubful value on balance, but was still worth exploring. B. The session agreed that we should approach the Soviets on the question. Acting Secretary Irwin did not think the two views in the issues paper were necessarily exclusive. He thought we could feel our way, initially discussing the problem with the Soviets and then decide later whether we should urge them to press the Indians in light of their response. On the question of discussing the issue with China, Wilson said EA found value in our allaying Chinese suspicions that we and the Russians were “up to something” with the Indians. It was also thought useful to point out to the Chinese the negative impact on India of their launching ICBM’s over South Asia. [ text not declassfied ] In summary, Acting Secretary Irwin said that we should do those things that seemed reasonable in the pre-decision phase. Mr. Cargo agreed quite strongly, saying that since we really do not have a good fix on the decision-making calculus on the nuclear question, it was worth our effort to do what we can and try to stimulate action by other. 4. Options After an Indian Decision. Mr. Sisco thought the idea of “sanctions” was too strong. He did not think we can decide before the fact what to do after an Indian explosion. We need to decide this at the time in light of the state of ourrelations with India and other circumstances then prevailing. He was, therefore, reserved about spelling out categorically measures to be taken. In any case, he was doubtful about the US’ unilaterally becoming a moral judge, as suggested by the paper. We need to weigh very carefully the impact of what we do on US-Indian relations. Others agreed in general with Sisco; several thought that the third option (essentially a pro-forma resopnse) should not be rejected out of hand, as recomended in the paper. Acting Secretary Irwin said he did not like the options approach for this exercise and isntead thought the paper should list a spectrum of possibilities, both in the pre and post decision phase. This would indicate a range of things that could be done. In the pre-decision phase we could proceed right now, while in the post-decision phase we would have to decide at the time. 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 387, Working File’Indian Nuclear Intentions. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted in NEA/INC on August 2 by Dennis Kux. The 42-page draft response to NSSM 156, prepared in NEA/INC on August 4, is ibid. For NSSM 156, see Document 275 . 297. Memorandum of Conversation 297. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 2, 1972 SUBJECT: Indo-American Relations PARTICIPANTS: Acting Secretary Irwin Indian Ambassador L.K. Jha Distribution: The Deputy Secretary—1 Joseph J. Sisco (NEA)—1 Amembassy NEW DELHI—1 (Charge only) Ambassador Jha said one aspect of his trip home which worried him was that he sensed for the first time a growing public antipathy with the United States. He emphasized he was not speaking of the governmental level but of the public at large. The Ambassador was concerned that the longer the two governments delayed starting “the dialogue” the firmer anti-American sentiments would tend to become and the more difficult it would be to improve Indo-American relations. He thought that any dialogue between the governments should have in mind what might be done to reverse this growing anti-US feeling. Ambassador Jha said that in some instances relatively minor US actions could be helpful. In this connection, he noted the upcoming 25th anniversary of Indian independence. He thought that a message on this occasion, while a small thing, would be noticed and appreciated. He also noted that President Nixon, in his last letter to Mrs. Gandhi, dated December 18, 1971, had written that he would be in further communication with Mrs. Gandhi. To date, there has been no further communication. Another annoyance from the Indian view was the parallelism in phraseology used by the USG with regard to the current status of our arms supply policy to Pakistan and our development assistance program toward India. In both instances we were saying that the two programs “were under review.” As the Indians saw it, we appear to be equating arms and developing. They did not understand or like such a comparison. On the other hand, Ambassador Jha thought that some of our more recent statements with regard to the prospects for improved relations were couched in a more objective, less patronizing language. This was noticed in India and received positively. He had in mind that our public statements were now no longer making improved relations and the related dialogue conditional on other developments. We were saying that we wanted a dialogue per se with no strings attached. This sounded to the Indians as if our attitude had somewhat altered, and was a helpful development. The Connally visit, Ambassador Jha reported, had gone off well. Some in the GOI had been somewhat apprehensive before the Secretary came but afterwards felt the talks had been useful. Jha said that he had talked with Mrs. Gandhi after her meeting with Connally and she shared these views. She was hopeful about a possible up-turn in Indo-American relations. The Acting Secretary commented that it was also our view that the Connally visit had made a positive contribution. However, with regard to getting “the dialogue” going, the Acting Secretary said that regretfully whenever one side or the other seemed ready an event occurred which seemed calculated to create new problems. The Acting Secretary then showed Ambassador Jha a sanitized version of Ambassador Keating’s telegram reporting his farewell call on Mrs. Gandhi. The Acting Secretary added that the expression of views and feelings by the Prime Minister were not conducive to promoting an atmosphere for “a dialogue” which he thought we both wanted in order to seek to improve Indo-US relations. He said it seemed to show an almost ingrained antipathy to the US. Without trying to justify Mrs. Gandhi’s performance, Ambassador Jha spoke to some of her comments. Ambassador Jha obviously had not received any report of Ambassador Keating’s farewell call. After reading the sanitized version carefully, Ambassador Jha said he thought that the temper outburst could have been sparked by recent US actions on the debt rescheduling question. The GOI understood that the US had unilaterally opposed the other lenders and the World Bank and frustrated the achievement of an agreement. This created the disturbing impression for the Indians that the US was using humanitarian and economic development assistance for political purposes. In effect, our actions were signalling the Indians that if they wanted aid, India would have to act the way we wanted. This would be difficult for any nation to accept. The debt rescheduling question, Ambassador Jha said, perhaps also recalled to mind events of the recent past in which the US had acted in a way that Mrs. Gandhi considered hostile to India. These factors, the Ambassador thought, may have helped trigger her criticisms of the US. It was also possible, Jha said, that Mrs. Gandhi was simply tired, and her temper threshold was lower than would normally be the case. With regard to specific subjects discussed by Ambassador Keating and Mrs. Gandhi, Ambassador Jha said there was uneasiness in India about the scope and character of some US exchange programs. Suspicions had been stirred by the revelations in America in the late sixties of extensive CIA involvement in such overseas programs. Thus, when the purpose of a particular project was not entirely clear or when Americans acted in a way that seemed unusual to the Indians, suspicions regarding the bona fides were raised. Ambassador Jha knew the overwhelming majority of visiting Americans created no problems, but if one did, that was sufficient to stir difficulties. The PL 480 rupee programs also remained a source of constant concern and irritation, Ambassador Jha said. The Indians noted, in this regard, that two years ago the Saulnier report on the PL 480 rupee question had been completed, but nothing further had been done to resolve what they considered a fundamental problem. The failure on our part to act on PL 480, plus the impression we created in our handling of the $87 million aid commitment and the debt rescheduling issue, all served to hurt Indian sensitivites. No doubt, Ambassador Jha said, this was not our intention, but nonetheless this was the impression we created in India. One result of US use of PL 480 rupees created on occasion academic irritation. The Americans seemed to have unlimited Indian rupee resources and were, in effect, able to outspend Indian institutions working in similar areas and “buy up” available Indian talent. Thus, an American professor could come to India for six months and complete research that Indians had been working on for several years. In addition, there was a feeling that the Americans were not always forthcoming in providing the Indians with the results of research activities. This created particular concern if the subjects were ones India regarded as sensitive. With regard to Mrs. Gandhi’s comments about US activities in Bangladesh, the Acting Secretary re-iterated that US assistance in no way was intended to drive a wedge between India and Bangladesh. We had no interest in doing so and wanted only to assist in stabilizing the political situation in the new country and in alleviating human suffering. We thought this was also India’s desire and, therefore, saw no conflict between our respective policies. Ambassador Jha said that he understood our policy. He noted that Mrs. Gandhi’s concerns may have been stirred by some Bangladesh officials who had expressed to her their view that, in fact, the US was trying to drive a wedge between Dacca and Delhi through its activities. Returning to the question of the “dialogue,” Ambassador Jha reiterated his hope that this would shortly start in a serious fashion. He also restated his concern that the longer we delayed the harder it would be to remove some of the current irritants. Acting Secretary Irwin also expressed the hope that a dialogue would begin. He stressed the importance of avoiding statements that made the start of a dialogue more difficult. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on August 7 by Kux and cleared in draft by Irwin. 298. Special National Intelligence Estimate 31–72 298. Special National Intelligence Estimate 31–72 1 Washington, August 3, 1972 INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR LIKELY IMPLICATIONS CONCLUSIONS Indian Capabilities A. India is capable of detonating a nuclear device within a few days to a year of a decision to do so. (Actual time required would depend on how far preliminary work had gone, and there is at present insufficient evidence on this question.) It could fairly quickly build up a stock of 10–12 low-yield devices using existing plutonium, and then make two per year until sometime between 1977 and 1980 when new unsafeguarded reactors will be in operation. Thereafter, it would be technicilly feasible to fabricate 50–70 each year. B. India’s delivery capabilities are rudimentary. They, will consist probably for some years at least, of a fleet of Canberra bombers with an effective radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and conceivably some Air-India Boeing 707s and 747s (which would require extensive modifications)-all vulnerable to Chinese air defense. Relying on native resources alone, India could probably not develop a strategic missile capability for at least a decade; effective help from external sources seems unlikely. C. A crash or accelerated Indian program for the development of high-yield weapons and long-range delivery systems is unlikely during the 1970s. Present nuclear and space programs could enable India greatly to enhance its weapons potential by the 1980s; heavy additional expenditures now would bring only marginal returns. Indian Intentions and International Implications D. The chances are roughly even that India will conduct a test in the next several years and label it a peaceful explosion. It will certainly keep open the option to do so. It is, however, impossible to pinpoint a specific precipitant or time for a decision to go ahead. If India does conduct a test, it would almost certainly be conducted underground; and would probably be secretly ordered and prepared. Following a test, India would probably go ahead to make a small number of devices—which could be used as weapons. E. To New Delhi, the arguments both for and against conducting a test are strong. Mrs. Gandhi knows that it would be popular at home, stimulate a rising sense of national pride and independence, and-in the eyes of many-reinforce India’s claim, that it should be taken seriously as a major power. F. But a test would bring adverse foreign reactions. It might endanger some of the foreign-particularly economic-aid which is still valuable to India, though less critically necessary than formerly. An Indian nuclear explosion could also lead to demands for costly new weapon systems at the expense of Mrs. Gandhi’s domestic programs and of conventional weapons procurement. G. The USSR is opposed to nuclear proliferation, and would no doubt prefer to see India avoid testing. But Moscow would probably see its continued close ties with India as too important to jeopardize by very vigorous opposition to an Indian program. If the Soviets were asked to join in multilateral representations concerning an Indian program, they would probably be unresponsive. H. In making a decision, India will, of course, take Western concerns into account. Private demarches and counsels well in advance of a decision might possibly have some effect. However, pressures by the US and other Western Powers would probably not have a decisive impact on New Delhi if Mrs. Gandhi was convinced that a test was required to serve important Indian interests. Indeed, given present Indian resentment of US policies, unilateral pressures by the US would probably prove counterproductive. We doubt that most non-Communist Powers would be willing to bring sanctions against India for going nuclear. Even if such sanctions were imposed and included substantial reductions in economic assistance and access to technology, India would accept these difficulties. I. An Indian test would reinforce India’s dominant position in South Asia. It would be a psychological jolt to Pakistan, but would probably note lead Pakistan to capitulate to India on outstanding disputes, and indeed for some time to come would make it more difficult for Bhutto to make concessions. Islamabad would seek more political and military support from China and especially the US. It would cause China some concern, but we cannot foresee any major changes in Chinese policies that would ensue from such a development. J. While an Indian nuclear test would be a setback to the non-proliferation cause, we doubt that it would have a determining effect on whether any other non-nuclear power, e.g., West Germany, Japan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, goes nuclear or not. Each would decide according to its own political and security considerations. Were any to go nuclear, however, it could cite the Indian precedent as one justification. DISCUSSION I. INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (N.B., This section is couched strictly in terms of capabilities. Intentions are discussed in Sections II and III.) 1. India has the requisite skills and materials, to set off a nuclear explosion, probably of low yield. The civil nuclear program in India is broadly based, and an objective of that program has long been to move toward greater self-reliance and less dependence on foreign technology. The total program including power applications has been large; the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), has spent about $900 million since 1954. It employs several thousand scientists who have pursued studies in the US and Europe. As a result, the civil nuclear program could provide both the technical know-how and the fissionable material required for a nuclear explosives program. In addition, other technologies—electronics, metallurgy, computer capabilities, and high explosives—are more than adequate to support such an effort. From a technical standpoint, there is no distinction between a simple nuclear device for military or “peaceful” applications. 2. We have long estimated that it would take the Indians from six months to a year to manufacture and explode a device after a decision to do so. But we do not know how much, if any, preliminary work has been done, or whether or not the government has directed the DAE to have one readied for detonation on short notice. Depending on the amount of preliminary work already done, they could explode a device anywhere from a very short time to as much as a year after the order is given. Only a relatively small number of people, from the Prime Minister through the technicians, to those preparing the site need be involved. Security could be very tight. Thus both the decision and the test could come as a surprise both to most Indians and to the outside world. Intelligence might be able to give precise advance warning, but there is no certainty; that this would be the case. 3. The weapons would have plutonium as their fissionable material. The Indians now have enough plutonium to make 10–12 bombs and could add about two additional ones annually from new production. Each would probably be similar in fissionable material and yield (15.20 kilotons [KT]) to the first US test in July 1945. The plutonium is produced and separated in the Bhaba Atomic Research Center (BARC) on Trombay, an island, in Bombay Harbor. A reactor there, designed by the Canadians and built jointly by the two countries, is fueled by natural uranium mined in India. The only safeguard on the reactor is a written Indian promise that the reactor and its products will be used only for peaceful purposes. There are no provisions for periodic or automatic Canadian speed of BARC. Nor is there agreement on what peaceful purposes means: Canada and the US have taken the position that any explosion is tantamount to a nuclear weapons test, regardless of the declared purpose of the explosion. India has not accepted this interpretation. 4. The selection and preparation of a suitable site for a fully contained test (India is signatory to the Limited Test Ban Treaty) would involve considerable time and expense. Relatively primitive facilities and modest instrument would probably be chosen for an initial test that could be conducted in a natural cave or man-made tunnel, possibly a worked-out mine. Verbal drilling for emplacement of the device would probably require more than a year. 5. Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons themselves, are modest. With respect to China they are marginal at best. A fleet of about 40 Canberra bombers with radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and a carrying capacity 5,000 pounds could reach India’s closer neighbors, including most of Tibet and Sinkiang but not the heavily populated areas of China. India has no long-range bombers, but could conceivably, with extensive modifications, use some of its Air-India fleet of nine Boeing 707s and four 747s to carry weapons several thousand miles. All these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defense. In any event, the cost of a weapons system that used only current nuclear and delivery capabilities would not be great; the added expense of operating a program for the production of a few devices would probably be only $10–20 million a year. 3 6. For at least five years, India will be unable to enhance this extremely limited capability. A large Indian-built nuclear-power plant with two reactors using domestic uranium is scheduled to be in operation somewhere between 1977 and 1980. 4 With current and planned separation facilities, these reactors could produce enough unsafeguarded plutonium to make 50–70 20 KT bombs a year (or fewer ones of higher yield). A new generation of fastbreeder reactors producing U–233 from India’s huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s. To come anywhere near competing with the Chinese, the Indians would have to make higher yield (possibly thermonuclear) devices and develop a strategic missile system. Atmospheric testing might also be required. Costs in the billions of dollars, lead times of a decade or more, lack of required technical expertise, and competing demands for non-military and conventional military programs would serve as major-though not final-barriers to programs of this nature. In the unlikely event that India were able to buy complete systems abroad, the price would still be very high. 7. India’s planned and slowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and space-related field will eventually remove some of these constraints. By the 1980s there will be enough plutonium and U–233 to make a number of high-yield (up to 500 KT) weapons. The Indian space program, which is still in its earlier stages, will also probably have borne fruit by then. To date only sounding rockets have been tested. A full-scale satellite launch is scheduled for 1975, though there will prob. ably be slippage. After this, the Indians will be in a better position to develop a missile. Technical problems would be substantial, how. ever, and it would still require quite a few years and considerable money to achieve an operational missile system. II. FACTORS IN AN INDIAN DECISION 8. In formulating its future nuclear polities, India has three broad options. It could, of course, pursue nuclear research and development while postponing a nuclear explosion indefinitely. It could conduct an underground nuclear test, labeling it peaceful but acquiring a limited weapons capability as an inescapable by-product. It could proceed openly and with a determined effort to develop a substantial weapons capability. Each course has strong advocates; each can be supported or opposed with strong arguments. A. A Major Weapons System 9. In Parliament and in the press, there are many advocates of a major effort to develop a credible nuclear deterrent. Such an act would on the whole be politically popular in India. But the Indian Government (under both Shastri and Mrs. Gandhi) has rejected and, at least for the rest of the 1970s, will probably continue to reject this course. The present Foreign Minister’s publicly stated reasons for refraining are probably still persuasive to the government: (a) that the building of a credible deterrent would be prohibitively expensive; (b) that India could count on third party support to deter Chinese nuclear aggression; and (c) that India’s military problem with respect to China is primarily a conventional one. 10. There are other reasons as well. The development of an advanced system might require above ground testing. India has signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning this and its leaders continue to be strong in their support of it. Renunciation of that Treaty would be a major and difficult policy shift. In addition, the moral argument—the Gandhi/Nehru position that nuclear bombs are evil—still has adherents even in an India which seems to relish newly proven skills in realpolitik. And the Chinese, with their missiles and thermonuclear weapons, are already so far ahead of the Indians that “catching up” is out of the question for a very extended period. Some argue that a primitive anti-Chinese weapons system would more likely provoke Peking than effectively protect India. Given the fact that India with its present nuclear and space programs, could approach the potential of a substantially improved weapons capability by 1980 or 1985, a decision now to speed-up the development of a high-yield, long-range, anti-Chinese nuclear weapons system would involve considerable extra costs for marginal returns. B. A Nuclear Test 11. India could also conduct an underground nuclear test described as part of a peaceful uses program. It is conceivable that India, after conducting what it called a peaceful nuclear explosion, might actually rest there—i.e. avoid the production of further nuclear devices. Such a course would satisfy those who want simply to demonstrate India’s nuclear capability: it would also skirt the issue of safeguards. Nevertheless, we think this course unlikely. We base this judgment on the view that strictly plowshare purposes make little sense for India and, further, that if India does decide to pay the price of any nuclear test, it would probably decide to acquire some weapons capability. Thus if an explosion is conducted, it will in all probability be conducted with intent to manufacture at least a few low-yield devices which could be used as weapons. The following discussion is based on this belief. Arguments For 12. There have been continuing rumors and reports that the government is planning to conduct a test, and these have increased in volume over the past year or so (the Indians have denied all public ones). Some of these, e.g, those predicting a test immediately prior to the March 1971 elections, the January 1972 Republic Day celebration, or the June 1972 Simla Conference, proved wrong. But there may be rising pressures for, and possibly a greater official receptivity to the idea of exploding a nuclear device. 13. India has consistently refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite considerable great power urgings. One of its publicly cited reasons has been that it insists on keeping the option to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions for plowshare purposes. One major, if unstated, reason for refusal has been that signing the NPT would, in the eyes of nationalistic Indians, permanently deny their accession to great power status. They point to their nation’s vast human resources (only China has more people), its substantial industrial base, its considerable scientific and technological capacity, and its armed forces (the world’s fourth largest) as proof that India is more than just an ordinary Afro-Asian country. Thus setting off a nuclear explosion would, they feel, force the world to view India in its proper perspective, i.e., as one of the world’s principal powers. 14. A nuclear explosion would, as noted earlier, be extremely popular at home where national pride is riding very high; the detonation of an Indian device would be received with great enthusiasm. Many of those who are antinuclear in principle would be mollified by assurances that Indian-made devices would be used only for peaceful purposes. Many who believe that long run security for India should not rest on a commitment by the Soviets or any other external power would applaud the act as a step toward genuine national self-reliance. And the possession of what could be a nuclear weapon as easily as a peaceful device would appeal to many as a clinching symbol of India’s dominant position in the subcontinent and its desires to be taken seriously as a great power. 15. The events of 1971, culminating in India’s decisive military victory over Pakistan, could reduce the motivation for a nuclear demonstration especially in the short run, but over time are more likely to reinforce it. The military proved itself not merely big but highly effective. The breakup of Pakistan demonstrated India’s paramountcy in South Asia. In New Delhi’s view, India is a major Asian power to be taken not less seriously than China or Japan. In addition, the closer connection forged with the USSR (as signaled in the August 1971 Treaty of Friendship) has temporarily enhanced India’s sense of security with respect to the Chinese. Indian fears that even a small inventory of nuclear bombs could, in time of crisis, trigger off a pre-emptive Chinese attack has almost certainly been eased by recent demonstrations of Soviet support. In these circumstances, the Indians may feel that a nuclear test now would not only enhance their country’s image but entail much let risk than in the past. 16. The durability of the Soviet guarantee, however, is undoubtedly open to question in New Delhi. Moreover, New Delhi clearly believes it has lost any hope of a US nuclear umbrella against China. The fear of becoming further dependent on the Soviet Union for its ultimate security against China and the need to hedge against possible depreciation of the present Soviet guarantee would be two powerful motives in favor of an early nuclear decision. A Nuclear Test: Arguments Against 17. But Mrs. Gandhi would think very carefully before ordering a test. It could bring adverse reactions from most if not all the principal world powers from whom India receives political, military, technical, and economic assistance. India’s leaders would probably hope (but not be sure) that these reactions would soon die down. The Soviets have long urged the Indians to sign the NPT. though they apparently have not pushed the matter forcefully. The Indians cannot be certain that Moscow’s reaction to an actual test would be confined to pro forma regrets. 18. Mrs. Gandhi no doubt realizes that a successful test would set off new demands that India quickly use its technology to develop a full-scale weapons program. These demands would come from military leaders (some of whom have already said they favor this course) and patriotic civilians alike. Mrs. Gandhi may feel she could contain such pressures, and indeed she probably could do so, at least for some time. But with the high priority she has given to costly social welfare measures even at the expense of overall economic growth, she would probably see demands for new weapon systems as a threat to matters she considers more important. III. INDIA’S LIKELY POLICY 20. There is no inexorable process, force, or logic compelling India soon to conduct, or not to conduct, a nuclear test. To the Indian Government the arguments pro and con are both strong. Over an extended period—with large quantities of unsafeguarded fissionable material on hand and the space program showing fruit—the arguments for are likely to become more persuasive; the odds are high that India will enter the nuclear club eventually. 21. The short term outlook is far less certain, but some guidelines may be noted. The strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the Indians’ belief that it would build up their international prestige; demonstrate India’s importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it. 22. Most of the arguments against conducting a test have to do with foreign reactions, and these are becoming of less importance to India. Though New Delhi is hardly entering an era of extreme xenophobic defiance, it has now clearly made resistance to outside pressures an important element of its foreign policy. “Self reliance” is a regularly evoked, rarely challenged, and sincerely felt slogan of the Indian Government. A complete isolationist policy is unlikely, but the degree of effective persuasion available to outside powers is less than in the past. One main reason is the matter of economic assistance. Most of this has been in the form of loans; over the past 25 years, India has acquired a huge debt. The latter now requires repayments on principal and interest of over half of current aid receipts, greatly reducing its net value. There are now many articulate Indians who state that it would be in the country’s interest to renounce new aid. In any event, the possibility of losing Western economic aid is one which would inhibit but not decisively deter the Indians from conducting a nuclear test. 23. The chances are roughly even that India will set off a nuclear device at some time during the next several years. The factors pro and con will vary at any specific moment in this period. India will never forego the option; at any given moment the decision will not be between “no” versus “yes” but between “yes” versus “not now”. The decision would be made by Mrs. Gandhi. Her unquestioned dominance of the government and unchallenged political strength in the country give her full control of decisions over matters of this import. She could afford to do without the domestic political advantages of an affirmative decision, and she could also cope with the adverse consequences of going ahead. So far she has publicly defended the policy of abstaining from making nuclear weapons. But both foreign and domestic political considerations might work to change her policy. 24. Mrs. Gandhi is bent both on mobilizing the energy of her people in a massive assault on social inequities, and on making India’s voice heard with respect in international councils. There are obviously contradictions between her domestic reform needs and spending vast sums on advanced weapons in pursuit of international status. But she may come to believe that some kind of nuclear capability would be useful in terms of adding to national support for her domestic programs, and that having a limited weapons capability, perhaps in the guise of a peaceful program, would give India increased stature or greater security on the world scene. IV. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS A. The Soviet Position 25. From the point of view of the USSR’s purely strategic interests, a limited Indian nuclear capability would probably not give Moscow great concern. Its relations with Mrs. Gandhi’s government remain close and cordial; any step which would strengthen her regime and build up its image in South Asia and elsewhere has some advantages for Soviet interest. The USSR would probably not consider that a limited Indian capability would seriously aggravate area tensions. 26. At the same time, the USSR is seeking to prevent the future proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in principle would oppose any country’s taking this step-India included. It has long urged New Delhi to sign the NPT, but has not made an issue of refusal to do so. Moscow would have to consider whether an Indian test would encourage other states (e.g., Japan, Israel, and, particularly, West Germany) whose joining the nuclear club would be a matter of grave concern to the Soviets, to take this step. Overall the Soviets are more likely to conclude that the damage to the cause of non-proliferation would be neither immediate nor great, and that its interests would be best served by making the best of it. Thus if India conducts a test, Moscow might pretend to accept New Delhi’s peaceful protestations at face value, and exert such pressures as it could to keep the program limited. It would also continue to push for ratification of the NPT by other countries. If the Soviets were asked to join in multilateral representations concerning an Indian program, they would probably be unresponsive. B. Western Positions 27. The Indians are not unconcerned about Western reactions. Any decisions they make will of course take their relations with the Western Powers and Japan into account. But concern is one thing and acquiescing to pressures by these powers is another. Almost any external pressures would be resented by the Indians, particularly if they came after a decision to conduct a test had been made, and most especially if they involved any publicity. Private demarches well in advance a decision might possibly prove more effective; much would depend, however, on how many countries approached the Indians, how hard they pushed the matter, and how seriously India viewed the danger of sanctions. 28. Indian resentment would be especially severe if the US took the lead in efforts to pressure or even threaten the Indians into not pursuing a program of nuclear proliferation. The Indian Government is wary of the US, believing it to have a strong pro-Pakistan bias; this sentiment is paralleled in the press and among large sections of the articulate and politically aware public. Nor, with the end of the PL–480 food program, of even limited arms sales, and with suspension of new increments of economic aid, does the US have much tangible leverage on the Indian Government. Given this fact, plus the frosty suspicion about US motives which currently exists in some circles in India, active American pressures directed against Indian nuclear plans would probably prove counterproductive, at least in some quarters of the Indian Government. 29. This would probably not be so with respect to the UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the West European countries who collectively supply most of India’s foreign economic aid and who individually get along pretty well with Mrs. Gandhi’s government. But it is very doubtful that any one or all of these countries could persuade New Delhi not to go the course of nuclear proliferation, if a firm conclusion had been reached that it would be in India’s interest to do so. Not only is it doubtful that these countries could or would offer enough inducements, e.g., security guarantees and money, to divert India from this path, but India would probably calculate that they would not, in the event, engage in serious punitive sanctions. 30. A threat by all non-Communist Powers to terminate—not just suspend—all economic assistance unless and until India renounce nuclear testing would require some hard thinking in New Delhi. India would also be concerned if it thought that a nuclear explosion might reduce its access to Western technology. The Indians probably feel that such contingencies are unlikely and they are probably right in this assessment. State to state ties with many of these countries are close and trade relations (as with Japan and the UK) are substantial. A united embargo on aid and technical access would be difficult to achieve and maintain. It would also cut both ways. India has large debts to these states, and a cutoff of aid could lead India to declare a moratorium on debt repayments. The obvious beneficiary, in terms of political position in India, would be the USSR. 31. It is difficult to say precisely how much India would be hurt by an aid cutoff. The loss of a net income of several hundred million dollars a year would force cutbacks in development programs, slow down economic activity, and reduce living standards for some people. Substantial cuts in imports would be required. But these would be unlikely gravely to cripple the modern economic sector (the principal beneficiary of aid), much less bring India to reverse its decision. Even with all its poverty and difficulties, India has considerable skills and resources and could make up for lost sources of technology from the French and the Communist countries. Its drive for “self-sufficiency” has not brought autarky, but has given India greater means to resist outside pressures and blandishments. These would be in a sense enhanced as a Western aid cutoff would bring on a massive nationalist public reaction in favor of official efforts to resist and overcome the new difficulties. Given this, and the fact that the Indians could probably hope to receive some additional Soviet and East European assistance in the aftermath. Western economic pressures to stop India’s nuclear programs would probably be limited in effect. C. Reactions Among India’s Neighbors 32. China continues to be Pakistan’s principal source of arms. No Indian nuclear capability, large or small, is likely to alter China’s willingness to support Pakistan. China would continue to supply only conventional weapons; there is no apparent reason for Peking to break precedent and share its nuclear secrets with an outside power. Peking would feel little concern about Indian nuclear developments per se, at least for many years. Its margin of superiority, in weapons’ yield and delivery vehicles is overwhelming, and will remain so well into, and probably beyond, the 1980s. Its prinicpal concern will continue to be the USSR and secondarily the US, both of whose nuclear arsenals it does take very seriously. The Chinese would probably discount the threat to themselves of an Indian nuclear weapons program, and would perhaps recognize that the program was motivated primarily by India’s aspirations to great power status. 33. The fact remains, however, that China is the only logical target for such weapons. Moreover, the Chinese would be concerned about the impact an Indian explosion might have on Japanese thinking. Peking would also take a dim view of any enhancement of India’s prestige among the weaker countries of the Third World. For these reasons, the Chinese would be likely to condemn an Indian nuclear explosion. How strongly they did so would depend on whether Peking was interested, as it seems to be now, in a general improvement of Sino-Indian relations which have long been strained. It is even possible that an Indian decision to go ahead would make a Sino-Indian detente more desirable to both parties. 34. An Indian nuclear test would at least initially be a startling development in much of South Asia. To many there, it might even seem to bring an entirely new situation to the area. Some of India’s neighbors, traditionally wary of New Delhi, would be concerned that India would feel a new sense of manifest destiny and be more inclined both to meddle in their internal affairs and arbitrarily to dictate settlements of outstanding disputes. But as the dramatic impact of the explosion faded, and as the fact of a nuclear India came to be taken for granted, it is likely to prove of less consequence than many would initially fear. In any case none would or could do much about it. 35. Most states would feel no new or pervasive sense of military threat; none could hope to match or counter, on their own, India’s new capability. Political reactions would, of course, vary from country to country. For those who are client states, ie: Sikkim and Bhutan, an Indian nuclear explosion would only reinforce, New Delhi’s already predominant status. Much the same would be true of Bangladesh, Burma and Afghanistan, whose ties with India have been distant and not greatly troubled, are not likely to see much if any new consequences for them. Nepal would probably feel some apprehension. The Nepalese, who saw open and direct Indian interference in their domestic affairs until the early 1960s and who still must use Indian facilities to nearly all their trade and communications with the outside world, would be wary lest New Delhi try to again assume its former role as heir to the British Raj and protector of the little mountain kingdom. But Kathmandu has adroitly balanced off Indian pressures by maintaining friendly ties with neighboring China and to a lesser extent with other large outside powers. These efforts would probably be increased immediately following an Indian nuclear explosion. In the long run, New Delhi’s position in Kathmandu is not likely to be chanted by this event. 36. India’s relations with Ceylon have traditionally been more distant and less abrasive than with Nepal, though not without their problems. About 20 percent of the residents of Ceylon are of Indian origin, and this minority has been the object of discrimination, communal rioting, and demonstrations. A 1965 Indo-Ceylon treaty agreeing to repatriation of some Indians and Ceylonese citizenship for the rest was intended to settle the problem. But it has been implemented only slowly and partially. In addition, Ceylon has suffered from social unrest so severe as to lead to Ceylonese concern, that the colossus of the north might intervene to suppress subversion. In any event, many in Colombo would, on hearing the news of an Indian test, probably fear that New Delhi would be less inhibited in further efforts to resolve problems in Ceylon to its own satisfaction. This would probably lead them, like the Nepalese, to seek some kind of greater support or assurances from one or more of the great powers. But the end result, in our view, would be little significant change in Ceylonese relations with India. In an extreme situation, either a non-nuclear or a nuclear India would probably intervene directly if developments in Ceylon involved important Indian interests; otherwise, the present not unfriendly relationship is likely to continue. 37. Most Pakistanis would be psychologically jolted by the news that India had gone nuclear. Despite their recent crushing defeat and their obvious military inferiority, the sense of hostility toward Indian designs remains strong. There would of course be considerable public excitement and alarm in Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of an Indian test. But balanced against this would be the fact that the government (which has long been well informed of India’s nuclear potential and many of its plans) would not be greatly surprised. Nor would it likely be panicked into abrupt policy changes. 38. Islamabad in its own right would be in no position to do anything concrete to counter the event. One of President Bhutto’s proposals during the 1970 electoral campaign was the development of nuclear weapons to counter India’s larger size, population, and resources. But Pakistan will be technically unable to set off a nuclear explosion for many years; it has some research facilities, a large safeguarded Canadian reactor, a few informed scientists, but little more. On the whole we doubt that Bhutto (or any successor) would find it either neccessary or desirable to concede much to a nuclear India that he otherwise would not. An Indian test, at least for some time to come, would enhance domestic pressures on the Pakistani Government to stand firm in dealing with India. In these circumstances, Pakistan’s most likely course would be to continue to bargain hard over whatever disputes with India were currently outstanding, meanwhile using the new Indian threat to argue for much outside backing, particularly from the US and China, as it could get. 39. Pakistan would try to build up and modernize its conventional armed forces (as did India both before and after China became a nuclear power). For some years its principal sources have been the US, France, and China. The US would be an especial object of new Pakistani request for defense guarantees, military materiel, and economic support. Iran and Turkey would be very sympathetic to Pakistan. But able to provide little themselves, they would urge the US to be generous. D. The Cause of Non-Proliferation 40. A successful Indian test would of course set back the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. India would have demonstrated that it is feasible even for an underdeveloped non-authoritarian country with limited natural and financial resources to develop an independent nuclear capability. It would also come to be recognized as a potential source of the technology and personnel necessary for other countries interested in such a program. No other non-nuclear state, however, would be likely, simply because of India’s example, to embark on a plowshare or weapons program of its own. Such decisions are going to be made by each government on the merits as seen by that government. Nevertheless, it is true that an Indian program would help erode barriers to further proliferation in the sense that additional countries would find it somewhat easier to get around the arguments against going ahead. 41. Such potential nuclear countries as South Africa, Israel, and Brazil would not be significantly affected by an Indian nuclear test or weapons program. Each of these states is involved in a different situation in another area and each will continue to act according to its national interests. The Israelis, for example, who are furthest along in this respect, could use the possibility of Indian-Arab nuclear cooperation as one more argument against signing the NPT and for keeping their options open. Overall, an Indian test would give these other states a reason to explain or excuse similar actions of their own (were they to take them); it would not cause them to do so in the first place. In the unlikely event that the other powers effectively made an example of India, one or another might be inhibited from going further with their own program but probably only temporarily. 42. In determining West Germany’s policy towards nuclear proliferation, ratification of the NPT will depend on German relations with countries in Eastern and Western Europe, with the US and the USSR, and on negotiations on military safeguards being conducted by the European Community. Indian nuclear developments would play little role in determining Bonn’s course of action. 43. Immediate Japanese concern over an Indian test would be stronger than in the case of West Germany. Japan is already aware of and concerned with India’s nuclear potential. It has signed but not ratified the NPT. As a major industrial power, a principal Asian state, and a potential nuclear giant, Japan periodically hears a debate over whether it should exercise this option, and an Indian test would touch off another round of the argument. For most Japanese the threshold of nuclear anxiety remains high, and indeed public opinion against developing weapons has been rising in recent months. The new Tanaka government certainly does not wish to make nuclear weapons. The small group that does would use the argument that India’s joining the nuclear club was an additional reason for a much more powerful Japan to do so. But the argument would carry little weight with those making the decisions, in the absence of radical changes in the inter-national environment. Japanese decisions on nuclear policy will be based on such central factors as trends in public opinion, Japan’s evolving relations with the great powers, and its view of its proper role in Asia. An Indian test will not materially affect Japan’s disposition to avoid a nuclear weapons program. It might, however, tip the balance against a Japanese decision to ratify the NPT—already doubtful—or at least provide further reason for Japan to stall on this question. ANNEX COSTS OF INDIA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS 1. India now has a gross national product (GNP) of about $55 billion, an annual federal budget of $8 billion; and spends about $1.9 billion on defense. Not included in the defense budget are the appropriations of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). During 1954–1971, the DAE spent about $870 million. Of this about $312 million has been for nuclear power plants, the rest for everything from research to uranium mining and the building of heavy water plants. The DAE spent $136 million (0.25 percent of GNP) in fiscal year 1971–1972 (11 April through 31 March); it is scheduled to spend $157 million in 1972–1973. 2. The expenses of present space related programs have been paid for by the DAE. Scanty evidence points to current expenditures of from $5-$10 million a year. With the development of more complex rockets and boosters (a satellite launch is tentatively scheduled for 1975), costs should rise, though we cannot give exact data. 3. Given the already heavy investment in nuclear activities the additional costs of making nuclear device alone would be very small. An initial underground test would cost no more than $10 to $20 million for research, development and fabrication of the device, and preparation of the test site. After the initial test, the annual average operating cost for a program to produce 1 or 2 weapons per year would be about $10 million to $20 million. Such a program would be adequate for any weapons, system based on India’s present capability for delivery by aircraft. The additional cost of a larger weapons program based on facilities now being developed and aimed at producing some 75 warheads over a 10-year period—perhaps for delivery by missiles—probably would be no more than $20 million to $40 million per year. 4. Indian plans with respect to future delivery systems are conjectural. The development of an intermediate-range ballistic missilw (IRBM) delivery system would be an expensive, long-term project. The present space program is still in its research and development (R&D) stages. India could take advantage of its experience with its satellite launch vehicles to start missile R&D. Such R&D would probably take at least 5 years and cost some $500–750 million. Once the initial know-how and technology had been acquired (perhaps by the early 1980s), India could start a program of production of IRBMs. This would be costly: $300 to $400 million a year (and much of that in foreign exchange) for at least 5 years but still a sum within India’s capabilities if it chose to do it. 5. In sum, the following rough cost options open to India for the next decade and probably beyond. a. Conduct an underground nuclear test.—$10-$20 million. b. After a test, produce 1.2 weapons to be delivered by aircraft—$10-$20 million a year c. Develop a strategic weapons system of some 50 IRBM launchers: 1. Conduct missile R&D over approximately a 5 year period using experience gained from the space program—$500–750 million total program cost. 2. Follow-on missile production for a period of at least 5 years—$1.5-$2 billion total program cost 3. Produce 75 nuclear warheads over 10 years for delivery by missiles—$20-$40 million a year. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. 3 India’s defense budget for the current year is $1.9 billion; its atomic energy budget $157 million. See Annex for details. 4 There are two other plants under international safeguards; one is in operation and the other under construction. 299. Memorandum of Conversation 299. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 30, 1972, 11:10–11:30 a.m. SUBJECT: Courtesy Call of Pakistani Ambassador Participants: Participants: Department of Defense Secretary of Defense—Melvin R. Laird Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter Military Assistant to the Secretary—Col. Robert C. Taylor Country Director for South Asia (ISA/MESA)—LTC Woolf P. Gross Embassy of Pakistan Ambassador—Sultan Mohammad Khan Military Attache—Col. Khan Ahmad Shamshad 1. Nonsubstantive Issues In response to a query by Mr. Laird concerning the recent Chinese veto of Bangladesh entry into the UN, the Ambassador outlined his country’s viewpoint on the matter and the effects of the veto on South Asian affairs. He indicated that Pakistan and initially, he believed, India preferred postponement of the Bangladesh entry issue rather than the confrontation that developed. It appeared that the matter emerged in the Security Council debate as another indication of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The Ambassador volunteered that Pakistan remained committed in principle to recognition of Bangladesh as implied at the Simla Conference, but that Sheikh Mujib’s intransigence was impeding progress in that direction. He mentioned their concern over the plight of the 90,000 POW’s still being held in India and opined that India continued to hold them in defiance of the Geneva Convention and world opinion as a pressure tactic. 2. U.S. Military Supply Policy Secretary Laird led into the subject of military supply with a question concerning Pakistan’s current defense posture. The Ambassador pointed out that Pakistan had lost a great deal of equipment along with the 3 1/2 divisions taken captive in East Pakistan. This had not been replaced. Its loss was compounded by Pakistan’s current inability to maintain its residual U.S.-source military inventory due to the embargo. Ambassador Sultan briefly reviewed the programs stalled by the embargo making particular mention of the “one-time exception” sale offer of October 1970 covering four categories of lethal equipment. His reference to “B–52 bombers” as part of the package was quickly corrected to B–57’s by the U.S. participants. Mr. Laird took note of the difficulties for Pakistan portrayed by the Ambassador, but asked that Islamabad not press US for the time being. The Ambassador gave his assurance that Pakistan would not ask for renewed arms assistance now, adding that he hoped we could take another look at their requirements during the remaining months of this year. The Secretary indicated we were prepared to proceed on that basis. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 75–0125, Pakistan 1972. Confidential. Drafted on September 5 by Lieutenant Colonel Gross and approved by Nutter. The conversation was held in Secretary Laird’s office. 300. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156 300. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156 1 Washington, September 1, 1972 SUMMARY Indian Capabilities/Intentions At present India’s relatively sophisticated nuclear energy program provides the capability of conducting a test on short notice and of mounting a rudimentary weapons program at relatively low cost in the $10–20 million annual range. However, India currently lacks either long-range bombers or missiles needed to strike major urban targets in China. India will probably not be able to develop IRBM’s before the 1980’s and then only at a cost of $2–2.75 billion. There is no firm intelligence that Mrs. Gandhi has given a political go-ahead for detonating an underground nuclear device (which the Indians would undoubtedly label a peaceful nuclear explosion) or for developing nuclear weapons and a delivery system. In July 1972, she reiterated that the GOI’s nuclear policy was to investigate the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions, but not to develop nuclear weapons. Our intelligence assessment is that over the next several years the chances are about even that India will detonate a nuclear device. The arguments in New Delhi both for and against testing are strong. Public opinion, in its present nationalist mood, would probably favor tests, although, in the wake of India’s victory over Pakistan, the political pressures for going nuclear are less than a year ago. Implications of an Indian Nuclear Decision An Indian test would be a setback to non-proliferation efforts. By itself it would not prompt other near-nuclear powers to follow suit, but would make it easier for them to do so should they decide the acquisition of nuclear weapons was in their national interest. The Soviets would be concerned about additional proliferation, but would probably be wary of hurting their position in India. The Chinese would regard an Indian test as a significant development, adding to China’s strategic defense problems. In Japan, the hands of those favoring a nuclear weapons program would be strengthened. In South Asia, an Indian explosion would be extremely unsettling for Pakistan. US Interests and Objectives Limiting the number of nuclear powers remains a major US interest. Additional interests are our desire for a stable South Asia, and our wish to develop mutually satisfactory relations with India. Since an Indian nuclear decision would probably conflict with all three interests, our objective should be to do what we can to avert or delay an Indian test and, if these efforts fail, to limit the harmful repercussions. US Options The choices divide between things we can do before and after an Indian nuclear explosion. In both instances US ability to influence events is marginal, Indeed, given the present poor state of Indo-US relations, an overly visible US effort could hasten, rather than delay, the day India explodes a nuclear device, Multilateral and non-US bilateral efforts, especially if joined by the Soviets, have somewhat better prospects of affecting Indian actions, but would probably not per se be decisive. Possible Actions Before a Decision Unilateral Actions We can continue low-keyed efforts to dissuade the Indians by: —stressing continued US concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation; —stressing the US view that peaceful and military nuclear explosive technologies cannot be distinguished; —pointing out (but not threatening) that Indian nuclear testing would require a review of US cooperation in the atomic energy and space fields, and possible reductions in our programs; —stimulating discussion among Indian academics and scientists of problems inherent in developing PNE’s, of the high cost of an Indian force de frappe and of its questionable strategic value; —maintaining, and possibly expanding, scientific cooperation in the nuclear and space fields to help in channeling Indian efforts towards peaceful applications. In addition, we could consider offering India PNE services. This could, however, be viewed as weakening the value of our offer to provide PNE services to NPT signatories. In any case, it is unlikely the Indians would accept if such an offer foreclosed the possibility of India’s developing its own explosive device. Multilateral Actions —In the past we have periodically talked with the UK; Canada; Japan and France about the Indian nuclear question. We can continue these discussions, trying to stimulate other countries to use their influence with the Indians to prevent or delay a nuclear decision. —We can also try to enlist USSR cooperation. Given the close relationship between Moscow and Delhi, Soviet actions could have a considerable impact on the Indians. While we are uncertain the Soviets will be willing to cooperate, we see no harm in raising the issue with them. —We can also discuss the subject with the Chinese to allay their suspicions that we and the Soviets were “up to something” with the Indians and to point out that Chinese actions, such as launching an ICBM over South Asia, could increase public pressure on India to conduct a nuclear test. —In the International Atomic Energy Agency, we can continue our efforts to gain wider international acceptance of our view that, since the technology for civil and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished, “peaceful” or “non-military uses” terminology in IAEA agreements precludes using IAEA safeguarded material in explosive tests of any sort. In the past, the Indians have questioned this position. —We could also seek more rapid progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if the President should decide to move toward active negotiations on a treaty. India has long favored a CTB and, while it would probably not sign if China continued testing, the fact of an agreement would increase pressures against Indian nuclear testing. (Defense does not believe that the conclusion of a CTB would have a significant effect upon India’s decision t o conduct nuclear testing.) After an Indian Nuclear Decision Proliferation. In deciding on a course of action, we will have to weigh the potential pluses in the non-proliferation field against the losses in the Indo-US relationship. Although penalties against India would be unlikely t o have a decisive policy impact on major near nuclear powers (Japan, Germany, and Israel), apparent US acquiescence could lead them, and others, to anticipate nothing more severe if they became Member No. 7 in the nuclear club. The range of choices includes: 1. Relatively Mild Response : This would include some public indication of displeasure, but few, if any, tangible penalties. 2. Some Penalties Against India in Scientific Area :—We could terminate the supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur nuclear reactor and curtail or end other USG cooperation with India in the nuclear energy and space fields. We could urge other nations to follow suit and of course sharpen our public expressions of displeasure. 3. More Extensive Penalties : We could launch a major effort to penalize India by moving beyond the nuclear energy/space field, reducing o r terminating all economic and technical assistance programs (assuming we have any) and mobilizing an international campaign to condemn the Indians. We would expect most other countries would respond relatively mildly. Some would impose penalties against India in the scientific field. (Canada has said it will.) It is, however, doubtful other countries would join in more sweeping penalties, especially if the Indians label their test a PNE and not part of a weapons program. Other Repercussions We would have to consider carefully our handling of Japan, the most important near-nuclear power and the country outside of South Asia where the repercussions would probably be strongest. In South Asia, our problem would be how to steady the Pakistanis. A spectrum of possible actions with the Paks includes: —Doing nothing. —Providing Pakistan an expression of support against nuclear blackmail by recourse to the United Nations along the lines of the declaration we gave in 1968 in connection with the NPT. —Providing a more specific and firmer commitment of US nuclear protection. —Broadening the 1959 US-Pakistan bilateral to include support against aggression by non-Communist powers (i.e., India). I. The Problem Over the past two decades India has developed a large and sophisticated civil atomic energy program. Six nuclear power reactors are in operation or under construction. Indian nuclear policy, as stated on numerous occasions by Mrs. Gandhi and other leaders, is to utilize atomic energy only for peaceful purposes and not to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission is developing technology and industrial facilities capable of supporting a small nuclear weapons program, India has been unwilling to sign the NPT and has maintained that an Indian underground peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) would not violate India’s international undertakings, a position with which the US has disagreed. In recent years we have periodically received intelligence reports that India was going to test a nuclear device. While to date these reports have proven false alarms and we have no firm evidence that Delhi has decided to explode a nuclear device, India does possess the capability of doing so fairly quickly once her decision-makers approve such a step. India does not, however, currently have an advanced nuclear weapons delivery system—either long-range bombers or Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. India is unlikely to have the capability of producing IRBM’s before the early 1980’s. Were India to explode a device in the near future, it would almost certainly call the test a PNE rather than a first step in a weapons development program. II. Indian Intentions/Capabilities It remains our assessment that the evidence to date does not confirm an Indian political decision to test a nuclear device. Moreover, there appear no new political or security considerations which would impel the Indians toward a nuclear test in the near future. At the same time, the Indians have the capability of exploding a nuclear device on relatively short notice and there is considerable nationalist sentiment in India in favor of joining the nuclear club. [ text not declassfied ] we conclude that India is likely to keep open the option to test a nuclear device and ultimately to develop its own missile delivery system. The direction of the Indian nuclear and space programs will continue t o provide India this possibility. India will also continue its policy of non-accession to the NPT, but is Likely to live up to its commitment under the Limited Test Ban Treaty not t o conduct atmospheric tests. The conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would increase the force of arguments against Indian nuclear tests even though India would probably refuse to adhere to a CTB if China continued nuclear testing. (Defense does not believe that the conclusion of a CTB would have a significant effect upon India’s decision t o develop nuclear weapons. The Indian nuclear decision will be based on its perception of its national interest.) In this regard and as a factor in determining what actions we may wish to take, it is useful to review the arguments among Indian policy-makers for and against a positive nuclear decision: A. Arguments Favoring Nuclear Program . 1. To achieve major power status, India needs to be a member of the nuclear club. It could achieve this status at relatively low cost by exploding a nuclear device which it could label a PNE. 2. The possession by India of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, even in rudimentary form, would provide a deterrent against a Chinese nuclear threat and reduce India’s sense of dependence on a Soviet and/or US nuclear shield. 3. By freeing India from Great Power dependence, the possession of nuclear weapons would contribute positively to India’s ability to remain non-aligned and to provide a Third World nuclear balance to China. 4. A nuclear weapons program would be a means of achieving a measure of technological equality with the developed world. 5. Membership in the nuclear club would further strengthen the sense of India’s nationalism that Mrs. Gandhi has cultivated in building a strong political base. B. Arguments Against Nuclear Program 1. The Chinese military threat is primarily conventional. This can be best met by further modernization of Indian conventional forces; an expensive Indian nuclear weapons program would divert scarce resources from this end. 2. The possession of a rudimentary nuclear force, especially one lacking an advanced delivery system, could in the short run weaken, rather than strengthen, India’s national security if this move led to increased tensions with China. 3. India lacks the economic base to compete with China in the strategic nuclear-field where the Chinese already enjoy a long lead. 4. A nuclear weapons program could harm relations with the US and the USSR and also endanger peaceful nuclear cooperation programs with these countries as well as with the UK, Canada, France and others. 5. India’s view of its position as a moral leader of the third World would be further tarnished by going nuclear. 6. Development of an advanced nuclear weapons missile delivery system would be very costly and would divert scarce resources from badly needed economic and social development programs. 7. A nuclear testing program could also affect economic assistance relationships with Japan, the US, Canada and other countries strongly opposed to further proliferation. III. External Impact of Indian Nuclear Explosion . A. South Asia . The explosion by India of a PNE or the development of nuclear weapons would further confirm Indian political/military dominance in South Asia. While none of India’s neighbors would like such a step, only Pakistan would react strongly. 1. Pakistan . Unless a radical shift in Indo-Pakistan relations occurs, an Indian nuclear decision would severely jolt Islamabad. Pakistan’s fears of India would be intensified and the prospects for relative stability in South Asia would be set back. An Indian blast would make it more difficult to work out the post-Simla arrangements to establish a modus vivendi between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. To protect itself against a perceived Indian nuclear threat, Pakistan might attempt to launch its own nuclear weapons program, though this would be a long-term project given Pakistan’s currently limited capability in the nuclear field. Pakistan would also seek, to the extent feasible, to involve major external powers, especially the United States and China, in providing assistance for a Pakistani nuclear program or at least assurances of protection against potential Indian nuclear blackmail. The Pakistanis would perhaps seek to expand their military relationship with China in to the strategic nuclear area, in order to gain additional “protection” against India. They might even seek the stationing of Chinese nuclear weapons on Pakistani territory. In the case of the US, the Pakistanis would probably ask for assurances of support and/or assistance in the event India threatened the use of nuclear-weapons, but would be unlikely to go as far as with the Chinese. 2. Banaladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal . An Indian nuclear blast would not create major political/security concerns in Dacca although the Bengalees would probably prefer a non-nuclear Indian neighbor. Even if Bangladesh/Indian relations become strained, an Indian blast would be unlikely to spur an effort to develop nuclear weapons by Bangladesh. The concerns of Sri Lanka and Nepal about the danger to their independence from a strong India would be heightened if India went nuclear. While these countries might look to outside powers for reassurance, India’s action would not be likely to prompt a major policy shift. Neither country has the capability of developing nuclear weapons. 3. China . Peking would view an Indian nuclear explosion as a matter of concern. Although the public reaction might be relatively muted, specially in view of China’s own nuclear testing program, Chinese policymakers would be prompted to take a fresh look at China’s policy toward India. Even though the Indian blast was labeled a PNE and an advanced delivery system for Indian nuclear weapons was not at hand in the short term, the Chinese would-interpret the Indian action as a first step toward the ultimate development of an Indian force de frappe and make their calculations on this basis. Militarily, a nuclear India—even one possessing only a rudimentary delivery capability—would be regarded as adding to China’s strategic defense problems. In assessing the implications, the Chinese could come to either of two conclusions. They might regard India’s nuclear decision as part of a Soviet sponsored effort to tighten the containment ring around China and this could lead to heightened Sino-Indian tensions. Alternatively, Peking might decide to work more actively for a settlement of outstanding disputes with India to reduce the possibility that a Moscow-Delhi axis would confront China with nuclear enemies along its northern and western borders. about proliferation and in this context would regret India’s proceeding with the development of PNE’s or a nuclear weapons program. But the Soviet response could well be ambiguous, despite Soviet preference that India remain non-nuclear. Moscow values its relationship with Delhi and it would probably be unwilling to press India on the nuclear question to the extent of damaging the friendly relationship. Nonetheless, given Moscow’s current close relations with Delhi, the Soviets would have greater influence with the Indians than any other country. C. Near Nuclear Powers . It is difficult to measure precisely the impact of India’s becoming the world’s sixth nuclear nation on the other near-nuclears, especially Japan, Israel, and the Federal Republic of Germany. By itself an Indian test would not be decisive as each country would decide its nuclear policy according to its own political and security considerations. But the Indian example would make it easier for others to follow suit, if they conclude that—nuclear testing is in their national interest. 1. Japan . Japan would react negatively to India’s going nuclear. The Japanese would be disturbed by further proliferation and by the additional political military destabilization which India’s nuclear decision might cause in Asia. While an Indian PNE or even the development of a weapons system would probably not cause an immediate shift in Japanese policy, the hands of those in Japan who favor the nuclear path would be strengthened. The prospect for Japanese ratification of the NPT would be lessened. The example of another Asian power, especially India, far inferior to Japan in economic strength or military potential, breaking the nuclear monopoly could prompt a rethinking of the on-nuclear policy Japan has to date adopted. 2. Federal Republic of Germany . An Indian nuclear decision would cause some concern to the Federal Republic of Germany and could make it somewhat more difficult to obtain ratification of the NPT. It would not, however, produce any fundamental reassessment or change in Germany’s nuclear policy. The Germans will continue to adhere to a “European” policy on nuclear matters and not embark on their own weapons program for the foreseeable future. A decision by Germany to develop nuclear weapons would not be triggered by what India did. 3. Israel . India’s action would probably not have significant impact on Israel, the other principal near-nuclear power, except to remove the psychological deterrent against being the first to make the break. Israel considers its nuclear policy intimately linked to the confrontation with the Arabs and will not be decisively affected by an Indian nuclear decision. Since the Israelis consider their relationship with the United States unique, a highly negative US reaction to an Indian explosion would have limited impact; however, the appearance of US acquiescence in an Indian nuclear venture would be considered significant by the Israelis. 4. Other Near-Nuclear Powers . Other potential nuclear powers, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and Taiwan, would be principally affected by the response of the United States and other powers to an Indian nuclear blast as an indicator of likely response to further proliferation on their part. In this regard, failure by the United States to react in the face of an Indian nuclear explosion could suggest that the US was not prepared to take forceful I action elsewhere. On the other hand, each potential nuclear power would see itself in a somewhat unique situation and would not necessarily directly apply the Indian example to itself. IV. Implications for India of a Nuclear Explosion A. Political-Psychological . India’s decision to explode a nuclear device would help satisfy Indian nationalist aspirations for major power status and Third World leadership, but would be unlikely to cause a fundamental shift in Indian foreign policy. India’s feeling of dependence on the Soviet Union, especially for protection against a potential Chinese nuclear threat, could lessen. India’s new strength could stiffen India’s attitude toward China and decrease the prospects of Delhi’s making concessions needed to settle the northern border dispute. Conversely, India might conclude its enhanced power position made it possible to adopt a more flexible stance on the border issue. A nuclear decision would probably not prompt a shift in India’s attitude toward the US, except-in response to our reaction to India’s move. Possession of a nuclear device could make India more self-assertive in dealings with its South Asian neighbors, and with regard to the Indian Ocean. Finally, an Indian nuclear decision could be both the effect of rising Indian nationalism and a cause of a further increase in Indian nationalistic confidence. B. Political-Military . Until India possesses long-range bombers or missiles, an Indian nuclear decision would probably have only marginal impact on India’s military capabilities. India could use aircraft in its current inventory such as Canberras or reconfigured Boeing 707’s or 747’s, as delivery vehicles, but these would be a rudimentary affair, essentially for one-way missions. Given China’s air defense systems, and the distances between India and China’s urban centers (approximately 1800 nautical miles from airfields in Assam to Shanghai and 1200 nautical miles to Canton), a rudimentary nuclear bomber force would face some difficulty in striking China’s major cities, even if range were increased by air refueling. China’s nuclear facilities would, however, present closer targets (only 800–1200 nautical miles) and would be within the existing range of Indian Canberra. At present, the Indians have no long-range bombers although there are indications they have unsuccessfully sought these from the Soviets. Unless India elects to develop or purchase a long-range bomber force, she will need intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to have an “advanced” delivery system capable of striking China’s urban centers. The Indian space program can ultimately provide the basis for an IRBM, although India is at present a long way from possessing this capability. The space program aims at launching a satellite in the mid-1970’s with foreign support and appears unlikely of being able to produce an Indian IRBM capability before the 1980’s. Barring a policy shift, we doubt the Soviets would help India develop this capability; it is conceivable the French would be prepared to collaborate with the Indians. One defensive military use, which would not require an expensive and sophisticated delivery system, would be emplacing atomic demolition munitions (ADM’s) in the Himalayan passes which constitute China’s only direct land access to India. Considering the terrain of the border area and the type of threat (primarily ground) that China poses, ADM’s could be considered favorably by the Indian military. Although this possibility has been discussed, we do not know what conclusions the Indian military has reached. C. Economic. * The development and detonation of an initial nuclear device, followed by a relatively small nuclear weapons program, should not impose major strain on Indian financial or technological resources. As noted previously, India already has a well-developed atomic program and could, with relatively limited extra expense, produce the needed nuclear fuels and undertake other necessary work for a nuclear weapons program. [ text not declassified ] The development of an IRBM delivery system would pose a far harder problem, both in terms of money and know-how. [ text not declassified ] India’s GNP is currently about $57 billion and its defense budget about $1.9 billion. In the early 1980ts, GNP would rise to about $80 billion, assuming a 3 per cent growth rate, and over $90 billion, assuming a 5 per cent rate. Expenditures required to test a number of nuclear devices and even to proceed with a modest weapons program could be absorbed without substantial impact on India’s development program. The development of a missile delivery capability would, however, require a major diversion of resources from India’s social and economic development efforts and also from programs of modernization of conventional military forces. Nonetheless, the needed financial resources could probably be generated by an economy the size of India’s. The domestic political impact of the loss in momentum would be heavily influenced by the mood then prevailing. A strong and popular government could present the decision as one needed to realize Indian national goals and would gain popular acceptance for it. A weaker leadership might well face criticisms for diverting scarce resources from the economic development process. V. US Interests and Objectives and Policy Options A. US Interests 1. Non-Proliferation . Limiting the number of nuclear powers remains a major US interest. The acquisition of nuclear devices by any new state, whether India or some other country, would increase the ultimate possibility of nuclear war and thereby diminish the security of the United States. A new member in the nuclear club would make more difficult the task of holding the line on proliferation elsewhere. 2. Stability in Asia . A second US interest is in attaining a stable and peaceful Asia. By adding fresh complications to Sino-Indian relations and risking new troubles with Pakistan, an Indian nuclear decision would probably be destabilizing. 3. US-Indian Relations . A third US interest is in having mutually satisfactory relations with India in view of the country’s regional political/ military importance and its strategic location in the Indian Ocean area. An Indian nuclear decision would cause fresh difficulties in our bilateral relationship. At a minimum, we would have problems regarding possible Indian violations of existing bilateral and/or trilateral peaceful uses agreements as these are interpreted by the US. * B. US Objectives . Our analysis indicates that an Indian nuclear test, either of a “prestige” PNE or a nuclear weapon, would be contrary to US interests. Our actions should be designed to develop arguments and provide incentives that reinforce existing Indian policy and make a PNE or weapons program look less attractive. We should also try to corral supporting pressures on India from other countries. Our efforts should take into account and follow logically steps we have been taking in support of this objective since we first became concerned about Indian nuclear intentions in the mid-1960’s. Even if India eventually commences testing, a further delay would assist our non-proliferation efforts by allowing more time for the NPT regime to become firmly established. C. Possible US Actions . In considering the spectrum of possible US actions, it is well to remember that any Indian decision will be based on Indian calculations of national interest. The impact of advice, and the degree of persuasiveness of outsiders, will depend on how many and who are trying to persuade and the overall context at the time, including progress toward disarmament. Only to the extent that the US and others (particularly the Soviets, but also the French, British, and Japanese) are prepared to draw upon their relationships with India—political, economic, and technical—will there be a possibility of affecting Mrs. Gandhi’s calculations of Indian national interests. Even with maximum pressure, Delhi could decide India’s interests were better served by going nuclear. In this regard, the Soviet position will be of much greater significance than our own, although even Moscow’s influence is limited given India’s increasingly self-reliant nationalism. US influence has drastically diminished over the past year and our current unilateral ability to affect an Indian nuclear decision is marginal. Indeed, in view of the present poor state of Indo-US relations, a major US initiative would probably produce an effect opposite to that intended and hasten, rather than delay, an Indian nuclear test. 1. Possible Measures Before India Decides to Explode Nuclear Device . (a) Unilateral US Efforts . Over the past decade, the USG has on several occasions reviewed the question of India’s nuclear intentions and carried on an extensive dialogue with the Indians on this subject, both in the context of the NPT negotiations and subsequently. For example, we discussed the costs, of a nuclear weapons program and as recently as June 1970 gave them unclassified data. In November 1970, US officials stated our view regarding the indistinguishability between the technology of manufacturing a PNE device and a nuclear weapon. We also presented the Indians an Aide Memoire, which stressed our position that bilateral US atomic energy agreement with India prohibited using materials supplied by US or produced in a US-assisted reactor for an Indian PNE (attached as Annex 2). (i) Private Cautions : The US could continue a low-keyed, bilateral effort with India, taking into account the prevailing state of relations. The Indians could periodically be informed at senior levels of the likely impact of an Indian nuclear test on US actions toward India. Discussion should be in terms of our non-proliferation policy interests and possible legal problems rather than in the form of threats. If relations continue strained, any threat would probably be counterproductive. We could make the point that a nuclear decision would require a searching review of our existing technological cooperation. We could underscore our view that a nuclear decision would be a short-sighted move unlikely to enhance India’s security. In addition, we could reiterate the points made to the Indians in our November 1970 Aide Memoire. (ii) Discussion of the Costs : We could continue to stress to the Indians the economic costs of developing an advanced nuclear weapons and missile delivery system. In addition, we could try to focus attention on the technical difficulties and costs involved in developing a meaningful indigenous PNE program. We could sponsor or encourage the visit to India of academic experts an proliferation and nuclear policy, as we have in the past, to promote better understanding in Indian academic and governmental circles of the issues involved in a nuclear weapons and missile delivery program, particularly questions relating to the cost effectiveness. Such discussions might help to demonstrate to the Indians the negative aspects of nuclear weapons in relation to India’s security situation or national interests. (iii) Encouragement of Peaceful, Scientific Research and Programs : India has a very substantial number of trained nuclear scientists and a growing number in the space field. It would be desirable to engage their energies as far as possible in non-military research not involving nuclear explosion or delivery system technology. If usefully employed in meaningful peaceful scientific applications, India’s scientific elite might be less likely to urge the adoption of a military program, one which would clearly divert Indian manpower and resources from peaceful programs. Through technical cooperation programs, we are currently assisting India’s peaceful atomic and space programs. We should continue and, depending on concrete possibilities, perhaps increase these efforts. In this context, we should ensure that our technical cooperation in the space field does not contribute directly to an Indian delivery capability, the existence of which might encourage an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons. (iv) Undercut India’s Pretext for Developing a PNE Device : We might seek to dissuade India from developing its own PNE device on the ground that, India could obtain PNE services either from the US or the USSR when concrete applications appear economically attractive. Even though India is not a party to the NPT and hence not a beneficiary of the Article V assurances relating to PNE services, we (possibly together with the Soviets) could offer these to the Indians on the condition India would forego testing its own PNE device. Acceptance of an offer of this kind would deprive India of its public rationale for continuing a nuclear explosives program and, of course, prevent India from gaining the prestige of carrying out a nuclear test. As such, it is doubtful the Indians would respond affirmatively. Moreover, offering to provide PNE services to a non-signatory to the NPT could subject US to criticism that we were undercutting the incentive provided by Article V for countries to adhere to the NPT. The offer could also lend support to those Indians who are promoting a PNE project. (v) US Actions in Relation to Indian Security Calculations : An important element in Mrs. Gandhi’s calculations on the nuclear issue—in addition to the desire to reinforce Indian prestige and Indian nationalism—will be India’s sense of security vis-à-vis its principal external foes—Pakistan and China. US actions in South Asian security matters of concern to India, especially the question of arms for Pakistan, could play an indirect role in the Indian decision-making equation on the nuclear question. Moves by the US, such as the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan, that would unsettle the Indians, would strengthen the hands of those in favor of an Indian nuclear explosion. On the other hand, US political/military policies that did not conflict with important Indian security interests could improve the chances that India would continue to forego demonstrating a nuclear explosive capability. (vi) The Chinese Threat as a Factor : Similarly, an improvement in Sino-Indian relations would reduce the security pressures for an Indian nuclear decision. While the scope for US action is clearly limited, anything we could do, either with the Chinese or the Indians to improve Sino-Indian relations, would serve our interests with regard to non-proliferation and Asian security. [ text not declassified ] One action likely to increase pressures for India’s exploding a device would be the firing of Chinese ballistic missiles over South Asia to target areas in the Indian Ocean. (b) Multilateral Efforts . Other powers share our concern about an Indian nuclear decision. These include not only our NATO allies, particularly Canada and Great Britain, but also Japan and the Communist powers including the Soviet Union and China. All of these nations, for different but perhaps mutually reinforcing reasons, do not want India to become a nuclear power. (i) Soviet Union : In light of the strong Soviet commitment to non-proliferation, and the desirability of not having our own efforts isolated, we should periodically raise the Indian nuclear problem with the USSR. This is a common interest of the US and the USSR, and it might do some good to remind the Soviets of this. [ text not declassified ] Nonetheless, we appear to have little to lose by initiating exchanges with the Soviets. The chances of their exerting pressure on Delhi would be greater if we maintain a dialogue on the issue rather than delaying an approach until after we learn of an Indian nuclear decision. Accordingly, we should have more regular exchanges with the Soviets, especially with disarmament and nuclear energy specialists, in Geneva and Vienna, and periodically raise the Indian nuclear question through diplomatic channels in Moscow, Washington and New Delhi. (ii) Britain and Canada : [ text not declassified ] we should periodically consult with the British and Canadians regarding actions we should take both before and after an Indian nuclear decision. Discussions with the Canadians and the British are particularly pertinent since an Indian nuclear weapons program might involve material provided under an Indo-Canadian agreement or material produced from the CIRUS reactor in Trombay, and since the British currently have increased influence in New Delhi as a result of their policy in 1971. (iii) France : In recent years France has, become a major provider of technical assistance for India in the nuclear energy and space field. Despite France’s independent nuclear policies, it continues to oppose proliferation and would be unlikely to collaborate in an Indian nuclear weapons program or to assist directly in developing an Indian IRBM capability. * In February 1971 we discussed the French position on PNE’s in the light of reports that there might be more extensive Franco-Indian nuclear cooperation, including the provision of a PNE service. The French reiterated the view that France would act as if it had signed the NPT. They have, however, continued to be less restrictive than the US in providing India with nuclear equipment. For example, they have supplied technology for producing heavy water for the unsafeguarded reactors India is constructing near Madras. At periodic intervals, we should hold further discussions with the French on the Indian nuclear issue. In the context of these, we should continue to seek French cooperation in efforts to inhibit Indian development of nuclear devices and/or missile delivery systems and to provide international safeguards on India’s peaceful nuclear activities, such as the two unsafeguarded reactors under construction near Madras. (iv) Japan : Since Japan is a major non-nuclear power whose nuclear policies might be affected by any Indian nuclear decision, we included the Japanese in our recent exchanges (along with the British and Canadians) and informed them of our concerns and of the diplomatic and other steps which we contemplate taking if India takes a nuclear decision. We should stay in close touch with the Japanese. It would be useful if Tokyo periodically reiterated the warning it gave the Indians a few years ago that Japanese public opinion would demand a reduction in economic assistance were India to go nuclear. (v) China : Although India regards China primarily as a threat in conventional military terms, it also fears nuclear blackmail by China. To the extent that Sino-Indian relations improve and India’s concerns about China lessen, the pressures for a nuclear detonation might diminish. In this regard, we could usefully discuss the Indian nuclear question with the Chinese. On the one hand, we might allay Chinese suspicions that we and the Soviets “were up to something” with the Indians. On the other hand, we could point out that Chinese actions, for example the launching of an ICBM over South Asia, could create considerable stir in India and increase the pressures on Delhi to explode a nuclear device to satisfy nationalist sentiments. * (vi) Other NATO Countries : In addition to the British, Canadians and French, several other NATO allies, particularly the Germans, have a concern about the general question of proliferation. Now that we have had low-key consultations with Canadians, British and Japanese, we should consult the Germans concerning our assessment, policies and diplomatic efforts. If we have a series of substantive discussions with the Soviets, we may also wish to advise other NATO allies. (vii) IAEA : A further multilateral forum in which we can take action is the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. In this body, the US has been trying to gain international acceptance of the view that all nuclear explosives, regardless of their intended purpose, should be considered the same, as far as international safeguards are concerned. The Indians, on the other hand, have maintained that a difference exists between peaceful and military explosives, and that the IAEA “peaceful uses” concept, and also India’s atomic energy agreements with the US and Canada, do not prohibit PNE’s. * In line with this approach, at the March 1972 Board of Governor’s Meeting, the US representative reiterated our position that the term “peaceful uses” in US agreements and the related agreements preclude nuclear explosive devices of any sort. Following the US lead, the UK representative at the June 1972 IAEA session made a similar declaration that all UK agreements barred the use of any items supplied by the UK for any type of nuclear explosive device. This position has not been accepted by the Indians and has also been contested by the Brazilians, at whom the March 1972 US statement was specifically directed. At present,efforts are under way in the IAEA to induce the Soviet representative to issue a similar statement at a future session. We should continue to seek Soviet agreement to do so. A parallel Soviet statement would considerably strengthen the position we have upheld. It would also prove a potentially important way to undercut the ability of India to label an explosion a “PNE.” A second area in which the IAEA might be helpful is the so-called Zangger Committee of supplier state representatives that has reviewed controls over the export of nuclear-related equipment and materials to determine what items would trigger IAEA safeguards. In the group’s deliberations we should keep in mind the possibility that export controls might prove effective in limiting India’s ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The value of this forum would be enhanced if efforts succeeded in inducing the USSR, France and others to apply the same standards in the requirement for safeguards on nuclear exports. (viii) CCD : The possibility of any action by the CCD in Geneva affecting Indian decisions in the short term is not large. However, the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, especially one which included-China, could influence an Indian decision. India has publicly long favored a CTB. It is doubtful that India would adhere to a CTB if China refused to sign and continued testing. A successful CTB would, however, strengthen those domestic forces in India opposed to nuclear testing, even if India remained outside the treaty. (Defense believes India’s decision to develop a nuclear capability will be based on the perceived threat, the factors of national security, and the need for additional prestige. Domestic pressures have not halted the development of a technology including components, that would permit India to detonate a nuclear device once the decision to do so is taken.) After Decision Taken . Once India takes a decision to explode a nuclear device, whether for reasons of prestige or on national security grounds, the ability of the US to affect or reverse the decision would be minimal. Between the decision itself and the actual detonation of a first device, however, there might be a limited period during which it would conceivably be possible to take steps to prevent or delay the detonation. While we would hope to have information on an Indian decision to detonate a device in advance of the actual event, we may not know of a decision until the explosion is imminent or a fact. In an attempt to delay the implementation of an Indian decision, we might urge India to defer any detonation for a period of years. This effort would be more likely to be successful if we were able to hold out hope of progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban or some other major disarmament step. It is, of course, understood that any decision toward active negotiation on a CTB would be taken on the basis of overall US national security interests. In order to reinforce any appeal for delay, we might simultaneously offer India certain inducements in terms of aid or technological cooperation, although this requires further detailed study to evaluate what possibilities are realistic and desirable. We could also make clear we might have to cut back future nuclear cooperation if India nevertheless detonated a device. Prospect for success would be measurably increased if we had the cooperation of the Soviets as well as others. After we concluded there was no realistic chance of averting or delaying an Indian nuclear test, we should make our objections clear but focus our attention on the problems India’s action would cause. (a) Non-Proliferation Problems . The spectrum of actions that might be taken include the following: (i) Public Statement : At a minimum, we would wish to express our regret over the Indian action as setting back efforts to limit the number of nuclear nations in the interest of world peace. Assuming the Indian explosion is labeled a PNE, we would wish to underscore our view regarding the indistinguishability of a nuclear device for peaceful and military purposes. We would probably also want to indicate that the USG was reviewing its various programs of scientific cooperation with India in light of the Indian nuclear action. Should we decide that circumstances dictated a stiffer response, our public posture would accordingly be more negative. The criticism of the Indian action would be sharper and we might state what other facets of US-Indian cooperation (i.e., technical and economic assistance, etc.) were under review in light of the Indian nuclear move. (ii) Possible Unilateral Actions to Limit Technical and Scientific Cooperation : If the Indian explosion occurs before the two unsafeguarded Madras reactors go online in the late 1970’s, it is likely the plutonium would come from the unsafeguarded CIRUS research reactor provided India by Canada in the 1950’s for which the United States supplied heavy water. Under the terms of the 1956 Indo-US agreement on CIRUS, the Indians agreed that the heavy water was to be used for peaceful purposes only. Since we have officially advised the Indians we consider them committed not to use the plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor, including any future generation of the plutonium, for nuclear explosions, we could cite the 1956 agreement as the basis for restricting our nuclear assistance to the Indians. (It should be noted t h a t the Indians do not agree with our interpretation of the 1956 agreement, arguing that the “peaceful uses” concept does not exclude a peaceful nuclear explosion.) As a practical matter, there are two areas in which we could act. The first would be to discontinue the supply of enriched fuel to the Tarapur reactor (which unlike CIRUS is safeguarded). Under our 1963 agreement on Tarapur we are obligated to provide all Tarapur’s requirements for enriched uranium. However we could use the breach of the CIRUS agreement as justification for discontinuing further supplies of enriched uranium. * How damaging this would prove would depend on the attitude of other potential enriched uranium supplies, specifically the French and Soviets. If they stepped in as a substitute for the US to provide the enriched uranium, we would simply be making a political gesture and not penalizing the Indians in a practical manner. At the same time, the Indians could retaliate against the US if we break the agreement on Tarapur by refusing further repayments of the $15 million for fuel already supplied and another $73 million owed on an AID loan for the Tarapur reactors. A second area in which we could take action would be our program of scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field. We have over the years established a good working relationship with the Indian atomic energy scientists. As a sign of our displeasure, we could take steps to limit and/or terminate these relationships. We could also initiate action to restrict Indian access to the nuclear energy field in the US (i.e., refuse to invite Indians to technical conferences, refuse student visas for higher education in the atomic energy field, etc.). Such a course could of course, deprive US of future opportunities to influence and keep informed on the progress of the Indian nuclear program. (iii) Possible Multilateral Actions : The effectiveness of any unilateral US measures would be greatly increased is our actions were seconded by parallel steps of other nations, especially the USSR. Obviously each nation will weigh what it does in terms of its interests in preventing further proliferation and its relations with India. The chances for something like a meaningful collective response would be much greater if this possibility were discussed with other countries in the pre-decision phase. One international forum where the Indian situation could logically be raised would be the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this regard, the success of efforts to gain wider acceptance of our view regarding the indistinguishability between peaceful and nuclear explosives would be particularly significant. (iv) Other Unilateral US Actions : If we chose, the US could obviously impose more wide-ranging penalties against India than those outlined under (ii) above. We could curtail all cooperation in the space as well as atomic energy fields, where some potential military applications existed. We could also curtail our other programs of scientific cooperation and reduce or eliminate our economic assistance programs with India, assuming these are resumed. (b) Likely Prospects and Impact . Possible moves would, of course, have to be analyzed in light of the situation that prevails at the time of an Indian test, as well as the manner in which India describes its device, i.e., whether as a PNE or as a nuclear weapon. Assuming a test in the near future labeled a PNE, we would anticipate the following prospects and possible impact: (i) In terms of US-Indian relations, sweeping penalties, especially in view of the likely Indian contention that their explosion is peaceful, would cause drastic damage. India would probably retaliate in ways available to it, most likely in terms of obligations it could repudiate in the area of our AID relationship. If our penalties were more specifically related to India’ s nuclear energy activities, we would probably lessen the prospect of Indian retaliation. The Indian reaction would nonetheless be strong and the effect on Indo-US relations severe. This would be especially true if the US actions were substantially harsher than those of other countries. (ii) Some other countries might be willing to impose penalties in the nuclear field. The Canadians have already stated publicly they would do so. We are doubtful how I far the French and the Soviets would be willing to go. Probably they would make some noises of displeasure, but then not join in any multilateral effort to penalize the Indians. We believe it doubtful that other nations would be willing to take actions against the Indians that ranged beyond the scientific and technical area, however prior consultations might establish the basis for concerted actions. (iii) In terms of the effect on other near-nuclear powers, penalties against India would be unlikely to have a decisive impact. Some of the near nuclears—Germany, Japan and Israel—would not expect the US to apply the same criteria to them as to India because of their special relationship with the US, although a very mild low-key US response could lead them to anticipate nothing more severe if they became number seven in the nuclear club. Others might be influenced to a greater degree by a stiff US reaction. (c) Regional Impact . As discussed earlier, the major regional repercussion would be from Pakistan. Unless a major shift in Indo-Pakistan relations has occurred, an Indian nuclear test would trigger requests for political support and some form of US umbrella against an Indian nuclear threat. The other countries in South Asia would express concern about an Indian nuclear test, but would be unlikely to seek any concrete steps by the US to counter India’s increased political / military power. In dealing with Pakistan, our choices probably range from, on the one extreme, advising the Pakistanis that we see no Indian nuclear threat to them and hence no need for support, verbal or other wise, to the other extreme of offering Pakistan the sort of nuclear assurances we have given our NATO allies and Japan. Outlined below are four possible choices within this broader spectrum: (i) Essentially Do Nothing : We could tell the Pakistanis not to exaggerate the Indian threat. India does not require nuclear weapons to prove its superiority over Islamabad. We would offer Pakistan support available to all countries under the UN Charter, but would do no more. (ii) Calm the Pakistanis by Verbal Assurances But No New Commitments : We would recognize the Pakistani fears as real, if overdrawn, and seek to convince them, possibly drawing on help from allies like Iran, that they were exaggerating the military significance of an Indian nuclear test. At the same time, we could, without making any fresh commitments, make a statement along the lines of the declaration of support against nuclear blackmail which we made in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and possibly even seek some form of reaffirmation of the related UN security Council Resolution 255 of 1968. (Annex 5 provides pertinent texts.) (iii) Provide Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella : We could explicitly offer Pakistan US nuclear support in the event India threatened or used nuclear weapons against its neighbor to the West. This presumably would be in the form of new US-Pakistan bilateral. This would be regarded by India as a major policy action against it by the US with inevitable drastic consequences on US-Indian relations. It would also run counter to the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine of maintaining existing commitments, but not expanding them. Substantial public controversy would be likely in the US. (iv) Revise 1959 Bilateral to Expand Protection : To provide more concrete assurances for Pakistan, we could revise our 1959 bilateral security agreement to enlarge the scope of coverage from aggression by a Communist power to any form of external aggression. For both options (iii) and (iv) the costs we would pay in terms of fresh destabilization in South Asia and the controversies generated at home and elsewhere through the expanded US commitments in Asia would not balance our gains in terms of steadying Pakistan. We are, therefore, doubtful about the utility of these options. At the same time, we think (i) does not go gar enough in providing Pakistan the sort of psychological lift Islamabad will need in responding relatively calmly to an Indian nuclear test. The best means of achieving this, without at the same time creating new fundamental problems for the US in South Asia, would appear to be something along the lines of action outlined in (ii). (d) Impact on Other Countries . The other country most immediately affected by an Indian explosion would be Japan. How we dealt with the Japanese once India joined the nuclear club would be of considerable importance, both in terms of Japan’s nuclear policy and our relationship with Tokyo. In view of Japan’s military potential, we would want to consider carefully, in light of the specific circumstances at the time, what steps we should take to help in maintaining Japan as a non-nuclear power. Preferably before, but certainly after an Indian pro-nuclear decision, we would want to demonstrate to the Japanese that our nuclear security relations can keep pace with changing conditions. It will be more important than ever that the Japanese be assured that their voice can be heard on security matters without Japan’s having to go nuclear. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77–0094, India, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The paper was circulated on September 26 to the CIA, the JCS, and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury by Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary of the NSC, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the paper would be considered by the Senior Review Group at a time to be determined. Copies were also sent to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Ibid) The paper was prepared by an ad hoc group representing State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and ACDA, headed by Sisco, as chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The annexes cited in the paper were attached but are not published. The footnotes in the paper occur in the source text. For NSSM 156, see Document 275 . * [ text not declassified ] * Any Indian test in the next year or so would have to use plutonium from the US-assisted CIRUS reactor at Trombay, although in the late 1970s India could develop devices from plutonium produced in unsafeguarded reactors it is currently building near Madras. * This would not necessarily exclude French collaboration on aspects of India’s space program which might indirectly contribute to India’s developing an IRBM capability. * In addition, it has been suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of a parallel undertaking by nuclear weapon states, including China, similar to that undertaken by the US and the UK in Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against India if it did not develop nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or permit weapons to be deployed in its territory. * The ambiguity stems from the fact that the NPT refers directly to “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” while the basic IAEA Statute (applying to non-NPT parties) refers to safeguards against use of nuclear material “to further any military purpose.” * See Annex 3 for discussion of the legal situation. Annex 4 discusses the relevance of Article I of the NPT. 301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 8, 1972 SUBJECT: Military Supply for Pakistan The Pakistani Ambassador has asked if it would be possible to move a small amount of military equipment which belongs to Pakistan, but was caught up in the embargo when all military shipments to India and Pakistan were prohibited. Background You will recall that you told Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed last spring that resumption of military supply would create too sharp a reaction in the Congress, but that you would look at the whole military supply question after the November election. President Bhutto has since indicated his understanding of this position. Most recently he told Secretary Connally that he would not want to do anything that would embarrass you before the election, but that after November he would like an opportunity to make representations about Pakistan’s requirements. Against this background, Ambassador Sultan Khan has now asked for the release of about $1.7 million of military equipment which was in the process of shipment out of the U.S. at the time when all arms shipments to South Asia were halted last winter. There was, of course, a larger amount of equipment licensed or on order at the time of the embargo, but these are the cases of special current concern to the Ambassador; (a) an assortment of spare parts for aircraft, tanks, weapons and electronic equipment worth about $935,000 being held in a New York warehouse at a monthly storage cost to the Pakistanis of $1,500; (b) engines for Pakistani military aircraft (F–104, C-130, B–57, helicopter) worth about $800,000 and owned by Pakistan but here for overhaul. There are also other inequities and financial hardships which American companies and the U.S. Government have had to bear as a result of the embargo, There is some $17.2 involved for U.S. manufacturers and about $16 million for the USG. The Problem There is no question about the fact that the $1.7 million worth of equipment in immediate question belongs to Pakistan and should be returned. Serious consideration should also be given to correcting the other inequities caused by the embargo, including commercial hardship cases. The only real issue—and it is a very sensitive one—is when this should be done, both in terms of U.S. and Pakistani interests. This problem of timing stems from the fact that any adjustments right now in the embargo that would allow any military shipments to Pakistan would jeopardize the Aid Bill and could turn our military supply policy toward South Asia into a campaign issue. There is a movement in Congress led by Senator Church to include in the Aid Bill a prohibition against all military assistance to South Asia and it was included in the original Senate version. The House version of the bill now under consideration does not, however, include this prohibition and we are hopeful about getting the Senate prohibition stricken. There is, of course, opposition and during the period between now and the passage of an aid bill any appearance that we are moving toward resumption of military assistance to Pakistan would strengthen the hand of those who claim that the only way to stop the Administration is to include a prohibition against all military supply to South Asia. The problem, therefore, is essentially one of tactics. The $1.7 million worth of equipment in question should in principle be released to Pakistan and could be now by simply issuing the necessary Munitions Control licenses,. It is not, however, in either the U.S. or Pakistani interest that this be done in a way that jeopardizes the Aid Bill. In short, it would be wiser to hold back on the release of this shipment awhile longer and thereby preserve our ability to not only clean up other inequities and commercial hardships but to consider revising our entire arms policy toward South Asia after the election. Recommendation : Hold up on this Pak request until after action on the Aid Bill is completed or until after the election, whichever is later. At that time we can then take action to (1) release the $1.7 million of equipment by issuing the necessary licenses and (2) resolve the issues of other existing inequities within the framework of an overall review of our military sales policy for South Asia. Approve * Other 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1972–Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that Caspar Weinberger and William Timmons, the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations, endorsed Kissinger’s recommendation. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. * Weinberger and Timmons recommend. 302. Telegram 7547 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 302. Telegram 7547 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, September 8, 1972, 1314Z Subject: Conversation With Pres Bhutto: Part I-The Subcontinent 1. Summary: Bhutto expressed disappointment at his inability to proceed with recognition of BD in August as earlier planned, as result Mujib’s refusal to meet him and domestic political opposition. He reaffirmed intention to move toward BD recognition as soon as circumstances permit. Also reaffirmed intention to continue efforts toward rapprochment with India per Simla agreement. Although timetable has been set back somewhat. He is quite aware of relevance of GOP recognition of BD to continued progress with India. Bhutto indicated he had taken initiative on Chinese veto of BD application for admission to UN. He did not think position would be changed in time to permit admission by this year’s UNGA. End summary 2. Pres Bhutto invited me for dinner Sept 7 at his Rawalpindi residence. During a three-hour period, with no others present, we touched on a variety of current issues spiced by Bhutto’s reminiscences from his years of involvement in Pak affairs at high level. Bhutto seemed relaxed and reasonably well rested despite hectic pace which he has been maintaining. This message covers highlights of our conversation on relations with Bangladesh (BD) and India and the Chinese connection. Other principal subjects covered during the evening being reported septels. 3. Bhutto acknowledged there was setback to timetable he had envisaged in normalizing relations with Bangladesh and India. He had not found it possible to proceed as he had hoped to put BD recognition before National Assembly when it convened in mid August. As he had earlier told me, his domestic opponents had taken advantage of every opportunity to belabor him as getting ready to sell East Pakistan down the river. Meanwhile, he was vulnerable because Mujib had stubbornly continued to reject any meeting with Bhutto without prior formal recognition of BD by GOP. I said I thought Bhutto had decided before he went to Simla in late June, that he would move ahead on BD recognition in August even if he could not meet Mujib beforehand. Bhutto acknowledged that he had been thinking along those lines, although he had been given reason to believe (especially by Indonesians) that meeting with Mujib would be arranged for July. In absence such meeting and in light of political attacks on him especially in Punjab, Bhutto had decided to make tactical retreat. 4. Bhutto said he had perceived no change in Mujib’s position when he telephoned Mujib in London a couple of weeks ago. He had gotten impression that several other persons were present with Mujib at that time, and that Mujib was—at last in part—reiterating past positions for their benefit. Bhutto then recalled, once again, solemn promise which he said Mujib had made to him before being freed from detention here last January, that the two would meet again shortly to discuss common problems. But on this point, as on others, Mujib had shown that he was not much of a statesman. Bhutto remarked that all his other efforts to reach Mujib, including calls on him in London by Baluch leader Akbar Bugti, had drawn a blank. 5. I asked whether the delay in his timetable implied any basic change in Bhutto’s strategy for recognizing BD, noting that this issue was apparently crucial to further progress in implementing Simla agreement with India. Bhutto said firmly that his basic strategy remained same. He was a realist and pragmatist, even if Mujib was not. He knew that GOP had, sooner or later, to recognize BD and that delay had its costs although he also could not afford to ignore domestic political considerations. In October he planned to go to the people and launch a campaign to get better understanding of the problem that would, in effect, prepare the way for recognition of BD. He could not, however, fix a date when he would see the time ripe to put matter to National Assembly for approval. Problem would be considerably simplified if Mujib could be persuaded to modify his stand on meeting Bhutto. Some friends (he mentioned French and Indonesians) had suggested possibility of arranging meeting at which GOP recognition of BD would be announced when the two principals came together. Bhutto said he was ready to offer Mujib the presidency of reunited Pakistan, if for nothing more than to show his own good faith (and also, it occurred to me to try to absolve himself of opposition charges that he had connived in breakup of Pakistan so that he could become President in the west.) 6. I asked to what extent Bhutto was linking in his own mind the question of BD recognition with the release of POWs and the proposed war crimes trials. Bhutto said it would be disastrous to him if all the POWs were not released and if trials were begun in Dacca after recognition of BD. If trials were begun in the interim, it would be great setback to the prospects for recognition. Bhutto reiterated his own readiness to put on trial any Pak personnel charged with crimes in East Pakistan in 1971. He said he had no desire to protect rapists or others of that ilk. 7. Noting it was most desirable to find some way to break the current impasse between Mujib and Bhutto,I asked Bhutto how his detention of the Bengalees in Pakistan figured in the picture. Bhutto interjected that he knew I had discussed this matter with some Pak officials including Air Marshal Chaudhry only last week (Islamabad A-140 September 1, 1972 notal). (This was the first I knew my informal conversations this subject, expressing doubts about the wisdom of not allowing the Bengalees to depart, had come to Bhutto’s attention.) Bhutto said he too was sympathetic to humanitarian problems being faced by Bengalees detained here. They had been caught up in a complex of troubles not to Bhutto’s liking (i.e., as innocent victims of the failure of India/BD to release the Pak POWs). He said he was looking at some possibilities for allowing some of the Bengalees to leave Pakistan. He agreed with my remark that whatever he could find it possible to do along that line should tend to counter the very unfavorable image which Pakistan had acquired in many countries during the events of 1971. 8. I asked if Bhutto could tell me how the Chinese veto of BD admission to the UN had come about, saying I surmised that Peking would not have applied its first veto unless it were in accord with Peking’s own assessment of principles and interests. Bhutto indicated that he had himself taken the initiative on this question. He had sent FonOff SecGen Aziz Ahmed to Peking in June (before Simla) to talk about contingencies and strategy. At that time, he was still planning on recognition of BD in August. But he had instructed Ahmed also to explore an alternative strategy in the event Bhutto felt unable to proceed with recognition. In that connection the possibility of a Chinese veto in UNSC had been discussed. Subsequently, Amb Shahi had been called back for consultations and then returned to Peking for further discussions on the veto. Bhutto intimated that these efforts had been of importance and that the Chinese veto was a sign of Peking’s desire to help Pakistan at a very critical time. It was also taken in recognition of damage incurred by Pakistan as result of Soviet intrigues in 1971. Bhutto said he thought Peking wished to establish good relations with BD but it was willing to wait. In response to my query, Bhutto reaffirmed that the application of the veto was not inconsistent with his own continuing intention to pave the way for acceptance in Pakistan of the reality of BD. He thought, however, that Pak recognition of BD would probably not come in time for a reversal of the Chinese position and the acceptance of BD into the UN at this year’s session of UNGA. 9. I asked about recent visit here by PRC Vice FonMin Chiao Kuan-Hua. Bhutto did not offer any details, commenting merely that Chiao had come for a review of issues at forthcoming UNGA. (MFA DirGen for UN affairs has given similar explanation for Chiao’s visit, which attracted much speculation here because it came at very short notice and in wake of Chinese veto of BD in UNSC.) 10. Subject of Indo-Pak relations cropped up at various times during above discussion. Bhutto said he was determined to move ahead on efforts at rapprochement in wake of Simla accord. He recalled that PriMin Gandhi had taken personal decision, in last moments at Simla, to break deadlock on a few points and to sign the accord with Bhutto. Bhutto admitted that he had spoken to Mrs. Gandhi of his hopes and intentions on recognizing BD in August, and that she could well have been disappointed when Bhutto subsequently found himself unable to follow through. He had sent Aziz Ahmed back to Delhi last month to explain how events had obliged Bhutto to slow down on recognition. He then reiterated his dedication to moving from confrontation to a new relationship with India. 11. Bhutto said he was sorry that the deadline set at Simla for the completion of force withdrawals to either side of the Indo Pak border had not been met. He thought delineation of the Kashmir line of control, which the Indians considered as prerequisite to withdrawal to international border, would eventually be completed although the military negotiators on both sides had to be guided with a firm hand. Bhutto said he was not sure when the next meeting of Indo-Pak officials would take place pursuant to Simla accord, but it surely would not be before force withdrawals were completed. Planning for the next meeting with PriMin Gandhi would thus have to await further developments. Bhutto said he recognized the importance which GOI attaches, in this regard, to question of Pak recognition of BD. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and Lahore. 303. Memorandum of Conversation 303. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 22, 1972, 4:20–4:55 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs L.K. Jha, Indian Ambassador to the United States Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker) [The notetaker joined the meeting shortly after it had begun.] Ambassador Jha: The big question in the Indian mind is: We have a sorry experience coming back from the past. There was no question of the U.S. taking a particular attitude toward us but it was the result of a more global strategy. Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Ambassador Jha: But how can we be assured that our future relations will not reflect a repetition of the past? Could there be in the future a similar occurrence? Dr. Kissinger: If you attack a neighbor with Soviet arms, then there will be a repetition. But how often do you do that? Every twenty years? Ambassador Jha: No, every twenty-five years! You would prefer that we be attacked with your arms rather than we attack someone else with Soviet arms? Dr. Kissinger: I told you last time the framework of our arms policy. There will be no massive re-equipping. Ambassador Jha: That is the arms question. But the other problem is: China has a certain attitude toward the Subcontinent. We hear that it is China’s view that the Soviet Union is seeking the encirclement of China. Dr. Kissinger: That is their view. They have told us that. Ambassador Jha: And you, for your own reasons, are cultivating China. Dr. Kissinger: Well— Ambassador Jha: You would use different words. But in any event, we are concerned to know, to what extent will this encourage China to conduct a certain policy detrimental to our interests? Dr. Kissinger: That’s a fair question. Ambassador Jha: This is not the question of Indian-Pakistani relations or the arms question, but it is our question anyway. Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It is no secret that China is terrified of a Soviet attack, so that any country with Soviets arms that attacks someone else—no matter how provoked—raises in the Chinese mind its fear of the Soviets. And particularly where you have this contentious border problem with them. Our concern in the India-Pakistan war was with the precedent that the use of force might set for other areas, for example, the Mideast, that could be seen by the Chinese as foreshadowing the use of force elsewhere. Obviously, we would not do something deliberately to affront China when China feels its security directly threatened. But in the normal conduct of diplomacy, we see no reason to coordinate our policy with China. What you and I are concerned with, the improvement of our relations, is totally independent of China. If there were an Indian attack on China—which of course is highly unlikely—we would be concerned. If China engaged in military adventures against India, we would not support it at all. Our attitude on that has not changed at all. Look, L.K., when I go to Moscow and conclude all sorts of deals, Peking is unhappy. If we can do it with Moscow, we can do it with New Delhi. Ambassador Jha: But the global interests of the U.S. can be cited to justify anything. A signed agreement on aid has been gone back on— your role in the Consortium, etc.—all these things need to be explored in some depth. I would much rather have a dialogue with you than have someone coming out there. Dr. Kissinger: We’re sending Maury Williams as an act of good will. If he’s better off here, we’ll keep him here. Ambassador Jha; Williams going will be effective only if there is some prior understanding reached. Otherwise it might be counterproductive. When he comes, he will be asked what has happened on aid. There will be questions in Parliament. If there is nothing to say, it will do more harm than good. More positively, I.G. Patel is coming here tomorrow. It will be more constructive to have a dialogue between I.G. and Maury here. And then we can take a second look at Maury’s coming. Dr. Kissinger: You should handle it from the point of view of whatever makes the most contribution to better relations. If you want our dialogue here to continue, that’s fine. Ambassador Jha: Consortium rescheduling is one of the specifics. It is not our birthright to get aid from you, but a signed agreement is something different. It is a very different situation in relations between governments. I have enough political sense of the atmospherics here to see that the President cannot just get up and say he’s changed his mind. Dr. Kissinger: Particularly in an election year. Ambassador Jha: That I can understand. Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, we can’t do it before November. It would bring up the whole debate again; it looks like an admission that we treated you badly. And it is not in your interest either that it looks like we did it for electoral reasons. Ambassador Jha: I understand. Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you for that reason Maury wouldn’t be able to say anything. Maybe Maury should go in November. Ambassador Jha: Yes, maybe. Dr. Kissinger: If we can keep our dialogue going here, and—to the extent we can control it—moderate the press campaign.... Ambassador Jha: There is another item: P.L. 480 rupees. We know that a solution, which will require Congressional approval, will take time. After Saulnier’s visit to India two years ago to study this, nothing has happened. Dr. Kissinger: What do you want us to do? Ambassador Jha: It was buried. Dr. Kissinger: I frankly don’t know the technical problem. I will look into it. You want those balances abolished? Ambassador Jha: Well, we will have to discuss some ways to handle it. There are many ideas. Dr. Kissinger: We will approach a solution to this problem with a constructive attitude. If we approach it this way, our problem of last year can be used in a very salutary way. In many ways our two countries had a love affair. We took each other’s criticism too seriously. We forgot that we were both great powers and that great powers have to make policy and consider their interests. For this very reason we perhaps rubbed each other more than countries that did not have this relationship. We need a new basis now. This is our attitude. The aid business, it will occur. This is not a commitment, just my personal judgment of how it will develop. Ambassador Jha: One thing: Bangladesh in the UN General Assembly. You want ways of being more forthcoming. Dr. Kissinger: Our attitude is this: We will agree to have it put on the agenda. We will not want it given any special treatment or attention, but we will support its inscription on the agenda—which is not the view of your Chinese friends. Ambassador Jha: We want to know, is it something you’re just reconciled to because it has majority support, or are you actively in favor? I sent my number two to talk to Van Hollen. His answer was, he could not communicate. Dr. Kissinger: I will see to it that there is somewhat easier communication. Ambassador Jha: We should just start to do business with each other again as governments usually do business with each other. Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. And this is a topic we should be discussing anyway. Ambassador Jha: How do you see the culmination of our dialogue? Dr. Kissinger: First, we should continue it. Second, we should begin discussing removing some of the inequities that came out of last year. And then we should discuss the more general issues—such as, what should be our economic relationship—on which we have really no settled view. It is still in our interest to have India as a useful member of the international community. Our relations with the Soviet Union have improved somewhat, and to the extent you’re seen as a Soviet client, even that is not a problem. But you didn’t gain your independence to be anyone’s client. Ambassador Jha: Right. Dr. Kissinger: And this will take care of itself in the normal evolution of diplomacy. On the grain thing, our information is that you loaded 30,000 bags (1,300 metric tons) on a Soviet freighter for North Vietnam. This runs afoul of some law. There are legal consequences according to which we can’t give aid, and there was a discussion about whether debt rescheduling is a form of aid. There was no ammunition. Ambassador Jha: I thought we had none of that kind of relationship with North Vietnam. There was a trade ban on North Vietnam and China since the time of the Chinese attack; this was abolished last year. Dr. Kissinger: At any rate, it raised unshirted hell here. Let’s talk about the more long-term problems. Let’s see what we can do to normalize our relationship and then go from normalization to our traditional friendship. I will see Sisco next week, and we will see what we can do to let you feel there is a warming up of personal relations. On Maury, why don’t you let me know after he sees Patel whether this is the best time or whether we should wait until November? Ambassador Jha: Let’s let them talk. I won’t put anything into I.G.’s head about waiting until November. Then we can see. Dr. Kissinger: But between us, let’s plan tentatively on November. Just confirm it to me next week. We don’t want—either of us—to have it look like an election maneuver. On the grain deal, my recollection is that countries that trade with North Vietnam are ineligible for aid. And the question was, is debt rescheduling a form of aid? We frankly are taking the position that it is not. Ambassador Jha: I hope the Vietnam problem won’t be with us long. I mean I hope you settle it. Dr. Kissinger: What do your North Vietnamese friends tell you? Ambassador Jha: [Laughs] They don’t tell us anything! 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971–21 Dec 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. I. G. Patel was the Special Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance. 304. Telegram 3739 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 304. Telegram 3739 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 New York, October 6, 1972, 2300Z Memorandum of Conversation: FM Singh (INDIA) October 5, 1972; 11:30 a.m. Waldorf 35A; Part II of II Indian Allegations Regarding CIA Activities 1. Participants: India-Foreign Minister Singh; Ambassador Sen, UN; Ambassador Jha, US; US-The Secretary, Mr. Pedersen, Mr. Sisco, Mr. Bray, Mr. Schneider, Country Director (reporting officer). 2. Summary: Secretary indicated USG perplexed by Mrs. Gandhi’s allegations regarding CIA activities. Singh insisted India had its own reports proving improper CIA activities. Claimed these activities might not be known to US policy officials as it well known CIA was separate from administration and functioned in independent manner. Secretary said this clearly not true. USG had no desire interfere in Indian affairs and India thought it had evidence against CIA it should present it privately. The Secretary strongly criticized GOI for making statement in public and claiming it was up to CIA to disprove allegations. Said such false charges would have most harmful effect on US/India relations. 3. Secretary initiated discussion this subject saying he was perplexed at Prime Minister Gandhi’s public remarks regarding CIA activities in India. Initially Singh tried to side step issue in lighthearted manner saying Mrs. Gandhi paid compliment to CIA for its activities. Secretary replied this clearly not our understanding of her remark and Sisco set out details of allegations by Congress President and Chief Ministers which made clear to us Prime Minister’s meaning. 4. Singh then shifted tactics referring to previous discussions with Secretary of this subject. Said while perhaps it is not easy for either side to prove what taking place, it has not been difficult for GOI to come to know of CIA activities. GOI has its own sources and knows that CIA has been in contact with people in India in “abnormal ways”. Said GOI aware function of such intelligence organizations is to get information, and influence people. For example, GOI had information that proceedings of Congress working committee were known to US officials within two hours of meetings. Said when this happens it offends people. Singh concluded that it would be good if as result present controversy activities of Americans in India would become more cautious. 5. In reply Secretary said he couldn’t emphasize too much how harmful these false accusations are to US/India relations. Particularly disturbing was Prime Minister’s statement that India did not have to prove activities but that it was up to CIA to disprove them. This was offensive and contrary to our democratic traditions. Secretary took particular exception to India’s making charges in public saying President Nixon feels as strongly about this as he does. Said if India has suspicions it should raise them with USG privately first. Said we would examine them and if necessary take corrective action. 6. Singh continued that CIA is known to act in ways not in interest of established governments. India is not exception to this. While India does not have judicial proof—and prefers not to resort to use of tape recorders and other devices to produce such proof—it has no doubt about activities. Singh then said he was sure Secretary knew that CIA sometimes functioned in ways not known to policy level officials of administration and on occasion may be reluctant to send information regarding their activities to such officials. Claimed CIA was separate from administration, saying there was general understanding CIA acted on its own. 7. Secretary replied this is clearly not so. We know precisely what such organizations do. Furthermore, USG hasn’t slightest interest in interfering in India. Sisco emphasized that Ambassador Keating had known everything about CIA in india. He had been scrupulous in inquiring of GOI for specific allegations which he could look into. We had pursued this issue with GOI in 1970 and it has been unable to backup charges. We have been trying to get into dialogue with GOI but these allegations poison atmosphere. 8. Secretary then repeated that US hadn’t any interest whatsoever in creating difficulties within India. Inquired again why GOI had made public statements. Such statements gave us the impression India either deliberately trying to cause trouble or a little paranoiac. If India makes these unsubstantiated charges this will be harmful to our relations. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Also designated as Secto 70. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Dacca. The allegations made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to which Rogers referred were reported on October 3 in telegram 1577 from Calcutta. In a speech before Congress Party workers, Gandhi stated that she had information that the CIA had become active in India and she asked party workers to be vigilant and counteract its activities. (Ibid., POL INDIA–US) 305. Telegram 8436 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 305. Telegram 8436 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, October 12, 1972, 1229Z Subject: PL 480 Title I-Pak Request for 400,000 Tons Ref: (A) Islamabad 8317 (B) Islamabad 7484 1. In connection with our consideration of Pakistan’s urgent request for another 400,000 tons of wheat to see country through until next harvest, I believe issue merits your personal attention. Would like to recall to your attention the exceptional representations Pres Bhutto has made to me on this subject. These were noted in ref (B) which I hope you will reread. Bhutto’s urgent interest in obtaining assurance on additional 400,000 tons was reiterated to me today during course of telephone conversation with him on another subject. Governmental interest as measured by President’s personal concern has not been higher on any other single economic aid issue during my three years in Pakistan. It is clear that government sees this wheat as essential to internal stability and its domestic political strategy, and is strongly banking on U.S. Title I to finance it. Within framework of Pakistan’s politically determined price constraints, we are convinced that need exists. We hope positive response to Pak request will be forthcoming shortly despite current squeeze on US wheat stocks, of which we acutely aware. 2. Working closely with AID, I have tried to use this request for 400,000 tons to obtain a better focus by GOP on its agricultural policies. I consider the price adjustments recently announced as a useful first step, but only a first step. Within framework of a positive decision by the US on the 400,000 tons, I intend to discuss with Pres Bhutto important measures his govt should take to accelerate its agricultural production programs. I will tell him that even despite his urgent preoccupation with internal and external political problems, his govt ought to move faster to articulate and put into effect an agricultural strategy. The govt needs to assure adequate inputs, including fertilizer and pesticides; developing capacity throughout the govt for agricultural policy analysis; and pursue series of initiatives in areas of agricultural research, barani (rainfed) agriculture and water utilization at the farm level in the irrigated areas. I will tell him that our positive decision on 400,000 tons reflects a truly exceptional effort by USG to be helpful to Paktstan, at time when our wheat stocks have been very heavily committed elsewhere as he is aware; decision recognizes the signal importance which Bhutto attached to this request as voiced in his discussions with me; and, finally, i will say that our decision is taken with assumption that pakistan during coming year will put more money and more talent behind its own agricultural production programs. I will add that our AID mission stands ready to be helpful to GOP on such programs if our help is wanted. Wheeler and I plan to discuss this approach with MacDonald during his visit later this month. 3. I believe favorable decision on Pak request will improve atmosphere, beyond realm of agriculture, for our continuing discussions with Bhutto and GOP on variety of other issues, he has promised as much. 4. I would appreciate any word—even of interim nature—you could give me which I could pass to Bhutto within next ten days. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Pakistan made the case for additional PL–480 supplies in an aide-mémoire submitted to the U.S. Embassy on October 3. According to the aide-mémoire, the wheat harvest in Pakistan had suffered from drought and unless the requested supplies were provided by the United States, the Government would be confronted with sharp rises in politically sensitive wheat prices. (Telegram 8317 from Islamabad, October 6; ibid.) 306. Telegram 8648 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 306. Telegram 8648 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, October 23, 1972, 1053Z Sub: Pres. Bhutto Pleads Again for 400,000 Tons of PL–480 Wheat 1. Summary: Pres Bhutto has pleaded for positive response to pending GOP request for 400,000 tons of wheat under Title I. He cites variety of political steps he is taking to help get Pakistan on its feet. He considers the additional wheat from US as essential to meet country’s requirements in coming months and to support his other efforts to assure stability. He is aware of exceptional supply and budgetary squeeze on PL–480 wheat in US, but appeals for most sympathetic consideration. Action requested: That we do our very best to meet Pak request for 400,000 tons, and that positive decision be conveyed soonest. End summary. 2. Pres. Bhutto called me late Sunday night Oct 22 to express, once again, his sense of urgency in getting favorable reply on pending GOP request for additional 400,000 tons of wheat under Title I of PL 480. Following is summary of points he made (details on some issues will be reported septels): A. Constitutional agreement hammered out unanimously in past week among leaders of all parliamentary parties (under Bhutto’s leadership) is great step forward. By and large, it means Pakistan’s most critical and immediate domestic political problem has been settled. Problem of northwest frontier and Baluchistan provinces (which are governed by parties insisting on substantial autonomy) has been solved, assuring integrity of country. Now country can get on with other basic issues that need to be tackled. (I told Bhutto I fully shared his view that agreement on constitutional principles is tremendous step forward, and congratulated him on his statesmanship and political acuity in working it out.) B. He is going ahead with other political measures to help get country on its feet. He noted specifically “strong steps” taken in Karachi (where govt has moved vigorously in recent days to end illegal strike that shut down most of Landhi industrial area). C. He is also moving to clean out his own (Pakistan Peoples) party. He had just accepted resignation from cabinet of Meraj Mohammad Khan (formerly Central Minister of State for Public Affairs and reputed communist, who has been criticizing govt for not following sufficiently radical policy). Meraj, President added, is now going around accusing Bhutto of selling out to the Americans”. D. He was doing his best to resolve his problems with India. He was very disappointed at the latest delay in completing delineation of the Kashmir line of control, which had been expected this weekend. He had just written to PriMin Gandhi expressing dismay and a desire to see the delineation and force withdrawals completed as soon as possible. E. Pres. Nixon had promised Pakistan economic support. We had been generous and our help was greatly appreciated. Pakistan now badly needed extra support in the wheat it had requested. F. The additional wheat is essential to meet requirements in the coming months. without it, Bhutto’s other efforts to bring stability to the country would be undercut. 3. Bhutto referred to current visit to Islamabad of MacDonald (AID/Asia) and said he hoped MacDonald had brought some good news on the wheat request. I said MacDonald and I had discussed the issue the previous day with the Finance Minister and had been discussing it in some detail only a few hours earlier with the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. We had no doubt of Pakistan’s need for the wheat. Washington was aware of the extremely high importance that Bhutto attached to this request. There was every sympathy for Pakistan’s need. As I had told him before, I went on, the problem lay rather in the exceptional squeeze on our own wheat stocks as result of unforeseen purchases by the Soviet Union and other buyers, and related serious budgetary constraints. I said we had told the Finance Minister and the Planning Commission head that the final decision on Pakistan’s request had not yet been made but that it seemed most unlikely we could provide the full 400,000 tons under PL 480. It looked as though it would be necessary for Pakistan to go into the commerical market with its own funds to supplement what we might be able to supply under Title I. Bhutto responded that, as we knew, the GOP had already had to spend a large amount of foreign exchange to meet an unexpectedly large deficit in sugar. As he had previously told me, the govt had also taken action to conserve its limited exchange reserve in other ways like deferring payments (and delivery) on Mirage aircraft previously on order from France. 4. Bhutto then asked that I convey the urgency of this matter, and said he hoped USG would be considerate of difficult problems he is facing and of effort he is making. I reiterated that we were indeed aware of his problems and I was sure we would do as much as we could against the background of our own very serious supply and budgetary squeeze. I promised to get word back to him as soon as possible. 5. Comment: As I have reported before, no Pak economic request in recent years has been couched in such urgent terms as current appeal for additional 400,000 tons of wheat. We believe Pakistan has absolute requirement for this wheat to meet demand through govt fair-price outlets and thus avoid increase in price of this basic staple. I agree with Bhutto that Pakistan needs assurance of adequate wheat supply to backstop the political effort he is making to put country on its feet. Finally, a positive response to provide 400,000 tons will be understood by Bhutto as exceptional effort by highest levels of USG to help Pakistan. 6. Action requested: I recommend that we do our very best to meet Pak request for 400,000 tons wheat under Title I. I discussed with MacDonald, before he left Islamabad today, my last night’s conversation with Bhutto, and MacDonald concurs in above recommendation. My country team concurs. I hope positive decision can be conveyed soonest. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Sent with instructions to pass to Agriculture, AID, the Treasury, and the White House. 307. Memorandum of Conversation 307. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 27, 1972, noon–12:45 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Iftikhar Ali, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Sultan Khan, Ambassador of Pakistan Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff The Ambassador of Pakistan had requested appointments with Dr. Kissinger and General Haig on behalf of the visiting Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. In view of Dr. Kissinger’s heavy involvement with the situation in Southeast Asia, General Haig agreed to see the Foreign Secretary. One subject was disposed of in the anteroom with Mr. Saunders before General Haig was available. Ambassador Khan asked Mr. Saunders when an answer could be expected on President Bhutto’s request for 400,000 tons of wheat under PL–480. Mr. Saunders replied that an answer was imminent—within the next day or two. Mr. Saunders then went on to explain the intensive exercise that the NSC Staff and the Office of Management and Budget had gone through in connection with responding to Pakistan’s request and others like it. He explained that the US in this situation faces three main problems: (1) There is the overall problem of limitations on our own budget since the President is making a major effort to hold spending under control. (2) Then there is the question of physical availability since the US has been called on to make unexpectedly large sales to the Soviet Union. (3) Finally, there is the problem which is related to availability, of maintaining a large enough stock in the United States to keep grain prices within reason for the American consumer as well as for purchasers from abroad. Mr. Saunders commented that this last problem is very similar to the problem that the Government of Pakistan faces, which is the reason for the Pakistani request. At that point the group moved into General Haig’s office. Foreign Secretary Ali began the conversation by thanking the US and the President for past support. He said that the Pakistani Government “looks forward to what happens after November 7th.” General Haig said that we have made strong statements of support in the past and the President intends to live up to them. The President hopes that a decisive victory in the November 7 elections will provide a political base—most notably in the composition of the Congress—that will make a helpful Presidential decision easier. The primary question for the President is what is politically possible. The Foreign Secretary thanked General Haig for that comment and said that President Bhutto had asked him to mention the subject. The Foreign Secretary then went on to describe the state of Pakistan’s diplomatic maneuvers with Bangladesh, especially at the United Nations. He indicated that there is some possibility that Pakistan would “settle with Bangladesh out of court, so to speak.” He said it was his feeling that no one in New York is keen on a major debate in the General Assembly over the South Asian issue. In any case, debate seems likely to be put off until after discussion of the Middle East item at the end of November or in early December. The Foreign Secretary described some of the efforts now going on to attempt to encourage a settlement before that debate, and he noted Robert Jackson’s mission to Dacca and visit with Bhutto as well as the efforts of the Muslim group at the UN trying to win Bangladesh acceptance for a Pakistani package. So far this group has been rebuffed. The Foreign Secretary described the package which the Pakistanis have put together as follows: —Bangladesh, for its part, would remove its veto on repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war, except for those few cases against whom there is evidence which requires a war crimes trial. He spoke of the number of possible crimes as “one-hundred.” He said that the number had started out at 1500 but was now down as low as 100. —Pakistan would then send back the 30,000 odd Bengali soldiers who had been in the Pakistan army before the separation; the 10–12,000 Bengali civil servants and their families from Pakistan; and would lift the ban on the return of all Bengalis in Pakistan who wish to return to Bangladesh, some 300–400,000. —If the above exchange could take place, Pakistan and Bangladesh could negotiate the handling of the remaining 100 Pakistani prisoners of war. They could either be tried in Bangladesh or returned to Pakistan for trial. —Then it would be possible to move on to recognition and to other outstanding questions such as the division of debts and financial assets and liabilities. So far, Bangladesh had no great enthusiasm for this process. But intermediaries are trying to see how such a package might be worked out. The Foreign Secretary continued that he had been in authorized but unofficial contact with representatives of Bangladesh in New York. He said that they appeared to be desperate about getting into the UN and establishing contact with China. They do not want to be over-dependent on India and the USSR. They have the US in Dacca but obviously they do not want to neglect the Chinese. They seem to be looking with greater eagerness on any reasonable package. The Foreign Secretary said that, at the UN, no one seemed keen on another polemical match between the USSR and China. The Yugoslavs are backing down on the resolution that they had previously thought of pressing on the General Assembly. They apparently now see no virtue in a General Assembly Resolution recommending that the Security Council reconsider Bangladesh membership. The Chinese will continue to veto until the December 1971 resolutions are carried out. Therefore, even the Yugoslavs seem prepared to settle for a bland resolution expressing the hope that the provisions of the December resolutions will be carried out. The Bangladesh government does not seem to have the support for a strong resolution. In the meantime, there is hope that there may be a breakthrough in the Bangladesh-Pakistan negotiations. General Haig replied that it is encouraging that there is constructive thinking and diplomatic activity. He said he was not surprised that Bangladesh would be concerned about total dependence on India and the USSR. Ambassador Khan said it was “inevitable that they should talk with us.” There are many issues such as the common financial problems and the desire to re-establish reciprocal markets that need to be discussed. General Haig said it was not surprising that, following a change in relationship of this importance, that the implications of the change would take time to sink in. The Foreign Secretary, turning to relations with India, described how the implementation of the agreement with India had been delayed. Having agreed on a line of control and having agreed that maps would be exchanged on October 21 and that troops would be withdrawn within ten days thereafter, the Indians are now insisting that there be demarcation of the new line on the ground. The result has been to delay withdrawal of troops. The Chinese had asked him at the UN why the Indians are delaying in this way. He felt there were a couple of explanations. He felt that, first, if there was a Pakistani breakthrough with Bangladesh, India would then set forward further conditions of its own in order to delay further. The Indians would require that Pakistan first recognize Bangladesh. The reason he felt they were requiring demarcation of the line of control on the ground is that they would later require Pakistan to recognize it as the international border. That is why they are being so careful now. General Haig noted that perhaps the Indians also have some interest in keeping the external issue alive at the time when the Indian government is facing domestic dissatisfactions. The Foreign Secretary agreed and said that, in contrast, there had been a significant breakthrough on domestic issues in Pakistan. General Haig began to wind up the conversation by, first, apologizing that the White House was so heavily preoccupied with Southeast Asia at the particular time of the Foreign Secretary’s visit. General Haig then asked the Foreign Secretary to take President Nixon’s best wishes to President Bhutto. The President recalled the promises made to President Bhutto when he was in Washington. General Haig said he is confident that there is no equivocation on those promises. There is very strong admiration in Washington for the statesmanlike way Pakistan has proceded—with great care and caution but not out of weakness. He felt that it was extremely important that Pakistan not act out of weakness. In the long run a firm position executed with patience would bring the kind of results that every one wants. Ambassador Khan said that, conversely, Pakistan wishes President Nixon success in bringing the war in Southeast Asia to a close. He felt that Dr. Kissinger’s briefing of the press the previous day had been very hopeful. Pakistan very much hopes that the US will achieve the objectives that it has set out for itself. General Haig replied that we are confident that those objectives can be achieved if the same good will that has existed since October 8 persists. However, as agreement comes closer, the little things begin to appear more important. However, we remain optimistic. Ambassador Khan asked whether an agreement seemed likely before election. General Haig said that this is probably not likely, but the President has made very clear that no arbitrary deadlines are to be set. When the agreement is right, there will be no delay in signing it. The President felt that the worst thing that could happen is for us to be driven by artificial deadlines. He felt that nothing would be worse than being saddled with an agreement that was imperfect. Even North Vietnam did not have an interest in that. The meeting concluded at that point. During a lunch hosted by Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, the Foreign Secretary elaborated on some of the above points to the following extent: —He seemed to indicate that the package he had outlined earlier was subject to negotiations and that recognition could be placed in the scenario earlier than he had indicated. This was subject to discussion. —There is no substantial political pressure yet in Pakistan for return of the POWs. The families of the prisoners are accustomed to having their men away for a whole year at a time, and their incarceration in India has not been an unusual circumstance for those families. There have only been one or two demonstrations and the Foreign Secretary acknowledged that “frankly, the government has stimulated them.” —The most pressing issue politically in Pakistan is the withdrawal of the Indian troops because that would permit the return of 1.5 million Pakistanis to their homes. Unless they go back in the next few weeks, they will have missed the winter planting season. —Recognition of Bangladesh is a potentially sensitive issue in Pakistan, but if the context is right, it is manageable. —In his long discussions with the mainland Chinese, he had not heard the Chinese indicate that their opposition to Bangladesh admission to the UN related in any way to their concern about Taiwan. They were taking a stand that they felt would cause Bangladesh to recognize that China is a factor that Bangladesh must reckon with. China has political assets in Bangladesh which it can influence—not Bashani, whom the Chinese think is a “fool” but Maoists and other political elements who are responsive to China. While the Chinese are very much concerned about the faithful implementation of the UN resolutions and will press this matter of principle, they are also interested in establishing themselves as a political force that Bangladesh must take into account. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. The memorandum bears Saunders’ typed signature. The meeting was held in Haig’s office in the White House. 308. Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (Schneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 308. Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (Schneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, October 30, 1972 SUBJ: Recent GOI Actions Affecting US Activities in India You asked for a check-list of recent GOI actions curtailing American programs in India. Specific actions taken by the GOI since December 1971 follow: —Drastically reduced AID personnel in India. —Effectively ended use of trust fund rupees to support AID local administrative costs. —Stopped making use of US AID participant training programs in the US. —Refused to approve an Exim loan to an Indian company. —Stopped making use of US military training programs offered for Indian military personnel in US installations. —Ended providing US-financed participant training in India for Nepalis. —Outspokenly attacked the US for CIA interference in India. —Approved no new US-owned rupee-funded joint US-Indian scientific research projects. —Refused to approve rupee-funded international visitor program (IVP) invitations to Indians to visit the US. —Issued no visas for individual scholars or professors to visit India under cultural exchange programs. —Cancelled MAC agreement and refused to clear additional MAC cargo and passenger flights to India. —Forced removal of defense attache and ODRI aircrafts. —Refused to invite COMIDEASTFOR to pay farewell visit to India. —Applied new rule requiring non-nuclear declaration prior to approval of ship visits; this makes US Naval visits to India impossible. In addition, the GOI has pressed demands for payment of Indian income tax on behalf of American International School teachers, the US director of USEFI, and American director of Wheat Associates; thereby jeopardizing the future of these institutions in India. There are indications that the GOI intends to curtail the Library of Congress book-purchasing program in India. We have learned indirectly that the GOI is also restricting US voluntary agency rupee-financed programs in India. No new Peace Corps groups have been approved since December 1971; the last volunteer would leave by December 1973. The GOI might place a limit (say 50 PCVs) on all national volunteer programs in India. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/INC by Donald W. Born. Sent through Armin H. Meyer, who was assigned to NEA as a special consultant after returning to the Department following 3 years as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. He had previously been Ambassador to Lebanon and Iran. 309. Telegram 13259 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 309. Telegram 13259 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, November 3, 1972, 1335Z SUBJ: CIA Charges Continue Ref: New Delhi 12541 1. Summary: Press attention to CIA allegations abated somewhat, but topic now self-sustaining, with only infrequent assist from Prime Minister and Congress President. Momentum fed by communist and other newsmen who dredge up old CIA stories, by fresh local disturbances for which CIA convenient scapegoat, by opposition parties’ denials, and by concurrent allegations elsewhere. Radio Moscow pushing allegations and pro-Moscow communists urging action against CIA. First anti-CIA demonstrators appeared at Embassy nov 2. Public debate, particularly opposition demands GOI act or drop charges, probably will increase with convening of Parliament November 13. End summary. 2. Mrs. Gandhi and Sharma: Only reported comment by Mrs. Gandhi since October 14 (reftel) was when she told questioner in Darjeeling October 26 “neither Congress President nor I or anybody have said CIA was responsible directly for certain situation. But foreign intelligence working could aggravate things beyond our control. Today we are in very vulnerable position.... It is for this reason that we cannot afford to be complacent and have to be vigilant ... when unseen forces are active. Congress President Sharma reportedly told Congress workers in Jaipur October 29 CIA doing best to disrupt socio-economic life of country, and in Bhopal October 20 CIA colluding with opposition parties to “create chaos and frustrate our efforts to banish poverty”. 3. Press stimulation of interest: In addition to keeping issue alive by asking questions of political leaders, press has drawn on own files, published Western accounts of CIA operations, and communist concoctions. Bulk has appeared in leftish periodicals such as CIP New Age, which ran who’s who of CIA at US Mission in New Delhi, and leftist blitz and link, which have devoted much of recent issues to articles on CIA. But responsible press, which editorially resistant to raw charges of CIA involvement, recently has reflected more sophisticated approach. Prestigious Times of India ran two part feature on “shadowy world of espionage” and Sunday magazine item “dollars for scholars”, for example. Many articles detail allegations of involvement in India of organizations such as Asia foundation, thereby creating impression of proven history of CIA activity, several allege that during Sino-Indian crisis Indian intelligence grew close to CIA and even received technical assistance. 4. Fresh local disturbances: Punjab Chief Minister reportedly told press October 18 he had “definite” information CIA behind recent violence in state and implied it supporting either Sikh Akali Dal or Naxalites, which he held directly responsible. Blitz charged CIA involvement in disturbances at Prime Minister’s Darjeeling meeting. Minister Nandini Satpathy alleged October 14 CIA active in Orissa in collusion with Swatantra and Jana Sangh parties, and Kashmir Chief Minister October 20 renewed allegation of CIA activity there. 5. Opposition reaction: Opposition of right (Jana Sangh, Congress, Swantantra) and left (socialists, CPM) does not deny CIA active in India but demands GOI in order to prove allegations not simply to divert attention from growing socio-economic problems, conduct public investigation and drive out CIA. Congress says unanimity of opposition views on this subject is proof grant alliance exists, and leftists add that opposition denials result from guilt complex. 6. Political sceptics: Some continue debunk charges and Swatantra leader Piloo Mody is reportedly wearing medallion stating “I am a CIA agent”, Bihar Chief Minister told Embassy and ConGen visitors October 27 he had absolutely no evidence of CIA activities, and press reported Mysore Chief Minister saying no CIA activity noticed in his state. This also private reaction of many Indians with whom Embassy normally deals. Even so, intelligentsia less likely to laugh off allegations now that Mrs. Gandhi personally involved and press commentary more sophisticated. 7. Bangladesh revelations: Charges by Awami League Secretary concerning CIA involvement in Bangladesh reinforced campaign in India, as did release of book in US with report of CIA theft of Sputnik and stories by American newsmen in Delhi acknowledging CIA in India but targeted elsewhere. 8. Soviet attitude: pro-Moscow CPI, in addition to featuring CIA in own publications, calls for expulsion of known agents. Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress give heavy play to allegations and to own concoctions re CIA missionary activity, support for right-wing organizations and stimulation of separatist movements. 9. Demonstration: first anti-CIA demonstration, sponsored by Delhi Youth Congress, occurred at Embassy November 2. About 70 students took part. 10. Comment: When Parliament convenes November 13 opposition will have forum for face-to-face debate with GOI about allegations. This debate, which CPI could enter to urge actions, will increase pressure on GOI to put up or shut up. Given (a) Mrs. Gandhi’s apparent belief in truth of charges; (b) GOI policy resentments and psychological hangups from top down; (c) zeal of GOI intelligence operations in documenting US activities; and (d) Soviet disinformation effort GOI may tempted provide more specific allegations and even expel some Americans. Stone 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USIS message. Repeated to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Moscow, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. 310. Telegram 201141 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 310. Telegram 201141 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, November 4, 1972, 0022Z Subj: Indian Debt Rescheduling 1. USG has decided to participate for one year rpt one year in World Bank proposal for debt relief for India with US share of $29.12 million. 2. We have informed World Bank of this decision as part of our continuing technical discussions with bank. Bank is informing Indians and other AID-India Consortium members. 3. Pending further guidance Embassy should avoid any interpretive comment regarding this decision in discussions with Indian officials. Embassy should not rpt not issue press statement and should restrict response to possible press queries to simple confirmation that decision made. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 9 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted on November 3 by Schneider; cleared in the Office of International Finance and Development of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs by John Gervers, and in the Office of Planning and Development of AID’s Bureau for Asia by Alfred D. White; and approved by Meyer. 311. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 311. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 8, 1972 SUBJECT: Pakistan’s Apparent Recognition of Hanoi You should be aware of reports this morning that indicate that President Bhutto has approved the following steps: —According to the Korean Consul in Islamabad, Pakistan intends to announce diplomatic recognition of North Korea on November 9 and at the same time intends to announce recognition of North Vietnam and of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia. Our Charge has been called in to see the acting Foreign Secretary today, despite the fact that today is a high Islamic religious holiday. —Pakistani withdrawal from SEATO was announced this morning. —We also have a report that the decision on SEATO was made at a cabinet meeting where President Bhutto was reportedly “extremely angry” at the US response to his PL–480 request. You will recall that he had asked for 400,000 tons of wheat over and above 600,000 tons for which agreements have already been signed. Following a careful review of our availabilities in the wake of the Soviet purchases, we promised 250,000 tons for the time being with another look at the situation in March. As you recall, we have in past conversations with the Pakistanis urged them to hold off the recognition of Hanoi. In response to those approaches, Bhutto graciously said that he did not want to complicate the President’s life before his election and would “defer action” until after the election not only on establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam but also on recognizing the Sihanouk government and North Korea. The Pakistani step does not take into account the delicate stage of the Vietnam negotiations. Also, the recognition of the Sihanouk government works at cross purposes with our support for the Lon Nol government. The only operational question today is whether we should put on the record our disappointment that these steps have been taken at this delicate stage in Vietnam negotiations. We have made substantial efforts to help Bhutto as far as possible, and we might have expected him to take into account our timing problems. We can expect him in the near future to present a sizable shopping list for military equipment, but we cannot deal with that issue now. The only point that need be addressed now is whether or not we want him to understand that he has taken a step which is not consistent with US interests. Recommendation: That you call Ambassador Sultan Khan and express your personal disappointment and have State put our Charge in Islamabad in a position to do the same. Approve Have State do it Remain silent 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. Hoskinson initialed for Saunders. Telegram 9038 from Islamabad, November 8, reported that Pakistan had recognized North Korea and North Vietnam and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. (Ibid.) Kissinger checked the approval line. A handwritten notation in the margin next to the approval line, in Richard Kennedy’s hand, reads: “Kennedy to call in Amb Khan per telcon with HAK 11/9/72.” 312. Memorandum of Conversation 312. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 9, 1972, 4:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Sultan Khan, Ambassador of Pakistan Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff After initial pleasantries, Mr. Kennedy indicated that we had received confirmation from our Charge in Islamabad of Pakistan’s recognition of North Korea and North Vietnam. We had also heard that consideration is being given to the recognition of the Sihanouk “government.” Mr. Kennedy noted that these steps were cause for some concern to the US at this juncture. He said that Dr. Kissinger wanted to be sure the Ambassador understands our problems. We understand Pakistan’s problems and fully respect Pakistan’s right to make decisions in its own interests. As these decisions are made, however, we would hope that we might see things together and work things out together. In particular, Mr. Kennedy continued, these steps by the Government of Pakistan come for US at a difficult time—a time when the negotiations in Southeast Asia are at a sensitive stage and a time when we are bending all our energies to ending a conflict that has gone on too long. In short, these steps come at a particularly difficult time for the US. Mr. Kennedy went on, noting that, as the Ambassador is aware, the Administration has been working very hard to be as helpful as possible to Pakistan—in economic assistance and in the arms matters which Dr. Kissinger had discussed with him. On this latter issue we are trying to work out ways of being helpful. We are concerned that steps of the kind taken in the last two days will make it that much more difficult to do the things we want to do. It is clearly difficult in the very complex matter of arms supply to get even the acquiescence if not the support of the Congress for the things the President wants to do. In summary, Mr. Kennedy concluded, we would hope that the government of Pakistan could take these thoughts into consideration should there be any further deliberations on these subjects—for instance, the possible recognition of the Sihanouk government. We realize that the recognition of North Vietnam and North Korea are settled issues. If other actions such as the recognition of the Sihanouk government have not been taken, we hope that our concerns may be taken into account. Ambassador Khan said that he would transmit these thoughts to Islamabad. He expressed hope, however, that there was no misunderstanding in the White House about the recognitions. These actions were to have been taken last spring, but President Bhutto delayed a decision during the American election campaign so as not to embarrass the President. It was simply not possible to delay further beyond the election. Mr. Kennedy indicated that we realized that this, was background to the current decision. Ambassador Khan said that he was not aware of any further communication from the US Government on the need to delay beyond the election. He asked that Mr. Kennedy convey this general background and this particular point to Dr. Kissinger and the President. The Ambassador further explained the difficulty Pakistan faces. India already has embassies in these places. Pakistan has relations with the other countries of Asia which flow from their relationship with China, and it has been difficult to delay these recognitions as long as Pakistan has. The Ambassador promised to convey our views on the question of Pakistan’s recognition of the Sihanouk government. The Ambassador said he hoped that the US views on these steps would not be related to Pakistan’s very real requirements for military supply. Mr. Kennedy interjected that he had not been suggesting that the Administration was making a direct linkage between the two steps. He wanted to make very clear that he had been saying that reaction in the US would make it more difficult to take the steps that the President would like to take. This is a difficult problem in the Congress. Ambassador Khan said that the difficulty of the problem depends on which way the Congress chooses to look. India has relationships with both of these countries. He admitted that he could see a “political twist” to the problem to Pakistan’s disadvantage if someone wished to make it. He felt that this event alone would not govern Congressional action but he recognized that it might provide an excuse. He felt that with or without these steps, the Congress was generally opposed to military assistance for Pakistan. Mr. Kennedy reiterated that steps like this might make it more difficult for the President to cope with those Congressional problems. The Ambassador said he simply hoped that it would not be an insurmountable problem. Turning to humor, he noted that there had been an article in the Washington Post this morning by Lewis Simmonds noting that Pakistanis had been “praying for President Nixon’s election victory.” He noted that, since the Democrats still control the Congress, Pakistan’s “goose would be cooked in any case.” Mr. Kennedy indicated that the President and Dr. Kissinger are aware of and appreciate Pakistani support for the President. The Ambassador, repeating, asked that Mr. Kennedy please convey to the President and Dr. Kissinger that this is an old decision, that it has been held for some months until November. He pointed out that President Bhutto faces a strong leftist lobby that has pressed for the evolution of Pakistan’s relationships with these countries. The Ambassador also surmised that perhaps the acceleration of US negotiations with North Vietnam has had its effect in Islamabad. Pakistan’s experience in relations with East Germany had been an example they did not want to repeat. Since Pakistan did not develop a relationship with East Germany while it was “out in the cold.” the East Germans are not very interested in relations now that they have normalized relations with West Germany. Pakistan perhaps did not want to face that situation in Hanoi. That is why he had said that the rapid progress in US-North Vietnamese negotiations may have been a factor in Pakistan’s moving as quickly as it had after the election. In response to a question from Mr. Saunders, the Ambassador described briefly the present negotiating situation between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir line of control. He said that the Indians are clearly stalling. Each time agreement appears to have been reached, Indian negotiators open a new subject. What is holding up the agreement now is that Pakistan has stood on a matter of principle. The principle applied throughout negotiations has been that the line of control will be drawn for the most part according to the actual line of physical control. Now in the final sector under negotation, the Indians are trying to persuade the Pakistanis to give up an area which they control. The Pakistanis fear that if they give on this issue in that circumstance, the Indians will have a reason to reopen the whole negotiation. Returning to the issue addressed by Mr. Kennedy, the Ambassador said that he had speculated on reasons why he had been asked to come into the White House.. He thought that it might be the subject which Mr. Kennedy had broached. On the other hand, he hoped that perhaps Mr. Kissinger had moved with great rapidity and was prepared to provide an answer on the question of the blocked military supplies in New York. He noted that Dr. Kissinger promised him an answer in the month of November and hoped that perhaps this meeting was for the purpose of conveying that answer. The Ambassador said that Pakistan would be the last to want to create difficulties for the United States. He hoped that Dr. Kissinger and the President understood this. Mr. Kennedy said that we are confident that the Government of Pakistan has not taken a step, calculated to cause the US inconvenience We did, however, want to note that the step does come at a time when it is particularly difficult for us. Harold H. Saunders 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. 313. Telegram 207769 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 313. Telegram 207769 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India 1 Washington, November 15, 1972, 1609Z Subject: Call on Deputy Secretary by Indian Foreign Secretary-Designate 1. Summary: During November 13 call, Indian Foreign Secretary-designate Kewal Singh and Indian Ambassador Jha had general exchange of views on problems of Indo-US relations and recent South Asia developments with Deputy Secretary Irwin. Both Kewal Singh and Deputy Secretary expressed hope for improved Indo-US relations. End summary. 2. Indian Foreign Secretary-designate Kewal Singh, accompanied by Indian Amb. Jha, called on Deputy Secretary Irwin November 13. Kewal Singh, who currently GOI Ambassador to Bonn, has been visiting UN for about one week and spent day in Washington. 3. Kewal Singh said he was looking forward to taking over new position in December and would “work earnestly” for better Indo-American relations. Deputy Secretary commented that US too wanted better relations with India. He noted there existed similarity in long range interests and aims of both countries. For example, both wished political stability in South Asia—a central factor being India’s attitude and actions toward its South Asian neighbors—peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia, and general reduction of level of tensions in the world. 4. Deputy Secretary stated that President Nixon’s initiative vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking and also Japanese initiative toward Peking were useful steps for peace. They introduced new element of flexibility into international relations, and made possible greater mutual understanding. Regarding possible Indian concerns about improved Sino-US relations, Deputy Secretary said that our efforts in no way directed against India nor did we have any desire to play China off against the USSR. 5. Amb. Jha asked what specifically seemed to bother us most with respect to India. Putting aside differing policies with regard to Bangladesh crisis and related issues, Deputy Secretary said that there appeared exist suspicion of US by India that went beyond normal disagreement over policy questions. US also thought that India made effort to go beyond “normal” lengths in criticizing US actions in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Similarly, we were disturbed by way India handled certain Indo-US bilateral issues, such as false allegations about CIA, question of exchange programs and related cultural matters. We don’t understand why Indians do such things as making false charges about CIA. 6. In turn, Amb. Jha agreed that there in fact no real conflict of interests between US and India. Difficulties often appeared more in terms of atmospherics and way problems handled by two sides. For various reasons, mutual lack of confidence had developed which contributed to “present vicious spiral.” From Indian standpoint, Jha said, there had been one persistent problem, namely US arms assistance to Pakistan. While Indians understand US rationale, such aid nonetheless added to security threat as perceived by India. 7. Kewal Singh commented that with regard to future, he had not slightest doubt that India wanted good neighborly relations with all countries of South Asia. India wanted to live in peace with Pakistan and earnestly hoped it could solve Indo-Pak problems in spirit of Simla accords. It also hoped Pakistan and Bangladesh could start dialogue after recognition. He was very optimistic that India could work with neighbors. 8. Deputy Secretary said we also regarded the simla agreements as significant step forward and were hopeful that India could establish harmonious relations with its neighbors. Return of the POW’s would be helpful in this regard, as well as resolution of question of war crimes trials. US was especially sensitive to POW question, because of Hanoi’s using our POW’s for political purposes. Deputy Secretary added that it unfortunate that both Bangladesh and Pakistan seemed to be taking “set positions” with respect to mutual problems which made it harder to resolve present difficulties. He said anything India could do to assist two sides to a solution would be very helpful. 9. Kewal Singh emphasized that India earnestly desired the Simla agreements be implemented fully and regretted delays which had occurred so far. With regard to Indo-US relations, he concluded that there no reason why not only “normal but friendly” relations could not be restored. In this respect, Singh expressed hope that long postponed US-Indo bilateral talks might be rescheduled, in which case he would be pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary to New Delhi. 10. Comment: Half-hour discussion provided useful opportunity for general exchange of views. Kewal Singh seemed intent on underscoring positive and stressing hope for improvement in Indo-US relations. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kux on November 13, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, USUN, Bonn, Kathmandu, and Colombo. 314. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon 314. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon 1 New Delhi, November 28, 1972 Dear Mr. President, I am touched by your message of November 19. I share your conviction that we now have the best opportunity of building a new structure of lasting peace. The vision itself is inspiring. Its translation into reality would indeed contribute a glorious chapter to the tortured history of mankind. Everywhere, people yearn to be released from the anxieties of poverty and war. If our actions are guided by this consciousness, we can bring peace within our reach. Friendship between our two countries, based on an understanding of each other’s experience and aspirations, will make a distinct contribution towards the larger vision of a generation of peace. It is gracious of Mrs. Nixon and you to send me your greetings on my birthday. I deeply appreciate this friendly gesture. With warm regards, Yours sincerely, (Indira Gandhi) 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Gandhi sent Nixon a message of congratulations following his reelection. Nixon responded on November 19 with a letter to Gandhi in which he looked toward improved relations between the U.S. and India: “I hope our two countries can develop a sounder relationship based on understanding and respect for mutual interests.” (Ibid., Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, India (1972)) Gandhi’s letter of November 28 was delivered to the White House by the Indian Embassy on December 5. The text was transmitted to New Delhi on December 6 in telegram 220565. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US) 315. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 315. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 29, 1972 SUBJECT: The Current State of US-Pakistani Relations Just to keep you abreast of the current state of play in our present relationship with Pakistan, the following are the main issues: 1. Arms Supply . While we have not yet received any major specific post-election requests from the Pakistanis, we can expect almost any time to receive a list of the major items of equipment that they would like to procure from us. Sultan Khan has already reminded us once of his expectation that there will be a response in November to his earlier requests for release of the “blocked” equipment in New York. The President’s decisions before election, as I understood them, were that he wanted to do something but that he recognized the need to look at the whole problem in connection with the aid bill (and, presumably, our relationship with India). You know better than I exactly where this stands, and the following is simply to recall the two elements of the problem: —You will recall that, during the fall, we proposed a “clean-up exercise” if the President wanted to take a helpful step soon. The rationale in explaining this to the Congress would be to clean up hardship cases that resulted from the embargo imposed during the war last year. Under this, we would release the Pakistani items that were held up at the docks in New York. We would also release some items whose suspension imposed particular hardship on American manufacturers. Some of those would go to India, but the argument is that a couple of the American companies involved are literally on the brink of bankruptcy. As a possible supplement to this option, there are two major items of about the same size for India and Pakistan—the $13 million in armed personnel carriers under the one-time exception of two years ago and completion of a radar network begun in India in the mid-1960s (about $13 million). State recommended against including these because of the obvious combat role of the APCs. It was decided during the fall not to go ahead with this step before the election and not to go ahead with it as long as the aid bill was still in question. The latter point was relevant because the Administration was trying to delete from the aid bill a prohibition against all military assistance to the sub-continent. —Beyond the smaller cases, we will have to deal with the question of normal military supply over the longer term. Ideally, this should be worked out in phase with our evolving relationship with India. President Bhutto is pessimistic about our ability to provide all he wants on this score, but nevertheless we can expect him to ask us what the limits will be. We will owe him a straight answer at some point, although the fact that the aid bill is still pending in Congress complicates our decision-making. 2. Food Assistance . Early in the fall, Bhutto asked us for 400,000 tons of grain over and above the 600,000 tons for which agreement had already been signed. This request came at a time when we were reviewing our tight grain supply and budgetary situation in the wake of the large Soviet purchases. Following detailed review, the Pakistanis were told that we would provide 250,000 tons now and would review the situation next March. To achieve even that level, we had to give Pakistan 50,000 tons earlier programmed for Korea. The problem in Pakistan was not one of food shortages but of rising prices. We felt that this amount would keep the Pakistani pipeline full through early next spring at which time we could see how our supply situation looks then. Given the tightness in our program, we felt that the 250,000 was all we could muster now. This was 50,000 higher than AID and State recommended. We had one CIA report that Bhutto expressed “anger” over this US response in his Cabinet. 3. Recognition of North Vietnam, North Korea and Sihanouk Government . You will recall that, while you were in Florida after the election, you asked Dick Kennedy to call in Ambassador Khan to express our concern over Pakistan’s move to recognize North Vietnam, North Korea and the Sihanouk government. The response of the government of Pakistan was that recognition of the first two was an accomplished fact but that, while the decision to recognize the Sihanouk government was firm, the timing of that step would be delayed. The points Kennedy made at your request were that these moves came at a particularly sensitive time in our Southeast Asia negotiations and that we hoped our interests would be taken into account. 4. Bangladesh UN Debate . Today the UN General Assembly debate over Bangladesh UN membership is in suspense for twenty-four hours while the Bangladesh observer group in New York seeks instructions from Dacca. It looks as if the debate will come out in a way satisfactory to us and in a way that both the Chinese and Pakistanis seem willing to accept. The current approach is to have a consensus statement by the UNGA President rather than a vote on two resolutions, which would (1) enccourage the Security Council to consider favorably Bangladesh admission to the United Nations and (2) call for the fair settlement of outstanding issues and the return of POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention and last December’s Security Council resolution. While this is not perhaps the ideal solution from the Pakistani point of view, they have gone along with it as have the Chinese. In Pakistan, Bhutto has again begun trying to create support for recognition of Bangladesh in his public speeches. 5. South Asian Settlement . Except for Bhutto’s recent statements and some discussions between Pakistani and Bangladesh representatives in New York, there seems to be little significantly new on the settlement scene. The one thing that has happened recently is that the Paks have offered to release their POWs (a few hundred), and the Indians have said they will release the Paks captured on the Western front. There has also been an exchange of civilians. This leaves, of course, still some 30,000 Paks captured in the “East” in India’s hands. Moreover, final agreement on delineation of the “line of control” in Kashmir is being held up, probably for political reasons on one side or the other. Ambassador Khan will tell you that the Indians are delaying agreement, and Ambassador Jha will tell you the reverse. It is difficult to know from this vantage point where the truth lies, but it would not be surprising if the Indians were delaying withdrawal to put additional pressure on Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh. As background, you should be aware of one new note in the tone of President Bhutto’s recent comments about the US. In a Washington Post interview with Lewis Simons a couple of weeks ago and then again in a speech at Peshawar in the last few days, President Bhutto has taken the line that “the US owes Pakistan something.” In the Post interview, he pointed to the aid that has been provided to Bangladesh since independence and questioned why we had not provided such aid when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan. The answer to that is that AID pressed for five years to provide additional aid to East Pakistan, but the central government in Islamabad allocated the resources differently. But the point is not that fact but rather that Bhutto took an accusatory tone. The other day in Peshawar he also accused us of providing excessive help to India and made the point that “the US owes something to Pakistan” because of Pakistan’s help in achieving the breakthrough to China. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger highlighted the first of the paragraphs dealing with arms supply and underlined the first three sentences of the paragraph. 316. Memorandum of Conversation 316. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 29, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: Sultan M. Khan, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff The Ambassador: There are some things that have been coming up from time to time, accumulating, and I thought I would come and talk to you about them. Dr. Kissinger: Certainly. The Ambassador: In your absence, I received a message from Mr. Kennedy concerning our plan to recognize North Vietnam, North Korea and the Sihanouk Government. We have no intention to embarrass the U.S. Government. We had told you about this a long time ago and it was suggested to us that we should wait a bit, until after your election. We felt that we had indicated our desire and had waited for a better time and, therefore, we feel there has been no breach of faith. The recognition of the Sihanouk Government, however, has been delayed for the time being. If you have any preference about this let us know. Dr. Kissinger: We would actually prefer that nothing happen until the agreement is reached. The Ambassador: When would this be? Dr. Kissinger: I am confident it will be done within a month. The Ambassador: Oh, I see. That is not long. Would it cover the whole of Indochina? Dr. Kissinger: In various ways. The Ambassador: Then we can wait. There is a series of things you have done and assurances you have given: there was the President’s February speech to the Congress and the visit of the Secretary General of our party and my various talks with you. We are very grateful for your many assurances that you are committed to the future security and well-being of Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely. Let me talk to you about our military support Frankly, the easiest way for us to release your supplies is to do it in con-junction with releasing some blocked items for India too. This may include some radars, I understand. The Ambassador: Yes, though I don’t know whether the radars would be on the Chinese border or facing Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger: We know they are on the Chinese border. Now we are not hostile to China either, thanks to you. As soon as we get our new people in place we will release this, certainly the equipment which you sent here for repairs. The Ambassador: There are three types of items. One, the equipment that was literally lying on the docks when the embargo was imposed. Second, equipment sent here for repair and overhaul. And third, the one-time exception. We hope certainly that the material lying on the docks and sent here for repair can be released. Dr. Kissinger: We will do it certainly. They really belong to you. I wild give you an answer within a week. The Ambassador: The other thing is your promise of economic aid. I have found everyone’s attitude here cooperative and helpful, but the procedures being followed seem to be the normal procedures you would follow for any country. We anticipated as early as March that there would be a short-fall in wheat. Everyone here spent months studying it. In August and September we reached an agreement for 600,000 tons. But then we were told that the supply had run out and that only 400, 000 tons were available. Only 250,000 tons were sent. Now it is acknowledged that our estimate of a short-fall was correct. We are now running short by 100,000 tons. I have talked with State and A.I.D. about this. Dr. Kissinger: What do they tell you? The Ambassador: They say that money is the main problem. Dr. Kissinger: I will look into it. You know we will do what we can. I am told that we have given you 50,000 tons more than was agreed. The argument our bureaucracy makes is that the 250,000 tons is 50,000 tons more than we had, and we had to take it away from somewhere else. The Ambassador: Our information is that your stocks are not in short supply except in a technical sense. What goes into PL 480 has to be declared surplus stocks, and since the Russian deal there has been little surplus. Dr. Kissinger: I will have to check. The Ambassador: We have a Civil Aviation delegation here for talks. What they want is this. When we lost the eastern wing, our airline had to spread out in other directions. We are now operating to Japan, to Canton and Shanghai. What we want to do is extend from Japan to Honolulu or even to San Francisco. We would hope for either an open route (with daily flights) or a restricted route, with three flights a week. Your Civil Aviation people replied that our airline is doing well in terms of dollar earnings, and, therefore, has no need for new routes. This is true for now, but like any other airline we have to look ahead. Certainly it is a lucrative market. Your people have no other objection except that they look at our dollar earnings. We are prepared to give a designated U.S. airline, if necessary, a route to Islamabad, which you do not now have. And if China some day opens up to you you can use Islamabad as a stop on a route to China. Your people see no need to give us something now for this and they fear we will ask for something else later when this prospect opens up. We are pre-pared to give assurances now that we will not ask for anything else later. Dr. Kissinger: I will look into this. The Ambassador: Our delegation is meeting today and tomorrow. Dr. Kissinger: [To Mr. Rodman] Get this to Flanigan right away and ask him for some sympathetic consideration. The Ambassador: Do you have anything on a new Ambassador to Pakistan? Dr. Kissinger: We want someone we can trust. This is what is taking so long, but I can assure you we will do it within four weeks. The Ambassador: I saw a press item here attributed to White House sources saying that the U.S. Government was making an invitation to President Bhutto to come to Washington. Dr. Kissinger: That is nonsense. Everybody is a White House source these days. Would President Bhutto welcome an invitation? The Ambassador: He might. He has visited Moscow and Peking this year. Dr. Kissinger: I will look into it with the President. I will see. The Ambassador: Is there anything in the way of special messages being exchanged now between the U.S. and India? There are stories about this. The press say that Billy Graham was carrying a special message from the President to Mrs. Gandhi. Dr. Kissinger: That is nonsense. The Ambassador: I want to leave with you a copy of President Bhutto’s message to President Nixon congratulating him on his reelection [Tab A]. Note the warmth and friendship in it. Dr. Kissinger: You know we appreciate this. The Ambassador: Let me finish. Here is President Nixon’s reply. It probably came from the State Department [Tab B]. Compare it. Dr. Kissinger: I will be honest with you because you are a friend. These things are done by our bureaucracy which happens to be pro-Indian. President Nixon will write a letter to Bhutto within a week referring to this message. You should rest assured that we do not abandon our friends. I can tell you there is nothing going on with India. They are getting hungry so they need us. There is a slight difference in their tone, but nothing is going on. You have seen that the President stands by you. The Ambassador: Here is a message I wanted to call to your attention about the Indian killings of Pakistani POWs [Tab C]. We have also heard from our people in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia was under pressure from you to extend recognition to Bangladesh. Dr. Kissinger: God damn it. That is our bureaucracy. I will look into that immediately and find out what is going on. [After closing pleasantries, the meeting ended.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, 13 Sept 1971–7 Mar 1973. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Tabs A–C were attached but not published. 317. Telegram 217378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 317. Telegram 217378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, November 30, 1972, 2242Z Subject: Situation in South Asia 1. During year that has followed Indo-Pak war and UNSC resolutions of December 1971, USG has scrupulously avoided involvement in political issues resulting from war, out of conviction that impetus for peaceful solution these issues must come from states in area directly concerned. For this reason we warmly welcomed Simla agreement, as well as Delhi discussions in August designed keep that process moving. 2. This posture will continue to influence our policy in South Asia, as most recently demonstrated during UNGA focus on BD admission item. In conversations this subject with host government officials, action addressees should be especially guided by statement by Ambassador Phillips at conclusion UNGA debate [USUN 5166], amplified along following lines: A. US continues to regard bilateral approach embodied in Simla agreement and discussions that have taken place in that context as major contribution to peace. B. It remains our hope that the same constructive spirit of accommodation that resulted in the Simla agreement will extend to efforts by Pakistan and Bangladesh to find a basis for resolution of problems between them. C. We regret the current impasse affecting the delineation/withdrawal process under Simla and the continued inability of Pakistan and Bangladesh to find the basis for talks. D. At the same time we are encouraged by continuing efforts resolve individual issues as part larger process of attaining peaceful settlement in South Asia. In this connection, we also encouraged by the decisions of the Governments of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh to release some of the Pakistani and Bengalee civilians detained since the war and to take the first, urgently-needed steps on POW repatriation. We believe these actions hold promise for improvement atmosphere and are conducive to ultimate solution of outstanding issues. E. Now that UNGA debate concluded, we hope as friend of all three states that there will be new and tangible steps that will demonstrate that all three governments mean what they say about wanting settlement in South Asia. As we see it, leadership in all three countries now have roughly equal opportunity to take and respond to initiatives that could bring real movement on variety of issues. We do not intend involve ourselves in any way in these efforts, nor do we propose pass judgment on positions of parties directly concerned. But as government that seeks closest possible relations with all states in the area, we see our own interests also served by redoubled efforts among all those involved. 3. Above guidance intended for general use when subject of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh problem comes up in discussions with officials. We would not expect addressees would take initiative to present above points. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Schneider and Meyer, and in IO/UNP by John Kimball; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to New Delhi and Dacca. Repeated to London, Kabul, Tehran, Ankara, Colombo, and USUN. 318. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 318. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 1, 1972 SUBJECT: Response to Ambassador Sultan Khan Following is a report on each of the issues Ambassador Khan raised with you with a suggested response on each. Each suggested response below is followed by a recommendation for your approval. If you like, I will be glad to deliver these responses to him on your behalf since you may not have time. You can note your wishes below. This memo also requests your authority to go back to State now and put together an updated package for release of some embargoed military equipment. 1. Food Aid . Ambassador Khan reviewed the Pakistani requests of the last few months and said that “we are now running short by 100,000 tons.” He said that State and AID say that money rather than grain availability is the main problem. a. The facts are as follows: (1) The Paks asked early in 1971 for 1,000,000 tons of grain. This was before either of us had a clear assessment of our respective availabilities but in order to be forthcoming we agreed at that time to an initial tranche of 600,000 tons with the understanding that this was not our final response for the year. (2) Following the heavy Soviet purchases and other circumstances which tightened world wheat supply, the Executive Branch here conducted a careful review of our world-wide PL 480 programs to determine how to divide what was available. During this period, Bhutto made a strong pitch for another 400,000 tons—not because of potential starvation in Pakistan but because of his need to control urban food prices for political reasons. Everyone admitted that this was a legitimate request, but the most that we could squeeze out in the end was 250,000 tons. The bureaucracy’s recommendation was for 200,000 tons, and our staff moved 50,000 tons from Korea to Pakistan to raise that as far as possible. Moreover, we felt that 850,000 tons would keep the Pak pipeline full until early next spring since the initial 600,000 tons was still to be shipped to Pakistan. (3) We have promised the Paks to review the situation early next year without making any commitment that we will be able to raise our amount. The grain supply situation remains very uncertain here. (4) I understand from Ambassador Khan’s deputy that he did not raise this subject with you on instructions from Islamabad. His only instruction is to go ahead and buy another 100,000 tons commercially as he can. b. A suggested reply to Ambassador Khan could be made along the following lines: (1) Our response to Pakistan’s request was based on a combination of three problems which the US faced: —A coincidence of events put unexpected pressure on US supplies. These included low wheat crops in other producing countries, a transportation blockage in Canada, heavy purchases from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and our own crop which was only normal. This pressure drove prices up. —The known demand in US markets is so large that it will require drawing our stocks down to that level which the USG feels is the minimum carry-over for next year necessary (a) to hedge against an unusually low US crop and (b) to maintain an orderly market and prices. In short, there is no surplus in USG hands for additional concessional sales; what stocks there are must be held rather than being used for PL 480. —The President has pledged himself to maintain a specific overall spending ceiling. PL 480, unlike many other domestic and international programs, has not been cut back but will have to remain within our original budget plan. This presents a serious problem because the prices of many commodities have gone up since that budget was put together. (2) To get as close as we could to the Pakistani request, the White House took 50,000 tons from another potential recipient and provided it to Pakistan. This should be taken as a measure of our serious desire to come as close as possible to meeting Pakistan’s needs within our limits. (3) We have promised that we will look at the whole situation early in 1973. It would be misleading to promise that more will be available at that time, but we are not going to let any stone go unturned. (4) All of this comes against a background of significant financial assistance over the last six months. Recommendation : That the suggested reply above be given orally to Ambassador Khan as the response to his approach to you. Approve __________ Other ____________ 2. Military Supply . Ambassador Khan noted three types of items: equipment on the docks when the embargo was imposed, equipment sent here for repair and overhaul, and the one-time exception. He said that he hoped that the materiel lying on the docks and that sent here for repair could be released. You noted to him that it might be easier for US to release some of this if we released some of the embargoed materiel, like radar equipment, to India. a. The facts are: The equipment Ambassador Khan speaks of as on the docks or in the US for overhaul would amount to about $1.7 million worth of equipment. There is no question that this equipment belongs to Pakistan and should be released. The questions are when and with what rationale. One way to approach the problem would be simply to release these items. But this would cause a sharp Congressional reaction and a blow to our efforts to strike from the aid bill the prohibition against any military supply for South Asia. If you want to balance this with the Indian side as you indicated to Ambassador Khan to continue to rebuild that relationship and to lessen Congressional reaction, there are two possible ways to do this: (1) One way would be to have a “clean-up exercise” to take care of all of the hardship cases which resulted from our embargo last year . In addition to taking care of the Pakistani items, this would provide relief to several American companies which have been very hard hit by the embargo. The problem with this is that, narrowly defined, it would provide more materiel to India than to Pakistan. Specifically, this would involve $2.9 million worth of equipment for Pakistan and some $16 million for India, $12 million of which is the radar system which involves one of the American companies that has been hardest hit. (2) Another approach, therefore, would be to define “hardship” broadly enough to balance dollar-wise the amounts going to Pakistan and India. To do so, we would have to release the 300 armored personnel carriers valued at about $13 million which the Paks had ordered and even made a $1.3 million downpayment on under the so-called one-time exception approved in the fall of 1969. If this were done, we would be providing $16 million worth of equipment to both India and Pakistan. The disadvantage of this approach would be that adding the APCs would cause the Indians and, more importantly, the Congress to react sharply since they would say this looked like resumption of normal military supply. The aid bill is of course still in question in the Congress. b. The issues are ones of timing . First, there are the questions of whether we should do this before final consideration of the aid bill or before an overall decision on where we want to be with long-term military supply towards South Asia. I raise the latter point simply because moving ahead on a “clean-up exercise” would raise questions about whether this was the beginning of a new military supply pipeline or the end of an old one. The second timing question is how this relates to the effort to rebuild relations with India. I should think it imperative to find a way to include this issue in your dialogue with Ambassador Jha before we go ahead. I have a feeling that the “clean-up” rationale would be defensible with the probable exception that the APCs would raise the worst in the Indian reactions. Our response to that reaction would require us to know where we want to go on military supply in the future. There is a further option also talking about an exercise to “clean up” all past aid commitments to South Asia which would at some point mean lifting the “suspension” on the $87.6 million of economic assistance committed to India prior to the war at the same time we went ahead with a full military supply clean up operation for both India and Pakistan. c. Suggested reply . You have already replied that we will release this equipment when our new people are in place. But this requires preparation if it is to be done in the context of a broader policy. If you are ready to authorize me to work specifically with State and Defense to develop a “clean-up” package on aid (even if it would require talking to some of the manufacturers involved), I would suggest responding to Sultan Khan with the following points: (1) As you mentioned the other day, release of the Pakistani equipment would be a lot easier for us if we could use the occasion to clean up a number of other hardship cases created by the embargo. We agree that a US move to clean up past commitments is long overdue. (2) We have, therefore, begun to work on constructing a “clean-up” package to be in position to move on this around the first of next year. We will stay in touch with Pakistan on this in the interim. Recommendations: a. That you authorize me to tell State that the President would like a precise package for a clean-up exercise as outlined above. Approve _________ Other ___________ b. That the above response be given to Ambassador Khan. Approve _________ Other ___________ 3. Appointment of new ambassador to Pakistan . The Ambassador simply asked whether you had any news on a new US ambassador for Pakistan, and you said it would be done within four weeks. a. The facts . Obviously this is tied up with the overall question of the President’s appointments. However, we have long had a recommendation in that Ambassador Neumann be appointed to Pakistan, which Secretary Rogers opposed. I have recently sent you a long personal letter from Neumann indicating his personal interest in either Pakistan or India (as well as some other posts). Another candidate for Pakistan is Armin Meyer. I realize that you will have to work this out with Fred Malek, but I shall be glad to do anything additional that I can. b. Suggested reply . You have already told the Ambassador that we will do something within four weeks, so no further reply is necessary. Recommendation : That you take this as well as the appointment to India up with Fred Malek at whatever you regard as an appropriate time. 4. Presidential Message . The Ambassador complained about the comparative tones of President Bhutto’s congratulatory message on the President’s re-election and of the President’s reply. a. The fact is that the President himself dictated general language in response to congratulatory messages from other chiefs of state. He instructed that the second paragraph of his dictated message could be “slightly varied if the people on the substantive side think so—but I want it to be in this tone.” Since you had approved the addition of one sentence in the reply to Mrs. Gandhi indicating our desire for rebuilding our relationship with India, I inserted a sentence in the reply to President Bhutto indicating that our continued cooperation in the search for peace can only enhance the friendly relations between the United States and Pakistan.” You will also recall that on the day after our election and before receipt of President Bhutto’s message, the Pakistani government had announced its intention to withdraw from SEATO and to recognize the governments of North Vietnam, North Korea and Sihanouk. b. The issue , therefore, is whether you still feel the President should drop Bhutto a personal note simply saying that the more formal message had been written with the thought that it might be published and that the President wanted to add a few words of personal thanks for the warm personal words in President Bhutto’s message. A draft memo for the President and letter for his signature is at Tab A in case you want to go this route. c. Suggested Reply . If you felt a Presidential note were desirable, this could be given to the Ambassador as the reply to his point. There may be no choice since you told him there would be a letter within a week. The alternative would be to say orally: The President’s message was intended to be warm since we had noted and very much appreciated President Bhutto’s kind personal comments; the President’s answers to all congratulatory messages had been written with the thought that they might be published at some point; they had therefore been written with some restraint. We had felt that to do more could have embarrassed the recipient. But you can reassure the Ambassador orally that the President intended only the warmest feelings (which, I assume, is true). Recommendation : That Ambassador Khan be given the above oral response reassuring the Ambassador of the President’s warmest feelings, unless you feel you are absolutely committed to a letter. In that case, a possible draft letter is at Tab A for your approval. Oral response ___________ Approve the letter at Tab A _________ 6. PIA landing rights : The Ambassador asked for your assistance with a request which the Pakistan International Airline had pending at a conference here for landing rights at the end of a proposed Pacific route. You promised sympathetic consideration and to put a word in with Peter Flanigan. [Peter Rodman followed up with Flanigan, and his memo is at Tab B.] a. The facts are that what the Paks were seeking was an international route stretching from Pakistan through China and across the Pacific to the major US cities. This is potentially, especially on the China-US leg, a lucrative route, which a number of friendly countries would like but which we are preserving for ourselves. The Pak request, therefore, does not seem likely to be approved. b. The issue . The Paks seem to understand that there is little chance of a change now when we have to think first of our own airlines and balance of payments in order to be in a position to help them and others like them in the long run. c. Suggested reply . You have done what you promised—ask the bureaucracy for a sympathetic hearing—and there is no reason to bring this matter up again. One final thought on responding to the Ambassador is whether you will have time to do this before you leave. If not, do you want me to call on him and deliver these points informally in your absence? Yes _______ No ________ 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action with Kennedy’s concurrence. Kissinger initialed his approval of each of Saunders’ recommendations, with one exception. He did not respond to recommendation b of the second section relating to military supply. Approval of recommendation b for dealing with the issue of military supply was implied in Kissinger’s delegation to Saunders of the responsibility for providing a response to Khan on the issue and in the handwritten note Kissinger added in the margin in approving recommendation a: “But move fast & give Pakistan a break”. As for the recommendation in section 4, Kissinger authorized a letter to be sent to Pakistani President Bhutto rather than an oral response. The memorandum did not have a section 5. In section 6, Kissinger approved of Saunders meeting with Ambassador Khan to discuss the issues dealt with in the memorandum. The draft letter at Tab A and the memorandum dealing with Pakistan’s request for landing rights at Tab B were attached but not published. 319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 2, 1972 Subject: Statement by Indian Foreign Minister An analysis of Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh’s November 30 statement on Indo-U.S. relations is attached. This analysis was prepared by the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Information Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs Washington, December 1, 1972 STATEMENT BY INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Sigh’s November 30 statement is noteworthy as the most balanced and positive review of Indo-U.S. Relations by the GOI since the 1971 War. His remarks constitute a strong signal that India now desires better relations. The Foreign Minister’s remarks were addressed to the United States, and, equally important, to Indian public opinion. Swaran Singh’s statement provides a well-reasoned basis for domestic acceptance of an effort to improve relations with the U.S. In his remarks, he describes differences between the U.S. and India, which he characterizes as “temporary” in a calm and rational manner. —On Vietnam, he sees the conflict on the way to a peaceful solution. Once peace is resolved, India will cooperate with the U.S. and others in the reconstruction effort. —On Bangladesh, he welcomes our recognition and our participation in the reconstruction effort. —On South Asia policy, he sees “every reason to believe” that the U.S. will “encourage and support” the spirit of the Simla Agreement. While expressing interest in improved relations with the United States, Swaran Singh makes clear what India will seek from the U.S. in this relationship. He underscores continuing Indian concern about possible U.S. military assistance to Pakistan; he urges the U.S. to accept the “realities of the new situation in the area” (i.e., a predominant Indian role); he seeks U.S. support of the policy of bilateralism in South Asia (i.e., India and Pakistan should work out their disputes by themselves). Several factors have contributed to the evolution of the more forthcoming Indian attitude toward the U.S. articulated yesterday by Swaran Singh. Domestically, the euphoria of victory over Pakistan has worn off. India is facing major economic difficulties and a potential food shortage. The flow of U.S. resources, including food, into India looms more important than six months back. Events influencing the timing of the Foreign Minister’s statement probably include our favorable action in participating in multilateral debt relief and the President’s friendly response to Mrs. Gandhi’s congratulatory message on his reelection. An additional element may be strains in Indo-Soviet relations, about which we have received intelligence reports. The Indians have reportedly resisted Soviet pressures to join COMECON, to undertake joint naval exercises and to provide more active support for the Asian security proposals. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Unclassified with confidential attachment. Deputy Executive Secretary Harry Barnes signed the transmittal memorandum for Eliot. Foreign Minister Singh made the statement on November 30 in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian Parliament. The text of the statement was transmitted to the Department on December 1 in telegram 14364 from New Delhi. (Ibid.) 320. Memorandum From Douglas M. Cochran of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 320. Memorandum From Douglas M. Cochran of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, December 8, 1972 Subject: Pakistan: Growing Nervousness It is certain that in the course of your forthcoming lunch with Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan you will be made well aware of growing GOP uncertainty regarding the state of its relations with the United States. Members of the Pakistan Embassy, including the Ambassador, have impressed upon officers of NEA/PAB their concern as to the extent and nature of our relationship. This week’s call on the Secretary by Minister Roy and the Ambassador reflected that concern as well. There are three distinct areas in which the Pakistanis have been expecting more forthcoming positions on our part: PL–480 wheat, POWs and arms supply. Our less than maximum response to President Bhutto’s personal appeal for PL–480 wheat, our virtual silence on the POW issue, and our inaction since the election regarding arms supply all contribute to this atmosphere of worry. Anxiety on the latter issue clearly stimulated President Bhutto’s assertion to Lewis Simons of The Washington Post , reiterated to Consul Velletri in Peshawar, that Pakistan, while modest in its hopes for military supply from the United States, has yet to receive its “due”. What is basically involved of course are Pakistan’s concerns about and attitudes toward India. And in that context one can understand, though not defend, Bhutto’s and Sultan Khan’s limited appreciation for the very large support we have provided on the economic side in the period since the war. The more balanced tone of our recent exchanges with the Indians has simply added to Pakistani concern. In conversation with us on December 3, Ambassador Khan referred to the Secretary’s December 1 statement vis-à-vis India and pointedly asked “when are we going to get started?” Referring bluntly to arms, he noted that India can look to its “allies” for help but Pakistan, while it can obtain some assistance from China, seems unable to rely on the United States for even spares to keep its American-supplied tanks and aircraft in operation. We suspect that the Ambassador and Minister Roy went away from their meeting with the Secretary even more concerned that Pakistan was not getting its security concerns across to the USG. Thus we can anticipate that, the probing by the Pakistanis regarding our intentions in regard to a lifting of the arms embargo will continue, culminating it seems to us in indications fairly soon that Bhutto will want to come here to talk about what he can expect from us in the security area. FYI: We expect to have available by next week a study by the intelligence community on the nature of Pakistan’s military procurement efforts since the war. We are requesting separately an assessment of the impact that our embargo on spares has had on Pakistan’s U.S. equipment inventory—the latter with reference to Ambassador Khan’s statement to the Secretary that this equipment is now largely immobile. (NOTE: We suspect there is also, as far as Ambassador Sultan Khan is concerned, some sense of personal frustration in getting things accomplished. He has told both us and others—including Spencer Davis of the AP—that he feels he has failed in his mission here.) 1 Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 52, PAK/Indian Negotiations July–Dec 1972. Confidential. Cleared by Meyer and sent through Laingen. The December 4 meeting between Rogers and Tridev Roy, head of Pakistan’s delegation to the UN General Assembly, was reported to Islamabad on December 5 in telegram 220229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PAK) 321. Telegram 9952 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 321. Telegram 9952 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, December 12, 1972, 0600Z Subj: Indo/Pak Agreement on Kashmir Line: Withdrawal of Forces Ref: Islamabad 2237 1. I consider the December 11 agreement over the Kashmir line to have very important implications. Not only does it open the way for force withdrawals by both India and Pakistan to the international border, but it also makes it possible for both countries to pick up the thread of other positive steps anticipated in the Simla accord of last July. We are well aware, however, that many obstacles remain to the achievement of a qte durable peace in the subcontinent unqte as contemplated in the Simla accord. 2. I believe this is an appropriate time for us to show our pleasure over the Kashmir line delineation and the beginning of force withdrawals, and to underline our hopes that India and Pakistan will continue along the positive path drawn at Simla. This can be done by the Department’s spokesman, and perhaps will already have been done by the time this message reaches Washington. I believe that our pleasure and our hopes can most effectively be expressed to the Government of Pakistan (and presumably also to the Government of India) by a message from President Nixon to President Bhutto (and to Mrs. Gandhi). If some such message is not already in the drafting stage, I recommend that early attention be given to this suggestion. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was announced in Pakistan on December 11. Mutual troop withdrawals to the border between the two countries were scheduled to begin the following day. (Telegram 9965 from Islamabad, December 12; ibid., POL 31–1 INDIA–PAK) The troop withdrawals were completed by December 20. (Telegram 10226 from Islamabad, December 21; ibid.) 322. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 322. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 14, 1972 SUBJECT: South Asia—Pending Decisions and A Strategy This memo is written to relate two sets of decisions: (1) Recent Indian statements have brought the process of rebuilding a US-Indian relationship to a point where it seems wise to take a look at next steps and to establish control over their timing. (2) We will have to make good on the promise to release Pakistan’s blocked military equipment before long, and that step will have to be related to the dialogue with India (as well as with the Congress) if we are to avoid upsetting the process of rebuilding there. How we deal with these issues will have much to do with determining where this Administration comes out in South Asia over the next four years. Two action memos are attached : —At Tab A is a possible memo for the President suggesting a strategy for dealing with India and Pakistan over the next few months. —At Tab B is a possible memo for the President on how to release Pakistan’s blocked military equipment and how to relate this step to the gradual process of putting the US-Indian relationship on sounder ground. The Situation It has taken almost all of the year since the war to get into a position—on both sides—where it is now possible to consider seriously building some real momentum into the process of normalization. India . To review, these are the main steps in 1972 that have brought us to this point with India: —The first post-war move was the expression of willingness in the President’s foreign policy report in February to carry on a “serious dialogue” with India about our problems and future relationship. In retrospect, this may have been premature since the Indians were at that point unable to put aside the past and focus on the future. —In the spring came the series of gratuitous and offensive Indian criticisms, especially concerning Vietnam. —Secretary Connally’s visit to New Delhi and Simla in early July was a significant gesture. It produced no breakthroughs, but his discussions were reasonable and he was able to get across the point that there would be no hope of improving relations as long as the Indians continued to hit at us on Vietnam. —A warm exchange of messages and toasts was arranged in August and September on the occasion of India’s 25th anniversary celebrations. But this, like debt rescheduling, was drowned out by shriller negative noises. —Just as we were considering a decision on debt relief as a next step at the end of July, Ambassador Keating reported his difficult departure talk with Mrs. Gandhi. This was followed by the anti-CIA campaign which the Indians attempted to use to divert popular attention from the real causes of increasingly evident economic and social problems. In September came Mrs. Gandhi’s Foreign Affairs article and report of the wheat seed shipment to North Vietnam. —Since late October, the Indians have gradually shifted from sullen hostility to a public posture of conciliation. By this time the anti-CIA campaign had about reached the end of its course and, partly in our own self-interest in maintaining the aid-giving consortium framework for debt management, we went quietly ahead with the $29 million participation in the IBRD debt rescheduling. —Immediately after the President’s re-election, Mrs. Gandhi sent a surprisingly warm message of congratulations. The President’s response, with the added frill of a birthday greeting to Mrs. Gandhi, struck a responsive chord in New Delhi. —Most recently, the Indians have made three public statements—by Mrs. Gandhi, President Giri and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh—expressing a strong interest in improving relations with the US. Mrs. Gandhi has now followed with a personal letter to the President along the same lines. [Both Singh statement and Gandhi letter are at Tab C.] This recent shift in Indian attitude seems to stem from various factors. The psychological alienation of Mrs. Gandhi and some of her inner circle continues, but at the same time the importance of the US to India may be playing a bigger role in their thinking. For instance, economic difficulties, including food shortages, are probably causing them to realize that they might have to seek food and other commodity assistance from the US—or at least financial assistance indirectly related to food needs. India’s lack of economic progress has probably restored perspective on India’s continued need for development loans. The Indians may also be trying to offset pressure from Moscow for an even closer relationship and, by emphasizing their independence from the USSR, to keep open the way for normalization of relations with China. Another motivation may be to keep us from getting too close to Pakistan through re-establishment of cordial relations with us. Finally, there are some indications that the Indians may be looking for a future role in Southeast Asia. Pakistan . Our relationship with Pakistan over the last year has been much less complex and convoluted. The Paks have been grateful for the role we played during the war and for the fact that we have seen them through a hard first year of adjustment with substantial ($235 million) economic assistance. President Bhutto has been mainly engaged in the on-going process of redefining residual Pakistan’s relationship with India and Bangladesh and in reconstructing his country’s polity, economy and policy. In the future he hopes to also reconstruct Pakistan’s traditional three-cornered balancing act between China, the USSR and US. A certain amount of tension seems almost bound to creep into our relations as a result of the process. India-Pakistan-Bangladesh . It should finally be noted that, while India and Pakistan have not yet been able to normalize their relations, some important progress has been made in that direction. At Simla last July, the Indians agreed to a political framework far resolving their differences with Pakistan and in principle to return the 90,000 prisoners they hold and to withdraw from PAK territory. Recently, a limited number of POWs have been exchanged and, after a hold up over delineation of the “line of control” in Kashmir; the Indians have begun withdrawal from Pak territory. It seems reasonable to assume that once Bhutto recognizes Bangladesh—and he is heading in this direction—the release of the remaining POWs under joint Indian-Bengali control could follow. The Decisions Ahead Before going on to discuss what steps might be taken next, it is worth reviewing the decisions that lie ahead for the President in the foreseeable future relating both to the provision of arms and to economic assistance. The most immediate of these decisions concern commitments made prior to but suspended during the war, but some relate to decisions on new commitments. On the economic assistance side the issues break-out as follows: —With India, there is the “suspended” $87.6 million in economic assistance which had been committed but not disbursed. We also decided last December not to go ahead with any of the then programmed but not yet committed new development or PL 480 assistance. The Indians have regarded these moves as political. The “suspended” $87.6 million has especially become a symbol to them of the crisis in our bilateral relations. They feel that some movement on at least part of this problem will be necessary before long if we desire to sustain and accelerate the improvement in Indo-US relations. There is also the “rupee problem” which involves finding a satisfactory settlement of the $4.8 billion worth of rupees which we hold from the repayment of and interest earned on past loans but of which we can only spend a small portion. A solution on this will take time. —With Pakistan there have been no aid issues until recently. Since the war we have provided $235 million in economic assistance—$60 million in development loans, $50 million in debt rescheduling, $105 million in PL 480 (1,350,000 tons of wheat), $10 million in technical assistance, and $9 million in grant food aid for displaced persons. The Paks had hoped to obtain another 150,000 tons of wheat on con-cessionary terms and, although we pointed out that because of our own shortages this year we could not do any more right now, they are a bit upset. In any case, their pipeline is full, and they have been promised a review in early 1973. Substantial new development assistance is being programmed for next year also. On the military assistance side the issues break out as follows: —With Pakistan we have a series of past commitments for military supply to dispose of which have been held up by the embargo imposed during the war.. The most pressing is about $1. 7 million worth of equipment which legally belongs to Pakistan and should be released. In addition, there is $1.2 million in equipment involved in cases imposing severe financial hardship on American firms, and if there were a “clean-up” for Pakistan’s benefit it would be logical to help these American companies too. More important is the so-called “one-time exception” for lethal end items which we granted in 1970 and which was still under negotiation when the East Pakistan crisis erupted. At that time the Paks had decided to purchase 300 APCs at a cost of $13 million and had put down $1.3 million on them. They were undecided, however, on about $60 million worth of replacement fighter and bomber aircraft. Recently the Paks have begun to push for some movement on these aspects of the military supply problem and may soon come up with a shopping list for new equipment that could run as high as $200 million. At a minimum they would like an assured flow of spares. —With India , there is $19 million worth of communications equipment (including a $17 million FMS credit) to tie together an earlier-supplied radar system aimed at China which has been held up by the embargo. The main American private supplier has suffered severe financial hardship through no fault of its own but could still probably come out all right if we were to do something early in the year. The Indians, however, would gladly forego this assistance to keep us from providing any, even previously committed, military assistance to Pakistan. Other private American suppliers have about $3 million worth of contracts for spares and non-lethal end items, and these should be included in any clean-up operation. Next Steps—A Possible Strategy There is no question that we should continue to supply substantial economic assistance to Pakistan, meet our past commitments on military supply and give sympathetic consideration to new Pak requests for arms. The problem is how we fit this approach toward Pakistan into a strategy toward India over the next several months, since the two are unavoidably intertwined and if not played carefully will tend to cancel each other out and damage our interests in both countries. The first question on strategy toward India is how far we want too with the Indians down the path to normalization now . Assuming that it is not desirable to move too quickly but that there is reason to maintain a reciprocal process of improving relations, the purpose here is to examine exactly what our options for next steps are and how they should be timed . One basic general question on the timing of any future US moves to improve India-US relations is how we relate these to the process of postwar settlement in South Asia. —One approach would be to sit tight and do nothing of any real consequence until the Pakistani POWs are released and Indian troops are withdrawn from Pakistan. We would not inform the Indians of this linkage since that would be highly counter productive, but our actions would speak for themselves. Our main purpose would be to demonstrate to the Chinese and Pakistanis beyond doubt that we stand behind the principles we stressed at the UN during last year’s crisis. —An alternative approach would be to pace our moves to improve relations with India more in relation to progress in our own bilateral relations with India. As far as the process of normalization in South Asia is concerned, we would recognize that the Simla agreement along with the partial prisoner exchanges and the prospect of early Indian troop withdrawal from Pak territory are enough to justify some serious steps. Using this criterion, we would feel free to move ahead gradually in reciprocal moves with India and make whatever decisions are required in that context. Large steps like lifting the “suspension” on the $87 million would still be further down the path in any case. If a breakthrough in the South Asian settlement process came soon, releasing the $87 million could follow it by coincidence. If the settlement process dragged on, we would not feel constrained from moving ahead with India if Indo-US relations seemed to warrant. We do not, however, have to make a choice between these two courses yet since, in any event, we will want to start slowly with no more than talk about our future relationship and, if that is satisfactory, some limited tangible actions relating more to the past than the future. The “suspended” $87 million is an issue for the future in any scenario and we will have to cope with its relationship to prisoners and troop withdrawal only if those issues drag on. In any event, if we are to rebuild our relationship with India on a more solid foundation over the next four years, it is important that we do so on a reciprocal basis that stresses mutual respect for each other’s concerns and without abandoning Pakistan. We have laid out below a measured and gradual approach keyed to Indian response and movement in the postwar settlement between India and Pakistan. If you wanted to minimize the linkage to the South Asian settlement, you could simply speed up the timetable below: Phase I—December-January a. In December , respond to recent Indian signals of a strong desire to improve relations—particularly Mrs. Gandhi’s letter in late November—with a proposal to open a serious high-level discussion between special representatives about our future bilateral relationship . The purpose would be to see if the Indians are really prepared to move with us on a realistic basis or are just engaged in another public relations exercise. It could be presented in the context of finally opening the “serious dialogue” the President called for last February in the annual report. Procedurally : —The President could make the proposal in a general way in his response to Mrs. Gandhi’s most recent message . —You could give Ambassador Jha the President’s letter and discuss with him in more detail what we have in mikd. b. In early January if the Indians wanted to proceed, you could meet with Jha to work out (1) who should carry on the discussions and (2) the agenda. The discussions should be thorough but would not have to be elaborate. — The talks could either take place here between you and Jha, or the Indians might wish to send an emissary like former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul to meet with you. If he is to come here as ambassador, there would be some logic in that and he is close to Mrs. Gandhi . Another variation would be for us to send someone to New Delhi to talk directly with Mrs. Gandhi and her ministers. (The only person we can think of now, other than yourself, who could do this job would be John Connally, who under difficult circumstances last summer managed to strike a rapport with Mrs. Gandhi and still get across the basic points we wanted to make.) —The informal agenda would be significant because it would tell the Indians we are prepared to discuss certain issues at some point in the future and give them a sense that real progress is possible if they want to come along. During this period, we should have named our new Ambassadors to Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as to India. d. During this period also we would suggest certain limited practical steps that might be taken on both sides to maintain a modest momentum of reciprocal moves. Examples include their releasing blocked rupees for cultural exchange and completing agreement on the status of the American school in Delhi. Phase II—Late January through March a. The special representative talks would open with the first subject on the agenda which would be disco Sion of our respective views on key subjects which affect our relationship. Early political discussion is necessary to set a framework for other steps we want to take like releasing the blocked Pakistani military equipment. The subjects for consideration would include essentially those which Foreign Minister Singh mentioned in his statement to the parliament: —What the US expects from India and what India wants from us in the future. —US and Indian interests in South Asia where they merge and diverge especially on such questions as Pakistan and Bangladesh, We should discuss openly what each of us would like to see in Pakistan and even air the question of military supply, at least enough to set the stage for a clean-up exercise on blocked military equipment. —India’s relations with the other great powers, how the US plans to relate to the USSR and PRC and how those relationships affect India. —US economic and military assistance policies in South Asia. While in this first discussion we might want to be very general, we would want to set the stage for the “clean-up exercise” on military items and might agree that Maury Williams would take upthe economic aspects of this issue in detail later in the spring. —India’s role and our future relationship in the rest of Asia, especially post-war Southeast Asia. The Indians have taken exclusion from participation in a Vietnam cease-fire supervisory role in stride, but they no doubt would like to participate in any general conference on Southeast Asia and would like to lead the region into “non-alignment.” If this concept causes us problems, then we should let the Indians know exactly how we feel and why so as to minimize misunderstandings later. b. If the high-level “dialogue” produced a mutually acceptable clarification of intentions and attitudes, our next move might be to at least begin a clean-up of past military and economic assistance commitments to both India and Pakistan . For India a clean-up would mean : —Provision of $19 million worth of communications equipment ($17 million FMS credit) to complete the Peace Indigo radar system and about $3 million worth of spares and non-lethal end items from private suppliers. —Establishing a procedure and a date later in the spring for serious talks on a final resolution of the “rupee problem.” —[The final issue on this list is the question of lifting the “suspension” on $87.6 million in economic assistance. We are braketing this to underscore the fact that there is a choice of putting this step off. If India-Bangladesh had released the Pakistani prisoners and if Indian troop withdrawal were completed, one might choose to go ahead with this step at this point. If not, there would be a choice of dealing with it later when talks on our economic relationship begin.] With India we would stress that we are simply clearing away the debris of the past and these moves do not necessarily imply anything about future decisions on new economic aid or military assistance to either India or Pakistan. That, we would say, depends on India’s reactions to our clean-up actions and how the general situation in the area evolves. For Pakistan a clean-up would mean : —Immediate release of about $16 million worth of military equipment, including the 300 APCs, for which commitments already made. —While this goes beyond mere “clean-up,” this would be the time to give a firm indication that we intend to provide about $60 million in development assistance during the next fiscal year in addition to the about $25 million of debt rescheduling we are already committed to. —It seems unlikely that our foodgrain stock position will permit us to provide more grain at this stage, but we will in any case be starting conversations with the Paks about this time on the FY 1974 PL 480 program. —[As with India, there is an optional item. It would be possible to reopen talks on the remainder of the one-time exception (about $60 million worth of equipment, probably aircraft). Logically, it would be better to defer this until we are ready to discuss the question of longer term military supply. The Paks may not be interested in these elements of the one-time exception. They may prefer others.] With the Paks we would stress that these moves were a demonstration of our continuing support for them even as we move to improve our working relationship with India. c. Once the whole clean-up was implemented, we would sit back and assess the impact of these steps on new economic and military assistance. From India we would look for: —Moderation in government statements and actions concerning our fulfilling of past military supply commitments to Pakistan. This would be a demonstration of their willingness to accept a US relationship with Pakistan. —Acknowledgement of the contribution of US economic assistance. —Continuation of restraint on Vietnam and other sensitive foreign policy areas. —Progress on breaking the logjam on cultural and educational exchanges. —Signals of a desire to continue the normalization process with us. —Further acts of reconciliation with Pakistan. From Pakistan we would look for: —Understanding of our interests in maintaining good relations with both India and Pakistan. —Continuation of their realistic attitude toward the problems of redefining relations with India and Bangladesh. Phase III—Spring Once those returns were all in we would have reached the point where another stock-taking and set of decisions on where we were going would be in order. At this point—probably late spring 1973—the main decisions before us would be (1) new military assistance for Pakistan and (2) new economic assistance for India. The success of any scenario like this cannot, of course, be guaranteed since there is a sizeable degree of unpredictability built into it. On the other hand, it does provide a measured but steady approach to the problem of rebuilding India-US relations without abandoning Pakistan or our principles. Moreover, the critical element of timing both with regard to the impact of our actions toward Pakistan or India and the pace of the India-Pakistan settlement process, would be under control. RECOMMENDATION : 1. That you send the memo at Tab A to the President seeking his decision in principle to the above outlined scenario and permission to implement Phase I, a and b (proposal for serious discussion between special representatives). 2. That you send the memo at Tab B to the President on how Pakistan’s blocked military equipment will be handled under this scenario. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). Secret. Sent for action. The documents cited at Tabs A and C were attached but not published. Kissinger initialed the memorandum at Tab B and sent it to Nixon on December 23. (See Document 323 ) He apparently did not send to the President the memorandum attached at Tab A, which would have advanced the three phase proposals put forward by Saunders and Hoskinson. Under Phase I.a., Kissinger put a check mark in the margin to indicate he wished to discuss the President’s letter to Jha. Under Phase I.b., Kissinger wrote “No” in the margin next to the suggestion that Connally should be sent back to India. Under the same heading, Kissinger asked in the margin about an informal agenda to be discussed with the Indians: “What’s the agenda[?]” And under Phase II.a., Kissinger wrote in the margin next to the first item: “What is that? Expand.” 323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 23, 1972 SUBJECT: Military Supply for Pakistan You will recall that the Pakistanis have raised the question whether it would be possible to move about $1.7 million worth of military equipment caught by our embargo last winter. In September, you approved holding off on any action. The aid bill was being discussed actively in the Congress then, and the Administration was trying hard to have a general prohibition against military assistance for South Asia stricken from the bill. We did, however, promise to take some step toward the end of the year. There is no question that this limited amount of equipment should be released to Pakistan. The two issues are (1) how to do this without helping those who want to write a general prohibition into the aid bill and (2) how to fit this step into a strategy toward India over the next several months which sustains an effort to put US-Indian relations on a sounder basis. Background—Outstanding Military Supply Issues The value of the equipment involved in the Pakistani request totals about $1.7 million . This includes: (1) an assortment of spare parts for aircraft, tanks, weapons and electronic equipment worth about $935,000 being held in a New York warehouse at a monthly storage cost to Pakistan of $1500; (2) engines for Pakistani military aircraft (F–104, C–130, B–57, helicopter) worth about $800,000 and owned by Pakistan but here for overhaul. There is another category of equipment worth about $1.2 million which is of the same general character as that the Paks are talking about. This includes two cases where release is being pressed by American manufacturers who were particularly hurt by the embargo because they had completed an order but could not ship it and thus could not be paid. If we were to try to clear up the most painful of the hardships caused by the embargo, one would want to consider the Americans who have been hurt as well. A third item is in a class by itself. This consists of 300 armored personnel carriers worth about $13 million which were part of the package approved as a one-time exception to the pre-war policy of not providing finished combat items. The Paks made a down-payment and the vehicles are now coming off the assembly line. Alternative Approaches There is no question that the $1.7 million in blocked equipment belongs to Pakistan and should be released. The questions are when and with what rationale so as to avoid giving a handle to Congressional champions of a general prohibition on military assistance to South Asia and to relate this step to our rebuilding with India. There are three options : 1. One way would be simply to release the $1.7 million of blocked items to Pakistan . But this would cause sharp Congressional reaction, make it more difficult to delete the prohibition against military supply for South Asia and be misunderstood in India. It would also raise questions from American companies about why we are making exceptions to the embargo that favor the government of Pakistan but take no account of the financial hardships that U.S. companies have suffered as a result of blocked contracts with Pakistan and India. The Pakistanis understand these questions and have been told that it may be easier to release their equipment if we took a somewhat broader approach to the problem. There are two possible ways of doing this. 2. One way of broadening the approach would be to have a “clean-up exercise” to take care of the main hardship cases which remain from our embargo last year . The hope would be that this approach would have the support of some American suppliers and therefore their representatives in the Congress. In doing this, we would release equipment in the following categories: (a) cases in which financial hardship to a private American supplier is involved and (b) cases in which financial hardship or inequities to the governments of Pakistan or India are involved. This would involve $2. 9 million for Pakistan and $22 million for India. About $19 million of the amount for India is a communications system for a radar system the US began helping India to build after the Chinese attack in 1962. An American company is in bankruptcy as result of the cut-off in these shipments and must begin court action in January. The problem with this approach, however, is that the dollar amounts are heavily weighted toward India. 3. To balance the Pak side, a third approach could be taken by defining “hardship” broadly to include the 300 armored personnel carriers approved by you before the war under the so-called one-time exception . These are worth $13 million and the Paks have made a $1.3 million down payment. Fifty are in storage and the remainder will be rolling off the production line through next spring, The main disadvantage of this approach would be that adding the APCs would cause the Indians and, more important, the Congress to react sharply since they would say this looked like resumption of normal military supply. The aid bill, of course, is still in question before the Congress. Assuming that we were to go ahead with the second or third approach above, timing is still an important issue: —First, there are the questions of whether we should do this before final consideration of the aid bill or before an overall decision on where we want to be with long-term military supply towards South Asia. I raise the latter point simply because moving ahead on a “clean-up exercise” would raise questions about whether this was the beginning of a new military supply pipeline or the end of an old one. It might also give the impression that we were attempting to push something through. —Second is the question of how this relates to the effort to rebuild relations with India. I should think it imperative to find a way of discussing our general political relationship with India before we go ahead. I have a feeling that the “clean-up” rationale has a chance of being defensible—although the APCs could raise the worst in the Indian reactions—provided we put it in an overall context of improving relations with India. At this stage, we would at. least want to be in a position to say that this step is to clean up the past and does not indicate any decision one way or another on our future military supply relationship. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That you approve in principle a “clean-up exercise” involving release of equipment caught in the embargo as described above, including the armored personnel carriers for Pakistan. 2. That you approve telling Pakistan in January what is planned. 3. That you approve discussing this privately with Ambassador Jha in the context of a general discussion of US-Indian relations. Approve Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations. Kissinger then added a handwritten note for Saunders: “Hal–Do what is necessary.” Afghanistan, 1969–1972 Afghanistan, 1969–1972 324. Memorandum From the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) Kabul, February 13, 1969 NAAS recalled the assurance Neumann had received from King Zahir that Afghanistan did not plan military expenditures large enough to trigger congressionally mandated constraints on economic assistance to Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–1, Conte–Symington amendments 1969. Secret. Neumann’s meeting with King Zahir on December 30, 1968, was reported to the Department on January 4 in telegram 42 from Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 AFG) The Conte–Long amendment was section 119 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL 90–249; 81 Stat. 936) The Symington amendment was section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. The amendment required the President to withhold economic assistance if in his view the recipient country excessively and unnecessarily diverted resources to military expenditures. (PL 90–137; 81 Stat. 445) 325. Telegram 2080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, May 26, 1969, 1620Z Secretary of State Rogers reported on his conversations with Afghani King Zahir and Prime Minister Etemadi on May 25. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Rawalpindi. Repeated to Kabul, London, Moscow, Ankara, and New Delhi. Also sent as Secto 115. Secretary Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore, Pakistan May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25. A fuller account of Rogers’ conversation with Etemadi was sent to the Department on June 2 in airgram A–84 from Kabul. (Ibid., POL AFG–US) 326. Country Policy Statement on Afghanistan Washington, August 6, 1969 The country policy statement, approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, outlined U.S. policy and programs in Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret. According to an attached cover sheet, signed by Sisco as Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, and also signed by Country Director Spengler, and Sober, as Staff Director of NSCIG/NEA, the group approved the statement and issued it “for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Afghanistan.” A table of contents was also attached but not printed. Sober drafted the policy statement. Richardson sent an advance copy of the statement to Kissinger. (Ibid.) 327. Information Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Spengler) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) Washington, August 27, 1969 Spengler noted that Afghanistan had recently purchased three fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union, and he pointed to the problems the purchase could pose for U.S. assistance programs for Afghanistan because of the stipulations of the Conte and Symington amendments. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret. Drafted by Walter G. Ramsay. A copy was sent to Rockwell. 328. Telegram 146191 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, August 28, 1969, 2238Z Ambassador Neumann was instructed to seek clarification from the Afghan Government as to whether the purchase of SU–7 fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union violated the stipulations of the Conte amendment. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Joint State/AID message. For the Ambassador. Drafted by Ramsay (NEA/PAF); cleared by Rockwell, Richard C. Matheron (J/PM), and with DOD/ISA, AID/NESA, AID/GC, and AID/PPC; and approved by Spengler. 329. Letter From the Country Officer for Afghanistan (Ramsay) to the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) Washington, August 29, 1969 Ramsay wrote to NAAS to express his misgivings about the effect the Afghan purchase of fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union might have on the U.S. ability to continue to provide economic assistance to Afghanistan in light of the strictures established by the Conte amendment. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret; Official-Informal. The letter is an unsigned copy. NAAS’ August 21 letter to Ramsay is ibid. 330. Telegram 4515 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 4, 1969, 0835Z Ambassador Neumann reported that, as instructed, he had met with Afghani Deputy Foreign Minister Farhadi and raised the issue of the purchase of the SU–7s and the possible impact on U.S economic assistance to Afghanistan. Neumann asked for details concerning the purchase. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Repeated to DIA. 331. Telegram 5090 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, October 6, 1969, 1150Z Afghani Deputy Foreign Minister Farhadi assured Ambassador Neumann that the SU–7s were purchased as replacement aircraft, and that the agreement to do so was negotiated before January 2, 1968. Therefore, the Conte amendment should not come into play. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential. 332. Telegram 5218 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, October 14, 1969, 0815Z King Zahir reviewed for Ambassador Neumann the recent history of his government’s military acquisition policy and noted that the agreement to purchase SU–7s from the Soviet Union was signed in November 1964. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential. Repeated to DIA for DIACO. 333. Telegram 24 From the Consulate in Auckland, New Zealand, to the Department of State Auckland, January 16, 1970, 0600Z Vice President Agnew met with Prime Minister Etemadi in Kabul on January 7 and reviewed U.S.-Afghan relations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Kabul. Also sent as VIPTO 21. Agnew visited Afghanistan January 6–7, 1970, as part of a 3-week tour of Asia, which included stops in the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nepal, South Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. Additional documentation on Agnew’s visit to Afghanistan can be found ibid., Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 3051B, Box 508, Lot 70 D 387, CF 425. Documentation on the entire trip can be found ibid., Boxes 506–510. During Agnew’s visit to Kabul, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the Vice President with an aide-mémoire outlining the effort Afghanistan was making to deal with its development problems, and another which put forward requests for additional funding of the AID program in the Helmand valley. The texts of the two documents were transmitted to Washington on January 17 in airgram A-06 from Kabul. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, E 5 AFG) 334. Memorandum From Vice President Agnew to President Nixon Washington, January 21, 1970 Agnew reported on his January 7 conversation with King Zahir. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. On January 21 Agnew also sent Nixon a brief summary of his conversation with Prime Minister Etemadi, noting that it had been reported in greater detail earlier. (See Document 333) He sent copies of both memoranda to Kissinger, who forwarded them to Nixon on January 26, under cover of a memorandum summarizing them. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan) 335. Letter From the Afghan Minister of Planning (Sarabi) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) Kabul, July 20, 1970 Because of drought conditions in Afghanistan, Sarabi sent an urgent request to Neumann for 100,000 tons of wheat under the PL–480 program. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Unclassified. Sent to the Department on September 2 as an attachment to airgram Kabul Toaid A-375. Published from a copy that indicates Sarabi signed the original. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended. PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. (68 Stat. 454) 336. Telegram 6242 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, October 8, 1970, 0810Z The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquired about the status of the request for 100,000 tons of PL–480 wheat. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/AID message. On October 24, the Department authorized the Embassy to negotiate an agreement for 50,000 metric tons of wheat. Budgetary limitations precluded an agreement for the full amount requested. (AID airgram 2370 to Kabul; ibid.) The PL–480 agreement was signed in Kabul on March 27, 1971. (Telegram 2125 from Kabul, March 27; ibid.) The text of the agreement was transmitted to the Department on March 31 in airgram A-33. (Ibid.) 337. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Kabul, December 29, 1970 Neumann assessed the role played by King Zahir in Afghan politics and weighed the prospects for using the limited U.S. presence in Afghanistan to offset the preponderant Soviet influence. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Sisco added a handwritten note on the first page which reads: “DM I could not get thru the length of this. JJS” It is not clear to whom the note was addressed. Neumann sent a copy of this letter to Kissinger. On February 17, 1971, Kissinger responded with a letter to Neumann in which he praised Neumann’s “perceptive” assessment and noted “I found your description of the King’s balancing act a useful approach to the kind of political situation you are watching.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan) Sisco sent a telegram to Neumann on January 26, 1971, in which he indicated that it would not be possible to schedule a visit by King Zahir during the coming year. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 AFG) 338. Telegram 4311 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, July 12, 1971, 1020Z The Embassy supported an urgent request from the Afghan Government for 100,000 tons of wheat under PL–480. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message. The Afghan request was conveyed to the Embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an aide-mémoire on June 14. (Telegram 3767 from Kabul, June 15; ibid., AID(US) 15–9 AFG) On July 31 AID authorized the Embassy to begin negotiations for a PL–480 agreement for the requested amount of wheat. (AID airgram A-1632 to Kabul; ibid., AID(US) 15–8 AFG) 339. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, July 29, 1971 The intelligence note assessed the prospects for success of the Zahir ministry. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. On May 16, the Government of Nur Ahmad Etemadi resigned as a result of an impasse with the Parliament. (Telegram 3229 from Kabul, May 17; ibid.) On June 8 King Zahir appointed his “long-time friend and confidant” Dr. Abdul Zahir as Prime Minister and asked him to form a government. Dr. Zahir, who had a long career as a public servant, was educated as a physician in the United States. The Embassy in Kabul judged that Zahir’s strengths as Prime Minister derived from his knowledge of the Afghan Parliament and the fact that he enjoyed the King’s confidence. (Airgram A-69 from Kabul, June 19; ibid.) 340. Telegram 4745 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, August 2, 1971, 0946Z Ambassador Neumann met with King Zahir and pointed up the problems he felt the new Government would have to address, particularly with regard to the economy. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. In telegram 4797 from Kabul, August 4, Neumann reported that he raised the same issues in his initial conversation with Prime Minister Zahir. (Ibid.) 341. Telegram 4851 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, August 7, 1971, 1345Z Ambassador Neumann urged a prompt response to the Afghan request for emergency assistance to deal with the effects of drought. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 AFG. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Sent attention for the Disaster Relief Coordinator. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Canberra, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Ottawa, USUN, Brussels, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG. 342. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson Washington, August 9, 1971 Van Hollen briefed Johnson on the severe impact of drought on Afghanistan. The sale of 100,000 tons of wheat under PL–480 had been approved recently, and Van Hollen alerted Johnson that the U.S. could expect an Afghan request for an additional 100,000 tons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Memoranda to the Secretary, July to Aug 1971. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/PAF by Robert A. Flaten, and cleared by Laingen and Van Hollen. On August 9 Eliot sent a copy of this memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG) 343. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Kabul, August 12, 1971 Neumann explained the part his Embassy played in prompting the Afghan Government to respond vigorously to the impact of the drought, and he advocated that the U.S and other creditor nations offer debt relief and long-term economic support to Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, McDonald (AID), Russell S. McClure of the Operations Appraisal Staff in the Auditor General’s Office in AID, and Laingen (NEA/PAF). 344. Telegram 5041 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, August 16, 1971, 1002Z Afghanistan requested a moratorium on the repayment of debt owed to the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Tehran, Tokyo, and the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels. Also repeated to the US Asian Development Bank representative in Manila. 345. Telegram 5067 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, August 17, 1971, 0933Z Because of the impact of drought, Afghanistan increased its request for U.S. wheat to 250,000 tons and asked for it on a grant basis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, and Rome for FODAG. A PL–480 agreement for 100,000 tons of wheat was signed in Kabul on August 23. The text of the agreement was transmitted to Washington on September 27 as an attachment to airgram A–110 from Kabul. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–4) 346. Telegram 166666 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Kabul, September 10, 1971, 2109Z The Embassy was instructed to inform the Afghan Government that the United States could not agree to a unilateral moratorium on debt payments. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential. Drafted in E/IFD by Albert C. Cizauskas and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub, cleared in NEA/PAF, in substance with Treasury, E/IFD/ODF, IBRD, and in information in IMF. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, London, and Tokyo. 347. Telegram 5641 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 13, 1971, 1305Z The Embassy supported the Afghan request for an additional 150,000 tons of wheat. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message. 348. Telegram 6010 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 28, 1971, 0755Z Ambassador Neumann informed Foreign Minister Shafiq that the U.S. was prepared to provide an additional 100,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan on a grant basis. The two then discussed the Afghan proposal for a debt moratorium. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential. 349. Telegram 6169 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, October 4, 1971, 1150Z Prime Minister Zahir expressed appreciation for the grant of wheat, and Ambassador Neumann explained the U.S. position on the proposed debt moratorium and offered advice on the management of Afghanistan’s debt problems. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential. 350. Telegram Secto 157 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State New York, October 14, 1971, 1924Z Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Shafiq discussed the Afghan economy as affected by drought, debt rescheduling, and the problem of illegal drugs. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 AFG. Confidential. Also numbered USUN 3497. Repeated to Kabul and Moscow. Rogers was in New York for the autumn meeting of the UN General Assembly. 351. Telegram 7282 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, December 4, 1971, 1230Z Ambassador Neumann reported that King Zahir and Foreign Minister Shafiq shared the U.S. concern about the flow of illegal narcotics from Afghanistan and were “taking the subject very seriously.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara and Paris. 352. Telegram 7281 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, December 4, 1971, 1235Z Ambassador Neumann discussed Afghanistan’s reaction to the crisis occurring in Pakistan with King Zahir and Foreign Minister Shafiq. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, and Tehran. 353. Telegram 616 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, February 1, 1972 In his year-end assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, Ambassador Neumann reported favorably on the performance and prospects of the Zahir government. He observed that U.S. relations with Afghanistan were good, and he recommended U.S. initiatives that could be undertaken to support the Zahir government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 AFG. Secret. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Tehran. 354. Telegram 22013 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, February 8, 1972, 1912Z The Department transmitted its narcotics control plan for Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Drafted on February 7 by Robert A. Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared by Laingen and with the NEA Inter-Agency Working Group on Narcotics, and approved by Davies. 355. Telegram 884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, February 12, 1972, 1114Z The Embassy “brought home” the narcotics problem to Afghan officials by stimulating and circulating foreign press coverage of the problem. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Confidential. Also sent to USIA. Sent as a joint USIS/Embassy message. 356. Telegram 956 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, February 16, 1972 0416Z Ambassador Gross reported that, although adverse weather prevented him from visiting Afghanistan, he had conveyed through an Afghan official President Nixon’s message concerning cooperative efforts to control opium production in Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S/NM. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Geneva, Kabul, Paris, and USUN. Nelson Gross was the Secretary’s Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs. The reference to a single convention is to the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, signed in New York on March 30, 1961. (18 UST 1407) 357. Airgram Toaid A-71 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Agency for International Development Kabul, March 20, 1972 The AID mission within the Embassy assessed U.S. efforts to help the Afghan Government deal with the impact of drought and concluded that continuing U.S support would help Afghanistan with the aftermath of the crisis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Unclassified. Drafted in the AID mission by Charles L. Husick, cleared in the mission by Albert R. Baron, John R. Wilson, Alfonso D. Dominquez, and Cecil H. Uyehara; also cleared in the Embassy by David H. Cohn and Louis L. Mitchell, Jr., and approved by mission director Bartlett Harvey. A notation on the airgram indicates it was received on March 27. 358. Telegram 52513 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, March 28, 1972, 1542Z The Department expressed concern that domestic pressures in Afghanistan and Pakistan might be pushing both countries toward another confrontation over the Pushtunistan issue. The Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad were instructed to counsel restraint. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential. Drafted on March 27 by Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared in NEA/PAF by Peter Constable and Laingen, and with EUR/SOV, and approved by Van Hollen. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated to Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and London. The reference to a recent Moscow speech is to a speech made by Prime Minister Zahir in Moscow on March 14 in which he described the Pushtunistan issue as the only problem that existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan and called for a “solution based on Pushtunistan people’s right to determine own fate.” (Telegram 2307 from Moscow, March 15; ibid., POL 7 AFG.) 359. Telegram 1806 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, March 31, 1972, 0400Z Ambassador Neumann reported that, in the context of a “vague atmosphere of political crisis” in Kabul, former Prime Minister Daud had initiated contact with the Embassy through an intermediary to inquire what the U.S attitude would be in the event that Daud reassumed power. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 56321 to Kabul, March 31, the Department endorsed the response to Daud outlined in paragraph 8 of this telegram. (Ibid.) 360. Telegram 2042 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, April 13, 1972, 0945Z On instructions, the Embassy replied to Daud’s initiative. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis. 361. Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, April 15, 1972, 0340Z Ambassador Neumann “again raised narcotics problem” with Foreign Minister Shafiq, stressing the need for stricter enforcement. Shafiq discussed the steps he was taking to deal with the problem. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Geneva, Islamabad, London, Paris, Rome, and USUN. 362. Memorandum From Robert A. Flaten of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (Laingen) Washington, May 31, 1972 Based on his recent experience as a member of the Embassy staff in Kabul, Flaten assessed the “creeping” political crisis in Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 AFG. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kabul, to Islamabad for Sober, and to London for G.B. Lambrakis. Attached but not published was the memorandum on Pushtunistan cited in Flaten’s assessment. On May 30 the Embassy in Kabul reported that the Zahir government was “subjected to strong domestic pressures that could bring it down any day.” (Telegram 3016; ibid.) 363. Telegram 4008 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, July 12, 1972, 0645Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally discussed U.S. relations with Afghanistan with King Zahir and Foreign Minister Shafiq on July 7. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Limdis. Sent to the Department with a request that it be forwarded to the White House for Jeanne Davis and to the Treasury for Leonard Dixon. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. He made a 1-day stop in Kabul on July 7 following his visit to Pakistan. Additional documentation on the trip is ibid. During his conversation with Shafiq, Connally was handed a paper that outlined economic problems for which the Afghan Government was seeking U.S. assistance. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department on July 13 in airgram A-84 from Kabul. (Ibid.) 364. Telegram 4884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, August 22, 1972 Chargé Lewis reported on his conversation with Prime Minister Zahir concerning the importance of coordinating efforts to manage and distribute emergency relief supplies. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN. 365. Telegram 5348 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 14, 1972 The Embassy reported that unless vigorous efforts were made to provide food to highland areas affected by “severe famine” before winter weather isolated those areas, as many as 200,000 faced starvation. The Embassy proposed measures the U.S. could undertake, including an airlift of wheat, to help deal with the crisis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint State/USAID message. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. 366. Telegram 169365 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Kabul, September 15, 1972, 2237Z. The Department concurred in the need for urgent action to try to prevent starvation in the western mountains of Afghanistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Flaten (NEA/PAB), cleared in draft with AID/ASIA/NE, AID/PRI/DRD, and DOD/ISA and by Laingen. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Moscow. 367. Telegram 5368 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 16, 1972 Ambassador Neumann discussed with King Zahir the measures being taken by the Afghan Government to deal with the food crisis. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. 368. Telegram 5636 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, September 27, 1972, 0330Z The Embassy reported that King Zahir had rejected the resignation of Prime Minister Zahir, but Foreign Minister Shafiq had emerged as the effective head of government and would very likely be appointed Prime Minister before the end of the year. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and USUN. 369. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State New York, October 12, 1972 Rogers met with Foreign Minister Shafiq at the United Nations to discuss U.S.-Afghan relations. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 AFG. Limited Official Use. Also numbered USUN 3836. Rogers and Shafiq were in New York for the autumn session of the UN General Assembly. 370. Telegram 6029 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State Kabul, October 16, 1972 The Embassy recommended provision of 20,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan in response to an emergency assistance request from the Afghan Government. The Embassy further suggested that the U.S. provide $400,000 to help offset the transportation costs of trucking food into areas affected by famine. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG 371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 12, 1972 Sisco informed Rogers that King Zahir had accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Zahir and had asked Foreign Minister Shafiq to form a new government. Sisco concluded that Shafiq “seems an outstanding choice for Prime Minister.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 319, 1972 POL-15.1 Prime Minister. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Flaten (NEA/PAB) and cleared by Laingen and Davies. 372. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 18, 1972 Sisco noted that Prime Minister Shafiq had promised “effective measures” to stop the illegal drug traffic in Afghanistan, and he credited the Embassy in Kabul with Shafiq’s public recognition of the importance of the narcotics problem. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted on December 15 by Flaten (NEA/PAB), cleared by Laingen, Davies, Seymour H. Glazer (NEA/RA), and by Harvey R. Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Narcotics Matters. Rogers wrote “no” in the margin next to the recommendation. The draft telegram to Neumann was attached but not published. 324. Memorandum From the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) 324. Memorandum From the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) 1 Kabul, February 13, 1969 SUBJECT: Conte-Long, Symington Amendments You will recall that in your meeting with the King on December 30, you raised the question of Afghan military expenditures. The King assured you that he was strongly determined not to develop excessive armed forces or increase any segment of the military establishment beyond what had been planned many years ago. He said that, in his view, it would be madness to develop the military beyond basic requirements in view of Afghanistan’s economic needs. He noted that in fact the long term military plan which had been drafted during Prime Minister Daud’s time (a three phase plan) had been markedly reduced. He explained that, of course, attrited equipment would be replaced but emphasized again that there would be no step-up in total Afghan military strength. To the best of our knowledge, admittedly scanty, the defense budget is in line with similar budgets for the last several years and that there is no significant increase. Attache sources indicate that in fact the Executive is trying to enforce more careful control by the military of their resources. In the last year, again to the best of our knowledge, Afghanistan has received the following “sophisticated” equipment: (a) 10 MIG 21s,which were delivered in mid-1968, are more sophisticated than planes received before but were part of the agreed Air Force level under the 1965 Loan Agreement with the USSR. (b) There have been fragmentary reports of a newer, larger, perhaps surface-to-surface, missile having been introduced in Afghanistan in 1967 but we have not been able to confirm this. [ text not declassified ] doubt that such “new” missiles exist here but the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–1, Conte–Symington amendments 1969. Secret. Neumann’s meeting with King Zahir on December 30, 1968, was reported to the Department on January 4 in telegram 42 from Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 AFG) The Conte–Long amendment was section 119 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL 90–249; 81 Stat. 936) The Symington amendment was section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. The amendment required the President to withhold economic assistance if in his view the recipient country excessively and unnecessarily diverted resources to military expenditures. (PL 90–137; 81 Stat. 445) 325. Telegram 2080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 325. Telegram 2080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, May 26, 1969, 1620Z Subject: Secretary’s Visit to Kabul 1. Summary: Atmosphere of talks with King Zaher and Prime Minister Etemadi May 25 was warm and friendly with emphasis on human values shared by us and Afghans and lack of problems between two countries. Afghans stressed importance to balance of power in area of continued US interest and presence. They received suggestion for improved relations from Pakistani President Yahya conveyed by Secretary in friendly manner without giving any indication their intentions re follow-up. End summary. 2. King Zaher emphasized old and close ideological ties US and Afghanistan with common interest freedom and democracy. Said he delighted President Nixon knew Afghanistan, sent best wishes his success and that of American people in coping with world problems. This all important to Afghanistan. King grateful for US econ aid but even more so for good intentions behind it. Remarked Afghan economic development had recently fallen behind a bit because of political problems but he not pessimistic on future. Welcomed President Nixon statement on Viet-Nam. Suggested possibilities of US-USSR cooperation seemed to be increasing. Said Afghan rels with USSR good; with Iran, excellent; with Communist China correct; with Pakistan some problems. 3. Secretary presented President Nixon’s letter, said warm feelings of President and late President Eisenhower for Afghanistan had already give him sentimental attachment for country. He glad US AID was useful and that Afghans appreciated it. Viet-Nam was very important problem; US flexible; some hope for progress; peace possible if other side willing. US is seeking to improve relations with USSR; cited Asst Secty Sisco’s talk on Near East, our hopes for arms limitations; said USSR could be helpful on Viet-Nam also; noted ChiComs had recently given USSR priority over US as number one enemy. (King said he had noticed this too.) 4. Re Afghan-Pak relations, Secretary conveyed President Yahya’s expression of interest improving relations, adding he did not wish be arbitrator. King said he also eager settle outstanding problem, and if Pakistan willing, hopes be able do so. Last thing Afghanistan wants is another quote hot spot unquote in Asia. 5. Prime Minister Etemadi, in brief exchange views before his lunch, again emphasized Afghan gratitude US AID and appreciation common human values. Twice repeated Afghan Government’s belief that continued US presence Afghanistan essential to maintenance difficult. It had to coexist with powerful neighbors; hence Kosygin’s visit next day. Lamented quote Pakistan’s introduction of Communist China unquote into area. Afghan relations with Communist China were quote not quite warm unquote. Afghanistan did not wish hurt Pakistan, willing to do ten things for every one Pakistan did to improve relations. However, Paks did not reciprocate, abused Afghanistan in President Ayub’s book, refused cooeprate in Afghan plans for regional transit arrangement among USSR, Iran, Afghanistan, and India, and denied existence of quote Pushtunistan unquote problem. 6. Secretary remarked President Yahya’s statements previous night about Afghanistan had been almost same in reverse. Mentioned message which he had conveyed to King, and said he thought new government in Pakistan might be ready talk. Added US understood importance which Afghanistan and other Asian nations placed on our continued interest in area, but American people were also concerned over animosities among neighbors in Asia and hoped parties concerned would do something about them. Secretary ended by reiterating purpose his visit was to demonstrate US friendship for Afghan Government and people and to hear of their economic progress. (FYI: paper on economic problems and progress which Prime Minister passed to party will be forwarded Kabul Embassy after reproduction in Washington. End FYI) 7. For Rawalpindi: You may inform President Yahya that Secretary conveyed his message to King Zaher who received it in friendly manner. (FYI: As Secretary told PM Etemadi, it appears further progress on Pak-Afghan problems may turn on quote who makes the first telephone call unquote. We believe decision on this is up to Kabul and Rawalpindi. End FYI) Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Rawalpindi. Repeated to Kabul, London, Moscow, Ankara, and New Delhi. Also sent as Secto 115. Secretary Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore, Pakistan May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25. A fuller account of Rogers’ conversation with Etemadi was sent to the Department on June 2 in airgram A–84 from Kabul. (Ibid., POL AFG–US) 326. Country Policy Statement on Afghanistan 326. Country Policy Statement on Afghanistan 1 Washington, August 6, 1969 Country Policy Statement—Afghanistan Background Afghanistan remained outside the mainstream of international events as a backward and isolated buffer state between British and Russian power for over a hundred years. This power relationship changed significantly in 1947; component elements were the withdrawal of British power from the subcontinent, the creation of two relatively fragile independent nations out of British India, the rise of the Soviet Union as a major world power and the assumptiontion by the United States of far-flung security and assistance responsibilities in the face of Soviet ambitions and pressures. In the early 1950’s, the RGA decided to end its historic isolation and requested U.S. military assistance on the condition that some form of territorial guarantees would be extended by the U.S. This request was rejected by U.S. policy makers, who reasoned that American security guarantees were impracticable for isolated, land-locked Afghanistan and that, in view of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1926 (Neutrality and Non-aggression), a military and security relationship with Afghanistan might be considered provocative and result in a confrontation with the Soviet Union in an area in which Soviet power was strong and U.S. power vulnerable. Rebuffed in this approach to the U.S. and concerned over Pakistan’s increased military strength, as well as Pakistan’s adherence to CENTO and SEATO, the Afghans responded to the Soviet Union’s offers of large-scale military and economic assistance. Assessment A. Afghanistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union and its vulnerability to pressures from its northern neighbor make close relations with the Soviets imperative. This fact, plus the Afghans’ continuing conviction that massive economic assistance—both from the Soviet Union and the West—is essential to Afghanistan’s development, requires that the RGA pursue a carefully-structured non-aligned foreign policy. While the Afghans have recognized Communist China, seek close association with the neutralist camp of India, Yugoslavia and the UAR and are active members of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, they at the same time seek close and cordial relations with the United States, West Germany and other western states. B. The Afghans display an intense desire to maintain their national independence and territorial integrity and to develop their institutions and economy in directions and at a pace of their own choosing. C. Although Soviet propaganda and non-aligned rhetoric against imperialism have some psychological impact on Afghans, their leaders traditionally have been inclined toward Western institutions, culture and ideals rather than to Soviet models. The decision to institute the experiment in parliamentary democracy which commenced in 1963 is clear evidence of this bias of the Afghan leadership, which in large part is due to the training in the West of a substantial portion of its members. D. The Afghans’ shrewd appreciation of the dangers inherent in overly-close ties with the Soviet Union have led them to consider an important American presence in Afghanistan indispensable to help them balance Soviet influence. Therefore, our economic and technical assistance has considerable political importance and assures us a significant level of influence without having to match Soviet economic assistance on a dollar for ruble basis. At the same time, the very considerable Soviet leverage in Afghanistan has established limits to U.S. influence. E. Moscow has given its relations with Afghanistan a high priority—over a billion dollars in economic and military aid. The Soviets probably are reasonably satisfied with present conditions in Afghanistan where, using the methods available to any great power rather than direct intervention or active subversion, they have obtained the preponderant foreign influence and the potential of further expanding it. Through massive economic assistance, a virtual monopoly in training and equipping the Afghan armed forces, a favored position in Afghan trade, the careful dissemination of propaganda and the education in the Soviet Union of hundreds of Afghans, the Soviets can pursue a number of objectives: the limiting of U.S. influence and the prevention of any sort of Western alignment; obtaining Afghan support for their position on various international issues; and the use of Soviet foreign aid for the promotion of the state sector of the Afghan economy, so as to draw Afghanistan gradually into the “non-capitalist path of development”. Given present conditions, the establishment of control over Afghanistan by means of direct intervention or by a major attempt at subversion to achieve an Afghan communist regime would not appear to be in the Soviet interest. Such action would cause serious damage to Soviet interests in other Afro-Asian areas where Soviet policy objectives currently have a higher priority than Afghanistan. For example, in its dealings with other neighboring states, such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, Moscow can represent the Soviet posture toward Afghanistan as a prototype of the kind of relationship it would like to establish with those states. Parallel, however, with this policy of coexistence, the U.S.S.R. is also attempting to establish clandestine intelligence gathering and subversive assets which could be used in the event that: (1) new policy directions for the area were decided upon; (2) grave instability in Afghanistan appeared to threaten Soviet interests; (3) new Afghan leadership attempted to decrease substantially Afghanistan’s current relationship with the U.S.S.R.; or (4) the struggle with Communist China demanded in Soviet eyes more direct control of this country. F. Internally, Afghanistan is going through a difficult period of political and social reform. Since he emerged in 1963 as the principal power in the country, the King has attempted to lead his subjects from absolute monarchy to parliamentary democracy, while at the same time continuing the forced pace of economic development commenced in the mid-1950’s under the authoritarian regime of Prince Daud. Political reforms, which have been essentially imposed from above, moved cautiously forward during 1963–64, but their progress since has been less even. The inability of the present Government (and its predecessor) to work effectively with an inefficient but assertive parliament, recurrent student unrest over the past year, a stagnant economy and the growing strength and organization of disruptive, leftist factions have combined to raise questions as to the durability of Afghan democracy and its capacity for satisfying the demands of a slowly modernizing society. But the inevitable stresses caused by rapid social and political change in a traditional society still appear to be manageable. The king, whose role is of course crucial to the future course of political events, appears determined to proceed with the parliamentary experiment. This will require that he retain the backing of the principal power centers—the military, bureaucracy and the major tribes—and by and large he still has their support. G. Special Problems 1. “Pushtunistan”—The “Pushtunistan” issue poses a continuing threat to favorable Afghan-Pakistan relations. This controversy, which concerns the question of self-determination for the four to five million Pushtu-speaking tribesmen living in the northwest frontier area of Pakistan, poses a dilemma for the RGA in satisfying vocal, pro-“Pushtunistan” politicians and at the same time not creating serious tensions with Pakistan. (40 to 50 percent of the population of Afghanistan is Pushtun.) A severe deterioration of Afghan-Pak relations over this intractable dispute—with another closure of the border—would seriously obstruct Afghan economic progress, create additional pressures toward Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union, especially in respect to foreign trade, and seriously impede our own activities in Afghanistan. 2. Afghan Defense Expenditures —The Afghans’ determination to obtain greater security against a larger and militarily more powerful Pakistan, and to bolster the Government’s control over a largely tribal and frequently unruly population, brought about a thorough-going modernization and expansion of Afghan military forces beginning in the mid-1950’s. With Soviet assistance, the Afghan military have accumulated a variety of sophisticated weaponry, including MIG–21’s, and defense expenditures have consistently hovered at about 20 percent of the national budget or roughly 1.1 percent of GNP over recent years. As the military have obtained the capability of defending the regime against any coalition of tribal and ultra-conservative religious elements and as acute tensions with Pakistan have diminished, deliveries of sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union seem to have slowed. We have no knowledge of any supplemental arms agreements which might have been negotiated since January 1968, although some items may still be in the pipeline from earlier agreements. We have impressed upon Afghan officials the potential problem that their defense expenditures, or further acquisitions of sophisticated weapons, could cause us in terms of the Conte and Symington amendments, and counseled them to hold down defense expenditures. We have reason to hope that the RGA’s awareness of this potential problem, plus the intense fiscal constraints it is under in its effort to find the domestic resources to sustain its development effort, will cause it to hold the line on defense spending and, possibly, in due course even reduce them. H. The next five to ten years may be critical for Afghanistan. Externally, a growing Soviet presence in both Iran and Pakistan could affect our interest in keeping a neutral balance in Afghan policy. The same period could also set the pattern for Afghanistan’s posture towards greater regional involvement. Internally, this period will likely see the evolution of political parties and of new political leaders, with a consequent sharpening of political differences, particularly between extreme left and right. Also, there will be a doubling or trebling of Afghanistan’s university graduates, many of whom will face difficulty in finding a productive life in society, an increasingly informed public with rapidly increasing demands, and a weakening of the traditional institutions which in the past have given some security. At the same time, the new institutions will probably still be weak. U.S. Objectives The chief significance of Afghanistan for the United States is in the effect developments there could have on the area as a whole. We have long recognized that we have an important interest in this country in the sense that Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation from our overall area interests; historically, developments in Afghanistan have had a direct impact on neighboring countries and this is still the case. Excessive Soviet influence in Afghan affairs would materially increase the psychological and subversive vulnerability of Iran, Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, India—countries to whose security the U.S. has given a high priority. Our objectives in Afghanistan are: 1. An independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, willing and able to impose limitations on Soviet influence in its affairs. Following from this: a. The maintenance of internal security and political stability; b. The development of governmental institutions conducive to political stability in a traditional society which is undergoing rapid social change; c. Afghanistan’s economic development at a rate to meet the rising expectations of a more politically conscious people. 2. The development of closer Afghan regional ties through the improvement of relations with Pakistan and Iran. Strategy Our strategic aim is to maintain a substantial U.S. presence in Afghanistan to enable us to continue developing offsetting influences to the Soviet presence in the country. It would not be realistic for us to seek the exclusion of Soviet influence, nor would our interests be served by competing with the U.S.S.R. for preeminence in the country. We do not want Afghanistan to become a serious friction point in U.S.-Soviet relations and, it would appear, the Soviets share our view. Our presence in Afghanistan takes the form of economic aid programs, diplomatic representation, modest assistance in military training, a Peace Corps program and informational activities. Our strategy will be to exert influence on Afghan policy through building on the base of the cordial diplomatic relations we now enjoy with Afghanistan. The Afghans appreciate the manner in which the U.S. has respected Afghan non-alignment. Our general posture should be maintained but combined, as in the past, with firmness when the RGA strays from neutrality on issues important to us. We should seek opportunities to coordinate actions and policies, to explain our positions on key issues even though we know the RGA will not agree or change its public position, and to seek Afghan views on issues important to it. This posture can effectively, and relatively inexpensively, be strengthened through periodic visits of high-level U.S. officials to Afghanistan. A. Specifically, we can maintain a significant presence in Afghanistan and, barring major new Soviet initiatives, maintain over the next five years roughly the present balance between U.S. and Soviet influence, through the following lines of action: 1. A vigorous and selective economic assistance program —The U.S. has had a varied and active aid program over the last decade or more. The USAID Mission through its activities provides the bulk of the American presence in Afghanistan. (AID employees currently account for about 220 of the total of approximately 450 in the official American community.) Over time, our assistance has been a mixture of infrastructure projects (roads, airfields, irrigation and reclamation, etc.) and technical assistance (including participant training in the U.S.). At this point, our activities are almost entirely confined to technical assistance, largely concentrated in the key areas of education and agriculture. While we have no further developmental loans planned at the moment, we should be prepared to examine worthwhile project proposals as they occur and to consider periodic commodity assistance as a supplement to our technical assistance. To the extent it is compatible with our other aid objectives, selection of future projects and/or eligible commodity lists should serve the objectives of the U.S. export expansion program. Our program effort should be continued at roughly its present level; substantial cuts below this level could lead both the Afghans and the Soviets to conclude that we are “pulling our chips out”. Alternatively, we could retrench, cutting our economic support and reducing our presence substantially. But Afghanistan is far from capable of doing without external economic assistance, and for us to retrench significantly would in effect be a recognition of unchallenged Soviet influence on Afghan actions. This would adversely affect our area interests. On the other extreme, we could greatly increase our economic role in the country. But limitations on our resources, the inability of the RGA to handle massive new aid infusions and the danger that such a policy would be misconstrued by the Soviets make this line impractical and unwarranted. a. Increased Involvement of Other Donors —While continuing our own assistance, we should at the same time attempt to increase the involvement of other Western countries and such institutions as the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank in the Afghan development process. b. “Self-Help” —We should urge the RGA to maximize Afghanistan’s own contribution to the development process. The FAA’s economic “self-help” performance has not been fully satisfactory and the Mission has been obliged to press top officials of the RGA to make greater efforts to mobilize domestic resources for development. We should continue to use the leverage which we derive from our assistance to induce the RGA to improve its performance and we should also remain alert to possibilities for coordinating our demarches with those of other present and potential aid donors—the IMF, the World Bank, West Germany, the U.N. Development program and possibly the Asian Development Bank. c. Afghan Defense Expenditures —We should continue to impress upon Afghan officials the necessity to restrict expenditures in the military field, including those for sophisticated equipment, in order not to jeopardize the continuation of our economic assistance through the imposition of penalties under the Conte/Long and Symington amendments. d. Encourage more private-sector activity, domestic and foreign —Afghanistan’s investment climate is improving, opening up more opportunities for an effective boost to Afghan development through private initiative and investment. We should continue encouraging improvements in investment legislation and administration and the creation of needed credit facilities. We should also encourage useful private investment in Afghanistan from various western countries, including the United States, as the opportunities for viable investments increase. 2. Maintain an active, multi-pronged USIS Program —U.S. information, cultural and English teaching programs can contribute much to a better Afghan understanding of the United States, its people, its history and its policies. Also, by fostering a better understanding of Western approaches to national development, sovereignty and independence over the next ten years, our informational activities can contribute indirectly to the evolution of representative government in Afghanistan, which we consider desirable. The small (three officers) but effective USIS unit is now adequate to our needs. Increased emphasis on target group programming, improved methods of communications and the maintenance of active international visitor and student exchange programs are required to effectively promote understanding of U.S. policies. The information and cultural efforts of the Mission will be primarily directed toward the future leadership of the country, particularly university students and the academic community. 3. Continue the sizeable Peace Corps Program —Our large Peace Corps Program; which emphasizes close keying to projects to which the RGA gives real priority, is a significant part of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The Volunteers activities and the close contact they have with their Afghan counterparts are a very useful leaven in the process of social change. While the number of Volunteers in the country at any given time fluctuates, the present contingent of about 220 represents about the optimum figure. 4. Continue our MAP —We should continue to bring a few selected Afghan military officers to the U.S. for training each year. The officers we have selected in the past under our military assistance (training only) program provide our only entry into the politically-important Afghan military establishment, which is extremely vulnerable to Soviet influence. Moreover, a few (e.g., the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Air Force) have already risen to high command positions and more can be expected to do so over the next few years. The present program level, which allows us to train between 20 to 30 officers a year for $0.2 million, is about right. Significant increases in our military assistance would probably be imprudent because of Afghan reluctance to provoke an adverse Soviet reaction and the danger of upsetting the delicate foothold we now hold in the Afghan military. On the other hand, slight increases in program funding may be in order to keep the number of officers trained at the present level. B. Encourage and assist Afghanistan to closer regional ties —The promotion of closer ties between Afghanistan and its free-world neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran, can contribute to diminishing Afghan dependence on the U.S.S.R. and to regional stability. In Afghan-Pak relations, we must recognize that our influence with either Government in respect to the chronic “Pushtunistan” issue is very limited, as we found out in the 1961–63 crisis, but we must be alert to the danger signals and stand prepared to use whatever influence we have should a crisis develop. In the long run, probably the best that can be hoped for is a continuing low heat issue while both countries gradually integrate their tribes into their national societies and develop greater economic and commercial ties. Meanwhile, the U.S. should do what it can to encourage closer economic ties between the two countries and greater cooperation on such matters as transit trade. The climate may be the best in many years for efforts to develop Afghan-Iranian relations and we should investigate carefully areas of possible cooperation to ascertain whether we can play an unobtrusive, useful role. The Afghan and Iranian positions on the long-standing Helmand Waters dispute are now sufficiently close to make a settlement possible. We should consider offering technical advice, should both sides request it, and possibly encourage the World Bank or some similar multi-lateral group to extend its good offices to help resolve the remaining outstanding problems. We should be careful, however, in offering assistance, not to provide opportunities to either party to defer decisions among themselves. C. Encourage Afghans in the continuation of the “experiment in democracy” —Although we are in no way the authors of the movement toward representative government now underway in Afghanistan, the U.S. and the West are associated with it in the minds of many educated Afghans and its demise might reflect adversely on our position in the country. So long as the parliamentary experiment continues to be wisely directed, the new trend is clearly in our interest because, over the long run, representative government offers the greatest flexibility and the best prospects that Afghanistan can successfully cope with the social stresses arising from rapid modernization of a traditional society. Moreover, a politically free Afghan society should be the most resistant to the cumulative effects of continued Soviet propaganda and any future, major attempt at subversion All our programs, and particularly our information and cultural activities, can indirectly make an important contribution in discretely encouraging Afghans in their demonstrated preference for patterning their political institutions on western models. It is not in our interest to become directly involved in any way in Afghan domestic political affairs, however, and in this subtle and sensitive area our efforts to promote support of the experiment in democracy through personal contacts should be closely controlled. The brunt of this effort should fall on the Ambassador and selected high-ranking Mission officers who, in their contacts with Afghan decision-makers, particularly the King and those members of the Royal Family who support the reform movement, can express our moral support of the experiments. We should recognize that the sudden loss of the King or a decision by him to sharply slow down or even suspend the parliamentary experiment would create serious tensions and possibly produce a reversion to the strict authoritarian rule Afghanistan previously experienced. We should be prepared to maintain essentially the same posture in our relations with Afghanistan in such a situation, provided that any successor regime shows the same determination to preserve the country’s independence, its freedom from excessive Soviet influence and its non-aligned policy. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret. According to an attached cover sheet, signed by Sisco as Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, and also signed by Country Director Spengler, and Sober, as Staff Director of NSCIG/NEA, the group approved the statement and issued it “for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Afghanistan.” A table of contents was also attached but not printed. Sober drafted the policy statement. Richardson sent an advance copy of the statement to Kissinger. (Ibid.) 327. Information Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Spengler) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) 327. Information Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Spengler) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) 1 Washington, August 27, 1969 SUBJECT: Afghanistan’s Acquisition of SU-7 Jet Aircraft and the Conte and Symington Amendments As you know, we recently were alerted to the possibility of a Conte Amendment problem with Afghanistan. Our Defense Attache at Kabul has now confirmed by visual observation (during the August 23 Jeshyn fly-past) the presence in Afghanistan of three SU-7 fighter-bombers, a new item in the Afghan arms inventory and one which in terms of the Conte Amendment would quite clearly be “sophisticated”. The recent delivery of these SU-7’s confirms in part reports we received earlier that the RGA negotiated in December 1968 for the purchase of a total of eleven SU-7’s from the Soviets at a roughly estimated cost of $889,000 each. It also was reported that they were to be paid for out of a line of credit for military equipment previously granted to Afghanistan by the Soviets, quite possibly prior to 1968. Since January 1968, we have discussed with a number of Afghan leaders including King Zaher our concern, in the context of both the Conte and Symington Amendments, over Afghan defense spending and the Afghans’ acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, which includes T–54 tanks, MIG–21’s and over 100 SA-2 missiles. Being aware of our concern, the RGA must have anticipated a negative U.S. reaction to the appearance of the SU-7’s. On August 20, a Foreign Ministry official told our Charge that the SU-7’s “constituted nothing new whatsoever in terms of Afghanistan’s overall military capability” and said that they were intended as replacements within overall squadron strength and structure according to an “agreement” (presumably with the Soviets) which long predated the Conte Amendment. There are some possible discrepancies between the Foreign Ministry’s version of the SU-7 story and information we have from other sources. Moreover, even if the Afghans can make a persuasive case that the newly-acquired SU-7’s are being financed from a line of credit predating the Conte Amendment, it is not clear whether this would make the Conte Amendment inapplicable. This constitutes a neat legal point which AID’s General Counsel has not yet faced in Conte Amendment cases. We are preparing a joint State/AID message to our Embassy endorsing Ambassador Neumann’s proposal to seek clarification of the SU-7 transaction from top RGA officials and specifying the information we need from the RGA in order to help determine whether the Conte Amendment is applicable in this situation. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret. Drafted by Walter G. Ramsay. A copy was sent to Rockwell. 328. Telegram 146191 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 328. Telegram 146191 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 Washington, August 28, 1969, 2238Z SUBJECT: Conte Amendment REFS: (a) Kabul 4374; (b) NHK 3149; (c) NHK 3156 1. Afghanistan’s recent acquisition SU-7 jet aircraft poses question whether RGA has entered into firm arrangements with USSR, post January 2, 1968, for additions to present inventory of weapons which, in context of Conte Amendment, are sophisticated. Consequently, we must determine whether Conte Amendment is applicable in this case. 2. Agree (ref a) that there possible discrepancies between Farhadi’s account of SU-7 deal and information we have from other sources, and that you should seek high level RGA clarification and additional details. 3. In course your discussions with RGA, you should state that since January 1968, when we first informed Afghans of the obligations imposed on USG by Conte and Symington Amendments, we have hoped to establish a frank dialogue which would serve our separate national interests and our mutual interest in continuing, unimpaired, U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. We have hoped that this dialogue, while recognizing that Afghanistan as sovereign power has obvious right to determine its own security requirements, would nevertheless lead to Afghan policies and actions which would obviate any application of these U.S. legislative requirements. Unfortunately, appears Afghans have not responded as we had hoped. 4. You should make clear that that the RGA’s recent acquisition of SU-7’s makes it imperative that we now examine this transaction specifically in light of Conte Amendment. We obviously can be more effective in determining what must be done if we have all the facts and can thus be sure of our ground. We therefore hope that the RGA will now consent to provide information to permit 16s to meet our mandatory legislative requirements. 5. To determine applicability of Conte Amendment, we need to know: A. When firm arrangements for acquisition of SU-7’s were made, number of aircraft involved, and whether transaction on grant, loan or cash sale basis. B. If loan or cash sale, total amount of payment to be made and schedule therefor. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Joint State/AID message. For the Ambassador. Drafted by Ramsay (NEA/PAF); cleared by Rockwell, Richard C. Matheron (J/PM), and with DOD/ISA, AID/NESA, AID/GC, and AID/PPC; and approved by Spengler. 329. Letter From the Country Officer for Afghanistan (Ramsay) to the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) 329. Letter From the Country Officer for Afghanistan (Ramsay) to the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) 1 Washington, August 29, 1969 Dear Charlie: Thank you for your letter of August 21 regarding SU-7’s and the Conte Amendment. While we can answer some of your questions quite specifically, we have little to offer in the way of guidance on how to handle this problem because the Department and AID’s experience with Conte cases has been so limited and there are so many intangibles involved. You ask what the mood in Washington on all this is. You have the answer in the form of State 146191 which we sent off yesterday. Since we received the first reports last February that the SU-7 deal was impending, no one here has had any doubt whatsoever that if and when SU-7’s arrived in Aghanistan and were displayed in public a decision on the applicability of the Conte Amendment would automatically be required. I think you were somewhat wide of the mark in speaking of someone back here pushing the lever for a Conte determination. That lever was pushed in Kabul (and in Moscow) and the fact of the matter is that the Afghans have already boxed us and themselves in. In the weeks ahead we will do our best to cope with this Conte problem but I really am not very hopeful that this is going to work out very well. As you know, the Department has sent to the Hill a proposal to revise and soften the language of Section 620 (v). I hear optimistic noises coming out of AID to the effect that Congressman Conte seems to be agreeable to softening the Amendment, but a telephone call to Kay Folger today confirmed my impression that these hopeful statements are premature. Kay thinks it would be foolish to try to predict what, if anything, will be done to the wording of the Amendment. Even assuming the best situation, i.e., that the Afghans are financing this transaction out of a line of credit predating 1968, the situation is very uncertain. The AID General Counsel’s office, which will have a powerful voice in this matter, still tells us that even if the RGA can make a persuasive case that the SU-7’s are being financed from an earlier line of credit, it is still not clear whether this would make the Amendment inapplicable. This is creating a neat legal point which they had not yet faced in The vew Conte amendment cases they have handled. [ text not declassified ] reports we are receiving appear to make it increasingly less likely that the Afghans will be able to make a persuasive argument on this point. I might note here my appreciation for Rawan Farhadi’s marvelous obfuscation on this point (and several others) when he talked to Bruce Laingen (para 2, Kabul’s 4374). It is also very difficult to predict just it how we will react to what the RGA tells us or does not tell us about this transaction. During the last week, I have talked to the desk officers for the few countries where we have had substantial experience with the Amendment and learned that they could provide only limited advice because there are few hard and fast guidelines. What would we do, for example, if the RGA falls back on its national dignity and refuses to give us any information on the transaction and payment terms. This was the case in Nigeria where the GON’s acquisition of jet aircraft was public knowledge but the payment terms were not. We had obtained a fairly good idea of the terms through our Intelligence channels and made a deduction from our assistance on the basis of the Intelligence Community’s “best estimate: of the amount the Nigerians spent. Incidentally, we have penalized Nigeria due to the Conte Amendment not once but twice. In both cases, however, we fortunately were able to make the reductions from “suspended” capital projects in Biafran-held territory so the damage done to our political relations was held within acceptable limits. Another worrisome aspect of the SU-7 transaction is the effect it might have on Afghanistan’s status in respect to the Symington Amendment. To my surprise, our colleagues in AID are very relaxed in this regard and seem to think we have nothing to worry about. According to Bob Lkine in AID/PPC, they expect Afghanistan to remain on the “green” part of the Symington list when it is reviewed in September for FY 1970. He says this is because Afghanistan ranks well below the median in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP, under but close to the median in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of Central Government expenditures and over the median only in terms of foreign exchange expenditures. Kline did add that a “startling increase” in Afghan military expenditures would be likely to put Afghanistan on the “amber” list. I myself am inclined to be more uncertain of what would happen, for instance, if the Afghans were to come in with a PL–480 request in the near future. I recall how perilously close we came t o receiving a negative reaction from the White House in regard to the July 1968 PL–480 agreement, at a time when Afghanistan was on the “green” part of the Symington list. Although total defense expenditures may not have gone up since then, the vigor of the Afghan economy and the pace of Afghan development certainly have not gone up either and we do face the psychological impact of the recent SU-7 deal. I intend to take further soundings on this in the coming week or two and will keep you informed. We look forward hopefully with apprehension and a decided air of resignation. With warm regards, Sincerely yours, Walter G. Ramsay 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret; Official-Informal. The letter is an unsigned copy. NAAS’ August 21 letter to Ramsay is ibid. 330. Telegram 4515 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 330. Telegram 4515 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 4, 1969, 0835Z Subj: Conte Amendment Ref: State 146191 1. In call on Farhadi, Director General Political Affairs in Fon Off, Aug 30 I told him I was under instructions raise purchase SU-7s in light Conte Amendment. I reviewed legislative history and gave him copy of relevant protions of Foreign Assistance Act. I particularly drew his attention to language that “the President is directed...” and explained to him that executive branch of USG had no rpt no alternative but to investigate thoroughly purchase of sophisticated equipment by country to which US extending aid. 2. I then explained that to determine applicability of Conte Amendment we needed information on date of firm arragenements for SU-7s and financial details (para 5 reftel). 3. Farhadi said he would be in touch with us soon on my approach. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Repeated to DIA. 331. Telegram 5090 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 331. Telegram 5090 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, October 6, 1969, 1150Z Conte Amendment Ref: Kabul 4515 1. At first opportunity since Farhadi’s return from Rabat conference, I called on him Oct. 5 and noted that month had elapsed since my previous approach concerning acquisition SU-7 aircraft (reftel). 2. He said that following my earlier call he had discussed matter with King, PriMin and Min Def. Latter assured him that aircraft intended as replacement aircraft for planes which either have crashed or older aircraft to be removed from Afghan forces in view spiraling costs of maintenance. Min Def also said all negotiations for SU-7s had been concluded before Jan. 2, 1968 and he would provide Farhadi all pertinent details in near future. 3. Farhadi told me he believes King and others realize seriousness of Conte issue and fact that Embassy, as well as executive branch, had no option but to investigate thoroughly and enforce law if facts so indicate. He, therefore, expects full RGA cooperation although he has had some difficulties with Pri Min who has appeared very concerned over question whether amendment constitutes “condition” or political “string” to US aid. 4. I expect to see King within next two weeks (he will be in southern provinces until Oct 11) to follow up these preliminary steps at Fon Off level. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential. 332. Telegram 5218 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 332. Telegram 5218 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, October 14, 1969, 0815Z Conte-Long Amendment 1. During last week I had additional conversation (Kabul 5090) with Farhadi on SU-7 purchase. He passed some info which obtained from minister of defense, but we agreed it would be better get full story from king. 2. At audience with King Oct. 12 (other subject septels) he reviewed RGA military acquisition policy. Said that in 1955 a very detailed 20 year agreement was worked out with Soviets which included overall Afghan force levels, organization, and arms aid. Since that time there have been some changes in force levels (downward) and several delays in implementation, some due to Soviets inability provide equipment at scheduled time and others due RGA inability take on additional debts. He said he regretted more than anyone expenditures on defense in view nation’s great development needs and he supported overall objective of Conte Amendment. However, afghanistan, as was true for other countries, needed small effective defense establishment. 3. Turning to SU-7s, he said firm, written agreement for more sophisticated aircraft made in November 1964. Planes are provided on thirty year loan including ten year grace period, with latter to start on receipt of aircraft. according 1955 twenty-year plan, MIG 17s were to constitute this particular tranche of aircraft. However, due to earlier Pakistani acquisition F–104s, situation reviewed in Nov. 1964 and Soviets agreed provide MIG 21s. At later date Soviets said SU-7s had advantages in that they could be used in ground support role which potentially very useful for internal security. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential. Repeated to DIA for DIACO. 333. Telegram 24 From the Consulate in Auckland, New Zealand, to the Department of State 333. Telegram 24 From the Consulate in Auckland, New Zealand, to the Department of State 1 Auckland, January 16, 1970, 0600Z Subject: Bilateral Conversation With Afghan Prime Minister January 7, 1970 1. In addition Prime Minister Nur Ahmed Etemadi, following persons were on Afghan side: First Deputy Prime Minister Ardullah Yaftali; Minister of Planning Dr. Abdul Wahid Grabi; Minister of State Ghulam Ali Ayin; Director General for Political Affairs, MFA, Dr. Rawan Farhadi; Director Political Departments, MFA, Dr. Saadullah Gmaussi and Director Economic Affairs, MFA Dr. Abdul Wahid Karim. 2. In addition Vice President following Americans present: Ambassador Neumann, Blair, DCM Lainger, Houdek, Political Counselor Naas. 3. Following 35 minute tete-a-tete, Vice President and Prime Minister joined other participants. Pri Min commenced with warm welcome and expressions of pleasure having VP in Kabul which presented opportunity to exchange views on matters common interest. Moving into substance, Pri Min used technique of introducing his colleagues and then moving into subject in which they primarily involved. Introducing Yaftali he said that key problem for RGA was to move out of current economic stagnation. He emphasized Afghans intended rely primarily on their own efforts but hoped for continued support of US and other friends. 4. Turning to Sorabi, he explained that Afghanistan had mixed economy. First two 5-year plans had emphasized infrastructure and with help of US, USSR, FRG and others plans have been successfully implemented. 3rd 5-year plan was now in Parliament and emphasis was on small projects and private enterprise as ways get out of stagnation and provide employment. He said RGA must revise tax structure if it were to do more on its own. It was not easy task to convince people and especially Parliament of the need for self-reliance and austerity. It would be difficult to get land and livestock taxes through Parliament. 5. Presenting Farhadi, he said Afghan foreign policy of non-alignment and international cooperation with all was well known. Pointing to the long common boundary with USSR and 50 years of good relations, he said Afghanistan was living example of possibilities of coexistence of two countries which have absolutely nothing in common. Beliefs, political and social structures, history, etc. of Afghanistan-USSR were very different. Yet, USSR has helped greatly in Afghan economic development and there have been frequent contacts between officials of both countries; for example, Kosygin visited Afghanistan in 1969 to celebrate the 50th year of relations and PM, himself, had visited USSR in 1968. RGA firmly believed that such steady contacts and good relations with USSR had beneficial impact on entire area in relieving tensions. People had been skeptical in 1955 when particularly close relations had started, but in last 15 years affairs between two countries had gone very smoothly. In a sense, Afghanistan had shown this way to other countries in area; Iran, Pakistan and Turkey were now improving their relations with USSR. 6. As small country, PM continued, Afghanistan could not afford serious quarrels with neighbors; regional cooperation is essential. With this in mind, Afghanistan had proposed transit trade conference, but, unhappily Pakistan, in view its problems with India, had so far blocked convening of such conference. RGA believed economic and political problems must be separated. He noted that GOP attitude had hurt Afghan trade with India. He then added that there was, of course, the Pushtunistan problem with Pakistan. In very mild manner, he said that RGA simply wants self-determination for Pushtuns living in Pakistan and that RGA would always use peaceful means to reach solution. Under President Ayub relations between two countries had suffered, but he wished to assure VP that RGA had no ill intentions towards Pakistan. To contrary, prosperous, peaceful Pakistan was in Afghan interests. Under Yahya regime, relations had improved and current intention of GOP break up “one unit” was first visible step and it was premature to draw any long term conclusions. 7. With Iran, he said, there were no serious problems and two countries were united by special bonds of friendship and spiritual ties. He termed Helmand waters issue small “technical” problem and he was optimistic solution would soon be found. He expressed appreciation for past US good offices on this issue. Solution would open new era of cooperation, particularly in Chakhansur and Sistan. In connection with this matter, the PM said he wanted to record appreciation of RGA for US assistance in Helmand valley development. Afghanistan wanted to see this project succeed and this was important because so far more than $100 million had been invested and because the name of America was closely attached to it. More time would be needed to achieve the substantial contribution which this project could make. The RGA was especially anxious to see progress and development of the lower delta area and also the Kajakai hydroelectric scheme. (At this point the PM passed to the VP two aide-memoires. First generally describes RGA development efforts, plans and hope for continued foreign assistance. Second deals specifically with land development program of the Helmand-Arghandab valleys and desired US role. Copies being pouched NEA/PAF.) 8. Relations with China were “normal and correct” and China was extending some economic assistance. He recalled that President Nixon had said that world was entering “an era of negotiations.” RGA believed now is the time to apply this view to China as well. He hoped US would continue look for modus vivendi which would slowly dissipate misunderstanding over China problem. Philosophically, he said, all mankind has a common interest in surviving in this nuclear age. Unhappily arms races were seen everywhere and a terrible waste of resources was the result. 9. On Near East, he said he would be brief for RGA position well known: enforcement November 1967 Security Council resolutions and restoration of rights of Arab people. Afghans were saddened by strained relations between US and Arab states and he hoped US would place more faith and trust in leaders of Arab countries. 10. With respect Vietnam, RGA hoped peace would soon come so that Vietnamese people could solve their own problem. In allusion to Vietnam, he said, every country must find its own solutions to its problems; there must be a “national answer” and there could be no general pattern in peaceful settlement of disputes. 11. Turning briefly to internal affairs, he said development brings in its wake problems, particularly increasing expectations and the unrest of youth. Afgan society was divided; many want unrealistic overnight changes and yet at same time many doubt wisdom of current policy of social, political and economic development. His government, he said, was determined to adhere to principles of its democratic constitution and educate people not only on their rights but their responsibilities and obligations as well. He said his government came under heavy criticism from some quarters for moving too slowly but they did not understand difficult, time consuming, constitutional processes. Since there were no political parties as yet, he faced in effect 216 parties. However, he was optimistic that government would get through current very difficult period. 12. PM then concluded his presentation, again thanking the VP for his visit, a visit that had revived happy memories of visits by President Nixon, the late President Eisenhower, and Secretary Rogers. 13. The VP responded by expressing his own and Mrs. Agnew’s great appreciation for the welcome they had received in Afghanistan and in particular for the opportunity for frank talks with both the PM and his majesty. The VP said he deeply appreciated the emphasis on human dignity which the PM had referred to so often in his presentation of Afghanistan policies. This had deepened our respect for this very independent country that we admire so much. He had not at first expected to visit Afghanistan during this trip, and had been delighted when the President had asked him to add Afghanistan to his itinerary. He had been impressed to learn how rapidly Afghanistan had changed in the last 10 years, changes due in large part to Afghanistan’s firm policies of independence and neutrality and using its diplomatic skills to deal in a cooperative way with its neighbors in settling disputes and developing areas of understanding. 14. The US understood Afghanistan’s international posture completely. We were not distressed that the Soviets had close relations here; we hoped American assistance had been helpful too. The VP said he was also encouraged to hear of Afghan efforts to improve relations with China. The US was also trying, through relaxation of trade and travel, to improve its relations with China. The response had not yet been encouraging but the US recognized that China and its problems were large and complex and progress would not come quickly. We would keep trying to improve relations so that less of our resources are used in deploying arms against each other and more for the mutual benefit of our peoples. 15. However, we want Asians to know as well of our continuing commitments to our friends in Asia. Our friends must know that we will not turn our back on these commitments under any circumstances. President Nixon had made clear several cardinal points in our policy towards Asia: i.e. —We intend to stand by our friends and treaty commitments —Should small countries in Asia be the victim of outright aggression as distinct from subversion, we would feel constrained to look at the situation with a view toward protecting these countries including possibly utilizing our protective nuclear umbrella. —We believe strongly in regional economic cooperation, for example with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. While we recognize the obstacles to cooperation that stem from old and emotional political issues we will continue to encourage our friends to find bilaterally ways to outgrow these problems and to improve relations. —Finally the Nixon Doctrine clearly recognizes the solution of Asian problems rests with Asians. The US as a pacific power will help those nations that have the courage and vision to do things for themselves but the intitative must come largely from them. 16. THE VP told the PM that the USG applauded Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution. He had been personally deeply impressed by his conversations with the King, who showed a deep sense of awareness and readiness to make adjustments to meet political problems. As far as Afghanistan’s problems with Pakistan and Iran were concerned, we saw these best solved through a continuation of bilateral discussion and exploration. On the Helmand waters, he was glad to hear that US technical help was useful. He knew Afghan relations with Pakistan were difficult but was nonetheless hopeful they could resolve their problems and would report to the President that the Afghan attitude was not hostile but rather one of openess and receptivity to dialogue and a peaceful settlement beneficial to both. 17. On economic side, the US would like to continue support for Afghan development efforts but USG had serious budget problems and inflationary strains to cope with. He wanted the PM to understand that in terms of the attitude of the American Congress, which had been somewhat unresponsive to date on the aid program, this could best be favorably influenced by evidence that our friends were doing their best to help themselves. Afghanistan would be its own best advocate by demonstrating what it could do on its own intiative. These things were more important in terms of what the US could eventually do in the aid field than what individual congressman might be saying at home. 18. Turning again to Afghan-Soviet relations, the VP commented that we were doing our best to improve relations with the Soviets (SALT, NPT, etc), although there are some disturbing attitudes and trends in that country that make this effort difficult. He thought that Afghanistan, as a mutual, respected friend of the Soviet Union and us might well be able to contribute an ameliorating influence on Soviet attitudes. VP gave as an example of what he had in mind the Soviet treatment of his own current trip abroad and he suggested to the PM that he look closely at their treatment of his trip. The USG does not denounce and vilify Soviet leaders but every invective that the human mind could conceive had been cast upon him since the trip started. Perhaps Afghanistan could help in getting across to the Soviets that this kind of abuse and heavy-handed diplomacy would contribute in no way to better relations. Obviously, this applied to China as well. There is no reason to inflame our peoples with invective. Soviets do not talk like this in our direct, private conversations. VP concluded this subject by saying that while he was not charging PM with onerous task of making this point to Soviets, we would welcome Afghanistan’s injection of this thought in whatever way it saw fit. 19. VP continued that American admiration for Afghanistan was not a conventional one. Rather we sense in Afghan candor and friendship a kindred spirit growing out of a common heritage where we have both felt adversity in defending our freedom. He and Mrs Agnew would never forget their visit and were anxious someday to return. 20. The PM remarked that the VP’s comments well demonstrated the USA’s desire for rapprochement and easing of tensions and that his country would do everything it could in pursuit of this common goal. They would do what they could in their small way to convey to the Soviets the points the VP had made. He wanted to point out, however, the complication that the current Soviet-Chinese ideological quarrel presented in this connection. In effect these two countries were competing with each other in ideological invective. Indeed the effect of this situation was felt in Afghanistan itself. Where the conflict between the differing schools of Communist ideology had affected the youth and had for example contributed to the demonstrations that had taken place during the VP’s arrival in Kabul. PM also felt that level of invective was symptomatic of “old guard” school of thought in USSR asserting itself. 21. The VP responded by noting that he was not a long-time participant in international diplomacy but that he thought there was one cardinal truth valid in both diplomacy and in dealing with young people. In his opinion we had too long been skirting the issues that needed to be talked about. Too often we are motivated by a desire not to upset or irritate our young people rather than talking frankly about the problem to be faced. There has not been enough firmness or leadership. The same applies to the international scene. If we want to live together we need to talk in a nonabrasive but frank and candid manner about our problems and we need to accept that there are other points of view not our own. No nation or individual should have the freedom to compartmentalize its own rights and demands while ignoring and denying that the other side might have valid interests and rights as well. As a small country, he hoped that Afghanistan would tell us forthrightly, for example when it thinks we are wrong and do so at the same time with the Soviets and with the Chinese. We would be open to frank suggestion and we hoped the other side would be too. 22. On Vietnam, for example, not many people have stopped to consider what President Nixon has really said; namely, that only one thing is non-negotiable in Vietnam and that is the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny free of outside interference. We have no interest in bases or in prolonging our presence there, but after our heavy sacrifices we cannot simply withdraw and abandon the South Vietnamese. In Paris, we are confronted with invective and adamant demands that we withdraw unilaterally. No solution was feasible in this way. Afghanistan, as an independent country, could help if it could look at the Vietnamese situation and tell us frankly and privately where it thinks we are wrong. It should do the same to the other side. VP concluded that he made these points in utmost seriousness; we need more candor in diplomacy if for no other reason than the fact that safety of our planet is involved. 23. The PM concurred warmly in this and with respect to Vietnam expressed his government’s deep hope that America’s new initiatives would lead to peace. PM concluded by saying President Nixon’s Asian policy was a new and healthy approach as compared to five years ago and it was apparent to all to see. Roland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Kabul. Also sent as VIPTO 21. Agnew visited Afghanistan January 6–7, 1970, as part of a 3-week tour of Asia, which included stops in the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nepal, South Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. Additional documentation on Agnew’s visit to Afghanistan can be found ibid., Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 3051B, Box 508, Lot 70 D 387, CF 425. Documentation on the entire trip can be found ibid., Boxes 506–510. During Agnew’s visit to Kabul, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the Vice President with an aide-mémoire outlining the effort Afghanistan was making to deal with its development problems, and another which put forward requests for additional funding of the AID program in the Helmand valley. The texts of the two documents were transmitted to Washington on January 17 in airgram A-06 from Kabul. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, E 5 AFG) 334. Memorandum From Vice President Agnew to President Nixon 334. Memorandum From Vice President Agnew to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 21, 1970 SUBJECT: PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE KING OF AFGHANISTAN Following the private dinner, the King invited me into his study, where we talked for approximately an hour with only his interpreter present. A quiet, rather intense person, with great dedication to his country, the King appears to be very well versed in world affairs. His first effort was to make certain that I understood the sensitive Afghan relationship with Soviet Russia. He explained that his country was the first to have diplomatic rapport with the Soviet government, and that the Afghans had received a very substantial amount of Soviet aid. He nevertheless made clear his commitment to maintain the independence of the Afghan people and implied that the presence and interest of the United States were important to his country. He subtly mentioned the declining levels of United States assistance while at the same time expressing appreciation for the aid. He indicated that his “experiment in democracy” launched through constitutional reform in 1964 was proceeding satisfactorily, but had raised the expectations of his people and created some unrest. There was an indirect reference to our possible altered stance with reference to the ChiComs, and I was led to believe that while the present Afghanistan relations with China are proper and correct, there is no love lost and that the Afghans feel much closer to the Soviet Union. There was some discussion of the water problem with Iran, (Helmand River), but apparently the Afghan government feels it can work out the difficulties with the Iranian government. The King said that the United States commission and its activities of technical investigation in this area have been very helpful. The principal worry on the King’s mind was the long-standing Pushtoonistan dispute with Pakistan. Knowing the United States position favoring the Pakistanis, I simply expressed sympathy with the problem and indicated that while the United States had expressed an opinion, our new Asian policy was not to be persuasive, but to leave the Asian nations to work out their problems bilaterally without undue influence from America. The King said that even though the dispute with Pakistan was an emotional one, there was no evidence of any breakout of hostilities; and he felt that so long as both sides continue to suggest new bases of settlement the matter could be eventually resolved. He stressed that the Pakistanis and Afghans have a great deal in common and that their economic and social interests are quite closely related. In short, he indicated that there was more to unite them than to divide them. I indicated that since his country enjoyed excellent relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States he was in a position to encourage new accord between the great powers. I expressed disappointment that the official Soviet news media, regardless of the progress of diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia, continued to exacerbate and inflame the situation through vicious characterizations of American policy and personnel. Perhaps, I suggested, the Soviets could be affected by a subtle indication by the Afghan government that these tactics were really not helping to solve the problems. The King appeared to be interested in these observations and stated that whatever his country could do to lessen the tensions between the great powers would be a profitable venture for mankind. The King did not raise the question of military aid. There was mention of the Afghan initiative to create regional cooperation between Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This regional effort, the King stated, was being thwarted by the absolute refusal of the Pakistanis to enter into any economic or developmental schemes with the Indian government. He felt it was tragic that all the other governments were willing but that without Pakistan the plan could not be properly implemented. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. On January 21 Agnew also sent Nixon a brief summary of his conversation with Prime Minister Etemadi, noting that it had been reported in greater detail earlier. (See Document 333 ) He sent copies of both memoranda to Kissinger, who forwarded them to Nixon on January 26, under cover of a memorandum summarizing them. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan) 335. Letter From the Afghan Minister of Planning (Sarabi) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) 335. Letter From the Afghan Minister of Planning (Sarabi) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) 1 Kabul, July 20, 1970 Your Excellency: The Government of Afghanistan wishes to request 100,000 metric tons of wheat under the P.L. 480 program for delivery during the Afghan calendar year 1349 which ends March 31, 1971. The wheat is urgently needed to supplement domestic supplies of foodgrains which are expected to be unusually low this year because of drought conditions which are adversely effecting the 1970 harvest of cereal crops namely wheat, corn, barley and to a lesser extent rice. The overall cereal crop harvest for 1970 is expected to be some 16 percent (600,000 to 700,000 metric tons) less than the 1969 harvest; and about 8 percent (300,000 tone) below the five-year annual average of total foodgrain production for the period 1965–69. Current estimates of the 1970 harvest for various cereal crops compared to last year’s bumper crops are as follows: total wheat crop down 15 percent or 400,000 tons (irrigated wheat down 5 percent or 100,000 tons and dry land wheat down 50 percent or 300,000 tons); corn crop down 15 percent or 100,000 tons; barley crop down 25 percent or 90,000 tons; and the rice crop down 10 percent or 40,000 tons. This year’s prices at harvest time are currently running around 45 percent higher than a year ago at the same time in most areas of the country. With the coefficient of price elasticity of demand for wheat estimated to be between +/- 0.3 and +/- 0.5 in Afghanistan, a 45 percent increase in the price of wheat would indicate roughly a 13 to 22 percent decline in domestic wheat production. Pre-harvest prices for corn are currently running around 35 percent higher than a year ago in anticipation of a poor harvest for this important summer irrigated foodgrain crop which is likely to be even more severely affected by short supplies of irrigation water than was irrigated winter wheat harvested during May thru July. The current price of barley its 70 percent higher than a year ago at this time. The drought conditions this year in Afghanistan are due to a substantially less than average snow pack last winter in the mountain ranges upon which river irrigation depends, light and infrequent winter and spring rains in the major wheat producing regions of the country, and higher than normal spring and early summer temperatures which caused faster than optimum ripening and drying-out of the wheat crop, all of which has affected wheat yields adversely in most areas of the country. This year the Kajaki and Arghandab reservoirs failed to spill for the first time since 1966. In 1966 the snow pack was light and the wheat crop was substantially below average as is the case during the current crop year. The increased use of improved wheat varieties and fertilizer (estimated at around 10 percent of the total irrigated wheat acreage for 1970) no doubt has helped to make the situation less critical this year than it otherwise would have been. The prospects for continued expansion in the use of improved seeds and fertilizer are good and with private sector distribution of fertilizer emerging, we are confident that this year’s situation is temporary and that permanent self-sufficiency in foodgrains will be achieved in the near future. Because of the foodgrain shortage this year and the anticipation of even higher domestic grain prices during the coming winter and spring months it will be impossible for the Government of Afghanistan to purchase the projected 60,000 tons of wheat from domestic sources under the wheat purchase and price stabilization program. Government domestic grain purchases are likely to be not more than 20,000 tons this year. Government stocks of wheat on hand going into the current harvest season which were carried over from last year’s domestic purchases and imports are estimated at around 100,000 tons. The amount now in government storage and the anticipated small amount of government purchases of domestic wheat this year will fall far short of the requirements to help meet the bread-grain shortages which are expected to develop before the 1971 crop is harvested. Therefore, there will be a need to import wheat during the next 10–12 months beginning as soon as possible. A total of 150,000 tons of wheat is the minimum import requirement for 1970/71 and is an amount which can be stored and handled satisfactory. The 100,000 tons of PL 480 wheat being requested here is urgently needed and will help to alleviate what could develop into a serious breadgrain shortage and price situation later in the year. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan is faced with continuing serious financial and balance of payment problems. Hopefully, the positive actions and corrective measures now being employed by our government will help to improve the situation, but it will take time for the results of these financial reforms to be felt. The Government of Afghanistan hopes that the United States Government will respond favorably to request for PL 480 wheat assistance. Respectfully yours, /s/ A.W. Sarabi Dr Abdul Wahed Sarabi Minister of Planning 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Unclassified. Sent to the Department on September 2 as an attachment to airgram Kabul Toaid A-375. Published from a copy that indicates Sarabi signed the original. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended. PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. (68 Stat. 454) 336. Telegram 6242 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 336. Telegram 6242 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, October 8, 1970, 0810Z Subject: PL–480 Wheat, Title I Ref State 142801 1. Mohseni, Chief, Economic Section RGA, MFA, Oct. 6, asked EmbOff status Washington deliberations on Afghan request for 100,000 mt wheat under PL–480, Title I. Mohseni said that he had cable from Ambassador Malikyar reporting his call at Department and MFA wondering when we would begin negotiations. Malikyar reported USG could not rpt not supply full tonnage requested due budgetary restrictions but thought 60,000 mt’s would be possisle. Report added USG willing consider remaining amount in next fiscal year. 2. In the ensuing dicussion, it evolved that MFA had not rpt not given consideration to necessity for sufficient lead time to assure Kabul deliveries in March/April. As result this discussion, Embassy and USAID/A would appreciate guidance about date on which we could expect to receive negotiating instructions. 3. EMB/AID believe early conclusion PL–480 agreement would have salutary effect on wheat and flour prices which have risen precipitously over levels of year ago. Price increases in three grades of wheat as of Oct 1 compared with same date 1969 were 64 percent, 81 percent and 110 percent: those of wheat flour, 70 percent and 75 percent. RGA has successfully sought stem price rises by releasing wheat from food department’s stocks: however our best guesstimate available stocks not rpt not more than 100,000 mt. 4. EMB/AID question efficacy of idea, which conveyed to us through official informal channels and which RGA now rpt now aware that RGA request be split 60,000 mt FY 71 and 40,000 mt FY 72, to meet budgetary limitations. We believe that need for full 100,000 mt in FY 1971 fully documented and supported by available data. If absolutely impossible to provide full amount do not rpt not judge it wise to tie shortfall to possible subsequent fiscal year requirements. If RGA requests PL–480 food grains for delivery in fiscal 1972, such request should be considered in terms of requirements and conditions obtaining at that time. It may very well be that shortfall from requested tonnage for fiscal 1971 delivery would be one of such conditions. But let’s not rpt not put ourselves in positions of committing something for next year on basis this year’s need. Laingen 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/AID message. On October 24, the Department authorized the Embassy to negotiate an agreement for 50,000 metric tons of wheat. Budgetary limitations precluded an agreement for the full amount requested. (AID airgram 2370 to Kabul; ibid.) The PL–480 agreement was signed in Kabul on March 27, 1971. (Telegram 2125 from Kabul, March 27; ibid.) The text of the agreement was transmitted to the Department on March 31 in airgram A-33. (Ibid.) 337. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 337. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Kabul, December 29, 1970 Dear Joe: Your good letter of November 27 arrived here on December 17 which is very slow for the classified pouch. It gave me a welcome opportunity to compose a little sooner my reflections on Afghanistan in 1970 which I had intended to do early in the new year. You and NEA/PAF have been kind and complimentary in recent messages and I am grateful. But just as there was no reason to be disheartened during periods when little forward movement was discernible, so I would now wish to warn against over-optimism in the face of the King’s recent and laudable activities. If I have learned anything in this part of the world I would put the following two lessons high on the list: 1. Things do not flow—they jerk. In the West one usually discerns some flow, or at least some activity which may logically be expected to produce action. In the East very often, especially in Afghanistan, nothing whatsoever seems to move but under the surface pressures of various kinds are built up and suddenly at some mysterious moment there is a sudden, spasmodic forward motion and then again nothing untill the process starts again; 2. When something does happen and you line up all the reasons which might have brought this action about, the one most cogent and logical from a Western point of view is unlikely to ue the true one. More likely something more oblique, more emotional, more prestige-ridden has been the cause of whatever action occurred. Against this background let me now turn to the questions inplied in your letter: Why does the King act when he acts? Why does he not act more often? I think that if, one were to examine the King’s priorities one would first have to mention stability, or to put it differently, political over economic development. And stability means to him among other things the constant and rather shrewd balancing of numerous forces in the country. The downfall of King Amanullah in 1929 has taught him and many Afghans that if the modernization process goes too fast and undermines the power basis, the interlocking family structures on which this country is based, everything may be in danger. Moreover, the area in which the King has by far the greatest knowledge and supreme skill, tribal relations, is the one in which he has learned and in which he practices to a fine point the art of balancing. Thus balancing the Pushtuns and the non-Pushtuns, the government people and the private entrepreneurs, the military and the civilian establishments, the various tribal groups, and last but not least the various branches of the Royal Family, is a constant and wily endeavor which can work only if things do not move too fast. Certainly it could be argued quite seriously that particularly outstanding and rapid economic progress could unbalance this system. Now after nearly four years in this country I am also inclined to regard the “democratic experiment” as part of this balancing act rather than as a novel and revolutionary approach to government. It tends to atomize the political forces in this country further, gives real power to none but keeps everybody busy and puzzled, and thus deprives the opposition of an opportunity to organize in a really dangerous fashion. The left opposition is better organized and the right opposition is larger, but neither present a “clear and present danger” at this time, except this is less true of theft; it is organizing and making more use than any other group of the situation. Moreover the “democratic experiment”, if successful, would also tend to add stability in case of the King’s demise, always a dangerous moment in a Moslem country as the Islamic tradition tends to equate power with legitimacy. When the King expresses reluctance, as he frequently has to me, to intervene too forcefully because, as he put it, “such intervention would deprive the democratic experiment of credibility” he is perhaps revealing only a part of the truth. In his mind, I suspect, any forceful assertion by anyone, including himself, is in danger of upsetting this complicated, delicate and very oriental system of balancing forces. For that reason also he may not have favored the cabinet’s giving in too easily to the Parliament’s hostility against Minister of Information and Culture Habibi, although a valuable part of the parliamentary session was lost in a useless deadlock. Possibly the widely rumored contention that Mrs. Habibi, a very attractive woman and announcer over Radio Afghanistan, is allegedly the King’s mistress, could also have something to do with the way in which the King acted in this matter. Whatever it may have been worth, the Habibi affair was finally liquidated with a relative minimum loss of governmental prestige and was followed by the King’s new drive for more legislation. No doubt he was aided in this by foreign press reports criticizing Parliament’s inaction which the government has assiduously circulated. I am increasingly inclined also to favor the interpretation that the King’s choice of a weak prime minister is an important part of this balancing act. Perhaps also the King’s memory of the authoritarian personality of Prince Daud plays a significant role. The first prime minister under the “Democratic Experiment”, Dr. Yussef, was probably the ablest one. Fie was a qualified economist and may well have exerted too much leadership for the King’s taste. This, rather than the students’ unrest and the shooting of the Third of Akhrab, was probably responsible for Youssef’s downfall. The next prime minister, Maiwandwal, endeavored to shore up his position by building his personal and political power, and that brought him into conflict first with the Parliament, and then with the King. And now there is Etemadi who leads nothing and nobody. An honest and honorable man—not a mean feature in these parts, he is a man of very limited imagination, ignorant of economic problems (and apparently determined to remain so), cautious to the nth degree, and yet unbending—thus combining the disadvantages of two opposite courses of action. And with the prime minister showing neither talent nor real drive for leadership, either within the country or toward Parliament, the other ministers are handicapped even if some of them had what it takes—and that is far from certain. And yet this may well be what the King wants. Where, in my opinion, the King’s approach falls considerably short is in his under-estimation of the speed with which economic stagnation, rising prices, and in particular growing unemployment among school graduates could destroy this delicate system of check; and balances. Or in other words, the King’s analysis probably over-estimates the forces which he knows against those which he does not. It is therefore necessary for us to press for speedier and more effective economic measures than a reluctant and inexperienced government, totally unsure of itself and of its relatively new institutions, is often courageous enough to take. At the same time, the King’s balancing act also deserves understanding and a considerable measure of respect. It seems to me that Afghanistan’s progress and the American interest in Afghanistan must be measured in more complex and subtle terms than merely percentages of GNP. As you know very well the economist’s sliderule is a very inadequate tool for measuring anything in the Near East and South Asia. What is the American interest in Afghanistan and how might it best be served? We have stated in our NSC approved policy paper that our interest is that of strengthening Afghanistan’s will to independence. This I think is more important in its negative aspect than it its positive ones. Under the best of circumstances, a peaceful, reasonably balanced and stable Afghanistan will not add a great deal to the dubious stability of the region. But an unstable Afghanistan could have an exceedingly destabilizing effect because of the thousands of miles of virtually open frontier between Afghanistan and its eastern and western neighbors. An unstable, hostile Afghanistan could be an infectious cyst—a fact which is apparently much more seriously regarded by Iran’s Shah who under-stands this very well than by the Pakistanis whose preoccupations point in another direction. There is little doubt that the U.S. is part of the King’s balancing act in foreign affairs. But in view of the geographic location of this country and the modesty of our resources I find this, by and large, to favor our interests. Because the Afghans want to be independent and therefore welcome our presence, our input has, on the whole, significant results. But that means also that our tactics have to be very careful and flexible. To push too hard, to the extent that we might seriously upset the existing balances, could be counterproductive and undermine our position here. On the other hand, we have, I believe, a more realistic idea of the political dangers arising from an over-stagnant economy than the Afghans have and we must therefore press harder than perhaps we would like for more reforms, greater efficiency, better management and the rest. In this we are sometimes handicapped by our overly great permissiveness in past years when funds were plentiful, and the Afghans are therefore sometimes tempted to take us right down to the wire in the expectation that at the last minute the U.S. cavalry will rescue the fort from the redskins. This game of “chicken” sometimes requires strong nerves but fortunately there is nothing wrong with the nerves of this Mission and our problems, even at their worst, cannot even remotely compare to what you and your associates have to endure every day. One further item which our tactics have to bear in mind constantly is the limited Afghan capability for managing several crises at the same time. Thus, in our efforts to obtain faster action which are often necessary and sometimes governed by Washington deadlines which are part of the reality of life, we must constantly guard against overloading the circuits lest we have a breakdown of Afghan morale and an overdose of Moslem fatalism. A good example for this tactical situation in many of its ramifications is the Shamalon project. For a while the witlessness of the governor and the irresolution of the government in Kabul seemed totally incapable of overcoming certain local resistance much of which was based on misinformation which the government did preciously little to counteract. Thus, despite many warnings on our part, little happened and we had to envisage the possibility of going up for a final determination in which we might well have been forced to let the loan go. Fortunately in one of those incomprehensible situations in which the above-mentioned “spasm” takes place, a new and vigorous governor who knew the region well was appointed, speedily went to work and as if by magic greatly changed the situation in the Helmand Valley to the better. Now there was no resistance left. But a great deal of time had been lost and we were tip against the crucial amendment to the water law without which the governor’s good efforts would have come to nought. By that time, however, the Parliament and the government were hopelessly deadlocked over the Habibi affair and no legislation could be expected. Thus, although we kept pushing the government on this, there could be no realistic expectations for an amendment except by royal decree after the parliamentary session had come to an end. I therefore reserved my steam with the King until that moment would come although I realized that our time was getting preciously short. Then, however, the King did act to get the Parliament to move and prolonged the legislative session after the Habibi affair was liquidated. This, of course, changed the tactical situation and I went immediately to work on the King, as you know from my telegrams. As these lines are being dictated, we seem to be making progress but it is still not certain that this Parliament can take the additional load of the water law amendment, although there is no real resistance to it. In that case, however, we think we have a way out by way of a royal decree covering at least that portion of the amendment which is vitally necessary to permit the governor and ourselves to go ahead. This, however, may take us right up to the wire again but this is life in this mountain kingdom and I hope that I may count on your and every-body else’s understanding of what we are doing and why. In our endeavors to keep alive here what it still to me an astonishingly significant and strong American influence in the face of overwhelming Soviet presence and input we must nevertheless take note of the fact that the Russians have become more aggressive, are much better led by their new and very able Ambassador Kiktev, and are fully exploiting Afghan weakness and irresolution which present them with targets of opportunity. I do not see the Russian activity increasing in such a dramatic form as to make me believe in the imminence of forceful Soviet intervention and I would not see for what reason they would want to do so. But I believe that reasonably tolerable Soviet good behavior and self-restraint can be expected to continue only if the Afghans become economically stronger and more self-reliant and as long as the American presence remains a significant reality. We have, therefore, quite a job on our hands. To do this job in the best interest of our policy I do not believe that we need greatly increased budgets, even if it were possible to obtain them. As far as our USAID program is concerned our present levels are quite satisfactory although we are rethinking now certain priorities and a certain shifting of emphasis as well as consolidation of effort. On this I shall write separately in the not too distant future. There are, however, three areas in which we could and should do more: 1. One, though a very restricted one, is that of our military assistance program which as you know consists of a small number of training slots in the United States. I think the time is ripe now for a modest and quiet increase. I believe this is understood in the Pentagon and I feel confident that we could find understanding for an attempt to add a couple of training slots, especially in staff and command college training. I want to underline, however, that I am thinking of very small and gradual increases and that I fully agree that anything more abrupt or dramatic would be destabilizing and counterproductive. 2. The other field where we should be doing more is in public affairs. Our small USIS unit is doing a tremendous job under the most able leadership of Peter Brescia, PAO, but it is so small that it cannot fully exploit the very real opportunities which we have here. I fully appreciate the limits of budgeting and world-wide restraints but I believe that the two above mentioned areas, MAP and USIS, are those in which our small program pays off big dividends and where small increases could certainly he justified. 3. Finally there is my ever-present endeavor to counterbalance by optical counter-reaction the Afghan fear of American disinterest or withdrawal, and by “optical” I mean high-level official visits. I am certainly not complaining. I am deeply gratified by the fact that it was during my tenure here that both the Vice President and the Secretary of State were able to visit us. We were of course disappointed to learn that you and the Under Secretary will not be able to visit us at this time (State 186150) but we certainly under-stand your scheduling problems. (What does Kathmandu have that we do not have—besides Carol Laise?) But now, in view of the really very energetic Soviet push, the in-numerable visits between the two countries, the far more aggressive Soviet stance in all areas, I feel keenly that yet another significant counter-move from our side is required. Therefore it is my very strong and considered feeling that the times are uniquely right for the long discussed and much-postponed official trip by Their Majesties to the United States. You were good enough to refer to this in your letter and while I fully realize the many difficulties I want you to understand strongly the high priority, from our point of view, that should be given to such a visit now. The optimum time would by all odds be late winter or early spring, preferably before the new session of Parliament reassembles in mid-March (they actually do not get down to business before the beginning of April). A very real extra dividend would also come to us if the King’s visit were somehow to coincide with the next moon shot, not only because of the ring’s very great interest in space technology (and his not-inconsiderable knowledge on that subject but also because it would make it easier for us to play up, in connection with the publicity surrounding the King’s visit, America’s technological progress. But I do not know the schedule of the moon shots so this may not be possible. I realize this gives you little time. But I do believe that we have a real target of opportunity here, and that the King’s increased activities make the timing exceedingly right. Please let me hear about this soon. Best wishes for much success in the New Year. Sincerely, Robert G. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Sisco added a handwritten note on the first page which reads: “DM I could not get thru the length of this. JJS” It is not clear to whom the note was addressed. Neumann sent a copy of this letter to Kissinger. On February 17, 1971, Kissinger responded with a letter to Neumann in which he praised Neumann’s “perceptive” assessment and noted “I found your description of the King’s balancing act a useful approach to the kind of political situation you are watching.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan) Sisco sent a telegram to Neumann on January 26, 1971, in which he indicated that it would not be possible to schedule a visit by King Zahir during the coming year. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 AFG) 338. Telegram 4311 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 338. Telegram 4311 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, July 12, 1971, 1020Z Subject: PL 480 Reference: State 123928: Kabul 3767 Summary: RGA request for 100,000 tons wheat as part of 350,000 ton import requirement is fully supportable. USAID projections indicate deficit of even greater dimensions. On basis recent helicopter survey situation probably worse than previously indicated, with, extensive areas facing food/feed emergency. RGA requests grant but in view need early assurance supply program to establish RGA. Confidence moving some government supplies to other than largest urban areas and in absence any clear view of non-commercial emergency distribution mechanisms, Embassy/USAID recommend earliest authorization negotiate 100,000 ton Title I program on same terms as march agreement. Additional Title II request will follow. End summary. 1. Summary of RGA PL–480 request follows: A. Government’s request for 100,000 metric tons grant wheat for delivery prior end-March 1972 cites drought-induced crop losses for two consecutive years. Estimates current harvest as only slightly better than last over-all, with increases in irrigated area production offsetting dry land decreases. Total effect, however, is reduction from ’69 production by 348,000 this year and 367,000 tons last year or total of 715,000 tons. B. During year 1349 some 170,000 tons distributed through government channels including stock drawdown 100,000 and imports 70,000, but price action provides vivid evidence that this not nearly enough. Price at record levels about AFS. 100 per seer in many areas compared 45–50 a year ago. In event continuation present inadequate level imports and government distribution, further price rises to be expected probably to average index 392 during current year compared 317 last year and 219 previous year. Adequate imports should reduce level to average between 250 and 275 for current year. C. Agriculture sector badly hit incomewise by two-year drought, including extensive livestock losses. Deteriorating foreign exchange will be worsened by reductions in exports karakul, wool and casings, cotton and other agriculture commodities. (Rapidly rising debt payment requirements up 30 per cent from last year and probably in excess 30 percent total export earnings.) Internal financial strictures also limiting development budget expenditures probably to a level less than 1969. Therefore, drought situation interfering with development progress. D. Emergency food situation will result widespread hunger and hardship in absence outside help. Grain requested on grant basis. End summary RGA request. 2. Embassy/USAID Analysis: A. Embassy/USAID analysis uses somewhat different production and consumption base estimates and later information, with even more pessimistic conclusion. Afghanistan has been hit hard. This submission has been delayed in effort to obtain better data and assess factors still having impact on current crop. B. This effort heightened in last two weeks because of deep concern reaching highest levels over mounting evidence extensive current and prospective sheep losses, unseasonal sales of flocks for meat and bleak outlook for remainder when they come out of high grazing ground this fall. Results recent investigations via RGA-supplied helicopters by RGA, US, UN and other foreign observers subject septel directly related feed situation and therefore omitted this message except conclusion crop losses probably greater than previously anticipated except ally in south and west. C. There are some difficulties in reconciling stock and import figures, but these relatively insignificant compared magnitude unknowns on consumption and population. RGA estimates a deficit of 390,000 tons through March 1972 and is asking total imports 350,000. USAID study indicates higher deficit (460,000 tons) higher production figures. With 350,000 tons imports, total available for consumption 1971/72 would be less on RGA data and on USAID data about same as 1969/70. Taking into account population increases, the projected import requirement estimate certainly does not appear overstated. Therefore, we support it, strongly support the request for 100,000 tons from the US, and seriously doubt that all the balance can be secured. D. Prices are high averaging AFS: 81/seer ($130 mt) around country compared to 47 at this time last year and 32 in July ’69. Public agitation has become manifest and members Parliament making considerable issue, charging executive incompetence, etc. Point is not to raise political issue, though one could easily develop, but to confirm price movements, effect on population, and indirect support they give to crop loss issue. Available precipitation figures indicate last two years driest on record. On 13-year average index 100, this year (ending may 30) was 62, last year 70, previous year 115. Arghandab and Helmand supplies greatly reduced—Arghandab reservoir will be dry by about August 1. Visual observation much of dry land area indicates little or no crop; in many sheep already feeding on standing straw. 3. Pipeline picture (accepted that end-May RGA stock figure of 50,000 tons is about right, about minimum for that time of year, and therefore should be accepted also as end-May ’72 position; i.e., no drawdown for consumption) is 48,000 tons from present Title I program and 25,000 tons committed by USSR, leaving deficit of 277,000 tons. An additional 50,000 tons each is being requested of USSR and Canada. If those come through with 100,000 tons US, there still is uncovered deficit of 77,000 tons. Prospects of that much from other donors is not too promising. 4. RGA request and above analysis based on normal view of government supply requirements for essentially urban markets. We believe farmer stocks are as low as government and that with exteme drought heavy demands will be made on urban markets from normally surplus rural areas. For example, helicopter survey found Kunduz wheat in Qali Nau Bazaar in isolated western wheat area at four times normal price. We anticipate submitting request for Title II disaster relief grant shortly, when methods of reaching rural food/feed emergency are devised, but we now request fastest possible authorization negotiate Title I agreement for 100,000 tons for food admin distribution through sales channels. Improved market supply must inevitably be major part of cure given Afghani administrative weakness and assurance of some supply will bolster RGA willingness to act. 5. Recent Title I financial terms are very hard given high transport costs of wheat into Afghanistan. In interests of speed we propose no change from March agreement, but under present circumstances and given larger size of proposed agreement we and RGA would find shocking any effort by us to impose higher cup or other more onerous terms. 6. Propose same self-help paragraph as in March agreement. We are not satisfied with progress to date and are pushing for more performance from joint committees. 7. Request reply ASAP. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID(US) 15–8 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message. The Afghan request was conveyed to the Embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an aide-mémoire on June 14. (Telegram 3767 from Kabul, June 15; ibid., AID(US) 15–9 AFG) On July 31 AID authorized the Embassy to begin negotiations for a PL–480 agreement for the requested amount of wheat. (AID airgram A-1632 to Kabul; ibid., AID(US) 15–8 AFG) 339. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 339. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, July 29, 1971 AFGHANISTAN: DR. Zahir’S MINISTRY—CAN IT SUCCEED? On July 26 Dr. Abdul Zahir and his cabinet obtained the required vote of confidence from the Afghan Parliament to confirm their appointment by King Zahir. In so doing, the new Prime Minister and his colleagues have inherited serious political and economic problems which necessarily raise questions about the new government’s longevity. The most immediate problem is the threat of a major crisis in the country’s agricultural subsistence economy, severely impaired by two years of drought. The political problem is, however, more fundamental. Although Dr. Zahir appears to be far better prepared for his office than his predecessor, Nur Ahmed Etemadi, the institutional handicaps under which he must function limit his prospects for improving governmental performance. Etemadi Government Died Slowly, Achieved Little . The Etemadi government had been the target of growing criticism since its reappointment in 1969. Parliament was dissatisfied with Etemadi’s lackluster performance, which was marked by economic stagnation, bureaucratic lethargy and inefficiency, widespread corruption, and the growth of leftist forces. The “crisis” which led to Etemadi’s resignation, however, resulted from an essentially minor issue: the Prime Minister’s disregard of a parliamentary nicety in replying to members’ questions. This lapse served to crystallize the discontent, and a “no-confidence” vote was threatened. The proposed motion was dropped following efforts by King Zahir, but Etemadi nevertheless resigned on May 16, having concluded that his relations with Parliament were too strained to permit him to function. His departure marked the first time that Parliament had forced a change of government, and gains further significance since it appears to have been contrary to the King’s wishes. On June 8 Dr. Zahir, the prominent and experienced Ambassador to Rome, former President of the lower house of Parliament (Wolesi Jirgah), and close friend of the King, was named to the Prime Ministry. Domestic Problems the Major Challenge . The new government must turn prompt attention to the problem created by food and animal forage shortages. Although there is little evidence of rural or urban unrest at present, it could emerge this fall. Livestock losses, particularly karakul sheep, which are a major source of foreign exchange earnings, are a special source of concern. The government must also find ways to spur the lagging economy without adding to inflation. A prerequisite to economic growth will be new sources of revenue. Dr. Zahir’s ministry may also be faced by a fresh outburst of student unrest, spurred by leftists but based in large part on the antiquated and inappropriate education system. Afghanistan’s new government is not expected to face serious problems on the international front. Its non-aligned foreign policy is expected to remain unchanged, and long-standing frictions in relations with Pakistan and Iran have already been alleviated. In an effort to improve relations with Pakistan, the Etemadi government avoided comment on the current crisis in East Bengal, although both official circles and the public sympathize with the Bengalis of Pakistan’s East Wing; this approach is expected to continue. The Afghan dispute with Iran over division of the Helmand River waters is now fading as some progress toward resolution is being made, and Dr. Zahir’s government will seek only to insure continued forward motion. Afghanistan’s most important problem in the international sphere is closely related to its domestic economic concerns: the country’s debt burden is steadily increasing while Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance for economic development. What Future for Dr. Zahir? Dr. Zahir’s vote of confidence is only the first step in what is expected to be an arduous journey. He faces a parliament composed largely of conservative and landed deputies who will resist efforts to modernize the economy and to obtain new revenues from taxes on land and livestock. Moreover, since political parties do not yet function, he faces a house in which discipline is singularly lacking. Dr. Zahir’s willingness to exert leadership is open to question: he is respected, but aging and unambitious. His close ties with the King will help. Afghanistan’s ruler has been the dominant force in the political structure and the decisive influence in securing the Parliament’s approval of controversial proposals in the past. The King’s role, however, has begun to be questioned as a result of Parliament’s adamant attitude toward Etemadi. Since Dr. Zahir’s influence will in large measure flow from the King, his responsibilities will continue to exceed his authority, and his margin for failure will be too small for comfort. If Afghanistan is to continue to move into the modern world, Dr. Zahir’s government will have to demonstrate its ability to function effectively. The establishment of the parliamentary system was a “grace and favor” step by King Zahir, and he may weary of his “experiment in democracy” if it provides only ineffectual government which, in the end, must turn to the King for the authority to carry out its programs. There are reports that a number of influential Afghans have concluded that failure by Dr. Zahir will justify a return to authoritarian rule. Given Etemadi’s difficulties with the Parliament, the King’s powers may already have been eroded, and an effort to abolish the “experiment” might prove difficult. In any case, failure by Dr. Zahir would probably open an unpredictable chapter in Afghanistan’s history. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. On May 16, the Government of Nur Ahmad Etemadi resigned as a result of an impasse with the Parliament. (Telegram 3229 from Kabul, May 17; ibid.) On June 8 King Zahir appointed his “long-time friend and confidant” Dr. Abdul Zahir as Prime Minister and asked him to form a government. Dr. Zahir, who had a long career as a public servant, was educated as a physician in the United States. The Embassy in Kabul judged that Zahir’s strengths as Prime Minister derived from his knowledge of the Afghan Parliament and the fact that he enjoyed the King’s confidence. (Airgram A-69 from Kabul, June 19; ibid.) 340. Telegram 4745 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 340. Telegram 4745 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, August 2, 1971, 0946Z Subject: Audience With King Zahir 1. Intro and summary: I had 90-minute meeting alone with King Zahir July 27. Timing of meeting just after installation Zahir government was HM’s choice. Since meeting was tete-a-tete and HM obviously worried about crisis in economy accentuated by recent political stalemate, I decided to hit him hard re lack of progress in country, particularly deteriorating economic conditions. He appeared to react favorably to this more-forceful-than-usual approach and described actions by his government already underway to alleviate immediate problems brought on by drought. He also took notes during my presentation of economic reforms needed for longer-term solutions to end country’s malaise and I have hopes my message will have some impact. End summary. 2. King began conversation saying he had considerable hopes for new government’s prospects, especially in view PM Zahir’s experience as parliamentarian. He said he put great store in PM’s ability to establish good legislative-executive relationship, because in contrast to Etemadi, Zahir has served as elected legislator. In response my request for his analysis of recent events, he said Etemadi government and had become aware of deteriorating economic situation but by that time its parliamentary battle was already lost and government had run out of steam. He said government could have survived lower house assault but the survival would not have been a healthy one. Etemadi also believed that he should depart and that new government would have better chance. The crisis, he added, had constitutional aspects not related to general in-country situation but that real problem had been lack of dynamic leadership. 3. Turning to new government, HM said there were good people in Cabinet who were devoted, competent and totally dedicated to saving country. New government’s foreign policy views were similar to previous one’s and RGA, he said, would continue to follow same general line in external matters. But as far as economic problems are concerned, this government definitely understands them and in contrast to previous one, he implied, would act to solve them. 4. I thanked him for his views and told him I welcomed this opportunity for tete-a-tete. I said I hoped he would understand my speaking frankly about my grave concern about deteriorating political/economic conditions and declining morale of the country. I said no Ambassador has right to express himself in this way but trusted he understood it was motivated out of my deep affection for Afghanistan. I reiterated U.S. had no desire other than seeing stability and progress for country but in fact both were in danger now. I said monarch obviously needed stability but in my four and one-half years here I had never heard so many expressions at all levels of society about a feeling of hopelessness that new government could accomplish anything. I said we were also aware of some instances of unrest in country but felt they were not yet significant. I felt obliged to point out potential effects on monarchy and cited recent history to support my concern. 5. HM then began to take notes as I noted economic crisis was deepening with rising criticism and air of exasperation on part almost all donor countries including USSR. I said we recognized great problems facing RGA, especially those of a relatively new democratic regime dealing with a Parliament that did not fully understand overall problems. Nonetheless I said as student of comparative government I blamed failure of executive-legislative relations on executive in almost every instance and that executive cannot escape responsibility for lack of leadership. I also mentioned inter alia problem of widespread corruption. I said in my time here I had heard three confidence debates but never until this one so much emphasis on this subject. I said it is problem in every society but emphasized when it became serious barrier to progress it was decidedly against society’s interests. 6. I then offered my analysis of economic ills besetting nation, emphasizing I was concerned with the long as well as short-term situation. I pointed out that second year of drought has worsened situation by reducing amount of feed for animals thereby causing extensive reduction in flocks which would result in serious loss foreign exchange earnings over next few years. I said we believed key factor in correcting situation was greater use chemical fertilizer, pointing out that for each dollar expended for fertilizer return in wheat production was five to sevenfold, and therefore it was poor economics to import wheat rather than fertilizer. I outlined fiasco of last May/June re USAID fertilizer loan when we thought we had understanding with RGA that fertilizer distribution would be turned over to private sector only to discover that this was apparently not or no longer government’s position. I added there was no point dealing with Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, whose administration seemed aimed at holding up progress and that its system was corrupt. I noted publicized claim that MAI had distributed 24,000 tons fertilizer last year, but that I doubted it, adding that even if it had distributed this tonnage it was not enough when country should probably use something like 300,000 mt. I said I was not preaching free enterprise as kind of religion but that profit motive would see to it that fertilizer was distributed to those who needed it when they needed it. I briefly outlined mixed distribution system in India which worked successfully for that country, despite a basic socialistic approach to economic development. I said Afghan farmers were intelligent enough to know what fertilizer could do as demonstrated by their willingness to buy fertilizer on black market despite prices higher than those of MAI. There was no need to subsidize fertilizer, I added, given proper credit for farmers who would pay the price now that they had seen how much it could benefit their crops. paraphrasing Clemenceau, I commented that fertilizer import and distribution was too important a matter to be left to the MAI alone and that it should involve the Ministries of Finance and Commerce as well. I also noted need for expanded agricultural credit and said that the Agricultural Development Bank was doing fairly well but that its procedures were still cumbersome and greater speed was needed in providing credit to farmers when they needed it. 7. Turning to water shortage, I expressed approval that Jangalak factories were producing pumps on kpv nt basis and taking extraordinary measures to overcome production bottlenecks, such as bringing by air diesel engines from Germany, on other hand, I noted that sufficient work had not been done on appeal made to EEC for emergency assistance on drought situation. I urged that RGA go direct to EEC through one of its Ambassadors, rather than depending on friendly EEC member governments to present its case. In addition to urging speech from throne (see below), I suggested calling a conference of governors to stimulate action, and that army be called upon to help in distribution of relief supplies and equipment needed to overcome drought. I again urged action in agricultural sector was essential since this was number one activity of nation, involving more than 85 percent of the population, and steps needed to be taken to provide food, fertilizer, credit, pumps. 8. On other economic matters, I urged that country get going on implementation of Industrial Development Bank Bill which he had worked so hard to get parliamentary approval and to get IBRD and Chase Manhattan here to work out details. I added that this was an essential step in reforming and modernizing banking system, which was key to credit system and essential facet for development. I urged improvement in tax enforcement and customs collection. I noted that many in American mission who travelled in rural areas reported rural development expenditures would show parliamentarians that government resources being used to assist in development of their constituencies and provide basis for support of increase taxation. 9. I emphasized need to expand World Bank’s role in Afghanistan and noted it appeared ready and willing to help if there was evidence that RGA was serious about development. I urged that IBRD become involved in the planning process and that the RGA present to IBRD serious projects for development which the World Bank could follow up. This I said was a problem of persistency and continuity and not a one-time thing. I noted such actions would convince other donors of RGA’s seriousness and could result in increased flows of assistance. 10. In conclusion, I emphasized need for new government to take some psychological actions, such as a speech from the throne, designed to “jolt” the people and make them aware that this government intended to do something. I cited FDR’s first few months in office as crucial to his program in which he gave people sense of hope and thus brought about turning point in recovery process even before his programs began to take effect. 11. HM first resopnded by saying I had no need for concern on being frank. He said he valued my analysis and trusted my motives and my country’s. He said he knew my concern was motivated by friendship and accepted that U.S. interests in Afghanistan are unselfish. He acknowledged seriousness of current crisis and danger to stability of country and monarchy. He repeated his feeling that this government had better chance than any before to deal with the crisis and though it may not have been the best time to change governments, the problems must be solved. He said government’s newness is an advantage and that PM planned speech to Parliament in which he would declare something of an emergency state of the nation, though he did not use the word “emergency.” He said he himself would follow with an equally dramatic Jeshyn speech August 23. 12. I asked with whom it would be most useful to deal in new Cabinet on economic matters. He said Samed Hamed, Deputy Prime Minister, was the key man. He also noted that with regard to fertilizer and general agricultural productivity problems that Senator Wakil would be in charge and he agreed fertilizer was not a problem solely for Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. 13. I also took opportunity to inform HM of impending visit by Ambassador Popper. Reminding HM of President Nixon’s grave concern over international narcotics traffic and effect on youth in all countries. I solicited RGA’s cooperation with Popper mission. He assured me Popper would be welcome. 14. King concluded our meeting with repeated thanks for my views and said he hoped we could continue our dialogue, particularly in the area of foreign policy which we barely touched upon. He said he hoped we could get together within the next ten days as he especially wished to have my views on the India-Pakistan situation. 15. Comment: I feel meeting went extremely well. Conversation was conducted in French and some of my stronger words thus were perhaps not as brutal as they would have sounded in English. Since our meeting we have learned of planned RGA publicity campaign to dramatize drought which I take as hopeful sign that message conveyed has already had some impact. My decision to make no-holds-barred pitch took into account possible adverse repercussions in so dealing with a proud monarch but I believe that it was worth the risk. We shall see! Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. In telegram 4797 from Kabul, August 4, Neumann reported that he raised the same issues in his initial conversation with Prime Minister Zahir. (Ibid.) 341. Telegram 4851 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 341. Telegram 4851 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, August 7, 1971, 1345Z Subject: Afghan Drought Crisis—Emergency Actions and Assistance Refs: (A) Kabul 4311 (NOTAL) (B) Kabul 4193 (NOTAL) (C) Kabul 4827 (NOTAL) (D) Kabul 4745 (NOTAL) (E) Kabul 4797 (NOTAL) (F) Kabul 4841 (NOTAL) (G) Kabul 4826 (NOTAL) (H) Islamabad 8026 (NOTAL) 1. Introduction and summary: In accordance with authority contained in 2 FAM 060, I have determined that disaster of magnitude to require outside assistance exists in Afghanistan and that it is in interest of US to offer emergency assistance. Two years of drought are now expected cause losses of up to 70 percent of Afghanistan’s 22 million sheep and a short fall in food grain in neighborhood of 600,000 tons of wheat. New government in office less than two weeks has taken series steps with speed and determination that I have not previously seen in my four years here. In view situation of disaster proportion and as evidence US interest back up its oft stated desire support RGA if it demonstrated needed leadership, I have authorized the use of up to $25,000 for equipment and supplies to help alleviate acute water and feed shortages. In immediate future I will be requesting support for an expected RGA request for special food assistance in the area of 100,000 tons Title II wheat and Pakistani rupee or dollar financing for animal feed relief to extent bi-product feeds available. Immediate authorization open negotiations on pending Title I request on basis expedited third country consultations is also requested. End introduction and summary. 2. Afghanistan faces disaster resulting from two years unprecedented drought. Both RGA and foreign experts estimate that up to 70 percent of country’s 22 million sheep population will be lost, unless extraordinary relief measures undertaken. Such losses having already immediate impact on economy through major depression animal prices by flock owners dumping animals in desperate effort gain some return rather than suffer absolute loss. Longer term impact will be loss in foreign exchange from exports of Karakul and other animal products which will exacerbate present already serious balance of payments and debt repayment prorlems. Furthermore, drought causing, current estimate of short fall about 600,000 tons in wheat including prospect of major food shortage and relief needs in some rural drought areas. We expect RGA to request additional tonnages of wheat from present donors of assistance to help attack potential starvation. My action to utilize $25,000 of emergency contingency funds as first step will convey to new government that USG prepared back up its oft stated view that if RGA demonstrated clearly its leadership in combatting growing economic crisis USG would be in forefront of those friendly governments seeking help Afghanistan help itself. Actions by RGA outlined below and attitudes, ideas, proposals, etc., expressed to me and other members of this mission by King, Prime Minister and members of new Cabinet during past few days all clearly demonstrate that Zahir government is serious about attacking immediate crisis and longer range economic problems. 3. Steps taken thus far by RGA include the following: A. Two teams headed by Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation with US, IBRD, and US experts made country-wide on spot inspection of livestock conditions with transportation provided by Royal Afghan Air Force. Reports of mission pinpointed areas of greatest danger. B. Requested emergency assistance from all current foreign assistance donors, including PRC, Soviets, EEC, IBRD and ADB to attack drought effects. Preparing to send special mission headed by FonMin to various countries to back up request. C. Requested Parliament amend Article 29 of customs law to permit export of live animals to neighboring countries and preliminary steps taken by RGA with Governments of Iran, USSR, and Pakistan for expo of Afghan sheep. D. Asked USSR to permit grazing of Afghan flocks—reportedly refused by Soviets who offered purchase sheep, possibly in exchange for feed. E. Continued ban on export of Afghan cotton seed cake, which being distributed to flock owners. Furthermore, PM’s office has ordered Ministries of Mines and Industries, Public Works and Defense to utilize their vehicles for transportation of 1,467 mt cotton seed cakes from Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Kashkar Gah to Andkhoy [Farayab province], Ghazni and Qala-i-Nau, which are areas of greatest need. F. Announced that import of chemical fertilizer is free and no rpt no longer monopoly of RGA. Arranging negotiate purchase of urea in Pakistan and Kuwait. G. Increased efforts produce low lift pumps at Jangalak factory, including airlifting 100 diesel engines for pumps from West Germany. H. Undertaken campaign to inform world and own people about crisis including PM statment in Parliament (ref C), announcement that Jeshyn celebration this year will be one rpt one, day only instead of two weeks plus activities which has been tradition. Announcement said celebration would include only King’s speech to nation, military and student parades. Action taken “in view of the great economic difficulties and droughts which call for the adoption of austerity measures by the government and cooperation of the public. I. Creation of special task forces within RGA and announcement that Minister without Portfolio, Former Senator and Minister of Agriculture, Wakil appointed to coordinate all efforts to attack drought problems. J. Observable and successful efforts by PM Zahir and his Cabinet to rebuild executive-parliamentary relations. 4. As inital USG response to urgent RGA appeal for aid, I plan to use $25,000 emergency funds to finance purchase of few hundred tons bi-product animal feed in Pakistan (ref G) and pilot number of heavy lift pumps. If this initial shipment Pakistani animal feed successfully utilized by Afghan flock owners, I intend (a) urge RGA request GOP provide feed as direct relief contribution and (b) seek Washington approval for grant funding for Pak bi-product feed to extent of further available supply, using US held rupees plus CF dollars to extent cotton seed cake or other foreign exchange earnings components are included. Therefore, I urge Washington agencies concerned undertake necessary preliminary steps in preparation for fast action on this request. 5. Situation clearly will also require additional food aid, and RGA expected soon to present US with formal request for emergency deliveries of wheat in addition to pending PL 480 request. I urge that Washington agencies now reserve Title II capacity for up to 100,000 tons wheat emergency relief. Fast action on request will be needed not only because of situation here but also to assure loading of vessels prior to anticipated dock strike in US. 6. Lastly, I urge that third country consultations regarding pending 100,000 tons PL 480 Title I sales agreement for wheat be expedited and that we be authorized commence negotiations immediately. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 AFG. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Sent attention for the Disaster Relief Coordinator. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Canberra, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Ottawa, USUN, Brussels, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG. 342. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson 342. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson 1 Washington, August 9, 1971 Drought in Afghanistan For the second straight year, Afghanistan is faced with a drought which is expected to reduce the wheat crop by up to 25 percent and cause the death of up to 70 percent of the livestock (100 percent in some areas). Since wheat is the basic food in the near subsistence, predominantly agricultural economy of Afghanistan, and the pelts from the Karakul sheep, the largest hard currency earning export of Afghanistan, the drought is considered a major national disaster. On August 7, Ambassador Neumann determined that a disaster of the magnitude to require outside assistance exists in Afghanistan. Under standing emergency authority, he is purchasing small amounts of animal feed and heavy lift pumps in Pakistan. If these can be used effectively in Afghanistan, the Ambassador expects to request additional funding for greater quantities. On the basis of earlier information on the drought and a preliminary request from the Government of Afghanistan, we have approved the sale of 100,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan under PL–480 Title I. Negotiations should begin this week, and be concluded promptly. Ambassador Neumann anticipates a future request for 100,000 tons of Wheat on a grant basis. Since such a request cannot be met under present PL–480 Title II ceilings, Congressional action might become necessary. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Memoranda to the Secretary, July to Aug 1971. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/PAF by Robert A. Flaten, and cleared by Laingen and Van Hollen. On August 9 Eliot sent a copy of this memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG) 343. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 343. Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Kabul, August 12, 1971 Dear Joe: I know how busy you are at this time, therefore I want to confine myself here to highlighting the present emergency in Afghanistan, our strategy regarding it, and explain to you our more long range objectives. The Etemadi government began to totter in March and finally fell in April. The general economic stagnation was certainly one of the major reasons and on top of that the consequences of the second drought year became increasingly evident. The search for a new government and the parliamentary debate on the confidence motion proved long and the new government took office only on July 27. In the meantime there was no authority capable of action. The increasingly bitter tone of the confidence debate did show growing public awareness of the country’s plight but might also have induced the King to believe that facts were exaggerated for political reasons. Meanwhile, when the first scattered reports of large-scale animal dying reached us we immediately sent out all available specialists to ascertain the facts. What they brought back was still not conclusive but convinced me that we were almost certainly facing a major catastrophe which, if not checked, was capable of undermining the stability of Afghanistan. With the lame-duck government incapable of action, there was only the road to the King. I chose an indirect one, through the King’s energetic son-in-law (because an overt drive to the Palace might have been interpreted as an attempt to influence the formation of the government). This was the turning point. The King was immediately informed and sent me a message the next day that he was ready for action. The same message reaching the government produced helicopters which, manned by Afghan, U.S. and U.N. personnel, made a rapid survey whose result showed clearly the extent of the catastrophe, especially the possibility that as many as 70% of the estimated 22 million sheep in the country might perish, and that famine might make its dread appearance. As soon as the new Cabinet was confirmed, I had very frank meetings with both the King and the Prime Minister in which I pointed out the need for drastic action in both the psychological and actual realms. What followed then was a totally unprecedented (for Afghanistan) series of actions by the new government. Particularly notable were: 1. A frank government declaration of emergency and the decision to send a high level mission abroad; 2. Requesting and obtaining in record time a change in the Customs law to permit export of live animals; 3. Mobilization of the trucks of three ministries to collect cottonseed cakes and other by-products for distribution to flock owners as feed; 4. Freeing import of fertilizer by the private sector; 5. Streamlining and staffing of hitherto moribund High Economic Council; 6. Giving overall economic direction to Deputy Prime Minister flamed and creating a task force for the coordination of all drought-connected problems under Minister without Portfolio WAKIL; 7. Creating a Cabinet Secretariat under Minister without Portfolio Sirat to prepare the Cabinet agenda and avoid trivia so characteristic of previous Cabinet business. Upon this remarkable record of the new government (after only two weeks in office) I felt justified to proclaim a state of emergency and proposed the steps enumerated in Kabul’s 4851. All this was the result of Mission-wide team work in which the Department and AID can take great pride. But what I am trying to do goes well beyond the present emergency. Economically and politically Afghanistan had gone steadily downhill. I have long been convinced that only a major crisis could shake Afghanistan’s ruler and government out of their paralysis, hopefully setting patterns for action which might last sufficiently long to become habit-forming. Also the penalties for inaction and lacking foresight would be drastically demonstrated. Thus far, things have gone better than could be anticipated; the new government has not only been exceedingly active, beyond anything I have seen in 4 1/2 years here, but its actions have been methodical and steady. While some of the government measures listed above are of short term nature, others have more lasting implications. Now comes the next step. The government has informed us of its intention to request from the creditor nations a short—term moritorium for the rest of the Afghan calendar year (which begins in March) to gain some fiscal room for maneuver, and is considering issuing a request for a more long-term rescheduling of debts. This second effort is likely to commence in October, if the RGA decides on that step. If this is indeed to be done—and it would seem quite logical—then a very good case could be made for a consortium approach under World Bank leadership. Of course much would depend on the attitude of the USSR, the principal creditor (75% of current debt services). Of that we cannot be certain, of course, but high ranking Soviet diplomats here in Kabul have indicated very considerable receptivity and the Soviet Ambassador (presently on home leave) took the initiative to call on Mr. Horst Eschenburg of the World Bank for a detailed exchange of views. If a consortium could be formed, then it would also be easier to get the World Bank directly involved in a revitalization and revised Afghan planning mechanism and this in turn could result in some necessary and stringent conditions imposed on Afghanistan by the Consortium to effect a better and more rational use of Afghan resources. We may not he able to reach all of these objectives, but it is my sincere conviction that by helping Afghanistan substantially in this hour of crisis, we not only fulfill humanitarian considerations but, by our involvement, contribute in a major and direct way to Afghanistan’s consolidation, stability and progress—the principal objectives of U.S. policy. I am looking foreward to pursuing these thoughts with you later in the fall when I hope to be in Washington for consultations. By that time the picture should be much clearer. With warm personal regards and best wishes. Sincerely, Robert G. Neumann American Ambassador 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, McDonald (AID), Russell S. McClure of the Operations Appraisal Staff in the Auditor General’s Office in AID, and Laingen (NEA/PAF). 344. Telegram 5041 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 344. Telegram 5041 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, August 16, 1971, 1002Z Subject: Afghan Request for Debt Moratorium Refs: (A) Kabul 4841 (NOTAL); (B) Kabul 4851 (NOTAL); (C) Kabul 4853 (NOTAL); (D) Kabul 4971 (NOTAL) 1. Begin summary: I saw RGA Finance Minister Dawar at his request morning August 14. He said USG first government he approaching with request for favorable consideration of debt moratorium at least until March 21, 1972, and possibly until March 21, 1973. I responded that Embassy would recommend sympatetic consideration of Afghan request but that this matter for multilateral action and formal response would have to be in those terms. End summary 2. I saw RGA Finance Minister Dawar morning of August 14. Mohseni, Director, Economic Relations, MFA, and Chief, Embassy Economic Section also present. Dawar outlined briefly financial situation indicating that government income increasing problem in relation to expenses, especially since revenues declining at time when expenditures increasing to meet drought emergency. He noted specifically that government had been forced to take intensive and rapid steps for acquisition of feed for animals and drilling of deep wells for drinking water. He said that under circumstances, RGA forced to think about means of cutting expenditures, including moratorium on foreign debts. He said that RGA confident that friendly countries have a sympathetic understanding and that details would have to follow such conversation as this one. He asked for expression from us of how we view problem. 3. I said we do have real understanding of exceptional and unusual problem facing Afghanistan but that, of course, official answer regarding moratorium would have to come from Washington. I added that I was confident that deep understanding of U.S. Mission in Kabul would be reflected in our capital. 4. In response to my question about form and timing of moratorium, Dawar said these had not yet been ironed out in detail. He said, in broad terms, that initially there would be request for moratorium until end current Afghan year, March 21 1972; but, if general conditions in Afghanistan did not improve by that time, it likely RGA would request consideration moratorium for another year. He added that RGA does not wish to use this step as means of financing normal and routine expenditures; but in view expected decline in revenues and exports (losses from export of karakul and wool for example), and their unfavorable impact on direct taxation could force a two-year period. He said that there were number of approaches to moratorium; such as reduction in amount of interest only, postponement of payment due dates, postponement of payments of both interest and principle, etc. 5. I reiterated that mission sympathetic and hoped my government would be as well and then noted that U.S. debts were modest in relationship to others, especially USSR, and asked if there had been any reaction from USSR on such an approach. Dawar stated meeting with me was first approach and commented it true U.S. debts modest relative to USSR which in first place. He noted that immediately following my visit he was speaking with West Germany Charge. He added that Soviet Ambassador in Moscow and that he would be seeking meeting with Soviet Charge. He also noted that he would be heading delegation to IBRD annual meetings in Washington in September. 6. I urged that RGA consult not only with governments but especially with IMF. I pointed out that in such a moratorium exercise as this, IMF and World Bank play key coordination role. In order insure Dawar understood that this is intricate undertaking, I suggested, informally, that consideration would have to be given to various kinds of debts: for example, in case of USG there are ExIm, USAID and its predecessors, PL 480, and possibly private credits. He said he understood but that these were technical points that would have to be spoken to later; however, I wanted to be as sure as possible that RGA understood that this no rpt no easy problem. 7. FRG Charge Kilian and Economic Counselor Von Jena called on me and Cohn, respectively, following their meeting with Dawar. They reported scenario much as above. However, Dawar told them he would not rpt not be seeing Soviet Charge and would await return Soviet Ambassador and also RGA would wait until IBRD meetings in September to approach IMF. On August 15 Cohn informally spoke with Mohseni and suggested RGA instruct Malikyar call on IMF in Washington and also informally discuss situation with Kayeumi of IMF who presently in Kabul on vacation. IMF Res Rep Selby departed Kabul for Washington assignment August 12; his replacement not rpt not due until September. 8. Comment: Moratorium request has been expected as indicated in references. Mohseni indicated that MFA would be presenting us with formal note on this. Would appreciate Department advising IMF of this approach and that Department and IMF will work closely on matter. Would also appreciate early guidance. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Tehran, Tokyo, and the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels. Also repeated to the US Asian Development Bank representative in Manila. 345. Telegram 5067 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 345. Telegram 5067 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, August 17, 1971, 0933Z Subject: Afghan Wheat Requirements 1. On August 14 Ambassador Neumann accompanied by Harvey responded to request from MinPlan Sarabi for appointment. Sarabi explained that RGA estimate of wheat deficit this year based on country-wide survey conducted by MinAg and more recent information on current harvest indicated that gap in prospect exceeded 500,000 tons instead of 350,000 tons estimated earlier. He said also other potential suppliers, indicating Canada, Australia but not mentioning USSR, apparently were going to be disappointing in their responses to Afghan appeal for concessional wheat supplies. Accordingly RGA wished to increase its request to USG from 100,000 tons indicated earlier to 250,000 tons on a grant basis. 2. Ambassador responded that USG had been somewhat slow in responding to initial RGA request but now emergency appeal of new government had brought quick and definitive response including authorization negotiating long-term credit for 100,000 tons. He urged fastest possible signature this Title I agreement both in order avoid delay in shipment because of probable October 1 strike, and as demonstration of real urgency of need which would be the best support for serious consideration of increased supply. 3. Sarabi indicated he understood this but RGA currently in extremely thin situation regarding foreign exchange with which finance ocean transport and inland transport. He urgently requested any possible U.S. help with these transport costs which total $4 million or more on 100,000 tons. We explained dim prospect for help on ocean transport but urged RGA approach Government of Pakistan as basis Pak rupee loan cover inland requirements analysis to justify further shipments and information on plans concerning work project and other direct distribution to poverty stricken population of drought areas as basis for Title II recommendation. 4. Malikyar visit reported State 148924 not repeat not reflection this additional request but simply result of his belief based on previous conversation that State/AID had not understood that original RGA 100,000 ton request was for grant. RGA here did not share this confusion but instructed him that if he thought he could influence USG to provide this wheat as grant, he should try. 5. In subsequent conversations with MinPlan staff and advisors we have emphasized need for above analysis as basis for mission recommendation. We expect these shortly. Stocks are low and need for additional supplies is widespread. Our current hunch is that if imports of at least 300,000 tons cannot be assured for FY 72 further sharp price increases, commercial panic and widespread suffering in the late winter and spring will result. Requirement for further U.S. supply will depend in large part on availabilities from USSR on which any available information would be appreciated ASAP. Anticipate mission recommendation by September 10. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, and Rome for FODAG. A PL–480 agreement for 100,000 tons of wheat was signed in Kabul on August 23. The text of the agreement was transmitted to Washington on September 27 as an attachment to airgram A–110 from Kabul. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–4) 346. Telegram 166666 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 346. Telegram 166666 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 Kabul, September 10, 1971, 2109Z Ref: Kabul’s 542117 Subject: Debt Relief In addition to guidance provided in State 153803, you should inform RGA as follows: 1. We understand and sympathize with RGA debt problems. However, we support your advice to RGA that we cannot agree to any unilateral moratorium on debt obligations. Moratorium unacceptable for both statutory and policy reasons. 2. USSR accounts for almost three-quarters of Afghan’s foreign debt and over 50 percent of total debt servicing obligations in 1971 and 1972. Germany, whose debt smaller than ours, scheduled to receive about one-third more in debt service payments than us during these years. [UK and Japan are minor creditors]. These statistics indicate that afghan debt problem is multilateral and must be so approached. Thus, RGA should first present its case for debt relief to IBRD, institution which primarily concerned with LDC debt problems. If convinced of need for debt relief, IBRD would then presumably approach creditors on multilateral basis. However, application, or even threat, of unilateral moratorium could adversely prejudice consideration of Afghan request by IBRD and creditors. Eschenberg of IBRD enroute to Kabul for consultations with RGA providing timely opportunity for RGA to broach debt problem which we understand not yet done. 3. At same time, RGA may wish to discuss with IMF stabilization program and possible stand-by credits as is customary with LDC’s experiencing debt problems. Stabilization program under current circumstances might take into account domestic Afghan fiscal situation and measures to strengthen balance of payments including controls on exeternal debt. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential. Drafted in E/IFD by Albert C. Cizauskas and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub, cleared in NEA/PAF, in substance with Treasury, E/IFD/ODF, IBRD, and in information in IMF. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, London, and Tokyo. 347. Telegram 5641 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 347. Telegram 5641 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 13, 1971, 1305Z Subject: Further Drought Relief Wheat Refs: A. Kabul 4311 B. Kabul 5067 C. Kabul 5041 D. Kabul 5413 Background and summary: Earlier RGA request for 100,000 tons grant wheat based on June crop and requirements estimates showing deficit 390,000 tons and import-distribution program 350,000. Mission fully supported program of this magnitude as a starter, with distribution through government sales channels, indicated need probably understated but even so unlikely be fulfilled, recommended Title I program for the 100,000 tons in interest of speed and anticipated Title II sub-mission shortly (ref A). On basis revised crop estimates at harvest time RGA now projects deficit of 538,000 tons and has increased its request to U.S. by 150,000 tons on grant basis (ref B). RGA also making considerable effort mount food-for-work program which is expected to take 50,000–70,000 tons wheat, is arranging for quote advance unquote of wheat from normal stocks to start implementing program in five provinces in next few days. Meanwhile supply commitments other donors disappointing. From all appearances a serious gap of at least 150,000 tons remains if further sharp price increases and extensive village famine conditions are to be avoided this winter/spring. Mission recommends Title II program including freight for 150,000 tons of which 50,000–70,000 tons anticipated requirement for directly administered rural distribution program for work and direct relief, remainder for government rationed, below market sale. [Omitted here is the five page body of the telegram in which the Embassy supported the recommendation.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message. 348. Telegram 6010 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 348. Telegram 6010 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 28, 1971, 0755Z Subject: Conversation With MFA Shafiq—Economic Matters Refs: (A) State 1769881 (B) Kabul 6011 1. Summary: During my conversation with RGA, Foreign Minister Shafiq, September 26, I advised him of USG decision supply 100,000 tons wheat as grant under Title II and reviewed with him elements of Afghan request for debt moratorium and rescheduling with regard to Soviet position. Shafiq expressed profound thanks for additional wheat assistance and noted RGA did not have agreed position concerning soviets on moratorium. He well aware need for multilateral negotiations and equal treatment between Soviets and Western creditors. 2. During my conversation with RGA Minister of Foreign Affairs Shafiq, September 26 (see septels), I informed him that in response to RGA appeal for emergency assistance to meet effects of drought that USG had approved a program for 100,000 metric tons wheat as grant under Title II of PL 480 and that program included USG financing of ocean transportation to Karachi. I briefly sketched other details contained in ref A and said that we were pleased to be forthcoming and commented on speed with which Washington was able to respond to request once received. I also noted importance of Dr. Wakil’s food-for-work program as a key vehicle being utilized by RGA to meet this problem. 3. Shafiq expressed high gratification, thanking me personally for role I had played commenting in addition at length on speed of finalizing action on earlier August 23 PL 480 sales agreement. He commented that long tradition of assistance from U.S. is fully appreciated by RGA and grant of 100,000 tons was another example of this relationship. He said he would immediately inform Prime Minister Zahir and Dr. Wakil. I remarked that there had been relatively little publicity for August signing of Title I agreement due to absence of newspapers for one week during Jeshyn period and expressed hope that appropriate public announcement could be arranged. I noted that it possible that RGA might consider such publicity counter productive because other potential donors might feel that actions by USG were sufficient to meet Afghan needs. On other hand, I pointed out publicity could act as spur to encourage others. Shafiq replied that my observations were entirely proper and agreed that little had been done on this score. He observed, however, that we should not underestimate how rapidly and far such information is spread in Afghanistan. He said that within one week after signing August agreement there had been precipitous drop in wheat price and within ten days there had been drop of seven AFS per seer in public price of wheat and that this clearly demonstrated impact of even limited publicity. (Comment: Mohseni, Director, Economic Relations, MFA, telephoned EmbOff, morning, September 27, to report that Radio Afghanistan in its news commentary previous evening had reviewed full story US continuing and special assistance this year, noting specifically two Title I PL 480 agreements. He said that story would also be appearing in “national press.”) 4. Shafiq said that he hoped Afghanistan would be engaged in more active diplomacy and specifically noted relations and negotiations with EEC. He said RGA aware need for direct contact with European Community but could not afford a permanent mission. Therefore, two lower level people were being assigned to these. (Comment: We understand this to mean non-Ambassadorisal rank. I noted evidence of considerable work that has already been done on these relations and complimented the work done by HRH: Ambassador Zalmai Ghazi, Afghan Ambassador to Paris, who I understood was being replaced. 5. Foreign Minister then raised question of moratorium, and I again pointed out nature of such negotiations which involve many considerations and that degree of forthcomingness on part of creditors was dependent upon two primary factors. First, that debtor country had key role in its self help measures in fiscal matters and noted that this was concern for Ministers and personnel other than Foreign Ministers. I also noted that it required on part of RGA difficult and delicate political decisions, but nonetheless creditor governments would have to know and be advised of steps taken by executive action and those which might be proposed for parliamentary action. Second, I noted that foreign office would be concerned with multilateral aspects since all creditors would want to know what other creditors doing, lest one carry unequal burden. I underlined fact IBRD and IMF were widely experienced in multilateral negotiations, even if their relationships with USSR were informal. I also noted that it would be difficult for USG be forthcoming without information about USSR position, but even more important that Finance Minister Dawar be kept informed of developments relative to Soviet position. I told Shafiq I did not want to press for information which for many reasons he might not be prepared to pass on; but without some disclosure of role of Soviets I was pessimistic about USG help and added that this was worldwide problem for USG. Shafiq said he understood and noted that there was division within RGA on this point. He said those Ministries concerned with economic matters were pressing RGA to be forthcoming on this subject, but he was concerned that decision should not depend upon such a single point and that USG he was certain understood there was a “particular relationship” between RGA and USSR. Given geographical proximity and size differences RGA could not ignore political overtones that this relationship engendered. In view of these considerations, Shafiq said that linking of Soviets and Western creditors, in whatever form, was very difficult but that there was no agreement among RGA Ministries on this point. I pointed out that we were not seeking identity of action with USSR, recognizing full well that aid agreements vary greatly in nature. I said what was needed was an equality of burden and that full disclosure would assure this being done. I expressed my understanding of his concern but pointed out that I simply did not believe negotiations with USG or multilateral agencies could be successful unless some awareness of treatment being extended by USSR and again asked if he could convey some ideas of results Moscow visit regarding moratorium and debts. 6. Shafiq said that it must be borne in mind that it was a mutual USSR and RGA understanding that technical negotiations would not take place during royal visits. However, he said he had impression Soviets considered request for moratorium and debt rescheduling to be negotiable and that this was task for experts. He added that beyond that he had no details and commented that Minister of Planning Sarobi would be best source of information on this subject since he had been member of party who handled economic matters. He said that he was sure that Deputy Prime Minister Samad Hamed would also have many details. In response to my question regarding Soviet attitude towards IBRD and IMF playing a role, he said he only had impression but that there was no prima facie hostility on their part. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential. 349. Telegram 6169 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 349. Telegram 6169 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, October 4, 1971, 1150Z Subj: Debt Rescheduling—Discussion With PriMin Zahir Ref: Kabul 6881 Summary: I saw PriMin Sept. 30 and he expressed great and sincere appreciation for wheat grant, which, he said would be significant factor in strengthening government’s hand with Parliament. On debt rescheduling I pointed out no creditor wants carry unequal burden and all creditors would expect RGA do everything it could to improve own fiscal position. I also urged multilateral approach centered upon IBRD/IMF and pointed out special importance all other creditors would attach to Soviet response. PriMin agreed that increased Soviet aid for fourth Afghan five-year plan would not rpt not be suit[able. In con]clusion I urged PriMin not to endanger RGA’s good international reputation on debt payments since credit standing represents important national asset. End summary. 2. PriMin received me Sept. 30 for discussion debt rescheduling and other subjects which reported separately. 3. PriMin began conversation with obviously sincere expression of thanks for USG action on grant wheat. He said action had already had salutory effect on his government’s relationship with Parliament. RGA has promised Parliament it would concentrate on getting wheat; consequently, timing USG action was most gratifying. Government in effect had proved to Parliament that it could produce. I interjected that USG could not rpt not have been so helpful without speedy action on part RGA, and hoped Parliament really understood effective role played by PriMin and his government. 4. Prim Min continued saying he had been aghast at deplorable relations which had existed between previous governnent and Parliament. Now, rpt now, things were much improved even though government has to be negative on many pet projects of individual deputies. 5. I noted he fully aware our general policy toward Afghanistan of respect for Afghan non-alignment. Our action on wheat exemplified this policy which rooted in our desire help Afghanistan remain free and independent; it did not seek enhance or create any special role for us nor diminish role of others. 6. On subject debt rescheduling, I said there were three principal considerations in such excercises: (a) each creditor determined not to carry greater burden than any other creditor; (b) each creditor wants know what every other creditor likely do; and (c) each creditor wishes make certain that RGA will do everything it can to improve its own fiscal situation last foreign countries be asked carry disproportionate portion of burden. 7. Emphasizing I was talking as friend and advisor rather than as Ambassador, I said I belived that RGA should (a) adopt multilateral rather than bilateral approach; (b) use help of IBRD and IMF, who have greatest experience in these matters, to maximum extent possible; (c) make sure principal Afghan negotiators fully informed on actions and intentions of all creditors; (d) provide same full information to all creditor nations; (e) give urgent consideration to all measures in executive and legislative areas which will improve fiscal position of Afghanistan; and (f) be careful not endanger its future credit unduly by bringing too much pressure to bear now on creditors and IMF. 8. I said Soviet attitude was especially important, and their response will have great bearing on ultimate solution. PriMin said, as Shafiq had earlier stated (see Kabul 6010), that Soviet attitude appears be that requests are negotiable. PriMin added that experts of both sides are now at work. I told him that two things, besides full disclosure, were important with regard Soviet decision: (a) USSR should be as forthcoming as possible; and (b) not only amount but also nature of Soviet assistance would affect other nations’ assessments. I.e. a possible Soviet offer of additional credits for the fourth Afghan five-year plan would not be very useful, since it would not give immediate debt payments relief and would in fact result in increased future debt servicing burden. 9. PriMin said RGA fully aware latter point and had already taken steps to separate Soviet response to debt rescheduling request from assistance to five year plan. PriMin added, “Soviets have a lot to learn—they thought fertilizer plant they helping us build already in production.” 10. In conclusion I again urged PriMin bear in mind current good Afghan world record of payment and fact that its credit represents important national asset. These pluses should not be eroded. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential. 350. Telegram Secto 157 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 350. Telegram Secto 157 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 New York, October 14, 1971, 1924Z Memorandum of Conversation: FM Shafiq (Afghanistan) October 13, 1971 9:30 a.m. 35A Waldorf 1. Participants: Afghanistan-Fon Min Shafiq, Ambassador Malikyar; U.S.-The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, Mr. Naas (reporting officer), Mr. Bray. 2. Summary. The Secretary and Shafiq held a cordial, wide-ranging discussion on the Afghan economy/drought, debt rescheduling and drug problem. The Secretary noted that we will wish to talk further with the RGA concerning a cooperative effort on drugs. Shafiq assured the Secretary of the RGA’s full cooperation in this matter. End summary. 3. The Secretary opened conversation by recalling with pleasure his visit to Afghanistan a few years ago. Shafiq immediately said a second visit at any time would be most welcome. Shafiq then expressed the deep gratitude and appreciation for U.S. past and current assistance. He said it was good to know that a powerful country far away is sharing Afghanistan’s problems. He called attention to the current drought which is affecting all principal areas of Afghan economy and said that, since droughts are usually in a two or three year cycle, Afghanistan may have another bad year. The present water table is at lowest level in living memory. 3A. Shafiq emphasized that it was not only America’s assistance which brought the two countries together but even more important was fact that two countries shared principles of freedom and independence and were devoted to democratic method. He thought that it was of value to the U.S. that Afghanistan despite its difficult geographic position has maintained its independence, its culture and special identity, Secretary agreed. 4. In response to Secretary’s question Shafiq briefly summarized Afghanistan’s natural resources and, with respect to foreign private enterprise, Shafiq said Afghanistan has difficult problem of balancing which companies are invited into Afghanistan. Although Cold War is no longer, Afghanistan’s long border with Soviets still makes nationality of free enterprise a delicate matter. Recently the Austrians have indicated interest and in view of transportation problems were concentrating on easy to ship semi-precious stones and products. 5. Secretary then deftly turned to drug question by asking whether hippies continued to pose a problem for Afghans. Shafiq replied that years ago there was little drug problem in country and foreign visitors did not cause concern. However, in recent years large numbers of youngsters of many nationalities have been overstaying and engaging in “practices” harmful to their health and Afghans were concerned. Secretary said that a nation can easily develop a particular image to the outside world by attitudes to certain practices. For example, Turkey for a long time did not have a good image due to the poppy cultivation which made Turkey the center of the illicit drug business. He said that we will wish to talk further with the RGA concerning a cooperative effect on drugs. He noted that we made considerable progress on our programs with Turkey and Indo-China, but that if we are successful in Turkey there could be a tendency to look more to Afghanistan as a source of poppy. 6. Shafiq replied that cultivation of hashish and opium are prohibited under Islamic law since they are intoxicants but he admitted that these prohibitions had not always been enforced. Now the demand of foreign tourists and others had accentuated the drug problem in Afghanistan and it was difficult to enforce the laws, particularly in the remote mountainous areas where most of the drugs are grown. He wished to affirm, however, that Afghanistan shares the U.S. concern, it is the duty of all nations to cooperate in the control of dangerous drugs. He then repeated his assurance of Afghanistan’s full cooperation. Ambassador Malikyar interjected that in the poor and isolated areas of Afghanistan the poppy provided a good cash crop and Afghanistan has the problem of finding a substitute source of income for the people affected. 7. Shafiq then said that he was under instruction from his Prime Minister to raise two matters with the Secretary. The first was that of debt rescheduling due to the great loss or foreign exchange earnings because of the drought. He said Afghanistan has never defaulted on debts and does not wish to have its reputation in international financial circles harmed. But, Afghanistan does need help now on re-scheduling. He said that since the Soviet Union was not a member of the IBRD it was not immediately concerned in the efforts being made here with the IMF and the IBRD. Also, Afghanistan is in a peculiar position with respect to Soviet Union and it does not wish to be further indebted to Soviets by asking for special help on this matter. Present government wishes to cut down on its debts to Soviet Union. The Secretary replied that we are sympathetic to Afghanistan’s needs but the argument used by the Foreign Minister concerning the Soviets cuts both way. American people would want to know why we were being helpful when a close friendly neighbor is not being asked for the same kind of assistance. Shafiq reiterated that there was a sensitivity of permitting Soviets to become too deeply involved in Afghanistan’s economy whereas the Afghans did not feel the same toward U.S. For example, Afghanistan found no problem in letting U.S. revenue experts dig deeply into Afghanistan’s economy for there was a special intimacy with U.S. which was a far away friend whereas the Soviets were very close and same intimacy could not be permitted. Shafiq noted that the problem of rescheduling has been discussed at different levels and a repayment is due in October. Afghanistan would like a delay in this payment while negotiations on re-scheduling are going on. Secretary again said that we were understanding of Afghanistan’s problems and admire the Afghans for their present and past policies. 8. In conclusion Shafiq said that second matter was that he wished to reiterate strongly importance of U.S. to Afghanistan. Friendly relations should not only continue but should be strengthened and RGA will seize upon any opportunity for further improvements of current cooperative relations and would be open minded to any suggestion which we might have on this. 9. Secretary concluded by conveying his thanks and regards to His Majesty, the King, and Prime Minister and said he saw no reason why relations between the two countries could not continue on a friendly basis. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 AFG. Confidential. Also numbered USUN 3497. Repeated to Kabul and Moscow. Rogers was in New York for the autumn meeting of the UN General Assembly. 351. Telegram 7282 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 351. Telegram 7282 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, December 4, 1971, 1230Z Subject: Conversation With His Majesty and Foreign Minister—Narcotics Ref: Kabul 7281 1. Introduction and summary: I saw His Majesty King Zahir and Foreign Minister Shafiq on evening of December 2, separately and together. Both discussed with me Afghanistan’s concern with narcotics. Other subjects septels. 2. Shafiq, in response to my observations about USG concern on narcotics, noted Secretary Rogers’ comments to him in New York and referred to USIS press release in Kabul highlighting President Nixon’s remarks on subject. Shafiq said RGA is taking subject very seriously and measures to review situation are under urgent study. He said Cabinet committee will definitely be established as result Cabinet decision at its last meeting. Only step remaining in this regard is selection of members. He stated committee would concentrate on two facets: first, economic and technical steps regarding substitute crops; and, second, improvement of enforcement. He expected foreign assistance would be needed for both. MFA will be “operational hub” for RGA, not because of its technical competence on subject but because of urgency and need for coordination with other countries. He said USG advice this far greatly appreciated and would be needed in future. 3. In conversation with His Majesty, I mentioned narcotics and HM noted he aware of USG concern and President’s personal interest, adding that he had immediately put RGA into action on this subject. He repeated steps taken as reported by Shafiq adding that RGA takes its responsibility on this subject very seriously and hoped that special Cabinet committee would begin talks on technical level with USG and international agencies soon. I reiterated USG grave concern about narcotics and deep inroads being made in US society. HM responded he understood but that it was not just US responsibility. He stated every country morally responsible; RGA cannot escape its part of global responsibility; and RGA will shoulder its share of burden. 4. Comment: We have no illusions about RGA capability to fulfill any technical responsibilities; but we will take every possible step to ensure these expressions of support on part of highest levels of RGA are translated into operational positions by those Ministries and officials concerned. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara and Paris. 352. Telegram 7281 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 352. Telegram 7281 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, December 4, 1971, 1235Z Subject: Indo-Pak Situation-Views of Afghan King and FonMin 1. I saw FonMin Shafiq Thursday, December 2 and His Majesty later same day with Shafiq. I summarized for both my conversations in Washington. He stressed again his gratitude for generous US assistance in drought crisis. However, focus of both conversations was on Indo-Pakistani crisis. Other topics reported septels. 2. Shafiq opened conversation on Indo-Pakistan crisis by stating that Pak Ambassador had earlier brought from Yahya letter to HM complaining about Indian actions and asking King use his influence to restrain Indians. Shafiq said danger of all-out conflict is of grave concern to Afghanistan, more so than to many other countries. Situation made more difficult for Afghanistan by Pak recruitment among tribes on both sides of Pak-Afghan frontier. Shafiq said there is great pressure on government to take some action against Pakistan; and this pressure would increase if war started and refugees entered Afghanistan as result military action in west. Shafiq commented there so little any country can do except Great Powers, and he recognized their actions also limited. 3. Shafiq said no responsible person in Afghanistan wants see Pakistan dismembered. Earlier, both sides had approached RGA about acting in some sort of “mediating” role and RGA had been considering possible mechanics for this; however, events have now overtaken and sides are too far apart. (Comment: This conversation took place prior to receipt here of news of military actions in West Pakistan.) Shafiq then said RGA open all suggestions how it might help in spite anticipated problem with Parliament over any RGA action which could be interpreted as helpful to Pakistan. Despite pressure, Shafiq said, RGA must and will adhere to pledged policy to make Pakistanis “more nervous than they already are.” FM Shafiq stated that Afghan ability hold this line had been greatly damaged by Pakistani ban on National Awami Party (NAP) and by working of announcement which spoke of “enemies.” While RGA now satisfied reference had been to Indians. Pushtun version seemed to link Afghanistan with enemies, a fighting word in Pushtun society. In [garble] how GOP could have taken this decision. Shafiq offered following possible explanation: Peshawar Governor called Wali Khan to demand from him strong condemnation of Mujib and implied that ban on ANP would follow if Wali refused; when Wali refused, GOP had no choice but suppress party. Returning again to NAP ban, Shafiq said Pushtun working [wording] of declaration “very objectionable”, not only because of possible linking of Afghanistan to enemies but also reference to leader of Pushunistan movement Adbul Ghaffar Khan (Wali Khan’s father) who resides Kabul. 5. His Majesty confirmed he and his government very preoccupied over Indo-Pak conflict and profound ways in which deterioration would affect Afghanistan. He had tried exert calming influence on both sides, but time now running out, and he astonished by incredible mistakes of Pakistanis. King said he had been expecting from day to day separation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan, whether in context of war or declaration independence. King asked what USG attitude would be if war occurred and destruction West Pakistan seemed imminent. I said our entire efforts had been to prevent tragedy of war and that speaking personally, I was confident, if war broke out, our efforts to help control and limit consequences as much as possible would continue. In response to my query regarding Afghan attitude in such eventuality, King laughed and said Afghanistan as small country could not have much impact on outcome. (Comment: King was obviously less than frank in his response, fact which we both understood.) 6. King coninued that situation was further complicated for Afghanistan by attitude some Arab countries. He specified Morocco, which he said is helping Pakistan in spirit of Rabat Conference, Algeria which is trying mobilize non-aligned countries to help Pakistan. King said that both countries have made recent efforts to enlist Afghanistan. King also said he had recently seen Indian Ambassador to transmit appeal that India withdraw forces beyond border, but events have now overtaken. (Comment: King saw Indian Ambassador at 11:00 a.m. on December 2.) He had also discussed possibility of some settlement which would leave East Pakistan just short of full independence. Indian Ambassador had replied it too late for that. 7. King then mentioned internal pressures in Afghanistan which make hands-off policy toward Pakistan difficult. He particularly singled out conservative religious element, whose influence he characterized as controllable, and bringing pressure on RGA to act against Pakistan. (Comment: While some religious leaders fit this mold because of their strong support for Pushtunistan, others support Pakistan against Hindu India.) 8. His Majesty said he intended on return from UK to stopover in Belgrade for one day to discuss Indo-Pak situation with Tito. Yugoslav Ambassador here has told RGA that Tito “astonished” by Indian attitude and trying influence it. King added that Tito wants hold next Non-Aligned Conference in Kabul and “this will be considered: (Comment: King seemed less than enthusiastic about this eventuality.) In comment which I was not certain was King’s own evaluation or Tito’s, HM said Mrs. Gandhi blowing soft and hard between pressures of those on one hand who want military solution and those on other hand who feel she has weakened Indian policy by her militant attitude. King said Tito had probed through Yugo Ambassador here whether solution might leave East Pakistan short of independence, but that Indian Ambassador had responded same as he had to Afghans, i.e. too late for that. FYI: As of December 4, King’s departure for London now postponed 24 hours, with possibility that outbreak of war in West Pakistan may lead to cancellation. End FYI. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, and Tehran. 353. Telegram 616 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 353. Telegram 616 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, February 1, 1972 Subject: New Year Assessment of Afghan Government Performance and Outlook for US Position in Afghanistan I. Summary: Performance of Afghan Government considerably improved overall under Prime Minister Zahir in response to challenge of severe drought and economic crisis, although improvement highly uneven and concentrated among a few Cabinet members. Rapid and flexible US assistance has greatly contributed to government effectiveness and strengthened US position in country under more dynamic leadership, Afghani foreign policy steered careful and successfully neutral course during Indo-Pak war, even showing some limited capacity to resist Soviet pressures. RGA now moving with some determination to establish better relations with both Iran and Pakistan and to strengthen countries. Similar attitudes toward outcome of Indo-Pak war now tending to reinforce parallelism of US and Afghan policy goals in region, further strengthening U.S position here. As a result, I believe US should be prepared provide some new assistance this fiscal year, without, however, further raising US profile in country. II. 1971 produced some significant changes in RGA policies and performance. A. What has changed—internal. 1) PM Zahir’s personal relations with Parliament show great improvement over both Etemadi and Maiwandwal. It is possible (though not highly probable) that Zahir’s greater tactical skill and understanding of parliamentary imperatives can even be translated into a few concrete legislative achievements during longer March to August parliamentary session. 2) Deputy PM named and Minister without Portfolio Wakili have proven uncommonly (for Afghanistan) energetic and courageous Ministers. For the first time in my memory there is an attempt at some overall direction of the economy (Hamed), and a very energetic leadership regarding wheat, especially food for work, and fertilizer distribution, however chaotic still. Minister of Interior Mansuri seemingly energetic and cooperative. Also Minister of Commerce Ghaussi knowledgable and workmanlike but not up to high standards set by Nur Ali. Minister of Health Seraj active and effective, especially in promoting health centers in outlying areas. B. What has not changed—internal. 1) Rest of Cabinet not noticeably improved, nor are lower echelons. Minister of Finance clearly out of depth illustrating peter principle. Sarabi of Planning, always sad, getting sadder. Enayat-Seraj in Education has proved disappointing. 2) Hamed and Wakil, despite energy and good intentions, handicapped. Hamed long operating as a loner thus far has not staffed himself. Wakili, handicapped by operating as Minister without Portfolio without bureaucratic support from established ministry, less effective because of unclear lines of responsibility and certain amount of (hopefully diminishing) political naivete. Lower echelons still unable or unwilling exercise leadership and responsibility. Few people have been fired, and “business” as usual still pervades bureaucracy. 3) While PM Zahir’s personal handling of Parliament superior, he has still not been able to move necessary but tough measures, especially those needed to increase revenues. I am unfortunately not optimistic that this will change soon. I am convinced that PM fully understands significance of this but has come to conclusion move simply not possible politically. Regretfully I agree with his assessment. Parliament remains fragmented, undisciplined, and readily made hostage by demogagic members. Next session likely to produce very difficult challenges to government on foreign policy (Pushtunistan, Iran) on university crisis, and themes such as food distribution, corruption, and still sluggish economy. C. What has changed—external. 1) Arrival of new, energetic, ambitious and extremely intelligent Foreign Minister Shafiq has galvanized (Afghan style) Foreign Ministry. More changes in personnel and organization are likely to occur. Moreover quick thinking and quick-acting FonMin is quite willing to intervene in other (economic) matters to get rapid results. 2) Obviously with King’s approval, new FonMin seeks more active role for RGA in foreign affairs than over-cautious and negative Etemadi. This has been heightened by recent changes in subcontinent and shifts in power balance of area. 3) For first time RGA was apparently willing resist USSR pressure to some extent and take separate, independent line re Indo-Pak crisis (Kabul 7621). 4) Shafiq now taking long-delayed initiatives to settle Helmand dispute with Iran and smooth relations more generally with GOI. D. What has not changed—external. 1. Foreign Ministry, although clearly one of the best RGA Ministries, still slow and sluggish. Only Shafiq, Farhadi, Karzai, Mohseni, Ghaus hard-working and knowledgable. Rest remains as usual—which is not much. Chief of Protocol Saadallah Ghaussi highly knowledgeable and occasionally helpful outside area of protocol responsibilities. 2. While stirrings of independence re USSR development, we should be under no illusion as to the degree of this independence, should Soviets decide to push really hard on any issue. III. US program achievements: Complete list well known to Department. I want to point primarily to effective impact of USG forthcomingness on PL 480 Title I and II wheat, and US role in stimulating new RGA fervor for fertilizer import and distribution. While both programs have their unorthodox and chaotic features, primary and in my view distinctive features are that (a) tens of thousands of hungry have been fed, (b) many new local construction projects undertaken in food-for-work program with result growing rural awareness self-help possibilities, (c) democratic and friendly government has been considerably strengthened. Highly effective, and flexible collaboration between Peace Corps and USAID greatly enhanced impact of US policies, and exemplifies inter-agency cooperation at its best. USG has received much credit, and US position in Afghanistan considerably strengthened. IV. Afghanistan, the region and the US. 1. RGA is apprehensive over growing Indian power and possible further disintegration Pakistan. Despite considerable external and internal pressure RGA has exploited Pak difficulties to feather own nest. RGA wishes encourage moderate and realistic regime in Pakistan in order avoid encouragement for closer Pak alliance with PRC and consequent Sino-Soviet “cold war” intensifying at Afghan border, with strong possibilities increased and possibly irrisistable Soviet pressure on Afghanistan to confront Pakistan. B. Above consensus, plus desire for a more dynamic Afghan foreign policy, has moved RGA toward active pursuit closer cooperation with neighboring Muslim countries hoping thereby bring measure of support to Bhutto. This could also help in overcoming remaining problems with Iran, although powerful domestic (conservative) forces (aided by Matwandwal) and other government opposition constantly agitate against improvement relations with both Pakistani and Iran. King and PM therefore find it politically difficult move in both directions at once and had been giving Pakistan priority because of crisis. Recent dramatic visit to Tehran by FonMin Shafiq signals greater concentration on Iran relations to disarm parliamentary critics when parliament reconvenes in March. C. Whatever reaction to our policy re conflict may have been elsewhere, in Afghanistan it has served to strengthen US position because of parellel Afghan concerns re Russian influence, Indian intentions and Pak future. Because we were already doing well here as result prompt USG action in response drought emergency, I consider the present period high point in USG standing in Afghanistan. D. Because of the considerable common ground in USG and RGA policies I believe it is in USG interest to support present RGA, strengthening it where possible but without raising our profile dramatically. Cornerstone program directions to reflect this policy should include: 1) The food-for-work program; 2) The accelerated fertilizer program, under private sector distribution; 3) A continued US presence in Kabul University despite current crisis on campus (Kabul A-5); 4) Strong continued Peace Corps presence at about current volunteer levels, which both very effective and well received; 5) Support for IBRD role in providing future economic planning assistance and in addressing on multilateral basis long-term external debt burden—as moves in direction eventual IBRD-led “consultative group” of foreign donors; 6) Continued pressure for increased RGA cooperation in effort combat narcotics traffic and production; 7) Close, frequent consultations at highest levels RGA concerning US policies toward region; 8) Earliest possible invitation to King for US visit to underscore USG support and confidence. V. In conclusion I assess past year as one in which Afghan political system remained completely intact despite serious challenges both internal and external. System showed some capacity adapt to challenge, though response clearly slow and inadequate many fronts. No real threats to regime or throne on horizon. US position here somewhat enhanced, and selective support for progressive elements in RGA program can help solidify our gains during 1972. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 AFG. Secret. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Tehran. 354. Telegram 22013 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 354. Telegram 22013 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 Washington, February 8, 1972, 1912Z SUBJECT: Narcotics Control Action Plan REF: (a) Kabul A-130 (b) State 4073 1. Goals and basic strategy of Narcotics Control Action Plan for Afghanistan have been generally concurred in by NEA Inter-Agency Committee on Narcotics Control subject to qualifications in following paragraphs and further development of specific components with RGA. Agree, however, that implementation of most parts of plan dependent on receipt of commitment from King per para B.1.a. of plan. 2. Statement of Goals : The overall U.S. objective in narcotics control activities in Afghanistan is to prevent opium from Afghanistan from entering the heroin traffic to the U.S. U.S. Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics (CINC), in its December 16, 1971 meeting, reaffirmed that intelligence and law enforcement should continue to receive highest priority in U.S. international narcotics effort. Embassy’s plan objectives are in general harmony with this decision in placing priority on intelligence collection and on upgrading capabilities of Afghan enforcement agencies. However, plan implies larger short-term input into agriculture than may be needed. NEA Committee agrees, however, that in longer term, it may be necessary to put effective check on expansion of production or to seek complete eradication of production to prevent international traffickers from making major use of Afghanistan as alternative source to Turkey. 3. Strategy to Achieve Goals—Political : We agree that general approach must involve full spectrum of bilateral, regional and multilateral activities. We believe Turks and Germans can play most useful roles. We are particularly interested in CND’s Ad Hoc Group getting started and are concerned that there still no indication Afghanistan will participate. Request Embassy recommendations on strategy for seeking FRG assistance to proposed RGA narcotics bureau. Department to plans urge U.N. to expedite consideration of proposal to initiate for Afghanistan and to initiate discussions with RGA as soon as possible on content of project. 4. Strategy—Law Enforcement : Recommendations seem well-suited to Afghan situation and are generally concurred in by NEA group with understanding that changes in scope and emphasis may be needed as specifics of proposals worked out with RGA. Request Embassy amplify suggestion on improved Afghan Customs Service and describe how TDY or resident customs advisory team might best coordinate its efforts with proposed narcotics bureau and gendarmerie strike force. We also believe that, whether or not Afghans decide to participate in CND Ad Hoc Group, it will be highly desirable to develop cooperative arrangement among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran on intelligence collection, etc. Since almost exclusive demand for Afghan opium, and therefore main reason for growing it, seems to be from Iran, and since reaching long-term objective of ending opium production in Iran is believed unattainable until there is major reduction of opium flow from Afghanistan to Iran, interdependence of problem dictates need for coordinated solution. Embassies Tehran and Kabul are requested give careful thought to possible means of achieving coordination or cooperation, and to seek host government ideas at early stage in discussions of narcotics control action plans. 5. Strategy—Agricultural : Consensus of NEA Committee was that in light of Cabinet Committee’s decision, research strategy overly ambitious. Level of funding proposed seems out of proportion with priority established for agricultural projects at this stage of narcotics control planning. Existing Ag research program, which emphasizes wheat, will be evaluated by Ag review team in February. Team report may provide suggestions useful in narcotics control planning. In addition, USDA considering research targets which can be conducted in regional context, some but not all of which might be done in Afghanistan. On data collection, unfortunately, NASA ERTSA previously scheduled for 1972 will not be launched until 1973 at earliest, and ERTSB not until 1978. Most recent efforts at obtaining useful intelligence from aerial photography have not yielded positive results. State of art may be improved during course of 1972, but not expected be of use this crop year in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, mission should proceed to identify precise coordinates of several known poppy fields for use in establishing “ground truth” for early summer of next season’s possible use. 6. Following Embassy determination that King/RGA prepared to act, Embassy/Mission should discuss project proposals covering specific activities with RGA and submit for approval and funding. Additional proposals that may be suggested by CCINC priorities outlined para 2 above may be submitted as amendments to plan. Washington agencies may be able provide TDY assistance in project preparation if needed. Prior to funding approval, you should not, of course, make specific commitments to RGA on support of action proposals. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Drafted on February 7 by Robert A. Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared by Laingen and with the NEA Inter-Agency Working Group on Narcotics, and approved by Davies. 355. Telegram 884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 355. Telegram 884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, February 12, 1972, 1114Z Ref: Embassy 772 and 695 1. As indicated in post’s narcotics control action plan (Kabul A-130, December 13, 1971) page 9, mission decided in concert importance of taking action on narcotics problem in Afghanistan could be brought home to key RGA officials through the eyes of foreign press. All indications point to fact this mission campaign is constructive and producing results. 2. Afghanies, unlike other people are unusually sensitive about what foreign press writes about their country. 3. Influx of hippies and narcotic trafickers brought with it increased foreign press interest in newly evolving situation in Afghanistan created by both. Afghan hashish enjoys an especially high reputation among world travellers. 4. Articles both in the US and UK with times such as quote Embassies kept busy rescuing the drug-frazzled freaks: hippies find Afghanistan a hellish drug heaven: hippies begging like dogs in Afghanistan; hippies sell bodies to Afghans for fix; Britain depicts Afghanistan as center of narcotics; Afghanistan cracks down on drug users; hippies head for Kabul in all sorts of conveyances; a hippie burial; and Afghanistan: deadly economic opportunity unquote were reproduced in multiple copies by USIS and sent to the Prime Minister’s office, Deputy Foreign Minister, MFA’s Directors of Information and Economics, leading editor of independent and government newspapers and to President of Publications, MOIC. The Prime Ministers press advisor personally thanked PAO and request that PM’s office continue to receive all such articles. 5. Certain articles were reprinted in independent newspapers; some have undoubted been cause of editorials on narcotics and hippies; and some have undoubtedly been food for thought to leading officials who are attempting to grapple with overall problems of narcotics and hippies. 6. Afghanistan: Deadly economic opportunity written by Naomi Barry (International Herald Tribune) with cooperation of Embassy and USIS officers apparently hit home because it was result of a painful rebuttal from a high commerce ministry official, who is very well known by mission officers. Mrs. Barry ended her article by quoting a worried foreign diplomat quote the Afghans are sensitive people. When the government realizes the kind of reputation it is getting for itself abroad, it may become more severe at home unquote. 7. The Ambassador also took occasion to emphasize above quote by showing his majesty one of articles when subject of narcotics was discussed. 8. In addition, USIS has carried well over eighty percent of all articles that have been received by post through wireless file in United States bulletin which is distributed to approximately twelve hundred opinion leaders in Afghanistan, including all RGA officers concerned with narcotics. Copies of all wireless file stories on narcotics are sent immediately upon receipt to MFA Director concerned with subject. Brescia 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Confidential. Also sent to USIA. Sent as a joint USIS/Embassy message. 356. Telegram 956 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 356. Telegram 956 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, February 16, 1972 0416Z Subject: Narcotics: Nelson Gross Visit to Afghanistan 1. As Department aware I was not able to reach Kabul in view adverse weather and transportaion conditions. I remained in Jalalabad until advised by responsible Afghan officials that I could not reach Kabul Feb 13. I then returned by car to Peshawar with Kabul escort officer Helseth and thence via first available flight to Tehran for regional meeting. 2. Also stranded in Jabalabad was MFA Chief of Protocol Sadullah Ghaussi. Realizing that I would not have opportunity for planned ministerial talks, I emphasized to Ghaussi deep interest and concern USG and President Nixon re increasing drug abuse problem. I asked Ghaussi pass to RGA thru FonMin Shafiq following message from President Nixon and Secretary Rogers: A) USG hopes RGA will be represented at Geneva Plenipotentiary Conference in March to amend single convention. B) USG asked for RGA support of proposed amendments to single convention as stated in potential consensus which Embassy Kabul had already provided to MFA. C) USG urges RGA join and participate in CND ad hoc committee on illicit traffic. D) AMB Neumann will soon be presenting to RGA plan for cooperative narcotics control which USG hopes RGA will receive and consider favorably, plan includes proposals aimed at (1) increasing Afghanis enforcement capabilities, (2) improving Afghan capability for intelligence data collection in regard to illicit traffic, and (3) some suggestions which eventually will involve plans for crop substitution for affected Afghan farmers if RGA agrees stop all narcotic production. 3. Ghaussi took notes and said he would inform FonMin as soon as he could travel to Kabul. He said he could not, of course, respond to my message. 4. Ghaussi then said he “had heard” USG offering Turkey 39 million dollars to stop opium production but that Turks holding out for 40 million dollars, believing it best. I told Ghaussi 35 million figure was firm and already agreed, but I explained that bulk that amount was to make up for Turk loss foreign exchange as result loss of legal export market. I hope this may forestall Afghan expectations of equivalent quid pro quo. Ghaussi did not respond. MacArthur 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S/NM. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Geneva, Kabul, Paris, and USUN. Nelson Gross was the Secretary’s Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs. The reference to a single convention is to the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, signed in New York on March 30, 1961. (18 UST 1407) 357. Airgram Toaid A-71 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Agency for International Development 357. Airgram Toaid A-71 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Agency for International Development 1 Kabul, March 20, 1972 SUBJECT Disaster Relief Summary Report REFERENCE A. State 3375 B. M.O. 1565.1 C. TOAID A-230 1. Country: Afghanistan 2. Type Disaster: Drought 3. Location: Drought extended throughout Afghanistan but was more severe in the southern, central and western portions of the country. 4. The most successful portion of US disaster relief thus far was the wheat provided under Titles I and II of PL 480. The US made available to the RGA 100,000 tons Title II grant wheat and 100,000 tons Title I wheat under long term credit sales. This wheat, 2/3 of all the wheat made available to the RGA from all sources, during the June 71–72 period allowed the RGA to adopt aggressive programs for meeting a critical situation. The RGA programs took two forms; first in a generally successful attempt to make wheat available throughout the country the Government is selling wheat in provincial centers at a controlled price of 52.50 Afs. per seer (1 seer = 7.16 kg.) to all who want it. The effect of this program has been to reduce the market price of wheat. In Kabul the market price dropped from 74 Afs. per seer on September 24, 1971 to 65 Afs per seer on February 17, 1972. This also relieved social and political pressures that were building up due to the critical shortage of wheat. The second program is a Food for Work project designed to make wheat available to those too poor to purchase wheat even at controlled prices. The overall success of this project has been good. This program, still only implemented in selected provinces, has employed over 89,000 people in the first months of operation. If compared with the total problem, the contribution of the Food for Work program so far has been limited but significant. The overall impact of the RGA’s food distribution programs by making adequate wheat available to the people is to forestall the threat of runaway prices, widespread food shortages and the development of serious areas of famine. The least successful part of US drought relief efforts was the purchase of water pumps and animal feed with the Ambassador’s special fund. Water pumps: Difficulties developed in utilization of the water pumps purchased for the Kandahar area when the farmers along individual irrigation ditches could not resolve the problems involved in cooperative purchase of the fuel for the pumps and distribution of the water available to their irrigation system. Because of these social problems the pumps were not utilized to anywhere near their potential. Animal feed: Poor RGA administration has limited the distribution and sale of the animal feed made available through the special fund. As of this report only very little effective use has been made of this feed. 5. The initial reports of the disaster could be considered generally accurate except for projected livestock losses where nothing like the projected disaster, loss of up to 70% of the total herd, developed. 6. The RGA projected a need for 538,003 tons of wheat during 1970–71. Donor organizations made available approximately 300,000 tons. By the end of the 71–72 crop year it is expected the Government will have about 85,000 tons of wheat to carry over into the neat crop year, including about 25,000 tons of Title II Food for Work wheat. This is a normal carryover and in this respect the available relief supplies could be considered as excess to immediate disaster needs, but is considered a reasonable amount for RGA needs and will be used during the coming year. Reduction of the Government’s carryover stocks much below this level would be extremely dangerous. From this point of view the total stocks made available to the Government should be considered as reasonable. (Usage might well have been considerably larger if the distribution system had been more effective). 7. US personnel were effectively utilized in the Food for Work program (Peace Corps) and in a fertilizer distribution program (USAID and PC) related to the drought relief efforts of the Government. 8. There were no foreign voluntary agencies except the U.S. Peace Corps and the German volunteer service involved in relief operations. Both these agencies assisted in the Food for Work program. 9. In the early stages of the Food for Work program the number of volunteers and local personnel were too few to allow rapid implementation of the Food for Work program. A recruitment effort has since raised the number of available volunteers to an adequate level. 10. From the port of Karachi to Peshawar no special transport problems were encountered. At the height of the Indo-Pak war there was some slow down but the Pakistani railroad kept wheat moving from the port at almost a good pace. From Peshawar to Kabul a shortage of Pakistani trucks created delays. This was overcome by sending additional Afghan trucks to Peshawar. Within Afghanistan delays were encountered, especially in the Food for Work program, due to poor Afghan coordination and slow payment to truckers. USAID intervention and support, including that of the Nathan Team was only partially effective, but very useful. A protocol between the EGA agencies concerned in the allocation and transportation of the wheat was recently signed designating responsibilities for the transport of the wheat. This protocol should solve to some extent the transport problems encountered in the early stages of program implementation. 11. The Afghan Red Crescent Society served as a channel for the distribution of 15,000 tons of wheat from the Peoples Republic of China that was distributed free in especially hard hit areas of the country. The size of the drought area was so large that the local relief organizations could play no really significant role in relief operations. 12. No special problems were encountered in storage of supplies. 13. Preparedness facilities were not utilized. 14. The Mssion feels the channels of communication between itself and AID/W were good and the support given to Mission efforts outstanding. 15. Other countries and organizations providing food assistance (all wheat) were Canada 11,000 tons, Peoples Republic of China 15,990 tons, France 8,000 tons, World Food Program 30,000 tons, European Economic Community 21,640 tons, Turkey 5,090 tons, Germany 10,000 tons. In addition, Pakistan, Iran, USSR and Iraq, each provided assistance. Except for the USSR, these countries provided cash which the PGA used to purchase wheat seed or fertilizer. The USSR provided 2,000 tons of wheat seed and 10,000 tons of animal feed. Distribution of the seed and fertilizer was effective. The distribution of the animal feed from the USSR was not timely nor effective. 16. Total MI costs were in excess of $12,300,000. 17. The RGA is making imaginative attempts to meet the drought-caused disaster. For the first time, the RGA accepted as a responsibility of the Government the relief of the people suffering from effects of a drought. They made structural changes within the government to promote rapid agricultural development and to an extent never previously achieved focused resources, human and material, on meeting specific goals. Through these efforts the RGA was able to increase the use of fertilizer and improved seed throughout the country, begin a Food for Work program that could have a major immediate and long term impact on rural development and begin rethinking any structural changes that may be needed to promote continued increased agricultural production. Specific programs and their overall impact on meeting the drought-created food shortage have been successful. The country has come through the drought with a minimum amount of dislocation and hardship. The long-term effect of these relief efforts may develop an RGA with a clearer sense of development priorities, a greater sense of urgency in implementing development plans and a greater ability to focus needed resources on specific projects. 18. Continued support for the food production campaign, including support to programs reflecting a dramatically increased realization of the necessity of fertilizer, and for the RGA Food for Work program may be the only long-term assistance (3–5 years) that results from the drought. This latter assistance will be in the form of U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers and PL 480 commodities. 19. If, as described on the last part of 16 above, the RGA comes out of the period of drought with clearer development priorities and a greater will to implement programs based on these priorities, the US may find it advantageous to increase its level of support for the RGA’s development efforts. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Unclassified. Drafted in the AID mission by Charles L. Husick, cleared in the mission by Albert R. Baron, John R. Wilson, Alfonso D. Dominquez, and Cecil H. Uyehara; also cleared in the Embassy by David H. Cohn and Louis L. Mitchell, Jr., and approved by mission director Bartlett Harvey. A notation on the airgram indicates it was received on March 27. 358. Telegram 52513 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 358. Telegram 52513 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 Washington, March 28, 1972, 1542Z Subject: Pak-Afghan Relations Ref: Kabul 1545 Moscow 2480 Islamabad 2144 Kabul 1654 1. We are concerned that domestic political pressures in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be pushing both countries contrary to their own interests and desires—toward a confrontation over terrain and loyalties of Pushtun people. Afghanistan has found it expedient to reinvigorate its Pushtunistan propaganda in preparation for convening of Parliament. Bhutto government in Pakistan finds its most credible major opposition coming from Wali Khan who is coincidentially most effective spokesman for Pushtuns of NWFP. Emotional bond between latter and Pushtunistan irredentists in Afghanistan probably strong as ever in spite of ideological contradictions and conflicting objectives. 2. Recent agreement between President Bhutto and Wali Khan is hopeful sign, but we have also noted disturbing report that Bhutto harbors considerable irritation with Wali and may want another go at him later. If agreement should break down Afghanistan could react through intensified propaganda in manner which would not only be resented by GOP but could also lead Afghan Pushtuns and some of NAP followers in Pakistan to expect concrete action from RGA. in short, possibility exists for escalation from which it would be hard for RGA and GOP to withdraw. Seen from the outside, this confrontation makes no sense. We find it difficult to imagine any significant benefit to either side. 3. We see U.S. interests best served by continuation of improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan which seemed to be taking place during past few years. We have major interest, therefore, in continuation Bhutto-Wali agreement, or in event of breakdown, in facilitating resumption dialogue between President Bhutto and recognized leadership of NWFP. Similarly we have interest in continuing recognition by RGA of risks in any revival of official encouragement to Pushtun claims, especially during current crisis in Pakistan. Finally we attach considerable importance to continuation of GOP-RGA dialogue initiated by Bhutto visit to Kabul. 4. For Islamabad: Charge should continue find appropriate occasion compliment Bhutto on statesmanlike agreement with Wali and to encourage Bhutto to continue cautious approach to NWFP politics. You may share with him USG assessment that RGA’s increased interest in Pushtunistan appears basically designed for domestic political purposes, and that RGA ability to restrain parliamentary Pushtuns is inverse function of Bhutto-Wali or GOP-NAP tension. You should also note with Bhutto and other GOP officials our appreciation of Bhutto’s statesmanship in visit to Kabul and our hope that GOP can follow up with concrete measures, particularly in trade and investment, designed to demonstrate that Bhutto visit had constructive substantive purpose. Discussions with Wali by consul in Peshawar or Charge should stress same positive theme: Wali-Bhutto agreement was statesmanlike and we hope continuing dialogue between two leaders will facilitate development of democratic government in Pakistan. 5. For Kabul: In discussions with RGA, suggest you continue encourage such positive elements of past couple of years as RGA thanks to GOP for continuation of wheat shipments during war and King’s courtesies to Bhutto in January. In particular, you should continue stress need for low key approach to Pushtunistan publicity. Ambassador might find ways discreetly note, that recent Moscow speech and announced revival of issue in public media could fan issue in way that could have unfortunate backlash. We hope recent public announcement will itself be sufficient for political purposes for which it was apparently designed and follow-up will be held to absolute minimum. We trust moderates in RGA aware that Pakistan political situation still very fragile. Hostile propaganda from Afghanistan could encourage foolish behavior in WFP by NAP, GOP, or both, which could contribute to instability in region and redound against RGA’s long term interests. As you find opportunity, you should encourage RGA diplomatic initiative to reassure GOP on PM’s Moscow speech and on announcement of revival of Pushtunistan coverage in press. 6. Welcome addressee comments. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential. Drafted on March 27 by Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared in NEA/PAF by Peter Constable and Laingen, and with EUR/SOV, and approved by Van Hollen. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated to Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and London. The reference to a recent Moscow speech is to a speech made by Prime Minister Zahir in Moscow on March 14 in which he described the Pushtunistan issue as the only problem that existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan and called for a “solution based on Pushtunistan people’s right to determine own fate.” (Telegram 2307 from Moscow, March 15; ibid., POL 7 AFG.) 359. Telegram 1806 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 359. Telegram 1806 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, March 31, 1972, 0400Z Subject: Afghanistan-Political Uncertainties Summary. Vague atmosphere of political crisis has been developing Kabul in recent days, though known factors do not seem warrant as much malaise as exists. MinHealth resignation privately confirmed and other near resignations reliable reported. Approach to Ambassador through intermediary from former PM Prince Daud querying US attitude toward possibility his return to power. Action requested Dept comments on proposed line to follow in response Daud approach. End summary. 1. There is an ill-defined political crisis in Kabul which appears deeper than available facts and known factors warrant. Elements are continued university standstill, sluggish economy, high food prices in spots and uneven distribution, sugar shortage as well as confirmed (though possibly not accepted) resignation Minister of Health and reported consideration of resignation by Ministers of Education and Interior. Additional factors are government’s “hold-the-line” policy on Pushtunistan which critics interpret as further evidence of RGA indecisiveness. Stories of high-level corruption, administration malfunction and continued absence parliamentary quorum. 2. To the long-term resident, which I have become, none of these items seems unusual or exceptonally grave. Moreover the above list does a distinct injustice to many real RGA accomplishments of which Dept aware. And yet there is an atmosphere here of lassitude, of resignation, as if the elan vital of the government has become exhausted, and there is growing criticism of the King and his alleged inability or unwillingness to make decisions. 3. Against this background the following should be evaluated: Item-On March 11, Wahid Abdullah, Director of Information, MFA, came to residence at his suggestion. Wahid is well known to us as long time fervent supporter and booster of former PM Prince Daud. At that time, he asked me what would be USG reaction to Daud’s re-assumption of power. In response I inquired whether he was asking under instructions from Daud. He stated cryptically “Daud knows I am here.” I then stated that internal affairs Afghanistan not repeat not proper matter for me to comment on. Item-On March 27, Wahid sent me through Embassy Officer following questions as coming directly from Daud as result conversation previous day between Prince Daud, Prince Naim, and Wahid. A. What is attitude of US re Daud’s possible re-assumption of power? B. Could Daud/Naim count upon sympathy of USG if Daud becomes head of government? C. Would US then continue to support Afghanistan economically and morally? D. Will US safeguard Afghan national independence? Item [ text not declassified ] of March 28 confirming Daud criticism of failure government to act and not repeat not ruling out Daud return to power. 4. My evaluation is as follows: (1) we have absolutely no repeat no indication of any impending drastic change, coup or similar: (2) we are generally doubtful of Wahid’s accuracy and sense of proportion in reporting. Certainly there is a large self-serving element in all Wahid’s actions, but (underscore) (a) never before have such questions from Daud come with equal precision and every indication of authority. In view almost feudal relationship Wahid-Daud-Naim it seems most unlikely that Wahid could have dared take liberties with accuracy of message. (b) Newly arrived Iranian Ambassador Tafazoli asked my opinion of Daud, which question has not been asked for some time. 5. I consider likelihood of Daud return no more than outside possibility. Also Daud’s known politics and family and dynastic loyalty makes coup seem unlikely. Moreover vague nature of crisis improbable basis for act of despair. Nevertheless it is impossible to ignore that something is stirring in the Daud camp. Likeliest explanations in my view are (a) that Daud is considering more active role after long period; of inactivity and (b) that his main threat, if any, would be most likely to act in royal family council rather than by external force. 6. Under these circumstances and without overrating chance of Daud success, it would, in my opinion, not repeat not be in best interest USG to ignore Daud’s inquiry. To do so, would confirm his longstanding suspicion USG hostile to him, and he is capable of bearing long grudges. 7. At same time we must avoid giving Daud any card which he could and would use in strengthening his hand in an internal power struggle and which could even remotely be interpreted as USG support. 8. Therefore, if Dept concurs, I propose act as follows: A. Deal with Wahid only indirectly through same EmbOff. B. Respond along following lines: (1) internal nature of Afghan Government is matter solely within Afghan domain on which USG cannot repeat cannot properly comment. (2 ) As a matter of general world-wide principle, USG attitude toward any government is based on that government’s policies and actions, in particular toward, US interests and towards peace and stability in region. (3) If Wahid or Daud were to ask whether answers subject of instructions Washington, I would instruct EmbOff to say that above is all he is authorized transmit. 9. Request comments and guidance. 10. Dept, at its discretion, may wish repeat Tehran, Islamabad. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 56321 to Kabul, March 31, the Department endorsed the response to Daud outlined in paragraph 8 of this telegram. (Ibid.) 360. Telegram 2042 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 360. Telegram 2042 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, April 13, 1972, 0945Z Subj: Afghanistan-Response to Prince Daud REF: (A) State 56321 (B) Kabul 1806 1. Acting under my instructions, EmbOff gave Wahid Abdullah April 11 response indicated para 8, ref B, minus point three repeat three. Wahid took careful notes. Wahid immediately stated that there was no answer to question whether dialogue could continue. Wahid was pleased to learn that dialogue could continue through him and EmbOff. 2. Again on my instructions, EmbOff then made point suggested para 3, ref A, concerning continuing US relations with Afghanistan over years as his “personal and informed opinion.” 3. During conversation EmbOff asked how change in government might occur especially in view wahid’s earlier statement that Prince Daud could never take any action which would further divide Afghanistan. Wahid responded: (a) Daud still adheres to this principle; (b) some members royal family “would favor Daud’s return;” and (c) Marshal Shah Mali Khan and wife have for some time been actively working to effect reconciliation between His Majesty and Princes Daud and Naim. 4. For first time in several years I recently saw Princes Daud and Naim at public affair (wedding receiption for Dr. Aziz Seraj’s daughter) and made point of speaking briefly to both. Wahid told EmbOff in response question, that Princes attended because groom was son of Daud’s former Minister of Interior and is now protege of Daud. 5. Rumors now cropping up in various Kabul circles about possibility that Daud may reenter political arena. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis. 361. Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 361. Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, April 15, 1972, 0340Z Subject: Narcotics-A Conversation With Afghan FonMin Ref: Kabul 1705, Kabul 1404 1. When I saw FonMin Shafiq April 12 I again raised narcotics problem stressing need for stricter enforcement which would probably require new police, pharmaceutical and drug laws as well as need for Afghan active participation in CND ad hoc committee. While we agreed discuss subject at greater length on his return from PRC, Shafiq made following interesting observations: (a) he believed present two Cabinet committees too cumbersome and foreign governments need focal person to talk to; (b) he trying centralize problem by harmonizing action and speeding it up: (c) focal point should be in MFA. 2. Shafiq added he had proposed that Supreme Court take steps to see that uniform drug law is drafted. He said MFA now drafting note asking foreign help this regard. He implied note would go to most Embassies Kabul but was not specific. He said he had also proposed (a) creation of special drug courts and (b) special drug training courses for RGA personnel involved in narcotics effort. 3. Comment: I believe MFA focal point has definite advantages for us so long as procedure would not further delay initial work of Cabinet committees whose reports now due May. After above mentioned note arrives, I expect see respective chairmen in near future in effort obtain information on direction their work and possible tentative conclusions. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Geneva, Islamabad, London, Paris, Rome, and USUN. 362. Memorandum From Robert A. Flaten of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (Laingen) 362. Memorandum From Robert A. Flaten of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (Laingen) 1 Washington, May 31, 1972 SUBJECT: Afghan Politics—The Creeping Crisis Almost everyone agrees that there is some kind of political crisis in Afghanistan. To define that crisis is difficult and to predict where it may lead and when is impossible. Since much of the factual reporting on the situation has come in since I left Kabul, I will limit myself to the broad outlines of the situation as it was described to me by the Embassy and some of the Afghans I saw. The symptom of the crisis is the lack of a quorum in Parliament. It was scheduled to assemble on March 13, although not expected to have a quorum until mid April. But by mid May when I left Kabul the Lower House had had only two quorums and it was quite clear that the lack of quorum had been caused by the government. (Samiuddin Zhouand, Deputy Minister of Justice, told me with a wink that “the official position of the government is that the lack of quorum has been caused by the Parliamentarians”.) The government has been especially careful to avoid a quorum for the Tuesday question sessions. The issues which seem to have made the government unwilling to face a hostile Parliament, are serious and have followed a time sequence which has kept the RGA in a near crisis mood for almost six months without let up. First came the student strike in November, next the Indo-Pak War in December which revived old Pushtunistan feelings, then labor troubles in April, perhaps largely caused by the continuing high price of wheat, and finally in April and early May urgent and critical reports from the provinces that the drought relief measures of last fall had not been as successful as hoped. The government failed to solve the university strike during the winter recess of the Parliament (December 12 through March 13) and there is some indication that the King’s decision to overrule his government and capitulate to the students was based on Parliamentary pressures or at least a wish to appease Parliamentarians. On Pushtunistan the King had carefully avoided a confrontation with the Pushtun dominated Parliament (60%) in December, but when the new session began in March Pushtunistan was still an emotional issue, as Wali Khan and President Bhutto made and broke agreements in their delicate dance toward the recent formation of the NAP/JUI government in the NWFP. But the food crisis seems to have been the real clincher for which neither the King nor his government were prepared. As the snows began to melt reliable reports began to reach Kabul that people had gone hungry over the winter, some had starved, and they were blaming the government, or at least their members of Parliament were blaming the government, for their distress. It is hard to weigh the relative importance of these factors, but in combination they have clearly been enough to paralyze the government and probably to frighten the King. With long discussions on Pushtunistan and Baluchistan, Karzai of the Foreign Ministry was apparently trying to convince me that the Pushtun issue was the most important problem facing the RGA. (See separate memo on Pushtunistan.) Aside from the lack of a quorum in Parliament the only measurable effect of the crisis is a reduction in construction and new investment, and this, of course, is not really measurable in Afghanistan where there are no statistics. But the mortgage bank has stopped making new loans because of the political situation and some prospective industrialists appear to have shelved their projects or delayed them because of the uncertainties. But neither the issues nor the symptoms tell the full story. The issues will soon be over. The university strike has been settled, Wali Khan has his government in the NWFP with good prospects of continuing, and by mid June or early July the food crisis will have been overcome by the new harvest. If the symptom of the sickness is a lack of quorum then presumably the establishment of a quorum on a regular basis would symbolize the end of the crisis. The crisis could end this way, but while this may save the Zahir government, it probably will not stop the talk of crisis. When Afghans spoke of their crisis they spoke of a lack of leadership, the need for political parties, corruption and the disruptiveness of Parliament in addition to the immediate causes listed above. The Prime Minister went on record the other day in favor of the political parties bill in an interview with Caravan, but there is no indication that the King is more willing to permit political parties now than he was three years ago when the bill was sent to him, except that Parcham (Communist, Soviet oriented) recently declared itself to be a party and has not yet been prosecuted. Some feel that it is the fear of Parcham and other communist groups which prevents the King from signing the political parties bill. Ambassador Popal pointed out, however, that this is silly because under the Constitution “Un-Islamic” parties would be illegal any way. The Embassy assessment seems to be that the political party question is not the real issue. It is unlikely that the King would permit political parties to exercise real power even if he did permit their organization. The consensus in the Embassy seems to be that even if the issue of the crisis recedes into the background, the crisis itself will continue. This may mean a motion of no confidence in the Zahir government. If the King believes that such a motion has a chance of succeeding, he will then permit Prime Minister Zahir to resign for health reasons and probably appoint either Deputy Prime Minister Hamed or Foreign Minister Shafiq as Prime Minister. In the former case the crisis would still be there after a long confidence debate, and very litttle would be changed. Shafiq seems a little less predictable, smarter, more flamboyant but with good credentials as a son of a Mullah and an Islamic scholar, but a Shinwari. The chances for real leadership within the government would continue to be very limited because the King himself is most unlikely to permit a real change from his cautious style of government, and is unlikely in any case according to a number of observers to permit real power to fall into the hands of a “commoner”. It is entirely conceivable therefore that this crisis could continue for another year, until the elections of 1973, and perhaps on into 1974 or longer before the pressures for decisions bring it to a head. If and when it comes to a head the likely outcome is a return to direct royal family rule under a strong man, probably either Prince Daud or Sardar Abdul Wali. In spite of this political uncertainty, the US role in Afghanistan remains positive and welcome by almost all Afghans. Afghan gratitude for US assistance continues to be almost embarrassing. The Afghans are probably going to agree to the 10 percent payment for MAP training, the RGA is apparently willing to face off an adverse Russian reaction to an IBRD planning team which we greatly favor, and there appears to be little evidence of any increase in Soviet presence and influence within the country in spite of the governmental paralysis. From a strictly diplomatic point of view our position in Kabul is probably as strong as it ever has been and would be cause for considerable optimism if we could be assured of a responsible government with which to continue to deal. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 AFG. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kabul, to Islamabad for Sober, and to London for G.B. Lambrakis. Attached but not published was the memorandum on Pushtunistan cited in Flaten’s assessment. On May 30 the Embassy in Kabul reported that the Zahir government was “subjected to strong domestic pressures that could bring it down any day.” (Telegram 3016; ibid.) 363. Telegram 4008 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 363. Telegram 4008 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, July 12, 1972, 0645Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel: Memcons From Meetings in Kabul Ref: Conto 272 (Tehran 4111) 1. Draft uncleared memcons of Secretary’s conversations with FonMin Shafiq and His Majesty follow for approval. 2. Conversation with FonMin Shafiq (Ambassador Neumann present): A. FonMin Shafiq stated RGA and he personally determined “kill this evil” (narcotics), he himself was particularly firm, and he would pursue this struggle “whether he was Minister or not.” Fight is to be directed not only against narcotics grown in Afghanistan but also in transit (smuggling). Afghan authorities are up against complex of economic and social factors and he is aware of fact that negotiations about combatting narcotics have raised “hidden expectations”. B. Social structure of Afghanistan also affected by fact that it was adjacent to giant neighbor and by its ability to preserve its independence; but its determination to do so naturally brought Afghanistan closer to us. After dramatic visit of Buloanin and Kosygin in Afghanistan, there were concerns in US that Afghanistan might become Soviet satellite; but Afghanistan was able to preserve its full independence. C. On basis of these experiences RGA therefore feels that its relations with USSR and PRC are stable and will remain so as long as Afghan internal stability is preserved; that depends of course on Afghans themselves. It is easy enough for dangerous elements to exploit internal upheaval and any failure of RGA to meer basic demands of people, which must be satisfied. Economic difficulties and inefficiency in administration contribute to plight of Afghanistan. British left administrative structure in India but this was not case in Afghanistan. US has been very generous and, by helping Afghanistan, US has defensed its own ideals. D. Secretary Connally responded he was glad to know US has been able help Afghanistan master its internal and external problems. However, in times of strain, parliamentary mechanism has to be responsive to problems of country. Delays also constitute action, but negative action. Other countries are willing to help Afghanistan, but their agreements have not been ratified by parliament. Government must take leadership to propel Parliament into action. This is true in all countries and is as necessary in US as in Afghanistan. However, he wanted make it clear that US wants to help, not interfere in internal affairs of country. Shafiq commented that delays in action were indeed dangerous to Afghanistan and RGA was hoping to cope with problem. Secretary Connally then referred to President’s trip to Soviet Union and related that USSR leaders know clearly that they have not made enough domestic progress and that they want US enterprise and investment; but they also want US to finance all this, which is not acceptable. Shafiq then reiterated his appreciation for US understanding of present very critical times in Afghanistan. E. Conferees were then joined by Minister of Planning Sarabi and Minister without Portfolio Wakil. Wakil made point that there had indeed been shortcomings in distribution of food including food-for-work and that inaccessability of certain parts of country were particularly difficult. Therefore principal priority ought to go to road building under food-for-work auspices. Minister Sarabi stressed more general need for US aid for four year plan. 3. Conversation with His Majesty: A. His Majesty met with Secretary Connally at palace. FonMin Shafiq and Ambassador Neumann also present and shared between them interpretation into Farsi and French. His Majesty said he and RGA appreciated greatly high level visits from America. Demonstrating continued interest of US in Afghanistan. He mentioned former President Eisenhower, then Vice President Nixon and visits of Secretary Rogers and Vice President Agnew now followed by important visit of Secretary Connally. King also recalled his own visit to Washington and his meeting with President Kennedy—last such state visit before late President’s assassination. Secretary Connally then transmitted greetings of President Nixon to His Majesty and gave King short review of President’s Peking and Moscow trips. One point of special interest to King was Secretary’s contrasting of personalities of Chou En-Lai on one hand and Brezhnev and Kosygin on other. King replied this was also his own impression and that of FonMin, but he thought that perhaps there was in Chou something of old Chinese culture of politeness and diffidence. He had not expected any final settlements from those summit meetings but considered them most useful for future solution of problems, and had said so to Ambassador Neumann when later first briefed him on meetings. King said he highly appreciative of President’s message and reiterated his profound friendship for US. Even before diplomatic relations were established between US and Afghanistan there were friendly relations especially through many Afghans students studying in America. America’s ideals of independence and freedom were models and values for all people of world. B. Unfortunately Afghanistan had throughout its history been subject to many attacks and had to conduct three wars with major power. Other areas colonialism despite its ravages had left positive heritage of achievements, infrastructure building, civil service and like. In Afghanistan, however, colonialism had only left heritage of attack. It was only after these attacks finally stopped in 1919 that modernization of country could begin. This meant very late start. All this made development more difficult for Afghanistan than had been case elsewhere. C. King then said Afghanistan still has to fight for its national identity which it determined to preserve. In this, vital help has been given by US for which King is deeply grateful. All this, and especially wheat deliveries during drought had been stabilizing and had helped country defend its national existence. Actions had also shown deep understanding of US for problems of Afghanistan for which King is grateful because it helped Afghanistan against both its outside and inside problems. US by this help has made possible that a balance be struck and this again is a monument to US deep understanding of Afghan political and economic structure as well as realities in area. D. King stated creation of democratic system was perhaps premature; it was unfortunate also that serious economic crisis after two years of drought followed only six or seven years after beginning of democratic experiment. Here again help of US was vital in stabilizing problem; and king is determined to persevere and overcome it. E. Secretary Connally then related other parts of his trip after King had expressed his interest, especially concerning his meetings in India and Pakistan as well as in Dacca. Secretary expressed some concern over seemingly inflexible attitude of Mujibur Rahman regarding trial of war criminals which he thought would spoil chances for success in negotiations between India and Pakistan. King responded he hoped leaders of two major countries next to him could compose their differnces and would finally come to recognize political realities. He felt that Bhutto had capacity to be realistic. However in relations beetween Bangladesh and Pakistan there were deep emotional issues and trial of war criminals is most emotional of all. Moreover, Mujibur Rahman has to endure pressure by more radtcal elements and youth in his own country. F. Afghanistan is always deeply affected by all events in Pakistan. Anything which affects Pathan population of Pakistan in particular is of deep concern to Afghanistan and therefore, because upheaval can go further than just one or two countries, it is danger to world peace. King expressed hope solutions might be found. G. At luncheon at palace King and Secretary Connally were joined by FonMin, Min Planning Minister without Portfolio, Dr. Karim (MFA), Dr. Ghaussi (MFA), Ambassador Neumann and Messrs. Van Hollen, Donley and Hoskinson. Table conversation which was interpreted by Ambassador Neumann and Chief of Protocol Ghaussi, produced little of substance. 4. Septel on visit follows. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Limdis. Sent to the Department with a request that it be forwarded to the White House for Jeanne Davis and to the Treasury for Leonard Dixon. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. He made a 1-day stop in Kabul on July 7 following his visit to Pakistan. Additional documentation on the trip is ibid. During his conversation with Shafiq, Connally was handed a paper that outlined economic problems for which the Afghan Government was seeking U.S. assistance. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department on July 13 in airgram A-84 from Kabul. (Ibid.) 364. Telegram 4884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 364. Telegram 4884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, August 22, 1972 Subj: Coordination of Emergency Relief 1. As result of serious concern about lack of RGA coordination and direction over emergency relief effort expressed by AID Mission, Peace Corps, CARE, and UNICEF representatives, Charge called on Prime Minister Zahir with ADCM August 19. Wahen Karim, Director-General, Dept Political Affairs, MFA and Acting DepMin, and DepMin Finance Mohd. Khan Jallalar also present. Other subjects discussed being reported septels. 2. I opened discussion by recalling that several foreign governments and multilateral agencies had been working with number of RGA Ministries to help alleviate effects of two years of drought, compounded by severe winter conditions, which had resulted in emergency situation in number of provinces. Also observed that Kabul Times had reported creation of private group in US to raise $10 million for emergency relief in Afghanistan. Ministry of Health engaged in number of major programs of relief, Red Crescent had distributed large amount of supplies, and Afghan Women’s Association had also participated effectively. Noting that Ministry of Defense had provided some transportation for relief supplies, I stressed that where we have been asked, we have provided Peace Corps volunteers, trucks, food, technical advice, communications facilities,etc. I pointed out, however, that all these efforts appeared inadequate to seriousness of problem. We were now very concerned that in a number of provinces there remain only eight to twelve weeks in which to move supplies for stockpiling during winter and early spring when roads will be closed. 3. I observed that it impression of concerned foreign representatives, both bilateral and multilateral, that there was no coordinated RGA plan of action in establishing priorities, either as to provinces or supplies, and that there was no one individual in RGA to whom foreign donors or RGA officials could turn for decisions regarding priorities or allocation of domestic resources to complement available relief supplies. I noted that DepPriMin Samad Hamed had, prior to his trip to Soviet Union been playing an important role in this matter, but since that trip and his return he has been feeling somewhat unwell, and no further action has been taken to mount a truly coordinated program. 4. As example of problem faced by foreign agencies I described effort by US Embassy to utilize some $1,000 plus donated by individual Americans to support a special nutritional program of a small orphanage in Chakhcharan. Governor of Ghor province had refused such help, indicating no help was needed even though it was evident to our Peace Corps volunteers working in Chakhcharan that orphans badly in want and that there were food supplies available in the bazaar which were not being supplied to the children. 5. I stressed that foreign agencies not seeking force assistance on Afghans; perhaps we were overstating degree of emergency and there had been decision by RGA to reject outside help. If so, we would of course be guided accordingly. If, however, RGA shared our estimate of emergency need, we could assist effectively only in context of better coordinated and directed RGA relief effort. If needed changes made, RGA would find foreign donors willing to respond rapidly to any appeal for help, especially if appeal were supported by organized means of utilizing resources. 6. Prime Minister said we were not overstating problem, that RGA was well aware of potential second disaster if supplies not moved into areas which will be closed in wintertime. He said that, as matter of fact, he would be meeting in half an hour with key Cabinet members on this very subject and welcomed timeliness of our demarche. (We had learned of this scheduled meeting shortly before call on PM: it may well have been called in light of advance warning as to subject of my requested appointment.) 7. I suggested in leaving that the Americans and others sometimes pushed our ideas harder than they might be welcomed: e.g.the essentiality of appointing a cabinet-level relief coordinator with full authority for direction of the relief program. PriMin assured me that my remarks sounded like his own when he was coaxing his own people to get on with difficult chores. 8. We have been informed that as result of above meeting PriMin signed August 21 decree setting up centralized emergency relief organization which had been pending cabinet approval for weeks. Program under policy guidance of inter-ministerial cabinet committee headed by Wakil: all operations to be directed by General Kabir Seraj, Chief of Logistics for MinDef. MinDef representatives who last week were pulling out of relief effort in disgust at lack of policy decisions now returning. DepFinMin told us last night that he had been instructed produce additional funds immediately for support of relief effort (gasoline, truck rental, etc.). 9. We are under few illusions about degree of efficiency which can be expected of RGA in distribution of relief supplies even with best of intentions. Late reports from central and northwest provinces paint bleak picture of winter prospects. However, PM’s quick reaction to critical demarche provides some hope that worst can yet be prevented. Lewis 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN. 365. Telegram 5348 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 365. Telegram 5348 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 14, 1972 Subject: Continuing Emergency Conditions in Western Mountains Summary: Despite hopes and anticipations to contrary brought about by bumper crops in most of Afghanistan this summer, severe famine conditions remain in control highland areas of country. Present present RGA resources may be wholly inadequate to respond impending crisis involving isolated areas where perhaps 200,000 face starvation when winter makes regions inaccessible. RGA now gearing up for major emergency relief effort. Foreign assistance may be requested by RGA mission desirous Washington assistance now to determine feasibility substantive support, including possible utilization C–130 transports for wheat airlift several weeks this fall. Action requested: Response questions para 8 re technical feasibility utilizing C–130s and preliminary reaction to prospect emergency program involving commitment of contingency fund and Title II aid. 1. Reports from PCVs in area, private medical and relief personnel and occasional travellers indicate that actual and potential starvation conditions continue in isolated areas of mountainous central and western regions of Afghanistan. Areas involved cover at least dozen districts throughout Ghor, Eastern Badghis, Southern Faryab and northern Oruzgan. RGA data indicate that normal population of these areas is or was about 650,000 and current reports lead us to believe that at least one-third of that number are destitute and without food for this winter. These conditions result from severe drought of previous two years and last year’s extremely hard winter which resulted in death of nearly all sheep in area and consumption by local population of virtually all their seed in order survive. Thus this summer’s crops in these isolated valleys are extremely small despite excellent water conditions and population hs no animal products which normally constitute major element in their diet. 2. While these conditions have not been systematically reported by governors and sub governors in area, they have been object of private relief efforts and considerable RGA attention including relief expeditions to Chakcharan and surrounding areas by the Women’s institute to distribute medicine, clothing and some food, significant joint medical and MCH program currently being mounted by UNICEF and MPH, and currently planned government program under committee to be chaired by strong executive and supported by LTG Kabir Seraj, Chief of Army logistics, to move 5,000–7,000 tons of wheat into area, mainly to Chakcharan and Shahrak in Ghor with small amounts to seven other district centers which have only 100–150 mt government storage. FFW activity in these areas has been hampered by lack of wheat, lack of transport and poor administration through summer and aas failed to meet needs. 3. We believe our information on extent of need is of right order of magnitude and that proposed RGA efforts are radically inadequate and thousands people in these isolated areas will die of starvation this winter. Survival requirement through next spring of 200,000 destitute people would be about 30,000 tons of wheat at one half kg/person/day. This would be 6,000 truck loads to be delivered during next 2 and one half to three months prior to winter closure of mountain passes into dozen or more isolated district centers involving average of 6000 km round trip per load over terrible mountain roads. Probable turn around times are such that at least 1200 trucks working full time would be required. In addition several distribution centers cannot be reached by truck and substantial additional animal transport would need to be organized. Since there is insufficient public storage for quantities required in distribution centers, distribution to destitute families for family storage and eventual consumption at home would take place on delivery of wheat at distribution centers. We believe that, if supplies made available in isolated communities are adequate to their need, roughly equitable distribution could be organized through local communities including villiage headmen and mullahs. If, as was case last winter, government supplies available are only token in face of desperate need, ruthless exploitation of situation by local wielders of power for their personal advantage will continue. For example, in Morghab river valleys of Jawand where many died of starvation last winter, wheat was then being sold in bazaar for 350 Afs/seer while modest amounts of wheat remained available in nearby government godown which sub-governor refused to sell at government price of 52.5 Afs/SEER. 4. General Seraj who has headed team investigating famine believes our numbers of destitute people still in the country are substantially too high. Acting Prime Minister and Sardar Abdul Wali generally more inclined agree with our estimate of need and wheat requirements. All agree there is a major problem requiring immediate RGA action and that one aspect of that action must be better information on extent of need. 5. While both Afghan army and MPW have large numbers of trucks which are not fully utilized, many of them are not in fact capable of operation. It is unlikely that more than 300 or 400 trucks could be obtained from those sources without extreme disruption of other programs. RGA general transport department has standing relationships with some 1,600 privately owned trucks but also has major, other continuing responsibilities including this fall transport into Kabul 14,000 tons of coal and throughput the country 40,000–50,000 tons of fertilizer plus seed and food wheat. It is doubtful that more than 200 trucks could be obtained through general transport without seriously undercutting their ability meet other priority demands while there are perhaps 8,000 other trucks scattered throughout country in private hands, government has no command over them other than commercial hire. They are occupied with other chores, are difficult to persuade to undertake trips to remote mountain areas of concern and in face of demand such as herein contemplated would be exorbitantly expensive. Accordingly, we and RGA believe that only half of transport needed to meet our estimate of problem would be feasible with afghan trucks, even with expanded program and RGA commitment do all possible to provide such trucks. 6. RGA tardiness in facing this problem stem from several causes: first, extraordinarily poor leadership and analytical ability and apathetic attitude of most provincial officials including governors mitigates against their determining nature and extent of crisis. In central highlands area affected, people and government officials are so accustomed to deprivation and death without hope of outside assistance that they tend accept crisis or deny that crisis exists. Since June newsmen and foreigners have generally been kept out of these areas except for major centers. While there are individual horror stories there is no general Afghan awareness of approaching starvation among significant number of people. Second primarily due to above limitation, Wakil and other RGA officials are extremely reluctant to declare emergency for continued existence of which administration can be blamed and when they lack capability to respond fully and effectively. Third, government is faced with severe financial limitations. however, in latest conversations with acting Prime Minister and Abdul Wali (reported septels), Ambassador has been assured that RGA now mounting serious, large scale emergency program. 7. Should quantities of wheat required to prevent starvation indeed prove to be greater than can be moved by an all out Afghan transport effort, there appear to be two possible ways of effectively assisting. One, which would be less costly and probably less-satisfactory would be to use aid contingency funds to hire trucks in Iran and Pakistan to meet remaining need. We have not yet explored this possibility. Alternative would be airlift of wheat from Kandahar and Kabul into Bamiyan, Chakcharan and Qali-Nau. Eight C–130s making two trips a day could move 1,920 mt a week. This plus 650 trucks could provide transport that would otherwise require 1,200 trucks. 8. We request Washington consider feasibility this latter possibility. So far our thinking is based on following assumptions derived from discussion with Air Attache. Request you confirm following operational assumptions and advise on other-factors needed for logistical planning here: A. Up to 8 C–130s could be made available for several weeks this fall for emergency airlift on basis of reimbursement from aid contingency fund. We are not now repeat not now requesting this. B. C–130 can lift 20 mt of wheat plus round trip fuel from Kabul. Elevation 5,871 feet, length 9,184 feet and Kandahar elevation 3,281 feet. Length 10,500 feet. C. C–130 can land so loaded on available strips. At Chakcharan, elevation 7,320 feet, length 20,300 feet (gravel): Qali-Nau elevation 2,998 feet, length 2,968 feet (gravel); and Bamiyan elevation 8,367 feet, length 4,754 feet (gravel). D. Extended C–130 operations feasible from Kandahar and Kabul airports which have adequate fuel storage and crew support capacity but no C–130 maintenance facilities. E. Two round trips a day feasible Kandahar-Chakcharan, Kandahar-Qali-Nau, and Kabul-Bamiyan with coolie loading and unloading of aircraft supplemented by limited truck lift capacity at Kabul and Kandahar only. 9. Any proposal for use of airlift will depend on RG implementation to major collateral effort. This would include: A. Timely supply of needed tons of wheat to Kandahar and Kabul airports from existing government stocks or from RGA-financed local procurement. We would anticipate and would recommend favorable consideration of RGA request for replacement of all wheat used in this program under future additional title ii agreement. B. At least 400 trucks to move airlifted wheat from Chakcharan, Qali-Nau and Bamiyan to outlying needy areas. C. At least 250 additional trucks would be needed to haul wheat from Herat and Shibargan into additional needy areas. D. Requisite labor organized, paid and supervised at airfields to load and unload aircraft. E. Assignment of perhaps 100 provincial development department supervisory personnel plus 30 PCVs to needy districts to oversee distribution. Overall operation should be under direction of fully empowered emergency administrator with full funding and operational flexibility. Estimated costs exceed 100 million Afs plus wheat procurement. 10. Following table gives target areas with standing government estimates of population and USAID guess of number of needy based on spotty reports of degree of poverty. Tonnage requirements are derivative at 135 kg per needy person to meet 9 month requirements. These numbers are extremely problematical and should be taken as rough indicators of order of magnitude subject to further information from field: Province District Population Needy MT Needed Badghis Jawand 59,000 50,000 6,750 Faryab Kohestan 20,000 15,000 2,025 Darzab 8,500 1,150 Ghor Chakcharan 64,000 32,000 4,320 Abul (8,000) (1,080) Ghalmin (8,000) (1,080) Shahrak 65,000 16,000 2,160 Saghar 22,000 6,000 810 Pasabadnd 28,000 7,000 945 Lal Sar Jangul 52,000 13,000 1,755 Oruzgan Dazkunki 113,000 34,000 4,600 Shahrastan 53,000 13,000 1,755 Ajarisatan 42,000 13,000 1,755 Herat Gulram 63,000 16,000 2,160 Chati-Sharif 48,000 12,000 1,620 Total 663,000 235,000 31,805 11. Mission fully cognizant radical dimensions of action needed and organizational difficulties on RGA side even with airlift help. Primary condition precedent of such assistance is that RGA must acknowledge crisis publicly and request our (and other donor) response with detailed plan for adequate action including firm commitment their input and initial implementation. Given limited RGA administrative and financial ability, the need to import and position large quantities of fuels (diesel, truck/aviation gas), organization required to load, unload local transport and distribution, etc. Suggest “mind boggling” implementation problems. However, latest contacts with Shafiq, Wakil, Abdul Wali and others (septels) lead us believe RGA moving rapidly and at highest levels in direction of trying make major try and will enlist USG and other donor support. 12. While any such effort fraught with danger of mishaps, given short time before snowfall and large numbers of persons who may die this winter if food not provided, on balance we are in favor of strong USG support if RGA makes major crash effort to alleviate suffering of these people. We have dealt only with basic food (wheat) needs so far, but RGA likely include medicine and high protein items for children would appreciate washington reaction. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint State/USAID message. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. 366. Telegram 169365 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 366. Telegram 169365 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 Kabul, September 15, 1972, 2237Z. Subj: Famine in Western Mountains of Afghanistan Ref: Kabul 5348, 5349, 5350, 5354 1. Department appreciates urgency with which action must be taken if relief is to reach affected areas in time to prevent same type of suffering that occurred last year. We await your further reporting on action RGA taking and especially look forward to report on your conversation with King. 2. Preliminary review here indicates that airlift of wheat would be technically feasible to Chakcharan, Qali-Nau and bamiyan, particularly if air drop employed as on several past occasions in pakistan. this would reduce landings on undesirable fields to those required to recover drop gear. on contingency basis we have asked DOD to investigate availability of USAF C–130’s for month of October. AID investigating availability of commercial C–130’S. 3. Strongly recommend urgent exploration of availability of Pakistani and Iranian trucks on contract basis, [ref Kabul 5348, para 7]. advise. 4. If airlift should be decided necessary, Shafiq’s determination to “ignore political problem” [Kabul 5354, para 13] can be drawn on to suggest to RGA that it also seek help from Iran and Pakistan where C–130 aircraft also available. GOP known to have ample experience moving bulk supplies into comparable locations—e.g., Gilgit and Skardu. 5. For present you should avoid discussion any USG airlift possibility with RGA. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Flaten (NEA/PAB), cleared in draft with AID/ASIA/NE, AID/PRI/DRD, and DOD/ISA and by Laingen. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Moscow. 367. Telegram 5368 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 367. Telegram 5368 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 16, 1972 Subj: Food Crisis: Conversation With His Majesty Ref: (A) Kabul 5348 (B) Kabul 5349 (NOTAL) (C) Kabul 5350 (NOTAL) (D) Kabul 5354 1. Summary: His Majesty outlined to me September 14 RGA plans meet impending food crisis along lines previously enunicated by acting PriMin Shafiq. In response King’s reference to airlift, I made appropriate caveats. His Majesty stated additional value of food crisis operation would be experience gained which would assist RGA in tackling other problems. While operation leader not yet selected, program reveals considerable attention to problem with impressive arrangements which now have royal imprimatur. Action requested: none. End summary. 2. I saw His Majesty King Zahir evening September 14 primarily to discuss impending food crisis and RGA action in face thereof (other subjects septel). HM chose receive me alone. 3. My presentation on food crisis was essentially same that I had given acting PriMin Shafiq and Sardar Abdul Wali previously. Considering Shafiq’s recommendation concerning presentation, I balanced exposition of problem with possible solutions. Concluding, I said government appeared be doing very well in its initial planning to meet crisis. 4. King expressed his appreciation my approach to him as well as to Shafiq and Abdul Wali. This was first comprehensive analysis they had concerning critical food situation. this is now clear and reality of situation known. 5. King said government undertaking following activities: (a) Organization being set up under one person who will have absolute control over operation. This person will have complete power and total authority. (b) Under him will be regional agents throughout affected area, again with complete authority for all aspects operation without reference to Kabul. Authority granted regional agents supersedes that all local authorities including governor. (c) Inspection team based in Kabul will visit each area every two weeks. This team will have full authority to take necessary on-spot actions to correct any deficiences noted. (d) Larger body including non-government members in Kabul will oversee entire operation and will have juridical authority to indict. (e) Afghan Army will have principal executive role and will receive full cooperation of Afghan Air Force. 6. King mentioned possibility foreign airlift. I responded we willing to consider but that I could not commit USG. I emphasized need for ongoing program before this decision could be made. I also noted, even if airlift utilized, need for considerable local transportation move wheat from regional distribution centers to local consumer. I said airlift is very technical operation which requires suitable ground personnel and cooperation in airlift operation even between countries having similar equipment can be difficult. I would welcome Soviet cooperation in providing assistance to RGA this endeavor but noted it was clearly Afghan responsibility work out program for foreign assistance. I said food crisis had come up in Soviet Ambassador’s farewell call on me and that he had indicated their interest in type Afghan organization set up to meet this impending crisis. I concluded it was Afghan responsibility explore question of political risks and consequences involved in seeking foreign assistance (Note: During Soviet Ambassador Kiktev’s farewell call September 13, he indicated knowledge general situation and doubts that RGA could really mount effective organization. He mentioned Soviet sugar sat by river three weeks waiting for Afghan trucks. I believe Afghans will have problem convincing Soviets.) 7. HM then said that, regardless outcome of this operation, there was some value in it because quote we will have learned something unquote. Continuing, he said this is not just operation against food and transport shortages. It is operation against whole Afghan structure. When current problem is resolved, quote we must reconsider entire administration unquote. I responded this was very important and significant observations and I agreed with his reference to need reappraise entire Afghan structure and thereby entire nation. (Comment: I was agreeably surprised by this comment since it indicates HM and RGA aware real value this indication of ability organize and direct large-scale program is that it can be applied in other fields and situations. This realization could lead to greater and more useful activity in future on part government.) 8. HM said he would tell us beginning next week (Saturday September 16) who key personnel in this operation are. He added that he wants closest cooperation possible with foreign friends, who should be brought in on everything. 9. I expressed my admiration for what had been accomplished in last few days. I said I was especially impressed by Shafiq—his perception and understanding of problem and actions he had initiated. I said this illustrated effectiveness of unified control since there is no division possible between economic and political subjects. Program countering food crisis, I concluded, had shown correctness this principle. 10. Comment: King’s outline of RGA plans revealed effective collaboration at highest levels. There no doubt but that Shafiq quote sold unquote his proposals to HM. While I am confident that RGA will seek implement its plan of operations. I again emphasized need for strong, dominant personality to head up operation. Indeed, without this, whole operation could fail. Neither Shafiq nor King gave any indication whom they have in mind. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran. 368. Telegram 5636 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 368. Telegram 5636 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, September 27, 1972, 0330Z Subject: Government-Afghan Styles or, Is Zahir Still PM? 1. His Majesty evening Sept 25 rejected PM Zahirs resignation (ref A) and ordered PM continue in power (texts-by septel). 2. We now have clearer picture of present siuation, although, timing of future moves siill unclear and possibly subject to further change. It is certain Zahir wants to resigns but timing his Sept 24 resignation still unclear although firm decision resign reached prior PM’s German trip. We also are certain King had firmly decided Sept 24 accept PM’s resignation and name Shafiq PM. Is also clear that Shafiq on morning Sept 25 moved in, took over decision making and convinced him that now was not propitious moment for change in govt. We assume his arguments based upon anticipated absence both him and Shafiq beginning Sept 26 and continuing problem of legislative versus executive. We understand HM agreed with Shafiq that Zahir should remain in office until King returns. Then second look would be taken with particular emphasis on how Parliament (which reconvenes October 14) is behaving. We further understand that new govt with Shafiq as PM will be formed at that time but, in reality Shafiq has assumed complete charge as of now. Zahir will run govt in Shafiq’s absence but Shafiq will have final authorty when he returns even though Zahir will be PM in name until HM returns and carries out present intentions. 3. Question most foreign observers and thinking Afghans are pondering is, why was it done this way and why was there this untypical admission of failure of PM’s resignation message? Why my first was that PM Zahir had chosed his words in order to force King accept his resignation. I now inclined conclude that wording was King’s was of shifting blame and that Zahir is to be made scapegoat for failure his govt and King work out effective modus operandi with Parliament, lack of which has stymied govt action in almost every field of endeavor. If Shafiq had not intervened as he did, HM would apparently have carried through his plan and named Shafiq PM Sept 25. 4. Still undecided are return dates to Kabul of HM and Shafiq. It appears Shafiq will proceed from Turkey to NY for UNGA. We believe his stay in US will last only few days. On assumption Zahir and Shafiq keep domestic political situation under control it now appears HM will complete his vacation in europe before returning. 5. While it does not seem possible that govt could discover new nadir of inactivity, I am forced to conclude that immediate period until Shafiq returns will undoubtedly see virtual cessation of all activity. Excluded from this appears to be Minister Seraj’s emergency relief program for central highlands which going forward full blast. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and USUN. 369. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 369. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State 1 New York, October 12, 1972 Memorandum of Conversation: FM Shafiq (Afghanistan); October 11, 1972, 4:45pm; 35A Waldorf 1. Participants: Afghanistan, FM Shafiq, Ambassador Malikyar; US: The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, Mr. Laingen (reporting officer) 2. Summary: FM Shafiq expressed strong appreciation continuing US help in meeting Afghan drought and development needs. Afghans felt they had very close and healthy relationship with US. Afghan had lost some time in development because of preoccupation with “experiment in democracy”; said decision now made to focus more heavily on development as well. Asked Secretary to convey to President message that Afghans committed to “crusade” against narcotic drugs. Secretary said he would do so. Noted warm friendship Americans feel for Afghans. End summary. 3. FM Shafiq said RGA very indebted to US for its continuing help in meeting Afghan drought and development needs. Afghans very grateful for fact that American always respond with readiness pitch in and help when difficult situation arises. Said he was commissioned by his government express thanks to USG for generous US help. 4. Secretary said one of reasons why US—Afghan relationship good and Americans ready help Afghanistan probably stems from fact Afghans always express appreciation for help given them. This makes Americans want to continue this kind of association. Shafiq said another reason might stem from fact that Afghans, despite being far from US and next door to communist country, feel very close to US in terms basic approach and ideals. This made for very healthy and close relationship. Shafiq thought that occasionally it would be good if both countries could examine this situation deeper so as to focus more as to reason for good relationship and what could be learned from it. 5. Sisco noted that another reason why Americans feel warmly about Afghanistan is that they see there a people trying to deal with their own problems in their own way and standing on their two feet. Secretary concurred, adding that Americans sensed Afghans also doing this in difficult economic and political circumstances. Secretary thought this basic self-help approach by Afghans fit very well with approach of Nixon doctrine. 6. Shafiq observed that many people ask him why Afghans had not been affected by communism in neighboring USSR. Shafiq’s answer was that Afghanistan’s institutions basically strong and that if Afghan people continue to hold to these and try to progress economically, there should be no danger from communism or from any other quarter. Secretary said he thought perhaps there was some advantage to being as close to a communist state as was Afghanistan in sense that one understands better the limitations of communism the closer one gets to it. It was difficult to see how any young person in any society could feel attracted to a system so totally disciplined as communism. This particularly true when communism continues to fall short of material goals it sets for itself. 7. Shafiq said that Afghanistan nonetheless would be in difficulty if it could not begin to make substantial progress meeting needs of its people. He commented that because of preoccupation with “experiment in democracy” Afghan had lost some time in development. Now, however, it had come to realization that it must also focus more on development. In this process Shafiq hoped US would continue to help. 8. Conversation also included discussion between FM and Secretary on considerable Afghan potential in mineral resources and in tourism. Secretary also asked about Afghan population growth rate, observing that it of interest that those countries that have done well in development by and large are those that have found way to cope with population problem. Shafiq said Afghanistan had only begun to tackle this problem but noted that a recent report he had seen indicated Afghans responding well to population control ideas despite conservative orientated Afghan society. 9. Shafiq volunteered that in conversation a year ago Secretary had raised narcotic drugs problem with him. He wanted Secretary to know that RGA had taken considerable steps in this area. Two Cabinet committees had been formed, one to look into possibilities crop substitution and the other into smuggling problems. Crop substitution would be difficult because two principal districts where opium grown were areas where other crops did not do well. Also people in those areas appeared to be dependent to considerable degree on use of opium themselves. With respect smuggling problem, there was risk that international traffikers were moving their operations toward Iran and Afghanistan. RGA wanted to “kill this in the bud” before it got started. Summing up, Shafiq said he knew President Nixon was deepy concerned with this problem and HM the King wanted President to know that RGA embarked on “crusade” on this matter. It hoped to have detailed blueprint of action shortly and may be asking American friends to help in this plan Secretary assured Shafiq we would be responsive and looked forward to working closely with RGA on this problem. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 AFG. Limited Official Use. Also numbered USUN 3836. Rogers and Shafiq were in New York for the autumn session of the UN General Assembly. 370. Telegram 6029 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 370. Telegram 6029 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State 1 Kabul, October 16, 1972 Subject: Afghan Emergency Relief Request for Assistance Ref: A) Kabul 5986: B) Kabul 5348: C) Kabul 5741; D) State 183796 Summary: The RGA has requested emergency assistance totaling 50,000 tons of wheat to carry an expanded operation help program through the harvest in September 1973, and funds to help pay for domestic truck transportation cost relieving heavy financial strain. Based upon preliminary analysis mission is requesting AID/W approve an immediate emergency Title II PL 480 wheat grant of 20,000 mt to replace in-country wheat stocks now being trucked under Phase I operation help into emergency areas before winter. Now examining RGA transportation request in light of expanded Phase I and will advise mission recommendations when situation more clear. Action required: approve Title II PL 480 emergency wheat grant of 20,000 mt wheat. 1. Minister Seraj in discussion with Charge Lewis has amplified the written request received from Minister Sarabi for diversion of current Title II wheat to operation help and replacement under a new Title II program. Seraj said that isolated areas in northern and southern Badakhshan suffer from the same threat of winter starvation that exist in Hhor and surrounding areas. He points out also that these areas have major poppy production and that a major governmental program of help is a necessary prerequisite to prospective governmental efforts to eliminate opium production there. Accordingly, Badakshan is now included in operation help adding 3–5,000 tons of wheat to the requirement. Furthermore, initial surveys around Chakgcharan reveal that the number of needy people in the area is substantially greater than the estimate included in operation help, and that the needy population to be served may in fact be half again as large as the 100,000 previously estimated. 2. Seraj cites the necessity of a Phase II follow-on program in the spring and summer to continue food supply until the local harvest is available in late summer and to start the process of economic rehabilitation. Summing these requirements Seraj comes to a total need approaching 50,000 tons. There is some indication that WFP will meet 20,000 tons of this requirement but they are insisting on reports of the use made of wheat during the past year before addressing a firm request to Rome. We are also withholding any further request for food for work under Title II until improvements in the administration and reporting are demonstrated but judge that Phase I of operation help effort clearly warrants clear support at this time. 3. Planning for Phase II has been authorized but not yet begun. Requirements for it will be large including replacement of seed and animals and fertilizer in addition to continued food supplies. We suggest delay of any US commitment for assistance to Phase II until plans and requirements are clearer. 4. We have little to add at this time to the analysis of the overall wheat picture given in TOAID A-213. Current market behavior appears to support that analysis with prices remaining in the Afs mid-40’s per seer in most markets but as low as 35 in Lashkar Gah and Talaquan, i.e., the grain trade appears to be anticipating a normal supply situation for the winter. The government, however, is short of wheat with stocks currently below 50,000 tons and imports including U.S. Title I of only 110,000 tons in sight for this fiscal year. Since the anticipated drawdowns over this period include 70,000 tons for government employees and institutions, 30,000 tons government fixed price sales, and 30,000 tons for food for work, the government supply picture is very tight and the Cabinet has just authorized the Food Department to start domestic purchasing at the 35 Afs support price. The RGA in past good years has never purchased more than 20,000 tons of wheat locally according to Food Department officials, and we doubt if they could approach that amount at 35 Afs. Even if able to obtain 20,000 tons by paying more than 35 Afs per seer, the prospective June 30, 1973 stock position would be dangerously low. A. Supply: Present stock position 50,000 Imports including Title 1 110,000 Local procurement 20,000 180,000 tons B. Requirments: Government and military 70,000 Fixed sales 30,000 Food for Work 30,000 Operation help (Phase 1) 20,000 150,000 tons C. Ending stock June 30, 1973: 30,000 tons Given this tight supply picture the replacement of 20,000 tons of the operation help wheat, which is a demand not anticipated when the earlier estimates were put together, is reasonable. 5. All Titles I and II wheat available for sale in FY 72 was sold in that year. Of the 50,000 tons Title II and 10,000 tons WFP allocated for FFW approximately 16,000 tons had been used by August 22 with program continuing at about 3,000 tons a month. Thus in principle nearly 40,000 tons of above stocks should be earmarked for few. 6. It is clear now that Phase I will require a minimum of 20,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 in accordance with the original operation help plan, 3–5,000 tons for the added areas in Badakshan, and 5–7,000 additional requirement in Ghor and surrounding areas because the population to be served is larger than had been anticipated. We recommend immediate approval of a Title II grant emergency relief program of 20,000 tons of wheat for operation help to re shipped as early as feasible to replace the wheat borrowed by the RGA from FFW availabilities for that program. 7. For the past ten days the Department of General Transport has overfulfilled its commitment of 50 trucks/day and has sent over 8,000 tons of wheat, CSM, blankets and other supplies into the famine area of which over 6,000 tons is already on site. However, truck availability is now cut back to 30/day because Kabul is again running out of sugar and because of necessity of moving incoming fertilizer. While 150 military trucks and over 500 civilian trucks have been committed to the program, this degree of commitment cannot be maintained because of urgent competiting requirements. Accordingly, we see the necessity of the RGA either hiring 200–250 Pakistani trucks for up to six weeks to supplement Afghan transport availabilities or hiring equivalent numbers of bazaar trucks not under contract to general transport or of greatly increasing the commitment of military trucks. At 200 rupees per truck/day the Pak trucks would require approximately $150,000 and more Afghan trucks would increase the RGA bill for commercial trucking by as much over the Afs 20 million or $250,000 budget. Some cash has been committed to the program by the UNDP ($20,000), Yugoslavia (Afs15 million), Japan ($10,000) and other donors but these amounts will be more than needed for medicine, local purchases of clothing and blankets and other costs. However, preliminary indications are that use of Pakistani trucks would be difficult if not politically impossible domestically, given the jealousies and power of afghan truckers. cabinet is considering alternatives. 8. Despite an extraordinarily difficult cash position the government has gone ahead with operation help on its own. Seraj has obtained a budget of 16 million Afs and has in addition been authorized to draw wheat from Food Department stocks without reimbursement. This apparent affluence, however, is illusory since it has been accomplished by increasing the government’s overdarft at the DA Afghanistan bank to nearly 3 billion Afs and by using wheat which is needed for other purposes. We have learned in the fertilizer exercise that the government was only able to marshal the $4.9 million temporarily needed for the initial orders by selling SDRs. Seraj said at the beginning that the government would go ahead with this program with or without assistance. This is the first time the RGA has demonstrated the courage to do exactly that rather than waiting to move until necessary support was fully pledged. We feel very strongly that their belated but encouraging initiative deserves full and generous support. 9. Given the general financial burden of operation help on the RGA, we are inclined toward providing up to $400,000 CF to help in meeting transportation cost of expanded Phase 1. Will advise further in light RGA action decision. Neumann 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG 371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 12, 1972 New Government in Afghanistan King Mohammad Zaher accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Zahir on December 5, and on December 7 asked Foreign Minister Mohammad Moussa Shafiq to form a new government. Shafiq appeared before the Parliament on December 11 with a partial list of his Cabinet members, and, according to the Afghan Embassy, received a vote of confidence today. Shafiq seems an outstanding choice for Prime Minister. You met him at the UN both this year and last, and I believe you will agree with Embassy Kabul that he is a bright, intelligent young man with a quick and agile mind that penetrates immediately to the core of issues before him. He has demonstrated a willingness to make decisions, which is unusual in Afghanistan. The new Prime Minister has an M.A. from Columbia, and speaks warmly of the special bond between Afghans and Americans which he feels is based on similar ideals and basic outlook. He has privately suggested closer cooperation between Afghanistan and the U.S. on international issues. In his appearance before the Parliament December 11, Shafiq promised to continue Afghanistan’s nonaligned foreign policy, to suppress opium production, and to press economic and political reforms. Shafiq’s Cabinet is young, liberal and technically well qualified. Notable among the selections are Mohammad Khan Jalalar, age 37, one of the ablest economists in the country, as Minister of Finance; Sahabuddin Kushkaki, 39 year old publisher of the only good independent newspaper in Afghanistan, as Minister of Information and Culture; and Dr. Abdul Wakil, the organizer and motivator of the outstanding drought relief activity with whom USAID and the Peace Corps have worked very closely during the past year, as Minister of Agriculture. We expect the Shafiq Government to exercise stronger leadership on domestic issues and to pursue a more active and slightly more Western-oriented foreign policy. Shafiq’s major problem will be the extent to which the King will allow him to govern. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 319, 1972 POL-15.1 Prime Minister. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Flaten (NEA/PAB) and cleared by Laingen and Davies. 372. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 372. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 18, 1972 Afghanistan Narcotics Control In presenting his program to the Parliament prior to receiving its vote of confidence, Prime Minister Shafiq promised “effective measures” to stop the narcotics traffic, and added that the Government of Afghanistan, with foreign assistance, will also develop a program to stop illicit opium cultivation. The next day he repeated his determination to launch a “crusade” against drugs in an interview with an AP correspondent. Narcotics control thus became one of eleven planks in the platform of the government of the new Prime Minister, for the first time figuring as a priority item in the RGA agenda. This public recognition of the importance of the narcotics problem has undoubtedly resulted largely from the constant efforts of our Embassy in Kabul under the leadership of Ambassador Robert G. Neumann. Recommendation: That you approve the attached telegram to Ambassador Neumann commending him on a job well done. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted on December 15 by Flaten (NEA/PAB), cleared by Laingen, Davies, Seymour H. Glazer (NEA/RA), and by Harvey R. Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Narcotics Matters. Rogers wrote “no” in the margin next to the recommendation. The draft telegram to Neumann was attached but not published. Bangladesh, December 1971–December 1972 Bangladesh, December 1971–December 1972 Introductory Note During the course of the crisis on the subcontinent in 1971, United States officials in Calcutta and New Delhi met periodically with representatives of the provisional government of Bangladesh. The aspiring government sought de facto recognition from the United States and looked to the United States to facilitate negotiations with the Pakistani Government on issues such as the release of Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Documentation on these contacts is printed in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume XI , South Asia Crisis, 1971. 373. Telegram 5592 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, December 11, 1971, 1125Z Consul General Spivack recommended that the U.S. contact representatives of Bangladesh to “prevent them from assuming that we are inalterably opposed to idea of independent Bangla Desh or that we would take inordinately long to recognize a BDG substantially established in East Bengal.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Calcutta, and London. 374. Telegram 12575 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, December 15, 1971, 1034Z The Embassy recommended that the U.S. continue and expand contacts with representatives of Bangladesh and time recognition of the new government to follow actions by other major western powers. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Dacca and New Delhi. Repeated to Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, Kabul, and USUN. 375. Intelligence Note RNAN-34 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, December 17, 1971 Intelligence assessment of the leadership and orientation of the prospective Government of Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Drafted in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia by David C. McGaffey and cleared by Office Director Curtis F. Jones 376. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated This paper analyzed the U.S. relationship with Bangladesh and argued, in part, for “relatively early recognition.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret. The paper is undated but it was sent on December 22, 1971, by Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that indicated it had been prepared in response to a December 16 instruction from the WSAG to prepare a paper on the subject of the U.S. relationship with Bangladesh. The covering memorandum indicates the paper was drafted by Constable and cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, and Irwin. Presumably the same information applies to the attached study. For a record of the December 16 WSAG meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 318. A January 17 memorandum from Davis to the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA indicates that the paper was circulated again for consideration of the Senior Review Group at its meeting on January 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) For the minutes of the January 19 SRG meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 210. The reference in the paper to the Hallstein doctrine is to the policy of West Germany to break diplomatic relations with any country that established relations with the German Democratic Republic. 377. Telegram 5866 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, December 30, 1971, 1115Z In light of what he and his staff viewed as the “inevitable recognition of Bangladesh,” Consul General Spivack urged that he be authorized to enter into informal contacts with Bangladesh officials for discussion of matters relating to the functioning of the Consulate General. He also urged U.S. officials elsewhere to convey to Bangladesh representatives that the United States was not committed to the concept of a united Pakistan and was flexible on the matter of recognition. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, London, Manila, Moscow, and USUN. 378. Telegram 10 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0651Z In part one of his report on his January 1 meeting with Foreign Minister Samad, Consul General Spivack reported that Samad had solicited U.S. assistance in securing the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from imprisonment in Pakistan. Samad assured Spivack that the Consulate General would be allowed to function for the time being and would receive “honorable treatment” while the U.S. considered the question of recognition. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 379. Telegram 11 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0650Z Consul General Spivack reported that part two of his January 1 conversation with Foreign Minister Samad involved a discussion of the question of recognition. Samad asked about the factors being considered by the U.S. in weighing recognition of Bangladesh, and Spivack indicated that he was not authorized to discuss the question in other than broad, hypothetical terms. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 380. Telegram 12 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0713Z Consul General Spivack noted that at the conclusion of their conversation on January 1 Foreign Minister Samad raised the question of whether the U.S. intended to continue funding partially-completed projects begun by USAID. They then discussed how best to describe their meeting to the press. In his concluding comment, Spivack observed that press and television coverage of the meeting was extensive. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate, Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 381. Telegram 79 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, January 4, 1972, 1255Z Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan told Deputy Chief of Mission Sober that his Government continued to view “premature” recognition of Bangladesh as a hostile act. Pakistani President Bhutto felt that there was still the possibility that a political link could be maintained between what his Government continued to refer to as the two wings of Pakistan. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, and New Delhi. 382. Telegram 1047 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca Washington, January 4, 1972, 2232Z Secretary of State Rogers instructed Consul General Spivack to avoid further contact with Bangladesh representatives. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Calcutta, Islamabad, and New Delhi. 383. Telegram 239 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State New Delhi, January 6, 1972, 1509Z The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh appealed to the United States for recognition. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, and Madras. The attachments cited in the telegram were not found. 384. Editorial Note 385. Telegram 125 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, January 12, 1972, 0745Z Consul General Spivack reported that he had just been invited to attend the swearing-in ceremony for President Mujibur Rahman to take place that day. He cabled urgently for instructions. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Flash. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. The Department returned a Flash response within 2 hours instructing Spivack that no U.S representative should attend the ceremony. The cable was drafted by Van Hollen and cleared by Irwin and Kissinger. (Telegram 5773 to Dacca, January 12; ibid.) On January 13 Spivack cabled the Department that the United States was the only government with de facto representation in Dacca not represented at the swearing-in ceremony. (Telegram 136 from Dacca; ibid.) 386. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Tebbit) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 13, 1972 The British Embassy forwarded a message from Prime Minister Heath to President Nixon. In the message, Heath discussed a meeting he had just had in London with Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman. Mujibur told Heath that there could be no question of a formal link between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Under the circumstances, Heath felt it was important for Western powers to move fairly quickly toward recognition, and he asked Nixon to try to persuade Pakistani President Bhutto of the inevitability of recognizing Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret. On January 14 the Foreign Office told the Embassy in London that British recognition of Bangladesh would come within 2 weeks. (Telegram 412 from London, January 14; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH) 387. Letter From the Australian Ambassador (Plimsoll) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 13, 1972 Plimsoll forwarded a message from Australian Prime Minister McMahon to President Nixon. McMahon pointed up his concern about Soviet influence in South Asia and argued the importance of repairing relations with India and providing economic assistance to the new nation of Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Top Secret 388. Telegram 158 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, January 14, 1972, 0620Z The Consulate General made the case for early recognition of Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 26, 1972 The Department of State and AID responded to an instruction from the Senior Review Group to prepare recommendations for humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh and India. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Confidential. Signed in S/S for Eliot by Robert T. Curran. This memorandum was considered by the SRG at its meeting on February 1. The minutes of the January 19 and February 1 SRG meetings are Documents 210 and 220. Issues relating to South Asia were discussed in both meetings, but the latter was devoted largely to a discussion of humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh. 390. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath Washington, February 2, 1972 Nixon wrote to Heath to explain that the United States intended to defer a decision on recognition of Bangladesh “until we have a clearer picture of how it will relate to the broader situation in South Asia.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to London on February 3 in telegram 19242 for delivery to Heath. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH) The United Kingdom was among eight countries that recognized Bangladesh on February 4. (Telegram 429 from Dacca, February 5; ibid.) 391. Telegram 1113 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 3, 1972, 1725Z Pakistani President Bhutto suggested that the U.S. extend recognition to Bangladesh as early as February 20. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 392. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 4, 1972, 10:34 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed recognition of Bangladesh and decided to delay it until after Nixon had the opportunity to discuss the issue with Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 393. Letter From the Ambassador of Pakistan (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 7, 1972 Raza conveyed to Rogers a message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon in which Bhutto asked Nixon to intervene with the Indian Government and “the elected leaders in East Pakistan” on behalf of “hundreds of thousands of non-Bengalis including women and children whose very existence in East Pakistan is threatened as a result of planned retaliation and reprisals by armed personnel.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH. Immediate; no further classification marking. Forwarded under a covering memorandum by Eliot to Kissinger on February 8. (Ibid.) On February 10 the Department instructed Sober to acknowledge receipt of the message and to inform Bhutto that the United States shared his concern and was watching the situation closely. Sober responded on February 11 that he had done so. (Telegrams 23379 to Islamabad and 1364 from Islamabad, respectively; ibid., SOC 14 BANGLA DESH) 394. Telegram 1374 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 11, 1972, 1200Z Pakistani President Bhutto told Chargé Sober that he would prefer that U.S. recognition of Bangladesh be deferred until March, possibly to follow after Nixon’s trip to China. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 395. Telegram 26863 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, February 15, 1972, 2356Z The Department provided policy guidance for the Mission for a meeting called by the Secretary-General on relief for Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); cleared in NEA by Laingen, and Schneider, M. Kathleen Bell (IO/UNP), Frank Wiesner (S/R); and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, and New Delhi. The policy guidance conditioned USUN’s response to Waldheim’s appeal. (Telegram 617 from USUN, February 18; ibid.) 396. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 16, 1972 Kissinger recommended that the United States recognize Bangladesh “about the third week in March,” and Nixon approved the recommendation. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. 397. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 16, 1972 Nixon approved recommendations authorizing humanitarian assistance for Bangladesh. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Box CL 210, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of all of the recommendations. On February 17 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers that conveyed the decisions approved by the President. (Ibid.) The SRG discussion Kissinger referred to took place on February 1. For a record of the discussion, see Document 220. 398. Memorandum For the Record by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) Washington, February 22, 1972 General Haig called the Department with the instruction that nothing be done concerning recognition of Bangladesh until President Nixon returned from China. Contacts with Bangladesh officials were to be kept to a minimum. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Top Secret; Nodis. 399. Telegram 1675 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, February 22, 1972, 1110Z Pakistani President Bhutto suggested that the United States delay recognition of Bangladesh until March 17 at the earliest. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 400. Telegram TOHAK 111 from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 23, 1972, 2313Z Haig forwarded to Kissinger Consul General Spivack’s request (telegram 642 from Dacca, February 23) for “permission to engage in a broad-ranging exchange of views” with Mujibur Rahman. Haig stated that he had taken steps to ensure that such an exchange did not take place. He reported to Kissinger on developments relating to U.S. humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Exdis. Sent to Howe for Kissinger. Also numbered WH 20460. Telegram 642 from Dacca is also ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BANGLA DESH. 401. Telegram HAKTO 11 From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Peking, February 24, 1972, 0205Z Kissinger stated that agreement had been reached with the Chinese on “our general game plan” and it was essential to do nothing concerning recognition of Bangladesh until the Indian troops were withdrawn from Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Also numbered WHP 77. 402. Telegram 32170 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca Washington, February 25, 1972, 0234Z Consul General Spivack was instructed to take no action with regard to recognition of Bangladesh. He was also instructed to inform Bangladesh officials at a level below Mujibur Rahman of U.S. plans to participate in humanitarian relief, but he was not authorized to meet with Mujib before his trip to Moscow. The Embassy in Pakistan was instructed to inform the government of U.S plans concerning humanitarian relief, and that the question of recognition would be reviewed after President Nixon returned from China. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Islamabad and to Rogers in Peking as Tosec 102. Repeated to New Delhi and to the White House communication center. Drafted by Laingen, Van Hollen, and Sisco; cleared by Schneider, Williams, and in substance with Haig; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. 403. Telegram 689 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, February 26, 1972, 1040Z Consul General Spivack relayed a request from Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad for a statement of U.S. intentions with regard to Bangladesh. His Government wanted to know what to expect in regard to recognition and whether the interests of Bangladesh would be subordinated to those of Pakistan by the United States. He asked for a response before his impending trip to the Soviet Union and he intimated that the status of the Consulate General depended upon the reply. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 404. Telegram 33181 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca Washington, February 27, 1972, 0354Z Consul General Spivack was again instructed to go no further on the question of recognition than to indicate that the issue would be addressed after President Nixon returned from China. Spivack was further instructed to assure Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad that the United States was well disposed toward Bangladesh and would continue to respond to requests for humanitarian assistance. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Peking for Rogers as Tosec 122. Drafted by Van Hollen, cleared by Constable, Sisco, Saunders, and Haig, and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. Repeated to the White House, Islamabad, and New Delhi. 405. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, February 28, 1972, 1610Z Consul General Spivack reported that he met with Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad and, as instructed, informed him that the question of recognition would have to await President Nixon’s decision after his return from China. Samad remained concerned about the status of the Consulate General and whether its mission was to further U.S. relations with Pakistan or Bangladesh. He also expressed concern about the treatment of representatives of Bangladesh in the United States. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 406. Telegram 770 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 3, 1972, 0615Z Consul General Spivack cabled that he felt that “we are approaching the limits of tolerance of GOBD in matter of continued operation of this post without US recognition of BD.” He suggested that a decision on recognition be conveyed to the Bangladesh Government by March 9th in order “to do what we intend to do without appearing to be forced into it by GOBD action.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Saunders sent a copy of this telegram to Haig on March 3 with a covering memorandum in which he suggested that Haig approve an instruction to Spivack to return to Washington for consultation. “The main rationale for bringing him back here would be to gain the time necessary to allow us to recognize only toward the end of March. It seems unlikely that the Bengalis would throw us out if it appeared that we were on the verge of taking a final decision.” Haig returned the memorandum to Saunders with a handwritten note instructing that Spivack be recalled on March 17. 407. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon Washington, March 3, 1972, noon Nixon and Kissinger discussed the timing of recognition of Bangladesh. Nixon said “I am just going to drag my feet on it.” He and Kissinger considered delaying a decision until April. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan–Apr 1972. No classification marking. 408. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 6, 1972 Rogers recommended the United States recognize Bangladesh on or about March 25. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders sent this memorandum to Kissinger on March 16 under a covering memorandum in which he endorsed Rogers’ recommendation. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh) The attached draft messages to China and Pakistan are published in approved final form as Documents 414 and 415. 409. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 7, 1972 Saunders recommended that AID be authorized to extend an additional $10–20 million in relief assistance to Bangladesh. President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig approved for Kissinger. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig signed the approval line for Kissinger. In a March 10 handwritten note, attached to the memorandum and addressed to Jeanne Davis, Saunders wrote that he had informed Williams and Van Hollen of Haig’s approval of the recommendation. 410. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon Washington, undated Haig recommended that Nixon approve an additional $35 million contribution in cash through the United Nations for the relief effort in Bangladesh. Nixon approved the recommendation. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Saunders who forwarded it to Haig on March 20 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Haig signed the approval line for the President. For a record of the Senior Review Group’s discussion of South Asia on March 17, see Document 237. 411. Telegram 1019 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State Dacca, March 23, 1972, 0930Z The Consulate General reported on the increasing irritation with the United States exhibited by the Government, the media, and the public in Bangladesh. The Consulate General’s concern was that the Government’s patience was wearing thin and it might take action against the US mission. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. Prime Ministers Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman met in Calcutta February 6–8. On February 8 they issued a joint declaration summarizing the meetings and stressing the solidarity that existed between the two countries. (The text of the declaration was transmitted to the Department on February 9 in telegram 283 from Calcutta; ibid., POL BANGLADESH–INDIA) Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman subsequently met in Dacca March 18–19, where they signed a mutual defense treaty patterned on the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971. (Telegram 3714 from New Delhi, March 24; ibid.) 412. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon Washington, March 24, 1972 Haig detailed approximately $100 million in humanitarian assistance committed to Bangladesh by the United States through the United Nations and other international agencies. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 413. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 28, 1972 Kissinger informed Rogers that the President had decided that United States recognition of Bangladesh should be announced at the Department of State anytime after April 3. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Nodis. 414. Telegram 55123 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, March 31, 1972, 0023Z The Embassy was instructed to inform the Chinese Ambassador that that the United States intended to recognize Bangladesh on April 4. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Chicom–US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Homer. Drafted by Laingen and Van Hollen; cleared by Davies and Sisco, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown, and by Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 415. Telegram 56144 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, April 1, 1972, 0048Z Chargé Sober was instructed to inform Pakistani President Bhutto that the United States intended to recognize Bangladesh on April 4. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Davies, Sisco, Brown, and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. Repeated Priority to Dacca and New Delhi 416. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State Karachi, April 3, 1972, 1100Z Chargé Sober reported that he had informed Pakistani President Bhutto about U.S. plans to recognize Bangladesh. Bhutto expressed appreciation that the United States had waited a “reasonable time” before according recognition, and he asked that after recognition the United States provide the majority of its economic assistance to Bangladesh bilaterally. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Sent with the suggestion that it be passed to Islamabad and other posts as desired. 417. Telegram 56444 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca Washington, April 3, 1972, 1736Z The Consulate General was instructed to inform the Government of Bangladesh of U.S. plans for recognition on April 4. The Consulate General was also instructed to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Consul General Spivack would be returning on April 7 and would like to meet with Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman on April 8 to deliver President Nixon’s letter concerning recognition. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Constable, cleared by Laingen, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 418. Letter From President Nixon to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman Washington, April 4, 1972 Nixon wrote to accord U.S. recognition to Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence File, Bangladesh. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Dacca on April 5 in telegram 58480. (Ibid.) Secretary Rogers announced the recognition of Bangladesh at a press briefing on April 4. (Circular telegram 57428 to eight posts in South Asia, Moscow and London, April 4; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH) Mujibur Rahman sent a letter to Nixon on April 9 in which he warmly acknowledged the recognition accorded his country. (Telegram 1301 from Dacca, April 13; ibid.) Consul General Spivack was designated Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim of the new Embassy. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot, April 6; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh) 419. Telegram 60873 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh Washington, April 8, 1972, 2131Z The Department outlined for Consul General Spivack the overall U.S. policy objectives in South Asia and the specific objectives of U.S. policy in dealing with Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, and Kissinger; and approved by Under Secretary Johnson. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 420. Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, April 10, 1972, 1126Z Consul General Spivack reported that he delivered President Nixon’s letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman who “looked forward to the most friendly future relationships between our two countries at both official and popular levels.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. The telegram was sent as originating from the Consulate General in Dacca. The Consulate General, which had been accredited to Pakistan and which existed on sufferance in Dacca after the establishment of Bangladesh, became an Embassy following U.S. recognition. 421. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 21, 1972 Saunders took note of President Nixon’s intention to shift toward bilateral assistance to Bangladesh and recommended that Kissinger seek the President’s approval to indicate to the Bangladesh Government that such a change was contemplated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The attached draft memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which called for Nixon to respond to a recommendation that the AID officials in Bangladesh be authorized to indicate the U.S. intention to initiate a bilateral aid program, was not sent and is not published. Kissinger responded to Saunders’ memorandum in a handwritten note on the memorandum: “He intends to go into bilateral aid but to cut down on multilateral aid.” For a record of the SRG meeting on April 17, during which the question of economic assistance to Bangladesh was discussed, see Document 249. 422. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 15, 1972 In response to the President’s expressed desire to convert as much multilateral economic assistance to Bangladesh as possible into bilateral assistance, Eliot forwarded the Department’s recommendations as to how the remaining $130 million of a $200 million Congressional appropriation for South Asian relief could be channeled to Bangladesh in the form of bilateral assistance. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published. On May 22 NSC Staff Secretary Davis sent a memorandum to Eliot which reads: “In response to your May 15 memorandum, bilateral assistance of $75 to $100 million in the current U.S. fiscal year has been approved. Your recommendations on the mix of other relief assistance for Bangladesh is (sic.) also approved.” (Ibid.) On May 30 the Department of State announced that the United States and Bangladesh had signed a bilateral agreement providing for $90 million in U.S. assistance to Bangladesh as a grant for rehabilitation. (Telegram 94906 to Dacca, May 30; ibid., AID (US) 4 BANGLADESH) 423. Memorandum For the President’s File Washington, May 16, 1972 Ambassador-Designate Karim made his initial call on President Nixon who pledged that the United States would do everything it could to help Bangladesh survive and to provide hope for the future. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Hoskinson. 424. Intelligence Note RNAN–17 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, June 8, 1972 The INR assessment of political developments in Bangladesh concluded that: “The euphoria of victory in Bangladesh has faded, and the BDG must now contend with criticism in its exceedingly difficult task of reconstruction.” As a result, the analyst concluded, “it is likely that the BDG will tilt toward the left.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH. Confidential. Drafted in INR/DDR/RNA by David C. McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis F. Jones. 425. Telegram CONTO 237 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State Islamabad, July 6, 1972, 0852Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported on his July 3 conversation with Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also numbered telegram 5842. Repeated to Bangkok, Bombay, Budapest for the Secretary’s party, Dacca, Calcutta, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Madras, Rangoon, Singapore, and USUN. Sent to the White House for Davis, to the Treasury for Dixon, and to the Department of State for A/OPR, S/S, and NEA. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review matters of mutual interest with host governments. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 426. Telegram CONTO 262 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0700Z Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported on his July 3 conversation with Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also numbered telegram 4084. Sent with instructions to pass to New Delhi, Dacca, Islamabad, the White House for Davis, the Treasury for Dixon, and the Department for S/S, A/OPR, and NEA. 427. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 15, 1972 Kissinger sent to Nixon a summary of the relief assistance provided to Bangladesh January 1–June 30. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on July 15, in which he noted that “according to Saunders’ bookkeeping” the United States had maintained the 33% contribution level stipulated by Nixon. In a handwritten note on the covering memorandum Kissinger expressed his doubts: “I am sure bookkeeping is crooked. Last year above total was 67%.” Despite his reservations, Kissinger initialed the memorandum and sent it to the President. 428. Information Memorandum From the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Laingen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) Washington, August 3, 1972 Laingen summarized the international response to the appeal by the UN Secretary-General for foodgrains for Bangladesh. Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 16, AID 1, AID to Bangladesh 1972. Limited Official Use. Drafted in NEA/PAB by W. Scott Butcher. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published. 429. Telegram 4591 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, November 1, 1972, 1101Z To offset an anticipated shortage, Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman requested that the United States supply foodgrains to Bangladesh as quickly as possible. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Islamabad, New Delhi for Williams, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN. Sent as a joint Embassy/USCOR message. 430. Telegram 4747 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, November 13, 1972, 1142Z Chargé Newberry informed Prime Minister Rahman that the United States could provide 100,000 tons of wheat for arrival in January, and added that an additional 100,000 tons could predictably be provided during the remainder of the U.S. fiscal year. Newberry told Rahman that in all probability no additional amounts would be provided. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Unclassified; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Islamabad, Karachi, New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN. 431. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 22, 1972 Saunders posed the options open to the United States in the pending debate in the UN General Assembly on the question of membership for Bangladesh. Kissinger decided to continue to support the position taken on the question by Pakistan and China. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. In a November 23 note attached to the memorandum, Richard Kennedy informed Saunders that Kissinger had decided that the United States should hold to its former position on the issue. 432. Telegram 5451 Fromthe Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, December 19, 1972, 1200Z The Embassy proposed that it be authorized to stipulate that the first aid agreement to be signed with the Bangladesh Government in fiscal year 1973 be used as the “occasion to have Awami League cabinet make symbolic gesture to indicate it does not intend to disavow responsibility for BDG’s acceptance of US aid.” Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis. 433. National Intelligence Estimate 32.1–72 Washington, December 21, 1972 The estimate assessed political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Bangladesh. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. A cover sheet and table of contents are not published. 434. Telegram 231058 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh Washington, December 22, 1972, 2104Z The Department endorsed the Embassy’s suggestion that the next aid agreement with Bangladesh be conditioned on the public acknowledgement of the agreement by the participation of a senior member of the Bangladesh Government, such as the Foreign Minister, in the ceremony staged to sign the agreement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Butcher and Lawrence B. Lesser, cleared by Laingen and AID and in substance by USIA, and approved by Meyer. 435. Telegram 5547 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, December 27, 1972, 1034Z Chargé Newberry met with Foreign Minister Samad to express “serious concern” over a spate of attacks on USIS centers in Bangladesh and to ask for assurances that U.S. facilities in the country would be protected. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, New Delhi, and USIA. On December 11 the Embassy reported that a group of young men had defaced the USIS center in Dacca with anti-American slogans and Communist Party insignia. On December 22 a group of over 100 students, protesting the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, attacked the USIS center in Dacca and did serious damage. On December 26 the Embassy reported that a group of leftist youths had virtually destroyed the USIS center in Chittagong, and the following day reported that the same thing had happened in Rajshahi. On December 26 the Department instructed the Embassy to convey “serious concern of USG over spate of destructive attacks against U.S. facilities” and U.S. “distress over the inadequate police protection afforded.” (Telegrams 5310, 5512, 5533, and 5544, December 11, 23, 26, and 27 respectively, all from Dacca; telegram 232100 to Dacca, December 26; all ibid.) 436. Telegram 232926 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh Washington, December 28, 1972, 0001Z Country Director Laingen called in the Bangladesh Chargé to emphasize concern over the safety of U.S. personnel and facilities in Bangladesh and over the related issue of public statements critical of the United States by prominent government and Awami League officials. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Butcher, cleared with USIA, and approved by Laingen. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Calcutta. 437. Telegram 5584 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State Dacca, December 31, 1972, 1255Z Chargé Newberry called on Foreign Minister Samad to protest the failure of the Bangladesh Government to protect the USIS center in Mymensingh. Newberry suggested that a personal message of regret from Prime Minister Rahman to Secretary of State Rogers might help convince Washington that the problem was receiving the attention of the head of government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Niact; Immediate. Also sent NIACT Immediate to USIA, and routine to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Calcutta. In telegram 5583 from Dacca, December 31, the Embassy reported the “bombing, sacking, and burning” of the USIS center in Mymensingh. (Ibid.) 373. Telegram 5592 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 373. Telegram 5592 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 11, 1971, 1125Z Subject: British Plans re Bangla Desh Ref: Islamabad 123430 London 11230 1. We note with interest that British are moving smartly ahead to establish some basis for early dealing with Bangla Desh, which now appears to be as certain as anything normally is in international affairs. 2. While we appreciate difficult and complicated questions involved in working out conditions in which we would recognize new sovereignty, such as Bangla Desh, it seems to us that at this stage of the game, some little preparation such as the British have obviously been doing could make things much easier. We assume that last sentence para one of State 222979 refers only to West Pakistan and that USG is not “ready to make a major effort ... to preserve Pakistani territorial integrity and armed forces” including East Pakistan. I therefore again strongly urge that we make preliminary soundings with reliable Bangla Desh reps in Washington or elsewhere which would, at very least, prevent them from assuming that we are inalterably opposed to idea of independent Bangla Desh or that we would take inordinately long to recognize a BDG substantially established in East Bengal Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Calcutta, and London. 374. Telegram 12575 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 374. Telegram 12575 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, December 15, 1971, 1034Z Subject: US Policy and Bangla Desh 1. Summary: Over longer term USG will wish establish normal friendly reltions with Bangla Desh. Once BD Govt meets customary criteria for recognition, question will be one of choosing most advantageous time for recognition, in light our relationships with Islamabad, New Delhi and people of Bangla Desh. Although Pakistan will probably try to discourage others recognizing Bangla Desh (and may be for brief period contemplate breaking with those who do). We doubt our relations will suffer unduly if US recognition come after some other major Western powers have broken ice. With regard India, we may wish examine possibility that assurance of reasonable prompt recognition would prove modest bargaining counter with GOI in seeking satisfactoy resolution of crisis. As to Bangla Desh itself, recognition without undue delay would be important element—along with general manner in which we deal intitially with BD reps—in laying groundwork for useful relationship with new govt at time of maximum receptivity.US participation in expected international post. Hostilities relief and rehabilitation effort shold also offer opportunity hear recent wounds in our relations. Embassy recommends meanwhile that we continue (and expand) unofficial contacts with BD reps, seeking to assure them US looks forward to cordial relationship with new state. End summary. 2. Embassy has been considering implications for US policy of Bangla Desh regime in East Pakistan situation emergence independent Bangla Desh regime in East Pakistan, situation which it appears we will be faced with shortly. Having decided to seek retain ConGen in Dacca after Bangla Desh takeover, presently, also useful for us to look further ahead to larger question of US position on recognition Bangla Desh. 3. Chances reasonably good that shortly after raising flag in Dacca BD authorities will be able claim—with substantial valdity—fulfillment of basic criteria for recognition i.e., effective control over territory (with Indian Army backstopping) support of local populace, and expressed willingness to meet international obligations. On other hand widespread communal violence or general breakdown law and order either or both a distinct possibility in aftermath current conflict—conceivably could cast doubt on regime’s qualifications for international recognition. 4. It has been essential element of our posture during past year of crisis hopefully to emerge with the useful and cooperative relationship with peoples of both wings of pakistan. As matter of policy USG will wish to have normal friendly relations with Bangla Desh new state will be eighth largest in world. In terms of population and will control area which if not of much direct strategic significance to us, is likely to prove key factor for better or worse in stability of subcontinent country will be small element in world trade but, its humanitarian aid needs in wake of present ordeal are sure to be immense. Beyond that, Bangla Desh may well become focus of considerable competitive political maneuvering among Soviets, Chinese, Indians, and others, from which we would not want US excluded entirely. 5. Assuming absence of unforeseen factors which would militate against normal relations with Bangla Desh immediate question with regarding recognition is one of timing and tactics. Finding point at which recognition will produce maximum advantage (or minimum disadvantage) to USG will probabaly involve unavoidable tradeoff in our relations with Pakistan and with India and with East Bengalis themselves. 6. While Pakistani attitude toward Bangla Desh regime will be conditioned by terms under which current hostilities terminated, GOP can be expected, at least initially to resent and attempt discourage other countries from recognition Bangla Desh. Over longer term Paks may either move toward accommodation or continue to maintain claim off East Pakistan irredenta, but attitude over next few months likely to be bttter. As same time, we doubt Paks could sustain policy of breaking with countries which recognize Bangla Desh because, if our readings correct, they would shortly find themselves breaking with most major aid donors. 7. US aid policy will be influenced by course of events now underway. USG may wish resume economic aid to residual Pakistan when present crisis resolved, keeping it in consortium context. Could help mitigate impact on GOP of US recognition Bangla Desh if it were timed to coincide with US offer to take part in reactivating consortium and getting aid flowing. 8. While we not in position to assess Indian attitudes appears from here that effect of US on our relations with India might range from mild plus (if we recognize promptly) to minus (if we among last to recognize). One point that may be worth considering, however, is a possiblity of our using recognition—as a positive bargaining counter in our relations with GOI. Would US undertaking to move expeditiously in recognizing BD be helpful in inducing Indians to accept cease-fire formula acceptable to Paks? 9. Third element of equation is effect of recognition on Bangla Desh itself. Not unduly delayed recognition should help improve our misunderstood position with the Bengalis, while any long delay would certainly be taken as added affront. In this instance, Bengalis might seek exert pressure through harrassment or even ejections of ConGen Dacca to express their ire. 10. Beyond this are other pertinent considerations. First few weeks and months of Bangla Desh Govt will be period of special receptivity and sensitivity setting viewpoints and attitudes likely to endure for considerable time not only matter of formal recognition but more especially manner in which we initially deal (with BD reps likely to have greater impact on our long term relations with Bangla Desh than on our already established relations with either India or Pakistan. We have an opportunity to start with relatively clean slate in our official contacts with BD despite tensions and misunderstanding built up during recent months. Bangla Desh, although a central issue in crisis of last nine months has itself been less involved in US diplomatic initiatives than its Indian sponsor and thus possibly less affected by irritations stemming from these initiatives than either, US or INDIA. 11. Immediate operational opportunity to establish sympathetic working relationship with Bangla Desh—aside from recognition as such—will doubtless arise in post conflict requirements to provide for minimal needs of people of East Bengal. This will apply to Bengalis themselves (such things as food, refugee assistance, and rehabilitation) put also to non Bengalis whose fate may be even more precarious. We assume an international relief effort will be mounted we also assume that USG will not wish to stand aloof from such effort. Our participation could do much to help heal psychological wounds of recent months in our relations with East Bengalis (as relief program reached high gear however need for recognition could become increasingly important on operational grounds.) 12. As we have already said (Islamabad 12312) Embassy believes important USG continue (and expand) current unofficial contacts with BD reps. We should seek to assure them that USG is in no way opposed to legitimate interests or people of East Bengal. We should also seek to make evident that we look forward to cordial, mutually beneficial relationship with new state. That posture balanced against desirability of our retaining beneficial relationship with residual Govt of Pakistan, should govern our decision on timing of recognition and establishment of formal relations with Bangla Desh. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Dacca and New Delhi. Repeated to Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, Kabul, and USUN. 375. Intelligence Note RNAN-34 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 375. Intelligence Note RNAN-34 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, December 17, 1971 BANGLA DESH LEADERSHIP The composition of the future government of Bangla Desh will depend largely on the presence or absence of Sheikh Mujib. If he is released from jail and allowed to head the government, its membership will probably be drawn almost exclusively from the Awami League, and it will probably be similar though not identical with the present Bangla Desh cabinet, which was established in Calcutta during the civil war. If Mujib is not available, the government is likely to be a coalition of Awami Leaguers and moderate leftists from the Bangla Desh Consultative Committee organized about four months ago, and, quite possibly, prominent Mukhti Bahini commanders. The Awami League . Sheikh Mujib molded the character of the Awami League. He described himself as a British-style socialist, as a moderate on everything but autonomy for East Bengal, and surrounded himself with men of similar minds. The “inner circle” of the Awami League—the men who make up the Bangla Desh cabinet—are all law-trained, and have been successful both as lawyers and as politicians. They have all been long- active in the Awami League, have all held various elective offices, and many of them have been in jail for political activities. Their main point of contact was loyalty to Sheikh Mujib. While known to political professionals and possessing solid political bases in their home areas, none of them had a province-wide image or following prior to the civil war. Although all of them are classifiable as moderate socialists, Tajuddin Ahmed, the General Secretary of the Awami League and Bangla Desh Prime Minister, is probably the farthest to the left, while Khondkar Mushtaque Ahmed, the Vice President of the Awami League and Bangla Desh Foreign Minister, is the farthest to the right. Tajuddin Ahmed, because of his duties as General Secretary, has had the most extensive experience as an administrator, but none of them is a professional manager. Both in the Awami League and in the more recent Bangla Desh cabinet, this group has depended on advisers from the universities and business world to provide practical guidance, while the group supplied political expertise. In the absence of Sheikh Mujib and under the pressure of a civil war, a number of divisions appeared within the Awami League and the Bangla Desh cabinet, notably that between the Tajuddin Ahmed and Mushtaque Ahmed factions. The struggle for Bangla Desh, however, kept the party united and the differences hidden. Under the more intense strains of setting up a new government, the factions could split, weakening the overall influence of the Awami League. The return of Sheikh Mujib, however, would be enough to reduce the friction and reunite the factions, at least for the short term. The Bangla Desh Consultative Committee . Comprised of the Bangla Desh cabinet plus the political leaders of Soviet-oriented leftist parties, the Committee has been an Indian-sponsored attempt to give the Bangla Desh movement a wider base. The small membership of these leftist parties, because of their activist bent, played a disproportionate role in many of the insurgent activities. In a postwar situation the Soviet Union may well apply pressure to include these leftists in the eventual government. The Indians might also see advantage in promoting a solid front against radical leftist organizations. The leftist members—Muzaffar Ahmed of the pro-Soviet National Awami Party, aging peasant leader Maulana Bhashani, Hindu leftist Monorajan Dhar, and old-line Communist Mani Singh—have little enough popular support, however, and the Awami League would still be likely to dominate a coalition government. The Mukhti Bahini (MB) . The MB Sector Commanders and Commander-in-Chief Col. Osmani are all ex-Pakistan Army men. The question to be answered is their willingness to adhere to the “British Raj” tradition wherein the military stays strictly out of politics. They are the conquering heroes (only slightly diminished by the Indian Army role), have been fighting over the long term in East Bengal while the Bangla Desh cabinet remained safely in Calcutta, command the loyalty of a fairly well-armed and proven fighting force, and will probably be watching the political development of Bangla Desh with close attention. Their acquiescence and support will be central to a successful transition from war to a state of law and order, and they may well be invited into the government in some role to ensure their cooperation. If so, they will exercise a moderate rightist influence. Their sub-commanders, however, while presumably loyal, are said to be much more leftist-oriented and probably have the greatest degree of local influence. If new elections are held promptly, as has been announced, the participation of these local area commanders could well move Bangla Desh to the left. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Drafted in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia by David C. McGaffey and cleared by Office Director Curtis F. Jones 376. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 376. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated U.S. Relationship with Bangla Desh Summary The situation in East Pakistan is fluid. In the West, Bhutto is taking over power and still hopes to salvage something in the East by means of negotiations. In his conversations with us, he has not given up entirely on the idea, to use his own words, “of the loosest kind of confederal link between East and West.” While we believe a separate Bangla Desh is a reality, we should do nothing which would tend by our own actions to foreclose such an option for him, regardless of how slim the prospects are that he will be able to retrieve something in the East in the aftermath of the Indian military victory. Bhutto told Secretary Rogers he would understand the need for U.S. humanitarian assistance to Bangla Desh, so long as it was done in a way that no element of recognition was implied or involved and that it did not otherwise compromise his negotiating efforts. Bhutto would probably also agree that we should seek to retain a modest hard-core presence in the form of our Consulate General. This is justified both on immediate security grounds as well as our long-range interests which will be to have a reasonable relationship with whatever entity evolves in the East, and whether or not it retains a loose confederal link with the West. Therefore, the short-run approach of the U.S. should be to maintain low-key informal contact, be helpful through the UN (not through India) in projected humanitarian assistance to the East, and avoid any early move towards recognition, keeping this matter under review as the situation evolves. Over the next month at least we will have to assess carefully Bhutto’s tactics and plans regarding the former East wing, the nature of India’s relationship with Bangla Desh, and the Bangla Desh capacity or lack of capacity to exercise effective sovereignty in its own territory. Discussion In Islamabad, the new Bhutto regime is faced with the immediate problem of determining and articulating its stance toward the East, including therein its attitude on Sheikh Mujib. Bhutto told the Secretary on December 18 that he believes there is still a chance for a loose confederal link between East and West and that he will make an effort to this end. His tactics, including those on Mujib, are not yet known. In the East, a provisional government of Bangla Desh can be expected to move into Dacca in a matter of days. It will preside over the world’s eighth largest state in terms of population, one of the poorest in terms of development, and a state with enormous problems of rehabilitation and resettlement. The focus of its energies in the short run will need to be heavily internal—establishing itself as a government, rebuilding the administrative structure, and relocating and feeding its people. But it will probably also seek early UN membership and a maximum in international recognition. Urgent problems of humanitarian relief will probably form the first framework of international (and our own) involvement and role in Bangla Desh. Bangla Desh owes its existence at this early date to Indian military action with Soviet backing. This gives the Indians, and through them the Russians, a strong initial position. There are other factors, however, which should cause Bangla Desh leaders to seek to establish some distance between their new country and India. They may find, for example, that Indian forces will not be prepared to Withdraw as rapidly as the Bangla Desh might wish. They are also aware of Indian policies toward such neighbors as Nepal. They are familiar with hard Indian terms in previous India-Pakistan negotiations on matters of great importance to East Pakistan. Bangla Desh is a predominantly Muslim country and, despite statements about secularism, its leadership will be wary about the potential dangers arising from Hindu nationalism next door. Finally, Bangla Desh leaders know they have immense relief and economic problems which another impoverished nation—India—cannot meet and which also cannot be assured from the Soviet Union. There is some prospect therefore that the Bangla Desh leadership will seek broad international support to help assure their independence from India and the Soviet Union. Over the longer run frictions between India and Bangla Desh seem inevitable. Consequently, there are steps which we can take, both for the short and long term, which may serve to bolster independence from both India and the Soviet Union. Assumptions for the Immediate Future 1. That Indian forces can be expected to remain in Bangla Desh for a minimum of 30 days and up to six months. 2. That security and other considerations require immediate contacts between our Consulate General and Indian/Bangla Desh authorities. 3. That Bhutto’s comments to date indicate that as a minimum Pakistan will delay recognition and will otherwise seek to avoid dealing officially with Bangla Desh as a separate state for some time to come. 4. That the Soviet Union will move toward recognition fairly promptly, depending however on the nature of Pakistan’s attitudes re 3rd country recognition. 5. That the Chinese will delay recognition indefinitely. 6. That the British and other Commonwealth countries will move fairly promptly toward normal diplomatic ties. 7. That relief and refugee assistance to Bangla Desh will remain under UN auspices, and that our participation therein need not necessarily raise questions of recognition. Short Range Posture We should delay action on the longer range decision of recognition for the immediate future: —Bangla Desh authorities will be preoccupied in the short range with getting their own house in order and may not attempt to force us to take a decision immediately. —We need at least a month to assess (a) Bhutto’s stance toward the former eastern wing; (b) India’s intentions toward Bangla Desh; and (c) Bangla Desh ability to exercise effective sovereignty in its own territory. —There is good basis under customary international law to ask and expect Bangla Desh authorities to permit our Consulate General to continue consular functions on at least a limited basis, without prejudging the issue of recognition. (A total of 13 countries now have consular representation in Dacca.) —It is not presently clear how and when a Bangla Desh U.N. membership request might arise, but it seems unlikely in the immediate weeks ahead. We should address this issue when it arises, including whatever bearing it might have at the time to our own relationship with that regime. Assuming the above rationale to be accurate, the following short term posture would commend itself: —We would try to maintain our present hard core staff in Dacca, establishing a minimum working relationship with Bangla Desh and Indian military authorities, making it clear that our doing so does not imply recognition. We could try routinely to keep our USIS reading rooms open but avoid other USIS operations. AID operations would be restricted to whatever participation is essential to our role in humanitarian relief. —We would quietly convey to Bangla Desh authorities in Dacca and their representatives here that we have the matter of our future recognition under review and that in the interim we would wish to maintain a strictly consular presence. —We would review our position on Bangla Desh UN membership on the basis of information available when the issue arises. —We would continue to play a role in both the refugee relief (and rehabilitation) effort and former UNEPRO operations, but entirely under UN auspices. We would channel any foodgrain requests from Bangla Desh authorities through UN channels. We would want to get across to Bangla Desh authorities that their actions regarding minorities and humanitarian relief will have a bearing on our future policies toward Bangla Desh. —We would keep Islamabad fully informed of our actions. Meanwhile we would urge as appropriate in our relationship with Bhutto a maximum in moderation in GOP attitudes toward Bangla Desh, and in particular seek to prevent evolution of any kind of “Hallstein Doctrine” approach to the East. We should also convey our view that Sheikh Mujib remains an important factor in the evolution of Bangla Desh internal and external policies. —We would also want to keep in close touch with the British and other Consortium countries as to both our short and longer range policies toward Bangla Desh. —We would inform India of our position, indicating that our position on recognition will depend inter alia on a commitment on withdrawal of Indian forces and the ability of the Bangla Desh government to assume the responsibilities and obligations of a sovereign and independent state. Options for the Longer Range Future Among the options available to us for the longer term would be to withdraw our present consular presence from Dacca and have no relationship at all with Bangla Desh. We exclude this from consideration, since this would not support our basic policy of seeking a stable Subcontinent free of domination by any of the Great Powers, notably the Soviet Union. We also exclude, for the longer term, continuing a purely consular presence. Doing so would not serve our basic objective of seeking to limit India and especially Soviet influence. Moreover, the Bangla Desh authorities may fairly soon make our continued consular presence dependent on a decision on our part re recognition and therefore preclude it as a long range policy. If these premises are correct, and of course depending on the efforts of Bhutto to explore the basis for reunion on the basis of loose confederation, the issue for the longer range becomes one of timing of recognition. If and when this becomes the issue, we believe that U.S. interests would probably best be served by relatively early recognition, for the following reasons: —We will want to encourage Bangla Desh freedom of action and limit its reliance on the Soviet Union and India. Previous Awami League attitudes toward the U.S. were friendly and these are probably basically unchanged. We have no issues or problems with the emergent state of Bangla Desh. We believe they will actively want a relationship with us, which should permit us to determine the timing of recognition—provided we do not delay too long. —Leaving the field to the Soviets also runs the risk of contributing to a radicalization of the Bangla Desh leadership, a risk which is already real. Again, delay could enhance that risk. —A working relationship with Bangla Desh, established early, may enhance our ability to influence more moderate Bangla Desh attitudes towards Islamabad which in turn could be decisive in the long range posture Islamabad takes towards its former Eastern province. We may be as influential as any outside power in affecting the nature of that posture and trying to preclude any kind of. “Hallstein Doctrine stance” by the GOP. Eventual Pakistani rapprochement with Bangla Desh (assuming no success in efforts toward reunion) could be important (a) as a further offset to Indian hegemony over the new state and (b) in order to retain some of the advantages of an economic and trade relationship with the former eastern wing. —There is also the practical consideration that a number of very complex financial problems will grow out of the division of assets and liabilities of the two former wings of Pakistan. As a major creditor, we will be involved in this process and benefit in doing so from early and official contacts with Bangla Desh. —Finally, there is the factor of what will be considerable pressure in Congress and in the press for U.S. recognition, growing as other countries recognize. This will find particular focus in the field of humanitarian relief, where our ability to continue an active role beyond an interim period might be restricted in the absence of official Bangla Desh relations. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret. The paper is undated but it was sent on December 22, 1971, by Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that indicated it had been prepared in response to a December 16 instruction from the WSAG to prepare a paper on the subject of the U.S. relationship with Bangladesh. The covering memorandum indicates the paper was drafted by Constable and cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, and Irwin. Presumably the same information applies to the attached study. For a record of the December 16 WSAG meeting, see Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. XI , South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 318 . A January 17 memorandum from Davis to the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA indicates that the paper was circulated again for consideration of the Senior Review Group at its meeting on January 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) For the minutes of the January 19 SRG meeting, see Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. XI , South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 210 . The reference in the paper to the Hallstein doctrine is to the policy of West Germany to break diplomatic relations with any country that established relations with the German Democratic Republic. 377. Telegram 5866 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 377. Telegram 5866 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 30, 1971, 1115Z Subj: U.S. Policy and Bangladesh Ref: Islamabad 12575 1. Urgent preoccupations at time reftel received and in days immediately following receipt have unfortunately delayed our expression of admiration for this cogent and perceptive analysis of U.S. interests in dealing with new Bangladesh Government. Validity of this fine piece of work, has in our view, been reinforced by what has happened since. 2. Recent statements by Bangladesh leaders reveal increasingly mature and understanding approach to question of recognition. Rather than earlier chauvinistic and breast-beating pronouncements, these more recent statements appear to recognize need for mature consideration on part of other powers before recognition extended to Bangladesh as well as indicate willingness maintain de facto relationship until final decisions forthcoming—assuming that those final decisions expected to be favorable. 3. However, we believe it would be helpful both in enabling this office to be somewhat more productive and in easing transition from present limbo to what appears as of now to be inevitable recognition of Bangladesh, if (a) US officials at suitable places (New York, Washington, Calcutta, and in light of Manila 11728 Manila) entered into informal and unofficial dialogues with Bangladesh officials to convey to latter some sense of U.S. flexibility on matter recognition—at very least, to assure them that US not irrevocably committed to support of united Pakistan, and (b) I and my staff (who are personally acquainted with many important figures in BDG) were authorized to enter into strictly informal contacts with Bangladesh officials here for discussion of various practical matters relating to our presence in Dacca. In both these cases, it would, of course, be made clear that contacts concerned in no way constituted recognition or promise of eventual recognition. 4. Related to foregoing, I would hope that in our contacts with Pakistani officials at all levels we are scrupulously refraining from encouraging them to hope for our support in efforts to retain frame-work of united Pakistan. Given our very strong feeling here that any such efforts are doomed, we feel that encouragement by USG in that direction would serve neither Pakistan’s interest nor our own. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, London, Manila, Moscow, and USUN. 378. Telegram 10 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 378. Telegram 10 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0651Z Subj: Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad This message in three parts—part one 1. Summary. In cordial interview initated by him, Bangladesh Foreign Minister solicited US assistance in achieving freedom for Sheikh Mujib Rahman, assured me that USG “mission” in Dacca would be allowed to function for time being and would recieve “honorable” treatment, inquired into prospects of US recognition of Bangladesh Government (BDG) and into status of partially completed USAID projects. Action requested: Appreciate indications of type of responses, if any, Department wishes me to make points raised by Foreign Minister. 2. On morning of New Year’s Day, office of Bangladesh Government Foreign Minister Abdus Samad telephoned to Consulate General to request that I call on FonMin at noon. This request may have been related several highly tentative informal probes by Bengali contacts seeking ascertain whether I was planning call on FonMin. To such probes answer had been given that, in view of uncertain status of Consulate General, I would not initiate any contancts but would certainly respond if FonMin invited me. 3. FonMin received me with great cordiality in his office in Bangabhaban (former government house). After exchange of new year’s greetings, FonMin expressed appreciation for “widespread support of American people” for Bengali suffering under MLA and for creation of Bangladesh, he cited names of several Senators and Congressmen who had also supported Bangladesh but said he and his Awami League colleagues had been “shocked” by what appeared to be “hostile attitude” of present adminsitration to aspiration of Bengali people for independance. Without dwelling excessively on these points, Samad moved on to question of status of U.S. Consulate General. He said that he appreciated the need for some time on the part of the foreign powers to decide on recognition of Bangldesh, and he assured me that during period while such decisions being made, foreign missions in Dacca would be treated “with dignity and honor” and would be provided whatever protection was needed, although in latter question, he remarked with a smile that he was sure I had observed how peaceful and relaxed Dacca had become in past week or ten days. To my question whether missions would be afforded facilities for necessary movement of personnel, exchange offical mail, and importation of supplies, Samad said he was aware of these problems and was seeking to set up necessary arrangements for dealing with them. He then raised the question of relationship of USG office in Dacca to Embassy in Islamabad. He said that the BDG hoped that Dacca office would not continue to be regarded as Consulate General accredited to Pakistan. 4. Throughout interview Samad referred to this office as “U.S. mission in Dacca”, and press reference have maintained this style (see below). I explained that his question was, of course, tied in with matter of recognition, and that there were in addition certain administrative and other factors involved. I made point, however, that Dacca office had at all times been able to report freely to Washington and that he would be assured that this would continue. FonMin expressed appreciation, but repeated his hope that, at formal and official level, USG would not show Dacca office as Consulate General accredited to Islamabad. I said that I would convey his feeling to Washington, but I pointed out that our various diplomatic and foreign service lists were issued only once or twice a year, so that whatever decision might be taken, there could be considerable time lag before new listings appeared. FonMin said he understood that, but had simply wished to get the point across. 5. Samad then turned to what I suspect was major purpose of his invitation to me. He said that BDG, in addition to difficulties which it was experiencing, like every new government, in getting itself organized, suffered from grievous additional handicap of having its chief of state and acknowledged leader held captive my “foreign government”. He said that Sheikh Mujib Rahman’s presence in Dacca was desperately needed to help resolve problems and incipient differences of opinion which were beginning to show themselves inside country, he refered specifically to need to disarm irregulars and institute discipline in various “bahinis” all of them armed and some of them subject to diverse political influences. Above all, he said, Sheikh’s presence was needed to bring about coalescense of national spirit and harness energies of Bengali people to hard tasks of reconstruction and self government. Samad said that he believed it would be extremely helpful is USG would exert its influence on Pakistan and on President Bhutto in particular to free Mujib immediately. He said further, that it would go a long way toward eliminating “suspicions nad hostility” toward USG if latter’s appeal to Bhutto could be public one. 6. Samad said that BDG recognized need for some kind of relationship with “Pakistan—that is to say, former West Pakistan”: there were many matters, financial, political, and others which would have to be resolved by negotiations. Beyond that, he went on, BDG could not escape geographic implications of its situation as part of sub-continent; it included Pakistan. However, he stessed, continued imprisonment of Sheikh Mujib by Pakistan would make it unnecessarily difficult for negotiations to begin on pressing and immediate problems and would sour prospects for friendly relations in future. End part one of message Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 379. Telegram 11 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 379. Telegram 11 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0650Z Subj: Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad This message in three parts—part two 1. Turning to question of recognition, FonMin said he and his colleagues realized that this was matter which would require some time and that foreign governments would wish to ponder all aspects of situation; BDG was prepared for this and would soon make immediate recognition a condition for eventual good relations. However, he wondered if I could informally indicate to him considerations being taken into account by USG in matter of recognition. I said that I had no instructions of any kind on this subject and thus found difficulty in responding. When he pressed me further, saying that he was interested in a purely abstract discussion of question with no official implication, I agreed, on a purely personal basis and as a hypothetical case with no direct impliatton relating to specific case of Bangladesh, to discuss recognition as an aspect of relations between states. He agreed to accept this framework. 2. I said that recognition of a seceded or a separated territory posed more problems than an unconstitutional change of government such as a coup d’etate: in the latter case, the previous govt no longer existed, and new govt automatically occupied same space and territory; in case of secession or separation, previous govt still, existed so that third countries were faced with the problem of managing relation with previous govt as well as with newly-created govt occupying portion if space formerly (or in some cases still) claimed by original govt. In general, I went on, there was question of extent to which new govts were in full control of areas they claimed, whether they were in a position to govern those territories effectively, whether they were prepared to accept their proper international relations in accordance with generally accepted standards, and whether they were prepared to accept their proper international obligations. And over and above these considerations, I went on, still in purely hypothetical vein, all governments, particularly governments with widespread interests and commitments, had to view any important question such as recognition of a new state in light of their relations and obligations to many other countries. I pointed out that this was as true of the U.K., France, and USSR, as it was of USA. 3. Samad indicated his understanding and appreciation of points made in previous para and, with a smile, he said, “I suppose your relations with China will have something to do with it.” He replied that I supposed so also, and I stressed the importance which President Nixon attaches to his forthcoming visit to Peking as an effort to establish a constructive relationship with the world’s largest country, which had been in virtual diplomatic isolation for many years. Expressing purely personal speculation, clearly identified as such, I ventured the opinion the USG might not be able to give full consideration to matter of recognition of Bangladesh prior to conclusion of President’s visit to China. Samad pondered this for a moment and then indicated he regarded this as an important and valid consideration, acknowledging as he did so, disclaimers under which I had advanced this speculation. End part two of message. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 380. Telegram 12 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 380. Telegram 12 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, January 3, 1972, 0713Z Subj: Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minisier Abdus Samad This message in three parts—part three 1. Samad then turned to question of partially-completed projects begun under USAID. He said that BDG, in order to be able to decide on allocation of its own resources, would like to know what prospects were for completion of funding of those projects. (In this connection, assume he was referring to projects referred to in Dacca 5861). 2. At conclusion of interview, which lasted just over one hour, Samad asked me in friendly fashion, “now, what shall we tell those press fellows outside?” I suggested that he might wish to finesse question of who initiated visit by using innocuous word “met” rather than “called on” or “summoned”. In matter of substance of conversation, I suggested that Samad could say that he had expressed to me views of BDG on number of question, specifying them, if he so desired, and that I had undertaken to transmit those views to my government. Samad readily agreed to both these formulations, and I said that I would make no statement to the press but would refer them to his office for any comment. Yesterday’s press prominently featured my meeting with Samad and was completely in accord with agreement outlined above. 3. Comment. I found Samad thoughtful, sensitive, and entirely reasonable. He made no set speeches at me, refrained from common Bengali propensity for talking largely for sound of his own voice, and listened attentively and with obvious interest to what I had to say. It is clear that, of various topics he brought up, most important in his mind was BDG desire for some public expression of USG concern for liberation of Sheikh Mujib. While I undertook to convey all of his various points to Washington, I made no specific commitment as to whether, when, or in what fashion I would be able to respond to him on them. 4. Press and television coverage of my meeting with Samad was extensive (by Bangladesh terms) and well within bounds of my understanding with Samad set forth para 2 above. I believe that this exposure has had a favorable effect here without in any way committing the USG on any sensitive matters. During past two weeks, as we have reported, Soviets and Soviet bloc reps have made numerous and well publicized visits to wide range of BD officials and politicians. Prominent press and T.V. play given my meeting with Samad reflects, I believe, desire of BDG to establish some sort of balance. 5. I would appreciate advice from Department as to nature of responses, if any, I should make to various questions raised by Foreign Minister Samad as well as indication of way I should go about making them. While I believe it will be possible to arrange informal and off-the-record discussions, I believe it is inevitable that these will attract media attention. On other hand, it seems to me that this kind of limited exposure can serve useful purpose without committing us to anything we wish to avoid. End of message Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate, Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. 381. Telegram 79 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 381. Telegram 79 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, January 4, 1972, 1255Z Subj: GOP FonSec on Recognition of Bangla Desh Ref: Islamabad 13208 1. During call on FonSec Sultan Khan Jan. 3 on another subject, DCM asked about current status of GOP discussions with variuos governments on BD recognition problem. FonSec said he had sat in on number of reps. Bhutto’s initial meetings with foreign Ambassadors here, during which Bhutto had mentioned problems which recognition would cause him at time when he just taking over and planning to initiate discussions with Mujib. Bhutto’s response to questions this subject had varied slightly from meeting to meeting in context of questions posed by Ambassadors. Report had then been relayed to Bhutto to effect that certain Ambassadors were informing their governments that Bhutto was taking fairly relaxed view. To clarify ambiguity, FonSec said, Bhutto decided to restate his position at diplomatic reception Dec. 27, (Islamabad 13060), when he said it would be considered “hostile” act if foreign governments accorded “premature” recognition. WM FonSec said that Pak Ambassador in Moscow had had two talks with Soviet officials, and had reported that Moscow seemed be taking cautious line on recognition. FonSec said he had impression too from talks with Sov Ambassador here that Moscow did not want to act precipitately. 3. FonSec confirmed that Bhutto had told some Ambassadors that Pakistan would leave commonwealth if UK Government recognized Bangla Desh. This view, he said, has been officially communicated to HMG. Acknowledging that advantages accrue to Pakistan from continued membership in commonwealth, FonSec said GOP would in no way wish to damage its relations with members of commonwealth, but could hardly fail to react if “leader” of commonwealth took step to impugn territorial integrity of commonwealth member (i.e. Pakistan). 4. DCM inquired whether FonSec did not foresee practical difficulties in maintaining such a position on the event various governments proceeded nevertheless to recognize BD. He referred in that connection to imminent announcement by Pres. Bhutto of his decision to release Mujib unconditionally. FonSec said question of timing was critical. It was important that Pres. Bhutto’s discussions with Mujib be allowed to run their course to determine whether some sort of political link could be maintained between West and East Pakistan. If Mujib, once released and having had chance freely to make up his mind, decided firmly against such political link, GOP would take that into account. Then there would be question of continued Indian Army occupation of east wing, which would be factor in status of government there. 5. Inference from FonSec’s remarks is that, although he is not clearly getting out ahead of Pres. Bhutto in opposing “premature” recognition, he is taking longer-term view which seems essentially realistic and pragmatic. Farland 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, and New Delhi. 382. Telegram 1047 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 382. Telegram 1047 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 1 Washington, January 4, 1972, 2232Z For Spivack from Secretary In view of sensitivity and fluidity of situation you should seek to avoid further contact with Bangla Desh reps. If Bangla Desh reps seek appointment with you, you should seek instructions from Department. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Calcutta, Islamabad, and New Delhi. 383. Telegram 239 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 383. Telegram 239 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State 1 New Delhi, January 6, 1972, 1509Z Subj: Bangladesh Recognition Appeal 1. Following appeal for recognition on letterhead qte government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh unqte datelined President’s house, Bangabhaban, Dacca, December 30, addressed to President Nixon and signed Syed Nazrul Islam, Acting President, was left with FSL Embassy receptionist January 6. Format suggests letter may be round robin. UK high commission here has received near identical version dated January 4. Qte excelllency, I have the honour to draw your attention to the proclamation of the sovereign independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh on March 26, 1971. This declaration representes the unanimous verdict of 75 million people of Bangladesh. 2. Qte the foundation of the nation of Pakistan in 1947 was due in major part to the sacrifice in blood, lives and property of our people. Thereafter, as is well known, the people of Bangladesh were subjected to a long period of ruthless colonial domination, systematic economic exploitation, and gross political and cultural discrimination by successive regimes dominated by the ruling circles of West Pakistan. Over the last several years our people had waged a peaceful and non-violent struggle for the attainment of our basic rights. Even the frustration of effort after effort by successive regimes of Pakistan did not make us resort to violence. We continued our non-violent struggle. 3. Qte the people of Bangladesh recorded their overwhelming confidence in the leadership and policies of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the elections in 1970. The military rulers postponed the convening of National Assembly repeatedly, and while pretending to negotiate, augmented their military strength. On the black night of March 25, 1971, they let loose their army in a pre-meditated assault on the innocent and defenceless men, women and children of our country. they made a special target of the intellectuals, the elite of the youth and the leaders of the workers, peasants and students. This left us with no alternative but to declare independence, and resort to arms. 4. Qte the policy of repression continued with increasing brutality in the vain hope of liquidating the leadership and reducing the majority of the Bengali speaking people in Pakistan to a minority. Members of the minority communtiites became special victims of the reign of terror. As a result of this policy of genocide, rape, arson and loot, nearly ten million of our men, women and children were driven out and took shelter in India. 5. Qte we made the formal proclamation of our independence on April 10, 1971. Our struggle for liberation gained increased momentum and strength. Nearly 60,000 members of the former East Bengal regiment, East Pakistan rifles and other paramilitary formations identified themselves with the struggle of the people of Bangladesh, and took up arms in defence of our motherland. They were joined by hundreds of thousands of young men whom they trained to defend the sovereignty and independence of their homeland, with a view to release her finally from the bonds of colonial oppression by West Pakistan. 6. Qte we are glad to inform you, excellency, that this struggle has culminated in success. The liberation army of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Mukti Bahini have been joined by the armed forces of India, at our request, following the unprovoked attack on India by the Pakistani forces of occupation. Our development has not only been welcomed by the broad masses of our people, but the spontaneous and overwhelming support of the entirety of our people has been amply and publicy demonstrated. 7. Qte the proclamation of independence of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and subsequent announcements by my government are attached for the information of your excellency’s government. It is reiterated that the basis principles of Oru state policy shall by democracy, socialism, secularism and the establishment of an egalitarian society, where there would be no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or creed. In our foreign relations, we are determined to follow a policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence adn opposition to colonialism, racialism, and imperialism in all its forms and manifestation. 8. Qte conscious of our responsibility for the large number of citizens of Bangladesh temporarily in India, we would like to assure you of our governments firm intention of organising their expeditious return to their homes. 9. Qte my government hereby places on record its ability and willingness to fulfill all international treaties and obligations to which it may have succeeded. 10. Qte as the nation of Bangladesh emerges to take its place side by side with the other countries in Asia, Africa, North America and all the non-aligned world, it reaffirms its pledge to follow the principles outlined at Bandung and Lusaka. The valiant struggle for liberation and the heoric efforts of our people to throw off the imperialist yoke twice in one generation is a tangible proof of our adherence to these principles, we will continue to give principled support to all nations in their struggle against colonialism, racialism or imperialism in an all their manifestations. It is accordingly our hope that, in support of these same principles, Your Excellency’s government will now see its way to welcoming us into the family of nations. Speedy recognition by your government would be an acknowledgement of our aspirations. It is also our considered assessment that the granting of this recognition is a most necessary and important step to stabilise the situation in South and Southeast Asia. 11. Qte please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest esteem. Unqte. Keating 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, and Madras. The attachments cited in the telegram were not found. 384. Editorial Note 384. Editorial Note Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haig, January 10, 1972, 5:31–5:48 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 313–30. No classification marking. On January 10, President Nixon discussed the upshot of the crisis in South Asia with his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Alexander Haig. With regard to the question of the recognition of Bangladesh, Nixon asked when Pakistan and China were likely to recognize the new government. “Don’t we have to wait,” he said, “until they do.” He noted that “everybody else is jumping on the bandwagon,” making specific reference to Britain and France. Nixon agreed with Haig that the United States should move cautiously on the issue. 385. Telegram 125 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 385. Telegram 125 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, January 12, 1972, 0745Z Subj: Invitation to Swearing In Ceremony 1. I have just received by telephone (to be followed by formal invitatton now on way) invitation to attend swearing-in ceremony of President Mujibur Rahman and the government to be held at Banghabhaban in two and one-half hours (sixteen hundred hours local time). 2. Request by flash reply instructions. If no reply received by time I must leave, I shall base my attendance or my non-attendance on consensus of opinion among my French, British, and Australian colleagues. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Flash. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. The Department returned a Flash response within 2 hours instructing Spivack that no U.S representative should attend the ceremony. The cable was drafted by Van Hollen and cleared by Irwin and Kissinger. (Telegram 5773 to Dacca, January 12; ibid.) On January 13 Spivack cabled the Department that the United States was the only government with de facto representation in Dacca not represented at the swearing-in ceremony. (Telegram 136 from Dacca; ibid.) 386. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Tebbit) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 386. Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Tebbit) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 13, 1972 In the absence of my Ambassador on the West Coast, I have been instructed to forward the enclosed personal message to President Nixon from the Prime Minister, Mr Heath, relating to the sub-continent and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s sudden visit to London. I am of course at your disposal for the transmission of a reply or of any comments you may have. D.C. Tebbit H.M. Minister Attachment Message from British Prime Minister Heath to President Nixon undated Following is the text of the message for the President: Begins:- I have given much thought since we met in Bermuda to our policies in the Indian sub-continent in the new situation which has been created there. In this connection it was of particular interest to me to have an hour’s talk with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when he came through London. Mujib’s arrival was unexpected. We first heard of his release in a message from Islamabad which was received when the aircraft carrying him was only an hour away. He later told me that he had suggested that he should be sent to Dacca or handed over to the Red Cross or the United Nations. These ideas were not, however, acceptable to Bhutto. He himself had refused to go to Tehran, and had finally agreed to come to London. I thought that Mujib had borne his imprisonment well. Although obviously tired and not fully informed after nine months in solitary confinement, he spoke with confidence and assurance. He was anxious to reach Dacca as soon as possible and we gave him an R.A.F. aircraft for the onward journey. It was his own choice that he should not transfer to an Indian aircraft in Delhi. Mujib told me that there can now be no question of a formal link between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. He had said the same to Bhutto prior to his release. In this he has confirmed the position of the Bangladesh authorities in Dacca and our own assessment of the state of affairs in the East. However, although he spoke with understandable bitterness of the actions of the previous Pakistan regime, he showed no rancour towards Bhutto, and said that he wished to establish good relations with West Pakistan. The new partition should be, in his words, “a parting as of brothers”, but Bhutto had to acknowledge the division of Pakistan. Relations between the new Bangladesh and India would of course be much closer. Sheikh Mujib spoke of his hope of Commonwealth membership. I assured him of our goodwill, but at the same time explained the reasons why we could not recognise Bangladesh at once. He shared our wish for harmonious relations between Britain and the three countries of the Indian sub-continent and he hoped that we would help to persuade Bhutto to accept the realities of the situation. The independence of the East is clearly something which Bhutto cannot now change. If Mujib gets early recognition and support from the West it will improve his chance of keeping the country out of the hands of left wing extremists. While there may need to be a short delay to give him time to establish his personal authority, I am sure that it is not in the general Western interest that this waiting period should be long. The problem is one of timing. Too early recognition would antagonise West Pakistan and complicate Bhutto’s task. On the other hand, if we delay too long, the Communist countries will get a start on us in the East, and the position of their friends there will be strengthened. Anything which you can do to help Bhutto accept the inevitability of recognition of Bangladesh would be most helpful. I am myself in touch with him and have told him that Mujib, in his talk with me, ruled out any formal link between East and West. But your views will I know weigh heavily with Bhutto and his government. We shall also use all the influence we can to encourage Mijib, as well as the Indians, to be constructive and to avoid recriminations. The Awami League leaders have already asked us whether we can make our good offices available on a confidential basis for the resolution of problems between East and West Pakistan. I have told Bhutto that, although we have no wish to interfere, if there is anything that we can usefully do, we will be very ready to help. I very much hope that you will agree that the time has now come to move forward on these lines. There is much at stake and I believe that it is of great importance that jointly we use all the influence at our disposal to maintain our position and interests in the sub-continent. With sincere regards, Ends Edward Heath. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret. On January 14 the Foreign Office told the Embassy in London that British recognition of Bangladesh would come within 2 weeks. (Telegram 412 from London, January 14; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH) 387. Letter From the Australian Ambassador (Plimsoll) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 387. Letter From the Australian Ambassador (Plimsoll) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 13, 1972 Dear Dr Kissinger, I attach a message to the President which I have received from the Prime Minister of Australia, about the situation on the Indian subcontinent, and I would be grateful if you would pass it to the President. I am also passing a copy to the Secretary of State. Yours sincerely. (V.Plimsoll) Ambassador Attachment Message From Australian Prime Minister to President Nixon undated For some time now I have been deeply concerned with the problem of Pakistan and the strategic importance of recent events to the balance of power and influence in the Pacific and Asian theatres. This applies particularly to the sub-continent and the Russian potential, naval and political, in the Indian Ocean. Whatever past doubts there-may have been, our assessment now is that Bangladesh, painfully and haltingly, will come into being as an independent republic. The task of reconstruction after natural disasters, the brutal repression of the Pakistani martial law administration and then the devastation of war will be a tremendous one. Money and skills will be needed to rebuild the shattered economy and replace the skilled technicians who have been killed. Food and medical supplies are also lacking. The provision of these needs is far beyond the resources of India and Bangladesh. It is beyond the resources which the Soviet Union is likely to be willing to provide. In any case I believe it would be a great tragedy if we were to give India and the world the impression that we were content to leave to the Soviet Union the task of solving the problems of India and Bangladesh. It has never been the case, is not now, and will not be in the future, that the provision of aid to a country desperately in need of it, like India, ensures compliance with any particular line of policy. Natural disappointment when things go awry should not obscure fundamental longterm objectives. I also see grave dangers in giving the People’s Republic of China the impression that we are not concerned about Russian expansion into the subcontinent. They are highly sensitive to Russian moves in Asia and may well see in the appearances of some American coolness towards India an attempt to set the Soviet Union against China, however unjustified this obviously is. Our own view, as I know it also to be the view of your Administration, is that playing off China against Russia will be productive of dangerous domestic instability in South and South East Asian countries. Assuming as I do that the separation of the East and West wings is now inevitable, I still believe that both states can be economically viable. Indeed Bangladesh, with access to the markets and the raw materials of West Bengal, may prove more prosperous than she has been in the recent past. West Pakistan will no doubt look to a closer association with the states of the Middle East where its role might be a more helpful one than it has been when in association with the nations of South East Asia. My particular concern is with Bangladesh. As a country of more than 70,000,000 people, on the edge of the South East Asian region, it is an important neighbour for Australia. At present, the Government is not in effective internal control. However, we have made it clear to India that we are not against recognising Bangladesh once the government is clearly established, functioning and in control, and when President Bhutto’s attempts to reach some composition with East Bengal have been given a little more time to work themselves out. You will know, Mr President, that I hold the view that Australian and American interests run substantially parallel in most areas of the world and that I am acutely aware of the immense contribution which your country has made to the security and prosperity of the whole world. You will know too of my admiration for the leadership you and your Administration have taken in reducing world tensions and the contribution you personally are making in the cause of detente and world peace. Such actions can never be forgotten by us. For these reasons I am encouraged to write to you in this vein. I perceive the possibility that by withholding support and encouragement from India and the new country of Bangladesh at this time the United States runs the risk of facilitating a massive expansion of Russian activity in the Asian and Indian Ocean area, an expansion which we assess here as inevitably hostile in intent. Furthermore, there is chance that India will become politically and economically tied to the Soviet Bloc. Whatever may be one’s view of Mrs. Gandhi’s hard-headedness, India, without Western and mainly United States support, is just not strong enough to resist at least partial absorption into the Russian sphere of influence. May I urge you to consider these views at a critical time in the development of the balance of power and influence in a very important area of the world. One idea which presents itself to me and which I would like to submit to you is that because of our common interests we might have a joint study made at official level about these problems or perhaps we could prepare a basic paper and send it to you for your comments. I would deeply appreciate the benefit of your personal views on this and related matters. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Top Secret 388. Telegram 158 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 388. Telegram 158 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, January 14, 1972, 0620Z Subj: Bangladesh—The Case for Recognition 1. Recognition of Bangladesh rests on following assumptions: (1) it is in interest of USG that stability return to South Asia area as soon as possible; (2) USG would prefer not to see South Asia dominated by either Soviet Union or India; (3) all other things being equal, U.S. is inclined to recognize governments satisfying “normal criteria” and, in addition, democratic in character and based on expressed will of people of country. 2. General criteria. Bangladesh is a clearly-defined geographic area whose borders are not in dispute; government now in power is one which has received clear electoral mandate, has announced its espousal of secular democracy, and shows every sign of enjoying confidence of overwhelming majority of people of country; population of area is relatively homogeneous speaking same language and in general free of ethnic, religious, or linguistic separatism. 3. Political interests of USG. Present Government of BD is currently dominated by leaders whose orientation can best be characterized as “democratic socialtst”; circumstances in which this government has come into power have given USSR both directly and through association with India considerable advantage in terms or potential influence which Soviet reps in BD are seeking to build up and exploit, assisted by small but vociferous group of indigenous communists and fellow travellers. Govt leadership is clearly conscious of and fears Soviet influence and has taken steps which indicate strong intention resist participation in govt of left-leaning groups, although strongly pressed to do so both by USSR and by India (latter during period when BDG was located in Calcutta). Early recognition of BDG by non-communist world would strengthen present BDG leadership and weaken strong propaganda advantage Soviet bloc now deriving from its initial advantage. On other hand, BDG, while heavily indebted to India, shows signs of seeking to resist Indian domination and to establish its independence from its large and powerful neighbor. Here again early recognition will be of great help to BDG in maintaining an independent stance. 4. Economic factors. In description of BD as “international economic basket case”, while striking as rhetoric, is not entirely accurate, as pointed out in last para of Dacca 0092; BD will certainly require a great deal of assistance immediately and considerable assistance over medium term if it is to realize its potential for economic viability. Immediate future needs center on foodgrains, foreign exchange, and humanitarian assistance in resettling vast numbers of refugees apparently now beginning to return in quantity from India. In slightly longer perspective assistance will be required in planning, establishing economic priorities, and financing infrastructure projects. While India and Soviet bloc may make great public play of their willingness to help, amounts to be expected from them realistically are small; help of types and quantities required can only come from non-communist aid givers, acting either bilaterally or through international organizations. In either case effective assistance for reconstruction and development purposes, (as distinguished from purely humanitarian relief of suffering) will depend on recognition of BD by potential aid donors, whether individual countries, consortia, or international aid agencies. Thus, if BD is to achieve economic base for stable existence, it must receive early recognition from potential aid sources other than Indian and the Soviet bloc. 5. Relations with Pakistan. BDG Prime Minister, Mujibur Rahman, has categorically announced (Dacca 111) that there can be no “links” between BD and Pakistan; while acceptance of this reality has yet to be acknowledged by GOP President Bhutto, Islamabad 338 indicates apparent trend in that direction. BD and Pakistan have many important matters to negotiate out between them. This will be impossible until parties can approach negotiating table as psychological equals—condition which requires that Pakistan refrain from pressing claim of some kind of political tie and BD be relieved of psychological necessity of fending off such claims. This sine qua non cannot be achieved as long as Pakistan persists in its version of “Hallestin doctrine”. Recognition of BD by number of important world powers would call Pakistani bluff in this connection and settle issue once and for all, incidentally getting Bhutto off hook by doing so. 6. Special factors. (a) Large scale presence of Indian Army in Bangladesh raises question of full sovereignty of BDG. That latter is aware this problem is indicated by recent statements of Mujib and others that IA is present with full agreement and at invitation of BDG and will leave whenever BDG desires it to go. There has been no indication that IA presence has, of itself, in any way affected or limited freedom of BDG to conduct its own affairs; such Indian influence as exists, (and there can be no doubt that it does exist) is due to factors other than mere presence of army as such. (B) Timing of U.S. recognition could be important. Today’s announcement that Burma has recognized BDG is first by non-communist country; there are indications that Nepal and Indonesia may follow suit, while possibility of joint recognition by EEC countries in near future now being discussed in Luxembourg (Bonn 531). Should this happen, snowball effect likely. At that point failure of U.S. to extend recognition would become conspicuous and take on policy significance which it does not yet have. At very least U.S. failure to act would be attacked by Soviets and their Bengali supporters as clear evidence of hostility. As incidental effect, BDG could be expected request closure of this office and departure of all American official personnel from BD. 7. On basis of foregoing, we believe USG should be prepared extend formal recognition to BDG simultaneously or very soon after U.K. and other member common market countries do so. We are aware that there may re many factors arguing to contrary, but we here are not in position to assess them. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 26, 1972 Subject: Humanitarian Assistance Policy for South Asia At the SRG meeting on January 19, 1972 the request was made for recommendations on our humanitarian assistance policy for South Asia. Joint State/AID recommendations follow (details in addendum): BANGLADESH Support for UN Efforts —Support a formal request from the United Nations for renewed relief assistance in Bangladesh when a relief program has been worked out by the UN and specific requests and priorities put forward. —Seek the broadest possible international support for this effort, including full Soviet participation. —Within this framework, begin by making available PL–480 foodgrain and oil, utilizing portions of the approximately 725,000 metric tons of such commodities (valued at about $75 million) which were committed for relief efforts in East Pakistan under PL–480 agreements of August and September 1971, but not shipped because of hostilities. (These agreements, made originally with the Government of Pakistan, will need to be cancelled and new arrangements worked out with the UN before shipments could be made.) —Defer any further commitments of funds, including any support of UN administrative costs, until the degree of international response to the UN appeal becomes apparent. U.S. Share —U.S. support of the short range UN relief and rehabilitation effort should, under current circumstances, be in the range of 30 to 35 percent of the total actually made available by all donors. (Our contribution to the previous UNEPRO effort in East Pakistan was about 70 percent; our contribution to refugee relief in India is now less than 40 percent.) This means that we would withhold any substantial commitments until there was evidence of significant contributions being made available by other donors. —We should reserve the option of playing a larger role, depending on the trend of general relations in the area and the nature of Indian and other international participation in the relief and rehabilitation effort. Role of U.S. Voluntary Agencies —We should not limit our assistance solely to a direct response to the anticipated UN appeal but be prepared to make available some resources, including cash, rehabilitation commodities, and special high-nutritional foodstuffs, to U.S. voluntary agencies which have a proven record of competence and acceptability in Bangladesh. Red Cross and Minorities —We should be prepared to respond to an anticipated appeal from the International Red Cross for funds to sup-port Red Cross relief efforts among Bangladesh minorities, but our response in this area should be timed to be part of our overall response to relief needs in Bangladesh. Long-Term Reconstruction —Participate in UN (and possibly IBRD) discussion on longer range reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh but defer making any commitment until our future political relationship with Bangladesh is clear. This posture should also apply to our presently suspended AID development projects in the former area of East Pakistan. INDIA Support for UNHCR Appeal The UNHCR has just solicited renewed international support for Pakistani refugees in India, enclosing an Indian estimate of needs of $122 million. We recommend that the U.S. respond positively to that appeal by deciding to contribute 30 to 35 percent of the requirements for these refugees in commodities to be provided through the UNHCR, and that we announce an initial commodity contribution of $10 million. This will demonstrate once again the humanitarian concern of the President and would be in keeping with the leadership which the United States has consistently exercised in refugee assistance. Support for Volags —Continue to support those U.S. voluntary agencies, which have established effective programs of relief AID to Pakistani refugees in India. We anticipate channeling $1 to $2 million in funds to the work of these agencies. THE PRESIDENT’S REQUEST FOR SOUTH ASIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE Beyond PL–480 foodgrains, the kind of U.S. participation in relief in India and Bangladesh that is outlined above will depend upon further favorable Congressional action on the President’s request for a special $250 million South Asian relief allocation under the Foreign Assistance Act (the House has authorized $175 million). We are already drawing on the first $100 million of such funds under authority of the Continuing Resolution. Of this, $20 million has been spent for earlier obligations for the refugee program in India and $7.7 million for the earlier UNEPRO program in East Pakistan. What further allocations of these funds, if any, we use to support the continuing UNHCR role among the refugees in India will depend upon such factors as the rate of refugee return, other international support for the UNHCR’s effort, and our evolving relationship with India. As the refugees return, we would envisage the bulk of these funds to be required for immediate relief and resettlement of the refugees and other displaced persons in Bangladesh, and eventually for a longer-range rehabilitation effort there. In the short range, we anticipate continuing requirements for non-food commodities for the returning refugees, continuing support for U.S. voluntary agencies in the field, and possible contingency requirements to assist in transportation and resettlement of minorities in both Bangladesh and West Pakistan. (For a detailed analysis of postwar resettlement problems of the Biharis and other minority groups, see memorandum dated December 10, 1971, “India/Pakistan: Refugee Problems.” Longer-range requirements, and the nature and degree of our participation in such an effort, will depend upon the current UN assessment of rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh and on our future political relationship with the government in Dacca. UN Secretary-General Waldheim has told US that the UN envisages very substantial requirements of a kind that will require some kind of international Consortium approach. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Attachment Joint Recommendations undated HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AID TO SOUTH ASIA Background and Rationale BANGLADESH 1. Previous U.S. Role Humanitarian relief committed to the UNEPRO-directed relief effort in Bangladesh since March 1971 totaled approximately $180 million, of which about $140 million was from the United States. Relief shipments, including those from the United States, were disrupted by the hostilities, and the net amount of relief assistance which actually arrived in the East was approximately $90 million. Some 725,000 tons of U.S. PL–480 foodgrain and edible oil worth approximately $75 million remains unshipped. 2. Current UN Planning The United Nations is now mobilizing a new field relief operation (UN Relief Operation Dacca—UNROD) and is conducting an assessment of relief and rehabilitation needs. Their findings have not been made known except in a most preliminary fashion. Any United States commitments to support relief programs in Bangladesh would necessarily be conditional upon a careful assessment of such estimates. Mr. Paul Marc Henry, the resident director of UNROD in Dacca, estimates that the number of displaced persons in Bangladesh may total 20 million, including the refugees in India. Of the latter, GOI figures as of January 19 indicated that four million had already recrossed the border. The Department’s Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs estimates the cost of offering minimal assistance, including food, to the returning refugees inside Bangladesh as about $40 million for the next three months. The UNSYG is expected to make a new inter-national appeal for contributions to relief efforts in Bangladesh some time in early February. His appeal will be directed to all U.N. members, including the East Bloc, and apparently will en-compass a one-year program of rehabilitation for U.S. FY 1973. 3. U.S. Response We have not yet made any new commitment to the U.N. effort in Bangladesh. However, we told Bhutto when he was here in December that we would expect to be involved in any new international relief effort in the East. He said he understood but hoped we would do it in a way that would not complicate his own negotiation efforts with Mujib. When the U.N. Secretary General’s appeal is made, our response should be in conjunction with firm commitments of other contributors, including the Soviet Union, in order to ensure that we do not assume a preponderant share of the burden. We will generally rely on the U.N. to establish, on the basis of its assessment, what constitutes bona fide humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh. This task is complicated by the fact that India and the Soviet Union will most likely be providing assistance to Bangladesh directly, making it difficult to equate contributions made through the U.N. with what others are doing bilaterally. There will be a distinct advantage in channeling some of our assistance to U.S. voluntary agencies which are continuing to work in Bangladesh. These activities are justifiable for their humanitarian content but can also assist in providing an interim American presence in the area until such time as an official relationship is feasible. 4. Immediate Relief Requirements We estimate that Bangladesh will need to import one and one-half to two million tons of foodgrains on a concessional basis over the next 12 months. The requirements for other forms of relief assistance are not known but are bound to be enormous. It is not clear how much of the food requirement will be met from India and under what terms. We know that some food is now being shipped overland from Calcutta. This is encouraging because of the inability of Bangladesh ports to handle all of the import requirements. We can also expect Canada, U.K. and other countries to provide some food aid as they have done in the past. A U.S. contribution of up to 725,000 metric tons of foodgrain and oil (valued at $75 million) would meet an estimated one-third of the total import requirements of food over the next 12 months. Food aid also has special relevance to the immediate rehabilitation requirements of Bangladesh. Commodities sold through ration shops generate the funds required for rehabilitation, labor-intensive public works projects, and increase the purchasing power which is at a precariously low level. The critical need for such employment-generating rehabilitation projects has been underscored by U.N. representatives in the field. 5. Rehabilitation Program Bangladesh is also faced with a pressing need to rebuild roads, bridges, ports, and other communication and transportation links requiring both local currency expenditures (which could be met in part by food sales as noted above), as well as commodity imports utilizing foreign exchange. India has announced a grant of the equivalent of $35 million worth of cement, steel, and other commodities in addition to a $12 million loan in sterling. The USSR has announced that it will supply cotton for the local textile industry and will assist Bangladesh to revive the jute industry upon which the economy largely depends for foreign exchange. We will want to participate in U. N. (and possible IBRD) discussions on longer-range rehabilitation requirements in Bangladesh, but, under present circumstances, we should plan to hold our pledges of non-food aid to 30 to 35 percent of the verifiable total from all donors. At the time that our future political relationships in the area become clear, we should (a) first consider what actions we can or should take to resume our own presently suspended development projects in East Pakistan, and (b) then consider, if the policy framework is propitious, increasing our share commensurate with the level of needs and the amount of assistance given by other aid donors. INDIA 1. GOI Planning On January 20, the UNHCR received an aide memoire from the Government of India stating that as of December 31, 1971, the GOI had expended $320 million on direct relief aid, exclusive of indirect support offered by voluntary agencies. (The U.S. contribution is approximately $100 million, almost all of which has been shipped.) The note added that the GOI has already contributed $6.7 million in foodgrains to Bangladesh and expects to have to make additional expenditures of about $60 million primarily for food for the first three months of 1972 to take care of remaining East Pakistani refugees and to give returning refugees minimal support prior to departure from camps. This is in addition to the costs of repatriation which are estimated at another $55 million. The total cost of what India has contributed to Bangladesh and expects to incur for food and repatriation is $122.0 million. 2. UNHCR Soliciting Support The UNHCR has again solicited international support for the latest program of relief for refugees still in India based on the GOI aide memoire. The U.S. will wish to make a positive response to this appeal. To do other-wise would disassociate the U.S. from a successful inter-national humanitarian relief effort in which we have played a leading role. Our recommended position is that the U.S. plan to contribute 30 to 35 percent of the requirements for refugees in India in commodities to be provided through the UNHCR, and that we announce an initial commodity contribution of $10 million. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Confidential. Signed in S/S for Eliot by Robert T. Curran. This memorandum was considered by the SRG at its meeting on February 1. The minutes of the January 19 and February 1 SRG meetings are Documents 210 and 220 . Issues relating to South Asia were discussed in both meetings, but the latter was devoted largely to a discussion of humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh. 390. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath 390. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath 1 Washington, February 2, 1972 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I was very pleased to have your message conveying your impressions of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and your thoughts on the recognition of Bangladesh. Your people have kept us up to date on your government’s views since your letter was written, and I believe you know generally how our thinking is evolving. Mujib’s return to Dacca has had a significant impact on the situation in the East. We share your view that it is in our interest to bolster his hand against extremists. We are examining our own position on recognition but will want to defer any decision until we have a clearer picture of how it will relate to the broader situation in South Asia. Principally, we must consider how our recognition will affect a number of basic factors in the subcontinent, including the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and India; the future relationship between Islamabad and its former Eastern wing; and the question of how the Indo-Pakistani issues growing out of the war will be settled. When we talked with President Bhutto here in December, we found him to be quite realistic about the situation in the East. Nonetheless, he said he would need a little time to see what basis remained for a future relationship with Dacca and he hoped that we would bear this in mind in our own actions. The situation has now changed considerably with Mujib’s return and the statements he has made, and we are, of course, taking this into account in our continuing examination of the recognition question and other issues. But we will not want to complicate unduly any progress toward an understanding which they might achieve. We are most interested in keeping in close touch with you on your talks with Bhutto, and you can be sure that we will keep you advised on our own talks with him and on our thinking as it develops. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to London on February 3 in telegram 19242 for delivery to Heath. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH) The United Kingdom was among eight countries that recognized Bangladesh on February 4. (Telegram 429 from Dacca, February 5; ibid.) 391. Telegram 1113 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 391. Telegram 1113 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 3, 1972, 1725Z Subject: Bhutto’s Suggestion for Early USG Recognition of Bangladesh 1. Summary: Pres Bhutto has suggested that USG should move soon to regularize its position in Dacca. He believes we should establish contact with Mujib without delay and inform him of our intention to recognize Bangladesh shortly. From Bhutto’s point of view, Feb 20 would be appropriate date for USG to announce recognition of Bangladesh. He believes such step would be helpful in context of Mujib’s own problems and anticipated Indo-Pak negotiations on problems resulting from recent war. Bhutto suggests that we could tell GOI that GOP recognition of Bangladesh would follow in course of Indo-Pak negotiations. I believe Bhutto’s proposal is statesmanlike and merits our support. Action requested: Early indication of USG reaction to Bhutto’s proposal so that I may inform him; if our reaction is favorable, issuance of necessary instructions for follow-up in Dacca and New Delhi. End summary 2. When Pres Bhutto reached me on diplomatic receiving line at airport on his return to Rawalpindi from Peking yesterday evening (Feb 2), he said he would want to see me soon. Pursuant to call from his office this morning, I met with Bhutto at presidential residential residence at 1700 local Feb 3 for an hour. MFA SecGen Aziz Ahmed and FonSec Sultan Khan were also present. Bhutto said he first wanted to tell me something about visit to Peking (will be reported septel). Then he referred to our conversation of Jan 29 regarding third-country recognition of Bangladesh and his desire meet with Mujib (Islamabad 925 and 926). as Hehhad told me then, he wanted to come back to those matters, including particularly question of US relations with Bangladesh after his return from China. 3. In his discussions with Chou en-Lai and other Chinese leaders this week, relationship with east wing had of course come up. Chinese had been very understanding. They had said they were prepared to proceed along same general lines as GOP to extent Bhutto wished. Chou had said specifically that China would wish be guided by Bhutto’s views on recognizing Bangla Desh. Although China had interest in developments in Bangladesh it could afford to get along without an Ambassador in Dacca if that was Bhutto’s desire. Chou had said that Chinese would, in that case, be prepared to use other resources available to them within Bangladesh, implying reliance on pro-Chinese elements. 4. Bhutto said he was very much aware and deeply appreciative of understanding which USG had shown him at this critical time. He acknowledged specifically our declared intention not to cause unnecessary problems for him over recognition issue. As he had told me in our last meeting, he would not wish USG position in subcontinent, where we had a very important role to play, to be damaged over Bangladesh recognition. 5. Bhutto said that time was now close at hand when he thought it would be appropriate for USG to revise its position on Bangladesh recognition. British and Germans would be announcing recognition the next day (Feb 4) and presumably large number of other countries would also do so at same time or soon thereafter. He appreciated that USG would suffer if we lagged too far behind. An active USG presence was needed in Bangladesh. In this connection, positive USG presence was also needed in India to help sort out some serious problems in aftermath of recent war. I said I agreed fully with views he had just expressed, which seemed to me most statesmanlike. I noted that some of our people had expressed concern over our ability to maintain consular office in Dacca over an extended period without recognizing Bangladesh; meanwhile, out of concern to avoid any implication of recognition, our representatives in Dacca had been instructed to eschew contacts with Bangladesh officials; for example, USG had no contact whatsoever with Mujib. 6. Bhutto said he was grateful for effort we had made to avoid embarrassing him on this matter. He believed time had now come when we could and should revise our position and move toward early recognition Bangladesh. Meanwhile, he did not see why, if we wished, our Consul General in Dacca could not forthwith be authorized to expand his contacts up to and specifically including contacts with Mujib. If USG were willing to make decision to recognize Bangladesh in fairly near future, Bhutto thought it would be helpful if our Consul General were authorized to tell Mujib very soon that we were planning early recognition. That should preserve USG position until recognition accorded, and should also permit American officials in Dacca to play more normal role generally in advance of recognition. 7. Mujib needs American help, Bhutto went on, as he has terrible problems. He is basically a moderate man, although as politician he has been inclined to keep one step ahead of the extremists in his party. He will probably want to keep ahead of the extremists in future, Bhutto said, but fundamentally he is not extremist himself. In this general connection Bhutto said he believed that US can be more helpful to Mujib than anyone else. Despite Soviet prodding on subject of GOP relations with Bangladesh, Bhutto said, he had not spoken to Soviets at all along positive lines which he was now discussing with me regarding our relations with Mujib. 8. I asked Bhutto at this point if he had any particular time frame in mind. He responded that he thought USG might not want to follow with recognition of Bangladesh immediately on heels of countries which will be announcing recognition on Feb 4 or next few days. On other hand, he did not see, from his point of view at least, why USG would want to delay more than couple of weeks. He then commented that he expected to be announcing land reform measures on Feb 20. He thought that announcement of USG recognition of Bangladesh might be appropriate at that time because, among other things, attention here would be on land. This would tend to minimze likelihood of any adverse criticism of USG action among public here. (Implication of this part of discussion was that we could expect Bhutto’s sympathetic assistance if needed to dampen such criticism.) 9. SecGen Aziz Ahmed interjected that we might ask GOI to withdraw army before USG recognition of Bangladesh. Bhutto shook his head and said he did not agree. He did not mind if Indian Army remained in the east for some time longer. 10. I asked Bhutto if he could give me some indication of his approach to question of Bangladesh recognition by GOP itself. He said he was thinking that GOP recognition would be taken up in context of Indo-Pak negotiations to resolve problems left from war. He sugguested that USG could tell GOI that GOP decision to recognize Bangladesh would follow in couse of Indian negotiation with Pakistan. But it would be disadvantageous for GOP to announce recognition before beginning negotiations with India, as some in GOI had been demanding. If GOP came to negotiating table after having already recognized Bangladesh, Bhutto said, India would be in advantageous position permitting it to deal with Pakistan from even greater strength. 11. Bhutto said has basic interest in forthcoming negotiations with India lay in getting back the Pakistani POWs. (He agreed with Aziz Ahmed’s suggestion that GOP also had very strong interest in getting back West Pak civilian officials now in Indian hands.) Bhutto suggested that we might at some appropriate early time say to Mujib that there was no point in india’s holding on to the POWs. 12. I asked Bhutto how he approached question of likely Indian interest, during negotiations, in “rectifications” along ceasefire line in Kashmir, as had already been stipulated by some Indian leaders. FonSec Sultan Khan commented that, in his opinion, some of Pakistan’s positions which had been taken over by Indian forces were of substantial importance; he mentioned heights in Kargil region that that connection. Bhutto said that India’s demand for changes along ceasefire line was one reason why he did not want to be at disadvantage by recognizing Bangladesh before beginning negotiations with GOI. He recalled that Swaran Singh had reqeusted ceasefire-line rectifications during Indo-Pak discussions in late 1962 and early 1963, and that Pakistan had rejected them at that time. Bhutto said he could not be put in position where India would be nibbling away at Pakistan’s side of ceasefire line. He had enough problems as it was in coping with Pakistan’s many needs, and it would be unreasonable for him to have to take on any Indian demand to weaken Pakistan’s position along ceasefire line. Recalling his discussions with me in past several months, Bhutto said he was serious about moving from confrontation with India, but he could not be expected to retreat from ceasefire line. 13. I recalled having discussed with Bhutto last week the question of his readiness to meet Mujib. I had noted that Sino-Pak communique issued Feb 2 had quoted Bhutto as maintaining that negotiations between Mujib and himself should take place but only after Indian forces withdrew from East Pakistan. I wondered how the advance in Bhutto’s position, as reflected in our discussion today, related to his readiness to meet Mujib. Bhutto said that he was ready to meet Mujib “on neutral grounds, as soon as possible.” Specifically, he hoped way could be found to get Indians to tell Mujib that he should meet with Bhutto soonest. This specifically included meeting before Indian forces withdrew from the east to their own territory. 14. I told Bhutto I appreciated his initiative in suggesting way in which he believed USG could move in positive way at this time of crisis in subcontinent. I took his suggestion as reflecting his desire to “turn over new page” in Pak-US relations and to move to a more stable and peaceful situation in subcontinent. I said I was certain his suggestion would be received with considerable interest in Washington. To be perfectly sure of my position, I said, I wanted to confirm that it was Bhutto’s intention that course he outlined to me should be put up to USG as representing his own assessment of what USG could usefully do on this particular subject. Bhutto affirmed that this was indeed his intention and said he hoped it would receive careful attention of Pres Nixon and Secretary of State. I said I would report our meeting and his proposal promptly. Various considerations had to be taken into account, but I hoped to be able to report Washington reaction soon. 15. Comment: One thing that is perfectly clear from this discussion is that Bhutto has in fact given up hope of preserving some political link with “East Pakistan” and that he has accepted the reality of Bangladesh. I believe he has been moving toward that position for some time. It now appears that he may have wanted to check the matter out with Chinese and get their general blessing before moving further. (He himself recalled to me having asked British HiComer to request HMG to wait on recognition decision until after Bhutto returned from Peking.) In my opinion, Bhutto’s suggestion for our moving to regularize our position in Dacca and to announce reasonably early recognition of Bangladesh is statesmanlike and merits our support. I believe the course which he proposes is in American interest. From this vantage point, it seems we have opportunity not only of accommodating to suggestion of Pakistani chief of state, but also helping to retrieve our position in Bangladesh as well as in India. 16. I hope I can be authorized to give Bhutto report of (hopefully positive) USG reaction in near future. If we decide to move along course he suggests, appropriate instructions should be issued to our Consul General in Dacca to initiate contact with Mujib. Embassy Delhi should also, in that case, be informed appropriately. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 392. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 392. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 4, 1972, 10:34 p.m. P: What’s the dope today? K: Nothing of very great significance. Bhutto has indicated he has no objection to our recognizing Bangla Desh. I think we should hold up on that until you talk to Chou. It would give you an opportunity to show how much you take them into consideration. P: Sure. Either that or send them a message asking what they think about our doing that. K: Well, it’s only two weeks away. I think we can handle it. P: That’s not a big issues. K: No, and you can make points on it with the Chinese. Do it after you’re back and it will show our compatibility with the Chinese. But it means we ought to be able to do it in March. [Omitted here is conversation that does not relate to Bangladesh.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. 393. Letter From the Ambassador of Pakistan (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers 393. Letter From the Ambassador of Pakistan (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 7, 1972 My dear Mr. Secretary of State, The President of Pakistan has asked me to convey the following message to President Richard M. Nixon : BEGINS : Your Excellency, I am addressing you on a humanitarian matter of great urgency which is causing utmost distress to my Government and people. This concerns the safety and security of hundreds of thousands of non-Bengalis including women and children whose very existence in East Pakistan is threatened as a result of planned retaliation and reprisals by armed personnel. Following the occupation of East Pakistan by the Indian forces in December 1971 a reign of terror was let loose against the non-Bengalis particularly the Biharis in Mirpur and Mohammadpur localities of Dacca involving several hundred thousand persons for many days. The beleaguered residents of these areas were denied essentials of life to the extent of even stopping milk for infants. Soon after his return to Dacca Sheikh Mujibur Rahman gave the assurance that everyone in East Pakistan including the non-Bengalis would receive full protection and that their lives and properties would be safeguarded. We welcomed this statement. However, it is a matter of great anguish that the armed personnel in East Pakistan are committing savage atrocities on the non-Bengali residents in Dacca and other places in East Pakistan particularly Chittagong and Jessore. Incidents of brutality including rocket and mortar attacks on the unarmed Biharis have been reported by neutral observers. The International Red Cross teams have been refused access to the affected localities which are without food, medicines and water. These unfortunate people are now living in a state of extreme terror, helplessness and starvation. They have issued desperate appeals to the international community for relief and succour. Your Excellency in view of the over-riding humanitarian considerations and to avoid further bloodshed of innocent people I request your personal intervention with the Indian Government whose forces are still in East Pakistan and with the elected leaders in East Pakistan for the safety and security of the non-Bengali community. As parties to the United Nations Charter and in accord with the Geneva Conventions definite responsibilities devolve on all the countries to move in and to take active cognisance of and to stop the atrocities and killings of innocent people. Your prompt and positive contribution towards this end would not only earn the gratitude of the Government and the people of Pakistan but would also serve the greater cause of humanity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. ENDS. I will be grateful if you could kindly transmit the above message to its high destination. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLA DESH. Immediate; no further classification marking. Forwarded under a covering memorandum by Eliot to Kissinger on February 8. (Ibid.) On February 10 the Department instructed Sober to acknowledge receipt of the message and to inform Bhutto that the United States shared his concern and was watching the situation closely. Sober responded on February 11 that he had done so. (Telegrams 23379 to Islamabad and 1364 from Islamabad, respectively; ibid., SOC 14 BANGLA DESH) 394. Telegram 1374 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 394. Telegram 1374 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 11, 1972, 1200Z Subject: Bangladesh Recognition Ref: Islamabad 1113, State 21111 1. During meeting with Pres. Bhutto in Karachi evening Feb 10, I said I wanted him to know that his views on timing US recognition Bangladesh were under high-level USG review. He said he was glad to hear that. He then went on to say that his own timing on announcement land reform has slipped from Feb 20 date he had previously given me. He noted there will be a flurry of visitors here during latter part Feb, including Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Ardeshir Zahedi (former Iranian FonMin) and Princess Ashraf. He had decided that land reform announcement would have to be delayed and he was now thinking in terms of first week of March. After brief allusion to local press coverage that morning of Dr. Kissinger’s remarks to press on Bangladesh (Islamabad 1317), Bhutto said he thought short delay beyond Feb 20 on US recognition of Bangladesh would also suit USG. He thought, for example, Chinese might appreciate it if USG announcement of recognition were delayed until after Pres. Nixon’s visit to Peking, especially if Chinese were informed of our plans in advance of announcement. Meanwhile, Bhutto said, he saw no reason why we should not go ahead and establish early contact with Mujib and indicate our intentions to him. 2. I said I would report his comments promptly. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 395. Telegram 26863 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 395. Telegram 26863 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, February 15, 1972, 2356Z SUBJECT: Policy Guidance for SVG Meeting on Bangladesh Relief REF: (a) USUN 539; (b) USUN 508; (c) USUN 501 1. We understand that at February 16 meeting SYG is expected to announce appeal by United Nations for immediate relief aid to Bangladesh of magnitude over $600 million, of which 90 percent food imports. 2. If opportunity arises suggest you speak along following lines: (1) We are pleased to note what is obviously a comprehensive assessment of humanitarian needs of people of Bangladesh and (2) we welcome the role of the United Nations as a coordinator of humanitarian relief activities. You should also draw on language of President’s report to Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy in 1970’s in which he notes that QTE Our relief effort in East Bengal will continue. The authorities face the grim challenge of creating a viable political structure and economy in one of the most impoverished—and now newly devastated—areas of the world. We have never been hostile to Bengali aspirations. Our aid program in the 1960’s increasingly concentrated on development in East Bengal. We provided two-thirds of the world’s emergency aid to the province in 1971. We would expect other nations to bear a proportionate share of that responsibility in the future, but as the United States strengthens new relationships in Asia, we have no intention of ignoring these 70 million people. ENDQTE 3. You may also state that we will be able to indicate our initial response to the UN appeal after we have had an opportunity to study the UN assessment. We hope and expect other governments will respond generously to this international effort to alleviate humanitarian suffering. 4. FYI. We prefer to defer for the moment any announcement regarding form and content of our initial support of UN relief effort. END 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); cleared in NEA by Laingen, and Schneider, M. Kathleen Bell (IO/UNP), Frank Wiesner (S/R); and approved by Van Hollen. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, and New Delhi. The policy guidance conditioned USUN’s response to Waldheim’s appeal. (Telegram 617 from USUN, February 18; ibid.) 396. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 396. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 16, 1972 SUBJECT: US Recognition of “Bangladesh” You have asked for a possible timetable for US recognition of “Bangladesh.” This memo sets forth the major considerations related to the timing of such a decision and to the interim steps that could be taken to buy the necessary time. As you know, President Bhutto after his return from Peking told our Charge in Islamabad that he feels we should make official contact with the Bangladesh authorities, including Mujib, without delay and extend formal recognition soon, perhaps in early March. Bhutto said he does not want our position in “Bangladesh” or in India to be damaged any further by the recognition issue. He feels that we have a useful role to play in both places and that Mujib needs American help if he is to stay one step ahead of his extremists. The passage of time has reduced the purely legal questions involved in recognition. With the return of Mujib to Dacca, the government began to act like a coherent body, and there seems to be a chain of authority reaching into the countryside either through bureaucratic or Awami League channels. It has now been announced that the Indian army (about 25,000 troops) will be withdrawn by March 25. For the moment, the Indian army is generally keeping in the background, rendering assistance especially in keeping order and in facilitating the return of refugees. The government is financially weak, but professes readiness to assume its international legal obligations. Recognition by over thirty nations indicates a growing international consensus that Bangladesh is functioning as a state. There were initially three main considerations in delaying our recognition: —President Bhutto when he was here in December asked for a month to begin sorting himself out. He has now had almost two months and has himself suggested that we recognize. —We did not want to move too quickly in blessing the fruits of India’s action. However, one could argue now that this is perhaps properly handled in the pace with which we rebuild our relationship with India rather than in our relationship with Bangladesh since our argument is with the Indians rather than the Bengalis. In any case, Indian troops are scheduled to be withdrawn by March 25. —Having told the Chinese at earlier steps how we planned to proceed and having cooperated through the crisis at the United Nations, we judged that it would be appropriate to explain our thinking to the Chinese before changing our course, especially since your trip was so close. Once the China trip is behind us, most of the foregoing considerations will have run one phase in their course, and longer-term considerations will come into play with regard to our relations with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These would seem to be: —As Bhutto himself has pointed out, the US can have an important role in providing Bangladesh with an alternative to dependence on India and the Soviet Union. Some dependence on India in the intermediate future seems built into the situation but the Bengalis seem interested in moving away from that. The Soviets will make the most of the opportunity, and the present Bengali leadership has no particular interest in being overly dependent on them. —Now that Pakistan has split, the Chinese can have the best of both worlds. Having supported West Pakistan during the conflict, China can now move to increase its influence among the more radical elements in Bangladesh. Whereas US and Chinese interests were parallel during the 1971 crisis, China will presumably have an interest now in increasing Bengali radicalism in the hope that it will spill over into West Bengal and weaken India. The US, on the other hand, will have an interest in greater stability. —Pakistan, as Bhutto said, will have an interest in cultivating a friendly Bangladesh as a potential counter to India. The Bengalis may recognize a reciprocal need. In light of all these factors, it might be logical to time US recognition to coincide with final withdrawal of Indian troops the third week in March—a decent period after your return from China. If that were to be our timing, the problem would then become one of buying time until then. Some or all of the following steps could be taken to buy that time: —Your Foreign Policy Report and the comments made in connection with it already provide some hint of our moving away from our present posture. —Our spokesmen can change their public posture on recognition. Previously they were instructed to say that recognition is “not under active consideration.” Now they can say that we will be considering recognition next month. —Our Consul General in Dacca could be instructed to see the Foreign Minister to inform him of steps we are taking to provide food assistance through the United Nations. The mere fact of his seeking out the Foreign Minister would have implications to the Bengalis. —If then it is still necessary to buy a bit more time, we could instruct the Consul General in early March to seek out Mujib and discuss with him the policy of the Bangladesh government before returning to Washington for consultations on recognition. This week we should inform Bhutto of the elements in our timing so that he will know that we have not ignored his suggestion. RECOMMENDATION : That you approve in principle recognition about the third week in March and that you approve steps such as those outlined above to buy the necessary time between now and then. Approve Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. 397. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 397. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 16, 1972 SUBJECT: Humanitarian Assistance for Bangladesh As you know, we agreed in late December to provide Pakistan with PL 480 assistance as a form of postwar budgetary support. Shortly, the UN will tell us of requirements in Bangladesh. The Senior Review Group had discussed what the share and quantity of our participation should be, and we would now appreciate your guidance. There are three general issues in connection with the UN effort: (1) What share of the total international effort should the US assume responsibility for? (2) What quantities of assistance should we commit? (3) What financial support should we provide for UN administrative costs? With your views on these, we can sort out the details as they come up. The US Share The SRG considers that the US share should not be more than about one-third of the UN effort. The actual amount and percentage can be determined when we see what the UN concludes the needs may be. We certainly do not want to be in a position of an open-ended commitment. The practical problem with announcing a specific limit derives from two factors: (1) The US has a much greater capacity because of our food resources to contribute grain than other contributors, so there is an argument for a low share for financial contributions but perhaps a higher share of contributions in kind. (2) Tying ourselves too rigidly to a strict share publicly could put us in a position later where we would be refusing to feed starving people because others would not contribute. The experience during the Indian famine years of 1965 and 1966 was that the US agreed to match other contributions but then had to ignore its own formula in the end because the quantities became so great that only the US could respond. There are two ways to handle the computation of a share: (1) We could say that we will give one-third of the total international contribution. (2) Or we could agree to provide one-third of the total requirement as judged by the international community. The latter would give us greater flexibility. We could pace our contributions to go along with the contributions of others, but we would not be tightly restricted by them at any given time if we chose not to be. RECOMMENDATION : That you approve in principle US contributions in the multilateral effort of 33 1/3 per cent of the total international contributions. If we decide later to make a larger contribution, we can always do so. The Quantity The US had in the pipeline before the war some 725,000 tons (about $75 million) committed to the UN relief effort in East Pakistan. Some of this was already formally committed; other quantities were simply earmarked on our own books. Now the UN has asked us to release 175,000 tons, the amount formally committed to the UN effort before the war. Of course, the situation has changed, and these figures are cited only to note the background with the UN and what is available within our own programming. RECOMMENDATIONS : (1) For internal planning purposes, that we keep ourselves in a position to contribute 33 1/3% of the internationally judged requirement up to 725,000 tons of grain, the amount which had been previously earmarked for release in this area. (2) For the time-being, however, that we release only 175,000 tons as our 33 1/3% share in the context of substantial contributions by others. Financial Support Before the war we committed $2 million to the financial support of the UN operation in East Pakistan. Some $300,000 of that remains unspent, but the situation, of course, is changed. The SRG decided that we could hold off for a short time because others were making contributions and the UN did not need the money immediately. However, the feeling was that it would be appropriate to commit this eventually provided it were clearly within the range of our 33 1/3% share. RECOMMENDATION : That the US provide this $300,000 in financial support when it is clearly within the framework of a 33 1/3% share. US Voluntary Agencies There is one additional question apart from the multilateral framework. Bilateral aid is not an issue before recognition, and even after recognition is a matter for political decision. However, some private US voluntary agencies like CARE, Catholic Relief, Church World Service have been operating alongside UN agencies in East Bengal. The normal practice is for AID to provide small amounts of assistance to those agencies, partly in the form of help in buying and shipping specialized foods such as those needed in child nutrition programs. RECOMMENDATION : That you authorize continued assistance to the US voluntary agencies working in Bangladesh apart from the multilateral effort. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Box CL 210, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of all of the recommendations. On February 17 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers that conveyed the decisions approved by the President. (Ibid.) The SRG discussion Kissinger referred to took place on February 1. For a record of the discussion, see Document 220 . 398. Memorandum For the Record by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) 398. Memorandum For the Record by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) 1 Washington, February 22, 1972 General Haig called this morning to relay the following message from the Presidential party with regard to the issue of Bangladesh recognition: 1. Nothing should be done regarding the recognition issue before the return of the Presidential party. 2. Contacts with Bangladesh officials should be held to a minimum. 3. Any such contacts should be only related to relief questions. Robert H. Miller 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Top Secret; Nodis. 399. Telegram 1675 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 399. Telegram 1675 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, February 22, 1972, 1110Z Subj: Bangladesh Recognition Ref: Islamabad 1113 and 1374 1. Summary: Bhutto has suggested that we might wish to delay any announcement on Bangladesh recognition until March 17. End summary 2. FonSec Sultan Khan called me in Feb 22 and said he had been asked by Pres Bhutto to convey to me a recent thought on timing of US recognition of Bangladesh. Fon Sec said Bhutto had stressed that he was in no way going back on views he had expressed in our previous conversations this subject. They had noted Pres Nixon’s statement at Feb 10 press conference to effect that US decision on recognition should not be expected before Pres’ return from China. That meant that we would not be recognizing Bangladesh at least until some time in March. 3. Since Bhutto’s conversations with me this subject, FonSec went on, there had been announcement by Sheikh Mujib and Mrs. Gandhi that Indian forces would be withdrawn from Bangladesh by March 25. That had been superseded by later announcement that Indian forces would be withdrawn by March 17 when Mrs. Gandhi is to visit Dacca. 4. FonSec said Bhutto would like us to consider whether it would not be desirable to withhold any USG announcement on recognition until March 17. At earliest. Our announcement could then be linked with withdrawl of Indian troops and, in that context, would receive easier public acceptance in Pakistan. 5. FonSec then reiterated that Bhutto was in no way going back on his earlier suggestion to us and that he would find it “perfectly acceptable” if we felt we should go ahead and announce recognition prior to March 17. If decision to that effect had already communicated its intentions to interested parties, Bhutto wanted us to know that that was all right with him. 6. FonSec stated there was no change whatsoever from position which Bhutto had communicated to me regarding our establishing contact with Bangladesh officials. Specifically, this included telling Mujib directly, as soon as we were ready to do so, of our intention to recognize Bangladesh at an early date. 7. In answer his query, I told FonSec I did not know whether recognition question would come up in Pres Nixon’s talks in Peking. I said that I would, in any event, report promptly message which Bhutto had now conveyed through FonSec. 8. Comment: Assuming we may wish to accommodate to Bhutto on latest suggestion on timing, especially if firm decision that point not yet taken, desirability of our informing Mujib of our intentions at an early date merits careful consideration. Sober 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 400. Telegram TOHAK 111 from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 400. Telegram TOHAK 111 from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 23, 1972, 2313Z Subject: Mujib’S Visit to USSR Attached is Dacca 0642 in which SPIVACK requests authority to enter into “broad-ranging exchange of views” with Mujib prior to Mujib’S February 29 visit to Moscow. I discussed this with Under Secretary Irwin to ensure that it does not repeat not take place. In this regard the following scenario will occur with respect to this and related issue: 1. We are moving urgently this week on PL 480 for Pakistan and will inform Bhutto as soon as necessary action is completed but not later than the end of this week. 2. We are informing the United Nations tonight or early tomorrow morning of our decision to proceed with humanitarian aid for Bangladesh under formula you approved, with caution that UN should hold proposed U.S. action closely. (Irwin believes this can be done with good assurances of success.) 3. On Monday the Department of Agriculture will make a very low-key announcement to the effect that we are proceeding with humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh within the aproved formula. 4. State will reply to Dacca 0642 (attached) by denying Spivack authority to meet with Mujib on any subject. In lieu of this they will instruct him to inform Bangladesh Foreign Office on Monday of U.S. decision with respect to humanitarian assistance. 5. Warm regards. End page one 1. According to our best information BD PriMin Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is planning to depart Dacca for Moscow on Feb 29 for official visit, duration not yet disclosed. 2. Several of our recent messages have called attention to intensive and apparently well-financed Soviet effort in BD to establish strong position vis-à-vis both govt and general public. Delegation after delegation has arrived in Dacca from USSR, and intensive publicity campaign utilizing all available media appears designed to present USSR as staunch friend, supporters and aid-giver to BD. 3. It is therefore logical to assume that Mujib will be given full red carpet treatment in USSR in an effort to impress him with Soviet accomplishments, Soviet goodwill, and Soviet capabilities. Mujib for all of his charisma in Bengali terms and his udoubted personal shrewdness has had little experience in international affairs at high level. His travels abroad have been limited and probably insufficient to provide basis of comparison which would enable him to place what he sees in USSR in proper perspective or to resist flattering impact of high-level Soviet blandishments. 4. There is obviously little we can do at this late date to provide Mujib with bench marks against which he can measure what he will see in USSR. Moreover it now appears that his visit will take place before US recognition and before any American official has had opportunity to talk seriously with him about world affairs and about American policies and intentions. Even though we may assume that British, Australian, and other Western European visitors and contacts have discussed world wide problems and conditions with him, there would still appear to be a need at this particular juncture for some signal to Mujib of US views and interests. 5. I strongly urge therefore that I be authorized seek interview with Mujib in most private conditions possible for frank and broad-ranging exchange of views with him. If Dept judges such approach worthwhile I would also appreciate outline of points I can make and guidance as to what I can tell him about US views of developments and prospects in Asia and US intentions re BD. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Exdis. Sent to Howe for Kissinger. Also numbered WH 20460. Telegram 642 from Dacca is also ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BANGLA DESH. 401. Telegram HAKTO 11 From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 401. Telegram HAKTO 11 From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Peking, February 24, 1972, 0205Z 1. With reference to your message (TOHAK 111) on Bangladesh, your control of situation is greatly appreciated. It is now even more essential that we do nothing since we have reached a general understanding here that will enable us to follow our general game plan but only if we sit absolutely tight until Indian troops are withdrawn. (Please protect strictly.) [Omitted here are two paragraphs that do not relate to Bangladesh.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Also numbered WHP 77. 402. Telegram 32170 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 402. Telegram 32170 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 1 Washington, February 25, 1972, 0234Z REF: (a) Islamabad 1113 (b) Islamabad 2101 (c) Dacca 438 (d) Islamabad 1675 SUBJECT: Recognition of Bangladesh Please pass to Secretary of State Rogers 1. We continue have under active study Bhutto’s suggestion that we move toward normalization of our relations with Bangladesh regime. Charge should tell Bhutto that matter will be reviewed at appropriate time after President returns from Peking and that Bhutto’s latest views on timing (reftel d) will be weighed carefully. 2. For ConGen Spivack: For time being you should take no action with Mujib or others in GOBD on Bangladesh recognition. We assume Mujib is aware President’s comments on this subject in February 10 press conference, in which President said that we have under study our whole relationship with the Subcontinent but that with regard to recognition a decision should not be expected prior to the time his return from China. In same press conference, however, and again in his foreign policy report to Congress President pointed out that our support for UN relief effort in East Bengal would continue and that “as the US strengthens new relationships in Asia, we have no intention of ignoring these 70 million people.” If queried, you should stick with above. 3. For immediate future, you should continue keep your contacts with GOBD to minimum. However you are authorized to convey to GOBD, at level below Mujib you believe best, first steps we are taking (in spirit President’s comments above) in response to UNSYG’s appeal for humanitarian relief. These include (details septels) release 175,000 tons wheat and rice, $300,000 cash grant for UN administrative costs, and grants of $3 million and $650,000 to Catholic Relief Services and CARE respectively in support their housing demonstration and construction programs Bangladesh. In addition, as indicated State 80216, we have provided $50,000 to IRC in support operating expenses Cholera Research Lab and we have under active study what additional support might be desirable to insure continued operation this important humanitarian activity. 4. We have not yet made public announcement these actions but expect to do so (in very low key way) shortly. You should convey above information to GOBD no sooner rpt no sooner than February 28 but as early as possible on that date. FYI: Operating guidelines for our role in UN relief effort is that we will keep our contributions in low key and that actions to date and such later contributions as we decide make will be kept within policy framework of roughly one-third contribution to total international effort. (This fraction is not repeat not for disclosure or communication to other governments.) END FYI. 5. We have considered your suggestion (Dacca 642) that you be authorized seek private interview with Mujib for broad exchange of views prior his departure for Moscow but have concluded timing inappropriate. However, timing and nature your lower-level briefing of GOBD on our relief contributions cited above should be significant in helping meet general objectives you cite in your message. You should ask that information be relayed to Mujib. 6. For Charge: You should inform Bhutto or appropriate GOP official of foregoing decisions on relief, noting that Bhutto has consistently recognized need for US support of UN relief program and that this consistent also with his own action releasing rice surplus for Bangladesh. END Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Islamabad and to Rogers in Peking as Tosec 102. Repeated to New Delhi and to the White House communication center. Drafted by Laingen, Van Hollen, and Sisco; cleared by Schneider, Williams, and in substance with Haig; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. 403. Telegram 689 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 403. Telegram 689 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, February 26, 1972, 1040Z Subject: Government of Bangladesh Desire for Statement of US Government Intentions 1. Summary. GOBD FonMinister Samad at behest of PriMin Mujib Rahman would like to have before latter proceeds to Moscow, clear statement of US intentions vis-à-vis BD. GOBD also seeks US assistance vis-à-vis GOP in obtaining permission for UN, ICRC or other international organization to visit and ascertain situation of Bengalees in Pakistan. GOBD wishes to repatriate all of these as soon as possible. Action requested: Guidance from Dept on response to be given to Samad on subjects raised by him prior to Samad’s departure for Moscow, Tuesday afternoon, in party of PriMin Mujib. 2. By coincidence at same time I was seeking appointment with GOBD FonMin Abdus Samad to carry out instructions in State 32170, his office was under isntructions from him request me to call on him today. I met Samad at his office this morning for discussion lasting over one hour. 3. Samad opened conversation by recalling my talk with him on January 1 (Dacca 10, 11, 12) at which time he had made certain points and requested certain indications of US attitudes. He said that it had been disappointment to him and to GOBD that no responses had been forthcoming. This had raised serious question in minds of Bengalee people and of some members of Cabinet (whom Samad characterized as “leftists”) as to whether US consular mission should be allowed to continue to function here. Question had also been raised, whether, in view of clear indications of continuing USG friendship with Pakistan, purpose of consular mission in Dacca was not actually to serve interests of Pakistan under direction from US Embassy Islamabad rather constitute instrument for friendly relationship with GOBD. Samad said that he had counseled patience and had expressed view that favorable decision in regard US-BD relations would emerge after President Nixon’s visit to China; that visit was now almost over and GOBD felt that time was ripe to ascertain basic USG intentions in regard to BD and, in light of those intentions to judge advisability of allowing US mission to continue to function. 4. Samad stressed that actual date of recognition was not as important relatively as indications of attitude: In case of several other countries, including France, U.K., etc. even prior to formal recognition, local representatives had made contact with GOBD had exchanged views, and had established relationships which made GOBD willing give those govts whatever time was required to announce recognition in accordance with their own processes. This had not been the case with USG; after single official contact initiated by Samad himself, there had been no exchanges of view between USG reps and BD officials, and serious question had been raised in mind of Bengalees as to precisely what US Mission was doing in Dacca. Letters had been written to newspapers raising this question particulalry since US officials were clearly seen driving about the streets, and US flag was flying from both office building and Consuls General’s residence. While BD reps in US were denied such diplomatic priveleges as tax exemption and diplomatic licensing of their automobiles and were required to report to Department of Justice as “foreign agents” GOBD had been lenient and had treated US Mission and its members with full range of diplomatic courtesy. 5. In view of his forthcoming visit to Moscow, PriMin Mujib had felt need to know just what USG intended, if indeed, USG were ill-disposed to BD and intended to persist in subordination BD interests in US-Pak friendship, this was something PriMin needed to know. If, on other hand as appeared to be case from statements of prominent US Congressmen and Senators and from sentiments expressed by US press and public, there was genuine desire for friendship with BD, which would move USG in direction of sympathetic relationship as befitted one democratic country vis-à-vis another, this also was something PriMin needed to know. In undertaking discussion with major world power like USSR, PriMin was acutely consciuos that he would be setting pattern for relationship which might persist for considerable time in future, and he did not wish to do this in ignorance or misapprehension of attitude of another major world power. 6. In short, Samad said, precise date of formal recognition was not as important at present moment as clear indication of kind of relationship USG wanted to have with BD, clear statement of purposes and guidelines of US Mission in Dacca, and kind of treatment which would be accorded BD Mission in United States. 7. Turning to separate point, Samad said that GOBD was increasinlgy concerned over harsh treatment being accorded Begnalees in Pakistan: reports were reaching GOBD daily of forced separation of families, confinement in concentration camps, denial of food, water, and electricity to Bengalees’ residential areas, and actual physical mal-treatment. He said that GOBD strongly desired to repatriate all of these persons as soon as possible. In meantime it was imperative that international organization like UN and Red Cross be allowed visit camps and residential areas inhabited by Bengalees and insure that they were being accorded humane treatment. Samad pointed out that GOBD had allowed reps of UN and ICRS to visit Bihari areas in BD. And he urgently requested that USG use its influence with GOP to persuade latter to accord equal facilities to international organizations in case of Bengalees. 8. Samad said that he earnestly hoped some response could be forthcoming from Washington before he and PriMin departed Dacca for Moscow on afternoon of Tuesday, February 29. He urged me to communicate with Washington by fastest possible means and said he would be available to meet me at any time before departure. 9. Comment—I believe Samad’s emphatic presentation to me represents a critical point in setting tone of our future relationship with BD. Obvious even blatant wooing of BD by Soviets and multiplication of their activity here, as well as likelihood that specific long term proposals will be pressed upon him in Moscow, apparently make Mujib want to know what he can expect from us on other side of balance. Up to now USG has appeared to GOBD withdrawn, unforthcoming strongly partisan to Pakistan and hostile to India. On other hand there has been strong popular feeling that Americans as a people are friendly to BD and sympahtetic to sufferings this country has undergone. Samad’s presentation seems to represent crucial effort by leadership of BD to resolve this apparent ambivalence and gain some idea where they stand and what they can expect. 10. I believe it is in our national interest to respond fully and frankly to Samad’s approach. Recognizing constraints imposed by fact that President Nixon and Secretary Rogers are still in China and that therefore condition set in President’s statement of February 10th (of which Samad and presumably Mujib thoroughly aware) not yet fulfilled I nevertheless urge that maximum efforts be made provide Mujib with kinds of assurance he seeks before he departs for Moscow. In my view these would comprise as minimum (a) clear statement of US intentions extend formal recognition to BD in near future and thereafter establish diplomatic relations at Embassy level. (b) Assurance that interests of BD will not be subordinated in US world outlook to those of any other South Asian country. Particularly Pakistan, (c) indication of US desire to assist BD to maximum extent in meeting its needs for reconstruction and economic development through multilateral and bilateral arrangements; (d) generalized invitation to both Mujib and Samad to visit US at some unspecified convenient future time: (e) expression of willingness to undertake broad range of views on world problems with BD officials at both technical and political levels. 11. Request Dept’s instructions in time for me to convey sense of USG thinking to Samad before noon Dacca time Tuesday. Samad has solemnly assured me that whatever I say to him will be as closely held as I ask that it be. 12. Report of brief discussion of UN relief matters follows septel. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 404. Telegram 33181 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 404. Telegram 33181 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 1 Washington, February 27, 1972, 0354Z Ref: Dacca 0689 Subj: USG Intentions Toward Bangladesh 1. We are not prepared at this time to go as far as your main recommendation contained para 10a of reftel 0689. Moreover, discussions on certain aspects of your other recommendations are also premature, other than those relating to humanitarian relief on which you alread have instructions. However, in going back to Samad before his departure for Moscow with Mujib, you may make and must not under any circumstance go beyond following points which indicate positive direction in which U.S. policy is evolving. 2. President is now in China and, as Samad has himself acknowledged, decision on recognition as President said publicly on February 10 will not be addressed until after President’s return from China. You cannot, therefore, be precise at this time. 3. You should assure Samad that USG is in no way ill-disposed toward Bangladesh. On contrary, President in foreign policy message to Congress on February 9 said: qte we have never been hostile to Bengali aspiratons ... as the US strengthens new relationship in Asia, we have no intention of ignoring these 70 million people unqte. 4. You should go on to stress that deferral of recognition decision has not prevented US from responding positively and concretely to needs of Bangladesh for relief and rehabilitation assistance, details of which you have already conveyed to Samad. From previous instructions you are also clear that you are authorized to communicate further as neccesary on relief matters. 5. Re status of Bengalis in west, you should reaffirm to Samad that from beginning of crisis US has been deeply concerned about treatment of all minorities. We will be alert to any appropriate role we can play in ensuring protection of Bengalis. 6. In closing, you should stress that US has appreciated GOBD understanding to date of USG’s need for time in reaching decision on recognition. 7. Noting Samad’s offer to keep your remarks in confidence, you should seek from him an understanding that your converstation will be so treated and shared only with Mujib. 8. In view of general nature of Foreign Minister’s approach and compelling reasons here, you must limit yourself strictly to above. You are to make absolutely no rpt no comment to press on timing or conditions of recognition. Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Peking for Rogers as Tosec 122. Drafted by Van Hollen, cleared by Constable, Sisco, Saunders, and Haig, and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. Repeated to the White House, Islamabad, and New Delhi. 405. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 405. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, February 28, 1972, 1610Z Subject: USG Intentions Toward Bangladesh Ref: State 33181 1. I obtained appointment with FonMin Samad late this afternoon in accordance with instructions reftel. He received me in company of Foreign Secy Karim and Director General (Americas) Kibria. 2. FonMin opened conversation by reitrating (apparently for benefit of Karim and Kibria) substance of points he had made in our previous meeting (Dacca 689). From this summary it appeared that most important considerations, aside from actual recognition weighing on ForMin’s mind in connection with US-BD relations A. Status of U.S. Consulate General in Dacca; B. Treatment of BD reps in US; and C. Extent to which USG regarded BD as, in fact, separate from Pakistan. In connection with point (a) Samad’s main concern seemed to be whether actions and activities of this office were still directed toward furtherance of US-Pak relations or whether they took account de facto existence of new country of BD. Point (b) seemed compounded of nationalistic feelings—whether BD diplomats in US were being accorded inferior status as compared with US members of US office here and concern over requirement that these diplomats pay income taxes in the US (latter point seemed particular interest to Kibria and Karim, both of whom were last stationed abroad in US and were required to pay income taxes from time of their defection from Pak Embassy until their departure). FonMin’s thinking in regard to point (c) did not appear very precise and seemed directed principally at question of whether US would continue to direct its policy toward maintenance of territorial integrity of Pak as that country existed prior to dec 16th. 3. I made Samad points set forth in para 3–4–5–6 of reftel, pointing out that there was an unfortunate but understandably wholly fortuitous conflict in timing in that PriMin Mujib Rahman desired (understandably) to have some definite word of USG intentions prior to his departure for Moscow on Feb 29th, that being date on which President Nixon would and which he had specified for commencement of USG review of its policies toward South Asia including question of recognition of BD. Samad seemed to accept this ineluctable fact of all timing although with some regret. 4. On question of status of US Mission here and members of BD Mission in US, I pointed out that these were directly related to basic recognition question and could be resolved only in that context. I said that both I and my government were appreciative of forbearance of GOBD in its treatment of US office here during time required for resolutiqn by USG of basic recognition question. 5. Samad listened attentively to my exposition of substantive points set forth in reftel and remarked that while they represented no great advance over what he already knew he supposed that GOBD would have to exercise patience and hope that eventual decisions of USG could be in conformity with reality of situation and with democratic principles of self determination of peoples. 6. At conclusion of talk Samad raised question of what could be said to press, some 20 members of which were clustered at door to his office. I said that I had spoken to him in confidence and on his assurances that views i expressed would be held closely. Samad agreed but he said that my call at his office was known and that press must be given something. As I had done at my call on him, in January (Dacca 10–11–12) I said that I preferred to make no statement to the press but would not object if the Minister informed the press that I had conveyed the following to him. A. USG had no intention ignoring existence of 75,000,000 Bengalees; B. President Nixon had definitely committed his administration to review the question of recognition of BD upon return of President to Washington; and C. Question of recognition of relations aside, USG was moving without delay to join concretely and significantly in UN humanitarian and rehabilitation relief for Bengalee people. Samad seemed relatively satisfied with these points. 7. Upon my departure I wished Samad a pleasant journey to Moscow and asked him to convey similar wishes to PriMin. He thanked me warmly. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 406. Telegram 770 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 406. Telegram 770 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 3, 1972, 0615Z Subject: Bangladesh Government Tolerance on Recognition Question 1. [text not declassified] appears to confirm impression I have gained from various sources that we are approaching the limits of tolerance of GOBD in matter of continued operation of this post without US recognition of BD. 2. Dacca 722 and Dacca 689 give clear indications of nature of GOBD concern. I suspect without being able to prove that there had been an original intention on part of GOBD to require closure of this post in response to Samad’s presentaion on Feb 26 had been considered unsatisfactory. Assuming this I can only speculate whether there was a change in GOBD attitude between Feb 26 and 28 or whether response conveyed by me on latter date was judged satisfactory enough to allow Samad to make favorable decision. Latter seems more doubful proposition of two, since I doubt Samad would have had authority to make decision on spot without consulting Mujib. 3. Whatever may be the case in regard to foregoing I now believe that we are approaching the crunch. There are several dates which appear significant in this connection. Mujib will return Dacca from his Soviet trip on March 6. Indian troops are apparently scheduled for definitive departure from BD on March 12, which they will do with ceremonial functions to which foreign representitives will be invited. Given fact that President has now returned from China, any of these dates might be selected by GOBD as suitable for gesture demonstrating national self-respect by closing us down. 4. All other considerations aside, I assume if USG intends to recognize BD that there will be an interest in doing so at a time when that action will receive optimum favorable public attention. The best date for that purpose would appear to me to fall somewhere in the week of March 6th, preferable the 8th or 9th. If this is case we shold convey this to GOBD as soon as possible to avoid their acting earlier. 5. If on other hand USG does not rpt not intend recognize BD with next month, I believe we should be prepared for a demand that this office be closed. In that case I assume that we would seek protection of some other power here (Australians would appear on the job) and try to maintain as much of present physical equipment and custodial staff in place as possible as an American intrests section within the Australian diplomatic mission. 6. I raise the question whether our own self-respect does not require that we do what we intend to do without appearing to be forced into it by GOBD. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Saunders sent a copy of this telegram to Haig on March 3 with a covering memorandum in which he suggested that Haig approve an instruction to Spivack to return to Washington for consultation. “The main rationale for bringing him back here would be to gain the time necessary to allow us to recognize only toward the end of March. It seems unlikely that the Bengalis would throw us out if it appeared that we were on the verge of taking a final decision.” Haig returned the memorandum to Saunders with a handwritten note instructing that Spivack be recalled on March 17. 407. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon 407. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon 1 Washington, March 3, 1972, noon [Omitted here is conversation that does not relate to Bangladesh.] K: Well Joe Sisco called me yesterday and said could I give him a little information about Bangla Desh? P: Don’t give him anything. K: Well, I made a horrible mistake. I said that the President agreed not to do anything for about four to six weeks, give them advance warning first. I will be God damn if it isn’t in the papers today. I should have had sense enough but. P: Well, I may not do anything about Bangla Desh. You know how I feel about it Henry. I may just wait. For the Chinese it is worth it, just wait a couple of more weeks. What do you think? K: I think now that they have done it I think we should wait until the middle of April. P: That is right and I am just going to say—I am just going to drag my feet on it. There is no great hurry on it. K: You saw yourself we have made a lot of points in China by going as we did. We are not going to get any points by rushing it. P: Yeah, I suppose State could say that they didn’t say anything more than was covered in your backgrounder. K: No, I didn’t mention it in the Backgrounder. On Shanghai. P Yes. The point is that they are just restating it. They are rubbing it in. K: To state it on the record is quite different than to say it in general on backgrounder and it wasn’t really so(? ) P: Exactly. Exactly. [Omitted here is conversation that does not relate to Bangladesh.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan–Apr 1972. No classification marking. 408. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 408. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 6, 1972 SUBJECT: Recognition of Bangladesh I believe we should now move toward recognition of Bangladesh. I suggest that we announce the decision about March 25. This would be about two weeks after Indian troops are expected to be withdrawn (March 12). This would also give us time to notify the Chinese and Bhutto of our decision well before we inform Bangladesh authorities. You will recall that President Bhutto had earlier encouraged us to move toward recognition. He continues to feel that early recognition on our part would be in our mutual interest, suggesting however that our action await withdrawal of Indian forces from Bangladesh. The press reports that Mrs. Gandhi this week publicly promised that all Indian forces would leave Bangladesh by March 12. This withdrawal timetable presumably is designed to pave the way for Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Dacca on March 17. Our basic objective in South Asia is stable independence for the countries in the area. We want to create conditions which will help prevent any single power (i.e., India) from controlling its neighbors and also prevent any external power, such as the Soviets, from establishing a position of hegemony. Following early Indian recognition of Bangladesh, more than 40 countries have also recognized, including the Soviets, British, French, Japanese, Australians, Canadians, and Indonesians. Among these, the Indians and Soviets are playing a particularly active role as manifested by Mujib’s visit to Moscow this week and by large scale Indian economic assistance and the exchange of visits between Mujib and Mrs. Gandhi. We believe that Mujib is well disposed toward the United States and would strongly welcome U.S. recognition as an opportunity to expand his options and counteract excessive reliance on either the Soviets or the Indians. We believe the time is ripe and delay could erode this favorable sentiment and also jeopardize the official American presence in Dacca, where the status of our Consulate General has recently been questioned by Bangladesh authorities. If you agree to move toward recognition about March 25, subject to confirmation that Indian forces have actually withdrawn, I propose that we send the following messages to Chou En-lai and Bhutto informing them of our intentions. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders sent this memorandum to Kissinger on March 16 under a covering memorandum in which he endorsed Rogers’ recommendation. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh) The attached draft messages to China and Pakistan are published in approved final form as Documents 414 and 415 . 409. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 409. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 7, 1972 SUBJECT: Bangladesh Relief You will recall that the initial decision on our response to the Bangladesh relief program was to make available 175,000 tons of grain ($21 million) and $300,000 in support of the UN effort. That initial contribution was to be within a share of total contributions not to exceed 33 1/3%. The concept was that when other contributions move high enough so that our share had fallen clearly below the 1/3 level then we could consider another contribution. We are not quite at the stage where we would want to go ahead with another major contribution since the withdrawal of Indian troops is so close. That could be done several weeks hence. However, international contributions have come in at an unexpectedly high level, and there is one thing that Maury Williams and the Department of Agriculture would like to add quietly to our initial contribution. It would be in our interest and it would still leave US within the initial one-third share. Maury would like quietly just to go ahead and order that $10-$20 million in edible oil be added to the program. As you remember, edible oil is a major domestic problem for the Department of Agriculture, and its sale would be in our government’s interest. This can be done and still keep our initial contribution within one-third. For your information, pledges in hand now add up to about $280 million as follows: UK $25.8 Canada 5.5 Sweden 6.0 Australia 1.0 USSR (rice) 5.5 Pakistan (with US transportation) 10.0 Switzerland $2.5 New Zealand 1.0 Other contributions to the UN for refugee return and rehabilitatation in East Bengal 24.0 India (food, relief supplies, transportation, foreign exchange loan) 168.0 International volunteer agencies (Red Cross-3, Catholic agencies-10, World Council of Churches-5, CARE-1.3) 20.0 US 21.0 Total $279.3 Even without counting the Indian contribution, the total effort including our first contribution stands at about $120 million. Keeping strictly within the one-third for our initial contribution we could go up to $40 million. Against this background, Maury Williams really has authority to go ahead with this oil, but I thought I would let you know the situation so that you might inject any thoughts you might have. RECOMMENDATION: That Williams go ahead quietly with no fanfare on this supplement of $10–20 million in edible oil to our initial contribution and that we then hold a second major contribution until at least the end of March. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig signed the approval line for Kissinger. In a March 10 handwritten note, attached to the memorandum and addressed to Jeanne Davis, Saunders wrote that he had informed Williams and Van Hollen of Haig’s approval of the recommendation. 410. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon 410. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Bangladesh Relief Program The first phase of contributions to the Bangladesh relief effort has now been rounded out, and we must consider a second contribution. Reports are mounting that the famine which was feared for last fall now could come in the late spring, although this can be avoided. What is done now before the beginning of the rainy season in June will have an important impact. You will recall that for an initial contribution you authorized a donation of food as long as our contribution was no more than one-third of the total international effort. We have contributed so far some $37 million worth of grain and $10 million on edible oil. The other international contributions now add up to $300 million, of which $192 million has been provided bilaterally, not channeled through the UN—$162 million comes from India, about $20 million from the USSR and $10 million from Pakistan. If the US were to contribute one-third of the contributions made against the requirements described by the UN, our share could go up to about $100 million at this point. The SRG discussed whether bilateral contributions should be included in the base from which we calculate our share. The point was made that our objective is to meet a humanitarian need, and any contribution can fairly be counted if it is directed at that need. AID is recommending that we now move some $35 million in cash appropriated by the Congress for the Bangladesh relief effort. This would be used principally to improve the transportation system which is necessary to distribute food around the country as well as for other similar projects necessary to the relief effort. In short, now that Congress has appropriated the special relief funds you requested last October; now that the needs in Bangladesh are more precisely identified; and now that the scope of the international effort has become apparent—we are in a position to begin adding cash contributions to our commodity assistance. We can do so and still remain within a one-third share. Doing so this week will help to blunt Congressional charges that the Administration is not using the money Congress appropriated. Recommendation: That you approve an additional $35 million contribution in cash through the UN for the relief effort in Bangladesh. Approve Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Saunders who forwarded it to Haig on March 20 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Haig signed the approval line for the President. For a record of the Senior Review Group’s discussion of South Asia on March 17, see Document 237 . 411. Telegram 1019 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 411. Telegram 1019 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State 1 Dacca, March 23, 1972, 0930Z Subject: Attitudes Towards US 1. Summary: Approach first anniversary independence of Bangladesh (March 26) accompanied by evidence increasing irritation by government, media, and general public with us. Feeling among our contacts, both Bengali and foreign, is that GOBD patience wearing thin and that pressure building up which may soon require some action against US Mission here. 2. Indications of testier government attitudes apparent in media over past ten days. Joint declaration of PriMin Gandhi and Mujib was, of course, prominently carried, with special attention to portion which warned of unidentified (but implied be us) forces working against peace and stability in the surcontintent. “Morning News” recently featured editorial warning that acceptance of US food aid might dampen the revolutionary fervor of public and hence should be regarded with suspicion. Press on March 18 featured prominent picture of procession of wives of murdered intellectuals carrying Bengali sign calling for end of CPW activities and closure of illegal US Mission. 3. Awami League labor leader, Abdul Mannan, (recently returned from Moscow), quoted March 21 press as denouncing activities of CIA and Maoist Bangladesh. Mannan also claimed American journalists had informed him that Bangladesh would not last more than three months, which he took to be evidence of US ill intentions. 4. March 25 has been declared anti-imperialist day by minor left-wing splinter group (Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal). Though party itself negligible force, its activities are being given considerable coverage by both Bengali and English press. Imperialists are helpfully identified as USCV, Pakistan, and China. (Because we expect demonstrations on March 25 and March 26 against us, we have taken certain precautionary measures which we consider prudent.) 5. Another indication is increasing pressure being placed on our senior local employees. They are constantly queried by friends and associates as to why they continue to work for government that holds such ill-will towards their country. Delegation these employees informed us confidentially that they may find it difficult and dangerous to continue working after end of month if pressure continues. 6. US private cits, some VOLAG reps and US journalists report increasing difficulties in obtaining entry visas or extending stay permits. One US journalist told quite frankly by BD consular official that visas for US cits now required special screening. 7. Growing preoccupation with conspiracies no doubt accelerated by increasing gov’t frustration in dealing with staggering problems facing country. Soviet encouragement probably also factor. Nevertheless, time here may be running short for us and would not be surprising if government takes some steps in near future to reduce status and functions of this mission. Carle 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. Prime Ministers Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman met in Calcutta February 6–8. On February 8 they issued a joint declaration summarizing the meetings and stressing the solidarity that existed between the two countries. (The text of the declaration was transmitted to the Department on February 9 in telegram 283 from Calcutta; ibid., POL BANGLADESH–INDIA) Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman subsequently met in Dacca March 18–19, where they signed a mutual defense treaty patterned on the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971. (Telegram 3714 from New Delhi, March 24; ibid.) 412. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon 412. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 24, 1972 SUBJECT: The Facts on Our Humanitarian Relief for Bangladesh In your Foreign Policy Report of February 9, you pointed out that we had provided two-thirds of the world’s emergency aid to East Bengal in 1971, that our relief effort would continue, but that “we would expect other nations to bear a proportionate share of that responsibility in the future.” On February 16 you approved for internal guidance the principle that the US share in the multilateral relief effort for Bangladesh should be 33 1/3% of the total, with our contribution to be paced so as to encourage contributions from others. All of our contribution is being made through international agencies, and most of it is being made through the UN in response to the UN assessment of the requirements. There is no bilateral US program. Under this formula, we have made the following commitments, totaling about $100 million: —375,000 tons of wheat and rice to the UN Relief Operation; —50,000 tons of vegetable oil (valued at $22 million) to the UN: —$3 million to Catholic Relief Services for housing materials; —$650,000 to CARE for low cost housing projects; —$35.3 million to the UN to repair and expand the distribution system in Bangladesh (clearing harbors and improving internal transport); —$1.6 million to the International Rescue Committee (for a student rehabilitation project) and the Cholera Research Laboratory; —$15 million to the International Red Cross. The rest of the world, according to UN calculations, has contributed about $280 million to the relief effort since the war. This includes pledges through the UN like ours, as well as direct bilateral commitments. The largest contributor is India which has provided or pledged $161 million in foodstuffs, relief commodities and logistical support directly to the Government of Bangladesh. The Soviets are the third largest contributor (after India and the US), with a reported, though not confirmed, pledge of $51.6 million in loans for rehabilitation and commodity aid. Other important contributors are Great Britain, Japan, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and France. Because the war interrupted the flow of supplies in November, not everything that we committed to East Pakistan relief actually arrived. After the war, it was decided that we should start counting again from scratch. So some of the funds now being used—not all—are funds that we initially committed last fall. Senator Kennedy has accused us of double counting, but that charge cannot be justified because we have been careful in all our documents and statements to distinguish between what we committed and what was sent. In sum, the US contribution to the international relief effort for Bangladesh has been timely and substantial without being out of proportion with the contributions of the rest of the world. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 413. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 413. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 28, 1972 SUBJECT: Recognition of Bangladesh In response to your memorandum of March 6, 1972, the President has decided that U.S. recognition of Bangladesh should be announced at the Department of State anytime after April 3. He has asked that cables be sent (1) immediately to Islamabad instructing our Charge to inform President Bhutto, and (2) to Paris instructing Ambassador to inform the PRC Ambassador. Every effort should be made to keep this move confidential until the announcement is made. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Nodis. 414. Telegram 55123 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 414. Telegram 55123 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, March 31, 1972, 0023Z Subject: Recognition of Bangladesh 1. President has concluded we should now recognize Bangladesh, and we plan announcement this effect April 4, coincident with delivery in Dacca of presidential message to Mujibur Rahman. 2. You should inform PRC Ambassador as soon as possible of decision and ask him deliver following message to his government: During the discussions in Peking our assessments on the situation in South Asia were shared, including the question of the recognition of Bangladesh. Since then the matter has again been carefully reviewed and it has been decided that the situation in South Asia has evolved to the point where the US should extend recognition and simultaneously establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. It is our intention to make an announcement to this effect on April 4. This decision is based on the belief that it is important to help insure stability in the South Asian subcontinent.” 3. You should ask PRC Ambassador to hold this information in closest confidence until our announcement made. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Chicom–US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Homer. Drafted by Laingen and Van Hollen; cleared by Davies and Sisco, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown, and by Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 415. Telegram 56144 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 415. Telegram 56144 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 Washington, April 1, 1972, 0048Z REF: Islamabad 1675 SUBJECT: Timing of Bangladesh Recognition 1. You should inform President Bhutto soonest that we have reviewed entire matter of Bangladesh recognition, giving careful consideration to his suggestions on timing. We have concluded we should recognize in near future and want Bhutto to know that we plan to announce recognition on April 4. You should caution him that this information must be held in closest confidence until our announcement made. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Davies, Sisco, Brown, and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. Repeated Priority to Dacca and New Delhi 416. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 416. Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State 1 Karachi, April 3, 1972, 1100Z Subject: US Recognition of Bangladesh Ref: State 56144 1. I informed President Bhutto of USG decision to announce BD recognition April 4 during meeting at his home in Karachi morning April 3. I came to Karachi to deliver message inasmuch as Bhutto was not due back in Rawalipindi before April 6. 2. After hearing me out on all the points contained reftel, Bhutto said he appreciated our having taken his concerns into account and informing him in advance of announcement. He was glad we had waited “reasonable time” and reaffirmed that our decision as completely acceptable insofar as it relates to his dealing with problems facing him. 3. I asked whether he knew Peking’s present thinking on BD recognition. He replied he knew of no change since matter was discussed when he visited Peking a little over two months ago. At that time, Chinese had told him that PRC was not in any hurry to move on recognition. They would want to coordinate with GOP, but even when Bhutto recognized Bangladesh they might not want to follow suit in any particular time period. Bhutto said he assumed that Chinese remained “relaxed” on recognition issue. He also assumed that they were meanwhile maintaining contacts with people friendly to them in Bangladesh. 4. Bhutto said he had one request to make of us. This was that, after recognition, USG should provide main portion of its economic aid to Bangladesh bilaterally to GBD rather than through UN. He thought bilateral aid would tend to maximize impact of US help to BD, and thus be most useful in broadest terms in light of various influences working on Bangladesh. I remarked that I appreciated intent of Bhutto’s suggestion, but had to point out that we were operating under decision already made to provide major portion of our help to BD through UN or other multilateral channels. We had already announced substantial assistance via UN. I noted that provision of increasing share of USG economic aid through multilateral channels reflected decision which President Nixon had made with reference to US aid globally well over a year ago. I reiterated appreciation for Bhutto’s suggestion and said I would report it promptly although I wanted Bhutto to know about broader policy trend in administration of US aid. 5. Local press April 3 carried ticker times datelined Washington attributing to USG officials that decision had been made to recognize Bangladesh early this week; item in same vein was carried by VOA morning April 3. Luppi 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Sent with the suggestion that it be passed to Islamabad and other posts as desired. 417. Telegram 56444 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 417. Telegram 56444 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca 1 Washington, April 3, 1972, 1736Z Subject: Recognition of Bangladesh 1. Dept will announce late morning April 4 decision to extend diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. 2. You should inform Foreign Secretary Karim or Secretary Kibria no earlier than 7:00 a.m. EST on April 4 of USG decision and timing of announcement. You should also stress our desire to avoid any leak prior to April 4 announcement. 3. At same time, you should tell MFA that Consul General Spivack will return to Dacca on April 7 and would like to have appointment with Prime Minister morning of April 8 or as soon as possible thereafter to deliver recognition message. You should also say that we will be prepared to deal with members of the BD Mission in Washington as diplomatic representatives of Bangladesh. Dept plans as courtesy to inform Karim at BD Mission on morning of April 4 of decision to recognize. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Constable, cleared by Laingen, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 418. Letter From President Nixon to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman 418. Letter From President Nixon to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman 1 Washington, April 4, 1972 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I wish to inform you that the United States Government has recognized the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and that we would like to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level with your government. Historically, there have been warm ties between our two peoples. The United States has maintained an official mission in Dacca since 1949 and over the years many Americans, both in private and official capacities, have derived great satisfaction from the opportunity to work side by side with the Bengalee people in a variety of enterprises aimed at combatting disease, illiteracy, poverty, hunger and the impact of natural disaster. Enduring relationships have resulted from this collaboration. I am sure that the friendship and goodwill between our two peoples will be further strengthened in the coming years, and I trust that our traditional cooperative association with your development efforts will continue. We fully share your aspirations for the progress and the welfare of the Bengalee people and the hope that the nations of the Sub-continent can normalize their relations and work together to forge a lasting peace. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence File, Bangladesh. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Dacca on April 5 in telegram 58480. (Ibid.) Secretary Rogers announced the recognition of Bangladesh at a press briefing on April 4. (Circular telegram 57428 to eight posts in South Asia, Moscow and London, April 4; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH) Mujibur Rahman sent a letter to Nixon on April 9 in which he warmly acknowledged the recognition accorded his country. (Telegram 1301 from Dacca, April 13; ibid.) Consul General Spivack was designated Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim of the new Embassy. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot, April 6; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh) 419. Telegram 60873 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 419. Telegram 60873 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 1 Washington, April 8, 1972, 2131Z Subject: Dialogue With Bangladesh 1. When you begin your round of calls on Sheikh Mujib, Foreign Minister and other senior officials of BDG, you will be entering into dialogue which will have strong bearing on future relationships with BDG. Your talks will give you the opportunity to tell them of USG views on South Asia and our concept of US-BDG relations. 2. Message from President to Mujib which you took with you provides keynote for your conversation with Mujib. As further background we would define our political objectives with Bangladesh as establishment of cordial bilateral working relationship and reinforcement of stated Bangladesh desire to be neutral and non-aligned. Initial emphasis of our approach will be on U.S. support for relief and rehabilitation efforts of people of Bangladesh. Prospects for long time development remain to be assessed. We would not anticipate in immediate future any sort of relationship with BD in military sphere. Following are talking points which you can draw on in your dialogue with Mujib and senior BD officials: A. Our overall objectives in South Asia are reflected in President’s press conference statement February 10 that “we are going to do everything we can to develop a new relationship with the countries on the subcontinent that will be pro-Indian, pro-Bengalese, pro-Pakistan but mostly pro-peace.” We seek a stable and peaceful subcontinent, in which the independent nations of the area can chart their own futures free from domination by any outside powers. B. With act of recognition we look forward to friendly relations between our governments that will reflect warm sentiments long shared between Americans and people of East Bengal. In our relations with Bangladesh and with other countries of South Asia we seek no special advantage or position of influence in political, economic or military sense. C. At same time we will pursue policy of encouraging restraint among outside powers in the subcontinent, with no great power seeking dominant influence. We believe this policy is in the interests of all countries of South Asia. In this context we fully respect Bangladesh’s desire to play neutral and non-aligned role in international affairs for our part we will take no action that would abridge BD neutrality and non-alignment. D. For future we will look toward development of cooperation in continued effort to help meet Bangladesh economic problems, through cultural exchanges, and through full and frank political discussions on subjects of mutual interest. E. In economic sphere, we have already demonstrated our willingness to cooperate closely within the framework of coordinated international humanitarian assistance in immediate relief and rehabilitation efforts in Bangladesh. We take pride in what we have been able to do even before recognition in humanitarian relief field, both by USG and various U.S. VOLAGs with long tradition of help for people of Bangladesh. USG contributions to current UN appeal now total more than $115 million. We are prepared to make additional contributions as we, in close consultation with BDG and appropriate international organizations, examine additional needs. F. For longer term reconstruction effort, we look forward to report of UN/IBRD team which recently assessed problems in Bangladesh and are prepared to play a role. We also look forward at appropriate time to continuing exchange on bilateral basis as to role USG might be able to play in support Bangladesh development effort. FYI: This could include review of future handling U.S.-financed aid projects initiated before independence of Bangladesh, but you should not get into this review at this time. End FYI. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, Van Hollen, Sisco, and Kissinger; and approved by Under Secretary Johnson. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. 420. Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 420. Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, April 10, 1972, 1126Z Subject: Delivery of Presidential Letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister 1. Shortly after my return to Dacca on morning Saturday, April 8, I was asked to call on Foreign Minister Abdus Samad as preliminary to my meeting with BD PriMin Sheikh Mujib Rahman. Samad received me together with Foreign Secretary Karim, and the conversation (with one exception which will be subject septel) restricted to pleasantries and to discussion of procedural steps to be taken in establishment of diplomatic relations between US and BD. 2. PriMin Mujib received me at 1930 hours in his official residence, formerly “President’s House”. Since Awami League Council meeting in progress at that time, Sheikh had to absent himself from proceedings for my call, and he was obviously eager to return to this important political meeting as soon as possible. Despite this his reception of me was warm, friendly, and entirely devoid of formality. 3. Mujib opened and read President Nixon’s letter as soon as I handed it to him, and he expressed appreciation for its friendly tone. He said that he thoroughly reciprocated President’s desire to establish diplomatic relations between our two countries at Embassy level and that GOBD would move immediately to establish its Embassy in Washington. I told him that I had been discussing with FonMin Samad technical procedures which would be required, and he said that these would be accomplished with all expediation on the BD side. 4. Mujib then said he was very happy that USG had taken step of recognition; he had all along been aware of great sympathy in the US for the people of BD in their difficulties during the past eighteen months, and he now looked forward to the most friendly future relationships between our two countries at both official and popular levels. I assured him that USG fully shared his view and that we would continue to assist in the international effort to help BD through its present difficult period. Mujib said he was fully aware of the magnitude of US assistance tendered through United Nations and he acknowledged that without that assistance situation in BD would be much worse than it is. 5. Aside from brief reference to plight of Bengalees in Pakistan and his hope that USG and other friendly govts would seek persuade GOP to allow these to return to their homes, Sheikh brought up no matters of substance. For my part, I also refrained from substantive initiatives, merely saying that I looked forward to having useful discussions with members of BD Cabinet and high officials during next few weeks. Sheikh said he hoped to see me again himself in near future and urged that I call on him whenever I feel slightest inclination to do so. Sheikh asked whether there was any problem about communicating report of our interview to Pres, and I assured him there was none on my part to such report, including, if he desired, contents of President’s letter. Sheikh thanked me for this and said that he felt people of BD would appreciate warm and friendly tone of letter. Spivack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. The telegram was sent as originating from the Consulate General in Dacca. The Consulate General, which had been accredited to Pakistan and which existed on sufferance in Dacca after the establishment of Bangladesh, became an Embassy following U.S. recognition. 421. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 421. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 21, 1972 SUBJECT: AID Program in Bangladesh The basic framework for carrying out the President’s desire to shift towards bilateral economic assistance for Bangladesh will be provided by a report to be issued by the World Bank within the next week. Our response to the requirements identified in that study will provide the basis of the recommendation to the President which you asked AID for at the last SRG meeting. Meanwhile, AID would like to instruct its man in Dacca to begin consultation with the government of Bangladesh on their priorities to speed up our ability to firm up projects. Part of our problem is that the Foreign Assistance Act forbids allocation of more than 20% of any line of appropriation in the last month of the fiscal year. Therefore, much of the obligation should be accomplished in May, and that will require compressing our negotiations with the Bengalis. I assume from the President’s instruction that he fully intends to go ahead with a bilateral aid program. That being the case, it would seem logical for our AID people to be permitted to talk to the Bengalis about the sectors to which they will give highest priority. The purpose of this memo is to seek a go-ahead for a consultation that would not commit US to any aid level but which would indicate our intention to involve ourselves bilaterally. If there is any doubt about our moving into the bilateral aid business we should not do this, but I gather our intent is to go ahead. Recommendation: That you either seek the President’s go-ahead via the attached memo or indicate your feelings about his judgment. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The attached draft memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which called for Nixon to respond to a recommendation that the AID officials in Bangladesh be authorized to indicate the U.S. intention to initiate a bilateral aid program, was not sent and is not published. Kissinger responded to Saunders’ memorandum in a handwritten note on the memorandum: “He intends to go into bilateral aid but to cut down on multilateral aid.” For a record of the SRG meeting on April 17, during which the question of economic assistance to Bangladesh was discussed, see Document 249 . 422. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 422. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 15, 1972 SUBJECT: U.S. Bilateral Assistance—Bangladesh At the SRG meeting of April 17, you announced that the President wants as much aid for Bangladesh as possible to be bilateral. You asked for a paper considering how our humanitarian aid could be provided in this way. AID Commitments to Date PL 480: Since the Indo-Pakistani war we have committed to Bangladesh $73 million in PL 480 foods through the UN. The food pipeline is presently full, and there is no immediate need for more food commitments. Dollar Commitments: Since the war we have also obligated $35.5 million to the UN for relief operations in Bangladesh and $7.67 million to voluntary agencies (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Red Cross, and Medical Assistance Programs). These funds are provided out of the $200 million FY 1972 appropriation for South Asian Relief, of which $172.3 million was available after the war. These obligations leave a balance of approximately $130 million out of the $200 million appropriation. We would want to obligate a significant part of this balance before the end of this fiscal year. Reconstruction needs are urgent, and we should make commitments early enough to allow work to be organized to begin promptly at the end of the monsoon (October-November). Furthermore, we have made a Congressional record regarding early action, and there is much support for so moving. Future Rehabilitation Requirements and Plans for Bilateral Aid A UN/IBRD/IMF team recently completed a survey of Bangladesh’s rehabilitation and reconstruction needs through mid-1973. Their report, which became available last week, indicates non-food requirements totalling $648 million. Although some of the estimates are preliminary, they suggest areas of activity and orders of magnitude for appropriate U.S. bilateral action. Within this context we will proceed to initiate a bilateral program of about $75 million, concentrating in areas where the U.S. Government or particular U.S. contractors have special competence or prior successful experience. Besides providing essential imported commodities, we envisage a substantial effort in the repair and construction of coastal embankments, the rehabilitation of power installations, rebuilding of roads and bridges, and possibly repair and refurnishing of health centers, schools, water systems and other socially important facilities. Attached is a list drawn from the UN/IBRD/IMF report of requirements which are in areas that we believe are most appropriate for consideration for U.S. bilateral action. An AID team from Washington is now in Dacca, and as a result of their visit we expect to conclude a grant or series of grants which will permit the GOBD to engage the services of selected U.S. contractors to commence work as soon as possible. The grants will necessarily include a substantial local cost component, which is important in creating jobs in a country where a very high percentage of the labor force is out of work. The dollars used to finance local costs under these grants will be available for importing urgently needed commodities for relief and rehabilitation of the economy. In addition to this bilateral activity, we will reserve $10 to $15 million out of the $200 million appropriation for grants to assist the humanitarian programs of voluntary agencies. We have already received preliminary proposals from certain voluntary agencies (such as the Community Development Foundation and Church World Service) as well as requests for further support from the voluntary agencies that we have already helped. This would leave some $40 to $45 million out of the FY 72 South Asian Relief Appropriation available for further contributions for relief and rehabilitation in Bangladesh. We would keep this amount available for possible additional support for the relief and logistic activities of UNROD, for reconstruction programs that may be undertaken by the World Bank, or for other bilateral activity. As in the past our grants through the UN would be blended with those of other nations. Summary In tabular form, the above commitments and projections would look like this: ($ Millions) PL 480 to date : 500,000 tons $73 $200 Million Appropriation : Pre-War Refugee assistance in India. $20 Humanitarian assistance in $7.7 E. Pakistan Post-War to date UN $35.5 Voluntary agencies $7.67 Projected Bilateral grants $75 Voluntary agencies $10–15 UN, IBRD or bilateral $40–45 In obligating these funds we will be guided by the President’s directive that our contributions and their timing be such as to ensure that we do not ultimately assume more than a one-third share of total international contributions to relief in Bangladesh. To date total commitments to Bangladesh are calculated by the UN to be about $570 million of which the US share, including PL 480, is $116 million. In short, we presently are well within the amount we consider to be our fair share of the total cost. Also, the UN/IBRD/IMF estimate of $648 million for rehabilitation needs in Bangladesh is about five times the total of funds remaining available in the FY 1972 special appropriation. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published. On May 22 NSC Staff Secretary Davis sent a memorandum to Eliot which reads: “In response to your May 15 memorandum, bilateral assistance of $75 to $100 million in the current U.S. fiscal year has been approved. Your recommendations on the mix of other relief assistance for Bangladesh is (sic.) also approved.” (Ibid.) On May 30 the Department of State announced that the United States and Bangladesh had signed a bilateral agreement providing for $90 million in U.S. assistance to Bangladesh as a grant for rehabilitation. (Telegram 94906 to Dacca, May 30; ibid., AID (US) 4 BANGLADESH) 423. Memorandum For the President’s File 423. Memorandum For the President’s File 1 Washington, May 16, 1972 SUBJECT: Meeting with Enayet Karim, Ambassador Designate of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, on May 16, 1972, at 12:45 p.m. PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon Enayet Karim, Ambassador-Designate of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Samuel M. Hoskinson, NSC Staff Mr. Karim called on the President to present a letter from Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman responding to the President’s earlier letter informing of U.S. recognition and desire to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level. The meeting opened with the President and Mr. Karim posing for pictures by the press. The President began by saying that the United States desires good and friendly relations with Bangladesh. He realized that Bangladesh had suffered too much and said that we want the new country to succeed. The tragedy of conflict in South Asia must not be repeated. The President pledged that the United States would do everything it could to help Bangladesh survive and to provide hope for the future. He noted that the U.S. had already provided substantial humanitarian assistance to this end. Mr. Karim then handed Prime Minister Rahman’s letter to the President (he did not open it) and thanked him for taking time from his busy schedule for the occasion. Mr. Karim thanked the President for all the economic assistance the U.S. has provided and said that Bangladesh also looks forward to friendly relations with the U.S., despite the differences of the past. The President broke in to say that the problems of conflict are past and that we must build a better future together. He then told Mr. Karim of Bengalis, such as Mohammed Ali, whom he had known and liked in the past. The President said that he had never met Mujib but he hoped very much to do so some day. As Mr. Karim departed, the President wished him good luck in setting up his new mission here in Washington. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Hoskinson. 424. Intelligence Note RNAN–17 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 424. Intelligence Note RNAN–17 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, June 8, 1972 BANGLADESH: THE EUPHORIA FADES During Bangladesh’s struggle for independence, Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League (AL) enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Bengali people, especially the students who played so prominent a role in the early agitation for autonomy and the subsequent civil war. Only four months after an AL government was established in Dacca, however, those same students have rejected the AL-affiliated student organization in elections at Dacca University, and have elected critics of the present government. This AL reverse demonstrates clearly that public dissatisfaction with the Bangladesh Government (BDG) is rising; it is also finding expression in labor disputes, food riots, and, recently, in a call by student and labor leaders for Sheikh Mujib to disband the present government and institute a “revolutionary” rule. The euphoria of victory in Bangladesh has faded, and the BDG must now contend with criticism in its exceedingly difficult task of reconstruction. The students, especially in Dacca University, have long been influential in East Bengal politics, and were particularly prominent in the movement for provincial autonomy which led to civil war and eventual independence. A significant number were freedom fighters during the civil war and returned to the universities only at Mujib’s bidding. They feel they deserve some of the credit for the creation of Bangladesh and have a right to affect the way it develops. Because they are articulate, well-organized, and respected, they have the potential for becoming a potent opposition force. Most of the students probably still support Sheikh Mujib himself, but are no longer willing to accept uncritically the blunders of the inexperienced BDG or the venality of some government and AL officials. The elections at Dacca University were won by the Bangladesh Students Union (BSU), an affiliate of the pro-Soviet leftist National Awami Party, in opposition to the AL-sponsored Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL). The BCL had split into two warring factions, moderate and left-radical, and the AL itself was divided in its support for the two factions. The BSU also reportedly enjoyed the advantage of significant financial support for its campaign from the Soviet Mission in Dacca. Nonetheless, the performance of the BDG to date was a major issue in the campaign, and the vote was to some extent an indication of no confidence on the part of the students in the present government. The students are not the only groups who are dissatisfied. Labor unions are fighting among themselves for scarce jobs for their members, and blame the government for failing to reopen factories closed since the war. Farmers complain that the government has not made necessary agricultural inputs available to them. Slow and inefficient distribution of food relief has provoked riots in which government granaries have been destroyed. The commission of well-publicized crimes by armed ex-guerrillas has prompted charges of police and governmental incompetence, while attempts to use AL volunteers as vigilantes against the “miscreants” have brought accusation of official lawlessness and political vengeance. Anomalies in the handling of foreign relief goods have given rise to stories of officials’ enriching themselves by diverting aid. The charges of maladministration are not without foundation. The BDG lacks direction. The National Constituent Assembly met on April 10, supposedly to approve a constitution and then function as a legislative body, but adjourned on the second day after having done no more than appoint a constituent drafting committee. New governmental policies are being drawn up, but at the moment all questions must be decided by Sheikh Mujib himself. Even cabinet ministers are unsure of their positions and are unable to give directives to their subordinates. Since Sheikh Mujib cannot handle every problem and subordinates do not have enough authority, important decisions are being deferred, and problems are accumulating. Beyond Dacca, there are two structures. The old Government of East Pakistan officials remain at their posts, but often are afraid to act without direction from Dacca. The local AL political structure is apparently intact, but local party officials are either paralyzed or, reportedly, venal. So far, the administration has continued on its own momentum, but unless new directives come down, the government machinery will become progressively more enfeebled. Through this defective apparatus, the BDG is trying to rebuild a shattered economy—i.e., create a new financial system, restore the transportation system, and return land and industry to production. It must do all this with inadequate resources, while simultaneously supporting and finding jobs for ten million refugees who have returned from India to abandoned farms, burned-out shops, and closed factories. It has been offered substantial foreign relief, but, given the BDG’s limited competence, this has been marred by port congestion, inequitable distribution, and inefficient utilization. The BDG has been unable to keep pace, and has aroused the ire of much of the populace by its poor performance. So far, Sheikh Mujib himself has been exempted from major criticism. The dissatisfaction has centered on subordinates, and the Sheikh has only been accused of failing to control his followers. The students, however, in their call for a “revolutionary” government accused the Sheikh of failing to live up to his promises of instituting a socialist system. They demonstrated by the Dacca University election that they were not satisfied with the mildly socialistic actions taken by the BDG; they are likely to continue to exert pressure on the Sheikh to take a more radical stand. Sheikh Mujib is aware of the growing danger to his government. Despite the urgency of his work in Dacca, he recently undertook a tour of Bangladesh during which he spoke of “conspirators” and a “crisis of confidence,” and appealed to the people to give him at least three years to rebuild the country before they criticized the BDG. He has publicly threatened to dismiss and severely punish any AL figure or government official found corrupt. He has already dismissed several, and jailed a few. Mujib’s tour seemed to reduce the intensity of the criticism. He managed to persuade the students and labor leaders to withdraw their call for a new “revolutionary” government, but only through promises of faster reform and punishment of corrupt officials. The student elections were a clear reminder of the limits within which he must work. Increasingly, the BDG and the Sheikh himself will be liable to criticism. Public opinion will become a significant factor in BDG policy decisions, and because the leftists, who are very strong among the students and many of the ex-freedom fighters, are the most vocal and effective of pressure groups, it is likely that the BDG will tend to tilt toward the left. The honeymoon is over for the BDG. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH. Confidential. Drafted in INR/DDR/RNA by David C. McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis F. Jones. 425. Telegram CONTO 237 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 425. Telegram CONTO 237 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 Islamabad, July 6, 1972, 0852Z Subject: Secretary Connally’s July 3 Meeting With Bangladesh Foreign Minister Summary: After tracing history of liberation movement, Foreign Minister Samad said situation in Bangladesh now stable, good law and order prevailed and democratic process was working effectively. Although BDG had previously felt US administration pro-Pakistan, it was now happy with US-BD relationship and thankful for generous US assistance. Simla summit appeared to have made progress but Bhutto must recognize Bangladesh. Hoped US would use its influence with GOP re Bengalis in Pakistan while noting that Biharis well taken care of. Re foreign policy, Bangladesh wanted non-alignment, qte free zone unqte in Bay of Bengal, membership in United Nations (for which US support solicited), and closer association with countries in Southeast Asia. Secretary Connally said USG could agree with almost all BDG aspirations but corrected Samad’s contention US was pro-Pakistan during 1971. US wished Bangladesh every success, sought no special privileges or advantages in area and would help Bangladesh with UN membership. Was noncommittal re approach to GOP on Bengalis. Noted US had no designs on any part of South Asia and hoped external powers likewise had no designs. End summary. 1. Secretary Connally met for one hour and quarter July 3 with Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad. Samad accompanied by foreign secretary Karim, S.A.M Kibria and Rexaul Karim of Foreign Office and J.Karim, BDG Charge in Washington. Spivack, Hennessy, Van Hollen, Donley and Hoskinson sat in with Secretary. 2. Foreign Minister opened with comment Bangladesh had taken considerable inspiration from American independence being celebrated following day. He then entered into detailed description of events leading up to outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan during 1971, noting that as result of fighting 10 million Bengalis had fled to India, about 3 million had been killed and many women raped by Pakistan soldiers or Biharis. However, with attainment independence there was now law and order, democratic process was in operation and freedom of press existed. 3. Samad expressed pleasure USG had realized political realities of Bangladesh as well as gigantic tasks new government faced and had contributed generous assistance, first through UN and later bilaterally. BDG was grateful to people and press of United States although at first it had felt US administration had favored Pakistan regime. Now, however, Bangladesh people were friendly to United States which recently had established Embassy in Dacca and governmental relations good. 4. Expressing hope for durable peace in sub-continent, Foreign Minister noted recent Indo-Pak summit at Simla had resulted in some steps forward which was also favorable sign for Bangladesh. Secretary Connally had correctly stated in his arrival remarks at airport that settlement in South Asia must be worked out by the people of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, there were about one-half million Bengalis still in Pakistan and although BDG had agreed to variety of proposals for repatriation, including initial exchange of 1,000 Bengalis in Pakistan for like number people in Bangladesh, GOP had reneged and Bengali plight remained serious. Therefore BDG hoped USG would use its influence with GOP to expedite Bengalis’ return. Bhutto must recognize that he only represents Pakistan and consequently must recognize Bangladesh whose people have no enmity for people of Pakistan. 5. Samad then raised Bihari question noting that BDG was providing them shelter and food in excess of amounts received by population at large. Biharis were being well attended by both ICRC and Bangladesh Red Cross. 6. Turning to BD foreign policy and reading from briefing paper, Samad emphasized basic underlying principle was non-alignment. Bangladesh wanted to steer clear of super-power involvments and achieve economic self reliance. It did not want to divert scarce resources to military build-up but rather rely on non-aligned foreign policy for its defense. BDG wanted friendship with all countries including China and hoped China would soon recognize BD. Bay of Bengal should remain qte free zone unqte within which no foreign naval bases should be established. Soviet ships clearing Chittagong Harbor were there only on temporary basis because UN could not provide alternative harbor-clearing facilities soon enough. 7. Recalling USG had already supported Bangladesh’s entry into several international organizations Samad said BDG would soon apply for UN membership and hoped for US support. Also would appreciate assessment of prospects for BD membership. 8. Re Middle East BDG did not support acquisition of territory by force but supported settlement on basis of November 1967 UN resolution. 9. Concluding Samad recounted components in recent US assistance to Bangladesh noting again that BDG was particularly grateful. Wished to thank USG for very good beginning in bilateral relations. Such aid was particularly favorable because no political strings were attached and aid was not specifically tied to US purchases. Noted that US administration had also requested $100 million for FY 1973, adding that Bangladesh was also interested in IDA lending when available. 10. Secretary Connally, in thanking Samad for his exposition on Bangladesh policy, said US symphathized with Bangladesh problems and he could agree with almost everything Samad had said. However, did wish make brief comment in response Samad’s remark USG policy in 1971 appeared pro-Pakistan. From US perspective we did not feel we had taken Pakistan’s side. President Nixon had been consumed with effort to create atmosphere to reduce international tensions and contribute to stable world peace. That was reason he went to Peking and Moscow. US had contributed to Bengali refugee relief more than twice as much as all countries outside South Asia. While we could understand why BDG might feel US was taking sides, USG did not hold similar view but rather had worked actively for political settlement which, unfortunately, could not be achieved. 11. Secretary stressed US wished every success for Bangladesh from which US did not want anything except friendship and cooperation. We did not for example want any special position in Bangladesh or in India or Pakistan. We wanted all parties to exercise restraint and wanted to help where possible. We had deep understanding of Bangladesh-Pakistan problem having ourselves suffered civil war a century ago. 12. Re Bangladesh membership in UN Secretary said we would try to be helpful. He could not imagine US would not support Bangladesh membership when application was entered, although someone might veto application. In any event we would provide our assessment of Bangladesh’s prospects for membership. We would also take look at what we might do with regard issue of Bengalis in Pakistan although our basic stance was to remain detached and let countries directly involved sort out own problems. What was needed was cooperation and coordination between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Further outbreaks of violence in South Asia, where 700 million people lived, could release major destructive force in world. Secretary agreed Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto seemed to have made some progress at Simla and noted that some day soon Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto would have to get together. Reaffirmed US had no designs on South Asia, emphasizing we hoped no other external power had any designs either. 13. In response to question, Samad said his recent visits to Burma, Malaysia and Singapore had been designed to strengthen ties in Southeast Asia, area in which Bangladesh interests lay but which had been neglected during period of West Pakistan rule. During visits discussions had focused on methods of improving telecommunications between Bangladesh and Southeast Asian countries and increasing trade, including trade in rice. Bangladesh was link between South Asia and Southeast Asia and hoped exploit its geographic position. At present Bangladesh had decided not to enter into formal regional arrangements with other Southeast Asian countries, such as ASEAN, and this position had been conveyed to leaders of countries Samad had visited. China’s attitude toward Bangladesh was not clear and there had been no formal contact to date. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Confidential; Exdis. Also numbered telegram 5842. Repeated to Bangkok, Bombay, Budapest for the Secretary’s party, Dacca, Calcutta, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Madras, Rangoon, Singapore, and USUN. Sent to the White House for Davis, to the Treasury for Dixon, and to the Department of State for A/OPR, S/S, and NEA. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon’s request to review matters of mutual interest with host governments. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 426. Telegram CONTO 262 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 426. Telegram CONTO 262 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, July 8, 1972, 0700Z Subject: Secretary Connally Travel Memorandum of conversation from meeting with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur in Dacca on July 3, 1972 1. At the outset the conversation which I held alone with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman extended President Nixon’s greetings and complimented Mujib on the fact that he had taken a war-torn country and restored civil order in a matter of a few months, which was a great tribute to the qualities of leadership which he had demonstrated to the Bangladesh people. I told him that the President had asked me to discuss with him President Nixon’s visit to Peking and Moscow and to the extent that he was interested, the international monetary and economic problems as we saw them. I also wanted his evaluation of the situation in South Asia to take back to President Nixon. 2. Almost from the outset, Sheikh Mujibur started with a long impassioned recount of what had happened to the Bengalis in the last 18 months. He apologized at least four times during this recount for getting into it—for talking about it. Quote I know I am telling you information you already know. Unquote And on another occasion: Quote I don’t want to bore you but I must recount some of these things for you. Unquote. 3. He talked about the Bangladesh people; their desires for independence and went into great detail in talking about the atrocities which he claimed had been perpetrated by the Pakistani Army on the people. 4. He said when he got out of jail and came home that he found sheer chaos. He wanted to thank President Nixon and the US for his life, saying: Quote I know that you interceded to save me and I am very grateful. Unquote. He said that there was no food—that 10 million of his people had fled as refugees to India, although he could not be precise about the 10 million. Perhaps he was off 10 percent, maybe only 9 million, but there were millions homeless and foodless. Three million of his people had been killed—many in a very brutal and barbarous fashion. He did not count all the bodies and could not be sure, perhaps only two million, but there was hardly a family in Bangladesh that did not lose a member of the family or was not personally aware of the war crimes committed against quote my people unquote. His own father, who was 80 years old, saw a member of his family and five servants shot down before his eyes. His brother’s house was burned (this was what I understood him to say). His sister was homeless and started walking to India to seek refuge from the cruelty. 5. He found many of the teachers, many of the professional people, many civil servants had been tortured and killed in the most cruel and inhumane fashion. In one of the hospitals in Dacca, there is a plaque with the names of 40 doctors in that hospital who were annihilated. He recounted that eye doctors were taken out and their eye balls pulled out of their sockets before they were killed. Heart doctors had their chests cut open and their hearts removed while they were still living. He recounted that his wife had gone to a prisoner camp where there were 7,000 girls imprisoned. She had talked to a 13-year old girl who was in a state of hysteria and told his wife that she had been taken to a Pakistani soldiers camp where she was forced to stay for three months and she was raped from 10 to 15 times a night every night during this period. That she was pregnant as were tens of thousands of Bengalese women. That there were over 200,000 women who desperately needed medical assistance and abortions because these young and old women were bearing children that they did not want. During this period of recounting these stories, he was obviously expressing a very deep and emotional feeling about the circumstances which he found. 6. He then recounted his own political experiences in his own life after recalling the trials of the Bengalis and their quest for freedom dating back to 1885 when they first led a revolt against the British. He talked about his own experiences of being jailed—that he had returned after the cease fire to a devastated land to try to pick up the pieces and lead his people into a period of peace and tranquility and progress. He obviously had very difficult problems of law and order. There were still guerrillas in the land. Hundreds of thousands of people had been armed. He had travelled the country appealing for the Bengalis to turn in their arms and over 200,000 rifles had been turned in and he used these weapons to arm the army and the police force in all the villages. He found that many of his policemen had been killed by the Pakistanis along with the civil servants, the professional people, the educators, the intellectuals. the atrocities were aimed at the police force also. He said quote I cannot say that all of the arms have been turned in—I think no. Unquote. But relative peace had been restored and administrative control obtained in most of the country. They were trying to get food to their people and he was very aware and grateful for the assistance from the United States—the relief and rehabilitation, the food and funds supplied. Their problem was one of getting it distributed because the ports were clogged, the trucks destroyed, the facilities gone. It had been terrible and difficult, the position in which they found themselves. 7. At this point I said to him that he was obviously very moved and felt very deeply about what had transpired. I asked if under these circumstances he could with equilibrium sit down and discuss in a very rational manner with President Bhutto the resolution of some of their problems in the event the circumstances presented themselves. He said he could but not until Bhutto first recognized Bangladesh. Quote we are free. We are no longer a part of Pakistan. This is a reality. He must recognize this. The world has recognized this and he must first do that unquote. 8. I told him that we did not want to intrude on the situation or inject ourselves into the discussion of the many problems that existed. But I nonetheless wondered whether matters could be structured in such a way that he and President Bhutto might be able to start discussions as soon as possible toward solving some of the issues. specifically, what were the primary issues? 9. To my surprise, he indicated that the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan was a matter of the utmost if not the paramount importance. He stated that Pakistan was holding some 20,000 Bengali soldiers and, in total, they were holding a half million Bengalis, many civil servants and many business people, he said they were being kept in camps without proper care and food and some of them were being tortured. I asked if these people had indicated that they wanted to come to Bangladesh. He replied that the businessmen had their businesses taken away from them, that they had no means of livelihood. The soldiers were imprisoned, the civil servants were out of jobs. They were Bengalis and of course they would come if they were permitted to do so. 10. I expressed the view that although we were not going to involve ourselves, it was our hope—and I would express the same hope to Mrs. Gandhi and President Bhutto—that none of them do anything which would make it more difficult for a rational discussion to be held and hopefully an acceptable solution reached to the very emotional and difficult problems which faced the sub-continent. 11. I then asked what he planned to do with respect to the prisoners of war. From the press accounts he was demanding that there be trials. He said: Quote we must try them. They must pay for these crimes. Not all 1500 but maybe 300, maybe 200, or maybe 100, but we must have some trials. They must be tried on this soil for the crimes committed on this soil. Unquote. 12. He said some trials were inevitable and it was inevitable that Pakistan recognize Bangladesh before any conference could take place. I asked if he had talked to President Bhutto. He replied he had talked to Bhutto twice while in prison. In December and January Bhutto had sent for him and attempted then to negotiate some of the problems which had arisen—such as for the prisoners of war. Mujib replied that he could not negotiate, that he held no position of power but rather that he was a prisoner of war. This was what he told Bhutto the first time he sent for Mujib; this was what he told Bhutto the second time he sent for Mujib. He told Bhutto he could not speak for quote my people unquote. He was in jail and a prisoner. 13. We were having a very open and frank discussion and at this point I told him that I well understood the depth of his feelings about all that had occurred. I knew that many of his people, including his Foreign Minister with whom I had talked, felt that the United States had sided with the Pakistanis in their struggle. Perhaps he felt the same way. He said he did, but what was past is past. I responded by saying that in all fairness I felt he should know that we in the United States did not feel we had sided with the Pakistanis against him. I said I understood his feeling but I hoped he would accept the truth and sincerity with which I spoke in that we did not feel that we had sided against him. We had tried to do everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolution of a rapidly deteriorating political situation. We hoped we could avert a war. We felt that it would be the worst of all endings but we failed. Inevitably we were in the posture of being in the middle and, even though we tried to help reach an amicable solution, the Pakistanis also felt that we failed to support them. This was unfortunately the position of a mediator when his efforts fail and war erupts. 14. He responded by saying that it did no good to relive the past and what was over was over. Quote we are grateful for your help now. We need your help. Unquote. On my part, I went on to stress that we sought nothing from him except his friendship and that we wished him well. I told him we sought no sphere of influence with his nation or any other country in the sub-continent. We hoped no other major power would seek such influence. He responded by saying that whether or not anyone sought it they would not get it. He was grateful for our help and India’s help. India was the salvation of his independence but the Bengalis had fought for their independence and they were going to protect that independence. Their gratitude would not make them become subservient to India or anybody else. They had the air around them, the soil beneath them and the sea around them; the air, the soil and the sea were Bangladesh and they would fight to keep it so, but they wanted to be neutral and non-aligned. At this point I interrupted to say we applauded his ambitions for both neutrality and non-alignment. He said we don’t want to become involved as a strategic tool of major powers. Quote we have more than we can do in trying to establish our country. We cannot fight anybody. We are poor, we are weak. Unquote. 15. Mujib said one of the problems that brought on the trouble was that Pakistan devotes 6o percent of its budget to defense. This was an incredible waste. Bangladesh was a poor nation and surely could not survive with such an allotment. It was a quote criminal act unquote to use this money for military purposes when people were homeless and hungry. Bangladesh wanted to be left alone. When Sheikh Mujib was talking about the return of the Bengalis from Pakistan, he said, he had many people who had not been loyal to the independence movement, who wanted to go home and who owed their loyalty to Pakistan. They should be permitted to go. 16. I asked whether he was talking about the Biharis and he said quote some of them unquote. Some of them were not loyal to his country and he thought President Bhutto should take them. If they have not been disloyal to our fight for freedom and if they will pledge their loyalty to us we would be glad to have them stay here. we believe in democracy, we believe in socialism, secularism and nationalism. 17. I said I assume then that your country will have no prejudice on the basis of religion. He said none whatever. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, whatever—if they pledge allegiance to this country and if they are loyal, we will be glad we have them. Notwithstanding that some of them want to leave and do not want to be part of this country, we have given them food and we have treated them like they were all Bengalis. 18. Comment: Without attempting to quote him, his discussions reflected an acute awareness of his problems of administration. The thrust of much of what he said, including his adamant stand on having the Bengalis in Pakistan returned to Bangladesh, was interpreted by me to mean he was desperate for the 20,000 soldiers to come back to help him form the nucleus of his army and police force in the country. His desperate need for the knowledge and the abilities of the civil servants, the professional and business people. He did not express it in these strong terms, but the clear implication was that he needed the soldiers to build his army and the business and professional people to help him build an economy. It is my own evaluation, that this is the real motive for the return of the Bengalis, in addition, of course, to the emotional desires that are apparent. He clearly outlined the many problems that has in terms of trying to build a government structure at the national and local levels. He clearly recognizes the need for talent, skills and good management. End comment. 19. Mujib emphasized time and again that his country was bankrupt and in desperate straits because West Pakistan had always robbed East Pakistan of all foreign exchange. They took their foreign currency from the sale of jute and used it in West Pakistan. They took the tea from the tea gardens and what they didn’t use in West Pakistan they brokered and resold to the Middle East and kept the money. 20. In response to my question concerning the liquidation of assets and liabilities between Pakistan and Bangladesh, he said, whatever quote they unquote have in the treasury belongs to us. We control the government. We had an election in 1970 and won. We control the majority of the government. The assets of the government are ours and they would be ours if it were not for the military take over and reprisals and the refusal of the military to put into effect the results of the election process. 21. He specifically asked that the US sponsor Bangladesh’s entry into the United Nations. I responded that I did not see any reason we could not support his entry into the UN as we had done for other nations. This didn’t satisfy him and he came right back and asked for more than our support. He said he hoped the US would take the initiative and sponsor Bangladesh entry into the UN. He asserted that only the US could assure Bangladesh entry into the UN. 22. I responded that we cannot assure Bangladesh entry into the UN since a veto might be cast by another country. I told him that if he thought we could control the votes of those who have the power to veto then he had not been following the actions of the UN in recent months. He said, he knew the Chinese might cast a veto and that the US could not control China, but if the US took the initiative and if the Chinese did cast a veto, he would certainly understand that it was not our fault. If China did cast a veto, he said he would lodge a complaint with the UN that Pakistan should be removed from the UN. He would charge that the nation of Pakistan, which now holds membership in the UN, is basically Bangladesh. We, he said, are the majority of the people. We won the elections. But in any event the remaining people who call themselves Pakistan were not admitted to the UN. There has been a division of the nation since that time and they are not the same creatures who applied for membership. He said he did not want to raise this issue and did not want to hurt Pakistan. Qte I want to leave them alone; I want them to be happy. They have enough problems of their own. I want them to leave me alone unquote. He added that he only wanted them quote to face reality unquote. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also numbered telegram 4084. Sent with instructions to pass to New Delhi, Dacca, Islamabad, the White House for Davis, the Treasury for Dixon, and the Department for S/S, A/OPR, and NEA. 427. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 427. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 15, 1972 SUBJECT: Relief Assistance Totals for Bangladesh The following are the totals on relief assistance for Bangladesh from January 1 through June 30, 1972, as compiled by the United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca: Contributions from 20 other nations, the EEC and private sources $533.64 million Contributions from the USA $263.27 million Total Contributions $796.91 million The U.S. contribution thus stands at 33% of the total international contribution, which was the share approved by you in February. The composition of the U.S. contribution is as follows: To U.S. Voluntary Agencies $14.94 million To UN Relief Operation $35.30 million To the Government of Bangladesh $115.00 million Other (transportation) $7.28 million PL 480 $90.75 million Total $263.27 million The bilateral grants to the Bangladesh government were made at the end of May and in June after your instruction to provide as much of our assistance as possible bilaterally. The recognition of Bangladesh on April 5 had made it possible to begin making that shift from the UN channel. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on July 15, in which he noted that “according to Saunders’ bookkeeping” the United States had maintained the 33% contribution level stipulated by Nixon. In a handwritten note on the covering memorandum Kissinger expressed his doubts: “I am sure bookkeeping is crooked. Last year above total was 67%.” Despite his reservations, Kissinger initialed the memorandum and sent it to the President. 428. Information Memorandum From the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Laingen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 428. Information Memorandum From the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Laingen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) 1 Washington, August 3, 1972 SUBJECT: Response to Million-Ton Foodgrain Appeal for Bangladesh You will recall that on May 31 the UN Secretary General made an appeal for one million tons of foodgrains for Bangladesh for the remainder of the calendar year. To date in response to this appeal commitments are as follows: Country Thousands of Tons United States 350 EEC 128 Japan 61.1* India 50 Canada 50 Australia 40 ** Pakistan 22 UK 20 737.1 The US contribution includes 150 thousand tons valued at approximately $20 million which is additional to the $267.5 million previous total of US relief to Bangladesh, and which is scheduled to be announced shortly. Attached for your information is AID’s latest compilation of data on foreign contributions to Bangladesh relief. * under very concessional 30-year loan agreement ** possible this may increase by 10,000 tons 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 16, AID 1, AID to Bangladesh 1972. Limited Official Use. Drafted in NEA/PAB by W. Scott Butcher. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published. 429. Telegram 4591 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 429. Telegram 4591 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, November 1, 1972, 1101Z Subject: Mujib Requests More Foodgrains Ref: (A) Dacca 4454, (B) Dacca 4497 1. Charge invited to call on Prime Minister Nov 1. Mujib came to point immediately and in order meet expected serious shortage in near future, requested USG supply foodgrains ASAP, first ship to arrive in January. Acknowledged that UNROD assessing foodgrain requirement and may issue appeal for further food aid but asserted this too slow a process. To underline urgency of need, Mujib said he willing buy foodgrain under long or short term credit or even for cash. Said BD already buying from Burma, Thailand, Japan, and Singapore. 2. Charge responded by stating USG would be willing to help within our limited availabilities, in UN context, with others contributing their share. Emphasized need for adequate data base as reationale for request, as sought when food aid discussions held Washington early October with Finance Minister and Deputy Chairman Planning Commission. Also expressed view that in order to get foodgrains here by January, one route for BDG to follow would seem be to purchase commercially, drawing on currently high foreign exchange reserves (87 million pound sterling), rather than waiting for bilateral or muliteral assistance from afar. 3. Canadian HiCom also called in by Mujib. He reported pitch was much the same. In September Canadians had responded to earlier urgent request by explaining that shipping not available and probably would not be until March. HiCom suggested that if aman crop low, shortfall will not be felt until after January. Vice President, Canadian International Development Agency, arriving Nov 19 will be willing to discuss Canadian contribution to meet longer-term requirement at that time. 4. Australian HiCom said he was not rpt not invited by Mujib to call. He had been approached by Food Minister in mid-Sept. Canberra advised Australia lacked grain even for straight commercial sale of 100,000 tons. 5. Japanese Counselor reported that acting on behalf Mujib, Minister Industries sought Japanese food aid ten days ago. Japanese Embassy has been cabling Tokyo to speed up negotiation re 100,000 tons deferred-payment rice, but according Counselor, surplus disappearing and number of serious intra-GOJ problems remain. Counselor thinking of recommending foodgrains be provided as grant. In response to BDG, could only indicate that 50,000 tons of earlier deferred-payment rice arriving shortly in Chittagong. 6. In call on Umbricht, UNROD, Charge was informed that cable had just gone off to UN, forecasting 20 per cent short-fall of foodgrain supply against requirement. 100,000 ton gap which Umbricht said had been anticipated following response to SecGen appeal in may had now materialized. Umbricht cited as main reason for inadequate production here: drought conditions, fertilizer shortage, and low number of water pumps put to work. 7. In light worldwide tightness foodgrain supply, Umbricht felt only way situation might be relieved here would be by diverting to BD US grain ship going elsewhere. Said he had recommended UN raise this with USG. FYI: Umbricht discussed possibility diversion US vessel for arrival prior aman harvest; however, we advised that this unrealistic. Previously he had not discussed possible diversion for arrival in early 1973. End FYI. Assume diversion early 1973 not feasible but would appreciate Washington reaction. 8. Throughout discussion PriMin was vague in his references to amounts and timing of foodgrain arrivals. We continue believe estimates contained para 8 ref A are within resonable limits and that, as per ref B, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible for BDG initiate aggressive internal procurement policies following aman harvest. 9. Question food will remain at center of BDG economic and political concern. While fully aware difficulties these questions pose for Washington believe Mujib’s personal overture impels US to look for early response to questions raised para 9 ref A. Also urge immediate approach to UN be taken to determine state of its consideration of possible interim appeal, either public or private and direct, to major food suppliers. Newberry 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Islamabad, New Delhi for Williams, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN. Sent as a joint Embassy/USCOR message. 430. Telegram 4747 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 430. Telegram 4747 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, November 13, 1972, 1142Z Subject: Foodgrain Supply to Bangladesh Ref: State 202246 (NOTAL) Summary Mujib informed of USG willingness provide 100,000 tons wheat for arrival in January. BDG making commercial purchases as well—50,000 tons of rice from Thailand and Burma and 100,000 tons of wheat from continental grain, NY. Gap between this procurement and UN delared target 700,000 tons first quarter CY 1974 still great. Other sources foodgrains (outside Pakistan) may not be able to supply. BDG Food Secy has urged cash donations in lieu to enable BDG continue to make commercial purchases. End summary. 1. November 11 Charge informed Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman that in response to UN appeal for 700,000 tons foodgrains, USG prepared to provide 100,000 tons wheat for arrival in January. In accordance with reftel. Charge also told Mujib we can reasonably hope to supply another 100,000 tons during balance this fiscal year, but in all probability no more than that. 2. To emphasize latter point, Charge supplied Mujib with summary statement on tightness of foodgrain supply worldwide 3. Mujib expressed gratitude and went on to report that BDG was purchasing commercially as well—30,000 tons of rice from Thailand, 20,000 tons rice from Burma, and 100,000 tons wheat from Canada. We have been unable confirm Canadian purchase either with Canadian High Commission or Food Grain Secretary, BDG. Latter speculated that Mujib’s office may have confused commercial purchase from Canada with one of same magnitude from Continental Grain, New York, contract for which signed Dacca November 11. 4. Mujib did not request amplification USG foodgrain supply nor did he comment on gap between 100,000 tons from US and 700,000 ton requirement. Food Secretary did so, however, and urged that aid donors unable to supply further foodgrains consider providing cash in response UN appeal. Pointed out that BDG had agreed pay very high price to Thailand and Burma in order lay basis for future government-to-government purchases by BDG. Had also agreed that since US unable to ship rice, it in addition consider cash donation to enable BDG to continue to buy on world market. In this connnection mentioned purchases “through Singapore” (i.e., of West Pakistan rice). 5. Continental Grain’s rep Amram, now in Dacca, has told us their position Pak rice “strong”. He had almost gained BDG clearance to seek 100,000 tons via Singapore but last minute hitches have developed. Umbricht UNROD advises that another Pak rice deal was in train but was canceled when Paks allegedly tried to raise price yet higher. Singapore intermediary forced to withdraw from contract and pay penalty clause. According Umbricht, BDG not inclined consider further purchase Pak rice. 6. We have informed Canadians, Australians, and Japanese of USG response to UN appeal. None of them could give much assurance that their govts could provide foodgrains. Canadian International Development Agency chief arriving shortly and Canadian High Commission has urged that he come prepared to make some sort of offer of food side. 7. Japanese indicated only that GOJ moving to provide 12,500 tons rice as part of Kennedy round commitment. Did not see much hope in early shipment “deferred-payment” rice. We emphasized that if foodgrains could not be supplied in adequate measure, GOJ consider cash donation as its response UN appeal. Newberry 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Unclassified; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Islamabad, Karachi, New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN. 431. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 431. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 22, 1972 SUBJECT: Bangladesh Debate in UNGA The Bangladesh membership issue could come up for debate in the UN General Assembly on Friday. As it now shapes up: —The Indians are backing and have asked us to co-sponsor a Yugoslav resolution calling for the Security Council to admit Bangladesh to the UN. Ambassador Jha has put the issue in terms that our agreeing to co-sponsor “would be giving right signals to India on a whole gamut of things” and our opposition would be interpreted as the US joining forces with China against India’s interests. The Yugoslav resolution will probably win a strong majority. —The Paks will attempt to amend the Yugoslav resolution to link Bangladesh membership with fulfillment of the UN resolutions during the India-Pakistan war last December (essentially at this point return of prisoners and withdrawal of Indian forces from Pak territory). This amendment has little or no chance of passing, although the Chinese will vote for it. We voted for a similar “linkage” amendment in the Security Council in August and then, when that was defeated, went on to vote for a simple Yugoslav-type amendment. —A third alternative will be a separate resolution not directly linking Bangladesh admission with implementation of the UN resolutions but “associating” the two questions by treating them in the same resolution. This could take the form of an amendment to the Yugoslav resolution. Either way, this would be unsatisfactory to the Paks and Chinese. There is no issue about our vote on the Yugoslav resolution as such since it is entirely consistent with the low-key position we have taken all along favoring Bangladesh admission. To co-sponsor, however, would probably be more exposure than we would want. Nor would we have any problem with a resolution or amendment “associating” but not “linking” Bangladesh membership with fulfillment of previous UN resolutions. It might even be preferable if there were support. The only real issue, therefore, is how we want to vote on the “linkage” amendment that the Paks and Chinese are promoting. We voted for an amendment like this, which failed, in the Security Council last August and if we need to remain consistent we should do so again. The question is whether the passage of time, our having met whatever our initial agreement with the Chinese was, and our present interest in modest improvements in relations with India in any way changes the situation. As I see it, the one real question now is whether we would abstain rather than voting for a “linkage” resolution. Thus, in the end, the issue boils down to your judgment of the value of sending a positive signal to the Indians by abstaining or voting against linkage versus remaining in a consistent position relating to the Chinese (and to a lesser degree the Paks). Recommendation : That you indicate below your preference. Vote for “linkage” again Abstain on “linkage” this time Vote against “linkage” this time 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. In a November 23 note attached to the memorandum, Richard Kennedy informed Saunders that Kissinger had decided that the United States should hold to its former position on the issue. 432. Telegram 5451 Fromthe Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 432. Telegram 5451 Fromthe Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 19, 1972, 1200Z Subj: Initial FY 73 Grant to Bangladesh Summary: Embassy sees possibility to focus on signing first FY 73 aid agreement as occasion to have Awami League cabinet make symbolic gesture to indicate it does not intend to disavow responsibility for BDG’s acceptance of US aid. Action reduested: Instructions for discussing arrangements with BDG for concluding agreement. End summary. 1. Considerations of timely and orderly operations of AID/W and USCOR argue strongly for prompt signature of initial agreement with BDG in amount recommended reftel. Embassy is in accord with those considerations and wishes to avert program disruptions and management problems that would ensue from protracted delay in signing agreement. 2. We would foresee no difficulty from BDG side if Mujib government were willing to remove US aid as an issue from Awami League election campaign oratory. Manner of achieving this objective requires keen judgement on how best to insure long-term posture which Embassy and USIS are convinced it is necessary to assume at this time for sake of present and future aid relationship with BDG. 3. Charge d’Affaires cites unfortunate weakness of senior Awami League politicians (notably Finance Minister Tajuddin) for displaying in public oratory that they are more “anti-imperialist” than their Marxist rivals. Such oratory has tended to give currency to myth that US assistance to Bangladesh has somehow been insinuated behind backs of BD patriots. Unconscious assumptions take root that there is something shameful about accepting US aid and something sinister about our motives in giving it. Temptation of Awami Leaguers to play this theme—implicitly or explicitly—likely to grow during electoral campaign now begun. Such psychological backdrop could have—and may already have had—intimidating effect on BDG working level civil servants. 4. Embassy is convinced we cannot look forward to healthy or effective working relationship in implementation our aid projects unless we and BDG leaders dispel notion, that US aid programs are foisted on BD civil servants without concurrence of Awami League political leaders within BDG. 5. Charge believes that we have opportunity now to incorporate important point in scenario for signing FY 73 agreement. He therefore requests Washington guidance which would permit him either (a) to insist politely but firmly that new agreement be signed in public ceremony presided over by relevant BDG Cabinet Minister (preferably finance or foreign affairs) or (b) to induce BDG take some other step at ministerial level which would make clear to public that Awami League government not a party to hostile anti-US aid oratory or (c) delay signing until after March 7 elections. 6. Embassy conception scenario “a” does not envisage Cabinet Minister’s actually signing agreement. (It seems that BDG has fallen in with hoary tradition dating from British Raj calling for senior civil servant, such as Finance Secretary, to perform signature). 7. Cabinet Minister’s presence at signing ceremony (and Embassy-BDG discussions leading up to such arrangement) could drive home point that we do not expect Awami League to disavow responsibility for acceptance US aid or to impute clandestine motives on our part. 8. Embassy, in looking for opportunity to establish this element in our stance in Dacca, is not thereby inclined to depart from “low profile” which has characterized our activities here since BD independence. 9. Obviously we do not want to—indeed we must not—give occasion for inference that USG attempting to attenuate doctrinaire “socialist” orientation of BD regime now formally enshrined in BD constitution. 10. There could be ideological booby trap for us in reaching for our objective symbolically in signature ceremony. If BD leaders find signature ceremony unpalatable, BDG might come up with acceptable alternative. 11. For all we know BDG may offer no hesitation in providing relevant Cabinet Minister preside over signing under eyes of television and press cameras. Foreign Minister’s repeated protestations that he is seeking ways to deepen and strengthen BD-US relations would suggest ready acceptance. 12. On other hand, if Department considers that it would be politically too risky at this moment to take initiative in asking BDG to stage such ceremony or provide Bengalee-devised alternative, we should be ready to sit tight and wait for BDG overture. We then would respond that USG willing to wait until after BD elections since US assistance so patently a difficult subject for Awami League candidates to handle. Naturally we should have to weigh question as to whether USG inactivity might be construed as pressure to influence elections. 13. We should be sorry for many reasons—not least of which are loss of operational lead time in AID/W—if we are constrained to wait until after March elections to sign. Alternative, however, is to proceed with signature as though BDG civil service is merely initialling add-on to prior aid agreements still dimly understood by BD public and Awami League. For us to sign agreement in midst of political campaign while Awami League leaders are excoriating USG invites ridicule. Furthermore, we ought not to encourage state of mind among those Bengalees who would like to think that they are entitled to unlimited aid from USG of indefinite duration by way of expiating past US support of Pakistani oppressors. 14. To proceed as in para 13 alternative invites future misconstruction and misunderstanding—both in BD and with US Congress and public—in years ahead during which BDG so clearly and painfully will need our help. 15. Action reouested: Instructions (1) to approach BDG for arrangements signature first FY 73 agreement in early January on basis scenario “a” or “b” or (2) guidance to use with BDG if Department and AID/W prefer to delay signature until after March elections. Newberry 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis. 433. National Intelligence Estimate 32.1–72 433. National Intelligence Estimate 32.1–72 1 Washington, December 21, 1972 BANGLADESH NOTE This is the first National Intelligence Estimate on Bangladesh. Hence, more background data than usual on social, economic, and political conditions are included. Though the statistics are the best available, most should be regarded as rough general indicators. There are other peculiar problems in estimating about the country. These include its newness, the untested nature of its institutions, the lack or limited relevance of historical precedents as criteria for estimative judgments. There is also the uniqueness of an independent country suddenly facing problems of population and poverty on the scale involved here—a matter previously obscured by the area’s incorporation into a larger entity. These problems are especially acute in relation to long-term political assessments, which is uncharted territory. Fundamental aspects of the economy are more familiar, but new uncertainties have been introduced here as well—particularly as retards relationships between the course of economic developments and related political or social questions. This Estimate should be read with these caveats in mind. SUMMARY A. With about 75 million people living in a small, predominantly rural area, Bangladesh is the world’s most overcrowded country, and one of the poorest. In contrast to the peoples of the other states of the subcontinent, Bengalees are for the most part ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, and live in a fairly egalitarian society. There are some tensions, however, between the predominantly Muslim majority and the Hindus who make up about 15 percent of the population. B. Bangladesh’s population, growing at a rate of between 2.5 and 3.5 percent a year (statistics are unreliable), could double in 20–25 years. Population control efforts have so far not been effective and are not likely to have much impact for many years, if ever. C. The Bengalee economy is primarily agricultural, with most farmers living at the subsistence level. Prospects for large-scale industrialization are poor. Until the mid-1960s, the area enjoyed a trade surplus, exporting such products as jute, paper products, and tea. In recent year, changing export markets and increasing imports of food have given it a trade deficit. The government is now seeking to increase the production of export commodities and of food. D. The 1971 wars inflicted serious damage on some sectors of the economy, particularly on transportation facilities. Relief and reconstruction efforts, both by the Bangladesh Government and by outside sources have been fairly successful. E. Foreign aid is playing a critical role both in rehabilitation efforts and in financing agrarian development. To date, Bangladesh has received about $1 billion in pledges of aid (about a third from the US); it plans to have spent about half that by mid-1973. F. Bangladesh’s economic prospects are unpromising. It will need substantial foreign aid in the next few years, but cannot be sure that it will get it. It will probably be able to maintain sales of jute, the principal export, but will find it difficult to expand them appreciably. The rice harvest in the current crop year (July 1972-June 1973) will be disappointing, but production may rise in later years. The government plans to increase the production of rice so as to be self-sufficient in food by 1975. To do so will require heavy and successful application of the inputs of the Green Revolution and the prospects for success must be considered uncertain. At best, Bangladesh will see a constant race between an exploding population and efforts to feed itself. G. The new Bangladesh administrative apparatus, despite considerable ineptitude, is in control of the country. Now a functioning and accepted institution, it could probably survive any but the most critical challenge. Serious law and order problems which existed in early 1972 have been alleviated, though not fully solved, by the recruitment of a new police force and army. We judge that these services can maintain an acceptable level of public security against the kinds of threats they are likely to be faced with. H. Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) and his party, the Awami League, dominate Bangladesh’s political life. Barring an electoral upset in March 1973, they will continue to do so. Mujib will continue a moderate posture at home, and a non-aligned one abroad. I. Mujib is so important to the political system that his departure would be a traumatic event, though chaos would not automatically ensue. His successor would come from his political party, and might be forced to rely on the new armed forces to remain in power. J. The country’s enduring economic troubles will assure continued political difficulties—though not necessarily calamity. Even with Mujib in office, Bengalee politics are likely to see a process of radicalization, though perhaps not as severe as that in the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal. Pan-Bengalism may become a rallying cry for some elements in Bangladesh, but a union of Bangladesh with West Bengal will be highly unlikely. K. Bangladesh’s poverty and weakness set severe limits on the role it will play in the subcontinent and on the world scene. It will seek amicable relations with neighboring South Asian and Southeast Asian states, and will hope to get as much economic assistance as it can from the world’s principal powers. Consistent with its relations with India, it will play a generally passive role on the world scene and will try to avoid offending most outside states. L. The USSR’s efforts to cultivate Bangladesh have been quite extensive. The Soviets are probably seeking to ensure that the Bengalees will continue to work with them and the Indians in preference to establishing working relations with China. they may hope to gain access to repair or supply facilities in Bangladesh’ ports in connection with their Indian Ocean naval presence; but there is no evidence that they have asked for such access, and Mujib has repeatedly said that he has no intention of granting such privileges to any foreign power. M. India is and will probably remain the most influential external power in Bangladesh, and both states will likely find it advantageous to continue close relations. But Bangladesh is not a satellite. It will take Indian interests into account and will be inclined to avoid major actions repugnant to New Delhi, but within these limits, Bangladesh will act independently. THE ESTIMATE I. THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE 1. In December 1972, Bangladesh celebrates its first anniversary as an independent state. It faces difficulties of staggering dimensions—a huge population, widespread poverty, inadequate food production, serious war damage, uncertain trade prospects, internal dissension, and a none too competent bureaucracy saddled with major new responsibilities. A case can be made that its prospects are hopeless. 2. But such gloomy prognoses do not necessarily apply to this unique country. Most of its grave troubles have existed for some time, more or less hidden because the area was usually considered as a component part of larger Pakistan. (When East Pakistan was aggregated with the relatively prosperous, uncrowded west wing, more comforting statistics results—the reality being apparent only when a separate Bangladesh is analyzed.) And the new state can count on some assets. Its people are industrious; they are inured to hardship and privation; they are enthusiastic about their independence. The breakup of Pakistan has meant, overall, an end to exploitative foreign rule of East Bengal, giving it the chance to use its resources for itself. 3 3. Geographically, Bangladesh is small; with 53,000 square miles, it is roughly the size of Arkansas or Louisiana. Aside from the sparse population of the hill tracts, most of the 75 million Bengalees live in a waterlogged lowland of floodplains and delta formations—the product of three major rivers. The alluvium formed by them and their numerous tributaries and distributaries has formed an almost perfectly flat landscape who elevations range from the sea up to 200 feet above sea level in the far north. The rivers serve as major means of transport and communication, provide abundant supplies of fish, and deposit silt which maintains enough fertility to permit farming. The rivers rise and fall, and their flooding during the May-October monsoon season are major determinants of agricultural output. Too much or too little water, or proper amounts coming too soon or too late can mean major crop failures. 4. Bangladesh is overwhelmingly agricultural. Rice, the dietary staple, is grown on 80 percent of the cultivated area. It and jute, the principal cash crop, dominate the rural scene. The two often compete for the same acreage. Yields of rice are comparatively low. Most farming is of a subsistence nature. Transportation facilities, particularly railroads, are limited. Energy sources are scarce. There is some natural gas, but deposits are localized and distribution through the country difficult. Other exploitable minerals have so far been found only in marginal quantities. There is substantial timber in the 15 percent of the country not a part of the deltaic plain. 5. Barring a few city-states such as Hong Kong, Bangladesh—with nearly 1,400 people per square mile—is the most densely populated country in the world. (Were the US as crowded, it would have some 4.5 billion residents.) The population appears to be growing at a rate of from 2.5–3.5 percent a year, possibly even higher (statistics are not reliable). If the rate is 3.5 percent, the present population of 75 million or so would double in 20 years. 6. The Bangladesh Government, like its predecessor, has acknowledged the need to check the population explosion, but its efforts in this regard remain comparatively ineffective. That element of the regime now charged with family planning is apparently one of the more inept of official departments in a government not noted for competence. Its efforts achieved relatively little in the Pakistani era, even though the government gave high priority to population control. Public disinterest, ignorance, and a shortage of trained personnel and facilities will continue to be major barriers. In sum, population control efforts are not likely to have much impact for many years, if ever. 7. In such circumstances, emigration to the neighboring, even though crowded areas of India, and such disasters as mass starvation, epidemics, storms and wars have been—and could be again—the only means working to contain the growth of population. Between 1947 and 1970 some five million people, nearly all Hindus, left East Pakistan for India. Another 10 million (80 percent Hindu) fled during the 1971 civil war, but returned following Pakistan’s defeat. Over time, many Hindus are likely again to move to India, though not so rapidly or on such a massive scale. According to the Bengalee government, a half million people died in the huge cyclone of November 1970, and three million in the hostilities of 1971 (the actual number was probably much less). Deaths by disease induced by malnutrition are uncountable, but probably numerous. 8. Even with so many people in so little space, cities are few and small. Only Dacca, the capital, has more than a million inhabitants; only Chittagong, the major port, has anything approaching that number. Most towns are entrepots, markets, shipping centers, and processing facilities for nearby farms. According to the Bangladesh Government, 94 percent of the population lives in rural areas and is sustained mainly by agriculture. The great bulk of these people continue to live according to the patterns of a deep-rooted, cohesive, and traditional and social system. 9. Poverty is the norm. 4 Average annual per capita income is $50–70. Half the population have serious deficiencies in caloric intake while over 80 percent have some kind of deficiency in vitamins. About 17 percent of the people are literate and most students do not get beyond elementary school. Technical and vocational skills are in short supply. 10. Though the educated unemployed are a problem, Bangladesh is not plagued as is Sri Lanka with numerous liberal arts graduates permanently denied those white collar jobs which are the only ones they will accept. Indeed, the expulsion of the prewar non-Bengalee elite, the prospects of university graduates could be temporarily brightened. Even so, the 10,000–20,000 students now at the University of Dacca are already a troubling political force in their own right and the government is trying to restrict university enrollments because of limited job opportunities. 11. In contrast to India and Pakistan, Bangladesh has a generally homogeneous society. Only two to three percent of the population, broken down into two distinct groups, do not speak Bengali as their first language. There are about a million tribal residents of the Chittagong Hills area; closely related to the primitive nearby residents of Burma and northeast India, they remain isolated and are unlikely to have much impact on national life. Perhaps another million or so residents are the so-called Biharis. These are Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees and their descendants from northern India. Formerly treated as a privileged class by the ruling Pakistanis, the Biharis are now an oppressed people. Living in scattered ghettos and encampments in the cities, they are ostracized and persecuted. The Bangladesh Government shows little interest in assisting them even with basic necessities. This situation in unlikely to change even though many Biharis have technical, professional, and managerial skills that Bangladesh urgently needs. Their future, barring an improbably resettlement in Pakistan, is grim, but they are unlikely to be of political or social consequence for Bangladesh itself. 12. Muslim-Hindu hostility remains a reality in Bangladesh. It brought about the creation of East Pakistan in 1947 and led to the departure of the Hindu landlords and businessmen who until then had dominated the area’s social and economic life. Muslim Bengalees still fear a return of this expelled elite group which now lives in the Indian state of West Bengal. 5 But the Hindus who remain (now about 15 percent of the population) pose no particular threat nor do they have much influence on society. About half of them are so impoverished that they chief aim is survival the remainder form a better educated group whose skills, for example, as teachers are urgently needed in the new state. Communal disturbances in Bangladesh do occur periodically, but they have been and probably will be relatively small and severely dealt with. The Bengalee government’s condemnation of all religious persecution probably reflects the prevailing national attitude, at least towards those Hindus still in Bangladesh. 13. Bangladesh’s society is not merely homogeneous, it is also relatively egalitarian and free of class rivalries. The flight of Hindu landlords in 1947–1948 and the subsequent expropriation of their property has led to the widespread ownership of very small farms. There are very few large or absentee landowners. Thus in 1966 (and there has been little change since) only four percent of land holdings were of 12.5 acres or more, 45 percent were between 2.5 and 12.5 acres, and 51 percents were less than 2.5 acres. (About 30 percent of those living in the countryside are landless laborers.) Social and economic gradations of course exist as between the educated and the illiterate and between the landless laborers and owners of small plots. But unlike Pakistan or West Bengal, Bangladesh has no important class of the rural wealthy with big estates and many bitter enemies. 14. The convulsions of 1971 saw a leveling in Bangladesh’s small urban and industrialized society. Most industry had been set up, owned and managed by West Pakistani and Bihari entrepreneurs. 6 Their property included nearly all the area’s banks; shipping companies; jute, textile, and paper mills; and food processing plants. With the advent of civil war in March 1971, they began shipping out what could be moved, and eventually fled themselves. In the war’s aftermath, the new Government of Bangladesh took over their abandoned firms. It then nationalized nearly all the remaining plants in the country and put their management in the hands of Bengalee civil servants. II. THE ECONOMY 15. In the short term, Bangladesh’s major task has been the repair of war damage, the resettlement and feeding of refugees, and the revival of prewar economic activity. Simultaneously, but extending into longer term is an effort to raise export earnings and reduce food imports through increased crop yields. 16. Bangladesh’s economy is principally agricultural and is likely to remain so. Its planners recently described it as follows: In the most recent normal year, large-scale manufacturing contributed only about 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) while the modern sectors, including modern transport, organized services, power, modern construction and manufacturing, together contributed to more than 15 percent of GDP. Agriculture and ancillary activities, contributing well over two-thirds of GDP, have mainly been subsistence activities. Thus, the economy is rather devoid of any obvious sources of reinvestable surplus. 7 Most manufactured and consumer goods and a portion of its food are imported. The Bengalees pay for these with earnings from the export of basic commodities, principally jute but also timber products, tea, leather and a few others. Until the mid-1960s, the area enjoyed a trade surplus. 17. Foreign Aid. Static export levels and increasing imports, particularly of food, had made Bangladesh into a deficit area with a rising need for foreign aid even before the 1971 crisis. Since independence, it has received generous amounts of outside assistance. As of August 1972, it had received commitments of about $900 million in foreign aid, both for relief and for longer term economic development. 8 The principal donors—given both bilaterally and through the UN—were: COUNTRY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS U.S 335 India 270 Canada 65 UK 50 USSR 70 Miscellaneous (mostly Japan and West Europe) 113 Pledges since, principally from a World Bank subsidiary, the International Development Association, but also a new $50 million trade credit from the USSR, have brought the level to about $1 billion. 18. As of December 1972, India had given 900,000 tons of food grains, transport equipment, money for refugee resettlement, a $13 million foreign exchange loan, and had helped to repair damaged bridges. Canada had provided mostly food. The US had committed over 1 million tons of food grains, 75,000 tons of edible oil, and had resumed development projects suspended during the fighting—as had the Soviets. The latter’s projects include a thermal power plant, an electrical equipment factory, and radio transmitters. The Soviets also gave some food, fishing trawlers, and transport equipment. In addition they are clearing the port of Chittagong at a cost as yet unspecified. Between half and two-thirds of all foreign aid has been grants, with the remainder chiefly long-term development loans. As of 30 June 1972, about $115 million of all aid extended had been spent. There are no later figures on amounts drawn down, but the government’s first annual plan calls for spending about $500 million of foreign assistance in the period July 1972-June 1973. 19. Relief and Reconstruction. With this aid, and their own efforts as well, the Bengalees have made substantial progress. Nearly all the 10 million refugees who had gone to India in 1971 have returned and have been resettled with few apparent difficulties. Emergency food shipments, the initial handling of which has been done by UNROD (United Nations Relief Operation Dacca), have averted critical food shortages this year. Production of jute, after a sharp decline during the war, has returned to normal. The tea plantations, however, were badly crippled; even with extensive new investment they could not operate at former levels for several years. Given static world demand and the intense competition from other tea producers, such heavy investments are unlikely, and tea production will remain low. 20. Bangladesh’s small industrial plant suffered little physical damage in 1971, but revival of its activities has been hampered by new, inexperienced manager, by severe restrictions on raw materials and spare parts imports, and by damage to transportation and communications facilities. The latter were severely hurt in the war; they are now functioning again, but at lower than prewar levels. The ports have been largely restored to operation, as has road transport, although about 25 percent of the nations fleet of trucks was destroyed. The railways were badly damaged and remain a major bottleneck by the last quarter of 1972, rail transport was operating at only 40 percent of prewar capacity because of damage to bridges, rolling stock, and signal equipment. Return to normal operations is probably a year or two away. But the problem has been alleviated by the substitution of additional river craft (both imported and of domestic manufacture) for transport in this riverine country. 21. Foreign Trade Prospects. Secession from Pakistan has in some respects improved Bangladesh’s world trade position in that it is no longer a captive market for the west wing’s goods. The previous sizable inter-wing trade and financial transfers—which mostly worked to West Pakistan’s benefit—have ended. In addition, Bangladesh has not yet assumed obligations to repay a part of Pakistan’s $3 billion international debt—though it will probably in time accept some of that burden. The overall consequences of the loss of trade with Pakistan cannot be assessed as yet. There may prove to be inducements for the resumption of trade but these will not be the deciding factors in whether political relations are restored or not. 22. The Bengalees are now seeking to renew their exports and find new sources of imports. The Bangladesh Annual Plan projects export earnings in the fiscal year July 1972-June 1973 as follow (contrasted with previous highs including trade with West Pakistan): COMMODITIES AMOUNT 9 PREVIOUS RECORD HIGH (Millions of Dollars) (Year) Raw Jute 145 $187 (FY 67) Jute Manufactures 120 193 (FY 70) Tea 19 59 (FY 67) Paper and Newsprint 10 23 (FY 69) Leather and Miscellaneous 50 Not Available Total 344 23. When issued, these targets appeared realistic, even conservative. In the period July 1970-June 1971, during which time the civil war had started, total exports had amounted to about $359 million. In the past, a small proportion of jute exports and almost all tea and paper went to protected markets in West Pakistan; finding at least some substitute markets for them seemed feasible. Jute markets still exist elsewhere. But export performance up to the close of calendar year 1972 has been disappointing. After an initial surge early in the year, jute sales have dropped below hoped-for levels. This lag may be temporary, as a lack of shipping facilities held back shipments in the latter part of 1972. If the shipping problem is overcome, and it is too early to know whether it will be or not, jute earnings could come close to those targeted. Tea and paper exports have been only a small fraction of those projected, however, and their future (particularly that of tea) is uncertain. 24. The FY 1973 Annual Plan envisaged imports of some $840 million (as compared with East Pakistan’s imports of something less than $600 million in FY 1970 10 ), allocated as follows: $125 million...Reconstruction, rehabilitation 164 million...Development (1/3 for agriculture) 551 million...Maintenance imports, food, consumer goods, invisibles These were to be paid for by $497 million in foreign aid and $344 million of export earnings. But foreign aid is now paying for nearly all imports. A severely restrictive government import policy (except for food), inexperienced and inefficient traders, and a lack of business confidence have virtually prevented commercial imports. Thus, despite disappointing export earnings, Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves, negligible in December 1971, had risen to over $200 million in November 1972. 25. Public Finance. The regime’s financial position appears to be manageable. The July 1972-June 1973 non-development budget estimates ordinary domestic revenues of about $400 million and expenditures of $310 million. Two-thirds or so of receipts are to come from customs and excise taxes, the remainder from income and corporation taxes and profits from nationalized industries. Half of expenditures will go to “civil administration”, most of the rest to education and defense (about $50-$60 million each). 26. There is also a development budget of about $700 million which could make up unexpected shortfalls in the regular budget. Thirty six percent of this amount is to be spend on relief and reconstruction, nearly all the rest on development projects, principally in agriculture and transportation. Seventy five percent of the development budget is to be paid for by foreign aid, including counterpart funds from food sales, the remainder by the surplus in the regular budget and by local borrowing. Official estimates of both total receipts and expenditures are probably on the high side. As rough general guidelines, however, they do not appear to be wildly unrealistic. Barring a major miscalculation or unexpected disaster, the government should be able to function without critical fiscal difficulties at least in the next year or two. 27. Food Production: Short- and Long-Term Outlook. Bangladesh has not been able to feed itself for many years, and has had to import increasing amounts of food. BANGLADESH: RICE PRODUCTION AND FOODGRAIN IMPORTS Thousand Metric Tons CROP RICE FOODGRAIN IMPORT YEAR 11 PRODUCTION Wheat Rice Total 1961 9,620 234 464 698 1962 9,620 202 206 408 1963 8,870 894 542 1,436 1964 10,620 656 346 1,002 1965 10,500 250 95 345 1966 10,500 529 360 889 1967 9,580 647 432 1,079 1968 11,170 712 308 1,020 1969 11,340 884 236 1,120 1970 12,010 1,045 502 1,547 1971 11,140 898 381 1,279 1972** 9,970 1,350 500 1,850 * Ending 30 June ** Preliminary 28. The 1972 crop year (July 1971-June 1972 12 ) comprised both a period of fighting and one of initial relief efforts; it saw a poor harvest of 10 million tons of rice, with shortfalls made up by emergency food shipments. 1.7 million tons of food grains were imported between January and August 1972, and another million will probably have been delivered by January 1973. Dacca had hoped to grow 12 million tons of rice in the July 1972-June 1973 period, but this now appears out of reach. Droughts have reduced the size of the summer and winter crops to the point that even a good spring harvest would mean only 10 million tons for the year. Bangladesh can thus expect difficult times by early 1973, and food shortages could go on for many months. The price of rice has already gone up sharply, and has led to a painful increase in the cost of living. The government is seeking more emergency food aid and is purchasing food on the world market. It hopes to get from all sources about 2.5 million tons in the calendar year 1973, about the same it will receive in 1972. A detailed UN study just released substantiates this figure as a reasonable estimate of what will be needed. 29. Its efforts have been made difficult by a decline in the world of availability of cereals. Large Soviet purchases of grains from the US and other countries and poor harvests in neighboring India have made food costly and scarce. Indeed, there was considerable smuggling of food from certain areas of Bangladesh into India in the summer of 1972. It is still too early to say that Bangladesh will see a major food crisis in 1973. Much will depend on the amount of food that can be obtained from abroad and on how well the Bengalee government will be able to distribute it. Distribution in 1972 was assisted by UNROD. The latter expects to be reduced to an advisory status in the next few months, putting an additional burden on the Bangladesh Government. 30. As for longer term agricultural prospects, great benefits could come from major flood control efforts, which would harness Bangladesh’s three great rivers and end the area’s periodic floods and droughts. These are more feasible than in the past, as they require close cooperation with India—which was impossible when the Pakistanis ruled. But the engineering works involved would be very expensive and take a long time to complete. Thus the Bengalee government has written in general terms (really aspirations) of a $1.5 billion program to be completed by 1985. Such a scheme would probably require international financing even greater than the huge Indus Valley Project in West Pakistan. Not merely is such funding highly uncertain, but major technical problems are involved. 31. But some benefits are likely to come from more modest and shorter term efforts to help the farmers. In the next few years several hundred million dollars will probably be spent on agricultural development projects. Prominent among these will be ones for the procurement of much larger amounts of fertilizers, pesticides, improved high yield rice seeds which can be used in Bangladesh, tube-well drilling for dry season crops, flood control projects for limited areas where this is feasible, and agricultural credit and extension programs. 32. It is impossible to estimate the success of these schemes. Potential pitfalls are numerous. Bangladesh will remain susceptible to vagaries of flood and drought; the new rice may not grow successfully, the traditional Bengalee farmers may not be amenable to the technology of the Green Revolution. The widespread ownership of small plots may prove an obstacle to the innovations of the Green Revolution, e.g., as these involve irrigation schemes. But there appears a good chance, if the announced plans are carried through the next few years, that increases in rice (and jute) yields will result. Whether the country will become self-sufficient in food by 1975 as planned remains to be seen; indeed it may find intensified cultivation of jute at the expense of rice more beneficial—if with increased export earnings it can buy food abroad more cheaply than it can grow rice at home. 33. The Industrial Sector. There are, in Bangladesh, demands that the tiny industrial sector be expanded, particularly to produce the consumer items formerly bought from West Pakistan. But prospects for this are poor. Nor are larger capital goods industries comparable to those which have been built in India likely to be developed. There are virtually no entrepreneurs or private investment capital to finance such projects. Foreign private investment is discouraged by the new regime’s nationalization of industry. The government itself will be able to divert few resources from the major agricultural efforts to which it is committed. Sources of energy and power remain limited, and even now the present small complex of industry—now under new and inexperienced management and afflicted with labor unrest—will find itself hard-pressed just to restore operations. In these circumstances, Bangladesh will remain mainly a producer and processor of agricultural commodities. 34. Overall Economic Outlook. Our knowledge of the Bengalee economy is far from comprehensive. Far more than in the field of politics, there is considerable historical evidence still relevant to economic questions, but current data are incomplete; analyses must necessarily be partly impressionistic, and so must projections. 35. The country’s overall economic prospects in the next few years will principally depend on: (a) output of the agricultural sector; (b) export earnings; (c) foreign aid receipts. There is some reason for optimism that agrarian development projects will indeed boost the output of rice and jute, though by how much is still unpredictable. Export earnings will depend mainly on world demand for and pricing of jute. Competition from synthetic fibers has kept jute sales static for several years, and may in time actually reduce them. While jute sales may regain prewar norms and even register some small gains, say through aggressive sales campaigns and competitive pricing, long-term prospects for the export of this commodity are not promising. 36. Bangladesh seems assured of substantial quantities of foreign aid for the next year or two. Increased rice and jute production, if great enough, could over time produce enough of a trade surplus to reduce or even eliminate the need for aid. Such a development is, however, probably years away, if indeed it ever comes to pass. For the longer term, how much foreign aid it will need to any particular time, or get, cannot now be estimated. 37. Even if Bangladesh greatly raises rice output and jute sales and gets a great deal of aid, it faces a probably insuperable obstacle to major economic advance. The huge population will continue growing; it could double to size in 20–25 years. These new people will literally eat up most gains. The population might—though no specific time or numbers are possible because there are no precedents for a country like this one—reach such size that Bangladesh could no longer support all or even a substantial portion of its people. At the same time it should be noted that the Bengalees are accustomed to extreme hardship and have shown a great ability to adjust themselves to a degree of privation and difficulty that others would find intolerable. III. THE NEW BENGALEE GOVERNMENT 38. Administration. When Bangladesh became independent in late 1971, its new government found itself with a host of responsibilities and reduced means of carrying them out, though the old East Pakistani administrative apparatus remained generally in being. Many of the top and even middle-level civil servants in East Bengal had been West Pakistanis. Many Bengalees in the former East Pakistani civil service had been killed, exiled, or imprisoned during the troubles (some 12,000–16,000 are still detained in Pakistan). Others were arrested as collaborators. With managerial skills already in critically short supply, particularly at the middle and lower levels, the new regime had to take on or promote ill-qualified people not merely to handle the tasks of the former government, but also to supervise the repair of war damage, the return and sheltering of refugees, the feeding of the destitute, the restoration of security, the suppression of lawlessness, and the operation of a number of commercial and industrial enterprises formerly in private hands. 39. Not surprisingly, Bengalee administration has suffered from widespread incompetence, inefficiency, and corruption. In some areas, local administration was taken over by guerrilla commanders. A few of them are apparently still in charge, though the center is slowly expanding its control. Top officials throughout the government appear to be generally well-trained and competent, but the qualities of those at middle and lower level generally leave much to be desired. There has been considerable meddling by Awami League notables in administrative matters. Many of the accomplishments of the first year of independence were due to the direct activity of foreign governments and personnel. Thus important emergency relief and reconstruction measures—particularly food distribution—have been administered directly by the UN and various outside countries. Similarly, most large-scale reconstruction projects, e.g., the repair of bridges and clearing of ports and harbors, have been carried out by foreign governments. The rebuilding of most private homes and villages has been done mostly by the people themselves, using their own resources and labor. 40. At least initially, practically any decision of any consequence had to be made by the Prime Minister himself. That situation has since improved. With most major initial tasks completed, the bureaucracy, particularly at the center, now appears to generate enough momentum to function in a more or less “normal” manner. Some of the most blatant and harmful forms of corruption have been checked through arrests and dismissals. Even though it displays considerable ineptitude, the new Bangladesh Government appears to have established itself as a functioning and accepted institution and could probably survive any but the most severe and disruptive changes in the country’s political, economic, and social life. 41. Public Order. Bangladesh faced a serious public security problem when it became independent. The old East Pakistani police and security services, made up mostly of Bengalees, had been disrupted and dispersed by the Pakistani Army. During the civil war the area was infiltrated by some 30 thousand well-armed guerrillas. A large number of fire-arms, either provided by the guerrillas by the Indians or captured from the Pakistanis, remained in private hands at war’s end. In early 1972, the government tried to retrieve these weapons but with very limited success. A Bengalee official has estimated that a hundred thousand weapons are still held illegally throughout the country. 42. During 1972, Bangladesh has seem a large number of armed robberies and other crimes of violence in both the cities and countryside. Many of these are private crimes of the sort that traditionally have been common in the area, but others appear to have been politically motivated, e.g., murders of individuals who had collaborated with the Pakistanis or who were leading rival parties and factions. The latter will almost certainly increase in the election campaign of early 1973. Save in the tribal hill areas these violent acts have no had any of the connotations of an insurgency or a widespread armed uprising against the government. Paralleling this have been unsettled conditions in the cities. Trade unionists and refugees from outlying areas have demonstrated—sometimes violently—for better living and working conditions. 43. In the past year, the regime has found means of containing these elements, though not completely. It has done so in part by recruiting a new national police force. The latter is eventually scheduled to have 75,000 men. So far it numbers about half that, with equipment and standards of training still below par. The government has also organized some paramilitary bodies (with about 20,000 men) to help it maintain order. It has permitted some semi-official irregular forces, some of which have been helpful while others have occasionally become problems themselves. 44. It now appears likely that the government will be able to maintain an acceptable level of public security against the kinds of threats it is likely to be faced with, particularly as the Bangladesh Armed Forces grow in strength and capability. The army now has about 20,000 men, the air force and navy a few hundred each. Some air force personnel, including pilots, are receiving training in the USSR, and Bangladesh expects to receive a squadron of jet fighter-bombers from the USSR when the trainees return. Another 24,000–28,000 military personnel are still being held in Pakistan; most may be integrated into the armed forces when they finally return. The army’s only real responsibility will be the maintenance of internal security. Beyond the internal security role, the Bengalee armed force do not have and are not now expecting to acquire serious capabilities either for offense or defense. 45. Whether the army might also become a political force in its own right, as did the Pakistani military, remains to be seen, Its officer corps will differ from the Pakistani one in that its leading figures will not come from a conservative elite of landowners and tribal leaders out of sympathy with a democratic regime. In Bangladesh’s relatively egalitarian society, no such class exists. IV. TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL OUTLOOK 46. Bengalis are political animals and what is now Bangladesh has, in the past, seen periods of lively political activity. While these offer some clues for the future, the country is still so new as an independent state that the estimates of likely political developments must be tempered with extra caution. Not only are political precedents lacking and historical experience of limited usefulness in political prognoses about this state, but there are also more general long-term uncertainties about how such unequaled poverty and population stability or even governablility. 47. In 1945 and 1946 elections were held for a Bengali provincial legislature; the All Pakistani Muslim League, demanding an independent Islamic nation, captured most seats in what is now Bangladesh. In 1947 the League became the ruling party of the new country and of the province of East Pakistan. It did not distinguish itself, exhibiting infighting, effectiveness, and corruption. In Bengali eyes it also became associated with West Pakistani dominance. In 1954 free elections were help for a new east wing provincial legislature, and the Muslim League was overwhelmingly crushed by a United Front coalition. One of the parties in the Front was the Awami League (AL), 13 founded and headed by H.S. Suhrawardy. It stood for great political autonomy, “Bengal for the Bengalis”, and for social and economic reforms. 48. In the United Front’s cabinet was an Al legislator named Sheikh Mujib Rahman—usually known as Mujib—who had already spent over two years in a jail because of his agitation the Muslim League’s theocratic and anti-Bengali policies. The front soon collapsed, Suhrawardy and the Al became important fixtures in the Pakistani politics of the era, while Mujib rose in influence in the part. Suhrawardy ( who dies in 1963) and Mujib were jailed when the military took over in 1958. But the AL organization remained intact, particularly in East Pakistan, and was formerly revived by Mujib in 1965. It was periodically active there, even under the heavy-handed and restrictive controls of Ayub’s regime; thus Mujib was one of the leaders of an unsuccessful effort to defeat Ayub in a presidential election campaign in 1965. 49. A sequence of events from 1966 on transformed Mujib and the AL from just another East Pakistani politician and party to Bangladesh’s unchallenged leader and dominant political organization. These include: Mujib’s 1966 proposal of a program ( the “Six Points”) calling for almost complete provincial autonomy within the framework of a weak Pakistani confederation; his arrest and trial on trumped up treason charges; rioting in early 1969 which toppled Ayub and freed Mujib; the December 1970 elections in which the AL got 74 percent of East Pakistan’s popular vote; and the March-December 1971 civil and international wars which Mujib was arrested, nearly executed, and released, and triumphantly returned as father of his country and its unchallengeable leader. 50. Despite the continued incidence of violent crime, increased student and labor unrest, government ineptitude, suspicions of a powerful India and many other problems afflicting the new state, Mujib remains very much in charge. He is generally viewed as a “moderate” in his political and economic views. A sincere secularist, he is strongly opposed to religious or communal discrimination. Mujib has permitted a general measure of freedom, has tried to restore the rule of law, and has pushed through a new constitution. The latter provides, among others, for a bill of rights, parliament and cabinet system, a strong Prime Minister, an Ombudsman, and an independent judiciary. It also seeks to discourage the instability which had characterized earlier East Pakistani governments, by automatically expelling any member of its Parliament who votes against his party. 51. Elections for a Parliament under the new constitution will be help in March 1973. It is difficult to say which parties the AL’s most prominent opponents will be. Most of the formerly important offshoots of the Muslim League and the reactionary Islamic Parties have been banned because of their religious bias and association with the Pakistanis. The aged Maulana Bhashani’s extremist National Awami Party/Left has not appeared strong or impressive. There are Bengalee Communists, but to date they are few in number. The AL’s strongest challengers will most likely be new organizations like the leftist National Socialist Party, led by a former student leader (Abdur Rab) and a freedom fighter (M. A. Jalil). This group is trying to exploit such issues as continued lawlessness, corruption, poverty and too close an association with India. Mujib’s stature and the AL’s organization—apparently pervasive, efficient, and even ruthless—as well as the absence of credible alternatives, make his party the favorite to win, though probably not with so crushing a majority as in 1970. But this election, like most other free ones in South Asia, is subject to uncertainties. Mujib can hardly hope that in office to increase the popularity he enjoyed on his return, and erosion of support for the AL may prove significant. 52. If Mujib and the AL emerge as strong victors, most future significant Bengalee political developments will probably be within the Awami League itself. Like Pakistan’s Muslim League and India’s Congress Party, the AL united people of divergent groups in a successful independence struggle. Like them, it will probably fragment sooner or later, creating new groups inspired by personal rivalries and ideological split. There are no precedents or present clues in Bangladesh to predict when this will happen or what new factions will stand for. Adjacent West Bengal has, over the years, seen a process of radicalization, with extremist organizations. e.g., the left wing Communists, gaining enough strength so as to be voted into power on occasion. With this has developed an ultra-revolutionary force, the so-called Naxalbari Communists or Naxalites. Mostly students and young intellectuals. eschewing participation in electoral processes, advocating Maoist-type peasant revolts but usually engaged in urban terrorism, the Naxalites have periodically posed a serious threat to West Bengal’s social and economic life. 53. This could spill over into Bangladesh. Calcutta remains the intellectual and cultural center for all Bengalis. The ideas of Calcutta’s extremists are bound to appeal to Bangladesh’s underpaid trade unionists and intellectuals, landless laborers, politicized students with bleak futures, and its educated unemployed. Indeed Dacca’s students have already voted to back more radical economic and social policies. But Bangladesh’s brave economic problems will not automatically lead to extremism or violence, much less chaos, though they will probably ensure continued political difficulties. A repetition of West Bengal’s experience is far from certain; there are some important differences between the two areas. The explosive class antagonisms between industrialists and workers, large landlords and tenants do not exist in the more egalitarian Bangladesh. Calcutta has a far larger pool of unemployable intellectuals than Dacca. Even so, extremist ideas and programs will probably receive increasingly greater acceptance—though how far this process will go and how long it will take is uncertain. In any case, Mujib himself is likely to remain essentially centrist and moderate and will resist movements demanding more drastic social economic measures and methods. 54. Actual prospects for reunification of the two Bengalis are slight. Until 1947, the whole of Bengal was one unit, and Bengalis on both sides of the border still share great pride in their history, language, and culture. Some old economic links have been restored. Periodically there has been talk of the creation of a new separate, united Bengal of 120 million people. Certainly the Government of India would not countenance any such move. And even if it would, Hindu-Muslim antagonisms remain too strong. A completely independent Bengal would see the Hindus unhappily consigned to a permanent minority. But a united Bengal’s being absorbed into India, which is a s likely as an independent one, would leave the Muslims as second-class citizens. Though Mujib and AL are opposed to it, Pan-Bengalism could become a popular political rallying cry, no matter how futile its real prospects were. 55. Mujib’s importance is so great that his disappearance from the scene whether by retirement, defeat, or death would be a major and traumatic event. Chaos would not automatically ensue, however. The rural, traditional nature of the society produces its own inertial force. The Awami League and the Bengalee government and security services are functioning, nation-wide institutions. The regime has—despite some continuing lawlessness, violence and urban unrest—apparently acknowledged as Bangladesh’s legitimate authority. Mujib’s successor as Prime Minister would come from AL. The most likely candidates now appear to be Tajuddin Ahmen, the Minister of Finance; Syed Nazrul Islam, formerly President of the government in exile; or Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, the current President (a figurehead post). But they (who spent most of 1971 in Calcutta running the Bangladesh government-in-exile) and other known candidates are relatively colorless, uninspiring party officials with little personal following and appeal. 56. If post-Mujib Bangladesh Government (or one still headed him) were unable to generate public support and allowed serious and widespread disruption, the new Bengalee army would probably be called in (or move in) to restore order. In the generally successful campaign to suppress smuggling to India in late 1972, the army showed itself a national force to be reckoned with. Though its ability to cope with a massive uprising is untested, the area has historically been kept under control by very small number of regular soldiers. Thus until the crises of the early 1970’s, there were only 10,000–15,000 West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. The military is loyal to Mujib, and probably would be to his successor; there is no evidence available to us of serious anti-regime sentiment in the officer corps, though there have been some complaints (followed by dismissals) in the army about the alleged pro-Indian bias of the government. V. BANGLADESH AND THE WORLD 57. Bangladesh’s poverty and weakness set severe limits on the role it will play both in the subcontinent and not the larger world scene. Virtually devoid of resources, its economic and military power are negligible. It is of little intrinsic strategic significance to any country except India. It has been mired, along with India and Pakistan, in a stalemate over restructuring their relationships after the 1971 war. Dacca’s principal demands are that Pakistan recognize Bangladesh as an independent state and that the 35,000–45,000 skilled Bengalee military and civilian personnel now in Pakistan be returned. Beyond this, Mujib’s regime insists it will try an unspecified number of Pakistanis for war crimes. It demands allocations to Bangladesh of a proportionate share of such old Pakistani Government-owned assets as the national airlines. Dacca has indicated that it would be willing, in principle, to work out an acceptance of its share of the obligation of the old Pakistani national debt-trough negotiations to achieve this appear to be a long way off. 58. On its own, Bangladesh has virtually no means of compelling the Pakistanis to do anything: even the POWs it wishes to try are in Indian custody. India hold most of the high cards, Pakistan the rest; the current impasse is effectively between them. Though the Indians appear to be cooling to the idea of war crimes trials and reportedly have advised Mujib to drop this plan, they still publicly support his right to conduct them. even if new Delhi were to abandon all or part of its support of Bangladesh so as to achieve a detente with Pakistan, there would be little that the Bengalees could do about it. But Bangladesh remains a factor because India continues to back it. 59. Neither the fact that Bangladesh exists as a result of Indian military action, nor the heavy amounts of economic assistance political support extended by New Delhi mean that Bangladesh is an Indian satellite or puppet. Nor is it likely to become one. The Bengalees value their newly acquired independence and do not wish again to surrender it. They will remain residually suspicious of their huge Hindu neighbor (anti-Indian sentiments are now being voiced in Bangladesh). They are not dependent, as is Nepal for example, on India for access to the outside world, nor would they be particularly vulnerable to threats of an economic embargo. Even so, the Bengalees will not wish to see themselves pressured or threatened by an angry or unfriendly India. The latter’s power is so great in relative terms as to inhibit Bangladesh’s ever getting too far out of line. 60. Indian interest in maintaining in Bangladesh a state friendly to India was manifest in the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with Bangladesh in March 1972. This treaty assures India, among other things, that Bangladesh will not be a party to actions or activities inimical to India. Its defense provisions, although not including any agreement to come automatically to each other’s aid, prescribe mutual consultations in the face of aggression. The treaty could be invoked by India not only against inimical activities in Bangladesh by external powers but also against the use of Bangladesh as a sanctuary by Indian dissidents. 61. Both countries will probably continue to see their best interests served by maintaining close relations, whatever the difficulties, e.g., communal frictions, cross-border smuggling, that might appear. New Delhi prizes a friendly Bangladesh into he strategic north-eastern part of the subcontinent. The Bengalees in turn know that a determined and antagonistic India could make life very difficult for their country. Another regime in Dacca, say one pressing for the acquisition of West Bengal, or one moved by Muslim hostility to all things Hindu, or one conspicuously pro-Chinese, could change this completely and bring on an era of hostility. But such contingencies now appear to be comparatively remote. 62. The USSR’s efforts to cultivate the new state have been extensive: it is clearing the port of Chittagong, has provided other emergency relief, and had begun to train and supply Bangladesh’s tiny air force, and has sent diplomatic and technical assistance missions. Some 10 or so Soviet minesweepers and auxiliary craft are scheduled to remain engaged in harbor clearing operations at Chittagong throughout 1973. But in financial terms, Soviet aid has been relatively limited—some $120 million out of an overall total of $1 billion. The Soviet Union’s motive for its policy is subject to some dispute. The Soviets are probably seeking to ensure that the Bengalees will continue to work with them and the Indians in preference to establishing working relations with China. They may hope to gain access to repair or supply facilities in Bangladesh in connection with their Indian Ocean Naval presence; but there is no evidence that they have asked for such access, and Mujib has repeatedly said that Bangladesh has no intentions of granting such privileges to any foreign power. They show no signs of trying to preempt Indian influence, but at the same time probably wish some degree of independent ties so that relations with the new South Asian state are not entirely conditional on the ups and downs of Soviet Relations with New Delhi. Whatever Moscow’s motives, its efforts have been well received; the image of the USSR stands high in Bangladesh, though the country wishes, for sound economic and political reasons, to remain non-aligned with respect tot all the great powers. 63. Bangladesh remains on poor terms with China. This is due to Peking’s continued support of Pakistan in the latter’s South Asian bargaining—one manifestation of which was the Chinese veto of Bangladesh’s application for admission to the UN. Were a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani negotiations to occur and China’s posture to soften, Dacca would be eager to establish political and economic ties with Peking. 64. Generally, Dacca looks to the US, Western Europe, and Japan as its most important sources of economic aid and its principal export markets. Relations with all have been fairly good so far, and the Bengalees will seek to keep them so. This includes ties with the US, which has been the largest single source of outside assistance. The coolness or wariness which now prevails in India with respect to the US is not generally seen in Bangladesh though some public resentment of the US does exist there. This will be exploited by Bengalee politicians, particularly during the upcoming election campaign. But the government itself is unlikely to associate itself, say with the USSR or India, in moves or organizations which would antagonize the US or other Western counties. (Nor would it join any anti-Soviet, anti-Indian grouping.) Even so, as US and other foreign emergency relief programs are phased out, and as lower aid levels become the norm, the Bengalees will resent these reductions—particularly if they come to believe that the Pakistanis are getting as much or more then they are. 65. There are, besides India, very few countries in the non-communist world with which Bangladesh seeks any but ordinary and correct bilateral ties. It does put a high premium on its relations with the UK. On independence, it applied for membership in the common wealth. Its acceptance (followed by Pakistan’s withdrawal), the presence of many Bengalees in England, a favorable regard for London’s posture during the 1971 wars, and long-standing cultural ties have made the British something of a special case. The Bengalees have pegged their currency directly to the pound and have kept most of their exchange reserves in British Banks. 66. Though it is one of the world’s largest Muslim states in terms of population, Bangladesh’s relations with the principal Islamic states of the Middle East have generally ranged from bad to non-existent. Most Arab countries, and Turkey and Iran, have long had extremely cordial relations with Pakistan which in some cases extended to close military cooperation. They sided with the Pakistanis in the latter’s 1971 clash with India, and regarded Bangladesh as the creature and puppet of the Hindu state. To some extent they still do, though the situation will almost certainly ease over time. Even so, any sort of a close cooperative association of Bangladesh and Middle Eastern powers will remain out of the question. 67. Mujib has long regarded Bangladesh as much a Southeast Asian as a South Asian State. Since independence, he has established political and economic ties with several countries in the area including Indonesia, but almost certainly hopes to benefit from new arrangements set up after the end of fighting there. An impoverished Bangladesh—itself devastated by warfare—wishes to receive substantial material assistance in the context of postwar Southeast Asian international rehabilitation efforts. Beyond this, Dacca will probably seek profitable economic relations with major Asian powers, particularly Japan. Its aim will be greater amounts of both public and private economic assistance, greater export markets, and the most favorable sources of imports. Given Bangladesh’s gross poverty amend major problems it is no more likely to play a significant role in Southeast or East Asia than it will in the Indian subcontinent. 68. In sum, Bangladesh’s foreign posture is characterized by strong ties with India on the one hand, and virtually no close connections with any other country. Save Pakistan, now remote and no threat—politically, militarily, or otherwise—it has no enemies. Bangladesh’s interests will be served by seeking trade with and aid from the more advanced nations of the world, whatever their ideological persuasions. It needs as much help as it can get, as few enemies as possible. In such circumstances, it will consistent with its relations to India, play a generally passive role on the world scene, and will try to avoid offending outside countries. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. A cover sheet and table of contents are not published. 3 A detailed assessment of the overall costs and benefits of the former Pakistani union is outside the scope of this paper. The economic exploitation of the east wing by the west was probably not as bad as the Bengalis thought it was; indeed they did derive advantages from the old arrangement. The fact remains, however, that from 1947 on, East Pakistan provided a disproportionate share of its own resources for the west wing’s benefit, without profiting equally in return. 4 “Bangladesh would appear to be a rather unique phenomenon in the world. Nowhere else in the world is there anything like so much of poverty shared by so many squeezed into so little a land area.” Bangladesh Annual Plan 1972–1973. 5 West Bengal has 45 million people, of whom roughly 20 percent are Muslim. Unlike Bangladesh, it is heavily industrialized, mostly in and around the city of Calcutta. 6 Indian nationals had continued to own some important firms until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war when these were conflicted. 7 Bangladesh Annual Plan, Fiscal Year 1973. GDP in 1970 was roughly $4.5 billion. It was probably somewhat smaller in 1972. 8 In most cases it is impossible to isolate the aid serving one purpose or the other. 9 In addition $25–50 million a year is likely to be received in remittances from Bengalees living abroad. All these figures are calculated in Bengalee takas at a rate of 7.29 takas = $1. 10 According to official Pakistani statistics, imports were $734 million in that year, a figure derived by using the official value of the Pakistani rupee in calculating inter-wing trade. But the latter was overvalued by about 100 percent; when recalculated at this value, the figure of less than $600 million results. 11 There are three harvests during each crop year, in the summer, winter, and spring. They represent about 25, 60, and 15 percent respectively of annual rice output. 12 There are three harvests during each crop year, in the summer, winter, and spring. They represent about 25, 80, and 15 percent respectively of annual rice output. 13 Originally the Awami Muslim League and an offshoot of the Muslim League. “Awami” means “peoples”. 434. Telegram 231058 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 434. Telegram 231058 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 1 Washington, December 22, 1972, 2104Z Subj: Anti-U.S. Statements and Initial FY 1973 Grant to Bangladesh REF: A. Dacca 5451 B. State 229691 C. Dacca 5466 D. Dacca 5469 1. Dept. concurs with Embassy’s well-reasoned proposal for phased effort to seek closer identification by prominent BDG cabinet-level officials with U.S. aid activities in Bangladesh, beginning with signing of additional grant of $30 million. You should therefore seek earliest opportunity to raise matter with FonSec Karim, just prior to USCOR’s informing planning commission of USG readiness to proceed. 2. You should inform Karim that USG prepared to proceed with this grant despite fact that FY-1973 appropriation for humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh not yet passed (authority to make new commitments based on continuing resolution). We recognize urgent need for early procurement of inputs intended to have direct effect on agricultural productivity in 1973. 3. At same time you should say that we remain troubled over unjustified attacks on USG policies and motives by BDG officials (most recently by FinMin Tajuddin Ahmed in Purbodesh interview—Dacca 5450) and by prominent non-government Awami leaguers (such as Tofail Ahmed and Korban Ali). Foreign Secretary presumably aware from own service in U.S. that public atmosphere is important element of our bilateral relations, and irresponsible remarks if continued could have effect of eroding public and congressional favorable disposition to Bangladesh. You might note Rep Poage’s stated feelings on this subject. 4. In light of considerations stated above you should outline idea of participation in signing ceremony or other near-simultaneous event attended by prominent minister, i.e., Foreign Minister or other senior Minister, as suggested reftel A, para. 5. You should indicate that ceremony of this type would signal BDG recognition of benefits to Bangladesh rehabilitation effort and hopefully counter what appears to be growing public sentiment that USG fair game in election politics. You may suggest to Karim that we would welcome alternate suggestions as well as any additional ideas for follow-up actions to accomplish goal of keeping bilateral relations on healthy road we have begun to travel together. You may make it clear that we are ready to execute grant amendment as soon as BDG decides on acceptable manner of handling it. 5. Once you have made this approach to Foreign Ministry, USCOR may inform planning commission of USG intention to proceed with additional grant, adding that Embassy is discussing with Foreign Ministry our suggestions re signing procedure. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Butcher and Lawrence B. Lesser, cleared by Laingen and AID and in substance by USIA, and approved by Meyer. 435. Telegram 5547 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 435. Telegram 5547 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 27, 1972, 1034Z Subj: Destruction of USIS Centers in Bangladesh Ref: State 232100 1. My early morning request for urgent call on FonMin Samad was met by appointment for 1330 this afternoon. Alam (new DG for east, Pacific and Americans) and Sobhan were also present. 2. I told FonMin I had learned of Rajshahi event only by reading morning newspapers and wondered why BDG had not shared police reports with Embassy. Samad averred that he too had learned only from press and that he had immediately asked Home Minister for report (which is still presumably not prepared). 3. I then expressed, on instructions, USG’s “serious concern” over developments cited para 2 reftel. FonMin then acknowledged seriousness of these developments. He let me know by various circumlocutions that he was having trouble getting PriMin Mujib to focus on problem and/or make the urgent decisions that situation calls for. Samad also indicated that he was now recruiting Home Minister in joint effort to prevail on Mujib to do the necessary. 4. I informed FonMin that we had now closed all four USIS centers to public for “end-of-year inventory”. This transparent euphemism was not meant to suggest that we contemplated reopening next week. Rather, I told Samad, we would look to BDG advice as to when moment arrives for US prudently to reopen centers. Samad nodded assent. When I repeated this point at end of interview, Samad indicated to Alam that he was expected to stay in touch with Embassy in this regard. 5. Remainder of interview was devoted to Samad’s account of his encounter with hostile NAP (Musaffar) student group in Sylhet yesterday. Samad, if he was quoting himself accurately, did a masterful job of wrangling with students, developing astute rationale for a non-aligned, socialist government’s accepting aid from US. (If only he could make such a speech to public at large.). I chose the moment to remind Samad that USG in providing assistance to BD did so in full recognition of necessity for Bangladesh to adhere to truly non-aligned posture and of its commitments to “nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy.” 6. Samad then alluded to my December 26 conversation. With FonSec Karim about FY 73 aid grant and indicated he was fully conscious of importance of favorable public climate in US and with Congress. 7. Samad did not raise subject of Vietnam. 8. My general impression from interview is that Samad has good intellectual grasp of situation, that he is earnestly trying to accomplish his stated objectives. Up to now his is a lonely struggle within the Byzantine councils of Awami League. I of course do not rule out possibility that Logothete Samad’s account of his efforts is disingenuous. 9. Action requested: Department and USIA endorsement my interpretation that reopening of USIS centers in Bangladesh depends on decision of BDG while we remain ready to do so as soon as BDG advises us step will be prudent, BDG thereby implicitly telling us it is equipped to carry out its avowed responsibility to protect USG personnel and property. Newberry 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, New Delhi, and USIA. On December 11 the Embassy reported that a group of young men had defaced the USIS center in Dacca with anti-American slogans and Communist Party insignia. On December 22 a group of over 100 students, protesting the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, attacked the USIS center in Dacca and did serious damage. On December 26 the Embassy reported that a group of leftist youths had virtually destroyed the USIS center in Chittagong, and the following day reported that the same thing had happened in Rajshahi. On December 26 the Department instructed the Embassy to convey “serious concern of USG over spate of destructive attacks against U.S. facilities” and U.S. “distress over the inadequate police protection afforded.” (Telegrams 5310, 5512, 5533, and 5544, December 11, 23, 26, and 27 respectively, all from Dacca; telegram 232100 to Dacca, December 26; all ibid.) 436. Telegram 232926 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 436. Telegram 232926 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh 1 Washington, December 28, 1972, 0001Z Subj: Destruction of USIS Centers in Bangladesh Ref: A. State 232100 B. Dacca 5547 1. Country Director Laingen called in Bangladesh Charge Muhith December 27, to apprise latter of attacks on USIS facilities and nature of our discussions in Dacca with BDG officials on subject. Laingen stressed dual concerns for safety of personnel and broader but closely related issue of statements against U.S. by prominent BDG and Awami League figures and necessity, as we saw it, of public indication in some manner from BDG that U.S. AID supportive of Bangladesh interests. 2. Laingen cited recent anti-American episodes in Bangladesh, including defacing of USIS Dacca center, anti-U.S. statements by Finance Minister, and this week’s attack against USIS centers. Re USIS facilities, Laingen described in detail nature of damage drawing on initial Embassy/USIS assessments, as well as inadequate police protection. Stressed strongly adverse impact such developments had on U.S. public and congressional opinion and USG capacity to continue support of BD rehabilitation efforts. Expressed hope that representations our Charge in Dacca would result in action by BDG and improvement in security and psychological atmosphere in which U.S. Mission operating. 3. Muhith expressed regret over news and promised to convey USG concern to his government. Indicated he too disturbed over possible impact on atmosphere conducive to support for Bangladesh in its reconstruction and development efforts. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Butcher, cleared with USIA, and approved by Laingen. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Calcutta. 437. Telegram 5584 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 437. Telegram 5584 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State 1 Dacca, December 31, 1972, 1255Z Subject: Protest to BD FonMin over Mymensingh Incidents 1. I asked at 1400 hours for appointment with FonMin to discuss “urgent matter”. Appointment was granted for 1730. Despite three and a half hour lead time, FonMin apparently had not learned about Mymensingh incidents until I related them. 2. Samad expressed astonishment. Told me he had related to PriMin Mujib my earlier expression of worry over potential for trouble in Mymensingh. According to Samad, PriMin had assured him all necessary precautions had been laid on so that FonMin could make Friday trip his own constituency of Sylhet. Other remarks by Samad clearly laid blame on Mujib. 3. When I intimated to Samad that a personal message of regret from Mujib to Secretary of State might help me to convince Washington that problem was receiving serious attention head of government, Samad offered to make suggestion to Mujib tonight. 4. I went on impress on Samad that personal message would be only a beginning. What was lacking among other things was any sign that BDG attempting to apprehend culprits. No arrests have been made nor have any policy inquiries been made at any USIS centers. I acknowledged that it was personally reassuring to see reinforced police guards at Chancery and USIS Dacca but that we are concerned for safety of all USG employees and those working for UNROD. 5. Samad solemnly assured me of his personal concern but once again he failed to use the word “regret”, which is a word that has not been uttered to me by any BDG offtcial. 6. Samad eventually turned conversation to subject of forthcoming first FY 1973 US aid grant. Hinted that he had been drawn to judgment that it might be better to wait until after March 7 elections to sign grant. I asked him to let me know when he had come to definitive decision. 7. For the time being I am instructing USCORR coordinator that any contacts between USCOR officers and BDG officials at Director General level or higher must be cleared in advance with me. We clearly must demonstrate to BDG that faineant performance of BDG to date has brought serious disquiet into relationship with all agencies USG. 8. Department might want Wichozo to consider having me pose suggestion to BDG that Ambassador designate Hossein Ali remain in Dacca for a while to assist FonMin in coordinating efforts BDG to protect US property and citizens in Bangladesh. Newberry 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Niact; Immediate. Also sent NIACT Immediate to USIA, and routine to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Calcutta. In telegram 5583 from Dacca, December 31, the Embassy reported the “bombing, sacking, and burning” of the USIS center in Mymensingh. (Ibid.)