FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–2, DOCUMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, 1969–1972 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–2 Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2) Contents Preface Note on Sources Abbreviations and Terms Persons Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Implementation of Safeguard System (Documents 1-62) 2. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commitee; Seabed Arms Control Treaty (Documents 63-138) 3. Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention (Documents 139-276) 4. Nuclear Test Ban Issues; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Documents 277-315) 5. Conferences on Nuclear and World Disarmament and Soviet UN Initative on Non-Use of Force (Documents 316-354) 6. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Documents 355-358) Note on Sources Note on Sources Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (P.L. 93–526; 88 Stat. 1695) and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon estate. In February 1971 President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editors make every effort to verify the accuracy of the conversations. Readers are urged to consult the recordings for an appreciation of those aspects of the discussions that cannot be fully captured in a transcription, such as the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion. Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials Staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1972, Volume E–2 President Nixon usually opted not to concentrate on arms control issues, instead delegating policy direction and implementation to the Department of State and other relevant executive agencies, departments, and advisers. Nevertheless, White House involvement in the decision-making process and policy formulation certainly occurred, as in the cases of the problem of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) and the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Consequently, while the files of the Department of State provide the best source for arms control, the records of the Nixon Presidential Materials, at Archives II, constitute another key foundation. Moreover, documents concerning topics covered in this volume are located in diffuse and diverse files that do not correspond to the usual country or topical types of files cited in most other Foreign Relations volumes for the Nixon-Ford subseries. U.S. policy on arms control and disarmament during the years 1969–1972 as reflected in Nixon Presidential Materials, reveals that U.S. policy was shaped by a number of pressing domestic and international concerns that fell under the general category of arms control, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW), prohibitions on the production of fissionable material, and seabed arms control. Documents on these topics are often found in the Subject Files of the Nixon NSC Files. The most significant body of documents that cover negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on NPT ratification measures is found in the Nixon Presidential Materials, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) and Non-Proliferation Treaty. An additional excellent source that documents these negotiations are the Institutional Files (H-Files), which contain records of high-level meetings, requests for studies, and presidential decisions, including the complete set of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), and related studies and papers. A small selection of relevant foreign policy records within the Nixon Presidential Materials is in the National Security Council Files, Country Files, Europe-USSR. The volume also draws heavily from the Department of State Central Files. Along with the President, Secretary of State Rogers had meetings with premiers, chancellors, foreign ministers, and other high-level leaders of the FRG and the Soviet Union. DEF 18–6 and DEF 18–3 shed light on discussions on control and issues of NPT ratification, while POL 33–5 and POL 33–6 cover proposals for treaties relevant to the seabed. AE 13 IAEA provides insight on the problematic issues of safeguards and verification of the sharing of nuclear technology for civilian needs. Supplementary documentation on arms control and disarmament in the context of U.S. security interests are found primarily in the office files of the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (DOD). Disarmament is filed in the Department of Defense decimal system under 388.3 in the files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense cited below. Records from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are also useful in this regard, and reveal alternative approaches to biological and chemical weapons that deviate from those endorsed by the DOD. Researchers should also consult the Diary and Journal of ACDA Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg at the Department of Energy for Seaborg’s extensive contemporary view of the arms control process. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files AE 3 EURATOM, atomic energy, organizations and conferences relating to the IAEA AE 6 US, Peaceful uses of U.S. atomic energy AE 13 EURATOM, safeguards relating to EURATOM AE IAEA, safeguards relating to IAEA DEF 18, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament DEF 18–3, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences DEF 18–4, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, agreements and treaties DEF 18–6, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, control measures DEF 18–3 SWITZ (GE), defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences relating to Geneva, Switzerland DEF 18–8 US, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, testing and detection relating to the United States DEF 18–8 USSR, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, testing and detection relating to the USSR DEF 18–9 LA, defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, demilitarized and nuclear free zones relating to Latin America POL US–USSR, political affairs and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union POL 27–10 UN, military operations, chemical and germ warfare relating to the UN POL 27–10 VIET S, military operations, chemical and germ warfare relating to Vietnam POL 33–5, waters, boundaries, continental shelf POL 33–6, waters, boundaries, high seas Lot Files S/S National Security Council Files: Entry No. 5002 (formerly S/S–I Lot Files: 73 D 288) General files related to NSC matters for 1969–1972 Nixon Presidential Materials Project Nixon Security Council Files Agency Files Backchannel Files Country Files: Europe, USSR Files for the President, China Materials Kissinger Office Files: Country Files, Europe, USSR HAK Trip Files Name Files Presidential Correspondence President’s Trip Files Subject Files: Chemical, Biological Warfare, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, HAK/Richardson Meetings, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NSDMs and NSSMs, Seabeds National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) National Security Council Meetings National Security Decision Memoranda National Security Study Memoranda Review Group/Senior Review Group Minutes Review Group/Senior Review Group Meetings Verification Panel Meetings White House Special Files: President’s Office Files and Memoranda for the President White House Tapes Central Intelligence Agency Executive Registry Files, DCI Files 1969, Job 80–B01086A Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan Melvin Laird Papers Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–72–6309 Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1969 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–0083 Secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1971 OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0089 and FRC 330–75–0103 Secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and their assistants, 1969 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–0155 Top secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1972 OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197 Secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and their assistants, 1971 OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0028 Minutes of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s morning staff meetings, 1969–1973 RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/D Files: FRC 383–97–0010 Files of Director Gerard C. Smith, 1962–1977 ACDA/D Files: FRC 383–98–0004 Files of the former Executive Director Office, 1969–1970 ACDA/D Files: FRC 383–98–0005 Files of the Former Executive Director Office, 1971 ACDA/DD Files: FRC 383–98–0096 Files of Deputy Director J. Philip Farley, 1969–1973 ACDA/Files: FRC 383–98–0162 ACDA Central Depository of Top Secret Documents, 1955–1983 Library of Congress Manuscript Division Papers of Henry A. Kissinger Chronological File Geopolitical File Memoranda of Conversations Memoranda to the President National Security Council Meetings Senior Review Group Meetings Telephone Records: Telephone Conversations U.S. Department of Energy Records of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Glenn T. Seaborg Diary Published Sources Documentary Collections U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1969, 1971, 1972, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973) Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries, and Histories Seaborg, Glenn T. Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg , Pub–625, Volumes 18–24, Appendix, and Press Clippings (Berkeley: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1989–1992) Abbreviations and Terms Abbreviations and Terms ABM, anti-ballistic missile ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/D, Office of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/DD, Office of the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/IR, Office of International Relations?, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AG, Attorney General ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ASD (A), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) ASD (I), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) ASD (SA), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) ASW, antisubmarine warfare BOB, Bureau of the Budget BR, Biological (Bacteriological) Research BRDP, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel BW, Biological (Bacteriological) Warfare CAP, series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams CAS, controlled American source CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper CBW, Chemical and Biological (Bacteriological) Warfare. CC–CPSU, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program CDIP, Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program CEA, Council of Economic Advisers CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy CIP, Consolidated Intelligence Program CL, classified COMINT, communications intelligence Comite, committee COMSEC, communications security CPR, Chinese People’s Republic CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban CW, Chemical Warfare D/DCI/IC, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community D/DCI/NIPE, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State D/NRO, Director, National Reconnaissance Office DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DCID, Director of Central Intelligence Directive DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DD/P, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency DD/S&T, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency DDO/IMS, Deputy Director for Operations/Information Management Staff, Central Intelligence Agency DDR&E, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense Del, delegate Dept, Department Deptel, Department of State telegram DG, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency DIS, Defense Investigative Service Dissem, dissemination DOD, Department of Defense DOS, Department of State DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; John Ehrlichman ELINT, electronic intelligence ELR, Elliot L. Richardson ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee EOB, Executive Office Building EPA, Environmental Protection Agency EST, Eastern Standard Time EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community Exdis, Exclusive Distribution F.R., Federal Register FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FonMin, Foreign Ministry FonOff, Foreign Office FRC, Federal Records Center FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSO, Foreign Service Officer FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs GAC, General Advisory Committee, ACDA G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GC, General Counsel GDR, German Democratic Republic GOJ, Government of Japan H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations HAK, Henry A. Kissinger HUMINT, human intelligence IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile ICC, International Control Commission ICJ, International Court of Justice IDA, Institute for Defense Analysis IG, Interdepartmental Group IG/EUR, Interdepartmental Group for Europe INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/IL, Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IPMG, Interdepartmental Political-Military Group IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense J/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff K, Kissinger L, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Laird LANFZ, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Limdis, Limited Distribution LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty M, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Mbr, member ME, Middle East memcon, memorandum of conversation MIRV, Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle Misoff, Mission Officer MLF, multilateral force MR, Memorandum for the Record MRV, Multiple Reentry Vehicle Mtg, meeting NAC, North Atlantic Council NAS, National Academy of Sciences NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCA, National Command Authority NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NIRB, National Intelligence Resources Board NNWS, non-nuclear weapon states Nodis, No Distribution Noforn, not releasable to foreign nationals NPG, Nuclear Planning Group NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty NRO, National Reconnaissance Office NRP, National Reconnaissance Program NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NSC/OCB, National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum NSF, National Science Foundation NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum NUF, Non-use of Force O, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration O/DDI, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency OAS, Organization of American States OASD, ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense OASD, SA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness OMB, Office of Management and Budget ONE, Office of National Estimates OPANAL, Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSI, Office of Scientific Intelligence; on-site inspection OST, Office of Science and Technology P, President; Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State P.L., Public Law Para, paragraph PDB, President’s Daily Brief PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. PHOTINT, photo intelligence PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State PMG, Politico-Military Group PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Polad, Political Adviser PPBS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System PRC, People’s Republic of China Pres, President PSAC, President’s Science Advisory Committee R&D, research and development RDT&E, research, development, test, and evaluation reftel, reference telegram RG, Record Group; Review Group RMN, Richard M. Nixon RN, Richard M. Nixon S, Office of the Secretary of State S/P, Policy Planning Council or Staff, Department of State S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S–I, Information Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SAC, Strategic Air Command SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM, Surface to Air Missile SC, Security Council SCI, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State SEA, Southeast Asia SecDef, Secretary of Defense Septel, separate telegram SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SIGINT, signals intelligence SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLBM, Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile SLCM, Submarine-launched Cruise Missile SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOP, standard operating procedure SOSUS, Sound Surveillance Undersea System SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Country Director, Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs SRG, Senior Review Group SSR, Soviet Socialist Republic SU, Soviet Union SYG, Secretary General, United Nations TASS, Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) TIAS, Treaties and other International Acts Series TS, Top Secret U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; Under Secretary of State U/SM, Under Secretaries Memorandum UK, United Kingdom ULM, Undersea Long-range Missile UN, United Nations UNGA, United Nations General Assembly US, United States USAEC, United States Atomic Energy Commission USC, NSC Under Secretaries Committee USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USIB, United States Intelligence Board USIS, United States Information Service USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VOA, Voice of America WDC, World Disarmament Conference Z, Zulu time (Greenwich mean time) Persons Persons Abrams, General Creighton W., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from October 1972 Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 1969 to January 1973 Behr, Colonel Robert M., USAF, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Scientific Affairs) from 1969 to 1971 BeLieu, Kenneth, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations until 1970; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President for Senate Relations Brandt, Willy, West German Foreign Minister until October 1969; thereafter West German Chancellor Brezhnev, Leonid I., Secretary General, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brimelow, Thomas, British Ambassador to Poland; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office from March 1969 Brosio, Manlio G., General Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until October 1, 1971 Bush, George H. W., Republican Congressman from Texas from January 1967 to January 1970; Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations March 1, 1971–January 18, 1973 Butterfield, Alexander, Special Assistant to the President from January 1969 to January 1973 Cargo, William I., Director, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State from August 1969 to July 1973 Castaneda, Jorge, Mexican Representative to the United Nations Chapin, Dwight, Special Assistant to the President, 1969–1971; Deputy Assistant to the President (President’s Appointments Secretary), 1971–1973 Cheprov, I.I., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Chernyakov, Yuri Nikalayevich, Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury until May 16 1972 Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring), British Ambassador to the United States from February 8, 1971 Crowe, Sir Colin, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1970 to 1973 Curran, Robert Theodore, Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from August 1970 to September 1972; thereafter Deputy Director of Personnel for Management d’ Alena, Franco Cancellario, Director General for Safeguards and Supply, European Communities from 1969 David, Edward E., Jr., Science Advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Davis, Jeanne W., Director of the National Security Council Secretariat, 1970–1971 De Gaulle, Charles, President of France until April 28, 1969 De Palma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Full Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1971 Doty, Paul, Professor of Biochemistry at Harvard University and Government Arms Control Consultant Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander F., British Foreign Secretary from June 19, 1970 DuBridge, Dr. Lee A., Science Advisor to the President, 1969–1971 Eagleburger, Lawrence, Member of the National Security Council Staff until 1969; Chief, Political Section, U.S. Mission to NATO until August 1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs Earle, Ralph II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1969; Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO 1969–1972) Eklund, Sigvard, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, August 1969–September 1973 Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant to the President from January 1969 until March 1969; Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from March 1969 until June 1971 Farley, Philip J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until August 1969; Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 Fessenden, Russell, Deputy Chief of Mission (Chargé d’Affaires from January 14 to July 22, 1969) at the Embassy in West Germany until July 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from July 1971 to December 1972 Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until March 1969 Foster, Dr. John S., Director, Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense from 1969 Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Garcia Robles, Alfonso, Mexican Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Leader of Delegation to the ENDC/CCD Glennon, T. Keith, U.S. Representative to the IAEA from July 1970 Grinevskiy, O. A., Deputy Chief, International Organizations Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; participant in U.S.-Soviet technical talks on peaceful nuclear explosions, April 1969; member Soviet SALT delegation from 1969 Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; Full Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Guhin, Michael A., Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff, Scientific Affairs Haferkamp, Wilhelm, West German Commissioner of European Communities until 1970; thereafter, Vice President of European Communities Haig, Brigadier General Alexander M. Jr., USA, Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 to June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970 Haldeman, H. R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from January 1969 to April 1973 Halperin, Morton H., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January to September 1969 Hartman, Arthur, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister from June 1970 to March 1974 Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence Heydenreich, Curt, Director of the Washington Liaison Office, European Communities from 1969 Hillenbrand, Martin J. A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 1969 to April 1972; Ambassador to Germany from June 1972 Hixon, Colonel Robert C., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969 Hyland, William G., Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff, 1969–1972 Ignatieff, George, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva; Leader of Delegation to the CCD Irwin, John N., Under Secretary of State from September 1970 to July 1972; thereafter Deputy Secretary of State Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969 Keeny, Spurgeon, Jr., Member of the NSC Staff until 1969; thereafter Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., Member of the National Security Council Staff, 1970; Director after 1971 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, CDU, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 1969; CDU/CSU Candidate for Chancellor in the 1969 Bundestag election; also CDU Party Chairman until October 1971 Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 to January 1973 Korniyenko, Georgiy M., Chief of Soviet Ministry’s American Desk and Soviet Middle East negotiator Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kranich, Robert H., ACDA/IR Political Affairs Division Chief, 1969 Kratzer, Myron B., Assistant General Manager for International Activities, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, until 1971 Kuznetsov, Vassily V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Union Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense from January 1969 to January 1973 Lake, W. Anthony, Staff Member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, from 1969 to April 1970 Lebedev, Anatoliy, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington Leonard, James F., Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the ENDC/CCD Lincoln, George A., Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness from 1969 Lord, Winston, Member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1971; member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (United Nations Affairs) from September 1969 until 1970; Staff Member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1970 Luns, Joseph M.A.H, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1971 Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Assistant for Programs and then Directory of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 to September 1970 Macomber, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1969; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) from October 1969 to April 1973 Malik, Yakov Alexandrovich, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations Mansfield, Michael, Senator (Democrat, Montana); Senate Majority Leader Martin, Joseph, Jr., General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, 1970–1971; Special Assistant to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1971–1973. McCloy, John J., Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament McConnell, General John P, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until August 1969 Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser, Department of State, until July 1969; thereafter Ambassador to Romania Messelson, Mathew, Professor of Biology, Harvard University; Member of the National Academy of Sciences Millard, Guy E., Minister, British Embassy to the United States Miller, Robert M., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, 1971 Mitchell, John N., Attorney General until February 15, 1972; thereafter Chairman of the Committee to Re-Elect the President Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moose, Richard M., National Security Council Staff Secretary until 1970 Morris, Roger, Member of the National Security Council Operations Staff (Africa) from January 1969 until April 1970; Member of the National Security Council Planning Group from September 1969 until April 1970 Myrdal, Alva, Ambassador and Leader of the Swedish Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from March 1969 Odeen, Philip A., Director of Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff, from November 1971 Osgood, Robert E., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969; Director of the National Security Council’s Planning Group, 1969–1970 Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1969 to December 1971 Palmer, General Bruce, Jr., USA, Chief of Staff (Acting), U.S. Army, from June 1972 to October 1972 Pauls, Rolf, West German Ambassador to the United States Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor for the Department of State from January 1969 Pell, Claiborne, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization Podgorny, Nicolai V., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Pollack, Herman, Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State Pranger, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, 1971 Pursley, Lieutenant General Robert E., USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until 1972 Ramey, James T., Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission Read, Benjamin H, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until February 1969 Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State from January 1969 to June 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from June 1970 Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 1969 to September 1973 Roshchin, Alexey A., Leader of the Soviet Delegation to the ENDC/CCD Roth, Colonel Hellmuth, Chief of the Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, from September 1969 Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to Germany from July 1969 to February 1972; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense Ryan, General John D., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from August 1969 to July 1973 Sato Eisaku, Prime Minister of Japan until July 1972 Schaetzel, John Robert, U.S. representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, from January 1969 until June 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, from July 1970 until August 1971; thereafter Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Schumann, Maurice, French Foreign Minister from June 1969 to March 1973 Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission until August 1971 Shakespeare, Frank J. Jr., Director of the United State Information Agency from February 1969 Shultz, George, Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, from July 1970 until May 1972; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Smith, Gerard C., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from February 1969 Smith, K. Wayne, Director of the National Security Council’s Program Analysis Staff from 1970 to November 1971 Smith, R. Jack, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until May 1971 Smyth, Henry DeWolf, U.S. Representative to the IAEA until August 1970 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Member of the National Security Council Staff from January 1969 Spaak, Fernand, Belgium, Director General for Energy, European Communities, from 1969 Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from September 1969 to August 1973 Springsteen, George S., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1966 to June 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary from June 1972 to August 1973 Symington, Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri; member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Committee on Armed Services Taylor, General Maxwell, USA, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Board until April 1970 Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 31, 1971 Timerbaev, Roland M., Deputy Chief of the International Organizations Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Timmons, William, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations from January 1969 to February 1970; thereafter the Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations Tomkins, Sir Edward, British Ambassador to the United States Toon, Malcolm, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Trend, Sir Burke, British Cabinet Secretary Tucker, Gardiner L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from January 1970 Van Doren, Charles, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1969 Vannoy, F. W., Deputy Chief of Plans and Policy, Naval Operations, from 1972 Vorontsov, Yuli M., Soviet Minister Counselor to the United States Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 31, 1971; thereafter Secretary-General Walsh, John P., Acting Executive Secretary, Department of State, until 1969 Walske, Carl, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy until 1973 Walters, Lieutenant General Vernon A., Military Attaché to Paris to March 1971; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 1972 Ware, R. A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Warnke, Paul C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 1969 Watts, William, National Security Council Staff Secretary from 1969 until April 1970 Weiler, Lawrence D., Counselor, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 1972 Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1970 Wilson, James Harold, British Prime Minister until June 19, 1970 Yost, Charles, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations until February 1971 Zablocki, Clement J., Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary from January 1969 Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R. Jr., Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970 Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972 Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972 Contents 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Implementation of Safeguard System 1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Implementation of Safeguard System 1. Memorandum of Conversation New York, January 2, 1969 During a January 2 meeting, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Counselor at the Soviet Embassy Boris Sedov discussed the ratification of the NPT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe-USSR, Soviet Contacts (Sedov) 1968–1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Pierre Hotel. The attachment at Tab A is not published. 2. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 24, 1969 In this memorandum, Kenny analyzed each paragraph of the NPT provisions and provided a nuanced discussion of the potential problems of the proposed treaty. He focused his analysis specifically on those issues that were likely to effect U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany relations, IAEA/EURATOM safeguards arrangements, and PNEs (Peaceful Nuclear Explosives). Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. The attachments are not published. Copies were sent to Halperin and Sonnenfeldt. The memorandum was forwarded to the President by Kissinger under cover of a January 28 memorandum in which Kissinger suggested Nixon would want to skim through the memorandum prior to the NSC meeting the next day. 3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 27, 1969 Sonnenfeldt commented on National Security Council staff member Spurgeon Keeny’s January 24 paper concerning the NPT. In it, Sonnenfeldt cautioned against Keeny’s simplification of what he saw as a more complex German problem. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who wrote “Concur” next to his name on page one and initialed it. 4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew Washington, January 28, 1969 In this memorandum, Kissinger briefed recipients on the NSC meeting scheduled for the following day and attached a ten-page issues paper on the NPT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Secret. It was also sent to Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln. A copy was sent to the Wheeler, Helms, and Richardson. 5. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting Washington, January 29, 1969 The meeting was devoted to a detailed discussion of the NPT. Over the course of the two hour meeting, the participants examined the articles, debated various problems associated with the ways in which the treaty would affect U.S. interests, and discussed strategies for presenting the treaty to the U.S. Senate to ensure its ratification. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, National Security Council, Meetings, NSC, January–March 1969. Top Secret 6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 31, 1969 Kissinger forwarded a list of actions resulting from the January 29 NSC meeting. He specifically requested that the President respond with his comments on U.S. security capabilities and potential strategies for dealing with non-nuclear countries. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Top Secret; Sensitive. 7. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 3, 1969 In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, German Ambassador Pauls discussed the FRG’s concerns with the NPT. In this meeting, Pauls indicated FRG Chancellor Kiesinger’s support of the non-proliferation agreement, but indicated that it would be easier for the FRG to sign the NPT if the Soviets gave an assurance that the FRG would not be discriminated against but treated as other parties to the treaty. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on February 3 by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and approved on February 4 in S. 8. National Security Decision Memorandum 6 Washington, February 5, 1969 This memorandum announced President Nixon’s decision to go forward with ratification of the NPT. Although the U.S. would ratify the agreement, Nixon directed that no efforts be made to pressure other nations, specifically the FRG, to follow suit. Instead the U.S. Government “should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify,” and emphasize that the Treaty would not “broaden or modify U.S. commitments abroad.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM’s (1–50). Secret. The President submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification the same day. For text of his message to the Senate, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 62. The Senate gave its consent on March 13 by a vote of 83–15. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 78–97. 9. National Security Study Memorandum 13 Washington, February 5, 1969 The President directed that a study be made reviewing the positions of key countries on the treaty and the alternative courses of action available to the U.S. to influence their signature or ratification of the treaty. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret 10. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 17, 1969, 11:45–12:45 a.m. In this conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin and President Nixon discussed the ratification of the NPT and the corresponding situation developing in Berlin. The ensuing discussion outlined the mutual desire to work together to bring about an “era of negotiations, not confrontation,” and illuminated multiple domestic and international outcomes for the NPT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Malcom Toon. The conversation was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum of conversation is published in its entirety as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970. 11. Note From Soviet Leaders to President Nixon Moscow, undated In this note, Soviet leaders emphasized the need for cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR to ensure international security. Moreover, they stressed their belief that all possible efforts should be made to have the NPT start operating effectively and as soon as possible. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons. No classification marking. The note was given to President Nixon by Dobrynin during their February 17 meeting. The note is published in its entirety as Document 15 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970. 12. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger Bonn, February 26, 1969 In this private conversation between Nixon and Kiesinger, the two leaders discussed the need for an open “line of communication” connecting the two countries so as not to fall into the trap set by the Soviets to break the alliance. The NPT would prove to be a key component to that relationship. At the heart of this discussion was the need to maintain a “firm but not hostile” regarding the NPT and any subsequent Soviet action. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is labeled “Uncleared-For Embassy Use Only.” The memorandum was forwarded to National Security Council Operations staff member Sonnenfeldt by Russell Fessenden, Charge d’Affaires at the Embassy in West Germany, under cover of a March 10 letter in which he indicated that the memorandum of this “private session” between Nixon and Kiesinger was drafted by interpreter Hans Holzapfel. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation in its entirety is published as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972. 13. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group Washington, March 1, 1969 Prepared in response to NSSM 13, the study outlined three courses of action that the U.S. could utilize to secure the signing and ratification of NPT that ranged from a passive approach to a uniquely tailored and intensive treatment. In the 28-page discussion, not published here, the Ad Hoc Interagency Group recommended courses of action on a country-by-county basis. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret. 14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 19, 1969 Kissinger informed President Nixon that during a March 11 conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin handed him a copy of a note that the Soviets intended to deliver to Bonn to meet some of its concerns about the NPT. Kissinger attached an analysis of the note and copies of exchanges. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger1969 (Pt. 2). Secret; Nodis. In a March 6 memorandum, Kissinger informed the President that in a March 3 conversation he had told Dobrynin, “If the Soviet Union could give the Germans some reassurance on Article 2 [of the UN charter], either through us or directly, it would ease the problem of signature considerably.” (Ibid.) 15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 21, 1969 In this memorandum, Kissinger told Rogers that President Nixon wanted Rogers to explore the feasibility of synchronizing the completion of ratification and the deposit of procedures for the NPT with the Soviet Union. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Secret; Nodis. In a March 28 memorandum to Kissinger, Acting Executive Secretary John Walsh indicated that Rogers would meet shortly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin to propose simultaneous deposit. (Ibid.) For a record of that meeting see Document 17. 16. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 28, 1969 Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on instructions given the Department of State regarding NPT ratification and on his conversation with the German minister. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Confidential. Sent for information. Brigadier General Haig initialed the memorandum and a handwritten notation indicated Kissinger saw it. 17. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 1, 1969, 3:40–4:30 p.m. Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov discussed the benefits and drawbacks surrounding simultaneous ratification and the issues associated with Germany’s signing of the NPT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on April 2 by Krimer (OPR/LS) and approved on April 9 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 18. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 9, 1969, 10:30 a.m. Secretary of State Rogers and German Foreign Minister Brandt discussed the NPT, focusing primarily on the continuing FRG concerns and the Soviet response to simultaneous ratification. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll (EUR/GER) and approved on April 15 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 19. Editorial Note 20. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 1, 1969 In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger for the Under Secretaries Committee meeting scheduled to take place that afternoon that was to review an options paper prepared by ACDA on the NPT ratification. Sonnenfeldt attached the options paper for Kissinger’s consideration. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 66, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum at Tab B is not published. Written in the right hand margin of page 2 of the attachment is, “But Senate itself asked for simultaneous ratification.” An arrow points to the last sentence in paragraph (b). The attachment cited in the footnote to page one of Tab A is not published. 21. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, May 1, 1969 In this office diary entry, Seaborg recounted the discussion of the NPT at the May 1 Under Secretaries meeting. The Commission focused on easing German concerns, creating a strategy for depositing the ratification at the most advantageous time, and the status of other nations with regards to the NPT. Source: Department of Energy Archives, Records of the U.S Atomic Energy Commission, Job 65–42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 101003–101010. Confidential 5/1/69–3 22. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 7 Washington, May 2, 1969 The memorandum listed the follow-up decisions on the NPT, including the issue of Soviet-U.S. simultaneous ratification and the status of other national positions on the NPT, which had been made at the NSC Under Secretaries Committee meeting on May 1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, Atomic 388.3. Secret; Exdis. 23. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 8, 1969, 12:10 p.m. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Rogers discussed the U.S. proposal for joint action in the ratification of the NPT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR-Memcon’s, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 8 by Toon. 24. Letter From Premier Kosygin to President Nixon Moscow, May 27, 1969 In Kosygin’s response to Nixon’s March 26 letter, Kosygin reiterated the Soviet readiness to enter “into an era of negotiations” with the United States and their desire to improve relations with the FRG. The problem, according to Kosygin, lay with the West Germans whose “stubborn refusal” to accede to the NPT greatly impeded its entry into force. He then encouraged the U.S. to use its influence “to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 765, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence. Kissinger forwarded Kosygin’s letter to Nixon under cover of a May 28 memorandum in which he stated: “on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet ratification until then. He asks us to press the German and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by Soviet definition, Israel.” (Ibid.) Kosygin’s letter and Kissinger’s memorandum are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970. 25. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Commissioner for the European Communities (Haferkamp) Washington, May 29, 1969 The two men discussed the scope of the EURATOM safeguards and the process of negotiating compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 13 EURATOM. Confidential. Drafted on June 3 by H. Malin (ACDA/IR). The attached list of participants is not published. 26. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko New York, September 22, 1969, 10–11 p.m. Rogers and Gromyko discussed simultaneous ratification and deposit of the NPT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL US–USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved on September 24 by R. L. Brown. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, September 26, 1969 Kissinger discussed the issue of joint U.S.-Soviet ratification in light of Secretary of State Rogers’ meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 6/1/69 Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information 28. Telegram 14146 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, October 28, 1969, 1145Z. The telegram transmitted the text of the talking points that the German NPT delegation intended to use in its upcoming talks in Washington. The points indicated a positive FRG appraisal of the NPT, even in light of the less than satisfactory German-Soviet discussions the previous March. The FRG then listed several requirements before it would consent to sign the NPT. Among those were requests to the U.S. Government to issue a statement denying the Soviet alleged “right of intervention” as noted in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, for its continued support of NATO and the subsequent safeguards agreements, and its willingness to publicize its position in support of these requests to “avoid any subsequent disagreement” concerning the interpretation. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, US Mission Geneva, and USNATO. 29. Telegram 14209 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, October 28, 1969, 1145Z. The telegram reported on Chancellor Brandt’s decision to “push ahead” on the NPT. Brandt intended to approach the Soviets and requested Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s assurances of the expansion of peaceful atomic energy use in writing, so that Brandt could distribute it to the German Bundestag. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, Berlin, USNATO, USMission Geneva, and USUN. 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 29, 1969 Eliot discussed the prospects for German signature of the NPT now that Brandt had been elected Chancellor, noting they had improved considerably as the result of the lack of U.S. to sign the agreement and encouraging the continuation of that policy. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Sutter (EUR/GER); cleared in draft by Katz (EUR/RPE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Glysteen (ACDA). R.C. Brewster signed for Eliot. 31. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 29, 1969, 10:30 a.m. In the first of five U.S.-German NPT discussions, ACDA Deputy Director Farley commented on each of the FRG talking points provided to him. Ambassador Roth also raised the issues concerning the use of nuclear energy and assurances of nondiscriminatory safeguards. He intended to use the results of these discussions to determine priorities for future discussions. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. Drafted on November 3 by Malin (ACDA/IR). 32. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 29, 1969, 4:30 p.m. In their second meeting, U.S. and German officials continued their discussions of the NPT, focusing more specifically on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, safeguards, and the German Government Statement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 12 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. 33. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 30, 1969, 10:30 a.m. In this third session of U.S. and German NPT discussions, officials continued their discussion of the German talking points, focusing their energies most specifically on Points 7 through 14. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR) on November 18. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. 34. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) and the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control (Roth) Washington, October 30, 1969, 11:45 a.m. In this fourth session of U.S.-German NPT discussions, Hillenbrand and Roth discussed the status of the NPT talks, the Brandt government, and U.S. military force reductions in Germany. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Barkley (EUR/GER). The meeting took place in Hillenbrand’s office. 35. Note Prepared by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) Washington, October 30, 1969 Disarmament Division Chief Roth confidentially told Farley that Chancellor Brandt planned to have a one-day Bundestag debate on NPT in November. Following that discussion, the FRG would sign the treaty. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–0096, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, April–October 1969. No classification marking. The note is unsigned. 36. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 31, 1969, 9:30 a.m. In this fifth and final session of the U.S.-German NPT discussions, participants continued to ferret out problematic phrases and vague statements in the U.S. position and the FRG Statement. Both sides expressed approval with the overall accomplishments of the sessions. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting took place in the ACDA conference room. 37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 6, 1969 Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith’s October 30 conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on NPT and expressed concern about holding a joint U.S.-Soviet NPT deposit ceremony with, as Dobrynin put it, “full publicity.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 70, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicated Kissinger saw it on November 10. Also attached but not published is Part I of the Smith-Dobrynin conversation. 38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 7, 1969 In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt discussed the FRG request for a U.S. statement on NATO and security guarantees. The FRG wanted confirmation that, should the NPT outlast NATO, the U.S. nuclear guarantee would continue to pose as a deterrent to nuclear attack. While he noted he had “no real objection” to confirming U.S. support of the German requests, Sonnenfeldt called the U.S. statement “painful in the extreme.” As the procedure applied an outdated rhetoric to the NPT and made unavoidable connections between the NPT and SALT, which would force the U.S. to make unfortunate concessions on both should SALT encounter difficulties. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: “Can’t we get control of [these?] matters? How about showing Hillenbrand SALT instructions with Colorado language?” The attachments are not published. 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, November 11, 1969 Rogers asked Nixon to authorize release of a statement in connection with the signing of the NPT by the FRG. Rogers noted that recent talks between U.S. and FRG representatives revealed two requisite provisions before the FRG would adhere to the NPT, the continuation of NATO and U.S. commitment to European security. Rogers assured the President that the drafted statement would confirm U.S. support while not further extending U.S. international commitments. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Kissinger approved the statement for the President on November 12. (Draft memorandum to the President, undated; ibid.) 40. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 19, 1969 Sonnenfeldt notified Kissinger that the Soviets had indicated they planned to ratify the NPT on November 24. Given the perceived lack of Soviet interest in a signing ceremony, Sonnenfeldt recommended against a U.S. signing ceremony. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential. Sent “urgent” for information/action. A notation at the top of the page indicated Kissinger saw it and that action had been completed. 41. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon Washington, November 19, 1969, 3:30 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger tentatively decided not to have an NPT signing ceremony. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Records, 1969–76, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–28 April 1969. No classification marking. 42. Telegram 200453 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts December 2, 1969, 2013Z. The Department instructed posts in those countries that had not yet signed or ratified the NPT to encourage their host governments to do so. The telegram encouraged all officials to cite the recent U.S., USSR, Swiss, and FRG signature of the NPT as indication of NPT legitimacy and as reason to reexamine their own ratification status. It closed with further strategic advice for encouraging ratification in European capitals and former British dependencies. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) on November 28; cleared by ACDA/D, EUR, NEA, L, PM, AF, ARA, EA, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Rogers. Repeated for information to USNATO, USEC Brussels, USUN, U.S. Mission Geneva, and Helsinki. 43. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 30, 1969, 11 a.m. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Under Secretary of State Richardson discussed efforts to persuade enough countries to ratify the NPT to allow the treaty to come into force. By December, twenty four nations had indicated their intention to deposit their ratification by January, 1970. Should this occur, the two men tentatively agreed to hold a joint U.S.-Soviet ceremony for the deposit of instruments of ratification in early February. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. VI. Confidential. Drafted by Bowden (EUR/SOV); concurred in by Leonard (ACDA); and approved on December 31 by Abramowitz. The meeting was held in Richardson’s office. The memorandum of conversation is Part I of V. 44. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson Washington, February 11, 1970 Smith expressed concern over getting key non-nuclear governments to sign the NPT before it came into force. He attached a draft telegram to posts in most of the principal non-signatory states and proclaimed it as a “low-key way” to circumvent the U.S. policy against “arm twisting” reluctant governments into signing the agreement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Secret; Exdis. The attachments are not published. The telegram at Tab A was approved and sent on February 11 as telegram 211405 to multiple posts. (Ibid.) 45. Telegram 864 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, February 19, 1970, 1559Z The telegram provided an update on the IAEA negotiations over establishing a committee to implement the NPT’s safeguards provisions. It includes text outlining a set of eight responsibilities mandated by the NPT; encouraged all member states to engage in discussions concerning those tasks with the Director General; and ensured the prompt dissemination of those viewpoints to all member states for consideration. It closed with a discussion of the use of specific terms in facilitating the terms of the agreement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to AEC, Bonn, USEC Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 46. Editorial Note 47. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, March 18, 1970 Seaborg briefly summarized his meeting on NPT with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and attached the talking points of the discussion. These talking points emphasized cooperation, IAEA organization, and the identification of IAEA objectives. These goals included safeguarding NPT negotiations, the maintenance of an effective and credible system, encouraging acceptance in reluctant nations, and the creation of a resolution for a focused forum of discussion with specific time limits. Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 21, pp. 524, and 532–538. No classification marking. 48. Telegram 40032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, March 19, 1970 The telegram reported on Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg’s March 18 meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Seaborg recounted the FRG’s decision to sign the NPT. Dobrynin concurred with Seaborg’s assessment, cautioning that the difficulties would arise when “ironing out the differences in texts.” Both participants expressed their desire to prompt the adoption of the resolution at the April Board meeting. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to London and Vienna. Drafted and approved on March 18 by Allen (IO); and cleared by Kratzer (AEC). Trevithick (SCI) was informed. 49. Telegram 1465 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, March 25, 1970, 1320Z. The telegram reported that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev had handed the UK a statement criticizing its proposal for forming an IAEA safeguards committee. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to London and Vienna. 50. Telegram 45515 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria Washington, March 27, 1970 The telegram transmitted the text of the Soviet statement concerning the NPT’s entry into force on March 5 and the creation of the Safeguards Committee. This statement is reported in Document 49. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Moscow, London, and USMission Geneva. Drafted and approved by Trevithick (SCI/AE); and cleared in IO/OES, EUR/SOV, EUR/BMI, and ACDA. 51. Telegram 1930 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, April 10, 1970, 1529Z The telegram analyzed the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to establish a safeguards committee to prepare the agency for its NPT safeguards role. Specifically, the telegram examined the Soviet objection to certain paragraphs in the preamble, attempts to alter the focus of the committee, and the introduction of a resolution from Spain revising the Safeguards system. Given the wide ranging support for the Spanish resolution, the conclusion predicted continued discussion concerning possible revisions to the Safeguard system. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to AEC, USMission Geneva, USUN, USMission EC Brussels, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rome. 52. Document Adopted by the Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, April 20, 1971 This document entitled “The Structure and Contents of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Under the Nonproliferation Treaty,” outlined the objectives and applications of the agreement, including policies on cooperation, implementation, accountability, and finance. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 218–244. 53. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, undated The memorandum addressed concerns among Euratom countries that the U.S. might terminate its supply of enriched uranium and the Soviet threat to “make a public issue” should the U.S. continue to distribute the substance. Given that Euratom nations had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, Pollack and Hillenbrand supported the continued supply of uranium over Soviet objections and outlined a potential rationalization to use with the Soviets to assuage their concerns. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) December 1970–December 1971. Drafted by Loftness (SCI/AE) on December 3. Confidential. Drafted on December 3, by Loftness (SCI/AE) and concurred in by SCI/AE, ACDA, EUR/RPE, EUR/G, L/SCI. IO/SCT. Johnson initialed “Approve” on page 5 on December 7 but added a handwritten note stating, “on assumption AEC concurs & H does not perceive any Congressional problem.” The attachments are not published. 54. Telegram 32227 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna Washington, February 25, 1972 The telegram informed the Mission that the Department, the ACDA, and the AEC had approved of continued U.S. supply of enriched uranium to Euratom countries. It then included a three part statement outlining the official statement to use should the Soviets question the decision either in a formal discussion or in an informal format. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent priority to the Mission to the European Community in Brussels and repeated priority to Moscow. Drafted on February 23 by Haendler and Dodd (EUR/RPE); cleared in SCI, ACDA, EUR, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Springsteen (EUR). 55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 10, 1972 Farley recommended that Kissinger urge the Japanese to adhere to the NPT during his upcoming trip to that nation. Farley wanted to address recent reports cited in the Japanese press indicating that the U.S. had lost interest in Japanese adherence to the agreement. To correct this, he highlighted the following considerations for Kissinger to stress in his discussions: 1) U.S. interest in maintaining control over the number of nations with nuclear capabilities; 2) U.S. interest in the overall success of the agreement; and 3) U.S. interest in maintaining the momentum generated by U.S. Soviet cooperation in arms control. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972 (2 of 3). Confidential. 56. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 27, 1972 Sonnenfeldt reviewed the issue of delivery of U.S. nuclear material to Euratom after March 1, 1972. Concerned this could become an “irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations,” Sonnenfeldt recommended the approval of a statement to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin detailing the reasons for the continued delivery. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 719, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. 22. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Walsh. Haig initialed “OK” next to “Approve” on page three. An adjacent note in an unidentified hand states: “Livingston notified State by phone 5/25. To be followed by written confirmation by Mrs. Davis.” All Tabs are not published. 57. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 7, 1972 Johnson requested that Kissinger stress the U.S. Government’s interest in Japan’s ratification of the NPT on his upcoming trip. He cited the recent Japanese press reports portraying the U.S. as lacking in its commitment to preventing Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. These reports had also caused concern amongst Soviet officials in the IAEA. Johnson concluded by emphasizing the importance of putting “these fears to rest once and for all” and noting the reverberating effects the Japanese ratification would have on other “threshold” nations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972. Secret. 58. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 13, 1972, 11:43 a.m.–1:18 p.m. The President and Kissinger discussed the NPT and the Department of State’s effort to get Kissinger to urge Japanese ratification of the treaty while visiting that nation. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 732–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 59. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 16, 1972 Sonnenfeldt summarized negotiations between IAEA and Euratom on a safeguards agreement under the NPT. The attached telegram reported on a meeting between Department of State officials and a European Community delegation. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol. II 1971–1972. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is Document 56. Initialed by Kissinger. Tab B was drafted in ACDA and EUR; cleared in AEC/DIS, AEC/NUMS, SCI/AE, ACD, and EUR/RPE; approved by Springsteen. It was repeated for information to Vienna, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and Tokyo. 60. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 12, 1972 Sonnenfeldt forwarded a Department of State telegram containing the text of a verbal statement made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies in response to an April 10 verbal statement by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin complaining U.S. policy on nuclear fuel supplies to Euratom violated Article III of the NPT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXIII. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. At Tab A is Document 56. Tab B was drafted in EUR/SOV; approved in EUR, EUR/SOV, and L/SCI, and for information in SCI, ACDA, PK/AE, EUR/RPE, and AEC/DIP. It was repeated for information to USEC Brussels, USMission IAEA, USMission Geneva, USUN, USNATO, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, The Hague, London, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and AEC. 61. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson Washington, August 19, 1972 In this memorandum, Pollack reviewed the safeguards agreement program and proposed moving ahead with negotiations for a U.S. safeguards agreement. This agreement was not ultimately concluded until November 1977. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, U.S. Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and Administrative Statements June–September 1972. No classification marking. Drafted on August 14 by Zook (SCI/AE) and concurred in by L, L/SCI, IO/SCT, S/PC, EUR/RPE, H, PM/AE, USAEC, ACDA, PM/DCA. Johnson initialed his approval on August 24. The attachments are not published. 62. Telegram 227180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany Washington, December 15, 1972, 2318Z. The telegram discussed the reasons for the delay in signature of the Euratom-IAEA safeguards agreement. Disagreements over the limitation of inspector access were of particular importance to the delay. The postponement of the signature raised “serious problems” for the United States as it would suspend the implementation of the agreement, pave the way for those nations which had not adhered to the NPT, and raise additional obstacles in the U.S. Congress. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 3 EURATOM. Limited Official Use. It was also sent to The Hague, and Vienna. It was repeated to EC Brussels, Paris, Luxembourg, and Rome. Drafted by Boright (ACDA); cleared in IO/SCT, EUR/GER, EUR/RPE, and USAEC/IP; and approved by Brewster (SCI/AE). 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, January 2, 1969 PARTICIPANTS: Boris Sedov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy Henry A. Kissinger Boris Sedov, officially counselor of the Soviet Embassy, but in fact a member of Soviet intelligence, called on me today at his request. He had asked to see me during the previous week, but the meeting was delayed because of my trip to Key Biscayne. Sedov began by saying that the Soviet Embassy had given a copy of their Middle East note to Ellsworth on December 30 because I had warned Sedov against “surprises,” and because the Embassy wanted to deal with the President-elect on the basis of complete frankness. Sedov then read the attached communication (Tab A). I copied it and read it back to him (he made a few corrections). I then asked Sedov about the meaning of the phrase: “The Soviet leadership would do their utmost …to ensure ratification by states of the non-prolification [sic] treaty.” Did it mean that the USSR would try to create an atmosphere in which ratification of the treaty would be possible in the United States, or was it proposing joint action with the US to secure ratification by third parties. Sedov replied that both meanings were intended. I said we were studying the problem. Sedov then asked about strategic arms talks. I repeated my observation of December 18, 1968, that we did not believe that political and strategic issues could be completely separated. The Nixon Administration wanted to see more progress in Vietnam and the Middle East before committing itself to strategic arms talks. Sedov asked whether the Soviet overture on the Middle East could be seen as a sign of good faith along the lines of my communication of December 18. I said we would have to study it. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.] Sedov said that the Soviet Union was very interested that the inaugural speech contain some reference to open channels of communication to Moscow. I said that all this would be easier if Moscow showed some cooperativeness on Vietnam. Sedov replied that he would try to have an answer by January 10. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe-USSR, Soviet Contacts (Sedov) 1968–1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Pierre Hotel. The attachment at Tab A is not published. 2. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 2. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 24, 1969 Subject: Provisions of the NPT and Associated Problems At your request, I have prepared the following summary of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), copy attached (Tab A), and the problems associated with these provisions, particularly as they relate to the FRG. The FRG’s present reservations about the treaty, however, are not primarily directed at specific provisions but rather constitute reluctance to surrender a future nuclear option, particularly without obtaining compensatory concessions in its relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some of the points discussed below, including those previously resolved, could be advanced by the FRG as reasons for attempting to reopen the treaty or delaying signature. Articles I and II contain the basic obligations of the parties to the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Article I prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring to any recipient nuclear weapons or devices and from assisting the non-nuclear-weapon states in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Article II obligates the non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive nuclear weapons or devices from any transfer whatsoever, and not to manufacture or seek assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or devices. These articles, which were the product of a long negotiation with the Soviet Union and our NATO allies, were designed as a compromise that protects existing NATO arrangements but precludes arrangements such as the MLF/ANF. The precise implication of these articles on present and future arrangements was originally a matter of serious concern to our NATO allies, particularly the FRG. To resolve these questions, our interpretations of these articles were given to the Soviet Union and our NATO allies during the course of the negotiations in the form of a series of Questions and Answers (Tab B). While we did not ask the Soviet Union to agree with our interpretations, it was made clear that they would be made part of the legislative record of the treaty and that formal Soviet objections would present serious problems. To this end, Secretary Rusk made the following statement at the hearings on the NPT before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices, because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over the results. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. And, it does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components.” Although Foreign Minister Brandt has stated his satisfaction with these interpretations, there is a possibility that the FRG might seek to extend the interpretations to permit the establishment of a European “defensive” nuclear weapons system prior to the establishment of a fully federated European state. These articles prohibit non-nuclear-weapon states from developing a nuclear device for peaceful purposes since it is clearly not possible to distinguish these technologies. Brazil has made a major point of this issue as a basis for objecting to the treaty, claiming its sovereign right to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Despite continued efforts, however, Brazil has not been able to develop significant support for this position, and this has not become an issue among our Western allies. These articles deal only with nuclear weapons and devices and therefore do not preclude other military nuclear programs such as nuclear submarines. Article III requires that all non-nuclear-weapon states accept international safeguards to prevent the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear weapons. This article was initially criticized by our European allies and others as being discriminatory since it did not cover the nuclear-weapon states. It was argued that, although such safeguards were not technically required since the nuclear-weapon states were permitted under the treaty to continue the manufacture of nuclear weapons, this arrangement would put the non-nuclear-weapon states at a competitive disadvantage in peaceful uses. This problem was apparently resolved to the satisfaction of the FRG and most other countries when the US and the UK stated that they would voluntarily put their peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection when these safeguards were accepted by other countries. The 1st paragraph of Article III provides that the safeguards procedures on fissionable material will be contained “in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system… ” The wording of this and the subsequent paragraphs in Article III were the result of a long, and presumably successful, negotiation with our Western allies and the Soviet Union to find a formula that would provide for international IAEA-approved safeguards and also protect EURATOM as an independent institution without duplicating safeguard requirements. The problem was made extremely complex since France was a member of EURATOM but did not intend to sign the NPT. Moreover, France as a nuclear-weapon state was not subject to safeguards under the NPT which led to the stated fear that France might thereby obtain a special advantage with respect to the other members of EURATOM contrary to the Treaty of Rome. The language finally agreed upon and the US–UK unilateral voluntary acceptance of safeguards have apparently satisfied the FRG and other EURATOM countries that their interests are adequately protected. The 2nd paragraph of Article III prohibits any party to the treaty from providing fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon state unless the fissionable material is subject to the safeguards of Article III. Our EURATOM allies have been concerned that failure of EURATOM to negotiate an agreement with IAEA within the required time (see below) would prevent the US from providing fissionable material under previous or future agreements. In response to requests from EURATOM countries for commitments for future supplies that would clearly be contrary to the language of the treaty, we have taken the position that we do not believe this situation could arise and this point has not recently been pursued by any of the EURATOM countries. This could become a serious problem, however, if EURATOM and IAEA do not in fact work out an agreement within the required time. The 3rd paragraph of Article III requires that safeguards not interfere with the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities. This paragraph was intended to be responsive to the early concern, particularly in the FRG, that the system of safeguards would put them at a disadvantage in international competition in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. The 4th paragraph of Article III specifically permits the IAEA to negotiate with groups of states (i.e., EURATOM) and provides that negotiation of agreements with the IAEA shall begin within 180 days of entry into force of the treaty and that the agreements shall enter into force within 18 months after the initiation of the IAEA negotiations. For countries that deposit their ratification subsequently, the agreements will enter into force within 18 months after the deposit of ratification. The timing of IAEA/EURATOM negotiations presents a problem since we told the EURATOM countries that we would take into consideration the status of the IAEA/EURATOM negotiations before our ratification of the treaty. These negotiations, however, will presumably not begin until the FRG signs the NPT and it seems clear that the FRG will not sign until the treaty has been ratified by the US. In these circumstances, the lack of progress on a EURATOM/IAEA agreement does not constitute grounds for our withholding ratification and there is no pressure now from the EURATOM countries for us to do so. In view of the deadline in these procedures and their concern over an assured US supply of fissionable material (see above), EURATOM countries plan not to ratify until they are confident of the outcome of EURATOM–IAEA negotiations. Article IV is designed to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon states that the treaty will not affect their rights to participate fully in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All parties “undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” This wording may create a future problem if various countries, such as the FRG, claim that we have an obligation to exchange information on subjects such as U–235 isotope separation technology which relate to peaceful uses but which we consider to be sensitive security information. Article V is designed to compensate non-nuclear-weapon states for agreeing not to develop nuclear explosives even for peaceful uses by providing assurances and the mechanism for them to participate in the potential benefits from the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. It provides that devices will be provided under appropriate international observation on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge for explosive devices will be “as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.” It provides that non-nuclear-weapon states will obtain these services by special international agreements through an appropriate international body and that negotiations on this subject will commence as soon as possible after the treaty enters into force. Although Brazil continues to insist on the sovereign right to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, this article appears to have taken care of most of the earlier objections on this point by other states. Nevertheless, this article may create future problems since the nature of the international agreements and the indicated international body are not agreed upon and will present some complex technical and political problems. The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was particularly concerned about the apparently open-ended obligation assumed by the US to provide these services to all countries on a highly subsidized basis. Nuclear excavation projects which will probably be of principal interest to most countries will require an amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Finally, this commitment to the further use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes almost certainly rules out the possibility of a tenable comprehensive test ban treaty. Article VI commits all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to a cessation of the arms race and to nuclear disarmament. This is an essentially hortatory statement and presents no problems. Article VII makes clear that the treaty in no way affects the right to establish regional nuclear free zones. This is essentially a bow to the achievement of the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and presents no problems. Article VIII establishes procedures for amending the treaty and provides for a review conference five years after the treaty enters into force and each five years thereafter at the request of the majority of the parties to the treaty. Article IX designates the US, UK, and USSR as depository governments and provides that the treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification of the depository governments and 40 other signatory states. This procedure could permit the treaty to enter into force without any of the key near-nuclear-weapon states being parties to the treaty. The Senate has recommended that the President consider delaying depositing the instruments of ratification until such time as he has “recieved positive assurance that a majority of those countries nearest to a nuclear-weapons capability intend to adhere to the treaty.” This is a potential chicken-and-the-egg problem since it is clear that US ratification of the treaty is required to provide impetus to the treaty and is probably required before any of the hold-out near-nuclear countries will sign the treaty. Article X permits any party to withdraw from the treaty after three months’ notice “if it decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of this treaty jeopardize the supreme interests of its country.” It also provides that 25 years after the treaty enters into force a majority of the parties to the treaty will decide whether the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or for an additional fixed period. The latter provision was included primarily in response to the basic concern of the FRG (Chancellor Kiesinger) about entering into an obligation of indefinite duration. Article XI defines authentic texts and the procedure for depositing the original treaty as well as copies to the signatory states. The Preamble has twelve paragraphs expressing the consensus of the parties. The first three reflect the importance and urgency of preventing nuclear proliferation; the next two express support for international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and for improvements in safeguards techniques; the next two deal with the principle of sharing the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and of making technological by-products of work on nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes; the next four express the urgent need for further progress toward disarmament and limitations on the nuclear arms race; and the last reaffirms the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force and threats of force in international relations. Although the preamble is essentially hortatory in nature, it is given some additional significance by the provision in Article VIII that the first conference to be held after five years to review the operation of this treaty “with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized.” The principal problem area in the preamble is the final paragraph that reaffirms the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force and threats of force in international relations. During the course of Soviet-German bilateral exchanges in 1967 and 1968, the Soviets affirmed the continuing validity of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter (Tab C) regarding its rights to take measures against enemy states during World War II. The FRG, which has been concerned about the problem of “nuclear blackmail” has, therefore, questioned whether it is covered by this portion of the preamble in the eyes of the Soviet Union. After the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia focussed attention on this issue in the FRG, we publicly gave the FRG assurances that we did not consider Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter gave the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the FRG and reaffirmed the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty in the event of such Soviet action. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was particularly concerned that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was in violation of this part of the preamble. Military Guarantees —The treaty contains no military guarantees. Despite strong pressure from many countries, it was clear during the negotiations that neither the US nor the USSR was prepared to include these in the treaty. However, in connection with the UN General Assembly’s consideration of the draft NPT, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution essentially reaffirming the obligations of the UN Charter in connection with the NPT. This resolution was accompanied by separate statements by the US and the USSR which indicated their intention of honoring their commitments under the UN Charter in connection with the NPT. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary RUSK took the position that there were no additional obligations assumed by the US under the UN security guarantee resolution. Nevertheless, in recommending that the Senate approve the NPT, the Committee made a special point that this did not construe approval of security guarantee measures embodied in the UN resolution or the supporting US declaration. During the negotiations, the FRG raised the guarantee problem in the context of what would happen to their existing security guarantee from the US in the event that NATO lapsed while the NPT was still in force. We have taken the position that, while we expect NATO to continue, the FRG would have adequate reason to exercise its rights under the withdrawal clause (Article X) in the unlikely event that NATO should lapse. In the above discussion, I have attempted to point up all the major problem areas in the treaty, including some which are now hopefully largely only of historical interest. I think that it is clear that great attention has been given to the specific objections of the FRG to the details of the treaty and that these objections have been essentially resolved. The FRG’s continued reservations about the treaty reflect reluctance in many quarters there to give up a future nuclear option, particularly without compensatory concessions in the FRG’s relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some of these complex issues could still be used by the FRG, or others, in an attempt to reopen the treaty or delay its entry into force. Spurgeon Keeny 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. The attachments are not published. Copies were sent to Halperin and Sonnenfeldt. The memorandum was forwarded to the President by Kissinger under cover of a January 28 memorandum in which Kissinger suggested Nixon would want to skim through the memorandum prior to the NSC meeting the next day. 3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 27, 1969 SUBJECT: NPT Memorandum dated January 24, 1969 I think that this memorandum is a fair and comprehensive commentary on the provisions of the NPT. In my view, the problems with the FRG are understated. In the first place, German reservations are not due only to reluctance to surrender a future nuclear option but to a more general uneasiness regarding the FRG’s position in the world and US attitudes. Moreover, with the German election approaching the NPT has become one of those issues which different people for different reasons do not wish to stand up and be counted on. I consider it questionable whether, even after our ratification, the Germans would be prepared to sign before their election. Excessive US pressure might become an issue in the election campaign. In any case, I would think that the Germans will want to pursue further their contacts with the Soviets, which have lately been resumed, to see what they might be able to obtain by way of assurances that the Soviets will not again assert their alleged intervention rights under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. In short, I think the German problem is more complex than suggested in the Keeny paper. You also asked whether I thought there was any problem about your circulating this document to members of the NSC. Apart from the German aspects mentioned above I have no particular substantive problem about circulating the paper. As a matter of tactics and style, however, I wonder whether it would not be better to ask the Secretary of State, as the Cabinet officer principally responsible for shepherding through the NPT, to provide the NSC with a commentary on the provisions of the treaty. Since Spurgeon has already done the work, he could perhaps give his paper informally to whoever would be assigned by the Secretary of State to prepare such a commentary. If you prefer to circulate this paper yourself, I will be glad to provide a slightly expanded first paragraph to handle the German issues. Helmut Sonnenfeldt 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who wrote “Concur” next to his name on page one and initialed it. 4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew 4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew 1 Washington, January 28, 1969 SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, January 29, 1969 A meeting of the National Security Council will be held in the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, January 29, 1969 at 10:00 A.M. The agenda for the meeting is as follows: 1. Vietnam Alternatives 2. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) There will be no additional paper for the continuation of the discussion on Vietnam. The NPT discussion will be based on the attached paper. The NSC Review Group, in recommending at its meeting of January 23, 1969 that the NSC consider the attached paper on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, agreed to call to the attention of the Council the following points on which its members were in agreement: 1. The Review Group had to spread its net wide to develop many of the Con arguments listed below and believes they are outweighed by the Pros. A number of the Con arguments are listed not because members of the Group consider them valid in the current circumstances but only because they have been put forward by others and the Review Group believes that the NSC should be aware of them. Many of these arguments might have been valid two years ago but have been overtaken by events. 2. The Review Group believes that the decision to seek Senate consent and the decision to ratify must be made together. If the President recommends Senate approval, the Review Group feels, he will be committing himself to ratification. 3. The Review Group believes that a decision to seek Senate consent and to ratify the Treaty does not require a decision to press other countries now or at a later date to adhere to the Treaty. Henry A. Kissinger Attachment undated Issues Paper on the NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY A prompt decision is necessary as to whether or not the Administration will support the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has been signed by 85 countries since it was opened for signature on July 1, 1968; however, it has been ratified by only seven countries including the UK. The NPT will not go into effect until it has been ratified by the US, UK, and USSR and forty other countries. Moreover, it must be emphasized that many of the key countries capable of developing nuclear weapons have not yet signed, including the FRG, Israel, India, Japan, Australia, South Africa, and Italy. (Italy has just informed that it plans to sign on January 28.) A number of the key non-signers are clearly awaiting US ratification before they sign as are many of the signers before they ratify. Despite the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 17, 1968, voted 13 to 3 (with 3 abstentions) to recommend Senate approval of the NPT. In these circumstances, the following questions should be examined in determining the US position on the NPT: 1. Is the NPT in the over-all US interest? 2. If the NPT is in the US interest, should the President take the lead in seeking Senate approval? 3. If the NPT is in the US interest, should the President ratify the NPT immediately after Senate approval? 4. Should the US now or at a later date press other countries go sign or ratify the NPT? 5. If the NPT is not in the US interest, should the President formally seek to disengage at this time? The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along the following lines: 1. Is the NPT in the over-all US interest? a. Pro: (1) The NPT is the best way to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, which has been a policy objective of all previous Administrations. The present treaty was supported by all interested agencies of the government in the previous Administration, including the JCS, who were unanimous in their support. (2) The further spread of nuclear weapons would increase the threat of nuclear war by putting more and more countries in a position where they could initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Not only would there be the danger that some countries would prove irresponsible in the use or control of nuclear weapons, but there would be an increasing number of nuclear confrontations that could rapidly escalate local conflicts with increased danger of great power involvement. (3) The spread of independent nuclear capabilities would force the US and USSR into a nuclear competition to assist allies in developing nuclear capabilities. (4) The treaty safeguards on nuclear materials for peaceful purposes would provide a unique opportunity to create a worldwide system to monitor the vast quantities of fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons production that will soon be available all over the world as a result of the rapid spread of nuclear power reactors. (5) The economic impact of a general nuclear arms race would have a serious adverse effect on many countries, such as India to which we give economic assistance. (6) The treaty would protect our existing NATO nuclear arrangements and does not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. (7) The treaty, which demonstrates the ability of the US and USSR to negotiate complex issues of mutual interest, would set the stage for further steps in the negotiation of a US-Soviet detente. Failure would probably have a serious adverse effect on negotiations in other areas. (8) The treaty would be a stimulant to progress on other arms control agreements. Failure would probably set back the prospects for other serious arms control proposals for years to come. b. Con: (1) The treaty would reduce our flexibility in developing future arrangements that might contribute to regional defense or unity and spread the responsibility or cost of nuclear defenses (e.g., MLF/ANF and an Asian MLF). (2) The Soviets by their intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was in violation of the preamble of the NPT as well as the United Nations Charter and the Warsaw Pact, have demonstrated their disregard for treaty obligations such as those contained in the NPT when such obligations prove contrary to their immediate interests. (3) The treaty has had an adverse effect on our relations with some major countries (e.g., FRG, India, Israel), who either oppose or have strong reservations about the treaty. US ratification, if accompanied by further pressure, might have additional problems in certain countries such as the FRG. (4) The treaty may ultimately fail. For example, certain countries (e.g., Israel, India) may eventually decide to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, the growth of Chinese nuclear power over the longer term will place Asian signatories in an increasingly difficult position. (5) There is a possibility that the safeguards provision of the treaty might have a serious effect on the future of EURATOM. (6) Additional arguments that have been made by some include: (a) The development of an independent nuclear weapons capability might be desirable in some cases, if it could spread the responsibility for defense and enable the US to reduce involvement in the defense of other countries (e.g., India, Japan). (b) Although the treaty does not contain any military guarantees to non-nuclear weapons states, it clearly would have the effect of strengthening the moral, if not legal, US involvement through the UN in the collective defense of signatory non-nuclear weapons countries against nuclear aggression. It thereby would reduce US flexibility in disengaging militarily in various regions of the world. 2. If the NPT is in the US interest, should the President take the lead in seeking Senate approval? a. Pro: (1) This would be an effective domestic and international symbol and signal of the President’s deep interest in world peace and his desire to move from confrontation to negotiation with the Soviet Union. (2) It would in large measure pre-empt efforts by allies and neutrals to reopen the earlier issues on the NPT. Failure to do this would complicate our diplomatic negotiations on the NPT by encouraging countries to reopen all of the issues that concern them. (3) This would give the President a significant role in a major early Congressional action involving strong bipartisan support. b. Con: Withholding of the Presidential position might be used in bargaining with the USSR on certain issues such as the Soviet posture toward Germany. 3. If the NPT is in the US interest, should the President ratify the NPT immediately after Senate approval? a. Pro: (1) This is a key action required to regain the impetus behind the NPT. It would immediately result in positive actions on the signing and ratification by other important countries that would build up the pressure for action by other undecided countries. Some key potential nuclear-weapons powers (including the FRG) are clearly waiting to see whether the United States ratifies the treaty before facing the final decision on their own position. (2) Failure to act promptly would encourage new developments—such as a decision by India to develop nuclear weapons—that would vastly complicate or preclude regaining impetus for the treaty. b. Con: (1) In negotiating the safeguards arrangements in the treaty, we indicated we would take into account the status of EURATOM’s negotiations with IAEA before ratification. This action was taken in part to accommodate the EURATOM concern that the US may consider itself obligated by the treaty not to supply EURATOM with nuclear fuel in the event a EURATOM–IAEA agreement was not successfully negotiated. (It should be emphasized, however, that EURATOM–IAEA consultations have not begun since the FRG and Italy have not yet signed the treaty and the FRG will not sign the treaty until the US has ratified it. This would require further consultation with our allies before ratification.) (2) In recommending approval of the treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations urged that the President delay depositing the US instrument of ratification until he had received assurance that a majority of the countries nearest to nuclear weapons capability intend to adhere to the treaty. (Some of these countries, however, are awaiting US action before signing the treaty.) 4. Should the US press other countries to sign or ratify the NPT? For the last two years the US has carried on a continuing diplomatic campaign to persuade key countries first to support and then to sign the NPT. The key countries that have not yet signed the treaty include the FRG, Israel, India, Pakistan, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Italy. The reasons for these countries’ reservations or objections to the treaty vary widely. The extent to which we can influence these countries or be responsive to their concerns also varies widely from country to country. The timing of this action should also be keyed to domestic considerations in these countries (e.g., the FRG elections next October). Without resolving the specific tactic in dealing with individual countries, the general policy question should be faced whether we wish to continue or increase the level of diplomatic activity in support of the NPT if we decide the treaty is in the US interest. a. Pro: (1) An active, positive diplomatic campaign in support of the NPT will demonstrate the continuity of US policy in this field and thereby greatly reduce the incentive for various countries to reintroduce previous reservations or objections to the treaty in hopes of changing US policy. (2) The effectiveness of the treaty will depend in large measure on the breadth of adherence by key potential nuclear states. (3) Selective diplomatic pressure may be needed to avoid actions (e.g., Israel) that would prejudice attainment of the objectives of the treaty, or the treaty itself. b. Con: Our relations with our allies and the neutrals and thereby the long-term interests of the NPT would be better served by a minimum of diplomatic pressure at this time. If the President now endorses the NPT and subsequently ratifies it, this will be adequate support for the NPT and will at the same time permit a more general dialogue by the new Administration with our allies on this and related issues. 5. If the NPT is not in the US interest, should the President formally seek to disengage at this time? This would involve a public policy statement by the President as opposed to a long-term, quiet effort to kill the treaty either by a behind-the-scenes effort to delay Senate approval or by a delay of formal ratification. a. Pro: This action would have considerable support in the FRG and in some circles in Italy, Japan, India, and other key near-nuclear weapons states that either openly oppose the treaty or simply wish it would go away. b. Con: In general, such an action would be very unfavorably received in most articulate circles both internationally and domestically. It would be looked upon as a formal abandonment of efforts towards arms control and negotiated settlements with the Soviet Union and would be identified as a decision to base US security on the spread of nuclear weapons. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Secret. It was also sent to Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln. A copy was sent to the Wheeler, Helms, and Richardson. 5. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting 5. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting 1 Washington, January 29, 1969 In attendance were: The President The Vice President Secretary of State Under Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness General Andrew J. Goodpaster Dr. Lee DuBridge The President opened the meeting by announcing that this morning’s session would focus on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and that on Saturday, starting at 9:30 a. m. the Council would consider the Middle East problem. The President stated that he was publicly on record in favor of the NPT but that the main question here was one of timing and procedure. Specifically, he wanted to fix how we would inform our European friends, how we would orchestrate clearance with the Senate and how we could assure the skillful groundwork in order to achieve ratification. The President stated that he was convinced of the merits of the NPT but that he wished that everyone would be informed of the background by Mr. Fisher so that everyone would proceed from the same point of departure when dealing with questions from Senators, the press or our allies. The President stated he felt it also would be valuable to have Mr. Helm’s views on the attitude of our allies vis-à-vis the NPT. Mr. Fisher commenced the meeting with the briefing on the background of the NPT, emphasizing first the provisions of the Treaty itself and making the following points. — First operative paragraph of the Treaty provides that there will be no transfer of weapons or no help provided to non-nuclear nations by the signator. — Article 2 was a mirror image of article 1 and provides that havenots agree not to acquire or seek help. — Article 3 poses the most serious problems as it is the control article which provides for negotiation of IAE controls. Fisher stated that the Soviets maintain they do not need inspections of non-nuclear plants when they are producing weapons anyway. We have maintained that the Soviet position will create problems with our allies. Consequently, the U.S. has agreed to multilateral inspections on its part even if the Soviets will not accept them. Our allies are very concerned about this because they fear a permanent inferiority on nuclear technology. This issue was the genesis of the two-year period allocated to the finalization of the arrangements in this area. — Articles 4 and 5 deal with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and Article 5 prohibits not only weapons but peaceful nuclear explosive devices. This issue has also caused major problems among the havenots. Thus, the Treaty provides for PLOWSHARE services on an at-cost basis and does not include R&D costs. Mr. Fisher pointed out that the above were the main articles of the Treaty and added that Article 10 provides for a withdrawal clause. Fisher then touched on the present parliamentary situation, with respect to the Treaty, reviewing the status of countries within the UN forum. Mr. Fisher then turned to the problems associated with the Treaty as they affect our European allies, emphasizing that the control article seemed to be causing the most difficulty and that is why we have two years to work out this problem under the provisions of the Treaty. It appears that this is going to take some delicate work and perhaps some arm twisting. Mr. Fisher then discussed the issue of early U.S. ratification. Many of the countries are waiting for the U.S. lead in this area, he said, and of course the Czech Invasion set us back. Senator Aiken, Mr. Fisher stated, has a serious problem with the Treaty as it affects our commercial interests. He believes that the R&D provision will mean that the U.S. will pay all the bills with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Mr. Fisher stated that we had given a list of questions and answers to the Soviets not to get them to agree with our position but rather to get their views on where we stood on this sensitive problem. The President asked if the group had any questions. Dr. DuBridge inquired when does the clock start on the two-year time limit to get the control issue agreed upon. Mr. Fisher stated that it will be two years from the date of ratification and that this meant that it could be as long as three years from now, with six months to negotiate and perhaps another 18 months to complete these negotiations. The President asked what the implications of the Treaty were should we wish to help a small nation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. Fisher said that they would ask us, we would then tell the IAEA that we were going to do this and invite them to see what we were doing with the exception of the exact techniques involved in the peaceful explosion. The President said this was strange because if they could learn how to conduct a peaceful explosion, they would have no problems with the weapons. Fisher said this is correct but we would use a “black box” solution. Fisher added that the main problems with the Euratom countries are the need of getting some type of controls within the two years and working out the issue of peaceful explosions. The President asked specifically about the PLOWSHARE program as it pertains to the new Ismian Canal. Dr. DuBridge interjected that it was the AEC’s position that the Test Ban Treaty need not be amended, whereas Mr. Fisher insists that it will have to be. This is the long-standing, interdepartmental fight which has been going on for a considerable period. The AEC has been adamant, just as the ACDA people have. The President asked Mr. Kissinger to give him some advice on our ability to amend the Test Ban Treaty. Under Secretary of State Richardson inquired as to the status of the legal study on the need to amend the Treaty. Mr. Fisher stated that the real issue is that any fallout or debris resulting from a peaceful explosion violates the Treaty, for example, the harbor explosion in Australia which is outside of our own country definitely would violate the Treaty. Dr. DuBridge stated, “perhaps, but is the debris or fallout measurable or significant. This is the key question”. Fisher said any measurable debris would appear to violate the Treaty if it can be picked up by others. At this point, Mr. Helms commenced his briefing, which is at Tab A and which touched upon the attitudes of the various countries with respect to the NPT. Following Mr. Helms’ briefing, the President asked what the status of the Soviet’s PLOWSHARE activity had been. Dr. DuBridge replied that it had been considerable. The President pointed out that treaties don’t necessarily get us very much but that people tend to overestimate what such a treaty means. For example, suppose a country wanted to make their own weapons, then they could obviously abrogate the treaty without sanctions. The President also asked, for example, even with the treaty what are we accomplishing that would not happen without the treaty? Mr. Kissinger said the treaty permits us to give nuclear weapons to European countries, i.e., collectively. The President said “then as far as the Soviets are concerned, they have achieved nothing. What we are really going to get out of this are prohibitions against what we wouldn’t do anyway. Basically, I view the value of the treaty as its psychological impact. In this regard, Europe remains a problem area”. The Vice President asked the Director, CIA, how far havenot countries were away from having weapons. Mr. Helms replied that you could divide the countries into two groups, those that would have the materiel in about two years and those that would not have it for about five years. The Vice President said, “what would the treaty do to those countries who are near having the weapon but have not yet signed”? Mr. Helms replied, “it worries them.” The President stated that the Israelis are very close to a weapon. General Lincoln pointed out that he feels they will be ready within six months if they decide to proceed. General Goodpaster asked whether we were certain that they did not have it as early as January 1, 1967. It was pointed out that the main prohibition against an Israeli announcement or admission that they have nuclear weapons would be the threat that the Soviets or Chinese would help the Arabs. Mr. Helms and Mr. Fisher departed at 11:10 a. m. The President introduced the substantive discussion, stating that the group would now consider the means of dealing with our allies and other foreign countries on the NPT issue and, secondly, procedures we would follow with the U.S. Congress. He emphasized that this was not to be a decision meeting. We have already decided. We have also decided to go slow, especially with the FRG so as to give them time to resolve their own internal problem. The President stated he also wanted detailed coordination with the Senate before any announcement was to be made, adding we are going forward and here is the general game plan: 1. Clear our proposed action with the Germans with Mr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers coordinating on this. 2. Determine when we want to ask the Senate to go forward. Secretary Rogers stated that they had done some thinking about this and were prepared to advise the President. 3. Timing is crucial. The Secretary of State was told to hold up on any announcements until the necessary groundwork was laid. The Senate would be absent from the 7th to the 17th of February. Secretary Rogers recommended that the President just make a brief announcement and that it be sent over just before they go into recess, timed in such a way as to prevent a full-scale call for testimony. General Wheeler pointed out that when this was reviewed previously that the Foreign Relations Committee had moved ahead unilaterally and did not even invite the Armed Services Committee to special sessions on the NPT and that this had caused such stir among the Armed Services Committee that the Administration had to draw back. The President asked if this meant that Congress would insist on hearings to which the Chairman replied, “it certainly means that we must explore this matter with Russell and Stennis”. Secretary of State said, “I should see Mr. Russell anyhow and I will discuss this matter with him.” The President said, “well, let’s not sit on this one too long. The Czech issue could explode at any time and result in another delay”. The President stated, “I think we should proceed before the Senate leaves, adding that he wished to maintain the initiative. Once the issue was placed in their lap, it would be up to them”. Mr. Kissinger stated that he agreed with this and with Secretary Rogers and that the President should send his message to the Hill, indicating support of the NPT, by the middle of next week and that the President should get himself on record before they leave. Then, if there are to be hearings, they would be conducted after they return. Then the onus would be on the Hill. If the Czech issue should heat up, then we will have the initiative as to where to go from there. The President instructed the Secretary of State to call the Soviet Charge and tell him of our decision to proceed. The President stated that the FRG should be advised this action on our part is not to be interpreted as any acquiescence on our part to the Soviets interpretation of the intervention clause. The President asked if all these things could be done by Wednesday, stating that we might send the message over on Thursday. Secretary Rogers cautioned that perhaps Wednesday would look better. Secretary of Defense said the Congress will be in session on Thursday. Secretary Rogers reiterated that Thursday might look like too much of a finesse. The President stated that we should be ready to go no later than Monday with his message in final form and with the coordination effected with the Soviets and the FRG, as well as designated Congressional leadership. Secretary Rogers said once we tell the Soviets it will be all over the world. The President said, “should this occur, we would say I am considering the NPT”. General Lincoln pointed out that consent prior to ratification might take some time, anticipating that Thurmond will resist consenting. Secretary Rogers pointed out that this might be true but the onus would rest on the Hill. The President then emphasized his strong commitment to PLOWSHARE and his desire to get the test ban issue sorted out as soon as possible and that he is especially concerned that the Soviets will move ahead of us in this area. Dr. DuBridge stated that while the Soviets had probably exercised PLOWSHARE to a greater degree than we had, that they are not ahead of us in technology. He also emphasized that the resolution of the interdepartmental split on the Test Ban Treaty issue would be most difficult. The President asked if Dr. DuBridge wanted Mr. Kissinger to get all parties concerned together. The Chairman stated that this was an urgent matter, that we are abiding by the treaty quite literally, while the Soviets have been very careless. Mr. Kissinger stated there were two other issues to be resolved. First, following ratification, how much pushing would we do on others, especially the FRG with its internal political problems. Mr. Kissinger stated that if we don’t pressure the Germans, it would help them. The President emphasized that he was in full agreement with Mr. Kissinger and that he wanted it understood that there was to be no arm twisting of other states on the NPT issue, that it is completely up to them as to whether or not they follow U.S. lead. Secretary of State said that we must be careful not to give the impression that we don’t care whether they follow suit. The President said this may be so but we will just state that we are hopeful that they will follow suit, without adopting heavy-handed tactics. Mr. Kissinger said the second problem had to do with the security provisions associated with the Treaty. We have been speaking with two conflicting lines on this one. First, we assure our allies that we will give them protection if they sign the NPT and, on the other hand, we have been assuring the Congress that this action will not extend U.S. guarantees abroad. We need to get these two tracks in harness. The answer should be somewhere in between the two extremes and we must be consistent both at home and abroad. It is inconsistencies like this that build the credibility gap. The President stated that his travels abroad certainly confirmed Mr. Kissinger’s point. Our allies insist on guarantees and the Congress insists that there be no extension of U.S. commitments. Secretary of State emphasized that we would have to be very careful on this issue, that were it to explode it could kill the whole proposal. General Wheeler stated that when he testified before Congress on the NPT, he went on public record to the effect that we had no intention of going beyond existing guarantees. The President pointed out that we will need very careful approach to this issue. If there is any intimation of an extension of U.S. guarantees, Senate consent would not be forthcoming. The President said we will have to look at this in terms of our worldwide commitments and the Secretary of State again emphasized that this issue should not be mentioned. Mr. Kissinger said that it must be kept in mind that Mr. Johnson had stated publicly that we would protect the other countries in the event of nuclear attack. Secretary Rogers said, “but we cannot raise this issue now or we will be in a buzz saw.” The President emphasized that the U.S. people do not want any more commitments, would not permit them and despite what the former President had said, we must not get boxed in on this issue. Meeting adjourned at 11:35 a.m. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, National Security Council, Meetings, NSC, January–March 1969. Top Secret 6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 31, 1969 SUBJECT: Actions Resulting from the National Security Council Meeting of January 29, 1969 Attached is a list of the actions indicated during the NSC meeting on Wednesday, January 29, 1969 dealing with the NPT. The list has been coordinated on an Eyes Only basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them. With your approval I will prepare appropriate implementing instructions where required. Obviously most of the actions are already underway. However, your views on the future treatment of other non-nuclear countries, expanded U.S. security guarantees and U.S. PLOWSHARE capabilities should be formalized by appropriate written follow-up Study or Decision Memoranda. Approve [Nixon initialed] Disapprove Other Attachment undated List of Actions Resulting from Meeting of the National Security Council on January 29, 1969 The President decided to go forward with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The following scenario of time-phased actions was approved with the view toward having the Secretary of State prepare, by Monday, February 3, 1969, a Presidential message to the Congress confirming his decision: 1. The Secretary of State and the Assistant for National Security Affairs will coordinate in informing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of our decision to proceed, while clearly assuring them that we will continue to reject Soviet claims that the UN Charter will permit Soviet intervention in the FRG. The FRG is to be informed prior to February 5, 1969. 2. The Secretary of State and Assistant for National Security Affairs will coordinate in informing the Soviet Charge of our decision to proceed with the NPT. The Soviets are to be informed prior to February 5, 1969. 3. The Secretary of State should discuss the proposed course of action with Senator Russell and other appropriate Congressional leaders prior to February 5, 1969. For the present, the U.S. public stance with respect to the NPT should be that it is still being given consideration by the President and the National Security Council. The President wishes it clearly understood that associated with the U.S. decision to proceed with the NPT there will be no efforts by the U.S. Government to pressure other nations to follow suit, especially the Federal Republic of Germany. In this regard, the U.S. Government should reflect a tone of hopefulness that other nations will sign or ratify while avoiding any intimation of heavy-handed pressure or arm twisting. While recognizing the concerns of non-nuclear countries for new or expanded U.S. security guarantees, the President does not wish any public intimation that existing commitments have been modified. In this regard, the President wishes this issue to be decided when the need arises, based on the circumstances extant at the time. U.S. ratification or support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be interpreted as a broadening of U.S. commitments abroad. The President expressed his intention of moving rapidly on the development of U.S. Plowshare capabilities and directed his Assistant for National Security Affairs to provide him, at an early date, with recommendations as to whether or not amendments to the Test Ban Treaty will be required to achieve this objective. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Top Secret; Sensitive. 7. Memorandum of Conversation 7. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 3, 1969 SUBJECT: Part I—FRG Request for Consultations on NPT PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Rolf Pauls, Ambassador of Germany Mr. Carl Lahusen, Counselor, Embassy of Germany The Secretary Alexander C. Johnpoll, Acting Country Director, EUR Culver Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR Ambassador Pauls said he had been instructed to present some views of his government on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He recalled that Chancellor Kiesinger had given a TV interview in January in which he had said that the Soviet claim of the right of intervention in the FRG under the Potsdam Agreement and the UN Charter “enemy states” Articles on the one hand and the fact that the Soviet Union was asking the FRG to sign the NPT on the other creates a difficult situation. In his talks with Lodge before the latter’s departure, the Chancellor said this problem was the major stumbling block to German adherence to the NPT, although some minor problems also remained. Ambassador Pauls stated that Foreign Minister Brandt had a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on January 10 at which time he made the point that it would be easier for the FRG to sign the NPT if the Soviets gave an assurance that the FRG would not be discriminated against but treated as other Parties to the treaty. The Ambassador commented that Germany favors non-proliferation not only in principle but as a practical matter: It is the only country to have made an undertaking not to manufacture nuclear weapons and would like to have other countries placed on the same footing as itself. He said the FRG favors both horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. Hence the FRG has contributed to the negotiations on the NPT in a constructive way. It is approaching accession to the treaty in the same spirit. It must view the treaty in the context of its overall policy, with special reference to the FRG’s relationship with the Soviet Union because of the problem mentioned above. The FRG must expect the same obligations and rights under treaty and without any discrimination. The Ambassador said Soviets claim a special right to intervene under the Potsdam accords and the UN enemy states clauses. The Ambassador cited various Soviet notes in which the Soviet position was outlined, ending with a note dated July 5, 1968. More recently the Germans have noticed a certain change in nuance. In January the German Ambassador in Moscow had a conversation with the Chief of the International Organizations Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. This Soviet official stated that the Soviet commitment not to use force derives from the UN Charter, but until there is a German peace treaty, Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter and the Potsdam agreements remain the bases for the Soviet Union’s relations with the FRG. However, as far as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are concerned, there would be no discrimination against the FRG in the NPT. The Secretary commented that the picture was confusing. Ambassador Pauls then offered the FRG proposal: That assurances be sought from the Soviets that Article II of the UN Charter would apply to the FRG without any reservations once the FRG adheres to the NPT. The Ambassador stated that the FRG was not concerned with the actual use of nuclear weapons since the FRG is protected by an alliance. The statement made by the US on September 17, 1968 had been helpful in this connection. However, the FRG remained concerned about the threat of the use of nuclear force. The Ambassador stated his instructions were to request the US to examine this demand and to consult on how best to gain satisfaction. The Germans had two operational ideas—one was that their Ambassador in Moscow should raise the question with the Soviet Government; the other was that the US might take some parallel action in support of the German effort. This would be an important help to the FRG when it raises the matter with the Soviets. He wished to obtain our reaction as soon as possible. The Secretary asked whether the FRG would raise the matter in Moscow fairly soon. Ambassador Pauls said that they hoped to do so as soon as the FRG position could be coordinated with ours. The Secretary said he wished to make a few preliminary comments. He said that the President would be sending a message to the Senate this week on the NPT requesting prompt and favorable action on the treaty. He commented that the NPT had been inherited from the previous Administration and the project had become pretty well jelled before the present Administration took office. He said this of course should not be interpreted as any reluctance on the part of the Administration to proceed with the treaty. He noted that Senate action would not complete our ratification process and there would still be come time to consult with our allies before our instrument is deposited. The Secretary said we would take the FRG suggestion under consideration. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on February 3 by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and approved on February 4 in S. 8. National Security Decision Memorandum 6 8. National Security Decision Memorandum 6 1 Washington, February 5, 1969 TO: The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission SUBJECT: Presidential Decision to Ratify Non-Proliferation Treaty The President has decided to go forward with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Until this decision is reported in a Presidential message to Congress, the Government’s public position should be that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is still under consideration by the President and the National Security Council. The President directed that, associated with the decision to proceed with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there should be no efforts by the U.S. Government to pressure other nations, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, to follow suit. The Government in its public posture should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify, while clearly dissociating itself from any plan to bring pressure on these countries to sign or ratify. The President directed that the Government in its public posture should make clear that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not create any new U.S. commitments abroad and that it does not broaden or modify any existing U.S. commitments abroad. The President desires that the nature of U.S. commitments abroad be decided when the need arises, based on the circumstances at the time. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM’s (1–50). Secret. The President submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification the same day. For text of his message to the Senate, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969 , p. 62. The Senate gave its consent on March 13 by a vote of 83–15. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 78–97. 9. National Security Study Memorandum 13 9. National Security Study Memorandum 13 1 Washington, February 5, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Position of Key Countries on the Non-Proliferation Treaty In connection with the President’s decision to go forward with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he has directed that a study be prepared reviewing the positions of key countries on the treaty and the alternate courses of action available to the U.S. to influence the decisions of these key countries to sign or ratify the treaty. The President directed that the study be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary of State, with representatives of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be forwarded to the National Security Council Review Group by March 3, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret 10. Memorandum of Conversation 10. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 17, 1969, 11:45–12:45 a.m. SUBJECT: Ambassador Dobrynin’s Initial Call on the President PARTICIPANTS: U.S Side: The President Henry A. Kissinger, Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Soviet Side: H.E. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador The President greeted Ambassador Dobrynin in the Fish Room and escorted him into his office for a brief private chat. Ambassador Dobrynin told the President privately that, before his departure from Moscow last week, he had spent two days at a government dacha outside Moscow with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny and the message that he carried was based on his talks with the leadership. The President should understand therefore that what he had to say on substantive issues was an accurate reflection of the views of the leadership. After Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Toon joined the President, the President gave the floor to Ambassador Dobrynin. Dobrynin said that his government had noted with interest President Nixon’s statement that his Administration looked forward to an era of negotiations, not confrontation. He could assure the President that the Soviet Government shared this view and was prepared to do its part to see to it that the period that lies ahead was truly one of negotiations and not confrontation. This was on the understanding, of course, that the issues to be negotiated and the subjects to be discussed would be by mutual agreement, that negotiations would not be pursued simply for their own sake but for the purpose of bringing about constructive results. Past experience indicated the importance of beginning negotiations as soon as possible. Delay could be harmful, and it was important therefore to recognize the desirability of moving ahead at an early date. The Ambassador had been instructed by his government to ascertain precisely what the President had in mind by negotiations—specifically what issues the President felt should be the subject of negotiations and when, where, and at what level these should take place. So far as the Soviet Government was concerned, negotiations and an exchange of views on various subjects and at various levels could take place simultaneously. It was not excluded that at an appropriate time discussions could be carried on at the Summit level. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.] The President said that he wished to make clear that it was not his view that agreement on one issue must be conditioned by settlement of other issues. The President wished to express his conviction, however, that progress in one area is bound to have an influence on progress in all other areas. The current situation it Berlin is a case in point. If the Berlin situation should deteriorate, Senate approval of the: Non-proliferation Treaty would be much more difficult. The President wished to make clear that he favored early ratification of the treaty and he is optimistic that the Senate will act favorably in the near future. We should bear in mind, however, that just as the situation in Czechoslovakia had influenced the outlook for the treaty last fall, so would the situation in Berlin now have an important bearing on the Senate’s attitude. Ambassador Dobrynin had mentioned the desirability of making progress on some issues, even if settlement of other issues should not be feasible. The Non-proliferation Treaty is just such an issue. If we can move ahead on this it would be helpful in our efforts on other issues. The only cloud on the horizon is Berlin and the President hoped that the Soviets would make every effort to avoid trouble there. Dobrynin said that the situation in Berlin did not stem from any action taken by the Soviets. The President would recall that a meeting was scheduled in Berlin last fall and the Secretary of State had discussed the problem with the Ambassador, urging him to persuade his government to avoid any action in connection with this meeting which might possibly result in unpleasantness in and around Berlin. The Ambassador said he would not wish his remarks to be recorded but he felt the President should know that his Government had used its influence to insure that the situation remained calm. There was no confrontation then, and Ambassador Dobrynin saw no need for a confrontation between us in the present situation. The President hoped that there would be no trouble in Berlin and he welcomed Ambassador Dobrynin’s assurances on this point. The Soviets should understand that we are solidly behind the integrity of West Berlin, and we will do whatever is necessary to protect it. He noted in the press references to the “provocative nature” of his visit to Berlin. The President wished to assure Ambassador Dobrynin that these stories were totally without foundation and that his visit to Berlin was a perfectly normal action for any United States President to take in connection with a visit to Europe. The President concluded the discussion by pointing out to Dobrynin that the United States and the Soviet Union have all the power necessary to maintain peace in the world. If we play our role effectively, peace will be maintained. We do ourselves and others disservice, however, if we pretend that we agree on all the basic issues. We should rather insure that our differences do not lead to confrontation, that we are not drawn into confrontation by actions of others. We should recognize that diplomacy can play a vital role in insuring that this does not happen. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Malcom Toon. The conversation was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum of conversation is published in its entirety as Document 14 in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume XII , Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970. 11. Note From Soviet Leaders to President Nixon 11. Note From Soviet Leaders to President Nixon 1 Moscow, undated The attention has been paid in Moscow to President Nixon’s statements in which he set forth his views on questions of peace and international cooperation. As is known, the Soviet Union pursues and will pursue the policy of peace. We are prepared to develop relations of peaceful cooperation with all states which on their part strive for the same end, and we think that if both the Soviet Union and the United States in their actions proceed from exactly that principle [sic] basis, thereby there will be created the widest opportunities for mutual agreement and Soviet-American cooperation in solving the urgent international problems. We would like to particularly stress here, that although the great powers bear special responsibility for preserving peace, in their intentions and actions they—like all other participants of international intercourse—must respect the inherent rights of other states, big and small, for sovereign and independent development, they must proceed from the real situation existing in the world. If you agree with such understanding of major principles of our relations, we on our part can fully subscribe to your statement to the effect that “after a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation”. That is what we would like to say to the President right now in order to exclude any misunderstanding on the American side of our approach to one or another question. We do not see any other principle basis on which the Soviet-American relations could be built in the present world. We are deeply convinced that if such approach be followed then despite all differences of views, social and political systems and of state interests there can be no such situation that would lead with fatal inevitability to direct confrontation between our countries. All this, of course, presumes a certain level of confidence and mutual understanding that should also be present in searching ways to solving urgent world problems. It implies, of course, not only formal agreements but also opportunities provided by parallel or complementary actions including those based on the principle of “mutual example” and so on. We are convinced that by their mutual efforts the USSR and the USA together with other states could achieve a situation when international negotiations would serve first of all the purpose of preventing conflicts rather than finding ways out of them after peace and international security had already been endangered. It is of particular significance also because there is a lot of temptations to set our countries against each other. It may cause additional complicating elements in the process of development of Soviet-American relations which is not simple even as it is. At present there has accumulated a number of big international problems which are under discussion now, and the peoples have been waiting for a long time for their solution in the interests of consolidation of peace. First . We believe that all possible efforts should be made to have the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons start effectively operating. This is a question of war and peace of the future. The Treaty that had been worked out to a considerable degree due to the joint efforts of the USSR and the USA has not been signed yet by a number of states and this, naturally, strengthens the positions of the opponents of the Treaty and casts doubts upon the possibility of solving the problem of non-proliferation. If, however, a number of nuclear states grows the risk of new conflicts will increase with most dangerous consequences for universal peace. In Moscow, there is readiness to continue consultations with the U.S. Government to work out coordinated measures on securing the signing of the Treaty by a maximum number of states and its earliest entering into force. [Omitted here is discussion of other issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons. No classification marking. The note was given to President Nixon by Dobrynin during their February 17 meeting. The note is published in its entirety as Document 15 in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970 . 12. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger 12. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger 1 Bonn, February 26, 1969 [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.] NIXON: We must look at the long sweep of history, and isolating any one is a mistake. That will be my policy—to make clear that I want the closest communications with your people. We have talked it over. We have established a “line of credit.” The line of communication must be very clear and direct. CHANCELLOR: When the NPT issue was raised soon after I came into office, I was given a very hard time. I remember an article by Foster in which he said that if you want the treaty yon have to risk an erosion in our alliance. I think that would be a terrible mistake. NIXON: I couldn’t agree more. What I feel and reiterate because of our future relations—and as you know, I have suggested that the Congress ratify the treaty and eventually it will be passed—or on any problem you face, arms limitation or anything that we may talk about with the Soviets, the alliance is, as we say in the United States, the Blue Chip, the heart of the defense of Europe and the free world. As far as the Soviets are concerned, all their actions are designed to break up that alliance. We shall not fall into that trap. We will talk but we won’t get trapped. Let us not weaken the alliance. We have to think about what they want and then look at our alliance and particularly at Germany. We know their aim and are keenly aware that we “play the same game”. I think therefore they appreciate us more. CHANCELLOR: We must be firm but not hostile, open to discussion. We are prepared to maintain our rights but we and our people are realistic. The people are firm and will not waiver, but they are not emotional. They know very well whether our friends are with us or are not interested in us; but the people don’t want the impossible. The fact that you are going to Berlin is of the greatest value to us. The NPT situation is still difficult; there is division in my country and in my party, but we now should be discussing [sic] it on a higher level. There are the two UN resolutions that the Soviets want to utilize against us and there is the problem of control. We (Chancellor and President) should not deal with that now, but if that could be treated satisfactorily, also for public opinion, that would be a step in the right direction. NIXON: Do you need some reassurances from the Soviet Union on those two UN resolutions? CHANCELLOR: Our public opinion would not understand why we signed the treaty if the Soviet Union claims the right of military intervention at their pleasure. On control, for example, we have a common work plan with the Dutch on a centrifuge. So the Soviet Union says we cannot do that after the treaty is signed. Therefore the control question has to be cleared up. I am sure we can satisfy the Offset question satisfactorily and would like to do it over the longer haul. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is labeled “Uncleared-For Embassy Use Only.” The memorandum was forwarded to National Security Council Operations staff member Sonnenfeldt by Russell Fessenden, Charge d’Affaires at the Embassy in West Germany, under cover of a March 10 letter in which he indicated that the memorandum of this “private session” between Nixon and Kiesinger was drafted by interpreter Hans Holzapfel. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation in its entirety is published as Document 14 in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972 . 13. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 13. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 1 Washington, March 1, 1969 STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSM 13 At the present time 87 countries have signed the NPT and nine have deposited their instruments of ratification. Ratification by the United States, especially if followed soon thereafter by Soviet ratification, could lead within a relatively short time to several key signatures. In particular, positive decisions on NPT signature by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan would be facilitated by our ratification. The signatures or ratifications of several additional influential countries will in turn become more likely after Germany and Japan have signed; this is especially true of such countries as Switzerland and Sweden in Europe and Australia and Indonesia in Asia. In any case our ratification will help to impart a momentum to the treaty which itself will have a beneficial influence on the deliberations of other countries. There are three general courses of action at our disposal as we attempt to maximize the impact of our ratification. Each country’s particular attitude toward the NPT, together with the status of its consideration of adherence to the treaty, will dictate the most useful course to be adopted toward that country. The first course of action is essentially passive, and would apply to some countries in either of two categories: (1) those for whom U.S. ratification itself will probably be sufficient to bring about a positive decision, at least in conjunction with Soviet ratification. We believe this is probably the case with a number of smaller countries, such as Austria, Jamaica and Malta who are most likely simply waiting for a resumption of the treaty’s momentum; and (2) those whose early signature and ratification are so unlikely that there would be no practical point to any special US efforts. This group would include such countries as Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia, Communist China and Albania. The second course of action available to us is that of low-key diplomatic approaches. We would request our embassies in countries where such a course seems desirable to convey to the local government our hope that the treaty will come into force soon and thus begin to achieve its purposes. Our Embassies could review the world-wide security and economic considerations in favor of the treaty, drawing as appropriate upon the UN Secretary General’s Report on non-proliferation. Each set of instructions would, of course, be written so as to take into consideration our knowledge of the particular country’s attitude toward the treaty and, where applicable and potentially productive, would ask the Embassy to focus its remarks on that country’s specific concerns by reiterating previous statements we have made either privately or in public testimony. Each of our Ambassadors would retain discretion regarding the utilization of particular arguments to ensure that no argument was used which was likely to back-fire in discussions with individual officials. The level within the host government at which this approach is made would also be left in most cases to the discretion of the Embassy. This type of low-key representation will be applicable to almost all countries which are in general favorably disposed toward the treaty and which would not resent some further prodding. The third alternative course of action is that of uniquely tailored approaches for particular countries which we believe require and warrant more intensive treatment. These approaches could include any of the following elements: (1) letters from high-level U.S. officials, in cases such as Japan, where the suggestion has been made by the Japanese themselves, and Israel, where there is a precedent for such action; (2) coordination of our approach with other interested and influential governments, and (3) even the possibility of exercising leverage. In looking at the possibility of exercising leverage, we have of course borne in mind paragraph two of NSDM 6. Accordingly, such a course of action is seriously considered only in those cases where (1) the country has an existing nuclear program; (2) the country cannot be persuaded to adhere to the treaty through routine diplomatic persuasion alone; and (3) the country’s failure to sign could have a crucial effect on the considerations of other countries. Since the degree and type of influence which the U.S. can bring to bear varies so greatly from case to case, there is attached a series of individual country studies. Each study is in three parts: (1) a brief description of the status of the country’s consideration of the NPT and any specific problems it has with the treaty; (2) a description of the specific areas of special and applicable influence available for use with the country, especially by the U.S.; and (3) a recommendation in light of these factors as to which alternative course of action should be pursued regarding that country. It should be noted that in addition to the more immediate actions recommended for each country, the U.S. can also take steps over the longer term to demonstrate that non-nuclear parties to the NPT have ready access to the benefits of Articles IV (peaceful uses generally) and V (benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions). For example, the U.S. can make a point of responding with speed to any request for assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy from parties to the treaty. We should on the other hand be cautious in stimulating requests from countries which are clearly recalcitrant. We can also attempt to enhance the status of parties by supporting, where it seems appropriate and practicable, their representation in international bodies and their qualified candidates for positions of leadership in these bodies. In general, we should be careful to respond to specific requests for assistance having in mind the possible effects on the attitudes of countries considering either signature or ratification. Such visible demonstrations of the positive benefits of the treaty for its parties would play a significant role in inducing persistent hold-outs eventually to adhere. Another general factor likely to affect the prospects for wide adherence to the treaty is the extent to which significant nuclear arms control negotiations are taking place. One of our tactical objectives throughout will be to separate countries that have associated themselves in groups in connection with NPT signing. An example is the situation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, none of which has signed. As long as Argentina and Chile do not sign, it is easier for Brazil to be a hold-out. We may thus be able to get at the Brazilian problem in the long-term by influencing Argentina and Chile. Argentina, for example, should be interested in the fact that nuclear advanced countries of Europe have signed the treaty, including particularly Italy. In addition to consultations with our allies, particularly those who are members of Euratom, before the US deposits its instrument of ratification, we believe that we should also ascertain Soviet intentions regarding the timing of their ratification. Soviet spokesmen have in the past suggested that the Soviets would delay ratification until after FRG signature, if not ratification. It is possible the Soviets will defer ratification until the FRG signs. However, if it appears that FRG signature may be delayed until after the Bundestag elections in October 1969, it is also possible that the Soviets will ratify beforehand in order to exert additional pressure on the FRG and others to sign. Recently there have been some hints that the Soviets would act promptly after the US does. A possibly significant indication is the Czech decision to ratify in the next few weeks. It would not be prudent to leave this question up in the air. As the Italians have pointed out to us, with the UK having already completed ratification, if the US deposited its ratification and assuming the quota of the 40 additional ratifications, it would be left up to the decision of the USSR whether or not the NPT comes into force. It seems doubtful that the Soviets would consider their best interest served by holding up ratification and preventing the NPT from entering into force. Nevertheless, it would seem advisable for the US to raise the question officially with the Soviets before the US completed ratification. [Omitted here are country-by-country recommendations of courses of action.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret. 14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 19, 1969 Subject: Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, March 11, 1969 Dobrynin called me about 7:00 p.m. to ask whether I could see him that evening or the next morning. I agreed to drop by the Soviet Embassy about 9:00 p.m. Dobrynin was extremely cordial. He met me together with Mrs. Dobrynin and, after some social conversation about their daughter, they both mentioned that Mrs. Dobrynin was hoping to call on Mrs. Nixon soon. Dobrynin then handed me a brief message from Kosygin to the President acknowledging his good wishes on his birthday. He also handed me a copy of a note which the Soviet Union proposed to hand to the Germans the next day, designed to meet some of the German concerns about the NPT. Dobrynin said that the note had been influenced by some of our suggestions and was given to us simply for our information and as a token of their good faith. (An analysis of the note is attached at Tab A.) [Omitted here is material on other issues.] Tab A undated SUBJECT: FRG-Soviet Exchanges on NPT The texts of the Soviet memorandum to the FRG of February 6 and the FRG’s amendments to that memorandum of February 24 are at Tab 1. The Germans had given us their amendments before conveying them to Tsarapkin and subsequently made a formal presentation of the text to the Department on February 27. You will note from the Soviet rejoinder at Tab 2 that there are in it some four changes as compared to the Soviet text of February 6. They are marked and numbered in red, 1 through 4. The Soviet changes As a whole, the Soviet changes go some slight way toward meeting the rather far-reaching German propositions of February 24. — change #1 appears to be rhetorical and does nothing for the Germans; — change #2 uses the words “enjoy in full measure” in place of the previous “could make use of” the rights flowing from the NPT. Allowing for possible variations in translation, the new formulation gives the Germans somewhat more fulsome recognition of their rights. — change #3 falls short of the FRG’s explicit reference to rights “and positions” in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy; but it gives them assurance that rights inherent in “all provisions” of the NPT will be enjoyed by the FRG. It is thus a step in the FRG’s direction. — change #4 ignores the German request that the Soviets acknowledge the applicability of the three power declaration of intent in support of UN Resolution 255 (on assurances) to non-nuclear signatories in case of threat or attack with nuclear weapons on them; instead it now tells the Germans that Resolution 255 neither gives them special rights nor discriminates against them. The non-discrimination assurance goes some way toward the German position, although it does not, as requested by the Germans, go so far as to acknowledge the applicability of Article 2 of the Charter to the FRG. (The Germans hit upon this device as a means of getting the Soviets to renounce, in exchange for German signature of the NPT, their claimed rights of intervention under Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter.) Next Steps The question now is whether Kiesinger regards these Soviet changes as sufficient to convince enough of the NPT’s detractors in the CDU/CSU that he has succeeded in getting Soviet claims under 53 and 107 overridden. He will make some converts, but holdouts will remain. In any event, probably we should not take any steps with the Soviets until it is clear how Kiesinger assesses the new Soviet language and whether he considers it politically necessary to try another round of bargaining. The German Foreign Office had a fall-back position for the event of a Soviet rejection of the maximum demands made to them on February 24. This would involve a formulation calling for the applicability of Article 2 in the NPT context only, rather than for Soviet relations with the FRG as a whole. Such a fall-back might entail the drawback that it could be construed as conceding the non-applicability of Article 2 in matters other than the NPT. We should not give the Germans any advice one way or the other at this stage since the matter is wholly one of internal German politics. (Nothing the Soviets say will objectively add to or detract from German security.) If Kiesinger feels that another round is required, we should not stand in his way; if he then asks us to speak to the Soviets we should do so. But we should not do or say anything that gives the Germans reason to allege that we approve of their non-signature in the event there is no further give in the Soviet position. Soviet Calculations The Soviets apparently very much want a German signature. The Germans could probably squeeze a few more words out of them. But Moscow is probably nearing the end of its flexibility; the Soviets would not regard German refusal to sign as an unmitigated disaster since they could exploit it propagandistically, and use it against the FRG in Eastern Europe and to fish in German electoral waters. Beyond the election, the matter becomes more speculative and complex. The Soviets might calculate that a Social Democratic (SPD)/Free Democratic (FDP) coalition would sign on the terms as they now stand; but they cannot of course be sure of the outcome of the election. They might try to influence the outcome in favor of the SPD, but this is highly tricky and unpredictable business for them. If they find themselves facing a CDU government—with increased power for Strauss—it is conceivable that they might make the concessions they are now unwilling to grant the Grand Coalition. But this is far down the road—much farther than the Soviet bureaucracy has yet played through the game. Tab 1 [February 6, 1969] Tsarapkin Statement of February 6, 1969 The non-proliferation treaty which has been signed already by more than eighty states plays an important part in the efforts of the governments and the peoples with respect to the strengthening of peace and the prevention of a nuclear war. The entry into force of this treaty will, without any doubt, contribute to achieve progress in the field of disarmament and to contain the arms race. A signing and ratification of the treaty as speedily as possible on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany would have a positive effect on the situation in Europe and on the development of the relations between the states of this region. The Soviet Government proceeds, of course, from the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany as a party to the NPT could make use of the rights which flow from the treaty equally for all signatory non nuclear states. The Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations No. 255 would also apply to the Federal Republic as a party to the treaty. German Revisions * of Soviet Statement given Tsarapkin by Duckwitz, Feb. 24, 1969 The Soviet Government proceeds, of course, from the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany as a party to the NPT could make full use of the rights and positions, especially in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy which flow from the treaty equally for all signatory non-nuclear states and that the treaty will be applied in the same manner to all signatories. Regardless of the fact that no peace treaty has yet been concluded, the Soviet Union declares that in its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany the principles of Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the UN Charter apply without reservation or restriction. The Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. No. 255 and the declarations of intent of the three nuclear weapons states in support of it, would also apply in an unrestricted manner to the Federal Republic as a party to the treaty. Tab 2 undated In connection with the Memorandum which was handed by State-Secretary Dukwits to Ambassador Tsarapkin on February 24, 1969, the Soviet side would like to state the following. The Soviet side already gave on February 6 a comprehensive reply to the questions of interest to the West German side. As it was pointed out, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that as a party to the Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons the Federal Republic of Germany would together with the obligations taken on itself, enjoy in full measure the rights provided for in the Treaty equally to all non-nuclear states signatures to the Treaty. This naturally concerns all the provisions contained in the nonproliferation Treaty. While working out the Treaty and the Security Council Resolution No. 255 no additional provisions were formulated concerning some individual states, the Federal Republic of Germany included, which would give them some special rights or, to the contrary, would place them in position of discrimination. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger1969 (Pt. 2). Secret; Nodis. In a March 6 memorandum, Kissinger informed the President that in a March 3 conversation he had told Dobrynin, “If the Soviet Union could give the Germans some reassurance on Article 2 [of the UN charter], either through us or directly, it would ease the problem of signature considerably.” (Ibid.) * First para. of Soviet statement not affected by FRG amendments. 15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 21, 1969 SUBJECT: Ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty The President has asked that you explore the feasibility of our synchronizing the completion of the ratification/deposit procedures of the Nonproliferation Treaty with the Soviet Union. If simultaneous completion is not feasible, the President would like you to explore the possibility of completing the U.S. ratification process after the Soviets have done so. The rationale for simultaneous action would be: a. The symbolic significance of joint U.S.-Soviet ratification for world opinion and, especially, the hold-outs. b. Prevention of possible Soviet reservations to the Treaty after the U.S. has completed its ratification action. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Secret; Nodis. In a March 28 memorandum to Kissinger, Acting Executive Secretary John Walsh indicated that Rogers would meet shortly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin to propose simultaneous deposit. (Ibid.) For a record of that meeting see Document 17 . 16. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 16. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 28, 1969 SUBJECT: NPT Ratification In accordance with instructions from your office I conveyed to George Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary EUR, the following guidance: 1. That the Department should get moving on its consultations with the Soviets on simultaneous deposit of instruments. (Springsteen said that a paper on this has been on Secretary Rogers’ desk for sometime.) 2. That after the Soviets have been approached, the Department can tell the Germans and other allies that such an approach is in train and we are awaiting a response. 3. That in informing the allies the Department should caution them against press leaks on our approach to the Soviets or any other press leaks suggesting that we want simultaneous ratification to forestall last minute Soviet reservations, because any such leaks would simply be taken as an affront by the Soviets. Also in accordance with instructions from your office, I spoke with the German Minister (the German Ambassador is away for several days) and told him that in pursuance to your conversation with the German Ambassador, we would be approaching the Soviets on the matter of simultaneous deposit of instruments. I also told Oncken, as a personal suggestion, that it would probably be best for the Germans not to talk to the Soviets about simultaneous US/Soviet ratification since this would tend to arouse Soviet suspicions. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Confidential. Sent for information. Brigadier General Haig initialed the memorandum and a handwritten notation indicated Kissinger saw it. 17. Memorandum of Conversation 17. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 1, 1969, 3:40–4:30 p.m. SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty PARTICIPANTS: U.S.S.R. Participants Vassily V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States Yuri N. Chernyakov, Minister-Counselor Alexander I. Zinchuk, Deputy Chief of USA Division, MFA U.S. Participants William P. Rogers, Secretary of State Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Malcolm Toon, Deputy Assistant Secretary Adolph Dubs, Acting Director of Soviet Union Affairs William D. Krimer, Interpreter The Secretary suggested to Mr. Kuznetsov that in view of the fact that the U.S. Senate had approved the Treaty, it might be helpful if the final act of putting it into force, that is the deposit of the instruments of ratification, were performed at one and the same time in Washington and in Moscow. He thought that this would be helpful in getting other countries to accede to the NPT. The final act here included signing of the Treaty by the President and deposit of the instrument of ratification. Mr. Kuznetsov said that the United States and the Soviet Union had exerted very great efforts to prepare the draft of the Treaty. Last year, at the resumed session of the UN General Assembly we had worked “like hell” to get the Treaty into final form. Therefore the Soviet Union was anxious to have it enter into force as soon as possible. But, he noted that there were some unnamed countries in Western Europe (one in particular, whose government is headed by a Chancellor) which have taken a very reluctant position with respect to the Treaty. Therefore the Soviet Government was very carefully watching the situation, though it knew that the U.S. Government was keen on having the Treaty enter into force. Ratification in the Soviet Union has not yet started officially, but is in preparation. Members of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee know the Treaty in all its details. The government will present a report to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with a recommendation that the NPT be ratified. The Presidium then decides whether the Treaty should be presented to the Supreme Soviet at a Plenary Session or whether ratification by the Presidium is sufficient, followed by the signing on the part of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In any case, the Treaty will be considered by the two Soviet committees dealing with foreign affairs, one in the Council of Nationalities and the other in the Council of Soviets, before it goes to the Presidium. Replying to the Secretary’s question as to the time element involved, Mr. Kuznetsov said that he could not fix a precise date; this procedure varied, depending upon the importance of the Treaty and the press of other business. In any case, he thought, the process would be eased if other countries showed their willingness to participate in the NPT. He thought that some of these other countries should be watched carefully and that something should be undertaken by the United States to persuade them to sign the Treaty. The Secretary pointed out that here, too, some people, particularly in the Congress had asked pointed questions about why the Soviet Union had not yet ratified the Treaty, if it was true, as we believe, that the Treaty is as much in the interest of the USSR as it is in the interest of the U.S. He thought that the situation would be helped if such final ratification could take place simultaneously. Mr. Kuznetsov recalled that during the preparation of the draft of the Treaty a great deal of attention had been devoted to the need for certain other countries to participate in the Treaty. There had been a definite understanding, based on assurances given by representatives of the United States that a certain West European country would be a party to the NPT. But now, he was not certain; in that country some officials had spoken in favor of signing the Treaty, for example, the Foreign Minister of that country; but he could not fail to note that it did not take long for the Chancellor of that country to stress that the Foreign Minister had not been authorized to make his statement. The Soviet Union did not want to be deceived, did not want to be in a position where that country he had mentioned did not become a party to the Treaty. The USSR was not afraid of that country. It was not only capable of defending itself against attacks from that quarter, but could also defend its allies. But here we were dealing with an important question of principle: during the negotiations the USSR had received assurances from U.S. representatives that that West European country would be a party to the NPT. The proposal now that we do something together in order to induce that country to join was not in accord with the tacit understanding he was referring to. After all, the United States bore the main responsibility for getting the FRG to be a party. The Secretary said that he was anxious not to be misunderstood. He was not imposing a condition, but rather was suggesting that the Soviet Government consider the possibility of simultaneous ratification. After all, our two countries had worked hard to arrive at the final text, were equally interested in having the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible; and if we were to do something together now, it would provide added impetus to getting other countries to join in. Mr. Kuznetsov replied that he would take this proposal under consideration. He had just wanted to explain the history of how the Treaty had been arrived at. He and his government were constantly thinking about the Treaty and all of its aspects. In parting Mr. Kuznetsov explained that he was leaving for New York tomorrow, for a one-day stay, and was then returning to Moscow. He expressed regret that he had not been able to visit his old alma mater, Carnegie Tech in Pittsburgh. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on April 2 by Krimer (OPR/LS) and approved on April 9 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 18. Memorandum of Conversation 18. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 9, 1969, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT: Secretary’s Bilateral with Brandt Part II of V - Non-Proliferation Treaty PARTICIPANTS: FRG Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister Rolf Pauls, FRG Ambassador Hans Ruete, Assistant Secretary, FRG Foreign Office U.S. The Secretary Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary (EUR) Alexander C. Johnpoll, Acting Country Director (EUR/GER) The Secretary told Brandt that he had suggested to the Soviets that the US and Soviet Union ratify the NPT simultaneously. The Soviets’ first reaction had been negative; then they said they would think about it. Mr. Hillenbrand said that we had just heard from Geneva that Roshchin said he had recommended to his government against tying Soviet ratification in with German adherence. The Secretary said that the reason the Soviets had reacted negatively at first to our proposal for simultaneous ratification was that they wanted to see what the FRG was going to do about the treaty. We intend to keep trying to get the Soviets to move together with us on ratification; we would be in a difficult situation domestically if six months or a year after we had ratified there were still no action in Moscow. The Secretary asked Brandt about the situation in the FRG on the treaty. Brandt said there were some real problems. Germany is moving toward the election campaign. There is still some possibility that the FRG might sign the treaty in May or June. Brandt is scheduled to report to the Cabinet on the NPT on April 23. However, the Chancellor still has very difficult problems in his own Party. The Soviets have responded to FRG concerns over alleged rights of intervention with a bit of movement; but the Soviets could and should have offered much more. Brandt said that he hoped it would be possible to get something on the enemy states articles into the NATO Communique, but he knew that the French objected. However, he hoped that at a certain point in time when the FRG is ready to move on the treaty, we could issue another public statement on alleged Soviet rights of intervention along the lines of the one we had issued in September 1968. The Secretary pointed out that the NATO East-West paper had some language on this problem, which the press would undoubtedly get on a background basis. He said that he would have another press conference before going to SEATO, and could issue at that time a public statement on the problem similar to the September statement if the FRG were ready for it. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll (EUR/GER) and approved on April 15 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. 19. Editorial Note 19. Editorial Note Under cover of a March 26, 1969, memorandum, Henry Kissinger forwarded to Jacob Beam the President’s instructions for Beam’s meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin upon becoming Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Nixon’s instructions included the following: “5. As regards Berlin and Germany, you may say that we would welcome any improvement in Soviet-German relations. We think German signature of the NPT will assist this and we hope that the Soviets will be able to give Chancellor Kiesinger any help they consider feasible to enable him to get the treaty adopted. On Berlin, we are prepared to examine any way to improve the present unsatisfactory situation and I believe from my recent talks with the Germans that they are prepared to do so too. But this cannot be done under pressure. Perhaps some quiet exchanges would show the way. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel, Box 433, Beam Instructions, 3/26/69) Ambassador Beam met with Kosygin on April 22. The next day, in the enclosure to Airgram A–446 from Moscow, Beam reported on his oral presentation, including the following: “6. As regards Berlin and Germany, we would welcome any improvement in Soviet-German relations. We think German signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will assist this and we hope that the Soviets will be able to give Chancellor Kiesinger any help you may consider feasible to enable him to get the treaty adopted. Meanwhile as we have told Ambassador Dobrynin and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in Washington, nuclear powers, including simultaneous deposit of instruments of ratification, would be helpful in bringing about the widest possible endorsement of the treaty which we both seek. On Berlin, we are prepared to examine any way to improve the present unsatisfactory situation, and the President believes from his recent talks with the Germans that they are prepared to do so too. But this cannot be done under pressure. Perhaps some quiet exchanges would show the way. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Box 765, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence) 20. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 20. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 1, 1969 FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt SUBJECT: Under Secretaries Meeting on NPT You are scheduled to attend an Under Secretaries Committee meeting this afternoon at 4:00 to review the options paper prepared by ACDA on ratification of the NPT. The paper (Tab A) includes the following options: 1. No Action : This would lose momentum and provide opportunities for opponents in various countries to create additional problems; 2. Representations to Selected Countries : to contribute to momentum by obtaining additional signatures; 3. Presidential Signature to Complete Domestic Ratification Process : add to momentum and strengthen representations to other governments, but deposit still to be withheld; 4. Further Efforts to Achieve Simultaneous Deposits of Ratification with the USSR : 5. US Deposit Prior to Soviet Deposit : we would consider this if we received a formal negative reply from the USSR. Not explicitly mentioned is a variant of option 4 that is worth looking at; namely, that we add a declaratory aspect to our efforts with the USSR by publicly stating our ratification and deposit is dependent on their simultaneous action. You will also recall that your memorandum to Secretary Rogers of March 24 advised him of the President’s desire to make an effort to obtain simultaneous action with the USSR and that if this proved not feasible, to explore the possibility of completing the US process after the Soviets had done so. A related side issue may come up (Tab B). This concerns the German offset negotiations, in which the Germans are offering to buy enriched uranium for peaceful uses to contribute to balance of payments. ACDA believes this sale would violate the spirit if not the letter of the NPT. Others disagree. The issue is being debated and needs resolution at both the legal and political levels. My own view is that ACDA’s interpretation is questionable on legal grounds and potentially damaging on political ones as regards our relations with the FRG. Tab A Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) Washington, undated Subject: NPT Review for Under Secretaries Committee Since receiving the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of the NPT, we have asked the Soviets to join in a joint deposit of our instruments of ratification. The treaty enters into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the US, the USSR, the United Kingdom and 40 other states. The United Kingdom and 10 other states have already deposited their instruments of ratification, and 78 additional states have taken the preliminary step of signing the treaty. * Although we have not yet had a formal reply to our approach to the Soviets, there have been numerous informal indications that the Soviets are reluctant to ratify the treaty until the FRG has at least signed it. It has, however, become increasingly apparent that Germany is not likely to sign the NPT until after its fall elections. There has not yet been any firm decision, but the failure of the German cabinet to reach a decision at its April 23–24 meeting indicates that we should not anticipate German signature prior to elections. This presents the following dilemma: (a) If we defer deposit of our ratification until after the Germans sign the treaty, we run the risk of losing the treaty’s momentum and giving time for opposition to the treaty to grow in a number of key countries. For example, such inaction could well jeopardize or slow down adherence to the treaty by Japan and Israel, as well as Germany itself. We also may have to face domestic criticism for not acting to promote the treaty after having stressed its urgency to the Senate. (b) On the other hand, simultaneous deposit with the Soviets has the following advantages: it avoids giving the Soviets control over when the treaty comes into force, which they might use to bring undue pressure on the Germans and others; it avoids the risk that the Soviets will accompany their ratification by unacceptable interpretations of the treaty at a time when we will no longer have such control ourselves; and it is in accord with the opinion expressed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the Administration should endeavor to arrange for contemporaneous deposit. In light of the foregoing, the US has the following options for dealing with the present NPT situation: 1. No Action —The US might take no further action until we are able to deposit our instrument of ratification simultaneously with the Soviet Union. We would thereby accept the fact that there would be no significant momentum imparted to the treaty until that time, which possibly would be in late 1969. This would provide opponents of the treaty in several key non-signatory countries an opportunity over a substantial period of time to attempt to create further difficulties for the treaty, and we would again be vulnerable at the UNGA to procedural and other efforts to complicate the treaty’s entry into force. 2. Representations to Selected Governments —Although approaches to non-signatories would be more effective after the deposits of ratification by the US and the USSR, discussions with selected governments at this time would demonstrate continued US interest in the progress of the treaty and would thereby strengthen the hand of supporters of the treaty in the various countries. Mention can be made in our representations of the overwhelming support given to the treaty by the Senate. The instructions to be sent to our embassies in key countries would follow in general along the lines of the recommendations in the NSSM 13 study. In the present circumstances, additional signatures by relatively less significant countries not covered by the NSSM 13 study would also contribute to the treaty’s momentum, especially on a regional basis. The exact timing of these approaches would necessarily take into account relevant factors in our bilateral relations; in the majority of cases, however, they can and should be undertaken in the near future. 3. Presidential Signature to Complete Domestic Ratification Process —The President’s signature of our instrument of ratification, which would complete our own constitutional process, could itself add to the treaty’s momentum and would strengthen the approaches made by US representatives to foreign governments. The reasons underlying our desire for simultaneous US and Soviet deposits of ratification do not apply to the completion of our domestic ratification process. Absence of signature by the President has and will continue to create question as to the reasons for delay, with speculation that there may be some new reluctance on the part of the US. If the President does sign the ratification, this would not, however, constitute US adherence and would thus not bind the US to the treaty since deposit of the instrument would still be required. There are precedents for withholding deposit for a considerable time after signature. Accordingly, consideration should be given to having the President sign the US instrument at an early date. 4. Further Effort to Achieve Early Simultaneous US/USSR Deposits of Ratification —The reasons for which the decision was made to seek simultaneous US and Soviet deposits continue to apply. There is still some small possibility that the Soviet Union will agree to simultaneous deposit, even prior to German signature; now that it seems more likely that that signature will be delayed until after the FRG elections. We might therefore make an additional effort to persuade the Soviets that early simultaneous deposit is in their interest, since it would greatly increase the prospects for adherence by several of the most significant non-signatories. Ambassador Beam has suggested this type of approach. 5. US Deposit Prior to Soviet Deposit —We might review our position on the question of early simultaneous deposits of ratification if we receive a formal negative response from the Soviet Union. Until that time, we do not believe reconsideration is warranted. Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 66, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum at Tab B is not published. Written in the right hand margin of page 2 of the attachment is, “But Senate itself asked for simultaneous ratification.” An arrow points to the last sentence in paragraph (b). The attachment cited in the footnote to page one of Tab A is not published. * See attached list. The situation regarding signatures and ratification by key NPT countries remains essentially the same as that discussed in the NSSM 13 study. However, Swiss signature could take place as early as June or July. There is also a chance that Japan may sign by mid-summer. In addition the Swedish Government has expressed to Parliament its intent to ratify the NPT. 21. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 21. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, May 1, 1969 [Omitted here is material on other issues.] From 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. I attended a meeting of the National Security Council Subcommittee, held in Room 4216 of the Department of State. Present were: Elliott Richardson (Chairman), Alexis Johnson, Samuel DePalma, George Springsteen, R. Hartman (State), David Packard (DOD), General Wheeler and Major General Evans (JCS), Richard Helms and Mr. Jessup (CIA), Henry Kissinger and H. Sonnenfeldt (NSC), Gerard Smith (ACDA), myself, Myron Kratzer and Tony Joseph (AEC), and Mr. Loomis (USIS). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the question of U.S. ratification of the NPT and a few other matters. Richardson opened the meeting by referring to the talks within the U.S. Government concerning the use of German offset funds and indicated that there was now agreement on this among the various agencies. (Apparently this included agreement that the Germans might use some of these funds to buy uranium enriching services in the United States to enable them to stockpile some enriched uranium in Germany—this had been opposed by Charles Van Doren, Acting General Counsel of ACDA, and Deputy Under Secretary of State Samuels (for Economic Affairs), but apparently the AEC view that this should be allowed was accommodated in a compromise.) Richardson said that he had discussed the whole problem with Senator Symington, who displayed a cooperative attitude and indicated that he will await final action until the House has acted on this. Richardson then turned to the NPT and indicated the U.S. faced a dilemma as to whether it should ratify before the Soviet Union ratifies. Germany believes strongly that we shouldn’t ratify until the Soviets do, or that there be a simultaneous deposit of ratification papers by the U.S. and the Soviets which would tend to discourage the Soviets from challenging U.S. interpretations of the treaty after the U.S. had completed ratification. The Germans are afraid that the Soviets might put pressure on them to ratify it by interpreting the World War II treaty as giving them the right to intervene in Germany. Thus, joint deposit by the U.S. and the Soviet Union would serve to take the heat off the Germans as the principal cause for not bringing the treaty into force. Apparently the Germans do not intend to ratify until after the German elections next September. Thus, the issue we face is whether we should continue to tie our actions to those of the Soviets and delay our deposit if the Soviets decide to delay until Germany signs the treaty. Smith said that since the Germans may wait until September we should perhaps make another effort with the Soviets for a simultaneous ratification. However, the Soviets think that the U.S. made a commitment to deliver the Germans’ ratification before they (the Soviets) ratify. Richardson said we are thus faced with a “chicken and egg” proposition. He said that Meeker has made the legal interpretation that signature of the ratification papers and deposit of the papers can be separate actions. Thus, it might be possible to take the first step of signature simultaneously with the Soviets, perhaps tying them in with the announcement that we will undertake the SALT talks with them and then not actually deposit the papers until the SALT talks really commence. He asked how soon the ratification papers must be signed; Smith responded, “the sooner, the better; however, a couple of months would be okay.” Johnson indicated that we must also consider the Japanese because their ratification would be an important step. It was indicated that Japanese ratification might be tied to their obtaining membership in the ENDC and Smith indicated he thought that this has definitely been arranged. Kissinger said he didn’t think that ratification should be tied in with the SALT talks because the President wasn’t yet ready to commit himself on these discussions and hasn’t approved them as yet. He said that when the President definitely decides to go ahead with the SALT talks, we might have another look at this possibility. Richardson summarized the situation by suggesting that Ambassador Beam might indicate in the form of an aide memoire to Kuznetsov in Moscow, at the appropriate time, that we were ready to go ahead with simultaneous ratification. He then turned to the problem of getting agreement with EURATOM and IAEA for the administration of safeguards in EURATOM countries under Article III of the NPT and asked me to describe the status of this situation. I said that this was another “chicken and egg” deal. Euratom doesn’t want to conclude an agreement with IAEA until the IAEA safeguards are in effect and a number of countries have joined the NPT, whereas a number of countries do not want to join the NPT until the EURATOM countries have joined under an arrangement where the IAEA–EURATOM safeguards are in effect. I suggested that we discuss this problem with Haferkamp when he arrives later this month and with Jean Rey, President of the Commission of European Communities, when he comes to the United States in June; we might also discuss it with Sigvard Eklund. I said that if we don’t take the initiative neither EURATOM nor IAEA will do so and no progress will be made in accommodating the difficult IAEA–EURATOM safeguards relationship. Richardson said this was a matter of our encouraging the EURATOM countries involved but not leaning on them, and Kissinger agreed that this is the way it must be done. Richardson suggested that representatives of the European Office, the International Operations Office, and the AEC get together to recommend a program for breaking this stalemate, and I strongly endorsed this. Smith said that it is important to encourage India and Pakistan to sign the NPT. I indicated that Argentina is a key country in connection with their interest in ENDC membership, and that we might make our support for the latter contingent on their signing the NPT. Australia was also identified as an important country with regard to the NPT, and it was suggested that it be discussed with Prime Minister Gorton when he comes to town next week. The mention of Australia brought up the question of the application of nuclear explosives to build harbors which caused Richardson to ask me to describe the results of Dr. Tape’s discussions with the Soviets concerning Plowshare in Vienna. I said that the discussions were technical and that Tape led a U.S. team while Federov led the Soviet team. The two and one-half days of discussions covered the technical accomplishments of the two countries in the Plowshare field. I told them that Tape described our entire program, but the Soviets described only two events in their program and indicated, in private corridor conversation, that this was only about two-thirds of their program and all that they had permission to tell us. They said that if the meeting had been held in Moscow they could have obtained telephonic permission to tell us more once they learned the extent of our disclosures. Also, in corridor conversation, they told Tape and the members of his team that the interpretation of the LTBT with respect to the presence of radioactive debris needed to be defined. They suggested that this be on the basis of radioactive debris present in the atmosphere as a result of atmospheric weapons testing, and, thus, as this amount decayed, a corresponding amount could be added through Plowshare experiments and projects. They told Tape that they definitely did not want to modify the LTBT to take care of this problem, but that such an interpretation of permissible level of radioactivity would be the way to solve the problem. They described rather extensive projects involving up to 250 nuclear explosions to build a canal, which they thought could be carried out without modification of the LTBT under such an interpretation of the treaty. As a result of my description of the Tape-Federov talks, it was suggested that the President issue a NSSM, asking that the U.S. define a position on the level of radioactivity permitted from Plowshare experiments and projects under the LTBT, and Kissinger indicated that he would have such a NSSM issue. As the meeting was breaking up, I suggested that if many months went by without U.S., Soviet or German ratification of the NPT, we might reach a situation where the treaty could be jeopardized because of this and, therefore, we might want to consider the possibility at that time of unilateral signing by the U.S. with the withholding of deposition until there was some action by the Soviets. Richardson closed the meeting by indicating that anyone who had any new protects or considerations that he wanted the group to discuss should get in touch with him or Kissinger. [Omitted here is material on other issues.] 1 Source: Department of Energy Archives, Records of the U.S Atomic Energy Commission, Job 65–42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 101003–101010. Confidential 5/1/69–3 22. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 7 22. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 7 1 Washington, May 2, 1969 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission The Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Decisions on NPT Follow-Up 1. Soviet-U.S. Simultaneous Signature of the Ratification Instruments and Possible Deposit. a. It was decided to await the President’s reaction to the Secretary’s memo on setting a date for the SALT talks. If the President does not wish to move on the date at this time, it was agreed that a formal approach should be made to the Soviets in an aide memoire as a follow-up to the Secretary’s conversation with Kuznetsov. b. If the President decides on an immediate move to set a date, it was agreed that the two issues might usefully be linked in an effort to achieve simultaneous signature of the instruments of ratification and announcement of the date for SALT talks. 2. Japan. Agreed to continue encouragement for Japanese membership on ENDC and that subsequently Japanese would probably ratify NPT. 3. EURATOM/IAEA. a. State (IO, SCI & EUR) and AEC will review status of safeguards, discussions and prepare specific recommendations for coming talks with European Community Commissioner Haverkamp and EEC President Rey. b. This group will also suggest a line to be taken with Luns who is coming this month since the Dutch appear reluctant to allow EURATOM staff to prepare a negotiating position. 4. India/Pakistan. ACDA is to prepare a specific recommendation for the Secretary to press both India and Pakistan on NPT. This recommendation should stress for India the link between its position on the ENDC and ratification of the NPT. 5. Argentina. State (ARA) and ACDA should use our support for Argentine membership on the ENDC to encourage Argentina to ratify the NPT. 6. Australia. AGDA is to prepare a specific recommendation to the President to initiate discussion of the NPT with Gorton rather than waiting for the Australian argument to be presented. 7. Dr. Kissinger agreed to propose a NSSM to study peaceful nuclear explosions and their handling in the context of the Test Ban Treaty Elliot L. Richardson Chairman 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, Atomic 388.3. Secret; Exdis. 23. Memorandum of Conversation 23. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 8, 1969, 12:10 p.m. SUBJECT: NPT and SALT PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin The Secretary Mr. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs The Secretary asked Ambassador Dobrynin to stop in for a brief chat after his meeting with Mr. Sisco. The Secretary told the Ambassador that before his departure on the Far Fast trip he wished to discuss with him his current thinking with regard to NPT and SALT. NPT The Secretary asked when the Soviets would be prepared to respond to our proposal for joint action in ratification of the Treaty. Dobrynin said that he had been informed by Moscow this morning that Ambassador Beam had been given some information by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov with regard to Soviet ratification plans. Ambassador Dobrynin’s understanding on the basis of the cable he received was that the Soviets now intended to begin the ratification process. Mr. Toon added that according to Ambassador Beam’s reporting telegram, Kuznetsov had also said that his Government had not yet decided when the final act of ratification should take place. The Secretary said that the President was interested in holding joint ceremonies both here and in Moscow which might be covered on world-wide television through a Telstar hook-up. It was not the Secretary’s intention to press the Soviets to fix a date now for such joint ceremonies, but he did feel if we could reach agreement in principle, leaving the date open, it would be helpful to us in our planning. It was the President’s view that joint action by our two countries would give momentum to the NPT and might encourage reluctant non-nuclear countries to sign. Ambassador Dobrynin said be would report the Secretary’s remarks to Moscow. [Omitted here is discussion on SALT] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR-Memcon’s, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 8 by Toon. 24. Letter From Premier Kosygin to President Nixon 24. Letter From Premier Kosygin to President Nixon 1 Moscow, May 27, 1969 KOSYGIN’S REPLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON’S MESSAGE Dear Mr. President: I and my colleagues have attentively familiarized ourselves with your message, and also the additional considerations conveyed by Ambassador Beam. We have received with satisfaction confirmation by you of the idea of the necessity of entering into an era of negotiations and of readiness to examine any possible path for the settlement of international problems, in particular of those which are connected with the danger of a clash and of conflicts. This accords with our opinion, already expressed earlier to you, on the importance of achieving a situation in which negotiations would serve first of all to avert conflicts, and not to seek for ways out of them after peace and international security have been placed in jeopardy. Such a task is completely feasible if our two countries with their resources and influence will act in the direction of maintaining and consolidating peace, with due consideration of each other’s fundamental interests and without setting themselves against third countries. At the same time it is important not to permit anyone to exert pernicious influence on Soviet-American relations. The achievement of mutual understanding in this matter is all the more necessary since our countries must take into account the character and degree of influence on the international situation also of other forces. From this point of view much that can be done now, given mutual desire, and setting aside complicating (kon yunturnye) questions, may turn out with the passage of time either to be fully unattainable of much more difficult and complex. As far as can be judged by your statements, in principle we have with you a common understanding in this regard. It is a matter now, perhaps, of embarking on the practical realization of such an understanding, on a search for ways and means of resolving concrete problems which burden international relations at the present time and are fraught with great dangers for the future. In this regard, it seems to us, that, taking into account the complexity of each of these problems by itself, it is hardly worthwhile to attempt somehow to link one with another. Although it is indisputable that progress in solving each problem taken individually would facilitate the solving also of other problems, it would be unjustified in our view to draw from this a conclusion about the advisability of making the solution of one problem dependent on the solution of any other problem or of postponing in general their examination until there is some sort of general improvement in Soviet-American relations or in the international situation as a whole. Such a posing of the question would inevitably lead to the emergence of a vicious circle and would in no way facilitate the solving of problems which have become ripe for this. We have already transmitted to you through Ambassador Dobrynin our observations on a number of international problems and on questions of Soviet-American bilateral relations. In connection with your message we would like in addition to express the following thoughts. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT] We, Mr. President, are not at all against an improvement also of Soviet-West German relations. And the practical steps which have been undertaken by us in this direction are obviously known to you. Unfortunately, however, in the FRG the understanding still has not apparently matured that its relations with other countries, including those with the USSR, cannot be developed apart from the general foreign policy course of Bonn. And the fact that this course still is based on these which are contrary to the goals of strengthening European security and world peace is confirmed in particular by the attitude of the FRG toward the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, it is precisely the stubborn refusal of Western Germany to accede to the treaty—with whatever contrived pretext it fortifies itself—which greatly impedes its entry into force. We hope that the United States is using its influence order to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty by the FRG and by a number of other countries allied with the USA. As regards the ratification of the treaty by the Soviet Union, the matter is not up to us (to za nami delo nye stanet). [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT] In conclusion, I would like once again to stress our readiness to develop relations with the USA in a constructive plane on the basis of mutual confidence and frankness. In this connection, we consider useful the practice which has developed of a confidential exchange of views on topical international problems and on questions of Soviet-American relations. In this regard we agree with you, Mr. President, that in different situations—depending on the character of the questions and on other considerations—one must apply different forms and utilize various channels for such an exchange of views. With respect, A. Kosygin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 765, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence. Kissinger forwarded Kosygin’s letter to Nixon under cover of a May 28 memorandum in which he stated: “on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet ratification until then. He asks us to press the German and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by Soviet definition, Israel.” (Ibid.) Kosygin’s letter and Kissinger’s memorandum are printed in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume XII , Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970. 25. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Commissioner for the European Communities (Haferkamp) 25. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Commissioner for the European Communities (Haferkamp) 1 Washington, May 29, 1969 SUBJECT: EURATOM and the NPT (U) PARTICIPANTS: (See attached list) At Mr. Smith’s request, Mr. Haferkamp began by describing briefly the scope of EURATOM safeguards—an inspector corps larger than that of IAEA and still expanding; a precise materials accountability system; a requirement that all movement of fuel within, between, or out of member countries be reported; unlimited access by inspectors to all facilities, both with advance notification and unannounced; and a record of close cooperation with the US AEC. He said that, for the first time, funds had been budgeted for safeguards research. As a beginning, $600,000 would be available, to provide for 30 researchers. EURATOM would not duplicate research being carried out in individual states, but would coordinate with existing programs. Mr. Haferkamp described the problems of assuring compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT. He said with some pride that he had been able to overcome Dutch and French opposition to early establishment of an internal EURATOM safeguards position for negotiations with the IAEA, and that all six member countries had now agreed to technical talks for this purpose, to begin in Brussels May 29. He predicted that all technical problems would be worked out during these talks before the summer vacation. To Mr. Smith’s question, Mr. Haferkamp said that EURATOM could then be in a position to move ahead with negotiations with the IAEA around the end of the year, once France and Germany had formed new governments and Germany had reached a decision on NPT signature. Since the Commission was not likely to receive a mandate from the member countries for negotiations before those two changes in government, he thought it all the more important to proceed with the technical talks. Mr. Smith said the US stood ready to facilitate the conclusion of a satisfactory safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and Mr. Haferkamp indicated that EURATOM would also want to exchange views with the AEC during the technical talks, which of course could not completely avoid the political aspects of the safeguards question. When Mr. Haferkamp asked whether the US would use its influence during IAEA negotiations to maintain the integrity of the EURATOM safeguards system and to prevent duplication or replacement of safeguards, Mr. Smith disclaimed expertise on past exchanges on this subject, but, speaking personally, said he was impressed by the size and scope of the EURATOM system and thought it made sense to make maximum use of existing systems. It was recalled that US delegate Adrian Fisher had publicly stated three interpretations of NPT Article III during a speech in Geneva in January 1968, which paralleled closely the five principles on safeguards, which EURATOM itself had worked out in 1967. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 13 EURATOM. Confidential. Drafted on June 3 by H. Malin (ACDA/IR). The attached list of participants is not published. 26. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko 26. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko 1 New York, September 22, 1969, 10–11 p.m. U.S. Participants Secretary William P. Rogers Ambassador Charles W. Yost Mr. Gerard Smith Mr. Richard F. Pedersen Assistant Secretary Martin J. Hillenbrand Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco Assistant Secretary Samuel DePalma Deputy Assistant Secretary Emory C. Swank Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter U.S.S.R. Participants Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey A. Gromyko Ambassador Yakov A. Malik Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Ambassador Lev I. Mendelevich Mr. Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor of Embassy in Washington Mr. Valentin M. Falin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Yevgeniy D. Pyrlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter [Omitted here is discussion of other issues.] NPT The Secretary inquired as to the status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and asked if the Soviet Union was ready to proceed with simultaneous ratification and deposit of the Treaty. Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that his Government had started the process of ratification. The Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Supreme Soviet had considered the Treaty and had recommended that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet take final action on it. The Treaty was now before the Presidium for this final act in the ratification process. The Secretary said that we had completed all necessary steps short of actual ratification. We felt it would be useful if U.S. and Soviet ratification and deposit of the Treaty took place simultaneously. Putting these final acts on international television would send the Treaty off to a good start. Mr. Gromyko said his Government would consider this possibility and take appropriate measures to move ratification along. In this connection he wanted to inquire as to the position of the Government of the FRG with respect to accession to the NPT. He had discussed this question with FRG Foreign Minister Brandt. Mr. Brandt had told him he thought the new Government of the FRG, to be formed after the German elections, would take action to sign and ratify the Treaty. The Secretary said he believed that if the United States and the Soviet Union ratified the NPT, other Governments, including that of the FRG, would do so also. If, on the other hand, our two countries were to continue to hold back, there was the danger that others would lose interest. Mr. Gromyko said that in his talk with Mr. Brandt the latter had not referred to Soviet ratification as a condition for FRG accession to the Treaty. In any case, he thought the FRG must understand that the NPT was not a matter to be played with, and suggested that the Secretary and he remain in touch to speed completion of ratification and deposit. The Secretary agreed and remarked that it would be particularly desirable if the Treaty were ratified by both countries before the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began, in order to spur progress in the direction of control over nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko said that this argument had some “reason”. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL US–USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved on September 24 by R. L. Brown. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City. 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 26, 1969 SUBJECT: Bill Rogers’ Conversation with Gromyko [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT] 4. NPT . Gromyko seemed not to foreclose the possibility of joint US-Soviet ratification as we have repeatedly proposed. The Soviets will presumably decide on their course after the German election of September 28. (Brandt told Gromyko that the FRG will sign if the SPD wins the election. I think if the SPD leads the next coalition, this will be the case.) I understand that people at State are thinking of a major ceremony with full TV coverage in the event the Soviets agree to joint ratification, and Bill apparently discussed this possibility with Gromyko and UK Foreign Secretary Stewart. I think this kind of exercise would carry overtones of “condominium” and we would do well to avoid excessive atmospherics. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 6/1/69 Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information 28. Telegram 14146 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 28. Telegram 14146 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, October 28, 1969, 1145Z. Subject: NPT: Talking Points Transmitted herewith is the text of the talking points the FRG NPT delegation intends to use in their Washington discussions this week. Begin text: 1. The Federal Government is at present making a final appraisal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to signing it. In this review of the situation, German-American understanding is essential on the points which the former General [sic] Cabinet felt still required clarification. If these points can be settled satisfactorily, the Federal Government, whose positive attitude towards the aims of the Treaty are known to the United States, will make an early decision regarding signature. 2. In the event that the Federal Government decides to sign the Treaty, it has prepared a statement which will be delivered in the German Bundestag. It has also drafted a note which will be transmitted on the day of signature to the depositary governments accredited in Bonn. [3.] As the United States Government knows, the German-Soviet talks of February and March 1969 on Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did not produce entirely satisfactory results. In particular, the Soviet Union—in contrast to the attitude of the three Western powers in connection with the German renunciation of nuclear weapons of 1954—is unwilling fully to base its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany on the principles contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. The United States Government is therefore requested to have in readiness for publication in due course, a statement, which it has already offered to make, rejecting the Soviet claim to a right of intervention. The British Government has already proposed to make a similar statement: it is intended to ask the French Government to accede to such an American-British action. The Federal Government intends now to bring to a conclusion the round of discussions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty held with the Soviet Union in 1969, and to give further consideration to the problem of the so-called rights of intervention—which the Soviet Government claims to be referred to in Articles 53 and 107—in the talks with the Soviet Union on the exchange of declarations on the renunciation of force. 4. The Federal Government would like to use the interpretation of the term “control,” which was internally given to NATO, in the deliberations of the Bundestag committees in closed session. It feels this is necessary in view of the consent of Parliament required for accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It therefore requests the United States Government to allow this interpretation to be used in such committee deliberations. It would also be grateful to get the US views on whether it would not be expedient to make this interpretation known to the Soviet Union through appropriate channels in order to avoid any subsequent disagreement over interpretation. 5. The Federal Government would like to discuss with the United States Government how the risk of a Soviet objection to the “classical” American interpretations could be met after the deposit of the American instrument of ratification. 6. Considering the importance of NATO’s continued existence for German accession to the NPT, the Federal Government would be grateful if the United States Government would prepare a confirmatory statement—similar to the one made by Secretary Rusk in October 1969—and give us an assurance that, if necessary, that statement will be delivered in public. 7. It is the intention of the Federal Government, on the occasion of signing the NPT to make a statement in the German Bundestag to the effect that the existence of NATO or of a system providing similar security is one of the assumptions on which German accession to the NPT is based. Moreover, that statement will contain our viewpoint that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy—this situation could arise if NATO were to dissolve or substantially shrink—will remain free together with other European states to take the necessary security measures. The Federal Government requests the United States Government to give an assurance that it will express its understanding for this viewpoint by a statement in support of it. 8. The Federal Government requests the United States Government to give a formal confirmation that it agrees in principle with the German interpretations, and also to give a formal assurance that it is prepared to support them in case of dispute. They are the following interpretations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the verification agreement: A) Limitation to the purpose of the Treaty B) Freedom of research and development C) Onus of proof D) Supply of fissionable material E) Exchange of information F) Other nuclear explosive devices G) Safeguards and verification agreement (For full text see draft note, paragraph III). Interpretations A, B, C, E, and G are known to the United States, since they have already been made public and have been transmitted to the United States. The German side assumes that there is agreement with the United States side on interpretation D. it furthermore understands that the points in the American paper of 7 March 1969 on the interpretations regarding ‘onus of proof’ (c) and ‘exchange of information’ (e) have been satisfactorily clarified by the German reply of 23 April 1969. The German side requests support for these two interpretations along the lines of the understanding set forth in the German reply of 23 April 1969. The first paragraph of the interpretation regarding the problem of other nuclear explosive devices has been taken word for word from the statement made by the Japanese delegate during the United Nations debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the last half-sentence has been taken from the Netherlands statement. It is said that the United States has in principle agreed to those formulations. The second paragraph is in accordance with the second American interpretative rule. The third paragraph is taken literally from the statement made by the Australian delegate in the United Nations on 17 May 1968. In accordance with the views of various non-nuclear weapon states such as Japan and Italy, our interpretation is based on the idea that non-nuclears too are permitted to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, provided that a distinction can be made between other nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons. We assume that it will be unproblematic for the United States to support interpretation F. The Federal Government upholds the wording of the German interpretations. The German interpretations, which throughout include outside formulations already in international use, have been decided upon in their present form by the Federal Defence Council. The text of the interpretations as communicated has already been brought to international attention by the German side. For that reason the German side does not think it advisable to make any changes in the formulations used. The Federal Government assumes that the present wording of interpretations A, B, D, and G is acceptable to the United States. The Federal Government would, however, understand it if the United States were, if necessary,to use different language to express the purpose of the interpretations regarding ‘onus of proof’ (c), ‘exchange of information’ (e), and ‘other nuclear explosive devices’ (f), American formulations acceptable to both sides should be prepared without delay. 9. As regards the definition of “source or special fissionable material”, the Federal Government shares the Italian view that the words “source material” and “special fissionable material” used in the Non-Proliferation Treaty—subject to the amendments expressly adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany—have the meaning laid down in the present text of Article XX of the IAEA statute. The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT. 10. In view of the fact that a large portion of the German economy is made up of foreign trade, the problem of export provisions as contained in paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT is of considerable significance for the Federal Republic of Germany. As regards the definition of “equipment and material” to which the export provision in paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT also applies, reference is made to the preliminary talks already held with the United States. Generally binding provisions do not seem to exist. Certain indications may be drawn from: the list by the working group of the IAEA Board of Governors of 14 October 1964: —the informal agreement between members of the group of supplier countries on the trigger list items; —the replies by the AEC to questions asked during hearings in the United States Senate (printed on page 115 of the hearings, July 10, 11, 12 and 17, 1968). In accordance with the American view communicated to us on 5 August 1968, the Federal Government understands that each exporting country decides for itself which materials and equipment should fall under the provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. If more detailed arrangements should be made they would be binding upon the Federal Republic of Germany only if expressly adopted by it. The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT. [11.] It is of vital importance for the Federal Republic of Germany that a satisfactory verification agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA be sufficiently ensured. The relevant aspects in this connexion are political, economic and scientific-technological. For some months now work has been going on within the community to elaborate a joint position of the European Atomic Community with the aim of giving it a mandate for negotiations with the IAEA. The Federal Government expects that a German decision to sign the NPT will speed up the preparatory work within the community, and that in the foreseeable future the preconditions for starting talks with the IAEA will be created. The Federal Government wishes to ask the United States once again to promote the verification agreement until its successful conclusion by all suitable means and in all suitable quarters. The German side realizes why the matter is still being clarified wthin the community, does not, on certain substantial questions of the verification arrangement, make any comments going beyond the well-known American statements on the verification question. However, it asks the United States Government for the time being to give a general political assurance of continued promotion of the verification agreement between EURATOM and IAEA. For that agreement, the Federal Government introduced the following criteria into the internal EURATOM discussion: —no prejudice to EURATOM’s safeguards system; —the possibility for IAEA to verify that EURATOM’s safeguards do not permit, in accordance with the obligations assumed under the NPT by member states of EURATOM, the diversion of source or special fissionable material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; —acceptance of EURATOM’s safeguard’s system by IAEA in accordance with paragraph 28 (d) of the Agency’s safeguards system; —limitation of verification to reviewing whether 12. In order to ensure equal opportunities and to avoid competitive disadvantages,the Federal Government attaches vital importance to the assurance being honored which was give by the United States President in December 1967, and confirmed by President Nixon,that all American civilian nuclear activities will be subjected to safeguards when safeguards are applied under the NPT. The Federal Government trust thats that the United States assurance—like the similar British statement—will be fulfilled. Acceptance of the NPT safeguards by the United States and Great Britain would create in the West at least an equality of treatment in the civilian nuclear sphere, assuming that France will continue to take part in the non-discriiminatory EURATOM safeguard system. The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT. 13. The Federal Government trusts that American assurances regarding the continued supply of nuclear material to EURATOM will be honoured even in the unlikely event that a verification agreement in conformity with the EURATOM treaty cannot be concluded in time between EURATOM and IAEA. Apart from American assurances which had been given mainly under political and economic aspects, it would be of help if the United States could say in a more definite manner how it views the legal position in case of dispute. In conformity with available general American comments, the Federal Government considers that even the legal aspects of possible disputes can be solved. It is emphasized that a novel, long-term, commercialized and liberalized type of supply contract taking also into account the aspects of safeguarding and equipment, in accordance with the NPT, is desirable after the treaty has entered into force. The US Government is requested to give the assurance that the aforementioned principles will be applied in concluding the contract between the United States and EURATOM. 14. The Federal Government stresses once again that it attaches great importance to a permanent German representation on the Board of Governors of IAEA. In dealing with the NPT during subsequent accession stages,the realization of this wish will be of importance for the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States is asked to give an assurance that it will sppport the german efforts in every suitable way even in the face of expected soviet opposition. End text Rush 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, US Mission Geneva, and USNATO. 29. Telegram 14209 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 29. Telegram 14209 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, October 28, 1969, 1145Z. Subject: Chancellor Brandt on NPT 1. In the course of his first interview with the Ambassador on October 28, Brandt reaffirmed his intention to push ahead on the NPT and outlined his plans for doing so. Brandt called special attention to the importance of the Roth Mission now in Washington and hoped that it would be successful. The government also plans to approach the Soviets. Scheel will be seeing Tsarapkin later this week and intends to pick up with Tsarapkin a general statement Kosygin had made to Scheel during the latter’s visit to Moscow last summer to the effect that the Soviet Union would be prepared to do what it could to help. 2. In this context Brandt also referred to the oral assurances which Gromyko had given him regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy under the NPT. Brandt said it would be very useful to the German ratification process if Gromyko’s oral statement in this regard could be given the Germans in writing. 3. Brandt said there must be a full Bundestag debate before Germany can sign the NPT. It is currently set for the end of the week of Nov. 10–14. To give order to the debate, the government plans to circulate a paper in the Bundestag setting forth its position, and the results of its efforts with the US and Soviet Governments. The Ambassador said he welcomed Brandt’s intention to proceed with the NPT. Rush 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, Berlin, USNATO, USMission Geneva, and USUN. 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 29, 1969 Subject: German Signature of the NPT With the election of Brandt as Chancellor the prospects of early FRG signature of the NPT improved substantially. Brandt has stated publicly that his Government will act promptly and there have been reliable reports that he hopes signature will occur before the end of the year. As its first substantive action as opposition party, the CDU/CSU introduced an interpellation on the NPT in the new Bundestag. This interpellation poses questions to the new Government which cover the whole range of doubts and objections expressed on the German side concerning the treaty in the past. Signature of the treaty will not require Bundestag approval and the Bundestag debate which will be held in connection with the interpellation is not likely to dissuade Brandt from his announced intention of signing. The SPD and the FDP will, however, wish to be in a strong position to answer the questions in such a way as to take public opinion and their own party members along with them in support of German signature. Given the widespread doubts in Germany, which are shared—albeit silently—by SPD Defense Minister Schmidt, this will not be an easy task. Franz Josef Strauss, in particular, can be expected to attack the treaty vigorously. As its first step toward signature the Brandt Government is sending a delegation to Washington on October 29 to “clarify” a number of remaining questions concerning the treaty. The delegation will be headed by the new German Disarmament Commissioner, Colonel Roth, who is an SPD member and well-disposed toward the treaty. He will seek reassurances from the American side which will be helpful in support of the treaty whereas his predecessor, Ambassador Schnippenkoetter, often seemed to be contriving new reasons for German delay. We expect that the likely sequence of events will be (1) consultations in Washington; (2) a debate, in November, in the Bundestag; and (3) German signature around the end of the year. The absence of American pressure on the German Government for NPT signature during the present Administration has substantially decreased emotional resistance in Germany and thus facilitated the task of the SPD at the present time. We believe that this posture should be maintained as the best means of contributing to early signature. This would not preclude indications of the Administration’s interest in having the NPT enter into force as soon as possible. We will also wish to be as forthcoming as possible with the Germans in providing information and assurances during the consultations with the German delegation. The Soviet Government has already made clear to Bonn that an improvement in relations, including an agreement on the non-use of force, is directly related to German acceptance of the NPT. We do not believe any Soviet action other than early ratification would be helpful at this time. On the contrary, further Soviet threats or pressure could play into the hands of the opposition. Indications are that Soviet propaganda is taking a cautious tone in its treatment of the new Government in Bonn. The Soviets, until now, have given the impression that they will be satisfied with German signature of the treaty as sufficient to permit the completion of the Soviet ratification process. They have not been entirely specific, however, and it is conceivable that they might insist on German ratification prior to final Soviet action. This, as the Soviets certainly know, would present problems. The FRG as a member of EURATOM (one of the three European Communities) is bound by an opinion of the Commission of the European Communities, according to which ratification by member states must await the completion of satisfactory safeguard arrangements between EURATOM and IAEA. EURATOM is awaiting German signature before trying to work out a common negotiating position. Once negotiations between the two organizations have begun they could drag on for a year or more. In addition to these necessary delays, the Brandt Government, itself, once having signed the treaty, will be in no hurry to take on the task of obtaining Bundestag ratification. Before doing this it will need to be sure of almost unanimous support of the SPD and FDP Bundestag groups. Given these circumstances ratification may not occur for some time. The best way we can contribute to this process will be to consult with EURATOM, after German signature, on its negotiating position and lend our good offices to the eventual EURATOM negotiations with IAEA. Insofar as the Soviets are concerned, we shall wish to insist strongly that German signature of the treaty is evidence of German intent and is sufficient to permit both the US and the USSR to complete the ratification process, a development which in turn will encourage German ratification. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Sutter (EUR/GER); cleared in draft by Katz (EUR/RPE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Glysteen (ACDA). R.C. Brewster signed for Eliot. 31. Memorandum of Conversation 31. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 29, 1969, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT: US-German NPT Discussions PARTICIPANTS: Officials German Foreign office and German Embassy and US Officials (See Attached List) Mr. Smith began the discussions by welcoming the German visitors and by expressing pleasure over the positive attitude adopted by the new German Government towards the NPT. He confirmed that worldwide implementation of the NPT remained a central plank in U.S. arms control policy. He said that the U.S. would try to resolve any remaining unclear aspects of the Treaty over the next few days. He explained that owing to the preparations for SALT he would not be able to be present throughout the discussions, although he would keep abreast of progress made. Mr. Farley would serve in his stead. Ambassador Roth, in his introductory remarks, referred to a decision of the Federal Cabinet on August 13, whereby the Foreign Ministry was asked to seek clarifications on the NPT and to conduct discussions with other countries in this regard, particularly with the U.S. When the FRG informed the U.S. of this intention on August 29, the U.S. had agreed to such discussions, but the U.S. asked that they take place in one round in Washington following the German federal elections. Ambassador Roth said that he and his colleagues had come to finalize these discussions, and that the talking points provided to the United States the previous day would comprise all the points with which the German delegation, proposed to deal. He indicated that the outcome of the present discussions would be of interest to the German public which was aware of the August 13 Cabinet decision as a result of a recent parliamentary interpellation by the CDU. Ambassador Roth explained that between signing and ratifying the NPT, further attention would be given to questions involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and assurances of nondiscriminatory safeguards treatment. He proposed that the FRG talking points (Bonn 14146) form the basis of the discussions and that these talking points be gone through one by one with a view to disposing quickly of those points on which there was basic agreement and no further discussion was necessary, and to determining priorities for subsequent sessions for discussing those points which were not yet agreed. On points 1 and 2, Mr. Farley had no particular comment other than to ask for an opportunity, if possible, to see the statement the German Government proposed to make at the time of NPT signature and the related note to be delivered to Foreign Governments at that time. Ambassador Roth pointed out that the portion of the note dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear energy was already in U.S. hands. He also offered to make the draft statement available, but cautioned that the text was subject to change as the result of the outcome of the present discussions and of further consideration in Bonn. (At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Roth handed the text of the draft statement to Mr. Farley.) On point 3, Mr. Farley said that he did not see any particular difficulty in meeting the German request for public release of the U.S. statement, rejecting Soviet claim to a right of intervention. He said he would give the German delegation definitive word on this before conclusion of the discussions. In reply to Mr. Farley’s question, Ambassador Roth confirmed that the FRG was completely satisfied with the text of the U.S. statement proposed to then Foreign Minister Brandt by Secretary Rogers in his letter of May 10, 1969. On point 4, concerning the definition of the word “control,” Mr. Farley again foresaw no difficulty in agreeing that the definition provided to NATO in April 1967 be used by the FRG in closed sessions of the Bundestag Committees. He indicated, however, that making the definition available to the Soviet Union at this late date would create difficulties for the U.S. Since the definition had not been made part of the U.S. legislative history, there was a good possibility that presenting this definition to the Soviets now might create unnecessary discord. In any event, the U.S. and its allies had a common understanding of their obligations under the Treaty in terms of the definition of “control,” and the U.S. believed this was all that was necessary. Ambassador Roth said that the FRG understood U.S. concerns on this point but he raised the question in order to have U.S. views on the subject placed on the official record. He felt that if the final minutes of the discussions showed the U.S. position, then this would suffice for his government’s need to satisfy the Opposition in closed committee hearings. With regard to point 5, Mr. Farley summarized briefly the substance of Secretary Rogers’ talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, in September 1969, concerning the desirability of joint US and Soviet deposit of instruments of NPT ratification. He said the U.S. believed on the basis of Gromyko’s reaction to the Secretary’s presentation that the prospect for early joint deposit were good, and that the positive FRG approach to the NPT could only improve those prospects. Mr. Gescher indicated that the FRG apprehension over a possible Soviet contradiction of the U.S. interpretations of Articles I and II could be met completely through joint deposit of instruments of ratification so long as the Soviets did not take that occasion to raise objections. Mr. Farley agreed that this was part of the U.S. purpose in wishing to act jointly with the Soviets and that he believed that it was primarily a matter of orchestration to resolve this problem satisfactorily. On point 6, concerning the FRG request for a confirmatory U.S. statement as to the importance of NATO’s continued existence for German adherence to the NPT, Mr. Farley quoted the statement of Secretary Rusk during Senate hearings on the NPT on July 10, 1968 as an indication of the U.S. position. Ambassador Roth replied that Secretary Rusk’s remarks during a United Nations General Assembly speech on October 2, 1968 were of even greater significance to the FRG in that Mr. RUSK had related U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe directly to a successful resolution of the German question and to Berlin. He said, however, that the new statement could be based on either of the earlier ones. The important question at the moment was one of timing, and he expressed a desire to discuss further the question of when and where such a statement should now be made. Mr. Farley indicated that he would hope to have an answer to this request by the conclusion of discussions on October 31. Mr. Farley took note of the German intention, as expressed in point 7, to make a statement regarding the importance of the existence of NATO to German NPT adherence. He asked what the FRG had in mind when it referred in point 7 to the contingency that if NATO were to dissolve, the FRG would “remain free to get other European States to take the necessary security measures ,” Mr. Gescher read aloud the paragraph from the proposed FRG statement at time of signing the NPT, as follows: “[The FRG] signs the Treaty convinced that it shall not hinder European unification and that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free together with other European States to take the necessary security measures.” Mr. Farley said the sentence on unification was a judgment which the U.S. shared and had tried to protect in negotiating the NPT. He said the U.S. would want to have a closer look at the second part of the sentence before commenting further. Summarizing the first seven points on the political aspects of the Treaty, Mr. Farley said that the U.S. would attempt this week to confirm its readiness to publish the agreed statement on intervention rights. He saw no need for further discussions on the meaning of the word “control.” He took note of the German view that joint U.S. and Soviet deposit of instruments of ratification would meet the German need, so long as the Soviets raise no objections to the interpretations. He noted that the FRG had requested a new U.S. statement, relating the NPT to the continued existence of NATO, similar to that made by Secretary Rusk in July 1968. Finally, he said the U.S. would study the two sentences referred to in point 7 and would comment on them. Mr. Gescher pointed out that the first of these two sentences had been borrowed almost literally from the Italian declaration at the time of NPT signature. Mr. Farley asked whether the FRG had discussed with the French the question of a new French statement on intervention rights. Ambassador Roth replied that the FRG would approach the French, after the delegation returned from Washington, on the basis of the U.S. statement. Mr. Hillenbrand assured him that the US had no objection, if the FRG chose to make the US text available to the French. Annex List of Participants Subject: US-German NPT Discussions October 29, 1969, 10:30 a.m. Participants: U.S. Government Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, ACDA Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA Mt. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR Mr. James E. Goodby, EUR/RPM Mr. William W. Hancock, General Counsel, ACDA Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary, EUR Mr. Benjamin Huberman, ACDA/ST Mr. M. B. Kratzer, Asst. General Manager for International Activities, GM–AEC Mr. A. M. Labowitz, Special Assistant for Disarmament, GM–AEC Mr. Herbert S. Malin, ACDA/IR Col. Burr J. Randall, Jr., OSD/ISA Mr. J.S. Sutterlin, EUR/GER Mr. Charles N. Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel, ACDA/GC Dr. Y. L. Wu, Deputy Asst. Secretary, OSD/ISA (for Policy Planning and Arms Control) Federal Republic of Germany Col. Helmut Roth, Chief, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Mr. Dirk Oncken, Charge d’Affaires, ad interim, German Embassy Mr. Wolf Ramisch, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Dieter Gescher, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Wolf Haefele, Director of the Applied Physics Institute, Karlsruhe, Germany Mr. Adolf von Wagner, Second Secretary, German Embassy Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. Drafted on November 3 by Malin (ACDA/IR). 32. Memorandum of Conversation 32. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 29, 1969, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT: US-German NPT Discussions PARTICPANTS: Officials of German Foreign Office and German Embassy and US Officials. (See Attached List) With Mr. DePalma present, Mr. Ramisch outlined long standing German interest in permanent membership on the IAEA Board of Governors, given the increasingly important role of the IAEA once the NPT is in force. He asked for assurance of active U.S. support for the FRG candidacy, when the question came up. Mr. DePalma replied that the U.S. has indicated support for the FRG, and specifically for the Italian proposal for revision of Board membership, which he understood met German needs. He anticipated objection to the Italian plan from certain countries, namely Sweden and Spain, who oppose a designated seat for Italy. On the other hand, the plan might satisfy most Latin and African countries, as well as some Asians. The Soviet attitude was also crucial, but it appeared that the Soviets were not facing up to the issue until the FRG signed the NPT. The Soviets were in a position to be obstructive if they chose, and this in turn could hamper the work of the Agency in other fields. The US wished to have the Italian plan brought to a vote at the best possible time, but the question was primarily one of timing and tactics. Mr. Ramisch agreed that timing was important and noted that Talking Point 14 discussed gaining Board membership in terms of “subsequent accession stages” of the NPT. He said that the matter of designated or elective seat was not important to the FRG so long as it was permanent. The German request was for some assurance now of active U.S. support, not necessarily for the immediate present, but as the situation developed. Prof. Haefele further explained that the wording of the NPT was consistent with the IAEA safeguards document, but the manner of actual implementation of NPT safeguards would be determined by the IAEA Board. Germany, therefore, wanted a hand in those decisions. What was being asked of the U.S. was to take the second step, not just sympathy for FRG membership, but action in support thereof. Mr. DePalma offered to consult with the FRG on future tactics. The U.S. wanted to give a helpful answer, since both countries had a common objective. He said he was pleased that the FRG recognized the difficulties on timing. After Mr. DePalma left, Mr. Farley took up the draft German Government Statement, which had been examined to see whether it identified points of substance requiring comment. He noted that paragraph (7) seemed at first to be citing the NPT withdrawal article, but then ended by saying something different. He asked about the purpose for the change. Mr. Gescher explained that the language had the dual purpose of both contemplating withdrawal and assuring the German public that the Government had the security interests of the country in mind. Ambassador Roth pointed out that in any case, measures could only be taken “together with other European States.” Mr. Farley said it was understandable that the FRG would want to do what was necessary to protect its security, but he wondered then why the U.S. and non-European allies were left out. Ambassador Roth offered to study the text and discuss it further. Mr. Farley noted that paragraph (12) seemed to limit the FRG position on application of safeguards only to the principle of safeguarding at strategic points. He said that if this were really the FRG position, then the U.S. had a problem. Mr. Kratzer added that the US saw safeguarding as an evolutionary process, with the strategic points concept playing an ever larger role. This was the sense in which we accepted the preambular reference to the principle. Mr. Ramisch said that for the FRG, the more important reference was in Article III (2), which discussed applying safeguards “in accordance with the principle, etc.” Paragraph (12) was of basic importance to the FRG. If it were dropped from the Statement, it would be difficult to explain to the German public. Prof. Haefele said the strategic points concept was developing rapidly, and its elaboration was now approaching the stage where a specific action program could be implemented. Mr. Kratzer again stressed that we were in no disagreement as to the merits of the program, but that the problem was the degree of exclusivity. Prof. Haefele suggested that perhaps adding an “aid” before “in uniformity with the principle of safeguarding, etc.” might solve the program by making it clear that the word “only” referred to the earlier part of the sentence. Mr. Kratzer said this would help. Both sides agreed to study the problem further and address it in the agreed minutes. Mr. Kratzer said he wished to offer more definitive U.S. comments on the FRG talking points relating to peaceful uses and safeguards. With regard to the various paragraphs of the proposed German note containing interpretations he said U.S. contained no problems. However, the excerpted quotations should be drawn up in such a fashion as to make clear where deletions had been made and, in some instances, where the text had been paraphrased. Mr. Huberman agreed to check the original statements and to prepare the excerpts along these lines. On para c), Mr. Van Doren offered a suggested change which, from the U.S. point of view, would resolve two problems; namely, to make clear that suppliers were not committed to provide information, material, and equipment without any limitations whatsoever, and to eliminate a possible construction that the Treaty provides for no prohibition unless it is proved that a violation has actually occurred. Mr. Kratzer said that the U.S. maintained that the prohibition of the Treaty apply regardless of whether a violation has actually been detected. To meet these problems, Mr. Van Doren suggested the substitution of the words “on the basis of unfounded allegations” for “until it has been positively established.” Turning to para d), Mr. Kratzer said that he understood on the basis of the morning discussion that we may disregard this paragraph now, since the FRG planned to handle the problem in a different manner. Ambassador Roth confirmed that this was the case. Mr. Kratzer said that the U.S. had difficult problems with para f), particularly with the middle section. The first and last portions were acceptable except to clarify that the U.S. believed it too difficult to devise a comprehensive definition for nuclear explosive devices. The U.S. would not take exception to the FRG text as drafted, but, if asked, we would say that we believe that it is better advised not to attempt a definition of this kind. Ambassador Roth said that the German delegation would want to consider this proposed procedure. As for the middle portion, Mr. Kratzer again explained the U.S. difficulties as he had earlier in the day. He said the U.S. believed that the statement, as drafted, could provoke criticism, and therefore hoped that the FRG would agree to drop it from the text. Mr. Gleysteen suggested that perhaps the sentence could be phrased in terms of possible future amendments to the NPT, if and when a distinction could be drawn between PNED’s and weapons. Mr. Ramisch said the interpretive language was not contradictory to the recognition that a review conference would have to deal with the evaluation of developing exclusively peaceful explosive devices. Mr. Kratzer doubted whether the language as drafted made that point clear and suggested some rephrasing, which idea Mr. Ramisch offered to consider. Prof. Haefele agreed that the case was basically hypothetical. However, US publications were already referring to a process for generation of steam by underground nuclear explosions, a process which might ultimately be completely distinguishable from weapons. Turning to interpretation h), Mr. Kratzer noted that the statement was similar to those made by other EURATOM countries at the time of NPT signature. He suggested, however, that the text should leave open for now the question of whether the safeguards agreement should be signed by both the European Commission and the individual member states, or by only the former or only the latter. Mr. Ramisch agreed that it was the intention of the German language to leave the question open. He also agreed, at Mr. Kratzer’s suggestion, to change the word “decisive” to “dominant” in the fourth paragraph. Regarding the last paragraph, Ambassador Roth explained that, at the time of signing, the FRG intended to issue selected documentation of previous government statements on the NPT. He acknowledged that the sentence in question seemed a little open-ended, and said the matter was still under consideration in Bonn. Mr. Ramisch noted that Italy had made the same kind of statement on signing. Mr. Van Doren saw some potential difficulty with the procedure, depending on which earlier statements were included in the list. Resuming discussion of the Talking Points, Mr. Kratzer asked whether part of the problem in paragraph 9—whether new IAEA definitions of “source and special fissionable material” would be acceptable to the FRG might not be covered by the very nature of IAEA safeguards agreements. Each agreement contains the definition as used by both parties, and this would not be subject to unilateral change when the agreements were renewed. Mr. Ramisch said that if that were so, there was no real problem with the language of this paragraph. On paragraph 10, Mr. Kratzer said he has nothing to add, except that the US would gladly consider an extension of the suppliers’ agreement regarding the moving of equipment and materials. Mr. Ramisch explained that the primary purpose of this talking point had been to ascertain the US reaction to the FRG intention to indicate at that time of NPT signature its view that each exporting country must decide which materials and equipment are included in NPT Article III (2). On paragraph 11, Mr. Kratzer also had nothing to add, since U.S. readiness to facilitate a safeguards agreement between IAEA and EURATOM was well known. Mr. Kratzer likewise had nothing further to say about paragraph 12. When Mr. Ramisch asked whether the US would give a reaction to German intention to refer publicly to the US offer. Mr. Gleysteen suggested that this might be covered in the agreed minutes. On paragraph 13 and the question of an assured US supply of nuclear fuel for EURATOM, Mr. Kratzer said that Secretary Rogers’ reference to a “rule of reason” constituted the best formulation of the US position at this point. Mr. Ramisch said he recognized the importance of this point and the fact that continued fuel supply is a matter of mutual interest. Nevertheless, he proposed an exchange of views, in a smaller group, on the legal aspects of the hypothetical situation that would arise, should the IAEA–EURATOM safeguards agreement not be concluded within the time proscribed. Arrangements were made to meet the following morning. With regard to the specific position of liberalizing the current US–EURATOM supply agreements, Mr. Kratzer outlined briefly at Prof. Haefele’s request the kind of administrative changes that might be made within the framework of existing agreements, as well as the changes which would first require new legislation. He referred to the fact that in the past the US had considered it an obligation to set aside an amount of fissionable material equal to the ceilings authorized in agreements. He said it might be possible to have ceilings liberalized subject to availability of material, rather than with actual guarantees up to the amount specified. He offered to discuss this and other details of the supply agreement in more detail with Prof. Haefele during a meeting arranged for the following afternoon. Annex List of Participants Subject: US-German NPT Discussions October 29, 1969, 4:30 p.m. Participants: ACDA Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR Mr. Benjamin Huberman, ACDA/ST Mr. Herbert S. Malin, ACDA/IR Mr. Charles N. Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel, ACDA/GC Dr. Hanno Weisbrod, ACDA/IR State Department Mr. Samuel DePalma, Assistant Secretary, ID Mr. George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR Mr. James E. Goodby, EUR/RPM Mr. Abraham Katz, EUR/RPE Mr. James S. Sutterlin, EUR/GER Atomic Energy Commission Mr. M. B. Kratzer, Asst. General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. H. D. Bengelsdorff, Assistant to Asst. General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. A.M. Labowitz, Special Assistant for Disarmament, AEC/GM Mr. W.A. Strauser, Assistant Director for International Programs, AEC/SM Defense Department Col. Burr J. Randall, Jr., OSD/ISA German Delegation Col. Helmut Roth, Chief, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Mr. Wolf Ramisch, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Dieter Gescher, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Wolf Haefele, Director of the Applied Physics Institute, Karlsruhe Mr. Adolf von Wagner, Second Secretary, Germany Embassy Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 12 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. 33. Memorandum of Conversation 33. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 30, 1969, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT: US-German NPT Discussions (3rd Session) PARTICIPANTS: (See Attached List) Ambassador Roth suggested that the discussions focus on only those talking points for which there was not yet common understanding. Beginning with Point 7, he suggested that the sentence indicating that “the FRG will remain free together with other European states to take the necessary security measures,” be changed to read “together with its European and other allies…”. Mr. Farley agreed that this would be helpful but asked whether the FRG was reluctant to refer specifically to NPT Article X and its provision for withdrawal. Ambassador Roth explained that the FRG did not wish to maintain that withdrawal was the only recourse available and that the kind of action to be taken would depend on the future situation. Mr. Farley said that even with the FRG change, he was not sure that the text was entirely satisfactory. Why refer, he said, to “supreme interests in jeopardy” if withdrawal was not contemplated? Presumably, any alternative solution involved nuclear defense. At this point he handed to Ambassador Roth a suggested alternative text, which he indicated was intended to serve the same purpose. Ambassador Roth explained that the so-called European option figured in the FRG thinking here. He agreed, however, to consider the US language and to discuss it further that afternoon. Mr. Farley said that the US was not wedded to the specific wording offered, so long as the thought was retained. Ambassador Roth then turned to Point 14, concerning membership on the IAEA Board of Governors. He pointed out that there was a relationship between Point 14 and Points 11–13, in that the latter referred to issues on which the Board of Governors would play a role in shaping related political decisions. He again stressed that the German government would therefore appreciate active US support on behalf of revising Article VI of the IAEA Statute. He suggested that US willingness to be helpful be incorporated into a letter of intent from Secretary Rogers to Foreign Minister Scheel. Such a letter need not be public. Mr. Farley replied that US was not particularly concerned about the question of whether the US response be public or not. The point was, as Mr. DePalma had said the previous day, that active US support in itself would not guarantee success and that working together was essential to develop effective tactics. He doubted it would be possible to have a letter by the following day, although it might be possible to include a Statement of Intent, authorized by Secretary Rogers, in the agreed minutes of the talks. Ambassador Roth then indicated that he would recommend reconsideration in Bonn of the last half of the sentence under Part IV of the Interpretations with a view to eliminating the ambiguous reference to reaffirming “statements made on previous occasions.” On Interpretation c), Mr. Ramisch offered to change the text to read “the transfer of information, material, and equipment cannot be denied to non-nuclear weapon states, merely on the basis of allegations …”. Mr. Farley said the US could agree to this change. On Interpretation f), Mr. Ramisch thought that the US problem could be met by dropping the middle two sentences from the text. Mr. Farley agreed with this suggestion. Mr. Kratzer added, however, ’that while the US would not contest the definition of “nuclear explosive devices”, it did not want to associate itself directly with this or any definition. Mr. Ramisch said he understood the US position and suggested that the agreed minutes reflect the US view. In Interpretation g), Mr. Ramisch noted that the reference to “ concluding the agreement with IAEA” was in conformity with language from Article III of the NPT, and that the FRG would therefore wish to retain the reference. He agreed to change the word “decisive” to “dominant”. Mr. Van Doren agreed with both of Mr. Ramisch’s points. Ambassador Roth said that the technical talk earlier in the morning between members of both delegations had resulted in an acceptable clarification of the US position on the problem of concluding an Euratom/IAEA safeguards agreement within the two year time period. He understood that the Rogers “rule of reason” statement still stood. He had no further comments to make on the talking points. Mr. Farley then turned to paragraph (12) of the draft FRG statement to be made at time of signature. He suggested changing the language to draw directly on the phraseology of Article III of the Treaty text. Prof. Haefele could not agree to this suggestion since, as he explained Article III (3) did not talk in terms of “furtherance” of the principle of safeguarding at strategic points, as the Preamble did. Therefore, he felt that there should be a broad permissive interpretation of the “principle of safeguarding” to allow the strategic points concept to become the regular inspection method. Mr. Kratzer thought the difficulty could be resolved since both sides agreed that an evolutionary process was taking place in the development of safeguards and that the principal of “safeguarding… at certain strategic points” was not in effect now. He recognized that the language in Article III (3) could be construed as a requirement to have only instrumented safeguards techniques from the outset of entry into force of the Treaty, but this was certainly not the meaning the US and most countries ascribed to the Article. Mr. Farley suggested changing paragraph (12) of the FRG statement to read “in accordance with Article III and the principle, etc.” Ambassador Roth said the German side would attempt to redraft the language in question and discuss it at a later session. Mr. Kratzer noted that the last sentence of the paragraph, concerning the meaning of “source and special fissionable materials”, created the same problems as paragraph 9 of the Talking Points. Mr. Kratzer suggested that the reference in the first sentence of paragraph (16) of the draft Statement to “The Federal Republic of Germany” be changed to read “each Party to the Treaty” and that “it” in the second sentence be changed to “the FRG”. Reverting to Talking Point 6, Mr. Farley noted that statements of then Foreign Minister Brandt on this question had always been cast along the lines “that continued effectiveness of NATO was essential to favorable FRG considerations of the NPT.” The talking point, on the other hand, cited Secretary RUSK’s October 2, 1968 statement to the UNGA. The difficulty here was that the commitments referred to had not been made in the past to the Federal Republic as such, but dated back to a period prior to the existence of the FRG and concerned Germany as a whole. Ambassador Roth explained that the FRG had a problem with respect to its security which was distinct from that of other allies. It was for this reason that his government attached importance to a US reference to commitments to West Germany and Berlin for the period until German reunification became possible. He expressed the hope that the US could agree to language similar to that of the RUSK statement, which would be sufficient so long as the basic point was covered. Mr. Farley said he would keep Ambassador Roth’s arguments in mind in drawing up language to reaffirm earlier US statements relating to NATO and the NPT. Both sides recognized the need to point in the agreed minutes to a November 7 deadline for drawing up the US statement. Annex List of Participants Subject: US-German NPT Discussions October 30, 1969, 10:30 A.M. Participants: ACDA Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR Mr. Charles N. Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel, ACDA/GC Mr. Benjamin Huberman, ACDA/ST Mr. Herbert S. Malin, ACDA/IR Mr. Hanno Weisbrod, ACDA/IR State Department James S. Sutterlin, EUR/GER James E. Goodby, EUR/RPE Robert A. Stein, L/EUR Atomic Energy Commission Mr. M.B. Kratzer, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. H.D. Bengelsdorf, Assistant to Asst. General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. A.M. Labowitz, Special Assistant for Disarmament, AEC/GM Mr. W.A. Strauser, Assistant Director for International Programs, AEC/SM Defense Department Col. Burr J. Randall, Jr., OSD/ISA German Delegation Col. Helmut Roth, Chief, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Mr. Rolf Ramisch, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Dieter Gescher, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Wolf Haefele, Director of the Applied Physics Institute, Karlsruhe Mr. Adolf von Wagner Second Secretary, German Embassy Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR) on November 18. The meeting was held in the ACDA Conference Room. 34. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) and the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control (Roth) 34. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) and the German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control (Roth) 1 Washington, October 30, 1969, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT: NPT Discussions PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Hellmuth Roth, FRG Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard C. Barkley, EUR/GER Mr. Hillenbrand expressed the hope that the present NPT discussions were progressing to Ambassador Roth’s satisfaction. He said he was aware that final FRG action on the NPT would have to await the outcome of further negotiations in IAEA and EURATOM, but would like to have Ambassador Roth’s assessment of what procedures would be followed by the German Government in preparation for signature. Ambassador Roth said the present talks here represent the final round of FRG/US discussions on NPT before German signature. He said some exchange of letters on fine points of the treaty may be expected but no further formal talks would be requested. He said that Bundestag debate on NPT at this time would not effect FRG determination to sign the treaty rapidly. He pointed out that signature was an executive action not requiring parliamentary approval. He added that he was optimistic that discussions in IAEA and EURATOM would proceed to the point that the Bundestag would consent to ratify the treaty by late February or early March of 1970. Ambassador Roth’s discussion of these issues was often vague and convoluted. He appeared anxious to pass on his optimism regarding early signature and ratification of the NPT. Mr. Hillenbrand asked Ambassador Roth how he intends to operate in his new position as Disarmament and Arms Control Commissioner in the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Roth acknowledged that he was in a difficult position, but said he hoped to keep friction at a minimum between the Chancellor’s office and the Foreign Ministry on questions of disarmament. He said he hoped to use the Bundesverteidigungsrat as a forum to explain and coordinate governmental actions in his field with the Bundestag. He said he had a small but expert staff and foresaw no organizational problems. Mr. Hillenbrand said we welcomed the FRG’s forthcoming attitude on NPT. He said we were well aware of the political delicacy of the issue. He stated that the new government should be commended for its willingness to tackle sensitive problems of this nature. Ambassador Roth said that the new government was determined to move forward in search of solutions to the many problems facing it. He said that they were working hard to present a good governmental case on NPT. He claimed that Foreign Minister Scheel was now discussing the NPT problem with Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin. If all factors gelled satisfactorily, he maintained that the FRG position on NPT should assure not only signature but eventual ratification. Mr. Hillenbrand asked Ambassador Roth’s views on the survivability of the SPD/FDP coalition. Ambassador Roth said that if the government was able to survive the first six months intact it had a good chance of lasting for four years. He noted that the German system makes it difficult to overturn a government once in power, which should assist the coalition through minor difficulties. He said he thought the FDP would prove cooperative in that it had little other choice. He said he also envisioned considerable support from the CDU in the Bundestag on domestic issues, citing the non-partisan stance of several CDU representatives during the Grand Coalition. Mr. Hillenbrand said we have known and worked with many of the members of the new government for many years and trust and respect them as capable and intelligent leaders. He assured the Ambassador that we have no concerns at all about the continuation of the excellent relations we have enjoyed with past German Governments. He remarked that in fact we may be even closer to the new government on several issues. Ambassador Roth said that he fully expected the FRG to be franker in its relations with Washington than before. Mr. Hillenbrand said we were happy to hear that Duckwitz would stay on for a while in the Foreign Ministry. His presence will give some important continuity to the Foreign Ministry and he will be a great help to Scheel in his new position. He said he looked forward to meeting Scheel in Brussels in December. Ambassador Roth said he did not expect any major difference of opinion between Brandt and Scheel in the foreign policy area. He intimated that Brandt will prove to be the real leader in foreign affairs. Mr. Hillenbrand said we will cooperate fully with the FRG as a friend and ally. He assured Ambassador Roth that if he had any concerns or difficulties to feel free to pass them on to us through our Embassy. Ambassador Roth said he knew several members of the Embassy staff and would maintain contact there. He said the SPD was aware of the FRG’s need for United States and NATO support and would maintain good contacts with officials here and in Brussels. Mr. Hillenbrand expressed concern about Schmidt’s apparent pessimism regarding the future of United States force commitments to Europe reiterating the warning it may be tempting the fate of a “self-fulfilling prophesy”. Ambassador Roth said Schmidt was concerned about preparing the German public psychologically for possible United States reductions. He said that now the German people felt each American soldier reduced indicated a reduction in United States commitment. This was not the case, as he well knew, but the public have been taught to believe it was. He said the FRG wanted to support the United States in preparing German public opinion should the American force posture in Germany change. Mr. Hillenbrand said we were not in the process of getting out of Europe, nor is there any inevitability as to United States reductions in Germany. We are determined to meet our obligations. He said that NATO may consider balanced force reductions in conjunction with SALT negotiations but they would not be reductions in the sense of a unilateral American decision. He also pointed out that the imponderables of the post-Vietnam period made it difficult to assess what if any public pressure for further military drawdowns abroad would continue. Ambassador Roth said the FRG is primarily interested in maintaining an equilibrium in Europe. Not necessarily in numbers of men but in a total balance of military considerations. In this context he mentioned Schmidt’s book “Strategie des Gleichgewichts” as a good encapsuled treatise on current FRG thinking on defense policy. He emphasized the need for a candid exchange on mutual military actions in Europe and the avoidance of surprise moves. Mr. Hillenbrand said we would cooperate completely in this regard and reiterated that the FRG need not be pessimistic regarding our European commitment. He said that present military economy measures are specifically designed not to effect our European force posture. Ambassador Roth reverted to the NPT talks and said only linguistic differences were left to be ironed out. He said that the one important point for the FRG was securing a continuing seat on the IAEA Board of Governors. He said he appreciates our support here. He said the major consideration in NPT was that the FRG not be hampered in the development of nuclear power for civilian use. Mr. Hillenbrand said he never was too concerned about the problem of civilian use in that the treaty contained abundant safeguards to reassure the non-nuclear powers in that regard. He commented that the problems inherent in the use of civilian nuclear power were immense in themselves, particularly in their ecological effects. In that general area he said the new NATO committee on the Challenge of a Modern Society may serve a useful function in getting the Allies together on this potentially vital issue. Ambassador Roth said he was anxious to get the NPT signature out of the way so that he could concentrate in his new office on issues of more personal interest to him such as SALT and ESC. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Barkley (EUR/GER). The meeting took place in Hillenbrand’s office. 35. Note Prepared by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) 35. Note Prepared by the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) 1 Washington, October 30, 1969 GERMAN SIGNATURE OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY I met this afternoon with Ambassador Roth, Disarmament Commissioner in the Foreign Office of the new German Government. He is here for consultation with ACDA, State, and AEC officials on remaining questions on which the Brandt Government is committed to obtain clarification before signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He told me on a very private basis that Brandt hopes to have a one-day Bundestag debate responding to opposition questions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the week of November 10. Immediately on the conclusion of that debate, the FRG would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I commended this prospect. Roth and our people thought that this week’s US–FRG consultations would succeed in disposing of outstanding issues between us on this matter. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–0096, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, April–October 1969. No classification marking. The note is unsigned. 36. Memorandum of Conversation 36. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 31, 1969, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT: US-German NPT Discussions (Fifth and Final Session) PARTICIPANTS: (See Attached List) Ambassador Roth began by saying that the German delegation appreciated US advice and comments on the draft FRG government statement and Note. Since his government would be doing the actual formulation of these documents over the coming weeks, however, he could do no more at this time than to note the US suggestions and recommend that they be carefully considered in Bonn when the statement and Note were prepared. For this reason, he asked that the US comments on these documents not be included in the agreed minutes of the current talks. Mr. Farley agreed to this request, but cautioned that the US could obviously not be bound by any words in documents which it had not seen prior to being issued. Ambassador Roth thought that both sides understood the position of the other. Mr. Farley made the US comments available to Ambassador Roth as an informal paper. Mr. Farley referred to the various statements which the US government had been asked to issue in connection with FRG signature of the NPT. He said Secretary Rogers was particularly interested in what commitments were being exchanged, since as the FRG knew, the question of extending US commitments was a very sensitive matter. The Secretary wanted to avoid giving any appearance that the US was “buying” German NPT adherence. Careful coordination was therefore necessary to assure that the statements which were agreed upon would be issued in a way which would avoid creating any false impressions in this regard. The US position on NATO continuity, as well as on the intervention rights question was clearly defined, but we would want to work out the text of any new statements with the above factors in mind. Mr. Ramisch asked whether it was possible in paragraph 8 of the minutes to indicate US agreement with the substance of the German interpretations of the NPT. Mr. Farley thought that this would create an inconsistency, given the earlier sentence in the same paragraph that the US did not consider it desirable to confirm interpretations made unilaterally by others. Mr. Kratzer agreed and pointed out that the statement in the minutes under Interpretation (f), whereby the US specifically did not endorse the definition of “nuclear explosive devices” contained in the Interpretation. Ambassador Roth said he had instructions to seek some degree of confirmation of the Interpretation. The point was that in case of subsequent dispute over the meaning of the Treaty, the FRG would then be able to turn to others for support. Later in the same conversation the two sides agreed to rephrase the sentence in question to make clear that the US found the substance of the Interpretations generally acceptable, subject to specific comments elaborated in the minutes. Minor textual changes were also agreed on for Interpretation (c). Mr. Ramisch asked whether paragraph 11 of the minutes could not reflect some US agreement in substance with the safeguards criteria introduced by the FRG into internal Euratom safeguards discussions. Mr. Kratzer recalled that he had expressed satisfaction over the recognition in the German criteria of the fact that there should be some degree of physical access into Euratom facilities by IAEA inspectors, but that otherwise he had not commented one way or the other. The US was not prepared to express general approval of the criteria in the minutes. Prof. Haefele stressed that these criteria constituted an important point of substance for the FRG and were considered the absolute minimum requirements necessary to preserve the position of Euratom as an effective international safeguards system in its own right. Mr. Kratzer said he did not believe it appropriate for the US to make advance judgments regarding Euratom safeguards deliberations until Euratom itself had agreed upon a position. Mr. Farley explained that the problem was less one of substantive difficulty with the interpretations than one of maintaining good relations with all the countries and international bodies involved. After discussing possibilities for changing the text of paragraph 11, both sides finally agreed to delete all references to the criteria. Mr. Van Doren noted that there was no longer any reference in the agreed minutes to the discussions of the question of safeguarding at strategic points, now that the portion of the minutes dealing with the FRG draft government statement had been deleted. Mr. Kratzer also saw merit in trying to express in words those elements relating to the strategic points concept on which US and FRG views corresponded. Mr. Farley made clear that if the FRG issued the government statement and the US were subsequently asked about the references to the strategic points concept, the US would have to express its own views on the subject in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding that the US and the FRG were in full agreement on the language in the statement. Mr. Farley then informed the German side that he was authorized by Secretary Rogers to give a formal written assurance of US support for permanent FRG membership on the IAEA Board of Governors. It was agreed to incorporate the text of the US assurance in paragraph 14 of the agreed minutes. This completed consideration of the agreed minutes, which the US side offered to prepare in final form. The talks then adjourned with expressions on both sides of satisfaction over the successful outcome. It was agreed to deal with press questions in general terms, without getting into matters of substance. Annex List of Participants Subject: US-German NPT Discussions (Fifth and Final Session) Participants: ACDA Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Assistant Director, ACDA/IR Mr. Charles N. Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel, ACDA/GC Mr. Benjamin Huberman, ACDA /ST Mr. Herbert S. Malin, ACDA/IR Mr. Hanno Weisbrod, ACDA/IR State Department Mr. George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR Mr. Abraham Katz, EUR/RPE Mr. James S. Sutterlin, EUR/GER Mr. James D. Phillips, EUR/RPE Mr. Robert Stein, L/EUR Atomic Energy Commission Mr. M.B. Kratzer, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. H.D. Bengelsdorf, Assistant to Asst. General Manager for International Activities, AEC/GM Mr. A.M. Labowitz, Special Assistant for Disarmament, AEC/GM Defense Department Col. Burr J. Randall, Jr., OSD/ISA German Delegation Mr. Dirk Oncken, Minister, FRG Embassy, Washington Col. Helmut Roth, Chief, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Mr. Rolf Ramisch, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Dieter Gescher, Disarmament Section, German Foreign Office Dr. Wolf Haefele, Director of the Applied Physics Institute, Karlsruhe Mr. Adolf von Wagner, Second Secretary, German Embassy Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on November 19 by Malin (ACDA/IR). The meeting took place in the ACDA conference room. 37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 6, 1969 SUBJECT: Gerard Smith’s Conversation with Dobrynin (Tab A) Following are points of note: 1. On NPT, Dobrynin again picked up the Secretary of State’s earlier suggestion that joint US-Soviet deposit of instruments of ratification, when it comes, should be “with full publicity.” The President at one time in the spring also talked in these terms. If we don’t want a detente jamboree the time to stop is now . [Omitted here is information unrelated to NPT.] Tab A Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 30, 1969 SUBJECT: PART II—NPT Ratification and German Signature PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador Yuly VorontsOv, Counselor, USSR Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, ACDA Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Acting Asst Dir. ACDA/IR Ambassador Dobrynin inquired how our consultations on the NPT with the FRG were proceeding, and whether we had any indication when the Brandt Government would sign. Mr. Smith replied that the consultations were going smoothly. He could not say when the FRG would sign, but noted that the Chancellor had called for early signature. Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that he had spoken with other high US officials on this subject and indicated that the Soviets were all ready to complete their ratification and the only remaining problem now was German signature. He thought completion of the ratification process by the US and USSR simultaneously, with full publicity, would take place promptly thereafter. The Ambassador inquired whether our consultations had disclosed any new German concerns or whether they were simply asking for reiteration of positions taken by the previous Administration on such matters as had been made part of the public record. Mr. Smith replied that nothing that was going on would come as a novelty to the Soviets if he were in a position to discuss these consultations which were private among Allies. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 70, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicated Kissinger saw it on November 10. Also attached but not published is Part I of the Smith-Dobrynin conversation. 38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 7, 1969 SUBJECT: The NPT and FRG Request for US Statement on NATO and Security Guarantees In connection with their signature of the NPT, the Germans have asked us for a statement on the relationship between the NPT and our continued commitment to European security. There has been some confusion over whether the statement should be made by the Secretary at the time the FRG signs the NPT, or in a letter to Scheel in time for the Bundestag debate (November 12) or, alternatively, made by the Department’s press spokesman. As of today , the FRG has suggested the following procedure: no US statement prior to the debate; in his opening remarks on November 12, Brandt will refer generally to previous US assurances (by the last Administration) and say that he will ask the US to confirm these; depending on the developments in the debate, the FRG may ask us to have the Department spokesman confirm these prior assurances; finally, the Germans request that the Secretary make a statement at the time the FRG actually signs the treaty. Secretary Rogers has taken with him to Florida a draft memo for the President requesting authorization for him to make a statement at the time of signature. We have no official notice of this memorandum and do not know if it will be submitted to us. I have attached a bootleg copy of the EUR memo to the Secretary enclosing the memo to the President and the proposed text of the statement (Tab A 1, 2 & 3). Do not reveal that you have this. I have no real objection to the procedure outlined by the Germans. On the other hand, I find the text of the proposed US statement painful in the extreme (Tab A.3). It refers to the NPT with the rhetoric of the last Administration which this one, at least this part of it, has studiously avoided. It ties NPT to SALT (bottom of page 1) in ways which cannot help but raise pressures for US concessions when SALT runs into difficulties. It tells the Germans that wonderful things will happen to them as a result of their signature. But there is nothing that it seems feasible to do at this stage, because State and ACDA have negotiated this statement with the Germans, and to change it now would reverse an entire negotiating process. This is another case, where State has proceeded without reference to the White House and now confronts us—if indeed it chooses to ask us at all—with an accomplished, and to my mind wholly distasteful fact. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: “Can’t we get control of [these?] matters? How about showing Hillenbrand SALT instructions with Colorado language?” The attachments are not published. 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 11, 1969 Subject: Reaffirmation of NATO at the Time of FRG Signing of Non-Proliferation Treaty Recommendation: That you authorize me to release the enclosed statement in connection with the signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany. Approve Disapprove Discussion In their consideration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Germans have seen a possible risk to their security from the fact that the Treaty, as drafted, could outlast the North Atlantic Treaty. They fear that this might some day deprive them of the United States nuclear guarantee at a time when they would be unable to develop an effective deterrent against nuclear attack. During recent discussions between representatives of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Treaty, the Germans stated that a prerequisite for their adherence to the NPT is the continued existence of NATO or a system providing similar security guarantees. They said that a statement by the United States reaffirming its commitment to European security would be of great assistance in meeting this requirement. They said they desired such a statement by November 7 for use in the Bundestag debates on the NPT beginning November 10. We have prepared the enclosed statement which we believe will meet the needs of the Germans. The statement in no way adds to our existing international commitments. I believe the release of a statement of this kind will do much to reassure the FRG of our determination to meet our present commitments and to assist the German Government in its parliamentary debate on the Treaty. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Kissinger approved the statement for the President on November 12. (Draft memorandum to the President, undated; ibid.) 40. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 40. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 19, 1969 SUBJECT: Soviet Ratification of NPT—Tab A The Soviets have indicated that they plan to ratify the NPT on November 24. They apparently do not envisage a signing ceremony. You will recall that the Secretary of State on several occasions told Dobrynin (and also Gromyko at the UN) that we would like to have a joint signing ceremony with wide media coverage. Since the Soviets appear not to be interested in such a ceremony, I believe it would be inappropriate and undesirable for us to insist on it. If you agree, this probably should be conveyed to the Secretary of State as soon as possible so that he does not pursue the idea of a ceremony when Dobrynin calls on him today to announce Soviet intention to complete ratification. Tab A Telegram 6431 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, November 19, 1969, 1330Z. Subect: Soviet Ratification of NPT 1. Deputy Chief MFA American Section (Zinchuk) called in DCM November 19 to tell us “for information” that Dobrynin had been instructed (a) to inform Secretary Supreme Soviet Premier plans to ratify Non-Proliferation Treaty November 24 and (b) to propose that US and USSR make simultaneous press release same day at 1100 Washington time and 900 Moscow time. In response query, Zinchuk said under Soviet procedure Presidium action would be final step and no signing ceremony would be involved. 2. Zinchuk requested Embassy inform MFA once we have learned USG reaction. 3. Dept. inform Helsinki. Beam 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential. Sent “urgent” for information/action. A notation at the top of the page indicated Kissinger saw it and that action had been completed. 41. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon 41. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon 1 Washington, November 19, 1969, 3:30 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.] K said he was not sure we should make a big production of the NPT, because the Soviets aren’t. K said they plan simply to make a press announcement. The P said failing to have a signing isn’t going to be noticed there, but it sure is going to be noticed here. The P said we could just have a small one, not bother with Johnson. K said we don’t want to give them the impression that we were begging for an agreement. The P said he guessed K was right—let’s not have a ceremony. The P said he would just sign it and announce it. The P said Aiken, Mansfield, and Fulbright know it’s going to be done. The P said K might call them, say we found that the Soviets prefer just a press announcement, so we’re just going to sign it. Then we can make more of the meeting the next morning. The P said on that bacteriological thing, we have an awfully good case. The P said K should make him a talking paper on that for Tuesday morning. And K should call Fulbright, Aiken and Mansfield about breakfast Tuesday morning. The P said maybe we don’t have to tell them what the breakfast is going to be about. K said we could just say, a review of disarmament. The P said call it a consideration of a review of disarmament. The P said he would just sign the darn thing, and then announce it. We would get the credit for it anyway 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Records, 1969–76, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–28 April 1969. No classification marking. 42. Telegram 200453 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts 42. Telegram 200453 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts 1 December 2, 1969, 2013Z. Helsinki for Saltdel 1. US Govt wishes to have NPT enter into force as soon as possible and to encourage states which have not done so to ratify the Treaty as soon as political or constitutional considerations permit them to take this decision. Under terms of the Treaty, ratification by 40 countries plus those of three depositaries is necessary to bring NPT into force. Of latter category UK completed its ratification on Nov 27, 1968. The US and USSR signed their ratification instruments on Nov 24 of this year and expect to complete the process by depositing their instruments shortly. We hope to arrange deposit ceremonies in three depositary capitals in approximately two to three weeks time, fulfilling one condition for entry into force of NPT. We would be pleased if other countries which have signed could be in a position to deposit instruments at that time also, so that the Treaty could come into force. 2. In Dept’s view many countries have been waiting for fresh indication on part of US and USSR of their continued interest in NPT as well as moves by other significant countries before themselves taking decision regarding Treaty. US and Soviet action on Nov 24, Swiss signature on Nov 27, and FRG signature on Nov 28, and anticipated public announcement that Japan intends to sign NPT are events which we believe warrant re-examination by other countries of their positions regarding ratification. 3. We are sending by septel, up-to-date status report on which countries have signed or ratified NPT. With exceptions noted below Chiefs of Missions in countries which have signed but not ratified NPT should approach host governments at appropriately high level to inform them that US plans to complete its ratification in approxmately two to three weeks. If political consideration or constitutional procedures of host government permit, we would be pleased if they would ratify NPT at that time and thus join depositary governments in steps to bring NPT into force as soon as possible. Please report by December 5 if possible host government response and your appraisal of prospects. 4. Chiefs of Mission in countries which have not yet signed NPT should inform host governments of above, pointing out it continues to be US policy that countries must make their own decisions regarding adherence to NPT, but that recent developments regarding Treaty may warrant review of their positions concerning it. You may note number countries which have already signed and ratified drawing on septel. 5. For London: Because of UK interest in NPT we would greatly appreciate their help with former British dependencies which may have ratification procedures similar to UK (i.e., no constitutional requirement of parliamentary consent, but important treaties often in practice subjected to parliamentary debate). Such former British dependencies which have signed NPT include: Barbados, Ceylon, Cyprus, Gambia, Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Malta, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago. 6. For EURATOM capitals: You may advise FonOffs of above diplomatic steps and that we recognize there is no change in their policy with respect to need for satisfactory verification agreement between IAEA and European communities before their respective ratifications take place. It remains US policy to use its good offices to facilitate such agreement. 7. For Stockholm: We understand Swedish ratification under parliamentary consideration. We would appreciate it if Swedish ratification could be timed to coincide with world-wide effort we are making. 8. For Tokyo: You should advise FonOff of our planned representations elsewhere so that GOJ will not be caught off-base in its own consideration regarding timing of NPT signature. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) on November 28; cleared by ACDA/D, EUR, NEA, L, PM, AF, ARA, EA, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Rogers. Repeated for information to USNATO, USEC Brussels, USUN, U.S. Mission Geneva, and Helsinki. 43. Memorandum of Conversation 43. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 30, 1969, 11 a.m. SUBJECT: NPT—Simultaneous Deposit PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Acting Secretary Richardson Mr. James F. Leonard; ACDA Mr. Lewis W. Bowden, EUR/SOV Dobrynin said he had come to report on the results of the Soviet diplomatic canvass of countries that have yet to ratify the NPT. Out of some 30 governments contacted most had responded favorably, but many could not give specific dates when they might deposit their instruments of ratification. He asked what the results of our canvass had been. The Acting Secretary said he believed that we could go ahead with our planned simultaneous deposit, our contacts having turned up 24 countries that felt they could deposit their instruments by mid-January. That actually gave us six more than needed. We would like some of these countries to act at the same time as we and the Soviets deposit and believe that all parties concerned should have four weeks notice of the specific date we agree on. Mr. Richardson said that the first week in February 1970 was best for the Secretary and that he would check with the White House to see whether that was an agreeable period. Dobrynin commented that if 24 countries could deposit by mid-January then the treaty would be ready to go into force. Mr. Richardson rapidly read to Dobrynin the list of 24 countries. This list was typewritten and handed to Dobrynin at the end of the meeting. The Acting Secretary pointed out that 13 other countries thought they probably could act by mid-January and, therefore, our chances of getting the needed 18 out of a total of 37 possibilities seem very good. Dobrynin said the first week in February sounded all right to him but he would check with Moscow and would expect word from us if that week posed any problems for the White House. It was agreed that we would get in touch with each other during the week of January 5 to 9 to fix a date early in February if no great obstacles arose to that period. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to NPT.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. VI. Confidential. Drafted by Bowden (EUR/SOV); concurred in by Leonard (ACDA); and approved on December 31 by Abramowitz. The meeting was held in Richardson’s office. The memorandum of conversation is Part I of V. 44. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 44. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 1 Washington, February 11, 1970 Subject: Signature of Non-Proliferation Treaty—ACTION Recommendation That you approve the attached telegram (TAB A). Discussion Once the Non-Proliferation Treaty has come into force in early March, normal treaty practice would make it impossible for countries to follow a two-stage process of signing and, after a period of time, ratifying. Normal practice provides that after such a treaty comes into force countries wishing to become parties do so in the single act of acceding. While the possibility of an exception in this case theoretically exists, it is not likely to be made. It would require the consent of all three depositaries, and even should we wish to make an exception, the British have already given us a negative response on the question (when we were approached recently by the Japanese). Since signature even without ratification has political consequences and since this option will in all likelihood shortly be closed, we believe we should utilize the period prior to early March to raise the subject once again with key non-nuclear governments which have not signed, calling to their attention the effect of the treaty’s coming into force. This consideration led the Japanese to accelerate their signature, and we have reason to believe the Australian government is weighing the question in the same light (exchange of cables with Canberra at TAB B). We have no grounds to be optimistic that many other states would respond in the same fashion, but the effort would be worth making if only one or two additional key signatures could be obtained. In the case of certain of these states, other recent signatures of the NPT may help induce a willingness to sign; the effect of the Japanese signature upon the Indonesian decision is an example. The attached telegram for your signature (TAB A) makes this point in a low-key way to avoid an impression of arm twisting. It is addressed to our Embassies in most of the principal non-signatory states. The only important exception is Australia, which is being dealt with separately (TAB B). Guyana is included at ARA’s request because it is the only other Latin American government which has not signed, * and Saudi Arabia is included as the only Arab government (outside of Algeria) not having signed. The mention of constitutional considerations in the paragraph of the telegram intended specifically for Tel Aviv refers to the usual Israeli practice of making a decision to ratify before a treaty is signed. (signed) Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Secret; Exdis. The attachments are not published. The telegram at Tab A was approved and sent on February 11 as telegram 211405 to multiple posts. (Ibid.) * In addition to those listed in the telegram (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) and Cuba. 45. Telegram 864 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 45. Telegram 864 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, February 19, 1970, 1559Z Subject: Resolution to Establish a Safeguards Committee Ref State 022924 AEC: For Kratzer 1. USDel has been making consistent effort move UK resolution towards formulation that will clearly focus Committee’s attention primarily on agreements, yet avoid premature debate on EURATOM safeguards issue. 2. UK and EURATOM reps have indicated that they would sharply oppose circulation, under operative para 1, of DG’s current draft of agreement with individual NNWS. We have informed them that while we would prefer early circulation we will not insist on same. 3. Accordingly following is text we have developed, on ad referendum basis with UK. Several EURATOM reps including Italians and Germans are favorably disposed towards text. Major unresolved issue is preambular para F. Complete text follows: The Agency’s safeguards responsibilities in the light of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Proposal for the establishment of Committee. The Board of Governors (A) Recognizing that under its statute the Agency is required to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with the United Nations policies furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament, and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies. (B) Noting that the statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards at the request of the parties to any of that state’s activities in the field of atomic energy. (C) Noting also that non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are required, either individually or together with other states, to conclude agreements with the agency in accordance with its statute and safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the said treaty, for which purpose the agency will need to be in a position to commence to negotiate such agreements within 180 days of the original entry into force of the treaty with states which have ratified it prior to that event. (D) Noting further the statements by the United States of America and the United Kingdom about the application of safeguards to nuclear activities in their respective countries. (E) Noting further that the safeguards required by Article III of the said treaty are to be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV thereof, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the said Article III and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the said treaty. (F) (still open) (G) Noting further that various aspects of the application of the Agency’s safeguard’s system have been under examination by the Director General for some time. (H) Convinced that all member states must have a full voice in discussion of the matters covered in this resolution 1. Requests of the Director General, in the light of his examination of the implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the Agency’s activities in relation to safeguards, to circulate to the governments of all member states by 15 March 1970 such technical documentation as may assist them in formulating views on the desirable content of the agreements which will be required in connection with the said treaty. 2. Invites all member states to communicate to the Director General, if they so desire, by 1 May 1970, their views on the implications of the said treaty for the Agency’s activities in relation to safeguards and in particular on the desirable content of the agreements which will be required in connection the said treaty; and requests the Director General to circulate such views forthwith to all member states. 3. Requests the Director General, in the light of the said views of member states and of the said documentation, to circulate reports to all member states, containing his views on the implication of the said treaty for the agency’s activities in relation to safeguards, and in particular on the desirable content of the agreements be required in connection with the said treaty; the initial report to be submitted by 1 June 1970 and to cover agreements the negotiation of which in accordance with Article III paragraph 4 of the said treaty is required to commence with the agency within 180 days of the original entry into force thereof; reports on all other relevant matters to follow as soon as possible thereafter. 4. Decides, with the objective of putting the Agency in a position to carry out its responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connection with the said treaty at the earliest possible date, to establish a committee, on which any member state may be represented if it so desires, which shall (A) Have a Chairman and two Vice-Chairman designed by the Board. (B) For the facilitation of its work, be authorized to establiish working groups and to call on expert assistance (C) Hold its initial meeting in early June 1970 (D) In the light of the documentation prepared pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, and of its deliberations on the matter, advise the Board as matter of urgency on the Agency’s responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connection with the said treaty, and in particular on the desirable content of the agreements which will be required in connection with the said treaty. (E) From time to time, report the results of its deliberations to the Board, and make, as soon as possible, such recommendations as it deems necessary. 5. Further decides to review progress in the matter at its June meeting. 4. In order “accommodate” our preferences re preambular para F Jackson endeavored obtain EURATOM and London agreement following three new preambular paras. Believing that the agency’s safeguards system is flexible in application and subject to periodic review considering that it is necessary to clarify the application of the said system in connection with the said treaty believing that in prescribing the safeguards required in connection with the said treaty due regard should be paid to need for effectiveness and economy and to the need to take full advantage of technical advances. 5. We informed UK that allusion to “periodic review” could be construed as inviting a wholesale review of INFCIRC/66 at this time and that it would be preferable delete this phrase. As alternative we also have considered deleting first para and preserving following two with second changed as follows considering that it is necessary to clarify the application of the agency’s safeguard’s system in connection with the said treaty. UK also has advised that it would only be able support phrase beginning with word “considering” if word “adjust” were substituted for “clarify” or language read “clarify and adjust”. Italy has taken a similar position and is adamant on use of word “adjust”. We have expressed strong reservations re this proposal and have been informed that Michaels is of strong disposition only to retain on balance para beginning with the words “believing that in prescribing”. While Mission sympathizes with desires of Dept and AEC to have flexibility of INFCIRC/66 acknowledged on face of resolution there is strong sentiment here that US is endeavoring bias resolution and even such moderates as Dutch Amb believe we are pushing this point too hard. Accordingly, we intend co-sponsor text only using phrase beginning with words “believing that in prescribing”. We believe it is counterproductive to continue press “flexibility” language and that US should use occasion of debate to express its views on subject. Smyth 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to AEC, Bonn, USEC Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 46. Editorial Note 46. Editorial Note On March 5, 1970, signing ceremonies for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were held in Moscow and Washington, D.C. For text of President Nixon’s remarks on the occasion, made after signing the proclamation of the treaty at the Department of State, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pages 241–242. For the text of the treaty, see 21 UST 483. 47. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 47. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, March 18, 1970 [Omitted here is material on other issues.] At 3:30 p.m. I met with Ambassador Dobrynin in the presence of Dr. Harry Smyth, Ward P. Allen (Department of State), Myron Kratzer and Julie Rubin. I told him that the reason for the meeting was to discuss the NPT and means of insuring its success. Attached is a talking paper covering the points I discussed with him. I also gave him a copy of the paper which covered the main points of the discussion. Smyth, Allen, Kratzer and I all emphasized the importance of coming to an agreement on this matter with the Soviet Union before April 1, because if we do not work together we will not be successful in our common objective. [Omitted here is material on other issues.] Attachment Washington, March 6, 1970 PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN 1. The US has valued the close cooperation with the USSR that brought the NPT into effect. We sincerely hope this collaboration will continue so as to assure the effective implementation of the Treaty. 2. The question of how the IAEA should organize itself to discharge its safeguard responsibilities as called for by Article III of the NPT recently was the subject of discussion by the IAEA’s Board of Governors in February. Specifically, the Board considered a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to consider the form and content of the necessary safeguard agreements. The US decided to co-sponsor this resolution after extensive negotiations with the UK, during which we succeeded in obtaining agreement to a number of improvements on the very points of concern to the Soviet Union. We were convinced that further changes would be unacceptable to a number of Board members, and that a majority Board members favored its adoption. 3. In deference to a request of the Soviet Governor, the Board agreed to defer the question of establishing a committee until a special IAEA meeting on April 1. The USSR requested additional time to formulate its views on the proposal. Accordingly, we wish to use the time between now and the April 1 meeting to allay Soviet concerns on the resolution, since further delay or disagreement could seriously set back the steps necessary for widespread adherence to and effective implementation of the NPT. 4. We would hope to demonstrate to the USSR in these consultations that there is a close identity of objectives between the USSR and the US on how the IAEA should discharge its NPT responsibilities. If we have had any differences with the USSR, they have been primarily tactical in nature. 5. First, like the USSR, we wish to see the IAEA placed in a position to begin its safeguard negotiations with NPT adherents as soon as possible bearing in mind the time scale for negotiations specified in the Treaty itself. 6. Second, like the USSR, we have a strong interest in seeing the IAEA maintain a fully effective and credible safeguards system. Therefore, we would be strongly opposed to any efforts to cut back on the effectiveness of the Agency’s safeguards system or subject that system to protracted review and revision prior to the initiation of the negotiations called for by the Treaty. It is our basic position that the IAEA safeguards document INFCIRC/66 is sufficiently flexible to permit the negotiation of the safeguard agreements called for by the NPT and we shall be prepared to defend this position in Vienna. While some efforts towards revising the system undoubtedly will be made in Vienna, we believe we can resist them if we have the support of the USSR and other countries. 7. Third, and most importantly, we believe that the US and the USSR both wish to encourage acceptance of the NPT by a number of key industrialized countries, including Japan, the FRG, Australia, Italy, etc. 8. Events over the past year and at the February Board meeting have indicated that several key non-nuclear weapon states wish to have the opportunity to discuss, in some forum, the types of IAEA safeguard provisions that may apply to them. Certain key non-nuclear weapon states are specifically withholding their ratification of the NPT until the terms of the IAEA safeguard agree cents are clarified under conditions that permit them to express their views on the subject. 9. It also seems clear that the IAEA Director General requires guidance from the Board on the character of the agreements to be negotiated in connection with the NPT. Establishment of a safeguards committee as proposed by the UK is thus essential to enable the IAEA to promptly get on with the task of implementing the Treaty. It is essential in our view that the April 1 meeting of the Board accept the UK/US resolution in substantially its current form and we would hope this step could be taken with USSR suppor (or at least, without their objection.) 10. At the same time, we wish to emphasize that we agree with the USSR that the proposed committee’s deliberations should be well focused, should be handled as a matter of urgency, and should evolve in a fashion that will not lead to any erosion of the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. 11. We believe the UK/US draft resolution provides a desirable focus since it emphasizes that the principal matter to be discussed will be the provisions to be included in the various agreements to be negotiated in connection with the Treaty. We are convinced that efforts to establish terms of reference any more restrictive than those now proposed In the UK resolution would not be negotiable with others, would be interpreted as an effort on our part to muzzle the debate and would be unrealistic since those who wish to discuss various aspects of safeguards will find a way to do so in any event. We plan as noted to stand firm in opposition to any time-consuming review and revision of the Agency safeguards document as a precondition to negotiating the necessary agreements since we believe this is neither necessary nor desirable. 12. However, we agree with the comments made by the Soviet delegation in Vienna that the committee should complete its deliberations as soon as possible and hence we favor the inclusion within the UK/US resolution of a target date for the completion of the committee’s first report. We believe this first report should be submitted to the Board within the 180 day period for the initiation of negotiations specified in Article III of the NPT. We also would look with favor, on what we understand to be Soviet idea, that one or more special Board meetings should be convened starting in the late summer or fall of 1970 if this serves to help expedite matters. 13. We also understand that one of the Soviet concerns is that the UK resolution might delay the ability of a state, party to the NPT, to promptly negotiate with the IAEA even though that state is ready and willing to do so. Finland is one such example. We wish to emphasize that we do not regard the UK/US resolution in any way precluding the IAEA from negotiating, on an ad hoc basis, a safeguards agreement with Finland or any other country that is now prepared to proceed. 14. The UK resolution would have the proposed committee consider agreements to be negotiated with individual states, the agreements to be negotiated with regional grouping such as Euratom, and the agreements that would be designed to implement the UK/US voluntary safeguard offers. We have been informed that the USSR is opposed to including the US and UK offers within the committee’s terms of reference. We strongly believe that it would be contrary to our mutual interests in having a strong NPT to do anything which creates doubt that the US offer will be effectively implemented. Application of IAEA safeguards in the US will result in substantial inconvenience to us, and is not a decision which we took lightly. Moreover, while we would of course welcome parallel Soviet action in any degrees the US offer was never intended to place the Soviet Union under any pressure to put its own peaceful facilities under safeguards, and no suggestion to this effect was made at the time of US offer. The US offer was based on conclusion that industrial nations especially West Germany would not accept safeguards unless their competitors especially the US and the UK did so. Thus, US offer was in interest of and essential to NPT. 15. The US also believes its offer will be a key factor in maintaining the effectiveness of the IAEA system. This is so since we intend to stress the point that we are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards system as set forth in document INFCIRC/66. 16. In conclusion, we are ready to join with the Soviets to take the necessary steps to assure that the committee conduct its deliberations on a prompt and well-focused basis concentrating on the illustrative provisions that might be included in the various agreements. We believe that our common objectives will be seriously impaired if the USSR opposes the UK/US resolution or refrains from participating constructively in the committee’s deliberations. H.D.B. 1 Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 21, pp. 524, and 532–538. No classification marking. 48. Telegram 40032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 48. Telegram 40032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, March 19, 1970 REF: (a) State’s 037985, (b) State’s 039492 Subject: Establishment of Safeguards Committee 1. As indicated Para 3 REF (b), AEG Chairman Seaborg accompanied by Ambassador Smyth and Allen (IO) met with Soviet Ambassador at 3:30, March 18, Washington time. Seaborg made same points contained REF (a) with Dobrynin and gave him informal piece of paper embodying them. Seaborg also referred orally in passing to Para 4(k) and to US offer to place our facilities under safeguards Stated he felt this may well have been key factor in persuading others such as FRG to proceed with NPT. (These points not (RPT NOT) included in informal paper). 2. Dobrynin indicated he felt points made generally acceptable but question would be ironing out differences in texts of resolution. His remarks indicated that SOV DEL had expressed annoyance at some lack more thorough advance consultation in Viennaa Ambassador Smyth expressed regret at unfortunate slippage in communications between the two DELS in Vienna but pointed out all details thoroughly discussed with Soviets day before meeting and that up until last minute we had hoped acceptable text could be worked out. We agreed with Dobrynin’s hope that this can now be done in time to permit prompt adoption of resolution at April Board meeting but indicated would be difficult make changes draft substantial changes in present draft Resolution except for adding target date. 3. Dobrynin was advised US making same approach in Moscow and that we understand UK also making separate approach in Moscow. 4. UK Embassy Washington being informed of above meeting but without details. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use; Priority. It was repeated to London and Vienna. Drafted and approved on March 18 by Allen (IO); and cleared by Kratzer (AEC). Trevithick (SCI) was informed. 49. Telegram 1465 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 49. Telegram 1465 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, March 25, 1970, 1320Z. Subj: Safeguards Committee Ref: Moscow’s 1371 Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev read to me statement handed yesterday to UK Ambassador. Statement criticizes UK proposal as conducive to lengthy and complex enquiries re desirable contents of safeguards agreement between IAEA and non-nuclear powers when treaty is already clear this point. Proposal could be used by some countries to weaken system of controls envisaged under IAEA. Under questioning Kozyrev said Soviets not opposed in principle at present time to creation ad hoc committee, but could not assure that this would be final Soviet position. He said Soviets would pursue discussions in Vienna. I told him we were also against delay but believed committee could be useful vehicle for negotiation. Decon 3/26/71 Beam 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to London and Vienna. 50. Telegram 45515 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria 50. Telegram 45515 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria 1 Washington, March 27, 1970 SUBJ: Safeguards Committee REF: Moscow 1465 IAEA/DISTO 1. UK Embassy Washington has made available to Department text of Soviet statement reported reftel. Text (unnecessary words omitted) as follows: 2. “Entry into force on 5 March 1970 of NPT places new and serious problems before its participants. This concerns in first instance nuclear powers, with whom treaty is deposited and who bear special responsibility for putting it into practice. Before these powers stands task of taking all possible measures which will guarantee reliable control by IAEA and its establishment within period laid down by Treaty. 3. “From this stems necessity of achieving greatest possible mutual understanding with regard to those steps, which are being taken by each side in IAEA in spirit of striving for such mutual understanding; and in view of great role which IAEA play in accordance with NPT, in first instance in field of control, it desirable to communicate certain considerations about best way to guarantee that negotiations about special agreements between non-nuclear powers and the agency should begin within 180 days from date of Treaty’s entry into force, i.e. no later than 5 September this year; and that agreements themselves about guarantees should enter into force for present participants in Treaty no later than March, 1972, and, if all possible, earlier. Therefore, it is necessary to take urgent measures in Agency so that it can execute obligations entrusted to it. 4. “In view of urgency of this task and considering responsibility of depositary powers with regard to non-proliferation treaty, we cannot help but feel concern in connection with approach of British side to problem of preparing IAEA for fulfillment of functions of control over implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty. 5. “It is known to British side that Agency’s Secretariat has already drawn up, taking into full account statutes of IAEA, and system of guarantees, draft model agreement on control with non-nuclear powers. On basis of this draft, Finland has already expressed willingness to conclude agreement on control. 6. “Instead of making efforts to conclude quickly work of IAEA on draft model agreement, British delegation at last session of governing body in February this year, introduced proposal, point of which is to occupy consideration of states with complicated and lengthy enquiry on quote desirable content unquote of agreement about guarantees between IAEA and non-nuclear states. But it already quite clearly indicated in Treaty, as to what content of such agreements should be—they must conform to statutes and to guarantee system of agency. Question also arises—might not procedure, which is being proposed by British delegation, be used by certain states in order to attempt to revise very guarantee system of Agency, to weaken in same manner international control in accordance with Non-Proliferation Treaty and to delay for unspecified time establishment of such control? Such course of events would in no way promote resolution of tasks, lying before IAEA in connection with Non-Proliferation Treaty. IAEA has wherewithal to fulfill tasks in field of control in accordance with Treaty, on basis of existing guarantee system and of experience in its use. 7 “We are convinced that, as has been the case up to now, joint and agreed actions of the nuclear and depositary powers could play great role in concluding work on draft model treaty. We express hope that cooperation between Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States will be continued on all questions linked to Non-Proliferation Treaty.” End Text. 8. Foregoing text made available FYI only and should not be discussed with other delegations except UK and Soviets at their initiative. End. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to Moscow, London, and USMission Geneva. Drafted and approved by Trevithick (SCI/AE); and cleared in IO/OES, EUR/SOV, EUR/BMI, and ACDA. 51. Telegram 1930 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 51. Telegram 1930 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, April 10, 1970, 1529Z Subject: Safeguards Committee: Special Meeting of Board of Governors April 1 and 2 IAEA/DISTO Summary: The following is Mission’s analysis of results of special Board meeting of April 1 and 2 which resulted in establishment of Safeguards Committee to prepare Agency for its NPT safeguards role. End summary. 1. In its meetings on April 1 and 2 Board of Governors took an important step in preparing the Agency for its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT. The resolution adopted provided for a committee on which all member states could be represented and set forth a timetable of reports and meetings designed to insure that an initial report of the committee containing advice to the Board on NPT safeguards agreements will be in the hands of the Board prior to August 25, within the 180 day period at the expiration of which negotiations between the Agency and initial states parties to the NPT begin. 2. As a result intensive consultation prior to and during the Board we were able to get the support of the Soviets for the text of our resolution (with two reservations). The Soviet reservations related to mention of U.S.–U.K. to offer submit their peaceful program to NPT safeguards and to fact that only views of member states being solicited and not those of GDR. We met with Soviets on two occasions prior Board meeting once bilaterally and once together with U.K. and kept in close touch with them during meetings. The Soviets manifested a more accommodating attitude toward our resolution and at close of meeting Amb Arkadiev came over to shake hands with members of U.S. delegation, evidently pleased with meeting’s outcome. 3. Soviets were not alone in objecting to paragraphs in preamble. Most of pre-February Board discussion between U.K. and EURATOM countries and others related to contents of preamble. Until the end Trivedi (India) maintained that he could support operative paragraphs of our resolution but most of preamble caused him problems. If the preamble had been simpler we may have had considerably less difficulty with resolution. 4. We were able head off attempt by Spain abetted by India to distort the focus of the study and have the Committee study ways to update and revise the Agency’s safeguards system. In order to head off the Indian “compromise” which would have assigned to the Committee both the tasks of recommending the content of NPT agreements and that of revising the system, the U.S., U.K. and Italy drafted a consensus statement to the effect that when its NPT task was completed the Committee should consider the implications which the arrangements arrived at for parties to the treaty might have for the Agency’s other safeguarding activities. 5. The Spanish draft resolution calling for the revision of the safeguards system was received with enthusiasm by members such as Brazil and Argentina which wish to minimize IAEA involvement in NPT and sympathetically by many other members of the Board e.g. Japan, Australia, S. Africa and even Italy despite its co-sponsorship of our resolution. Many delegations shared Chairman Baxter’s view that the two resolutions were not incompatible and that the adoption of the U.S.–U.K.-Italian text would not necessarily preclude the Board from adopting the Spanish text. Ambassador Smyth, Kratzer and other members of U.S. delegation along with U.K. and Italian dels had extensive discussion with Professor Otero attempt persuade him not press his resolution and convince him that some of his concerns could be met by Committee established under our resolution. Prof. Otero would not accept the compromise proposal we offered whereby the Chairman would read the consensus statement referred to in paragraph 3 above. The Spanish preferred to support resolution of Trivedi (India) who attempted “marry” our text with Spanish text. Trivedi’s text was gaining some support until Smyth indicated it not acceptable. In light of consensus to be read by Chairman and our willingness delete three references to NPT in preambular paragraphs Trivedi agreed not press his resolution to a vote. 6. U.S. del found Jackson (U.K.) much more flexible in his approach than his colleagues from London who arrived in Vienna with preconceived notion that timetable Jackson and Mission had negotiated with Soviets was unrealistic. Mission at times had feeling that London contingent of U.K. del more inflexible than Ducci (Italy) who was somewhat restrained by his co-sponsorship of U.S.–U.K. resolution. 7. It clear from statements at February and April Board meeting and the sympathy expressed for Spanish resolution that many participants in Committee will press for wide ranging discussion of nature of safeguards to be applied under NPT and for some revisions in Agency safeguards system. Lewis 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 13 IAEA. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to AEC, USMission Geneva, USUN, USMission EC Brussels, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Rome. 52. Document Adopted by the Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency 52. Document Adopted by the Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency 1 Vienna, April 20, 1971 Structure and Contents of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, April 20, 1971 1 PART I basic undertaking 1. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article III.1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. application of safeguards 2. The Agreement should provide for the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. co-operation between the agency and the state 3. The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein. implementation of safeguards 4. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material. 3 (b) To avoid undue interference in the State’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and (c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. 5. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement, except that specific information relating to such implementation in the State may be given to the Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. Summarized information on nuclear material being safeguarded by the Agency under the Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned agree. 6. The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use should be made, for example, of such means as: (a) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; (b) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and (c) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under the Agreement. national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 7. The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under, the Agreement, and that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the State’s system. The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II below. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the State’s system. provision of information to the agency 8. The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II below, with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under the Agreement. Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In examining design information, the Agency shall, at the request of the State, be prepared to examine on premises of the State design information which the State regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information would not have to be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remarked available for ready further examination by the Agency on premises of the State. agency inspectors 9. The Agreement should provide that the State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement. The Agency shall secure the consent of the State to the designation of Agency inspectors to that State. If the State, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the State an alternative designation or designations. The repeated refusal of a State to accept the designation of Agency inspectors which would impede the inspections conducted under the Agreement would be considered by the Board upon referral by the Director General with a view to appropriate action. The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected, as well as to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge. privileges and immunities 10. The Agreement should specify the privileges and immunities which shall be granted to the Agency and its staff in respect of their functions under the Agreement. In the case of a State party to the Agreement On the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency 4 , the provisions thereof, as in force for such State, shall apply. In the case of other States, the privileges and immunities granted should be such as to ensure that: (a) The Agency and its staff will be in a position to discharge their functions under the Agreement effectively; and (b) No such State will be placed thereby in a more favourable position than States party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency. termination of safeguards Consumption or dilution of nuclear material 11. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder upon determination by the Agency that it has been consumed, for has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable. Transfer of nuclear material out of the State 12. The Agreement should provide, with respect to nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder, for notification of transfers of such material out of the State, in accordance with the provisions set out in paragraphs 92–94 below. The Agency shall terminate safeguards under the Agreement on nuclear material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in paragraph 91. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material. Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities 13. The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such nuclear material may be terminated. non-application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in non-peaceful activities 14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply: (a) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: (i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and (ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) The State and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such material; and (c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The Agency’s agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein. finance 15. The Agreement should contain one of the following sets of provisions: (a) An agreement with a Member of the Agency should provide that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in implementing its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the State or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or (b) An agreement with a party not a Member of the Agency should in application of the provisions of Article XIV.C of the Statute 5 provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs thereunder. However, if the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. party liability for nuclear damage 16. The Agreement should provide that the State shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of the Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the State. international responsibility 17. The Agreement should provide that any claim by one party thereto against the other in respect of any damage, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, resulting from the implementation of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be settled in accordance with international law. measures in relation to verification of non-diversion 18. The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked. 19. The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or ether nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance. interpretation and application of the agreement and settlement of disputes 20. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof. 21. The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board; and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. 22. The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 19 above or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: each party would designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, either party has not designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator had not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure would be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal would be binding on both parties. final clauses Amendment of the Agreement 23. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either of them, consult each other on amendment of the Agreement. All amendments shall require the agreement of both parties. It might additionally be provided, if convenient to the State, that the agreement of the parties on amendments to Part II of the Agreement could be achieved by recourse to a simplified procedure. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of any amendment to the Agreement. Suspension of application of Agency safeguards under other agreements 24. Where applicable and where the State desires such a provision to appear, the Agreement should provide that the application of Agency safeguards in the State under other safeguards agreements with the Agency shall be suspended while the Agreement is in force. If the State has received assistance from the Agency for a project, the State’s undertaking in the Project Agreement not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply. Entry into force and duration 25. The Agreement should provide that it shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the State written notification that the statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the entry into force. 26. The Agreement should provide for it to remain in force as long as the State is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [Omitted here is Part II of the document.] 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 218–244. 1 The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153). This document was adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on Apr. 20, 1971. 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461–465. 3 The italicized terms are defined at the end of the paper 4 INFCIRC/9/Rev. 2. 5 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956 , pp. 915 ff. 53. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 53. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, undated U.S Policy for Implementing Article III of the NPT after March 1, 1972 Summary: It is apparent that Euratom will not have concluded an agreement with the IAEA on the application of the safeguards to nuclear material by March 1, 1972, as we and others have interpreted the requirements under Article III of the NPT. There is concern among the Euratom countries that the US, to meet its own obligations under the NPT, may terminate its supply of enriched uranium to these countries at that time. In addition, the Soviets have indicated they may make a public issue should we continue to deliver material. Considering the fact, however, that Euratom is diligently negotiating a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, we are proposing to apply a “rule of reason” and to continue to supply enriched uranium to the Euratom countries for an interim period pending conclusion of their negotiations with the IAEA. We believe we can convince the Soviets that our course of action is more likely to lead to ratification of the NPT by Euratom countries than termination of supply after March 1972. Background: Under Article III (2) of the NPT (Tab A), each party undertakes not to provide source or special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless that material shall be subject to the IAEA’s safeguards system. Article III (4) requires with respect to the initial NPT parties that these safeguards agreements shall be negotiated and come into force within 180 days plus 18 months after the NPT itself (March 1, 1972). This deadline has been construed to apply to our shipments to non-parties for the purpose of Article III (2). The status of negotiations between various countries and the IAEA is given at Tab B. The initial slow progress in the negotiations between Euratom and the IAEA on the safeguards question has been of particular concern to us. These negotiations did not begin until September of this year because of disagreements among the Euratom countries on the details of acceptable safeguards procedures (Euratom safeguards procedures are less intrusive than IAEA safeguards) and over resolution of the status of France under IAEA safeguards (bearing on the special status of France as a weapons State). Because of the slow progress in initiation of these negotiations, the AEC sent a letter to the Euratom Supply Agency in July (Tab C), pointing out that our obligations under the NPT might make it necessary to terminate or suspend deliveries if such delivery were inconsistent with these obligations. This letter caused some uneasiness within the Euratom countries and Fernand Spaak raised the question during a recent visit as to how the US intends to approach the question of fuel supply after March 1972, recognizing that the IAEA-Euratom negotiations on a safeguards agreement will not be completed by that time (the earliest date for completion of these negotiations appears to be June 1972). Spaak has been pressing for some form of written assurance from the US that we will continue to supply material after March 1972. This matter has been further complicated by recent indications from the Soviets (Tab D) that they are focussing on the March 1 deadline and are contemplating using the threat of a cut-off of fuel supplies to hasten ratification of NPT and negotiation of safeguards agreements. They may call public attention to failure of other countries to meet Article III obligations as they interpret them (i.e. there should be no deliveries of special nuclear material after March 1, 1972, to countries which have not accepted IAEA safeguards). Discussion: We feel that circumstances and historical precedent permit us to adopt a “rule of reason” toward the Euratom problem and we suggest that the following views be transmitted informally to the EC Commission: (1) US continues to attach the highest importance to early ratification of NPT by Euratom and other key industrialized states. (2) The US views its responsibilities under Article III (2) of NPT most seriously. However, as Secretary Rogers indicated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, 1969, we have consistently and publicly stated that we would bring “rule of reason” to bear on the question of continued fuel supply in the event a recipient of our enrichment services has not brought into force an agreement with IAEA by March, 1972. (3) We are encouraged that the negotiations between Euratom and the IAEA have been inaugurated on a positive note following the constructive participation of EC member states in the deliberations of the Safeguards Committee. It is our understanding that the two sides are negotiating diligently with the expectation of being able to present an agreed text to the June IAEA Board of Governors for its approval. We wish to be as helpful as possible in seeing that that expectation is fulfilled and that the requirements of Article III are met as promptly as possible. (4) Against this background and recognizing that there is every reason to expect that the materials we supply to Euratom will be subject to an IAEA/Euratom verification agreement in the near future, the USG has concluded that it can continue to supply enrichment services to the Community after March 2, 1972, on an interim basis. Our ability to preserve this position, however, is predicated on the expectation that a mutually satisfactory IAEA/Euratom agreement is clearly in sight. (5) We plan to keep this matter under close continuing review and will consult with the Community if any developments arise which make it difficult for us to preserve this position. With regard to the Soviet stand on this matter, we suggest that we informally discuss with them the importance we attach to early ratification of the NPT by Euratom and other key industrialized states and that in our view such ratification by the Euratom countries would be greatly hindered should an issue be made of the continued delivery of special nuclear material to these countries during the brief interim period which we expect prior to conclusion of IAEA/Euratom negotiations on a safeguards agreement. Our withholding of nuclear fuel would strengthen the hands of opponents of the treaty in Germany in particular and throughout Western Europe generally. It would be misunderstood as a threat to pressure Euratom into an agreement with the IAEA contrary to Euratom’s negotiating desiderata. In discussing NPT in Moscow, the Soviets expressed satisfaction to our Embassy over the progress being made in IAEA/Euratom negotiations (Moscow’s 8929, Tab E). We share their satisfaction and feel it would not be in the interest of either of us to raise this issue at a time when our allies are engaged in negotiations in good faith with IAEA and thus risk upsetting the favorable climate and the forward progress that have been noted. We believe such arguments would be persuasive. The Soviets are as interested as we are in wide ratification of NPT and in the conclusion of safeguards agreements and are aware that agreement between Euratom and IAEA will lead to agreements with other key countries. It is also in Soviet interest to have the President’s visit to Moscow take place in as favorable an atmosphere as possible. For these reasons, we do not believe that they would be inclined at this time to make NPT—a matter in which we have cooperated so successfully—a public issue between us. At the same time, we cannot expect the Soviet to remain patient for very long and that we should therefore continue to urge Euratom to conclude its agreement with the IAEA. Recommendation: That you approve the proposed approach on the question of supply of special nuclear material to Euratom during an interim period after March 1, 1972. Approve [UAJ] Disapprove 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) December 1970–December 1971. Drafted by Loftness (SCI/AE) on December 3. Confidential. Drafted on December 3, by Loftness (SCI/AE) and concurred in by SCI/AE, ACDA, EUR/RPE, EUR/G, L/SCI. IO/SCT. Johnson initialed “Approve” on page 5 on December 7 but added a handwritten note stating, “on assumption AEC concurs & H does not perceive any Congressional problem.” The attachments are not published. 54. Telegram 32227 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 54. Telegram 32227 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 1 Washington, February 25, 1972 SUBJECT: Nuclear Fuel Supply for Euratom under NPT. 1. US position on fuel, supplies for EURATOM after March 1, 1972 has been approved by Department, ACDA and AEC. We do not wish Vienna Mission to raise questions relating to Article III.2 of NPT with Sovs, and if they do not raise it, Vienna Mission should let subject rest. 2. If Sovs do raise this question either informally with US delegation or formally at BG meeting Feb. 29, Ambassador Glennan should present low-key statement of our position, including the following points: (a) EC negotiating diligently and in good faith with IAEA on a safeguards agreement and both sides are optimistic that an agreement is in view; (b) accordingly, US has decided to continue make deliveries under supply contracts with EC on interim basis; (c) this decision is in accordance with Secretary Rogers’ public statement during hearings on NPT before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 19, 1969, that we would apply QUOTE rule of reason UNQUOTE to fuel supply question; (d) USG believes any other course of action at this delicate stage of negotiations between IAEA and EC would cause complications and might delay agreement which both US and USSR very much desire; it is therefore in our mutual interest to do nothing that might impede the progress being made in negotiations. If other delegations raise this question in Vienna, Mission may draw upon above contingency statement as necessary. 3. Should Sovs inquire as to how long we intend to supply fuel in absence of IAEA–EC agreement, we should reply that our policy will remain under review in the light of ongoing developments. 4. Should question be raised concerning ratification NPT by EC member states and how long process might take, we should decline to speculate, pointing out first step is an agreement between IAEA and EC. In no case should Mission comment on timing of ratification unless Sovs first mention this topic. 5. FOR USEC BRUSSELS. It is imperative that EC be informed of this contingency position before it may have to be conveyed to Sovs. Mission should therefore immediately inform EC Commission of our position on fuel supply and how we propose to handle question with Sovs in Vienna should it arise. Mission should also say this interim position predicated on expectation that materials we supply EC will be subject to NPT safeguards in relatively near future. EC Commission should also be advised that we will keep matter of fuel supply and NPT obligations under review and will consult with them should developments arise which make it difficult for us to preserve our position. USEC should immediately report its conversation with EC Commission to Department and Mission Vienna, so that Vienna may know when it can draw on contingency position. Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent priority to the Mission to the European Community in Brussels and repeated priority to Moscow. Drafted on February 23 by Haendler and Dodd (EUR/RPE); cleared in SCI, ACDA, EUR, IO, AEC, and the White House; and approved by Springsteen (EUR). 55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 10, 1972 Subject: Trip to Japan - Support of NPT In the course of your trip to Japan I urge you to reaffirm U.S. support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and our interest in Japanese adherence thereto. This recommendation is based on the following considerations: — our continued national interest in avoiding any increase in the number of countries having control over nuclear weapons, which could decrease our ability to prevent the initiation of nuclear war. This interest would appear particularly applicable to states, such as Japan, which are highly industrialized, whose position will influence others, and whose permanent coincidence of interests with the United States cannot safely be assumed. — the considerable diplomatic stake of the United States in the success of the NPT, which was ratified in this Administration. Such success could be jeopardized if key threshold states such as Japan did not adhere to it. — the importance of avoiding a break in the momentum that has been created by Soviet-US cooperation in promoting arms control measures, of which the NPT is a basic element. The specific need for such a reaffirmation of support by you in Japan is pointed up both by recent Japanese press articles and persistent reports from diplomatic sources that the Japanese are under the impression that the U.S. is no longer particularly interested in their adherence to the NPT. They cite the absence of any mention of the NPT in the Nixon-Sato talks and in the President’s 1972 Foreign Policy Report. This impression is being exploited by the Japanese opponents of the treaty. Philip J. Farley Acting Director 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972 (2 of 3). Confidential. 56. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 56. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 27, 1972 SUBJECT: Reply to Soviet Complaint about our Nuclear Fuel Supply Policy State has sent you under cover of a memorandum (Tab A) a proposed statement (Tab B) for Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand to make to Dobrynin about delivery of US nuclear material to EURATOM countries after March 1, 1972. Hillenbrand intends to make the statement orally as soon as possible. State requests an NSC clearance. This complicated issue is worth detailed explanation since it might conceivably become an irritant in US-Soviet relations if current prospects for an early IAEA-EURATOM agreement on safeguards over nuclear materials should prove illusory. You should be alert to this possibility, even though it does not seem likely now, according to ACDA. Background Non-Proliferation Treaty Article III (2) and (4). Paragraph (2) provides that parties to the NPG (and we are one) undertake not to provide nuclear material “to any non-nuclear weapon State … ” (and all the EURATOM states are, except of course for France) … unless the … material shall be subject to safeguards required by this article.” Paragraph (4) provides that parties to the treaty must conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within two years after the treaty enters into force—i.e., by March 1, 1972. Otherwise, as per paragraph (2) they can no longer be provided with nuclear material since such material would not be subject to treaty-approved safeguards. The Soviets have been interpreting this two-year “guillotine” paragraph as applying to non-parties to the treaty (including, among others, the EURATOM states) since the treaty was signed. We have tended to agree with them because we want to use the leverage of a potential cutoff of nuclear materials to get non-nuclear weapons states to sign and ratify. EURATOM–IAEA Negotiations EURATOM states (except France, a nuclear weapons state), when they signed the NPT, indicated they wouldn’t ratify it, until they had negotiated with IAEA the safeguards agreements required by Article III (2) and (4). Negotiations between EURATOM and IAEA didn’t begin until November 1971. The negotiations have been conducted in good faith since, with what ACDA believes are excellent prospects for successful conclusion in the “near future.” The late starting date left little time until the paragraph (4) deadline of March 1, 1972. Our EC mission in BRUSSELS (cable at Tab C) foresees conclusion by July. Soviet Position On March 17, Vorontsov in a low key noted to ACDA that Moscow might “misunderstand” our continued shipment of nuclear materials to EURATOM in view of Article III (2) obligations. On April 10, Dobrynin raised the issue with Hillenbrand formally in an oral statement (at Tab D, with a typo in the second line of para 2, which should read March 1, 1972). The statement argues that continued delivery to the EURATOM states without a safeguards agreement with IAEA constitutes a “clear violation” of Article III on our part. It asks for “clarification.” Comment: The Soviet complaints have been restrained and they have not pressed the point. They are probably intent mainly on building a record of protest for eventual use in case the IAEA–EURATOM negotiations should fail. In that case, we would be in the more difficult position of trying to justify continued delivery of nuclear materials to our allies in EURATOM without the safeguards envisaged in Article III. Our Position As early as January 1969, Secretary Rogers told the Senate that if the EURATOM countries had not concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA when the “guillotine” deadline came, we would have to consider the “rule of reason.” That has been our position since. Anticipating Soviet complaints when the deadline arrived, we instructed our IAEA mission last February in a cable cleared by the NSC (Tab E) that to tell the Soviets, if they raised the issue, that (a) since both EURATOM and IAEA were negotiating in good faith with good prospects of success; (b) we would continue to supply EURATOM with nuclear material on an “interim basis;” (c) this was in accord with the “rule of reason,” and (d) to do otherwise would impede progress in the negotiations and undermine the prospects for adherence to the NPT. Hillenbrand’s proposed reply to Dobrynin in effect lays out this position formally. ACDA made this same argumentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a statement which has been made part of the SFRC’s public record on the ACDA appropriation—and hence no doubt noted by the Soviets. RECOMMENDATION I recommend that you authorize me to clear Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand’s proposed statement to Dobrynin, which is fully in line with current policy. John Walsh concurs. Approve [HAK] Disapprove 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 719, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. 22. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Walsh. Haig initialed “OK” next to “Approve” on page three. An adjacent note in an unidentified hand states: “Livingston notified State by phone 5/25. To be followed by written confirmation by Mrs. Davis.” All Tabs are not published. 57. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 57. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 7, 1972 Dear Henry: During your visit to Japan next week, it would be extremely useful if you reconfirm to the Japanese that the United States Government has a continuing interest in Japanese ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We would then find an opportunity also to apprise the Soviets that this approach had been made. There have been recurring indications of uncertainty on the part of the Japanese Government and general public with respect to how firmly the U.S. Government is committed to the concept that Japan should not acquire nuclear weapons. The senior Soviet official in the IAEA also raised this matter in Vienna with the senior U.S. member of the Agency staff. This subject did not arise in the course of the Vice President’s recent discussions with Japanese Government leaders in Tokyo. Assurances of continued U.S. support for Japanese ratification of the NPT have already been given, both to the Japanese and to the Soviets. I feel strongly, however, that it is important to put these fears to rest once and for all at a high level. Japanese participation in the NPT would in our view be greatly welcomed both in Moscow and in Peking, and could also have highly beneficial effects on progress toward wider acceptance of the NPT by other “threshold” countries. The suggested approach would be particularly timely, coming on the heels of SALT, since agreement on strategic weapons limitations will tend to undercut criticism in Japan and elsewhere that the NPT places far greater obligations on the non-nuclear states than on the nuclear states. While an eventual Japanese decision concerning NPT ratification will obviously depend on many factors, an important element will be their leaders’ continuing confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. It would therefore be helpful if in connection with reconfirming the US desire to have Japan ratify the NPT, you could assure the Japanese that the US-Japan Security Treaty remains the key to regional stability in Asia and continues to be an essential element in the relationship between Japan and the US. In connection with the suggested approach, the following background information may be helpful. When the NPT came into force on May 5, 1970, 97 countries including Japan had signed the treaty. Some 70 countries have now become parties to the treaty, although the rate of accession has diminished substantially during the past year. Anticipated ratifications by the EURATOM countries during the coming year should, however, restore some of the earlier momentum. We hope that the Japanese will now promptly begin their talks with the IAEA, since their safeguards arrangements will have to be settled before they will be ready to propose NPT ratification to the Diet. The Japanese Government has consistently maintained that the NPT safeguards should not disadvantage Japan, especially with respect to its competitive position vis-à-vis the West Europeans. The IAEA is currently in the final stages of working out a safeguard agreement with EURATOM on the basis of guidelines which Japan helped to shape. The US has begun preliminary discussions with the IAEA on implementation of the US voluntary offer to place its non-military nuclear facilities under international safeguards. This fact should help reassure Japanese industry that it will not be disadvantaged in some fashion by safeguards. Sincerely, U. Alexis Johnson 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit, June 1972. Secret. 58. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 58. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 13, 1972, 11:43 a.m.–1:18 p.m. [Omitted here is dissussion unrelated to arms control] Kissinger: Now, just a minor thing. In the letter in which they are transmitting this thing [the SALT agreement] to Congress, we asked the Arms Control Agency to draft it—and it actually had already passed through my office and was on the way to your office. Nixon: Um-huh. Kissinger: It said “This culminates a twenty-five years of consistent American policy” - Nixon: Oh Christ! Kissinger: - “to bring nuclear weapons under control.” Well, I changed this to say, “This represents the efforts of this administration, pursued from 1969 on” - Nixon: Right! Of course! Kissinger: - “to” - Nixon: The nuclear policy over 25 years, now that’s a pure Smith gripe. You know that, as if—you know—he tries to say—his whole line has been, Henry, that this is the outgrowth of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It has not a goddamn thing to do with the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Test Ban treaty and all the rest. This is nuts. I wasn’t for those things, not really. Kissinger: I wasn’t either. Nixon: I supported nonproliferation because we had to. But you see, Smith, Bob, is always trying to put it as if—you know why that is? The son-of-a-bitch is trying to give credit to the Democrats. Do you agree? Kissinger: Of course. If it is an obligation entered into as a result of the Nonproliferation Treaty it’s a—we didn’t support—since we didn’t negotiate the Nonproliferation Treaty. It isn’t our record. Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger: So, again on my way to Japan, on my trip to Japan, the State Department was bugging the daylights out of me and I was getting briefing papers, letters, planted questions, if I would publicly support the Nonproliferation Treaty in Japan and squeeze the Japanese government. Nixon: I hope you didn’t. Kissinger: I didn’t. I sort of mumbled around where ever the ambassador was present. But I told Sato and Fukuda privately that what you said in San Clemente is our policy. [Kissinger is apparently referring to a January 7, 1972, meeting at San Clemente between the President and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. According to a memorandum of that conversation, Sato asked the President whether Japan should move rapidly to ratify the NPT and he replied as follows: “Each nation should handle this problem in the light of its own circumstances. It is not a matter for us to decide and we respect the right of each nation to decide for itself in the light of its own desires. The United States…is not exerting pressure. In fact…Japan might take its time and thus keep any potential enemy concerned.” According to the memorandum, Nixon then asked Sato to “forget the preceding remark.” The record of the meeting was attached as tab B to a January 21, 1972, memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Box 1025, Pres./HAK Memcons, President/PM Sato, Jan 6–7, 1972.] Haldeman: [unclear] have any problem? Kissinger: No, but— Nixon: [unclear] has to report it, Bob. [unclear] Kissinger: No, he’s a decent guy, incidentally. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: He’s a good guy. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: And this trip does him a lot of good. Nixon: Yeah, because he got to go the— Kissinger: Yeah, he got to— Nixon: Let me say, the State [Department] always puts that Nonproliferation Treaty in there. You know what the reason is? The State Department bureaucracy considers that to be theirs, Henry. Really, it’s a selfish damn thing. Now listen, the Nonproliferation Treaty has nothing to do with the security of the United States of America. You know very well. Kissinger: It’s made at the expense of other countries. Nixon: That’s right. Kissinger: And basically—we can’t say this publicly—I sort of would like to see [ text not declassified ]. Nixon: That’s right. I support it too. [Omitted here is discussion Kissinger’s recent trip to Japan.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 732–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 59. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 59. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 16, 1972 SUBJECT: IAEA–EURATOM Negotiations on Safeguards Agreement This is to bring you up to date on the negotiations between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM on a safeguards agreement for nuclear material. As you recall, I directed your attention in my memorandum of April 27 (Tab A) to our interest in these negotiations, which arises primarily out of the danger that the Soviets may insist that US shipments of nuclear materials to EURATOM, in the absence of a EURATOM–IAEA safeguards agreement, violate the non-proliferation treaty. A European Community delegation visited State last week (cable at Tab B) to report their hope that the negotiations might be completed by the end of June. There are still disagreements between EURATOM and the IAEA, notably over the role of IAEA inspectors who, according to the draft agreement, will accompany the EURATOM inspection teams (i.e., how independently will the IAEA men be allowed to function?). If the end of June deadline is met, an IAEA Board of Governors meeting could consider the agreement in July. Our missions abroad feel that any slippage beyond that, however, could be serious, since the EURATOM countries’ parliaments need to have an IAEA agreement by September in order to begin their ratification of the NPT. If the process in the EURATOM countries becomes protracted, we may expect the Soviets again to challenge our continued shipments of nuclear materials to these countries. For the moment, then, there is little need to worry. But we will keep an eye on the progress of these negotiations. TELEGRAM Tab B Telegram 103362 From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Community Washington, June 9, 1972, 2314Z Subject: Meeting With Haferkamp on EC–IAEA negotiations 1. On June 5 EC group led by Commission Vice President Haferkamp and EC Director General for Energy Spaak held one hour informal discussion on EC–IAEA safeguards negotiations with USG group headed bY ACDA Deputy Director Farley, with EUR, SCI,ACDA AND AEC representation. 2. Haferkamp and Spaak gave brief status report including little new information. Spaak said goal was for basic agreement to follow INFCIRC 153 with as few changes as possible, mentioning EC appreciation that basic agreement will also be applicable to individual states. Protocol will cover special position of EURATOM. Subsidiary arrangements will indicate specific application of guidelines contained in basic agreement. Spaak and Haferkamp were hopeful for settlement of remaining points before end of June and expected to present texts to EC member states at end of this week. They pointed out, however, that when actual language being drafted, there was inevitable tendency to reopen basic issues which senior negotiators had assumed were resolved. Spaak said there is still disagreement between EC and IAEA regarding basic philosophy and approach which he hoped could be finessed through skillful drafting. 3. Spaak characterized role of Agency inspectors as inactive observers accompanying EURATOM teams. He said that as observers they would be able to obtain independent samplings and be free to select any aspects of inspections for observation in order to fulfill their responsibilities to Agency in verifying that any diversion would have been detected. In his view this would minimize duplication. It would not be acceptable for IAEA observer to have function as part of inspection team as this would imply that EURATOM unable to fulfill its functions without help of IAEA inspectors. He implied there was not yet complete agreement with IAEA on nature of Agency participation. However, he vaguely indicated that under some circumstances Agency could supplement EURATOM inspection with some of its own. 4. Farley stressed that US for its own part would hope to learn more about specific technical details of IAEA–EURATOM arrangement. He noted that US Executive Branch would at some point have to satisfy itself and Congress as to technical adequacy of arrangements. Haferkamp seemed appreciate this need and in this connection mentioned possibility of consultation in US–EURATOM Safeguards Technical Working Group. 5. Haferkamp said that in interim between agreement and ratifications, EURATOM and IAEA would do everything necessary so that full implementation could immediately follow ratification by all member states. In response to question as to whether anything more could be undertaken during interim to actually implement safeguards, Haferkamp said situation for ratification is very delicate, particularly in FRG, and that any formal interim arrangement conceding right of participation Agency inspectors might be seized upon by NPT opponents as encroachment on authority of various national parliaments. He felt that best approach, therefore, would be for him to invite Vienna technicians and others to Brussels on his own authority as EC Commissioner for informal discussions and consultations in anticipation of safeguards implementation. Haferkamp also said ratification would be facilitated if current negotiations between EC and USG on updating cooperation [omission in original]. 6. Springsteen in discussing interim period and ratifications recalled Soviet demarche on US fuel supply to EURATOM to which us will shortly respond. He pointed out that Soviets and others may make further challenges on continued US shipments to community should ratification by EC member states become protracted. 7. Some questions were raised about how agreement would be characterized to IAEA Board of Governors by EC member states. Spaak declined to say whether they would term it unique or special. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol. II 1971–1972. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is Document 56 . Initialed by Kissinger. Tab B was drafted in ACDA and EUR; cleared in AEC/DIS, AEC/NUMS, SCI/AE, ACD, and EUR/RPE; approved by Springsteen. It was repeated for information to Vienna, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and Tokyo. 60. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 60. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 12, 1972 SUBJECT: Soviet Complaint about our Nuclear Fuel Policy You may recall (my memorandum of April 27 at Tab A) that several months ago we approved a reply to be made to Dobrynin about a Soviet complaint that continued delivery of US nuclear material to EURATOM countries might violate the non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet position, expressed orally to Hillenbrand in early April, was that the NPT provisions require that the EURATOM states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA if they were to continue getting such materials from us after March 1, and this agreement had not yet been concluded. The reply which was cleared here has now been made (State’s cable at Tab B)—in the form of an oral statement by Davies to Vorontsov. The Soviet appeared relaxed, stating that his government understood our position and had wanted to make a technical point. I now doubt that this issue will plague us, particularly since IAEA and EURATOM at present seem on their way to an early agreement. Tab B Telegram 61378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, July 5, 1972, 2321Z Subj: Nuclear Fuel Supply Ref: State 61738, April 11, 1972 1. In response to an oral statement of April 10 (reported reftel) made by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand, alleging a violation of Article III of the NPT as regards continued U.S. supply of nuclear materials to EURATOM countries. Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies called in Minister Counselor Vorontsov on July 5 and presented him with the following U.S. reply in the form of an oral statement: 2. Begin text USG is of the view that no contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is involved. To conclude that Article III (2) prohibits the continuation of supplies after March 1, 1972 on an interim basis in a case such as that referred to in your oral statement of April 10, 1972, it would be necessary to read into Article III a provision which it does not contain. The continuation of supplies to the EURATOM countries is a legally sound application of the generally accepted principle of treaty construction that, in dealing with a situation such as this which is not clearly provided for in the treaty, one should consider all the relevant facts and apply the treaty in a reasonable manner designed to give effect to its basic purpose. The Secretary of State has made this point publicly to the Congress on February 19, 1969, when asked what the United States might do in such cases. The basic purpose of this treaty is to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by achieving the widest possible adherence to the treaty’s undertakings. The treaty provides for “safeguards as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA.” The European Community is negotiating diligently and in good faith with IAEA on such an agreement with very good prospects for early resolution. At this delicate state of negotiations between IAEA and the European Community, it is in our mutual interest to do nothing that might impede the progress being made or undermine support for the treaty in the states involved. Therefore, the USG has decided to continue to make deliveries under supply contracts with the European Community on an interim basis. We believe this decision will contribute to realization of the basic purpose of the treaty. End text 3. Mr. Vorontsov appeared relaxed about the subject. He indicated he understood the U.S. position and stated that his government had wanted to make a technical point. Johnson 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXIII. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. At Tab A is Document 56 . Tab B was drafted in EUR/SOV; approved in EUR, EUR/SOV, and L/SCI, and for information in SCI, ACDA, PK/AE, EUR/RPE, and AEC/DIP. It was repeated for information to USEC Brussels, USMission IAEA, USMission Geneva, USUN, USNATO, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, The Hague, London, Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, and AEC. 61. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson 61. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson 1 Washington, August 19, 1972 Negotiation of U.S. Safeguards Agreement with IAEA: Circular 175 Request In connection with the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, President Johnson in 1967 offered to permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to all U.S. nuclear facilities, except those directly related to the national security, at such time as the Agency was applying safeguards under the NPT. President Nixon subsequently reaffirmed the offer when he transmitted the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Senate in February, 1969. The offer was designed to overcome the resistance of non-nuclear-weapon states (particularly the FRG, Italy, and Japan) to the NPT. These countries were concerned that international inspection might jeopardize their industrial secrets and work to their commercial disadvantage in relation to the nuclear-weapon countries, which were not obliged to accept safeguards under the Treaty. The U.S. offer was intended to lay these concerns to rest by demonstrating U.S. willingness to subject itself to the same international inspection system as would be applied under the NPT to the non-nuclear-weapon states. The AEC held consultations with representatives of the American nuclear industry before the offer was made. Consultations were also held with the appropriate Congressional committees. The UK made a similar offer, but the mode of implementation is uncertain in view of British entry into the European Community. The USSR did not, on the grounds that the application of “non-proliferation” safeguards in a country which already has nuclear weapons is pointless. At present, NPT safeguards agreements have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for 26 countries, including Canada, East Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, as well as Poland and four other Eastern Europeans, and 16 smaller countries around the world. Most of the remaining original parties to the Treaty should be in negotiation with the IAEA on safeguards agreements shortly. Since the U.S. offer was largely aimed toward gaining the adherence of the Euratom countries and Japan to the NPT and since negotiations between the Euratom countries and the IAEA now appear to be progressing on a timely basis and nearing completion, it is desirable for the U.S. to initiate formal negotiations with the IAEA in the near future. We would not propose, however, to have our agreement come into effect prior to the time the agreements with Euratom and other key industrialized countries also are concluded. As the result of intensive consideration by an ad hoc IAEA safeguards committee of 47 governments between June, 1970, and September, 1971, proposed terms and conditions for NPT safeguards agreements under the NPT have been developed and published in IAEA Document INFCIRC/153, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (Tab A). This document has been the basis for all of the NPT safeguards agreements negotiated so far, and has constituted the starting point of the Agency’s negotiations with Euratom. It has been the IAEA practice, which the U.S. endorses, to keep to a minimum any deviations from the standard terms and conditions set out in the Agency’s document and to confine such deviations to those which can be readily and reasonably related to the special circumstance of the particular situation. For this reason, it should be the objective, in negotiating an agreement with the Agency for NPT-type safeguards in the United States, to start with INFCIRC/153 and conform to its provisions to the greatest extent possible, although we expect that some modifications will be necessary, taking into account the character of the agreements being negotiated with other countries. The Presidential offer is cast broadly enough to permit IAEA safeguards and inspections covering all U.S. nuclear facilities and material except for those directly related to national security considerations. Full implementation of the offer in every single installation would, however, place an intolerable financial and manpower burden on the IAEA out of all proportion to the degree of coverage necessary to serve its purpose. Moreover, it would divert the Agency’s limited resources in the safeguards field away from application to the non-nuclear-weapon states. Accordingly, an informal group of member states of the IAEA, under the leadership of Australia and including participation from the FRG and Japan, has suggested that the U.S. offer be implemented by the IAEA in a manner which will subject to full inspection only those facilities which are innovative or involve technologies in competition with those of the more advanced non-nuclear-weapon states in international commerce, with the remainder of the U.S. facilities being subject only nominally to the full impact of IAEA inspections. Although the details have not been developed, we are hopeful that this approach would reduce the actual intensity of the IAEA effort within the U.S. to a reasonable level, without there being any derogation from the Presidential offer. We also hope to work out arrangements whereby the Agency would avoid inequitable treatment among similarly situated U.S. firms. The Legal Memorandum for authorization of the agreement is attached at Tab B. Recommendation: That you authorize: (a) initiation of an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to U.S. nuclear facilities consistent with the Presidents’ offer, the scope and content of the agreement being generally consistent with the Agency’s standard NPT safeguards provisions as minimally modified to accommodate selective, rather than comprehensive, application by the IAEA within this country; (b) presentation of the text of such an agreement for the Secretary’s approval at the conclusion of negotiations, provided that the text is acceptable to the Bureaus of SCI, PM, and IO, the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and that these offices and agencies concur in the decision to sign in the light of any relevant intervening developments. Approve [U. Alexis Johnson signed] Disapprove Date 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, U.S. Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and Administrative Statements June–September 1972. No classification marking. Drafted on August 14 by Zook (SCI/AE) and concurred in by L, L/SCI, IO/SCT, S/PC, EUR/RPE, H, PM/AE, USAEC, ACDA, PM/DCA. Johnson initialed his approval on August 24. The attachments are not published. 62. Telegram 227180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany 62. Telegram 227180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany 1 Washington, December 15, 1972, 2318Z. Subj: EURATOM–IAEA Safeguards Refs: A. IAEA Vienna 8609; B. EC Brussels 4754; C. Bonn 16432; D. IAEA Vienna 8720 1. Delay in signature IAEA–EURATOM agreement presents serious problems for U.S. It will probably result in delaying start of ratification process and entry into force, which is important to finally remove our legal and political vulnerability for continuing fuel supply to EURATOM and to remove an obstacle to NPT adherence by Japan and others. Failure to sign the agreement before the February IAEA BG meeting would also show such a delay in progressing from where the parties stood in September as to undermine the credibility of our position that our fuel supply continues to be justified by “rule of reason”. This would lead not only to international heat at the February Board meeting (cf. reftel A) but also could present difficulties with Congress when it considers the proposed amendment to the EURATOM Cooperation Act that is a prerequisite to the entry into force of the recently negotiated amendment to the US–EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation. (Questions as to legality of “rule of reason” raised in Congress and press last spring.) 2. Following attempts to summarize situation as we understand it (supplementing ref D report of background and status internal EURATOM discussions as conveyed in confidence by British): A. Question of inspector access to Almelo centrifuge plant is apparently blocking progress. Situation has developed as follows: Tripartite countries (FRG, Netherlands, UK) presented to U.S., in discussions in Washington and in The Hague, view that inspector access to cascade area of centrifuge plants not necessary or acceptable. Argument primarily based on low inventory of cascade area and on good input-output measurement accuracy. U.S. agreed not to challenge this access limitation for IAEA purposes. EURATOM was not involved in these discussions and U.S. has had no detailed interchange of view with EURATOM. B. At June IAEA TWG, IAEA Inspector GeneraL Rometsch accepted, with tripartite, U.S., and South African approval, access limitation as a working hypothesis. No disagreement with this was recorded. EURATOM attendees privately expressed concern to U.S. delegates over the consequences of access limitation as a precedent. The conclusion of the TWG was that safeguards equipment and procedures should be developed and considered again in 1–2 years, and that experience should be gained at Almelo without setting rigid precedents. Thus “working hypothesis” of limited access for IAEA purposes should be valid for the next few years, and it is our understanding that Agency is prepared to negotiate Almelo facility attachment on that basis. For Vienna: Mission requested to confirm this understanding. C. EURATOM inspectors have, under the EURATOM treaty, “access to all places … to the extent necessary …” for safeguards control. The FRG and Dutch are presumably arguing that at Almelo access to the cascades is not necessary for safeguarding, and that, in view of the sensitivity of the technology, EURATOM inspectors should not be permitted inside. EURATOM is apparently resisting, and because of this dispute no EURATOM proposal for Almelo safeguards has been presented to IAEA. It would be very difficult and awkward for U.S. to become involved in this dispute between EURATOM and its members, particularly since no U.S. material or technology will be involved at Almelo. D. The EURATOM–IAEA agreement and facility attachments will specify those EURATOM and Agency actions which will enable IAEA to reach its basic conclusions. EURATOM may decide to perform other safeguards activities in addition to those specified. EURATOM activities in areas off-limits to Agency would be unverifiable, and hence not relevant to Agency conclusions. Thus we believe that the question of EURATOM inspector access to the cascade could be decoupled from the question of inspector access provided for in the facility attachment for IAEA purposes. Since the Dutch and FRG will obtain their desired limits on Agency access for Almelo, and since further EURATOM access would not be relevant to the EURATOM–IAEA agreement, delay of signature over the access question seems to us unnecessary. 3. Even assuming general agreement can be reached on access question, we are concerned that agreement signature not be delayed until all details of the Almelo arrangements are worked out. Ref B reports EURATOM preparation of facility attachment has started but “research” remains to be done. It seems clear to us, then, that the process of EURATOM preparation and then negotiation with the IAEA is likely to take considerably more than six weeks. Rometsch, during his visit to AEC last month, guessed that six months might be necessary. Thus we believe that, if June IAEA TWG report is not sufficient reassurance for FRG and Dutch on IAEA access question, some “basic understanding” with IAEA, as suggested in refs C and D is the most that might be reached in short time. 4. We hope that the intra-EURATOM access question is soon solved or separated from the specification of IAEA access, that a “basic understanding” on IAEA access can be quickly reached without negotiating complete Almelo attachment, and that signature and start of ratification procedure could take place on basis of that “basic understanding.” 5. Addressees may draw on paras. 1, 3, and 4 in discussions with host governments/organizations on IAEA/safeguards question. Para. 2 is for posts’ background only. 6. Following occurs to us as a possibility of expediting progress. A letter might be sent by IAEA to EURATOM stating (1) IAEA readiness to start preparation of Almelo attachment; (2) IAEA intention to negotiate Almelo procedures on basis of working hypothesis of limited access; (3) need, in any case, to review procedures based on experience and data accumulated at Almelo in first year or two of IAEA safeguarding. Request Embassies Bonn and The Hague comment as to whether they believe this procedure would constitute an adequate “basic understanding” so that FRG and Dutch could proceed with signature. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, AE 3 EURATOM. Limited Official Use. It was also sent to The Hague, and Vienna. It was repeated to EC Brussels, Paris, Luxembourg, and Rome. Drafted by Boright (ACDA); cleared in IO/SCT, EUR/GER, EUR/RPE, and USAEC/IP; and approved by Brewster (SCI/AE). 2. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commitee; Seabed Arms Control Treaty 2. Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commitee; Seabed Arms Control Treaty 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 5, 1969 Kissinger recommended holding an NSC meeting to discuss the issues on the agenda for the upcoming Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) meeting in Geneva. In addition to this conference, he also recommended that an ad hoc study group be established to prepare a paper on the issues likely to be discussed, including the comprehensive test ban, ending production of fissionable material, and seabed arms control. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–136, NSSM 20. Secret. Nixon initialed his approval of both of Kissinger’s recommendations. 64. National Security Study Memorandum 20 Washington, February 12, 1969 President Nixon directed that a study be prepared on the full range of issues and proposals involved in the ENDC meeting scheduled to resume on March 6, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, 3/15/69. Secret. 65. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 13, 1969 Smith reviewed the issues on the agenda for the March ENDC meeting. The items included a comprehensive test ban (CTB), seabed arms control, chemical and biological warfare (CBW), prohibitions on nuclear weapons or fissionable material, nuclear free zones, conventional disarmament, general and complete disarmament, and ENDC enlargement. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. 66. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 28, 1969 Smith forwarded the four issues paper that had been prepared in response to NSSM 20. These detailed papers provide extensive background information, multiple perspectives, and proposals for the possible upcoming topics—comprehensive test ban, cut-off fissionable material production for weapons purposes, and seabed arms control—at the ENDC meeting. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Limdis. Copies were sent to Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, Helms, Seaborg, and Dubridge. 67. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 5, 1969 The memorandum briefed Kissinger for the next day’s Review Group. It focused on the three key issues for the ENDC, the test ban, the halting of production of fissionable material, and arms control for the seabeds. He went on to outline the “substantial” disagreement between the AEC, the JCS, the ACDA, and the DOD on each item. On the second issue, the NPT, Keeny reiterated the U.S. position of not pressuring nations to sign the agreement. Also included was an Agenda for the following day’s ENDC meeting. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret. Sent for action. 68. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 7, 1969 The memorandum summarized the discussion at the March 6 NSC Review Group Meeting. The Review Group conducted a brief discussion of the accuracy of the paper “Positions of Key Countries on the Non Proliferation Treaty” and a more complete analysis of the preparations made for the upcoming ENDC. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Director of Central Intelligence, ER Subject File, Box 7, NSC Review Group. Secret. Prepared by R.J. Smith. 69. Issues Papers Prepared by the National Security Council Staff Washington, March 8, 1969 The three issues papers on the U.S. positions for the ENDC were forwarded to NSC members prior to the March 15 NSC meeting. These papers addressed the three key issues on the agenda of the ENDC, the comprehensive test ban, the cutoff of fissionable material production, and the seabed arms control. The papers fully detail the problems, issues, and summaries of each item. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, NSC Meeting 1/29–4/9/69, ENDC–3/15/69 Meeting. Top Secret. Jeanne Davis forwarded the papers to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and George Lincoln under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which she stated that the papers would be discussed at an NSC meeting on March 12. The NSC meeting was held on March 15. 70. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 10, 1969, 4 p.m. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith discussed the upcoming ENDC meeting and signing of the NPT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Secret. Drafted on March 11 by Gleysteen. The meeting was held in Smith’s office at ACDA. 71. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President Washington, undated Prepared in anticipation of the March 12 NSC meeting, the paper outlined the four key issues on which the President should be prepared to make decisions. Although the paper encouraged the President to support the comprehensive test ban, it cautioned him not to “press for an agreement.” It then recommended that the President support the cutoff and insist the inspections be the responsibility of the IAEA. It requested the issue of seabed arms control be tabled to allow for future discussions. While the meeting was scheduled for March 12, it was held, instead, on March 15. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, ENDC 3/15/69. Top Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President. 72. Talking Paper Prepared for Secretary of Defense Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, undated This paper was prepared in the Department of Defense for use by Laird and Wheeler at the March 15 NSC meeting on the ENDC. The OSD and JCS opposed the support of a test ban, but had conflicting views on whether to support the CTB. On the issue of the proposed cut-off of fissionable material, the JCS and the OSD differed considerably. The OSD argued a cut-off was in the interest of U.S. security and the JCS disagreed with the assessment. Finally, both the OSD and the JCS agreed that a seabed arms control agreement was not in the interests of the U.S. and should not be supported. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, Box 7, FRC 330–75–103, 388.3 (August 1969). Top Secret. The approval lines on page 7 were signed by Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff and Ralph Earle II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Earle forwarded the talking paper to Laird under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) Document 69 includes the issues papers at Tab A. NSSM 20 at Tab B is Document 64. The OSD/JCS paper at Tab C is not published. 73. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 12, 1969 In this memorandum, Smith noted that the only “negotiable” issue concerned the seabed arms control agreement. He then asked for the authority to make a specific proposal at the ENDC. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Secret. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by NSC staff member Keeny under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) 74. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, March 15, 1969 Seaborg kept detailed notes on the March 15 NSC meeting. At this discussion, participants examined the current U.S. position on the three key issues presented at the ENDC meeting—the comprehensive test ban, the cutoff of fissionable material production, and the seabed arms control proposal—and debated whether to modify the position. Ultimately, the participants agreed to maintain the U.S. position on all three issues. Source: Department of Energy, Records of the U.S AEC, Job 65–42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 99100–99108. Confidential. 75. Letter From President Nixon to the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) Washington, March 15, 1969 In this letter, publicly released on March 18, Nixon issued instructions to Smith on the positions he should take at the conference in order to usher in “an era of negotiations”. Smith was to articulate the U.S. interest in working with other nations to address all issues on the agenda without making solid commitments to any one issue. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). No classification marking. 76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 17, 1969 Kissinger discussed Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith’s formal instructions for the ENDC. He attached a cable with a proposed change to the U.S. position on the fissionable material cutoff for Nixon’s approval. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon initialed “Approve.” Attached are Documents 75 and 77. 77. Telegram 41598 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, March 18, 1969 Secretary of State Rogers cabled detailed instructions to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith during the ENDC conference. Rogers confirmed that the U.S. supported a CTB providing the on-site inspections were sufficiently verified and to restrict production of fissionable weapons materials. Moreover, the U.S. favored a seabed arms treaty, providing a list of four questions were satisfactorily discussed. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, USUN, all NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Moscow. Drafted by Kranich (ACDA/IR) and Scoville (ACDA/ST); cleared in ACDA, AEC, DOD, J/PM, and the White House; and approved by Rogers. 78. Soviet Draft Treaty Geneva, March 18, 1969 The Soviets submitted a draft seabed arms control treaty at the opening session of the ENDC. This proposed treaty banned nuclear weapons and those of mass destruction from the seabed and the ocean floor outside of the twelve-mile territorial zone and opened those former ocean testing sites for inspection and verification. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 112–113. No classification marking. 79. Memorandum From the Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 25, 1969 In this memorandum, Haig recounted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler’s objection to the ACDA’s proposal to transmit to Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith additional instructions that, in Wheeler’s view, “clearly stepped beyond the bounds set earlier.” Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The March 25 memorandum at Tab A has four attachments; the attachments at Tabs 1 and 2 are Documents 75 and 77; [3/15 letter; tel 3/18] the draft telegram at Tab 4 was sent, as revised, to the U.S. Mission in Geneva on March 22. (Telegram 44780; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3) 80. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) Geneva, March 25, 1969 Following a number of general observations, Smith set forth the United States position on the comprehensive test ban proposal, restrictions on fissionable weapons material, and the seabed arms treaty to the ENDC. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 131–138. No classification marking. 81. Telegram 965 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, March 25, 1969, 1915Z. The telegram reported on the March 25 Co-Chairmen meeting in which Smith and Roshchin of the Soviet Union discussed progress toward a seabed arms treaty. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret; Limdis; Priority. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the telegram to Kissinger under a covering note noting “that things seem to be moving quite fast on this” and “we may find ourselves in the midst of a real negotiation on a treaty on the basis, so far, of telegraphic instructions rather than an NSC decision.” (Ibid.) 82. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, March 28, 1969 Kissinger and Smith discussed the situation at the ENDC meeting in Geneva. Smith told Kissinger that “if we wanted the Seabed Treaty we could probably get one.” Kissinger remarked that he thought the issue should go before the NSC. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 359, 14–31 March 1969. No classification marking. 83. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 8, 1969 Kissinger outlined the debate over the proposed Soviet treaty to ban all military use of seabeds and highlighted the ACDA counter proposal targeting nuclear weapons only. He then recommended that the NSC consider whether a treaty prohibiting nuclear arms on the seabeds would be in the overall U.S. interest and what time scale they should follow should the negotiations continue. He attached a draft NSSM requesting a study of the issue for Nixon’s consideration. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–146, NSSM 41. Confidential. Nixon initialed “Approve.” The attachment at Tab A is not published. The signed and dated NSSM is Document 202. 84. National Security Study Memorandum 41 Washington, April 11, 1969 The President directed that a report outlining both the positive and negative perspectives on the proposed plan to prohibit the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds. Specifically, Nixon wanted an analysis of all alternate suggestions and their feasibility, possible influential factors, and whether seabed arms control was in the best interest of the U.S. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1–42). Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum. 85. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 23, 1969 The memorandum briefed Kissinger on key issues and differing policy positions for the upcoming Review Group meeting on a seabed arms control treaty. The March 12 NSC meeting revealed conflicting opinions over what weapons to ban, the territorial zone restrictions, and the feasibility of hosting an inspection. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–35, Senior Review Group Meeting, Seabeds 4/25/69. Top Secret. Sent for action. 86. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc National Security Council Steering Committee Washington, April 18, 1969. The study was prepared in response to NSSM 41 and addressed whether the agreement proposed by the U.S. was in its national interests; the feasibility of the alternative solutions introduced; whether the agreement should create a blanket ban or target only certain weapons; would apply to a specific zone; and if there should be provisions for inspection. The study continued with a discussion of possible difficulties and prospective successes on an issue by issue basis. It was then circulated, with revisions, on April 26 for discussion at the April 30 NSC meeting. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limdis. Under cover of an April 26 memorandum, Jeanne Davis forwarded copies of the paper, for discussion at the NSC meeting on April 30, to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, and Helms. She noted that the study had been revised to take into account comments received on the version distributed April 25. (Ibid.) The telegram at Tab C was repeated for information to USUN and USNATO. 87. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, April 29, 1969 Ware transmitted a Talking Paper which discussed the projected seabeds treaty for Laird’s use at the NSC meeting on April 30. The more detailed Talking Paper unpacked the nuanced disagreement between the OSD and JCS over security interests, factors, and prospective success of the proposed seabed treaty. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 801.2, Jan–Mar. Top Secret. A stamped notation on Ware’s memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it on April 30. The attached Talking Paper is signed by G. Warren Nutter and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff. Attached to the Talking Paper at Tabs A and B are Documents 86 and 84. 88. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President Washington, undated Prepared in anticipation of the April 30 NSC meeting, the paper outlined the issues for decision. It recommended four things. First, that the President investigate the degree of opposition to the DOD position that the treaty is not in the overall interest of the United States before making any substantial decisions. Second, is to focus on a ban of fixed systems on the seabeds instead of all military activities. Third, that there should be no provision for a formal inspection to gauge compliance. Finally, that the zone be restricted to twelve miles. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President. The attached intelligence report, SNIE 11–12–68, Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed, is not published. It is printed in part in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 271. 89. Draft Minutes of National Security Council Meeting Washington, April 30, 1969, 10 a.m. The discussion at the NSC meeting focused on the recent ENDC meeting in Geneva, Switzerland and whether to go ahead with a seabed arms control treaty. They introduced a detailed list of pros and cons concerning each facet of the proposed Soviet draft and the U.S. counterproposal and debated the provisions at length. The President concluded that negotiations should proceed. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, TS 82, NSC Meetings, April 1969. No classification marking. On page 9 of the minutes is written, “Could not understand the tape. There was an echo.” The minutes were drafted on June 9, 1969. No final minutes have been found. 90. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, April 30, 1969, 3:05 p.m. Laird indicated that he had suggestions for the wording of a draft treaty which he did not want to discuss at the April 30 NSC meeting. He wanted to get his changes to the President before the final draft was determined and he asked to send them over to Kissinger. Kissinger agreed. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23–30 April 1969. No classification marking. 91. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, April 30, 1969, 6:25 p.m. Kissinger and Smith discussed the proposed treaty and the NSC meeting earlier that day. Smith inquired into a comment made by President Nixon at the meeting and Kissinger responded with an outline of Nixon’s general philosophy concerning international responsibility vis ‘a vis the seabeds treaty. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23–30 April 1969. No classification marking. 92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, May 1, 1969 Nutter forwarded a proposed memorandum to the President from Laird articulating the preferred DOD wording for the proposed seabed arms control treaty and discussed its purpose. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 May–July 1969. Secret. The attachment is not published. The signed memorandum is Document 93. 93. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, May 1, 1969 Laird indicated that the Defense Department did not favor a seabeds treaty; however, it suggested language for a treaty should the President decide to move ahead on it. The memorandum cautioned the President to take a “restrained and conservative” approach. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret. 94. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and Secretary of State Rogers Washington, May 2, 1969 Smith and Rogers discussed the problems associated with Laird’s position concerning the proposed seabed treaty, specifically the potential future problems associated with Congressional approval of the agreement. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley: FRC 383–97–10, January 1962–April 1977, Smith Correspondence with Secretary of State Rogers concerning SALT, NPT and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), February 1969–May 1970. Secret; Exdis. 95. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 3, 1969 Sonnenfeldt forwarded Laird’s May 1 memorandum to Kissinger and recommended that the President authorize presentation of a draft seabeds treaty at the ENDC incorporating the language proposed by Laird. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. Cleared in substance by Halperin. Tab A, the attached memorandum for the President, was not signed and forwarded by Kissinger and is not published. 96. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) Washington, May 6, 1969, 10:40 a.m. Kissinger told Packard the President would probably go ahead with the treaty if Smith put into the draft the changes that DOD wanted. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 97. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, May 6, 1969, 4:30 p.m. Kissinger and Laird discussed the next steps in the “Seabed matter.” Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 98. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, May 6, 1969 Smith reported on a meeting with Rogers on the seabed arms control treaty. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962–April 1977: FRC 383–97–10, ACDA–Telephone Conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February–October 1969. No classification marking. 99. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, May 7, 1969, 7:30 p.m. Laird indicated he was having problems with Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith. Smith had seen a letter written by Laird to the President and was upset about the first sentence noting Laird’s opposition to the treaty. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 100. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, May 7, 1969 Smith summarized his conversations with Kissinger regarding Laird’s letter. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962–April 1977, ACDA-Telephone conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February–October 1969: FRC 383–97–10. Secret; Nodis; Absolutely No Distribution. 101. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, May 7, 1969, 7:50 p.m. Kissinger responded to Smith’s concerns over Laird’s letter to the President. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 102. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 10, 1969 Smith informed Kissinger of steps taken toward a possible seabed arms control treaty and asked for authorization to start North Atlantic Council and Congressional consultations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, 1/20/69–12/31/69. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room on May 10 at 3:19 p.m. The attachments are not published. In the last paragraph the words “the State Operations Center” are crossed out and “S/S” substituted. 103. Telegram 75159 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, May 13, 1969 The Department transmitted instructions for consultations concerning the proposed U.S. draft for the seabed arms control treaty. It includes a commentary on each of the articles in the treaty. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential; Immediate. It was also sent immediate to USNATO, Tokyo, and all NATO capitals. It was repeated immediate to Moscow and USUN. Drafted by Durkee and NEIDLE (ACDA/IR); cleared in EUR, L, J/PM, J, EA, IO, AEC, OSD/ISA, JCS/SAAC, and the White House; and approved by Smith. 104. Telegram 80903 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, May 21, 1969, 1715Z The telegram transmitted instructions to table the U.S draft of the seabeds treaty to offset focus on the Soviet proposal, but to submit it without Articles VII and VIII. These articles were deleted to appease German concerns articulated at the May 19 North Atlantic Council meeting. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to immediate Bonn, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in substance by Hillenbrand (EUR) and McIntyre (IO/UNP); and approved by Kranich (ACDA/IR). 105. Draft Treaty Submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee May 22, 1969 The text of draft treaty, titled “United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor,” recognized national and global interest in restricting nuclear testing on the ocean floor and proposed six provisions articulating specific limitations. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 211–213. No classification marking. 106. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, June 5, 1969 Smith assessed the spring session of the ENDC and discussed plans for the summer session. The spring session made headway toward a suitable seabed arms control agreement. Smith requested to lead the summer delegation as well as he predicted an emphasis on biological and chemical warfare. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The memorandum bears Smith’s typed signature. 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 30, 1969 Kissinger forwarded, for Nixon’s approval, a message from the President to the ENDC to be read at the opening of the summer session. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential; Limdis. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed “Approve” for the President. The attached message is not published. 108. Telegram 2978 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, August 19, 1969, 2120Z. The Soviet Representative and Co-Chair of the ENDC, Alexey Roshchin, discussed with U.S. Representative and Co-Chair, James Leonard, a counterproposal to the United States May 22 draft seabed arms control treaty. In this discussion, the two men examined the differences between the articles proposed in the Soviet and U.S. drafts and analyzed the language of the Soviet counterproposal. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. 109. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, August 21, 1969 Smith articulated his thoughts on the new Soviet draft treaty to Rogers, noting that the Soviets embraced the U.S. emphasis on denuclearization over demilitarization and that the Soviet draft was indicative of the new “era of negotiation” the Nixon administration was working to cultivate. Smith then conducted a thorough, comparative analysis of the U.S. and Soviet proposals. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret. “Secretary Saw,” is written on page one. Tab B is Document 93. 110. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, August 30, 1969 Farley informed Rogers about the difficulties that State and ACDA officials were having in their negotiations with DOD and JCS officials on how to respond to the Soviets’ August 19 proposal on seabed arms control. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret. 111. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, September 3, 1969, 8:50 a.m. Kissinger and Smith discussed the problems associated with Article II of the proposed seabeds treaty. In previous meetings, the Soviets had agreed to apply the treaty outside of the 12 mile coastal zone. The Department of Defense, however, “refused to budge” on the zone extending outside three miles. Kissinger and Smith examined the issues associated with each side. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 112. Talking Points Prepared for Secretary of State Rogers by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, September 3, 1969 Smith stressed the urgency of responding to the Soviet proposed treaty. He encouraged Rogers to authorize Ambassadors Leonard and Ellsworth to negotiate with the Soviets and to accept the 12–mile zone. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381 Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret. Smith forwarded the talking points to Rogers under cover of September 3 memoranda and sent a copy of the talking points to Kissinger the same day. (Ibid.) 113. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, September 5, 1969, 11:55 a.m. Laird withdrew his objections to the 12 mile line providing there was some kind of provision preserving issues of accessibility. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 114. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers Washington, September 5, 1969, 12:15 p.m. Kissinger and Rogers discussed the 3 versus 12–mile issue. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 115. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, September 5, 1969, 12:20 p.m. Kissinger informed Smith that the President had agreed to go ahead with the 12–mile limit if a proviso was included for arms control purposes. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, September 11, 1969 Nutter briefed Laird on the new U.S. draft treaty in light of JCS concerns. The JCS maintained the position that the treaty should not blanket weapons of mass destruction, but cover only “fixed weapons installation” and that the inspection provision be modified to prevent an implication of access. Nutter then attached a memorandum for Wheeler analyzing these issues. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, 801.2 (June– 1969). Secret. The attached memorandum to Wheeler, was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard not Laird. Tabs A–D are not published. 117. Telegram 154164 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, September 11, 1969, 2130Z The telegram transmitted the text of the new U.S. draft seabeds treaty, applying the 12 mile zone and articulating specific conditions for inspection. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5 Secret; Immediate; Limdis. It was also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith. 118. Telegram 154165 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, September 11, 1969, 2132Z The telegram instructed USNATO to circulate the new draft treaty to other delegations. To expedite consideration of the draft by NATO Governments. Embassies at NATO capitals were instructed to convey the draft together with explanatory points provided in the telegram. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Gleysteen and Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Hancock (ACDA/GC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith. 119. Telegram 4138 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, September 15, 1969, 1845Z. The telegram reported North Atlantic Council approval to proceed with discussion of the draft U.S. treaty with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It then provided a detailed summary of the comments made by each permanent representative. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, USMission Geneva, and USUN. 120. Telegram 3307 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, September 15, 1969, 1855Z. The telegram reported Soviet Representative Roshchin’s questions and comments upon receiving copy of the new U.S. draft. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO and USUN. 121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) Washington, September 24, 1969 Farley discussed the issue of coastal waters raised by the Soviets and outlined five alternative courses of action. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nutter saw it. 122. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, September 26, 1969 Wheeler indicated that, of the five alternatives introduced by Farley in his September 24 memorandum, the Chiefs agreed alternative two—removing reference to “historic waters”—was the least detrimental to U.S. security. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) Washington, September 26, 1969 Nutter responded to Farley’s September 24 memorandum citing alternative two as the least detrimental to U.S. security. In the explanation of DOD’s concerns, Nutter noted that alternate two eliminated Soviet claim to the strategically important Sea of Okhotsk as “historic waters” and therefore opened it to compliance inspections. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Nutter signed the original. 124. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 29, 1969 Sonnenfeldt forwarded for Kissinger’s approval draft instructions to Geneva outlining the compromise reached by State, ACDA, and Defense on territorial waters. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret; Limdis. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed “Approve.” A handwritten notation on the first page reads, “Watts informed.” The attached telegram was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and London. Tabs B and C are Documents 121 and 123. 125. Telegram 3531 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, October 2, 1969, 1040Z. The telegram transmitted further Soviet comments on the new U.S. draft seabeds treaty, accepting the majority of the draft but rejecting the U.S. provision establishing the coastal zone as articulated by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret.; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. 126. Telegram 167972 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, October 3, 1969 The telegram instructed Leonard to seek a meeting with Soviet Representative Roshchin. At the proposed meeting, Leonard was to present a detailed response addressing each issue articulated by the Soviets with regards to the seabeds treaty. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO and Tokyo. It was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Sonnenfeldt and, in draft, in PM, H, AEC, IO, EUR, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Smith. 127. Telegram 3575 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, October 4, 1969, 1541Z The telegram transmitted the text of the joint U.S.-Soviet draft seabed treaty, to be tabled on October 7. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO. It was repeated to USUN and U.S. embassies in Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, and Tokyo. 128. Revised U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty Geneva, October 30, 1969 Text of the revised “American-Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof.” Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 507–509. No classification marking. 129. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers Washington, November 11, 1969 Kissinger complained to Rogers about the way that ACDA Director Smith handled the seabed arms control treaty. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11–17, 1969. No classification marking. 130. Telegram 4311 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 25, 1969, 2137Z. The telegram discussed problems and prospects for the seabed arms control treaty in the UN General Assembly. It reiterated the more problematic issue of the Article defining the “contiguous zone,” the potential Argentinean objection, and the various positions feasible in light of the previous extensive negotiations between the U.S. and USSR centered around that same issue. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva. 131. Telegram 1145 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, April 13, 1970, 1815Z. The telegram transmitted the Soviets’ revised draft seabed treaty. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. 1, May 1970. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to USUN and USNATO. 132. Telegram 1146 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, April 13, 1970, 2025Z. The telegram reported on the discussion at the Co-Chairmen’s meeting of the Soviets’ revised draft seabed treaty. The Soviets had made only minor changes and accepted all of the U.S. suggestions. As a result, Soviet Co-Chair Roshchin informed U.S. Co-Chair Leonard of the Soviet desire to compete consideration of the treaty by the end of the Spring Session. Leonard disagreed. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USUN, USNATO, and Vienna. 133. Telegram 55038 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, April 14, 1970 The telegram directed that U.S. NATO distribute the Soviets’ revised draft seabed treaty to NATO delegations and that embassies in NATO capitals circulate it to their respective Governments. It then concluded with a positive projection for the passage of the new draft at the upcoming CCD meeting. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent to all NATO capitals, USMission Geneva, and Tokyo. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and Vienna. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by NEIDLE (ACDA/IR) and in draft in ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, LO/PMO, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, OSD/ISA, and the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA/DD). The treaty, the text of which was essentially the same as in Document 131 was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on April 23 and is printed, along with statements by the U.S. and Soviet representatives to the Committee, in Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 175–188. 134. Telegram 3043 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, September 4, 1970, 1810Z The telegram focused on the seabed arms control treaty in its wrap-up of the 1970 meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It lauded the consensus supporting the revised treaty as the “main accomplishment of 1970,” and listed those nations which had articulated their support of the draft. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, Mexico City, Rio De Janeiro, Buenos Aires, USUN, and USNATO, and pouched to 21 other embassies. 135. Telegram 2548 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, October 19, 1970, 1418Z. The telegram reported on U.S.-Soviet consultations on plans for submitting a seabed disarmament resolution to the UN General Assembly and individually examined the response of the other delegates who supported the agreement. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and Moscow. 136. Telegram 2766 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, October 28, 1970, 0119Z. The telegram reported on the status of negotiations at the UN General Assembly over a resolution commending the seabed arms control treaty, highlighting the positive response to the draft and noting all CCD allies of both the United States and Soviet Union would co-sponsor the resolution. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva. 137. Telegram 191560 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Djakarta Washington, November 23, 1970 The telegram transmitted the final text of the UN General Assembly resolution commending the seabed arms control treaty. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USUN and USDEL SALT III. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in IO/UNP, PM/DCA, and EA/IND; and approved by Day (ACDA/IR). The resolution, 2660 (XXV), passed on December 7, 1970, by a vote of 104 to 2, with 2 abstentions. 138. Seabed Arms Control Treaty February 11, 1971 Text of the “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,” opened on this day for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 7–11. No classification marking. For text of President Nixon’s remarks at the signing ceremony on February 11, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 150–151. The treaty was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 15, 1972, by a vote of 83 to 0, and ratified by the President on April 26, 1972. It entered into force on May 18, 1972. 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 5, 1969 SUBJECT: U.S. Position for ENDC The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) is scheduled to resume its deliberations on March 6, 1969, in Geneva. In addition to the NPT and the strategic arms limitation talks, the agenda for the meeting includes the following complex arms control issues on which the Administration does not now have a position: the comprehensive test ban; cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons use; arms control on the seabed; and chemical and biological warfare. There will be considerable pressure on the U.S. Delegation to establish its current position on these and other important issues which have long been included in the general U.S. position on arms control. The problem is complicated by the fact that there appear to be major differences on all of these issues within the U.S. Government. I believe that, prior to the resumption of the ENDC, these issues should be reviewed by the NSC since they have such far-reaching security implications. The staffing of these issues does not fit within any of the permanent groups established so far under the NSC. The Committee of Principals, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, which previously handled these matters has not been continued. I recommend, therefore, that an ad hoc NSC group, under the chairmanship of the Director of ACDA with representatives of the appropriate agencies, be established to prepare a paper for the NSC’s consideration on an urgent basis. If you approve, I have prepared the attached NSSM. Approve NSC meeting on the ENDC [Nixon initialed] Disapprove Other Approve NSSM establishing ad hoc NSC group [Nixon initialed] Disapprove Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–136, NSSM 20. Secret. Nixon initialed his approval of both of Kissinger’s recommendations. 64. National Security Study Memorandum 20 64. National Security Study Memorandum 20 1 Washington, February 12, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The President’s Science Adviser SUBJECT: Resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) is scheduled to resume in Geneva on March 6, 1969. The President has directed that a study be prepared on the full range of issues and proposals involved in this meeting. The study should present alternative U.S. positions on key issues and possible initiatives although agreed recommendations may be submitted. The study should be prepared by a steering committee under the chairmanship of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with representatives of the following: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Director of Central Intelligence; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the President’s Science Adviser. The study should be forwarded to the National Security Council Review Group by February 24, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, 3/15/69. Secret. 65. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 65. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 13, 1969 Subject: ENDC Agenda The following items are on the agenda of the ENDC and are ranked in rough order of descending importance in terms of international interest and potentiality for serious negotiation. Delegates are not bound in their discussions to specific agenda items but there is a clear consensus that priority is to be given “to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Of these, there was a consensus at the last session of the ENDC that CTB holds priority interest. Most countries of the world will consider the principal obligations stemming from the NPT as that of the present non-nuclear weapon states to forego nuclear armament in exchange for that of the US, USSR, and UK to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and embark on nuclear disarmament. Thus, although neither the NPT nor SALT will be specific items for negotiation in the ENDC, progress on bringing the NPT into effect and initiating bilateral US-USSR talks on limiting the nuclear arms race will be predominant factors influencing the character, content, and pace of all other efforts to control armaments and will have a direct bearing on the prospects for a CTB or cut-off agreement. The ENDC will undoubtedly wish to be periodically informed of SALT developments, and will doubtlessly continue to serve as a useful forum for promoting adherence to the NPT. 1. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Most non-nuclear nations consider the achievement of a CTB as a much needed and readily attainable component in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race and create a viable NPT. Both the US and USSR have long been on the public record as favoring a complete ban on weapons testing, but have disagreed on the conditions for verifying such a ban—whether national capabilities are adequate or on-site inspections by international agreement are required. Most of the non-aligned nations, led by Sweden, believe.that the US insistence on on-site inspections should be dropped, convinced there is little motivation for, and good prospect of, detecting by other means any Soviet cheating. Many of our allies, including the UK, share this view, but as good allies do not press the issue in deference to our asserted need for continued testing. One problem in the ENDC will be to articulate the US position in a manner which keeps the CTB prospects alive while protecting our options to continue for the present our right to test underground. Although insistent on closing off military testing, most nations will agree to a CTB which contains provision for continued testing and use, under international supervision, of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PLOWSHARE). We, on the other hand, may wish to propose amendment to the Limited Test Ban in order to get ahead with certain PLOWSHARE experiments while awaiting resolution of the CTB problem. 2. Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons In view of their smaller stockpiles of fissionable materials the Soviets have never shown interest in the US standing proposal of four years that nuclear powers halt further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. However, most other countries are keenly interested in such a proposal, since it would not only contribute to the cessation of weapons manufacture, but would also promote safeguards on peaceful-purposes production in the Soviet Union similar to those the non-nuclears are obliged to accept under the NPT. Whether or not the Soviets are likely to take any more favorable attitude now, our continued support for this measure would give us a favorable stance in the ENDC discussions, build support for, the NPT, and maintain pressure on the USSR for eventual acceptance of international verification. Our only problem may be one of judging how hard to press the Soviets on this measure if it should prove prejudicial to dialogues on more negotiable proposals—such as seabeds. 3. Arms Control Measure for the Seabed During the last two years the imagination of the world community has been captured by the twin notions of reserving the deep seabed for peaceful purposes and exploiting its vast resources for the common benefit of all mankind. In agreeing to reserve the seabed for peaceful purposes the US has made clear that this does not prohibit the deployment of weapons or other military equipment, as such, but only their use for purposes inconsistent with the UN Charter. Given the lengthy time anticipated for any progress on SALT and the difficulty in making early progress on a CTB, this may prove to be the only significant area in which we can take a new initiative to demonstrate our desire to halt the nuclear arms race. To date US negotiators have been authorized only to explore the feasibility of an international agreement to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. In view of the anticipated pressures in both the ENDC and in the UN Seabeds Committee to ban all weapons and military equipment from this environment, our problem will be to propose a concrete measure which will not adversely affect our basic security interests, which will preempt more far-reaching and unacceptable measures, and which will demonstrate our willingness to extend the outer space ban on nuclear weapons to the ocean floor. 4. Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) There is growing interest in exploring means to curb the threat and even the capability of engaging in chemical and biological warfare. Increasingly questions are raised regarding the adequacy of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which in view of some of its ambiguities has provided a basis for increasing Communist propaganda attacks on US activities in Vietnam. This heightened attention has been manifested in the world press, and in official circles it represents the fear that CBW technology may soon offer “a poor man’s alternative” to nuclear weapons. A UN study on the effects of chemical and biological warfare, expected by mid-year, will provide impetus for far-reaching and searching analysis of the problem. The UK is in the vanguard of an effort to go beyond the Geneva Protocol in controlling chemical and biological weapons, in their belief that these agents will never be used because they are actually uncontrollable in warfare, and that generally the investment in their development and production is still so small that something can be done at this time about them, unlike chemical weapons. The problems for the US will be to weather the usual propaganda attacks on our tear gas and herbicide practices in Vietnam, but more importantly to develop a position on more, comprehensive control of biological weapons looking toward substantive negotiation later this summer. 5. Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons World support for persistent Soviet bloc efforts over many years to ban, unconditionally, the use of nuclear weapons appears to be on the wane since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Earlier in 1968 it looked as if many non-aligned nations would attempt to exact binding security commitments from the superpowers in exchange for their adherence to the NPT. Although both India and Israel have special security problems which they relate to the nuclear option, there has been increasing awareness since the Czech event that nuclear weapons are not the only threat to most nations’ security. Discussion of this subject in the ENDC is not expected to lead to serious consideration of a standing Soviet proposal for an international agreement. We can continue to insist that greater security for a country against nuclear threat can be gained by adhering to the NPT—which can be a first step on the long road to nuclear disarmament, rather than by “going nuclear”. We must also insist to countries that UNSC Res. 255 represents the limit to which we can go in providing any security assurances. (Our obligations—as well as those of the Soviets— are limited to those in the UN Charter and are accordingly not considered to be of substantial significance to those non-aligned nations which fear that prompt Security Council action would be impossible in the event of US-Soviet disagreement.) 6. Nuclear Free Zones Nothing much will come of this item, except that Mexico will undoubtedly urge all nuclear powers to adhere to the Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which treaty provides for a Latin American nuclear free zone. (We have signed Protocol II but have not yet ratified; the Soviets have not signed.) There is nothing on the horizon which would indicate early African emulation of the Latin American effort; no initiatives in the Far or Middle East. Perennial Soviet bloc suggestions for a Central European nuclear free zone are not likely to be discussed seriously in the ENDC. 7. Standing Soviet Proposals Apart from some of the above items, the Soviets can be expected to urge the following: (a) Ban on nuclear flights beyond national boundaries (aimed at US); (b) Restriction of missile submarine patrols (beyond limits where our Polaris can hit Soviet territory); (c) Elimination of all foreign military bases. These Soviet proposals will be presented largely for propaganda purposes, but the US will need to make its traditional responses. 8. Conventional Disarmament Experience suggests that the ENDC will give no more than lip service to the need to control the flow of conventional arms, particularly to the newly emerging and underdeveloped countries. No concrete proposals are expected, and it is not likely that the Soviets will seriously discuss the problem of arms control to the Middle East in the ENDC. The US will need to continue in its efforts to generate interest in non-nuclear areas of arms control. 9. General and Complete Disarmament A Resolution of the last UNGA calls for a “new look” at the whole questin of GCD in order to see if new approaches or greater momentum cannot be achived. Thus all countries can be expected to expound on the desirablity of general and complete disarmament and to call for new approaches and emphasis but it is unlikely there will be any new general approaches or proposals other than the partial measures covered aboved. 10. ENDC Enlargement The may become a subject for discussion, depending on the status of US–USSR bilateral negotiations and consultations with our allies. Should the Co-Chairmen agree on a slate, agreeable in turn to our NATO and their Warsaw Pact allies, during or before the March 6 session, it would be entirely appropriate for the Co-Chairmen to seek endorsement of the ENDC before seeking approval of the UN. Gerard C. Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. 66. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 66. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 28, 1969 Subject: National Security Study Memorandum 20—Preparations for ENDC Session 1. In response to National Security Study Memorandum 20 representatives of the addressees met and prepared a study on the full range of issues and proposals involved in the forthcoming session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), scheduled to open Tuesday, March 18 1969 in Geneva. 2. The provisional agenda (TAB A) agreed at the last ENDC session, which recessed at the end of August, 1968 specifies that priority be given to measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, which include a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and a Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Materials For Weapons (Cut-off). An Arms Control Measure for the Seabeds (Seabeds) was placed in the special category of “Other Collateral Measures” in order not to prejudge whether it should be primarily a nuclear arms control measure (US position) or a demilitarization measure (Soviet position). 3. Representatives can be expected to place heavy stress on finding practical next steps to follow the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to begin in earnest work towards nuclear arms limitation. Inevitably, most of the representatives will point to the US and USSR and challenge them to commence serious negotiations. Some may introduce new proposals, as well as renew initiatives already on the table. 4. Three measures, CTB (TAB B), Cut-off (TAB C), and Seabeds (TAB D) stand out in importance in terms of international interest and pressures for serious debate and require NSC policy decisions. 5. Negotiations toward a CTB were urged in a UN General Assembly resolution which we, as well as all other participants in the ENDC, voted for at the UN session last fall. The preamble of the NPT recalls the pledge in the Limited Test Ban Treaty to continue negotiations towards a CTB. The United Kingdom, Italy, the United Arab Republic and Sweden are all likely to renew their earlier proposals for reaching agreement on a CTB. 6. As to Cut-off, many ENDC delegations regard this long-standing US proposal as a logical measure to limit the nuclear states in a way roughly parallel to the limitations undertaken by the non-nuclear states in the NPT. Sweden and India in particular have promoted a Cut-off as a measure which would create significant nuclear arms control limitations. The measure is likely to be pressed even though it is widely known that it probably cannot be negotiated at this time because of Soviet objections. 7. The question of arms control for the seabeds is also currently active because interest in the peaceful exploitation of the seabeds has been greatly stimulated by recent UN activities in this field. The US and the USSR have taken the position that seabeds arms control should be dealt with by the ENDC, rather than the 42 member UN Seabeds Committee. Moreover, representatives of the USSR have indicated that seabeds arms control could be the next area of serious negotiations between the USSR and the US at the ENDC. 8. Other items before the ENDC do not require policy decisions at this time, since they can be dealt with adequately on the basis of existing positions. Some of these items are long-standing Soviet propaganda ploys, such as: Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; Ban on flights carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries; Limitation of area of patrol for missile submarines carrying nuclear weapons; and Elimination of foreign military bases. 9. Although the British may take the lead on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons (CBW), development of a new policy is not needed at this time since the UN Secretary General’s study on the effects of CBW will not be completed until June 15, 1969. 10. Other current items are not likely to be pressed at this session. On Nuclear Free Zones (NFZ’s) Mexico can be expected to urge the Soviets to accept the Latin American NFZ, but serious suggestions for new zones are not likely. ENDC members can be expected to stress the desirability of general and complete disarmament (GCD) and call for new approaches. But GCD will probably not receive substantially more attention than in past recent ENDC sessions. It is generally understood, though seldom publicly admitted, that in the absence of settlements of outstanding political problems, only partial measures offer realistic prospects for negotiation. Gerard Smith Tab B Issues Paper COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (U) I. THE PROBLEM What position regarding a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) should be taken by the United States at the ENDC in the light of: a) the long-standing international commitment of the USG, recalled in the preamble to the NPT to negotiation of a CTB with adequate verification; and b) the importance of protecting our freedom of action to meet current stated nuclear weapons testing requirements. II. ISSUE In view of the problem stated above, should the U.S. maintain its public position in support of a CTB with adequate (i.e., on-site) verification? PRO : 1 The U.S. has maintained its position in support of an adequately verified CTB for more than a decade. This position has had the formal endorsement of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. A reversal of the U.S. CTB position would inevitably be seen throughout the world as an inauspicious beginning for the new Administration in the field of arms control. 2. The U.S. has gone on record in the Limited Test Ban Treaty that it would pursue negotiations for a CTB. This obligation was recalled in the preamble to the NPT. Additionally, the NPT obligates the parties to work toward further nuclear disarmament. In the view of many important countries (e.g., UK, Canada, India, Italy, and Sweden), this clearly includes a CTB. Reversal of our position would be used by opponents of the NPT to support their charges that the Treaty is aimed only at non-nuclear states and puts no meaningful obligations on the nuclear powers. 3. Although presently we are not pursuing negotiation of a CTB, such a ban in the future could have advantages for the U.S., including: (a) Gaining Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections; (b) reinforcing the NPT and serving as a more acceptable non-proliferation measure to some important states (e.g., India); (c) further widening the Sino-Soviet split; and (d) creating additional pressure on France and China to stop their testing. In addition, halting Soviet nuclear weapon testing would inhibit the Soviets’ ability to develop new weapon systems or improve their existing systems. It would preclude Soviet use of new, tested warheads for MIRV’s or for an advanced ABM system. [ 2 lines not declassified ] 4. It is highly likely that low-key presentation of our present position would not trigger negotiations, and would preserve our freedom of action to meet our stated nuclear testing requirements. The Soviets have shown no real interest in recent years in pushing for a CTB, and we can work to focus attention on other arms control issues. 5. In the unlikely event that the Soviets accept on-site inspections, any resulting negotiations inevitably would be quite protracted. The difficult technical questions involved regarding the nature and procedures for on-site inspection, and the role of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, could provide sufficient opportunity to control the pace of the negotiations so that our options in terms of nuclear testing would be preserved until such a time as it would be in our net security interest for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to forego nuclear weapons testing. 6. Reversing our long-standing position on the CTB would make it difficult to obtain the international cooperation required to amend the LTBT as necessary to carry out large-scale nuclear excavations. CON : 1. U.S. military capabilities could be significantly reduced vis-à-vis potential enemies unless nuclear weapon testing is continued or additional delivery capabilities are acquired. If strategic arms limitations were to be adopted, the latter option could be foreclosed making continued testing even more important. Underground testing is necessary to accomplish development of some presently planned and MIRV systems a. ABM Underground detonations for testing SPARTAN and its warhead are necessary to determine that (1) the warhead functions properly, and (2) the missile is hardened sufficiently to withstand fratricide. b. MIRV Neither POSEIDON (MK3) nor MINUTENAN (MK12) have yet achieved their hardness criteria. Underground detonation of nuclear devices is the only means of generating sufficiently high fluxes of hot X-rays to test hardness levels. Simulators have not yet been developed for this purpose, nor is it anticipated that such developments will materialize in the foreseeable future. 2. In order to maintain maximum confidence in stockpiled weapons, it is necessary to continue a quality surveillance program, preferably including underground tests as necessary to assess or correct deficiencies. 3. We should not subject ourselves to the possibility of any additional pressures to cease testing, which would result if the Soviets did make a significant move to accept our position on verification, or if advances in detection and verification capabilities make national means of verification acceptable. 4. If we continue to favor publicly a test ban, we will be subjected to increasing pressure to modify our own position on verification to permit achievement of agreement, because there is very little, if any, prospect at present that the U.S.S.R. will accept any form of on-site inspection. 5. The new Administration can reverse the U.S. position on the CTB with less political cost now, rather than after this position has been reaffirmed by Administration spokesmen in disarmament forums. 6. The advent of strategic arms limitation talks would, if started, do much to fulfill our NPT obligations to pursue further measures of nuclear arms control and to offset pressures for the maintenance of our position in support of a CTB. 7. It is not clear at this time what arrangements, if any, could be prescribed in a CTB treaty which would permit development (as opposed to applications) of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, and which, at the same time, would not create opportunities for obtaining weapons development data which otherwise would be unobtainable under the terms of the treaty. ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION Instead of either low-key reiteration or retraction of our CTB position, we could attempt to evade the problem by either (a) remaining silent on the CTB or (b) stating that our CTB position was under review. Neither of these alternate courses of action appears viable. If we remain silent, it is certain that we will be asked pointed questions at the ENDC about our CTB position, as the CTB is a high priority item on the ENDC agenda. Continued silence would then be interpreted as a reversal of our position and would incur similar costs. If we were to state that our CTB position was under review, this would serve to focus even more attention on the CTB issue and would thus increase the costs of any eventual reversal of our position. Furthermore, an announcement of such a review would lead to widespread speculation that we were actually considering dropping our insistence on on-site inspections. Tab C Issues Paper CUTOFF OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES (U) In preparation for the Geneva Disarmament Conference in March, a decision should be made on whether the United States should reaffirm, modify or withdraw its long-standing proposals for a verified mutual cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. Background For more than ten years the U.S. has been proposing that the nuclear weapon powers agree to halt production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, and to transfer agreed quantities of weapons grade fissionable material to peaceful uses. We have also suggested that the transferred uranium-235 and plutonium could be obtained by “demonstrated” destruction of nuclear weapons. This package of proposals, referred to below as the “cutoff-transfer” proposal, is described in more detail at Tab A. In 1966, the U.S. representative made a series of speeches in Geneva elaborating many details of our cutoff-transfer proposal. On February 15, 1966, an approved position paper was sent to the U.S. Delegation in Geneva entitled “Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons to Obtain Fissionable Materials for Transfer to Peaceful Uses (U)”. In 1968, the Atomic Energy Commission suggested that the impact of the cutoff-transfer proposal on the ability to meet us military requirements for fissionable material be restudied before the U.S. reaffirms the cutoff-transfer proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum dated 24 April 1968, which addressed the subject of cutoff-transfer, opposed a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons use and recommended that “the future primary criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff would be the adequacy of the fissionable material available at the time of cutoff to meet the Nation’s forecast weapon requirements.” A review of the military requirements (through FY 71 with projections through FY 77) was completed by the Department of Defense and summarized in a Memorandum to the President on Nuclear Weapons Materials, dated January 17, 1969, part of which is quoted on page 3 below. When the U.S. described the verification aspects of the cutoff proposal to the ENDC in 1964, it called for inspection of declared production facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also called for “a limited number of inspections of suspected undeclared facilities on an adversary basis.” On July 2, 1968, ACDA proposed within the Government that we modify this latter aspect of our public proposal so as to rely on national capabilities. This would make the verification arrangements for the cutoff similar to those in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed past U.S. cutoff-transfer proposals, and is expected to continue to oppose any form of such proposals. Issues In these circumstances, the following issues should be examined in determining the U.S. position on the cutoff: (a) Would a cutoff-transfer agreement (Tab A) now be in the overall U.S. interest? (b) Should the U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal be modified so as to omit the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, but retain the offer to transfer agreed amounts of uranium-235 and plutonium to peaceful purposes? (c) Should the 1966 U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal be modified to call for verification similar to that of the NPT? (d) Should the 1966 U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal be modified to call for equal U.S. and Soviet transfer of fissionable material to peaceful use, instead of our previous proposal for asymmetric amounts? The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along the following lines. A. Would a cutoff-transfer agreement (Tab A) now be in the overall U.S. interest? PRO: 1. [ 4 lines not declassified ] It would make it impossible for the Soviets to achieve the “greater-than expected threat” to the U.S. which the DOD has used for U.S. strategic planning. The U.S. on the other hand, has available enough fissionable material to complete the currently planned Sentinel ABM program and the planned MIRV warheads for Poseidon and Minuteman III. Hence, an adequately verified cutoff-transfer agreement during the next several years would be to the net military advantage of the United States. 2. According to the Defense Secretary’s Memorandum to the President on Nuclear Weapons Materials, dated January 17, 1969: “Our FY 69 inventories of uranium and plutonium and programmed tritium production are sufficient for our recommended nuclear warhead stockpile plus the options that may be needed to protect against the combined greater-than-expected Soviet offensive and defensive threats through FY 77. If we decided to defend Minuteman we would need additional tritium production for Sprint warheads, but not before FY 74 See Note below. NOTE: The AEC notes that this statement does not take into account requirements for plutonium to support the stockpile (i.e., weapons R & D, tests, and fabrication pipeline) or to support other, non-weapons programs; only by extreme measures, such as removing all weapons grade Pu from active non-weapons R & D activities at the time of a cutoff and virtual elimination of Pu for future weapons R & D, could sufficient Pu be made available to meet the combined greater-than-expected threats. Accordingly, the U.S. has already unilaterally ceased production of all enriched uranium and of virtually all plutonium for weapons purposes. 3. Soviet acceptance of IAEA inspection, as required by this proposal, would involve a major, unprecedented opening up of the Soviet Union, particularly in its atomic energy programs. 4. Because the Soviets are continuing to produce fissionable material for weapons and the U.S. has virtually ceased, the Soviet Union is catching up to the U.S. in total stockpile size. By 1976 both countries will have accumulated such large stockpiles of fissionable material that any cutoff of production for weapons uses would be of little military significance. 5. If the Soviet Union agreed to the proposed transfer to peaceful uses of 60,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235 (at least 25% enriched) and agreed amounts of plutonium (up to 4000 kilograms) by the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, the impact on U.S. programs would be far smaller than the impact on the Soviet program. As noted above, the Soviets could not achieve the DOD “greater-than-expected” threat even under a cutoff agreement, let alone if they also transfer fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. 6. The U.S. transfer proposal was first made by President Eisenhower in 1956 when the U.S. stockpile was much smaller than it is now. If the U.S. were to withdraw that proposal now, such retraction would be widely interpreted as indicating that the U.S. was no longer seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament. 7. While there is no known way to verify reliably that real nuclear weapons are being destroyed without compromising nuclear weapon design information, the cutoff-transfer proposal (Tab A) does not require such verification. The net U.S. security interest would be advanced by verifying that the agreed amounts of fissionable material are transferred to safeguarded peaceful uses, whether or not the Soviets destroy real nuclear weapons * . This is because such transfers would limit Soviet military programs more than they would limit U.S. military programs. 8. In the NPT, the U.S. and Soviet Union will undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date …” It is clear from the negotiating history of the NPT that it will be hard to persuade many countries to sign, ratify, and remain parties to the NPT unless the superpowers demonstrate progress toward such measures. Many non-nuclear-weapon countries have urged the cutoff as a step which should be taken by the nuclear-weapon states to balance the renunciation accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon states in the NPT. A strong reaffirmation of our cutoff proposal would help to demonstrate U.S. sincerity in fulfilling its NPT pledge. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to back off from the cutoff proposals we have already made, the reactions of the non-nuclear weapon states would be very unfavorable. Such action could seriously set back our efforts to achieve wide adherence to the NPT and the policy goal of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. 9. If the Soviets oppose the cutoff, the political onus for doing so will fall on them. CON: 1. There is great uncertainty as to the future requirements for fissionable materials for weapons use. For example, in FY 1977 the JCS recommends a total nuclear warhead stockpile of nearly twice the size recommended by the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it would be premature to foreclose on the JCS position by a cutoff of fissionable materials production. 2. There are possible errors as large as 30–40% in U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet production of fissionable material, still larger uncertainties in the amount of fissionable material the Soviets plan to use in their weapons, and which of various possible options they are likely to select for weapons allocation. There are also large uncertainties in the effectiveness of Soviet defensive and offensive strategic weapons. Hence, it is difficult to make a reliable analysis as to if or when a cutoff would be to the advantage of the United States. 3. [ text not declassified ] 4. If the Soviet Union agreed to the U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal, such an agreement would have little political impact on the non-nuclear-weapons states, because they would assume that both superpowers were sure they had more than enough fissionable material for all their foreseeable weapons needs. If the Soviet Union continues to reject the cutoff-transfer proposal, as expected, the proposal would have even less effect on the attitudes of non-nuclear-weapon states. B. Should the U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal in Tab A be modified so as to omit the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons but retain the offer to transfer agreed amounts of uranium-235 and plutonium to peaceful purposes? PRO: 1. [ text not declassified ] However, the “greater-than-expected” threat by the Soviets could only be brought about by continued production on their part. Thus under a cutoff-transfer agreement, the requirement to meet such a threat might not exist. 2. If the demonstrated destruction proposal were agreed to, the U.S. would destroy real nuclear weapons, but we would not know whether the alleged Soviet weapons being destroyed were real or not. 3 Any negative political impact on non-nuclear-weapon states which might arise from U.S. withdrawal of the demonstrated destruction proposal could be minimized by skillful presentation. CON: 1. The proposal for demonstrated destruction of weapons has been an effective answer to the Soviet and non-nuclear-weapon countries’ argument that the cutoff-transfer proposal is not disarmament but would only involve transfer of material that was intended for our peaceful uses program anyway. 2. If an agreement, including the demonstrated destruction of weapons were concluded within the next two years, present retirement programs would provide materials for the transfer and still allow sufficient material to meet currently planned U.S. weapon needs through FY 1972. 3. Regardless of how the U.S. explains withdrawal of its demonstrated destruction proposal, many countries will view it as a regressive step, calling into question how earnestly the U.S. is seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament. 4. Since the Soviet Union will almost certainly continue to reject the entire cutoff-transfer proposal anyway, it would be better to maintain the U.S. posture by not retracting any part of it at this time. 5. It is not necessary from a U.S. security point of view to be able to prove that real Soviet weapons are destroyed as long as we verify transfer of fissionable material to peaceful programs * . C. Should the 1966 U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal be modified to call for verification similar to that of the NPT? PRO: 1. The U.S. now has the national capability which, combined with IAEA safeguards on the declared Soviet atomic energy facilities, would permit detection with confidence of any new fissionable material production facilities large enough or numerous enough to produce clandestinely sufficient additional amounts of fissionable material above those already in the Soviet stockpile to significantly affect U.S. security. In regard to the proposed modification of the cutoff proposal, a JCS memorandum, dated August 24, 1968, states: “the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the [verification] procedure proposed in the reference, providing the United States is prepared to exercise immediately the right to withdraw from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of U.S. detection methods.” A memorandum on U.S. national detection capabilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards, prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, states that “… we are confident that we have located all Soviet gaseous diffusion plants as well as reactor sites producing weapon-grade plutonium.” 2. The proposed modification would remove a potentially troublesome discrepancy between the verification arrangements we would be willing to accept for the cutoff and those we have asked other countries to accept under the NPT. It is difficult to justify treaty rights to search for undeclared plants in a country which already has a large stockpile of fissionable material, when the NPT does not set forth such rights for nations in which a small clandestine plant might be significant. 3. If the Soviet Union should prove interested in a cutoff, elimination of a treaty requirement for inspections for undeclared facilities would make the measure considerably more negotiable, and yet would only be a minor reduction in the amount of inspection of the Soviet Union required by the treaty. 4. While the USSR has always resisted proposals for inspections on its own territory, the Soviets would find it difficult to explain why they are unwilling to accept relevant IAEA inspection for the cutoff which is essentially the same as that which they had urged other states to accept under the NPT. CON: 1. If the U.S. should detect an undeclared clandestine plant for producing fissionable material, it may be difficult to justify U.S. withdrawal from the treaty to other countries. 2. U.S. efforts to justify such withdrawal might require revealing to the world at least some information on the existence of our sensitive detection methods. 3. The intelligence community believes that it is certainly possible that a gas centrifuge plant or plants could escape detection and they are unable to judge for how long. However, to operate a clandestine centrifuge plant under conditions which require IAEA inspections would also require clandestine feed materials facilities starting with ore concentration and running through uranium hexafluoride preparation along with the necessary clandestine transportation, storage and handling of thousands of tons of materials, all of which might not evade detection as easily as a gas centrifuge plant or plants. D. Would the 1966 U.S. cutoff proposal be modified to call for equal U.S. and Soviet transfers of fissionable material to peaceful use, instead of our previous proposal for asmmetrical amounts ? PRO: 1. In its 1966 proposal, the U.S. offered to transfer 60,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235 to peaceful use if the Soviet Union would transfer 40,000 kilograms. This offer was made because such a transfer would have been to the net military advantage of the U.S. in view of the relative sizes of the U.S. and Soviet stockpiles. Now that the Soviet stockpile has grown appreciably, it appears more appropriate to call for equal transfer by both countries. 2. [ 7 lines not declassified ] 3. Equal transfers might be more acceptable to the Soviet Union psychologically, since that would avoid an implied public admission on their part that Soviet stockpiles or production capabilities were inferior to those of the United States. CON: 1. [ 4 lines not declassified ] 2. It would be preferable not to harden the terms of our 1966 proposal unnecessarily, since that would open us to accusations by the non-nuclear-weapon states of failing to press in good faith for progress toward nuclear disarmament. Tab A Elements of Proposed Cutoff-Transfer Agreement (Proposed changes from 1966 US position are underlined.) 1. As of an agreed date, the U.S., U.K., and USSR would halt production of fissionable material (uranium enriched in U-235 and plutonium) for use in nuclear weapons. See Note. NOTE : The 1966 Position Paper commented on tritium as follows: “J. Discussion of the tritium problem should be avoided. The US position that tritium production would be for replacement only has been discussed with the UK. If progress in negotiations warrants it the Delegation may request approval to discuss it with the USSR. However, the disposition of tritium from weapons submitted for destruction should not be discussed. “K. Tritium is not a fissionable material, but facilities for the production of tritium would be subject to inspection associated with verification procedures. It is the US position that production of tritium would continue under a cutoff to compensate for the radioactive decay of the tritium in the weapons inventory and the stockpile, and to provide for non-weapons uses U–235 required to fuel reactors for producing tritium for weapons replenishment would be obtained from existing stockpiles. (Footnote) *FYI. A possible limitation on the amount of allowed production of tritium might be obtained by requiring that equivalent amounts of helium-3 be turned in. Preliminary results of an AEC study have shown that the decay of tritium is the only practical source of significant quantities of helium-3. However, tritium production rates are highly classified at this time and declassification would be necessary before any discussions that would reveal these rates could take place. END FYI. 2. Production of fissionable material would be permitted to continue for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons, such as power and propulsion reactors and nuclear explosives for peaceful uses. The International Atomic Energy Agency would be asked to safeguard the nuclear material in each state’s declared peaceful nuclear activities, and verify any declared shutdown facilities for production of fissionable material, to provide assurance of compliance with the agreement. National capabilites would be relied upon to detect any clandestine, undeclared production facilities. (There will not be any mention of reliance on national intelligence capabilities in the tabled draft agreement nor would it be referred to in public speeches. Prior to any private talks on this matter, the Delegation would request instructions). 3. [ 6 lines not declassified ] 4. This transferred material could be obtained by the agreed demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. The destruction procedures would be agreed in advance, and must not disclose classified weapon design information. (The demonstrated destruction of weapons was proposed to counter Soviet charges that the cutoff-transfer proposal was not “disarmament.” The essential U.S. security interest would be satisfied by verifying that the agreed amounts of fissionable material are transferred to safeguarded peaceful uses, whether or not the Soviets destroy real nuclear weapons?) * Tab D Issues Paper Washington, February 28, 1969 SEABED ARMS CONTROL (U) I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM A. Origin of the Seabeds Issue In the past two years the international community has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of exploring and exploiting the resources of the seabed. Within the UN, it has been widely held that if such exploitation is to be in the interests of all mankind, the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. A permanent seabed committee was established in December 1968 by UN Res. 2467A (XXIII) The committee is instructed, inter alia , to study the question of reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed without prejudice to the limits which might be agreed. The first working session of this committee is scheduled for March. Several countries, including the US and USSR, have proposed that the ENDC take up the question of arms control an the seabed The item is on the ENDC provisional agenda for its next session commencing in March. B. Present US Position In a message to the ENDC on July 16 1968 President Johnson proposed that the ENDC: “Take up the question of arms control on the seabed with a view to defining those factors vital to a workable, verifiable, and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.” In a speech in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Seabed on August 23, 1968, the US Representative stated: “We believe it is important to prevent the spread of the arms race to new environments. It is appropriate that the General Assembly should go on record in support of a resolution declaring that the deep ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, considering that the term “peaceful purposes“ does not preclude military activities generally, specific limitations on certain military activities will require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement. Military activities not precluded by such agreements would continue to be conducted in accordance with the principle of freedom of the seas and exclusively for peaceful purposes. “To that end, the United States proposes that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or deep ocean floor. These discussions must also consider the need for reliable and effective means for verifying compliance with such an agreement.” The US repeated that proposal in the UN debate on seabeds on October 29, 1968. The US voted in favor of UNGA Res. 2467A. The proposal approved by President Johnson, as outlined above, has not yet been taken up by the ENDC. C. The Position of the USSR and Others The USSR has also indicated its willingness to discuss arms control for the seabed in the ENDC. It introduced a draft UNGA resolution which would have prohibited all military uses of the seabed beyond the limit of territorial waters. The Soviet Union abstained from voting for UN Res. 2467A. As for the other nuclear powers, the UK will probably support US efforts. France has suggested that the seabed be “non-militarized.” Communist Chinese participation in negotiations or signature of any agreement is not expected in the present time-frame. A number of non-nuclear states have strongly supported reserving the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes, and have advocated complete demilitarization of the seabed, perhaps for economic reasons. NAC has placed the question of seabed arms control on its agenda as a continuing item. Several of our NATO allies supported the US proposal of October 29, 1968 in the UN. II. THE PROBLEM Should the US seek to negotiate an international agreement at the ENDC which would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or should we limit ourselves to discussing the factors vital to such an agreement? The questions which must be examined in determining the US position on this problem are presented below. A summary statement of an illustrative proposal for negotiation is attached as Annex A. A summary statement of illustrative “vital factors” for discussion is attached as Annex B. The nature of a possible agreement and the options open to the US regarding its essential elements, e.g., the activities to be prohibited, the limit of the zone of application, verification, and inspection, are discussed in Annex C. III. ISSUES WOULD SUCH AN AGREEMENT BE IN THE NET US INTEREST? 1. Would it serve the interest of US military security? Pro a. Such an agreement would prevent the spread of the arms race to a new environment. Use of the seabed as an area for the deployment of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would introduce additional complexities in the national security considerations which underlie US-Soviet relations. Such deployments would involve significant technological uncertainties, command and control difficulties, and problems of verification. As a consequence, the dangers of distorted threat perceptions and exaggerated or mistaken responses could increase An agreement accepted by the US and USSR would minimize an element of uncertainty, reduce the possibility of miscalculation, and thus help stabilize the US-Soviet strategic relationship. It would be easier to reach such an agreement now, before such weapons are actually deployed on the seabed. b. The US has no present plans or programs for seabed deployment of nuclear weapons. An agreement along the lines envisioned here would prohibit only those weapons emplaced or fixed on the seabed beyond some agreed line. Such an agreement would not prohibit other military uses of the seabed, nor would it limit the deployment of our SLBM forces. c. Although at present cost-effectiveness factors do not appear to justify the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the US would still have many thousands of square miles of underwater area in the narrow band along its coasts within which it could carry on research and development and deploy such weapons, if required by some future situation. d. While there seems to be little incentive at present for either the US or USSR to place weapons on the seabed, less advanced powers might be tempted to take advantage of the relatively low technological threshold for using crude nuclear devices on the seabed for the purpose of nuclear blackmail in local conflict situations. The existence of an agreement banning such weapons would help discourage states from this course, reducing the perceived utility of some forms of nuclear weapons deployment. e. While it is unlikely that Communist China would sign any such agreement, this potential threat would not be any worse with an agreement than without. The US would not need to respond in kind to a ChiCom seabed deployment because our present weapon systems provide overwhelming retaliatory power. Moreover, such an agreement might facilitate international support for any US response. f. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68 dated 15 August 1968), the US probably could verify by national means deployments of weapons of mass destruction under the open ocean, either individually encapsulated weapons or in missile-launching vehicles, before a substantial number became operational. It appears there is a reasonably good chance of detecting preparations to deploy, such as construction and testing, prior to actual deployment, but it would be difficult to identify a seabed weapons system as such prior to deployment. Once the approximate location of a deployment is known, the US has a limited capability to locate and examine or recover objects from the seabed, but such a process would be costly and time-consuming. All these capabilities must be maintained and improved whether or not an agreement is in effect. The SNIE also indicates that if any signatory decided that it could no longer tolerate the restrictions imposed by the agreement, it is believed that it would abrogate the agreement openly rather than try secret evasion, probably after making covert preparations for the prohibited emplacement in advance of the announcement. g. An agreement would not jeopardize existing or contemplated collective security arrangements. Those military uses of the seabed of significance to US allies would continue, and other military activities within a US ally’s internal waters (such as bases or anchorages) would be unaffected. Con a. An agreement would deny the US the option of using wide areas of the seabed as a means of maintaining the security of its nuclear capability. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the seabed in the area covered by the agreement, the option for their use would be politically foreclosed by this agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the US should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, such a requirement is a possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to possible future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration. b. The US enjoys an advantage in marine engineering and technology. An agreement would deny the US the military benefit of applying its technological lead in this environment. c. If pressures from other countries result in restrictions on seabed deployments, there may be concurrent or subsequent attempts to establish restrictions on military uses of the superjacent waters or the air space above, thus threatening the freedom of maneuver of US forces and other activities vital to US security d. An agreement, whether or not it includes an inspection clause, could be used to put public pressure on the US to reveal the nature or even the location of sensitive US installations. e. The USSR has a land area over twice that of the US, giving it an obvious land-deployment advantage. However, the US has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. A seabed arms control agreement would clearly reduce this US geographic advantage. f. The question of an arms control regime to be applied to the seabeds is one of great complexity and one which requires an acute awareness of the technological and scientific features of this environment. In light of the current ignorance about the oceans and the seabeds, it is impossible to envision all the ramifications which an arms control regime could impose upon the security interests of the US. g. According to a special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68, dated 15 August 1968) the chances of detection and identification of missiles either individually encapsulated or in missile-launching vehicles, would be considerably less in the case of deployment under enclosed seas covered by an agreement than in deployment of such missiles under the open oceans. The deployment of a small number of individually encapsulated missiles or of a few missile-launching vehicles probably would escape detection and identification for some time after initial operational capability. Our chances of detecting deployment of untended nuclear mines which did not make use of external command and control would be minimal. If construction of fixed missile installations an the seabed occurred under enclosed seas, or if the installations were tunnelled from shore, detection and identification might not occur before initial operational capability In the unlikely event that submarines alone were used in the construction of fixed missile installations on the seabed detection and identification would be much more difficult. 2. Would the attempt to negotiate such an agreement at the ENDC serve US political interests? Pro a. US efforts to negotiate this agreement would demonstrate our willingness to cooperate in curbing the arms race by foregoing strategic options, and would help blunt criticism that the US is only interested in arms control for others. Such a demonstration would strengthen our ability to defeat proposals by the Soviet Union and others which would be incompatible with our national security. This would also help us in our efforts to gain further support for the NPT. b. The US supported inclusion of this topic in the ENDC provisional agenda, and also worked in the UN to transfer arms control aspects of seabed questions to the ENDC. We will be expected to come forth with concrete suggestions. Failure to undertake serious negotiations would expose the US to a charge of bad faith and weaken our ability to influence the course of subsequent discussions. c. Given the existing range of possible arms control measures available for discussion, such an agreement is the most likely topic on which multilateral arms control discussions could be held and early progress could be expected. A possible seabed agreement would provide the ENDC with a suitable subject for debate and negotiation, and could reduce pressures for premature efforts to achieve agreement on more difficult issues, such as a CTB. d. US willingness to negotiate on a seabed arms control agreement will strengthen public confidence in the ENDC and help keep these discussions in the forum which best serves US interests. Failure to act positively at the ENDC will not head off debate, but will allow the UN Seabeds Committee to seize control of the issue under conditions less favorable to the US Moreover, this outcome could jeopardize the prospects of gaining agreement an other US objectives, such as legal principles for the seabed. Con a. The US has already proposed that the ENDC examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The ENDC has seabeds on its provisional agenda, and the US could be prepared and willing to undertake an examination of the vital factors without attempting to negotiate a specific proposal. b. Such a measure, even if achieved, would not satisfy demands by other states for comprehensive arms control restrictions for the seabed. Unfriendly states may seize on the omission of conventional weapons and other military activities as evidence that the US intends to proceed with such operations. Such a limited agreement could also be portrayed as inconsistent with the principle of reservation of the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes. c. Even serious discussions on seabeds in the ENDC will not satisfy such members as India, Brazil, and Sweden, who can be expected to continue to insist on discussion of, and progress in, more difficult items, such as a comprehensive test ban and other proposals on which agreement is not likely at this session. d. Regardless of what criterion might be used to limit the zone of application, some states will oppose such an agreement in order to protect their positions on questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction. The US risks raising a series of troublesome bilateral issues with other states. 3. Could ENDC consider the boundaries beyond which the prohibition would apply without adversely affecting attempts to negociate a territorial sea agreement? Pro a. Discussions of a boundary for a seabed arms control agreement, held prior to conclusion of a new territorial sea agreement, would not have an adverse effect on US efforts to negotiate an agreement establishing a maximum territorial sea of 12 miles and providing for passage through or overflight of straits. Such discussions could not reveal any element of the US law of the sea position that is not already widely known; the law of the sea articles agreed ad referendum with the Soviet Union have been distributed to approximately 20 countries by the United States. In 1958 and 1960 we indicated willingness to agree to a broader territorial sea than 3 miles. When efforts to reach agreement failed, we stated that this willingness had been conditioned on such agreement and asserted that we would continue to recognize only 3 miles. Discussions of, or even agreement to, a boundary for an arms control agreement for the seabeds will have no practical effect upon our ability to reassert our present position if concurrent or subsequent efforts fail to establish an agreed territorial sea with concomitant acceptable provisions regarding straits. We have agreed to a 12-mile contiguous zone and a continental shelf boundary that is poorly defined, and have by legislation established a 12-mile fisheries zone without producing such an adverse effect. The international community is fully aware of the complex of marine boundary issues. Discussions of, or agreement to, a boundary for a seabeds arms control agreement will not be viewed as predetermining or prejudicing other boundary issues—such as territorial seas, continental shelf, or fisheries zone. b. Our rights of passage through and overflight of straits would not be legally affected by an arms control agreement for the seabeds, just as they are not affected by several maritime boundaries in addition to the territorial sea. c. As a practical matter, however, discussion of, or agreement to, a boundary for a seabeds arms control agreement could have beneficial effects upon our efforts to reach a satisfactory territorial sea and straits agreement. Success on the straits issue is connected with our willingness to recognize 12-mile territorial sea claims and limited preferential fishing rights beyond 12 miles; it is probably not connected with seabed arms control. The impetus today for a broad territorial sea or fisheries zone stems from economic considerations, primarily fisheries. New claims are being asserted whose breadth is correlated to the continental shelf. A separate and much narrower limit for arms control purposes would, to the extent it has an effect, undercut rather than add impetus to these claims. Though it is not impossible that prior agreement to a 12-mile band of exception from a seabed arms control agreement could give impetus to international agreement to a 12-mile territorial sea without concomitant agreement on straits, as some have argued, it is much more likely that the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries would be seen as a separate set of interrelated issues that should be treated as such. d. Our refusal to discuss a boundary for a seabeds arms control agreement will not preclude difficult issues from arising at any subsequent law of the sea conference called to adopt territorial sea and straits provisions. Earlier discussion of, or agreement to, a boundary for a seabeds arms control measure will not affect our decision on these issues. e. Refusal to discuss a relevant issue such as the boundary issue could create suspicions regarding our motives that could make more difficult meaningful discussion in the ENDC. The UN resolution creating a seabeds committee envisions ENDC discussion of a boundary for an arms control agreement. Con a. The most difficult sea-related question facing the United States today is how to cope with the proliferation of territorial and other jurisdictional claims to the seas adjacent to other countries’ coasts. This is so because there is no internationally agreed maximum limit to these claims, and, as they increase and become entrenched, they will enclose over 100 straits throughout the world. Those straits, when and if closed to the US will effectively impair the ability of the US forces to navigate by sea or air to various parts of the world unless they receive the permission of certain countries to fly over their territory. As overflight of territory becomes increasingly difficult on account of the reluctance of the subjacent state to allow nuclear armed aircraft to fly through their airspace, the right of passage over straits becomes correspondingly more important. b. The US and USSR are now engaged in extremely delicate negotiations looking toward a worldwide law of the sea conference which would establish a 12-mile territorial sea and a right of free passage through and over straits. The traditional position of the US is that we do not need to recognize any claims to territorial seas in excess of three miles. While in practice this has become tenuous, it is nevertheless one of the few things which we have to concede in order to get other countries to agree to our straits proposal and a 12-mile limit. There is constant agitation in the international community with respect to territorial seas, fishing zones, and continental shelf boundary questions. As this agitation increases we run the risk of premature action in the UN on the territorial sea question before the USSR, and this Government can engineer what we hope will be a successful law of the sea conference. Discussion of the boundary for an arms control agreement will complicate these negotiations. If the US shows a willingness to go to a 12-mile limit, we will have once again demonstrated preparedness to use the 12-mile formula albeit for a special purpose. The US has already agreed to a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone and a 12-mile contiguous zone for customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations. The 12-mile territorial sea is now claimed by approximately 40 nations. If the US now indicates willingness to use 12 miles for an arms control boundary we will have for all practical purposes conceded the very issue we are trying to negotiate with the rest of the world. If we are to be involved in boundary discussions we should confine them to forums where we can make concessions to get a properly protected territorial sea. c. Since we will know where we are going with the Soviets in the course of the next year or so, we should wait to discuss the boundary question in the ENDC until after that time. There are several subjects which can be discussed in the ENDC relative to seabeds arms control without the question of boundaries being addressed. US interests would be better served if the boundary question were deferred. d. The US could advise members of the ENDC when the boundary question arises in discussion that it prefers to discuss other subjects for now since there is a great deal of ferment world wide on the question of boundaries, which may be settled in other ways in the relatively near future. The US should not discuss a boundary until we know what activities will ultimately be prohibited and whether we will be able to verify compliance with an agreement. However, if pressured, the US delegation could discuss different methods for drawing a boundary as described in Annex C without discussing any precise mileage figure. Annex A Summary Statement Summary Statement of Illustrative Proposal 1. The United States should seek to negotiate an international agreement at the ENDC pursuant to which the parties would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or ocean floor. 2. The prohibition should extend to launching platforms and delivery vehicles. Any agreement should assure adequate verification of compliance. 3. The prohibition should apply to the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band adjacent to the coast of each party and up to the coast of any other state. The narrow band should be measured as a specified distance from the coast of the parties, preferably to coincide with a wide agreement on a single-limit territorial sea but, failing that, a zone of special jurisdiction specifically for arms control purposes should be agreed which will provide adequate protection for other US interests. Annex B Summary Statement Summary Statement of Illustrative Vital Factors (Some of the factors listed below are more fully described in Annex C.) The ENDC has been asked to examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The examination should focus but not be limited to the following vital factors of such an agreement: 1. What weapons should be included within the term “weapons of mass destruction”? 2. What relationship to the seabed is required to constitute “emplace or fix”? 3. What forms of verification are necessary for such an agreement? 4. To what areas of the seabed should the prohibition of the agreement apply? (D.O.D. believes the precise mileage for the coast should not be discussed until a decision can be made on whether to convene a Law of the Sea Conference to establish a limit for the territorial sea and all the above factors have been discussed and agreed. On the other hand D.O.D. would not object to a discussion of the problems inherent in the different methods of delimiting the areas which should be prohibited.) Annex C Paper Washington, February 28, 1969 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SEABED ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND OPTIONS I. PROBLEM The preceding paper asks whether the US should seek to negotiate an international agreement at the ENDC which would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. Whether or not the decision is affirmative, additional decisions must be taken concerning the essential elements of a possible agreement. This paper discusses the options available to the US with respect to subsidiary questions, such as the activities to be prohibited, the limit of the zone of application, verification, and inspection. It is possible to discuss these questions individually. However, decisions taken on one or more of these matters will necessarily affect the positions taken on some or all of the remaining questions. II. DISCUSSION Some of the essential elements to be considered include: A. Activities to be prohibited : The basic US objective sought by the proposal is to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. There are two ways in which this may be achieved. 1. Prohibition of Weapons Only As used by the US “weapons of mass destruction” are those weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. They can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.” * The language of the proposal should clearly apply to such weapons. Moreover the prohibition should apply only to the emplacement or fixing of those weapons whose principal mode of deployment or operation requires the use of the seabed, and should not apply to other weapons. Indeed, the US should make clear throughout any discussions that such a prohibition would apply only to the seabed, and would not limit the uses of the superjacent waters. Moreover, the definition of ‘weapons’ would not apply to peaceful nuclear (Plowshare) explosive devices. Pro a. It avoids complicated negotiations by limiting the discussions of what is to be prohibited to weapons only. b. It parallels the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. c. It would provide greater latitude for US seabed operations and research. Con a. It permits states to make unrestricted preparations for the actual deployment of weapons. b. It makes verification more difficult, since actual presence of weapons must be established. 2. Prohibition of Weapons, Launching Platforms, and Delivery Vehicles In view of the possibility that some state might try to emplace launching platforms and delivery vehicles in advance of the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, the question arises whether the prohibition should also extend to such launching platforms and delivery vehicles Pro a. It would limit the extent to which states could make preparations for weapons deployment before abrogating the treaty. b. It would increase public confidence in the effectiveness of the measure by avoiding political problems, such as those which followed the introduction of FOBS. c. It would decrease the likelihood of successful evasion, since existence of specific kinds of equipment would constitute evidence of a violation. Con a. It might encourage other states to press for a description of prohibited equipment and installations, thus incurring the risk of making a public issue of sensitive US activities. b. The negotiations on prohibited activities would be made more difficult because certain types of equipment can be adapted or designed to operate either from the seabed or in the superjacent waters B. Zone of Application : The issues involved in the decision to discuss a boundary for the prohibition are stated in the basic paper starting on p.8. There are at least three possible definitions of the limit of the seabed beyond which the prohibition could apply. One approach uses a specified distance measured horizontally from the coast of a state; another uses an isobath or depth limit which would follow a prescribed contour of the submerged area along the coast of a state; the third approach would be based on the outer limited of national jurisdiction. 1. Specified Distance from Coast It should be borne in mind that the US is currently seeking agreement on a single limit territorial sea of 12 miles, which, if successful, would be the recommended limit of the narrow band for arms control purposes as well. If such an agreement on a single limit territorial sea cannot be concluded, the US could consider a zone of special jurisdiction for arms control purposes only, which would not prejudice other US interests. Pro a. Of the three approaches, this limit would be the easiest to determine, non-discriminatory, and therefore more susceptible of wide agreement. b. Such a limit could still provide a large submerged area for US research and weapons deployment, if necessary. c. The establishment of such a zone could be more acceptable to the USSR and other states because no inspection provision would be applicable to the zone. Con a. Existing differences among states concerning the extent of national claims over coastal waters would complicate efforts to achieve agreement on a specified distance from the coast. b. The US could be denied use of most of its continental shelf areas for purposes of weapons deployment. 2. Constant Depth Limit The criterion for measuring the outer limits of the zone would be an isobath or line of uniform depth adjacent to the coast of the parties to the agreement. Pro a. This method would build on the precedent of the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed by 39 states b. It would help disassociate the problem of seabed arms control from the issues relating to uses of the superjacent waters. c. It would permit the US to use much more of the area off the East Coast for weapons deployment depending on the agreed depth limit. Con a. In practice, this method would result in wide variance among the submerged coastal areas to which the measure would not apply. b. This method would infringe on the sovereignty of coastal states whose territorial waters extended beyond the agreed depth limit. c. States with extensive shallow continental shelves might not be effectively restricted. d. Both the negotiation and verification of any such agreement would be complicated by the lack of accurate bathymetric charts. 3. The Outer Limits of National Jurisdiction National jurisdiction over the seabed may be asserted either on the basis of sovereignty, as in the case of territorial seas, or on the basis of sovereign rights, as in the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, whichever is greater. Pro a. This limit would permit each state to use that area of the seabed over which that state claims jurisdiction. For the US, this method could permit weapons deployment on the entire continental shelves. b. Use of this method would not call into question claims of national jurisdiction, and would thereby facilitate agreement. Con a. This method would implicitly strengthen exaggerated claims of jurisdiction made by certain Latin American states and others. These claims are not recognized by the US. b. This method would also result in wide variance among the limits imposed on different states, depending on the claims of jurisdiction advanced by those states. c. Such a limit would not be convincing as an arms control measure because it would permit deployment in wide areas of the seabed. d. This method might encourage states to impose additional restrictions on activities in the superjacent waters of the seabed areas over which they claim jurisdiction, thus further infringing on freedoms recognized under the law of the sea. c. Verification and Inspection : The basic issue with respect to verification is whether the US believes its national verification capabilities are adequate to assure compliance with the agreement. If additional capabilities are desired, then the agreement could include a provision which would permit inspection of enclosed seabed installations. The agreement could adopt the precedent of the Outer Space Treaty regarding inspection on the basis of reciprocity. Pro a. An inspection provision would enhance the confidence of all parties that violations could be detected. b. It would be consistent with the US position that compliance with arms control measures must be verifiable. c. Since the security of US underwater surveillance systems could be compromised by discovery, a request for inspection subsequent to that discovery would not significantly increase the risks of further compromise. d As suggested in SNIE 11–12–68, inspection may be required to confirm the presence of weapons. Con a. An inspection provision could increase the risk of compromise of existing US detection systems. b. An inspection provision might lead to the loss of industrial secrets stemming from non-military research and development on the seabed. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Limdis. Copies were sent to Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, Helms, Seaborg, and Dubridge. * The JCS does not concur on this point. * The JCS does not concur on this point. * The JCS does not concur on this point. [ text not declassified ] * Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage , Washington, 1968 67. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 67. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 5, 1969 SUBJECT: Review Group Meeting, March 6, 1969 There are two items on the agenda for the Review Group meeting: 1. ENDC ENDC opens on March 18. The three major items on the agenda are the test ban, cut-off of the production of fissionable material, and arms control of the seabeds. On each of these issues there is substantial interagency disagreement. There are no agency positions stated in the paper but we know that the JCS are opposed to agreements on each of the three items and object to our publicly supporting agreements. The AEC supports the JCS position on the first two items. ACDA notes that in the past we have publicly supported a test ban and a production cut-off and argues that we should continue to support these proposals. ACDA believes we should advance a specific proposal on the seabeds going beyond our current willingness only to discuss “factors” in such a proposal. The position of State and DOD at high levels is not known, although State is likely to support the ACDA position. On security grounds there is no urgent reason for going forward and legitimate difference as to whether any of the proposals are in our interests. The basic issue is one of the President’s public and international posture. Does he wish to appear publicly as backtracking from proposals to control the arms race which were endorsed by his predecessors? There is a great deal of obfuscation which can be done and we can certainly put forward a position without pushing it if we decide to do so. Your talking points are designed to narrow down and sharpen the issues. 2. NPT Countries The NSSM asked for a study of what our policy should be toward key countries following the President’s decision to seek ratification by us of the treaty. The recommended courses of action are in every case quite moderate and none involve putting pressure on the countries to sign or ratify. This is basically an operational problem which could now be assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee. In effect, we would be assigning the responsibility to that Committee for implementing NSDM 6 using the guidance of this paper. You may want to discuss this with Elliot Richardson before the RG meeting. A letter by the President to the Israeli Prime Minister is suggested. This should be handled as a normal operational matter, with a draft coming from State to the President. Tab A ENDC Agenda In recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee, in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968, for bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles, which was welcomed by members of the Committee, the Co-Chairmen recommended the following provisional agenda which was adopted by the Committee on 15 August 1968: “1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. “Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the nonuse of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc. “2. Non-nuclear measures. “Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc. “3. Other collateral measures. “Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the seabed, etc. “4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The Committee also noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Top Secret. Sent for action. 68. Memorandum for the Record 68. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 7, 1969 SUBJECT: NSC Review Group Meething, 6 March 1969 1. The 6 March meeting of the NSC Review Group dealt with two related subjects: aspects of the Non Proliferation Treaty, and Preparations for the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) scheduled to begin meetings in Geneva on 18 March. 2. Discussion concerning NPT revolved around a paper titled “Positions of Key Countries on the Non Proliferation Treaty”, prepared in response to NSSM #13 by a NSC Ad Hoc committee. This discussion was brief and was directed only at questions of accuracy. Finding that the Review Group was in fundamental concurrence on the paper, Chairman Henry Kissinger directed that the paper, together with NSSM #13, be placed before the Under Secretaries Committee. At present it is not contemplated that NSSM #13 will go before tbe NSC but will be resolved by the Under Secretaries Committee. 3. The discussion concerning preparations for the ENDC session was divided into three parts: (a) issues related to a comprehensive test ban: (b) issues related to a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons; and (c) possible arms control measures for the seabeds. 4. During the discussion of the comprehensive test ban, the consensus appeared to be that favoring this measure is like favoring motherhood—without any of the attendant risks. It was pointed out that the U.S. has favored this position for years while the Soviets have steadily been negative because of its accompanying implications of an international inspection system. The JCS view, however, is that a comprehensive test ban is not in the US interest at the present time and will and will not be for several years to come. It was agreed that the whole position of the US needs to be reviewed by the NSC. The NSC staff was directed by Kissinger to boil NSSM #20 down so that it could be ussd as a basis for NSC discussion. 5. The discussion of the cut-off of production issues was fairly prolonged. Here again the JCS took a negative position regarding the desirability of the proposal. From this discussion emerged the view that it might be desirable to revamp the 1966 US cut-off proposal in the light of more recent considerations. The NSC staff was given the task of laying out a paper which would explore the pros and cons of continuing with the present proposal or setting up a new one. It was also agreed that a briefing would be presented before the NSC on this issue, the participants to be JCS and ACDA. I contracted to provide lnformation on CIA estimates of the Soviet nuclear production between 1966 and the present and a projection into the future. 6. The discussion of the seabeds control measures was fairly brief. Again the JCS took a basically negative view, saying that the JCS believes that not enough information is available at present to determine whether or not such control measures world be in our national interest. Other participants in the discussion agreed that a great deal remains unknown about the technology and utility of seabed nuclear weapons. It was agreed that the basic question to be decided by the NSC is whether negotiations can begin on this subject before eseïtial study is completed. It was agreed that intial discussions could conceivably be held by the disarmament committtee on what are the essential elements of a seabed arms control measure. This issue will be presented to the NSC in a paper from the NSC staff, possibly augmented by a briefing at the meeting. 7. At the outset of the meeting Kissinger announced that the Review Group will meet regularly henceforth at 2:00 pm on each Thursday. He also said that in a recent conversation, the President told him that he likes the options format for NSC papers. He wishes, however, that obviously absurd options be removed and wants the Review Group to indicate which options appear to be the more logical or “respectable”. R.J. Smith 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Director of Central Intelligence, ER Subject File, Box 7, NSC Review Group. Secret. Prepared by R.J. Smith. 69. Issues Papers Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 69. Issues Papers Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, March 8, 1969 ISSUES PAPERS on the U.S. POSITIONS FOR THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) resumes its sessions on Tuesday, March 18, 1969, in Geneva. The agenda includes three major issues on which the US should have a position at the beginning of the meeting: (1) the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB); (2) the Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons; and (3) Seabed Arms Control. The CTB and Production Cutoff have been basic elements of the US arms control position for the past decade. There is little likelihood that agreement could be reached at this time on the previous US proposals for a CTB and the Production Cutoff since they have been consistently opposed by the Soviet Union. The question of Seabed Arms Control is currently a matter of particular international interest, stimulated by recent UN activities in the field. This appears to offer the most promising area for early agreement with the Soviets on a limited arms control measure of international significance, should we decide that such an agreement is in our interest. There will be very strong pressure on the US delegation at the ENDC to take a position on these central issues. In view of the change in Administrations, any attempt to avoid discussion of the issues would probably be interpreted as a reversal in the basic US position. In these circumstances, there are two basic questions to be addressed on each of these proposals: 1. Is the proposal in the net security interest of the US? 2. What position should the US delegation take on the proposal at the ENDC meeting? Separate issues papers on each of these proposals, examining the pros and cons of these basic questions, are attached. Attachment Issue Paper COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) I. THE PROBLEM What position should the US take on the CTB at the ENDC? II. ISSUES The issues to be examined in determining the US position are: 1. Would agreement on a CTB be in the net security interest of the U.S. now ?—in 3 years if, as now scheduled, we complete sufficient testing of ABM and MIRV warheads for initial entry into stockpile? 2. Should the US reiterate its support for a verified CTB at the ENDC? The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along the following lines: 1. Would agreement on a CTB be in the net security interest of the US now?—in 3 years if, as now scheduled, we complete testing of initial operational ABM and MIRY warheads? PRO : a. Test ban now or in 3 years —Such a ban would have security advantages for the US, including: (1) inhibit the Soviets’ ability to develop new weapon systems or improve their existing systems by precluding testing of new warheads for MIRVs or advanced ABMs (this would have more effect now than three years from now); (2) reinforce the NPT and serve as a more acceptable non-proliferation measure to some important states (e.g., India) whose acceptance of a non-nuclear weapon status may be essential to success of NPT; and (3) gain Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections. b. Test ban in 3 years —US will, according to current schedule, have completed test programs for initial operational MIRY and ABM syster CON : a. Test ban during next 2–3 years—Underground testing is necessary to accomplish development of presently planned ABM and MIRV systems. b. Test ban now, or in 3 years— (1) In order to maintain maximum confidence in stockpiled weapons, it is necessary to continue a quality surveillance program including underground tests, in the event modification is necessary. (2) It is not clear what arrangements, if any, could be prescribed in a CTB treaty which would permit development and perhaps even effective use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes without creating a serious loophole for obtaining weapons development data. (3) US military capabilities could be significantly reduced vis-à-vis potential enemies unless nuclear weapon testing is continued or additional delivery capabilities are acquired. If strategic arms limitations were to be adopted, the latter option could be foreclosed making continued testing even more important. Continued testing is necessary for development in confidence of new or improved warheads and the study of damaging effects on weapons systems. 2. Should the US reiterate its support for a verified CTB at the ENDC? PRO: a. The US has supported an adequately verified CTB for more than a decade. A reversal of this position, which has had the formal endorsement of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, would be seen throughout the world as an inauspicious beginning for the new Administration in the field of arms control. b. The Limited Test Ban Treaty calls on the US to pursue negotiations for a CTB, an obligation recalled in the preamble to the NPT. Additionally, the NPT obligates the parties to work toward further nuclear disarmament. Reversal of our position would be used by opponents of the NPT to support their charges that the Treaty is aimed only at nonnuclear states. c. Low-key presentation of our present position would almost certainly not trigger negotiations. In the very unlikely event that the Soviets accept on-site inspections, the resulting negotiations would be quite protracted since they would involve the nature and procedures for on-site inspection and the role of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes This would allow us to control the pace of the negotiations so that we could continue testing until we decided it would be in our net security interest to forego nuclear weapons testing. d. Agreement is in our interest per pros above. CON: a. We should not subject ourselves to any additional pressures to cease testing, which would result if the Soviets accepted our position on verification or if advances in detection and verification capabilities undercut our position on on-site inspections. b. The advent of strategic arms limitations talks would fulfill our NPT obligations to pursue further measures of nuclear arms control and help cover any criticisms of a reversal of our CTB position. c. Agreement is not in our interest per cons above. NOTE: Instead of either low-key reiteration or retraction of our CTB position, we could attempt to evade the problem by either (a) remaining silent on the CTB, or (b) stating that our CTB position was under review. Neither of these alternate courses of action appears viable. If we remain silent, we will be asked questions at the ENDC about our CTB position and continued silence would then be interpreted as a reversal of our position. If we were to state that our CTB position was under review, this would focus more attention on the CTB issue and would thus increase the costs of any eventual reversal of our position. Attachment Washington, March 8, 1969 CUTOFF OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES I. THE PROBLEM What position should be taken at the ENDC on the proposal for the cutoff of fissionable material production for weapons purposes. For more than ten years the US has proposed that the nuclear-weapon powers agree to halt production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, and to transfer agreed quantities of weapons grade fissionable material to peaceful uses. In addition to the cutoff, the U.S. proposal currently on the table also provides for the transfer to peaceful purposes of 60,000 kilograms of U.S. and 40,000 kilograms of Soviet U–235 weapons grade uranium and up to 4,000 kilograms of plutonium. This material would come from the demonstrated destruction of weapons. Verification would involve IAEA safeguards inspection of material transferred to peaceful uses and of declared facilities, and on-site adversary inspection for clandestine facilities. The question has now been raised as to whether this proposal is in our security interests since our present stockpile of nuclear materials would cover existing requirements; it would not cover all future contingency requirements. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed past U.S. cutoff-transfer proposals and is expected to continue to do so. II. ISSUES In these circumstances, the following issues should be examined in determining the U.S. position on the cutoff: 1. Would a cutoff transfer-destruction agreement now be in the overall U.S. security interest? 2. Should the U.S. reiterate its support for the cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement? 3. Should the U.S. put forward a new proposal? The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along the following lines: 1. Would a cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement now be in the over-all U.S. security interest? PRO: a. [ 5 lines not declassified ] It would make it impossible for the Soviets to achieve the “greater-than-expected threat” to the U.S. which the DOD has used for U.S. strategic planning. The U.S., on the other hand, has available enough fissionable material to complete the currently approved weapons stockpile objectives, including the planned Sentinel ABM program and the planned MIRV warheads for Poseidon and Minuteman III, and still meet the transfer-destruction requirements of the proposal. b. The U.S. has already unilaterally ceased production of all enriched uranium and of virtually all plutonium for weapons purposes. According to the Defense Secretary’s Memorandum to the President on Nuclear Weapons Materials, dated January 17, 1969: “Our FY 1969 inventories of uranium and plutonium and programmed tritium production are sufficient for our recommended nuclear warhead stockpile plus the options that may be needed to protect against the combined greater-than-expected Soviet offensive and defensive threats through FY 1977. If we decided to defend Minuteman, we would need additional tritium production for Sprint warheads, but not before FY 1974.” c. Soviet acceptance of IAEA inspection, as required by this proposal, would involve a major opening up of the Soviet Union. d. If the Soviet Union agreed to the proposed transfer to peaceful uses of contained uranium-235 and agreed amounts of plutonium (up to 4,000 kilograms) by the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, the impact on U.S. programs would be far smaller than the impact on the Soviet program. CON: a. [ 6 lines not declassified ] b. [ 2 lines not declassified ] For example, in FY 1977 the JCS recommend a total nuclear warhead stockpile of nearly twice the size recommended by the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it would be pre- mature to foreclose on the JCS position by a cutoff of fissionable materials production. c. There are possible errors as large as 30–40% in U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet production of fissionable material, still larger uncertainties in the amount of fissionable material the Soviets plan to use in their weapons, and which of various possible options they are likely to select for weapons allocation. d. Transfer of plutonium to peaceful uses from “demonstrated destruction” of weapons retired from the stockpile on a current basis would make it impossible to meet the options to protect the U.S. against the combined “greater-than-expected” threats, even if serious measures were taken, such as moving all weapons grade plutonium from non-weapons uses to the weapons program at the time of cutoff. Although we have not taken a public position on this question, tritium production for weapons (apart from that required to compensate for the radioactive decay of the tritium in the weapons inventory and the stockpile) would be terminated at time of cutoff according to our previous internal position. If the agreement included this provision, the tritium requirements for the option to expand the Sentinel system by exercising the option to defend Minuteman by adding additional Sprint missiles could not be met. 2. Should the U.S. reiterate its support for a cutoff-transfer destruction agreement? PRO: a. The U.S. has supported an adequately verified production cutoff for more than a decade. A reversal of this position, which has had the formal endorsement of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, would be seen throughout the world as an inauspicious beginning for the new Administration in the field of arms control. b. NPT obligates the parties to work toward further nuclear disarmament. Reversal of our position would be used by opponents of the NPT to support their charges that the treaty is aimed only at non- nuclear states. c. Low-key presentation’ of our present position would almost certainly not trigger negotiations. In the very unlikely event that the Soviets agreed to a production cutoff-transfer agreement in principle, the resulting negotiations would be quite protracted since they would involve the nature of and procedures for on-site inspection. This would allow us to control the pace of the negotiations so that we could continue production until we decided it would be in our net security interest to forego nuclear weapons production. d. Agreement is in our interest per pros above. CON: a. We should not subject ourselves to any additional pressures to foreclose future production, which would result if the Soviets accepted the desirability of a production cutoff and accepted our position on verification. b. The advent of strategic arms limitation talks would fulfill our NPT obligations to pursue further measures of nuclear arms control and help dover any criticisms of a reversal of our production cutoff position. c. Agreement is not in our interest per cons above. 3. Should the U.S. put forward a new proposal? Such a proposal should involve: (a) modifying the inspection procedures to eliminate adversary on-site inspection for clandestine facilities, thus following the lines of the NPT. The Review Group agreed that the change in inspection requirements was acceptable and would improve our image; (b) eliminating the provision for demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons thereby permitting credit for the transfer of fissionable material other than that removed from weapons on a current basis; (c) requiring equal U.S. and Soviet transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses rather than the present [ less than 1 line not declassified ] (The pros and cons of the last two specific modifications are discussed in the attached tabs,) PRO: a. A new U.S. initiative would demonstrate the new Administration’s interest in progress in arms control. b. The existing proposal could be modified to make it more consistent with our security requirements as described in Tabs A and B and perhaps, by moderating the inspection requirements, more acceptable to the Soviets CON: a. Any new U.S. proposal would attract considerable attention, and we would be under increased pressure to work for its adoption. b. Relaxation of the inspection provisions would increase the risk to the U.S.; the other proposed modifications are not sufficient to make the agreement acceptable on security grounds. Tab A Should the U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal be modified so as to omit the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, but retain the offer to transfer agreed amounts of uranium-235 and plutonium to peaceful purposes ? PRO: a. [ text not declassified ] b. The U.S. would destroy real nuclear weapons, but we would not know whether the alleged Soviet weapons being destroyed were real or not. CON: a. The proposal for demonstrated destruction of weapons has been an effective answer to the Soviet and non-nuclear-weapon countries’ argument that the cutoff-transfer proposal is not disarmament. b. If an agreement were concluded within the next two years, present retirement programs would provide materials for the transfer and still allow sufficient material to meet currently planned U.S. weapon needs through FY 1972. The requirement would not exist to meet the “greater-than-expected” Soviet threat since it would require additional production on their part. c. Regardless of how the U.S. explains withdrawal of its demonstrated destruction proposal, it will be viewed as a regressive step. Since the Soviet Union will almost certainly continue to reject the entire cutoff-transfer proposal, it would be better to maintain the entire U.S. posture by not retracting any part of it at this time. Tab B Should the 1966 U.S. cutoff proposal be modified to call for equal U.S. and Soviet transfers of fissionable material to peaceful use, instead of our previous proposal for asymmetric amounts? PRO: a. The Soviet stockpile has grown appreciably since we offered in 1966 to transfer 60,000 kilograms of uranium-235 if the Soviets would transfer 40,000 kilograms. b. [ 3 lines not declassified ] c. Equal transfers might actually be more acceptable to the Soviet Union psychologically since that would avoid an implied public admission on their part that Soviet stockpiles or production capabilities were inferior to those of the United States. CON: [ 3 lines not declassified ] Attachment Issues Paper Washington, March 8, 1969 SEABED ARMS CONTROL I. THE PROBLEM Should the US offer to negotiate an international agreement to prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or should we limit ourselves to discussing the factors vital to such an agreement? In the past two years the international community has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of exploring and exploiting the resources of the seabed. Many countries, including the United States, have taken the position that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. Several countries, including the US and USSR, have proposed that the ENDC consider the question of arms control on the seabed. Specifically, President Johnson proposed that the ENDC: “Take up the question of arms control on the seabed with a view to defining those factors vital to a workable, verifiable, and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.” II. ISSUES In these circumstances, the following issues should be examined in determining the US position at the ENDC on Seabed Arms Control. 1. Would an agreement be in the overall U.S. security interest? 2. Should the U.S. put forward a specific proposal rather than reiterate its willingness to define factors vital for an agreement? The pros and cons of each of these issues can be summarized along the following lines: 1. Would an agreement be in the overall U.S. security interest? PRO: a. It would prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to a new environment. It would be much easier to negotiate now before nuclear weapons are actually deployed on the seabed. b. The US has no plans or programs for seabed deployment of nuclear weapons. c. Such an agreement would not prohibit non-nuclear military uses of the seabed, nor would it limit the deployment of our SLBM forces. d. Although at present, cost-effectiveness factors do not appear to justify the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the US would still have many thousands of square miles of underwater area in the narrow band along its coasts within which it could carry on research and development and deploy such weapons, if required by some future situation. e. While there seems to be little incentive at present for either the US or USSR to place weapons on the seabed, less advanced powers might be tempted to take advantage of the relatively low technological threshold for using crude nuclear devices on the seabed for the purpose of nuclear blackmail. f. While Communist China would not sign, the existence of such an agreement might provide international support for any US actions to negate Chinese deployments prohibited by the treaty. g. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68, dated August 15, 1968), the US probably could verify by national means deployments of weapons of mass destruction under the open ocean, either individually encapsulated weapons or in missile-launching vehicles, before a substantial number became operational. CON: a. An agreement would deny the US the option of using wide areas of the seabed as a means of maintaining the security of its nuclear capability if this should be required in the future. b. It would deny the US the military benefit of applying its technological lead in this environment. c. While the USSR has a land area over twice that of the US, giving it an obvious land-deployment advantage, the US has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. d. Any such restrictions on Seabed deployments may encourage proposals to establish further restrictions on military uses of the superjacent waters or the air space above. e. It might result in demands that the US reveal information on sensitive US underwater installations. f. In light of the current ignorance about the oceans and the seabeds, it is impossible to envision all the ramifications which an arms control regime could impose upon the security interests of the US. g. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68, dated August 15, 1968), there are a number of circumstances in which our capabilities by national means are limited. These include deployments under enclosed seas or of small numbers of individually encapsulated missiles or missile-launching vehicles. Moreover, our chances of detecting deployment of untended nuclear mines which did not make use of external command and control would be minimal. 2. Should the U.S. put forward a specific proposal rather than merely discuss the factors vital to such an agreement? PRO: a. It would demonstrate our willingness to cooperate in curbing the arms race by foregoing strategic options. This would help gain further support for the NPT. b. Given the existing range of possible arms control measures available for discussion, such an agreement is the most likely topic on which multilateral arms control discussions could be held and early progress could be expected. c. It would provide the ENDC with a suitable subject for debate and negotiation and would reduce pressures for premature efforts to achieve agreement on more difficult issues, such as a CTB. d. It would help keep the seabed discussions in the forum which best serves US interests. Failure to act positively at the ENDC will not head off debate, but will allow the UN Seabeds Committee to seize control of the issue under conditions less favorable to the US. e. Agreement is in our interests per pros above CON: a. The US has already proposed that the ENDC examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, and the ENDC could undertake an examination of the vital factors without attempting to negotiate a specific proposal. This is an adequate basis for discussion. b. Such a measure, even if achieved, would not satisfy demands by other states for comprehensive arms control restrictions for the seabed. c. Even serious discussions on seabeds in the ENDC will not satisfy such members as India, Brazil, and Sweden, who can be expected to continue to insist on discussion of, and progress in, more difficult items, such as a CTB. d. Regardless of what criterion might be used to limit the zone of application, some states will oppose such an agreement in order to protect their positions on questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the US risks raising a series of troublesome bilateral issues with such states at a time when negotiations on the territorial sea are commencing. e. Agreement is not in our interests per cons above. 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, NSC Meeting 1/29–4/9/69, ENDC–3/15/69 Meeting. Top Secret. Jeanne Davis forwarded the papers to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, and George Lincoln under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which she stated that the papers would be discussed at an NSC meeting on March 12. The NSC meeting was held on March 15. 70. Memorandum of Conversation 70. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 10, 1969, 4 p.m. Subject: PART I—ENDC Agenda, NPT and PNEs Participants: His Excellency Anatoly I.Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, ACDA Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Actg Asst Dir, ACDA/IR Ambassador Dobrynin inquired about our plans for the ENDC and whether we planned to press any particular measure. As for the Soviet side, it would stick with its nine-point memorandum. Mr. Smith replied he was not in a position to go Into any detail because our preparations for the ENDC are incomplete. We are aware that the subjects which will draw the most interest are a CTB, Cut-off, an arms control measure for the seabed, and CBW. We have not yet decided on what subject we believe the ENDC can use its time most constructively. However, Mr. Smith said we consider it would be useful for the ENDC to concentrate on practical and realistic measures. The Ambassador Inquired about prospects for Senate action on the NPT and signatures by other countries, particularly those of Japan, Israel, and the FRG. Mr. Smith said the outlook for a strong Senate vote now is better than last autumn, As for other countries mentioned, Mr. Smith was reasonably optimistic they would adhere in due time. He noted that Israel had voted for the UNGA resolution commending the NPT, but the Israelis were concerned about their security. A middle Eastern settlement would help. The Ambassador thought it would not be wise to put the NPT into one pot with all other aspects of the Middle Eastern situation. He observed that the Arab countries had signed the NPT, but he doubted they would ratify unless Israel adheres. Mr. Smith noted the Indians have always been skittish about IAEA inspections. He recalled that the late Dr. Shaba’s views a number of years ago foreshadowed the current Indian position on the NPT. Ambassador Dobrynin disagreed, stating that India’s position has changed over the past three years. An opening was given to the Ambassador to comment on ENDC enlargement. He ducked by saying that Japan’s candidacy for ENDC membership would be more logical if it signed the NPT. The Ambassador inquired about bilateral talks on peaceful nuclear explosions, noting he had also raised this with the Secretary, He was given the reply that this proposal, which we favor in principle, is under active consideration as to timing. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Secret. Drafted on March 11 by Gleysteen. The meeting was held in Smith’s office at ACDA. 71. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President 71. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President 1 Washington, undated ISSUES FOR DECISION NSC MEETING March 12, 1969 ENDC Following the NSC meeting, you may wish to make decisions on the following issues: 1. Test Ban With regard to the Test Ban Treaty, (a) Would a test ban treaty now, or in two or three years, be in our security interests? The Joint Chiefs and the AEC believe that it is not. ACDA believes that it is. The issues are extremely complex and technical. The choices are: (1) Decide a treaty now, or in two or three years, would be in our interest. (2) Decide that a treaty would not be in our interest. (3) Not reach any judgment and order a careful study of the issue. (b) Whatever decisions you make about this question, you will need to decide tactics for the ENDC. The choices are: (1) State our support for a complete test ban and press for an agreement. (No one recommends this position.) (2) State our support for a complete test ban but do not press. (3) Publicly indicate that we no longer favor a test ban. (The JCS recommend this position.) There is agreement that remaining silent or announcing that we are studying the issue are not real options since they would be taken as indicating that we no longer favor a test ban. I believe that announcing a reversal of our position would be such a fundamental change that we should not do that now. I recommend that you announce our support for a comprehensive test ban but instruct Gerard Smith not to press for an agreement. We should then undertake a study of the basic issues. 2. Cutoff a. Is a cutoff in our security interests? Although we have virtually ceased the production of fissionable material, the JCS feel that a cutoff is not in our security interests and the AEC points out that we might not be able to meet certain contingent requirements if there were a cutoff. The options are: (1) Decide that a cutoff is in our security interests. (2) Decide that a cutoff is not in our security interests. (3) Reserve your decision and order a study. b. Whatever you decide on this question, you will need to determine tactics for the ENDC. The choices are: (1) Announce support for the cutoff proposal which the U.S. has advanced in the past. (2) Introduce a new proposal which would modify the existing proposal by limiting the inspection to IAEA monitoring of peaceful production.(There is agreement that this is acceptable. The Joint Chiefs recommend two other modifications, but others object to them and the Chiefs would oppose an agreement in any case.) (3) Announce that we no longer favor a production cutoff. Since the Soviets do not want a cutoff and are very unlikely to change their mind, I believe it will be foolish for us to back off. I recommend that you alter the existing proposal so that the inspection is to be carried out only by the IAEA. We should then undertake a study of the issue including the changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs. 3. Arms Control of the Sea Beds a. Would a ban on the placement of nuclear weapons on the sea beds be in our interests? We have no current plans for affixing nuclear weapons on the sea beds but the Joint Chiefs believe that we should not foreclose our future options at this time. There is general agreement that further study of this matter would not produce any understanding beyond that contained in the current paper. The options are: (1) To decide that an agreement is in our interest. (2) To decide that an agreement is not in our interests. (3) To reserve a final judgment (perhaps based on looking at the details of any agreement which might be negotiated). b. With regard to the tactics, there are two choices: (1) The U.S. has announced a willingness to discuss the factors affecting an agreement in this area. We could begin a discussion of such factors. (2) The U.S. could table a specific proposal. While some work on a proposal has been done, if you decide you want to table a specific proposal, we could indicate at the opening of the talks that one was forthcoming and direct its preparation in a short time. I recommend that you direct that we continue to discuss factors vital to an agreement and not try to develop a specific proposal at this time. 4. Presentation of U.S. Position to the ENDC The options are: (a) A Presidential Statement. Such statements have been presented to the opening of each ENDC session since March, 1962. (b) Have the U.S. negotiators present an opening statement. I recommend that you issue a brief statement. We are working on a draft for your approval. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–21, NSC Meeting, ENDC 3/15/69. Top Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President. 72. Talking Paper Prepared for Secretary of Defense Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 72. Talking Paper Prepared for Secretary of Defense Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: National Security Council Study Memorandum 20—Preparation for ENDC Session ISSUE: The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its sessions on Tuesday, 18 March 1969, in Geneva. The agenda includes three major issues on which the United States should have a position at the beginning of the meeting: (1) The Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB); (2) The Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material (Cutoff); and (3) Seabed Arms Control (Seabeds). The issues papers to be discussed address two basic questions on each of the three proposals: 1. Is the proposal in the net security interest of the United States? 2. What position should the U.S. Delegation take on the proposal at the ENDC meeting? BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION : The issues papers at TAB A were prepared by the staff of the NSC after review by the NSC Review Group of a series of papers prepared by the steering committee formed pursuant to NSSM 20 (TAB B). The views of OSD and JCS were considered in the preparation of these issues papers. At TAB C is the joint OSD/JCS response to the penultimate issues paper. This tab includes three attachments of information specifically requested by the NSC Review Group. The CTB and Production Cutoff have been basic elements of the United States Arms Control position for the past decade. The question of Seabed Arms Control is currently a matter of particular interest, stimulated by recent United Nations activities on the subject of peaceful uses of the seabeds. The United States and the Soviet Union have taken the position in the UN that seabeds arms control should be dealt with by the ENDC, rather than the 42-nation UN Seabeds Committee. At TAB D is a copy of charts on production of fissionable material to be presented by the AEC at this NSC meeting. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) ISSUES: 1. Would agreement on a CTB be in the net security interest of the US now? - in three years if, as now scheduled, we complete testing of initial operational ABM and MIRV warheads? OSD–JCS VIEWS: a. No. Continuation of testing is essential to the maintenance of the U.S. strategic posture. In particular, testing is necessary to develop the ABM and MIRV systems. When the results of these testing programs have been evaluated we will be in a better position to judge the U.S. interest with respect to a CTB. We may also be faced, at that time, with a need to test new systems and this factor would have to be considered as well. b. The premise in the hypothetical question pertaining to three years from now is uncertain. Experience in the MIRV program indicates the achievement of specified time goals is unlikely. Granting the premise, the DOD would have to look at the situation at the time. The only firm position of the JCS is that it is not now in the net security interest of the United States to have a CTBT. 2. Should the United States reiterate its support for a verified CTB in the ENDC? a. Yes. Although, as noted above, OSD agrees with the JCS position from the technical and military point of view, political considerations are overriding and therefore the United States should not reverse its long-standing commitment to a CTB with adequate verification. The pros on the issue of the U.S. continuing to indicate public support for a verified test ban outweigh the cons. This matter is directly related to the progress of talks with the Soviet Union on offensive and defensive strategic weapons limitations and to the current review of U.S. Military Posture and Balance of Power (NSSM #3). b. A reversal of our position at this time could be used by opponents of the NPT to support their charges that the treaty is aimed only at non-nuclear states and puts no meaningful obligations on the nuclear powers. Also, a reversal of the U.S. CTB position would inevitably be seen throughout the world as an inauspicious beginning for the new Administration in the field of arms control. c. There is, however, one potential danger. Despite the fact that we in the U.S. see continued technical problems which would make unacceptable a CTB based on unilateral verification—i.e., no on-site inspection or in-country monitoring stations—other countries may not support us on this. The progress which is being made on seismic identification techniques will very likely cause other countries to be optimistic about a CTB based on unilateral verification, and to interpret the U.S. technical view as politically inspired. JCS VIEWS: No. The United States should not reiterate its support. On the contrary, it should publicly state its need for continued testing, thus reversing the U.S. position. Short of this, the Soviets might accept the tabled U.S. offer at a most inopportune time for the United States. Although the JCS recognize the political disadvantages of such a reversal, they find the alternatives of temporization and low-keyed responses to initiatives undesirable. Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production for Weapons Purposes ISSUES: 1. Would a cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement now be in the overall U.S. security interest? OSD VIEWS : Yes. Since the U.S. has adequate fissionable material for its current requirements and for those expected to arise in at least the next two years, we are in a position to reaffirm our position on a cutoff and accrue several advantages as stated in the pros on this issue. This matter, like the CTB issue, is directly related to the current review of U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power (NSSM #3) and to progress on SALT with the USSR. JCS VIEWS: No. It would not be in the overall U.S. security interest as it would preclude meeting the JSOP weapons requirements FY 70–77. 2. Should the United States reiterate its support for a cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement? OSD VIEWS: Yes. At the ENDC, the U.S. should reaffirm its cutoff proposal, omitting the demonstrated destruction (of sufficient weapons to obtain fissionable material for transfer) provision, and modifying the terms to call for verification similar to that of the NPT (TAB E). In taking the position, the U.S. should make clear that the progress of SALT and current reviews of the military balance will have an impact on future U.S. policy on this matter. JCS VIEWS: No. It should not reiterate its support of a cutoff-transfer agreement. Such reiteration would subject the United States to additional pressure to agree to a proposal that would not be in its overall security interests. 3. Should the United States put forward a new proposal? OSD AND JCS VIEWS: Should political considerations make negotiations on a transfer agreement mandatory, the OSD and JCS take the following positions on contemplated modifications to the current U.S. proposal: a. On modifying the inspection procedures to require less inspection following the lines of the NPT inspection procedures. Yes, provided the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from an agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities neither OSD nor the JCS object to this modification. b. On modifying the U.S. cutoff-transfer proposal to omit the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons but retain the offer to transfer agreed amounts of uranium 235 and plutonium to peaceful purposes. Yes. Neither the OSD nor the JCS have ever opposed a destruction provision provided: (1) U.S. weapon design and construction would not be compromised. (2) Procedures would guarantee that the USSR was positively destroying nuclear weapons. (3) An inspection and verification system is tested to insure feasibility and practicality. (4) Only weapons scheduled for retirement are destroyed. However, since the United States does not have enough weapons scheduled for retirement to obtain the needed fissionable material, OSD and the JCS would support the elimination of the destruction provision. c. On modifying the proposal to call for equal U.S. and Soviet transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses, instead of our previous proposal for asymmetric amounts. Yes, because of the relative increase by the Soviet Union in cumulative production of fissionable material. Seabed Arms Control ISSUES: 1. Would an agreement be in the overall U.S. security interests? OSD/JCS VIEWS: a. No, for the reasons set forth in the cons on page 2 of the Seabeds issues paper. b. While it is premature to decide whether the U.S. should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, such a requirement is a possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to possible future U.S. strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration. c. The question of an arms control regime to be applied to the seabeds is one of great complexity and one which requires an acute awareness of the technological and scientific features of this environment. In light of the current ignorance about the oceans and the seabeds, it is impossible to envision all the ramifications which an arms control regime could impose upon the security interests of the U.S. d. There are four complex and inter-related problems arising from currently active ocean-oriented issues: 1. The outer limit of the continental shelf; 2. The breadth of the territorial sea; 3. Arms Control and demilitarization of the seabed and ocean floor; 4. The legal regime applicable to the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Seabed arms control cannot be resolved separately from the other seabed issues of importance. With four variables to consider, it is impossible at this time for the OSD or the JCS to jointly or separately make sound judgments regarding the security implications of a seabed arms control agreement. e. Based on a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68, dated 15 August 1968), it is the OSD/JCS judgment that national verification capabilities are not adequate to insure compliance with a seabed arms control agreement. 2. Should the U.S. put forward a specific proposal rather than merely discuss the factors vital to such an agreement? OSD/JCS VIEWS: a. No, for the reasons set forth in the Cons on page 4 of the Seabeds issues paper. b. The Department of Defense has previously agreed to the ENDC taking up the question of arms control with a view to defining those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction. A serious study of this question has not yet taken place in the ENDC or within the U.S. Government. A clear definition of these vital factors is far more important to our security interests than the phrase “mere discussion” would make it appear. This study of vital factors should precede negotiations toward any specific arms control agreement. c. The United States is currently engaged in very delicate bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on the matter of the breadth of the territorial sea. The most recent discussions took place at the end of December 1968 and an agreement was reached, ad referendum , in which the United States would go to a twelve-mile limit provided that the right of navigation and overflight could be guaranteed through and over some 116 straits which, would be overlapped by territorial waters under a 12-mile rule. Certain preferential fishing rights for coastal states have been included in the agreement with the Soviets as a quid pro quo for the straits issue. We are now engaged in a series of discussions with our allies and friends, attempting to gain their acceptance and support for this agreement. Department of Defense interest in the successful outcome of these negotiations is such that we must strongly oppose any other discussions on boundaries which could influence the outcome of the territorial sea issue. Consideration of seabed arms control boundary in the ENDC, even in context of “a narrow band” could jeopardize our interests in this critical area. Since we will know where we are going with the Soviets in the course of the next year or so, we should wait to discuss the boundary question in the ENDC until after that time. d. There are several subjects which can be discussed in the ENDC relative to seabeds arms control without the question of boundaries being addressed, such as: activities to be prohibited; zones of application; verification and inspection measures; and definition of terms to be used. U.S. interests would be better served if discussion of the boundary question were deferred. RECOMMENDATIONS: Comprehensive Test Ban - OSD RECOMMENDATION: Support the reiteration of the previous U.S. position on a verified CTB. JCS RECOMMENDATION: Oppose the reiteration of the U.S. position on & CTB and recommend a public statement of the U.S. need for continued testing. Cutoff - OSD RECOMMENDATION: Support the reaffirmation of the U.S. position on a cutoff-transfer agreement. JCS RECOMMENDATION: Oppose the reaffirmation of the U.S. position as not being in our overall security interests. If a decision is made to reaffirm the U.S. position on the matter, OSD/JCS RECOMMENDATION - Support the following modifications: 1. Change the inspection procedures to require less inspection. 2. Eliminate the provisions for demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. 3. Require equal U.S. and USSR transfers of fissionable material to peaceful uses. Seabeds - OSD/JCS RECOMMENDATION - 1. That the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, oppose the proposal that the U.S. offer to negotiate, at this session of the ENDC, an international agreement to prohibit the emplacement on fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. 2. That the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, support the proposal that the ENDC discuss the factors vital to a seabed arms control agreement. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, Box 7, FRC 330–75–103, 388.3 (August 1969). Top Secret. The approval lines on page 7 were signed by Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff and Ralph Earle II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Earle forwarded the talking paper to Laird under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) Document 69 includes the issues papers at Tab A. NSSM 20 at Tab B is Document 64 . The OSD/JCS paper at Tab C is not published. 73. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 73. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 12, 1969 Dear Henry: Since Seabeds is the only ENDC item that appears to be negotiable, I hope I can obtain authority to make a specific proposal for the negotiation of an agreement banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. I believe this is far preferable to the mere examination of “vital factors” without being able to state clearly the type of agreement we have in mind. Sincerely, Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Secret. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by NSC staff member Keeny under cover of a March 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) 74. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 74. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, March 15, 1969 Saturday, March 15, 1969 —D.C. Office I attended a meeting of the National Security Council, in the Cabinet Room at the White House, from approximately 10:00 to 11:15 a.m. Present: President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, Gerard Smith (ACDA), myself, Lee A. DuBridge, Henry Kissinger, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Secretary Melvin Laird (DOD), Secretary William Rogers (DOS), Richard M. Helms (CIA), Elliott Richardson (DOS), and George A. Lincoln (OEP), plus Spurgeon Keeny and Col. Alexander Haig on the side line. When President Nixon entered the room, and we all stood up, he noticed my presence and said, “Hi, Glenn.” After we had all been seated, he called on Kissinger to set the basis for the meeting. Kissinger outlined the three items that were up for discussion: (1) the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB); (2) the Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons; and (3) the Proposal for Seabed Arms Control. He said that on each of these items the U.S. has a present position at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), and the question will be whether the proposal is in the net security interest of the U.S. and should we maintain our present position or should we take a modified position. As an argument for the CTB, he pointed out that such a test ban would inhibit the Soviet progress on the MIRV and the ABM, that the previous problem on this has been a disagreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the matter of on-site inspections, and that our own testing requirements are such that we would be in a position to accept a CTB some three years from now. Arguments against the CTB include our immediate need for testing, our continuing need to validate our weapons stockpile by testing, some inhibition to the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, and our inability to test new weapons concepts. President Nixon then called on Jerry (Smith) to explain the nature of the ENDC and inquired whether the NPT originated from the ENDC. He also indicated that he would want Smith to take positive positions at the ENDC and not merely indulge in gamesmanship. Smith explained the history of the ENDC and pointed out the role it had played in developing the NPT. President Nixon inquired specifically as to Soviet interest in participating in the ENDC and asked if they sent high ranking people to the deliberations. Smith said the Soviets took it very seriously and did send high ranking representatives. He said that the ENDC is a very useful forum and results in much publicity for arms control type negotiations. He also pointed out that there is a commitment in Article VI of the NPT to carry on negotiations in the arms limitation field. President Nixon asked what the Soviets were proposing in the ENDC, and Smith cited such aims as the banning of nuclear weapons, the cutback on strategic nuclear weapons, the prohibition of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons, the banning of underground tests (which raises the problem of on-site inspections, the prohibition of chemical and biological warfare agents, the dismantling of military bases, the creation of nuclear free zones and the peaceful uses of the seabed. The President then asked Smith for a summary of his general views of what the U.S. philosophy should be, and he said that he tended toward a program with the following four objectives: (1) a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons from one country to another (for which the NPT represents great progress); (2) an eventual ban on all nuclear weapons testing; (3) the cutoff in production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons; and (4) a ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons (for which the Antarctic treaty, the Outer Space treaty and now the Seabed Arms Control proposal are examples of progress). The President asked whether it was possible to fix nuclear weapons on the seabed, and Wheeler and I both replied in the affirmative. Smith said that we should probably emphasize the seabed proposal and seek to define what is fixed and also focus on the feasibility of verification. He turned to Helms to comment on verification, and Helms said that verification is feasible. Rogers urged that we reaffirm our support for the Seabed Arms Control proposal and indicated that, in any case, it would probably take four or five years of negotiation to accomplish such a treaty. Smith said it would take as long as he was in office, and the President indicated that it might even take longer than that. The President then asked for the position of the Department of Defense. Secretary Laird said that some elements of the Defense Department had traditionally taken a rather negative position. He said they feel there are certain things that have higher priority, such as the clarification of the outer boundaries of a country in the ocean, the matter of fishing rights, and things of that sort. He said the DOD doesn’t have any definite program for fixing weapons systems in the sea but the Joint Chiefs of Staff have urged that we not make any commitment that would forbid this. He then called on General Wheeler for his views. General Wheeler said that they have some interest and equipment in the seas, including fixed equipment but this is non-nuclear. He said that he doesn’t actually oppose the ultimate attainment of a Seabed Arms Control treaty but there has never been a serious study of its implications, and we don’t know too much about the ocean and the ocean beds. He feels, in connection with negotiating such a treaty, that we could talk about boundaries, verification procedures, etc., and he feels that Smith could be occupied with this aspect for some months. Secretary Laird said that he doesn’t oppose the concept of such a treaty but feels there should be a go-ahead for general discussion although we shouldn’t agree to all the details of the suggested proposals at the present time. The President reiterated that our general posture is against proliferation and the three areas under discussion should be pursued. He said it is important that we not present a picture of dragging our feet. Vice President Agnew said that there is strong support for such a seabed treaty in the Marine Council and in the Senate by such Senators as Pell. DuBridge supported Agnew on this by saying that such a treaty is almost a prerequisite for the large international program for scientific cooperation concerning matters of the ocean which is getting started. He said we would certainly need to agree not to use the ocean for military bases if these programs are going to be successful. The Vice President reiterated that he thought we should go ahead with the seabed treaty because this would be the safest area in which to begin arms talks. The President asked whether Senator Pell was actually so interested, and the Vice President indicated that Pell already has a treaty drawn up for consideration. The President stated that he agrees in principle with going ahead with such a treaty, and that he feels strongly that we should “take a positive position on this.” He said that we should be very specific and not indulge in general malarky in our negotiations. He said we should identify and pick out hard items, make our position clear and negotiate on these. DuBridge indicated again that this would advance the general concept of an International Decade of Ocean Exploration, which has been advanced by the United States, and the President said that perhaps this thought should be used in Smith’s statement at the ENDC. Agnew again emphasized that the International Decade of Ocean Exploration was our initiative. The President emphasized that the treaty should clearly refer to fixed nuclear installations outside of our territorial limits in the ocean. This led to a general discussion of the international controversy that surrounds the 12-mile limit. We then turned to the other items. I said that I was in complete agreement on the desirability of a Seabed Arms Control treaty, but I wanted to identify some problems with the CTB and the proposal for the cutoff of nuclear materials for use in weapons. I said that our testing requirements are such that we couldn’t develop the ABM and the MIRV warheads if we stopped testing immediately. We require a minimum of two more years of testing to develop the SPARTAN warhead and a minimum of one year to develop the MIRV warheads. There are also some other problems that need to be identified. It is desirable to be in a position to test our stockpile weapons of all kinds because we have found in the past a number of problems that made this necessary. Speaking of the cutoff, I mentioned the need to have a provision for continued tritium production. I said that our stockpile of enriched uranium and plutonium is such that we could just barely meet the DOD base weapons program if there was a cutoff within the next year or two and couldn’t entirely meet the DOD contingency program, corresponding to a greater than expected threat, and we, of course, couldn’t come near meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s suggested program. In order to meet the base program, it would be necessary to take all the material from the pipeline and even encroach upon the plutonium set aside for peaceful uses. Smith pointed out that we had quite an edge on the amount of enriched uranium and plutonium in comparison with the Soviets, and, therefore, a cutoff now would be to our advantage. He also said that an arrangement is contemplated whereby the tritium that has decayed would show up as helium-3, which could then be used as a basis for a replacement of the tritium; I agreed that this was an entirely feasible procedure. General Wheeler said that in addition to the problems I had identified was the one of the requirements of continued testing in order to work on the problem of hardening our warheads. He also identified and emphasized the problem of tritium replacement. He said that the Intelligence estimates of the stockpile of Soviet fissionable material were rather soft and, therefore, he wasn’t too impressed by the argument that we had substantially more than that. Helms agreed that they were soft estimates. Kissinger said that it certainly wouldn’t be feasible to walk away from our previous positions. The President said he agreed to this and that we should maintain the three proposals that we were discussing and not withdraw them from the ENDC. He said that with respect to the CTB and the Seabed Arms Control proposal, we should lay out our former position and “let it rest there.” This, then, might be accomplished by a full review within the U.S. Government as to the consequences of these proposals with the view of determining or modifying our future position. He indicted that if our national security depended in a very serious way on making weapons tests we would have to do so, even under the circumstances of a treaty. DuBridge said that he would like to make three points: (1) that the Soviets were catching up with us in their stockpile of fissionable material for weapons and this would stop them from reaching our level; (2) it is becoming easier to detect weapons testing through satellites and seismic means as a result of technological advances and, hence, were in less need of on-site inspections; and (3) that tritium is not fissionable and, there, might not be involved in the cutoff. I said that because tritium is a reactor product, it is treated in the same way as plutonium and would be involved in any cutoff. I said that I wanted to make it clear that I was supporting the U.S. position of the CTB and on the cutoff, especially as the position had been restated by the President. I said I just wanted to make it clear what the problems were and that they were understood. In the case of cutoff in production, I reiterated that it would be very tight to meet the DOD weapons bill requirement even for the base program, and this would be even more difficult if the two Hanford reactors were shut down. I suggested privately to Smith that he bring up the matter of the proposed transfer of 60 tons of enriched uranium-235 from weapons for peaceful uses. Smith brought up this point, pointing out that part of the cutoff proposal was that the U.S. would transfer 60 tons of enriched uranium-235, and the Soviets would transfer 40 tons. Smith said that there had been some suggestions that the U.S. change their position to insist on a 50–50 arrangement with the Soviet Union, but Smith was not in favor of it, Rogers said he thought it would be better not to change any of these positions and that we should stay with the 60–40 ratio; the President agreed with him. Thus, in summary, it was agreed that the U.S. position would be to remain with all three proposals at the ENDC, recognizing that long negotiations would be required and that there would be opportunities to re-evaluate our position as these negotiations proceeded. [Omitted here are the President’s closing comments, in which he indicated that the discussion of Vietnam scheduled for this NSC meeting would be postponed to the next one.] 1 Source: Department of Energy, Records of the U.S AEC, Job 65–42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 99100–99108. Confidential. 75. Letter From President Nixon to the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) 75. Letter From President Nixon to the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) 1 Washington, March 15, 1969 Dear Ambassador Smith, In view of the great importance which I attach to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, I wish to address directly to you, as the new Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the head of our delegation, my instructions regarding the participation of the United States in this conference. The fundamental objective of the United States is a world of enduring peace and justice, in which the differences that separate nations can be resolved without resort to war. Our immediate objective is to leave behind the period of confrontation and to enter an era of negotiation. The task of the delegation of the United States to the disarmament conference is to serve these objectives by pursuing negotiations to achieve concrete measures which will enhance the security of our own country and all countries. The new Administration has now considered the policies which will help us to make progress in this endeavor. I have decided that the Delegation of the United States should take these positions at the Conference. First, in order to assure that the seabed, man’s latest frontier remains free from the nuclear arms race, the United States delegation should indicate that the United States is interested in working out an international agreement that would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. To this end, the United States delegation should seek discussion of the factors necessary for such an international agreement. Such an agreement would, like the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty on Outer Space which are already in effect, prevent an arms race before it had a chance to start. It would ensure that this potentially useful area of the world remained available for peaceful purposes. Second, the United States supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences regarding verification have not permitted achievement of this key arms control measure, efforts must be made towards greater understanding of the verification issue. Third, the United States delegation will continue to press for an agreement to cut off the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to transfer such materials to peaceful purposes. Fourth, while awaiting the United Nations Secretary General’s study on the effects of chemical and biological warfare, the United States Delegation should join with other delegations in exploring any proposals or ideas that could contribute to sound and effective arms control relating to these weapons. Fifth, regarding more extensive measures of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, the United States Delegation should be guided by the understanding that actual reduction of armaments, and not merely limiting their growth or spread, remains our goal. Sixth, regarding the question of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms, the United States hopes that the international political situation will evolve in a way which will permit such talks to begin in the near future. In carrying out these instructions, the United States Delegation should keep in mind my view that efforts toward peace by all nations must be comprehensive. We cannot have realistic hopes for significant progress in the control of arms if the policies of confrontation prevail throughout the world as the rule of international conduct. On the other hand, we must attempt to exploit every opportunity to build a world of peace—to find areas of accord—to bind countries together in cooperative endeavors. A major part of the work of peace is done by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. I expect that all members of the United States Delegation will devote that extra measure of determination, skill, and judgment which this high task merits. I shall follow closely the progress that is made and give my personal consideration to any problems that arise whenever it would be helpful for me to do so. Please convey to all your colleagues my sincere wishes for success in our common endeavor. Over the years, their achievements at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference have been outstanding. I am confident that in the future our efforts, in cooperation with theirs, will be equal to any challenge and will result in progress for the benefit of all. Sincerely, Richard M. Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). No classification marking. 76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 17, 1969 SUBJECT: Instructions for Ambassador Gerard Smith for the ENDC Attached for your approval is the cable of formal instructions to Ambassador Smith for the ENDC which resumes its sessions tomorrow, Tuesday, March 18, in Geneva. This would supplement your letter of general instructions (copy attached) to Ambassador Smith that will be released simultaneously tomorrow in Geneva and Washington. I am submitting this for your personal review since it authorizes Ambassador Smith to propose a change in the verification procedures connected with our proposal for the Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons. Although this change, which had been agreed to by the NSC Review Group, has now been cleared with all agencies, including the AEC and JCS, it does go beyond the decision that emerged from the NSC meeting and is incorporated in your attached letter to the effect that we simply repeat our previous Cutoff proposal. Specifically, the cable authorizes Ambassador Smith to propose that we rely solely on IAEA inspection of declared fissionable-material-production facilities and would drop our previous requirement for on-site inspection for undeclared clandestine facilities. This would parallel the verification procedures required of non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Given our level of intelligence on the Soviet atomic energy program and the quantity of material involved in significant cheating, there is agreement that the IAEA system supplemented by our unilateral intelligence can adequately monitor such an agreement. By reducing the on-site inspection requirement, our proposal would appear to be much more forthcoming and would counter a central Soviet objection. There is still no reason, however, to believe that the Soviets would accept this proposal, at this time. I recommend that you approve the attached cable instructions. Approve [Nixon initialed] Disapprove Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon initialed “Approve.” Attached are Documents 75 and 77 . 77. Telegram 41598 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 77. Telegram 41598 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, March 18, 1969 FOR SMITH FROM THE SECRETARY You are instructed to take the following positions in the ENDC: 1. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). You will indicate that US supports conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban adequately verified (on site inspection). You should also make clear that the US will assist in any reasonable effort to achieve greater understanding of the verification issue involved, and in this connection you are instructed to reiterate the US seismic investigation proposal of December 5, 1968. 2. Cut-Off of Fissionable Materials. You are authorized to reiterate US support for a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. You should propose modified verification procedure of cut-off through acceptance by nuclear states of IAEA safeguards on declared facilities. Your presentation should retain offer transfer agreed amounts U–235 and PU to peaceful purposes, but should leave open question whether all material should come from demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. 3. Arms Control of the Seabeds. You are authorized to state that US favors a treaty which would ban the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. To that end you should seek discussion of the critical factors which need to be considered in developing such an agreement. The list of critical factors to be discussed should include: (a) What weapons should be included within the terms “weapons of mass destruction? Launching platforms and delivery vehicles?” (b) What constitutes “emplace or fix” to the seabed? (c) What forms of verification are necessary for such an agreement? (d) To what areas of the seabed should the prohibition of the agreement apply? You should not allow the prohibition to be extended to conventional weapons nor to peaceful nuclear explosive devices. You should also make clear the US cannot accept complete demilitarization of the seabed. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, USUN, all NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Moscow. Drafted by Kranich (ACDA/IR) and Scoville (ACDA/ST); cleared in ACDA, AEC, DOD, J/PM, and the White House; and approved by Rogers. 78. Soviet Draft Treaty 78. Soviet Draft Treaty 1 Geneva, March 18, 1969 Soviet Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Use for Military Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, March 18, 1969 3 The States Parties to this Treaty, Noting that developing technology makes the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof accessible and suitable for use for military purposes, Considering that the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes serves the interests of maintaining world peace and reducing the arms race, promotes relaxation of international tension and strengthens confidence among States, Being convinced that this Treaty will contribute to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the twelve-mile maritime zone of coastal States is prohibited. It is prohibited to place on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, and to set up military bases, structures, installations, fortifications and other objects of a military nature. Article 2 All installations and structures on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof shall be open on the basis of reciprocity to representatives of other States Parties to this Treaty for verification of the fulfillment by States which have placed such objects thereon of the obligations assumed under this Treaty. Article 3 The outer limit of the twelve-mile maritime zone established for the purposes of this Treaty shall be measured from the same base-lines as are used in defining the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States. Article 4 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ………., which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. 6. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith notify the Governments of all States signatory and acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 7. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 5 This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. DONE in . . . . . at . . . . ., this . . . . . day of . . . . ., . . . . .. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 112–113. No classification marking. 3 (1) ENDC/240, Mar. 18, 1969. 79. Memorandum From the Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 79. Memorandum From the Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 25, 1969 SUBJECT: ENDC Seabed Negotiations Reference your conversation this morning concerning Gerard Smith’s activities on the seabed, at Tab A is a memorandum from Colonel Lemnitzer for you, sent at General Wheeler’s request, which outlines some serious problems they had with ACDA over the weekend. As a result of your instructions this morning and Colonel Lemnitzer’s memorandum, I called John Walsh and gave him the bill of particulars outlined by Colonel Lemnitzer and also asked where the status of the seabed negotiations stood. John stated that he was completely unaware of ACDA’s weekend doings and in order to get a handle on them, would request an immediate report from ACDA on the status of the negotiations, with emphasis on the seabed talks. John feels this action will smoke out any precipitous movement at Geneva with which we may not be aware. Tab A Memorandum from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Lemnitzer) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 25, 1969 SUBJECT: Arms Control Policy-Making 1. General Wheeler has asked me to bring to your attention an example of attempted policy-making through hasty interagency coordination of instructions for U.S. delegates. As you will recall, the recent NSC meeting of March 15 on the current ENDC session, plus the President’s letter of instructions (Tab 1) to Mr. Smith, amplified by State 041598 (Tab 2), clearly illuminated the U.S. position with respect to seabed arms control discussions. 2. However, last Thursday, March 20, ACDA orally requested rapid interagency coordination of additional instructions which clearly stepped beyond the bounds set earlier. As a result of the Chairman’s personal request (Tab 3) on Friday to revise the ACDA draft message, an interagency meeting was held Saturday to redraft the instructions in accordance with the President’s guidance. At Tab 4 is a line-in, line-out comparison of the ACDA draft and the final U.S. message. It would appear that significant changes to the U.S. position with respect to arms control of the seabed would have been implied if the original draft had been dispatched. 3. This method of operation by ACDA is not new. A similar instance relating to seabeds occurred last fall, and you are familiar with the difficulties following the Inauguration concerning consultation with the NATO allies on objectives and principles for strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). In the least, this hasty and leading technique is a bothersome and generally unnecessary procedure. It could be far more serious, however, if this process were to result in the U.S. appearing to make an arms control proposal which the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not, in the interests of the national security, subsequently support. 4. The Joint Staff will continue to monitor as closely as possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff this particular aspect relating to arms control. However, in the interest of presenting the best possible U.S. image in our foreign relations, it might be appropriate to insure that U.S. arms control policy is made whenever possible in a careful, disciplined, and deliberate manner. Tab 3 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, March 21, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Arms Control 1. The attached draft message, orally referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), would commit the United States to positions, on the critical factors of a Seabed Arms Control agreement that are beyond my understanding of the approval given by the President at the NSC meeting on 15 March 1969. It was my interpretation that the list of critical factors should be discussed but that the United States is not irrevocably committed at this time to a fixed position on any one factor. The draft message seeks informally to establish positions on objects of prohibition and the definition of “emplacement or fixing” that should be addressed formally through regular procedures for intergovernmental coordination. 2. Recognizing that the United States will be expected to elaborate on the subjects contained in the President’s letter that was read in the opening meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, it is recommended that the 25 March speech be limited to the instructions that were provided by the Secretary of State in State 041598 of 18 March 1969. The list of critical factors could be mentioned as items for further discussion without committing the United States to a specific course of action on each. Other delegations should be asked to suggest factors that they consider essential to such an agreement. 3. It is recommended that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be requested to prepare a proposed governmental position paper on the factors and that it be formally coordinated. Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Tab 4 Draft Telegram TO: US Mission GENEVA US Mission NATO AmEmbassy TOKYO AmEmbassy CANBERRA INFO: USUN New York AmEmbassy MOSCOW All NATO Capitals STATE FOR Smith SUBJECT: Seabed Arms Control REF: a) STATE 041598 b) TOKYO 2101 c) USNATO 1249 NOTAL d) USUN 837 NOTAL 1. You authorized draw on following for seabed portion your speech for Mar 25. Following intended to elaborate critical factors for discussion outlined reftel but not, rpt not, specifically designed to rebut Soviet draft. However, we fully recognize that in discussing our factors you will directly by or indirectly be relating to issues raised by Soviet draft. You should make this clear with Soviets and others, indicating that Soviet draft being studied with great interest in Washington, and that subsequent fuller comment on Soviet draft will be forthcoming. 2. General U.S. Approach: [text struck through: U.S. firmly-committed to realistic steps to curb arms race on seabed.] U.S. interested in taking realistic steps to prevent arms race on seabed. We pleased other delegations share interest in working out effective and viable international agreement. [text struck through: However we must paint out that complete demilitarization simply unworkable and probably harmful.] In examining this question, we must consider that some seabed uses, such as communication and navigation aids are utilized for both military and nonmilitary purposes. Existence of submarine forces requires states to take action in self-defense, such as warning systems that might use the seabed. Moreover, much useful scientific research on seabeds supported or carried out by military personnel using military nonweapons equipment. Therefore, we must point out that complete demilitarization simply unworkable and probably harmful. [text struck through: Finally] Moreover , U.S. believes it completely impractical to try prohibit conventional weapons on seabed. Encumbering seabeds arms control measure with this type prohibition would raise insuperable verification problems. Such considerations illustrate need for careful study of all relevant factors in developing acceptable agreement. 3. U.S. offers following criteria for consideration any seabed proposal and welcomes views other delegations on these or other relevant factors: a. Objects of Prohibition : U.S. believes most urgent problem is danger of emplacement weapons of mass destruction on seabed. Such weapons, whether nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological in nature, should be banned. [text struck through: However] In view possibility some state might make advance preparation for sudden abrogation any treaty ban of this nature [text struck through: will be necessary include] consideration should be given to whether launching platforms and delivery vehicles for such weapons should be included under the ban . [text struck through: Moreover, care should be taken to avoid foreclosing possible use of peaceful nuclear explosive devices on seabeds for resource exploitation purposes when and if technology makes possible.] b. Meaning of “Emplace or Fix”: Objective of prohibition is to block deployment of specified weapons on, within, beneath, or to seabed. To achieve this, careful consideration must be given exact definition of words “emplace or fix.” [text struck through: should apply both] We must consider whether they should apply to permanent installations affixed to or implanted in seabed [text struck through: and] or should also apply to [text struck through: all] containers or carriers whose principal mode of deployment or operation requires physical contact with seabed. [text struck through: Hence, bottom-crawling machines or missile silos equipped with weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited.] U.S. believes [text struck through: focus of] prohibition must apply to [text struck through: be on] seabed, not waters above seabed, in order avoid infringement traditional freedoms of [text struck through: high seas] navigation. c. Verification and Inspection : U.S. deems it vital to insure compliance with prohibition by all parties through verification procedures. May be desirable draw on useful precedents of [text struck through: Antarctica and] Outer Space Treat [text struck through: ies] y in this respect to establish right of access and inspection. Such right should [text struck through: not be subject to veto but] be based on reciprocity and should not be subject to veto. As in outer space, difficulties of hostile environment probably require reasonable advance notice be given of prospective visit in order avoid dangers to personnel or disruption of normal activity. Consideration of verification question also demonstrates need to restrict scope of prohibition to weapons of mass destruction since otherwise task of inspecting multitude present and future facilities [text struck through: might] would be beyond capabilities. d. Zone of Application of Prohibition: One of most difficult questions is definition of boundaries beyond which prohibition would apply. Regardless of method which might be agreed, U.S. believes goal should be to apply arms control to broad area of seabed [text struck through: broadest possible coverage of seabeds for purpose of arms control.] Therefore, prohibition should apply to seabed beyond a narrow [text struck through: narrowest feasible] band along coasts of states. [text struck through: If you deem it advisable you may proceed to indicate that in order achieve agreement, U.S. believes such zone can be defined for arms control purposes only, without prejudice to the limits that might be agreed for any other purposes.] To extent possible, method chosen to define band should provide ease of determination and uniformity of interpretation, and should be equitable in its application. For example , zone could be defined by several methods: i) One approach is specified horizontal distance from coast.[text struck through: This method seems easy to determine and equitable in application to different states. Soviet draft provides one example.] ii) Another method uses specified isobath or depth limit which would generally follow contour of seabed. [text struck through: This follows precedent of Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf but would result in wide variance among zones for different states and would also be difficult to measure. There are also no agreed world-wide charts in existence.] iii) [text struck through: Third method] Some have suggested method based on outer limits of national jurisdiction deriving from either sovereignty or sovereign rights. This approach would on surface appear feasible because it based on existing boundary claims, but differences in international community regarding legitimate extent of such claims would result in gross inequities and weaken effect of measure by excluding wide areas of seabed from zone of application. 4. Apart from speech you should begin private talks with Soviets on ways to reduce areas of disagreement. You should make clear unacceptability of demilitarization or ban on conventional weapons. FYI. In meantime, ACDA giving consideration [text struck through: being given here] to need for early tabling U.S. counterdraft in order to prevent Sovs from molding discussion solely in terms issues posed in their draft. END FYI. 5. For USMission NATO: You should inform NAC reps prior Mar 25 in appropriate manner of substance paras 1–3. You may say U.S. wishes keep up momentum on this question without establishing firm positions prematurely, pending assessment of Soviet draft and consultation with allies. U.S. believes NAC meeting Mar 26 with ACDA Director Smith appropriate opportunity consult further on this subject. 6. For TOKYO [text struck through: and CANBERRA]: You should inform appropriate officials of [text struck through: GOJ] of substance of paras 1–3 and solicit views on Soviet draft. 7. For USUN: You may draw on substance paras 2–3 for statement to seabeds committee on Mar 27 or 28. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The March 25 memorandum at Tab A has four attachments; the attachments at Tabs 1 and 2 are Documents 75 and 77 ; [3/15 letter; tel 3/18] the draft telegram at Tab 4 was sent, as revised, to the U.S. Mission in Geneva on March 22. (Telegram 44780; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3) 80. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) 80. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Smith) 1 Geneva, March 25, 1969 Statement by ACDA Director Smith to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, March 25, 1969 1 7. I have listened with close attention to the statements that have been made by various representatives here since the opening of this session of our Conference and fully appreciate the concerns that have been expressed about the need to move forward with the work of our Committee. I share the hopes that this and subsequent sessions will be productive. I appreciate the opportunity to hear the observations of my colleagues here, both in formal meetings and in equally important private conversations. 8. Good will alone cannot create results. All of us know only too well that it is not enough to be for peace we must also work for concrete measures that make for peace. Only through the constant efforts of people determined to change the world will we move forward to our common goals. 9. May I be permitted to make a personal comment? It was this kind of determined effort by the men who have served before me in the United States Government that helped to make possible the achievements of the past few years. Bill Foster, my distinguished predecessor and long-time friend, and Adrian Fisher, whose able mind has contributed to the solution of so many problems, have helped members of this Conference to turn hope into reality. I shall seek to emulate them. 10. I wish at this time to make some general observations about our work and then to set forth the views of the United States on one of the items in our agenda. 11. First there is the question of where we are, and where and by what means we should go from here. Certain limited but still highly significant successes have been achieved in the past. I need not elaborate on these to this Conference, but we must not forget that the first steps are sometimes the most difficult. Moreover, our achievements have significance beyond their direct effects for they have started the process of bringing the nuclear arms race under some control. Certainly the world is different today from what it would have been without those agreements. 12. As for the future, progress on arms control and disarmament is a many-faceted undertaking. We need not and should not be forced into an arbitrary decision as to which area or measure should receive priority to the exclusion of others. Of course, we can determine which areas have a logical relationship to the foundations we have already laid and to our goals for the foreseeable future. My point is that we should not be rigid in our priorities. 13. I think this Committee can and should explore various measures concurrently. In that way our understanding can be increased and our differences reduced. It is to be hoped that some agreements can be reached without delay. 14. It is not fair or necessary to assume that the monopoly of the time of this Committee which the negotiations for the non-proliferation Treaty 2 produced will be repeated in connection with some other arms control measure. There are few negotiations that are without complications, and I do not infer that our task in the future will be simple. However, it is important that we keep in mind that the non-proliferation negotiations were of a special kind. Some students of current history have said that, because of the variety of technical and political issues involved and the number of countries immediately affected, those negotiations were among the most complicated and involved international negotiations since the end of the Second World War. Therefore I believe that we should not be too concerned that any one measure might monopolize the attention of this Committee. We must try to move forward in all relevant areas while remaining alert to any opportunities to move forward more rapidly to the conclusion of a particular agreement. Any agreement we reach makes other possible accords less difficult and more probable. 15. President Nixon, in his letter which I submitted on 18 March, discussed areas which the United States believes merit particular attention. 3 16. There is common agreement, I believe, that the prospects for progress in one particular area lie in bilateral discussions. A number of representatives here have quite rightly referred to the importance of prospective strategic arms limitation talks. The critical significance of such talks in the efforts to bring the nuclear arms race under control is obvious. That the obligations of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty are relevant in this regard no one would dispute. But I think it is important that we keep in mind that it is a question not merely of obligation, but rather of opportunity to control the nuclear arms race and thereby increase international, security and reduce the burdens of the arms race, that is of greatest relevancy. 17. In this regard it should perhaps be pointed out that under the recent Administration of President Johnson the United States Government had made preparations and last August was ready and willing to commence such negotiations on strategic arms limitations. Now it is only prudent for the new Administration of my country to prepare itself thoroughly for negotiations that could be of a most sensitive nature, going to the heart of the strategic balance in the world and having a direct and central bearing on the mutual security of the United States, its allies, and indeed much of the world. In matters of this magnitude careful preparation is the greatest contribution that a nation can make to fruitful negotiations. 18. The question of timing is thus two-fold. The passage of some time is needed for the new Administration to make the necessary preparations; and the timing should be favorable in a political sense if even carefully prepared strategic arms limitation talks are to proceed with real promise of being productive. 19. At this point I should like to submit one additional thought which I would hope members of this Committee and their Governments would keep in mind. My Government is fully aware of the responsibilities which it, along with others, carries to make every effort to halt the nuclear anus race. Therefore in major national defense decisions taken in the present, and in the absence of relevant arms-control agreements, every effort is made to see that they are not provocative and that they will not make arms-control negotiations more difficult. This type of consideration, we believe, is also in the spirit of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. 20. With respect to the questions on the agenda of this Committee 4 the United States, as I have indicated, will submit views during the course of this session which we hope will contribute to progress in our work. In particular, I hope we can have profitable and realistic exchanges on a comprehensive test ban and on the long-standing proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. My delegation will return to these matters in later statements. 21. We have not failed to note the importance attached to progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This general concern is evident not only in the joint memorandum of 26 August 1968 submitted by eight members of this Conference 5 and in a recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, 6 but also in the remarks of previous speakers during the present session. 22. My Government understands and shares the vital concern felt by others. President Nixon’s message reaffirmed our commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban, adequately verified. To achieve adequate verification, the principles and techniques of verification methods, their capabilities and limitations must be understood and appropriately implemented in any comprehensive test-ban agreement. It is well known that we continue to believe that a certain number of on-site inspections are essential for adequate verification. 23. With respect to seismic research designed to improve seismic verification methods, I am gratified by the interest expressed so recently by Ambassador Sule Kolo of Nigeria 7 and Ambassador Porter of the United Kingdom 8 in the United States seismic investigation proposal which was set forth on 5 December 1968 by my predecessor, Ambassador Foster, in the First Committee of the General Assembly. 9 I can now say that in the course of this year there are two possible nuclear experiments in the United States Atomic Energy Commission’s “Plowshare” programme that could be used in implementing our seismic investigation proposal. These experiments are research and development tests in the field of commercial application, and they will depend upon the working out of necessary arrangements with private concerns involved. Until such arrangements are final, data concerning them must be considered tentative. 24. As currently programmed, these two experiments are to take place in west-central Colorado. The first of these would be held in late May or June and the second towards the end of the year. The first experiment is conceived as a forty, kiloton explosion - with a possible upper limit of sixty kilotons - which is to take place in a type of sandstone at a depth of a mile and a half. The second would be similar to the “Gas Buggy” experiment, with which I am sure you are familiar. Its yield would be about twenty-six kilotons and it would be detonated at a depth of 3,300 feet—also in a form of sandstone. As final contract arrangements are completed, we will be in a position to make available more specific data on time, location, geological medium, depth and yield for these tests. 25. I think all delegations here have also given attention to the 1968 report on seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions, drawn up under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research at Stockholm (SIPRI). 10 The advances in seismic science described in that report were the product of research conducted in a number of countries represented here. We hope that such research will continue to be pursued diligently, and that the conclusions contained in this SIPRI report will be further refined. We believe this type of research will assist us in our task of achieving an adequately verified comprehensive test-ban treaty. 26. Today, however, I wish to set forth some substantive comments on another item on our agenda. I refer to the question of arms control for the sea-bed. I should like to use my remaining time to present observations on this subject for two reasons. First, it is appropriate that various views on this subject should be submitted for consideration early in our session because this is a relatively new item. There is a background of facts, positions and views on several of the other items, but this item is not one where a full understanding of facts and attitudes of the various countries is at present available to form the basis for serious discussion. Therefore it seems wise for the United States delegation at the outset to submit some comments on this subject, as the Soviet delegation submitted some views on this subject in the form of a draft treaty 11 —although my delegation does not believe we are quite at the stage where trying to agree on treaty language would be the best way to go about reaching an agreement. 27. Secondly, it is appropriate to discuss the sea-bed item now because there is intrinsic merit in our seeking to prevent a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed while there is still time. This has been called preventive disarmament or preventive non-armament. The significance of action to preclude new types of arms races from beginning should never be under-emphasized if we are to be successful in our efforts to halt the arms race. Our initial successes so far have been partial efforts to limit the arms race in some areas or to exclude other areas from arms competition. We have been trying with some success to fence in the arms race. This is true of the partial test-ban Treaty. 12 It is true of the Antarctic Treaty 13 and, in a more significant sense, of the outer space Treaty. 14 28. If we ignore areas of potential arms development while exploring areas of present arms competition, we run the risk that the potentials for agreement in the areas where there is at present an arms competition may, as the moment of success draws nearer, be neutralized or upset by a developing arms competition in a new area. 29. There is a third and perhaps intangible reason why it would be important to reach agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons on the sea-bed. Even if such an agreement might not trench upon existing military competition, it could not help but have certain positive psychological and political effects upon the international scene. 30. May I therefore make some initial observations on the problem of preventing the sea-bed from becoming an area for the nuclear arms race? 31. We are all aware that in the past two years the international community has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of exploring and exploiting the vast resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The United Nations General Assembly responded to this interest by establishing first an Ad Hoc Committee 15 and then a permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The United Nations has called upon the permanent Committee to— inter alia …study further, within the context of the title of the item, and taking into account the studies and international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament, the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor without prejudice to the limits which may be agreed upon in this respect. 16 The request in that resolution that the sea-bed Committee should take into account international negotiations being undertaken in the field of disarmament is a clear indication that the Committee, now concluding its first working session in New York, will closely watch what progress is made here on the question of sea-bed arms limitations. 32. Technological advances are continually being made which increase the types and extent of operations on the sea-bed. At present the high cost of operating in this difficult environment has effectively limited commercial exploitation to relatively shallow waters. However, it seems clear that scientific and commercial activities will soon be moving into deeper waters. Likewise, as technical capabilities are developed and improved the possibility increases that the sea-bed could be used as a new environment for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 33. The United States is interested in taking realistic steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. We are pleased that other delegations share an interest in working out an effective and viable international agreement. In this regard the draft treaty submitted to this Committee by the Soviet Union is being studied with great interest in Washington, and we expect to comment on it more fully at a future meeting. 34. In examining the question of arms control on the sea-bed we must consider that some sea-bed uses, such as communication and navigation aids, are for both military and non-military purposes. The existence of submarine fleets requires States to take action in self-defense, such as establishing warning systems that use the sea-bed. Moreover, much useful scientific research on the sea-bed is supported or carried out by military personnel using military non-weapons equipment. Therefore we must point out that complete demilitarization of the sea-bed would, in our judgment be simply unworkable and probably harmful. 35. Moreover, the United States believes that it is completely impractical to try to prohibit conventional weapons on the sea-bed. Encumbering a sea-bed arms control measure with that type of prohibition would raise insuperable verification problems. Such considerations illustrate the need for a careful study of all the relevant factors in developing an acceptable agreement. 36. The United States offers the following criteria, for consideration of a sea-bed agreement and would welcome the views of other delegations n these or other relevant factors. 37. First, the United States believes that the most urgent problem is the danger of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Such deployments, whether nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological in nature, should be banned. In view of the possibility that some State might make advance preparation for the sudden abrogation of any treaty ban of this nature, consideration should be given to whether sea-bed-based launching platforms and delivery vehicles for such weapons should be included under the ban. 38. Second, the objective of the prohibition is to block deployment of specific weapons on, within, beneath or to the sea-bed. To achieve that, careful consideration must be given to the exact definition of the words “emplace or fix”. We must consider whether they should apply only to permanent installations affixed to or implanted in the sea-bed, or also to containers or carriers whose principal mode of deployment or operation requires physical contact with the sea-bed. At the same time we should take care that the prohibition applies only to the sea-bed and not to the superjacent waters. The age-old doctrine of freedom of navigation is the foundation of international maritime law, and we must be certain that our agreement in no way infringes that freedom. 39. Third, in order to constitute a genuine and stable contribution to international peace and security, any arms control measure relating to the sea-bed should be of such a nature that the participating countries could feel confident that all participants were fulfilling their obligations. Verification of compliance could involve special problems in the geographically hostile environment of the sea-bed. Nevertheless, the United States, which has consistently supported the principles of adequate verification of arms control measures believes that some appropriate provision must be included in the agreement in order to provide the needed reassurances that all the provisions are being complied with. In this respect it may be desirable to draw on useful precedents of the outer space Treaty to establish a right of access and inspection. Such a right should be based on reciprocity and should not confer, or imply the existence of, any right or power to veto proposed visits. 40. As in outer space, the difficulties of the environment probably, require that representatives should give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit. That would permit maximum precautions to be taken to avoid dangers to personnel and the disruption of the normal operations of the equipment or the facility. 41. Consideration of the verification question also demonstrates the need to restrict the scope of the prohibition to weapons of mass destruction, since otherwise the task of inspecting the multitude of present and future facilities would be beyond capabilities. 42. Fourth, one of the most difficult questions is the definition of the boundaries beyond which the prohibition would apply. Regardless of the method which might be agreed, the United States believes that the goal should be to apply the arms control measure to as broad an area of the sea-bed as possible; therefore the prohibition should, we think, apply to the sea-bed beyond a narrow band along the coasts of States. To the extent possible, the method chosen to define that band should provide ease of determination and uniformity of interpretation, and should be equitable in its application. For example, the zone could be defined by several methods such as: (1) A specified horizontal distance from the coast; (2) The use of a specified isobath or depth limit which would generally follow the contour of the sea-bed; or (3) As some have suggested, a method based on the outer limits of national jurisdiction derived from either sovereignty or sovereign rights. This approach, at first glance, would appear feasible because it is based on existing boundary claims. However, the differences in the international community regarding the legitimate extent of such claims would result in gross inequities and would weaken the effect of the measure by excluding wide areas of the sea-bed from the zone of application. 43. Those are some of the considerations which will need to be discussed before an effective international agreement can be worked out, and we urge the Committee to undertake such discussions as soon as possible. In this way we shall be doing what the world community expects of us: seeking ways to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to new environments, and at the same time helping to ensure that the potential for peaceful purposes of this great area of our planet will be enhanced. If we can do this much, it will be no small accomplishment. In effect, we shall have placed nearly 70 per cent of the earth’s surface off-limits to the arms race and shall have achieved a significant restraint on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction. 44. I am sorry I have had to make a rather lengthy statement today, particularly in view of the fact that there are still two representatives on the list of speakers for today. I did, however, wish to set forth the considerations in my statement, since I shall have to return for a time to Washington, where, as you know, I have the responsibility of heading a Federal Agency. Since I only recently assumed this position, the obligations requiring my presence in Washington are obviously greater than will normally be the case. I am glad to say that after my departure the United States delegation will be headed by Mr. Adrian Fisher, whose abilities and whose contributions in the past are well known to members of this Committee. I hope that through deliberations in this Committee we shall move forward to new agreements. While I am in Washington I shall devote my efforts to ensuring that the United States contribution to that task is a positive one. 45. Finally, on behalf of my delegation I should like to welcome the return to this Committee of the doyenne of our disarmament negotiations, Mrs. Myrdal, and to express our pleasure in having the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Zagari, with us today. I should also like to thank other representatives for their warm words of welcome to me. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 131–138. No classification marking. 1 (1) ENDC/PV.397, pp. 4–13. 2 (2) The treaty appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 461–465. 3 Ante, pp. 109–110. 4 Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 583–584. 5 Ibid., pp. 589–591. 6 Ibid., pp. 796–797. 7 ENDC/PV.396, p. 7. 8 Ibid., p. 11. 9 Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 769–770. 10 Ibid., pp. 455–458. 11 Ante, pp. 112–113. 12 Documents on Disarmament, 1963 , pp. 291–293. 13 Ibid., 1944–1959, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556. 14 Ibid., 1967, pp. 38–43. 15 Ibid., pp. 727–729. 16 Ibid., 1968, pp. 802–804. 81. Telegram 965 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 81. Telegram 965 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, March 25, 1969, 1915Z. Subject: March 25 Co-Chairmen Meeting Summary: Roshchin said Smith’s comments on seabed being reported fully to Moscow and he indicated hope basis for US-Soviet agreement would emerge. He suggested US present counter-draft to Article I. Smith said he believed it necessary agree first on what agreement would ban; otherwise issues such as verification would be hopelessly complicated. End summary. At March 25 Co-Chairmen meeting Smith said he had instructions begin private talks with SovDel to reduce areas of disagreement. He thought there no point in discussing questions like verification or geographic jurisdiction until it was settled what treaty would ban. Smith said that Soviet draft would prevent warships from anchoring outside a 12-mile zone and asked whether USSR itself could accept such a restriction. Roshchin agreed this would be difficult for Soviet Navy: but pointed out that conventional weapons which could be used for offensive purposes should be covered. He also agreed treaty should not ban military communication which shared facilities on seabed with civilian uses. Roshchin said Soviets prepared discuss what would be banned and would welcome counter-draft of Article I from US. Roshchin said he understood we would wish to consult with our allies, just as Soviets would want to consult theirs, but believed best procedure to obtain agreement was to follow NPT example of Co-Chairmen agreement, presentation and discussion in ENDC, and later presentation at UNGA. He recognized it unlikely we could reach agreement during current ENDC session, but considered it essential to have agreement at summer session in order to present 24th UNGA with concrete ENDC arms control measure. Smith replied he would explore possibilities for next steps when he returned to Washington but hope US and Soviet dels in Geneva would continue efforts narrow differences. Soviets raised question about geographic coverage. Smith replied we were thinking more in terms of first two approaches mentioned in this speech. Roshchin said isobath limit would raise questions about continental shelf and run into competing national claims. Soviet draft deliberately worded to avoid thorny continental shelf problem. Grinevsky added that Soviets did not wish to prejudge results of a future Law of Sea conference through provisions of a seabeds arms control measure. Smith asked whether Soviets envisaged their draft as exending ban to Sea of Azov and Caspian Sea. Roshchin replied that ban would apply to all open seas, such as Mediterranean and Black Seas, but would not apply to Caspian Sea, which is closed except to USSR and Iran. By same analogy ban would not apply to Great Lakes, which matter for US-Canadian decision. On verification issue Smith said we envisaged approach similar to outer space treaty. If ban covered other than weapons of mass destruction inspection of facilities of all naval powers would be involved. It would be possible to get some degree of satisfaction through national verification of a seabeds measure if delivery vehicles for nuclear and mass destruction weapons were what one was looking for. But it inconceivable how we would go about verifying other miltary activities on seabed—if our objective is to have realistic agreement. Roshchin noted this was interesting point and again suggested US submit counter-draft on Article I. During luncheon which preceded meeting, Soviets complained about attacks against ENDC and Co-Chairmen at UNGA. Some of same countries which used to harangue US and USSR about easing East-West tensions complain about cooperation of US and USSR in arms control field. Roshchin indicated he did not know how to resolve this problem other than to make ENDC as effective forum as possible. For this reason he hoped we could develop concrete measure before 24th UNGA. His delegation would stand ready discuss matters with ours on same basis which successfully produced complicated NPT project. Smith responded that Fisher would be coming over soon and of course Gleysteen would be available at any time. Tubby 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret; Limdis; Priority. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the telegram to Kissinger under a covering note noting “that things seem to be moving quite fast on this” and “we may find ourselves in the midst of a real negotiation on a treaty on the basis, so far, of telegraphic instructions rather than an NSC decision.” (Ibid.) 82. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 82. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, March 28, 1969 Smith wanted to know if there had been any changes in our course of action in light of Sec. Rogers’ testimony yesterday. HAK said not from this end of town. HAK wanted to know how things were going in Geneva. Smith said fine and that if we wanted the Seabed Treaty we could probably get one. He said a draft treaty had been drawn and would be in HAK’s hands soon. HAK said he thought it should go before the NSC. Smith agreed. HAK wanted to know Smith’s personal recommendation. S said he thought we should. The Soviets want to move in this direction too. HAK said he wanted to go over Butch Fisher’s paper and would call Smith back after reviewing it. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 359, 14–31 March 1969. No classification marking. 83. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 83. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 8, 1969 SUBJECT: Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds The debate on arms control of the seabeds has moved more rapidly at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva than was anticipated during our discussion of the subject at the NSC meeting on March 15. The Soviet Union has now tabled a draft treaty prohibiting all military uses of the seabeds. ACDA would like to counter the unacceptable Soviet draft treaty with a U.S. draft treaty for nuclear arms control of the seabeds. Moreover, ACDA believes that there is evidence that such a treaty might be acceptable to the Soviet Union. As you recall, Secretary Laird and General Wheeler expressed reservations about such a treaty at the March 15 NSC meeting. Nevertheless, on the understanding that the negotiation of such a treaty would take a long time, Gerry Smith was authorized to take a forthcoming position at the ENDC and indicate our interest in working out an international agreement. In these circumstances, before deciding to accelerate the negotiation by tabling a U.S. draft treaty, I believe the NSC should first consider whether such a treaty would, in fact, be in the overall U.S. interest; and, if so, on what time scale we should proceed with the negotiations. The study will have to be conducted on a relatively short time schedule if we want to maintain the option of tabling a draft treaty at the present session of the ENDC which will recess in the middle of May. However, the study should not be difficult for the interested agencies to prepare since much of the material was covered in connection with the preparation for the resumption of the ENDC. If you approve, I will sign the attached NSSM requesting a study on the issue of a possible treaty on nuclear arms control of the seabeds. Approve [Nixon initialed] Disapprove Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–146, NSSM 41. Confidential. Nixon initialed “Approve.” The attachment at Tab A is not published. The signed and dated NSSM is Document 202 . 84. National Security Study Memorandum 41 84. National Security Study Memorandum 41 1 Washington, April 11, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Science Adviser to the President SUBJECT: Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds The President has directed that a study be prepared on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds. The study should examine:— a) the pros and cons of whether such a treaty is in the overall U.S. interests; b) the pros and cons of the alternative formulations of the specific provisions of such a treaty; c) the prospects for obtaining agreement on the various formulations of the treaty; and d) the factors affecting the timing of our proposing a specific treaty draft. The study should include complete drafts of the alternative formulations of the treaty considered in the study. The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc NSC Steering Committee, chaired by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with representatives of the following: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Science Adviser to the President. The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by April 18, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1–42). Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum. 85. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 85. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 23, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Nuclear Arms Control Item for RG Meeting April 25 ACDA would like to table a draft US treaty on seabed nuclear arms control at the ENDC before it recesses on or about May 22. ACDA believes that this is the only effective response to the unacceptable Soviet draft treaty calling for prohibition of all military activities on the seabed which was tabled at the beginning of this ENDC session. As a result of the NSC meeting on March 12, ACDA was given authority to take a forthcoming posture on this subject at the ENDC and to indicate our interest in working out an agreement in due course. The issue was not resolved at the NSC meeting as to whether we are in fact prepared to negotiate a specific treaty at this time. The NSSM 41 study, therefore, has re-examined the desirability for such a treaty to overall US interests and the specific alternative formulations of such a draft treaty. The JCS will take the position that such a treaty is not in our overall interest, while State will support ACDA is position that the treaty is in our overall interest at this time. The JCS staff anticipates that the JCS will be over-ruled in this matter and is recommending that the JCS oppose the ACDA position on the following four specific points of treaty language (see summary paper for more detailed explanations): 1. ACDA believes the treaty should cover all nuclear weapons on the seabed, while the JCS believes it should cover fixed -only nuclear weapons. 2. ACDA believes the prohibition should extend beyond a narrow band up to the coast of any other state, while the JCS believes it should extend beyond a narrow band up to a corresponding band adjacent to the coast of any other state. 3. ACDA believes the width of the narrow band beyond which the prohibition would apply should be 12 miles , while the JCS believes it should be 3 miles . 4. ACDA believes the treaty should formally provide for inspection , while the JCS believes there should not be such a provision. None of these issues is of overriding importance. Whatever position we initially put forward we will almost certainly find ourselves compromising later. The Soviets have proposed that there be inspection , but they and others would almost certainly accept our proposal to drop an inspection clause. The key issue here is whether we want to be in the position of asking for less inspection than the Russians are prepared to accept, balanced off against the military’s desire not to give the Soviets the right to examine U.S. military installations on the seabeds. The Soviets have proposed that the ban apply only up to a corresponding band adjacent to the coast of any state and this appears logical since in effect we would be banning these weapons from international waters. With regard to the 12 versus 3 mile limit the Chiefs are concerned about the impact on other negotiations in which we are prepared to accept the 12 mile limit but only in return for innocent passage through straits. State does not feel that our position in these other negotiations would be jeopardized by listing 12 miles in this draft. The Chiefs would like the added flexibility of banning only fixed installations . If we start out with this position we will almost certainly end up agreeing to ban as well mobile systems which move along the seabeds in return for Soviet willingness to drop a ban on other military activities. There seems to be general agreement that, if we decide to table a treaty it should be done as soon as consultation with our allies will permit so that we can improve our negotiating posture at the ENDC and keep the UN Seabeds Committee from taking over the issue. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–35, Senior Review Group Meeting, Seabeds 4/25/69. Top Secret. Sent for action. 86. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc National Security Council Steering Committee 86. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc National Security Council Steering Committee 1 Washington, April 18, 1969. SEABED ARMS CONTROL I. BACKGROUND In the past two years the international community has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of exploring and exploiting the resources of the seabed. Many countries, including the US, have taken the position that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. Several countries, including the US and USSR, proposed that the ENDC consider the question of arms control on the seabed. As authorized in the Presidential letter of instructions, Ambassador Smith on March 18 stated to the ENDC “that the US is interested in working out an international agreement that would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed.” To that end, the Delegation identified in general terms the major questions pertinent to such an international agreement. On the same day the Soviet Union introduced a draft treaty which would prohibit the use of the seabed for military purposes beyond the 12-mile maritime zone of coastal states. Although the US Delegation has pointed out in general terms to the Conference the unacceptable features of the Soviet proposal (including conventional weapons and certain non-weapons military activities under the ban), there is little disposition, given the Soviet draft, to discuss vital factors in the abstract. Discussions are proceeding in general terms oriented around and favorable to the Soviet draft. Most ENDC members, including the Soviet Union, expect the US to table a counter draft early on in order to have a basis for comparing detailed opposing positions. II. ISSUES In order to develop a detailed US position, NSSM 41 directs that a study be prepared on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds. This study examines: a) the pros and cons of whether such a treaty is in the overall US interest; b) the pros and cons of the alternative formulations of the specific provisions of such a treaty; c) the prospects for obtaining agreement on the various formulations of the treaty; and d) the factors affecting the timing of our proposing a specific treaty draft. 1. Pros and Cons of whether such a treaty is in US interest PRO: a. It would prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to a new environment. It would be much easier to negotiate now before nuclear weapons are actually deployed on the seabed. b. It would give concrete expression to the President’s announced desire to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation and would help in rebutting those critics of the US who doubt our willingness to accept restrictions on ourselves. c. By demonstrating US willingness to cooperate in curbing the nuclear arms race, it would help gain further support for the NPT at a critical time in the launching of that treaty. d. The US has no plans or programs for seabed deployment of nuclear weapons. However, if required by some future situation, the US would, under the draft treaty at Tab A, still have many thousands of square miles of underwater area in the narrow band along the coasts within which it could carry on research and development and deploy such weapons. e. Achievement of a treaty limited to prohibition of weapons of mass destruction would help to reduce international pressures for adoption of more sweeping limitations on military uses of the seabed and superjacent waters which might, unlike the US approach, restrict deployment of surveillance systems (SOSUS) or our SLBM forces. f. The Intelligence Community has estimated (in Special National Intelligence Estimate 11–12–68, dated August 15, 1968) that neither the USSR nor any other country would, during the next ten years or so, deploy weapons of mass destruction on the seabed in violation of an agreement banning such deployment, and that, in any case, the US probably could detect and identify by national means deployment of such weapons under the open ocean—either individually encapsulated missiles or missile-launching vehicles—before a large number become operational. g. It would reinforce US efforts at a number of international forums to promote international cooperation in peaceful uses of the seas. CON: a. An agreement would deny the US the option of using wide areas of the seabed as a means for diversifying, enhancing and providing security for its nuclear weapons capability if this should be required in the future. b. In light of the current lack of understanding of many of the scientific and technical aspects of future ocean activities and their relationship to legal considerations, it is impossible to envision all the ramifications which an arms control regime could impose upon the security interests of the US and its allies. c. While the USSR has a land area over twice that of the US, giving it an obvious land-deployment advantage, the US has a conveniently located territorial base and a lead in-the necessary technology for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. d. Any such restrictions on seabed deployments may encourage subsequent proposals to establish further restrictions on military uses of the seabed, the superjacent waters or the airspace above. e. It might result in demands that the US reveal information on sensitive US underwater installations. f. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11–12–68, dated August 15, 1968), there are a number of circumstances in which our capabilities for verification by national means are limited. These include deployment under enclosed seas or of small numbers of individually encapsulated missiles or missile-launching vehicles. Moreover, our chances of detecting deployment of untended nuclear mines which did not make use of external command and control would be minimal. 2. PROS AND CONS of Alternative Treaty Formulations If it is determined that such a treaty is in the national interest, there are several issues with regard to Treaty articles that need decision. (Complete text of a proposed draft treaty, including alternative formulations, is attached at Tab A.) A. Article I— Should the treaty prohibit ALL weapons of mass destruction, together with associated launching platforms and/or delivery vehicles? * (See Tab B for examples of what would be prohibited or permitted under the different formulations of Article I.) PRO: (1) Such a formulation would make it clear that the US intends to foreclose all avenues which could leave open the possibility of a costly extension of the nuclear arms race to this environment and would thus help make the US approach more acceptable to other countries. (2) It would reduce the likelihood that states would develop mobile seabeds weapons systems. CON: (1) It would increase the problem of verification, since certain mobile submersible systems may be adapted or designed to operate either from the seabed or in the superjacent waters. (2) It would eliminate our option of deploying mobile weapons systems on the seabed, should such deployment be in our interest in the future. B. Article I - Should the treaty prohibit ONLY FIXED weapons of mass destruction, together with associated launching platforms and/or deliver vehicles? PRO: (1) Such a formulation would permit us to take advantage of our lead in technology by deploying mobile submersible systems (as described in Tab B) should it be in our interest. (2) Restricting the treaty to fixed weapons and fixed launching platforms is more compatible with expected national verification capabilities to insure compliance, not only because of the difficulty in finding a mobile system on the seabed once deployment had been detected, but also because of the difficulty in proving that a mobile system was designed specifically for use on the seabed. (3) Such a prohibition would be a useful first step in achieving the objective of preventing an extension of the nuclear arms race to the seabed. CON: (1) By permitting states to deploy mobile submersible systems carrying nuclear weapons, it would not achieve the objective of preventing an extension of the nuclear arms race to the seabed. (2) By limiting the coverage of the treaty, it would probably be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, the UK, and the non-nuclear countries. (3) Such a limited proposal would raise suspicions about US intentions concerning peaceful uses of the seabed being discussed in other forums. C. Article I— Should the area of application of the treaty extend UP TO THE COAST of any other state? PRO: (1) Such a formulation would increase the zone of application of the treaty to the maximum area beyond the narrow band, thus enhancing the significance of the treaty as an effort to prevent an arms race in this area. (2) It would avoid political controversy arising from the implication that states could emplace prohibited weapons in offshore areas of other friendly states with their consent. CON: (1) In the event of a suspected violation, within the territorial waters of any state, it would give rise to the necessity for clandestine inspection, unless special procedures for inspection can be negotiated. (2) It could be viewed by our allies as an undesirable restriction, if they wish to keep open the option of having US weapons emplaced off their coasts, should this ever be in the interest of the alliance. D. Article I— Should the area of application of the treaty extend UP TO A CORRESPONDING BAND adjacent to the coast of any other state? PRO: (1) Such a formulation would avoid the problem of providing special procedures for inspection of suspected violations by states occurring in the territorial seas of other states within the narrow band. (2) It would preserve the option of emplacing weapons within the narrow band of our allies should it be in our mutual interest. (3) It has greater chance of acceptance because it is less likely to impinge on the sensitive subject of territorial waters and would more closely parallel the concept of the Soviet draft. CON: (1) Such a formulation may give rise to suspicion that the US wishes to legitimize the emplacement of weapons within the narrow band of other states thereby escaping the effect of the restriction. (2) It would reduce the zone of application of the prohibition. The significance of the fact would depend upon the width of the narrow band. E. Article II— Should the width of the band beyond which the prohibition would apply be 12 miles? * PRO: (1) A 12 mile band, on the basis of existing international law and practice, appears to be most susceptible of wide agreement. (2) While extending the ban to broad areas of the seabed, such a band would still provide thousands of square miles of underwater area within which we could carry on research and development or deployment of weapons, should that be in our interest. (3) While such a band would be established for the purposes of the treaty only, with no legal effect on national claims of sovereignty or jurisdiction over the seabed or the superjacent waters, it might reinforce efforts to establish a 12 mile territorial sea, together with transit rights. CON: (1) The US would be denied use of most of its continental shelf for purposes of weapons deployment. (2) Existing differences among states concerning the extent of national claims over coastal waters might complicate efforts to achieve agreement on such a zone. * (3) Some countries may be reluctant to accept such a zone because they are concerned about the implications for other seabed and law-of-the-sea negotiations. The UK, for example, has expressed the fear that a 12-mile zone would jeopardize exploitation of its continental shelf. F. Article II— Should the width of the band beyond which the prohibition would apply be 3 miles? PRO: (1) It would be more consistent with our present international position on the limit of the territorial sea. (2) An initial position based on the current US claim to territorial seas would serve to protect the US position in other ongoing international discussions on the limit of the territorial sea and rights of transit through straits. (3) Such an opening position will serve to test the resolve of the Soviets and to probe their intentions with respect to the limits they would accept for a seabed arms control measure. CON: (1) The US would be denied use of most of its continental shelf for purposes of weapons deployment. (2) Such a formulation might be unacceptable to states claiming 12 miles who would not be willing to extend implicit recognition to the validity of the 3 mile territorial sea. (3) A 3 mile limit would limit the right of states claiming 12 miles to deploy weapons in a portion of their territory and would, if an inspection provision is included, convey the right to others to inspect in that area. Such a restriction is likely to be unacceptable to many states, especially the Soviet Union. (4) Even as an opening position, such a formula could give rise to charges that the US, by proposing an unacceptable measure, is not serious about obtaining an agreement. G. Article III— Should the treaty provide for inspection? PRO: (1) The basic issue regarding inspection is whether US national verification capabilities are adequate by themselves to protect US security. SNIE 11–12–68 concludes that even after detection of deployment, verification of a violation would probably be a costly and time-consuming process and we might not be able to confirm that a violation had occurred unless we had a right of inspection. (2) An inspection provision would strengthen the confidence of all parties that the prohibition would be observed. Moreover, rights of inspection utilizing national means would parallel provisions of the Soviet draft, thus making it easier to obtain agreement on this approach. (3) Interference with legitimate activities could be minimized by means of the provision that advance notice be given and that maximum precautions be taken to assure safety and avoid interference with normal activities of installations to be inspected. (4) The absence of any provision for unilateral inspection might lead to unacceptable proposals for an international inspection system. (5) The US has traditionally held that arms control arrangements must be adequately verified by inspection when necessary. Failure to so provide in this instance could undercut US efforts in other arms control agreements to obtain adequate inspection. In view of the Soviet advocacy of the inspection in the seabeds treaty, this could prove to be politically embarrassing as well. It would also present problems, from the standpoint of world opinion, in explaining this reversal of a traditional US position. CON: (1) An inspection provision could increase the risk of compromise of sensitive US installations and might deter their deployment. (2) An inspection provision will be unsatisfactory to states that do not possess their own national capabilities, thus provoking possible unacceptable proposals for international inspection. (3) An inspection provision might raise concerns by other states regarding interference with commercial or other non-military uses of the seabed or compromise of industrial secrets. (4) The right of inspection may create international pressures for the US to describe and indicate locations of all military equipment and military installations thus incurring the risk of making public sensitive US activities. (5) We have far more military and commercial installations on the seabed. * (6) The major problem in verification of this treaty would be to locate the suspected device. This location problem is not resolved by an inspection (visiting disassembly or unbolting) provision. 3. What are the prospects for obtaining agreement on the various formulations of the treaty? A. General Prospects The US draft treaty , although less sweeping than the Soviet draft and probably less attractive to many non-aligned countries, stands a good chance of acceptance. This conclusion is based on the following considerations: (1) The Soviets want an arms control measure to show the UN General Assembly when it meets in September. They have indicated some flexibility regarding the provisions of a seabed treaty. The major differences between the US and Soviet position—inclusion of conventional weapons, surveillance systems and other military activities—can probably be negotiated. There is already some support from other countries on excluding surveillance and other defensive non-weapons systems from the prohibition. If we stand firm on our position of prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, and if other differences appear negotiable, Soviet interest in achieving some kind of treaty before the General Assembly meets may lead them to drop their insistence on the prohibition of conventional weapons. (2) The other ENDC members also want progress on a concrete measure before the General Assembly meets, since they too have an interest in the continued viability of the ENDC. Given the current impasse on other items before the ENDC, there is a growing consensus that a seabeds agreement is the only measure ripe for negotiation. Once it becomes clear that the US will not accept further restrictions, the interest of the other members in making progress on a treaty would facilitate their acceptance of an agreed US–USSR draft. (3) Other countries , especially the non-nuclear states, would probably welcome a treaty which, by banning weapons of mass destruction, constitutes a restriction on the superpowers, who are the only states able to deploy such weapons on the seabed. Such a restriction would appeal to the non-nuclear states as an initial effort to redress what many consider the unbalanced obligations of the NPT. B. Prospects for Agreement on Specific Formulations (1) All Weapons vs. Fixed Weapons Given the sweeping Soviet draft, the US draft will be judged according to how far it appears to go in preventing extension of the nuclear arms race. In this situation, prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, as well as their launching platforms or delivery vehicles will be more likely to gain acceptance than prohibition of only fixed weapons or launching platforms. (2) Width of Band: 3 miles vs. 12 miles A 12-mile band would coincide with a limit which is well-grounded in international law and practice, and has already been proposed by the Soviets. Since many states will regard a 3-mile limit as an infringement of their sovereignty, the 12-mile band could probably be more susceptible ’of agreement. (3) Prohibition Up to the Coast or Up to the Narrow Band Any preference for one of these alternative formulations can not be confidently predicted. On the one hand, prohibition up to the coast of any state provides maximum coverage of the area beyond the band adjacent to a state and thus eliminates the option of deploying weapons in the band adjacent to a friendly or allied state. On the other hand, a prohibition extending only to the band adjacent to the coast of any other state avoids the problem of verifying compliance within the narrow band adjacent to other states (which might raise questions of infringement of sovereignty). This latter formulation also protects the right of states to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons in their territorial waters by other states. On balance, it appears that the formulation which extends the prohibition up to the narrow band of other states would be easier to negotiate. (4) Inclusion of Inspection Provision Most countries, whether or not they intend to conduct inspections, will view such a provision as insurance that other parties will comply with the treaty. Also, in view of the inclusion of such provision in the Soviet draft, omission of inspection in the US draft would be conspicuous and would require explanation in order to allay possible suspicions of our intentions. Accordingly an inspection provision would probably enhance the prospects for agreement. However, it should be noted that the prospects of agreement on inspection rights depend on the extent to which any inspection involved would need to be carried on in areas of claimed national sovereignty or jurisdiction. 4. What are the factors affecting the timing of our proposing a specific treaty draft? (See TAB C) A. Status of ENDC Discussions : Submission of a US draft at an early date will facilitate progress in the negotiations by permitting consideration in capitals during the expected ENDC recess from mid-May to mid-June. In view of the strong pressures to start early negotiations on a sea-beds arms control measure, the Co-Chairmen have had no recourse but to initiate informal discussions on this subject April 30. B. August Meeting of UN Seabeds Committee: Progress in the ENDC on this measure will be needed to hold down pressures for the UN Seabeds Committee (scheduled to meet in mid-August) to assume a more active role in seabeds disarmament. Several members of this committee were clearly dubious that the ENDC would accomplish anything. We would be in a less favorable position if the primary focus of discussions shifted from the ENDC to the UN Seabeds Committee. Such considerations also argue for early submission of a US draft. C. Consultations: We will wish to consult with our allies before tabling a draft. These consultations would focus on whether the US draft offers a reasonable basis for initiating negotiations. Since preliminary discussions of the vital factors of our approach have already been held in NAC and elsewhere, consultations could be completed in time to submit our draft before the ENDC recesses in mid-May. However, we should also be prepared to consider circulating the draft during the summer recess, if consultations require additional time. Tab A Draft Treaty Draft Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty will further the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have Agreed as Follows: ARTICLE I 1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to [Alternative 1: emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or launching platforms or delivery vehicles therefor, on, within, beneath, or to] [Alternative 2: emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath] the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band, as defined in Article II of this Treaty, [Alternative 1: adjacent to its coast and up to the coast of any other State.] [Alternative 2: adjacent to the coast of any State.] 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way anticipating in the activities prohibited by this Article. ARTICLE II 1. For purposes of this Treaty, the outer limit of the narrow band referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn in the manner specified in paragraph 2, hereof. The width of the narrow band [Alternative 1: shall be twelve (12) miles.] [Alternative 2: shall be three (3) miles.] 2. Leave Blank ARTICLE III Any State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to inspect all installations and structures emplaced or fixed on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond the narrow band adjacent to the coast of any State for the exclusive purpose of verifying compliance with this Treaty. In the event access to such installations and structures is needed, representatives of any such State Party shall give reasonable advance notice, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety, and to avoid interference with normal activities and operations of the installations or structures to which access is requested. (The alternative to this formulation is to omit the provision.) ARTICLE IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE V Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its Country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE VI 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ___________; which are hereby designated the depositary governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by five governments including the governments designated as depositary governments. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE VII This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding States. EFFECT OF PROHIBITIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF ARTICLE I I. Alternatives 1 and 2 of Article I (Tab A) involve differing prohibitions. In order to clarify the differences, they are spelled out below in terms of representative lists of activities and weapons systems, both prohibited and non-prohibited. Although the lists of examples are not intended for public use, at some point in the negotiations it may be necessary to illustrate what kinds of facilities would be prohibited under the US draft treaty. Further, it may be desirable to indicate to our allies the kinds of facilities that would be permitted. II. What Would not be Prohibited under Either Alternative There will be a wide range of military activities on the seabed which would not be prohibited under either formulation. In particular, both formulations are designed not to prohibit the use of the seabed by submarines and other mobile submersible weapons systems whose principal mode of deployment or operation does not require use of the seabed. For example, if a submarine requires contact with the seabed to launch its missiles, it would be prohibited only under Alternative I. However, if a submarine has the operational option of launching its missiles either from the seabed or in the water column above, it would not be prohibited under either Alternative. All other military uses of the seabed not involving weapons of mass destruction would also be permitted under either formulation. For example, the following activities would not be prohibited: A. Temporary anchorage of submarines (or other ships carrying nuclear weapons), whether for emergency purposes, for purposes incident to navigations, for purposes of avoiding detection, or for purposes of launching missiles (Polaris, Poseidon, ULMS). B. Deployment of conventional weapons. C. All other non-weapons activities, such as: 1. Surveillance systems 2. Oceanographic research 3. Sealab-type installations 4. Nuclear power reactor III. What Would be Prohibited under Alternative 2 of Article I. The effect of Alternative 2 would be to prohibit only the emplanting or emplacing of fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or their associated fixed launching platforms, on, within, or beneath the zone of application. Under this formulation the prohibition would include, for example: A. Manned or unmanned missile silos or other fixed installations for weapons of mass destruction. B. Encapsulated weapons of mass destruction: 1. Resting on the seabed 2. Anchored to the seabed and floating above it. C. Tethered nuclear mines IV. What would be Prohibited under Alternative I. In addition to the prohibitions under Alternative 11, the following would be prohibited: A. Mobile submersible weapons systems whose principal mode of deployment or operation requires use of the seabed, such as: 1. Bottom crawlers 2. Bottom resting system moved from one station to another V. Either alternative of Article I would probably be interpreted, in the absence of a negotiating record to the contrary, to preclude the conduct of nuclear weapons test on or under the ocean floor beyond the limit of the agreed band. Thus, if circumstances led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibitions not being applicable, the prohibition in this Treaty could still ban such testing. The consequences of this additional prohibition should be weighed in the light of our interest in such testing, in the event that the LTBT prohibitions (including those relating to the atmosphere, outer space, and under water) no longer applied. Tab C Telegram 1133 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, April 12, 1969 Subject: ENDC Prospects for Progress 1. After four weeks, pattern of current ENDC session has begun to emerge clearly. Most dels (and particularly those “non-aligned” dels which bore the brunt in 1968 resumed session UNGA in getting resolution commending NPT passed by large vote) feel strongly that substantial progress must be made by ENDC before 24th UNGA if ENDC is to continue to be accepted as primary negotiating forum for diarmament. 2. It is obvious now that no real progress is possible on CTB or cut-off in absence major changes in positions by nuclear powers. Progress on CBW awaits SYG experts study scheduled for completion early summer. Non-use, NFZs and GCD despite usual initiatives are generally recognized as non-starters. 3. Mood of conference is that time has arrived to turn seriously to hammering out an agreement on seabeds as only item on which practical results before 24th UNGA are possible. Soviets have tactical advantage of having tabled draft treaty. In addition to Soviet EE claque, Nigeria, Sweden, Mexico, and Ethiopia in plenary speeches have praised Soviet initiative in submitting draft. Brazil and India have voiced support privately and it likely they will do so in plenary. 4. US has clearly stated its position on seabeds (Geneva 964). However, most dels believe next move must come from US in form of counter-draft at least of Art I of seabeds treaty. In meantime consensus seems to be emerging in favor of holding additional meetings on Wednesdays exclusively for discussing a measure on which agreement is promising, i.e. seabeds. 5. Presentation of counter-draft would on short term prevent seabeds discussions from being molded solely around Soviet draft. Tabling counter-draft Art I of Soviet treaty would focus discussion on what should be prohibited and give us time to formulate positions on other factors at later date. In this connection we think most dels would not expect agreement to be reached on complete treaty until toward end of resumed ENDC session this summer. But in view expected delays of other delegations in getting reactions from their capitals to counter proposal, we expected to make, believe it would be advantageous position to table counter-draft on Art I next week, or at latest at first substantative Wednesday meeting (likely to be held April 23). Tubby 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limdis. Under cover of an April 26 memorandum, Jeanne Davis forwarded copies of the paper, for discussion at the NSC meeting on April 30, to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, and Helms. She noted that the study had been revised to take into account comments received on the version distributed April 25. (Ibid.) The telegram at Tab C was repeated for information to USUN and USNATO. * The prohibition in this Article is not intended to affect the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions (Plowshare) or the application of nuclear energy in reactors, scientific research, etc. This point would be made clear in course of international discussions and negotiations and could be covered explicitly in an appropriate treaty article, if desired at that time. * Article II states that the width of the band will be measured from baselines. Under any formulation concerning baselines it will be necessary to reach an understanding on certain marginal seas being claimed as inland seas. Most particularly, the U.S. cannot accept certain Soviet claims that would allow for much broader areas than the band adjacent to our coasts within which weapons could be placed. As a matter of tactics, we should publicly recognize the difficulty and, accordingly, have left blank paragraph 2 of Article II. We believe the issue should be resolved in the ENDC. In a statement at the ENDC, we should say that we prefer drawing baselines in the manner specified in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to which some 38 States are parties, but that an agreed interpretation of its principles must be reached to assure an equitable band and balanced obligations. * DOD would substitute the following for this paragraph: (2) Many nations may view a U.S. arms control proposal incorporating a 12-mile band as implicit recognition of the validity of the 12-mile territorial sea. This might jeopardize the current negotiating position of the United States that it will not recognize the validity of 12-mile territorial sea claims unless international agreement can be reached on transit rights through and over straits. (State does not believe that US efforts to negotiate an agreement establishing a maximum territorial sea of 12 miles and providing for passage through or overflight of straits would be prejudiced. Such discussions would not reveal any element of the US law-of-the-sea position that is not already widely known. We have already agreed to a 12-mile contiguous zone and have by legislation established a 12-mile fishing zone without adverse effect.) * DOD would add: “therefore, the U.S. has more to lose than the Soviets do from an inspection provision.” 87. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird 87. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, April 29, 1969 SUBJECT: Joint Talking Paper for SecDef and Chairman, JCS, for NSC Meeting, 30 April (NSSM 41 - Seabed Arms Control) Attached Talking Paper and backup material is forwarded for your use at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, 30 April. The JCS views on this subject at TAB D provide a good background on the principal issues. These views are fully supported by ISA. The recommended DOD view on inspection represents a reversal in the Long-held view that an inspection provision should be included in any arms control agreement. This reversal arises from the impracticability of conducting any meaningful inspection in this hostile environment beyond that possible under existing rights. You should anticipate strenuous opposition on this issue from the Director,ACDA, who desires an inspection article because the Soviets included a reciprocal inspection provision in their draft treaty on seabed arms control. You will probably gain support for the DOD position that U.S. should begin negotiations on the basis of a three-mile width for the band of exemption if you indicate a willingness to reconsider this matter once the territorial sea problem has been resolved. U.S. is separately negotiating for a 12-mile territorial sea with transit rights through straits. Successful outcome is very important to DOD. No coordination is required on this issue at this time. R.A. Ware Attachment Talking Paper Talking Paper for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSC Meeting of 30 April 1969) SUBJECT: National Security Study Memorandum 41—Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds (U) ISSUE: At Presidential direction, TAB B, a study has been prepared on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: The study at TAB A has been submitted by the NSC Staff after review by the NSC Review Group. It consists of a basic paper, a draft treaty, and a list of examples of weapons systems and activities which would be prohibited or non-prohibited under the alternative formulations of Article I of the treaty. The views of the OSD and JCS were considered in the preparation of this study. The following have been examined in the study: a. THE PROS AND CONS OF WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A TREATY IS IN THE OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE US. OSD–JCS VIEWS No. Treaty is not in overall security interests of US at this time because: (1) Current lack of understanding of scientific and technological aspects of future ocean activities, and their relation to legal considerations, make it impossible to envision now all of the ramifications which an arms control agreement could impose upon the security interests of the US. (2) Although it is premature to decide whether the US should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capability in the future, such a requirement is a possibility. The primary consideration is not the question of current programs, but they risk to possible future US strategic nuclear programs. (3) National verification capabilities are inadequate to insure compliance with such an agreement. b. THE PROS AND CONS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SUCH A TREATY. OSD–JCS VIEWS (1) If the decision is made to table a draft, TAB C sets forth the recommended choices among the various a alternatives which would be the least detrimental to security of US. The DOD preferred formulations are set forth as Alternative 2 in each of the operative paragraphs of the draft treaty (TAB A of the study). These alternatives would set forth an initial US proposal which would prohibit the emplacement or emplanting of fixed weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, from a three-mile band adjacent to the coast of any state, (DOD should indicate a willingness to consider some other band width once the territorial sea question is resolved), without an article on inspection. (2) A principal consideration represented by these choices is the DOD view that the US Government’s opening position on these issues should be restrained and conservative instead of attempting to accommodate to views previously expressed by the Soviet Union. During negotiations, these restricted formulations can be broadened by interpretive statements as required to accommodate to points of view expressed by other states. c. THE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF THE TREATY. OSD–JCS VIEWS This is considered to be a State Department judgment. If a decision is made to table a draft treaty, then this section is a logical analysis. d. THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE TIMING OF OUR PROPOSING A SPECIFIC TREATY DRAFT. OSD–JCS VIEWS If a decision is made to table a draft treaty, the OSD and JCS agree with the discussion in this section. RECOMMENDATION That the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, support the foregoing views at the NSC meeting. Attachment Memorandum From the Vice Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Reaves) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, April 22, 1969 Subject: Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds (U) 1. (C) The study directed under NSSM 41 on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed has been forwarded by the NSSM 41 Steering Committee to the National Security Council Review Group for its consideration on 25 April 1969 and for National Security Council discussion on 30 April 1969. It is considered appropriate to provide the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. 2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reexamined the issue of a seabed arms control treaty and have again concluded that the question of an arms control regime to be applied to the seabeds is complex and requires full awareness of the technological and scientific features of this environment. Due to the current lack of understanding of many of the scientific and technical aspects of future ocean activities and their relationship to legal considerations, it is impossible to envision now all the ramifications which an arms control regime could impose upon the security interests of the United States. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capability in the future, such a requirement is a possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to possible future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration. Further, national verification capabilities as set forth in Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 11-12-68, subject: “Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed,” are considered inadequate to insure compliance with a seabed arms control agreement. Finally, the fact that the Soviets have a land deployment advantage vis-à-vis the United States and a relatively limited access to the deep oceans makes a seabed arms control agreement clearly advantageous to the USSR. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a treaty is not now in the overall security interest of the United States and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that National Security Council (NSC) consideration of the problem might result in a Presidential decision to table a draft treaty in order to counter the Soviet tactical advantage gained by their tabling of a draft treaty in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). In recognition of this possibility and considering the many uncertainties of a treaty for this environment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the following formulations would probably be least detrimental to the security of the United States: ARTICLE I Each state party to this treaty undertakes not to emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and their associated fixed launching platforms on, within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band as defined in Article II of this treaty adjacent to the coast of any state. ARTICLE II For purposes of this treaty, the outer limit of the narrow band referred to in Article I shall be measured from NORMAL 2 base lines drawn in the manner specified in the Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone for drawing SUCH 2 base lines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured. The width of the narrow band shall be three miles. ARTICLE III There should be no inspection article. 4. (S) Regarding the zone of application, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in the event a decision is made to support a boundary formulation other than that outlined in Article II of paragraph 3, above, such an article should not be tabled at the current session of the ENDC. To do so could complicate and prejudice other ongoing law of the sea discussions. 5. (U) The rationale for the above views is-contained in the Appendix hereto. 6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request the opportunity to comment on the instructions to the ENDC delegation. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: K.L. Reaves Major General, USA Vice Director, Joint Staff Appendix RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF JCS VIEWS 1. ARTICLE I a. Prohibition of fixed weapons and fixed launching platforms. Holding open the option to deploy mobile submersible systems would permit the United States to take advantage of its technological lead and offset the Soviet land deployment advantage. If a decision is made for an inspection article (Article III), restricting the treaty to fixed weapons would remove a significant uncertainty with respect to verification. Moreover, in view of the lack of knowledge of the seabeds, a cautious evolutionary approach is appropriate. b. Zone of Application. The band-to-band formulation would preserve the option of emplacing weapons within the band of other nations should it be in our mutual interest. It would also avoid the problem of special procedures for inspection of suspected violations try states occurring in the territorial seas of other states. 2. ARTICLE II a. Method of measuring the base line. With regard to determination of the base line from which the width of the zone of application is measured, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the method of using the sinuosities of the coast (normal base line) is the most advantageous to the United States. In any event, any treaty formulation must not permit the USSR, or other adversaries, to gain an advantage in a seabed area by permitting the deployment of weapons or installations in specific waters claimed by them. For example, the USSR interpretation of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and other principles of international law would permit them to use wide seabed areas such as the Sea of Okhotsk. b. Width of Band. The 3-mile limit is consistent with the present US public position on the width of the territorial seas. Use of this figure at this time will not have an adverse affect on other law of the sea negotiations. It is recognized that the 3-mile limit will be extremely difficult to negotiate, but it will test the Soviet resolve to have a treaty. In any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is premature to discuss the 12-mile limit in connection with arms control negotiations before settling the question of transit rights and territorial seas. To do so would extend implicit recognition to the validity of the 12-mile territorial sea without achieving a concomitant right of navigation through and over straits. When negotiations on the territorial seas have been concluded to the satisfaction of the United States, and as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee discussions on the seabed proceed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would wish to reevaluate the most favorable outer boundary for an arms control agreement on the seabed from a national defense point of view. 3. ARTICLE III (INSPECTION) The major problems in verifying compliance with this treaty would be to detect and locate suspected devices and installations in order to permit inspection. The right to inspect does not help in this regard. Present international aw permits some inspection, such as X-raying, measuring emanations, and photographing. However, it does not permit dismantling or physical interference. Accordingly, a logical interpretation of the inspection Article is that it adds the right to dismantle suspected devices or installations. The United states now has more military and commercial installations on the seabed than any other nation. At the present time, it is believed that the Soviets have little or nothing for the United States to “inspect.” If and when they do, and these devices are detected and identified, but not “inspected,” the US Government would be able to withdraw from the treaty without compromising its source of intelligence. In view of our limited national capability to locate devices, the right of such inspection, as a practical matter, would not materially enhance our verification capabilities. Not having “inspection” rights in a treaty would better permit the United States to avoid the possibility of being pressured to reveal the locations and purposes of all underwater installations and devices. As a consequence, the right of “inspection” would do more harm to US interests than could be gained by the United States “inspecting” suspected violations. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, 801.2, Jan–Mar. Top Secret. A stamped notation on Ware’s memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it on April 30. The attached Talking Paper is signed by G. Warren Nutter and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson of the Joint Staff. Attached to the Talking Paper at Tabs A and B are Documents 86 and 84 . 2 The capitalized words were not included in either alternative. 2 The capitalized words were not included in either alternative. 88. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President 88. Briefing Paper Prepared for the President 1 Washington, undated ISSUES FOR DECISION SEABEDS NSC MEETING April 30, 1969 I. Is a treaty in the U.S. interest? The basic decision that you have to make is whether or not a Seabeds Arms Control Treaty is in the net interest of the United States. The U.S. has no current plans to deploy nuclear weapons on the seabed. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that we should not foreclose the future option particularly since the technical possibilities are not yet fully understood. The Joint Chiefs also point out that there are certain possible, although admittedly unlikely, applications by the Soviets which would be undetectable. The basic argument on the other side put forward by ACDA and State is that a treaty would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to a new environment. ACDA points to an agreed Intelligence Estimate (at the Tab marked Intelligence Estimate) which, on the whole, concludes that we would detect any significant violations. ACDA also points out that putting forward a U.S. draft treaty would reduce international pressures for a more sweeping agreement. Recommendation You will probably want to test the depth of the DOD opposition by hearing from Mel Laird and General Wheeler at the NSC meeting. Subject to that discussion, my feeling is that, on balance, the case for proceeding is more persuasive. II. Text of the Treaty There is agreement that if we are going to seek a treaty we should put forward a U.S. text as soon as possible. There is also agreement on the text except for four issues. None of them are very major and they are all quite technical, but they do require a decision on your part should you decide to proceed since there are deep splits within the government. These issues are: (1.) Whether to ban all systems which use the ocean bottom, or only fixed systems. The JCS prefer the latter formulation since it would permit the deployment of systems which crawl along the ocean bottom. ACDA points out that in order to persuade the Soviets to drop their proposal for prohibiting non-nuclear operations, we will almost certainly have to agree to ban all nuclear deployments from the sea bottom. Recommendation Our basic objective is to ban fixed systems since mobile systems Which use the sea bottom are not, in principle, very different from submarines. There is also some value in taking an opening position different from where we may be prepared to end up. I, therefore, recommend that our treaty draft ban only fixed installations but that, at the same time, you make it clear that you are prepared to consider at a later stage in the negotiations a recommendation to ban all nuclear systems. (2) Should provision be made for international inspection? International inspection, as proposed by the ACDA draft treaty, would permit a country to ask for the right to visit and, if necessary, dismantle an installation that it suspects may carry nuclear weapons. Such inspection would not deal with the fundamental difficulty of locating suspected installations, but it would enable us to remove uncertainties about whether an installation had a nuclear weapon. State/ACDA would prefer to ask for such inspection in part because the Russian draft calls for inspection of this kind and they point to the problems that we would have in appearing to be less forthcoming than the Soviets on inspection issues. Defense is concerned about giving the Soviets the right to inspect our installations on the sea bottom. They point out that we have many more such installations than do the Soviets. They propose not to include an inspection provision. Looking to the future, any agreement that comes out of SALT may not include formal inspection provisions. Therefore, reinforcing the precedent of the Limited Test Ban Treaty that agreements need not include formal inspection arrangements when they are not necessary could prove helpful. If the Soviets or others insist on this provision we can always include it later. Recommendation That we should not include a formal inspection provision. (3) Should the application of the treaty extend up to the coast of any State or only up to a band adjacent to the coast of that State? The issue here is whether a State should be permitted to deploy nuclear weapons on the seabed in the territory of allies. DOD would leave in this option as would the Russian draft. ACDA apparently does not feel strongly but State wanted to retain this option for NSC consideration. The argument for extending the ban up to the coast is that it would avoid the issue of stationing weapons in allied waters. The arguments against are that it would deny us the option of putting weapons in allied waters and it would complicate the inspection problem since weapons would be prohibited in territorial waters. Recommendation That the ban apply only up to a narrow band adjacent to the coast of other States. (4) Should the width of the narrow band be 12 miles or 3 miles? Defense argues for 12 miles asserting that a 3-mile limit could jeopardize our efforts in another forum to accept a 12-mile limit in return for free passage through straits. State argues that a 12-mile limit would not adversely affect these negotiations. They point out that we have accepted 12 miles for other specific purposes. Recommendation That the band be 12 miles. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–22, NSC Meeting 4/30/69. Secret. The paper is not signed and bears no indication of who drafted it or whether it was forwarded to the President. The attached intelligence report, SNIE 11–12–68, Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed, is not published. It is printed in part in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 271 . 89. Draft Minutes of National Security Council Meeting 89. Draft Minutes of National Security Council Meeting 1 Washington, April 30, 1969, 10 a.m. SUBJECT: Eighteen Nation Disarmament Treaty, specifically the Seabeds Treaty U.S. Policy Towards Japan Attendees: (List can be obtained from NSC Secretariat) The meeting convened at 10:00 a.m. and was introduced by the President. The first topic for discussion was the U.S. participation in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) and the decision to be faced at this meeting was whether or not the U.S. would accept the initiative of the Soviet Union to enter into a seabeds treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons on the bed of the open ocean floor. The President commented that the initial meeting of the ENDC held in Geneva had moved far more rapidly than had originally been anticipated. The President stated that the decision at hand today was whether or not the U.S. wished to enter into a seabed treaty with the Soviet Union at this time. He listed the pros and cons of such a course of action. Under the pros were: a) such a treaty would reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons; b) such a treaty might reduce growing pressures for greater demilitarization worldwide; and c) such a treaty would reinforce U.S. efforts favoring the peaceful development of the open seas. The cons working against a U.S. decision to enter into such a treaty were: a) such a treaty would such a treaty would deny the U.S. the option of utilizing international seas for the emplacement of nuclear weapons; b) at the present time the actual potential value of seabeds were not known and a treaty at this time might be premature; and c) entering into such a treaty might open up demands on the part of the Soviets for information on our current undersea military capability, which are especially sensitive in the anti-submarine acoustical area. In general, the President stated, the Department of Defense was opposed to such a treaty while the Department of State was in favor. Other issues involved in this seabed treaty included a) whether or not the treaty should include the banning of all types of weapons, fixed and mobile or be limited only to fixed weapons which might be emplaced on the seabeds thereby excluding submarine launched nuclear weapons; b) whether or not such a treaty should provide for specific inspection and enforcement procedures. Favoring an affirmative answer to this issue would be that proper inspection would of course reinforce the treaty. The disadvantage of such a provision would be the development of pressures for the U.S. to reveal sensitive SOSIS development which we have already achieved and in an area in which the Soviets are badly lagging; c) how far reaching such a treaty might be. For example, should it ban nuclear weapons right up to the coast line of the respective signatories or should it be limited up to accepted territorial waters three miles or twelve miles. The key issue in the President’s view is whether we should in fact have a treaty at all. The Secretary of State stated that a seabed treaty is in our national interest, assuming it does not pose greater disadvantages and specifically if these disadvantages do not place us in a position of military inferiority to the Soviet Union. The President asked Mr. Smith, Director of Disarmament Agency, for a finite presentation on what the U.S. is really seeking under such a treaty. Mr. Smith stated that he would like to touch upon the background of how we got where we are today. Several years ago a proposal for a seabed treaty was introduced at the United Nations. At that time the issue was complete demilitarization versus partial or complete denuclearization. If such a treaty, Mr. Smith continued, were to continue within the auspices of the United Nations then pressures would grow for complete demilitarization of the open seas and the ENDC was an effort supported by the U.S. to extract this issue from the UN so that the less-developed countries could not continue pressuring for complete demilitarization. Technically, the ENDC is not conducted under the auspices of the UN. We and the Soviets both see this as a means of dealing with this problem in a more realistic and hopeful way. Just prior to the recent meeting of the ENDC in Geneva, I as the U.S. delegate was armed with a Presidential letter which expressed the U.S. interest in a seabed treaty. I read this letter to the Conference. Simultaneously and somewhat unexpectedly, the Soviets tabled a complete treaty proposal with the support of Sweden, Egypt, Ethiopia and the remainder of the Eastern Bloc. It is obvious that the Eastern Bloc and certain neutral countries will favor the Soviet proposal unless we come up with a counter proposal of our own. Thus it is simple that we need a seabed treaty proposal of our own. A U.S. initiative in this area would show our total support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically Article 6. In general, the tabling of a U.S. draft would advance our interests because one may simply ask if we cannot arrive at a treaty in this area where controls are relatively simple and progress to date had been so limited, how could we expect to arrive at a viable agreement in the strategic arms limitation area. The President then asked the Secretary of Defense to comment. Secretary Laird stated, we take an entirely different view, that is, both the Secretary of Defense and his staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1) It is clearly to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have less access to the open seas and they are primarily dependent on land mass for the emplacement of their weapons. On the other hand, the U.S. has a large measure of its offensive strategic capability on sea-based platforms. Secondly, the U.S. has far greater knowledge in this particular area. We have a SOSIS system on the seabeds which is so effective at detecting the movement of Soviet nuclear submarines in the open seas. Thirdly, it would be very difficult to develop a policing capability to verify compliance with such a treaty. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, such a treaty would constitute a piecemeal approach of dealing with the arms control issue. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, added, I agree precisely with Secretary Laird’s analysis, as do the Joint Chiefs themselves. We have looked at this seabed treaty issue over the years and have concluded that such a treaty may not in fact be in the national interest because it does not enhance our overall security. The President inquired whether even a minimum package might be acceptable. General Wheeler replied, we have no ongoing program for weapons development on the seabeds but frankly we know very little of what the ocean floor can do for us. Our knowledge is quite small. The Soviets have twice our land mass. We have a distinct advantage with respect to contiguous waters and accessibility to these waters. Furthermore, verification procedures would be most difficult, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas which are in effect inland seas of the Soviet Union. As a simple matter, the seabed treaty would give the Soviets an enhanced opportunity to capitalize on the seabeds in a way in which we could not verify. Finally, we are very concerned about a compromise of our SOSIS system, which the Soviets do not have. Secretary of State interrupted, this would not be included in our proposed draft treaty so why does the SOSIS issue become involved? Secretary Laird stated, simply because to establish acceptable verification procedures we would have to jeopardize the presence and technical capabilities of our SOSIS. Mr. Smith replied, this would not necessarily involved a compromise of our SOSIS system. All that we would have to insist on in inspection is whether or not nuclear weapons were emplaced and the fact that SOSIS does not involve nuclear should preclude it from detailed inspection. General Wheeler stated, I am not so sure. We are now in a program of enlarging the size of our closest phones which would be quite simple to pick up under a good verification system. The President asked whether or not as General Rickover (?) has stated the Soviet nuclear submarine capability is growing substantially. Laird said that he agreed that it was. The President then asked Mr. Smith whether or not specifically his draft would go beyond verification for nuclears. Secretary Laird continued, I think we are just starting to get into trouble on our land-based strategic systems and we may well need the ocean floors to develop our future capabilities. If we are to trade this option away we should certainly get something for it in return. Secretary Rogers asked, Mel you are saying we just can’t have a treaty period. If we use the twelve-mile limit as the provisions for such a treaty, then we can in effect have the best of both worlds since everything within twelve miles would be available for the emplacement of future systems. Laird said, I would like to make it clear that the seas are not like outer space where we have no specific advantage. The seabeds do afford us an advantage which we should not lightly opt out of. Why should we give up so much for nothing? The President added, it appears that time is a factor on the issue. Suppose our strategic arms limitations talks progress rapidly how long would it take to get progress in this area. Mr. Smith stated, we could get some kind of an agreement as early as September and then move it to the General Assembly. In short, it is very possible that we could have a complete seabed treaty with the Soviet Union as early as this coming September. Mr. Kissinger asked whether or not we were actually obligated to table a draft treaty? Secretary Rogers answered, we stated we were ready. The Soviets had tabled their own version. Now it is up to us. The President stated, well certainly we will need some time to think about this and to consult with our NATO Allies. The Vice President stated, I am concerned that we are always responding to Soviet initiatives. Why the double standards here? They are [omission in original]. We always examine on their terms. We are hemmed in by always letting them put us in a corner. I support the Secretary of Defense. We will never satisfy the disarmament critics no matter what we do. Why don’t we counter with some tough proposals of our own? The Secretary of State stated, our NATO friends think we are not interested and then we look arbitrary to them. The Vice President added, so what? Why don’t we have our own proposal? Mr. Smith said this is our proposal, Mr. Vice President. We have stated for some time that we want to terminate the arms race. How can we fail to do this now? General Lincoln stated, we’ve moved way down the road on this disarmament issue and we probably cannot turn back now. However, we need security guarantees. Also we should ask ourselves whether or not movement here could trigger movement in other areas. Secretary Laird stated, anything we do at the ENDC will be snapped up by the other side. Look what the Soviet have done so far. Under Secretary of State, Mr. Richardson, said, looking at relations as a whole, what are we going to get out of such a treaty. We should be concerned if we are talking in two forums. In other words, it would be foolhardy to be very forthcoming here. If the Soviets are intransigent with respect to our other relationships, it is a question of moving on all thoughts? simultaneously. The President stated, I supported the Test Ban Treaty with strong reservations. As I look back, I don’t think this Test Ban Treaty helped us nor did it hurt us. The seabed treaty might be in both of our interests. The President then asked [unclear] Laird stated, what has this got to do with the problem? The President asked, aren’t the Soviets actually ahead of us in oceanography. Most of the members of the Council agreed that they probably were. The President then summarized this has been a helpful discussion. We must take judgments on all of the factors, not just security and not just initial implications. But we must remember one solid fact. If the Soviet power is to be deterred it will only happen in this room. We are the individuals who must orchestrate that effort. We are not to be influenced excessively by other nations and what other nations think are good. We must base the decisions on our own interests. It may be that under this formula it is well to proceed with the seabed treaty. But we must remember that it is our decision to make. We’ve got to decide on our own interests as we see it. We lead the free world. We must pay attention to this obligation and responsibility. The President continued, if we are to lead the free world [Omission in original] but we must base our decision on our own interests and what we consider to be their own interests. On occasion it may be necessary for us to bring them along or to influence them basically in our own direction. The President then asked Mr. Smith if he had a draft treaty ready for tabling. Dr. DuBridge stated he would like to add his support for the seabed treaty, stating that if the Soviets are allowed to maintain the initiative it would be turned against us. The President said this will conclude our discussion of the seabed treaty. I will consider it and announce my decision. [Omitted here is discussion of U.S.-Japan relations.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, TS 82, NSC Meetings, April 1969. No classification marking. On page 9 of the minutes is written, “Could not understand the tape. There was an echo.” The minutes were drafted on June 9, 1969. No final minutes have been found. 90. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 90. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, April 30, 1969, 3:05 p.m. L said he wanted to talk a bit about seabeds thing. L said he did not want to get into argument at meeting - it seemed to him the thing is to lay draft on table. L said he did not want that draft laid on table, however - he has some suggestions for draft but did not want to come out with them. L asked if he could send them over to K and K said yes. K said maybe President will go ahead and decide - in order to get time on other things - and L should get his changes into the draft. L said that was bad forum to do it. K said President has not made up his mind but if he does go ahead, the procedure would be one K and L are talking about. L said he wanted to get harder position on it. K said L fought good fight this morning. K said for L to get his changes over and if President decides to go ahead we will make L’s changes condition for going ahead. L said o.k. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23–30 April 1969. No classification marking. 91. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 91. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, April 30, 1969, 6:25 p.m. HAK said why do you keep giving away things we haven’t got yet and jeopardizing our national security? (in same light vein) Smith said that’s just mischief-maker. HAK said he had been talking to the President about it and, although he didn’t want to give Smith any inside information, we are going to try to work it out so we can handle this thing. HAK will have word for Smith in a day or so. Smith asked about a Presidential remark toward the end of the meeting, where the Pres said something about the allies wouldn’t do very much—we would have to take on responsibilities. HAK said that was general philosophy and not relevant to what Smith is doing. Pres. meant “don’t come to me all the time and tell me what allies want me to do.” Since we basically have responsibility, we have to make judgment on that. At the same time this shouldn’t be interpreted to mean let’s ignore them. But don’t let them trigger us into negotiations, etc.—just because the domestic situation requires them to make noises for which they are not willing to pay the price. It is not an instruction one way or another. Smith said that makes good sense. HAK said he will want to talk to Smith before the end of this week to see whether we can get that treaty into shape that Smith can live with and that would meet a few of Mel’s points. Smith said he will be giving some thought to the matter and would be free whenever HAK would like to see him. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 23–30 April 1969. No classification marking. 92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, May 1, 1969 SUBJECT: Proposed Memorandum for the President on the Seabed Arms Control Treaty Proposal Subject memorandum sets forth DOD preferences for the wording of the operative paragraphs of a seabed arms control treaty proposal. These preferences have been developed with the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against the contingency that for political reasons the President might find it necessary to authorize a treaty proposal. We recognize that this proposed wording presents a very tight and restricted opening position but believes that in light of the proposal tabled by the Soviets, on 18 March which calls for a ban on all military activities beyond the limits of territorial waters (12 miles in the Soviets’ case) with a right of reciprocal inspection. We believe that a U.S. proposal of this nature, in opposition to the Soviet draft, will bring about a meaningful discussion of the factors vital to an acceptable agreement, a discussion which the JCS and OSD have long held should be undertaken in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) prior to the consideration of any specific proposal by that body. Dr. Bob Frosh, the ASN (R&D),who has been closely involved in this matter for the past 19 months, concurs in this approach and in the proposed memorandum. General Wheeler also concurs. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum for the President. G. Warren Nutter 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 May–July 1969. Secret. The attachment is not published. The signed memorandum is Document 93 . 93. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 93. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 1, 1969 SUBJECT: DOD Position on the Seabed Arms Control Treaty Proposal As you know, the Department of Defense does not favor having the U.S. propose a seabeds treaty at this time. If you should nevertheless decide to move ahead on this matter I suggest the adoption of the following language for initial use in the operative articles in order best to protect our security interests: ARTICLE I 1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band, as defined in Article II of this Treaty, adjacent to the coast of any State. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way participating in the activities prohibited by this Article. ARTICLE II 1. For purposes of this Treaty, the outer limit of the narrow be referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn in the manner specified in paragraph 2, hereof. The width of the narrow band shall be three (3) miles. 2. Leave Blank. (To be determined by negotiation.) ARTICLE III (There should be no inspection provision.) The above suggested position reflects the DOD view that the U.S. government’s initial approach on this issue should be restrained and conservative. We recognize that some of these initial positions may have to be broadened during the course of negotiations, but we will be able to make these decisions case-by-case when necessary, based on assurances and interpretations that may evolve. General Wheeler has seen and concurs in this proposal. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret. 94. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and Secretary of State Rogers 94. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, May 2, 1969 [Omitted here is discussion of SALT] I pointed out to him the difficulties that the Laird approach to NSC procedure would give us in future years if it came to a question of Congressional approval. I told him I understand Laird is preparing a memo urging the President not to accept the seabeds treaty but if it has to be accepted, to adopt all of the defense positions. The Secretary said he thought we could live with a ban just on fixed installations. He prefers the ban to ban formulation. He thinks it would be impossible to get a treaty without a verification provision through the Congress. He thinks the three mile limit would look foolish. I told him that Kissinger had indicated he would be getting in touch with me shortly about how one could tailor a decision that might give the Department of Defense some comfort. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley: FRC 383–97–10, January 1962–April 1977, Smith Correspondence with Secretary of State Rogers concerning SALT, NPT and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), February 1969–May 1970. Secret; Exdis. 95. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 95. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 3, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Nuclear Arms Control Treaty Attached for your signature is a memorandum for the President forwarding Secretary Laird’s memorandum concerning the Department of Defense’s position on the Draft Treaty on Seabed Nuclear Arms Control. On the basis of this memorandum, Mort Halperin and I believe that the President should authorize presentation of the Draft Treaty, incorporating all of the treaty language proposed by Laird and Wheeler, at the ENDC after appropriate consultation with our allies. Given the fact Laird and Wheeler recognize that our position may have to be broadened during the course of the negotiation, we believe that the proposed DOD–JCS treaty language should be acceptable to ACDA and State as an initial position. You may wish to talk with Secretary Rogers and Gerry Smith about this proposal before submitting it to the President. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the President at Tab A. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 382, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. Cleared in substance by Halperin. Tab A, the attached memorandum for the President, was not signed and forwarded by Kissinger and is not published. 96. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 96. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 1 Washington, May 6, 1969, 10:40 a.m. K said he was calling Mel but could not reach him and asked if P was familiar with Seabed problem. P said just vaguely.K said Mel opposed it at NSC but called K after and said if we had to proceed he would like to make sure it contained some amendments. K said he wondered if he could get these changes. P said the main thing is that there is nothing in the draft that would jeopardize their underwater capability. K said President will probably go ahead with treaty but on the condition that Gerry Smith puts into the draft the changes Defense wants. P asked when K wanted it and K said by tomorrow morning. K said he is seeing Gerry Smith at 6:00p tomorrow night at his office. President wants K to negotiate this. P said K would have them by morning. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 97. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 97. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, May 6, 1969, 4:30 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] L said he would do it, but they are concerned about L’s Seabed thing. K said not to worry about it. K said he called Dave on Seabed matter and if L could get him some of his suggested changes he would appreciate it. L said they were sent over a couple of days ago. K said President then said he would talk to Gerry and say his condition for going ahead with it would be to include L’s changes - that way he could buy more time on SALT. L said he understood. K said Pres will not make a ruling like that until everyone has chance to express views. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 98. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 98. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, May 6, 1969 I talked to the Secretary at his luncheon about the seabeds situation and told him that I was to see Kissinger tomorrow night. He agreed that we should try to work out an arrangement where we would keep inspection and the 12-mile limit and give on crawlers and band to band. Alexis Johnson was there and I told him I would get in touch with Farley about this. GS 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962–April 1977: FRC 383–97–10, ACDA–Telephone Conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February–October 1969. No classification marking. 99. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 99. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, May 7, 1969, 7:30 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to inspections.] Laird said he was having problems with Jerry Smith. HAK said he (Smith) saw Laird’s letter to the President and was upset about the first sentence to the effect that Laird was opposed. Laird said when the decision is made he will testify and so will the Chiefs. He had to write that letter to the Pres. HAK said he didn’t know how Jerry got it in the first place. HAK wanted to know if Laird would be satisfied if we had no inspection but have a review conference to see whether an inspection is needed. Laird agreed with that. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 100. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 100. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, May 7, 1969 On the 7th of May, Henry Kissinger spoke to me about Laird’s letter on Seabeds. I told him that we could go along as an initial position with a three mile limit, no coverage of crawlers, band to band, and in lieu of a specific no-inspection clause, a provision for a review conference after 5 years. I pointed out the poor practice involved in Heads of Departments writing to the President giving their position after an NSC meeting and mentioned how difficult this might make the subsequent problem of testifying in favor of a treaty. Subsequently, Kissinger telephoned me to state that all hands were now in agreement and that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs would testify in favor of a Seabeds treaty. GS 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Chronological/Working Files of G. Smith and P. Farley, January 1962–April 1977, ACDA-Telephone conversations Between Ambassador G. Smith and U.S. Government Officials, February–October 1969: FRC 383–97–10. Secret; Nodis; Absolutely No Distribution. 101. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 101. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, May 7, 1969, 7:50 p.m. HAK said he had talked to Mel and Mel is willing to go along with that revision as discussed—a five year review conference. He (Laird) also said he would testify and so would the Chiefs for this. Laird’s memo to the President shouldn’t be brought up and Smith agreed that he hadn’t seen it. HAK said this should meet Smith’s problem. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–14 May 1969. No classification marking. 102. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 102. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 10, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Arms Control Following our meeting of May 7 on a possible seabed arms control treaty, I have suggested to Mel Laird joint DOD/ACDA base-touching with appropriate congressional people. He will be back at me Monday on this score. Representatives of ACDA, State, Defense, and JCS have met to consider what provisions should be included in such a treaty, pending formal White House decision. Attached are the cables of instructions and text worked out and cleared by DOD, JCS, the State Department, and the AEC on contingency basis. The verification provision does not include a right of access and therefore is agreeable to DOD and JCS. Combined with the review provision, I believe the present verification article gives us a better position internationally and with Congress than would a treaty draft containing no provision. Since the ENDC will recess on May 23, and since we wish to have maximum possible time for NATO consultations, we believe it would be most advisable if we can be authorized to start NAC and congressional consultations early in the week of May 12. Contingent on White House approval, we would therefore like to send out the attached cables on Monday, May 12. The copies of the cables are being held in S/S and can be sent when and if approval is indicated by you. I will be available Sunday at Easton, Maryland, Area Code 301/TA. 2–3553. Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, 1/20/69–12/31/69. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room on May 10 at 3:19 p.m. The attachments are not published. In the last paragraph the words “the State Operations Center” are crossed out and “S/S” substituted. 103. Telegram 75159 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 103. Telegram 75159 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, May 13, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Arms Control 1. This cable contains instructions regarding proposed US draft seabed arms control treaty (text sent septel). Consultations described below should focus on whether US language offers suitable basis for ENDC negotiations and not repeat not whether allies prepared sign such treaty as is. Draft text represents initial US position and it recognized that certain positions may be modified during course negotiations. Decisions whether to accept such modifications will be made as required on basis of evolving understandings and interpretations. Consultations should stress need to table US draft before end current ENDC session, in order offset growing focus on Soviet draft as only available basis for negotiations. 2. For Geneva : You should consult with W–4 members ASAP in order draw on disarmament expertise that group. Immediately following W–4 consultation, you may give text and explain US position to outer six and indicate that consultations will take place shortly in NAC. FYI In order accommodate Japan, consultations will also take place in Tokyo, but we would prefer hold consultations primarily within ENDC and NAC frameworks. END FYI. 3. For NATO : You should give text to NAC members with request it be discussed initially at Wednesday NAC session, May 14. You should add that we are aiming to table text in ENDC on May 20. However, since ENDC recesses May 23, last possible date for tabling is May 22. We regret need to compress consultations but believe we should do everything possible to prevent ENDC session from closing with only Soviet draft on table. At May 14 meeting, we suggest that US Expert from Geneva (Fisher or Gleysteen) be present to answer questions. USNATO should propose second NAC session for May 19, at which time we should again be prepared have US expert present if this desired by others and at which time experts from other capitals could also be present. If third meeting necessary, this could take place at regular NAC on May 21, so that May 22 final deadline can be met in Geneva. 4. For TOKYO : You may give text and explain US positions to appropriate GOJ officials. 5. For NATO capitals : You should transmit treaty text to FonOffs ASAP in order facilitate host governments consideration of questions which will be raised in Brussels and Geneva. If officials in capitals raise particular points, you my may draw on guidance provided below. 6. All action addressees should use following guidance to explain US position on draft seabed arms control treaty. 7. General considerations: (a) US believes main task in field of seabed arms control is to prevent extension of nuclear arms race to seabed. Draft treaty designed accomplish this in simplest manner consistent with interests of US and allies. Ban would not repeat not affect such vital on-going activities as surveillance or deployment of missile submarines. In US view, treaty could be achieved without infringing freedom of seas and without prejudicing other law-of-sea questions. (b) US convinced that agreement on treaty highly desirable, since it might be much more difficult, and perhaps not possible, to reach agreement once deployments had started. For this reason, draft treaty does not repeat not attempt to solve all problems at once, but would be realistic and important first step toward more comprehensive disarmament. Treaty would be subject to review and could be amended in light of experience gained in its operation and technological developments, for example, developments relating to verification. 8. Specific Provisions: (a) Article I—Prohibition would apply to fixed weapons and associated fixed launching platforms, thus protecting option of deploying mobile systems if required in future. Restricting prohibition to fixed weapons systems would lessen verification problems in that it would eliminate problem of localizing and identifying mobile systems or equipment which could operate either on seabed or in superjacent waters, as opposed to those systems emplanted in seabed. Moreover, language of prohibition would be clear in its meaning and would thus minimize possibility of controversy over its application. Zone of prohibition would apply beyond band adjacent to coast of any state. FYI: This formulation also leaves open alliance option of deploying weapons in territorial waters of members, with consent of coastal state. If question raised by others, this may be confirmed. END FYI. (b) Article II—Boundary of narrow band would be established for purpose of this treaty only. Three-mile band would provide adequate area for research and development purposes and would extend prohibition to maximum practical area of seabed. Question of baselines arise as result claims to certain marginal seas as internal waters, for example, Soviet claim to White Sea. To establish equitable boundaries and balanced obligations for all parties, agreement must be worked out, especially with Soviet Union, on how such seas to be treated. US prepared to accept baselines drawn in manner specified in Geneva. Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone if appropriate interpretations can be agreed. Para 3 of Article II suggested by similar provision of Antarctic Treaty and intended eliminate any legal effect of treaty on other law-of-the-sea questions such as breadth of territorial sea or right to exploit resources of seabed. (c) Article III—US has consistently supported principle of adequate verification. For near term, US believes verification should be based on present and developing capabilities, which would permit observation and detection adequate for the purposes of this treaty. Further, seabed differs from outer space situation because it involves existing claims of national jurisdiction and growing number of scientific, commercial, and other uses. Therefore question of access for purpose of verification raises many difficult political and legal questions. In addition, there is immense technical problem of operating in difficult and hostile environment. For example, problem of observer entering installation on seabed at great depth and pressure is both difficult and hazardous, and its solution could require special equipment designed for that particular installation; thus entry of single installation, in addition to hazards, could take lengthy preparations and be extremely expensive. In order avoid complicated efforts to establish complete verification procedures at this time,US proposes simple and straight-forward provision. When review conference meets, technological or other developments may warrant revision of treaty regarding verification. (d) Article IV—Amendment provision of Outer Space Treaty appears satisfactory. (e) Article V—Provision for review conference included because US considers treaty as initial undertaking in complex environment. US believes all parties will have interest in assuring opportunity to consider effect of technological changes on operation of treaty. (f) Article VI—Withdrawal provision of NPT appears to offer adequate protection. (g) Article VII—Drawn from Outer Space Treaty. Entry into force after ratification by five governments including depositary governments would facilitate early entry into force. (h) Article VIII—Drawn from Outer Space Treaty. Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential; Immediate. It was also sent immediate to USNATO, Tokyo, and all NATO capitals. It was repeated immediate to Moscow and USUN. Drafted by Durkee and NEIDLE (ACDA/IR); cleared in EUR, L, J/PM, J, EA, IO, AEC, OSD/ISA, JCS/SAAC, and the White House; and approved by Smith. 104. Telegram 80903 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 104. Telegram 80903 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, May 21, 1969, 1715Z SUBJECT: Seabed Arms Control Treaty - Accession Clause REF: Bonn 6708 1. You should proceed to table US draft Seabeds treaty May 22, but should delete Articles VII and VIII from text. In presenting treaty, you should explain that although administrative articles left blank for time being, these can be worked out at later stage of negotiations, once progress has been made towards agreement on substantive treaty articles. 2. Prior to tabling, you should advise W–4 that articles omitted to meet German concerns expressed in NAC May 19. Say that US continues to favor inclusion of “all states” formula, however, and intends to insert it at appropriate time. Say that FRG aware of this intention and has indicated it would not object. 3. ACDA officer (Kranich) informed FRG Counsel Lahusen of US plans along above lines today. Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to immediate Bonn, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in substance by Hillenbrand (EUR) and McIntyre (IO/UNP); and approved by Kranich (ACDA/IR). 105. Draft Treaty Submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 105. Draft Treaty Submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 1 May 22, 1969 United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, May 22, 1969 1 The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty will further the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I 1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band, as defined in Article II of this Treaty, adjacent to the coast of any State. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way participating in the activities prohibited by this Article. ARTICLE II 1. For purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the narrow band referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn in the manner specified in Paragraph 2, hereof. The width of the narrow band shall be three (3) miles. 2. Blank (Baselines) 3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or nonrecognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, relating to territorial or other contiguous seas or to the seabed and ocean floor. ARTICLE III 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty shall remain free to observe activities of other States on the seabed and ocean floor, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law including the freedoms of the high seas. In the event that such observation does not in any particular case suffice to eliminate questions regarding fulfillment of the provisions of this Treaty, Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate in endeavoring to resolve the questions. 2. At the review conference provided for in Article V, consideration shall be given to whether any additional rights or procedures of verification should be established by amendment to this Treaty. ARTICLE IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the State Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE V Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened. ARTICLE VI Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 211–213. No classification marking. 1 (1) ENDC/249, May 22, 1969. 106. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers 106. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, June 5, 1969 Subject: Assessment of Spring Session and Plans for Summer Session of ENDC Summary The Spring Session of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) recessed on May 23. The summer session will begin on July 3 and should last two months. Two new members will participate at the outset (Japan and Mongolia) and it is hoped that agreement can be reached on the rest of the enlargement in time for other members to participate during the summer session. I propose to head our delegation for the first few meetings of the summer session. We believe that most delegations considered that the spring session was constructive and laid the basis for more concrete achievement during the summer session, notably an agreement on a seabeds arms control treaty. In this way we had a measure of success in implementing the instructions contained in the President’s March 15, 1969 letter addressed to me, particularly in the expression of US interest in utilizing the ENDC as an instrument for moving from confrontation to negotiation. There was general recognition in Geneva that major achievements in the field of nuclear arms control, such as agreement on a comprehensive test ban or a cut-off agreement, depend on progress on SALT. There also was understanding that pending such progress, the ENDC should concentrate on whatever practical measures offer the best hope of early agreement. Other members of the Committee also are anxious to develop a good record before the UN General Assembly next autumn, where absence of concrete achievement will make the Committee vulnerable to criticisms, particularly from non-members and from the large regional caucuses. Spring Session of ENDC At the previous session of the ENDC in the summer of 1968 and at the Non-Nuclear Conference of 1968, the view was widespread that, having opened the NPT for signature, the nuclear super-powers were in no hurry to negotiate arms control constraints affecting themselves. Difficult maneuvering by the US was required at the Non-Nuclear Conference, and later at the 23rd UN General Assembly, to head-off proposals which not only would have been damaging to the NPT, but which would have established cumbersome and duplicative international machinery to deal with the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, as well as put us under greater pressure to discuss such subjects as the non-use of nuclear weapons. At the spring 1969 session a prime concern of the US delegation was to reestablish the authority of the ENDC as the most suitable and effective international negotiating body for arms control measures. Bilateral US-Soviet contacts cannot fully satisfy international opinion, and failure of the ENDC to reassert its role could result in another non-nuclear conference or the reactivation of the UN Disarmament Commission, both highly undesirable. The latter is a committee of the whole of the UN and would be subject to the same troublesome voting patterns and extraneous interests which affect arms control matters in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Efforts to strengthen the ENDC were pursued along two planes: first, to give priority to an arms control measure on which agreement seemed possible at a fairly early date; and second, to expand the membership of the Committee to make it more representative, geographically and politically. The Seabeds Negotiations A resolution of the 23rd General Assembly called on the ENDC to give priority to negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), but there was general recognition at the ENDC that progress in bilateral US-Soviet talks on strategic weapons was, for practical purposes, a pre-requisite for a CTB. Most delegations agreed that a measure to prevent an arms race on the seabed stood the best chance of early agreement. Moreover, such an agreement was recognized as having intrinsic merit. The Soviets, despite their own priorities for various arms control measures for propaganda purposes, also seemed to recognize that a seabeds agreement provided the best target for the Committee’s efforts. The Soviets gained an advantage through their early tabling of a draft treaty. Although we enjoyed the support of our allies in pointing up the shortcomings of the Soviet proposal for complete demilitarization of the seabed, this proposal was supported by many non-aligned delegations. The ability to table a US counter-draft, limiting the ban to fixed weapons of mass destruction, served to redress this initial Soviet advantage. During the recess other governments can compare the Soviet and US drafts, and we hope that a finished treaty will emerge from the summer session, based on our approach. It has been made clear that the US simply could not accept the Soviet approach of complete demilitarization. During the spring session our delegation debated in some depth the issues involved in a CTB and a cut-off, and sought to demonstrate that the US is not to blame for lack of progress. Informal, off-the-record debates were held on CTB, Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare (CBW), seabeds, and procedural questions. These informal debates increased the tempo of work and developed an atmosphere of greater participation on the part of other delegations without stimulating unrealistic hopes. At the end of the session several important delegation heads as well as the representative of the UN Secretary General, Dr. Protich, expressed their satisfaction over how the spring session had developed. They noted that the ENDC’s deliberations are among the most orderly of any major recurring conference. Dr. Protich, in particular, considered that the ENDC had pulled itself out of the doldrums into which it had fallen during the protracted NPT negotiations. The Enlargement Issue There was general acceptance by other members of the Committee that Japan and at least a few more governments should be added. Delay in working out Co-Chairmen agreement was caused on our side by protracted NAG consideration of the Netherlands candidacy. The Soviets responded to our February 25 proposal on March 20. It was then not until April 24 that we were prepared to make a counter-proposal, putting aside the question of German representation and making the Netherlands the NATO candidate. We had no Soviet response and on May 15 we provisionally offered to drop Pakistan. The Soviets never directly responded to this offer but on May 21 offered to add Japan and Mongolia immediately, and to negotiate the rest of the enlargement later. We did not go back to NAC for a further round of consultations, as this would have excluded the possibility of getting Japan on the Committee immediately. The Soviets preferred an immediate Co-Chairmen decision, but it was our judgment that at least an informal discussion by the ENDC should occur before invitations were extended to Japan and Mongolia, i.e., before adjournment of the ENDC on the 23rd. This US judgment we believe was vindicated by the fact that although there was grumbling, there was no serious objection in the ENDC to the position presented by the Co-Chairmen. We are pressing the Soviet Embassy here on further enlargement. Summer Session In spite of my SALT responsibilities, I believe I should head the US delegation to the summer session for the first several meetings. It has been reported that Foreign Minister Aichi will lead the Japanese Delegation at the outset. But, apart from this consideration, it will be important to demonstrate our continuing interest in the Committee. For the remainder of the session I propose to leave James Leonard, Assistant Director of ACM for international relations, in charge, although I may, depending on SALT developments, wish to return to the ENDC for several meetings later in the summer. The name ENDC is no longer relevant since there will be 20 members, instead of 18 (including the French empty chair) at the beginning of the session, and probably as many as 25 or 26 later on. I believe the name Geneva Disarmament Committee would be most appropriate and should be proposed at the beginning of the summer session. Greater attention is likely to focus on the subject of Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare (CBW) during the summer session. This topic is being pressed by the UK. A report being prepared by a panel of international experts on behalf of the UN Secretary General and in response to a General Assembly resolution last winter will be completed around the time the Geneva Committee reconvenes. This report will deal with the characteristics and effects of CBW and no doubt will raise the question of whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol is adequate or needs up-dating. It will also draw attention to the fact that the US has not ratified the 1925 Protocol, although we maintain that we adhere to its principles and purposes. Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential. The memorandum bears Smith’s typed signature. 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 30, 1969 SUBJECT: Message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Attached is a message from you to the members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, shortly to be renamed in light of the recent enlargement. The message will be read by a member of the U.S. delegation (Gerard Smith will not be present) when the Committee reconvenes in Geneva on July 3rd. Presidential messages at the opening of a Session have become customary. Gerard Smith adds that a letter at this time would be particularly desirable so that the ENDC will not appear to be completely downgraded as a result of SALT. The principal points in the attached message are as follows: 1. Seabeds . The message states that, in spite of differences, “it should not prove beyond our ability to find common ground so that a realistic agreement may be achieved that enhances the security of all countries”. Furthermore, it states agreement could be achieved in the course of this Session and that our goal should be to present a sound seabed arms control measure to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations. 2. Chemical and Biological Warfare . You welcome the Secretary General’s study on the effects of chemical and biological warfare, and state that the U.S. delegation is prepared to examine carefully, with other delegations, any approaches that offer the prospect of reliable arms control in this field. 3. SALT . While stating that these will necessarily be bilateral negotiations, the U.S. is deeply conscious of its responsibilities to its allies and to the community of nations. RECOMMENDATION That you approve the attached message to be read on July 3rd (at Tab A). Approve [HK initialed for the President] Disapprove See me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential; Limdis. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed “Approve” for the President. The attached message is not published. 108. Telegram 2978 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 108. Telegram 2978 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, August 19, 1969, 2120Z. Subject: ENDC Proposal for Draft Seabed Treaty Ref: Geneva 2976 1. When presenting text of Sov draft seabed treaty (reftel) at Co-Chairmen meeting this afternoon, Roshchin told Leonard that he was instructed to make following points: A. Begin quote: Sov side is proposing to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable draft treaty so as to submit it on behalf of USSR and US to ENDC at its current session, having in mind that draft approved by the committee should be submitted to 24th GA. B. Sov consent to prohibit emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on seabed is subject to acceptance by US of Sov proposal to establish 12 mile maritime zone, and in this sense is to be regarded as conditional. C. Prohibition provided for under Art I of Sov draft covers any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities designed for storing, testing or using such weapons regardless of the method of their emplacement on the seabed. d. Phrase “any objects” (Art I, subpara 1) implies launching installations and other underwater facilities, nuclear mines, various storage facilities and structures designed or capable of being used for storing, testing, or using nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction. End quote (above language is SovDel translation, of its instructions.) 2. Roshchin then said he would attempt answer any questions of US del following points of interest were subsequently covered. A. Article 1. Leonard noted that new Sov text, unlike US text, did not refer to “fixed” nuclear weapons. He asked whether Sovs intended by their wording to prohibit submarines containing nuclear weapons from anchoring or resting on ocean bottom. Roshchin said that submarines should be viewed like any other ships, which would not be violating treaty if they were anchored to bottom. Leonard said Sov language might however create misimpression or at least ambiguity as to its coverage. Roshchin said that it would be most undesirable to use word “fixed” because this would give impression of narrowing the treaty’s prohibitions excessively and word “fixed” was not really needed. Re second paragraph of Article 1, Sovs explained that their language was based on Article 1 of NPT. B. Article 2. Leonard inquired whether Sovs had given more thought to baselines problem. He said that proposed Sov language would permit some parties to determine unilaterally that adjacent seas were not covered by treaty. He added that it was necessary for a balance of obligations to be established, and therefore we would like to understand Sov thinking on this issue. Roshchin said that baselines problem would be difficult to negotiate since Sovs would not be willing open up their internal seas for seabeds treaty. Roshchin inquired whether US proposal would be to have Sov internal seas not only covered by treaty but subject to treaty inspection. Leonard answered that he would report question to Washington. Leonard asked whether Sovs would be willing provide names of internal seas which they would wish to regard as not being subject to treaty. Roshchin again expressed hope that this matter would not have to be subject of negotiation but said he would report question to Moscow. Leonard inquired whether Sovs intended apply 1958 Geneva Convention in drawing baselines. Rimberaev stated that Sovs were party to 1958 Convention and USG should take this into account. Also, 1958 Convention does not settle matter of historic bays. In concluding, Roshchin and Rimberaev repeated several times that Sov proposal was as contained in paragraph 1 of Article 2. C. Article 3. Leonard inquired why Sovs had not utilized US concept of “observation” and what Sovs meant by “right to verify”. Roshchin said that mere “observation” was not at all attractive to members of committee, who wished to see more substantial rights of verification. Therefore, “right to verify” would be definite advance for these representatives. However, net result would be same as that in US draft since right to verify must be carried out “without interfering with such activities (those being verified) or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas.” Accordingly, “right to verify” would include such activities as overflights, observation from ships and even observation by divers. Leonard inquired whether Sovs intended include “right of access” in “right to verify.” Roshchin responded that “access” in form of visits and entry into facilities would not be included because these would interfere with the activities being verified. D. Article 4. Sovs explained that their amendments provision was based on NPT. E. Absence of review provision. Leonard inquired why Sovs had not included US idea for review provision, commenting that this had evoked favorable response in committee. Roshchin stated that not many members of committee really believed review conference would achieve more comprehensive prohibitions. Neidle asked whether Sov del had in mind holding some provsions for possible development in the commitee itself, such as a review provision. Rimberaev said that addition of review provision in NPT had not made NPT acceptable to those countries that disliked NPT. F. Article 6. Re depositary governments, Roshchin said that these should be the nuclear powers, but as in case of NPT we should not specify US, UK and USSR until we have given France a chance to decide if it wished to join. G. On preamble, Sovs said second para derived from Limited Test Ban Treaty and fourth para reflects Sov approach that nuclear measure will be a partial step. 3. Procedure. Leonard said he would, of course, report Sov text and comments to Washington and request reaction ASAP. However, we could not repeat not expect to have instructions immediately and meanwhile we must face tactical problem of what to tell other dels who are now anxious to make plans regarding length of their stay in Geneva. In addition, it would be in interest of Co-Chairmen to head off tabling of drafts by other dels since this could seriously complicate process of negotiation. Therefore we would probably wish to inform other dels that Sovs have made serious step toward our position and that we now foresee concrete negotiations on draft treaty. We might also wish to consult with our allies on Sov proposal. 4. Roshchin replied that Sovs could not attempt suggest a possible adjournment date before receiving our response to their proposal. He said he plans initially to tell Sov allies general nature of Sov proposal without going into details. However, text would probably be given to Sov allies in near future. As to other dels, Roshchin thought Co-Chairmen could hint that concrete negotiations were beginning so that they would understand reason for remaining in Geneva. Roshchin concluded that Sov del was prepared stay on in Geneva as long as necessary to reach agreement on seabed measure although he hoped our response would permit this to be done rapidly. Leonard asked if Sovs had considered possibility of submitting partially agreed text to UNGA. Roshchin said this formed no part of Sov thinking; Sovs want to negotiate complete treaty now. 5. Roshchin, at several points, stressed that Sov Government had made decision to accept main proposal of US, that Sovs had therefore taken major step toward US position in interest of reaching agreement, and that Sovs therefore hoping that USG will not insist on its proposal one hundred percent. Tubby 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. 109. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers 109. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, August 21, 1969 Dear Bill: Here are my thoughts about the latest seabeds treaty development in Geneva, and how I believe we might best go about dealing with it. 1. The USSR appears to have accepted our idea that a seabeds treaty should deal with denuclearization and not demilitarization. There is attached a comparison of the US and USSR positions. 2. This is a substantial move in the direction of our draft and an important development on which we should try to capitalize. This could be the first hard evidence that an era of negotiation was in prospect Tommy Thompson confirms the significance of the Soviet change of course and hopes that we can act promptly on it. 3. Roshchin, the Soviet negotiator in Geneva, in transmitting the Soviet compromise draft made it clear that he was able to do so only on the condition that we would accept a 12–mile narrow band which would be exempted from the operation of the treaty. In doing this loshchin undoubtedly was aware that most of the other members of the ENDC strongly prefer a 12–mile narrow band to the 3–mile narrow band which the US suggested in its draft treaty tabled at the ENDC on May 22. 4. If we are unable to accept the Soviet offer (which admittedly was made very late during the ENDC session), we may appear to be turning down a proposal which meets the US requirement on the most important aspect of the treaty, denuclearization, rather than demilitarization, over an issue on which the rest of the Committee and most of our allies probably would not support us—the width of the narrow band. For example, the British informed us last week that they want to retain at least a narrow band around UK shores where military activities are permitted and safeguarded from inspection. From the military point of view the British consider that 12 miles is the minimum for this purpose. There is a general assumption among other delegations in Geneva that the US has proposed the 3–mile narrow band as a negotiating tactic to get the Soviets to abandon their position on complete demilitarization. Thus our rejection of this Soviet basis for compromise might be construed as US reluctance to reach agreement on any seabeds measure at all. 5. In his July 3 message to the ENDC the President said: “I ask the participants in this Committee to join with us in elaborating a measure that is both practical and significant. With good will on all sides and a fair measure of hard work, we may achieve agreement in the course of this session. With each passing day the seabed becomes more important for the security and well-being of all nations. Our goal should be to present a sound seabed arms control measure to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations.” 6. Roshchin said that the USSR would like to negotiate a treaty which could be presented to the ENDC at its present session and be submitted to the UNGA this fall. In view of the Soviet delay in making this proposal, which is difficult to explain but which may be bound up with Soviet consideration of when to start SALT, it will not be easy to meet such a timetable. But it is possible if we move fast. 7. Earlier an adjournment date of around the end of August was under discussion by the US and Soviet Co-Chairmen. In signalling to us the possibility that they might make a compromise proposal, the Soviets requested that the discussion of the adjournment date be suspended. The Soviets also have suggested to other EDC delegations that the ENDC remain in session through September. If other delegations become aware that there is prospect that the US and the USS1 now have a serious basis for working out a compromise solution on the seabeds treaty, I believe they will be content to remain in session at Geneva for another month. The possibility of presenting a measure to the UNGA which would be a constraint on nuclear powers, and primarily on the superpowers, in the spirit of Article VI of the NPT, will have appeal and will be recognized as an effort by the superpowers to heed Article VI. 8. You will recall that after the NSC meeting on the seabeds treaty in May, the Department of Defense proposed some changes from the draft that we had prepared, e.g.: a 3–mile narrow band, language which would permit so-called “bottom crawlers”, and a verification clause that would not amount to verification. In submitting these changes the Department of Defense recognized that they would be put up for bargaining purposes and were not the last word. Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President on this score. 9. Our present plan is to send over draft instructions to our delegation in Geneva to DOD before the end of this week. We would favor adopting part of the Soviet offer, including the essential condition of a 12–mile narrow band. Some clarification of the definition of baselines will probably be necessary. We are working on such a draft, together with the interested offices in the Department of State. I would hope that Defense could give its reaction in time to permit something to be submitted to you and the President next week in California. It may then be possible to get word back to Jim Leonard in Geneva about the end of the month. 10. An additional reason for acting promptly is that public knowledge of the Soviet counter-offer will probably develop over the next few days. Congress is likely to become interested shortly after its recess ends. If this procedure does not suit you, I would appreciate hearing from you. Sincerely, Gerard Smith Tab A August 20, 1969 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. and U.S.S.R. DRAFT TEXTS OF SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY PREAMBLE The first paragraph of the U.S.S.R. draft of August 19 follows closely the first U.S. paragraph. The U.S. text was derived from UNGA Res. 2467A (XXIII) expressing recognition of the common interest of mankind in the peaceful use of the seabed. The second Soviet paragraph reflects their earlier proposal for a complete prohibition of military use of the seabed and expresses willingness to continue negotiations towards that end. The third Soviet paragraph is identical to the second paragraph of the U.S. text which states that the prevention of a nuclear arms race would serve the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening friendly relations among States. In the fourth paragraph, the Soviet draft again states that the treaty serves as a step toward a complete ban on all seabed military activities. The Soviet preamble does not pick up the last paragraph in the U.S. draft stating that the treaty will further the “principles and purposes of the Charter of the U.N., in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas”. This paragraph is based on statements made by U.S. Representatives on August 23, 1968, before the U.N. Ad Hoc Seabed Committee, and on October 29, 1968, before the U.N. First Committee. ARTICLE I—PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES The Soviet draft Article I represents a substantial change in the earlier Soviet proposal to prohibit all military activities on the seabed. The new Article I would prohibit the emplanting or emplacement on the seabed and ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof, of objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. It would also prohibit structures, launching installations or any other facilities designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. When the text was presented on August 19 Ambassador Roshchin informed the U.S. Representative (Geneva 2978) that the phrase “any objects” in paragraph 1 of Article I implied launching installations and other underwater facilities, nuclear mines, various storage facilities and structures designed or capable of being used for storing, testing or using nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ambassador Roshchin also stated that the word “fixed” in the U.S. draft Article I was not adopted by the U.S.S.R. because it would give the impression of narrowing the treaty’s prohibitions excessively and the word “fixed” was not really needed. In response to a U.S. query, Ambassador Roshchin said that submarines should be viewed like other ships and would not violate treaty if anchored to the bottom. Paragraph 1 of Article I states that the prohibitions would apply beyond a maritime zone as defined in Article II. This formulation is apparently an attempt to remove the ambiguities in the earlier Soviet draft. In the second paragraph of Article I the Soviets use language based on Article 1 of the NPT to prohibit assistance in carrying on prohibited activities. The U.S. draft text on this point was drawn from language in the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. text would impose an obligation on each party not to emplace or emplant fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the seabed. The restriction would apply only to immovable systems. ARTICLE II—NARROW COASTAL BAND (U.S.) or MARITIME ZONE (U.S.S.R.) Paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Soviet draft prescribes that the maritime zone shall have a width of 12 miles measured seaward from the same baselines as are used to define the limits of the territorial sea of coastal states. Baselines The Soviet definition does not clear up the problems arising out of “historic” Soviet claims to certain coastal waters. While it is not clear that in every case such waters are claimed by the Soviets as inland rather than territorial waters, Roshchin responded to a query as to Soviet thinking on this point by saying the “baselines problem would be very difficult to negotiate since Soviets would not be willing open up their internal seas for seabeds treaty.” Roshchin inquired whether the U.S. proposal would bring Soviet internal seas within the treaty and also subject them to treaty inspection? In a reply to a U.S. query whether Soviets would be willing to provide names of internal seas which they would wish to regard as not being subject to treaty, Roshchin said he would report the question to Moscow but hoped that the matter would not have to be the subject of negotiation. Paragraph 2 of Article II of the U.S. draft treaty was left blank with an indication that the paragraph was reserved for baselines. When the U.S. treaty text was tabled on May 22, Ambassador Fisher stated that definitions of baselines were necessary for equitable boundaries and balanced obligations in view of existing claims to certain marginal seas (EMDG/PV, 414, p. 16) (The problem is not confined to Soviet claims, but may include also claims made by some U.S. allies (State 117102, 107285, 075159)), The Soviets indicated on August 19 that the U.S. should take into account that the U.S.S.R, is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea but no interpretations of that Convention such as the U.S. called for on May 22 were suggested. WIDTH OF COASTAL ZONE In presenting the new draft Ambassador Roshchin made it clear that the Soviet offer to confine the treaty prohibitions to weapons of mass destruction was conditional on U.S. acceptance of a 12–mile coastal zone. This promises to be a most difficult matter within the U.S. Government. ARTICLE III—VERIFICATION-OBSERVATION The new Soviet text provides categorically that each Party has the “right to verify” the activities of other treaty Parties on the seabed. If these activities raise doubts under the treaty, the Parties would undertake to consult and cooperate to remove the doubts. The operative paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article III does not mention verification, and it provides that the Parties “shall remain free to observe” activities of other States. This provision is essentially a declaration of existing principles of international law. Paragraph 1 also provides for consultation and cooperation if observation does not eliminate questions. The U.S. text, as a declaration of existing law, does not confine the right of observation to the activities of other treaty Parties. Paragraph 2 of U.S. Article III provides that the Article V Review Conference shall consider whether additional “rights or procedures of verification” should be established. The provision in the Soviet text for a right to “verify” without interference is somewhat fuzzy. Ambassador Roshchin explained in Geneva on August 19 that the net effect of the Soviet text would be the same as the effect of the U.S. text. The right to verify must be exercised without interfering with the activities being verified or otherwise infringing rights recognized in international law, including freedom of the high seas. It would include overflights, observation from ships, and observation by divers. Entry would not be included since it would interfere with the activity being verified. The Soviet draft does not include any provision for subsequent review of the treaty. AMENDMENT Unlike the U.S. draft, the Soviet text would require acceptance of an amendment by nuclear weapon states. According to Ambassador Roshchin this is derived from the NPT. Both texts would bind only parties accepting an amendment. WITHDRAWAL Both the U.S. (VI) and the U.S.S.R, (V) drafts have withdrawal provisions based on the NPT. REVIEW CONFERENCE Article V of the U.S. draft treaty provides for a review conference to be held in Geneva five years after the treaty’s entry into force. This Article, inspired by similar language in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expressly states that the conference will take into account relevant technological developments. Under the operation of this treaty language, the scope of prohibited activities, and of verification procedures could be enlarged. The Soviets have not accepted the U.S. proposal for a review conference. Ambassador Roshchin stated that not many ENDC members really believed a review conference would achieve more comprehensive prohibitions. Timerbaev stated that the addition of review provisions in the NPT had not made the NPT acceptable to those countries that disliked the NPT. In drafting the review conference provisions, however, the U.S. had in mind not only the possibility of more comprehensive prohibitions but also possibility of arrangements for more intensive verification activities. Contrary to Timerbaev’s views, statements have been made at the ENDC indicating that a review conference provision would be attractive to some members. Unlike the NPT, there is no opposition to the seabed arms control treaty, although there is yet no agreement on its full scope. ENTRY INTO FORCE The Soviet text (paragraph 3 of Article VI) provides that the Treaty shall enter into force after ratification by 22 states, including the depositary Governments. On August 19, the Soviets indicated that the depositary Governments should be the nuclear weapons states, but have not specified these until France has been given a chance to join. The U.S. treaty has ho administrative provisions because of FRG objections to the “all states” formula again repeated in Soviet paragraph 1 of Article VI. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE U.S. and U.S.S.R. DRAFT TEXTS OF TREATY FOR SEABED ARMS CONTROL U.S.S.R. TEXT * U.S. TEXT DRAFT TREATY ON PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF DRAFT TREATY PROHIBITING THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND OCEAN FLOOR The States Parties to this Treaty, The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes. Seeking to achieve agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereofand determined to continue negotiations to this end, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the complete prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, Convinced that this Treaty will further the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: Have Agreed as Follows: ARTICLE I ARTICLE I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplaee on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maritime zone, as defined in Article II, any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow band, as defined in Article II of this Treaty, adjacent to the coast of any State. 2. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to commit actions prohibited by paragraph 1 of this Article and not to participate in any other way in such actions, 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way participating in the activities prohibited by this Article. ARTICLE II ARTICLE II I. The maritime zone established under Article I shall have the width of 12 nautical miles, and its outer limit shall be measured from the same base-lines as are used in defining the limits of the territorial sea of coastal States. 1. For purposes of this Treaty, the outer limit of the narrow band referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn in the manner specified in paragraph 2, hereof. The width of the narrow band shall be three (3) miles. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, relating to the territorial sea or other contiguous waters or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. 2. Blank (baselines). 3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any State party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, relating to territorial or other contiguous seas or to the seabed and ocean floor. ARTICLE III ARTICLE III In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the activities of other States Parties to-the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maritime zone, as defined in Article II, if these activities raise doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this. Treaty, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas. 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty shall remain free to observe activities of other States on the seabed and ocean floor, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law including the freedoms of the high seas. In the event that such observation does not in any particular case suffice to eliminate questions regarding fulfillment of the provisions of this Treaty, Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate in endeavoring to resolve the questions. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult and to cooperate with a view to removing doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty. 2. At the review conference provided for in Article V, consideration shall be given to whether any additional rights or procedures of verification should be established by amendr ment to this Treaty. ARTICLE IV ARTICLE IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty, including those of all the States Parties to this Treaty possessing nuclear weapons and shall enter into force for each State Party to the treaty accepting such amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the treaty, including the States which possess nuclear weapons and are Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for any other Party to the Treaty-after it has accepted such amendments. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE V ARTICLE VI Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such -withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its Country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months In advance Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interes ts. ARTICLE V Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending whether and when an additional review ARTICLE VI 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States, Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _______, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty two governments, including the Governments designated is Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith notify the Governments of all States signatory and acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations ARTICLE VII This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments, Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in _____ at __________ this ______ day of _______, __________. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret. “Secretary Saw,” is written on page one. Tab B is Document 93 . * Geneva 2976, August 19, 1969 110. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to Secretary of State Rogers 110. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, August 30, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabeds Treaty Information Memorandum Because of a hardening of the Defense position Friday afternoon, we will not be able to get instructions to Ambassador Leonard in Geneva this week regarding the Soviet August 19 Seabeds Treaty draft. Initially, as Gerry Smith told you, we hoped to get comprehensive instructions out no later than today, authorizing Leonard to tell the Soviet representative that we could accept a 12-mile band, if other aspects of the treaty could be worked out satisfactorily, and specifying other points which we would need added to the Soviet draft or clarified, and points on which we could concede something to the Soviets. An initial meeting with Warren Nutter and others from Defense on August 27 revealed that Defense was unwilling to move toward the 12-mile limit and resolution of the associated problem of historic waters and the handling of verification in those waters, at least until the matter had gone to the President. We were given encouragement that they could accept some Soviet changes in our original draft, as an earnest of our readiness to negotiate while our decision on the 12-mile band is being taken. Accordingly, with the White House staff (Dr. Halperin) agreeing, we have been trying to get out instructions to inform the Soviets that we needed more time for our decision on the 12-mile band but we were prepared to negotiate on other matters and on this basis the other members of the Committee on Disarmament could be told that the matter was active. Friday afternoon, however, Defense and Joint Staff representatives gave us inflexible positions which meant, in sum, that there would be no move toward the Soviet position. In particular: a. They will not agree to any reference in the preamble to continuing negotiations toward prohibition of military activities on the seabed, even pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament; b. They cannot agree (as they had earlier in the week) with deletion of the word “fixed” in Article I with the negotiating history showing that submarines were not affected, but would require that “bottom crawlers” also be exempted in the negotiating history; and c. They could not accept the Soviet substitution of “right of verification” for our phrase “right of observation” even with a negotiating history making clear that access to seabed facilities was not permitted as well as the treaty provision that there must not be interference with underseas activities. Since the Soviet August 19 draft goes very far in our direction by accepting our denuclearization approach in place of their demilitarization approach, we do not believe that we can instruct Ambassador Leonard to open negotiations with the Soviets on a basis which gives no indication of readiness to bargain in a “give and take” spirit on remaining differences and gives no indication of our position on the 12-mile band. We would risk a strong Soviet reaction and a very difficult position in the Geneva Conference. In general, the Soviet proposal has seemed very forthcoming to other participants, including our allies, virtually all of whom consider the Soviet 12-mile band to be the best solution. I have told Warren Nutter that we believe there is urgency to a substantive response to the Soviets, and that we believe the 12-mile band can be accepted without prejudice to US interests, and that compromises can be found similarly on other points of difference. This position is reinforced by the Soviet action August 28 in giving us an aide memoire proposing urgent US-Soviet discussions on Matters relating to a draft convention on Law of the Sea. This meets Defense concerns that the Soviets have not responded to our approaches on this related subject. More specifically, it reveals an apparent Soviet desire to do business with us on a number of matters which it should be in our interest to respond to. State and ACDA officers are now proceeding to develop a policy memorandum which will afford a basis for establishing a US position on the seabeds treaty during the course of next week. State and Defense lawyers are meeting September 2. Shortly thereafter we will provide you with a memorandum outlining the US interests which make it desirable to respond to the Soviet proposal promptly and affirmatively, in hopes of working out a seabed treaty which could be submitted to the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly. We will also set forth specifically positions on the 12-mile band and other questions which appear best adapted to protecting US interests while being negotiable in a situation where the Soviets appear to have presented a draft which on most points meets our stated objectives and the positions of the great majority of the countries who have expressed views on this subject. Hopefully, when you receive that memorandum, it might provide a basis for you to get informal agreement from Secretary Laird that we can instruct Ambassador Leonard to tell the Soviets that we view their proposal affirmatively and will be ready shortly to negotiate in specific terms with them looking toward agreement on a treaty submission to the forthcoming General Assembly. Some indication of the US attitude is urgently needed in Geneva, where the Disarmament Conference had been scheduled to adjourn this week and delegations are in effect standing by to see how the United States reacts to a Soviet concession to our position. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 9, NSC Miscellaneous-Seabed. Secret. 111. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 111. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, September 3, 1969, 8:50 a.m. Smith said he had a situation developing on the seabeds. He talked to Rogers and Laird yesterday. About two weeks ago, the Soviets came back with a counter proposal which accepted the substance of our position on denuclearization instead of demilitarization. They had accepted the 12 mile limit. Defense refuses to budge on their position of 3-Mile limit. Smith feels we should accept the 12-mile limit. Most of the people in the General conference think the 12-mile limit makes sense. NAC(?) is puzzled. In addition to NAC discussions scheduled for the 10th of this month, we will have a situation in the UN General Assembly if we don’t appear to be making progress on this. Smith hoped that we could have the beginnings of a joint draft by the time we get to UNGA. There are also a few other points we could negotiate on. K wondered about the 3- and 12-mile limits. It (the 12-mile) gives them more miles to put their missiles. Smith are looking at the problem of the Law of the Sea conference. If we accept the 12 mile limit here before we have a clear understanding of the narrow straits. This would mean that Gibraltar would be blocked unless we had an understanding that certain narrow straits could be traversed. K said it could force a lot of people to commit themselves against it. Smith indicated that the Soviets in large part had accepted our Law of the Sea. If we and the Soviets could agree on the 12-mile limit and the narrow straits thing it would be good. I think we have a politics problem if we can’t go into UN GA with a concrete position. K wondered how we could accept a 12-mile limit on this if we can’t on the Law of the Sea. Smith said really we couldn’t. In answer to K question, Smith said that Rogers would support him and will talk to Laird on it. Smith has prepared a talking paper for Rogers to submit to Laird. K said he was inclined to to along with Smith and asked if Smith would send him something on his thinking for his guidance. Smith said he would get it right out. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 112. Talking Points Prepared for Secretary of State Rogers by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 112. Talking Points Prepared for Secretary of State Rogers by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, September 3, 1969 TALKING POINTS FOR DISCUSSION OF SEABEDS TREATY WITH SECRETARY LAIRD A. It is important that we respond quickly and positively to the Soviet August 19 proposal on a seabeds treaty. 1. The Soviet draft, by focusing on denuclearization rather than demilitarization of the seabed, is a substantial move in our direction. In making this shift, they have given up a strong propaganda advantage over us. 2. The Soviet draft is in the hands of our Allies and presumably theirs; the non-aligned members of the Geneva Disarmament Committee have presumably learned of its contents; and press leaks out of Geneva have made known its general nature. Our reply is awaited eagerly in Geneva and (Bob Ellsworth has just cabled) in NATO, where discussion is to be scheduled September at Brosio’s initiative. 3. The Geneva Conference was to have recessed last week. It is held in session in hopes that the US and Soviet Co-Chairmen can make rapid progress in a draft to be submitted this month. 4. It would be useful to produce a joint draft, not only for the Geneva Disarmament Conference but also for tabling in the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly—or at least be able to report substantial progress. The Geneva Conference needs evidence of success, or this forum, with its limited membership and US/Soviet control, may be challenged by the impatient and excluded majority in the United Nations. For us in the UNGA, this could represent a positive achievement in disarmament where the status of action on other matters such as chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and perhaps even SALT will be equivocal. The President is on public record in his July 3 message to the Geneva Conference where he called for priority for the Seabeds Treaty and said that “our goal should be to present a sound seabed arms control measure to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations.” 5. Failure to respond in a prompt and business-like way to the very forthcoming Soviet proposal could lead them to reconsider their acceptance of our narrow seabeds approach and return to their propagandistically rewarding stance of pressing for complete demilitarization of the seabed. Other countries in Geneva and at the UN can be expected to press for still stricter verification provisions. B. The key is acceptance of a 12-mile zone as the negotiating basis. 1. Soviet insistence on a 12-mile zone (which is the width of the territorial sea we and they seek in general Law of the Sea negotiations, and the width they now claim) matches the views of most of our Allies and of the Geneva Committee members, who strongly prefer a 12-mile zone to a 3-mile zone. Indeed the 3-mile zone appears on the record to date to be non-negotiable, and it seems unlikely that any other number than 12 could be the basis for a consensus. 2. We understand and have reflected on the Defense argument that abandoning our 3-mile proposal now would weaken U.S. efforts to assure free passage through straits for ships and aircraft in Law of the Sea negotiations. But the 12-mile zone here is related to a special arms control purpose, and both the U.S. and Soviet drafts have sweeping disclaimer provisions. Sticking rigidly to a 3-mile proposal here might slow down our efforts on a Law of the Sea agreement and hamper US/Soviet cooperation. It is significant in this regard that the Soviets have just come in with an Aide Memoire on August 28 calling for US-Soviet cooperative efforts looking to a Law of the Sea Convention on bases satisfactory to us. The State Department Legal Adviser believes that a 12-mile zone here would not prejudice our broader Law of the Sea efforts. (His views are expanded more fully in the enclosed memorandum.) 3. As a result of a memorandum by Secretary Laird on July 1, Henry Kissinger on July 12 asked the Under Secretaries Committee to see that US negotiating positions on the 3 and 12 mile limits in the Law of the Sea Convention and the seabeds treaty be coordinated. As these two matters now stand, the most effective way to achieve such coordination in a timely manner is directly among Defense, State and ACDA as the agencies principally concerned. C. A number of other points need not be settled at the Secretary level. We need to move quickly however, and to recognize that what is involved is not just being tough in negotiations with the Soviets; they have adopted positions, where they differ from our draft which will have wide support among our Allies as well as theirs and the nonaligned. The US will bargain as long and as hard as necessary to protect substantial US national security interests—but we must be sure when we stand on positions receiving little support that there are indeed valid national security reasons for doing so. 1. The Soviets, in relinquishing their treaty draft prohibiting all military activities on the seabed, propose a preamble calling for continued negotiations to this end. We would take the sting out of this by putting such negotiations in the context of general and complete disarmament—but they will have wide support for their position; and we should recognize that they need some reference to their previous position as a face-saver. 2. They have asked that the term “fixed” be omitted in characterizing the facilities to be prohibited, but will join us in making a legislative history that submarines are not affected. We cannot expect much support for an effort to restore “fixed”, or to create a negotiating history that “bottom crawlers” are permitted. 3. They have substituted a “right of verification” for our “right of observation”, pointing out that most states who have gone on record have urged movement in this direction. Their language guards against interference with underseas activities, and they concede that access to such facilities would not be permitted. We will not have much support for arguing against the word “verification”, particularly when so narrowly defined. 4. A difficult problem will be dealing with Soviet claims to historical waters, and devising a proper treatment in the treaty. D. In sum, we need by the end of this week to authorize Ambassador Leonard in Geneva and Ambassador Ellsworth at NATO to indicate that we are prepared to negotiate in a “give and take” spirit with the Soviets, in an effort to work out a draft seabed treaty for this session of the Geneva Disarmament Committee and for tabling at the United Nations General Assembly this fall, if possible. We should be prepared to say we will negotiate on the basis of a 12-mile zone. Other matters on which State-Defense-ACDA agreement is not at hand should be worked out just as quickly as possible. Hopefully, Secretaries Rogers and Laird might report agreement on the above line to the President, get out such instructions by the end of this week, and charge State-Defense-ACDA staffs with working out remaining matters on a priority basis. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381 Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret. Smith forwarded the talking points to Rogers under cover of September 3 memoranda and sent a copy of the talking points to Kissinger the same day. (Ibid.) 113. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 113. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, September 5, 1969, 11:55 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] K said the President asked about the seabeds thing and K wanted to know how strong Laird felt about the 3 vs 12-mile issue. Laird thought the 12-mile was fine if we could have some language put in then about the accessibility of the straits. This is a matter than can’t be worked out later. The Russians won’t object to that stance in the treaty. K asked if he could get State to go along with that, would it be o.k. Laird indicated he talked to Rogers and they both agreed. Jerry Smith came in really too late on this and said we can’t even raise the question. We told Jerry that the Russians didn’t object. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 114. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers 114. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, September 5, 1969, 12:15 p.m. Rogers said he discussed the seabeds with Mel. They are satisfied but they want to put something in the body that the Soviets and we agree on 3-mile matter for other purposes or some such language. We can’t put it in the body but could footnote it. K said he talked to Mel and under these conditions we should go ahead. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 115. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 115. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, September 5, 1969, 12:20 p.m. K said the President has agreed to go ahead with the 12-mile issue providing a proviso is included for arms control purposes (3-mile issue). Smith had talked to the lawyers. If we could get the Soviets to put out a joint submission instead of getting something specifcally in the treaty would that be o.k. K said the agreement he had is that it should be in the treaty or as a footnote. Smith wanted to know if Mel knew and K said yes. The only issue we raised was the 12-mile one. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to seabeds.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–18 September 1969. No classification marking. 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, September 11, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Proposal My staff and the General Counsel’s office have worked with the Department of State and ACDA to prepare a response to the Soviet draft treaty on the Seabeds. In these consultations we have taken into account the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in JCSM–534–69 of 28 August 1969 (Tab A). We have participated in preparation of a new draft treaty (Tab B) based on the recent decision made at the highest level to accept the principle of a 12 mile coastal zone while at the same time protecting defense interests in the law of the sea. We have also helped draft an explanatory telegram (Tab C) for use in consultations with NATO allies. We have received the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D) on these new drafts. In implementation of the White House decision, the new draft treaty describes the coastal zone as being coterminous with the contiguous zone provided in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. According to the Geneva Convention this zone may not exceed 12 miles. It is a helpful formula for disguising the 12 mile feature since the US has always taken the view that the contiguous zone in the Geneva Convention is a nine mile zone contiguous to a three mile territorial sea. Although the JCS are still concerned that any formulation of a 12 mile limit in a seabed arms control treaty could prejudice our position on the law of the sea, they agree that the contiguous zone concept is an effort to satisfy their concern on this score and suggest no other formulation which would better protect DOD interests and be within the perimeters of the White House decision. There are two points on which the Joint Chiefs still hold serious reservations. They believe that the treaty should prohibit only “fixed” weapon installations, thereby allowing various bottom-crawling systems. State and ACDA think that the purpose of the treaty requires exclusion of all mass destruction weapons except submarines; they are willing to accept the term “submersible” and we believe this provides sufficient flexibility to cover any device except one which is continuously in contact with the bottom. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also concerned over the implications of the term “right to verify”, believing that this might be interpreted to imply right of access and an obligation on our part to disclose our activities wad assist other nations in their efforts to verify. The Chiefs would prefer to use the term “right to observe”. State and ACDA have accepted that the negotiating history should define “right to verify” as meaning no more than the US concept of non-interfering “right to observe”. It would also be clear in the negotiating history that no obligation to disclose or assist is implied. We believe this negotiating history affords adequate protection for defense interests. We expect that the North Atlantic Council will meet tomorrow, expecting a presentation on the United States response to the Soviet proposal. I believe we should concur in the new US draft treaty and the explanatory comments (Tabs B and C). I recommend that you sign the attached memo for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. G. Warren Nutter Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, September 11, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabed Proposal Thank you for your memorandum of 10 September (JCSM–564–69) providing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the proposed new United States draft treaty on the seabeds and proposed explanatory comments to be used in consultations with NATO allies. I appreciate the reservations expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, I believe defense interests can be adequately protected within the context of the proposed treaty, which was attached as Tab A to Mr. Ware’s memorandum to you of 9 September 1969, provided that the negotiating history reflects clearly the points outlined in our explanatory comments. As you know, DOD has been vigorously pursuing the US/USSR initiative on law of the sea and we will continue to do so. However, in view of the recent decision made at the highest level, I believe the definition of the coastal zone in terms of the contiguous zone described in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone will not unacceptably degrade that effort. With respect to the types of weapon systems which would be prohibited, our explanatory comments would indicate that only those systems which are by design required to remain continuously in contact with the surface of the seabed would be prohibited. We want to retain maximum flexibility to exploit our technological advantages and I believe the term “submersibles” provides such flexibility. The concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the possible implications of the term “right to verify” is valid. However, in the context of arms limitations, neither of the terms “verify” or “observe” can be considered to have an accepted definition. Therefore, careful attention to the negotiating history can preclude interpretations which might imply right of access or any obligation to disclose or assist. In view of the foregoing considerations, I intend to concur in the draft treaty and the explanatory comments as set forth in the drafts attached to Mr. Ware’s memorandum of 9 September (I–24541/69). I intend to monitor carefully the progress of negotiations on this proposed treaty and to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all issues of concern to the Department of Defense. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, 801.2 (June– 1969). Secret. The attached memorandum to Wheeler, was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard not Laird. Tabs A–D are not published. 117. Telegram 154164 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 117. Telegram 154164 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, September 11, 1969, 2130Z SUBJECT: Soviet Seabeds Proposal REF: STATE 150814 (NOTAL) Following is text of new US draft treaty we propose to present to Soviet Co-Chairman subject to NAC green light (see septel for instructions): DRAFT TREATY ON PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without if infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article shall also apply within the maximum contiguous zone referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, except that within that zone they shall not apply to the coastal State or to any other State acting pursuant to agreement with the coastal State. 3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to commit actions prohibited by this Treaty and not to participate in any other way in such actions. ARTICLE II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be measured from the low water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state and from closing lines across bays and rivers that are drawn in the manner specified in Articles 7 (paragraphs 1 through 5) and 13 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed and the ocean floor. ARTICLE III 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone referred to in Article II, if these activities raise doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas. 2. The right of verification recognized by the States Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised by any State Party using its own means or with the assistance of any other State Party. 3. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult and to cooperate with a view to removing doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty. ARTICLE IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty, including those a of all the States Parties to this Treaty possessing nuclear weapons, and shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting such amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, including the States which possess nuclear weapons and are Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for any other Party to the Treaty after it has accepted such amendments. ARTICLE V Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE VI 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. ( Footnote : US does not plan to agree to inclusion of paragraph in any Co-Chairmen joint recommendation until all other provisions of treaty are agreed upon.) 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ______ which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith notify the Governments of all States signatory and acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE VII This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in ____ at ____ this ____ day of ___, ____. END 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5 Secret; Immediate; Limdis. It was also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith. 118. Telegram 154165 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 118. Telegram 154165 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, September 11, 1969, 2132Z SUBJECT: Soviet Seabeds Proposal REF: State 150814 (NOTAL) 1. USNATO should circulate to other delegations on Sept 12 text of seabeds arms control treaty (septel), which has been formulated as a response to the Soviet August 19 draft. In view of fact that there already has been extensive discussion in NATO on this subject, we would hope to get green light, if possible at special Council meeting, on Sept 15, to negotiate with Soviet Co-Chairman of CCD to achieve a draft to be submitted on behalf of US and USSR to CCD. 2. To expedite consideration of our counter-draft by NATO Governments, Embassies at NATO capitals should convey this draft with following explanatory points to Foreign Ministries on Sept. 12. These points will also serve as basis for explanatory material to be circulated with draft text by Ambassador Ellsworth to NATO Delegations. (1) US considers Soviet August 19 counter-proposal to our May 22 seabeds draft a substantial move toward our position. This move suggests that Moscow wishes to demonstrate its support for NPT, and in particular Art. VI of that treaty, by a concrete arms control measure which is realistic and attainable. Move can also be interpreted as support for CCD as forum for working out arms control measures relatively free from extraneous political pressures which exist at the UNGA. (2) Soviet counter-proposal was made late during current CCD session and it has been difficult for US Govt to respond rapidly because of important issues involved. In seeking NAC green light as soon as possible, we are motivated by fact that other CCD delegations have been standing by beyond normal recess date to learn US response to Soviet proposal which has become widely known. Seabeds arms control already has been subject of extensive discussion in NATO in connection with tabling our May 22 draft and possible British draft. We therefore would hope to obtain green light to new US draft, having in mind that this draft will be subject to negotiation not only with Soviet Co-Chairman in effort to present joint recommendation to CCD, but also with other delegations of that Conference after and if a Co-Chairman recommendation can be achieved. As has been our past practice, we shall keep NATO promptly advised of significant developments in Co-Chairmen negotiations and will consult NAC further before any Co-Chairmen draft is presented to CCD. (3) When Soviet Co-Chairman presented Soviet draft on Aug. 19. he said Soviet consent to prohibit emplacement of weapons of mass destruction was subject to acceptance by US of Soviet proposal to establish 12-mile maritime zone and in this sense is to be regarded as conditional. New US draft Articles I and II accept 12-mile width but have been formulated in such a way as not to prejudice objectives, which we believe important to the security of US and our NATO Allies, in forthcoming negotiations on law of the sea. Articles as now drafted will also protect US and Allied objectives with regard to other aspects of use of Sea and seabeds. (4) Under Article I (1) we have added “specifically” after words “other facilities” in order to emphasize the exclusiveness of the undertaking. (5) We are prepared to delete the word “fixed” in Art. I if it is made clear in the negotiating history of any treaty that submersibles should be viewed as any other ships and would not be violating treaty if they were either anchored to, or resting on, the bottom. (On an if-asked basis only you may say submersibles exclude vehicles which can navigate only when in contact with the seabed.) We are prepared to accept the view already expressed by some of our Allies in Geneva and Brussels that the prohibition in this Article should be as broad as possibly provided that our security interests are not affected. We also would want to have it made part of negotiating history of treaty that prohibitions under Art. I (1) are not intended in any way to affect conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions or applications of nuclear reactors, scientific research, or other non-weapons applications of nuclear energy. (6) To meet problem of a gap between outer limits of a 12-mile zone and narrower territorial seas, we propose addition of new paragraph 2 to Article I. Paragraph 2 of Soviet draft would become paragraph 3 of our draft. (7) Paragraph 1 of Art. II is drafted to insure that treaty would cover seabed under large bodies of water claimed by some states as historic waters in order to have the treaty cover as wide an area as possible and to provide for balanced obligations. When U.S. draft treaty tabled at ENDC on May 22, US stated readiness to accept baselines drawn in manner specified in 1958 Convention provided appropriate interpretations would be agreed on with respect to certain marginal seas claimed as internal waters. Soviets have not been forthcoming on issue of historic waters and under their formulation of Article II we believe they would treat extensive waters along virtually entire coast as internal waters not subject to treaty prohibition or verification. Such treatment would not result in balanced obligations, and is therefore unacceptable. U.S. draft would establish low water line as single baseline, resulting in uniform obligations for all. (8) We are prepared to accept words “right to verify” in Art. III only if it is clearly established in negotiating history that in actual implementation this does not go beyond the US concept of non-interfering “right to observe” under international law, and that this does not imply either right of access to seabed installation, or any obligation to disclose activities on the seabed which are not contrary to the purposes of this treaty. We would number second paragraph of Soviet Article III as paragraph 3, and add paragraph 2 as follows: “The right of verification recognized by the States Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised by any State Party using its own means or with the assistance of any other State Party.” This is designed to meet desire expressed by various CCD members that each party should have right to carry out verification with assistance of another state, but does not create an obligation to provide such assistance in verification. (9) In Art. IV, a comma is inserted after “possessing nuclear weapons.” (10) In the preamble we have deleted the second and fourth paragraphs of the Soviet draft. The third paragraph would become second paragraph. A third preambular paragraph would read “Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step toward a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end.” This approach is consistent with NPT precedent and is designed to satisfy other CCD delegations which view collateral measures as max steps toward CCD. (11) Third preambular paragraph from US May 22 draft is reinserted as new preambular paragraph four. (12) We are agreeing to deletion of our previous Article on review conference. 3. You should add footnote after Article VI (1) of partial text to explain that US does not plan to agree to tabling in CCD of joint Co-Chairmen draft containing “all states” accession clause until all other articles of joint draft worked out with Soviets. If accession formula question raised by FRG or others during NATO discussion, you should be guided by exchanges reported in State 144450 and 145271 (NOTAL). 4. FOR GENEVA: You should call meeting Western Five plus Japan to make US draft and explanations available to CCD Dels of our Allies. 5. FOR CANBERRA: Copies principal cables related to Soviet draft treaty being repeated for your information. We are giving Soviet draft and our response to Australian Embassy Washington and plan to consult here regularly on further seabeds developments. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent immediate to all NATO capitals and USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, and USUN. Drafted by Gleysteen and Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared in draft by Packard (DOD/OSD), Labowitz (AEC), Hancock (ACDA/GC), Stevenson (L), Hillenbrand (EUR), Greene (IO), and Shaw (J/PM); and approved by Smith. 119. Telegram 4138 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 119. Telegram 4138 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, September 15, 1969, 1845Z. Subject: Seabeds Ref: USNATO 4128 1. Summary: Extensive discussion in September 15 a.m. NAC resulted in approval for US to proceed immedately discuss with Soviet Co-Chairman US draft treaty on seabeds arms control. Italy and France merely stated no objections. Several PermReps made detailed comments; others were without specific instructions. Exchange highlighted number of specific points which our allies wish us to take into account. End summary. 2. Grewe (FRG), citing President’s assurances in Brussels welcomed consultation in NAC. With respect to Soviet draft, on which we had instructions, he indicated it posed no specific security problems to FRG as long as it was clear it would not affect operations of nuclear submarines. With respect to US draft, on which his instructions were only preliminary, he indicated that right of verification ought to be capable of being exercised jointly, through an international organization (presumably such as NATO). On the administrative articles, he made strong plea to delete reference to states parties possessing nuclear weapons in both places in Article 4, on the grounds that otherwise nuclear weapon states would be given premium of veto and becoming a nuclear state might hence become more desirable. He pointed out that US seabeds draft covered weapons addition to nuclear weapons and disadvantage to non-nuclear states inherent in NPT should not be extended. On accession he made standard plea for Vienna formula and stressed that nothing should be done “unnecessarily” to jeopardize FRG position, particularly in light of fact that 24th UNGA would shortly be considering results of 1969 Vienna Treaty Conference. He added that in the event all states formula was used, FRG would insist on formal disclaimer statement on accession by unrecognized regimes. Grewe concluded FRG believed seabeds treaty should have three depositary governments, like NPT. 3. Compbell (Canada) warmly welcomed US–USSR progress and said he was prepared to give “green light” to further US-Soviet talks. He hoped that US would keep interests of allies in mind in Geneva. On procedure, he suggested that, in event Co-Chairman or CCD not reach agreement in Geneva, the draft treaties and CCD-approved revisions be attached to CCD report to 24th UNGA. This would, he said, avoid appearances of CCD rubber stamp and preclude less responsible amendments in UNGA. With reference to comment in Ellsworth Sept. 12 letter (para 2 (1) of State 154165) that Moscow might wish demonstrate support for NPT he said illusory to think non-aligneds would regard this as true and he urged US to stress to Soviets importance Soviet ratification of NPT and beginning of SALT talks. Campbell then offered following specific comments. It might be necessary to modify preambular para 3 to obtain non-aligned support and he offered new text (see septel). He welcomed broadening of prohibition and wider zone in Article 1 (1) even though neither went as far as advocated by canada. he preferred US way of treating maritime zones to that of USSR. He asked whether Article 1 covered nuclear tests (as distinguished from explosions) beneath seabeds and wondered whether this might be covered under 1963 LTB. He said Article 2 (1) was unacceptable to Canada because it would make subject to the treaty prohibition areas now regarded as internal matters. Moreover, he said Article 2 (1) was incompatible with international law and the Geneva Convention on territorial seas, inasmuch as it incorporated only some of the provisions of the convention but left out others of equal importance or validity. (He referred specifically to paras. 4, 5, and 7 (6). while there might be some disagreement as to the application of these provisions there was no suggestion that these would not have legal force or effect, especially since they incorporated principles enunciated by ICF in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case. Campbell continued, without elaboration, that Article 2 (2) was not consistent with Article 2 (1). He said that Canada’s views on Article 3 were well known and indicated awareness that Article 3 (2) was gesture towards countries such as Canada. He wanted further information on Soviet and US reasoning leading to deletion of provision on review conference. He said some provision for review was essential. 4. De Ferrariis (Italy) said there had not been enough time to study latest US Text. He expected further consultation in NAC, even though he had no specific remarks on the US text, De Ferrariis mentioned without further explanation, preamble, review conference, Article 3, nuclear power veto on amendments and Articles 5, 6 and 7 as needing further discussion and not fully satisfying Italian interests. He said he could not approve US draft at this juncture and could not give general sign of approval because Italy could not approve certain points of substance. 5. Boon (Netherlands) distinguished between procedural and substantive “green light” and said he was in position to give former. It would not be a good idea, according to Boon, to get NAC fixed on a specific text; some room for concessions should remain and at this stage there would be a distinct virtue in having US go forward with text which was not approved in every detail by NAC. The Netherlands would still like to see mention in imperative part of text of (a) further disarmament measures, (b) a provision for review conference and (c) a more specific verification procedure, such as proposed by Canada. Netherlands also had views similar to those of FRG about nuclear power veto on agreements. Boon specifically said that Netherlands could agree to Article 1 as long as it was clear that submarines could rest on sea bottom. For sake of clarity he suggested deletion of phrase “objects of nuclear weapons or any other” of Article 1. He expressed agreement with 12-mile zone in Article 2. He said Article 3 was in line with general policy of Netherlands on arms control. On Article 6 he made strong pitch in favor of UNGA disarmament committee. He concluded that he had received further comments on Article 4 but had been asked at last moment not to make them. 6. Burrows (UK) gave “green light” on understanding UK not committed to details US draft. He said UK still preferred certain of its own formulations to those of US and cited Article 1 (1) as example. He held open the possibility that, in absence of US- Soviet agreement,UK might revert to its draft. 7. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) reiterated familiar four principles on which French policy based (USNATO 368R, para. 13 and USUN 2808). There were some points not entirely satisfactory in U.S. draft and he said “sincerely” that he could not “give or withold green light”. French position would be communicated in due course through the proper channels. 8. Huorth-Nielsen (Denmark) said his authorities would have preferred broadening scope of treaty to include offensive conventional weapons but concluded that discussions so far failed justify expectations for treaty with such wide scope. He was pleased to give “green light”. He thought draft could be strengthened by inclusion of article along lines of Article 6 of NPT. He also observed that treaty would apply to historic waters and in this connection wondered about meaning of Articles 4 and 7 (6) of Convention on Terrttorial Sea. 9. Birgi (Turkey) gave “green light”, though without instructions. His authorities had been “positive” toward Soviet draft. He thought Canada’s proposal for 200 mile security zone worth considering. 10. Kristiansen (Norway), in giving “green light” expressed appreciation for US efforts to take views of allies into account and make prohibition as broad as possible. He also expressed preference for Vienna formula on accession but said he was not hopeful. He concluded Norway most appreciative at chance to consult in NAC. 11. Da Cunha (Portugal). In supporting “green light”, thought Article 3 left verification “in the air”. He echoed Grewe’s remarks about nuclear power veto on amendments. He said his authorities preferred 3 rather than 12 miles for the contiguous zone (Da Cunha left impression he was confusing contiguous zone with width of territorial sea). 12. De Staercke (Belgium) joined other in “green light” and expressed support for Boon’s argument that US should not at this stage be tied to text which NAC had approved in every detail. 13. Schaus (Luxembourg) expressed hope negotiations would lead to agreement on seabeds arms control treaty. He also echoed Grewe’s point on nuclear power veto on amendments. 14. Cavaleirato (Greece) expressed gratitude at US consultation and, though without instructions, gave “green light” on personal basis. 15. Sigurdson (Iceland) welcomed fact that US and Soviets were moving to agreement, expressed appreciation at NAC consultation and gave “green light”. 16. Ellsworth expressed thanks for serious and detailed responses. He stressed that “green light” related merely to use proceeding to take matter up with Soviets and did not imply NAC agreement to substance of US text. He concluded US hoped now proceed immediately in Geneva. 17. Brosio attempted to finesse Italian position by stating that NAC had given US procedural “green light”, De Ferrariis objected that he was not able to agree to procedural “green light”. He said he could take note of US Sept. 12 communication (State 154164 and 154165), express satisfaction for US efforts and offer no objections to the US proceeding in Geneva, but a “green light” was not possible and indeed a misapplication of the term to the current situation. In response to Ellsworth’s question whether Italy would object to the US proceeding with Soviets in Geneva, De Ferrariis said no. Brosio then summed up that NAC had taken note (a) that US would begin discussions with Soviet Co-Chairmen and (b) of remarks made in course of NAC consultation. Brosio added that matter would remain on NAC agenda and encouraged those who had not made substantive comments to do so, if possible at September 17 NAC. Ellsworth 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, USMission Geneva, and USUN. 120. Telegram 3307 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 120. Telegram 3307 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, September 15, 1969, 1855Z. Subject CCD: September 15 Co-Chairmen Meeting on Draft Seabed Treaty Reference (A) State 154164; (B) State 154165 1. At Co-Chairmen meeting afternoon Sept 15, Leonard gave Roshchin copy of new US draft treaty on seabed (reftel A) and drew on points outlined for nato presentation (reftel B) to explain changes from Sov draft of Aug 19. 2. Roshchin Asked following questions: (A) By inserting word “specifically” after words “other facilities” in para 1, Art 1, does the US intend to leave open the possibility of using seabed installations to store or test nuclear weapons if the installation could also be used for something else? Leonard said that addition of word “specifically” would, for example, exclude from treaty’s coverage research facility which large enough to store a nuclear weapon but which clearly not designed for this purpose. (B) What is the meaning of the word “submersibles” used in US explanation of its willingness to delete word “fixed” from previous draft Art 1? Leonard confirmed that main problem is submarines and added that contingency explanation contained in para 5 of reftel B that submersibles excluded vehicles which can navigate only when in contact with the seabed. (C) What does US mean by making interpretations part of negotiating history? Leonard stated that we wish to have these points clearly understood in first instance with Sov Co-Chairman and that we would also want them in public record, but we had not decided on exact procedure. 3. Roshchin said he would, of course, send US draft treaty and explanation to Moscow. His preliminary comment was that difference between two sides was not great except on question of baselines. He noted that the US draft was not based on all provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention since it excludes para 6 of Art VII, recognizing possibility of historic bays. He said provisions of this para are important to the security of the USSR and therefore it was unlikely Moscow could accept US draft which made incomplete use of Geneva Convention. He reiterated that very substantial difficulties would be created if US insisted on this approach of interpreting Geneva Convention to eliminate one of its stipulations. Leonard stated that the Sov draft did not insure balanced obligations and was therefore unacceptable to the US. he stressed that the US draft was intended to insure that the obligations under this treaty would be balanced. Tubby 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO and USUN. 121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) 121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) 1 Washington, September 24, 1969 SUBJECT: Treatment of Marginal Waters in Seabed Arms Control Treaty As you are aware from cable traffic from our delegation in Geneva, the Soviet reaction to the counter-draft seabeds treaty we presented them on September 15 high lighted two issues as standing between Co-Chairmen agreement, One of these was a preambular reference to further demilitarization measures, which now seems to pose no insuperable difficulty, since the Soviet delegation has put forward ad referendum the suggestion that we use the phrase “Preventing an arms race” on the seabed. This formulation seems innocuous to us, particularly as it is a quotation from the ENDC provisional agenda. This leaves the treatment of historic waters as the remaining important issue to be resolved. Notwithstanding a broad disclaimer article, the Soviets have indicated they would not accept a baselines provision that would extend coverage to the extensive coastal waters to which they lay claim. In particular, they reject any provision that would open these claimed coastal waters to verification. On the other hand, to agree that these areas of the seabed are exempt from treaty coverage would be inconsistent with the arms control objective of an agreement based on balanced obligations. Notwithstanding the divergent interests, I believe it may be possible to develop a baseline formula that will adequately protect our security requirements and meet our basic criteria for a balanced arms control agreement and perhaps be negotiable with the Soviets. The tactical situation in Geneva is that the CCD seems to be willing to remain in session into October if the Co-Chairmen can present an agreed treaty draft in time for the other members of the Committee to discuss it and hopefully to approve it before the dialogue is transferred to the UN. A draft treaty which has CCD backing will be less vulnerable to undesirable amendments in New York. It would also strengthen the CCD’s position vis-à-vis the UNGA and the latent threats to convoke the UN Disarmament Commission as a follow-up to the 1968 Non-Nuclear Conference. We believe it is in the US interest to reach a solution with the Soviets on the historic waters question as soon as possible. We can think of five alternative courses of action to meet the problem and would appreciate prompt consideration by the Department of Defense as to which one best serves our overall interests: 1. 1958 Geneva Baseline Rules Plus Bilateral Understanding on Marginal Waters. A treaty provision prescribing rules based on the 1958 Geneva Convention and international law for drawing the arms control baselines would he supplemented by a special understanding, expressed in a Soviet declaration or exchange of notes with the US which would state that as to coastal waters whose juridical status in international law is in dispute, the USSR would not act contrary to the undertakings of Article I, i.e., the prohibitions of the treaty. This could be paralleled by a U.S. declaration or note that any action contrary to the treaty in disputed waters could result in US withdrawal from the treaty. This alternative would not attempt to clarify the ambiguities mentioned in the second suggestion, nor would it preclude our taking the position on disputed waters outlined in that suggestion. (Our acceptance of special statement by the Soviets with respect to disputed waters could possibly be used by the Soviets in support of their claims to these waters.) 2. 1958 Geneva Convention Rules. The baseline provision would prescribe that baselines be drawn “as specified in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas, and in accordance with international law”. Except for the incorporated reference to “historic bays” in Article 7(6) of the Convention, there would be no other reference to “historic waters”, and the ambiguous relationship between the Convention and claims based on “historic title” would not be resolved. On the other hand, if in implementing the baseline provision another party attempted to exclude areas from the coverage of the treaty on the basis of claims not generally accepted in international law, the US would be in a position to reject such exclusion and act accordingly. 3. 1958 Geneva Baseline Rules Plus Declaration Listing Historical Waters. Instead of a general declaration as described in the first suggestion, we would seek a declaration from the Soviets specifying that certain named waters, whose exclusion would give a strategic advantage to the USSR, would in fact be covered by the treaty. This would be aimed primarily at obtaining an admission from the Soviets that the Sea of Okhotsk is not included in claimed Soviet waters. While this would clarify the major area of doubt with respect to imbalanced obligations, it has two disadvantages: a) At the deputy delegation chief-level (Geneva 3386), the Soviets already have informed us that it would take several years to obtain such a declaration; and b) Such a US request could be exploited to cast a shadow on our claim that such waters are high seas. At present we assert our claim over the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, by regular overflights. 4. Prohibition Without Verification. The treaty text would be designed to extend the undertakings of Article I beneath coastal waters claimed an the basis of “historic title”, but to extend the right of verification only up to the outer limit of those waters. Since in the final analysis we are not dependent on verification provisions of the treaty, we would incur no unacceptable risks by this formula. On the other hand, this approach would suggest that at least in special circumstances the US is prepared to enter an arms control agreement in which the verification rights do not coincide with the scope of the prohibited activities. 5. Tabling Blank Art. II(1). We could offer to table a Co-Chairmen sponsored draft with a blank paragraph 1 of Article 11, with an accompanying statement that the Co-Chairmen would intensify their efforts to reach agreement on this provision of the treaty. There is some doubt the Soviets would agree to this procedure since they refused for 5 months to table an NPT draft with a blank article in 1967. If this were proposed they also might prefer to return to their demilitarization text if a complete text cannot be produced by the Co-Chairmen. However, if they were to agree to tabling a blank Article II(1), we would be likely to find our ally Canada joining the Soviets on the historic waters issue at the CCD. Moreover, many CCD members might cite the failure of the Co-Chairmen to produce a complete draft as evidence of their inability to complete the treaty at the present CCD session and might urge immediate adjournment. This would negate, our effort to limit UNGA consideration the seabeds treaty and also would reflect adversely on the CCD as an institution. The seabeds underlying the most exaggerated Soviet claims of marginal waters, including the Sea of Okhotsk, constitute less than one per cent of the world’s total. The Soviets probably calculate and would be prepared to argue, if there was an open debate about imbalance of areas available for deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, that the US and its allies possess vastly greater coastlines and marginal waters than the USSR and its allies. If we are to make any progress in Geneva this fall, it will be important to have one or more concrete proposals to present to the Soviets in the near future. I would be happy to meet with you, or your representative, at your earliest convenience to try to reach a decision on this matter. I think the time element requires us to reach an agreed solution by this Friday, to permit a resolution of differences by our principals if we are unsuccessful. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nutter saw it. 122. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird 122. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, September 26, 1969 SUBJECT: Treatment of Marginal Waters in Seabed Arms Control Treaty (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) memorandum, I–24.880/69, dated 24 September 1969, subject as above, with its enclosed ACDA memorandum, subject as above, dated 24 September 1969. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that measuring the coastal band from the sinuosities of the coast is the option on base lines least detrimental to the US security. The US draft treaty given to the Soviets on 15 September 1969 essentially reflected this “sinuosities of the coast” position. Unfortunately, both the Soviets and the Canadians found the language that reflected this position unacceptable. 3. (S) Of the alternatives proposed by ACDA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff find alternative 2 the least detrimental to the US security since this alternative does not recognize Soviet “historic waters” claims. The treaty formulation should not permit the USSR, or other adversaries, to deploy weapons or installations in historic waters claimed by them but not recognized by the United States. In addition, the treaty should not preclude observation activities in any area covered by the treaty. Since the zone of application is not clearly defined by the language of alternative 2, questions inevitably will be asked on the extent of this zone. However, should any future dispute on this issue be resolved in a manner which would prejudice US security interests, the withdrawal provision of Article V could be invoked. This must be clearly understood within the US Government. Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) 123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) 1 Washington, September 26, 1969 Dear Phil, Your memorandum of 24 September 1969, on the subject “Treatment of Marginal Waters in Seabed Arms Control Treaty”, has been reviewed within the Department of Defense. In the list of five alternative approaches you suggest, we find that alternative two would be the least detrimental to the United States security. We are particularly concerned with the Sea of Okhotsk, which the United States currently regards and treats as high seas. Soviet claims with respect to these waters are ambiguous but it is not unreasonable for us to expect that they will more precisely define and intensify their claim in the future. As you are aware, the United States is often reluctant for a variety of reasons to contest claims on the high seas, especially if such action could give rise to a confrontation. Thus, the result of Soviet action to clarify their Sea of Okhotsk claim, if we did not physically contest it, could well be to eliminate our capability to verify their compliance with the treaty provisions within this strategically important area. Because of the serious national security implications which would arise, we believe it would be necessary in such a situation to invoke the withdrawal provisions of Article V of the treaty. In light of the disadvantages your memorandum points out for the five alternatives proposed, there would seem to be no other way to cure such a problem. In order to facilitate the achievement of a seabed arms control treaty we could assent to proceeding in accordance with alternative two. This does not change our view that neither the treaty nor its negotiating history should permit the Soviet Union, or other adversaries, to deploy weapons or installations in historic waters claimed by them but not recognized by the United States, or preclude observation activities in such waters. Should any such situation develop, exercise of the withdrawal provision of Article V would most probably be necessary. All statements in the CCD on seabed arms control, from this point onward, have an important bearing on the ultimate interpretation of any seabed arms control agreement. Accordingly, it is requested that all such statements be reported by telegram so that the Department of Defense will continue to have an opportunity to assist, in a timely manner, in the development of the negotiating record. Sincerely, G. Warren Nutter 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–72–6309, 388.3 (August–September 1969). Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Nutter signed the original. 124. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 124. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 29, 1969 SUBJECT: New US Proposal on Seabeds Treaty Attached at Tab A is a copy of instructions to Geneva outlining a new compromise worked out by State, ACDA and Defense. In effect, it buys one-half of the informal Soviet suggestion to move the negotiations off dead center. It leaves ambiguous the most contentious issue, that of defining territorial waters, but rejects the idea of unilateral Soviet declaration renouncing any intention to use its “historic waters” in violation of the treaty. Our last position defined the zone of exclusion as measured from the low-water mark to the “outer limit of the contiguous zone,” in effect 12 miles. The Soviet position was defined as 12 miles measured from the “baseline” used by coastal states. We now propose that the outer limit of the contiguous zone shall be measured “from baselines drawn as specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention… and in accordance with international law.” The reference to the Geneva Convention is intended to satisfy the Soviets, because the Convention does refer, ambiguously, to claims to historic waters. The phrase “in accordance with international law” is intended to save our position if and when problems arise in interpreting the excluded zones particularly if the Soviets draw their base lines to exclude their “historic” waters from treaty coverage. We intend to tell the Soviets that if they act “inconsistently” with the treaty, we will have to invoke the withdrawal clause. Chances are the Soviets will accept this approach. If, however, they attempt to pin down an understanding that their claims are thereby recognized, then it is likely the treaty will founder. ACDA proposed five alternatives to handle this issue (Tab B), and Defense accepted the approach now proposed (Tab C). Judging from the memorandum from Nutter to Farley, Defense will not go much further, and ACDA is not pushing for recognition of Soviet claims. Unfortunately, if we cannot agree with the Soviets soon, the Committee will adjourn and the other members of the Committee will take the issue into the UN, where we may have a nightmare of proposals. All things considered, as long as we have gone down the road of these negotiations as far as we have, the proposed approach is probably the one we will have to follow. Later, the Congress may raise some thorny questions and we may face problems with the USSR. ACDA proposes to initiate early briefings and discussion in the Congress once the treaty seems on the tracks. Given the basic decision to negotiate a treaty and the initial US compromise accepted this summer, there seems little alternative to proceeding on the proposed approach. The other points in the cable to be prepared are non-controversial. RECOMMENDATION: That we clear the cable. Approve [HK initialed] Disapprove Attachment Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 29, 1969 The attached telegram on the Seabeds Treaty has been approved by Secretary Rogers and by Gerry Smith subject to the President’s concurrence. If he concurs, Gerry will want to consult with a few key Senators before the instruction is sent. Attachment Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva, the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Embassy in Japan Washington, September 29, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabeds Treaty You should make following presentation to Soviet Co-Chairman as soon as possible. 1. Our proposal, presented to Soviet Co-Chairman Sept 15 was designed to assure equitable balance of obligations and we continue to believe that any effective and durable arms control measure must reflect this key provision of 1961 Joint Statement of Principles. 2. Having in mind the provision of paragraph 2 of. Art II (on which we believe there already is agreement) we propose formulation for para. 1 of Art II as follows: “For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn as specified in the 1958 Geneva convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous zone and in accordance with international law.” The formulation is designed to facilitate international agreement on a significant arms control measure which would be responsive to Article VI of the NPT, but which would not prejudice the existing rights or claims of potential parties to a seabeds treaty with respect to waters whose juridical status in international law is in dispute. 3. As Soviet Govt is aware, US does not accept claims asserted by Soviet spokesmen or writers in past regarding marginal waters off Soviet coasts. Thus we are adopting the provisions of the Geneva Convention as the basis for drawing baselines for the purposes of this treaty, with understanding that, where there is any question as to how that Convention should be applied, or as to situations that are not clearly covered by that Convention including disputed waters of any description such as waters claimed on the basis of so-called “historic title” or under an archipelago theory of baselines, the baselines shall be drawn in accordance with international law. We will use baselines drawn in this manner to determine the area in which the treaty applies, and to govern our behavior under the treaty. If other parties act inconsistently with the treaty as so understood and if consultations between the parties concerned are unavailing, US might have to go so far as recourse of withdrawal from the treaty. 4. We have carefully noted suggestion that Soviet Govt might make statement to effect that USSR would not violate purposes of treaty on seabed underlying disputed waters. However, US Govt believes that it would better serve our mutual interest if no statements are made affecting the coverage of seabeds with respect to disputed waters, because statements would require counter-statements. 5. Regarding Soviet objection to our omission of preambular reference to further negotiations on complete demilitarization of seabed, you should say US does not envision possibility Of negotiating such an agreement except in context of GCD. You authorized accept informal suggestion of Deputy Chief Sovdel (para 3, Geneva 3352) as separate preambular paragraph or to combine it with third para of US Sept. 15. proposa1 as follows: “Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end,” 6. If Soviets continue to object, you authorized to delete word “specifically” from Art I (1) in US Sept. 15 proposal. 7. Regarding point raised informally in paragraph 3 of Geneva 3329 you may say, if it is raised again, that emplacement or emplanting of nuclear mines or seabed would be prohibited. 8. US Govt has had difficulty in reaching decision over problem presented by claims of various states, including USSR, to marginal waters which US regards as high seas. We hope the Soviet Govt will agree rapidly to tabling a draft treaty recommended by the Co-Chairmen. We are prepared to do so subject to the views of our allies. 9. After making above presentation you should inform Western Five plus Japan of presentation and, in your discretion, initial Soviet reaction. You should inform allies that we believe our position is consistent with what we believe represents interests of our allies and assume that if Soviets agree to table seabeds on basis of our compromise suggestions, there will be no objection. However, we plan NAC consultation as soon as warranted and would appreciate expression Japanese views through Japanese CCD del. 10. FOR USNATO : You should send letter to NATO dels drawing on above on same day presentation made to Soviets. You should coordinate with Ambassador Leonard in Geneva on exact timing. You also should say we would like NAC “green light” to table Co-Chairman draft before CCD as soon as possible. For this purpose you should indicate that if Soviet response favorable, we would seek special NAC meeting on October 3. 11. FOR TOKYO : You should fill in Fonoff soonest on above and say we hope GOJ will not object to our tabling draft treaty at CCD if Co-Chairmen agreement reached. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret; Limdis. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed “Approve.” A handwritten notation on the first page reads, “Watts informed.” The attached telegram was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and London. Tabs B and C are Documents 121 and 123 . 125. Telegram 3531 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 125. Telegram 3531 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, October 2, 1969, 1040Z. Deliver Gleysteen (ACDA) 8:30 a.m. Subject: CCD: Oct 2 Co-Chairmen Meeting—Seabed 1. At Co-Chairmen meeting called by Sovs, Roshchin read following talking points in response to US seabed proposal of Sept 15: Begin quote A. The Soviet side is satisfied to note US agreement to take as a basis for further negotiations the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Taking into account the statement by the US delegation of September 15, we consider Articles III, IV, V, VI and VII as well as paragraphs I and 3 of Article I and paragraph 2 of Article II as agreed. B. The principle of measuring of the outer limit of the 12-mile coastal zone proposed by the American side is unacceptable to US since it does not accord with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea which proceeds from the existence of historical waters and does not prejudice the rights of states to such waters. It would be inappropriate to take arbitrarily from Section II of the Geneva Convention only Articles 13 and 7, and the latter even not in its entirety. We, however, will not object to this article of a sea-bed treaty making a reference to the whole of Section II of the Geneva Convention. We would agree also to a formulation of a more general nature which might read as follows: “For the purpose of this treaty the outer limit of the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of the 1968 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone”. It is our view that this provision should satisfy both sides since the US and the USSR are parties to the above convention. C. The Soviet side accepts the paragraphs of the preamble proposed by the American side subject to US agreement to include a preambular paragraph which might read as follows: “Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end”. D. The Soviet side does not object to US understanding of Article I in the sense that it does not prevent states from conducting peaceful nuclear activities on the sea-bed, and that self-propelled submersibles should be viewed as any other ships and would not be violating the treaty if they were either anchored to or resting on the bottom. E. The Soviet side does not object to the understanding of Article III on control as meaning the verification shall be implemented without interference in the activities of states under international law and will not imply either right of access to sea-bed installations or any obligation to disclose activities on the sea-bed which are not contrary to the purposes of this treaty. F. The Soviet side does not find it necessary to include paragraph 2 proposed by the American side in Article I. Article proposed by the Soviet Union does not prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the contiguous coastal zone of other states. But we cannot agree to legalizing such emplacement of nuclear weapons since this would be contrary to the Soviet basic policy-line aimed at controlling the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. We proceed from the situation that has come into existence and do not introduce any new elements as regards the prohibition or legalizing of the right to place nuclear weapons in other countries. End quote 2. Re Soviet suggestion to delete para 2 of Art I in US draft, Leonard commented that, if this clause not included, there would still be problem as pointed out by Sweden in case where coastal state claims less than 12-mile territorial zone, i.e. problem of coverage of gap in area beyond 6 or 9 mile territorial zone up to 12-mile contiguous zone. Roshchin said that under US proposal, based on concept of contiguous zone, there would not be practical problem. Contiguous zone would be area free from nuclear weapons except for possibility of nuclear weapons emplaced by coastal state. Leonard doubted whether this could be clearly read from the language of Art I. 3. Re para (B) of Sov statement, Leonard asked Roshchin to clarify Sov suggestion regarding 1958 Geneva Convention. Roshchin said that Sovs could accept either general provision as quoted, or alternatively, could accept inclusion of specific reference to Section II of Geneva Convention; however, Sovs would prefer general provision as quoted in their paper. 4. Leonard noted that Sovs apparently did not contemplate making a statement about not using their historical waters contrary to purposes of treaty. Roshchin said this was correct. He believed it would be most undesirable to focus attention of committee on possibilities that were completely hypothetical. 5. On procedure, Roshchin said Sovs would be ready table text at earliest possible moment, even tomorrow, Friday, October 3. Leonard said that this would hardly be practical. Roshchin said that in any case we should plan to table complete text Monday or Tuesday next week. Leonard said he would report Soviet demarche immediately and hoped for very prompt response. Roshchin repeated extreme urgency of tabling soon, in view very limited time available to CCD and increasing dissatisfaction and impatience of other dels. He hoped US could agree to above “very forthcoming” Soviet proposals since it would not be possible to get rapid response from Moscow to still further US counterproposals. 6. Recommendations by septel. Bassin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. I, May 1970. Secret.; Limdis. It was repeated to Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. 126. Telegram 167972 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 126. Telegram 167972 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, October 3, 1969 SUBJECT: Seabeds Treaty REF: GENEVA’s 3531. You should seek meeting with Soviet Co-Chairman to make following presentation: 1. We appreciate prompt Soviet response to proposals made by us on September 15 and we share objective of tabling Co-Chairmen draft treaty to CCD at earliest possible moment. Subject to concurrence by our allies and final Co-Chairmen agreement on remaining differences we would hope to table such draft on October 7. We also appreciate that Soviet side does not object to our understanding of Articles I and III (paragraphs 1–D and E reftel) 2. Our proposal presented to Soviet Co-Chairman Sept. 15 was designed to assure equitable balance of obligations and we continue to believe that any effective and durable arms control measure must reflect this key provision of 1961 Joint Statement of Principles. 3. We believe formulation suggested by Soviet Co-Chairman on Oct 2 for paragraph 1 of Art II is ambiguous in its reference to “outer limit” to mention baselines. Having in mind the provision of paragraph 2 of this article (on which we believe there already is agreement) we would suggest formulation as follows: “For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous Zone referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn as specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and in accordance with international law.” The formulation is designed to facilitate international agreement on a significant arms control measure which would be responsive to Article VI of the NPT, but which would not prejudice the existing rights or claims of potential parties to a seabeds treaty with respect to waters whose juridical status in international law is in dispute. 4. As Soviet Government is aware, US does not accept claims asserted by Soviet spokesmen or writers in past regarding marginal waters off Soviet coasts. Thus we are adopting the provisions of the Geneva Convention as the basis for drawing baselines for the purposes of this treaty, with the understanding that, where there is any question as to how that Convention should be applied or as to situations that are not clearly covered by that Convention, including disputed waters of any description such as waters claimed on the basis of so-called “historic title” or under an archipelago theory of baselines, the baselines shall be drawn in accordance with international law. We use baselines drawn in this manner to determine the area in which the treaty applies, and to govern our behavior under the treaty. If other parties act inconsistently with the treaty as so understood and consultations between the parties concerned are unavailing, US might have to go to so far as recourse to withdrawal from the treaty. 5. We have carefully noted Co-Chairman statement that Soviet government does not contemplate making statement that USSR would not violate purposes of treaty to seabed underlying disputed waters. US Government believes that it would be better if no statements are made affecting the seabeds with respect, to disputed waters, because such statements would require counter-statements. 6. Regarding Soviet objection to our omission of preambular reference to further negotiations on complete demilitarization of seabed, you should say US does not envision negotiating such an agreement except in context of GCD. You authorized accept Oct 2 suggestion of Co-Chairman (para C Geneva 3531) on additional preambular paragraph covering this point or to suggest combining it with third para of US Sept. 15 proposal as follows: “Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end.” 7. US prefers not to delete para 2 of Art I in US draft since it clarifies ambiguity in earlier US and Soviet drafts. US, however, prepared to table Co-Chairmen draft without this provision to expedite tabling and consideration of treaty draft by other CCD members, with understanding that this or some similar provision can be reintroduced, if desirable, during later stages of negotiations. 8. Regarding point raised informally in paragraph 3 of 3329, you may say, if it is raised again, that emplacement or emplanting of nuclear mines on seabed would be prohibited. 9. After making above presentation you should inform Western Five plus Japan of presentation and, in your discretion, initial Soviet reaction. You should inform allies that we believe our position is consistent with that we believe represents interests of our allies and assume that if Soviets agree to table seabeds treaty on basis of our compromise suggestions, there will be no objection. We plan NAC consultation on Oct. 6 and would appreciate expression Japanese views through Japanese CCD del. 10. FOR USNATO: You should circulate letter on Oct. 3 drawing on above and Geneva reftel for your presentation. You should also propose special NAC meeting on Oct. 6 at which time we would like “green light” to table draft at CCD if Soviets agree to our proposal for resolving remaining difference over formulation of para 1 of Art II. You should say we have had difficulty reaching decision over problem presented by claims of various states, including USSR, to marginal waters which US regards as high seas. We believe that formulation suggested by us is most consistent with disclaimer clause (para 2 of Art II) and therefore should be acceptable to our allies. Per para 7 above, although we prefer retain Art 1, para 2 in order provide explicit coverage of points discussed paras 1–F and 2 reftel, we prepared accept deletion this paragraph with understanding these points implicitly covered under Art I, and under proviso Soviets prepared be receptive suggestions for meeting these points if others wish pursue matter in CCD. 11. We regret necessity for requesting special NAC meeting to deal with draft seabeds treaty but believe it desirable to table draft as soon as possible to permit next stage of negotiation to start within CCD which has been standing by almost one month beyond normal adjournment time in anticipation of Co-Chairmen agreement. 12. FOR TOKYO: You should fill in Fonoff soonest on above and say we hope GOJ will not object to our tabling draft treaty at CCD if Co-Chairmen agreement reached. 12. NATO CAPITALS: You should draw on above in explaining US position to appropriate Fonoff officials to facilitate their instructing NATO dels for October 6 special NAC. Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO and Tokyo. It was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Sonnenfeldt and, in draft, in PM, H, AEC, IO, EUR, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Smith. 127. Telegram 3575 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 127. Telegram 3575 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, October 4, 1969, 1541Z SUBJECT: CCD—Joint US-Soviet Draft Seabed Treaty Following is text of joint US-Soviet draft seabed treaty we plan to table at CCD Oct 7, copy of which we have provided to Sov del for coordination (text is based on State 154164; preambular para in para 1 (C) of Geneva 3531 and Art II para 1 as in para 3 of Geneva 3356): Begin text Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes. Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among states, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes step towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 2. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to encourage or induce any state to commit actions prohibited by this Treaty and not to participate in any other way in such actions. Article II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous zone referred to II Article I shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of Section II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone and in accordance with international law. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be intepreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or nonrecognition of rights or claims asserted by any other state, related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed and the ocean floor. Article III 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone, referred to in Artcle II, if these activities raise doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas. 2. The right of verification recognized by the States Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised by any State Party using its own means or with the assistance of any other State Party. 3. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult and to cooperate with a view to removing doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assume under this Treaty. Article IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendment to this Treaty. Amendments must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty, including those of all the States Parties to this Treaty possessing nuclear weapons, and shall enter into force for each State Party to this Treaty accepting such amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, including the states which possess nuclear weapons and are parties to this Treaty. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for any other party to the Treaty after it has accepted such amendments. Article V Each party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. Article VI 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all states. Any state which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the governments of . . ., which are hereby designated the depositary governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty two governments, including the governments designated as depositary governments of this Treaty. 4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The depositary governments shall forthwith notify the governments of all states signatory and acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article VII This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the states signatory and acceding thereto. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in . . . at . . . this . . . day of . . .. End text Bassin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO. It was repeated to USUN and U.S. embassies in Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, and Tokyo. 128. Revised U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty 128. Revised U.S.-Soviet Draft Treaty 1 Geneva, October 30, 1969 Revised American-Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, October 30, 1969 1 The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 2 any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article shall also apply within the contiguous zone referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, except that within that zone they shall not apply to the coastal state. 3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to commit actions prohibited by this Treaty and not to participate in any other way in such actions. ARTICLE II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I Section II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and in accordance with international law. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed and the ocean floor. ARTICLE III 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone, referred to in Article I, if these activities raise doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas. 2. The right of verification recognized by the States Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised by any State Party using its own means or with the assistance of any other State Party. 3. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult and cooperate with a view to removing doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the event that consultation and cooperation have not removed the doubts and there is serious question concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, States Parties to this Treaty may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council. ARTICLE IV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE V Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened. ARTICLE VI Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE VII 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of … which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith notify the Governments of all States signatory and acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE VIII This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in………at………this………day of………. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 507–509. No classification marking. 1 CCD/269/Rev. 1, Oct. 30, 1969. 2 15 UST 1606. 129. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers 129. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, November 11, 1969 [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Seabeds] K said what really got him on Jerry was the way he handled the Seabed Treaty. J told the P he would wait for 3 or 4 years on that, and then he came back to the P 3 weeks later and told him he was morally committed. K said he knew how that happened—we didn’t think the Soviets would respond. K said his own impression of Jerry is that he’s an honorable guy and that he plays the game. R said he will if we let him. R said that in the meeting, the P didn’t like what Jerry was saying so he cut him off. K said he had not been watching that. R said on the Soviet thing, if you are careless on your recollection, you might conclude as K did. What J said was that if we were in a position of doing something we don’t like, we can delay it. R said he doesn’t think there’s anything wrong with the Seabed Treaty. If we’re going to have an era of negotiation, it’s a good thing. K said he agreed, and that on every decision that came to the White House, we sided with Jerry. R said that when Jerry talked about delaying 3 or 4 years, he was talking about if it was unsatisfactory, but it didn’t happen. R said if he were President, he would say he was glad Smith worked that out. R said it will be some time before the treaty will be a treaty, another 3 or 4 years. K said he didn’t think there was any basic damage done, but he would do what he could to keep it quiet. R said on the Smith thing, tell the P the delay could have been invoked, but the Soviets moved in our direction—we thought they would move the other way. And also tell the P that it is going to 3 or 4 years till it is a treaty. K said he didn’t even think he would raise it with the P, it wasn’t that important. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Seabeds] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11–17, 1969. No classification marking. 130. Telegram 4311 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 130. Telegram 4311 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 25, 1969, 2137Z. Subj: Seabed Treaty: Problems and Prospects 1. Our objective of gaining UNGA endorsement of seabed treaty has faced several problems which have already made it doubtful that we can obtain endorsement (or functional equivalent) without exerting more pressure and creating more than objective is worth. We have in mind that even if we are able to get positive resolution voted by this GA, we would still need a sufficiently favorable atmosphere so that when treaty was open for signature it would have good prospects of getting substantial number of ratifications fairly soon. If treaty is “railroaded” through GA in final days over objections of any substantial group, we might face a reluctance to ratify or even sign on part of many smaller countries who could feel that treaty is complicated document, participation in which would bring them no benefit so long as nuclear powers have signed it but which could somehow prejudice their position on complex Law-of-the-Sea or seabed questions which they scarcely understand. 2. Difficulties on path of treaty may be grouped under three headings: A. Problems involving Article III (verification); B. Problems involving use in Article I and II of “contiguous zone” from 1958 Geneva Convention to define area exempt from prohibition; C. Cosmetic changes such as Swedish amendment which calls for operative paragraph on continued negotiations. 3. We believe most problems associated with verification article will be met by redraft of Article III negotiated with Canada. It is our impression that Canadian effort to sell this redraft is going rather well, and if accepted by Soviets without damaging deletions could solve verification question. We note, however, that neither US del nor Canadian del yet has any clear reaction from Brazil, and it may be several days before we can be confident that serious Brazilian objections will not persist. 4. Most serious difficulty at this point appears to be problem involving “contiguous zone”. This problem was raised at Geneva by Argentines who receive some support there from UAR, Ethiopia, Brazil, Nigeria, and Pakistan. After approximately one week of debate in first commitee, Nepal, Ecuador, El Salvador, Tanzania, and UK have joined in objecting to reference to 1958 Convention while Brazil and Nigeria have underlined their previous criticism. Belgium has also suggested a revision and Dutch both in NATO and privately to US del have voiced criticism. Thirteen speakers in First Commitee debate have not objected but none has endorsed formulation in treaty and several, notably Mexico and Yugoslavia, have privately indicated sympathy with Argentine position. 5. Original Argentine objection was based on their fear that use of “contiguous zone” to define coastal strip would enhance status in international law of concept embodied in 1958 Convention that maximum total width of territorial water and contiguous zone should be 12 miles. 6. Argentine del in Geneva pointed out correctly that contiguous zone was conceived of as something lying beyond territorial waters and was thus fundamentally incompatible with any territorial waters of more than 12 miles. They argued that disclaimer was invalidated ab initio by inclusion in Article I of contiguous zone concept. Argentine objection has, of course, been echoed by other 200 mile countries speaking in Commitee I (Ecuador and El Salvador) and we can expect that Chile and Peru will take same line. LA “solidarity” then came into play to encourage delegations like Brazil and Mexico to support Argentine objections. If problem had stopped there with prospect of absention or negative vote from 20 odd LA delegations to any positive resolution, it would have been bad enough. Other African and Asian dels have, however, now begun to echo Argentine objections in a way which almost certainly will become cliche formula as debate proceeds. The way that indirect definition of coastal strip in fashion which never even permits number 12 to appear in treaty is not only unnecessary but almost certainly is evidence of dubious motives. Since many delegations here are small, harrassed with multiplicity of problems, and lack legal expertise, it is easy for them to conclude that superpowers must have some concealed objective behind this complicated formula even though they cannot see what this objective is. Even such sophisticated allies as UK and Netherlands do not find our explanations convincing. Position of UK as close ally of U.S. which shares our basic security outlook and objectives on Law-of-the-Sea questions is most noteworthy, and they have formally indicated desire to table simple language unless we strongly object (USUN A–2805). All our explanations, whether to sophisticated or unsophisticated delegations, end with their asking why if disclaimer clause is good enough for others it isn’t good enough for us and why we feel compelled to protect our Law-of-the-Sea position in such an elaborate fashion. 7. US del has taken strong line here on great difficulty we would face in revising Article I which represents agreed conclusion to difficult negotiation with Soviets. But if changes in Article I are not in fact possible, it is more than probable that we will fail to reach our objective of endorsement for treaty by this GA; and it is our estimate that we are not likely to be able even with unlimited time to overcome suspicion and reservations of a substantial number of states and treaty would thus be unlikely to gain general acceptance at next GA. 8. Roshchin and other Sovs have told us on several occasions that revision to simpler language in Article I would pose no problems for them. It is thus clear to all informed disarmament officials that present language is not dictated by positions of either Sovs or of US allies. We have taken line that it would be most regrettable if offer by nuclear powers to accept limitations in seabed treaty is rejected here by non-nuclear states; but if US maintains its inflexible and solitary stand on wording of Article I, we judge that onus for failure of treaty will in fact come back on us. 9. Argentine delegation is anxious to play positive role in disarmament negotiations and appears genuinely regretful that this problem has arisen. Since they first drew attention to it, it seems likely any change which met their needs could be sold to other reluctant delegations. Without suggesting precise language of possible revisions we would urge consideration of following elements, some combination of which might well satisy Argentines. A. Inclusion in Article I of explicit reference to “12 mile” width of coastal strip. B. Simplification of Article I to remove from it words “contiguous zone” and reference to 1958 Convention. Coastal strip would be mentioned in Article I but defined only in Article II. C. Inclusion in Article I, if “contiguous zone” is retained, of some disclaimer phrase or sentence. D. Strengthening of disclaimer clause (Article II, para. 2) by specific reference to “contiguous zone” and 1958 Convention. E. Substitution of “seabed zone” for “contiguous zone” throughout Articles I, II and III; deletion of reference to 1958 Convention in Article I; and restructuring of Article II para 1 so that it establishes outer limit of “seabed zone” as vertically beneath line 12 miles outward from baselines drawn in accordance with the provisions of part 1, section II of the 1958 convention. (This is idea mentioned by Belgian del.) Argentine del has told us privately that they could accept retention of references to “contiguous zone” and 1958 Convention in Article II para [garble] they have been discouraging us from hoping that any strengthening of disclaimer clause (Article II para 2) would meet their needs. 10. They are anxious to table amendments themselves if it does not appear likely that US will be able to meet their requirements. We have successfully discouraged this so far but Argentines are likely to feel that their position is best protected by formal tabling of an amendment even though they recognize that such action would complicate possibilities of negotiating something acceptable to Co-Chairmen. 11. Third group of problems which Treaty still faces are those of less substantive character such as Swedish amendment. This proposal has been widely endorsed both in Geneva and in New York, but if we are able to meet all or almost all of foregoing problems, it is not likely that many delegations would oppose treaty simply because of US reluctance to convert what is now preambular paragraph into operative paragraph. Since, however, we may well not be able to give complete satisfaction on above problems, it is possible that going some distance towards Swedish amendment could tip the balance with a substantial number of delegations. A second suggestion in this category is for some endorsement in preamble of concepts taken over from debate here in Seabed Commitee (see USUN 4156). This suggestion has particularl resonance here where there has been widespread dissatisfaction with US and Soviet position in seabed discussion, and any gesture we could make in this area could have significant impact on considerable number of dubious delegations. We recognize this may lead to pressure to insert ref to “common heritage of mankind”. 12. A third cosmetic suggestion would have the disclaimer clause removed from Article II, where it seems to some to relate only to baselines questions, and give it status of independent article applying to entire treaty. 13. Foregoing catalog of problems may seem rather disheartening, but picture would not be complete without noting several positive factors. Our most serious problems in Geneva derived from hyper-activity of Canadian del during periods when focus of action was in Moscow or Washington. Redraft of Article III negotiated with US has been pleasant surprise to Ignatieff and he is now exerting all his energies to secure GA endorsement of treaty. Leaders of Nonaligned, such as Shahi (Pakistan) and Kolo (Nigeria) who are Chairman and Vice-Chairman of First Committee, are anxious for this GA to produce some results in disarmament field and they see seabed Treaty as only possibility. Husain (India) feels same way and Garcia Robles (Mexico) is at least carefully neutral, ready to board bandwagon if one appears. Hostilities and suspicions toward “superpowers” among Nonaligned were rife at opening of GA but have been substantially reduced by such positive developments as opening of SALT and US-Soviet ratification of NPT. We therefore face unmanageable situation in which emotions are dominant but rather one in which most delegations will look at amendments we may suggest in serious, positive frame of mind. 14. Perhaps most serious problem is mechanical one of limited time available first to agree with Soviets on texts of changes to Oct 30 draft, and then to elicit support of influential delegations final revision. Unless we are able to begin final selling job during week of Dec 1, it is unlikely we can obtain satisfactory result in voting on disarmament resolutions which should come about Dec 11 or 12. We do not have to have final text of all changes in hand before beginning this selling job but we do have to have clear idea what these changes are to be and should be able to table revised text no later than Dec 5. We will be able to continue on present ambiguous line of action for remainder of this week, neither pressing nor abandoning our basic objective. Our decision whether to continue effort or to accept referring treaty back to CCD should, however, be made within next few days in light of whatever can be done regarding above problems. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva. 131. Telegram 1145 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 131. Telegram 1145 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, April 13, 1970, 1815Z. Subject: Revised Draft Seabed Treaty Following is text of revised draft seabed treaty which Roshchin (USSR) provided to Leonard (US) at April 13 Co-Chairmen meeting. US del comments by septel. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America draft treaty [garble] the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and strengthens friendly relations among states, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a Treaty on general and disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner, consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the seas, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone as defined in Article II any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using weapons. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article shall also apply to the seabed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within such seabed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal state or to the seabed beneath its territorial waters. 3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and not to participate in any other way in such actions. Article II For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in Article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in Part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, signed in Geneva on 29 April 1958 and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I, Section II, of this Convention and in accordance with international law. Article III 1. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in Article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities or otherwise infringe rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas. 2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts and, if the doubts persist, shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification, as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in Article I. Parties in the region of the activities and any other party so requesting, shall be notified of, and may participate in, such consultation and cooperation. 3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and cooperate with other parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the parties in the region and of any other party desir1ng to cooperate. 4. If consultation and cooperation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter. 5. Verification pursuant to this Article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party. 6. All verification activities conducted pursuant to this Treaty shall be conducted with due regard for the sovereign or exclusive rights of a coastal state with respect to the natural resources of its continental shelf under international law. Article IV Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State related to waters off its coasts, including inter alia territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the seabed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves. Article V Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the states parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article VI Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view for assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of the parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened. Article VII Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other states parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. Article VIII The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the governments of . . . which are hereby designated the depositary governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two governments, including the governments designated as depositary governments of this Treaty. 4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The depositary governments shall promptly inform the governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the [garble] In witness whereof the undersigned being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in . . . at . . . this . . . day of . . .. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 381, Subject Files, Seabeds Vol. 1, May 1970. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to USUN and USNATO. 132. Telegram 1146 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 132. Telegram 1146 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, April 13, 1970, 2025Z. Subject: CCD: Co-Chairmen Meeting on Revised Seabed Treaty Ref: Geneva 1145 1. At Co-Chairmen meeting afternoon April 13, Roshchin (USSR) gave Leonard (US) text of revised draft seabed treaty (reftel) proposed that it be tabled in CCD as joint US–USSR draft ASAP. 2. Sov draft is identical to text contained in Annex A of US position paper (with deletion of bracketed language and addition of underscored language) except for expected deletion of references to international procedures and good offices of SYG in paras 3 and 5 of Article III, and following minor drafting changes: Article II reference to “that Convention” in second line from bottom appears “this Convention” in Sov draft. Article III, para 3, end of second sentence—words “paragraph 2 above” appear as “paragaph 2 of this Article”. Article V phrase: “to the Treaty” in first sentence and at beginning of second sentence is deleted in Sov draft. Article VIII—Sovs substituted words “the Treaty” for word “it” in second line. Article IX, para 2—Sovs have not listed names of depositary states. Comment: USDel recommends that we agree to and table Sov draft as revised joint draft treaty. End comment. 3. In conveying text, Roshchin pointed out that it incorporates all changes desired by US, or recommended by us in response to suggestions of other CCD dels. He noted that depositary govts are left blank in para 2, Article IX to allow France to associate itself with Treaty at a larger stage if it so desired (a procedure he said was used with NPT). 4. Recalling problem of UAR (see Geneva 718) with what it considered “requirement” in Canadian Article III that parties consult other parties about suspected violation before referring matter to Security Council, Roshchin said he was instructed to make statement when presenting draft to CCD and to request that US Co-Chairman make parallel statement in CCD. Leonard said he would recommend to Washington that we do so, since the statement sets forth thoughts we had already expressed to UAR delegation: Begin text Consultations among the States Parties provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III with a view to removing doubts that may arise regarding the fulfillment of the treaty are not of course an obligatory precondition of the use under paragraph 4 of the same Article by the States Parties of the right to apply to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in cases when there exist serious grounds to do so. Therefore, any State Party might apply directly to the Security Council without resorting to consultations. End text 5. Roshchin said his instructions called for completing consideration of seabed treaty at spring session of CCD. He thought it should be possible to do this since Sovs had accepted so many suggestions of other dels and had exhausted possibilities for further substantive changes in treaty text. Leonard argued against such course, pointing out that many Nonaligned dels have told us it would take them at least a month to get instructions on new text. He said it would create an extremely bad atmosphere in committee if Co-Chairmen pressed for quick action on treaty before recess, holding dels here for several weeks for this purpose, and that we would have better chance of developing consensus in support of treaty if we allowed dels and their govts sufficient time to review text. Co-Chairmen agreed to postpone decision on recess and to consult with other CCD dels on this matter during next few days. 6. On timing of tabling, Leonard said he would report immediately to Washington and hoped to have reaction to new text within a few days. He said we would inform our CCD allies morning April 14 that Sovs had given us response on seabed treaty; however, we would give our allies copy of revised draft only after we had received Washington’s comments and had confirmed to Sov Chairman that there were no outstanding problems between ourselves regarding text. Leonard added that we would need about ten days to complete consultations within USG and with allies before actually tabling treaty and therefore date for tabling would probably be about April 23. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USUN, USNATO, and Vienna. 133. Telegram 55038 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 133. Telegram 55038 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, April 14, 1970 SUBJECT: Revised Seabeds Treaty Draft REF: GENEVA 1145, GENEVA 1146 1. US NATO should circulate to other delegations text of revised Seabed Arms Control Treaty contained GENEVA 1145 which was presented to US Co-Chairman by Soviet Co-Chairman at Geneva on April 13 and which US prepared to table at CCD as new joint co-chairmen draft. In view of fact that most changes in revised draft were discussed in NATO and with Allies in New York last fall, you should seek to obtain concurrence at special Council meeting on April 21, or at latest at regular meeting April 22, for Co-Chairmen tabling April 23. 2. To expedite considerations revised treaty by NATO govts, embassies at NATO capitals should convey draft text to FonOffs. Following points will serve as partial basis for explanatory material to be circulated to NATO delegations with draft text by US NATO: (a) Soviet response is gratifying since it represents virtually complete acceptance of changes which we proposed to Sovs at UNGA last fall and elaborated on at CCD this February. New text incorporates, with few modifications, amendments contained in working papers tabled at UNGA by Argentina, Canada, and Mexico. These in turn were designed to meet concerns of various countries that had found October 30 draft Co-Chairmen treaty text (GENEVA 39805, NOTAL) lacking in certain respects. Canadian and Argentine amendments were circulated with explanations to all NATO allies last fall and should be available in capitals. Additional minor and editorial changes in new draft reflect various improvements suggested by UK, Belgium, Japan, and others. (b) In view of fact that new substantial improvements desired by many other govts, we are hopeful that tabling of new text, after further discussion in Geneva, will result in achievement of treaty that will be broadly acceptable. 3. For GENEVA. You should call meeting Western Five plus Japan to make new draft and explanations available to CCD dels of our allies. Re proposed USSR statement on UAR problem, we are prepared go along with Roshchin text since first sentence of text makes clear that right under Charter to go directly to Security Council is not prejudiced. However, we would not ourselves wish to make statement in identical terms. You should include in speech presenting treaty to CCD, following statement parallel to Roshchin’s: BEGIN TEXT. The procedures provided for in Art III do not, of course, prejudice or limit the right of any State to apply directly to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. END TEXT. 4. For TOKYO: Embassy may draw on above in advising Japanese govt of new developments and our desire to table revised Co-Chairmen draft soonest. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential; Priority. It was also sent to all NATO capitals, USMission Geneva, and Tokyo. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and Vienna. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by NEIDLE (ACDA/IR) and in draft in ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, LO/PMO, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, OSD/ISA, and the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA/DD). The treaty, the text of which was essentially the same as in Document 131 was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on April 23 and is printed, along with statements by the U.S. and Soviet representatives to the Committee, in Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 175–188. 134. Telegram 3043 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 134. Telegram 3043 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, September 4, 1970, 1810Z Subject: CCD—Wrap up of Sessions (Seabed Treaty) 1. Summary: Achievement of genuine consensus in support of US-Sov revised seabed treaty has been main accomplishment 1970 CCD meetings. Only one delegation of 25 in CCD, that of Mexico, said treaty draft should be further amended. Prospects now look bright for endorsement of treaty at 25th GA and GA recommendation that it be promptly opened for signature. End summary. 2. Plenary statements on treaty. Of 25 delegations, 21 spoke during last days of session in support of revised Co-Chairmen draft. These statements consisted principally of either formal expressions of support or acceptance (Argentina, Brazil, US and USSR and of their allies) or statements that delegation approved by General Assembly at 25th session. Of 12 nonaligned dels, all spoke in favor of treaty except Mexico, which reserved its position in favor of further drafting change in para 2 of Art I on geographic scope of application of treaty. All US allies supported treaty including Canadian del which last year was one of leading dels seeking extensive changes in treaty. Of Sov allies, all expressed support for treaty except Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, who remained silent but who are expected to support treaty at GA. 3. Adoption of CCD report to UNGA. Final text of passage in report on seabed treaty, which was adopted without objection, reads as follows: “Delegations expressed satisfaction with the general consensus achieved and the spirit of compromise which resulted in the inclusion in this draft of amendments responsive to their suggestions. Hope was widely expressed that the draft treaty would be commended by the General Assembly and opened for signature at an early date. The text of the final draft of the treaty discussed above is contained in Annex A.” 4. Success of seabed treaty at CCD resulted from combination of following factors: (A) Amendment on international verification procedures. Willingness of Sovdel to include clause providing that parties might utilize any appropriate international procedures of UN in carrying out verification permitted inclusion of clause which, though from our standpoint a truism, was responsive to deeply felt desire of many delegations, including most US allies as well as all Non-Aligned dels. Sovdel in fact conducted negotiations with leading members of Non-Aligned to help them reach formula which Sovs could affirmatively recommend to Moscow. (B) Further negotiations. Willingness of US to accept operative Article pledging further negotiations for prevention of an arms race on seabed was also responsive to widespread and strong sentiments in committee. Though formula accepted by US was slightly different from that of longstanding Swedish proposal, intensive consultations by US del with other dels succeeded in convincing others that US formulation represented satisfactory solution of problem. In last round of statements accepting treaty, no dels criticized final formula as too narrow or otherwise deficient, and many dels expressed warm appreciation for inclusion. (C) Avoidance of Law-of-Sea complications. US del’s ability to negotiate seriously with Argentine and Brazilian dels about possible changes in verification Article which would avoid particularly troublesome Law-of-Sea issues in exchange for Argentine and Brazilian support treaty, which has now been expressed formally in plenary sessions by both dels, was major element in finally making many dels perceive that near unanimous consensus was possible for seabed treaty. Strong personalities and responsible approaches of new Brazilian Ambassador Guerrero and Argentine Ambassador de Rozas undoubtedly contributed to ability of their governments to take prompt decisions, in advance of other Non-Aligned dels, in order support treaty. (D) Procedures utilized by Co-Chairmen in negotiating revised draft procedures adopted by Co-Chairmen were effective in two respects: first, Co-Chairmen dels continued tradition of maintaining extremely close and cooperative liaison throughout negotiations; they jointly planned consultations with other dels and kept each other informed of problems and opportunities vis-à-vis others; we also noticed considerable effort by Sovdel to extend itself to maximum in effort meet points of USdel, e.g., in formulating substitute recommendations to capitals on points helpful to us. Second, Co-Chairmen for first time in any CCD negotiations made special efforts bring Non-Aligned dels into genuine consultations about draft formulations before these were approved by Moscow and Washington. USdel continued practice of first consulting with US allies on major developments, but unlike situation in earlier CCD negotiations, both we and Soviets brought Nonaligned into discussions immediately after informing our allies of significant developments. In their final statements on treaty, great dels expressed warm, and we think genuine, appreciation for procedures followed by Co-Chairmen in developing new draft. 5. Prospects at UNGA: We think seabed treaty stands good chance of overwhelming approval at GA and that GA will recommend that treaty be opened for signature. Mexican del is only CCD member still suggesting further change in treaty. Since Argentine and Brazilian dels are supporting treaty without change, we think damage potential of Mexican del with other LA dels in New York is limited. In time, it is possible Mexican del may accept, in lieu of change in treaty, US and Sov del statements of explanation upon tabling treaty which were designed cover Mexican objection. However, despite favorable sendoff of treaty by CCD, further work will be required in NY to explain worthwhile character of seabed treaty, since among UN dels not represented at Geneva there inevitably will be some tendency to question limited scope of treaty. Problem of relationship of treaty to Seabeds Committee seems much improved from that which existed at last GA, when some countries belonging to both CCD and Seabed Committee were dissatisfied with treaty, e.g. Brazil; however, at recent August meeting of Seabed Committee in Geneva relatively little interest was shown in treaty. In conclusion, we think present prospects for treaty succeeding at NY are very good. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, Mexico City, Rio De Janeiro, Buenos Aires, USUN, and USNATO, and pouched to 21 other embassies. 135. Telegram 2548 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 135. Telegram 2548 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, October 19, 1970, 1418Z. Subject: Consultations With Sov Del on Seabed Disarmament Treaty Res 1. Summary. US and Sov dels, after reviewing status of consultations with CCD dels, have determined that IO dels are now ready to co-sponsor seabeds res and that at least 3 or 4 more are expected to be able to do so in very near future. US and Sov dels have agreed recommend to their capitals that they receive authority make several changes in current draft prior to moving forward week of Oct. 19 with broader consultations with dels not in CCD. End summary 2. Reactions of other dels: (A) Japan, Netherlands, UK, Morocco, Pakistan, UAR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia have given definite replies that they are prepared to co-sponsor. (Italy replied affirmatively on Oct. 17) (B) Ignatieff (Canada) has recommended to Ottawa that Can del be authorized cosponsor text as is but that it should propose elimination of preambular language on freedoms of high seas; on personal Ignatieff has already urged Sov del as well as US del to delete this phrase. De Rozas (Argentina) has strongly urged that reference to freedoms of seas be deleted and has recommended to GA that Argentine del cosponsor res if language is deleted. Zelleke (Ethiopia) has suggested that this reference be deleted to avoid unnecessary problems. (C) Garcia Robles says Mexican co-sponsorship might be possible after substance and procedure for interpretive statements on Mexican problems re treaty have been worked out. He has suggested, however, that third preambular para beginning “recognizing the common interest etc.” be changed to read “recognizing the common interest of mankind in the reservation of the seabed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes”, explaining that language he proposes was included in last year’s GA Res 2602, which both US and USSR voted for, and that he believes many members of GA, especially members of Seabeds Committee, will strongly prefer language from last year’s res. (D) Sweden, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Burma and Yugoslavia are still awaiting guidance from capitals. According to Sov del, Bulgaria is expected to co-sponsor while Romania still uncertain. (E) Brazilian del has referred text home but has not recommended co-sponsorship because it believes most constructive tactic for Brazilian del is to rest with existing GOB instructions on seabed treaty, which include affirmative vote for res but do not cover co-sponsorship. (F) Italian del has received approval to vote for res but still awaiting approval for co-sponsorship. (Italian approval for co-sponsorship received Oct. 17) 3. Soviet del offs (Shustov and Krasulin) and US del offs (Neidle, Givan and Brandt), meeting October 16, exchanged notes on status of consultations, as in above para, and discussed tactics, including possible changes, to gain widest support for res recommending treaty. Shustov believed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary problems. He thought it was not necessary to repeat in res language or concepts which were already contained in satisfactory and balanced ForMin treaty. It would be best to change last preambular para so that it would merely read “convinced that this Treaty would further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN”. The language on freedoms of seas could be deleted, he explained, because subject was covered to our mutual satisfaction in treaty. Shustov also believed that this change should be made promptly, before text of draft is given wide circulation. Neidle said that Shustov’s comment were very similar to US del’s thinking, but question of changes in res would have to be referred to Washington. On tactical level, he observed that it would be important in next stage of consultations to enlist enthusiastic and effective support from Canadians and Argentines who were two of most influential dels on questions pertaining to treaty. Prompt deletion of reference to freedoms of high seas would remove possible obstacle to their full cooperation. 4. On question of change suggested by Garcia Robles (para 2C above), Shustov said that he thought Soviets would have no difficulty in voting for any appropriate preambular clause which they had voted for in a past resolution. Neidle said he thought USG would take similar view. Neidle and Shustov agreed, however, that since Mexico was not in fact offering co-sponsorship in exchange for this change and since no other dels had yet proposed it, it would be best for US and Sov dels to seek standing contingent authority to substitute clause from last year’s res if it appeared advantageous to do so to gain broader co-sponsorship during next round of consultations. 5. On general tactics US and Sov del offs believed it would be important to be in position to begin consulting non-CCD members early week of Oct 19. They agreed to recommend to their capitals, therefore, that they authorize changing final preambular para to read “convinced that this treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. Objective then would be to nail down Argentine co-sponsorship and ensure active Argentine lobbying with other dels as soon as possible. Key dels outside of CCD will be approached as potential co-sponsors starting Oct 21 or 22. 6. Recommendations: We recommend that we be given authority to change last preambular para as indicated above. As Shustov, Ignatieff, De Rozas and Zelleke have all said to us, and we agree, treaty stands by itself and there is no need to repeat any particular excerpts from it in preamble to GA res. We think it would be best, therefore, to go forward at this time with totally unexceptionable clause merely involving UN Charter, which would avoid any possibility of causing arguments about freedoms of high seas in general and help assure early and enthusiastic cooperation from Argentina and Canada. We also recommend that we be authorized to make changes suggested by Garcia Robles if and when it may appear advantageous to do so during next round of consultations. We would appreciate receiving these authorizations Tuesday evening or Wednesday morning at latest. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and Moscow. 136. Telegram 2766 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 136. Telegram 2766 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, October 28, 1970, 0119Z. Subject: UNGA Draft Res Commending Seabed Disarmament Treaty 1. Summary. This cable summarizes current status of consultations to gain support for US-Soviet draft of res commending seabed disarmament treaty. US and Sov dels have agreed last week to circulate revised res with last preambular para amended as authorized by State 173723 to delete reference to freedoms of the seas. Twenty CCD dels now prepared to co-sponsor revised draft. Ten additional dels outside CCD have been consulted. OSV del has also received contingent authority from Moscow to change third preambular para as suggested by Garcia Robles. No new changes in res are now under discussion between US and Sov dels. End summary. 2. All of US and Sov CCD allies (UK, Canada, Netherlands, Italy and Japan: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and Romania) have agreed to co-sponsor revised res. 3. Of Non-Aligned CCD dels, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Argentina, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and UAR (subject to condition, see below) have agreed to co-sponsor revised draft. 4. Sirry (UAR) told US del off (Neidle) that though UAR had earlier agreed unconditionally to co-sponsor, it had since perceived a problem. Final draft of treaty had been amended to state that all interested parties are “entitled” to participate in verification consultations. This revived problem which UAR had raised earlier at CCD that Israel might claim right to consult with UAR about possible treaty violation and that UAR might not be able to take its case to Security Council unless it agreed to these consultations. Accordingly, UAR del would be willing to co-sponsor res provided US and Sov dels would repeat in committee their statements made in Geneva that treaty did not limit rights of UN members under Charter to take a case directly to Security Council. Neidle said he thought there would be no difficulty in repeating what we had already said in Geneva. 5. Souza y Silva (Brazil) took up with visiting Brazilian Fon Min question of possible Brazilian co-sponsorship. Fon Min agreed with Brazilian del that Brazil should, of course, stick by commitment to support treaty and vote for res but that it would not go step further and co-sponsor res. possibility of Mexican co-sponsorship remains to be considered pending agreement with US and Sov dels on statements to cover Mexican substantive problems. 6. Indian del has provided conflicting signals. Amb Sen reportedly told Amb Roshchin (USSR) that India agreed to text. However, Jain (Indian CCD expert) told both Roshchin and Neidle that he personally believed res ought to have clause on further disarmament negotiations in seabed area. Edelstam (Sweden) confirmed to Neidle that Swedes would not raise issue of adding clause on further negotiations and agreed to Neidle’s request to seek to dissuade Jain from pursuing this idea. 7. No answer yet received from Yugoslavia or Burma. 8. US del offs have begun consultations with following additional non-CCD dels, requesting that they consider co-sponsorship of draft res: Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Austria, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark. (We plan as soon as opportunity can be arranged to consult with additional dels, including Dominican Republic, Iceland, Norway and Belgium.) Soviet del has approached Finland. Amb Ignatieff (Canada), at-our request, has given copies of res to Amerasinghe (Ceylon) and Pardo (Malta) urging their co-sponsorship. Ignatieff reports that both of them asked questions about origins of various clauses in draft, but did not state any objections. Ignatieff, based on his first impressions, thinks prospects are fair that he will receive affirmative answers. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO and USMission Geneva. 137. Telegram 191560 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Djakarta 137. Telegram 191560 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Djakarta 1 Washington, November 23, 1970 SUBJECT: Resolution in UN to Commend Seabeds Disarmament Treaty REF: 191559 In accordance reftel, following is text of UN resolution commending Seabeds Disarmament Treaty: BEGIN TEXT. The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 2602F (XXIV)of 16 December 1969, Convinced that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reducing international tensions and strengthening friendly relations among States, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the reservation of the seabed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes, Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, dated 11 September 1970, and appreciative of the work of the Conference on the draft Treaty, attached to the report, on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Commends the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil. Thereof, the text of which is attached to the present resolution, 2. Requests the depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date, 3. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty. END TEXT. Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 33–6. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USUN and USDEL SALT III. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in IO/UNP, PM/DCA, and EA/IND; and approved by Day (ACDA/IR). The resolution, 2660 (XXV), passed on December 7, 1970, by a vote of 104 to 2, with 2 abstentions. 138. Seabed Arms Control Treaty 138. Seabed Arms Control Treaty 1 February 11, 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, February 11, 1971 1 The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear-arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to the seabed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within such seabed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the seabed beneath its territorial waters. 3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and not to participate in any other way in such actions. Article II For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958, 2 and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of part I, section II, of that Convention and in accordance with international law. Article III 1. In order to promote the objectives of and insure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. 2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and cooperation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures. 3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and cooperate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to cooperate. 4. If consultation and cooperation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter. 5. Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves. Article IV Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or nonrecognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, including, inter alia, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the seabed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves. Article V The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Article VI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and, thereafter, for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article VII Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened. Article VIII Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. Article IX The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons. Article X 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this eleventh day of February, one thousand nine hundred seventy-one. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 7–11. No classification marking. For text of President Nixon’s remarks at the signing ceremony on February 11, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971 , pp. 150–151. The treaty was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 15, 1972, by a vote of 83 to 0, and ratified by the President on April 26, 1972. It entered into force on May 18, 1972. 1 S.Ex. H, 92d Cong., 1st sess. The treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow on Feb. 11, 1971. It was approved by the U.S. Senate on Feb. 15, 1972, by a vote of 83 to 0, and ratified by the President on Apr. 26, 1972. It entered into force on May 18, 1972, when the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR deposited their instruments of ratification at Washington, London, and Moscow.> 2 15 UST 1606. 3. Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention 3. Chemical and Biological Warfare; Geneva Protocol; Biological Weapons Convention 139. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 30, 1969 Laird recommended that the National Security Council undertake an immediate review of U.S. chemical and biological weapons programs. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0089, Box 50, 370.64 CBR (April 1969). Confidential. Sent for action. 140. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, May 23, 1969 Kissinger recommended the President approve an NSSM calling for an overall study of U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare and agents. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. Sent for action. The attached NSSM is printed in Document 141. 141. National Security Study Memorandum 59 Washington, May 28, 1969 NSSM 52 directed officials to conduct a study of the U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare and agents. The study was to include U.S. programs and operational concepts; problematic issues encountered with those programs; and the ways in which those programs effected U.S. relationships with its Allies. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43–103). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler 142. Minutes of the Secretary of Defense’s Staff Meeting Washington, August 4, 1969 In this meeting, Laird stated that it was important to discontinue the use of the term CBW term as such since it lumps together two separate programs, one for chemical warfare and one for biological research. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–28, Office Chrons, June–Aug 1969. Secret. 143. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) Washington, August 6, 1969 Laird indicated he wanted the views of the various interested DOD elements incorporated in DOD’s input into the NSSM 59 study and he wanted to be consulted as DOD papers on key policy issues were formulated. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, 370.64 CBR (August 1969). Confidential. A handwritten notation by Laird stated: “Warren—As you know I requested this study and I’m most interested in it—hope the item I discussed at Monday staff meeting is handled as per my instruction. MRL.” 144. Intelligence Report Prepared by Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, August 18, 1969 This detailed CIA report, entitled “Disarmament: Chemical-Biological Warfare Controls and Prospects for Improvement,” provided historical background, analysis, and projections on chemical-biological warfare controls and the prospects for improvement. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence." 145. Memorandum From Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 28, 1969 Halperin informed Kissinger that DOD’s input into the NSSM 59 study would be delayed. It then provided a five-page overview of U.S. policy, programs, and issues of chemical and biological arms control. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on September 23. 146. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 4, 1969 As chairman of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, Spiers discussed the delay in response to NSSM 59 from the Department of Defense and the implications of the delay. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. Halperin forwarded Spiers’ memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a September 10 memorandum. (Ibid.) 147. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, September 16, 1969 Kissinger extended to October 5 the due date for completion of the NSSM 59 study. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. It was also sent to Laird, Helms, DuBridge, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Wheeler. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko New York, September 22, 1969, 10–11 p.m. Rogers and Gromyko discussed the Soviet proposals to ban chemical and biological weapons and to maintain international security that were before the UN General Assembly. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL US–USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City 149. Telegram 168999 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 4, 1969 The Department of State issued instructions to the United Nations and the Committee on the Conference for Disarmament delegations on how to handle the UN General Assembly discussions of chemical and biological warfare while awaiting NSC guidance from the NSSM 59 review. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 27–10 UN. Confidential. It was also sent to USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Ottawa, London, Moscow, Stockholm, and USNATO. Drafted on October 3 by Day and Lorenz (IO/UNP); cleared in IO, IO/UNP ACDA, ACDA/GC, L, L/UNA, DOD/ISA (info), and PM; paragraph 6 was cleared in substance in DOD/OGC; and approved by De Palma. 150. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, Washington, undated. Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting Folders, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. 151. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) New York, October 29, 1969 Yost noted that the U.S. delegation would be in considerable difficulties if the U.S. position on CBW remained unsettled and expressed hope that a decision could be made to seek ratification of the 1925 Protocol. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969–31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential and Personal. 152. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated This ten-page analytical summary of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Paper on CBW, prepared in response to NSSM 59, addressed U.S. policy on biological and chemical warfare, and the use of tear gas in war. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting Folders, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for the NSC Review Group meeting on October 30. The summary bears no drafting information. 153. Talking Points Prepared for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, undated The Talking Points outlined the policy issues for discussion at the upcoming Review Group meeting under three main headings: 1) biological warfare; 2) chemical warfare; 3) ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the use of tear gas and herbicides. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The handwritten revisions made to II A (“1,” “2,” “3,” and “appears to be”), to II B (“Option one and perhaps option two”), and to III B (“1” and “2”) are in an unknown hand. Other handwritten markings are Kissinger’s, including “incapacitants” on page 4, “Def. of retaliatory capability?” at the top of page 5, “State & Defense in disagreement” at the bottom of page 5, and “Why? State?” on page 6. 154. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 29, 1969 In this memorandum, Guhin discussed the Talking Points prepared on CBW for Kissinger for the upcoming NSC Review Group meeting. He then attached an outline of probable agency positions on the various policy issues. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. Sent for information. 155. Minutes of National Security Council Review Group Meeting Washington, October 30, 1969, 2:25–3:55 p.m. The group discussed chemical and biological weapons for 90 minutes. Over the course of the meeting, participants specified 7 changes to be made in reworking the IPMG paper—which included regrouping the issues into categories; clarifying the distinction between offensive and defensive R&Ds; outlining the arguments for and against informing the German Government on the deployment of chemical weapon stocks in Germany; specifying policy on the UK’s draft biological weapons convention; defining an adequate chemical weapons retaliatory capability; a discussion of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol; and the possibility of requiring a Presidential decision to use tear gas in conflicts other than Vietnam. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The minutes bear no drafting information. 156. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Washington, November 10, 1969 This fifty-one page report on CBW, prepared in response to NSSM 59 and revised following the October 29 Review Group meeting, outlined the U.S. policies on chemical and biological warfare and agents and was considered at the NSC meeting on November 18. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. Davis forwarded the report to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Mitchell, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Gerard Smith, and DuBridge under cover of a November 12 memorandum in which she noted that it reflected discussion at the October 30 Review Group meeting and would be considered at the upcoming NSC meeting. (Ibid.) Under cover of a November 17 memorandum, Davis notified recipients of the IMPG report that on page 46, line 4, the text should read, “The United States has not sought to establish.” (Ibid, Box H–153, NSSM 59) 157. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) Washington, November 13, 1969 Kissinger responded to Yost that the National Security Council would discuss the issue on November 19 and that Yost would be given policy guidance on the 1925 Protocol and other CBW issues shortly thereafter. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969–31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential. 158. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, November 17, 1969 Kissinger briefed the President for the NSC meeting on CBW the next day, emphasizing the need to develop frameworks compatible with the national security and arms control objectives. The attached Issues for Decision paper outlined Kissinger’s recommendations for the policies on the use of chemical and biological weapons; the use of tear gas in relation to the 1925 protocol established by the Geneva Convention; and the authorization policy for the use of tear gas and herbicides in war. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. The attached Talking Points are not published. 159. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, November 17, 1969, 7 p.m. Kissinger and Laird had a brief discussion of CBW issues in anticipation of the NSC meeting the next day. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11–17, 1969. No classification marking. 160. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, November 18, 1969, 11:55 a.m. Kissinger and Laird discussed further the upcoming NSC meeting on CBW. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18–28, 1969. No classification marking. 161. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting Washington, November 18, 1969 The meeting focused on U.S. chemical warfare policies. It included some discussion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological agents in warfare and where tear gas and herbicides fit into that agreement. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The minutes bear no indication of who drafted them. The attachments (the NSC book and Helms’ briefing on Soviet chemical and biological warfare) are not published. 162. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, November 18, 1969, 5:50 p.m. The conversation dealt with follow-up to the NSC meeting and the possible draft of a legislative strategy to address the CBW. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18–28, 1969. No classification marking. 163. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the British Ambassador (Tomkins) Washington, November 24, 1969, 7:55 p.m. Kissinger informed Tomkins about the decision to be announced the next day concerning chemical and biological weapons. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–28 November 1969. No classification marking. 164. Document number not used 165. National Security Decision Memorandum 35 Washington,November 25, 1969 Among the President’s decisions on chemical warfare and bacteriological/biological research were decisions to submit the Geneva Protocol for Senate ratification and to associate the U.S. with the UK draft convention on biological warfare presented to the ENDC in August 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50). Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Wheeler. 166. Statement Issued by President Nixon Washington, November 25, 1969 The President highlighted his decisions on CBW. This statement confirmed the U.S. alliance with the objectives of the UK Draft Convention banning the use of biological agents in war. It included the decision to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the first use of chemical and biological agents in warfare, to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Moreover it established a research agenda to investigate the methods of disposal for bacteriological weaponry and restricted research to “defensive measures” only. Source: Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 968–969. No classification marking. For text of the President’s remarks on his CBW decisions, made the same day, see ibid., pp. 969–970. 167. Memorandum From Michael Guhin and Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 2, 1969 Guhin briefed Kissinger on the CBW resolutions at the UN. He then attached a Department of State telegram transmitting guidance to the U.S. Mission to the UN. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69–31 Jan 70 [Part 3]. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on December 3. A copy was sent to Behr and Sonnenfeldt. The attached telegram was drafted in IO/UNP; cleared in ACDA, L, and PM/ISP; approved in IO. It was sent for information to Geneva. 168. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, December 16, 1969 The paper discussed a New York Times article that alleged an interagency disagreement over whether toxins were more properly classified, for purposes of the President’s November 25 statement, as chemical or biological agents. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, 370.64 CBR, October–December. Top Secret. 169. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, December 16, 1969, 12:30 p.m. Laird noted that there was no disagreement on labeling toxins as chemicals and told Kissinger it was essential to stop the ACDA people from discussing toxins. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 9–16 December 1969. No classification marking. 170. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 18, 1969 Guhin briefed Kissinger on the toxins issue. Guhin included the definition of “toxin”, an outline of the current toxins program, and those arguments in favor and opposed to maintaining a complete toxin program. He concluded with a commentary on the ways in which the information given fit into the larger international discussion of the Geneva Conference and the UK Draft Convention. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it December 20. The memorandum was sent through Behr. 171. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, December 19, 1969, 8:57 a.m. Kissinger and Laird engaged in a detailed discussed about the hearings in the House of Representatives concerning the toxins issue. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 17–31 December 1969. No classification marking. 172. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 30, 1969 Guhin forwarded a draft NSSM indicating the President authorized a study and review, to be conducted by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, of current U.S. programs and policies on toxins. Given that the Joint Chiefs, and the Departments of State and Defense, had already undertaken steps to comply with the request for information, Guhin noted there should be no difficulty complying with the January 9 deadline. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–168, NSSM 85. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Behr. At Tab A is a draft of Document 173. At Tab B is Document 170. At Tab C is a document (not published) in the margin of which Kissinger wrote that a NSSM should be issued for the following reasons: “Laird’s sensitivity;” it was “a policy & not an operational issue;” the President should “get credit.” 173. National Security Study Memorandum 85 Washington, December 31, 1969 The President informed the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Directors of Arms Control and the Office of Science and Technology that, in compliance with NSSM 59, he had directed the preparation of a study on all aspects of U.S. policy and programs with respect to toxins. The report was due January 16. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43–103.) Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Wheeler. 174. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 27, 1970 Guhin briefed Kissinger on the status of the Geneva Protocol package, explaining that a Presidential decision was needed on three contentious issues before the Protocol package could be completed: the use of riot control agents and herbicides; issuing a separate NSDM for these two agents; and the U.S. right to retaliate with CBW. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. Kissinger wrote on the first page, “Where is the Geneva Protocol package? When can we move it?” 175. Telegram 122 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 27, 1970, 2227Z. Yost advised that a decision not to ban the use of toxins, or to allow for their continued manufacture, would be seen as a retreat from the President’s position announced November 25 by members of the United Nations. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69–31 Jan 70–. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to the White House 176. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting Washington, January 29, 1970, 2:37–4:00 p.m. The Review Group met to consider the draft NSSM 85 study on U.S. toxin policy. The group agreed to make some substantive changes to Part II but did not render any policy decisions. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. This meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The response to NSSM 85 is Document 177. 177. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Washington, January 30, 1970 Prepared in response to NSSM 85, this two part analysis of U.S. policies, programs, and operational concepts, with respect to toxins, provided a detailed discussion of IS and foreign production capabilities, those existing research programs investigating chemical and biological agents, and the possibly utility of toxins by the U.S. military. It then outlined the ways in which the international community dealt with the issue of toxins in the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the UK Draft Convention. Part II was devoted to a close examination of the U.S. policies, programs, and preparedness surrounding possible chemical warfare in light of the international agreements. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The report was submitted to the NSC by the IPMG on January 21 and revised following the Review Group meeting on January 29. 178. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) Washington, January 31, 1970 Nutter discussed the drafting of a joint memorandum to the President on the recent U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Before the memorandum would be sent to the President, Secretary of Defense Laird wanted the issues raised by the memorandum considered by the Under Secretaries Committee. Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan–Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Secret. The draft memorandum at Tab A is not published. The attachment at Tab B, signed by Packard, is Document 179. 179. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson Washington, February 2, 1970 Packard requested an Under Secretaries Committee meeting to review the draft memorandum on the Geneva Protocol. Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan–Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Confidential 180. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 3, 1970 Guhin updated Kissinger on the status of the Geneva Protocol package. Per Secretary of Defense Laird’s request, the joint memorandum prepared by Departments of State and Defense had been sent to the Under Secretaries Committee for review. Guhin noted the next meeting would take place on February 12. He then commented on the necessity of expediting the ratification of the Geneva Protocol or risk criticism from the President’s political opponents. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 338, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970– March 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr (NSC). Document 175 and its attachment include Tabs A and B. The document at Tab C is not published. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, “Discuss with Richardson to-morrow.” Guhin’s memorandum is attached to a January 6 memorandum by Haig, according to which Kissinger discussed the issue with Richardson on the 6 and both agreed to have the Under Secretaries Committee meet “at an early date.” 181. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 4, 1970 The memorandum lists the main points of a CIA report on commercial toxin production in the U.S. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). None of the attachments are published 182. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, undated Shakespeare commented on the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy. He emphasized the importance of maintaining the credibility of the President’s November 25 renunciation of biological weapons, for fear it could potentially damage his reputation domestically and internationally. Then outlined those points in the study he believed would be helpful in maintaining that credibility. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The attachment is not published. 183. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 9, 1970 Smith recommended Option III in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy, renouncing the use of toxins and confining development to defensive purposes. Smith argued the other two options could incur potentially high political costs by undermining the President’s November 25 announcement and that the prohibition of synthesized toxins would not impede upon U.S. security interests enough to outweigh the prospective damage to the U.S. reputation in the international community. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. 184. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 10, 1970 DuBridge recommended Option II in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy, arguing it would be more favorably received in public forums than Option I and less restrictive of DOD’s future activities than Option III. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. 185. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon Washington, February 10, 1970 Richardson recommended Option III of NSSM 85. Richardson argued the political liabilities for maintaining an arsenal of toxic weaponry vastly outweighed the potential national security benefits of the other two Options. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret 186. Memorandum From the Deputy General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Van Dorn) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, February 11, 1970 Van Dorn discussed the differences between State, the ACDA and DOD on three issues in the draft memorandum for the President on the Geneva Protocol. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–0004, Chemical Biological and Radiological Warfare (CBW), Laser Technology and U.S. Position on Toxins, February 1970. Secret. Drafted by Van Doren (ACDA/GC). The memorandum is an unsigned copy. The attachment is not published. No record of the Under Secretaries Committee meeting was found. 187. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 12, 1970 Packard indicated that Secretary of Defense Laird favored Option II in the NSSM 85 report on toxin policy but did not believe it was urgent to announce U.S. policy on toxins in the immediate future. Packard then analyzed the differences which led to the JCS recommendation of Option I and the Department of Defense recommendation of Option II. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Se 188. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Kissinger outlined the three options on toxin policy, reviewed the agency recommendations, endorsed Option II, and attached a draft NSDM and draft public statement. The President approved Option III. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret; Nodis. The President initialed his approval of the draft NSDM. Written above his approval is “OPTION III.” The President also initialed his approval of the draft public statement. 189. White House Press Release Washington, February 14, 1970 The White House announced its new policy on toxins, renouncing the use of toxins in warfare and restricting all programs concerning toxins to defensive purposes only. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. No classification marking. 190. National Security Decision Memorandum 44 Washington, February 20, 1970 The NSDM listed the President’s decisions, in accordance with Option III of NSSM 85, on U.S. policy on toxins. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler 191. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 25, 1970 Guhin briefed Kissinger on the three issues for Presidential decision prior to submitting the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. Noting that the U.S. use of herbicides in Southeast Asia would most likely come under the scrutiny of the U.S. Senate, Guhin introduced three possible options for informing the Senate of the Administration’s decision to interpret the Geneva Protocol as allowing for the use of tear gas and herbicides in war. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr and Kennedy (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. At Tab A is a draft of Document 192. 192. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 10, 1970 Kissinger presented Nixon with the three options outlined by National Security Council member Michael Guhin in his February 25 memorandum and proposed taking Congressional soundings prior to making a final decision. Nixon approved but instructed Kissinger to resubmit the options in thirty days. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon checked “Approve” and wrote “But” next to his check. Below he wrote, “Delay all this for 30 days – ask me then – give no [“no” is underlined twice] reasons – Just say the matter is being prepared – The Senate isn’t ready to take it up anyway.” 193. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 2, 1970 Guhin forwarded, and Kissinger approved, a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Laird requesting his recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons, future candidates for the Directorate of Biological Operations, and the transfer of biological weapons facilities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Robert Behr (NSC). Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Doesn’t need Pres. Give Laird 2 weeks in memo.” Rather than forwarding the memorandum at Tab I to the President, Kissinger initialed approval for him. The memorandum to Laird at Tab A, revised to provide a two week deadline, is Document 195. 194. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, June 15, 1970 Kissinger asked Laird for Defense’s recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons and the transfer of biological weapons facilities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Secret. 195. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 16, 1970 At an NSC operations staff meeting, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger asked Colonel Behr to redraft a staff paper on the ways in which Congressional testimony during the ratification hearings for the Geneva Protocol could be used to reserve the right to use tear gas and herbicides. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Staff Meetings 1969–1971. Secret. Prepared by Jeanne Davis. 196. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 18, 1970 Guhin forwarded two versions of a memorandum for the President requesting his decision on how to proceed on ratifying the Geneva Protocol while reserving the right to use tear gas and herbicides. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Behr and Kennedy. The attachments are not published. 197. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 25, 1970 Guhin reviewed recent Congressional comments in response to the delay in submitting the Geneva Protocol for ratification, discussed options for submitting it during the summer, and attached a letter from Senator Fulbright. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent through Behr. A handwritten notation on the top, right hand corner of the memorandum states, “Action.” Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, “Pres. has answered memo – Now how about timing?” Following the last sentence on page two is written, “Behr/Guhin now working on this.” 198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 3, 1970 Kissinger forwarded an interagency decision memorandum for the President, along with his own analyses and recommendations, asking inter alia how the administration should reserve the right to use tear gas and herbicide when it submits the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of all of Kissinger’s recommendations. At Tab D is Document 192. At Tab E is an attachment to Document 197. At Tab A is a draft of Document 201. At Tab B is a draft of Document 202. 199. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, July 6, 1970 Laird responded to Kissinger’s June 15 memorandum with a complete outline of the Defense Department’s recommendations on the destruction of biological weapons and the transfer of biological weapons facilities. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Kissinger initialed the memorandum next to the subject line 200. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Kissinger recommended prompt submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate and a meeting with key Senators. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval on August 4. 201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, August 5, 1970 Kissinger notified Rogers of the President’s decisions regarding three Administration amendments to the Geneva Protocol prior to its submission to the Senate. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Laird and Moorer. 202. National Security Decision Memorandum 78 Washington, August 11, 1970 U.S. forces were authorized to use riot control agents and chemical herbicides. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (51–96). Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer 203. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 11, 1970 Eliot forwarded Rogers’ report on the Geneva Protocol. Included with it was the Presidential message that was to be submitted with the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Chemical Biological and Radiological Warfare (CBW), Laser Technology and U.S. Position on Toxins, August–December 1970. Secret. Drafted by C.I. Bevans. The attached Presidential message and Protocol are not published. For text of the message as submitted by the President on August 19, see the Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 677–678. 204. Telegram 129723 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, August 11, 1970, 2036Z. The telegram reported on indications the Soviets might be interested in negotiating a treaty dealing solely with biological weapons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by Perry (SOV); and approved by Day (ACDA/IR). 205. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 17, 1970 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger and his staff discussed Senator Fulbright’s proposal for a “uniform interpretation” of the Geneva Protocol with regard to tear gas and herbicides. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council (Classified), 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71. Secret. Prepared by Davis on August 19. 206. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 18, 1970, 8–9:05 a.m. The memorandum provided a record of the President’s meeting with select Senate bipartisan leaders on the upcoming submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 82, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files 1969–74, Memoranda for the President, Beginning 8/16/70. No classification marking. Prepared by BeLieu on August 19. An attached list of signatories to the Protocol is not published. 207. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, September 14, 1970 Kissinger apprised the President of the status of DOD’s plan to destroy all U.S. biological and toxin agents and attached memoranda to Secretary of Defense Laird and Chairman of the Council on Environmental Equality Russell Train requesting environmental impact statements and policy regarding the destruction of such agents. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Written at the top of page one is “copy to John Whitaker & Ken Cole.” 208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 4, 1970 Kissinger recommended the President approve a memorandum to Laird authorizing him to proceed with the Defense Department’s plans for the destruction of biological and toxin agents. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on page two indicates that Kissinger approved the memorandum for the President. It was sent to Laird on December 15. (Ibid.) The attachments at Tabs A, B, C, H, and I are not published. NSDMs 35 and 44 (at Tab G) are Documents 165 and 190; [11/25/69; 2/20/70] Laird’s July 6 memorandum and the inventory of weapons (at Tabs E and F) are Document 199 and its attachment; and Kissinger’s memorandum at Tab D is an attachment to Document 207. [9/14] 209. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 2, 1971 Packard notified Kissinger that all of the requirements outlined his December 15, 1970 memorandum concerning the plan for destruction of biological agents and weapons had been met. Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. III, Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (1). No classification marking. 210. National Security Study Memorandum 112 Washington, January 7, 1971 The President directed a study of policy options with regard to the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in post-Vietnam warfare, the environmental effect of that use, and of any relevant international or Congressional considerations related to those topics. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Moorer. In an April 23, 1971, memorandum, Kissinger notified recipients of NSSM 112 that the due date for the NSSM study had been extended to October 15, 1971. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIET) 211. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State (Spiers) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, January 22, 1971 Spiers advised that Rogers seek a Presidential decision to phase out the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam prior to his upcoming appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the General Protocol. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Pickering of PM. Sent through S/S. The memoranda at Tabs C and D are published but not the press release at Tab D. At Tab A is Document 212. A revised version of the memorandum at Tab B is Document 214. 212. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, February 2, 1971 Rogers requested Laird’s support in recommending to the President that the U.S. immediately cease the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. The attachment is Document 214. In a February 3 memorandum, Eliot notified Laird’s aide, General Pursley, that Rogers planned to forward his memorandum to the President on or about February 10, not February 1 as Rogers’ letter erroneously stated. (Ibid.) 213. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, February 4, 1971 In forwarding the first Annual Review of the U.S. chemical and biological research program, Irwin summarized its most important recommendations and discussed several issues raised in the review that had been resolved. Source: Washington National Records Center, ACDA Central Depository of Top Secret Documents Covering the Period of July 1955–April 1983: FRC 383–98–162, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Annual Review of U.S. Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs, February 1971. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published. 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, February 11, 1971 Rogers discussed the possibilities for the Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol and, in light of his upcoming testimony in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked the President to order an immediate phase out of the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10. Top Secret; Exdis. In a February 11 memorandum, Eliot informed Rogers that DOD did not concur with an immediate phase-out of defoliants in Vietnam and Rogers’ memorandum to the President had been revised to reflect that fact. (Ibid.) 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, February 19, 1971 Given the recent restrictions on the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam and the possible compromise of U.S. military authority, Laird did not concur with Secretary of State Rogers’ request for an immediate phase out, Instead, Laird recommended leaving further action to accelerate the phase out imposed by the Geneva Protocol to those military authorities directly effected by the decision. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret. 216. Message From President Nixon to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Washington, February 23, 1971 The President urged an agreement prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 19–21. No classification marking. 217. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 4, 1971 Guhin informed Kissinger that Secretary of State Rogers had withdrawn his request to the President that the U.S. cease the immediate use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Sent through Behr. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “OBE” (Overtaken By Events) and “(Put into personal file).” Attached is Document 214. 218. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Senator J. William Fulbright Washington, March 19, 1971 Nutter explained the rescheduling of his appearance before Senator Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the Geneva Protocol. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Feb–Mar). No classification marking. Written at the bottom is, “Dick, “Capen has talked to Sen. Sparkman and Sen Aiken. They were not upset in the first place. This is a ‘non-issue’ contrived by Sen. Fulbright’s staff. REP [Robert E. Pursley].” A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it March 22. 219. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 19, 1971 Kennedy highlighted the problems associated with the appointment of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Nutter to testify in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Geneva Protocol. Scheduling conflicts had prevented Nutter from testifying certain days and gave the Committee the impression that the Defense Department did not support ratification. If the Administration truly wanted ratification, the President needed to appoint a higher level DOD representative. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 1]. No classification marking. The attachments are not published. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Talk to Pursley—that we want higher level representative.” In a March 20 note, Kennedy wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “Dave—Adm Murphy advised that both Secretary Laird & Mr. Packard were already committed to appearances with the Hill on the 22nd. I informed Ted Curran that DOD had been urged to provide higher level representation but was unable to do so—for the delay in appearing would affront the Committee. Curran noted that he would make a note for the file to this effect and assume the matter was put to rest.” A note adjacent to “(Tab A)” in line one of the memorandum reads, “—destroyed—telcon of 3/17/71, jlj.” 220. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 58A Washington, March 23, 1971 The President directed that the study of ecological and physiological effects of the use of herbicides in Vietnam give due consideration to the question of restoration and future use of the sprayed areas. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret. 221. Draft Convention Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Representative Geneva, March 30, 1971 The draft convention prohibited the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 190–194. No classification marking. 222. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 30, 1971 Guhin commented that the Soviet draft convention on biological weapons submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that morning. This draft indicated a substantial shift toward the U.S. position and Guhin noted the Soviet position hinged on the U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV [Part 1]. Confidential. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Kissinger initialed the memorandum. The attachment is not published; the text of the draft convention contained in the telegram is Document 231. 223. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 31, 1971 Eliot reported that Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Fulbright personally favored the ratification of the Geneva Protocol with the understanding that riot control agents and herbicides were covered by the Protocol’s prohibitions and noted the Foreign Relations Committee generally concurred. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. 224. Telegram 1259 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, April 5, 1971, 1845Z. The telegram reported on an informal meeting between the U.S. and Soviet delegations on the Soviet draft Biological Weapons Convention. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to London, Moscow, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT. 225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 28, 1971 Kissinger briefed the President on the Soviet draft convention prohibiting biological weapons and summarized the main points of an attached memorandum from Rogers on the subject. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. The instructions at Tab C were transmitted in Document 226. 226. Telegram 72644 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, April 28, 1971, 1647Z. The telegram transmitted the U.S. response to the Soviet draft convention banning the production and stockpile of biological weapons that had been discussed at the March 30 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It also included instructions on the negotiating strategy for a possible biological weapons convention. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT, and London. Drafted by McCormack (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), DE PALMA (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 227. Telegram 72645 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, April 28, 1971, 1648Z. The telegram transmitted the revised draft text of the Biological Weapons Convention. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT IV, and London. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), De Palma (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 228. Telegram 78171 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, May 6, 1971, 0149Z. The telegram reported on changes to the U.S. draft Biological Weapons Convention resulting from a May 4 meeting with British Minister Millard and Embassy Officer Middleton. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]. Confidential. It was repeated to London, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT IV. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); paragraphs 7 and 8 were cleared in OSD/ISA, ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, IO/UNP, and L/PM, and, in substance, in the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA). The proposed text in paragraph 7 was added to the text of Document 226 [4/28 telegram 72644] and sent as telegram 71873 to all NATO capitals on May 6, 1971. (Ibid., Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]) 229. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, May 13, 1971. Laird requested the President’s approval to continue a limited herbicide program in Vietnam. Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. III Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (5). Secret; Sensitive. 230. Note From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 21, 1971. Guhin updated Kissinger on the impasse in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the Geneva Protocol due to tear gas/herbicides issue. Guhin requested additional information on options and arguments regarding tear gas to use when addressing the Committee and recommended that the Administration sit tight and wait for NSSM 112 before making any substantive response. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 1–248, NSSM 112. Confidential: Secret; Eyes Only. The attached memorandum of June 17 from Guhin is published but not the attachments to the June 17 memorandum, other than the letter from Fulbright to the President, which is an attachment to Document 226. 231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 24, 1971. Rogers advised against granting Laird’s May 13 request (Document 229) to continue the use of herbicides in Vietnam citing political grounds. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, TS Files, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. 232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, June 28, 1971. Kissinger forwarded Fulbright’s April 5 letter (misdated March 5) on the Geneva Protocol, which indicated the Committee’s support of the Protocol, but cited contentious issues that needed to be addressed before it could be ratified. Kissinger, given the deadlock in the Senate over the Protocol, then requested a careful review of the situation. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Helms, Smith, Moorer, and David. Regarding the proper date of Fulbright’s letter, see the attachment to Document 230. According to an undated, unsigned note attached to Document 272, a secretary in Fulbright’s office erroneously typed March 5 prior to sending the letter to the White House. 233. Telegram 137470 From the Department of State to All NATO Capitals Washington, July 29, 1971 This eleven-page telegram provided instructions for consultations with allies on the text of the draft Biological Weapons Convention jointly agreed upon with the Soviets. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Tokyo. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USDel SALT V, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Van Heuven (ACDA/IR); cleared by Day (ACDA/IR), Martin (PM/DCA), Breer (EA/J), and Nolan (OSD/ISA); and approved by Goodby (EUR/RPM). 234. Telegram 3312 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, August 4, 1971, 1545Z The telegram reported that the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen had reached agreement on the text of the draft Biological Weapons Convention. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT V, London, The Hague, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 235. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Geneva, August 5, 1971. Text of the draft convention submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 456–460. No classification marking. The text of the draft convention was transmitted to Washington in telegram 3312. 236. Report on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Washington, undated Prepared in response to Kissinger’s June 28 memorandum (Document 232), this report focused on the issue of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC— Miscellaneous, Memos, October & November 1971. Secret. Under cover of a September 8 memorandum, Davis forwarded the report to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Moorer, Farley, and Edward David with a request that their views on the report’s options and alternatives be submitted to NSC by September 16 for incorporation in a memorandum to the President. Document 232 and its attachment are at Tabs A and C. The other attachments are not published. 237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) Washington, September 13, 1971. Nutter forwarded draft instructions to Geneva concerning the draft Biological Weapons Convention and asked for JCS’s comments. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan–1971. Secret. For text of the August 5 draft convention, see Document 235. 238. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 16, 1971. Responding to the IPMG’s report on the General Protocol and the question of riot control agents and chemical herbicides, David recommended implementing Alternative 1 of Option B. This alternative affirmed that the Protocol did not cover riot control agents and herbicides, but maintained that, in future conflicts, the U.S. would not initiate their first use. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Secret. 239. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, September 17, 1971. Responding to Nutter’s September 13 memorandum, the JCS objected to several of the proposed changes in the draft Biological Weapons Convention. The JCS then stipulated it would only pledge its support of the draft if the draft did not 1) alter the U.S. position on the Geneva Protocol, 2) impede future negotiations concerning chemical weapons, and 3) make specific time commitments for chemical weapons negotiations. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan–1971. Secret. 240. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 17, 1971. Guhin briefed Kissinger on changes in the draft Biological Weapons Convention, most notably the shift from eliminating biological and toxic weapons to chemical and bacteriological ones and the separation of the bans on chemical and biological weaponry. Kissinger approved the changes. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote “Approved H” on page one and initialed the “Approve” option on page two. At Tab A are the instructions transmitted in Document 241. At Tab B is Document 225. The attachment at Tab B is not published. 241. Telegram 175047 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, September 23, 1971 The telegram transmitted instructions for the final text of the draft convention on biological weapons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to All NATO Capitals, USUN, Moscow, Tokyo, and USDel SALT V. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in PM/DCA, DOD/ISA, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, L, the White House, ACDA/IR, and ACDA/GC; and approved by Farley. 242. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 23, 1971. Responding to the IPMG report on the Geneva Protocol, Packard stated that, while the ratification of the Protocol remained a desirable object, the military had used herbicides to successfully decrease civilian and military casualties in warfare. The DOD wanted to preserve the option to use riot control agents and chemical herbicides in future conflicts. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 40 NSC (September 1971). Secret. 243. Telegram 4163 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, September 27, 1971, 0845Z. The telegram summarized negotiations over the first paragraph of the draft Biological Weapons Convention resulting in a decision to accept the version recommended by the co-chairmen. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO and USUN. 244. Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Geneva, September 28, 1971. Text of the revised version of the draft convention. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 568–573. No classification marking. The final text of the convention is in Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 133–138, but is essentially the same as the revised draft convention dated September 28, 1971. 245. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon Washington, October 5, 1971. Responding to the IPMG’s report on the Geneva Protocol, Johnson, like Edward David, recommended Alternative 1 of Option B. This alternative affirmed that the Protocol did not cover riot control agents and herbicides, but maintained that, in future conflicts, the U.S. would not initiate their first use. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC Miscellaneous Memos, October & November 1971. Secret. 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 1, 1971. Spiers forwarded the recently compiled DOD studies of the military utility of herbicides and riot control agents, fulfilling the requirements of NSSM 112. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Jul–). Secret. Davis circulated the memorandum and its attachments to Laird and other officials, under cover of a memorandum in which she requested comments before December 28. (Ibid.) 247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, December 23, 1971. Rogers discussed planning for the signing ceremony for the Convention on Biological Weapons and recommended that the President participate. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Van Novena (ACDA/IR). 248. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 28, 1971. Farley contended that DOD’s studies on the utility of herbicides and riot control agents (see attachments to Document 246) did not generate a need to modify the judgments contained in the Geneva Protocol study (Document 236). [ca. 9/8] Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–96, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, September–December 1971. Secret. 249. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 14, 1971. The Department of State informed Kissinger that the Department of Defense studies did not require modification of the IPMG study on the Geneva Protocol made in Document 245. It then outlined three options for the Administration to consider and recommended that the Administration actively move ahead with gaining support for ratification. 250. Telegram 37639 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, March 4, 1972 The telegram reported on a telephone conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary DePalma concerning the upcoming signature of the Biological Weapons Convention. Dobrynin proposed that the signing occur between March 20 and 24, and be done at the foreign minister level in the presence of heads of Government. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Confidential. Also sent to London. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted on March 3 by Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by De Palma (IO) and Shaw (PM); and approved by Leonard (ACDA/IR). 251. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington March 9, 1972 Guhin indicated that the President had decided not to participate in the signing ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention and forwarded an appeal from Secretary of State Rogers. The appeal noted that the absence of the President was likely to be construed as a rejection of the Soviet’s March 3 démarche (see Document 250) and as appropriate given the leading role the U.S. had taken in bringing the Convention to fruition. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent through Walsh. Below the “Recommendation” line Sonnenfeldt wrote, “I reluctantly concur in view of Sec Rogers’ appeal. HS.” Below that, Kissinger wrote, “Add that Dobrynin has appealed because Kosygin will participate,” presumably meaning that Guhin should add the information to the schedule proposal for the President. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. At the top of the memorandum is written “Rush,” with a line linking “Rush” to Kissinger’s note at the bottom. The schedule proposal is not published. 252. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 10, 1971. Smith emphasized the importance of the President’s attendance at the Biological Weapons Convention signing ceremony in light of Dobrynin’s March 3 request (Document 250) and Soviet suspicions over Nixon’s recent trip to China. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Confidential. 253. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) Washington, March 17, 1971. Dobrynin pressed Kissinger for a decision on Nixon’s attending the signing ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 395, Telephone Conversations, Dobrynin, September 1971–April 1972. No classification marking. 254. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Chief of Staff (Haldeman) Washington, March 17, 1972, 3:05–4:37 p.m. During this discussion, Haldeman convinced the President to attend the signing ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 323–33. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 255. Draft Convention on Chemical Weapons Geneva, March 28, 1972 Text of Communist draft convention prohibiting production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 120–124. No classification marking. For text of the U.S. Work Program regarding negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted to the CCD on March 20, and the statement of the U.S. Representative on chemical weapons, made March 21, see ibid., pp. 98—113. 256. Editorial Note. 257. Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 21, 1972 Rogers summarized the negotiations concerning the Biological Weapons Convention and analyzed its terms in anticipation of its submission to the Senate for ratification. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 380–386. No classification marking. Nixon submitted the convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on August 10, 1972, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held up the vote along with the vote on the Geneva Protocol because of its disagreement with the administration over whether the Protocol prohibited the use of herbicides and riot control agents. In December 1974, after a concerted lobbying effort by the Ford administration, the Senate gave its consent to both treaties, and President Ford ratified them on January 22, 1975. 258. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, June 29, 1972 Nutter forwarded a DOD study of chemical warfare initiatives for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and offered a detailed analysis of the options presented. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Appendices A and B to JCSM–276–72 are not published. 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, July 12, 1972 Laird recommended seeking international acceptance of an arms control treaty prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Laird sent a similar letter to ACDA Director Smith. (Ibid.) 260. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 14, 1972 Guhin briefed Kissinger on chemical weapons arms control discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V, 1972-. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Walsh. 261. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, July 19, 1972 Rogers responded positively to Laird’s proposal to pursue a chemical weapons arms control agreement prohibiting production and transfer. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. 262. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 19, 1972 Smith indicated that ACDA was prepared to develop a draft chemical weapons arms control proposal in support of Laird’s recommendation. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-155, 384. Top Secret. Drafted on July 18 by McCormack (ACDA) and cleared by Leonard and Keeny. The letter is a copy that bears an indication Smith signed the original. 263. National Security Study Memorandum 157 Washington, July 28, 1972 The President directed a prompt review of the U.S. position on negotiations regarding chemical weapons at the CCD. The review was to focus on methods of verification, related procedures and their effectiveness, and their level of acceptability to the U.S. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. 264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, August 12, 1972 Nutter forwarded the study prepared in response to NSSM 157. His covering memorandum outlined the study’s seven negotiating options regarding chemical weapons and recommended Option 2, prohibiting the production and transfer of such weapons. The detailed study analyzed each option and its supporters. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 40 NSC. Top Secret. The attachment at Tab A is not published. At Tab C is Document 259. 265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\ Washington, August 15, 1972 Laird expressed his support for Option 2 in the NSSM 157 study calling for a treaty that prohibited the production and transfer of chemical weapons but did not limit present stockpiles. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. The memorandum at Tab A is not published. 266. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 15, 1972 Farley believed the U.S. should seek the most comprehensive feasible controls on chemical weapons. Given this perspective, he supported Option 2 of the NSSM 157 study banning production and transfer of chemical weapons, but not placing restrictions on present stockpiles. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 267. Memorandum From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, August 16, 1972 Moorer presented the views of the JCS on the NSSM 157 study, concluding that a treaty limiting stockpiles and prohibiting the transfer of chemical weapons would not adversely affect U.S. national security. 268. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 17, 1972 David expressed support for Option 1 in the NSSM 157 study, placing no ban on production and no limitation of stockpiles, and urged that the U.S. retain a chemical weapons retaliatory capability Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting,NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 17, 1972 Irwin provided a detailed analysis of the reasons why the Department of State favored Option 2 in the NSSM 157 study, prohibiting the production and transfer of toxic agents, over Option 3 supported by the Department of Defense. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting,NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 270. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 23, 1972 Guhin briefed Kissinger on recent developments at the CCD on the possible chemical weapons treaty, reviewed the seven treaty options outlined in the NSSM 157 study, and presented his views. He concluded with his recommendation that the issues be discussed in the NSC. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192 and Box H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote in the margin on page 3 near “Option 2,” How could we monitor?” The attachment at Tab A is not published, however for additional information see Document 273. 271. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 5, 1972 Guhin responded to Kissinger’s handwritten query on page 3 of Document 270 [8/23] regarding how limitations on stockpiles and production of lethal chemical weapons could be monitored. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. Attached is Document 270 and, at Tab A, presumably Document 273. 272. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 7, 1972 Guhin attached a draft memorandum for the President, prepared at Kissinger’s request but not forwarded. The draft recommended the U.S. preserve the first-use option for herbicides and tear gas by sticking to the position that the Protocol should not be interpreted as prohibiting it. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig. At the top of page one Kissinger wrote, “Hold for next session of Congress.” Neither of Guhin’s recommendations is marked as approved, and the attached memorandum is not signed nor its recommendation marked as approved or disapproved. Kissinger’s note on page one and a covering note in the file indicate that Kissinger did not forward the memorandum to the President. 273. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 25, 1972 The President requested a National Security Council review of the NSSM 157 study in anticipation of commenting at the February 1973 CCD meeting on proposals for a chemical weapons prohibition. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. 274. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 20, 1972 Guhin recommended updating three aspects of the NSSM 157 study to allow for analyses of ensuing Soviet proposals, possible shelf-life restrictions, and recent developments in the U.S. binary weapons program. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Elliot. A handwritten notation that was crossed out indicates it was also sent through Scowcroft. At Tab A is Document 275. 275. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 5 1973 Kissinger requested reports reflecting recent discussions on verification measures and the question of stockpiles shelf-life pertaining to the NSSM 157 study be completed by January 21, 1973. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Helms, Smith, and David. 276. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon Washington, January 25, 1973 The memorandum summarized the Annual Review of the U.S. chemical warfare and biological research program. It included discussion on the issue of limiting riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published. 139. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 139. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 30, 1969 I am increasingly concerned about the structure of our chemical and biological warfare programs, our national policy relating to such programs, and our public posture vis a vis chemical and biological warfare activities. It is clear the Administration is going to be under increasing fire as a result of numerous inquiries, the more notable being Congressman McCarthy’s and Senator Fulbright’s. It would seem reasonable to have the subject brought before the National Security Council at an early date. I suggest the necessary studies and reviews be initiated immediately, to facilitate early consideration by the NSC. Melvin Laird 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0089, Box 50, 370.64 CBR (April 1969). Confidential. Sent for action. 140. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 140. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 23, 1969 SUBJECT: Proposed NSSM on U.S. Policy and Programs Relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents The attached NSSM requests a basic study of U.S. policy, programs and operational concepts relating to chemical and biological warfare and agents. The study requests a comprehensive review of present U.S. positions, including analysis of the main issues confronting U.S. policy in this field, and of possible alternative approaches thereto. Secretary Laird has recommended that such a study be initiated “immediately”, and the Department of State has requested a review of CBW policy and programs “as soon as possible”. Both interim policy guidelines on CBW and public posture guidelines have been in a state of flux due to the fact of substantial disagreement between departments on some fundamental aspects of the subject. In the light of the uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy and programs in this area, and in light of the increasing public concern and attention being given the subject, I believe that an overall study of present policy and possible alternatives is required. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the attached NSSM. APPROVE: [RN 5/28 initialed] DISAPPROVE: 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. Sent for action. The attached NSSM is printed in Document 141 . 141. National Security Study Memorandum 59 141. National Security Study Memorandum 59 1 Washington, May 28, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents The President has directed a study of U.S. policy, programs and operational concepts with regards to both chemical and biological warfare and agents. The study should examine present U.S. policy and programs on CBW, the main issues confronting that policy, and the range of possible alternatives thereto. The analysis should delineate (1) the nature of the threat to the U.S. and its Allies and possible alternative approaches in meeting this threat; (2) the utility of and circumstances for possible employment of chemical and biological agents, both lethal and incapacitating; (3) the operational concepts relating to possible use, testing and stockpiling; (4) the research and development objectives; (5) the nature of and alternative approaches to the distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical and biological agents, including a review of current applications of U.S. policy relating to non-lethal agents such as chemical riot control agents and chemical defoliants; and (6) the U.S. position on arms control, including the question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The study should include consideration of the effects upon U.S. international posture in general and upon relationships with Allies in particular; of the relevant legal questions; of the various cost factors; and of the environmental control and public affairs aspects of U.S. policy. The President has directed that the NSC Political-Military Group perform this study and that the addressees be included in the PMG for purposes of this study. The President has authorized the PMG to establish the necessary subgroups for special or technical aspects of this study. The report of this Group should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by September 5, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43–103). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler 142. Minutes of the Secretary of Defense’s Staff Meeting 142. Minutes of the Secretary of Defense’s Staff Meeting 1 Washington, August 4, 1969 Mr. Laird Mr. Packard Mr. Beal (for Mr. Resor) General Westmoreland Mr. Warner (for Gov. Chafee) Admiral Moorer Dr. McLucas (for Dr. Seamans) General Ryan General Wheeler General Walt (for General Chapman) Dr. Foster Mr. Cooke (for Mr. Frostlike) Mr. Henkin Admiral Mack (for Mr. Kelley) Mr. Brasier (for Mr. Moot) Dr. Nutter Dr. Selin Mr. Shillito Mr. Niederlehner Mr. Wallace Mr. Stompler Dr. Walske Mr. Glass Mr. Baroody Mr. Garbac Colonel Pursley Colonel Hixon Captain Wilson Colonel Furlong Mr. Livesay 1. Attendance Mr. Laird began meeting 0930. All three Service Secretaries are on leave, but are well represented by Mr. Beal, Mr. Warner and Dr. McLucas, respectively. General Chapman is on his way to a Western Pacific trip and General Walt is attending; Mr. Moot is on leave, Mr. Brazier is attending; Mr. Froehlke is on leave. Mr. Cooke is attending; and Mr. Kelley is on the Hill testifying this morning, and Admiral Mack is attending. This is General Ryan’s first meeting as Chief of Staff, Air Force. We are looking forward to his four-year term. Admiral Moorer is here in a new term as Chief of Naval Operations, but this is not a new experience for him. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 13. Chemical Warfare/Biological Research Mr. Laird said he would like to discuss guidance on these programs. He feels that it is important to discontinue the use of the CBW term as such. This has all of the various programs lumped together. He feels they should be broken down to two separate programs—one for chemical warfare and one for biological research. There are a number of differences between these programs on what we are trying to accomplish. The complete term puts us on the defensive much more than we have to be. Dr. Foster said it was a correct and straight forward way to go. Dr. Selin said there is no “biological warfare program.” Mr. Beal said we should realize, however, that we are producing some biological warfare agents, although these are not being produced in the form of munitions. Mr. Warner suggested that we use the term chemical ordnance. Dr. Selin said we spend more on defense against chemical weapons. Mr. Laird said we do not want to limit the term to ordnance. Ordnance sounds like too much emphasis on the offensive use which is not a major concern. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–28, Office Chrons, June–Aug 1969. Secret. 143. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) 143. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) 1 Washington, August 6, 1969 SUBJECT: National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 59 The NSSM 59 study constitutes the first full-scale, detailed review of the chemical warfare and biological research area in almost a decade. It serves the interest of the Department of Defense (DoD), as you will agree, for this study to be as thorough, complete, and well-reasoned as possible. In order for the DoD positions to be as cogent as possible, I believe we must solicit and give consideration to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual Services, and numerous elements of the OSD staff. I am especially interested in seeing that, in addition to the more purely military views, the Secretary of the Army inputs as well as the DDR&E, the Systems Analysis, and the Installations and Logistics views, receive full consideration. The inputs DoD makes, even on a “working paper” level, will be important in the formulation of the final positions offered for full NSC consideration. I would appreciate your insuring (a) that the views of the various interested DoD elements are incorporated in the “working papers” and (b) that on this vital issue I am consulted as the DoD papers on key policy issues are formulated. Melvin Laird 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, 370.64 CBR (August 1969). Confidential. A handwritten notation by Laird stated: “Warren—As you know I requested this study and I’m most interested in it—hope the item I discussed at Monday staff meeting is handled as per my instruction. MRL.” 144. Intelligence Report Prepared by Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 144. Intelligence Report Prepared by Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, August 18, 1969 No. 1842/69 Disarmament: Chemical-Biological Warfare Controls and Prospects for Improvement Introduction Accelerating interest in disarmament has recently brought a palpable increase in efforts to gain international control over the development, production, and use of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. While primary attention since World War II has focused on the nuclear arms race, popular concern over CBW has grown as a result of press reporting on the use of harassing agents in Vietnam by the US, on Egypt’s alleged use of gas in Yemen, public disclosures of research programs and foreign deployment, and various incidents involving CBW. In international forums diplomatic initiatives reminiscent of the 1920s are once more directed to finding ways and means of eliminating the threat of CBW. In particular, the United Nations-sponsored Geneva Disarmament Committee (referred to here as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, or ENDC, in spite of its recent enlargement) is now discussing CBW. The UN General Assembly is expected to take up the issue in the fall. The diplomatic history of CBW control is a lengthy one, the first efforts in the field going back to the last third of the 19th century. Proponents of new initiatives are therefore confounded by the multiplicity of existing international documents and diverging interpretations thereof that make up the body of law on the subject. Moreover, in addition to the tangle of legal opinions, certain international customs are sometimes cited as constituting implicit international restraints having the force of formal agreements. The history of efforts to regulate CBW within the overall context of disarmament, and a discussion of recent developments on the subject and their prospects for success follow. Conclusions appear in paragraphs 43 and 44. Background Documents of Historical and Current Interest General 1. The “unnecessary suffering” principle, which has given rise to earlier attempts to control the class of weapons referred to as CBW agents, accounts for the perennial controversy as to which weapons should fall within the class. The list of offending agents has varied with time and with the contributions of science. The principle itself has undergone several mutations. In conferences during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nations appear to have generally agreed on the axiom, if not its implementation, that devices causing suffering out of proportion to their military effect, or those indiscriminately acting upon military forces and civilian populations alike, should be shunned. In recent times, massive retaliation strategies involving civilian populations appear to have rendered this principle obsolete, and it has been superseded by the more comprehensive goal in disarmament circles of outlawing all weapons of mass destruction along the way to general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the old philosophic disputes have bequeathed a legacy of confusion to the various documents treated below that make up CBW law today. Declaration of St. Petersburg 2. In 1868, 20 states signed the Declaration of St. Petersburg, which prohibited “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable… as contrary to the laws of humanity.” This language was used frequently at later conferences to support the “unnecessary suffering” principle and, specifically, to argue against waging gas warfare or using poisons. It is considered the earliest evidence supporting the contention advanced from some quarters that CBW weapons are proscribed by general practice and customary international law. The Hague Gas Declaration 3. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 produced the Gas Declaration of 1899, which provided in part: Inspired by the sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg,… The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The declaration ultimately was ratified by 27 states. Both it and the so-called Convention IV of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, which banned the use of “poison and poisoned weapons,” were in effect but were largely ignored during World War I. 4. The Gas Declaration was deficient in several respects. It outlawed only projectiles with the sole object of spreading gas. The phrase “asphyxiating and deleterious gas” was open to various interpretations, and the uncertainty over the noxious substances to be controlled has yet to be resolved. The on-going controversy over tear gas and other harassing agents can be traced to the Gas Declaration. Controversies of interpretation, as well as broad-gauged disregard of it and Convention IV during World War I, have probably rendered both ineffectual as viable commitments of states. 5. The Treaty of Versailles, and the other agreements at the close of the war, included language prohibiting the defeated states from manufacturing or importing “asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices.” Thought by some to be an effort to rehabilitate the earlier agreements, others nevertheless sought further measures and for a time the focus for CBW efforts was in the League of Nations. The Treaty of Washington 6. As part of a comprehensive attempt to limit armaments, the US called a conference in 1921 that, among other things, produced the Treaty of Washington of 6 February 1922. It never went into effect because, of those signing, France never ratified. The language pertaining to chemical warfare, (CW), however, survived to be used almost intact in the Geneva Protocol. Geneva Protocol (Protocol Prohibiting the Use, in War of Asphyxiating or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925) 7. Following presentation by a League of Nations group of experts of a report on chemical and bacteriological warfare that emphasized the unpredictable effects of these weapons on civilian populations, the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War was convened in Geneva. After much debate, a protocol was drafted that made use of the language in the Treaty of Washington and added a clause on bacteriological warfare. The final version reads in part: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, and Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in treaties to which the majority of the Powers in the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations; Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE RATIFIED OR ACCEDED TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL Asterisks indicate ratification or accession with reservations. Argentina Iceland Norway *Australia *India Pakistan Austria *Indonesia Paraguay *Belgium Iran Poland Bulgaria *Iraq *Portugal *Canada *Ireland *Romania Ceylon *Israel Rwanda *Chile Italy Sierra Leone China Latvia *Spain Cuba Lebanon Sweden *Czechoslovakia Liberia Switzerland Cyprus Lithuania *Syria Denmark Luxembourg Tanzania *Estonia Madagascar Thailand Ethiopia Maldive Islands Tunisia Finland Mexico Turkey *France Monaco Uganda Gambia *Mongolia *Union of South Africa Germany *Netherlands *United Kingdom Ghana Nepal *USSR Greece *New Zealand UAR Holy See Niger Venezuela Hungary *Nigeria Yugoslavia Note: Paraguay is believed to have acceded in 1933, but France, the depository government, never notified other adherents of the fact. Communist China has recognized the Republic of China’s signature as binding on the Peking government. Both Germanies are considered adherents. The following countries have signed but not ratified to date: United States, Brazil, El Salvador, and Japan. 8. The Geneva Protocol is currently in force and effect. To date it has been acceded to by nearly 70 states (see chart). In spite of continuing dialogue among members of the League to improve upon it, it stands over 40 years later as the most significant multilateral undertaking on the subject. Almost all major, and most minor, military powers have acceded to it with the important exception of the United States and Japan. Few documents of international law have experienced the difficulties of interpretation, however, that have surrounded the Geneva Protocol. United Nations and CBW 9. The changing emphasis in arms control after World War II is reflected in a resolution of the UN Security Council’s Commission for Conventional Armaments dated August 12, 1948: …weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons…. This category of “weapons of mass destruction” has occupied the attention of arms control experts almost exclusively since 1945, with nuclear controls receiving the bulk of the effort. Nevertheless, for CBW the resolution quoted above marked a shift of emphasis. CBW’s identification as of comparable destructive capability with nuclear devices focused attention on the difficulties of enforcing and verifying compliance with any new measures seeking to control the development, production and stockpiling of CBW agents. It is generally conceded, moreover, that these verification problems with regard to CBW promise to be more difficult than equivalent problems in nuclear disarmament. 10. A number of nations have maintained continuous pressure, primarily at the UN, to gain additional adherents to the Protocol in order to strengthen its effectiveness. The Soviet Union levied charges, in the aftermath of the Korean War, that the US had used biological warfare (BW) against the North Koreans and Chinese, and, as a means of making the allegations more plausible, pointed to the failure of the US to ratify the Protocol. The Soviets have made use of the UN and other forums to state their support for the Protocol and urge other nations to ratify it. 11. In 1966, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that called for strict observance by all states of the principles and objectives of the Protocol, encouraged its widespread acceptance, and condemned all actions contrary to its objectives. The resolution passed by a vote of 101 in favor, none opposed, and three abstentions. Although the US and a number of other nations that have not ratified the Protocol voted for the resolution, this does not bind them to accede to the Protocol itself. The Secretary General’s Report 12. In response to a request by the UN’s Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, the General Assembly in 1968 commissioned the Secretary General to undertake a study of the effects of the uses of CBW. That report, which was prepared by a group of 14 experts from various countries whom the Secretary General appointed, was made public on 2 July 1969. 13. It emphasized the dangers to international security of developing, perfecting, producing, and stockpiling CBW agents. It observed that the outstanding characteristic of CBW is the unpredictability of waging it. The impact of a given application could be devastating or negligible, depending upon conditions and the particular agent used, and possible upsets of ecological balances could result. Civil defense against CBW was termed prohibitively costly and administratively impossible. The report also emphasized the danger that escalation to even more formidable weapons (i.e., nuclear and thermonuclear devices) could be triggered by the use of CBW. Moreover, because the means for acquiring these weapons is well within the capability of virtually all countries, proliferation is stressed as a frightening eventuality. The report concludes: It is the hope of the authors that this report will contribute to public awareness of the profoundly dangerous results if these weapons were ever used, and that an aroused public will demand and receive assurances that Governments are working for the earliest effective elimination of …[CBW]… weapons. 14. In a foreword to the report, the Secretary General gave his full endorsement to its findings and conclusions, and called upon the members of the United Nations to undertake the following measures: 1. To renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol; 2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist, or which may be developed in the future; 3. To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons. 15. These recommendations were transmitted to the ENDC and the General Assembly as part and parcel of the report. Simultaneously with its receipt in Geneva the UK delegation of the ENDC introduced a draft treaty to govern the use, development, and production of BW weapons. The ongoing negotiations in that forum and the further discussions of CBW that are expected to follow when the General Assembly convenes in September will be strongly influenced by interpretations of the report, Thant’s recommendations, and of course the body of law represented by the documents outlined above. The Existing Law of CBW as Currently Interpreted 16. In the consideration of CBW controls, three broad questions have received attention more or less continuously since 1925. They are: A. What weapons, agents, and devices are referred to in the Geneva Protocol? B. What activities regarding them are proscribed? C. What nations are bound by the restrictions, and are they effectively bound? A. What weapons, agents, and devices are referred to in the Geneva Protocol? 17. The English version, “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and …all analogous liquids, materials or devices” appears on its face broadly to encompass all agents and substances commonly associated with chemical warfare. Commentators and official policies seem in general agreement that it includes the common varieties of gas intended to produce permanent disabilities or death. Among these are numbered the nerve agents (e.g., Sarin), blister agents (mustard), choking agents (phosgene), blood agents (hydrogen cyanide), and toxins (botulinum toxin). The clause that prohibits “bacteriological methods of warfare” indisputably refers to such pathogenic bacteria as cause anthrax, typhoid, and tularemia in human beings. 18. Once this consensus is recorded, however, official and unofficial opinions alike diverge on whether the Protocol outlaws certain other categories of CBW agents. Of perhaps greatest current interest is the controversy over tear gas and other “harassing” agents, and “incapacitating” agents like LSD–25, designed to induce temporary mental aberrations. Whereas the Protocol’s English text seems broad enough to outlaw these agents, the equally-authentic French text raises doubts. It refers to “ gas, asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matieràs ou procedes analogues …” The French, not a literal translation of the English, has inspired the argument that the Protocol was intended to ban only specified classes of agents: those intended to kill or permanently disable. Advocates of this position frequently maintain that to stretch the “unnecessary suffering” principle to include nonlethal harassing and incapacitating CW agents extends the ban by inference logical inference to most other weapons of modern warfare. Under such a broad construction would come smoke, white phosphorous, incendiaries, napalm, and even conventional explosives, all of which give off gas, and perhaps even asphyxiating gas. Such a comprehensive interpretation, the argument goes, would certainly produce results not intended by the Protocol’s draftsmen; hence, harassing and incapacitating gases should be exempted. 19. To draw the line at “lethal” gases, however, occasions still other disagreements. For, if administered in great quantity, harassing and incapacitating agents can prove lethal. This matter has long since become a political, not a juridical, controversy. The Protocol’s imprecise language and over 40 years of debate have failed to produce accord. Other differences have focused on the status of anti*plant and anti-livestock chemical agents. Probably the balance of opinion favors an interpretation of the Protocol outlawing harassing and incapacitating as well as anti-plant and anti-livestock chemical weapons. 20. The meaning of the ban on “bacteriological methods of warfare” has also provoked disagreement. Other pathogenic micro-organisms including certain fungi, rickettsiae, and viruses, which do not technically fall into the “bacteriological” category, have been discovered since 1925. It has been argued, but without much conviction, that their use would not be prohibited by the Protocol. This interpretation clearly distorts the intended objective of the Protocol, however, which was to make illegal the use of germ warfare, or warfare with “microbes.” Uncertainties similar to those regarding chemical agents also arise with respect to harassing and incapacitating biological agents, and biological agents directed against plants and livestock. But it appears that the consensus on this point leans toward an inclusive interpretation of “bacteriological warfare.” B. What activities regarding CBW are proscribed? 21. The statement is sometimes made by international law experts that a general, customary international ban on the use of CBW is in effect. They base their contention on the various documents referred to above taken in the aggregate, on the general abhorrence of CBW, on official statements of various governments (including those like the US which have not accepted the Geneva Protocol), and on the abstinence from CBW by both sides in World War II. The Protocol’s language suggests that the general opinion of the civilized world has condemned the use of CBW. But the language therein also appears to create contractual commitments among only those nations ratifying the Protocol. There have been official statements of policy by a number of powers, including the US, the USSR, the UK, and France, that they will not be first to use lethal CBW agents. Whether all these circumstances add up to a general customary international law banning CBW use may be academic. But the hypothesis has exerted pressure on governments over the years, and has molded world public opinion, which now operates as a reasonably effective de facto deterrent against the use of CBW. 22. No legal sanctions exist at present, however, against the development, production, and stockpiling of CBW agents, and until lately even public opinion seemed to accept these activities as inevitable aspects of the arms race, however repugnant. The Geneva Protocol does not treat these matters, and deals exclusively with use . Current initiatives, of course, seek to develop verifiable controls over these other aspects. C. What nations are bound, and how effectively? There is a distinction between customary and contractual undertakings. 23. In international law, the former exist as a general expression of intent among nations, honored informally by practice and custom, but do not involve the mutual exchanges of promises. The latter depend upon formal documents of state and have as their basis the mutual exchanges of promises with contingencies and definitions spelled out to mutual satisfaction. For an undertaking to be self-enforcing, that is, augmented by guarantees of compliance beyond the mere good will of the obligor nation, it must in nearly every case be contractual. In some fashion it will probably infringe the sovereignty of the obligor nation, for example by granting other nations the right, on a reciprocal basis, of carrying out inspections inside its territorial boundaries for the purpose of verifying compliance. In general, customary law is less binding than contractual, and bare contractual law is less binding than self-enforcing contractual law on the consciences and practices of nations. 24. At present there exist no self-enforcing restraints in the field of CBW. While language in the Geneva Protocol taken alone does appear to create contractual restraints among ratifying nations, a number of nations, when ratifying, stipulated various reservations. France, in its reservation, which has been used as a pattern by other nations, said it considered its obligation to be contractual with other ratifying countries only. It further stated that France would terminate its obligations with any state whose armed forces or allies should “fail to respect” the Protocol. The Soviet Union reserved the right to disregard the Protocol in the case of states whose armed forces or allies either de jure or in fact “do not respect” the Protocol. Some have concluded that Moscow might interpret the mere failure of a country to adhere to the Protocol as a de jure failure to respect it. In short, the Geneva Protocol probably does create contractual commitments among its assenting parties, but subject to the terms of whatever reservations they have stated. 25. Other language in the Protocol suggests an attempt to bind even nonadherents by referring to world opinion condemning the use of CBW. As noted above, many experts believe this and other circumstances have created a customary restraint which binds all nations. Beyond its utility as a device to underscore public moral outrage in the event of a CBW attack, however, any such customary law has little force or effect. 26. In summary, the existing restraints are not self-enforcing. Among adherents to the Geneva Protocol, the minimum common contractual obligation is to forbear from the first use of CBW. Nonadherents that have unilaterally eschewed first use (e.g., the US) have probably assumed customary obligations nearly as strong as if they had ratified the Protocol, and nonadherents with no formally declared policy are presumably only bound by whatever force moral suasion might have. CBW in the Context of Disarmament Negotiations The Piecemeal Approach 27. The new international trend in disarmament has been pragmatic. Where the US and USSR have been able to agree on limited objectives in specific areas, some disarmament progress has resulted. Hence we have the Outer Space Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This piecemeal approach has superseded earlier efforts to reach a single comprehensive agreement on general and complete disarmament. In pursuit of further progress, the US and USSR may soon undertake negotiations in the field of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The ENDC is now studying various separate items, including prospects for agreement on a seabed arms control measure, a comprehensive test ban, and the UK-proposed ban on BW. During 1969, the primary focus in the ENDC has been seabeds, a fact that has detracted from prospects for progress in CBW. The BW Draft Treaty at ENDC 28. On 3 July 1969 the UK delegate to the ENDC tabled a draft treaty that, according to its preamble, is designed to reinforce the Geneva Protocol. It spells out two undertakings. In Article I, all parties engage never to use biological warfare, defined as agents causing death or disease by infection or infestation. In Article II, all parties agree not to produce, acquire, or assist in the production or acquisition of these agents in quantities except for peaceful uses or of equipment to facilitate their hostile use; they agree not to conduct, permit or assist in research programs pursuant thereto; they agree to destroy or divert to peaceful uses all their stocks and equipment. 29. Any party believing itself to be the victim of a BW attack in violation of Article I may ask the UN Secretary General to investigate and report to the Security Council. Any party believing that another nation is breaching either Articles I or II may complain to the Security Council and request that it authorize an investigation. All parties further undertake to cooperate with the Secretary General and the Security Council, and to negotiate for achievement of effective chemical warfare controls. Once in effect, the treaty would be of unlimited duration, although it does include an escape clause. By its terms, a country which felt that its supreme national interests were jeopardized by events relevant to the treaty could, upon three months’ notice to the other parties, disavow its obligations under the treaty. A companion to the draft treaty is a draft Security Council resolution that empowers the Secretary General to make immediate investigations of alleged Article I violations. 30. Public debate on CBW has been quite active in Britain over the past several years, and London has taken the lead in seeking enforceable controls. The British press has focused on the Egyptians’ alleged use of various lethal gases against the Yemeni Royalists from 1963 to early 1967. Reporting has also focused on the use of harassing and antiplant agents in Vietnam by the US, as well as on the nerve gas incidents in Utah and Okinawa. The British government has remained sensitive, however, to the fact that the US considers tear gases and other nonlethal substances permissible under the Geneva Protocol and international custom. Deference to the US no doubt played a part in Britain’s decision not to treat CW in its present initiative, since debate on the tear gas issue, part and parcel of any CW discussions, is potentially embarrassing to the US. London has adopted the “piecemeal” method of splitting off a subject upon which agreement is possible while ignoring a potentially volatile issue. In this case, both Britain and the US are apprehensive of reopening US–USSR debate on tear gas in the ENDC. 31. The British have contended that BW merits separate treatment since it is “totally indiscriminate” whereas CW can be used with a “certain amount of precision”. They also maintain that to forgo production of BW agents is no substantial concession, since a nation exercising its prerogative to renounce the treaty could reactivate its BW production facilities in a short time. 32. The British draft has met with considerable resistance in the ENDC from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Their fundamental objection has been that it separates CW and BW, which, they argue, weakens and undermines the Geneva Protocol. Moscow’s spokesman has charged that to treat BW separately might cause an indefinite postponement of a solution to CW, a greater “real threat” than BW, and that it could even accelerate the CW arms race. The Soviets have also informally expressed reservations as to the verification scheme, which affords the Secretary General a powerful role. They have historically sought to limit the powers of that office, and hence would prefer an arrangement conferring more discretion on the Security Council. 33. The Soviets in preventing meaningful discussion of BW in the ENDC, may be hoping to raise the issue in the General Assembly this fall. Recent Soviet propaganda efforts in Southeast Asia and in their domestic publications, together with hints in Gromyko’s recent policy speech, suggest the possibility of a Soviet CBW initiative in that forum. Considering the number of countries interested in discussing CBW and their sensitivity to the use of tear gas by the US in Vietnam and the fact that Washington does not accept the Geneva Protocol, it will be difficult to treat the issue without embarrassing the US. It is not thought, moreover, that Moscow really intends to press for new international controls on CBW at this time. 34. The Polish delegate in the ENDC has echoed Moscow’s general line on the UK draft treaty. In a working paper he urged strengthening of the Geneva Protocol and called on all UN members to affirm that it applies to the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological agents, including tear gas. Warsaw also indicated an interest in new measures, but with joint treatment of CW and BW. The Bulgarians have endorsed Moscow’s position and have pointed to the “grave accidents of recent weeks” as reminders of the need for progress on CBW. Romania seems to have been alone among Soviet allies in favoring the British draft. 35. Other ENDC members have made statements, generally in support of the UK initiative, but serious negotiations to develop agreement on specific issues have not materialized. The Canadian delegate has stated his approval of the draft, observing that BW is more easily dealt with because it is not now part of NATO’s strategic doctrine. Ottawa desires greater restrictions on CBW and would be pleased if a new initiative could resolve the differences of interpretation surrounding the Geneva Protocol. 36. The Dutch see the draft treaty as reinforcing the Protocol, but have questioned the wisdom of extending the ban to research in view of the obvious difficulties of verifying compliance. The Dutch press has closely followed recent disclosures that the US stockpiles CBW agents in Okinawa and West Germany. Increasing public anxiety in the Netherlands led to a recent official statement by the minister of defense that no such US stockpiles were present in the Netherlands. 37. Japan—a new member in the ENDC—favors supplemental measures to the Protocol and supports the outlawing of development and production in spite of the inherent verification problems. In light of the incident on Okinawa, Tokyo advocates a complete prohibition on the use and production of biological and chemical weapons. Italy’s initial reaction was quite negative. The Italian delegate pointed out even the tabling of the BW initiative undermined the Protocol since it reflected the feeling of one of its adherents that the Protocol is inadequate. 38. In Sweden, the press has charged that both the US and USSR are indifferent to the BW initiative. The newspapers have emphasized the need for giving CBW as serious consideration as the nuclear weapons problem, and have made much of “nerve gas accidents” in the US and Okinawa, which were followed by US acknowledgment of its stockpiles in Germany. Sweden has urged that the ENDC follow the Secretary General’s recommendations on CBW (see paragraph 14) and has drafted a resolution for the ENDC to approve and submit to the General Assembly to implement the Secretary General’s second recommendation, which spells out the agents prohibited. The draft resolution is apparently worded so as to minimize conflict over the tear gas question. Its operable portion …condemns and declares as contrary to the laws of war the use for hostile purposes of any chemical agents of warfare: chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants, and any biological agents of warfare: living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, other animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked…. 39. Stockholm prefers to treat CW and BW together, and has included in the draft resolution a call to negotiations in the ENDC to “reach agreement or agreements on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and biological means of warfare, and on the elimination of such means of warfare as have been produced or otherwise acquired for hostile purposes.” 40. It appears wholly unlikely that the Geneva talks will be able to present the Assembly this fall with a BW treaty modeled on the UK draft. Nothing like a consensus favoring the UK’s initiative is present, and no other drafts have been tabled. Most delegations, however, appear to favor continuing the CBW debate in the Assembly this fall, and in spite of the Swedish effort to minimize disagreements in advance, discussions in New York could prove lengthy and polemical. Prospects for CBW in the 24th General Assembly and Beyond 41. Disarmament will probably occupy considerable time in the 24th General Assembly, which begins on 16 September. The nonnuclear countries are increasingly disturbed over what they see as a superpower nuclear monopoly. Their anxieties over the NPT, which many charged was a perpetuation of the monopoly, were assuaged temporarily by the NPT’s Article VI, whose language was intended to obligate the nuclear powers to negotiate new disarmament measures. A number of countries delayed signing or ratifying the NPT to see if the two principal powers, the US and USSR, could agree on meaningful new arms control provisions during the two ENDC sessions this year. It is now becoming doubtful that the ENDC will be able to present such agreements to the Assembly. Prospects for a seabeds treaty, considered earlier the most promising area for US–USSR cooperation, have lately dimmed. Bilateral US-USSR consultations on strategic arms limitation talks have no prospect of producing results in time for the Assembly’s opening. Hence the nonnuclear countries, distressed by the lack of progress and anxious to have a greater voice, may implement their threat to reconvene the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), an unwieldy committee of the whole of the Assembly, which has not met for over ten years. This could well result in extended shrill debates that the superpowers will be able to guide only with difficulty. 42. The CBW issue is certain to receive much attention, even should there be no UNDC session. Secretary General Thant’s report on CBW will be discussed in the light of his three recommendations. At a minimum, his inclusion of harassing agents within the category of CBW will be hotly debated. It is possible that a great deal of support for his second recommendation will develop, which could conceivably result in an Assembly resolution affirming that the Geneva Protocol applies to the use Of harassing agents. Heated discussions of CBW in the Assembly might well aggravate the problems of future ENDC sessions concerning CBW. Even if the tear gas issue were put to rest, any enforceable ban on all aspects of CBW poses difficult problems of verification. The scheme proposed in the UK draft, making use of UN machinery, might avoid the difficulties of negotiating reciprocal national inspection rights. On the other hand, this might result in a less effective verification system, and it is problematical whether it would gain broad acceptance. Conclusion 43. The UK initiative on BW in the ENDC will probably founder, whatever its merits. The Soviets and their allies seem intent upon avoiding substantive consideration of it in Geneva in favor of taking the problem to the Assembly. Once the issue is opened in New York, as it most probably will be, various UN members can be expected to exploit the tear gas issue at US expense. 44. Recent international interest, while generating considerable CBW debate, has nevertheless failed to stimulate attitudes that are sufficiently forthcoming to force new international agreements. The basic disputes over existing constraints no longer appear to hinge on philosophic interpretations of the “unnecessary suffering” principle or technical legal argumentation. Instead, they have become political issues in the larger context of general and complete disarmament 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence." 145. Memorandum From Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 145. Memorandum From Morton Halperin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 28, 1969 SUBJECT: U.S. Policy, Programs and Issues on CBW There is no comprehensive inter-Agency policy on CBW. Present policy is therefore embodied in a series of public statements by U.S. officials and DOD procurement, testing and deployments decisions over the past three decades. Consequently, it is difficult to pinpoint policy in some areas (e.g., chemical and biological incapacitants), and apparent contradictions exist between stated policy and actual practices. “CBW” needs to be broken down into distinct categories before policy issues can be discussed and decisions made. These categories are: (1) Lethal Chemical, (2) Chemical Incapacitants, (3) Tear Gas, (4) Chemical Herbicides and Anti-Crop, (5) Lethal Biologicals, (6) Biological Incapacitants and (7) Biological Herbicides and Anti-Crop. In each case the issues concern U.S. procurement, testing and deployment and what constraints we should seek or accept in arms control agreements. The current NSC study is dealing with all of these questions. Until a few weeks ago DOD inputs into the study reflected the JCS view that we need a greatly expanded CBW capability. Secretary Laird, apparently at the urging of Systems Analysis, has now withdrawn all of the DOD papers and is having them rewritten. Laird has not given any indication of where he stands on the issue. DOD has requested a one month extension from the original due date of September 5. We have indicated informally that we were prepared to grant the extension provided it was agreed that in the interim the Departments would not anticipate the results of the study in their actions or public statements. The remainder of this memorandum briefly discusses policy, programs and issues for each category of CBW and the two current arms control proposals. You should keep two points in mind. First, there is general agreement that our information about Soviet, Chinese and other foreign programs is very minimal. For example, most of the information upon which current estimates are based is dated, usually a decade or more old, and there are serious deficiencies in confirmed intelligence. Second, there is general agreement that the U.S. has not taken the necessary defensive measures either to protect its troops or to lend credibility to a retaliatory capability. CHEMICALS 1. Lethal Chemical (C) Policy . Although the U.S. has not ratified the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. has renounced first use of lethal chemical weapons. It is generally understood that the development and maintenance of a lethal C capability is for deterrence against the use of such agents in war and retaliation in the event that such weapons are used against U.S. or allied forces. Use of lethal C requires Presidential authorization according to JCS regulations. Programs. The U.S. (1) conducts offensive and defensive RDT&E on lethal C; (2) develops and maintains a stockpile, both in bulk and in munitions, of approximately 35,000 agent tons including the nerve agents VX and GB, and Mustard (HD); and (3) has forward deployed a one to two weeks’ large-scale operational supply in the Far East (1,585 agent tons being moved from Okinawa to Guam) and about a five day large-scale operational supply in Europe (488 agent tons in the FRG). Issues . There seems to be general agreement that some lethal chemical capability is necessary (1) for deterrence against the use of chemicals in war and (2) for retaliation against the use of chemicals so that we need not resort to tactical nuclear weapons. The basic issues center about how large a stockpile and actual capability and where deployed. JCS has favored a full war fighting capability, which would mean considerable expansion in present production and stockpiling, both overseas and in CONUS. State favors something less than a full war fighting capability or a minimum deterrent capability which would still provide some option for a given period of time. State also holds that overseas deployment should be held to a minimum. OST favors a rapid expansion in defensive measures, the lack of which weakens any capability. OST and State favor stringent controls and safety measures on testing, stockpiling and disposal which the Army has reluctantly accepted in some degree. 2. Chemical Incapacitants (C Incaps) Policy . While the U.S. has never used such agents (estimated lethality 2% or less although depending upon several variables), the U.S. position with respect to use is ambiguous and uncertain. The U.S. has reserved the option of first use to exploit military advantage with Presidential authorization. Programs . The U.S. conducts offensive and, indirectly, defensive RDT&E on C Incaps. BZ, an hallucinatory agent causing muscular incoordination and mental confusion, is the only incapacitating chemical agent (non-riot control) which has been standardized by the Army to date. The U.S. stockpile of BZ is approximately 10 tons. Important Characteristics . The characteristics of C Incaps themselves tend towards first use concepts and doctrine, as C Incaps have no basic deterrent function and no retaliation value. Uncertainty surrounding the effects and duration of BZ, the only standardized C Incap to date, the general unreliability of the agent and the limitations on existing munitions make the use of BZ highly questionable on technical and military grounds alone. Issues . The basic issue is should the U.S. develop and maintain an option for first use of incapacitating chemicals, and should it stockpile a capability for C Incaps. JCS favors an expanded program in C Incaps, and would like to reserve the option for first use. State favors R&D on C Incaps, no production and stockpiling, and does not favor reserving an option for first use. OST favors R&D on C Incaps. 3. Tear Gases (CS1, CS2, and CN) Policy . The U.S. has maintained that the first use in war of tear gases is neither contrary to international law nor prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. (The U.S. position differs from the positions taken earlier by NATO Allies and most other nations adhering to the Protocol.) Presidential authorization is not now required for first use of tear gases in war. Programs. The U.S. conducts offensive RDT&E on tear gases and has developed more effective weapons for delivery, and a micropulverized product which affects the lungs and which is silicone-coated to last longer in tropical climates. The U.S. develops and maintains large stockpiles, both in bulk and in munitions, in CONUS and overseas. Use in Vietnam. CS has become an integral part of the Army’s armament in Southeast Asia, the R&D community having been quite responsive to requests for improved munitions. As field commanders have gained experience with CS, it is viewed as an increasingly useful weapon in operations of several types: (1) attacking fortified positions before or in conjunction with high explosives; (2) city, village and hamlet fighting; (3) tunnel clearing; (4) defending against ambush; and (5) rescuing downed airmen. Use of tear gases is determined by the commanders in the field as the situation lends itself to such use. Use of tear gases was initially authorized by President Johnson, and actual operations are now authorized at battalion commander level. Issues. The basic issue is whether or not the U.S. should continue to maintain an option for first use of tear gases in war. JCS is strongly in favor of this option.DOD will probably support this position strongly. Rusk supported use in Vietnam despite the strong feeling in State that this is illegal. Rogers has not taken a position. 4. Chemical Herbicides & Anti-Crop Policy. The U.S. has maintained that the first use of chemical herbicides and anti-crop agents is neither contrary to international law nor prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Programs. A sizeable current capability exists in chemical herbicides in support of Southeast Asia operations, and herbicides have been used on a large-scale in Vietnam operations. Defoliants have proved useful in protecting against ambush and in improving visibility. Use of chemicals for crop destruction has been on a much more limited scale. Use of defoliants and crop destruction agents in Vietnam requires authorization by a joint US–SVN committee in Saigon. Issues. There is general agreement that the U.S. should reserve some option for the use of herbicides for defoliation purposes as long as use is limited and controlled. There is disagreement on the option for use of chemical anti-crop agents.JCS favors retaining the option and use. State generally is against crop destruction although has concurred in crop destruction to date in Vietnam. OST does not favor retaining the first-use option for crop destruction. BIOLOGICALS 5. Lethal Biologicals (B) Policy. As with lethal C, the U.S. has renounced first use, and it is generally understood that efforts in this area are for deterrence and retaliation only. Use of lethal B also requires Presidential authorization. The U.S. has not committed itself to support the recent UK proposals on BW at Geneva which would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of B agents and weapons. Programs. The U.S. (1) conducts offensive and defensive RDT&E on lethal B, and (2) develops and produces modest quantities of lethal B, stockpiled in special warfare devices at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Important Characteristics. Compared to lethal C, lethal B is (1) far more toxic, (2) less reliable, (3) relatively uncontrollable, (4) slower in bringing about effects, and (5) easier and cheaper to produce, although more difficult to stockpile. Lethal B has no effective battlefield uses, being essentially anti-population. (For example, anthrax and pneumonic plague.) Issues. The basic issue is whether or not the U.S. should maintain a stockpile and capability in lethal B. Since lethal B would be used against population the question is whether or not U.S. B capability adds significantly to our nuclear capability in deterring B attacks. JCS favors a lethal B capability as a co-deterrent with nuclears. State favors R&D on lethal B, but no production and stockpiling.OST is not in favor of maintaining an actual lethal B capability. With regards to testing, JCS favors offensive and outdoor testing, although primarily with simulants. State favors defensive and very limited, if any, outdoor testing of either simulants or toxic agents. 6. Biological Incapacitants (B Incaps) Policy. As with C Incaps, the U.S. position on B Incaps is ambiguous and uncertain. The U.S. has reserved the option for first use to exploit military advantage with Presidential authorization. Programs. The U.S. conducts offensive and, again indirectly, defensive RDT&E. The U.S. produces and maintains a stockpile of approximately 8,300 gallons (FX or Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis and MN or “Q” Fever) at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Important Characteristics. As with C Incaps, the characteristics of the agents themselves tend towards first use concepts and doctrine. Issues. The basic issue is whether or not the U.S. should maintain and develop a capability in B Incaps and whether or not it should reserve an option for first use. JCS favors an expanded program in B Incaps, and would like to reserve the option for first use. State favors minimal R&D on B Incaps, no production and stockpiling, and does not favor reserving an option for first use. OST favors no capability and destruction of current stocks. 7. Biological Herbicides and Anti-Crop Policy. Ambiguous and uncertain. Programs. The U.S. currently stockpiles 0.9 tons of LX (the amount of Rice Blast capable of infecting approximately 5,000 square miles) and 40 tons of TX (amount of Stem Rust of Wheat capable of infecting 106,400 square miles of wheat crop) given adequate tanks for delivery. (All the wheat crops of the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea add up to approximately 124,000 square miles.) Issues. The basic issue is whether the U.S. should maintain and develop a biological anti-crop capability and reserve the option for first use.JCS favors an expanded program. State does not favor maintaining a capability and is against reserving a first use option. OST is against a crop destruction capability, and does not favor a first use option. ARMS CONTROL 1. Geneva Protocol Policy. While having supported and signed the Protocol, the U.S. has not ratified it. Congress has never voted on the Protocol, and the Truman Administrationwithdrew it some years ago. All NATO Allies, Warsaw Pact countries (including the Soviet Union), and Communist China have ratified the Protocol. Japan is the only other major industrial nation which has not ratified the Protocol. The U.S. has supported UNGA resolutions calling on all nations to abide by the principles of the Geneva Protocol (1966 and 1968). Issues. Several nations have maintained that the principles of the Geneva Protocol have become customary international law and are, therefore, binding upon the U.S. as such. Generally speaking, DOD disagrees and State agrees with this interpretation. More importantly, the issue is whether or not the U.S. should ratify the Protocol and, if so, with what, if any, reservations or interpretations. The sticky issue here is tear gas. DOD would request an amendment or interpretation to the effect that the U.S. does not consider tear gases as coming under the prohibitions in the Protocol. State legal counsel has maintained that use of tear gases in war is contrary to international law, and State might be inclined to favor ratification of the Protocol without reservations on tear gases. 2. UK Proposals on BW (1969) Policy. The UK proposals would ban the development, production and stockpiling of biological agents. The U.S. has maintained that the proposals are worthy of study, but has not committed itself to support the treaty. Issues. The issue is whether or not to support the treaty and, if so, what alterations, if any, should be recommended. JCS would oppose the treaty. DOD position is not yet clear. State would probably favor supporting the treaty with minor alterations, especially those making it clear that development of small quantities for research purposes would not be prohibited. There is, of course, no way to verify compliance. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare-Vol. I. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on September 23. 146. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 146. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 4, 1969 SUBJECT: NSSM 59 You established a due date of September 5 for the NSSM 59 study on US Chemical and Biological Warfare policy. On August 22 the IPMG met to commence preparation of the final report. At that time the DOD representative sought, at the request of Secretary Laird, a one month delay in submitting the report (i.e., until October 5) in order to permit DOD to develop a departmental position. Mr. Halperin, representing your office, thought such a delay would be acceptable but that all agencies involved would have to agree to the delay and also agree not to make public statements that would extend or revise current policies in the interim. No objections were expressed to these qualifications and the tentative agreement at the IPMG meeting was to honor the DOD request subject to confirmation from the agencies involved. However, the State Department representatives pointed out that such a delay could present serious problems in the forthcoming UN General Assembly, which begins meeting September 16. Subsequent to the IPMG meeting, I checked with the responsible officers in State and ACDA who will be dealing with CBW issues in the forthcoming UNGA meeting. You should be aware that we have a real operational problem in that the US will be expected to take positions in the UNGA on resolutions and draft conventions relating to CBW. While we may be able to use procedural devices to maneuver our way through many of the problems until a policy is developed, this is at best a temporary expedient and the absence of a policy will unquestionably make it difficult to obtain results from the General Assembly which are satisfactory from the US point of view. There may also be some Congressional criticism when it becomes known that a delay in completing the study is envisioned. I conclude, therefore, that while we should agree that the Department of Defense take time to review and develop their position, we should still strive to get NSSM #59 before the NSC as rapidly as feasible. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. Halperin forwarded Spiers’ memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a September 10 memorandum. (Ibid.) 147. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 147. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, September 16, 1969 SUBJECT: NSSM 59, “U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents” At the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group meeting on NSSM 59, on August 22nd, your representatives concurred in the Department of Defense request for a one month delay in the submission of the study to the Review Group. The due date for the NSSM 59 study has been extended from September 5th to October 5th. As indicated in a memorandum to me from the Department of State, the Department of State may encounter some operational difficulties requiring special handling because of the delay. Nevertheless, it is expected that all involved agencies will refrain in the interim from public statements or actions which would extend or revise current policies. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 1–348, NSSM 59. Secret. It was also sent to Laird, Helms, DuBridge, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Wheeler. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 1 New York, September 22, 1969, 10–11 p.m. U.S. Participants Secretary William P. Rogers Ambassador Charles W. Yost Mr. Gerard Smith Mr. Richard F. Pedersen Assistant Secretary Martin J. Hillenbrand Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco Assistant Secretary Samuel DePalma Deputy Assistant Secretary Emory C. Swank Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter U.S.S.R Participants Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey A. Gromyko Ambassador Yakov A. Malik Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Ambassador Lev I. Mendelevich Mr. Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor of Embassy in Washington Mr. Valentin M. Falin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Yevgeniy D. Pyrlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter [Omitted here is unrelated material.] SOVIET PROPOSALS TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Foreign Minister Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary’s attention to the proposals he had laid before the UN General Assembly. These consisted of two main parts. The first concerns a ban on chemical and biological weapons. This was not a matter of special interest to the Soviet Union alone, but he thought it was in the interests of all powers and states. He would like to have the Secretary study the proposal and approach it objectively to see if some common language could be worked out. The second proposal concerned the maintenance of peace and international security. Although the second proposal was worded in very general language, it did contain some specific provisions. In a word, he wanted to ask the Secretary to study it and he would be very glad if we could find some common language. If our two powers could do anything to lessen international tensions, a great deal would have been accomplished. He thought this was indeed possible. With respect to the first proposal the Secretary inquired of Mr. Smith if he did not think that this was a matter for the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. Mr. Smith said that would normally be the case. The Secretary went on to say that we were in accord with the objectives stated, but that he, too, was of the opinion that this was a matter normally to be taken up in Geneva. As for the second proposal, he would give it some attention. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not know what was “normal” with respect to submitting such proposals. There was nothing in the UN Charter to direct any particular approach. He thought the “shortest” way was to lay the proposals directly before the General Assembly. He would like to speed a resolution of this problem, since the passage of time would make its solution more difficult. That was the only consideration the USSR had in putting the matter before the General Assembly. The Secretary said maybe he had used the wrong word. He felt the CBW issue could be handled more quickly in Geneva. In the GA the proposals were likely to develop into a propaganda exercise. Mr. Gromyko said that in fact the proposal was already before the Geneva Committee. In any case, he appreciated the Secretary’s remarks. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL US–USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City 149. Telegram 168999 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 149. Telegram 168999 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 4, 1969 SUBJ: CBW Tactics in GA REFS: (1) Geneva 3517, (2) State 138489, (3) State 144771, (4) USUN 3280 1. We recognize that there will be strong focus on CBW at current GA. We will be handicapped in dealing with problem by fact that US internal policy review on CBW will be continuing at least until early November as schedule now stands. 2. Accordingly we will wish to deal with CBW issue at GA in non-substantive terms to extent possible. Even if US policy were clearly established, however, our preference would probably be for General Assembly to refrain from becoming deeply in substance of problem at this stage. 3. Optimum result from our point of view would be referral of all CBW items to CCD with substantive comments not going much beyond GA Res 2162B (XXI). This is essentially what draft submitted to CCD by Canadians seeks to do. We recognize that Canadian proposal received little support in CCD and that many regarded it as marking no advance over status quo. Submission of Soviet draft convention directly to GA, however, has introduced new element which gives added force to argument that all proposals should be considered further by CCD before any substantive action taken. It may be possible to increase attractiveness of Canadian-type proposal by beefing up content somewhat, as by commending study of all existing draft proposals (rather than UK BW convention alone) as useful efforts toward agreed objective of reducing likelihood that CB weapons would be used. Strong commendation of SYG CBW Report should also be helpful, so long as this focuses on Experts’ Report and avoids explicit endorsement of recommendations of SYG’s covering letter. 4. We recognize that outcome of US policy review, should it be completed prior to end of GA session, could affect chances of acceptable result in GA, and that there might be moves then available to us which would help curb pressures for damaging substantive resolutions along lines of Swedish draft. It is not practical at this stage, however, to include such factor in designing our tactical approach. 5. We therefore believe that best approach will be to begin laying groundwork for referral of all CBW items to CCD. Presumably we would wish to reach understanding with Sovs on such outcome. Meanwhile, you should make clear in New York, as we have in Geneva, that Swedish draft is unacceptable from our point of view (drawing on Reftels 2 and 3). We are aware that emphasis on inappropriateness of consideration by GA may be used to support arguments for UNDC, but believe latter problem will have to be dealt with on its own merits. 6. We realize that reportedly contradictory statements by US sources regarding uses of riot control agents such as tear gas in Vietnam (Reftel 4) make this subject particularly troublesome. Obviously Mission will want to avoid discussion whenever possible. If pressed on US policy re use of tear gas in war, you should confine yourself to reiterating that agents being used in Viet Nam are those that Governments around the world commonly use to control riots. You should avoid debating whether such use is “humanitarian” or not. 7. We would appreciate comments from New York and Geneva on foregoing and on tactics and timing. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 27–10 UN. Confidential. It was also sent to USMission Geneva. It was repeated to Ottawa, London, Moscow, Stockholm, and USNATO. Drafted on October 3 by Day and Lorenz (IO/UNP); cleared in IO, IO/UNP ACDA, ACDA/GC, L, L/UNA, DOD/ISA (info), and PM; paragraph 6 was cleared in substance in DOD/OGC; and approved by De Palma. 150. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, Washington, undated. 150. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, Washington, undated 1 . Washington, undated. [2 pages not declassified in time for publication] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting Folders, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. 151. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 151. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 New York, October 29, 1969 Dear Henry: May I ask your advice and assistance on a matter of considerable concern to us here. The Disarmament debate is due to open in the First Committee about November 12. While the Seabeds Treaty will no doubt be featured, the real center of interest is likely to be CBW. Not only have the Soviets introduced a special item on this subject but the Swedes and many others have been and will be pushing it intensively. We of course are handicapped by the fact that our policy review of the subject is still incomplete. Could you give me an estimate as to whether we are likely to have clarifying decisions on this matter by mid-November? Of course what would be most useful to us here would be a decision to seek ratification of the old 1925 Convention. I very much hope that this might be our initial decision on the matter which we could use in the course of the debate here. If it seems necessary we could make clear in the course of testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, whenever that occurs, that we do not consider that the Convention applies to tear gas. We shall be in very considerable difficulties during the 3 or 4 weeks of debate here if our whole position on CBW is still unsettled. Best regards, Sincerely, Charles W. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969–31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential and Personal. 152. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 152. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated NSSM 59 U.S. POLICY ON CW–BW ANALYTICAL SUMMARY I. Objective and Issues for Decision The overall objective of the NSSM 59 study is a U.S. policy on CW–BW which will serve both as a foundation for determining employment doctrine and operational requirements and as a foundation for U.S. negotiating positions on CW–BW arms control measures. There is, today, no comprehensive or coherent national policy for CW–BW from which the nature, scope and direction of U.S. practices and programs can be determined. There are three principal issues: Policy on Biological Warfare (BW) Policy on Chemical Warfare (CW) Policy on the Use of Tear Gas and/or Herbicides in War and the Geneva Protocol. II. Policy on Biological Warfare (BW) A. Background 1. Characteristics. BW employs biological agents to infect human, animal or crop targets. The agents are (a) highly toxic (a small amount can infect hundreds of square miles); (b) relatively uncontrollable (effects cannot be confidently confined, even in a large target area); (c) relatively unreliable (effects difficult to predict); and (d) relatively inexpensive. 2. Policy. The U.S. has clearly renounced first-use of lethal biologicals , and any use requires Presidential authorization according to JCS directives. Policy on incapacitants and anti-crop is uncertain and undefined. The U.S. has reserved the option for first-use of such weapons with Presidential authorization. 3. Programs — Offensive and defensive research and development. — Stockpiles of lethal biologicals, incapacitants and anti-crop. Since all biological agents decay, stockpiles are replenished at an annual rate (e.g., 16 tons for wheat rust at a cost of $800,000). Replenishment of stocks has been stopped pending the outcome of NSSM 59. 4. Threat . Intelligence in the BW field is necessarily very limited. Virtually any industrial nation could produce BW agents. However, no nation is known to consider BW as a vital or even an important link to its national security. While clandestine use to achieve strategic military objectives is not a tenable threat, there always remains the possibility of clandestine use which could kill large segments of the U.S. population. However, because of the unlikelihood of detecting the “attack” or the “attackers”, there is really nothing the U.S. can do outside of the realm of public health process and perhaps better warning devices. Also retaliation in kind could not be timely or effective because of the long time period for defenses and preparations, and would probably achieve no military objective. Strategic use of BW in conjunction with or after nuclear weapons in an “all-out” strategic exchange with the Soviet Union is a credible but tenuous threat. In short, the threat is unclear, undefined and undetectable. (Military defense against BW is easier than against chemicals.) 5. Utility . Lethal biologicals are generally strategic, purely anti-population weapons. Because (a) of the relative unreliability and uncontrollability of such weapons, (b) of their probable redundancy in an “all-out” nuclear exchange situation, and (c) of the inevitable time delays in detecting an attack, delivering a counterattack and infecting the target population, lethal biologicals have no clearly defined military utility. Incapacitating biologicals also have no basic deterrent function and no apparent value as a weapon for retaliation. The use of incapacitating biologicals would appear to confer no significant military advantages except possibly in the case of first-use (and also one-sided use) against an unprepared, undefended and unsophisticated enemy with no means of escalation (i.e., “third world” countries). The rationale for biological anti-crop (i.e., starving populations and “ruining” economies) also falls into the strategic category of all possible means in “all-out” and-population warfare. B. Policy Choices 1. Retain a full capability for use of BW agents including [handwritten insertion “lethal”] agents. Current programs would have to be expanded for this option. The political costs would be unacceptable, and there would be no offsetting military advantages as the value of such a capability, either for first-use, for deterrence or for retaliation in kind, is highly doubtful at best. All agencies, except possibly JCS, oppose this position. 2. Retain a capability only for incapacitating BW agents. The political costs would still be high and as there would be no offsetting military advantages except possibly in wars with “third world” forces if the U.S. were willing to adopt a first-use policy with regard to such agents. No agency supports this position, except possibly JCS. 3. R&D for Offense and Defense. The political costs would be high and, as before, the offensive utility of such agents remains doubtful at best. No agency except possibly JCS supports this position. 4. R&D for for Defense Only. The threat does not demand an actual capability, because the military utility of such weapons (either for first-use or retaliation in kind) is doubtful. OSD recommends this position, and all other agencies [handwritten insertion “except JCS”] agree. Such a policy would, by definition, require only a very limited program. For this reason, if such a position were to be credible, certain subsidiary questions (e.g., the future of Pine Bluff Arsenal, the “openness” of Fort Detrick, and the disposition of current stockpiles) will require subsequent decision. 5. UK Draft Convention. If Research and Development for Defense policy is chosen, the basic issue as to whether the U.S. can support the U.K. Draft Convention on BW (with minor and understood alterations) is settled. (This is the only option which would allow the U.S. to support the draft convention if we choose to do so. Decision as to whether to support the draft would be made on the basis of such questions as relationships to other arms control discussions and measures, responses of other parties, verification procedures, et cetera.) III. Policy on Chemical Warfare (CW) * A. Background 1. Characteristics. Lethal chemical weapons , such as the nerve agents VX and GB, are anti-personnel weapons which take effect very rapidly and which are, therefore, generally designed for tactical or battlefield situations. Large quantities of chemical agents must be delivered on target to produce the desired effects. Protection against CW is more difficult than against BW since protection requires not only a mask but also encumbering protective clothing. Incapacitating chemical weapons are intended to cause temporary disability without residual injurious effects (estimated lethality less than 2%). 2. Policy . Although the U.S. has not ratified the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. has renounced first-use of lethal chemical weapons . Any use of such weapons requires Presidential authorization according to JCS directives. U.S. policy on chemical incapacitants is ambiguous and uncertain. The U.S. has reserved the option of first-use to exploit military advantage with Presidential authorization. 3. Programs. Lethal —Offensive and defensive R&D. Inventory of approximately 30,000 agent tons (approximately 13,000 tons of which is Mustard, which OSD has recommended be destroyed or detoxified). The one to two weeks’ large-scale operational supply in the Far East is to be moved from Okinawa either to Guam or ultimately to CONUS. The U.S. maintains about a five-day large-scale operational supply in the FRG. Incapacitant —Offensive and defensive R&D. Stockpiles approximately 10 tons of a chemical incapacitant (BZ, a psychochemical or hallucinatory agent). 4. Threat . Intelligence as to many of the details (e.g., protection, storage, actual programs) in the CW field is necessarily very limited. However, there is more basic evidence than in the BW field. The only current chemical threat to the U.S. is the Soviet Union. The Soviets probably consider chemical weapons subject to the same political restraints as those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision to use chemicals would almost certainly be made at the highest political level. It is generally agreed that the Soviet Union’s CW offensive and defensive capability in Europe surpasses that of the U.S. 5. Military Utility . Lethal —The basic rationale is that lethal chemicals offer a response in kind to a chemical attack which imposes the same operational constraints (e.g., masks, protective clothing and movement limitation) upon the attacker as he imposed upon U.S. forces. (Of course, the initial attack itself might well force the initiator to take such protective measures regardless of the response.) The rationale for lethal chemicals is essentially based upon the premise of a “middle option” of “conventional-chemical warfare” in Europe. Two questions are not adequately addressed in the rationale: (a) What is the utility of chemicals in a chemical-nuclear environment? (b) What is the probability of this “middle-level option” without nuclears? Incapacitants —The U.S. does not have an operationally effective chemical incapacitant . Their utility would appear to confer no military advantages except in the case of first-use against an unprepared, unsophisticated enemy with no capability or retaliation or escalation (i.e., “third world” forces). Incapacitants have no apparent value as a retaliatory weapon. [a handwritten “?” was written next to the last two lines.] B. Policy Choices 1. First Use . All agencies support a declaratory policy of “no first-use” of lethal chemicals. The political costs of a declaratory “first-use” policy would be prohibitively great and the dollar costs of such a policy could easily run 8-10 times current expenditures (for added offensive and defensive capabilities). The question is: Should the U.S. preserve a first-use option for incapacitating chemicals? — The principal argument for this option is that successful development of an effective incapacitating agent (the current U.S. stockpile is not operationally effective) could provide a capability to gain a military advantage with fewer casualties. — The principal argument against this option is that first-use of such agents would probably be construed by most nations to be contrary to international law, the Geneva Protocol and past expression of U.S. policy, and that first-use might well lead to escalation as the enemy might well not acknowledge any distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents. 2. Accepting a “no first-use policy” for lethal chemicals, the question is: Does a retaliatory capability policy or a defensive measure with R&D policy best balance the military and political factors? — Retaliatory Policy The principal arguments for are: (a) that the capability is needed to deter enemy use of lethal chemicals; (b) it offers the lethal chemical option (as compared to the expanded conventional option in low level conflicts and the nuclear option in high level conflicts) in retaliation against a CW attack; and (c) that a response in kind would force an enemy to operate under the same operational constraints as had been imposed upon U.S. forces. The principal con arguments , are: (a) that other military means, including nuclear weapons, are sufficient to deter the use of CW weapons; (b) that the deterrent threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a CW attack could be more credible without a CW offensive capability; and (c) that NATO allies (not to mention OSD and the U.S. Congress) have not given and cannot be expected to give the necessary support for a sufficient NATO-wide retaliatory chemical capability. — R&D and Defensive Programs Only The principal pro arguments are: (a) that an R&D program protects against any technological surprise; (b) that nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter the use of CW weapons, and that this deterrent would be more credible without an actual CW capability; and (c) that it would eliminate the political problems with overseas storage. The principal con arguments are: (a) an actual capability is necessary to deter a chemical attack; (b) it gives up the option to retaliate in kind. 3. Overseas Stockpiling (FRG) . If a retaliatory policy is decided upon, the question of overseas stockpiles arises. If a fully effective retaliatory capability is desired, expansion of current overseas and CONUS stockpiles would be necessary. Current stockpile levels tend to place the U.S. in the position of doing enough to arouse criticism but not doing enough to have an effective capability. OSD has decided that the only overseas support should be for U.S. forces in central NATO. The principal arguments for overseas stockpiles are: (a) stocks in close proximity to where they may be used are necessary for a time and adequate response in kind (it is estimated that stockpiles in CONUS would impose a delay of approximately 14 days if there were no advance warning of an attack); and (b) such stockpiles are necessary for deterrence. The principal arguments against overseas stockpiles are: (a) expansion of such stocks necessary to create a sufficient retaliatory capability would probably involve increased political problems for the U.S. with its allies; (b) even present stocks on foreign territory could become a source of political friction with the host country; and (c) secret removal of present stocks could avoid negating whatever deterrent value exists in their forward deployment. 4. OSD Recommendations on CW Policy (at marked tab in your book) are in summary: — A retaliatory deterrent capability. — Reduction in current capability and no production until binary weapons are developed. — Concentration on R&D of binary agents. — Overseas stockpiles only in Europe (FRG) at current levels. IV. Geneva Protocol/Tear Gas 1. A “no first-use” policy would settle the question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol were it not for the question of tear gases and, more specifically, their use in Vietnam. 2. While these two issues are related, the decision does not turn on use of tear gases in Vietnam alone. Rather there is the general question of whether the military utility of tear gas in the future will outweigh the political costs of its use. The use of tear gases in conjunction with lethal weapons in Vietnam has made it easier to kill the enemy with fewer U.S. casualties but military utility of such use appears to be limited to Vietnam-type situations. Many nations consider unrestricted use of tear gases to be (a) contrary to the Protocol, and (b) a loosening of the barriers against CW in general, and criticize the U.S. use. 3. The U.S. could simply ratify the Protocol if it were willing to limit use of tear gases in Vietnam and in the future to obvious riot control situations. If the U.S. were willing to accept far more restricted use of tear gases than is now the practice in Vietnam, we could ratify the Protocol with an interpretation * (not a reservation) that it does not prohibit use in war of tear gases for “humanitarian and riot control purposes”. While this would probably cause no major controversy, such a position would require changing or substantially reducing the current uses in Vietnam which have escalated beyond the original published justification for “humanitarian and riot control” purposes, (e.g., tear gases in conjunction with high explosives and other lethal weapons). 4. If unrestricted use in Vietnam or in the future is desired, the choices are: (1) ratify the Protocol either with an interpretation or public statement that we do not consider unrestricted use of tear gases in war to be prohibited—this interpretation would be more difficult to “sell” internationally than limited use (especially in the “third world” where tear gas would be most applicable); or (2) whether we ratify or not, attempt to buy time on the issue by further discussion of its application to tear gas. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting Folders, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for the NSC Review Group meeting on October 30. The summary bears no drafting information. * Tear gas and/or herbicides are handled in Part IV. Depending upon the resolution of the issues in this and the following section, such agents can either be included in an overall U.S. CW policy or treated separately. * or simply an official statement to this effect. 153. Talking Points Prepared for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 153. Talking Points Prepared for the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, undated HAK TALKING POINTS REVIEW GROUP MEETING NSSM 59—US Policy on CW and BW I. Introduction A. This is a complex subject B. It will simplify our consideration if we focus on the three basic issues to be decided. What should be our policy on: — Biological Warfare (BW) — Chemical Warfare (CW) excluding Riot Control Agents (Tear Gas and Herbicides) — Ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the use of Tear Gas and Herbicides. C. Each of these basic issues subsumes a number of Policy Issues stated in the IPMG paper. D. I suggest we consider: — The three basic issues and related questions — How we should present the issues to the NSC II. Biological Warfare (BW) Policy A. The issue is whether we should retain: 1. Full capability including lethal agents for deterrence and retaliation and to give us the option of “first use”. 2. Capability for only incapacitating agents the principal utility of which appears to be in a “first use” role against an unsophisticated enemy. 3. Only R&D capability for offense and defense or for defense alone. B. There seems to be general agreement that only an R&D program for defensive purposes alone should be maintained (OSD recommended this course) — Option one and perhaps Option two imply a need for—and relevance of—a retaliatory or deterrent capability. But in BW these concepts are doubtful at best. — Effectiveness and controllability of both lethal and incapacitant weapons is admittedly questionable. — With an R&D base and the existing production facility in readiness we could move quickly to produce agents for offensive use. — JCS may support retention of an offensive capability—both lethal agents for possible deterrence and incapacitating agents for possible flexibility in attacking certain targets, (e.g. amphibious landing areas.) D. Our position on UK Draft Convention (1969) on BW is a related issue. — A decision to confine BW program to R&D for defensive purposes would allow us to support the UK draft if we choose to do so. Decision as to whether to support the draft could be made on basis of relationship to other arms control discussions and measures, responses of other parties, verification procedures, etc. — Only a decision to restrict BW programs to defensive R&D keeps our options open on the UK draft . Under any other course we would have to oppose the draft. III. Chemical Warfare (CW) Policy A. I think we should consider the lethal and incapacitating agents first and leave the riot control agents such as Tear Gas for later. Tear Gas relates to our position on the 1925 Geneva Protocol and it would be best to consider them together. B. There are two basic policy issues: 1. Should incapacitants be covered by the “no first use” policy now applicable to lethal agents? 2. Should we maintain a chemical capability for retaliation/deterrence? or — Should the program be limited to R&D and defensive measures only? C. “First Use” — We have renounced first use of lethal chemical weapons (but we have not ratified the Geneva Protocol) ( No agency supports “first use” policy for lethal agents—the political costs of withdrawing from our declared renunciation would be excessive.) 2. Should incapacitating agents be covered by this policy? — Is a “no first use” policy credible if we continue the incapacitants program? — Their military utility appears to be limited primarily to “first use” situations. They appear to have little deterrent or retaliatory value. (We do not now have an effective operational capability.) D. Retaliatory/Deterrent Capability 1. The first question is “ Do we need a chemical capability to deter a chemical attack or to retaliate? — Without this capability we would be relying upon nuclear weapons and enemy uncertainty of our capability for deterrence. —Should we forego whatever deterrent effect the chemical capability provides? —Does retaliation in kind provide a real “middle option”? [2. To conduct full-scale chemical retaliation against large-scale chemical attack (the most extreme case) would require major increases in the CW program (at minimum a tripling of the overseas stocks in the FRG and elsewhere—U.K. and Italy have refused to allow such stocks—a greatly increased US stockpile, and more emphasis on defensive measures at a total program cost of at least $2-3 billion). Only JCS have favored support of this extreme case. OSD has concluded that the capability to deter requires much less (potential enemy would be uncertain of scope and capability of our programs) and that, while it still provides some option for retaliation in kind, support of the extreme case would be redundant at best since nuclears cannot be ignored in such an equation.] 3. If we want a retaliatory capability, should we maintain stockpiles in the U.S. or overseas? — Should we give up the capability we have in view of (a) uncertainty of deterrent effect and (b) our limited retaliatory capability? — Should we withdraw stocks from the FRG? (Stocks there enable some possible rapid response but are a potential source of friction.) E. R&D and Defensive Measures 1. Will such a program provide any deterrent? — Opponents would still be uncertain as to our retaliatory capability and the nature of our response. 2. For all practical purposes, this would foreclose the option to use chemicals in retaliation. 3. Would this policy keep our options open for future decision on binary agents? — Binary agents (safe to store and handle) are in R&D now. F. (You may wish to ask OSD to discuss their recommendation on CW policy. OSD recommends: 1. Stockpiles in U.S. and Europe only. 2. Retaliatory/Deterrent policy. 3. Limit program to R&D of binary agents until these are developed.) IV. Geneva Protocol/Tear Gas A. The basic question is: 1. Do we want to continue extensive use of tear gas in Vietnam and to retain an extensive unrestricted use option for future conflicts? B. Ratification of Protocol with a “no first use” chemical policy and restriction on use of tear gas for riot control and humanitarian purposes would not appear difficult. 1. This would require change or substantial reduction in our use in Vietnam (e.g., in conjunction with high explosives and aircraft delivery). C. If we want to use tear gas more extensively (JCS do—military utility in Vietnam type conflict) the choices appear to be: 1. Ratify with interpretation or public statement that we do not consider unrestricted use in war prohibited, although unrestricted use would probably be difficult to sell internationally. 2. Attempt to buy time by further discussion of application of Protocol to tear gas. V. Are there any other issues which the NSC should address? (OST will probably suggest another issue: “Should the use of all chemicals in war, including tear gas and herbicides, require Presidential authorization?” — We agree that it is an issue—JCS directives require Presidential authorization for all except tear gas and herbicides. If OST does not raise the issue, we recommend you do so along the following lines? — I note that use of tear gas and herbicides do not require Presidential authorization. — In light of possible political and military implications, should we not consider this an issue for the NSC?). Do we agree that these are the issues for NSC consideration? 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. The handwritten revisions made to II A (“1,” “2,” “3,” and “appears to be”), to II B (“Option one and perhaps option two”), and to III B (“1” and “2”) are in an unknown hand. Other handwritten markings are Kissinger’s, including “incapacitants” on page 4, “Def. of retaliatory capability?” at the top of page 5, “State & Defense in disagreement” at the bottom of page 5, and “Why? State?” on page 6. 154. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 154. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 29, 1969 SUBJECT: Specific Issues and Agency Positions Your “Talking Points” deal only with Part II (“CW and BW Policy Issues”) of the IPMG report as Part I is background information only. Your “Talking Points” simply (1) re-phrase the specific issue where appropriate; (2) highlight the principal issues in each basic policy consideration while attempting to point out the interrelationships between these issues; (3) emphasize various pro and con points of consideration under each issue; and (4) stress the point that consideration should be focused upon these three broad policy areas: Policy on Biological Warfare Policy on Chemical Warfare Policy on Geneva Protocol and the Use of Tear Gas and/or Herbicides. There are no substantive differences between the issues highlighted in your “Talking Points” and in the IPMG paper—merely differences in structuring and emphasis. Your “Talking Points” also mention that OST will raise another issue, (which we agree should be addressed): “Should the use in war of tear gases and herbicides require Presidential authorization?” (This issue can be added to the NSC CW–BW agenda for discussion.) Attached is a list of the specific issues under the headings as they stand in the IPMG report along with probable agency positions. On most of the specific issues, we do not know CIA’s position. CIA is therefore included only when their position appears obvious. Attachment ISSUES AND AGENCY POSITIONS * I. CW Policy Issues A. Should the U.S. maintain a capability to employ lethal chemical agents? Agencies For : OSD, State, JCS, OST,CIA, USIA Agencies Against: ACDA (?) B. Should the U.S. continue to maintain stockpiles of chemical munitions overseas (1) in Europe, and (2) in the Pacific? Agencies For Europe Stocks: OSD, JCS, OST Agencies Possibly Against Europe Stocks: State, ACDA, USIA Agencies for Pacific Stocks: JCS Agencies Against Pacific Stocks: OSD, State, ACDA, USIA C. Should the U.S. preserve a first-use option for incapacitating chemicals? Agencies For: JCS, OSD:(?) Agencies Against: State, ACDA, OST, USIA D. Should the U.S. maintain an option for unrestricted use of riot control agents (tear gas) in warfare and continue exercising this option in Vietnam? Agencies For: JCS, OSD Agencies Against: State (?), ACDA,OST, USIA E. If the U.S. maintains an option to use tear gas in war, should it be limited to “humanitarian purposes”? Agencies For: State (?), ACDA, OST, USIA Agencies Against: JCS, OSD F. Should the U.S. retain a policy permitting first-use of chemical herbicides? Agencies For: OSD, JCS, State (?) Agencies Against: ACDA, USIA II. BW Policy Issues A. Should the U.S. maintain a lethal biological capability beyond research, development and testing? Agencies For : JCS Agencies Against: OSD, State, ACDA, OST,USIA B. Should the U.S. maintain a capability for use of incapacitating biologicals? Agencies For: JCS Agencies Against: OSD, State, ACDA, OST,USIA ** III. Geneva Protocol Issue A. Should the U.S. ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with either a reservation or an interpretative statement permitting the U.S. to use chemical and biological incapacitating agents, tear gas, and other non-lethal agents in wartime without restriction? Agencies For: JCS Agencies Against: OSD (?), State, ACDA, OST,USIA B. Should the U.S. ratify the Geneva Protocol with a reservation or interpretative statement permitting the U.S. to use tear gas in wartime without restrictions? Agencies For: JCS, OSD Agencies Against: State (?), ACDA,USIA, OST C. Should the U.S. ratify the Geneva Protocol with a reservation or interpretative statement to the effect that the U.S. does not view the Protocol as prohibiting the use of riot control agents in wartime for humanitarian purposes? Agencies For: State, ACDA, USIA, OST Agencies Against: JCS, OSD 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, Review Group Meeting, NSSM 59, CW and BW, 10/30/69. Top Secret. Sent for information. * Positions based on opinions expressed in IPMG and Working Group sessions. ** These three policy options in the IPMG report boil down to the fact that JCS and OSD favor unrestricted use of tear gas in wartime, State’s position is unresolved, and ACDA, USIA and OST do not favor unrestricted use of tear gas. 155. Minutes of National Security Council Review Group Meeting 155. Minutes of National Security Council Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, October 30, 1969, 2:25–3:55 p.m. Subject: U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents (NSSM 59) Participation: Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger State - Richard F. Pedersen - William I. Cargo - Ronald Spiers - Donald McHenry Defense - G. Warren Nutter CIA - Edward W. Proctor JCS - Rear Adm. Frank W. Vannoy Colonel James M. Bates OEP - Haakon Lindjord USIA - Henry Loomis ACDA - Howard E. Furnas OST - Vincent McRae NSC Staff - Michael Guhin - Col. Richard Kennedy - Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF DECISIONS 1. The paper is to be reworked by the IPMG to: a. regroup the 11 issues into three categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides; b. clarify the distinction between offensive and defensive R&D; c. state the arguments for and against briefing the German Government on deployment of CW stocks in Germany; d. include a specific policy issue on the UK draft convention on BW; e. define an adequate CW retaliatory capability; f. state the pros and cons for ratification of the Geneva Protocol including the question of a reservation on tear gas; g. raise the issue of a requirement for a Presidential decision to use tear gas in conflicts other than Vietnam. 2. The NSC meeting on CBW will be postponed from November 12 to November 19 in view of a conflict with the NPG meeting. Dr. Kissinger noted that the IPMG paper had been grouped into 11 issues. He would find it more useful, if the group agreed, to divide these into three basic categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides. He suggested the discussion begin with biological weapons and identified the three choices: (1) retain full capability including lethal agents for deterrence and retaliation with an option for first use; (2) retain capability only for incapacitants; (3) retain only an R&D capability, for both offensive and defensive purposes or defense alone. Mr. Pedersen asked if BW R&D could be broken down into offensive and defensive weapons. Mr. Kissinger replied yes, saying defensive moves would include warning devices, immunization, etc., but with no capability to conduct biological warfare. Mr. Spiers noted the military view that we would have to perform offensive R&D also. Admiral Vannoy said we would have to have offensive weapons in order to test our defenses. Mr. Kissinger asked if this meant there was no point in having defensive R&D only. Admiral Vannoy agreed. Dr. McRae noted that some aspects of R&D were specifically meant to strengthen our offensive capability, e.g., spray capabilities, weapons development, etc. Mr. Nutter agreed but said it was hard to draw a line. Mr. Kissinger asked how we could distinguish between offensive and defensive R&D. Mr. Proctor said we would not prepare for mass production in R&D for defense. Dr. McRae stated that, generally speaking, defensive R&D could be distinguished by leaving out engineering development. Mr. Kissinger commented that an operational R&D program for defense would include enough work on offensive to give meaning to the defensive aspect. Dr. McRae said offensive R&D would include an engineering component which would enable quick production. Mr. Kissinger asked if the issues were correctly stated, and if the JCS favors full capability. Admiral Vannoy replied yes. Mr. Kissinger asked if the paper adequately stated the JCS views. Admiral Vannoy said they had circulated proposed changes to the paper to give a better balance to the pros and cons. Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone else opposed the JCS view. Mr. Spiers noted that State had not taken a formal position since the Secretary had not considered the issue. However, State will recommend that he oppose JCS views. Mr. Kissinger noted that the Secretary would of course express his views at the NSC meeting. He asked if the paper represented a fair statement. Mr. Pedersen commented that some of the proposed JCS changes would cause trouble for State. Mr. Kissinger summarized the arguments against a lethal BW capability in terms of its ineffectiveness for retaliatory purposes (e.g., delays in detecting attack, delivering a counterattack and in counterattack taking effect), and that it was not needed in the light of nuclear and other weapons. He asked about possible Soviet clandestine use. Mr. Proctor replied that we have no information on Soviet plans. He noted that our information was at best ambiguous. Mr. Kissinger asked how we get intelligence information in this area. Mr. Proctor replied we have information on exercises in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact countries on CW but none on BW. Mr. Kissinger noted that a Czech chemist had told him a major effort was underway but that he was not sure whether this was CW or BW. Mr. Loomis noted that the best use of BW would be clandestine and that such use would not appear to demand field exercises. Mr. Kissinger asked if there were not an incubation period and why field exercises would be useful if the weapons were not immediately effective. He thought the major use of BW would be on centers of population over a period of time. Dr. McRae pointed out that the military would probably not elect BW weapons because of their limited effectiveness except in rare circumstances. He cited the incubation period and the uncertain human response. Mr. Kissinger asked if it was not easier to produce BW as an effective weapon than certain other alternatives. Admiral Vannoy agreed, saying that it would be highly effective on a civilian population. Mr. Kissinger asked if countries cannot achieve a BW capability before a nuclear capability. All agreed that this was true. Mr. Loomis noted that experiments in this country indicated that BW would be extremely effective in any air-conditioned building. Mr. Kissinger thought there would be very few occasions where we would use biological weapons first. If they were used against us, BW would not necessarily be the best response. He asked if, on moral grounds, we would not use BW first even if we could conceal it. Mr. Spiers said he could see some circumstances for first use of BW, almost as a strategic weapon. In the circumstances, however, he thought we would also use nuclear weapons. Mr. Kissinger asked why we would need BW if we used nuclear weapons. Admiral Vannoy replied that it would depend on the degree of destruction desired, giving Western Europe as an example. Mr. Kissinger asked if we could be sure that an epidemic in Western Europe would not spread to Eastern Europe. Admiral Vannoy replied that the population could be prepared. He noted also the importance of developing a capability for flexible response. If a stringent nuclear arms control agreement were concluded we might face a strong Soviet BW capability not matched by the U.S. Mr. Kissinger asked if General Wheeler would not make this point at the NSC meeting and Admiral Vannoy replied that the JCS Staff would so recommend. Mr. Kissinger asked about the arguments for use of incapacitants and for an illustrative first-use scenario. Admiral Vannoy cited an island situation, saying although we have BW incapacitants, we have no CW incapacitants. He cited a BW incapacitant which would, within two to four days, produce a high fever which would last a week or ten days. He noted we had no militarily significant quantities of lethal BW. Mr. Kissinger asked if BW incapacitants might not kill people already weakened. Admiral Vannoy acknowledged there would be a certain incidence of death, possibly among children, the elderly, and people with other illnesses, but this was not the primary purpose of the weapon. Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone but the JCS rejects the island argument. Mr. Spiers thought there was a consensus to retain R&D only with enough offensive R&D for defensive purposes. Mr. Kissinger asked what the time lag was from R&D to production. Mr. Spiers replied two to three years assuming we started from scratch. Mr. Kissinger asked if R&D only implied no production facilities. Mr. Spiers said yes, but that some facilities would be required to produce offensive BW for defensive purposes—testing, etc. Admiral Vannoy noted that we now have a plant at Pine Bluff spending approximately $5 million a year producing BW for R&D purposes. Mr. Kissinger saw two issues for the NSC to consider: (1) whether we should have both offensive and defensive R&D, or defensive only; and (2) whether we should or should not retain production facilities. Mr. Pedersen asked if it would be necessary to build a plant from scratch or whether normal medical or pharmaceutical facilities could not produce BW. Admiral Vannoy said it would not be possible to use commercial plants because of certain control and packaging requirements. Mr. Pedersen asked if, in a state of war, adaptation of present commercial plants for BW purposes could not shorten the two to three-year period. Admiral Vannoy agreed this might be possible. However, he thought an equally important problem would be development of a delivery and packaging system and that this would be as difficult as the production of the biological agents themselves. Dr. McRae noted that we have little data with which to assess the effectiveness of BW even in an island situation. He thought the degree of incapacity was ambiguous. Mr. Kissinger referred to the UK draft convention on BW and asked if the only decision consistent with the convention would be R&D for defensive purposes only. Would it be consistent to pursue offensive R&D for defensive purposes ? Mr. Spiers replied no. Mr. Kissinger asked if there are reasons for supporting the UK convention other than those of substance. Mr. Spiers noted the verification issue, and also commented that the UK paper was not widely supported, mainly because it separated BW from CW. Admiral Vannoy noted that we have zero capability of determining whether or not there is a production capability without on-site inspection. Mr. Proctor agreed. Mr. Kissinger noted that the JCS believes defensive R&D is impossible without doing enough offensive work to know what to defend against. In itself, this is inconsistent with the UK draft. Also, we could not tell whether a plant was being used for BW, even less whether for offensive or defensive purposes, without an obtrusive inspection. Would we be bothered by such inspection? Mr. Spiers said there would be complications. Mr. Kissinger asked that we categorize the arguments in light of the above discussion in a reshaped paper. Dr. McRae thought we could eliminate the possibility of acceptance of the UK draft excepting the proposal on R&D. Mr. Spiers noted the complications of trying to separate continued production from continued R&D. He noted, however, that the UK draft was not a high priority problem. Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that we would have a problem with both the Soviet and UK drafts and that we will need a position. Mr. Spiers thought our position on these issues would be affected by what we want in the way of arms control. Mr. Pedersen asked if it were possible to pursue this along tactical lines. (At 2:55 p. m. Mr. Loomis left the discussion.) Mr. Cargo commented that the verification issue is less acute if we limit ourselves to R&D. Mr. Pedersen agreed that if we undertake a unilateral limitation, we could then argue for the treaty for what we would get out of it. Mr. Kissinger thought we should offer this as an argument in favor of the UK draft, if we are moving in that direction anyhow. He commented that others may not know that we have adopted such a position unilaterally. Mr. Spiers thought that there were other arguments. Mr. Kissinger noted the low priority of the BW program, commenting that high level interest sometimes brings with it higher priorities. He thought the low priority interest in BW was a form of tacit arms control. Mr. Kissinger moved to the subject of chemical weapons and raised two issues: (1) are incapacitants covered by the no first-use policy on lethals; (2) do we want to maintain a capacity for retaliation (both lethal and incapacitant) or limit ourselves to R&D? He assumed no one was in favor of first-use of lethal CW. Admiral Vannoy noted that the JCS position was qualified by the knowledge that we would have a retaliatory capability. If we had a retaliatory capability, we would, in fact, have a first-use capability. Mr. Kissinger asked what the difference was between first use and retaliatory capability. Admiral Vannoy replied that we would need more to retaliate than to initiate, since we could assume some stocks would be destroyed by the enemy in an initial attack. Mr. Kissinger assumed we would not be bothered by declaring a no first-use policy since we could always change our mind. Mr. Nutter questioned the effect of a declaratory policy on our deterrent. Mr. Kissinger asked if anyone believed we would undertake the first-use of CW. Mr. Nutter noted that we had been careful not to make any such final statement on nuclear weapons. Mr. Kissinger replied that we had, however, made a no first-use statement on CW. He asked if we would let Europe be overrun rather than use CW first. Admiral Vannoy replied that at the present we would have no choice. Mr. Spiers noted the difficulties involved in reversing present policy on no first-use of CW. Mr. Nutter noted that our statement is one of intention. Mr. Kissinger asked if there were any significant pressure for altering the no first-use policy for lethal CW. Admiral Vannoy said the JCS would fight to retain the capability. Mr. Kissinger asked if the no first-use policy applies to incapacitants. Mr. Spiers said we had never said whether this applies to incapacitants. He noted that the only Presidential statement (President Roosevelt in 1943) referred to “poisonous or noxious gases” and that we had not had a CW incapacitant at that time. Admiral Vannoy replied that we did, in fact, have a CW incapacitant—49 tons of it—but that it was not very good and that we have had difficulty stabilizing it. In response to questions, he said that it became effective in the respiratory system in 1 1/2 to 2 hours and lasted 3–5 days. Dr. McRae described the effects of a CW incapacitant on the ability to coordinate bodily functions, giving illustrations. Mr. Kissinger asked if this had been tested. Dr. McRae replied that it had. Mr. Kissinger asked if this were an issue if we have no effective CW incapacitant. Mr. Spiers thought that it was an issue—do we want to retain a CW incapacitant capability because of the production aspect? Mr. Kissinger asked what we know about the other side. Dr. McRae replied that we had heard rumors about a Chinese Communist CW incapacitant but they were only rumors. Mr. Kissinger asked why we would know about their CW capabilities when we know so little else about Communist China? He asked about possible use of a CW incapacitant—would we use it in an island situation? Admiral Vannoy said yes, or wherever we want to acquire real estate without destroying it. Dr. McRae thought it might possibly be useful if you could get an effective CW incapacitant—in fact, it would be more useful than BW because of its quick onset, predictable response, and the fact that it is not contagious. Mr. Kissinger asked if the arguments for and against CW incapacitants (pp 26–27 of the IPMC paper) had been adequately stated? Dr. McRae thought there was an additional question: should you plan for the use of a CW incapacitant or merely plan to retain a capability. Mr. Kissinger thought the first question could be added to the question of first-use and that the second should be phrased “should we retain a capability even though we have agreed on no first-use?” He asked if there were a consensus that we should retain a capability for retaliation. Mr. Spiers commented that the State Department would support Secretary Laird’s recommendations on CW including his recommendation that all stocks of mustard and phosgene gas should be destroyed or detoxified, and that production of other lethal CW agents should be discontinued until binary agents are fully developed. He thought they would recommend to the Secretary of State that once R&D on binary agents had been completed, we should request a Presidential decision whether or not to go into production. Mr. Kissinger summarized Defense position as calling for an end to production of any more chemical weapons; detoxifying or destroying mustard and phosgene stocks, while maintaining other stocks (e.g., non-binary nerve gases); continuation of R&D on binary agents. State adds the issue of a Presidential decision on the production of binaries when development becomes possible. Admiral Vannoy said that JCS wishes to maintain a retaliatory capability with lethal chemicals. Mr. Spiers commented that State would not have raised the possibility of the destruction of existing stocks. Mr. Kissinger noted the Defense Department debate on the definition of a lethal retaliatory capability. Secretary Laird has recommended some detoxification or destruction, and the replacement of existing lethals by binary weapons which could be put into production later. The JCS judgment is that destruction of stocks and failure to produce more would leave us without a retaliatory capability. He thought this issue should be raised in the paper so that the President could address all CW and BW problems together. Dr. McRae asked if our existing retaliatory capability is adequate. Admiral Vannoy replied that it is not. Mr. Kissinger asked what would be considered an adequate retaliatory capability. Admiral Vannoy replied 8 tons per division per day. Mr. Kissinger asked for what objective? Admiral Vannoy replied for the destruction of Warsaw Pact forces. Mr. Kissinger asked if JCS was, therefore, defining a retaliatory capability as nothing short of the capability to destroy Warsaw Pact forces totally by CW. Admiral Vannoy added in conjunction with conventional weapons. Mr. Cargo commented that we should be able to retaliate until the enemy stops using the weapon. Admiral Vannoy said that the JCS have stated an additional requirement for deployment [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Mr. Spiers noted that the JCS say stocks are inadequate without saying what is adequate. Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae what was meant by an inadequate retaliatory capability. Dr. McRae noted that U.S. forces were concentrated in small areas in Europe such as air bases, they had no protective clothing, no decontamination equipment, no safe transportation between buildings and their aircraft, etc. An attack by lethal CW could take out our attack air forces. He mentioned that a retaliatory capability would involve more than stocks. Mr. Kissinger asked if we could distinguish between retaliation and deterrence—could we deprive an attack of its effectiveness? If we should retain a deterrent/retaliatory capability, we would need a definition of what is needed. He thought the principals might call for a study of precisely what is required for retaliation. Mr. Lindjord asked how far away we are from development of binary agents. Admiral Vannoy thought it would be 1974 or later. Mr. Pedersen noted that the IPMG paper stated that the Soviets have larger stocks than we have. Mr. Proctor noted the CIA revision of the paragraph on information about the Soviet CW program which qualifies our ability to estimate the size of Soviet stocks. Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that the net impression of the paper was that the Soviets have larger stocks. Mr. Proctor agreed that the stocks in Warsaw Pact countries are larger than those of NATO countries, but said we did not know how much larger. Dr. McRae thought this was not too relevant in determining policy. Mr. Proctor agreed. Admiral Vannoy thought it was relevant, however, if we were to have a retaliatory/deterrent capability. Mr. Pedersen also thought it was relevant in the no first-use context—if the enemy is far ahead of us this is all the more reason for no first-use. Mr. Kissinger said a sensible definition of a CW retaliatory capability would have to include some reference to nuclear weapons. He thought it inconceivable that we would rely on CW if we were attacked in Western Europe. Mr. Proctor said that Soviet exercises clearly combined CW and nuclear elements with the ratio of CW to tactical nuclear weapons going down in recent years. He thought this could be attributed to the greater availability of tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. Kissinger asked if CIA had an estimate of Soviet capabilities? Mr. Proctor referred to an NIE of February 1969. (This paper was later identified by the staff as having been partially overtaken by a reexamination within the intelligence community of the validity of the evidence on which it was based.) Mr. Furnas said ACDA would place more emphasis on the development of binary agents—they would retain a lethal capability until we see about the development of binaries and until we can see the future of arms control efforts. Mr. Kissinger concluded that the CW issues were fairly clearly stated for NSC consideration, and moved to the next question of stockpiles overseas. He noted that, with the withdrawal of stocks from Okinawa, we maintain stocks only in Germany and asked why. Admiral Vannoy replied that one needed the deterrent in close proximity to where one intended to use it. Mr. Kissinger asked how we would deliver it. Admiral Vannoy replied by tactical air, missiles or artillery. In response to a question, he said that our airlift capacity would be overcommitted in the first 15 days of any difficulty. Mr. Kissinger said that, if we had no stocks in Germany, we would be faced with the question of introducing chemical weapons into the country and that any such introduction would probably be too late to do any good. Mr. Spiers commented that it would take 15 days to bring in even an initial supply, but would take 75 days to acquire the capacity for any sustained use. Mr. Kissinger said we could bring them in as a crisis approaches, but would then be susceptible to the charge that we had intensified the crisis by bringing them in. Why could we not bring such stocks in during a quiet period. Is domestic pressure an argument? Mr. Spiers said we should tell the new German government that we have CW stockpiles in Germany, ask them if this is a problem for them, and, if so, bring it back. Mr. Kissinger asked why go to the Germans? Mr. Spiers thought we should ask them to focus on the question before it becomes a major issue. Mr. Kissinger asked, if CW stocks are necessary in Germany, why raise it with the Germans? Mr. Spiers thought we needed to explain to them the rationale, brief the new government on what is there and get their reaction. Mr. Kissinger thought it would present Brandt with a very tough question if we asked for approval. If we are willing to take these supplies out, well and good. If we are unwilling, we should look very carefully at the question of reopening the question with the Germans. Mr. Spiers commented that, if it should become a major issue, he thought the State Department would argue that the stocks in Germany wouldn’t be worth a major confrontation. Mr. Kissinger said that if the Germans did not already know we had CW stocks in Germany, it would be all right to brief them. But they do know about these stocks and he saw no reason to reopen the question. He thought the German government was already overloaded with domestic issues. At least he thought the White House should have a crack at any decision in this area. Mr. Spiers agreed, saying that the Secretary had not yet been consulted and may not agreed with the recommendation for briefing the new German Government. Mr. Kissinger thought this issue might be included in the paper. If we don’t care about retaining the stocks in Germany, it is okay to raise the question. State should lay out the arguments for and against briefing the Germans and let the principals decide. Mr. Spiers agreed to do so. Mr. Kissinger asked if we would take the weapons out of Germany if they asked us to or do we prefer to keep them in? If we choose to retain a retaliatory CW capability, he assumed we would want to keep them there. Is talking to the Germans the best way to keep them there? Mr. Spiers thought it might be better to raise the question now than to run the risk that it might become a major issue and that we would then have to retreat under pressure. Mr. Kissinger thought it unlikely that the Germans would make this a political issue, If not, why embarrass Brandt by asking him about it? Mr. Nutter asked where we would put these stocks if we should remove them from Germany. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] were suggested. Mr. Pedersen asked whether there was a good argument for keeping stocks overseas if we were agreed on a no-first-use policy. Mr. Nutter replied that NATO wants a retaliatory capability. Mr. Cargo asked if any of our allies has any CW capability. Mr. Spiers replied that there is some cooperative R&D for defensive purposes with the UK and the Germans. Mr. Cargo asked if we could soak up anything from our allies to contribute to a retaliatory capability. Admiral Vannoy thought we could get nothing useful from our NATO allies. Mr. Kissinger moved to the question of the Geneva Protocol specifically as it relates to tear gas, and asked if we could adhere to the protocol if we decide on a first-use policy for tear gas. Mr. Spiers noted that Defense lawyers say we can, while State Department lawyers say we can’t. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol would mean that we could not use lethal agents. The State Department lawyers say that the Protocol also prohibits use of incapacitants, but Defense says no. State’s lawyers say we can only use tear gas for humanitarian purposes—i.e., where no lethal weapons are also employed. The non-legal side of State does not agree. They believe we could ratify the Protocol with a net political advantage if we retained the right of unrestricted use of tear gas. Mr. Kissinger asked if ratification of the Geneva Protocol would not force us into a declaratory policy. If we ratified without some statement, would not the use of incaps and probably tear gas be prohibited. Mr. Spiers noted that some nations who had ratified the Protocol were using tear gas—specifically Australia and Thailand were using it in Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger saw two conclusions: either the Geneva Protocol doesn’t mean anything or it doesn’t apply to tear gas. Mr. Pedersen noted again that that was not the legal view, and Mr. Kissinger asked how that squared with the Australian and Thai position. Mr. Spiers replied that it doesn’t. The lawyers say we are bound by the principles and objectives of the Protocol and that the use of tear gas in Vietnam is illegal. The Administration should clarify this question. We could ratify the Protocol with a reservation on the humanitarian use of tear gas and tailor our policy in Vietnam accordingly. Mr. Pedersen noted that our defense of the use of tear gas in the General Assembly discussion on Vietnam has been based on humanitarian use. Admiral Vannoy asked if humanitarian use might not include saving the lives of U.S. soldiers. Mr. Kissinger remarked that humanitarian consideration usually referred to the victim. Mr. Spiers thought it distasteful to refer to humanitarian uses. Mr. Kissinger agreed, saying it is hypocritical. He asked whether there were other issues concerning ratification of Protocol other than those relating to tear gas. He thought there were three issues: 1) should we ratify the Protocol? 2) if we ratified, should we reserve our position on incaps or tear gas? 3) if we ratified, should we not enter a reservation but simply assume the freedom to use tear gas. (3:20 p. m. Mr. Loomis returned to the meeting) Mr. Spiers noted the legal arguments but said this has to be a political decision. Mr. Kissinger thought we should ask the question with regard to tear gas and riot control agents, then ask if there are other reasons why we should not ratify the Protocol. Mr. Loomis raised the specific question of their use in Vietnam. Mr. Spiers said if we ratify the Protocol without a reservation, then we would be agreeing not to use it. Mr. Loomis cited the Australian and Thai use in Vietnam. Mr. Kissinger asked if we could have an internal reservation without going public. All agreed that we could not. Mr. Pedersen asked if we would accept a restriction on tear gas for certain purposes or for all purposes. Mr. Furnas asked if there were a military necessity for using it. Mr. Kissinger thought this should be included under the pros and cons. Mr. Cargo thought if we ratified the Protocol it would require some sort of reservation on first use. Mr. Kissinger asked that the paper be redone to take these considerations into account. Mr. Spiers recapped the issues to be added in a redo of the paper: 1) a clarification of the distinction between offensive and defensive R&D; 2) the arguments for and against briefing the German Government on deployment of CW stocks in Germany; 3) a specific policy issue on the UK draft convention on BW; and 4) a definition of an adequate CW retaliatory capability. Dr. McRae asked if it would require a Presidential decision to use tear gas for conflicts other than Vietnam. Admiral Vannoy said this was not included in the paper since President Johnson had specifically authorized the use of tear gas in Vietnam. Mr. Spiers agreed that there was a question as to whether it would require authorization by a new administration for use of tear gas in situations other than Vietnam. There was general discussion of the timing of an NSC meeting on this subject and it was agreed that November 19 was the earliest date o n which a meeting could be scheduled. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The minutes bear no drafting information. 156. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 156. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 1 Washington, November 10, 1969 REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL US POLICY ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND AGENTS Submitted by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in response to NSSM 59 US POLICIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND AGENTS Introduction In response to NSSM 59, this report by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) examines US policies, programs, operational concepts and alternatives thereto with regard to both chemical and biological warfare * and agents. Part I contains background information on US policies and programs essential to an understanding of the policy issues. Part II addresses the important policy issues and options, and the relevant pros and cons. While chemical and biological weapons are often referred to as a single group or category, there are important distinctions between them. For purposes of policy, international law, military application and public discussion, it is essential that these distinctions be kept clearly in mind. For the purposes of this report, CW and BW are considered separately. There are also significant differentiations within the broad chemical and biological categories that require separate consideration. Biological agents require a period of incubation before they can take effect, and are generally not considered useful where rapid results may be required in tactical or battlefield situations. There are two other notable characteristics of biological weapons: First, a small amount of an agent (in terms of weight and hulk) has the potential to infect a large target area measured in hundreds of square miles. Second, it is difficult to confine their effects to a given target area. With some agents, the disease could spread beyond those originally infected with it. Various living organisms (e.g., rickettsiae, viruses and fungi), as well as bacteria, can be used as weapons and, in the context of warfare, are generally recognized as biological warfare agents. Most chemical agents take effect rapidly. Consequently, they are more suitable for battlefield situations. However, considerably larger quantities of chemical agents must be delivered on target to produce desired effects. For purposes of this report chemical and biological agents are categorized as follows: Lethal Agents —Chemical and biological, are those which are intended to cause death. (We have included mustard gas in this category.) Incapacitating Agents —Chemical and biological, are those which are intended to cause temporary disability without residual injurious effect. Riot Control Agents —A few chemical agents such as tear gases, have been used by governments in civil disturbances, and in warfare for a variety of other missions. These latter are referred to in this report as riot control agents (RCA). Chemical herbicides are used as defoliants and as anti-crop agents. Biological anti-crop agents are intended for use only against crops. Smoke, flame and incendiary agents are not categorized as either CW or BW and are not dealt with in this report. As far as is known, biological agents of warfare have never been employed in modern times. On the other hand, lethal chemical agents have been employed: (1) by both sides during WW I; (2) by Italy during the Abyssinian conflict (1935–6); (3) by Japan in China in 1939–1942; and, (4) by the UAR against Yemeni royalists in 1962–1967. Riot control agents (tear gas) and herbicides have been used by the US and its allies in Vietnam. Small quantities of tear gas have been used by the other side. Part I: Background A. Statement of the Problem Since World War I the US has maintained a chemical warfare (CW) program, and since World War II a biological warfare (BW) program. Yet during these years the United States has not had a fully developed national policy in either the CW or BW fields. Recent developments have generated considerable controversy over US policies and programs. These include: 1. A series of incidents relating to testing, transportation, disposal and overseas storage. 2. The use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in combat situations by US forces in Vietnam. 3. The introduction of new arms control initiatives in the international arena, both at the CCD at Geneva and the UNGA, and in the Secretary General’s report. 4. Congressional reviews and proposed restrictions. B. The Nature of the Threat to the US and Its Allies 1. Soviet Chemical Warfare Information about the USSR’s CW program is rather extensive yet incomplete in some important details. One such detail concerns the size of the Soviet toxic agents stockpile. The evidence relating to this question has recently been reexamined in an attempt to determine the validity of the estimate of 275,000 tons now carried in the national intelligence estimates. This reexamination revealed that the available evidence is not sufficient to ascribe high confidence to estimates of the size of the Soviet stockpile of toxic CW agents; it is however, good enough to reach the conclusion that this stockpile is large * and militarily significant. The Soviets class CW weapons with nuclear weapons as “weapons of mass destruction.” We conclude that the use of chemical weapons by the USSR is subject to the same type of political control at the highest level as are atomic weapons. We believe it virtually certain that they would use CW in the event of general nuclear war if they considered it to their advantage to do so. We believe, however, that they would not initiate their use in a conventional conflict against an opponent capable of retaliation in kind. They would not hesitate to retaliate with CW if chemical weapons were used against them in a conventional war. Soviet documents indicate that the USSR expects NATO to employ BW as well as CW in the event of war and is preparing against both. It is worth noting that the Soviets have maintained an active defense program over the years in an attempt to reduce the vulnerability of their population to chemical, biological, and radiological effects. The Soviets appear to appreciate both the capabilities and limitations of chemical weapons. Soviet doctrine on tactical use of chemical weapons appears to be based on the concept of utilizing the best attributes of these weapons in relation to HE and nuclear weapons. Thus, chemical weapons may be used instead of nuclear weapons where physical destruction of a target is not desirable. In small sectors, large-scale use of chemical warfare might be used to produce large casualties as well as to demoralize enemy troops and to facilitate movement of ground forces. From the Soviet point of view, chemical weapons are especially advantageous for use in mountainous terrain, where precision artillery or aircraft bombardment is difficult, and in other areas where natural or constructed physical features protect personnel from the effects of nuclear and/or high explosive detonations. We have good indications that current Soviet plans for general nuclear war call for about one-third of all warheads available for Soviet ground-launched tactical missiles and rockets to be chemical. There is better information regarding research and development that may relate to CW and on doctrine for tactical use than on the production of chemical agents. It is known that the Soviet Union has considerable interest in CW and that the Soviet arsenal includes CW agents of the WW I type as well as the more recently developed nerve agents. Soman, which appears to be a major component of the Soviet nerve agent stockpile, is of special concern to the West because it is resistant to the usual nerve agent antidotes and therapy. Another important Soviet nerve agent, designated VR–55 by them, appears to be a V-agent type material. Its toxicity is believed to exceed somewhat that of VX standardized by the West. A point of particular relevance to this study is that the Soviets appear to be emphasizing lethal agents in their CW activities and, while we have evidence of their R&D interest in them, there is no evidence that they are stockpiling incapacitating agents of any type. The USSR possesses considerable production capacity and storage facilities which would be suitable for lethal agents. Although the US has never been able to identify production facilities precisely nor to pin down the scale of the Soviet production effort, the Soviet chemical technology should be able to support the production of any of the known CW agents in quantity. The absence of information on production facilities for CW agent manufacture constitutes a weak link in any verification arrangements in the event of an agreement with the USSR to ban CW agent production. We could at this point do no better than provide a lengthy list of facilities in which such manufacture could be accommodated. Just how ready Soviet forces are for offensive CW and how far forward stocks of chemical munitions are maintained are matters on which there is still uncertainty, but there is good reason to believe that weapons capable of delivering chemical munitions are available at division, army, and “Front” level. There are increasing indications that at least some quantities of CW agents are stored under Soviet control in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. We believe that the Bloc countries are not producing CW agents nor are they allowed to accumulate stocks of them free of Soviet control. The Warsaw Pact’s current capability to wage CW in Europe undoubtedly surpasses that of NATO. Defensive CW equipment includes protection, detection, and decontamination equipment effective against all known lethal chemical agents; Soviet Bloc attention to defensive CW training and protection against chemical attack exceeds that of the US as well as of its NATO allies. Most new construction Soviet ships are provided in varying degrees with washdown systems, filtered ventilation systems and decontamination stations that would enable the ships to carry out their assigned missions in a CB environment. Extensive training is provided for the maintenance of a permanent, high level of CW and BW readiness for the various naval units. 2. Soviet Biological Warfare Our intelligence on Soviet BW capabilities is much less firm than on CW activities. Soviet interest in various potential biological warfare agents has been documented and the intelligence community agrees that the Soviets have all the necessary means for developing an offensive capability in this field. But useful intelligence on actual production, weaponization, and stockpiling is nonexistent. In Soviet writings, BW is linked with nuclear and chemical warfare in terms that indicate a high degree of political control and restraint. We believe that Soviet vulnerabilities would weigh heavily against Soviet initiation of BW. Recently, a high-level Czech defector reported the existence of contingency plans in the Warsaw Pact military alliance to deliver BW from the USSR to East European Front Commanders in the event of a decision to use them to stop or slow an invasion. Additionally, Warsaw Pact military organizational plans have depicted components responsible for deploying BW weapons. There are frequent Soviet references to BW weapons as a “means of mass destruction” that would be used in future conflicts. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would employ BW as a primary means of initial strategic attack, although it might subsequently be used in the course of a general war. Soviet and NSWP military forces, including naval units, are equipped with personnel and collective protective devices which could enable them to operate in a biological warfare environment. The Soviets probably believe that biological warfare weapons can be effective in some tactical situations, though ineffective in many, and are especially suitable for clandestine delivery. 3. CBW Capabilities of Other Countries There is evidence of Chinese Communist interest in the CBW weapons field, but Communist China at present has at most an extremely limited offensive capability in chemical agents only. A limited chemical and biological warfare capability, at least in terms of crude weapons, can be acquired by States with even a limited modern industrial base. Important aspects of CBW technology are widely known and easily obtainable through open sources. Some existing chemical and pharmaceutical facilities can be adapted for the development and production of CBW agents. As delivery can be accomplished by several kinds of relatively unsophisticated weapons, the acquisition of a limited offensive capability in BW and CW need not be expensive. It should be noted that there is evidence of interest on the part of some nations (e.g., France, UAR, Israel) in acquiring or enhancing CBW capabilities and of limited use of chemical weapons by the UAR in Yemen. Considerable related and high-quality research is even carried on by countries that indicate no intention of developing offensive capabilities of their own (e.g., Sweden). C. Current US Policy There is no document that sets forth National Policy in this field comprehensively or definitively. Discernible elements of a National Policy have been suggested in statements by US officials, and in Government documents. However, the extent to which these define policy is unclear. The lack of clarity concerns what the US policy is, where that policy is to be found, the reach of that policy, and whether that policy purports to be based upon rules of international law. The only public statement of policy by a President was Roosevelt’s 1943 statement which emphasized two points: (a) no first-use of poisonous or noxious gases and (b) “retaliation in kind.” The terms “poisonous or noxious gases” have never been officially defined by a US spokesman. Presidential policy guidance was incorporated in the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), which was issued on August 5, 1959 and rescinded in January 1963. It stated: “The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President. If time permits and an attack on the United States or US forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is made by the President.” On November 17, 1966, in a letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense proposed DOD responsibilities for CW and BW in the following terms: “It is in the national interests of the United States to be prepared to employ CB weapons and to maintain a balanced offensive and defensive capability for CB operations. The possession of a credible capability to employ them could deter their use by an enemy. Accordingly, US forces shall be prepared to defend against CW weapons by an enemy, to conduct operations in a toxic environment, and to use these weapons when directed to do so. The President does not now expect to authorize US forces to use lethal anti-personnel CB weapons prior to their use by another nation. In certain situations of national urgency, the President may authorize the use of CB incapacitating weapons.” There is no extant policy directive from a President that requires Presidential authority prior to employment of these weapons. However,DOD policy specifies that the President must approve the employment of CW and BW other than riot control agents and herbicides. President Johnson reaffirmed the authority of the JCS to authorize use of RCA’s in Vietnam. D. US Chemical Capabilities Stockpile R&D and Costs 1. Current Lethal Chemical Capabilities A review of the current US chemical posture indicates the following: The US inventory of chemical agents, mustard and nerve agents GB and VX, is approximately 30,000 tons. Of this amount, 13,000 tons are WW I mustard agent. The immediately usable portion of the US stockpile amounts to about 18,400 agent tons consisting of the agents in filled munitions plus bulk stocks for munitions to be filled in the field. Stocks in Europe would provide about 97 tons of ground munitions each for the five US divisions now committed to NATO or about five tons of ground munitions per US and NATO division if chemical operations begin after D+60, versus estimated requirements of about 8 tons per day. Stocks now in the Pacific (currently on Okinawa but to be removed) total about 1,600 tons for the entire theater. Total US inventories of 155 mm and 8-inch GB and VX munitions and aircraft spray tanks are grossly inadequate to engage in large-scale chemical operations in either Europe or the Pacific. 2. Incapacitating Chemical Agent Capabilities The one standard chemical incapacitating agent, BZ (stockpile 49 tons) is unlikely to be employed due to its wide range of variability of effects, long onset time, and inefficiency of existing munitions. Agents in R&D, which may have greater military potential, are not currently standardized. 3. Riot Control Agent (RCA) Capabilities RCA’s are being procured commercially to support both Southeast Asia operations and civil disturbance missions. Stockpiles are located in CONUS and overseas. 4. Herbicide Capabilities Defoliants have been and are used on a considerable scale in Vietnam, and have proven effective in clearing the sides of roads, canals and rivers and around encampments. The US has also conducted chemical anti-crop missions in Vietnam and Laos. 5. Chemical Defense Capabilities Over-all, the present US chemical defensive posture is marginal or poor, allied defensive capabilities are even worse. US chemical defensive posture provides protective masks, some manual detection and combat vehicle collective protection. There are no plans or capabilities for protection of the US civilian population. However, a mask for the use of the civilian population has been developed and tested. 6. Chemical Production Capabilities Decisions on new or future procurement of lethal chemical warfare agents and related delivery systems are deferred pending the outcome of this NSSM. No operational chemical warfare agents are being produced. No delivery systems are being procured. No additional agent production is programmed until binary agents become available. The United States has no production facilities for bulk mustard. Riot control agents, herbicides, and the chemical incapacitant BZ are procured commercially. Production facilities for the nerve agents GB and VX are in lay-away status. Under emergency conditions, GB production could be resumed in 12 months, with maximum production by 15 months, and VX in nine months, with maximum by 12 months. Neither on-hand stocks in CONUS, nor pre-positioned stocks overseas, nor the sum of these, is capable of sustaining large-scale chemical operations until production could be resumed. 7. Binary Munitions The US is developing a shell or bomb in which two non-toxic chemicals are filled in separate compartments. The chemicals are mixed after firing and form a lethal chemical agent, which is disseminated when the munition arrives on target. The development of such weapons is expected by 1974 at the earliest. Binary munitions are safer during storage and handling than previous chemical munitions and may alleviate many problems—both technical and political—that present agents raise. During storage and transportation, the two components could be separated so that if an accident occurred there would be no formulation, much less release, of toxic materials. Binaries could be dispersed as are conventional munitions instead of having to be stored in special ammunition storage sites. For binaries, there would probably be no need to construct and operate large, costly government-owned toxic production facilities. The components, being relatively non-toxic, could easily be manufactured by the US chemical industry and procured by DOD on competitive contract purchase. 8. Current Costs of Chemical Programs The proposed FY 70 funding for chemical warfare is shown below: Procurement ($ in millions) Lethal Chemicals 0 Incapacitating Chemicals l0 Riot Control Agents & Weapons 57 Herbicides 10 Defensive Equipment & Misc. 28 Sub Total 95 RDT&E * ($ in millions) General Investigations 8 Offensive R&D 20 Defensive R&D 19 Test & Evaluation 11 Sub Total 58 Operational Maintenance of Depots, Transportation 15 Military Construction 4 Sub Total 19 Total 172 E. US Biological Capabilities, Stockpile, R&D and Costs 1. Current Operational Capabilities Approximately 8,350 gallons of incapacitating biological agents—3,950 gallons of FX (Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis) and 4,400 gallons of MN (“Q” fever)—were produced two years ago and remain stockpiled in support of unified command contingency plans, along with about 200 associated delivery systems (spray tanks and aerosol disseminators). This incapacitating capability represents the sole US incapacitating capability for support of contingency plans requiring incapacitation or attack of areas where casualty limitation is needed. There are no plans now to replace existing material as it decays, pending the review of this study. Forty tons of TX (Wheat Rust) and 0.9 tons of LX (Rice Blast) are on hand. No large inventory of dry (powdered) antipersonnel lethal or incapacitating biological agents is maintained and only eight aircraft spray disseminators are in the inventory. No missile delivery capabilities are currently maintained for delivery of biological agents, although a bomblet-containing warhead for the SERGEANT missile has been standardized, but not produced in quantity. Small quantities of both lethal and incapacitating biological agents are maintained in special warfare devices. 2. Current Research and Development Program a. Funds —RDT&E funds for the biological research program reached a high point of $39 million in FY 64 and since have been reduced by DOD action to $30 million. b. Defensive Problems —Timely detection of an attack and the identification of the agent used are the major defensive problems. No biological detection system is presently deployed or in prospect. There is no effective prophylaxis for large-scale or multi-agent biological attacks. No nation is known to have solved these problems. 3. Costs of Biological Programs The total biological program has a relatively low dollar cost as the table below indicates. Replenishment of the current existing biological stockpiles has been stopped since August 1969, pending a decision of this NSSM. (Annual Cost of Current Biological Program in Millions of Dollars) Total RDT&E * (including basic cost) $29.4 Replenishing existing Stockpiles 1.5 Operation and Maintenance of existing Pilot Plant Production Facility 5.5 TOTAL $36.4 F. Military Considerations and Doctrine Doctrine, as well as US military policy, governing the use of CW and BW weapons, may be found in the plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in studies prepared for them on concepts of operational use, and in the various service field manuals that provide direction on CW and BW employment and defense. US military doctrine views CW weapons as having a wide variety of possible military uses both in defensive and in offensive (retaliation as well as first use) warfare throughout the entire spectrum of conflict ranging from counterinsurgency operations to general war. Defense. Given adequate warning devices and proper troop training, equipment such as gas masks, protective clothing, airproof structures with filtered ventilation, and decontamination equipment, a reasonably successful defense against either lethal or non-lethal chemical agents can be made. The requirement of preparing for chemical operations impose certain disadvantages, principally by restricting maneuverability through logistically encumbering defensive equipment. Battlefield defenses against chemicals would be largely effective against biological agents. Delivery Systems . The various chemical and biological agents can be delivered by a wide variety of weapons. Artillery shells with chemical-agent projectiles have a limited-area coverage capability. This can be enlarged by rockets whose warheads, if massed, can attack targets on the order of several square kilometers. For even larger attack areas, rockets and missiles with self-dispersing bomblets can be used. Conventional minefields can be reinforced by mines containing persistent chemical nerve agents. Chemical agents can also be delivered by aircraft by means of bombs, spray tanks, cluster-bombs and dispensers of self-dispersing bomblets. Dissemination by helicopter in a variety of situations is also feasible. The major delivery means for biological agents in the present military inventory is aircraft spray tanks. All of these weapons are to some degree sensitive to variations in the environment in which they are to be used. In some cases, there is considerable uncertainty as to the effects of different terrain and weather conditions on particular agents. The effects of chemical and biological agents depend to varying degrees upon agent and proposed use and on specific conditions of wind, temperature, humidity, and terrain. G. Arms Control Initiatives in the International Arena At the July 10, 1969 session of the ENDC, the United Kingdom presented a draft convention, and an accompanying draft Security Council Resolution (ENDC/255), which would ban research aimed at producing biological agents for hostile purposes, and production, possession and use in any circumstances of biological methods of warfare. * The draft treaty does not provide for on-site verification, but it does contain complaint procedures for investigation of treaty violations under UN auspices. No consensus has emerged on the UK draft, but many delegations in Geneva opposed the attempt to give separate treatment to biological weapons. The US, in informal sessions of the ENDC and in meetings with the British, commented on the UK drafts without in any way preempting decisions likely to follow the current NSSM exercise. As a result of these informal sessions, the UK submitted a revised draft convention on August 26, 1969. Also in early July, the Report of the UN Secretary-General on CBW was distributed at Geneva and the UN, and widely publicized. The Group of Consultant Experts, who prepared the report, including a representative from the US, cited the danger of proliferation of these weapons and concluded that the momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if their production were effectively banned. The Secretary-General urged in a forward to the Report that UN Members undertake the following measures: 1. To renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925; 2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future; 3. To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons. Sweden , on August 26, 1969, introduced a UNGA draft resolution which condemns and declares as contrary to international law the use of any C and B agents in international armed conflicts. The draft resolution states that an existing customary rule of international law prohibits the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare. Canada , also has submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly. It reiterates, inter ali a, a previous UNGA invitation to all States to accede to the 1925 Protocol, recommends that the UNSYG’s report be used as a basis for the CCD’s further consideration of the elimination of C and B weapons, and urges the CCD to complete work on the UK draft convention at an early date. The USSR , as well as most members of the CCD, have insisted on: (1) the need for universal adherence to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as a condition precedent to the consideration of more comprehensive measures; and (2) the undesirability of according separate treatment to C and B weapons. At the UN General Assembly, on September 19, 1969, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that the USSR, all other Warsaw Pact countries (except East Germany), and Mongolia were submitting to the 24th UNGA an item on conclusion of a convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical and Biological Weapons and on their Destruction. The Soviet draft convention would ban development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of both chemical and biological weapons. It relies on self-policing rather than on any plan of international control by inspection. The Soviet initiative has been allocated to Committee One of the UNGA for debate this fall along with the Report of the CCD (CBW related sections) and the Secretary-General’s Report on CBW. H. Cooperative Program with Allies The United States has a cooperative research agreement with Great Britain, Canada and Australia for the exchange of chemical and biological warfare information. We have less extensive CBW information exchange agreements with other countries, including Germany. Under the agreement with Germany, the US has provided over the years small, sample quantities of agents for use in RDT&E of defensive equipment. The extent to which this practice will be continued will be reviewed in the light of the decisions made by the NSC on the fundamental issues raised in this study. I. The USE of Tear Gas (CS) in South Vietnam 1. CS has been used in South Vietnam since 1965. CS provides the possibility of a nonlethal solution to military operational problems and their military utility in the following circumstances: a. Increases the possibilities of the capture of PW’s from mixed military/civilian population without civilian casualties. b. In urban areas, decreases the destruction of housing and public facilities. Any destruction of housing or public facilities provides the VC with tangible propaganda and is used against the United States. c. Provides the commander with a nonlethal option to the use of massive HE in overcoming a dug-in enemy. (CS forces enemy into the open where he has the option of surrendering. The alternative to CS use is massive use of HE, killing or trapping the enemy in destroyed fortifications, or exposing American soldiers by attacking individual fortifications by gun and bayonet. Friendly casualties in this method of attack are extremely high, while use of CS allows great reduction in friendly casualties and gives the enemy the option of surrendering if he so desires.) d. If used for area restriction, it limits the use of terrain and prevents reuse of field fortifications. Denial of areas with CS has in many cases altered enemy infiltration routes and thus required him to develop new routes. It can also be used to canalize an enemy assault and increase enemy vulnerability. e. In reconnaissance-by-fire employing CS rather than HE shells, it is particularly effective for checking heavily wooded areas and is much more effective for detection of occupied fortifications than is HE. 2. CS, when used in offensive operations, a. Assists in the assault of point targets such as bunkers and automatic weapons emplacements. Within a few seconds any occupants lacking protection against CS will be rendered unable to defend themselves effectively. b. Aids in the assault of area targets. c. Is effective in flushing bunkers and caves. d. Is very useful in the suppression of small-arms fire around helicopter LZ’s. 3. CS when used in defensive operations: a. Assists in perimeter defense by impeding approaches to and passages through the perimeter. 4. CS has been found to be increasingly effective by military commanders in South Vietnam. Procurement of bulk CS, primarily to support SVN, has amounted to 3.5 million pounds in FY 1968 and 4.0 million pounds in FY 1969. Sixteen hundred tons have been expended in the past 18 months. J. Public Attitudes in the International Arena Public attitudes toward chemical and biological weapons have generally been largely formed by: (a) continued Communist propaganda charges citing US failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol; (b) US use of riot control agents in Vietnam since 1965; (c) The Communist campaign of the early 1950’s charging the US with germ warfare in Korea. A series of accidents since early 1968, and the US domestic controversy over transport and storage of chemical agents, has sharpened public criticism here and overseas. Part II: CW and BW Policy Issues Introduction Before the nature, scope and direction of a coherent US policy for CW and BW can be decided upon, several underlying issues should be addressed and resolved. These issues fall into three categories. The first two categories deal with CW and BW programs respectively, for policy will indeed be concerned with the objectives, scope and nature of future programs. The third category deals with a set of issues concerning the public and international posture of the US on CW and BW issues. This involves legal issues, arms control policy, and US positions in international conferences and negotiations. Before examining the various policy issues, over which there is disagreement, a few areas of agreement deserve mention. First , there is need for a continuing US RDT&E program to improve defenses and guard against technological surprise. Indeed, there is a consensus that, regardless of decisions on the following issues, there should be more emphasis upon defensive measures and programs. Second , the US should continue to work on, develop and improve controls and safety measures in all chemical and biological programs. Third , a requirement exists for more definitive intelligence on other nations’ CBW capabilities. Fourth , Declaratory policy with respect to lethal chemicals and lethal biological agents is and should continue to be “no first use.” Fifth , no agents except RCA’s and/or herbicides can be used except with Presidential approval. Finally, to try to keep public opinion problems manageable, public affairs policy should be planned and implemented on an inter-agency basis in close integration with substantive policy. I. BW Policy Issues * A. Should the US maintain a lethal biological capability? Pros: 1. Maintenance of such a capability could contribute to deterring the use of such agents by others. 2. Without any production capability and delivery means for lethal agents, the United States would not be able to reconstitute such a capability within likely warning times. 3. Retains an option for the United States at very little additional cost as a hedge against possible technological surprise or as a strategic option. Cons: 1. Control of the area of effect of known BW agents is uncertain. ** 2. A lethal BW capability does not appear necessary to deter strategic use of lethal BW. 3. Limits our flexibility in supporting arms control arrangements. B. Should the US maintain a capability for use of biologicals ? (We now have two biological incapacitants in stock.) Pros: 1. From a military standpoint, incapacitating biologicals might be an effective method of preparing for an amphibious invasion, disrupting rear-echelon military operations, or of neutralizing pockets of enemy forces. 2. Biological incapacitants could provide in some circumstances a method of capturing particular targets or areas which might be more humane than conventional weapons. 3. Without a production facility in being at the present state of readiness, it would take approximately 2–3 years, starting from scratch, to produce biological agents in militarily significant quantities. 4. Maintains the only existing US incapacitant capability for those situations where incapacitation over a period of several days is desirable. Cons: 1. Biological incapacitants have a questionable deterrent or retaliatory value. 2. First-use of incapacitating biologicals would be construed by most nations, including most US Allies, to be contrary to international law and the Geneva Protocol. 3. An enemy may perceive no clear-cut distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents under wartime conditions. C. Should the US maintain only an RDT&E program: There are really two sub-issues here: (1) should the U.S. restrict its program to RDT&E for defensive purposes only or (2) should the U.S. conduct both offensive and defensive RDT&E? While it is agreed that even RDT&E for defensive purposes only would require some offensive R&D, it is also agreed that there is a distinction between the two issues. A defensive purposes only R&D program would emphasize basic and exploratory research on all aspects of BW warning devices, medical treatment and prophylaxis.RDT&E for offensive purposes would emphasize work on mass production and weaponization and would include standardization of new weapons and agents. If a decision were made to continue an RDT&E program for defensive purposes only, it would be necessary to review the necessity for retaining existing production facilities. (1) - in the offensive and defensive areas? Pros: 1. Minimizes risks of technological surprise. 2. Provides knowledge and capability for physical and medical defensive measures. 3. Retains a relatively short lead time for response to new threats (depending on level of RDT&E effort). Cons: 1. Could he construed as preparation to use biological agents in war. 2. Would degrade US capability for response in kind. 3. Would reduce US response options. (2) - in the defensive area only? (Maintenance of a defensive RDT&E program inherently requires some offensive RDT&D effort.) Pros: 1. Would provide some knowledge, although less than with the preceding option. 2. Would result in a more economical program. 3. Could not be construed as preparation for use in war. Cons: 1. Would, as compared with (1) above, further degrade US capability to employ biological agents. 2. Could require disposal of certain material and facilities and loss of expertise. 3. Would increase the hazard of technological surprise. D. Should the US support the UK Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare? (For brief discussion, see page 18.) Pros: 1. If the US decides not to maintain a lethal biological capability, it would be in our interest to obtain an undertaking by others not to do so. 2. The UK Convention contains provisions for investigations of allegations of violations, and an escape clause, both of which may provide some measure of security to the parties to the agreement. 3. If the US limits its BW program to RDT&E, the security of the US would be no more endangered under the UK agreement that it would be in the absence of an agreement, and the inhibitory aspects of the convention could be important. 4. The British interpret their Convention to permit the development of a passive defensive capability against BW, e.g., development of vaccines and the production of protective and warning devices. Cons: 1. The Convention does not provide assurance of compliance because there is no provision for on-site verification and violations could not be detected by unilateral means alone. Acceptance of an unverifiable treaty provision would weaken our ability to resist similar obligations in other arms control contexts. 2. Would require the US to renounce all existing offensive biological capabilities and thus would deprive the US of options it might wish to exercise in the future. II. CW Policy Issues * A. Should the US maintain a capability to retaliate with lethal chemical agents? (There is no consensus on what constitutes adequate retaliatory capability.) Pros: 1. The principal argument in favor of the development and stockpiling of lethal chemical agents is that such a capability is needed to deter possible use against US or allied forces by others in war. 2. Reliance on nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against CW would deny to the decision-maker the lethal chemical option in retaliation, in the event US or allied forces were subject to a CW attack. Depending on the military capabilities of the enemy, an expanded conventional response could be inadequate and a nuclear response could prove too escalatory. 3. A response in kind would force an enemy to operate under the same cumbersome operational constraints (protective clothing, movement limitation and limited logistics) which would be imposed on our forces. 4. If the US were unilaterally to eliminate its lethal CW capability, this would remove a major bargaining lever for obtaining sound and effective arms control measures. Cons: 1. The principal argument against the development and stockpiling of a lethal chemical capability is that other military means, including a whole range of nuclear weapons, are sufficient to deter the use of lethal chemicals. 2. The deterrent threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a CW attack could be more credible if the US were to eliminate its CW capability. B. Should the US destroy or detoxify its stockpiles mustard? (All stocks of phosgene have been disposed of.) Pros: 1. Mustard is an obsolete World War I type gas which has considerably less military utility than modern nerve agents. 2. An announcement that we planned to dispose of these stocks would help to demonstrate US interest in controlling lethal chemical munitions and thus might have some political value. Cons: Would remove about 40% of existing lethal chemical artillery capability which although not as desirable as nerve agents do have a proven casualty producing capability. For these reasons, destruction is not appropriate until binary agents are available. C. Should the US continue to maintain stockpiles of Chemical munitions overseas (1) in Europe, and (2) in the Pacific? (European stockpile is only in Germany) Pros: 1. Stockpiles in close proximity to where they may be used are necessary for deterrence and for a timely and adequate response. Current stocks in Europe represent only 8–10 days of combat usage and in Asia about 15 days. 2. Not to continue to maintain chemical munitions overseas would impose a delay of at least 14 days for initial response and up to 75–90 days for sustained operations. 3. If stockpiles are not established during peacetime, it might be provocative to attempt to reinforce chemical stocks quickly in a crisis. Cons: 1. Present stocks do not provide a significant operational capability; the expansion of overseas stocks necessary to create such a capability could involve increased political problems for the US. 2. Even maintaining present stockpiles of lethal chemical agents on foreign territory could become a source of political friction with the host country. D. Should the US consult with the FRG concerning the US CW stockpile in Germany? Pro: Early discussion would help to remove a possible irritant in relations before it developed into a major issue. Con: If the US decides to retain these stocks, raising the issue could unnecessarily jeopardize this objective and place the FRG in an awkward position. E. Should the US preserve a first-use option for incapacitating chemicals? * Pros: 1. Successful development of an effective incapacitating agent could provide a capability to gain a military advantage, but with fewer casualties than is possible throu01 the use of conventional, lethal chemical, or nuclear weapons. 2. Because they are non-lethal it may be possible to make these agents acceptable in world public opinion as being more humane than conventional or nuclear weapons. 3. Eliminating a first-use option without compensating political or military gains may unnecessarily deprive the US of a means of engaging in armed conflicts with resultant fewer casualties than in conventional war. Cons: 1. First-use of incapacitating chemicals would probably be construed by most nations, including some US allies, to contravene international law and the Geneva Protocol and to be contrary to past expressions of US policy. * 2. First-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemical or biological warfare (if the enemy force had the capability) since the enemy might well not acknowledge any distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents. 3. First-use of incapacitating chemicals could lead to a loosening of international constraints on CW and BW, make effective arms control measures more difficult and probably bring the US considerable international and domestic criticism. F. Should the US maintain an option for unrestricted use of RCA’s in warfare, and continue practicing this option in Vietnam? (The discussion below excludes peacetime use by US forces for crowd control and base security which is not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol or international law generally.) Pros: 1. In many military situations, use of RCA can contribute to military effectiveness; reduce US, civilian and enemy casualties and fatalities; decrease the destruction of civilian housing and public facilities; increase the possibilities of the capture of PWs; and impede enemy avenues of approach. Cons: 1. The use of tear gases in combat situations could blur the “no first-use” doctrine and ultimately contribute to a lowering of barriers against use and proliferation of CW capabilities in general. 2. Use of tear gases in Vietnam as an adjunct to lethal weapons may be construed by some to be contrary to past US official statements on use of tear gases in Vietnam. 3. The use of tear gases in war (even if limited to humanitarian purposes) has been considered by man nations to be contrary to customary international law and by most to be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. G. If the US maintains an option for the use of tear gas in war, should it be limited to “humanitarian purposes”? * Pros: 1. Would permit the US to ratify the Geneva Protocol with a public interpretation that would create a minimum of international opposition. 2. Wartime use would be allowed in much the same way as riot control agents are used in time of peace, allowing for broader use than most restrictive interpretations of the Geneva Protocol would permit. 3. Maintaining this option would help us to explain our use of tear gas in Vietnam as consistent with our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol. Cons: 1. If accepted, the military might well have to be restricted to use of tear gas in wartime to crowd control and base security which would deprive the military commander of the most useful military applications of tear gas. 2. Implementation of this principle would cast doubt on the legality of our present use of tear gas in Vietnam. 3. “Humanitarian purposes” is a term difficult to define conclusively and field commanders and others would be constantly beset by doubts about particular proposals to use tear gas, especially if its use would save the lives of their own troops, perhaps at the possible expense of the lives of the enemy. * H. Should the US retain a policy permitting first-use of chemical herbicides? (There is agreement that use of herbicides as a defoliant is not contrary to international law and is less likely to have international repercussions than use against crops. Thus the main issue centers on anti-crop use. Some believe that further research is required at least on possible long-term ecological effects of herbicides, and on such effects on human embryos as has led to the recent reaffirmation and extension of the policy banning the use of Agent 2, 4, 5 T in populated areas of CONUS and in Vietnam.) Pros: 1. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to clear the sides of roads, canals and rivers and around encampments, thereby reducing the possibility of enemy ambush and concealment, and providing more protection to US and SVN forces. 2. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to destroy crops, thereby making it more difficult for the enemy to secure food supplies. Cons: 1. The use of herbicides in an anti-crop role blurs a “no first-use” doctrine. 2. If the US continues to take the position that these agents are excluded from a “no first-use” policy, it could make international control of CW more difficult. 3. It is difficult to determine that crops are solely for the consumption of the armed forces which is the sole target sanctioned by international law. I. Should the use in war of all chemical and biological agents, including tear gas (riot control agents) and/or herbicides, require Presidential authorization? Pro: The political implications of the unrestricted use of tear gas and/or herbicides in war could be of such magnitude that it would be unwise to have them introduced without Presidential authority. Cons: 1. These non-lethal weapons should not be singled out of the US arsenal for special authorization. 2. This type decision should be predelegated in order for adequate planning and logistics support, if RCA is to be used. III. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 A. The Geneva Protocol of 1925: “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.” The position which the US Government takes with respect to the Protocol will depend upon: 1. The decisions reached on the policy issues described above, and in particular the decision with respect to tear gas; and 2. Legal interpretations of the scope and status of the Protocol which are considered at the end of this section. B. Background 1. At present, 84 States are Parties to the Geneva Protocol, including the USSR and Communist China. All major States are Parties except the United States and Japan. * The United States signed the Protocol in 1925 but never ratified it. In operative part, the Protocol reads as follows: “Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; “Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and “To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; “Declare: “That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition of the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.” 2. Thirty-nine States accompanied their ratifications with reservations or declarations which declare the prohibitions of the Protocol, as to the reserving State, to be inapplicable as to non-Signing States or toward Signing States which have first violated its provision (i.e., “no first-use”). Some reservations also include “Allies of Signing States” in this exception. 3. Since many States (including the United Kingdom, France and the USSR) have ratified with reservations, the United States may wish to add a “standard reservation” similar to the operative portions of prior reservations relating to “no first use” and “allies”. Although there is no consensus as to the scope and exact language of a proposed U.S. reservation, all agree that ratification by the U.S. should be accompanied by a reservation which limits the undertaking to a “no first use”, but would permit retaliation in the event of use by another state or its allies. 4. If the United States ratifies the Protocol, it will probably be desirable to include with ratification (and any reservation which it might wish to make) an interpretive statement. Such a statement would set forth the United States position and interpretation as to the Geneva Protocol’s effect on the use of C agents such as herbicides, defoliants, the use in warfare of RCA’s, and any other points which require interpretation. Interpretive statements which differ from generally accepted interpretations of the Protocol may be considered by Parties as reservations subject to acceptance nr rejection. 5. Ratification would not prohibit, restrict, or regulate any research and development, production, deployment, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons deemed necessary by the United States. C. Should the US ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare” , with—(four options) * 1. A reservation or interpretive statement permitting the United States to use chemical and biological incapacitating agents (Presumably such a reservation/interpretation also would include tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s for which pros and cons are in #2 below.) Pro: It would make clear our intent to preserve the option, wherever necessary and appropriate, to employ incapacitating agents to reduce overall casualties. Cons: (a) Ratification under such conditions would run contrary to the expressed views of nearly all other members of the international community and adherents to the Protocol, and is likely to be rejected by many Parties to the Protocol, thus raising serious questions whether ratification would advance US interests. (b) First use of chemical or biological incapacitants would be viewed by many countries as contrary to customary international law and any attempt to reserve an option for such use as legally ineffective. (c) It could be construed as inconsistent with past US statements of policy. * 2. A reservation or interpretive statement permitting the United States to use tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s in wartime without restrictions? Pros: (a) It would accomplish the positive step of ratifying the Protocol while at the same time preserving for the United States the wide latitude for the military use in wartime of tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s, ensuring that whenever necessary and appropriate, we would have the option to employ some non-lethal agents instead of other more lethal means of warfare. (b) Ratification would signal US interest in reinforcing the barriers against CBW, and could enhance the US position as regards the possible initiation or negotiation of any further arms control measures in the CBW area. (c) A reservation or interpretive statement or both is desirable to clearly state that we do not regard our use of RCA’s and herbicides in Vietnam as contrary to the Protocol. (d) Such a reservation or interpretive statement would coincide with the practice in Vietnam of the US and certain of its allies (Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Australia, the last two of which are parties to the Protocol.) Cons: (a) Ratification under such conditions would be contrary to the view of many members of the international community and Parties to the Protocol that unrestricted military use of tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s in wartime is prohibited by the Protocol. Ratification under such a statement of interpretation might be regarded by Parties to the Protocol as an attempt to change the actual nature of the existing obligations. (b) Ratification under such restrictions would limit “first-use” options for CW and BW incapacitating agents, which have some military value. (c) It could be construed as inconsistent with past US official statements. * 3. An interpretive statement or reservation setting forth the United States view that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of tear gas and riot control agents in wartime for “humanitarian purposes.”? Pros: (a) It would preserve some latitude for the use of tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s in wartime for genuine humanitarian purposes. (b) Ratification would: (i) strengthen the legal forces of the Protocol and international restraints on the use and proliferation of CW and BW agents; (ii) be interpreted as a positive, welcome step by the international community; (iii) reinforce past US official statements on the “no first-use doctrine”; (iv) reaffirm past US votes in favor of resolutions calling for strict adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol; (v) and could enhance the US position as regards the possible initiation or negotiation of any further arms control measures in the CBW area. Cons: (a) Ratification under these conditions, because of the difficulties of actually determining “humanitarian purposes”, would, of necessity, tightly restrict the military use of tear gas and other non-lethal RCA’s in wartime effectively limiting their use to crowd control and base security. In some cases where non-lethal agents might otherwise be used, lethal conventional weapons would have to be employed instead. (b) Ratification under such restraints would restrict “first-sue” options for non-lethal RCA’s and CW and BW incapacitating agents which we might wish to retain. (c) A ratification without an interpretive statement regarding RCA’s and herbicides (i) could lead to doubts on the legality of our present use of tear gas in Vietnam and (ii) preclude future use of this weapon with the consequent loss of its military value. 4. “Without an attempt to expressly reserve the right to use RCA’s in war?” Pros: (a) Ratification without additional reservation or interpretation would accord with the view of many States that the widest latitude ought to be given to the prohibitions of the Protocol. (b) Ratification would: (i) strengthen the legal force of the Protocol and international restraints on the use and proliferation of CW and BW agents; (ii) be interpreted as a positive, welcome step by the international community; (iii) reinforce past US official statements on the “non first-use doctrine”; and (iv) reaffirm past US votes in favor of resolutions calling for strict adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol. (c) Ratification would signal US interest in reinforcing the barriers against CBW, and could enhance the US position as regards the possible initiation or negotiation of any further arms control measures in the CBW area. Cons: (a) A ratification without an interpretive statement regarding RCA’s and herbicides (i) could cause grave doubts on the legality of our present use of tear gas in Vietnam * and (ii) preclude future use of this weapon with the consequent loss of its military value. (b) In the view of many members of the international community and Parties to the Protocol, it would restrict certain “first-use” options for tear gas, other non-lethal RCA’s in wartime, and CW and BW incapacitating agents which we might wish to retain, ruling out the use of these agents even for “humanitarian purposes”. D. Should the United States decide not to ratify the Geneva Protocol, choosing perhaps to make official pronouncements reaffirming United States CBW Policy? Pros: 1. It would avoid taking any firmer official position on the Protocol, particularly before the Senate during the ratification process, which might result in a restrictive interpretation of the Protocol and deny useful military options. (State and Defense differ over the scope of the prohibitions in the Protocol. See legal views at the end of this section.) 2. Ratification is not strictly necessary to establish US support for the principles and objectives of the Protocol in view of past official statements supporting and announcing adherence to those principles and objectives. 3. It would avoid the disadvantages of ratifying the Protocol with a reservation that might not have international acceptance. Cons: 1. Non-ratification would be regarded by many nations who are aware of our current policy review as representing a negative outcome to this review, and would leave us vulnerable to propaganda exploitation by the Soviet Union. 2. Non-ratification would be seen as a blow to progress in disarmament and arms control measures in the CBW field. 3. Non-ratification would represent loss of an opportunity to: (a) strengthen the legal force of the Protocol and international restraints on the use and proliferation of CW and BW agents; (b) take a positive step, which would be welcomed by the international community; (c) reinforce past US official statements on the “no first-use doctrine”; and (d) reaffirm past US votes in favor of resolutions calling for strict adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol. E. Legal Issues 1. The Department of State (a) While the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, as qualified by standard reservations, is not free from ambiguities, the most persuasive interpretation is that it prohibits the first-use in warfare among parties of (i) all biological weapons and agents and (ii) all chemical agents and weapons except (i) herbicides and (ii) those riot-control agents widely used for domestic law enforcement purposes when they are used for “humanitarian purposes.” Most States, including the US in official statements at the UNGA in December 1968 and at the CCD, maintain that the term “bacteriological” in the Protocol includes all “biological” agents and weapons. (b) While use of “asphyxiating” and “poisonous” gases is clearly prohibited by the 1925 Protocol, the term “other gases” is ambiguous. Some have suggested that a distinction may be drawn between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. However, there is no basis in the negotiating history of the Geneva Protocol for making this distinction. In addition, there is no objective way to differentiate lethal from supposedly non-lethal chemical weapons. Many States, and the Secretary-General or the United Nations, interpret the words “other gases” in the Protocol as prohibiting the use in warfare of any C weapon or agent, including herbicides and tear gas, under all circumstances. The United States, speaking through the US Ambassador to the United Nations, has taken the position that the Protocol does not prohibit the use in warfare, for humanitarian purposes, of anti-personnel C gases which are widely used by governments to control riots by their own people. Today, this would permit the use of tear gas for humanitarian purposes, since it is the only riot-control agent presently widely used by governments domestically. (c) The central purpose of the Protocol is humanitarian—to prevent the use of a class or classes of agents in warfare that cause unnecessary suffering. Wide domestic use of tear gases for riot control purposes and the absence of permanent or long-term damaging effects provide grounds for arguing that use of these agents in warfare is not inconsistent with the purpose of the Geneva Protocol. The primary rationale for an interpretation amounting to a total ban on chemical agents—that there is no reliable and noncontroversial distinction between legal and illegal agents on the basis of their harmless nature—may be overcome if legal agents are limited to those widely used by governments for domestic law enforcement purposes. Moreover, the humanitarian purposes of the Protocol are not offended, but rather furthered when these agents are used in combat in a manner calculated to reduce enemy and civilian casualties. It cannot, however, be argued that use of these agents in conjunction with other weapons to facilitate the killing or wounding of the enemy furthers the humanitarian purposes of the Protocol. Any attempt to distinguish between the use of poisonous gas itself to create casualties, and the use of non-poisonous gas in conjunction with other deadly weapons to create casualties, is not persuasive in the context of the purposes of the Protocol, and would almost certainly be widely condemned. (d) The Department of State has also taken the position that the principles of the Protocol have become part of customary international law. Thus, in Congressional correspondence in 1967, it was stated that “We consider that the basic rule set forth in this document [the Protocol] has been so widely accepted over a long period of time that it is now considered to form a part of customary international law.” While the establishment of these principles as customary international law is not free from doubt, this conclusion is based on the practice and statements of States, including the United States, and the nature and purpose of the Protocol. Most recently, over 90 States, including the United States, have voted for UN resolutions (in 1966 and 1968) that demand strict and unconditional compliance with the “principles and objectives” of the Protocol. The establishment of the principle of the Protocol as customary international law renders inoperative reservations of some States which seek to apply the Protocol only to other Contracting States. All States, whether or not Parties to the Protocol, are bound to observe rules of customary international law. (e) Some have argued that there is no “humanitarian purposes” limitation either in the Protocol or under customary international law on the ways in which RCAs can be used in warfare. The United States has not sought to establish a broader exception that would permit the use of such agents in connection with conventional fire to kill enemy troops. Most states which have expressed views and the Secretary-General take the position that the Protocol prohibits any use of tear gases in warfare. Accordingly, if the United States determines to ratify the Protocol and wishes to maintain the option to use tear gas “for humanitarian purposes,” an express interpretation to this effect should accompany ratifications. * (f) If the United States were to determine to maintain the option for unrestricted use of tear gas and other incapacitants, it would be necessary not only to include (with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate) an express interpretation or reservation to this effect in ratifying the Protocol, but also to take the position that the United States does not recognize any customary international law restriction on such uses and to oppose UN resolutions evidencing such a customary law limitations. 2. The Department of Defense The Department of Defense does not agree with the Department of State position that the Geneva Protocol now states principles of customary international law and that its prohibitions extend to the type of agents now being employed by the United States in Vietnam. First, the Protocol language, itself, only purports to bind the Parties “as between themselves,” and the many reservations limiting its application further deprive it of any general law declaring effect and convert it into a confusing array of contractual relationships. That there is, at the least, major disagreement on the Protocol’s legal effect is reflected in the UK study tabled at the ENDC in Geneva in August 1968: “(ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.” The reason for this disagreement is obvious. The reservations to the Protocol create the following congeries of differing contractual relationships, depending upon the substance of the reservation, and upon whether other ratifying States have accepted or objected to the reservations. (a) States which have ratified the Protocol without reservations have an unqualified commitment with all other such States, in which no use of the prohibited weapons is legal, except, the limited right of reprisal. (b) All States taking reservations concerning non-party States have qualified their obligations to permit use against a State which is not a party. (c) Reserving States have qualified their legal obligation so that a use of the prohibited weapon is legal if another State or its allies have first used it against them. The language of the reservations regarding this “second use” however, is not clear, i.e., whether any and all CW or BW agents may be employed as a second use or whether the second use is limited to the specific CW or BW agent used by the first using State. (d) All States which have objected to the State or States making reservations, have either prevented the Protocol from coming into force between them, or have established a contractual relationship modified in terms of the reservation and objection. These varying contractual relationships, which confuse the interpretation and application of the Geneva Protocol, clearly show that the States which have ratified it did not intend to declare rules of customary international law. Further, they deprive the Protocol from being an adequate “source” of customary international law. This conclusion is buttressed by a recent study conducted for ACDA by the noted publicists Ann and A.J. Thomas, of Southern Methodist University School of Law. After surveying the confusion, they concluded: “The best that can be said, therefore, of the Geneva Protocol is that it does not constitute a completely legal obligation even between its signatories. It establishes a whole host of legal regimes which seem to be impossible to untangle.” (At page 102) Second, while it is true that the practice of States since the 1925 Protocol has generally shown compliance coinciding with its provision, there is no evidence to show that such compliance was based on legal restraints rather than policy reasons, facts which must be shown to deduce a rule of law from State practice. Nor is there evidence to show that compliance was necessarily linked to the Geneva Protocol. Indeed, the United States representative recently stated categorically in the United Nations that the United States considered that non-use of C & B agents during WW II was based upon the fear of retaliation rather than on the Protocol’s legal restraint. (Ambassador Fisher, November 27, 1967.) Finally, recent discussions of Western disarmament expects in NATO (US Mission NATO 4454) demonstrates no consensus on the subject of whether or not the Geneva Protocol now states customary international law. Only the Netherlands was willing to come out affirmatively on this point. The UK opinion was that there was “some evidence” of a customary rule, while Italy and Belgium expressed doubt. Denmark stated categorically that no such customary rule existed. Third, with regard to the type of agents which are prohibited by the Protocol, the DOD agrees with the DOS that the Protocol language is ambiguous. The DOD is of the further view that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of incapacitants, RCA, herbicides or defoliants. There is, in fact, considerable disagreement among States on the Protocol’s coverage, i.e., whether all gases, or whether only those which are lethal in nature are prohibited. This is a matter which is not resolved by the Protocol. A UK study tabled at the ENDC in August 1968, stated, in this regard: “(IV) There is no consensus on the meaning of the term “gases” in the phrase “asphyxiating, poisonous or devices.” The French version of the Protocol renders “or other” as “ou similaries” and the discrepancy between “other” and “similaries” has led to disagreement on whether nonlethal gases are covered by the Protocol.” The Department of Defense view is supported not only by the Practices which have been sanctioned by the United States Government for the use of RCA in Vietnam, but also by many statements of policy by United States’ officials on these practices. These statements demonstrate, contrary to the DOS position, that taken as a whole, US justification of its use of RCA’s in Vietnam is that these agents are not banned by the Protocol or by international law—not on the narrow ground that a “humanitarian purpose” exception exists. Further, there is no evidence that this distinction proposed by the Department of State—that riot control or incapacitants may be used in warfare only for “humanitarian purposes”—has been accepted by all or even a majority of States. The negotiating history of the Protocol does not show that this doctrine of “humanitarian purpose” was even considered by its draftsmen. In the DOD view, use of RCA’s or incapacitants is either prohibited by the Protocol or it is not . There is no basis for the argument that their use is permitted for “humanitarian” purposes and prohibited for all others. The Department of Defense view is that there are no rules of customary international law which prohibit, per se , the use of any chemical agent reasonably employed to secure a military objective, other than the generally accepted principle that weapons shall not be used against non-combatants or to cause unnecessary suffering, and those rules which state that a soldier who is hors de combat is not a lawful target under the laws of war. Whether or not the enemy is hors de combat , however, is a factual and not a legal question. There is no rule which says that gases and conventional weapons cannot be used together. There is, instead, the above-mentioned test to be applied on a case-by-case basis to the facts. This position is in accord with that developed by Thomas and Thomas for ACDA (pp 171–173), referred to above. There is no support for the DOS argument that CW or BW agents—or any other weapon—shall be used “only for humanitarian purposes” i.e., only to save lives or reduce casualties. With respect to biological agents the Department of Defense takes the view that the term “bacteriological” is vague and ambiguous and was not intended to encompass organisms which are not “bacterial” in nature. Other biological organisms such as rikettsiae, viruses and fungi under this view do not fall under the Protocol’s prohibition. This view is supported by the “draft convention on biological warfare” tabled by the United Kingdom at the ENDC in June 1969, the purpose of which is to overcome the ambiguous provision in the Geneva Protocol concerning “bacteriological” warfare. The United Kingdom considers this term “not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbiological agents.” Additionally, since the Protocol prohibition of “bacteriological methods of warfare” is only an extension to such agents of the basic Protocol prohibition, the same rationale as set forth above with respect to chemical agents would apply to incapacitating bacteriological agents. Hence, such agents are considered to be beyond the reach of the Protocol. Finally, it should be noted that if DOS views on the status of the Geneva Protocol as customary international law and on its scope are adopted by the US Government, and if public pronouncement of such adoption is made, the effect would be for our Government to brand itself and its allies as lawbreakers, and to publicly announce that our own actions in Vietnam and those of our allies, were and are contrary to established principles of international law. Further, if the option is taken to ratify the Protocol with an interpretation that RCA’s are prohibited per se by the Protocol, as some States contend, we would be in the anomalous position of saying it is a crime to use RCA’s against enemy soldiers but legal to use the same agents against our own civilians in peace time. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. Davis forwarded the report to Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Mitchell, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Gerard Smith, and DuBridge under cover of a November 12 memorandum in which she noted that it reflected discussion at the October 30 Review Group meeting and would be considered at the upcoming NSC meeting. (Ibid.) Under cover of a November 17 memorandum, Davis notified recipients of the IMPG report that on page 46, line 4, the text should read, “The United States has not sought to establish.” (Ibid, Box H–153, NSSM 59) * Department of Defense prefers the terms “biological agents” or “biological research agents.” * The Department of State view is that given the paucity of available evidence, as is reflected in the above, it is not possible to characterize the size of the stockpile. DIA believes it is possible to characterize the size of the stockpile. * The report of the House-Senate conference on 4 November 1969 indicated a reduction of $10.5 million in RDT&E on chemical and biological warfare agents and delivery systems, a reduction of about 11 percent from the President’s budget figures shown in this table and the table on page 16. * See footnote on page 14. * The UK stated at the July 2 NAC discussion of their convention that parties would be free to produce biological agents for use in vaccines, etc. The convention does not attempt to establish exactly what level of production or testing is consistent with a passive defense capability. * Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. ** Although BW agents do require large safety zones, their controllability under other than a strategic attack is possible, based on results of testing to date. * Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. * The US currently does not have an effective operational incapacitating chemical capability. * DOD does not believe such would contravene international law. * “Humanitarian purposes” has never been clearly defined. By way of illustration, however, the use of tear gas in Vietnam would be authorized where civilians and enemy forces were thought to be intermingled and the purpose of using tear gas was to save civilian lives. Tear gas would not be authorized where the primary purpose was to deny enemy troops cover or concealment and make conventional weapons such as artillery or airstrikes more effective. OSD/JCS believe that no “humanitarian purpose” doctrine on the use of weapons exists. * ACDA believes that workable rules of engagement could be issued which, at a minimum, prohibited use of RCA’s in conjunction with conventional weapons such as artillery or air strikes to facilitate killing of enemy troops. OSD/JCS disagrees. * Since 1965, 20 States have become Parties to the Protocol and Japan has recently indicated its willingness to consider ratification. * Legal issues underlying the pros and cons are discussed in Section E, below. * DOD does not believe that past US official statements of no-first-use of lethal agents apply equally to non-lethal agents. * DOD does not believe that past US official statements of no-first-use of lethal agents apply equally to non-lethal agents. * This disadvantage could be overcome if the decision were accompanied by a statement indicating this was a unilateral policy change not required by international law. (ACDA) This disadvantage may, in part, be justified by an official pronouncement declaring that the United States has made a unilateral policy change toward the legal content of the Geneva Protocol. On the other hand, such an official pronouncement would not overcome the propaganda effects which unfriendly States would enjoy. As such, an official statement of this kind would be harmful rather than beneficial (DOD) * It is State’s view that if this position is adopted, any public statements on the extent of the United States obligations under customary international law could and should be avoided. 157. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) 157. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Yost) 1 Washington, November 13, 1969 Dear Charlie: Thank you for your letter of October 29 concerning the CBW issue at the United Nations and, in particular, the question of ratifying the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We have been fully aware of the great interest in this subject at the United Nations and elsewhere, and have attempted to move this complex issue through the NSC system with all reasonable speed. Last week the Review Group considered the interagency CBW report, and it is now being revised for a National Security Council meeting on November 19. In light of your letter, we have attempted to move up the November 19 date, but the present schedules of the President and other NSC members make this impossible. You will be armed with policy guidance on the 1925 Protocol and other CBW issues promptly after the NSC session. I hope this will be early enough to make your tasks manageable. It would be most useful if you were to attend the NSC meeting on CBW as well as the meeting on Southern Africa which is now tentatively scheduled for the following week. The President will want to hear your views on these matters. It was good to hear from you. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Vol. II, 1 Aug 1969–31 Jan 1970, Pt. 3. Confidential. 158. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 158. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 17, 1969 SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on CBW, November 18 The NSC meeting is intended to consider the basic U.S. policy issues relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW). The objective of the meeting is to establish a policy framework for future CBW programs which will be consistent with both national security and arms control objectives. Because the subject of CBW is highly complex, it will be possible during the meeting to address only the key issues. Your decisions on these issues, however, will provide the policy direction for the groups of sub-issues. There is consensus on a number of policy aspects of CBW. All agree that there is need for: — Continuing research and development, with emphasis on defense. — Refinement of controls and safety measures. — Better intelligence on other nations’ CBW capabilities. — Doctrinal reliance on a “no first-use” policy for lethal chemical and biological weapons. — A closely coordinated public affairs policy. Attached and tabbed are: — Your talking points , which will introduce the subject and structure the discussion. Briefings are called for by Mr. Helms and General Wheeler. I would propose to lead the discussion centering about the key issues. When I complete my outline of the issues, I suggest that you call on appropriate participants at the meeting for their views. Your talking points proceed in this way. — An “Issues for Decision” paper which includes my recommendation on each of the issues. You need to read only your talking points and the “Issues for Decision” paper. Additional background material is enclosed in a separate background book. Briefly summarized, the topics for discussion are: 1. Policy on Biological Weapons Specific Issues for Decision a. Should we retain a capability for combat use of lethal or incapacitating biological weapons? If not, what should be the extent of research and development on biological weapons? b. Can we or should we support the UK Draft Convention which would prohibit development, production and use of biological weapons? 2. Policy on Chemical Weapons Specific Issues for Decision a. Should we retain a capability for use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons or should we confine our chemical programs to research and development? b. If we wish to retain a lethal chemical capability should we maintain stockpiles overseas? c. If we wish to retain an incapacitating chemical capability should the “no first-use” policy apply to them as well as to lethal chemicals? 3. Policy on Tear Gas and our Position Toward the Geneva Protocol Specific Issues for Decision a. Do we wish to continue unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam and to keep this option open for the future? b. Do we wish to ratify the Geneva Protocol which bans first use of chemical and biological weapons? c. If so, are we willing to include incapacitating agents and tear gas within the strictures of the protocol or can we interpret the protocol to exclude them? 4. Policy on Authorization for Use of Tear Gas and Herbicides Specific Issues for Decision a. Should Presidential authorization be required for the use of tear gas and herbicides outside of Vietnam as it is for all other chemical and biological weapons? b. If not, to what level should the authority be delegated? Attachment Washington, undated ISSUES FOR DECISION There are four principal policy issues for decision. Each major issue subsumes an additional number of specific questions. I. POLICY ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) There are two questions to be decided. A. What should be the nature and scope of U.S. policy on biological warfare? There are four options: 1. Retain a Full Capability Including Both Lethal and Incapacitating Biological Weapons. 2. Retain a Capability for Incapacitating Weapons Only. 3. Research and Development Program Only, but for both Offensive and Defensive Purposes. 4. Research and Development Program for Defensive Purposes Only and to Protect against Technological surprise. — Some argue that we should retain a full BW capability because (1) a lethal BW capability helps deter BW attack and gives us another strategic option; (2) because it would take considerable time to reconstitute stockpiles and delivery means; and (3) because biological incapacitants —the only effective incapacitating capability we maintain—could be useful in military operations such as amphibious invasion. — Others argue that we should maintain a research and development program only because (1) our nuclear deterrent serves to deter strategic use of lethal BW; (2) the control and effectiveness of BW weapons are uncertain as are the deterrent or retaliatory value of incapacitants; (3) though they could possibly be useful in a “first-use” situation, such use could risk escalation and would be considered by most nations to be contrary to the international law; and (4) a research and development program would protect against technological surprise. All agencies, except the Joint Chiefs, support Option 4. Recommendation: That you approve Option 4, (research and development for defensive purposes) to include only enough offensive research and development to protect against technological surprise. B. Should the U.S. support the U.K. Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Warfare? There are three options: 1. Defer any decision. 2. Associate in principle only. 3. Do not support. — If our BW policy is to concentrate on research and development for defensive purposes (Option 4) we can support the Convention. Under any other policy we would have to oppose it or seek major modifications. The Convention provides for no on-site verification, but relies on procedures for investigation of treaty violations by agencies under UN auspices. Also, its relation to other CBW arms control proposals is unclear. No one argues that we should agree to the Convention as it stands. — Some argue that we should associate in principle (1) to evidence our willingness to consider limitations on biological warfare, particularly if we maintain a research and development program only, and (2) because we could gain political benefits without tying our hands until questions such as scope of the Convention and suitable verification procedures were resolved. — Others contend that there is no urgency to consider the Convention and that any association with it might weaken our opposition to unverifiable provisions in other arms control proposals. Recommendation: That you approve Option 2 (Association in Principle) subject to the satisfactory resolution of such questions as verification procedures and the relation of the U.K. Draft Convention to other arms control measures. II. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) POLICY ISSUES There are three basic issues. A. Should we maintain a lethal chemical capability and if so where and at what level should we maintain stocks? There are two options: 1. Maintain lethal chemical stockpiles for deterrence or retaliation: a. In the U.S. only. b. In the U.S. and overseas. 2. Rely on Research and Development only. — Some argue that we need lethal chemicals (1) to deter chemical attack, and (2) as a retaliatory option between a conventional response (which might be inadequate) and escalation to nuclear response. They also argue (1) that unilateral elimination of this capability would give up a valuable bargaining counter in arms control discussions and, (2) that so long as we maintain our declaratory policy of “no-first-use” the international political costs of retaining the capability are not excessive. They contend that stocks should be maintained overseas (particularly in Germany) to assure the capability for timely response and because, were they to be removed, attempts to replace them in a crisis could be both difficult and provocative. The JCS also believe that existing stocks of mustard gas should be retained until improved agents are developed because they represent a large portion of existing casualty producing chemical stocks. — Others argue that (1) our tactical nuclear capability makes lethal chemicals unnecessary as a deterrent, and (2) that existence of the chemical capability may encourage chemical attack because the threshold of response appears lower to the enemy. They believe that an offensive and defensive research and development program would guard against technological surprise and the improvement of defensive measures could lessen the likelihood of chemical attack because of inevitable enemy uncertainty about the true extent of our CW capabilities. They contend that, in any event, we should not retain stocks overseas because (1) existing stocks are too small for an adequate response and to increase them would cause political problems with our allies; (2) needed chemical support to theaters of operation can be provided from the United States quickly; and (3) continued presence of these stocks, particularly in Germany, could become a source of friction. They argue further that mustard gas is far less effective than our other chemical weapons and that its destruction would yield political benefit. The Secretary of Defense favors destruction of mustard gas. Recommendation: That you approve retention of a lethal chemical capability and retention of the stocks in Germany (Option 1-b). That you also approve the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to destroy or detoxify the stocks of mustard gas, but in a phased manner to assure an adequate capability while the development of safer weapons is in progress. B. Should the U.S. “no first-use” policy on lethal chemicals apply also to incapacitating chemicals? Two options: 1. Affirm that the U.S. policy of “no first-use” applies also to incapacitants. 2. Exclude incapacitants from a “no first-use” policy. — All agencies support our declaratory policy of “no first-use” for lethal chemicals but there are differing views as to whether it should apply to incapacitants. The incapacitant we now have is not an operationally effective agent because of its uncertain effects, but research is continuing with some promise of development. — The proponents of including incapacitants in the policy argue that (1) their deterrent or retaliatory value is questionable, and their principal utility would be in a “first-use” situation against an unprotected enemy; and (2) that most nations would see such use contrary to the Geneva Protocol, international law and past expressions of U.S. policy. They argue also that first-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemicals, and loosen international constraints on chemical warfare. — The opponents argue that an effective agent, if developed, could give military advantage in a variety of situations with fewer casualties and might be accepted internationally as more “humane” than other weapons. — The JCS position is uncertain but they probably favor retaining a “first-use” option. The Secretary of Defense may, and all other agencies will, support including incapacitants in our no “first-use” policy. Recommendation: That you approve a “no first-use” policy for incapacitants with the understanding that this does not preclude continued research and development toward an effective agent. III. THE USE OF TEAR GAS AND/OR HERBICIDES AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL The United States signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925 but has not ratified it. The Protocol in effect bans the first-use of chemical and biological weapons but the question as to whether tear gas and herbicides are included under this ban is unresolved within the bureaucracy. Our policy as to future use of tear gas and herbicides may affect when and how we ratify the Protocol if we want to do so. There are two questions to be decided. A. Should we maintain the option for unrestricted use of tear gas in war in Vietnam and in the future or adopt a more limited policy? There are three options: 1. Unrestricted use to give us full military advantage when and if we want it. 2. Limited use. 3. No use in war except for riot control. — The proponents of unrestricted use argue that, used with conventional weapons in Vietnam, tear gas has been effective in limiting U.S. casualties and in restricting enemy mobility. Moreover, we should not forego the advantages it affords us now, nor should we foreclose our options for the future. They contend that limitation on its use would also cast doubt on the legality of our practices in Vietnam. — The opponents contend that the advantages in Vietnam may not accrue in other situations where enemy defenses are more effective, or where the enemy has an appreciable chemical capability of his own. They argue also that most nations consider the Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of tear gas except for crowd control and that a policy of “no use” or limited use for “humanitarian” purposes would make it possible for us to ratify the Geneva Protocol with less difficulty than a policy of unrestricted use. No agency, except possibly Arms Control and Disarmament, proposes limitations on use in Vietnam. Recommendation: That you approve continued unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam, but defer decision as to future use. B. Should the U.S. ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol and, if so, with what if any reservations or interpretations? The Geneva Protocol prohibits “use in war and asphyxiating, poisonous and/or other gases… and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. The position we can take toward ratification depends primarily on whether we wish to continue our use of tear gas in Vietnam and to a lesser extent on whether we wish to exclude incapacitating agents from our “no first-use” policy. If we were to forego the use of tear gas and apply the “no first-use” policy to incapacitatants we could ratify the protocol without reservation or interpretation. If we want to exclude incapacitants from the “no first-use” policy, ratification is all but out of the question since most parties to the protocol would reject such a reservation. If we wish to continue using tear gas we could ratify either with a legal interpretation that the Protocol does not prohibit use of tear gas or with a statement of understanding to this effect. — Proponents argue that ratification (1) would strengthen the legal force of the Protocol and international restraints on proliferation of BW and CW, (2) would be welcomed internationally as a positive step reinforcing our past statements, and (3) could enhance our position in any future CBW arms control negotiations. — Others argue that ratification would impose undesirable legal inhibitions on our freedom to use these weapons first when it might be in our interest to do so. Also, willingness to accept limitation of tear gas would forego a weapon of proven utility in Vietnam and cast doubt on the legality of use there. JCS probably oppose ratification and at least would want to reserve incapacitating agents and tear gas from the prohibitions of the Protocol. The Secretary of Defense may support ratification as long as we keep our options open on the use of tear gas. The Secretary of State favors ratification with a statement of understanding (not a legal reservation) stating our position on the use of tear gas. Recommendation: That you approve ratification without a legal (formal) reservation but with a statement of our understanding that the provisions of the Protocol do not prohibit use of tear gas in war. IV. AUTHORIZATION POLICY The issue is whether the use of tear gas and herbicides in war, other than in Vietnam, should require Presidential authorization as is the case for all other chemical and biological weapons. Use of tear gas and herbicides do not now require such authorization. There are three options: 1. Require Presidential Authorization. 2. Delegate authority to the Secretary of Defense (a) for tear gas and herbicides or (b) for herbicides only 3. Require no prior authorization. — Those favoring Presidential authorization argue that (1) the political implications of unrestricted use of these weapons particularly tear gas and anti-crop herbicides are grave, as demonstrated by our experience in Vietnam. Furthermore, we should not authorize future use until the situation in which they would be employed is clear. — Others argue that these are non-lethal weapons of proven utility and maximum flexibility for their use should be retained. They contend that the authority at minimum should be delegated to permit planning and development of logistic support for use. They contend that defoliants in particular should require no prior authorization because they are of proven benefit in reducing U.S. casualties and criticism of their use has not been great. JCS probably prefer that no prior authorization be required for the use of tear gas and herbicides. The Secretary of Defense probably would prefer delegation of authority to him. The Secretary of State may argue for a delegation to the Secretary of Defense provided that decision to authorize use would require his concurrence. Recommendation: That you require Presidential Authorization for the use of tear gas and anti-crop herbicides (Option 1) and a delegation to the Secretary of Defense to authorize use of defoliants. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–25, NSC Meeting, 11/18/69, CBW, NSSM 59. Top Secret. The attached Talking Points are not published. 159. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 159. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, November 17, 1969, 7 p.m. Laird wanted to check a couple of items before the NSC meeting tomorrow. He thought the public affairs part of these discussions had been completely overlooked in the paper. He said biological research is something that can be supported but biological warfare cannot be supported by anyone. K asked if that wasn’t the purpose. Laird said as far as the paper is concerned, they would miss (?) the public affairs impact. K thought Laird should make that point at the meeting. K said that would be the thrust. On Geneva protocol, Laird thought they could go along with that provided that there is the reservation on 14B (teargas). These are agents that we use right here. We should tie that reservation but support everything else. K said these papers are written so that everyone can say he has had a fair hearing. That would be K’s recommendation and where he hopes the President will come out. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 11–17, 1969. No classification marking. 160. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 160. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, November 18, 1969, 11:55 a.m. K wanted to discuss the NSC meeting. #1 K said he was going to ask General Wheeler to give facts of what strikes we have. When they get into the policy, K said he would make sure the President calls on Laird first. On the BW, K’s view was that we should keep R&D for decision positions (?). Laird said the thing about it is that this paper deals with some important issues down the line—it doesn’t address the basic question—what kind of weapons, strategic or [omission in original] that have conversion capability. Laird didn’t think biological warfare is a strategic weapon. K said that would be brought out at the meeting. There will be no affirmative decision for any BW program. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18–28, 1969. No classification marking. 161. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting 161. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting 1 Washington, November 18, 1969 PARTICIPANTS: The President Vice President Agnew Secretary of State Rogers Secretary of Defense Laird Attorney General Mitchell General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS Director of Intelligence Helms U.S. Representative to the U.N. Yost Assistant to the President Kissinger Under Secretary of State Richardson Lee DuBridge, Science Advisor to the President Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State William Watts, NSC Michael Guhin, NSC RN - This is a difficult and unpleasant subject about which we have little real knowledge. HELMS - (Director Helms briefing is attached.) RN - I hope we know more about ours than about theirs. WHEELER - At the end of World War II, we captured a great deal in the way of German shells and stockpiles. There is an apocryphal story that the Germans planned to use (chemical warfare) against the Normandy landing. It is apocryphal because the German General Staff ignored orders. The main use to us of Chemical Warfare is as a deterrent. I am inclined to think that the Soviets’ capability is greater than ours, since ours is so small. They can resupply quickly by land to Europe or Asia. They do show plans to use them. They have experimented with decontaminants. If the enemy used chemical warfare and the U.S. lacked defenses, the advantage would accrue to the enemy. Historically, the use of chemicals has never been initiated against a nation which had them. The Italians used them against Somalia, and the Egyptians used them in Yemen. If we had no retaliatory equipment, we would have to be prepared all the way along the front. If both had such equipment then neither would have the advantage. I therefore conclude that we should have a modest deterrent capability. Chemical warfare has many uses: — Attrition — in actions smaller than nuclear exchanges — to give credibility — for long-lasting effect We must deploy our stocks forward; we can’t move them rapidly in time of crisis. There are chemical incapacitants which we don’t have in large enough quantity. They having five too many. With regard to our biological warfare program, its major value is deterrence. If this fails, then we have a modest ability to retaliate. Our stockpiles are in terms of pounds, not tons. We don’t know what the Soviets have, but they are interested. If the enemy uses BW, we must take a massive conventional or nuclear response. A nuclear response means the risk of nuclear escalation. The psychological impact would be high. Our BW program is the only free-world program. Eighty percent of our program is RDT&E. It costs $7 million a year for agents and delivery systems. Our facility at Pine Bluff can go into production in 30 days. If it were closed, it would take two to three years to reactivate. The JCS believes that, on balance, it has a low cost, that it would be a catastrophe if we can’t respond, and there is a difficulty in verifying enemy capabilities. Therefore, the JCS believes that we must retain our present stockpile and the option of production if needed. With regard to riot control agents, these are primarily tear gas. They reduce casualties. They assist in withdrawal and breaking off contact. They can reduce the fire aimed at helicopters. They can be used to deny the enemy avenues of approach. Herbicides improve vertical and horizontal visibility and help reduce ambushes. KISSINGER - (Presented the issues and options as contained in his talking points in attached NSC book.) RN - Charlie (Yost), any comment? YOST - The only action to go to the UN on the subject has been the Canadian procedural item which refers the subject back to Geneva. There is general concern at the UN with CBW and seabeds. If we can present a generally cooperative position, then there is no immediate problem. We can go with the Canadian resolution. FARLEY - We need to decide the security requirements first. It is difficult to devise an inspection scheme. We would welcome limiting our own efforts to R&D. We would then be willing to look at the UK initiative. But we must look at verification, inspection and complaints procedures, and the question of aid to countries who claimed they were attacked. DUBRIDGE - There is great public interest in this subject. What is the military use? The value of a BW retaliatory capability is not clear. There is slow incubation, perhaps two weeks, and then 2 weeks to retaliate. We don’t know how it spreads and we are unsure about possible epidemics. The military retaliatory value of BW is not great. I would think it was better to go to chemical warfare than nuclear. We could be in a better situation. The whole issue is not clear from the scientific side. RN - The UK proposal would allow R&D for defensive purposes? FARLEY - It is hard to be sure. ROGERS - The language is flexible. It could be done. WHEELER - We don’t feel as strongly about BW as about CW. We would like to see a minimal RDT&E program pointed to defense, guarding against offensive actions by the enemy. KISSINGER - On incapacitants, what we have is lethal to anyone without two nurses. It would be unlikely that we would use lethal chemical weapons in a strategic attack. Nuclear weapons would be more cost-effective. We should therefore use chemical weapons for tactical purposes. The tear gas question concerns ratification of the Geneva Protocol. It would ban the first use of CW and BW. It is not clear about tear gas and herbicides. ROGERS - Australia has ratified without making an interpretive statement. Wasn’t the Protocol withdrawn in 1948? Would we have to resubmit it? There is Congressional pressure to resubmit it, and we could say we comply. YOST - In 1966, the Administration called for support of the Protocol. KISSINGER - If we ratify, we must fill in the gap about the first use of incapacitants. It would be another unverifiable arms control agreement. ROGERS - If we exclude tear gas, we wouldn’t have really changed our position. LAIRD - This was a good study. We should go beyond it. I must defend these programs. We are falling into a bad trap. CW and BW should not be put together. People who are against biological warfare also go against chemical warfare. But the latter is necessary for deterrence. These are two entirely different subjects. We need to clarify what CW and BW really mean. BW does not have a deterrent quality. We need a strategy for CW. We need a simple and understandable policy statement on it. We need a legislative and public relations game plan. This paper doesn’t do that. I believe we should renounce biological warfare, but go forward with an immunization program and research. There are communicable disease programs in Atlanta and under HEW. The scientists there can do good work. From the standpoint of deterrence, the deterrent program is good. We are on the verge of losing our CW capability. In the transport of phosgene gas, we do one percent and private industry does 99 percent. RN - It is not a good paper. LAIRD - Two points are particularly important: CW and BW should be separated, and a public relations and legislative game plan is not set forth. MITCHELL - There should be no prohibition of tear gas. This would be hard on our law enforcement. We need tear gas. And it makes your sinuses clearer. LAIRD - It helps with the reduction of casualties in Vietnam. And not oily necessarily in preparation for attack. It gets the enemy out so you can see who they are. DUBRIDGE -I agree with General Wheeler and Secretary Laird. CW has a deterrent effect. There is the danger of transportation. This can be lessened with binary weapons. LAIRD - We are close to this. RN - It is important to distinguish these. Also, you should move some programs to HEW and still get all the information you need. That relaxes the scientists. ROGERS - There is not really much disagreement. We need decisions, and we can work out a scenario. We should not delay. LAIRD - We shouldn’t leak this around town. RN - The public relations aspect is very important. KISSINGER - You should reflect for a day. We can then issue an NSDM and work out the public relations and game plan. RN - We could take a forthcoming position. YOST - And ratify the Geneva Protocol. RN - Does this bother you? ROGERS -We should do it with no reservation. RN - We should approve it without reservation, but make a statement of understanding. We need tear gas and will use it. KISSINGER - We can show this in the NSDM. RN - We should clear this with Sato. We have mixed CW and BW together and should get them separated. RICHARDSON - There is no significant international pressure for getting rid of CW stockpiles. The Protocol applied to its use. FARLEY - It will go to Geneva, and then you can get it passed back to me. RN - We can fuzz up the language. We should develop a simple statement within 48 hours. Then I want a positive public statement. It should emphasize that this is an example of the right leadership, but which has the national security in mind. WHEELER - The last time this was before a National Security defense panel was during President Eisenhower’s Administration. ROGERS - We shouldn’t do this while Sato is here. LAIRD - That is no problem. RN - I want a well thought-out statement. It should be released Sunday for the Monday papers, Bill. DUBRIDGE - It should say we will destroy dangerous chemicals and are moving to binaries. LAIRD - We would need three years to burn them. RN - Bryce Harlow thinks it is imperative to brief the legislature on Okinawa. Phil Farley and Henry Kissinger did this on SALT. We should do it on Okinawa. ROGERS - Yes. Alex Johnson and Henry should do it at first, and then you should come in. RN - We must brief the Armed Services Committee. They will be against it. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The minutes bear no indication of who drafted them. The attachments (the NSC book and Helms’ briefing on Soviet chemical and biological warfare) are not published. 162. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 162. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, November 18, 1969, 5:50 p.m. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] K said on the CBW thing … L said don’t call it CBW, that’s what the opponents call it. K said anyway, he would run that guidance past L. K wanted to make sure it’s what L had in mind. K asked L if he could send over some legislative strategy. L said the problem is this has never been done—L has been working on this for 16 years, and they’ve never been able to get anybody to address himself to this. L said this would be useful—it’s important to develop a few positions down the line like this. K said he would send over a draft. L said both on public affairs and legislative side. Then we can issue instructions, and L thinks we can keep everybody quiet until this thing comes out. L said they would try to get it released this weekend. K asked if L went along with the Geneva protocol thing; L said yes, but we shouldn’t get tear gas mixed up with the protocol thing. K said he would make sure in the NSDM to leave no doubt about the President’s feeling about that. K asked if L had noticed what K put out yesterday on ABM. L said yes, very good. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, November 18–28, 1969. No classification marking. 163. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the British Ambassador (Tomkins) 163. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the British Ambassador (Tomkins) 1 Washington, November 24, 1969, 7:55 p.m. K wanted to tell T now, on a personal basis that we are going to make an announcement tomorrow about our policy with regard to biological and chemical warfare. K said we are going to endorse the principles of the United Kingdom draft convention. And we will offer to work out specific provisions with you. T asked if we would announce the last part. K said yes. K asked that T make sure the Prime Minister knows; K asked that he handle it on a personal basis between the President and the Prime Minister. T said he would and that he was most grateful to K. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–28 November 1969. No classification marking. 165. National Security Decision Memorandum 35 165. National Security Decision Memorandum 35 1 Washington,November 25, 1969 TO: The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT: United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program Following consideration by the National Security Council, the President has decided that: 1. The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reference henceforth should be to the two categories separately—The Chemical Warfare Program and The Biological Research Program. 2. With respect to Chemical Warfare: a. The objective of the U.S. program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons is reaffirmed. c. This renunciation is hereby applied to incapacitating chemical weapons as well. d. This renunciation does not apply to the use of riot control agents or herbicides. A special NSDM on authorization for their use will be issued. e. The Administration will submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, “Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. An appropriate interpretive statement will be prepared by the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense to the effect that the United States does not consider that the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical herbicides or riot control agents, widely used domestically, in war. The statement will be unilateral in form and will not be a formal reservation. f. Existing overseas stockpiles of chemical weapons can be maintained except in Okinawa without additional consultation. If the matter is raised by the FRG, we will agree to consultations about the future of stockpiles located in Germany. g. The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop and improve controls and safety measures in all Chemical Warfare programs. h. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain surveillance of the Chemical Warfare capabilities of other states. i. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Chemical Warfare programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President. 3. With respect to Bacteriological/Biological programs: a. The United States will renounce the use of lethal methods of bacteriological/biological warfare. b. The United States will similarly renounce the use of all other methods of bacteriological/biological warfare (for example, incapacitating agents). c. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes (immunization, safety measures, et cetera). This does not preclude research into those offensive aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defensive measures are required. d. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations about the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological/biological weapons. e. The United States shall associate itself with the principles and objectives of the Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use of Biological Methods of Warfare presented by the United Kingdom at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on 26 August 1969. Recommendation as to association with specific provisions of the Draft Convention should be prepared by the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in coordination with other interested agencies, for the President’s consideration. f. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop controls and safety measures in all bacteriological/biological programs. g. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall continue to maintain surveillance of the bacteriological/biological warfare capabilities of other states. h. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Bacteriological/Biological Research Programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50). Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Wheeler. 166. Statement Issued by President Nixon 166. Statement Issued by President Nixon 1 Washington, November 25, 1969 461 Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs. November 25, 1969 SOON AFTER taking office I directed a comprehensive study of our chemical and biological defense policies and programs. There had been no such review in over 15 years. As a result, objectives and policies in this field were unclear and programs lacked definition and direction. Under the auspices of the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Science and Technology, the intelligence community, and other agencies worked closely together on this study for over 6 months. These Government efforts were aided by contributions from the scientific community through the President’s Science Advisory Committee. This study has now been completed and its findings carefully considered by the National Security Council. I am now reporting the decisions taken on the basis of this review. CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM As to our chemical warfare program, the United States: —Reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons. —Extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals. Consonant with these decisions, the administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 3 which prohibits the first use in war of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.” The United States has long supported the principles and objectives of this Protocol. We take this step toward formal ratification to reinforce our continuing advocacy of international constraints on the use of these weapons. BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. I have therefore decided that: —The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare. —The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures. —The Department of Defense has been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. In the spirit of these decisions, the United States associates itself with the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom Draft Convention which would ban the use of biological methods of warfare. 4 We will seek, however, to clarify specific provisions of the draft to assure that necessary safeguards are included. Neither our association with the Convention nor the limiting of our program to research will leave us vulnerable to surprise by an enemy who does not observe these rational restraints. Our intelligence community will continue to watch carefully the nature and extent of the biological programs of others. These important decisions, which have been announced today, have been taken as an initiative toward peace. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men. 1 Source: Public Papers: Nixon, 1969 , pp. 968–969. No classification marking. For text of the President’s remarks on his CBW decisions, made the same day, see ibid., pp. 969–970. 3 (1) League of Nations Treaty Series (vol. 94, p. 65). 4 Annex to United Nations General Assembly Document of November 3, 1969 (A/7741 DC/232). 167. Memorandum From Michael Guhin and Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 167. Memorandum From Michael Guhin and Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 2, 1969 SUBJECT: CBW Resolutions at the UN This gives you a brief status report on the state of play in New York on disarmament questions, with emphasis on the various CBW resolutions for which State has just sent guidance to our UN Mission. (The State cable is attached at Tab A.) We talked to State informally about these instructions to New York and said that we would let them know immediately if there seemed to be any problems with their UN tactics on CBW. We do not see any. General debate on all disarmament items has been taking place the past two weeks in the First (Political) Committee and will conclude in the next couple of days. The remainder of this week should be taken up by negotiations among delegations on the texts of various resolutions, with voting commencing next week. In addition to CBW, the major item of interest will be the Seabeds Treaty (Hal Sonnenfeldt is following this—Canadian changes in the verification section have increased chances for General Assembly endorsement of the draft treaty but this may still be impossible in light of remaining problems and the December 16 GA adjournment). There are also various resolutions on other disarmament topics such as peaceful nuclear explosives, the SALT talks, enlargement of the Geneva Disarmament Committee (CCD) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The operators (Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bob Behr) and I (Lord) have been following these items; State and USUN are taking the appropriate lines in New York. The overall U.S. objective is to center substantive disarmament matters in Geneva and protect the prerogatives of the CCD against inroads by the General Assembly. Resolutions on CBW The President’s CBW announcement and the NPT ratification have of course helped Ambassador Yost greatly in New York, with the stickiest problem still being the question of tear gas and herbicides under the Geneva Protocol. There are four main CBW proposals floating in New York. The attached cable guides Ambassador Yost as follows. — Canadian Resolution. This is essentially a procedural resolution which would have the General Assembly refer all CBW proposals to the Geneva disarmament talks. This Canadian effort remains our preferred vehicle for heading off substantive resolutions and wrapping up the CBW debate at the UN. — British CBW Convention. Per the President’s November 25 statement, we will associate ourselves with the principles and objectives of this convention while working in Geneva toward clarification of such problems as the conduct of biological research. — Soviet Draft Resolution. This commends their own draft CBW convention which covers the waterfront and allows for no international verification. The Soviets seem intent on pressing this issue. We are telling them that their initiative is unfortunate; that the President has made clear our CBW positions; that the Soviet move hampers the efforts of the cochairmen in common handling of arms control matters in Geneva and New York; and that we hope they will not press for a vote. We are telling other delegations that we oppose the Soviet resolution and are asking for their help in preventing a vote and burying it in the Canadian omnibus resolution. — Swedish Draft. This Swedish proposal, with co-sponsorship by nonaligned nations might give us the most difficult time. The resolution inter alia would put the General Assembly on record that the use of any chemical weapon, including tear gas and herbicides, is contrary to the generally accepted rules of international law. We hope to persuade the Swedes to withdraw their resolution or at least not press it to a vote—but they seem determined to move ahead and might well muster widespread support. In New York we are reaffirming our position on riot control agents and herbicides, pointing out that this will not be changed by a GA resolution, and saying that focusing CBW debate on this question is unconstructive and ill-timed after the President’s far reaching decisions. Attachment Telegram 199735 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 29, 1969, 0038Z. Subj: Tactics re CBW Resolutions 1. Following is guidance for handling CBW resolutions, taking into account Nov 25 statement of US–CBW policy: Soviet draft resolution (USUN 4308) Soviet tabling of resolution has made it more difficult to send their convention on to CCD together with other CBW proposals without vote in GA on substance, though we inclined doubt they seriously intend press it to vote. You should tell Roshchin that we consider their move most unfortunate, pointing out that as we have already told them their draft convention is seriously defective in our view in particular because it lacks verification provisions. Moreover, President made clear Nov 25 that our policy toward use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons is expressed in Geneva Protocol (with standard reservation) while with respect BW we have associated ourselves with principles and objectives of British draft convention. Pressing Soviet resolution to vote could only hamper efforts of CoChairmen in common handling of arms control matters both in GA and in Geneva. You should urge advantage of accepting reference to Sov convention in omnibus res such as Canadian draft as against open fight with US. At same time you should continue to express to other dels our opposition to Soviet resolution and seek their support in persuading Sovs to refrain from pressing it to vote. Swedish/Non-Aligned draft This resolution, even with modifications already made, gives us more serious trouble than Soviet draft since its passage by overwhelming majority could make more difficult our legal defense of even limited uses of tear gas and herbicides. Suggest you take line with Swedes and others that Nov 25 US announcement has made clear nature and limits of US CBW policy. FYI: Precise US policy on tear gas and herbicides will be stated in interpretive statement in connection with consideration of the protocol by the Senate. End FYI. It must be evident to all that we do not consider riot control agents or herbicides to be covered by Geneva Protocol and that we do not therefore intend to include them in prohibition we accept in seeking ratification of protocol. Continued efforts of Swedes to put Assembly on record as considering these chemical agents to be prohibited might result in mustering further international opposition to declared US policy but it could not be expected to have any more fruitful result. We consider our newly announced policy to be eminently sound and justifiable and we would very much regret having issue of tear gas and herbicides now become focus of future handling of CBW issue when there are more constructive approaches to be taken (e.g. British BW Convention.) We would hope that Swedes could be induced to withdraw their res or refrain from pressing it to vote. We should seek support of friendly dels in dissuading Swedes on basis foregoing arguments and on grounds that GA should not seek to declare existence of purported customary international law which is not accepted by significant group of states, including major power. Might also be useful with some dels to note that, coming directly on heels of major and much applauded US policy statement, res putting US in the dock for not having gone farther would be ill-timed to say the least. British BW Convention You should take line set out in Nov 25 CBW statement, and specifically press as seems necessary for retention of language in Canadian omnibus res giving adequate recognition of British draft. You should also reassure UKDel re question raised in London 9605, para IA, drawing on septel to London. Canadian Draft Res Latest draft, tabled Nov 28, less desirable than earlier version because it equates British and Sov draft conventions, but this probably unavoidable if we to prevent Sovs and others from pressing forward with substantive resolutions. You may inform Canadian and UKDels that we expect be able support their resolution in its present form if it provides basis for compromise procedural resolution referring all CB proposals to CCD. We assume Canadians, like us, much prefer substance their previous draft and would wish consider reverting to it if current version does not accomplish tactical purpose for which it designed. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69–31 Jan 70 [Part 3]. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it on December 3. A copy was sent to Behr and Sonnenfeldt. The attached telegram was drafted in IO/UNP; cleared in ACDA, L, and PM/ISP; approved in IO. It was sent for information to Geneva. 168. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense 168. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense 1 Washington, December 16, 1969 SUBJECT: New York Times Article December 16, 1969, “Two Agencies Clash over War Toxins” The above named New York Times article alleges a disagreement between Department of State and Department of Defense over whether President Nixon’s announcement last month on chemical warfare and biological research precludes the development or use of toxins as falling within the renunciation of biological warfare. In the brief time available to investigate this article the following conclusions and observations have been made: 1) There is a disagreement between the two Departments on this issue. DA is of the view that toxins (defined as products of living organisms which are toxic—poisonous) are properly classified as chemicals and that therefore they may be used in retaliation against a chemical warfare aggressor. Department of State takes the view that toxins are more properly classified in the biological area for purposes of the President’s pronouncement. 2) It is doubtful that Dr. Kissinger instructed the Army to stop production of toxins until the NSC addressed this matter. However, on 14 August, DA ordered the cessation of all “production of toxins and biological agents and the filling of dissemination devices within these agents.” 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, 370.64 CBR, October–December. Top Secret. 169. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 169. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, December 16, 1969, 12:30 p.m. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] L: We’ve got to shut ACDA people up on the toxin thing. They are saying we don’t consider toxins as chemicals. Everyone agrees they are chemicals. We aren’t manufacturing them and we haven’t manufactured them, but I don’t want to come out and announce that. K: Could you send over anything they have said and I will slap them down. L: The article in the Times came from them. We don’t want to give away our negotiating position in advance. Even U Thant said toxins are chemicals. And when the U.N. is saying that and a 14-nation team is saying it, I don’t know why we should take another position. K: I’ll get that article and take action. L: I called just to keep in touch. K: You’ve been terrific and everybody here appreciates it. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 9–16 December 1969. No classification marking. 170. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 170. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 18, 1969 SUBJECT: The Toxins Issue A. Background The issue here arises because toxins are chemicals (non-living matter which does not multiply itself) which are produced by biological processes from living organisms (i.e., fermentation). DOD has publicly defined toxins as chemicals. The definition is technically correct and accords with the 14-Nation UN Experts’ Report (1 July 1969), the more recent World Health Organization (WHO) Report on chemical and biological weapons (21 November 1969), and OST’s understanding. The only technical dividing line is that biologicals are living and replicate and chemicals do not. The WHO Report qualifies its definition somewhat: “In some discussion… such toxins are classified as biological agents because the technology of their production resembles that of biological agents rather than that of chemical agents.” Until last year, toxins were placed in the U.S. biological program category only because of the origin of toxins and the technology of production. The issue is not whether toxins should come under the chemical warfare program or the biological research program, as this would only confuse the established technical definition. Keeping the definition of toxins as chemicals, the real issue is what should the toxin program be when considered on its own merits as a separate weapons system, and how would this relate to the President’s decisions and our association with the principles and objectives of the UK Draft Convention. B. Current Toxin Program The current toxin program is not large and there is now no production other than for R&D. Stockpiles consist of one lethal botulinum toxin (23,000 cartridges and other special devices), a few hundred pounds of an incapacitant (staphylococcal enterotoxin, PG) which is not yet standardized, and very small research quantities of shellfish poison and snake venom. From the Joint Staff point of view, the main interest seems to be the promising incapacitant (PG) now in research and development. In light of recent tests, Joint Staff hopes to be able to standardize and produce this incapacitant. C. Pros and Cons The main arguments for keeping a complete toxin program are: 1. Toxins are considered chemicals and are defined as such by the UN Report and the WHO Report. 2. Our options for the production of toxins and associated weapons system development should not be restricted because toxins are chemicals. 3. The most promising incapacitant (12–36 days) in R&D is a toxin (PG), and without PG the U.S. may not be able to field an incapacitating capability in the near future. 4. Some toxins can now be synthesized and, therefore, it may be possible to develop an effective toxin capability without any biological production process. The main arguments for confining our toxin program to R&D for defensive purposes are: 1. Toxins are technically chemicals, but because of the origin of toxins and their production technology, a complete toxin program would appear to be circumvention of the decision that our biological programs will be confined to R&D for defensive purposes only and to protect against technological surprise. 2. Toxins have no relation whatsoever with the development of binary weapons. [This position usually appears in conjunction with OSD’s recommendation, on 8 October 1969, that the chemical warfare program (offensive aspects) should concentrate entirely on R&D of binary weapons.] 3. While the lethal toxin we now have is more toxic than nerve agents before dissemination as a weapon, it is not more effective after dissemination because it decays rapidly and is unstable. 4. Nerve agents are more militarily effective because lethal and incapacitating toxins act through the respiratory system and require only a mask for defense and not full protective clothing. Moreover, the military value of incapacitants in retaliation is questionable. 5. The British have publicly stated (North Atlantic Council Meeting, 2 July 1969) that their Draft Convention would prohibit the manufacture of toxins. (The production of toxins in more than research quantities would require a Pine Bluff-type facility, unless we were able to develop an effective synthesized toxin.) D. Comment In light of the discussions which will be coming in Geneva (Conference of the Committee on Disarmament), and our association with the principles and objectives of the UK Draft Convention, we cannot avoid confronting the question. We should avoid the semantic problem and affirm the definition of toxins as chemicals. (No agency disagrees with the definition.) The question of the extent of the U.S. toxin program should then be decided on the basis of their relative utility as chemical weapons and whether or not their stockpiling contributes to national security. Since NSDM 35 calls for an annual review of our programs by the Under Secretaries Committee, this problem might be considered by that body. Whatever the decisions on this matter, I believe that the primary objective should be to avoid any unnecessary erosion of the President’s announced decisions on chemical warfare and biological research. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it December 20. The memorandum was sent through Behr. 171. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 171. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, December 19, 1969, 8:57 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to toxins] L said next item regarding the hearings going on in the House of Representatives on Geneva Convention. L said I think they are making a big issue up there about toxins. L said the Committee said they could care less but it continues to be brought up. I told Clem we are not producing any of those and have not since last delivery from an order placed some time ago. L said I don’t think we should go out and make a big denouncement now. They are trying to get them into the bacteriological field. L said I don’t think we should spill all of our guts before we get into this tear gas thing. K said when you called me the other day about toxins, I thought you were talking about contingency plan. I have tracked down what happened. McCarthy called Richardson. Richardson told him this was being studied in the NSC system. Someone from McCarthy’s office must have leaked it. K said I did not know anything was being done on it until you called me. L said I don’t see any point unless you think I should come out and announce that we are not producing them right now. K said no, Mel, I think we should study it. L said then we can give a little on something like that. We are not being pressed in this area right now and at some future date we might need it. K said you are not being pressed from here and I am having a staff paper prepared for me so that I will understand it. L said very good. I will not announce it. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to toxins] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 17–31 December 1969. No classification marking. 172. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 172. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 30, 1969 SUBJECT: Proposed NSSM on U.S. Policy and Programs with Respect to Toxins The basic issues relating to the subject of U.S. toxins programs were outlined in our memorandum to you of December 18 (Tab B). As stated therein, toxins should be handled as a separate issue without in any way confusing the matter with definitions and semantics. Also, we are going to have to confront this issue in the near future at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and should establish some firmer guidelines before entering the Senate hearings on the Protocol in order to avoid any unnecessary erosion of the President’s policy initiatives. Pursuant to your note of December 27 (Tab C), attached at Tab A is a draft National Security Study Memorandum which (1) states that the President has directed a study of United States policy and programs with respect to toxins; (2) states that the review should consider current and alternative U.S. policies and programs, and should include discussion of R&D programs and objectives, production methods, current capabilities, the military utility of toxins, and the effects upon the U.S. international position; (3) requests that the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) perform this study; and (4) requests that the study be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 9, 1970. With regard to the very short time frame, as stated in our cover memorandum of December 23 (Tab C), steps have already been taken between State (IPMG), Defense (ISA) and Joint Staff to coordinate an issues memorandum. Joint Staff has already drafted a response as part of a coordinated IPMG memorandum, and this response is now awaiting ISA concurrence and Secretary Laird’s approval. Captain Birdt (IPMG) has assured me that an interagency issues paper could be forwarded within a very few days after Secretary Laird clears on this matter. The IPMG hopes to have a coordinated paper completed by the end of this week or January 5 at the latest. It is our conclusion that this matter will require a boost if the subjects of appropriate guidelines and policy are to be considered before the discussions at Geneva and in the Senate hearings, possibly in February. Thus, it should not be very difficult to meet the due date of January 9 which would allow ample time for Review Group consideration in January or early February. We will handle the other matter discussed in the action memorandum of December 23 (i.e., cooperative research and information exchange agreements with other countries) separately as an operational matter for the Under Secretaries Committee. Colonel Kennedy concurs in the draft NSSM. RECOMMENDATIONS: That you sign the proposed NSSM at Tab A That either you or General Haig contact Secretary Laird regarding the desire to move this matter along. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–168, NSSM 85. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Behr. At Tab A is a draft of Document 173 . At Tab B is Document 170 . At Tab C is a document (not published) in the margin of which Kissinger wrote that a NSSM should be issued for the following reasons: “Laird’s sensitivity;” it was “a policy & not an operational issue;” the President should “get credit.” 173. National Security Study Memorandum 85 173. National Security Study Memorandum 85 1 Washington, December 31, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Office of Science and Technology The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Toxins As a follow-up to National Security Study Memorandum 59, and in light of the decisions set forth in National Security Decision Memorandum 35, the President has directed a study of all aspects of United States policy and programs with respect to toxins. The review should consist of a presentation of current and alternative United States policies and programs with respect to toxins and the pros and cons of each. It should include discussion of research and development programs and objectives, production methods, current capabilities, the military utility of toxins, and the effects upon the United States international position. The President has directed the NSC Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) perform this study and that the addressees be included in the IPMG for purposes of this study. The report of the IPMG should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 16, 1970. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (43–103.) Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Wheeler. 174. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 174. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 27, 1970 SUBJECT: Current Status of the Geneva Protocol Package Pursuant to your request, here is the current status of the Geneva Protocol package as of this morning. Commitment. NSDM 35 states that (1) the Administration will submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate; (2) an appropriate interpretative statement will be prepared by State in coordination with Defense to the effect that the U.S. does not consider the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical herbicides and riot control agents in war; and (3) the statement will be unilateral in form and will not be a formal reservation. Current Status. A lengthy State-Defense Memorandum has been in the bureaucratic process since November 25 because of disagreements between the politically-minded and the legally-minded. The memorandum was forwarded to Secretary Laird’s office for clearance on January 22. If he approves, the Secretary of State will forward the memorandum to the President. Note: This memorandum is not the formal package or interpretative statement for submission to the Senate. It is a memorandum requesting decisions on two or more issues where State and Defense disagree. These issues require decision before the formal Protocol package can be forwarded to the President. Once these issues are decided, it will take only a few days to have the formal papers sent to the White House. However, since the memorandum setting forth the issues is quite involved, it may be held up for some time. We understand that Secretary Laird may request a meeting with you, Secretary Rogers and the President on this matter. As you know, Secretary Rogers is leaving for Africa in about ten days. An early meeting could perhaps move these matters off the dime. Attached at Tab A is a description of the issues along with some of the major arguments and agency positions. (The issues may be modified after Secretary Laird considers them.) The issues center about (1) how we handle our understanding on riot control agents and herbicides; (2) what type of “no first use” reservation we take; and (3) whether, as promised in NSDM 35, the follow-on NSDM on authorization for use of riot control agents and herbicides in war should be issued before the Protocol is submitted to the Senate. At any rate, State, Defense and ACDA are agreed that final decisions on the form of the submission of the Protocol to the Senate should not be made until a decision is reached whether the U.S. should preserve the option to retaliate with toxins. (This relates to “2” above.) We agree that the decision on toxins should be made before actually submitting the Protocol to the Senate, but there is no reason why this subject should hold up the issues memorandum. [FYI: Japan hopes to submit the Protocol to the Diet for ratification sometime between February 14 and the end of March (Tab B). Japan will also be taking the position that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of riot control agents and herbicides in war. In order to coordinate this matter, we are making arrangements to send advance copies of the Secretary of State’s report to the President and the President’s message to the Senate to the GOJ.] Conclusion. Since November 25, we have been pushing this matter daily at the bureaucratic level. Unless it receives a high level boost, it could be another two-four weeks before the issues arrive at the White House for decision. Tab A Washington, undated OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON THE GENEVA PROTOCOL [The information below comes from an informally transmitted draft of the State-Defense Memorandum and from working group meetings.] Issue A. Understanding on Riot Control Agents (RCAs) and Chemical Herbicides There appears to be three options for handling our understanding that the Protocol does not prohibit the use in war of RCAs and chemical herbicides. Options 1 and 2 involve communication of our understanding to other States but differ with respect to Senate action. This understanding would be in the legal form of a formal interpretation; but, of course, it could be treated as a reservation by other States. Both Options 1 and 2 are based primarily on legal considerations. Option 3 is based primarily on political considerations in that we would not formally communicate our understanding on RCAs and herbicides to other States. Option 1. Request the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification with the understanding on RCAs and herbicides explicitly stated in the Senate Resolution. The Resolution would then be formally communicated to the other States as part of the instrument of ratification. The working group had originally agreed to drop this approach, but DOD persisted in its support for this option being addressed. This option would be the most legally effective internationally to preserve our position on RCAs and chemical herbicides in the event of an adverse advisory opinion by the International Court on the scope of the Protocol. If the International Court were requested to deliver an opinion, it might be rendered within four-six months after a request. It is also argued that this approach would avoid any possibility of later charges that the Senate was misled. In short, the Senators would be asked to vote particularly on the issue of RCAs and herbicides. At worst, the Senate could pass an opposite understanding by majority vote which would make it impossible to ratify with our understanding. It is also very likely that, under both Options 1 and 2, a substantial number of States would make public their disagreement with our interpretation. Other States would in effect have to choose between rejecting our interpretation, thereby treating it as a reservation and modifying the treaty relations to that extent, or being deemed to have acquiesced in our understanding. (Other States could reject us as a Party, but this does not appear very likely.) (Comment: We believe this approach, by placing the monkey on the Senators’ backs, could both complicate the proceedings and lose some votes on the Protocol.) Option 2. Same as Option 1, except the Senate would be advised of our understanding but it would not be referred to in the Senate Resolution. Senate would be advised, however, of our intent to communicate this understanding to the other Parties in the form of a note along with the instrument of ratification. DOD probably supports this as a fallback position, depending upon the results of Congressional soundings. This may be the first choice of State and ACDA. However, again depending upon Congressional soundings, both State and ACDA will have a fallback position in Option 3. This option is also designed to protect the U.S. legally should the International Court be requested to deliver an advisor opinion on the scope of the Protocol and in the event the Court went against our interpretation. If we had given formal notification of our interpretation to the other Parties, it could not then be said that we were legally in violation of a treaty obligation as our interpretation would become a formal reservation. While this would protect the legal position, we would still face the political problems surrounding the use of RCAs and herbicides in war. Also, other States would have to choose between rejecting our interpretation , thereby treating it as a reservation, or being deemed to have acquiesced in our understanding. Option 3. We would advise the Senate of our understanding, but our understanding would neither be included in the resolution of the Senate’s advice and consent nor communicated formally to other Parties. State and ACDA prefer this option as a fallback position if it appears to be the only way of obtaining Senate consent. The option would place neither the Senate nor other Parties in the position of accepting or rejecting the interpretation. DOD probably considers this option unacceptable for legal reasons. In the event of an adverse International Court opinion, we could not legally make use of RCAs and herbicides in war. Issue B. No First Use Reservation There appears to be three alternatives regarding how to deal with our policy of no first use of chemical weapons. Option 1. Reserve the right to retaliate with chemical weapons but not with biological weapons. State and ACDA prefer this option as being most consistent with U.S. policy. Unlike the reservations of all but one other reserving government, the reservation does not assert the right to use biological weapons in retaliation. DOD probably opposes this option. There are those who are worried about legally giving up the right of retaliation with biologicals. While we would indeed be doing such in terms of this reservation to the Protocol, we understand there is always the more limited right of reprisal under the Laws of Land Warfare. There is also a legal position which, in the event of a violation of the Protocol, could contend that the whole agreement was suspended with regard to the violating party. However, this option could leave questions as to whether we had the right to retaliate with toxins since, in terms of the negotiating history of the Protocol, other Parties might claim that toxins should be considered bacteriological methods of warfare in interpreting the Protocol. Option 2. Reserve in effect the right to retaliate with chemicals and biologicals by stating that the Protocol ceases to be binding upon any State or its allies which violate the Protocol. This is similar to the reservation by the U.K., France and the USSR. The U.S. would be reserving tile right to retaliate with both chemicals and biologicals, and the question of toxins would not arise. DOD probably supports this position. State and ACDA probably oppose it. Option 3. Ratify without any explicit reservation on the right of retaliation. With respect to the 39 States which have taken reservations, we would legally have the benefit of their reservations in our relations with them to retaliate with chemicals or biologicals. With respect to the States which have not taken reservations, the U.S. could still say that any violation of the instrument would mean its termination and we would have the right to retaliate with either chemicals or biologicals. This seems to be the fallback position of State, DOD and ACDA. Issue C. Follow-On NSDM on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides NSDM 35 stated that a follow-on NSDM on the use of RCAs and chemical herbicides would be issued. State and ACDA recommend (1) that a follow-on NSDM covering the use of RCAs and herbicides be issued before final decisions on the form of the submission of the Protocol to the Senate are made, and (2) that the NSDM include guidance on public statements. State and ACDA think a statement to the effect that use in war would require Presidential authorization and that more restrictive guidelines for their use had been instituted might reduce both Senate and international opposition to our position. DOD sees no need for the NSDM prior to submission of the Protocol to the Senate and in any event objects to any public statement of restrictions on their use in specific tactical situations. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. Kissinger wrote on the first page, “Where is the Geneva Protocol package? When can we move it?” 175. Telegram 122 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 175. Telegram 122 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 27, 1970, 2227Z. For the Secretary ACDA for Smith White House for Kissinger Re: CBW A US decision not rpt not to ban use of toxins or to continue their manufacture would in my view be widely interpreted by UN members as retreat from Pres’ position announced to GA Nov 25. Pres’s significant policy decision was warmly welcomed by Assembly then considering CBW not only because of his action on Geneva Protocol but even more because of his initiative in renouncing retaliatory as well as first use of all methods of biological warfare and disposing of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. While recognizing that toxins are chemical rather than bacteriological agents, I fear that, in view of their origin, our continued use or manufacture of them would seriously undercut impact of Pres’ decision. Additionally, if US were to retain bacteriological facilities for the manufacture of toxins, we would have difficulty in overcoming suspicion that we were in fact maintaining bacteriological weapons capability. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 296, Agency Files, U.S.U.N. Vol. II, 1 Aug 69–31 Jan 70–. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to the White House 176. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting 176. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, January 29, 1970, 2:37–4:00 p.m. Subject: U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85) Participation: Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger State - Richard F. Pedersen William I. Cargo Capt. George Birdt Donald McHenry Defense - G. Warren Nutter CIA - R. Jack Smith JCS - RAdm. Frank W. Vannoy OEP - Haakon Lindjord USIA - Frank Shakespeare ACDA - Howard Furnas OST - Dr. Vincent McRae NSC Staff - Michael Guhin Winston Lord Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF DECISIONS The Review Group agreed to: 1. reverse the two sentences of Option 2 and rephrase both Options 1 and 2 more permissively so as to reserve the right of production and stockpiling, 2. draft public justifications for each option and clear with USIA, 3. ask OST to determine how many toxic bullets are produced commercially, the method of production and if any controls are exercised on their production or sale. (JCS and ACDA circulated proposed changes and additions to the paper at the table prior to the meeting.) Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of a toxin. Capt. Birdt referred to recent reports by the UN Secretary General and the World Health Organization which defined a toxin as a chemical, with the only difference between toxins and other chemical agents being that the former are also manufactured by living organisms. It is generally chemical in effect but biological in method of production. Mr. Kissinger asked how it differs from nerve gas. Mr. Cargo replied that nerve gas is not produced by living organisms. Dr. McRae added that nerve gas changes the function of the organs. Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of disease. Dr. McRae defined disease as the introduction of foreign matter into the body. Mr. Kissinger asked if nerve gas or mustard gas did not constitute foreign matter. He asked if the considerations were how the material was produced or the nature of its effect. Capt. Birdt noted that nerve gas affected only the respiratory system [sic] and caused almost instant death, whereas a botulinus toxin would cause death in a matter of hours. Dr. McRae agreed that the difference could be characterized by the different methods of production or by their effects. He said biological agents reproduce themselves while chemical agents do not. Therefore, toxins are chemical although certain of their characteristics resemble biological agents; for example, the body develops antibodies to toxins. He thought the basic distinction was whether or not the agent replicates; if it does not, it should be treated as a chemical. Mr. Kissinger asked if he were right in saying that the present form of toxins are biologically produced but that their effect is more analogous to chemical agents. Dr. McRae agreed that this was true of the toxins that we can now produce in quantity. Mr. Kissinger asked if a toxin were produced chemically, would it not be difficult to distinguish between it and a chemical weapon. Dr. McRae and Capt. Birdt agreed. Mr. Kissinger asked for the difference between full R&D and defensive R&D in toxins. Admiral Vannoy replied that full R&D would give us the capacity to experiment with a weapons system intended for retaliatory use; defensive R&D would not. Mr. Kissinger asked what you could do under full R&D that you could not do under a defensive R&D program. Admiral Vannoy said that under full R&D you could develop a toxin of a type you would propose to use. He also said full R&D could consider delivery systems and production techniques, and would vary in the amount of material produced. Mr. Kissinger asked if we should announce a defensive R&D program, would the other side be able to tell that we are not doing full R&D? Admiral Vannoy replied that they would not know without fairly full inspection. Dr. McRae agreed that it would be difficult for the other side to see the distinction. Mr. Kissinger asked, therefore, what we would accomplish by announcing a defensive R&D program. He recalled that defensive R&D in biological agents involved work on methods of immunization, etc. Dr. McRae said that under a defensive R&D program we would not be developing delivery systems specifically for bacteriological agents or for toxins; for example, we would not have spray tanks. This, he thought, might be visible to the other side. He agreed that defensive R&D would permit all R&D short of actual engineering development—the same as the Presidential decision on bacteriological or biological agents. Mr. Kissinger asked what had been the practical effect of the Presidential decisions on biological weapons—were we closing down the Pine Bluff installation? Admiral Vannoy replied that a decision had not yet been reached on Pine Bluff because that plant produced other things, such as riot control agents. Dr. McRae said Defense and OST were examining the future of Pine Bluff. He said Pine Bluff has both chemical and biological programs and he saw no reason to maintain the biological programs. He said at Fort Detrick the research program had been reduced by approximately one-third, with a personnel cut of approximately 15 percent. He thought these were visible effects of the President’s decision and that planned additional moves would make the effect even more visible. Mr. Kissinger asked what toxins were good for. Admiral Vannoy replied that with regard to military utility, toxins are an intermediate weapon between biological and chemical weapons. They are better than chemical weapons in some ways but not as effective in other ways as biological weapons. You could cover a larger area with a smaller amount of a toxin than with other chemicals. On the negative side, however, toxins were not persistent. Dr. McRae added toxins were not as stable as chemicals, and, because they deteriorate in sunlight, would require a heavier dose for an effect of similar duration. Mr. Kissinger asked what we would use toxins for. He recalled that in a discussion of biological weapons it had been agreed that they were useful for offensive purposes but less useful for retaliation because of the time lag. Dr. McRae suggested that we separate the discussion into lethal and incapacitating toxins. He said we had one lethal toxin at present—botulinum—which he considered a poor military weapon. There is an effective toxoid which can be used to immunize troops which increases the amount required by 10(5). Admiral Vannoy agreed with Dr. McRae’s comments on botulinum but thought this was not the only lethal toxin on the horizon. He thought there were others possibly with greater potential, such as shellfish poison. Dr. McRae agreed that we do not expect to get an effective toxoid for shellfish poison and that it was more dangerous than botulinum. It can also probably be produced in significant quantities only synthetically. He thought, however, that masks still provide reasonably good protection. With regard to chemical incapacitants, he considered they were of limited military utility since a mask can provide reasonably good protection. He cited their effects (high fever, faulty coordination, etc.) and compared them to food poisoning except that they were taken into the body through the nostrils. They take several hours to become effective and their effects last from six to thirty hours, depending on the individual and the size of the dose. Mr. Kissinger asked, since it was agreed that bacteriological weapons were primarily for offense, if toxins could be useful for retaliation. Capt. Birdt commented that their incubation period was from one to six hours. Dr. McRae added that, since masks provide good protection against toxins, they would be good primarily for first use. Mr. Kissinger said that since we have renounced the first use of chemical weapons, we would therefore not use toxins first. We must assume that if the other side uses toxins first, they would have masks; therefore, toxins would not be the most effective retaliatory weapon against toxins. Dr. McRae agreed. Admiral Vannoy commented that in the event of leakage a mask would not be as effective against toxins as against some other chemical agents, because the amount of toxin required to be dangerous is less than the amount of a chemical agent. Mr. Kissinger commented, however, that some chemical weapons can be absorbed through the skin and that therefore masks would have no effect. Admiral Vannoy replied that anyone using chemical weapons would be wearing decontamination suits. Dr. McRae agreed that mask leakage would be more serious with toxins than with other chemical agents, adding that it was difficult to operate with masks on for long periods of time. He thought if a military commander faced a choice of retaliating with percutaneous agents or toxins he would use the former. Mr. Kissinger asked if it would take a smaller dose of toxins than of nerve gas. Dr. McRae thought toxins would be better than some nerve gas but would not be better than VX for retaliation. He thought a combination of nerve gas and toxins could be best because defending troops would have to be particularly careful of mask leakage and would have to wear bulky decontamination suits. Mr. Kissinger commented that in the earlier discussion we had covered both chemical and biological agents as first use weapons and as retaliatory weapons. We had decided, with JCS endorsement, that biologicals would not be good as strategic weapons and that nuclear weapons would be preferable. We had agreed that chemical weapons were primarily for battlefield use. He asked if the same were true of toxins. Were they largely a battlefield weapon? Admiral Vannoy agreed that they were. Mr. Kissinger asked if, as a battlefield weapon, they would be used essentially in retaliation. Mr. Smith asked if they could be used against civilian populations as an adjunct to an attack. Dr. McRae agreed that this would be possible, saying that shellfish poison would be better than nerve gas. However, we do not know how to produce shellfish poison in mass quantities and would have to be able to produce it chemically. Mr. Kissinger asked why we would use a toxin if we were going to produce it chemically. Dr. McRae said a chemically produced toxin would be identical in its chemical structure to that produced by the shellfish. He cited synthetic penicillin which differs from bacteriologically grown penicillin only in the way it is made. He thought shellfish poison would be a more strategic weapon than nerve gas because a larger area could be covered with a similar dose. Admiral Vannoy said that we know little about toxins. We had paid very slight attention to toxins when we were working on biological weapons. Because we knew so little, he thought it would not be in our interests to preclude our examination of various systems for possible future employment. He thought toxins may prove to be the best thing we have. Mr. Kissinger repeated his understanding that while toxins also exist in nature, in fact, they act like chemicals. Mr. Furnas added that toxins create a disease which is not transmissible. Dr. McRae said scientists see the only difference between chemical and biological agents to be that biological agents reproduce themselves and chemical agents do not. While some toxins can reproduce themselves, you can get the same human response to a synthesized toxin although it might require twice as much. He said work was now being done in a laboratory in West Berlin on a synthetic toxin which could not be distinguished from a natural product—its chemical structure and the human response to it were exactly the same. He cited alcohol as a toxin because it is a poison, originally produced by a bacteriological process but now easily synthesized. The natural and synthetic products were exactly the same. Mr. Pedersen asked if the effects of a toxin on the human body were not more analogous to the effects of a biological weapon than a chemical weapon. Mr. Furnas agreed with the exception that these effects were not transmissible. Dr. McRae agreed that this was true in bacteriological toxins. Mr. Kissinger then moved to a discussion of the three options. He asked if anyone saw any other options. All agreed that they did not. Mr. Kissinger characterized our present program as including both offensive and defensive R&D: offensive R&D involving the production of agents and including the work on delivery systems with defensive R&D primarily devoted to immunization programs, plus an option to produce and stockpile weapons. We are not now doing this but, under Option I, would not be precluded from it by a Presidential decision. Admiral Vannoy commented that we have no production facilities for producing in quantity. He said under Option 1 we would not renounce production but would not necessarily opt for it. Mr. Pedersen thought this option should be defined more clearly since he had understood that it would automatically include the production and stockpiling of toxins. Admiral Vannoy replied that in practice we had no capability for production and stockpiling of toxins. Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was true now but need not be true in the future. Mr. Cargo cited the modest size of the stockpile indicated on Page 4 of the basic paper. Mr. Kissinger noted the 15 lbs of lethal toxins, but said he did not know how potent this would be. Admiral Vannoy said these stocks were maintained basically for research purposes. Mr. Kissinger asked about the “toxic bullets”. Admiral Vannoy replied that those we have are old, are being removed from our stockpile and not being replaced. He noted that such bullets are produced and sold commercially for various uses—e.g., for use in zoos, fired from sporting rifles to kill a dangerous animal. In response to a question from Mr. Kissinger, he said these bullets are produced in civilian life, both in lethal and incapacitating forms. Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae to find out how many of these bullets are produced commercially and how, and if any controls are exercised either on their production or sale. Dr. McRae commented that a botulinum toxin was produced commercially because it was necessary to produce the toxin before you could produce the toxoid. Admiral Vannoy raised the problem of verification and control of such production. Mr. Kissinger said that if there were substantial civilian production of toxins for whatever purpose, foregoing the military production would not be as significant—nor would it be as convincing to the other side. He asked if we stay with Option 1 do we not in effect nullify the President’s decision on biological weapons. How could we answer expected arguments? Mr. Furnas commented that it was very hard to distinguish between the effect of toxins and of biological agents except that the former are not communicable. Dr. McRae said we were not producing toxins—a chemical—by biological process, would we not also be building up our biological capability—getting into biological production by the back door. If the President announced that he is using biological laboratories to produce toxins what would be the effect on his decision on biological agents? Mr. Shakespeare thought it would mitigate the entire effect of the President’s statement. Mr. Pedersen remarked that this then throws you into Option 2. Mr. Kissinger said that under Option 2 we would not renounce toxins but we would renounce biological production and biological R&D except for defense; we would apply to bacteriological toxins the same criteria as to other biological weapons and would apply to chemically produced toxins the same criteria as to other chemical weapons. In other words, we would make a decision not on the effect of the weapons, but on their origin. The effect of such a decision would not necessarily eliminate toxins but would make the President’s earlier decision on biological weapons stand up. Such a decision would be consistent with the earlier biological decision and would not differentiate between different kinds of chemical weapons, i.e., toxins and other chemical weapons. Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 2 we would retain the right to produce and stockpile synthetic toxins. Mr. Kissinger added, however, that we have no present intention to do so. Mr. Shakespeare referred to CON–6 of Option 2 and the vast PR problems that would be created by this option. Mr. Kissinger said his problem with Option 3 was that if we eliminated toxins, we would have to go through every weapon in our chemical arsenal to be sure that it does not also occur in a natural form. He asked if the President could not say that we could continue with chemical toxins if they were considered useful (but would not necessarily do so) and could reaffirm our renunciation of the first use of any chemical weapon. Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 3, since the only present method of producing toxins is biological, we would be left automatically with only a research program. Mr. Nutter noted that the biological method might not be the only method of production in the future. Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we could say that if chemical methods of production were developed, we could consider the resulting toxins the same as chemical weapons. Dr. McRae noted that this would permit researchers to produce for R&D purposes but not to stockpile. Mr. Shakespeare asked once chemical methods of production were developed, what would prevent people from producing by bacteriological methods and saying they were producing by chemical methods. Mr. Kissinger thought we could close the bacteriological production facilities. Dr. McRae thought the toxins we would want to produce chemically would be different than those we would want to produce biologically. He said that while Option 2 mould permit the elimination of large bacteriological weapon production facilities, factories producing toxins could produce biological weapons. Mr. Pedersen thought we might revise Option 2 to say that we reserved the right to produce chemically produced toxins. Mr. Kissinger thought it would be hard to convince anyone that we were not chemically producing toxins if we have a chemical weapons production capability. Mr. Shakespeare asked how this related to our problems with the Geneva Protocol and the UK Draft Convention. He asked if we would have to oppose the UK. Mr. Pedersen replied that the British statement in New York would preclude all bacteriological agents for military use. It would bar production of chemical toxins by bacteriological means but would not prevent production by chemical means. Mr. Furnas said the UK was opposed to toxins but he did not know how they would react to toxins produced by chemical methods. He thought this distinction might stand up legally and ethically but would be hard to defend from an international and a PR point of view. Mr. Kissinger asked if we would have to say anything about production and stockpiling. Could we just say we are stopping toxin programs? He thought the danger in Option 3 was that it might re-open the entire chemical warfare question. He said he was not convinced of the utility of toxins on military grounds. He noted that when the military had considered various chemical warfare programs it had focused on other forms of weapons, not on toxins, and it had deployed other chemical weapons overseas. He said although he was not impressed with the arguments on military utility, he did not like to preclude all work on toxins. Mr. Pedersen commented that although toxins are chemical, they are biological in the public mind. Mr. Kissinger thought we would be accused of having made a grandstand play on biological weapons, and of now producing something biologically. He noted the President has renounced biological warfare and has retained only defensive R&D with enough offensive R&D to determine the threat and to test our defenses. Why could we not renounce any weapon which was biologically produced—including toxins? For PR purposes we could make it clear that we have no chemical production capability. If we should acquire a chemical production capability, we would face the PR problem at that time. By this time we might be considering chemical weapons in the context of arms control discussions at which time we could again renounce first use of chemical weapons. Mr. Shakespeare asked if, under Option 2, we would proceed with a crash program to synthesize toxins. Mr. Cargo thought that any Presidential decision could require that any production of synthetic toxins would require specific Presidential authorization. Admiral Vannoy replied to Mr. Shakespeare’s question that, for budgetary reasons alone, there would be no crash program to develop synthetic production methods. He said this was not that high on the priority list. Mr. Kissinger asked that the three options be revised to indicate that under Option 1 we would not necessarily be producing or stockpiling but would be reserving the right to do so and to include statements of justification for options 2 or 3 from a PR point of view. Mr. Pedersen noted with regard to the international aspects of Options 2 and 3 that there was at present a strong drive to eliminate the production and stockpiling of both bacteriological and chemical weapons. When the focus shifts to toxins, everyone will want to ban them also. Mr. Kissinger said we could certainly agree to consider banning toxins in an international framework but need not ban them unilaterally. He thought no options would be withdrawn from possible arms control negotiations. Mr. Furnas thought this raised the problem of verification and questioned whether we would be willing to go into an international agreement without adequate verification and inspection. Mr. Cargo thought that whatever was done would not preclude looking at the decision in the international Mr. Kissinger thought this was true in the entire range of issues. Mr. Smith asked if we might break Option 2 into two parts. Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we would reaffirm our renunciation of bacteriological warfare; we would renounce production and research in bacteriologically produced weapons, except for defensive purposes; and we would permit R&D on chemical weapons even if the chemical also exists in nature. We would leave the questions of stockpile and production for later decision. Mr. Smith asked if the first part of Option 2 was not in fact a part of the chemical decision. Mr. Kissinger thought that the first sentence of Option 2 was stated too positively—it should be rephrased permissively so as to reserve the right of production and stockpiling. He also thought the two sentences of the option should be reversed. Mr. Cargo suggested that the same thing be done in Option 1. Mr. Kissinger asked that the public justification for each option be drafted and shown to Mr. Shakespeare. Mr. Nutter thought this should also include comments on the form in which any announcement should be made. Mr. Kissinger noted the grave security problems on this item and the need to limit distribution of documents to prevent such things as the recent New York Times story. Mr. Cargo asked if, under Option 3, we limited R&D to defense only, what in fact would we be omitting which could be included under offensive R&D. Would we be precluded from R&D on a chemically produced toxin? Mr. Kissinger thought we would be giving up the options of production and stockpiling. Mr. Cargo asked if we would be doing R&D on both bacteriological and chemically produced toxins. Mr. Kissinger asked why bother with chemically produced toxins if we were interested in defensive R&D only. Mr. Nutter commented that they might be cheaper. Dr. McRae noted that if, under Option 3, we were denied the right to produce and stockpile by a Presidential decision, the R&D people would probably not try to synthesize toxins since there would be no possibility of their production, stockpiling or use. Mr. Cargo asked if we would not need agents for R&D purposes. Dr. McRae agreed there would have to be some production but it would not be necessary to synthesize. Mr. Cargo asked if there could not be possible variants between synthetic and naturally produced agents. Dr. McRae agreed there theoretically could be variants but that naturally produced toxins would be close enough. He thought the nature of our R&D might be different under Option 3 and the military services might order their priorities somewhat differently. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Meeting Minutes, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. This meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The response to NSSM 85 is Document 177 . 177. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 177. Report Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 1 Washington, January 30, 1970 REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL US POLICY ON TOXINS Introduction In response to NSSM 85, this report by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) examines US policies, programs, operational concepts and alternatives thereto with respect to toxins. Part I contains background information fundamental to consideration of the policy issue. Part II addresses the policy issue and options together with the relevant PROS and CONS. PART I: BACKGROUND Toxins are chemical substances. Unlike biological agents, they are not living organisms and are not capable of reproducing themselves. The effects of toxins, such as botulism (food poisoning) and tetanus, are generally thought of as illnesses or diseases. * Toxins do not cause infectious disease and are not transmissible from man to man. Hence, unlike biological agents, toxins cannot cause epidemics or establish long-term sources of illness. At this time, the only method of producing the toxins currently thought to have potential military utility is from bacteria or other biological organisms, although we could probably develop a way of synthesizing some toxins chemically. Regardless of the method of production, toxins have some of the characteristics of biological agents and it is here that ambiguity enters. There is a period of time ranging from minutes to hours before the effects of toxins are produced, a delay intermediate between that of chemicals and the incubation period of biological agents. Moreover, as the effective dosage is extremely small, the area that they can practically cover is considerably larger than possible with chemical agents, though not as extensive as for biological agents. Military toxins are currently defined in U.S., Quadripartite # , and NATO military documents as chemical agents and the Secretary of Defense has so classified them publicly. Until NSDM 35 was issued there was less need to differentiate clearly between biologicals and chemicals. * Soviet civil and military defense publications classify toxins as biological agents, while acknowledging that by their action and methods of employment toxins are more closely related to chemical weapons. France includes toxins in their defensive manuals with biologicals, but has agreed with the NATO position as noted above. The recent UN Secretary General’s report (July 1, 1969) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (November 21, 1969) both treated toxins as chemical substances. Of interest, the WHO report did add a caveat that “in some discussions of chemical and biological weapons, such toxins are classified as biological agents because the technology of their production resembles that of biological agents.” Toxoids, the immunizing materials that protect humans from toxins like tetanus, can be made only by growing bacteria and extracting the toxin to be used as the starting material for the production of toxoids. Hence, toxins have to be produced for public health and defensive purposes. This facet of toxin production is not at issue in this paper or in the UK draft Convention. However, the requirement for such production must be considered in the verification provisions of any relevant arms control agreement. * Production Process for Toxins Toxins are produced by bacteria as well as by many other biological organisms or forms of life—for example, mollusca, corals, and fish. Bacterial toxins are produced by growing the specific bacteria in a nutrient broth, removing the bacteria by filtration or centrifugation, and concentrating the toxin by chemical processes such as precipitation and absorption. Toxins of plant origin (e.g., ricin from castor beans and aminita toxin from mushrooms) are produced by macerating the plant and chemically extracting the toxin in suitable solvents. Toxins of animal origin are also extracted chemically. There appears to be no technical reason why some toxins could not be made synthetically in a chemical plant, although none of current military interest have as yet been so produced. There may be an analogy to penicillin and other antibiotics which originally were manufactured by growing micro-organisms and then extracting the antibiotics, but now are also made synthetically. Current U.S. Capabilities Three toxins (see chart on following page) are currently considered to have potential military use. A number of others are being investigated as discussed in the next section. TOXIN EFFECTS RAPIDITY OF ACTION DURATION OF EFFECTS NATURE OF PRODUCTION EXISTING PRODUCTION CAPABILITY Botulinum Approaching 100% fatalities 12 hrs. 36–72 hours for survivors Purified from bacterial culture 280 lbs/mo Shellfish Poison Approaching 100% fatalities 5–10 minutes 36–72 hours for survivors Chemical extraction from biological source Negligible Staphylococcal Enterotoxin Incapacitating 1–6 hours 12–36 hours Purified from bacterial culture 600 lbs/mo There are fewer than 15 pounds of bulk lethal toxins and 100 pounds of incapacitating toxins in stockpile. These constitute stocks for research and development and would provide only a token military capability. The U.S. is not now producing toxins for stockpiling, only for research and test purposes. The so-called “poison bullets” are obsolete, have deteriorated, and are scheduled for destruction with no replacement planned. The major delivery system now available for toxin dispersal is the A/B 45Y–4 airborne disseminator, which can disseminate 230 pounds of agent. The system was tested on F–4 aircraft near Einwetok Atoll in September and October 1968 with the incapacitant staphyloccal enterotoxin. These tests indicated that the weapon would cause a 30% casualty rate over 2400 square kilometers, assuming unmasked target populations. There have been no field tests with lethal botulinum or lethal shellfish toxin in the A/B 45Y–4. Research and Development The bacterial toxins botulinum and staphylococcal enterotoxin have been the most thoroughly investigated. The lethal dose for man of botulinum toxin is estimated to be 4,800 nanograms * . The dose of the incapacitating staphylococcal enterotoxin has been accurately determined to be 26 nanograms, making it one of the most potent physiologically active materials known. Non-bacterial toxins have been studied and an extremely toxic lethal material has been isolated from several species of coral of the genus Palythoa . The lethal dose for man of this material is estimated to be of the order of 100 nanograms. Prospects for success in the synthesis of some toxins are good, but the synthesis of others will be difficult. Botulinum is a protein with a high molecular weight and its synthesis would offer difficulties that appear to be insurmountable with present technology. Staphylococcal enterotoxin is also a protein, but with a lower molecular weight. Its synthesis might be technically possible but attaining an economical production capability is by no means assured. Protective toxoids to immunize against botulinum have been developed and tested by the Army and are very effective. Toxoids to protect against incapacitating staphylococcal enterotoxin are much less effective. The non-bacterial toxins are quite different. The toxin from Palythoa , for example, is a small molecule with a weight of about 350 and very likely could be synthesized and probably produced by synthetic process. The toxin from puffer fish is similar. Toxoids for protection against such toxins are not expected to exist. Current military R&D on toxins is devoted to efforts to synthesize toxins of low molecular weight, especially the lethal toxin from Palythoa , to developing the most effective of several types of incapacitating staphylococcal enterotoxins, and in a search for methods of detecting and warning against attacks by toxins. There is no military R&D on botulinum toxin at this time. Toxins have general scientific interest and a significant amount of research is conducted throughout the world. This work is primarily on the mechanism of toxic action and on synthesis of toxins. Foreign Capabilities Soviet scientists have carried on investigations pertaining to a variety of plant, animal and microbial toxins in the course of work that appears to be medically oriented. The number of published studies indicates no special interest or emphasis. The only toxin known to have received consideration in Soviet BW defense-related research is botulinum toxin. The Soviets list this toxin along with three bacterial diseases (anthrax, plague, cholera) as the BW agents to be tested for first in their BW detection and identification procedures. With respect to a Soviet capability to produce toxins, we believe that they can probably produce at least two of the six types of botulinum toxin by biological processes. We are virtually certain that they have not been able to produce any of the types of chemical processes. They have conducted a sizeable military R&D program in aerogenic immunization, using these two types, as well as studies on decontamination and identification procedures, means of purifying and stabilizing the toxin, and methods of handling military and civilian casualties arising from its use. The Soviet explanation for their interest in aerogenic immunization is that in the event of biological warfare “the most likely attack will be by the aerosol route.” The extensive work on aerosolized botulinum toxin provides them with a quite adequate basis for an offensive capability. We have no evidence of production or stockpiling of this toxin for this purpose. There is no evidence of military interest in toxins for offensive purposes on the part of any other country. Military Utility In circumstances in which troops are not masked nor immunized, the effective dosages of toxins can be delivered over large areas with far less logistic effort as compared to nerve agents. Decontamination of affected areas is relatively uncomplicated. Because of the lower dosages required, greater tactical flexibility would result from the use of toxins as compared to other chemical agents. Smaller quantities are sufficient to achieve equivalent area coverage and targets can be attacked from greater upwind distances. Masks provide less certainty of protection against toxins than against other non-persistent chemical agents, for example GB, because minor leaks are more critical; however, they still afford very substantial protection. Also, no country is now known to have an effective detection and alarm system for toxins. The development of such systems poses more technical difficulties than for nerve agents. If it can be assumed that the enemy has not been immunized and/or is not wearing masks; these toxins could offer logistic advantages over other chemicals. Fewer tons of toxins would need to be moved to attack an equivalent area. Under these circumstances this reduced logistics requirement could expedite retaliation in any area of the world where the U.S. does not maintain overseas chemical stockage. Toxins are not generally adaptable to present explosive munitions but development tests of non-explosive munitions indicate that toxins may have an approximately eight-fold advantage in effectiveness over present chemical artillery munitions against unprotected personnel. On the other hand, some toxins take longer to act than chemical agents VX and GB and are therefore less useful where rapid reactions are required. Also, enemy defense would be easier in the event of retaliation with toxins because toxins do not penetrate through the skin and therefore do not require the cumbersome defensive equipment (e.g., protective clothing) and decontamination measures needed against persistent agents. Because existing toxins are not persistent, these cannot be used to create barriers or deny terrain. For certain toxins (e.g., botulinum) there are effective immunization techniques available and this must be considered in connection with employment. Finally, in response to an enemy attack with nerve agents or mustard, retaliation with toxins might be perceived as the introduction of “biological warfare” because of the similarity of their effects to disease. The military uses, advantages and disadvantages of toxins apply equally to possible use by enemy forces against U.S. forces. Toxins, as all chemical agents currently stockpiled except mustards, have never been employed operationally. As a result, the advantages and disadvantages discussed above are largely derived from studies, war gaming, and chamber and test data. Until the recent renunciation of biologicals, toxins have been somewhat overshadowed by biologicals both in the research and development field and in production efforts largely because biologicals have been considered to have greater cost effectiveness and because stockpiles of incapacitating biologicals have been maintained for a number of years. The incapacitant staphylococcal enterotoxin represents the only incapacitating capability likely to be available for at least the next three to five years. No synthetic chemical incapacitant appears to have equally promising characteristics and no other incapacitant in R&D has been operationally tested to date. In the area of lethal toxins, it is clear that none of the present lethal toxins could serve in lieu of our existing persistent chemical capability, largely because of their lack of persistency and inability to penetrate the skin. However, a number of lethal toxins in R&D appear to have such low effective dosages that they might serve a complementary role to non-persistent lethal chemicals, largely through their ability to increase the criticality of normally acceptable leakage in protective masks and to increase difficulty in enemy detection and warning systems. Toxins having military interest have yet to be synthesized. Thus, if a near term capability in toxins is to be developed, the U.S. would have to rely on a biological production process. Toxins and the UK Draft Convention, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 UK Draft Convention The United States has associated itself with the principles and objectives of the UK draft Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Means of Warfare. The toxin issue is certain to be raised at the resumed session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in February. The UK draft Convention does not prohibit the use of toxins, but the UK has stated that it would be willing to consider redrafting the Convention to include toxins. The UK draft Convention is itself ambiguous as to whether it would preclude the use of biological materials as intermediates in the production of toxins. The UK draft Convention would preclude the production, acquisition, or research aimed at production of “ microbial or other biological agents of types and in quantities that have no independent justification for prophylactic or other peaceful purposes .” While some UK spokesmen have publicly stated that production and possession of bacteria for the development of toxins for hostile purposes would be prohibited by this language, the language in the UK document could be interpreted to apply only to end products which are biological agents. If we wished to make sure that we had preserved the option to produce military toxins by biological means, we would have to make certain that the UK draft Convention did not prohibit their production. However, this would put our position at odds with the publicly stated UK interpretation * of their draft and add to the task of winning support for the principles and objectives of the Convention. Moreover, if the draft Convention were construed to permit biological production facilities and if other countries took advantage of this, verification under the UK draft Convention could be rendered even more difficult. On the other hand, if the U.S. accepted the UK interpretation that their draft Convention prohibited the production of toxins by biological processes (all toxins of current military interest are produced biologically today), the association of this technically chemical agent with the Convention could encourage pressure toward the prohibition of all chemical agents without more verification than provided by the UK draft Convention. The UK has expressed a desire to review the U.S. and UK positions before the next meeting of the CCD. Geneva Protocol The Geneva Protocol prohibits any use in war of lethal or incapacitating chemical or biological agents. Most of the major powers have converted this into a “no-first use” undertaking by means of a reservation to the effect that the Protocol shall cease to be binding with regard to any State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol. The negotiating history of the Geneva Protocol is not conclusive as to whether toxins were deemed to come either within the category of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and analogous liquids, materials or devices” or within “bacteriological methods of warfare.” However, two toxins—those causing botulism and tetanus—were specifically mentioned in the discussion of bacteriological methods of warfare. Thus, from the standpoint of the negotiating history (although not from a scientific viewpoint), other parties could claim that toxins must be treated as bacteriological methods of warfare in interpreting the Protocol. No government has stated its position on this question under the Protocol. The most immediate problem would arise if we wished to ratify the Protocol with a reservation that would codify announced U.S. policy—i.e., reserve the right to retaliate with chemical weapons but not biological weapons. In this event we would have to make clear to the Senate and to the other parties that our reservation included toxins. This could create difficulties in the Senate ratification proceedings, as well as highlighting the toxin issue internationally. This problem would not arise if the U.S. took the standard reservation taken by the major powers that the Protocol would cease to be binding if violated by others. Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Article 23 of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land—by which the United States is legally bound—provides that “It is especially forbidden… to employ poison or poisoned weapons.” Legal authorities are divided on whether the prohibition covers use of toxins. No government has taken a public position on this question. PART II POLICY ISSUE AND PROGRAM OPTIONS There is one basic issue: Should the U.S. maintain an option to develop capabilities to retaliate with toxins against chemical or biological attack? (Implicit in this issue is an understanding that defensive research and development programs will be authorized whether the option to develop capabilities in toxins is retained or not. Defensive research and development programs are implied in the first two options and, as noted, constitute the third option. In general, an offensive research and development program differs from a defensive research program in that the former includes R&D on weapons-delivery systems and large-scale production techniques and the latter does not.) Since toxins may be produced either by biological processes or eventually by chemical synthesis, there are three program options. OPTION I: Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Produced by Either Biological Processes or Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option is an offensive, as well as defensive, research and development program for toxins produced by either method and for related delivery systems/weapons.) OPTION II: Renounce the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Which are Produced by Biological Processes. Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Only Those Toxins Produced by Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are: (1) a defensive research and development program only for biologically-produced toxins; and (2) offensive, as well as defensive, research and development programs for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins are related delivery systems/weapons.) OPTION III: Renounce the Use, and Hence the Development and the Stockpiling, of Weapons Systems Using Toxins Produced Either by Chemical Synthesis or Biological Processes. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are only defensive research and development programs for all toxins with the purposes of assuring adequate defensive measures and of protecting against technological surprise.) OPTION I Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Produced by Either Biological Processes or Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option is an offensive, as well as defensive, research and development program for toxins, produced by either method, and for related delivery systems/weapons.) PROS: 1. As the U.S. has renounced biological weapons, toxins represent the only candidate agents to achieve significant logistic advantage or large area coverage in either a lethal or an incapacitating role. Toxins could provide anywhere from 10- to 1000-fold advantages in these respects (depending on the toxin * ) over existing chemical weapons assuming that the enemy has not been immunized and/or is not wearing masks. 2. Staphylococcal enterotoxin (produced by biological processes) represents the most promising current potential to achieve an incapacitating capability. 3. This option retains maximum flexibility to develop a variety of toxins which may have military utility as part of a U.S. retaliatory capability. (Could provide either an incapacitating capability for U.S. forces within 1–3 years or another lethal option [botulinum] besides currently stockpiled GB and VX nerve agents.) 4. Assuming that the enemy has not been immunized and/or is not wearing masks, logistic supply by air for retaliation from CONUS would be simpler than for other chemicals because of much lower container weight requirements and possible lower supply requirements. 5. This option may complicate the military planning and defense problems of other countries. 6. Even though the predicted military utility of toxins may never be realized, retention of the option (and announcement thereof) could provide a bargaining lever for future arms control discussions. CONS: * 1. Biological programs for toxins could be used as a basis for charging the U.S. with preparation for biological warfare. 2. The use of toxins could be used as a justification for employing biological agents against U.S. forces. (The use of toxins could be perceived as or used as a basis for charging the U.S. with biological warfare in view of the fact that the victims—who would constitute a large percentage of all unprotected personnel within the affected area—would contract disease [botulism; tetanus, et cetera] even though not communicable ones. This would be true regardless of whether the toxins were produced by biological or chemical means.) * 3. Production of toxins by biological processes would cast doubt on the significance and credibility of the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare and tend to weaken its favorable domestic and international impact. (For example, maintenance of facilities for the production of toxins by biological means could be claimed to be inconsistent with announced U.S. policy that “the United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures” and that “our bacteriological programs in the future will be confined to research in biological defense, on techniques of immunization, and on measures of controlling and preventing the spread of disease.”) Production in amounts needed for a significant military capability would require operation of our present production facility or new chemical facilities for synthetically-produced toxins. 4. The increased publicity that toxins would receive from the national and international attention incident to choosing this option could stimulate interest in the development of toxins and perhaps biologicals by other countries. Thus, it could encourage proliferation. ** 5. Production, storage, transportation and open air testing could cause domestic political problems incident to complying with public law which requires advance notification to Congress and the Governors concerned with projected activities in these areas. 6. This would place the U.S. in opposition to the UK interpretation of the UK Draft Convention by requiring the U.S. to take the position that bacteriological/-biological processes could be used for the production of toxins. * 7. If we choose to ratify the Geneva Protocol with the type of reservation that codifies U.S. chemical warfare and biological research policies (i.e., that preserves the right to retaliate with chemicals but not biological warfare agents), preservation of this option would require us to establish that, regardless of the negotiating history of the Geneva Protocol, we did not consider the use of toxins to be a biological method of warfare. This could complicate the Senate ratification proceedings and, unless formally conveyed to other Parties, would be legally vulnerable to challenge. Public Affairs Rationale. ** Any public explanation of Option 1 could utilize the following points: 1. Toxins are indeed chemical substances and are so defined in the UN Secretary-General’s report, the World Health Organization report and by the international technical community. 2. Toxins differ from other chemicals in that the production of toxins happens to occur in biological organisms, but toxins are not transmissible from man-to-man and cannot themselves cause epidemics as is the case with biologicals. 3. The method of production is not germane to the basic policy question and, therefore, toxins should be treated entirely as part of the U.S. chemical warfare program. 4. The U.S. policy of “no first use” would, of course, apply to toxins as it does to all other chemical weapons. 5. The U.S. will continue to work towards effective arms control agreements in this area. 6. U.S. policy renouncing all biological weapons has been made clear and there should be no question of diverting any of the biological processes for toxins to preparations for biological weapons. Major Drawback. Possible drawbacks to this explanation are delineated in the arguments against the option. In brief, the principal drawback from the public affairs standpoint could be the accusation that, despite the President’s announcement of November 25 renouncing all offensive preparations for biological warfare, a U.S. biological warfare program would continue under the guise of a toxins program and that the U.S. had simply renounced one type of “disease weapon” * to embrace another. OPTION II Renounce the Option to Develop, Stockpile, and Use in Retaliation Toxins Which are Produced by Biological Processes. Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Only Those Toxins Produced by Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are: (1) a defensive research and development program only for biologically-produced toxins; and (2) offensive, as well as defensive, research and development programs for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins are related delivery system/weapons.) PROS: 1. Would leave open the development of a toxin capability by chemical synthesis. Thus, the advantages cited for Option 1 of flexibility and relative logistics simplicity could accrue under this option if the U.S. developed effective toxins by chemical synthesis. 2. Would not require modification of the UK Draft Convention. 3. Would remove a basis for claiming that we were acting inconsistently with the President’s announcements on our biological research program by renouncing the production of toxins by biological processes. 4. The production of the lethal toxins which may have the most potential military utility can probably be accomplished in militarily significant quantities by chemical synthesis only. CONS: * 1. Would tend to limit U.S. capabilities to lethal toxins as the only known incapacitating toxin (staphylococcal enterotoxin) is of bacterial origin and much less amenable to chemical synthesis than a number of lethal toxins. 2. Would deny toxins to the U.S. for a period of some years (at least 3–5 years) while methods of chemical production were being developed. 3. The U.S. basis for retention of chemically-produced toxins (i.e., method of manufacture) could be difficult to sustain. * 4. Could continue some of the contentions over the existence of possible loopholes in the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare by creating questions as to the significance of differences based solely on the method of manufacture of toxins. 5. Could stimulate foreign interest in toxins and thus risk possible proliferation, *** while the U.S. limited itself to chemically-synthesized toxins. 6. Could perhaps complicate future arms control measures and verification procedures in the sense that, as it becomes possible to synthesize chemically those toxins that now require a biological process, a country could produce biological toxins while claiming that they had been chemically produced. Public Affairs Rationale . Any public explanation of Option II could utilize the following points: 1. Even though toxins are chemicals, as defined by the UN Secretary-General’s report, the World Health Organization’s report and the international technical community generally, the U.S. will engage in no biological production processes for the production of toxin weapons. 2. As announced on November 25, U.S. biological research programs will be for defensive purposes only, such as developing techniques of immunization and preventing the spread of disease. 3. The U.S. will have no need to operate any secret facilities capable of producing biological or bacterial toxins and hence also capable of producing biological weapons in large quantities. * 4. The President has directed that all stocks of toxins which are not necessary for strictly defined defensive purposes be destroyed. 5. These decisions are taken with full confidence that they are in keeping with the overall security of the U.S. 6. This action underlines U.S. support followingr the principles and objectives of the UK Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use of Biological Means of Warfare. 7. The U.S. will continue to work towards effective arms control agreements in these areas. When asked about the policy on chemically synthesized toxins, the reply could utilize the following points: 1. Toxins are chemical substances and differ from other chemicals only in that toxins happen to occur also in nature. 2. Unlike biological agents, which the U.S. has clearly renounced, toxins do not replicate, are not transmissible from man-to-man and cannot themselves cause spreading epidemics. 3. The U.S. is not in the business of differentiating between various chemicals or blurring the primary technical line which can be drawn between chemicals and biologicals (that is, the latter replicate and the former do not). Major Drawback . Possible drawbacks to this explanation are delineated in the arguments against the option. In brief, the principal public affairs drawback could be the accusation that the U.S. continues to devise loopholes for its policy in this area because, while biologically-produced toxins had been renounced, the option was left open to produce these vary same “disease-producing” toxin weapons by chemical processes. OPTION III Renounce the Use and Hence the Development and Stockpiling, of Weapons Systems Using Toxins Produced Either by Chemical Synthesis or Biological Processes. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are only defensive research and development programs for all toxins with the purposes of assuring adequate defensive measures and of protecting against technological surprise.) PROS: 1. Would provide the necessary defensive measures for U.S. forces and protect against technological surprise. 2. Would tend to eliminate questions as to the significance and credibility of the U.S. renunciation of biological methods of warfare and U.S. policy on biological research. 3. Would put the U.S. in the best position to ratify the Geneva Protocol with the type of reservation that most closely corresponds with U.S. policy on chemical warfare and biological research. 4. Would enable the U.S. to accept the UK position on the UK Draft Convention without risk of creating the appearance of loopholes. 5. Would be favorably received in public discussion by appearing to extend the recent prohibition on biologicals to include toxins and would avoid any appearance of a loophole in U.S. policy with respect to biological research. 6. Would be less likely to stimulate foreign interest in toxins as weapons or to risk proliferation. CONS: 1. Would foreclose the development of toxin weapon systems which may have military utility. 2. Would put the U.S. at a disadvantage if other countries had toxin programs and we failed to persuade them to place similar restrictions on such programs. 3. The U.S. could be challenged as to why it was willing to unilaterally renounce one class of chemical agents but not all chemicals. 4. If the U.S. wished to insist on adequate verification of arms control agreements involving chemicals, this position could be difficult to sustain in light of the fact that the U.S. would have already unilaterally renounced one class of chemical agents. Public Affairs Rationale. Any public explanation of Option III could utilize the following points: 1. In spite of the fact that toxins are today produced by biological processes, toxins are indeed chemical substances as defined by the UN Secretary-General’s report, the World Health Organization’s report and the international technical community generally. 2. The review of U.S. policy on toxins was a difficult one. Toxins are like other chemicals in that toxins do not replicate, are not transmissible from man-to-man, and cannot cause spreading epidemics. While some toxins cause what is thought of as “disease”, others do not. 3. Nonetheless, after carefully considering all the facts and the possible consequences, the U.S. has decided to renounce any offensive preparations for and the use of all toxins as a method of warfare, even in retaliation. 4. Toxins are associated with many diseases, and the U.S. renounces the use of any disease as a method of warfare. 5. U.S. toxins programs will be for defensive purposes only, such as developing better immunization techniques, safety measures, and preventing the spread of disease. 6. The U.S. will have no need to operate any secret facilities capable of producing biological toxins and hence also capable of producing biological weapons in large quantities. (Same for Option II) 7. The President has directed that all stocks of toxins which are not necessary for strictly defined defensive research purposes be destroyed. (Same for Option II) 8. These decisions are taken with full confidence that they are in keeping with the overall security of the U.S. Toxins do not add a significant or necessary contribution to the U.S. defense posture. 9. This underlines U.S. support for the principles and objectives of the UK Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use of Biological Means of Warfare and goes one step further. 10. The U.S. hopes that other nations will follow this example and join us in working towards effective arms control agreements in these areas. (Same for Option II) Major Drawback. Possible drawbacks to this explanation are delineated in the arguments against the option. In brief, the principal drawback could be the challenge that, if the U.S. has decided to renounce one class of chemical agents, what reason does the U.S. find for not renouncing all of these types of weapons and destroying the other chemical weapons stockpiles. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The report was submitted to the NSC by the IPMG on January 21 and revised following the Review Group meeting on January 29. * The pathological effects of some diseases are caused in part by toxins which are produced by bacteria within the human body. # U.K., Canada, Australia. * Toxins have frequently been included in the biological sections of U.S. and allied military documents. The Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, dated 1 August 1968 indicates that France, Belgium, SEATO and CENTO use the following definition of biological warfare : “Employment of living organisms, toxic biological products and chemical plant growth regulators to produce death or casualties in man, animals or plants; or defense against such action.” (Emphasis added) NATO and the JCS limit the definition of biological agents to: “A micro-organism which causes disease in man, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel.” Toxins were also included in the definition of biological weapons in the 1954 Protocol establishing arms control provisions for the Western European Union. * The JCS believe that the amounts of biologically-produced toxins likely to be required for defensive/medical purposes are probably larger than the amounts that would be required for offensive military use. * One nanogram = one billionth of a gram or 1x10 -9 grams. * The DOD notes that the UK has taken no official governmental position on these matters, and further notes that the views expressed are those of mid-level UK spokesmen, the highest of which being the Head of the Disarmament Section, British Foreign Office. * About 10–20 fold for botulinum (lethal) and about 1000-fold for staphylococcal enterotoxin (incapacitating) and certain lethal toxins still in research and development. * OST maintains that toxins would have marginal utility as retaliatory weapons in battlefield situations assuming that an enemy force which had initiated the use of chemical or biological weapons in war would have taken protective measures, such as the provision of masks. Although mask leakage would be more critical with toxins than with some other chemical agents, masks alone provide no adequate protection against the skin-penetrating nerve agents. * OSD and JCS believe that the portions in parentheses are unnecessarily redundant in view of CON 2 and unduly exaggerate the importance of this point. ** OSD and JCS believe that in practice proliferation of a toxin capability is probably considerably less likely than proliferation of other chemical capabilities, as evidenced by the production difficulties, required dissemination techniques and equipment, and the requirement for a highly developed chemical and biological technology which the purification/production of toxins requires. * OSD notes that the UK has taken no official governmental position on these matters, and further notes that the views expressed are those of mid-level UK spokesmen, the highest of which being the Head of the Disarmament Section, British Foreign Office. ** The lead into any public explanation would probably be much the same for all three options and could include: (1) a reiteration of the significant policy initiatives taken on November 25 (for example, the renunciation of all offensive preparations for and methods of biological warfare); and (2) a statement that after these new policies, the President directed that a further comprehensive study of U.S. policies and programs on toxins be conducted for consideration in the National Security Council system. * The term “disease” is a functional term only in the sense that it describes the introduction of a foreign poisonous substance into the body. “Disease” does not imply that the particular substance involved is transmissible from man-to-man. * OST maintains that toxins which might be synthesized would have somewhat improved but probably still marginal utility as retaliatory weapons in battlefield situations. * OST believes that this position is no more difficult to sustain than the comparable question in Option III, Con 3. *** OSD and JCS, for reasons noted, believe that in practice proliferation of toxins capabilities is probably less likely than proliferation of other chemical capabilities. * Such an announcement, however, might best await the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations with regard to the implementation of NSDM 35 on chemical warfare programs and biological research programs. On the other hand, if either Option II or Option III were selected, one can state with confidence that there would be no need for the operation of production facilities in secret. The Departments of Defense, Agriculture and HEW, the Office of Science and Technology and the National Academy of Sciences are looking into possible uses for the present biological production facilities and the possible de-classification of some of the other biological laboratories. 178. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 178. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 1 Washington, January 31, 1970 SUBJECT: Ratification of Geneva Protocol of 1925 NSDM 35 provides that the Administration will submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It directs the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense to prepare the necessary papers to this end. During the course of drafting those papers differences of opinion arose between State and Defense which require further decisions by the President on the implementation of NSDM 35 before the papers can be put in final form. Three weeks ago, State planned to send a unilateral memorandum to the President requesting his decisions and advising him that Defense would submit its own memorandum on the issues. A copy of their proposed memorandum was furnished for our information. At our request, they agreed to convert their memorandum into a joint State-Defense-ACDA memorandum if our comments on their draft were furnished expeditiously. The State draft was circulated by the General Counsel within Defense for comment to me, the JCS, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the DDR&E, the ASD/PA, and the ATSD/LA. Based on these comments, the Assistant General Counsel (International Affairs) and the Legal Advisor of the Joint Staff collaborated with State and ACDA officials in the preparation of the draft joint State-Defense-ACDA memorandum, dated 22 January 1970, which is attached at Tab A. Transmittal of the joint memorandum to Mr. Rogers for forwarding by him to the President has been held up by his staff pending Mr. Laird’s review and approval. Mr. Laird has instructed me that, for procedural reasons, he wishes to have the issues raised by the joint memorandum considered by the Under Secretaries Committee and that he sees no reason why these issues should be handled outside the NSC mechanism. I have accordingly prepared, and recommend you sign, the letter to Mr. Richardson at Tab B requesting him to place the matter on the agenda of the Under Secretaries Committee. G. Warren Nutter 1 Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan–Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Secret. The draft memorandum at Tab A is not published. The attachment at Tab B, signed by Packard, is Document 179 . 179. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 179. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 1 Washington, February 2, 1970 Dear Elliot: A joint State-Defense-ACDA memorandum for the President has been drafted by our respective staffs to obtain his decisions on various issues which need to be resolved prior to submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. While not necessarily taking issue with the substance of the draft, Mr. Laird has advised me that, in his view, these issues should be thoroughly considered by the Under Secretaries Committee before being referred to the President. I accordingly request that you call a meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee to review the draft memorandum and the issues it presents. Sincerely, David Packer 1 Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 38, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. II, Jan–Dec. 1970, Calendar (1). Confidential 180. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 180. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 3, 1970 SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Packard’s Request to Have the Under Secretaries Committee Review the State-Defense Draft Memorandum on the Geneva Protocol State informed us informally today, 3 February, that Mr. Packard wrote Mr. Richardson, on 2 February, requesting that the Under Secretaries Committee review the State-Defense draft memorandum on the Geneva Protocol before forwarding it to the President. We understand that Mr. Packard’s letter to Mr. Richardson was written at the suggestion of Secretary Laird. As noted in our memorandum to you, on 27 January (Tab A), the State-Defense memorandum is neither the formal package nor the interpretative statement for submission to the Senate, as requested in NSDM 35. It is a memorandum requesting decisions on two or more issues where State and Defense appear to disagree. Attached to our earlier memorandum was a description of the issues between State and Defense, along with some of the major arguments and agency positions (Tab B). The Under Secretaries Committee could schedule a meeting on this subject next Thursday, 12 February, and we have recommended that the Committee aim toward this date at the latest. Ken BeLieu wrote you a memorandum (Tab C), on 2 February, stating that Democratic Hill leaders are becoming restive on the lack of the Administration’s follow through on the Geneva Protocol and “unless action is completed very soon— the President may be embarrassed”. (We are now preparing a reply for Mr. Belieu.) One matter upon which there appears to be agency agreement is that the toxins issue should be settled before the Administration submits the Protocol to the Senate. The toxins paper has already been revised as per the instructions of the Review Group last Thursday. The toxins paper will be forwarded tomorrow (4 February) for comments by the members of the Review Group by the middle of next week. It is necessary for us to have all of these matters in hand so that the Administration can move once decisions are made. Therefore, we recommend pushing on both the toxins issue and the Protocol package simultaneously. In brief, we believe that an Under Secretaries Committee meeting on the State-Defense Geneva Protocol memorandum could serve useful purposes (1) perhaps by coming to the conclusion that some of the issues are not really substantive, and (2) by moving this matter off the dime. [FYI: We believe that, out of the three issues stated in the memorandum, there may be only one truly substantive issue relating to how the U.S. should handle its understanding on riot control agents and chemical herbicides (See Pp. 1–2, Tab B.] Our understanding of these issues will be presented in more detail in your briefing book for the proposed meeting. The primary point now is that the Under Secretaries Committee consider the matter and forward it to the White House as soon as possible—hopefully, the day after the meeting. Recommendation: That you call Mr. Richardson to discuss these matters. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 338, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970– March 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr (NSC). Document 175 and its attachment include Tabs A and B. The document at Tab C is not published. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, “Discuss with Richardson to-morrow.” Guhin’s memorandum is attached to a January 6 memorandum by Haig, according to which Kissinger discussed the issue with Richardson on the 6 and both agreed to have the Under Secretaries Committee meet “at an early date.” 181. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 181. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 4, 1970 SUBJECT: Commercial Toxin Production in the U.S. Pursuant to your request of Dr. McRae (OST), at the Review Group meeting on the toxins paper (January 29), he has forwarded a CIA report (Tab A) on “Toxin Production in the U.S.” The report does not consider the status of toxin production in the military. The main points of the report are: 1. Contrary to the understanding expressed at the meeting, the CIA knows of no commercial production of toxic flechettes or bullets other than those specifically contracted for by the military. Veterinarians do not use lethal flechettes or poisoned bullets. They use chemicals for sedation or anesthesia, not bacterial toxins. 2. There are a significant number of commercial plants that could be converted to the production of bacterial toxins. The facilities are adequate for production, but production expertise for highly toxic material exists only in a very few people, mostly within Government organizations. 3. Twelve U.S. companies are licensed to produce toxins. These companies either sell antitoxins (toxoids) or make them for their own use. Few of these companies appear to be manufacturing toxins at the present time. 4. However, two companies specifically produce botulinum toxin in order to obtain botulinum toxoid. 5. Bacterial toxins of various kinds can be produced in a large number of laboratories in quantities adequate for research. A list of the attachments at Tabs is attached to this memorandum. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). None of the attachments are published 182. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 182. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85) The statement of the arguments for and against the three options in NSSM 85 represents an improvement in clarity. The new public affairs rationale for each option fills a need that was overlooked in the earlier version of the paper and gives a more realistic picture of the problems and advantages of each of the three alternative positions. I feel that the public affairs rationales contain valid points and helpful arguments but do not give enough attention to the drawbacks or probable negative public reaction that would follow the adoption of either Option I or II and that certain additional factors might usefully be considered. In considering the public treatment of this subject, the first aim should be to maintain the credibility of the President’s November 25 renunciation of biological weapons and if possible to extend the wide and highly favorable momentum his statement produced at home and overseas (see attached summary of foreign media reaction). First, an assessment of the general problem: The toxins issue while presently a “sleeper” could grow, once attention is focused on it, into a major public controversy which could damage the President’s reputation at home and abroad. The repugnance with which the public regard such agents—whether they are classified as chemical or biological—is so great that technical explanations and attempts to justify rationally their possible military use would fall mainly upon deaf ears. Public awareness of toxins as possible military weapons is very limited at the moment, but it could rapidly increase if critics at home and abroad were to find a means of attacking the Government through this issue. The groundwork has been laid by several press stories highlighting toxins as a fearful and unsolved problem. A major public controversy over toxins might well occur during the Senate hearings on the Geneva Protocol. Our position reserving the right to use riot control agents and herbicides has already drawn fire from some members of the Senate, and if the decision is made to reserve the option to develop and use toxins we should be prepared for sharp and emotional criticism from both Congress and the press. Thus, our opponents abroad would be handed not only an issue but arguments voiced by American legislators and publications. The revised paper points out that the principal drawback of Option I from the public affairs standpoint would (not could) be the accusation that in spite of the President’s renunciation of all biological weapons the U.S. in effect was retaining them under a different label. We should expect charges that we were opening a major loophole in the November 25 statement after second thoughts about the value of toxins as weapons. The impression would be either that the government regretted the original renunciation of biological weapons or intended all along to water it down after the fact. The argument over whether toxins are chemical or biological is not meaningful to the public nor would it be effective in overcoming public resistance to them. To the extent there is public awareness, the public only knows and cares that toxins, however produced, can cause swift and fatal diseases. In fact, to insist that toxins are chemical (and therefore admissible) in the face of conflicting public usage would create an impression of trickery. (This does not dispute the fact that toxins are technically chemical and that most experts agree on this. We are faced with the fact that public usage does not coincide: the two dictionaries in most common use in the U.S., Webster’s Collegiate and Webster’s New World , define them in biological terms, as does the famous Petit Larousse in France.) To justify the development and military use of toxins on the ground that they were chemicals would most likely only reinforce the impression that we were playing a version of the shell game. For these reasons, USIA believes that Option I would be costly and damaging to the reputation of the government and highly undesirable from the public affairs standpoint. In dealing with public attitudes the best would be Option III, since this, by clearly including toxins with the renounced biological weapons, would raise no issue of duplicity and would carry here and abroad a forthright ring of honest follow-through on the President’s announcement. The seven points mentioned on pp. 23–24 of the revised paper would be essential in any public defense of Option II. (We assume that point four should read “… defensive research purposes” as in point seven, p. 27.) I suggest our public position under Option II concerning chemically synthesized toxins might be better defended by explaining initially that: 1) At the present state of scientific knowledge toxins are produced through biological not chemical processes; therefore our renunciation of biologically produced toxins includes all forms that have been produced. 2) If it should become possible to synthesize toxins chemically this would constitute a new situation which the U.S. would naturally review at that time. This explanation would be understood by the public, and although it might not answer all concerns it would be accepted, I believe. The three points suggested on p. 24 of the paper could be used to reply to any journalists who wished to pursue technical aspects of the subject further, although they do not provide an answer to the probable question whether the U.S. has a research and development program to achieve the chemical production of toxins. Depending upon the facts of the matter, our good faith might still be called into question. Frank Shakespeare 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. The attachment is not published. 183. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 183. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 9, 1970 Subject: U.S. Policy on Toxins After considering the report submitted to you under NSSM 85, I recommend Option III—renouncing the use of toxins regardless of their method of production and confining our toxin program to research and development for defensive purposes only and to protect against technological surprise. This recommendation is based on my conclusion that the case for developing a retaliatory capability with toxins (in addition to current and planned lethal chemical agents) is not persuasive, while the domestic and international political costs involved are incommensurately high. Specifically, preserving the option to do so would seriously undermine the favorable impact, and even the credibility, of your November 25 announcements; increase the difficulty of winning international support for the UK Draft Convention; and create serious difficulties in connection with our ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Moreover, there is some risk that such an indication of U.S. interest in the military utility of toxins would stimulate further interest in them by other countries. I do not believe that renunciation of the use of synthesized toxins would affect our ability to insist on treating biological methods of warfare separately from chemical warfare in arms control negotiations. Nor do I think it would impair our ability to insist on such verification requirements as we may deem necessary for an agreement relating to other chemical warfare agents. Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. 184. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 184. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 10, 1970 Subject: Revised Paper, dated 4 February 1970, on Toxins (NSSM–85) As requested, the following comments on the subject document are provided: 1. It is my judgment that the selection of Option II, rather than Option I, represents the soundest way to implement the policy the President has already enunciated and at the same time permit the Department of Defense to develop additional capabilities with toxins when they are synthesized as ordinary chemicals. It would answer most of the critics of the President’s policy, since it would be clear that we would have no need for maintaining biological production facilities at Pine Bluff for military purposes. The selection of Option III rather than Option II would appear to do little more in this regard but would be more restrictive on the future activities of the DOD. The selection of Option II, I believe, would be favorably received in public discussions since it would extend the recent prohibition on biological warfare to include toxins actually produced by biological means. It would not, however, preclude the use of synthesized toxins, whose exclusion could introduce ambiguities into what was and was not allowable. 2. Before forwarding the document to the President, I would suggest the following changes be made: a. Add to the footnote at the bottom of page 18, the following: “but provide very substantial protection against presently available toxins.” b. Page 22, item 3, modify to read: “Would remove the most important basis …” c. Page 24, item 1, modify to read: “Toxins are chemical substances and differ from other chemicals only in that the toxins are produced primarily by biological organisms.” Lee A. DuBridge Science Adviser 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret. 185. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 185. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 10, 1970 Subject: U.S. Policy on Toxins I have considered the report submitted to you in response to NSSM 85, and I recommend that future U.S. policy with respect to toxins be based on Option III. The U.S. should renounce the use of toxins regardless of the method of production and limit its efforts in this field to research and development for defensive purposes only and to protect against technological surprise. This recommendation is based on the following considerations. First, it does not seem to me that a strong case can be made for developing a retaliatory capability with toxins as a military requirement essential to U.S. security. While toxins appear to have some logistic advantages as compared to lethal the chemicals, they also appear to be easier to defend against and thus would not add any significant capability to our existing and planned chemical arsenal. On the other hand, preserving the option to develop toxins would have some distinct political liabilities. It would distract from the favorable impact of your November 25 announcement on U.S. chemical warfare and biological research policy. It would make it more difficult for us to achieve international support for the U.K. draft Convention, the principles of which you endorsed in your November 25 statement. It would be likely to complicate our efforts to gain Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Finally, if the U.S. were to maintain the option to develop toxins it would make it more difficult for us to limit such programs by others. I believe that any announcement that you make with regard to our policy on toxins need to be carefully couched. If you do adopt Option III, there is some risk (which we regard as small) that we will find ourselves subjected to pressures to expand restraints on chemical weapons inasmuch as toxins are chemicals. Therefore, I recommend that the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group be charged with the preparation, for your approval, of a public policy statement describing our policy on toxins and relating it to your earlier policy announcement. Eliot Richardson Acting Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret 186. Memorandum From the Deputy General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Van Dorn) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 186. Memorandum From the Deputy General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Van Dorn) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, February 11, 1970 SUBJECT: NSC Under Secretaries Committee Meeting on Geneva Protocol, February 12, 1970, 4 P.M. There is general agreement at the staff level in State, ACDA and DOD that the attached paper fairly states the issues, the relevant pros and cons, and the differences of view between the departments. Thus the staffs believe that the paper is in satisfactory form to present to the President, and saw no reason for an Under Secretaries meeting. Secretary Laird nevertheless requested that there be such a meeting, probably with a view to persuading Kissinger, Richardson and yourself to adopt their views rather than those indicated in the paper as State/ACDA views. There are only three issues on which the paper indicates differences of view between State/ACDA, on the one hand, and DOD on the other. These are listed below, with a few supplementary comments: Recommendation 2 - No First-Use Reservation (discussed at pp. 4–7) The alternatives are: First , reservation of right to retaliate with CW but not BW; Second , reservation which, like those of other major powers, has effect of reserving right to retaliate with CW or BW; and Third , no reservation, but rely on reciprocal rights against other reserving parties and rights arising from material breach. I understand that Mr. Farley thinks we should hold the State Department’s coat on this one, since he does not consider the difference between the first and second alternatives worth a major fight with Packard. You should, however, understand that, unlike the other Alternatives, the second one is likely to lead to charges that the President is hedging on his renunciation of biological warfare. Your views may be asked on the point made in the DOD argument (p. 7) that converting our announced BW policy into a legal obligation not to use BW “would deprive the U.S. of a bargaining point in upcoming arms control negotiations on biological warfare.” If so, I recommend that you indicate that such a bargaining point is certainly not necessary (since the U.K. Convention involves giving up more than the use of BW) and would not be particularly helpful (since it would not be considered by others as a significant step beyond our highly publicized policy against the use of BW.) Moreover, it might cast doubt upon the firmness of such policy. The third alternative, while slightly messier from a legal point of view, would have the merit of enabling us to ratify the Protocol without reservations, which is the way that was recommended by the Administration and the Foreign Relations Committee in 1926, and normally the preferable way to ratify treaties. Recommendation 3 - Follow-on NSDM on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides (discussed at pp. 12–13) Since NSDM 35 indicated that there would be such a follow-on, we think it should be issued before we face the Senate. It might well prove to be helpful to the Administration in the debate over RCAs and herbicides (which will be the most controversial issues). At the very least it will give us a base from which to formulate the Administration’s case on these issues. I fail to see how any harmful revelation of our “battlefield rules of engagement” would result. Recommendation 4 (b) Understanding on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides (discussed at pp. 7–12) Option 1 : Senate vote on understanding, communicated to parties Option 2 : No Senate vote on understanding, but communication to parties Option 3 : Neither Senate vote on understanding nor communication to parties It is noteworthy that, with the single exception of Tully Torbert (who seems to favor Option 2), all the State and ACDA officers involved—Stevenson, his two deputies, DEPALMA, Spiers, Pickering, Farley, Leonard, Hancock, Furnas, Day, Cutter and myself—would really prefer to see Option 3 chosen provided the President is willing to accept the consequences. Moreover, NSDM 35 can be read as choosing Option 3. But we all recognized that this choice was made without realizing that it would result in loss of the legal right to make first use of RCAs in war if an adverse opinion of the ICJ should be obtained. Thus it might fail to give lasting effect to that portion of NSDM 35 that excepted RCAs from our renunciation of the first use of chemical weapons. Accordingly, in this memorandum State and ACDA merely recommend that the President be prepared to consider Option 3 “at least as a fallback position.” DOD is strongly opposed to Option 3 for the reasons given in the Cons at pages 11–12. As for Con 4, 1 doubt that any choice we make among these options would be likely to affect the result of a Communist conducted “war crimes” trial if it ever occurred. The only country that has conducted a war-crimes trial on charges of preparing and using bacteriological weapons is the Soviet Union, which convicted 12 former members of the Japanese Army on these charges even though Japan had not ratified the Geneva Protocol. RECOMMENDED ACDA POSITION: That the paper fairly states the issues and the differing views on them and should be forwarded to the President as is. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–0004, Chemical Biological and Radiological Warfare (CBW), Laser Technology and U.S. Position on Toxins, February 1970. Secret. Drafted by Van Doren (ACDA/GC). The memorandum is an unsigned copy. The attachment is not published. No record of the Under Secretaries Committee meeting was found. 187. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 187. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 12, 1970 SUBJECT: Program Options on Toxins Your office advised the Department of Defense on 10 February 1970 that you requested the Department’s preference from among the three Options presented in the revised report of 30 January 1970 on U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM–85) with the understanding that the report and the choice of Options by the several departments will be sent to the President without further Review Group or National Security Council discussion. The Secretary of Defense, after consideration of all relevant factors, favors and recommends Option II. The Secretary further recommends that in the final report transmitted to the President, the follow-on parenthetical explanation in Option II (2) be reworded as follows: “Research and development program for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins and related delivery systems/weapons.” The Secretary of Defense does not believe it is urgent to announce U.S. policy on toxins in the immediate future. Further, he feels that the President should await the appropriate time and circumstances to announce whatever option he chooses, making clear that any policy chosen, short of Option I, represents an important concession and restraint on the part of the U.S. in view of established U.N. and other general views on toxins. For the President’s information, it is noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed the options with an emphasis on the military implications and have selected Option I with a recommended rewording as follows: “Reserve the option to develop and stockpile toxins produced by either biological processes or chemical synthesis and thereby retain maximum flexibility in chemical retaliation.” The rationale in support of this recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is attached. I recognize that for the near term, three to five years, there is a similarity between Options II and III since we now lack the technical ability to create toxins through chemical synthesis. From the military point of view, I further recognize the JCS concerns. However, through the near term we will retain a deterrent capability against chemical warfare with other types of chemicals. These other chemicals will also provide a capability for retaliation as necessary. For the longer term, beyond five years, I feel that there is little difference between Option I recommended by the JCS and Option II, the recommendation of the Secretary and myself. In that time period, we expect to have the ability to chemically synthesize toxins, thus meeting the JCS military concerns. I recognize the military judgment of the JCS in their recommendations. However, in view of the factors outlined above, and the political considerations in this issue, Option II is recommended as rewritten above. David Packard Attachment. APPENDIX RATIONALE - It is agreed by all agencies that toxins are chemicals. - Option III, and a portion of Option II, provide essentially the same program for biologically produced toxins as is provided by recent US biological research policy despite the fact that toxins are not biological agents. - The best evidence available indicates that the US does not now have the capability to synthesize chemically toxins of military interest. Chemical synthesis would require at least 3 to 5 years and extensive resources, with no assurance of success. Thus, selection of Option II is tantamount to selection of Option III, for the present and near future. - Both Options II and III have an inherent danger in future arms control discussions, since it will be argued that the US unilaterally renounced some “chemicals” while not being willing to renounce all chemicals without verification. - Option I as changed is the only option which would be fully consistent with the President’s recently announced policies on chemical warfare. - Selection of Option I as changed has the advantages of retaining maximum flexibility in chemical retaliation, maximum bargaining positions should it later be decided to renounce a toxin capability, and avoidance of a premature decision prior to full and complete study of toxin potentials. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Se 188. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 188. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85) The NSC Review Group has completed its study of U.S. Policy on Toxins (Tab - Basic Paper). To assist you in your consideration of the issues, I have enclosed a brief background paper. The study was initiated because of the ambiguity regarding whether toxins were classified as chemical or biological and, therefore, where they were meant to fall under your announced policies for biological research and chemical warfare. This ambiguity flows essentially from the fact that while toxins are chemicals (non-living matter which does not reproduce itself), they currently are produced by biological processes from living organisms. Though their production by chemical synthesis is technically possible, none of military interest has yet been so produced. Moreover, if used, the effects of some toxins would be similar to those of biological agents in the sense that some toxins cause what is commonly described as disease. Toxins, however, do not cause contagious disease which is transmissible from man to man, and are therefore non-epidemic. There are three options: OPTION I: Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Produced by Either Biological Processes or Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option is an offensive, as well as defensive, research and development program for toxins, produced by either method, and for related delivery systems/weapons.) — This option would retain (1) a capability to achieve significant logistic advantage or large area coverage in either a lethal or incapacitating role, (2) maximum flexibility to develop a variety of toxins which may have military utility, (3) the most promising current potential to achieve an incapacitating capability (staphylococcal enterotoxin—produced by biological processes), and possibly (4) a bargaining lever for future arms control discussions. — But this policy could be used as basis for charging the U.S. with preparation for biological warfare. Production of toxins by biological processes would cast doubt on the significance and credibility of the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare and cause domestic political problems associated with production, storage, transportation and testing. Moreover, any use of toxins could be used as justification by others for employing biological agents against U.S. forces. Also, our interpretation of the U.K. Draft Convention on biological warfare would differ from that of the U.K. itself if we take the position that the production of toxins by bacteriological/biological processes is permitted, and Senate ratification proceedings on the Geneva Protocol would be more complicated. OPTION II: Renounce the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Which are Produced by Biological Processes. Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Only Those Toxins Produced by Chemical Synthesis. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are: (1) a defensive research and development program only for biologically-produced toxins; and (2) offensive, as well as defensive, research and development programs for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins and related delivery system/weapons.) — This option would leave open the development of a toxin capability by chemical synthesis thereby retaining the advantages of flexibility and relative logistics simplicity of Option 1 if synthesis is accomplished. Moreover, it (1) would not require modification of the U.K. Draft Convention and (2) would remove a basis for claiming that we were acting inconsistently with the November 25th announcement on biological programs. — But , it would tend to limit future capabilities to lethal toxins more amenable to synthesis than is the only known incapacitating toxin. It also would deny toxins to the U.S. for at least 3–5 years while chemical production methods are developed. Since the end product is identical regardless of production method, it also might be seen as a loophole in the renunciation of a biological warfare program based solely on the method of manufacture. It might complicate future arms control measures and verification (a country could produce toxins biologically and claim they were chemically synthesized). OPTION III: Renounce the Use, and Hence the Development and Stockpiling, of Weapons Systems Using Toxins Produced Either by Chemical Synthesis or Biological Processes. (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are only defensive research and development programs for all toxins with the purposes of assuring adequate defensive measures and of protecting against technological surprise.) — This option would provide necessary defensive measures and protect against technological surprise. It also would (1) eliminate questions as to the significance and credibility of the U.S. policy on biological methods of warfare and research, (2) put us in the best position to ratify the Geneva Protocol with the type of reservation most closely corresponding to our policy on chemical warfare and biological research, (3) enable us to accept the U.K. position on the U.K. Draft Convention, and (4) be received favorably in public discussion avoiding any appearance of loopholes in U.S. policy on biological research; — But , it would foreclose development of a weapons system which may have military utility and could place us at a disadvantage if other countries had toxin programs without similar restrictions. Moreover, it could expose us to a challenge as to why we are willing to unilaterally renounce one class of chemical agents but not others. Unilateral renunciation of this class of chemicals could weaken our case for insisting on adequate verification of arms control agreements involving chemicals. Agency positions and comments on the Review Group paper are enclosed and tabbed. Under Secretary of State Richardson and Ambassador Smith both favor Option III on the grounds that (1) the need for a retaliatory toxin capability in addition to current and planned chemical capabilities is highly questionable and (2) the international and domestic political costs of retaining the option to retaliate with toxins will be high. Both believe that preserving an option to retaliate with toxins ( Option 1 or Option 2 ) would (1) detract from the favorable impact of your November 25th announcement on U.S. chemical warfare and biological research policy, (2) make more difficult the winning of international support for the U.K. Draft Convention, and (3) complicate efforts to gain Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Both also believe that there is some risk that indication of U.S. interests in toxins could stimulate further interest in them by other countries. Ambassador Smith does not believe that renunciation of chemically synthesized toxins would affect our ability to insist on treating biological methods of warfare separately from chemical warfare in arms control negotiations or impair our ability to insist on verification requirements we deem necessary. Dr. DuBridge favors Option II. He believes that it implements your announced policy on biological research. At the same time he notes that it would permit development of additional capabilities through chemical synthesis of toxins, and avoid introducing ambiguities into what was and was not allowable in the chemical field. Mr. Shakespeare prefers Option III on the ground that it would be the clearest follow-through of your November 25th announcement and thus be most acceptable to the public at home and abroad. I recommend that you approve Option II renouncing biologically produced toxins and confining U.S. programs involving them to research and development for defensive purposes only but reserving the option to produce chemically synthesized toxins. In so doing your renunciation of biological means of warfare will be reinforced and ambiguities in our position which could arise from biological production processes for toxins will be eliminated. We can continue to support the principles of the U.K. Draft Convention as you announced on November 25th. Though we will be questioned in the Geneva Protocol ratification proceedings, our position on chemically synthesized toxins will be the same as that for all chemical weapons and the reservations we will take need not be modified further. I believe it important to reserve the option for chemically synthesized toxins for two reasons. The field is new and we do not know where research will take us. I am not convinced that toxins will have significant military utility. But until we know what the potential is, we should not unilaterally foreclose development of what may be a useful weapon system. Moreover, toxins are chemicals however they are produced. If we unilaterally forego the research and possible future production of chemically synthesized toxins we increase the risk that our entire retaliatory chemical program will come under attack. If we are willing to renounce one chemical weapon produced by chemical means, the argument will run, why should we not renounce all chemical weapons. I do not believe that we should run this risk. I have enclosed a draft NSDM and draft public statement which give effect to a policy based upon Option II of the Review Group paper which I recommend you approve. Draft NSDM Approve [RN initialed] Disapprove. See Me Draft Public Statement Approve [RN initialed] Disapprove. See Me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. Secret; Nodis. The President initialed his approval of the draft NSDM. Written above his approval is “OPTION III.” The President also initialed his approval of the draft public statement. 189. White House Press Release 189. White House Press Release 1 Washington, February 14, 1970 On November 25, 1969, the President renounced all offensive preparations for and any use by the United States of biological or bacteriological agents and weapons in war. Since that decision, at the direction of the President, a comprehensive review of United States policy and military programs concerning toxins has been in progress. Toxins are chemical substances, not living organisms, and are so regarded by the U.N. Secretary General and the World Health Organization. Although the effects of some toxins are commonly described as disease, they are not capable of reproducing themselves and are not transmissible from one person to another. However, the production of toxins in any significant quantity would require facilities similar to those needed for the production of biological agents. If the United States continued to operate such facilities, it would be difficult for others to know whether they were being used to produce only toxins but not biological agents. Moreover, though toxins of the type useful for military purposes could conceivably be produced by chemical synthesis in the future, the end products would be the same and their effects would be indistinguishable from toxins produced by bacteriological or other biological processes. Accordingly, the President has decided that: — The United States renounces offensive preparations for and the use of toxins as a method of warfare; — The United States will confine its military programs for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or any other biological method or by chemical synthesis, to research for defensive purposes only, such as to improve techniques of immunization and medical therapy. The President has further directed the destruction of all existing toxin weapons and of all existing stocks of toxins which are not required for a research program for defensive purposes only. The United States will have no need to operate any facilities capable of producing toxins either bacteriologically or biologically in large quantities and therefore also capable of producing biological agents. These decisions have been taken with full confidence that they are in accord with the overall security requirements of the United States. These decisions also underline the United States support for the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare. The United States hopes that other nations will follow our example with respect to both biological and toxin weapons. The renunciation of toxin weapons is another significant step, which we are willing to take unilaterally, to bring about arms control and to increase the prospects of peace. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–26, NSC Meeting 2/11/70, Policy on Toxins. No classification marking. 190. National Security Decision Memorandum 44 190. National Security Decision Memorandum 44 1 Washington, February 20, 1970 TO: The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The Director, Office of Science and Technology’ SUBJECT: United States Policy on Toxins Following a review of United States military programs for toxins, the President has decided that: 1. The United States will renounce the production for operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either by bacteriological or by chemical synthesis. 2. The United States military program for toxins will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes only. 3. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerning the disposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. These recommendations should accompany the recommendations pursuant to National Security Decision Memorandum 35 regarding the disposal of bacteriological/biological weapons. 4. The Under Secretaries Committee’s annual review of United States chemical warfare programs and public information policy, as directed by National Security Decision Memorandum 35, will include review of United States military toxins programs. Henry A Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50). Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler 191. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 191. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 25, 1970 SUBJECT: Submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate We have received the State/Defense/ACDA memorandum raising three issues for the President’s decision preparatory to forwarding a recommendation to the Senate for ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Two of these issues—what form our reservation of the right of chemical retaliation should take, and whether we should reserve to the President authorization for use in the future of tear gas and herbicides—are clear cut. We are drafting a memorandum from you to the President which defines these issues and their options and recommends Presidential decisions in each case. The third issue—how to inform the Senate and Parties to the Protocol of our interpretation that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of tear gas and herbicides in war—is not as clear cut. Our use of tear gas and especially herbicides in Southeast Asia will probably be the prime issue in the Senate proceedings. There are three options: Option I : Follow the normal treaty practice by having our understanding on tear gas and herbicides explicitly stated in the Senate resolution which would then be formally communicated to the Parties to the Protocol. Option II : Advise the Senate of our understanding and of our intention to communicate it to other Parties as part of our instrument of ratification, but the understanding would not be referred to in the Senate resolution. Option III : Advise the Senate of our understanding on RCAs and herbicides, but with our understanding neither included in the Senate resolution nor communicated to other Parties in the form of a legal interpretation. The choice really depends upon a sensing of the attitudes of the Senate. Option 3 carries a risk of legal problems later if, in response to a U.N. General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice were to rule that tear gas and/or herbicides were prohibited by the Protocol. In the event of such a ruling, if we had not formally transmitted our understanding to the other Parties and then used tear gas or herbicides in war, we could be considered in violation of the Protocol. Option 3, therefore, would be the preferred course only if it were essential to Senate ratification of the Protocol without restrictions on tear gas and herbicides. Both Options 1 and 2 protect against the possible international legal problem which Option 3 risks. Our interpretation conveyed to the other Parties now would have the legal effect of a reservation in the event of a subsequent adverse ICJ opinion. The only difference between Options 1 and 2 is in our approach to the Senate. Option 1 would require the Senate to vote expressly on the question of tear gas and herbicides; Option 2 would not. However, under Option 2, if more than one-third of the Senators voting for the Protocol indicated that they did not consent to our transmitting our understanding on tear gas and herbicides to other Parties, we could not communicate this understanding. The question is primarily one of tactics. All agencies recommend that, before final decisions on the form of the submission of the Protocol are made, coordinated preliminary Senate soundings be taken on Options 1 and 2. While not necessarily eliminating Option 3 as a fallback position, we agree that Senate soundings are required only on Options 1 and 2. Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President which (1) informs him of the tactical question on presentation to the Senate of an understanding that the Protocol does not prohibit tear gas and herbicides and (2) recommends he approve preliminary soundings with the Senate to ascertain the preferred course. If the President approves we recommend that Bill Timmons be asked to coordinate the taking of the Senate soundings. RECOMMENDATIONS That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab A) and, That if the President approves preliminary soundings, Bill Timmons be requested to coordinate them. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Behr and Kennedy (NSC). Haig initialed the memorandum. At Tab A is a draft of Document 192 . 192. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 192. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 10, 1970 SUBJECT: Submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for Its Advice and Consent to Ratification The package of issues for decision, preparatory to your submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of biological and chemical means of warfare, is well in hand. Two of the issues for decision—what form our reservation of the right to chemical retaliation should take and whether we should require your authorization for future use of tear gas and herbicides—are clear cut. The third issue—how we handle our interpretation to the effect that we do not consider the Protocol to prohibit the use of tear gas and herbicides in war—is not as clear cut. There are three options: Option I : Follow the normal treaty practice by having our understanding on tear gas and herbicides explicitly stated in the Senate resolution which would then be formally communicated to the other Parties to the Protocol. Option II : Advise the Senate of our understanding and of our intention to communicate it to other Parties as part of our instrument of ratification, but the understanding would not be referred to in the Senate resolution. Option III : Advise the Senate of our understanding on tear gas and herbicides, but with our understanding neither included in the Senate resolution nor communicated to other Parties in the form of a legal interpretation. The question is primarily a matter of Senate tactics. Our understanding that the use of tear gas and especially herbicides is not prohibited and the current use in Southeast Asia will probably be the prime issue in the Senate proceedings. State, Defense. and ACDA recommend that coordinated Congressional soundings be taken on Options and 2 before any final decisions are made as to how the Protocol will be submitted to the Senate. Ken BeLieu also recommends that the Senate leadership be probed before finalizing decisions on how the Protocol should be presented. I agree. As soon as these soundings are taken, I will forward the entire package for your consideration and decision. If you approve, I will call Bill Timmons and advise him of your wish to have these soundings taken as soon as possible in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense. APPROVE [RN initialed] DISAPPROVE SEE ME 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon checked “Approve” and wrote “But” next to his check. Below he wrote, “Delay all this for 30 days – ask me then – give no [“no” is underlined twice] reasons – Just say the matter is being prepared – The Senate isn’t ready to take it up anyway.” 193. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 193. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 2, 1970 SUBJECT: Request for Defense’s Recommendations re Destruction of Biological Weapons and Transfer of Biological Facilities NSDM 35 (25 November 1969) requested Secretary Laird’s recommendations regarding the destruction of biological agents/weapons. NSDM 44 (14 February 1970) requested his recommendations regarding the destruction of toxins. Also, since issuance of the two decisions, Defense, OST, Agriculture and HEW have been reviewing the possible transfer and alternative uses of the existing biological facilities. 1. Destruction of Biological and Toxin Agents/Weapons. There is inter-agency agreement on all phases of the destruction plan proposed by Army except Defense is waiting for HEW to decide the last stage involving the disposal of denatured biological materials after the agents are no longer active. The final solution of this last step is not necessary prior to implementation of the President’s decisions. 2. Future of Directorate of Biological Operations (DBO) at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Secretary Hardin (Agriculture) has requested two months to formulate his final comments on whether Agriculture wants DBO. Some worthwhile environmental work can be performed at DBO, according to OST, but it is really a matter of fiscal priorities. At any rate, final decisions on the future of DBO do not have to be settled now. The destruction of biological agents will take approximately a year. Any public announcement could include a general statement that DBO would not be part of any military program after destruction of the weapons, nor would it be mothballed for future programs. 3. Biological Labs at Fort Detrick. Secretary Finch has asked for the labs at Fort Detrick and for supplemental funds for a research program there. Budget does not want to grant additional funds in the form of a supplemental, but approves the transfer to HEW subject to approval by Secretary Laird. We understand Secretary Laird has two recommendations on his desk: (1) JCS and Army recommend keeping Fort Detrick at one half capacity; (2) DDR&E and ISA recommend transferring the labs to HEW while moving the defensive program to Dugway and Edgewood Arsenal. 4. Plant Sciences Labs at Fort Detrick. All agencies agree that these labs should go to Agriculture. We believe a well-timed and comprehensive announcement on the implementation of the President’s decisions would be advisable prior to sending the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Such an announcement could include, for example, an invitation for international observation of the destruction process and perhaps an international lab setup at Fort Detrick. (As noted, the future of DBO at Pine Bluff Arsenal and the last step of the destruction program do not require decisions at this time.) Attached at Tab A is a proposed memorandum to the Secretary of Defense which requests his recommendations on these matters by June 19. OST (Dr. Vincent McRae) assures us that this is ample time as almost all of the leg work within Defense has been completed. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President stating the reasons for the memorandum to Secretary Laird and requesting his approval thereof. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I 2. That, if the President approves, you sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird at Tab A 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Robert Behr (NSC). Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Doesn’t need Pres. Give Laird 2 weeks in memo.” Rather than forwarding the memorandum at Tab I to the President, Kissinger initialed approval for him. The memorandum to Laird at Tab A, revised to provide a two week deadline, is Document 195 . 194. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird 194. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, June 15, 1970 SUBJECT: Implementation of National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44 With reference to National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44, the President has asked that recommendations regarding the destruction of biological agents/weapons and toxin agents/weapons be submitted for his consideration by June 30, 1970. Additionally, the President has requested that any other recommendations regarding implementation of the decision to confine the United States biological program to research for defensive purposes only (e.g., alternative uses of biological facilities) be submitted for his consideration at the same time. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Secret. 195. Memorandum for the Record 195. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 16, 1970 SUBJECT: Monday Morning Operations Staff Meeting (6/15/70) [Omitted here is unrelated material.] He [Kissinger] asked whether there was anything on the Geneva Protocol other than the memorandum he had. Col. Behr said there was not, but he referred to the letter to State from Congressman Zablocki and the necessity for getting a Presidential decision. Dr. Kissinger said he had not made up his mind as to the options. He was bothered by the idea that testimony before a Congressional Committee created a binding commitment. Under this concept, a country could make a treaty and could then change its commitment under the treaty by testifying to a Congressional committee and not telling the other party to the treaty of the nature of the testimony. He acknowledged that a decision to use these agents (tear gas and herbicides) would not depend upon what we have said. He agreed that we had taken this course with the Non-Proliferation Treaty but thought our interpretation expressed in testimony would have no force. He asked if we had communicated our interpretation to the Soviets. Mr. Sonnenfeldt replied we had told them we were going to give certain testimony. Dr. Kissinger said such testimony, without communicating it to the other side, does not constitute a legal commitment for the other side and that he did not see how it would work. He asked Col. Behr to recast that part of the paper to cover this point . 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Staff Meetings 1969–1971. Secret. Prepared by Jeanne Davis. 196. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 196. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 18, 1970 SUBJECT: Optional Memorandum for the President re Geneva Protocol and the Tear Gas-Herbicides Issue As you requested at last Monday’s staff meeting, attached at Tab I(2) is an optional memorandum for the President on the Geneva Protocol and how we handle our understanding that we do not consider it to prohibit the use of tear gas and chemical herbicides in war. The original memorandum (Tab I), which recommends Option 3, also has been revised to include a brief discussion of the effect of the legal ambiguities arising from selection of that Option. The optional memorandum is identical to the original memorandum in all respects except that you recommend Option 2 (pp. 3–4) whereby we would inform the Senate of our understanding and of our intention to communicate it formally to the other Parties to the Protocol, but would not place it in the resolution proposed by the Administration. If you choose to recommend Option 2, attached at Tab A(2) is a revised memorandum for the Secretary of State which (1) informs him that the President has decided for Option 2, and (2) instructs State, in coordination with Defense and Timmons’ Office, to hold consultations with the principal members of the Senate. In the memorandum at Tab I, you recommended Option 3 whereby we would inform the Senate of our understanding but would neither place it in the resolution proposed by the Administration nor formally communicate it to the other Parties. At Tab A is the proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State which coincides with this recommendation. There are a few additional points regarding the options which deserve to be mentioned or expanded upon here. The selection of Option 2 leads to an important question: Will the Senate “buy” the attempt to gain the legal effect of a reservation without placing the question on the line for consideration, or will many Senators balk on procedural, not to mention substantive, grounds? Procedural arguments could be strengthened by the fact that communication of our interpretation would make the US the only formally interpreting Party. While the UK, Japan and Australia have announced policies similar to our understanding, none has formally communicated its position to the other Parties. Compared to Options 1 and 3, Option 2 is not a usual procedural practice on treaty matters. As far as the legal departments can ascertain, the approach has never been used on controversial issues. For this reason, your memorandum to the President recommending Option 2 also mentions that State and Defense should conduct Senate consultations prior to submission of the Protocol to test this option from both procedural and substantive standpoints. While we can expect Senator Fulbright (Tab E) to oppose formalizing our interpretation, we do not know where the other key Senators fall on this issue. Under Option 2, if the total number of Senators—adding those who indicate their affirmative vote does not constitute consent to communicating our understanding plus those who vote against the Protocol—equals more than one-third, then we could not communicate it and would be left essentially with Option 3. If our interpretation were expressed in the Senate resolution (Option 1), it would require a majority vote to pass a resolution dropping the formal interpretation and, ultimately, a two-thirds vote of the Senate for the Protocol without an expressed interpretation. Option 2, therefore, could have some appeal to “anti-interpretation” Senators because it says, in effect, US adherence to the Protocol is the overriding factor and that our interpretation is not in the resolution because the Protocol should not be torpedoed because of disagreement over this interpretation; (2) this approach allows Senators to vote affirmatively for the Protocol and yet still oppose formalizing our interpretation; and (3) if more than a third go on record against communicating the interpretation, we could not do so but could continue to act in accordance with our understanding until such time as it is overridden or settled by law. Option 2 may thus be saleable and well worth a try. We can surely live with leaving the decision to the Senate without sabotaging the Protocol itself (i.e., presented in the above light). But we still believe Option 3 provides the best mechanism for obtaining agreement among the Senate leadership that the primary issue is US ratification of the Protocol and that no interest will be served by having the Protocol bogged down in a “Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia-tear gas-herbicides” debate. Moreover, Option 3 avoids placing the US in the position of being the only formally interpreting Party to the Protocol. Lastly, it does not flag the issue internationally by forwarding to other Parties a note which puts them in a position of having formally to react or acquiesce. We recognize the thorns in the selection of Option 3: for example, it may offer less political difficulties now, but could pose serious difficulties later if the ICJ were to deliver an opinion contrary to our position. This could place the President in a difficult position if we continued to use such weapons in Southeast Asia and, particularly, if it became known that the legal advisers indicated beforehand that the US would not, under these circumstances, have a legal reservation permitting use of such agents in war. Lastly, we do know that, with the probable exception of anti-crop, these weapons have been useful in Southeast Asia. However, there has been no thorough analysis of their relative effectiveness in Vietnam nor any assessment of their probable utility in the future. We intend to initiate a study of their utility, but have preferred not to do so until the Protocol matter is settled since the knowledge that such a study was in progress could create havoc with the proceedings. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Behr and Kennedy. The attachments are not published. 197. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 197. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 25, 1970 SUBJECT Updating on Geneva Protocol and the Senate, Plus Some Considerations for Timing of Submission 1. Updating On June 12, Senator Fulbright wrote Secretary Rogers (Tab A) requesting word on the Administration’s intentions with regard to submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol because of the Committee’s desire to arrange its schedule for the remainder of the session. He mentions reports of differences within the Executive over tear gas and herbicides, and states that his views Con the subject were set forth in a letter to the President on February 19 (Tab B). On June 16, Senator Kennedy charged the Administration for failure to submit the Protocol in spite of its support for a UN resolution, approved unanimously at the last session, which “invites all States which have not done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol in the course of 1970”. He views the Protocol as an opportunity to review the whole range of CBW issues including (a) whether our CW policy has gone far enough in light of our nuclear capability, and (b) the conflicting interpretations over tear gas and herbicides and our use of these weapons in Vietnam. On June 17, Senator Young (D-Ohio) charged the Administration for failure to submit the Protocol and censured the use of defoliants in Vietnam. Congressmen Zablocki and Fraser (House Foreign Affairs Committee) urged that the Protocol be submitted to the Senate in time for hearings this session. Both expressed opposition to a reservation on tear gas and herbicides. II. Considerations for Timing of Submission We recognize that Senate hearings on the Protocol (1) could be troublesome on the tear gas and, particularly, the herbicides and anti-crop issues, and (2) could highlight the issue during the UN General Assembly this fall which, in turn, might lead some state(s) to push for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice or for some resolution against the US position. On the other hand, in light of the UN resolution (80–3–36) against our position last fall, those states against our understanding might either consider another resolution redundant or prefer to wait until the US has ratified the Protocol in one form or another. We believe that the Protocol should be forwarded to the Senate this summer before the UN General Assembly convenes in mid-September. Ambassador Yost has cabled Secretary Rogers (Tab C): “If we have failed to move by the time GA convenes this matter could become quite embarrassing particularly since main focus of disarmament debate this year is likely to be CBW and seabeds.” Ambassador Yost hopes it will be submitted in the “very near future” and will “feel no embarrassment in defending” our understanding on tear gas. Assuming that the Protocol will be forwarded before the UN convenes, there remain two options. Option 1. Forward the Protocol to the Senate as soon as possible (e.g., mid- or late-July) which would very likely mean some hearings this session. Option 2. Forward the Protocol to the Senate too late for hearings this session (e.g., very late August). Option 2 has an advantage in avoiding possibly embarrassing hearings now. However, it would be difficult to delay this long since our position, whenever submitted, will not differ materially from that which the Senate expects. You have our proposed memorandum for the President outlining the issues yet to be resolved preparatory to submission of the Protocol. As soon as these decisions are reached, a memorandum on timing will be forwarded with a scenario of consultations and approach to the Senate. Tab A Letter From Senator Fulbright to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, June 12, 1970 Dear Mr. Secretary, I would like to know the nature of the Administration’s present intentions with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. On November 25, 1969 the President announced his intention to resubmit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent. He has not yet done so, of course, nor has there been any further indication either from the State Department or the White House, regarding the administration’s plans. Since November 25, 1969 there have been continuing reports of differences within the Executive branch over the interpretation of the Protocol as regards tear gas and herbicides. It would be useful to know whether these points have now been resolved so that the Protocol might be submitted to the Senate. My own interest in the Protocol and my view on its interpretation were expressed in a letter which I sent the President on February 19, 1970. Apart from a pro forma acknowledgement signed by Mr. William E. Timmons of the White House staff, I have had no response to my letter. In view of the foregoing, because of the Committee’s desire to arrange its schedule for the remainder of the session, I would appreciate an early reply from you concerning the Protocol. Sincerely yours J. W. Fulbright Chairman Tab B Letter From Senator Fulbright to President Nixon Washington, February 19, 1970 Dear Mr. President: I feel that I should communicate to you at this time my personal concerns regarding the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which you decided last November to submit to the Senate. I certainly welcomed that decision just as I did your more recent one regarding toxins. At the same time I am increasingly troubled by a question which I suspect has also occasioned considerable debate within the Executive Branch. Although you yourself have not spoken on the question, I take it there are those who believe we must reserve the right to initiate the use in war of certain chemical weapons, namely harassing gases and herbicides. It troubles me that the United States should take the view, and should be attempting to persuade other nations, that these chemicals are not within the scope of the Geneva Protocol. I believe if our position were different, there would be every reason to believe that we could achieve total, or near total, unanimity among all nations as to just what the Protocol prohibits. Surely it is strongly in our long-term interest to reinforce the existing understandings and restraints which now discourage nations from devoting their efforts to the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons and which act as a restraint against the use of such weapons. If the rest of the world can be brought to accept a broad and uniform interpretation of the Protocol, why should we seek to make it otherwise? It can be said, of course, that because we are using harassing gas and herbicides in Vietnam, we can not give them up. I believe that this issue must be decided in the broader context of a conflict between highly questionable short-term interest and an important long-term one. Our overriding interest is to discourage the acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons so as to keep this relatively unexploited dimension of military technology from developing further. In this regard, I noted with interest a recent statement of the United States representative on the UN Secretary General’s study of chemical and biological weapons, Dr. Ivan Bennett, Jr., who is also the Chairman of your Science Advisory Committee’s panel on chemical and biological weapons. Dr. Bennett recently told a House subcommittee that, “… most individuals with whom I have had any opportunity to discuss this who are in any way connected with it, deeply regret the fact that we ever initiated the use of tear gas in Vietnam. I think that we did it with good intentions; but I think that what is going on now is deeply regretted by all decent people.” I have not completed my study of the issues presented by the Geneva Protocol and will not do so until the treaty is submitted to the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings on it. However, I believe that even before the Protocol is submitted we should seek an approach that will allow us to achieve a uniform interpretation of the Protocol and, in years ahead, to discourage the employment of all forms of chemical warfare. One way in which we might do this would be to note the existence of certain ambiguities in the Protocol and to reaffirm that we have not previously regarded tear gas and herbicides as coming under its scope. However, at the same time we would announce that upon becoming a party to the Protocol we would agree to extend our interpretation of the scope of the Protocol to include these substances. We could explain that this action was being taken in good faith in an effort to achieve the broadest possible agreement on the meaning of this important international agreement. Sincerely yours, J. W. Fulbright Chairman Tab C Telegram 1293 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 23, 1970, 2233Z Subject: Geneva Protocol on CBW I have noted recent telegrams from our CCD del in Geneva reporting statements by Sovs and Japanese reps concerning ratification of Geneva Protocol on CBW. Having in mind the President’s statement on this subject last November which we announced with some fanfare to the GA Political Committee during disarmament debate, we may be sure that other dels will privately and publicly before and during next GA remind us of our announced intention to seek Senate consent to ratification at an early date. If we have failed to move by the time GA convenes in mid September, this matter could become quite embarrassing particularly since main focus of disarmament debate this year is likely to be CBW and seabeds. I should therefore very much hope that we might in the very near future again request Senate consent to ratification. I should moreover feel no embarrassment in defending an interpretation of the protocol which would maintain that it does not apply to tear gas. Yost 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent through Behr. A handwritten notation on the top, right hand corner of the memorandum states, “Action.” Kissinger wrote at the top of page one, “Pres. has answered memo – Now how about timing?” Following the last sentence on page two is written, “Behr/Guhin now working on this.” 198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 3, 1970 SUBJECT: Issues for Decision re Submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for Its Advice and Consent to Ratification Acting Secretary Richardson forwarded a joint State/Defense/ACDA memorandum (Tab C) requesting your decision on three issues preparatory to forwarding a recommendation to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The issue of how we handle our interpretation on tear gas and chemical herbicides is the most complex. On March 10, I recommended that you authorize Senate soundings on this matter (Tab D). You approved in principle but requested that, before any action on soundings, I come back to you in 30 days (Tab D, Page 2). In the meantime, the following events have occurred: — Agriculture, Interior and HEW have announced the suspension of the herbicide 2,4,5-T for all uses except in remote areas as tests indicate it could constitute a hazard to human fetuses. — Deputy Secretary Packard immediately suspended the use of 2,4,5-T by US forces pending a further evaluation. [2,4,5-T and 2,4-D have been the most widely used defoliants in Vietnam; 2,4-D is also used with other chemicals; it is suspect and being studied further.] — The Vietnamese General Staff embargoed the use of 2,4,5-T by their forces. — Senator Fulbright, whose committee will handle the Protocol, has written you (Tab E) expressing his concern about a possible reservation on tear gas and herbicides and his belief that our long-term interests would be better served by a uniform interpretation. — A House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee issued a report recommending that (1) the Protocol be submitted to the Senate as soon as possible; (2) the question of using tear gas and herbicides in war be left open by the Executive and/or the Senate; and (3) the US, after becoming a Party, seek agreement on a uniform interpretation of the Protocol either through a special international conference among the Parties or through established international juridical procedures. Issue A. How to inform the Senate and the Parties to the Protocol of our understanding that we do not consider the Protocol to prohibit the use of tear gas and herbicides in war. NSDM 35 directed State and Defense to prepare an appropriate interpretive statement on tear gas and herbicides. The statement is to be unilateral in form and not a formal reservation. The direction was the genesis of Option 3 below. But State and Defense Legal Advisers subsequently raised a question of legal ambiguity in the event of an adverse International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion. This question prompted Options 1 and 2 below. Option 1. Ask the Senate for its advice and consent to a resolution proposed by the Administration with our understanding explicitly stated therein, which resolution would be formally communicated to the other Parties. Option 2. Advise the Senate of our understanding and of our intention to communicate it to other Parties as part of our instrument of ratification, but it would not be placed in the Senate resolution proposed by the Administration. Options 1 and 2 are designed to protect against any possible international legal ambiguity regarding our right to use tear gas and herbicides in war. Our interpretation, communicated to other Parties formally, would have the legal effect of a reservation in the event of a subsequent ICJ advisory opinion that such agents are prohibited by the Protocol. Communicating our understanding would place all other Parties in the position of having to choose among rejecting us as a Party, objecting to our understanding and treating it as a reservation, or being deemed to have acquiesced in our understanding. Options 1 and 2 differ only in our approach to the Senate. Option 1 would require a Senate vote expressly on the question of tear gas and herbicides. Option 2 attempts to avoid the direct vote, but the Senators would be informed that we intend to communicate our interpretation as part of our instrument of ratification. Option 3. Advise the Senate of our understanding, but it would be neither included in the Senate resolution proposed by the Administration nor communicated to other Parties as part of our instrument of ratification. Option 3 has the advantages of (1) not placing other Parties in the position of having formally to declare their opposition to our interpretation, and (2) not placing the US in the position of being the only formally interpreting Party to the Protocol with respect to the exclusion of certain agents. The UK, Portugal, Japan and Australia have unilaterally announced policies on tear gas similar to our policy, but none has formally communicated its understanding to the other Parties. [The Japanese Diet recently gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol; the UK, Portugal and Australia ratified in 1930.] Option 3 carries some risk of an ambiguous legal right to use such agents in war if the ICJ were requested for an opinion and were to rule that the use of these agents in war was prohibited by the Protocol. If the ICJ were so to rule and we then used such agents in war, we could be considered in violation of our treaty obligations. State and Defense Legal Advisers maintain, as does the joint State/Defense/ACDA memorandum, that such an ICJ opinion would foreclose the option to use these agents in war if we selected Option 3 as we would then have no legal right for such use. On the other hand, ICJ advisory opinions are not legally binding though we have stated in the past, particularly when rulings were adverse to the position of the Soviet Union, that such opinions should be considered authoritative and followed by nations. State, Defense and ACDA recommend that, before final decisions on the form of the submission are made, preliminary Senate soundings be taken on Options 1 and 2. State and ACDA believe Option 3 should be considered at least as a fallback position if it appears necessary to obtain Senate ratification. Defense considers Option 3 unacceptable. Recommendation and Rationale I recommend Option 3. Upon reexamining the legal issues and in light of the herbicides problems and Senator Fulbright’s letter, I do not think Senate soundings would accomplish much. There may be a possibility of obtaining agreement among the Senate leadership that the primary issue is US ratification of the Protocol and that no interest will be served by having the Protocol bogged down in a “Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia-tear gas-herbicides” debate, though full hearings would be expected. I believe Option 3 provides the best mechanism for possible Senate leadership agreement. We would make our position clear in the hearings, but not by formal language in a proposed Senate resolution or in communication to the other Parties. On the other hand, it is normal treaty practice, for good reason, to inform other Parties of interpretations on controversial matters (Option 1 or 2). An interpretive statement would be of doubtful international legal effect unless formally communicated to the other Parties. Therefore, if we did not communicate our interpretation (Option 3) and if the ICJ were to deliver an opinion contrary to our position, I believe that we would be accused of violating our treaty obligations if we were to use these agents in war. Nevertheless, I consider the ICJ issue largely a “red herring”. While Options 1 and 2 would clearly legally reserve against an adverse opinion, in a practical sense neither would mitigate the political and psychological flak we would take in continued use of such agents. An unfavorable ICJ opinion would be embarrassing under all three options. Moreover, depending upon the circumstances and further analysis of the utility of these agents in war, we would still retain the option of abiding by such an ICJ opinion should we deem it in our interest. Though there may be risks of international legal ambiguity later, Option 3 does not place the US in the position of being the only Party formally to submit an interpretation on the scope of the Protocol. Other Parties (e.g., Britain) have announced policies similar to our understanding, but none has formally communicated its understanding to the other Parties. Option 3 neither flags the tear gas-herbicides issue nor places every Party in the position of having to react or acquiesce, thus leading to a complex web of interlocking legal relationships. On balance I recommend that you approve Option 3, whereby the Administration will inform the Senate of its understanding but it will neither be included in the proposed Senate resolution nor formally communicated to the other Parties. APPROVE [RN initialed] DISAPPROVE SEE ME Issue B. Whether Presidential authorization should be required for the future use of tear gas and herbicides in war and whether some restrictions should be placed on current use in Southeast Asia. Option 1. Require Presidential authorization for future use of these agents in war and place some general restrictions or guidelines upon their use (e.g., no use for offensive purposes in conjunction with high explosives). Option 2. Require Presidential authorization for the future use of these agents in war, but do not affect current authorities in Southeast Asia. Option 3. Require no authorization except that of the Secretary of Defense. NSDM 35 states that a follow-on NSDM on authorization will be issued. Those favoring Presidential authorization argue that (1) the political implications of unrestricted use of these weapons are grave as demonstrated by our experience in Vietnam; (2) we should not authorize future use in war unless the need is unequivocal; and (3) these weapons may have utility in Vietnam, but their utility in other potential conflicts may be less evident. Others argue that (1) these non-lethal weapons are of proven utility for both offensive and defensive purposes in Southeast Asia; and (2) maximum flexibility for their use should be retained. State and ACDA recommend Option 1. Defense recommends Option 3. Recommendation and Rationale I recommend Option 2: that is, require Presidential authorization for future use in war without restricting present authorities and uses in Southeast Asia. A policy of Presidential level review and decision could be very helpful in approaching the Senate. Moreover, the future utility of these weapons is still under study and, therefore, no bases exist to judge whether the weapons should constitute part of the US arsenal for the future. Since the political costs are even now high and could be higher in terms of longer-range effects, Presidential level review and decision should precede any introduction of these weapons in other theaters or conflict situations. I recommend that you approve Option 2. APPROVE [RN initialed] DISAPPROVE SEE ME Issue C. What rights of retaliation, if any, should the United States expressly reserve in ratifying the Protocol. Option 1. Expressly reserve the right of retaliation with respect to chemical weapons but not with biological weapons. This option would reflect your new policy and also codify this policy with respect to the Protocol. State and ACDA recommend this option. Option 2. Take a reservation which states that the Protocol as a whole shall cease to be binding on us with respect to any State or its allies which fail to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol . This option would reserve the right to retaliate with either chemical or biological weapons. It parallels reservations which all but one of the 39 reserving States have adopted since 1925. Defense prefers this option. Option 3. Ratify without any formal reservations with respect to either chemical or biological weapons. With respect to the 39 reserving States, we would have the reciprocal benefit of their reservation on retaliation with chemical or biological weapons. With respect to non-reserving States, we could rely upon a general rule of law, if occasion arose, to regard a material breach of the Protocol as suspending Protocol relations with any violating State. All agencies have a fallback position in Option 3, though they agree that it does not establish our legal position as clearly as either Options 1 or 2. Recommendation and Rationale I recommend Option 1, expressly reserving the right of retaliation with chemical weapons but not biological weapons. It is clear reaffirmation of your policy and would internationally signal your renunciation of biological weapons, whereas Option 2 might be interpreted as a qualification of your renunciation. Option 3 could involve complicated explanations of our legal position, but I can live with Option 3 as a fallback position. I recommend that you approve Option 1. APPROVE [RN initialed] DISAPPROVE SEE ME Summary Attached at Tab A is a proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State for your approval which informs him of your decisions along the lines recommended. Attached at Tab B is a draft NSDM which states that the use in war of tear gas and chemical herbicides shall require Presidential approval, but that present authorities for use in Southeast Asia are not affected. The NSDM clarifies which agents are considered in this category and reaffirms the policy of Presidential approval for the use of all other chemical weapons. Following your decisions, I will prepare a scenario leaving the timing flexible. The proposed NSDM and memorandum to the Secretary of State will be held pending a further decision on timing. Timmons’ Office (Ken BeLieu) concurs in forwarding the issues to you for decision, but stresses that there is no current sensing of Congress because of Cambodia. His main concerns are that there should be no inconsistency with your statement of November 25 and that we should do whatever possible to take the steam out of the tear gas-herbicides issue. Tab C Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon Washington, February 18, 1970 Subject: Submission of 1925 Geneva Protocol to Senate Recommendations: (1) No First Use Reservation This memorandum discusses three alternative ways of dealing with our policy of no first use of chemical weapons. State and ACDA recommend the first alternative discussed under this heading; Defense recommends the second alternative; each prefers the third alternative as a second choice First alternative Approved Second alternative Approved Third alternative Approved (2) Follow-on NSDM on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides NSDM 35 stated that a follow-on NSDM on use of riot-control agents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides would be issued. State and ACDA recommend that a follow-on NSDM covering use of RCAs and chemical herbicides be issued before final decisions on the form of the submission of the Protocol to the Senate are made, and that the NSDM include guidance on public statements. Defense sees no need for the NSDM prior to submission of the Protocol to the Senate and in any event objects to any public statement of restrictions on use of RCAs and chemical herbicides in specific tactical situations. State/ACDA position Approved Defense position Approved (3) Understandings on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides (a) This memorandum discusses three options for handling our understanding that the Geneva Protocol does not prohibit the use in war of RCAs and chemical herbicides. The first two (Options 1 and 2) include communication of our understanding to other Parties but involve different formal action by the Senate. Option 3 would involve no formal communication of our understanding to other Parties. State, Defense and ACDA agree that Options 1 and 2 have the same international legal effect and that the choice between them should be made on the basis of Congressional soundings. State, Defense and ACDA recommend that, before final decisions on the form of the submission of the Protocol are made, coordinated preliminary Congressional soundings be taken on Options 1 and 2 (but not on Option 3). Approved______ Disapproved_____________ (b) State and ACDA believe you should be prepared to consider Option 3 at least as a fall-back position if it appears to be the only way of obtaining Senate consent to ratification of the Protocol. Option 3 is considered unacceptable by Defense since it would not be legally effective internationally to preserve our position on RCAs and chemical herbicides in the event of an adverse ICJ opinion. State/ACDA position on Option 3: Approved Defense position on Option 3: Approved (4) Chief Coordinator. State, Defense and ACDA recommend that the Legal Adviser of the Department of State should be designated chief coordinator of the Administration’s presentation of the Protocol to the Senate. Approved__________ Disapproved Discussion: Implementation of NSDM 35 with respect to Protocol NSDM 35 records your decision to submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. With respect to the renunciation of the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, the NSDM contains no directive as to the procedure to be followed in making the Administration’s policy in this respect legally effective internationally, i.e., it is silent as to whether ratification should be subject to a reservation. With respect to legal preservation of a right to make first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides, the NSDM directs that our interpretation of the Protocol not be made by means of a “formal reservation” and that it be “unilateral in form”. Since, for reasons of brevity, the NSDM did not treat the legal distinction between reservations and interpretive statements (or understandings), nor discuss the domestic and international law requirements applicable, we need your further decision as to how to proceed in the context of the considerations outlined below. A reservation under international law is by definition a formal statement made by a State before it becomes bound by a treaty whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. A reservation must be communicated in writing to the Parties. If no objection is made to the reservation, the treaty is modified to the extent of the reservation on a reciprocal basis between the reserving State and a non-objecting Party. A Party formally objecting to the reservation may regard the treaty as not in force at all between it and the reserving State or may elect to regard all of the treaty except for the reserved provisions as in force between them. Under United States practice, a reservation proposed by the President must receive the advice and consent of the Senate, and the Senate may also, on its own initiative, formulate a reservation as part of its resolution advising and consenting to ratification. An interpretive statement (or understanding) under international law is a declaration which indicates the meaning that a State attaches to a provision of a treaty but which it does not regard as changing the legal effect of the provision. Such a statement would be of doubtful international legal effect unless formally communicated to the other Parties. Under customary treaty law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any statement by which a ratifying State seeks to limit or otherwise condition its legal obligations under a treaty must be communicated to the Parties. Unless other Parties to the treaty formally object to the interpretation communicated to them, they are bound by it in their relations with the declaring State. If a Party disagrees with the interpretation, it may treat the interpretive statement as a reservation and apply the rules on reservations. * Under United States law, an interpretive statement which the President proposes to communicate to other Parties must be made known to the Senate, which can either concur or acquiesce in such communication or Prevent it by making clear that it does not consent to ratification with such a statement. The Senate may also, on its own initiative, formulate an interpretive statement as part of its resolution of advice and consent. If the Senate, on its own initiative, formulates a reservation or an interpretive statement as part of its resolution of advice and consent, the President must include the reservation or interpretive statement in the instrument of ratification if he decides to ratify the treaty. No First Use Reservation The Protocol itself prohibits any use of chemical and bacteriological agents in war among Parties. The Protocol is frequently described as prohibiting “first use” since thirty-nine (including France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and other major powers) of the eighty-four Parties have ratified subject to a reservation that expressly preserves the right to retaliate should chemical or bacteriological weapons be used by another State or its allies. There are three alternative means of dealing under the Protocol with our policy of renunciation of any use of biological weapons and first use of chemical weapons. First , we could ratify with a reservation in the following form: “That the said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and analogous liquids, materials or devices in regard to any State if such State or any of its allies de jure or de facto fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.” This reservation is designed to implement our policy of no first use of chemical weapons, since the Protocol itself proscribes any use of such weapons in war. Unlike the reservations of all but one other reserving government, however, the proposed reservation does not assert the right to use biological weapons in retaliation, and thus reflects your recent announcement that we would renounce any use of such weapons. Furthermore, it does not state that the United States is bound only toward other Parties to the Protocol. Such a qualification might be redundant (in the light of the language of the Protocol itself) and seems undesirable since it would be narrower than our announced policy of no first use of chemical agents. Second , we could ratify with a reservation in the following form: “That the said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the United States in regard to any State if such State or any of its allies de jure or de facto fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.” This reservation is similar to the reservations by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and other major powers. However, like alternative 1, it does not state that the United States is bound only toward other Parties to the Protocol. It reserves the right to use both chemical and bacteriological agents in retaliation. Third , we could ratify without any reservation. With respect to the thirty-nine States that have ratified with reservations, we would legally have the benefit of their reservations in our relations with them to retaliate with chemicals or biologicals. With respect to each of the non-reserving States, the United States could rely upon the right under international treaty law to regard a first use by another State of materials prohibited by the Protocol as constituting a breach of that instrument which gave us the right to consider that instrument as suspended or terminated in our relations with the State committing the breach. If this alternative is selected we should make our position clear in the President’s submission of the Protocol to the Senate that we nevertheless had the retaliatory rights described above in order to offset the possible argument that, having ratified without any reservation in the face of reservations by thirty-nine other States, the United States intended to apply the prohibitions of the Protocol in all circumstances without any exception as to “first use”. State and ACDA prefer alternative 1. They consider alternative 2 undesirable since it would appear to undercut the United States renunciation of biological methods of warfare, and since they do not believe that preserving the legal right to use such methods of warfare would be necessary or particularly helpful to the negotiation of the U.K. draft convention on the prohibition of biological means of warfare. In addition, alternative 1 would establish our legal position more clearly than alternative 3, especially with respect to Parties who ratified without any reservations. Their second choice would be alternative 3, since it would not require the formal communication to other Parties of a reservation that could be claimed to be inconsistent with the United States renunciation of biological methods of warfare. Defense prefers alternative 2. A reservation such as alternative 1 which would assert only the right to retaliate with chemical weapons is an unnecessary unilateral international legal codification of a policy decision, and would create a significant legal imbalance between the United States and other major powers. It is unlikely to result in similar initiatives under the Protocol by the other Parties to the Protocol and would deprive the United States of a bargaining point in upcoming arms control negotiations on biological warfare. Further, since most other Parties who have made reservations have adopted the standard broad reservation, they would not be in a position to criticize us for using the same formulation. These same considerations lead Defense to prefer alternative 3 over alternative 1. As between alternatives 2 and 3, Defense prefers alternative 2 since it would more clearly establish our legal position. Understanding on RCAs and Chemical Herbicides The most sensitive issue is how we handle our understanding that the Protocol does not apply to RCAs or chemical herbicides. While the United States has maintained since at least 1930 that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of RCAs in war, a large number of other States will not agree with this understanding. Any formal communication of the United States position should be in the form of an understanding (rather than a reservation), to sustain our position that we are interpreting, rather than modifying, the Protocol. Three possible ways of handling this matter are as follows: Option 1 - Follow the normal treaty practice of requesting the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification with such understanding explicitly stated in its resolution, which would then be formally communicated to the Parties to the Protocol. Option 2 - Same as Option 1 except that, while you would advise the Senate of the understanding and of your intention to communicate it to other Parties, it would not be referred to in the resolution of advice and consent. However, you could not communicate the understanding in this event if the Senate made it clear that it did not consent to your doing so, and even serious Senatorial criticism of this understanding could make its communication difficult politically. Option 3 - While you would advise the Senate of the understanding, it would neither be included in the resolution of advice and consent nor communicated formally to other Parties. Whichever option is chosen, disagreement with this understanding by the Senate might be expressed in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations or otherwise. At worst, the Senate could, by majority vote, add to the resolution of advice and consent an amendment expressing the opposite understanding. If it did so, and the resolution were passed in this form, we would be unable to carry out the decision to ratify the Protocol while preserving the right to use RCAs and chemical herbicides. It is virtually certain that a substantial number of Parties to the Protocol will make public their disagreement with our understanding. The way in which they do so would, of course, be affected by the way in which we record our view (through formal communication or otherwise). Beyond this registering of disagreement, the most serious risks with respect to countries that disagree with our position are (i) that some Parties might refuse to accept us as a Party to the Protocol on this basis; or (ii) that the UN General Assembly might request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as to the correctness of our understanding. (Such an opinion might be rendered as soon as four to six months after it is requested.) The likelihood of such a UNGA request is difficult to judge, but it might be affected by which of the options we pursue. There is a substantial risk that the ICJ, if requested to rule, would decide that the Protocol prohibits the use of RCAs in war. It is not likely that the ICJ would determine that the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical herbicides in war. It is probable that, in any event, the ICJ would have more difficulty in ruling that customary international law prohibits the use of RCAs or chemical herbicides. If the United States formally communicates its understanding to other Parties (Options 1 or 2), our views would have the legal effect of a reservation in the event of an adverse opinion by the ICJ. Accordingly, our legal position would be preserved as against other Parties, although we would still face difficult political problems if we wished to act contrary to the Court’s opinion. If our views are not formally communicated (Option 3), we could not legally make use of RCAs or chemical herbicides in war after the ICJ decision. The pros and cons of the three options are briefly described below: Option 1 (Included in Senate resolution and formally communicated) Pros: (1) Is consistent with our normal treaty practice of stating in Senate resolution United States understanding on important ambiguous issues and formally communicating this understanding to other Parties. (2) Avoids any question as to the Senate’s acquiescence in our understanding. (3) Makes the issue clear in Senate consideration, thus avoiding later charges (as in Tonkin Gulf Resolution) that Senate was misled. (4) Preserves legal right to use RCAs in war in event of adverse interpretation of the Protocol by the ICJ. (An interpretation formally communicated to other Parties would be treated as a reservation in this event.) Cons: (1) Requires Senate vote on our understanding, which might lead to impasse with, or rejection by, Senate. (2) Requires other Parties to choose between rejecting United States as Party, objecting to United States interpretation and treating it as a reservation modifying the treaty to that extent, or being deemed to have acquiesced in our understanding in treaty relations with them. (Facing them with this choice would probably intensify international controversy over this issue.) (3) Might not be effective politically (even though effective legally) in protecting the option to use RCAs and chemical herbicides in the face of an adverse ICJ opinion on the scope of the Protocol. Option 2 (Not included in Senate resolution but formally communicated) Pros: (1) Does not require Senate to vote on resolution expressly stating understanding that Protocol does not prohibit use in war of RCAs and chemical herbicides, but would require you to advise Senate, before its vote, that you intended to communicate formally our understanding to other Parties. (2) Same as Pro 4, Option 1. Cons: (1) If more than an aggregate of one-third of the Senators voting and present either voted against such a resolution of advice and consent or indicated that their affirmative vote did not constitute consent to your communicating the understanding to other Parties, you could not properly effect such communication. (2) Could lead to charge that you are trying to mislead the Senate or limit the exercise of its constitutional prerogative in advising and consenting to a treaty. (3) Same as Con (2), Option 1. (4) Same as Con (3), Option 1. Option 3 (Neither included in Senate resolution nor formally communicated) Pros: (1) Does not require Senate to vote on resolution expressly stating understanding that Protocol does not prohibit use in war of RCAs and chemical herbicides. (2) Does not require other Parties to choose between rejecting United States as Party, objecting to United States understanding and treating it as a reservation, or being deemed to have acquiesced in our understanding in their treaty relations with us, and thus might avoid some of the adverse international political consequences of Options 1 and 2. (3) Is consistent with practice of all other Parties (none have formally communicated understanding on RCAs or chemical herbicides). (4) Would provide a possible way out of impasse if Senate unwilling to consent to ratification with our understanding on RCAs and chemical herbicides. Thus we could take the position that, unless and until an adverse ruling of the ICJ were obtained, we would continue to act in accordance with the understanding we have had for many years that the Protocol does not cover RCAs and herbicides, but that we would be willing to abide by a ruling of the ICJ on this question. This approach might mollify those Senators who disagreed with our understanding; our use of RCAs and herbicides pending the ICJ decision could at worst be claimed to be a mistake of law (rather than a deliberate violation of our treaty undertakings); and the political impact of an adverse ruling would be softened by our willingness to abide by it. This approach would also add to the stature of the ICJ and demonstrate our respect for international law. Cons: (1) Would result in foreclosing use of RCAs and chemical herbicides in future wars if adverse advisory opinion by ICJ were obtained. (If the United States were to disregard its treaty obligations as interpreted by the Court, this would seriously undermine the position of the Courtand the basic cornerstone of treaty law that pacta sunt servanda .) (2) While not requiring a Senate vote, it would not preclude a Senate debate on the issue and, as under Options 1 and 2, the Senate could on its own initiative formally or informally reject our understanding. (3) While not requiring other Parties to take a position on our understanding, other Parties will inescapably become aware of the reaffirmation of our position during the course of the Senate hearings and debates and hence international controversy is not likely to be substantially foreclosed. (4) If adverse opinion by ICJ is issued while Viet-Nam war is still in progress, it could be used for propaganda purposes to substantiate charges previously made that our operations have been in disregard of the laws of war in many respects. In addition, there is a substantial risk that a “mistake of law” might not be regarded as a defense (as distinguished from mitigation of punishment) in a war crimes trial of personnel sanctioning or using RCAs after our ratification of the Protocol should such persons be captured by Hanoi. Follow-on NSDM on Use of RCAs and Chemical Herbicides State and ACDA believe that a follow-on NSDM on the use of RCAs and chemical herbicides should be issued prior to submission of the Protocol to the Senate. It is their view that both Senate and international opposition to our understanding on RCAs and chemical herbicides might be reduced if Administration witnesses could testify that as a matter of policy, Presidential authorization would be required for specific uses of such agents in specific theatres, or could describe some general guidelines for such use. Defense sees no need for the issue of a NSDM prior to submission of the Protocol to the Senate. Defense agrees that Washington level authorization would be required for the use of RCAs and chemical herbicides in specific theatres. Presidential authorization, however, appears unnecessary; Secretary of Defense authorization is considered adequate. However, Defense believes that, with respect to public announcement of restrictions on specific use of these weapons, any statement of restrictions would be inadvisable. First, it would communicate our battlefield rules of engagement to an enemy, or to a prospective enemy, without any compensating benefit to us. Second, the utility of such a public statement in securing Senate support for ratification of the Geneva Protocol appears illusory since the initial impact of such a statement would be dissipated as soon as debate on the issue began. The result might be to create pressure for the imposition of further restrictions which, if imposed, could result in increased United States casualties in Viet-Nam and future conflicts. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, ACDA, join in this memorandum. Eliot Richardson Acting Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of all of Kissinger’s recommendations. At Tab D is Document 192 . At Tab E is an attachment to Document 197 . At Tab A is a draft of Document 201 . At Tab B is a draft of Document 202 . * Regardless of the phrasing or designation of the statement (whether interpretation, understanding or some other name), any Party has the right to consider the substance of the statement and to treat it as a reservation if the Party considers that it excludes or modifies the legal effect of any provision of the treaty. 199. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 199. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 6, 1970 SUBJECT: National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44 In National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44 you directed that all stockpiles of biological agents and munitions be destroyed and that the biological research program of the Department of Defense be confined to defensive purposes only. You also asked for recommended plans to achieve these ends. This memorandum provides our recommendations. A detailed plan for the destruction of all biological agents, toxins and associated weapons has been prepared. It has been reviewed and concurred in by the Office of Science and Technology, by the Surgeon General of the U. 5. Public Health Service, by the Department of Agriculture and by the Federal Water Quality Agency of Department of the Interior. These reviews satisfy the requirements of Section 409, Public Law 91–121. Notification to the Senate, the Congress and Governors as required by that legislation will be made as soon as you approve our recommendations. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] biological agents are stored at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, and [ less than 1 line not declassified ] agents at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. Destruction will be accomplished at the sites so that no transportation will be involved. The agents will be rendered completely innocuous, and there will be no hazard to public health and welfare. Destruction of [ less than 1 line not declassified ] agents and munitions will require 107 weeks and $6,442,000. Destruction of [ less than 1 line not declassified ] agents and munitions will take 112 weeks and $3,768,000. Both operations will run at the same time. A summary of materials to be destroyed is given at Tab A. The Department of Defense has directed that plans be made to reduce the biological research and development program from about $20 million per annum to $10 million. The $10 million is solely for defensive purposes. It will provide for medical research on diagnosis, therapy and immunization to be done at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Frederick, Md.; for research and development on detection and warning of biological agents at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; and for testing of defensive equipment, and vulnerability analyses at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. We have decided that the U.S. Army Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick and the production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal will not be needed by the Department of Defense. We have notified Dr. DuBridge of this decision and are working with him and the Bureau of the Budget to effect their transfer to HEW. We hope that the transfer of the U.S. Army Biological Laboratories can be effected during Fiscal Year 1971 and that the production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal can be transferred early in Fiscal Year 1972 when we will have destroyed all biological agents and decontaminated the facility to make it safe for other occupancy. It is hoped that the $10 million per year program level can be reached by the beginning of Fiscal Year 1972. However, this is dependent on the rate at which transfer of facilities and people to other Federal agencies can be made. Melvin Laird TAB A [text not declassified] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Kissinger initialed the memorandum next to the subject line 200. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 200. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate You earlier decided that you would submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification. You also decided that when the Protocol is submitted: - The Administration will inform the Senate of our understanding that tear gas and herbicides are not prohibited by the Protocol, but the understanding will neither be included in the proposed Senate resolution nor forwarded to the other Parties to the Protocol. - We will reserve the right of retaliation with respect to chemical weapons only. We can move forward with submission as early as mid-August. Since you announced your intention last November to submit the Protocol to the Senate, I think we must do so this session. The choice of timing of submission therefore is between going forward now or waiting until nearer the end of the session this fall. The argument for waiting is that it might avoid relating consideration of the Protocol with what may be protracted and acrimonious debate on the use of tear gas and herbicides. There will be a test vote in the Senate on the herbicides issue probably before mid-August. Senators Goodell and Nelson have submitted an “anti-environmental warfare” amendment to the military use or stockpiling of herbicides. On the other hand, going ahead now might head off an extensive debate on tear gas and herbicides. Your statement of intent to submit the Protocol was welcomed by the Senate and there has been sentiment for early ratification. The Senate, therefore, may limit the debate on these issues in the interest of ratifying this session. Moreover, Ambassador Yost believes, and I agree, that if we have not submitted the Protocol before the UN General Assembly convenes in mid-September we will suffer considerable embarrassment in that forum. I do not see how submission can be delayed any longer. I have discussed the matter with Bryce Harlow. He concurs in forwarding the Protocol as soon as possible. If you agree we will prepare the ground for submission with soundings and consultations. Because of the interval since the November announcement of your decision to submit the Protocol, Bryce Harlow and I believe that you should meet with the Senate bipartisan leaders (Mansfield and Scott), plus Fulbright and Aiken, the day before the day of submission to advise them of how you are forwarding the Protocol and the reasons for your decisions. A breakfast session would appear well suited to this purpose. You could give them, at that time, a run down of the steps that have been taken or are in process as a result of your decision to renounce biological warfare. This would add to the favorable impact of your submission of the Protocol. I recommend that you approve prompt submission of the Protocol and a meeting with the indicated Senate leaders the day before the actual submission. Bryce Harlow concurs APPROVE [RN initialed 8–4–70] DISAPPROVE SEE ME 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval on August 4. 201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, August 5, 1970 SUBJECT: Submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for Its Advice and Consent to Ratification The President has reviewed the Acting Secretary’s memorandum, of February 18, 1970, requesting decisions preparatory to the submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The President has decided that the United States shall expressly reserve the right of retaliation with chemical weapons only. Additionally, the President has decided that the Administration will inform the Senate of its understanding that the United States does not consider the Protocol to prohibit the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war, but this understanding will neither be included in the Senate resolution to be proposed by the Administration nor formally communicated to the Parties to the Protocol. The foregoing specific decisions of the President as to the form of the presentation of the Protocol to the Senate should be closely held. The President has requested that the final Geneva Protocol papers be forwarded by August 11, 1970, for his consideration and has designated you to coordinate the Administration’s presentation of the Protocol to the Senate. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Laird and Moorer. 202. National Security Decision Memorandum 78 202. National Security Decision Memorandum 78 1 Washington, August 11, 1970 TO: The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT: Authorization for Use of Riot Control Agents and Chemical Herbicides in War After further review of the issues set forth in response to National Security Study Memorandum 59, the President has considered United States policy on authorization for use by United States forces of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war and has decided that: 1. The use of riot control agents by United States forces shall require Presidential approval except in cases of riot control and installation security on United States bases and posts. 2. The use of chemical herbicides by United States forces, either for defoliation or for anti-crop purposes, shall also require Presidential approval. 3. These decisions shall affect neither the current authority of United States forces in Vietnam to employ riot control agents nor the joint authority of COMUSMACV and the United States Ambassador, Saigon, to authorize support of Government of the Republic of Vietnam requests for herbicide operations. These requests will be handled in consonance with MACV Directive 525–1 (August 12, 1969), particularly Paragraph 5. 4. Any request for Presidential authorization shall be submitted by the Secretary of Defense and shall include the views of the Secretary of State. Each such request shall include (a) the specific agents to be used, (b) the specific theater of operations, (c) general categories of situations for use, and (d) justification for use. 5. Currently only Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) and Chloracetophenone (CN) are classified and considered as riot control agents for military purposes. However, any agents which are accepted and used domestically for riot control and law enforcement purposes can be considered in this category in the implementation of this policy. 6. Chemical herbicides are considered as those chemical compounds which are used domestically within the United States in agriculture for weed control and similar purposes. 7. The annual review of United States chemical warfare and biological research programs, conducted by the Under Secretaries Committee as directed by National Security Decision Memorandum 35, will include a review of United States military riot control agent and chemical herbicide programs. The President also has reaffirmed that his approval is required for the use of any lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (51–96). Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer 203. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 203. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 11, 1970 Subject: Transmission to the Senate for Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Warfare There are enclosed a Report by the Secretary of State and a Message by the President for the resubmission to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva June 17, 1925. This was requested in your memorandum to the Secretary of August 5, 1970. The Protocol was submitted to the Senate in 1926 but did not receive Senate approval and was returned to the Executive in 1947. The Report and Message recommend that the Senate advice and consent be given with a reservation of the right to retaliate with chemical weapons, but no such reservation is recommended with respect to biological weapons. The Report indicates that the United States considers the term “bacteriological methods of warfare” used in the Protocol includes all biological methods of warfare and the use of toxins however produced. The Report and Message reflect the position, which had previously been recommended by the Department to the White House, that the Senate be informed of the Administration’s understanding that the United States does not consider the Protocol to prohibit the use in war of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides. It is not proposed that this understanding either be included in the Senate resolution of advice and consent or formally communicated to the parties to the Protocol. The proposed submission to the Senate has been approved by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and coordinated with the Department of Defense. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure Message From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, August 11, 1970 The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva June 17, 1925. The United States proposed the Protocol in 1925 and submitted it to the Senate in 1926. Although the Senate never voted on the question of ratifying the Protocol, which was returned to the President in 1947, the United States has always supported its principles and objectives and has pledged itself internationally to observe these principles. At present there are 85 parties to the Protocol, the most recent of which, Japan, became a party on May 21, 1970. The United States is the only major military power which is not a party. Recent support of the principles and objectives of the Protocol was given by the United States in 1966, 1968 and 1969 at the United Nations. The United States has voted in the General Assembly for resolutions which called for “strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol” and invited “all States to accede to” the Protocol. The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and bacteriological methods of warfare. The Protocol is the basic international agreement in this field, and its principles have been observed in almost all armed conflicts since 1925 by parties and non-parties alike. While the Protocol itself speaks in terms of flat prohibitions on the use of chemical and bacteriological agents in war, thirty-nine States (including France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom) have ratified or acceded with reservations. The reservations of most of the reserving states assert that the Protocol is binding on them only with respect to other parties to the Protocol and limit the prohibitions to no first use. It is proposed that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification subject to a reservation as follows: “That the said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard to an enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.” This reservation would permit the retaliatory use by the United States of chemical weapons and agents, but would not limit in any way the Protocol’s prohibition with respect to biological weapons. Ratification of the Protocol as qualified by the proposed reservation would put the United States in the following position: - unlike France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and most other reserving States, the United States would not assert by reservation a limitation of its obligations under the Protocol to the Parties thereto. - like France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and other reserving States, the United States would reserve the right to use the prohibited chemical agents in retaliation against any enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol. - unlike France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and all but one other reserving State, the United States would not assert by reservation the right to use bacteriological agents in retaliation. It is the United States interpretation of the Protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides. Smoke, flame, and napalm are also not covered by the Protocol. The United States considers that the term “bacteriological methods of warfare” as used in the Protocol encompasses all biological methods of warfare and the use of toxins however produced. The subject of arms control as it relates to chemical warfare and biological warfare is of continuing and increasing importance in the international field. At the 1969 summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the United Kingdom presented a draft convention establishing a comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological methods of warfare. In accordance with your announcement of November 25, 1969 that the United States would associate itself with the principles and objectives of that draft convention, we have taken an active role in its negotiation. Other proposals on the subject of chemical and biological warfare have also been introduced in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by other Governments. Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have indicated the need for universal adherence to the Protocol as a condition Precedent to agreement on more comprehensive measures. The United States should become a party to the Protocol to strengthen the general prohibitions on the use of chemical warfare and biological warfare and to facilitate our participation in the formulation of new arms control provisions in this area. Respectfully submitted, William P. Rogers 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Chemical Biological and Radiological Warfare (CBW), Laser Technology and U.S. Position on Toxins, August–December 1970. Secret. Drafted by C.I. Bevans. The attached Presidential message and Protocol are not published. For text of the message as submitted by the President on August 19, see the Public Papers: Nixon, 1970 , pp. 677–678. 204. Telegram 129723 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 204. Telegram 129723 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, August 11, 1970, 2036Z. Following sent action SecState from Geneva 10 Aug 70: Qte Geneva 2718 Exdis Disto Subject: CCD—Soviet Views on CBW 1. Summary: We have recently received some significant indications of possible forthcoming shift in Soviet attitude toward negotiation of separate biological weapons prohibitions (as opposed to present insistence on one comprehensive treaty for chemical and biological weapons). One of these indications is remark by Roshchin in informal CCD meeting on August 5 that Sovs were studying Moroccan proposal re CBW treaty. (Moroccans have proposed that BW prohibitions would come into force immediately after conclusion of CBW treaty but CW obligations only later after verification provisions worked out.) This has been commented upon to us by knowledgeable Polish diplomat as probably foreshadowing significant shift. However, we have also received extremely confidential comments from sov dep rep to effect that Sovs may already be preparing for shift. Sensitivity of these remarks has led us to give this cable Exdis classification. We continue think Sovs may well be considering shifting position for next year’s negotiations at CCD though we cannot preclude possibility that Sovs will even approach US with new proposal before termination of CCD this summer. End summary 2. Following long informal luncheon between staff level officers of US and Sov dels on Aug 3, Neidle (US) expressed to Tcheprov (Sov Dep Rep) hope that Sovs would begin soon to study seriously policy considerations thai might permit them to negotiate a BW convention. Tcheprov, making sure he was not being overheard by other Sov deloffs, said “you already have it”. Neidle asked how we might then encourage Sovs to actually make shift in their position and asked specifically if it would be helpful for US Del to make formal statement at Co-Chairman level explaining serious policy reasons for making progress on BW. Tcheprov said this would be good idea and suggested we make such a statement privately to Sovs to Co-Chairmen meeting at end of conference (end August or first week of Sept). Tcheprov added that “I will do my best.” 3. Zybylski, Polish Deputy Rep to CCD, approached Amb Leonard (US) Aug 6 to inquire whether USDel had noted significant remark made by Roshchin (USSR) at end of his intervention in informal CCD meeting Aug 5. Leonard responded that he had noted Roshchin’s references to proposals of Sweden, Yugoslavia, and particularly to Moroccan idea of a CBW convention whose provisions would be suspended until effective verification measures could be agreed upon. He asked if Zybylski was confident Roshchin’s remarks were truly significant. 4. ZYbylski affirmed his confidence, basing it on marked shift in Roshchin’s attitude in recent meeting of Socialist dels as compared with similar group discussion of Moroccan proposal in April. Roshchin then had urged Poles and other East Europeans to attack Moroccan proposal (Zybylski said he had refused), but in recent meeting Roshchin had commented favorably on Moroccan idea. Zybylski had been stuck by apparent discrepancy in attitudes of Roshchin and other members of Sov delegation and had concluded that Roshchin had received “Eyes Only” message from Moscow directing him to moderate Sov position but not to explain reason even to his own staff. Zybylski had discussed these events with Amb Natorf (Poland) who, as former student in Soviet Union, had better feel for Sov conduct. Natorf had concurred that development had far-reaching implications. 5. Asked why such a shift in Soviet policy might be materializing, Zybylski professed to have only views but said he had little doubt that serious Sov desire to reach agreement in SALT negotiations was behind development. He thought Sovs believed that chances of agreement in Vienna would be enhanced if they demonstrated serious and flexible attitude toward disarmament matters under discussion in Geneva, even though subject matter quite distinct. 6. Comment: Roshchin’s remarks have been centerpiece of corridor discussions in last 48 hours and other East European reps have, we expect, been commenting on possible importance of development. 7. Department may wish to repeat this message to SALT del for Amb Smith and to Emb Moscow. Rimestad Unqte Rogers INFO: AmEmbassy Moscow COMMCENTER: Please repeat Geneva 2718, dated 10 August 1970 to above addressee. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Malin (ACDA/IR); cleared by Perry (SOV); and approved by Day (ACDA/IR). 205. Memorandum for the Record 205. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 17, 1970 SUBJECT: Monday Morning Staff Meeting, August 17 (The first few minutes of the meeting were filmed by CBS-TV) Briefing on Geneva Protocol Dr. Kissinger asked who was going to brief tomorrow on the Geneva Protocol. The President or himself? Col. Behr said the President, and that the procedure would be the same as for the breakfast. Dr. Kissinger said he wished to talk to Col. Behr about the matter, saying he did not understand what Fulbright is proposing. [Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.] Geneva Protocol Dr. Kissinger told Col. Behr that if the President did not wish to brief on the Geneva Protocol tomorrow, he would use the material prepared for the President. He asked what Fulbright is proposing. Col. Behr replied that he was asking for a uniform interpretation of the Protocol with regard to tear gas and herbicides. Dr. Kissinger asked if he wished us to make a unilateral announcement. Col. Kennedy said no—he will say that we should discuss the issue with all parties to the Protocol with a view to reaching a uniform interpretation. He believes all will agree ultimately that tear gas and herbicides are covered and one way to handle the issue would be a conference of all the parties. Col. Behr commented that this was a useless exercise. Dr. Kissinger asked if we should state our view. Col. Behr replied that if we do not enter a reservation and the member states want a uniform interpretation, we can’t refuse to discuss it. Dr. Kissinger asked if we are telling the Senate what we think. Col. Behr said yes, but we are not making a formal reservation or interpretation. Col. Kennedy said we are merely stating the understanding we have held from the beginning—an understanding that is shared by the Australians and the Japanese and, to an extent, by the UK. Col. Behr said the Japanese and Australians had given their interpretations to their Parliaments. The new British Government hasn’t yet taken a position. Dr. Kissinger said he did not understand Fulbright’s letter. On the one hand he says we should renounce the use of tear gas and herbicides and get other nations to go along with us. On the other, he says he has no objection to our reservation on tear gas and herbicides as long as others go along. Col. Behr said he is playing cat and mouse, and waiting for the President to take a position. Dr. Kissinger asked if he would then take a position in opposition? Col. Behr replied he would not push it to the point that the Protocol goes down the drain. Col. Kennedy added that Fulbright won’t let the argument over tear gas and herbicides get in the way of ratification of the Protocol. He loses nothing by ratification now if he wants later to get a uniform interpretation by all parties. This issue does not have to be faced now. He reminded Dr. Kissinger that one reason for the procedure used was to avoid making the Senate state its view. Dr. Kissinger said he understood our procedure but had trouble understanding Fulbright’s two proposals—neither of which we intended to do. [Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.] 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council (Classified), 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71. Secret. Prepared by Davis on August 19. 206. Memorandum for the Record 206. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 18, 1970, 8–9:05 a.m. Subject: Bipartisan Senate Leadership Breakfast on Tuesday, August 18 at 8:00 a.m. in the Residence Yesterday, the President met with Select Senate Bipartisan Leaders, members of the White House Staff and Cabinet Members to discuss submission of the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. The following were present in addition to the President: Secretary Rogers - State Secretary Laird - Defense Senators Mansfield, Aiken, Fulbright, Scott and Stennis Messrs. Harlow, Kissinger and BeLieu of the White House Staff (Senator Margaret Chase Smith was invited, but could not attend.) The President opened the discussion following breakfast stating that he had invited the Senate Leadership to meet with him in order to discuss his plans to submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate on August 19. He said that he would ask Mr. Kissinger to outline the salient features of the proposal and then would be ready to answer any questions. Mr. Kissinger then briefed the group on the background of the Geneva Protocol and of the format and content of the President’s decision. Mr. Kissinger followed almost verbatim the confidential/sensitive memorandum he had prepared for the President in anticipation of the meeting. After a brief description and definitions, those present were reminded that the United States had signed the Protocol in 1925; that it was submitted to the Senate in 1926, but never brought to a vote; and, again, returned to the Executive in 1947 along with several old treaties. Henry Kissinger pointed out that the Administration’s position did not include the use of tear gas or herbicides in the request to the Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol basically prohibits the use in war of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.” This, the President pointed out, was consistent with his statement earlier this year. The United States renounced the use of bacteriological warfare and toxins. Even if attacked, would not use them for defensive purposes, but, rather, would limit our activities to antidotes and protective serums. Because there seemed to be some confusion on definitions, the President asked that a brief talking paper be prepared which could be forwarded to the Hill in order to make it easier for us to answer questions on the Geneva Protocol when it was discussed in the Senate. (This action was given to Henry Kissinger. These fact sheets have been prepared and distributed to the Hill. Copies of the two basic sheets are attached.) Senator Fulbright again questioned saying, “Do I understand correctly, that you are excluding tear gas and herbicides? In other words, is U.S. position that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of tear gas and herbicides?” Henry Kissinger answered yes and then there was a discussion as to why this was so. Fulbright said that while he could understand that he would, however, like the President to actively take the position that the United States would pursue the question of proper use of herbicides and tear gas—the point being that we would be better off on the positive side rather than the negative. Secretary Laird pointed out that herbicides have an unfortunate name. In actuality there are many good uses. He specifically emphasized the fact that herbicides are used to increase the potato yield in Maine. The President commented that there was pending before the Senate now an amendment to the military procurement authorization bill by Senator Nelson prohibiting the use of anti-plant chemicals or the stockpiling of anti-plant chemical weapons. It was agreed that it would probably be desirable to utilize our Geneva Protocol position as a background for discussion of the Nelson Amendment when voted on. Senator Fulbright said that he could understand that peaceful uses of herbicides were o.k. He agrees that we should not open the subject of tear gas or herbicides in connection with our ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Then again he reemphasized the needs for positive statement. Perhaps we could have a study he said. Secretary Rogers spoke up, said this is understandable but let’s not fog-up the Protocol question. We need to get it ratified and we don’t want the ratification to be side-tracked by rather extraneous arguments to which we do not now know the answer. The President said it would be appropriate for the environmental people to study the use of herbicides in non-defense areas. Senator Stennis remarked that we would need an answer to the Nelson Amendment. The President said that the Protocol Message would be sent up tomorrow (that is today, August 19). Stennis agreed that this would help in the discussion. Senator Mansfield who had been listening to the discussion to this point spoke up and said, “I’ll support the agreement as you are sending it up. It goes further than any other country just about. I think the subject of herbicides is extraneous to the Protocol question at this time, but maybe it would be a good idea for this government to raise the question of herbicides in Geneva now—outside of the Protocol question—as an earnest of our good faith.” The President suggested that we develop a letter, or set of instructions, to communicate to Geneva on this subject and raise the question. Secretary Rogers said we could do that. The President then said that in this manner we could answer any floor arguments that pertain to the Nelson amendment by shoving we are taking positive action to answer the question. Senator Stennis said that that was a very good idea. The President then wound up the meeting by asking if there were any further questions. Apparently, there were none. The President said, “Alright, let’s have a talking paper. Henry, you prepare this.” (This is the one previously referred to and attached.) “Then, for State to get up a letter or paper to Geneva on the herbicide question.” The President said that we would send the Protocol Statement up tomorrow and that has been done. Meeting adjourned sharply at 9:05 a.m. Attachment Washington, undated FACT SHEET ON THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 — The Protocol prohibits (1) the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and (2) the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. — The Protocol does not prohibit research and development, testing, stockpiling and defensive measures. Smoke, flame and napalm are not covered by the Protocol. — The Protocol incorporates Article V of the Washington Treaty of 1922 with regard to the prohibition of the use in war of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases…” The United States Senate gave its consent to the Washington Treaty of 1922 without a dissenting vote. The Treaty failed to come into effect because of French objections to a provision on submarines. — In 1925, at the Conference on the International Arms Trade, the United States first proposed a prohibition on the export of chemical armaments and then proposed a separate Protocol prohibiting the use in war of chemical weapons. The Conference agreed with the Polish delegation’s suggestion to include a prohibition on the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. — On June 17, 1925, the Protocol was approved by the Conference and signed by 30 countries, including the United States. — The Protocol was submitted to the United States Senate in 1926, but was never brought to a vote and returned to committee. (In 1947, the Protocol was returned to the Executive along with other treaties which had not been acted upon.) — In 1930, the United Kingdom attempted to get agreement that the Protocol prohibits the use of tear gas in war. Although several States agreed, there was no unanimity and many delegations were silent. The issue was not resolved. — In 1966, 1968 and 1969, the United States voted for resolutions in the United Nations affirming its adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol. — The principles of the Protocol have been observed in almost all armed conflicts since 1925 by Parties and non-Parties alike. — Today, there are 85 Parties, including every other major power, to this basic international agreement in the field of chemical and biological warfare. (Japan became a Party on May 21, 1970.) — While the Protocol speaks in terms of flat prohibitions on the use of these weapons, thirty-eight Parties (including France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) have ratified or acceded with reservations on the right to retaliate with chemical and bacteriological weapons. — The Netherlands has reserved the right to retaliate with chemical weapons only. — No Party to the Protocol has taken a reservation with respect to the scope of the operative language of the Protocol. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 82, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files 1969–74, Memoranda for the President, Beginning 8/16/70. No classification marking. Prepared by BeLieu on August 19. An attached list of signatories to the Protocol is not published. 207. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 207. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 14, 1970 SUBJECT: Secretary Laird’s Recommended Plan for the Destruction of Biological and Toxin Agents In your November and February memoranda on chemical and biological programs, you directed that all stockpiles of biological and toxin agents and munitions be destroyed and that the biological research program be confined to defensive purposes only. You also requested from Secretary Laird a plan to implement these decisions. The Secretary has forwarded the description of his plan, and this memorandum informs you of the steps I have taken to insure that all relevant aspects of the plan are covered before we seek your approval for its implementation. At Tabs A and B are memoranda that I have sent to Secretary Laird and Russell Train, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, directing that the following be done before seeking your approval of the plan or any official public announcement relating to it: — submission by Secretary Laird of an Environmental Impact Statement to the Environmental Quality Council; — a report to your Environmental Quality Council on the environmental aspects of the plan; and — submission of the Department of Defense’s proposed public relations plan. Once these reports are in hand your domestic advisers and I will come to you for your approval of Secretary Laird’s plan and the launching of briefings for appropriate Congressmen and Governors. I believe handling this issue in this fashion allows us to move forward on implementing your decisions while assuring that potentially troublesome aspects are fully considered before the plan is executed. While political problems should be greatly reduced because no transportation of these agents is involved, the subject obviously remains potentially controversial. Tab A Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, September 3, 1970 SUBJECT: National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44 The President has reviewed your memorandum of July 6, 1970, in which you report that a detailed plan for the destruction of all biological agents, toxins and associated weapons has been prepared and concurred in by the Office of Science and Technology, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Water Quality Administration of the Department of Interior. Prior to approving the execution of this plan or any official public announcement relating thereto, the President has directed that: — An Environmental Impact Statement be prepared and submitted to the Environmental Quality Council pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, with classified annexes as necessary; — The Environmental Quality Council report to him on the environmental aspects of the plan; and — The Department of Defense’s proposed public relations plan, to be used when the destruction plan is approved for execution, be submitted for his consideration. Henry A. Kissinger Tab B Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Council on Environment Quality (Train) Washington, September 3, 1970 SUBJECT: National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44 In National Security Decision Memoranda 35 (November 25, 1969) and 44 (February 14, 1970), the President directed that all stockpiles of biological agents, toxins and associated weapons be destroyed and that the biological research program be confined to defensive purposes only. The President also requested a plan covering implementation of his decisions from the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense has forwarded a report on the detailed plan for the destruction of all biological agents, toxins and associated weapons. This plan has been reviewed and concurred in by the Office of Science and Technology, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Water Quality Administration of the Department of Interior. Prior to approving the execution of this plan and any public announcement related thereto, the President has directed that the Department of Defense submit an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, with classified annexes as necessary. The President has further directed that the nature of this review be held closely and that your conclusions on the environmental aspects of this plan be forwarded for his consideration. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Written at the top of page one is “copy to John Whitaker & Ken Cole.” 208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 4, 1970 SUBJECT: Completion of Plans and Proposed Announcement for the Destruction of Biological and Toxin Weapons As directed by you in NSDM’s 35 and 44 (Tab G), Secretary Laird forwarded a description of his plan for the destruction of all stockpiles of biological and toxin agents and munitions in July (Tab E/With Inventory of Weapons, Tab F). This plan required further action by Defense before forwarding it for your approval. In response to my memoranda (Tab D) — Defense has now submitted its environmental impact statement (Tab H) and public affairs plan (Tab I) to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ): and — CEQ Chairman Train has reported to you (Tab C) assuring you of the adequacy of the destruction plan from the environmental standpoint and stating that the Army, HEW and Agriculture are to be congratulated on a comprehensive plan ensuring complete protection of the environment. The plan also has the concurrences of your Office of Science and Technology, the US Surgeon General, the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Water Quality Administration. Major points of the plan are: — Destruction of anti-personnel agents will take place at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas (little over a year in process). Destruction of anti-crop agents will take place at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (about two years), Beale Air Force Base, California and Fort Detrick Maryland (both taking less than two months.) — All destruction will be accomplished at the sites so that no transportation is involved. — The agents will be rendered completely innocuous by contained sterilization and incineration. Defense wants approval to begin operations as soon as possible. I think we should move ahead with this matter now. John Whitaker and Bill Timmons concur. At Tab A is a proposed memorandum from me to the Secretary of Defense which (1) informs him that you approve the plan, (2) forwards the compliments of the CEQ to those responsible for it, and (3) requests that he call the Governors involved and make the necessary arrangements to notify concerned Congressmen and Senators as a courtesy shortly before the announcement. At Tab B is a proposed public release for your approval. The substance of the release has been cleared with John Whitaker and Bill Timmons. The text has been cleared by Ray Price. Recommendation: That you approve the memorandum for Secretary Laird at Tab A and the draft public release at Tab B. APPROVE DISAPPROVE SEE ME [HAK approved for Pres] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 311, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc) Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on page two indicates that Kissinger approved the memorandum for the President. It was sent to Laird on December 15. (Ibid.) The attachments at Tabs A, B, C, H, and I are not published. NSDMs 35 and 44 (at Tab G) are Documents 165 and 190 ; [11/25/69; 2/20/70] Laird’s July 6 memorandum and the inventory of weapons (at Tabs E and F) are Document 199 and its attachment; and Kissinger’s memorandum at Tab D is an attachment to Document 207 . [9/14] 209. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 209. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 2, 1971 Dear Henry: This is to advise you that all requirements stated in your memorandum of 15 December 1970 concerning the plan for destruction of biological agents and weapons have been met. Each involved Congressional delegation, Governor, and Mayor of the local city was notified and provided a copy of the unclassified Environmental Impact Statement for review at 1100 hours on 18 December 1970. The Pentagon Press Briefing was conducted on 18 December 1970 at 1130 hours. Simultaneous press briefings with the Pentagon Press Briefing were held at the three principal operational areas. A copy of the Detailed Notification and Briefing Schedule is enclosed for your information. No adverse publicity has been received at this time on the detailed plans presented. I am very gratified in the President’s reaction to the plan for destruction of the biological materials. I will send a separate message to the Secretary of the Army to assure that President Nixon’s commendation is passed on to those who participated in the effort. Sincerely, David Packard 1 Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. III, Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (1). No classification marking. 210. National Security Study Memorandum 112 210. National Security Study Memorandum 112 1 Washington, January 7, 1971 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Office of Science and Technology The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy on Use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War The President has directed a study of the full range of United States policy options with regard to the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war after Vietnam. In this study, riot control agents and chemical herbicides should be dealt with separately. The study should address the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. policy options, taking into account: — the military utility of and possible circumstances under which these agents might be employed in future conflict situations other than Vietnam; — the environmental aspects relevant to use in the situations described; — international policy considerations; — Congressional and public relations aspects. The position which the United States would take concerning its understanding as to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 under each policy option should be discussed. The President has directed that an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of Department of State and comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff, conduct this study. The fact and nature of this review should be very closely held, and distribution should be restricted on an absolute “need to know” basis. The study should be forwarded to the NSC Senior Review Group by February 1, 1971. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Moorer. In an April 23, 1971, memorandum, Kissinger notified recipients of NSSM 112 that the due date for the NSSM study had been extended to October 15, 1971. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIET) 211. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State (Spiers) to Secretary of State Rogers 211. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State (Spiers) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, January 22, 1971 SUBJECT: Policy Decisions in Connection with your Geneva Protocol Testimony - ACTION MEMORANDUM You have agreed to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early or mid-February to testify in support of the Executive’s request for the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We have reviewed outstanding policy questions in connection with the preparation for your appearance and testimony, and believe that the issue of the continued use of chemical herbicides as a defoliant in Vietnam should be decided by the President before your appearance. On December 26, the White House issued a press statement indicating that we would phase-out our chemical herbicide program in Vietnam. This was in response to a memorandum from Secretary Laird to the President recommending the phase out (memorandum and press statement at Tab C and D respectively). Subsequently, during the Annual Review of our chemical and biological programs by the Under Secretaries Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard agreed the crop destruction program should be terminated immediately. This recommendation is being forwarded to the President by the Under Secretaries Committee. This leaves only the defoliation operations of our chemical herbicide program to be phased out. The phase-out is scheduled for about May of 1971, because that is the approximate date when existing stocks (agents “blue” and “white”) of chemical herbicides presently authorized for use in Vietnam will be exhausted. Further shipment of these agents to Vietnam has been suspended by DOD. In August of 1970 two legislative amendments to DOD bills indicated significant concern in the Senate about the questions of crop destruction and defoliation by chemical herbicides in Vietnam. Among the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Case, Cooper, Javits, Church, Mansfield, and Symington supported termination of crop destruction. A separate measure aimed at the termination of all use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam was supported by Senators Mansfield and Case. Their opposition has been based on the ecological effects and possible damage to human beings of such use, as well as a belief that herbicides are of limited military value to our own and Vietnamese forces. Given the fact that phase-out will take place in several months, and that the commander in the field is willing to accept whatever risks accrue after this date—the date having been set in order to use up existing stocks—I recommend that you forward a memorandum to the President containing a recommendation that the President decide to terminate immediately the use of all chemical herbicides in Vietnam and that he announce this decision or authorize you to announce it in your statement on the Geneva Protocol before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We expect that the Department of Defense and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to oppose an earlier phase-out. They will argue that the question of military utility is significant since use is still permitted in defoliation operations around firebases and other defense perimeters. We believe the issue is primarily one now of timing since General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker recommended a phase-out of chemical herbicide operations in Vietnam which they anticipated would be completed by about May 1971, and Secretary Laird and the President supported the phase-out operations. Defense may also argue that our own phase-out would make it impossible for us to continue to support Vietnamese (ARVN) chemical herbicide operations. We believe this is true and do not see how we can support the Vietnamese in such operations where we no longer see them as of sufficient military value to continue to use them ourselves and at a time when we will still have over 250,000 of our own troops in Vietnam (May–June 1971). We are not convinced Secretary Laird personally would not concur in your memorandum to the President. We therefore suggest that you forward the memorandum to him for his concurrence, or should he not concur, then explain you will be sending the memorandum in any event, and invite him to append or separately to send his views to the President. A letter to Secretary Laird in this sense is attached at Tab A. We believe that a positive decision by the President will be significant in helping to obtain the favorable votes of an important number of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and of the Senate as a whole in favor of positive action on the Protocol. This is true because, with the cessation of all use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam, those Senators opposed to such use will no longer see the Protocol vote as a lever to try to change the herbicide policy, or as a basis for pressing the view that the treaty should somehow cover herbicides. Some may well argue that if we cease using herbicides in Vietnam, we should agree to interpret that treaty as covering them. But in the attached memorandum to the President, we have made clear that we should not change our position that the Protocol does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides. To change this view now would raise a number of serious questions of treaty interpretation, since chemical herbicides were not yet invented or in use when the treaty was drafted and signed. We will forward separately a draft of your statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It states that all herbicide operations have been terminated and reaffirms our interpretation that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of chemical herbicides or riot control agents (tear gas) in war. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Secretary seeking his concurrence on your memorandum. Tab C Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, December 22, 1970 SUBJECT: Policy Regarding Use of Herbicides in South Vietnam I want to report to you on the continuing actions we are taking, at your direction, to reduce the use of herbicides in Vietnam and to advise you that new steps will be taken so that there will be strict conformance in Vietnam with policies governing the use of herbicides in the United States. The present ban on the use of the herbicide known as “ORANGE” remains in effect. Additionally, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams have advised that they are initiating a program which will permit an orderly, yet rapid phase-out of the use of other herbicides while preserving the option to reinstitute this program, if necessary, to assure the protection of American lives. During the phase-out, the use of herbicides in Vietnam will be restricted to remote, unpopulated areas or around firebases and US installations in a manner currently authorized in CONUS. In short, any herbicides used in Vietnam henceforth will be used only under conditions which would apply in the United States. As a result of new orders to the field, herbicide use in Vietnam will be such that the stresses and risks involved are no greater than those sustained by the United States population and the United States environment in normal peacetime activities. I recognize, of course, that there could be some temporary risks to our forces as a result of these decisions. Should the military situation change as a result of an increase in the enemy level of activity, we would need, of course, to reassess this policy in order to assure the protection of American lives, particularly as we withdraw thousands of additional US military personnel from South Vietnam in accordance with your program. Melvin R. Laird Tab D Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, December 28, 1970 SUBJECT: Policy Regarding the Use of Herbicides in Vietnam The President has asked me to thank you for your report on the continuing actions you are taking to reduce the use of herbicides in Vietnam and particularly the steps taken to ensure that there will be strict conformance in Vietnam with policies governing the use of herbicides in the United States. The President has noted the initiation of a program which will permit an orderly, yet rapid phase-out of herbicide operations in Vietnam, while preserving an option to reinstitute the program. The President has directed that an extension or any expansion of the current program and plans, if any, regarding Vietnamization of chemical herbicide capabilities be submitted for his approval. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Pickering of PM. Sent through S/S. The memoranda at Tabs C and D are published but not the press release at Tab D. At Tab A is Document 212 . A revised version of the memorandum at Tab B is Document 214 . 212. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird 212. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, February 2, 1971 Dear Mel, As we go into the Geneva Protocol hearings in the Senate next month, I am asking the President to decide to phase out immediately, rather than waiting until May this year, all chemical herbicide operations in Vietnam. You will recall that both Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams recommended the phase-out and the President supported the idea. I believe an earlier phase-out, for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum to the President, would be very much in our own broad interests, and will help to ensure that the President’s decision to seek Senate advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocol is carried out. I hope you will be able to concur in my memorandum. If not, I suggest that you write to the President on the subject. In view of the Hearing schedule and the preparations required, I plan to forward my memorandum to the President on or about February 1st. With best personal regards, Sincerely, William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. The attachment is Document 214 . In a February 3 memorandum, Eliot notified Laird’s aide, General Pursley, that Rogers planned to forward his memorandum to the President on or about February 10, not February 1 as Rogers’ letter erroneously stated. (Ibid.) 213. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 213. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 4, 1971 SUBJECT: Annual Review of US Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Program The Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed and approved the attached first Annual Review of the US chemical warfare and biological research program you requested in NSDM 35. This review also includes riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides. We have asked that prior to the next Annual Review the following studies be conducted on an interagency basis with DOD taking the lead: — To determine what constitutes an adequate and effective deterrent and retaliatory capability against a chemical and biological attack. — To develop appropriate guidelines for the public information program on US chemical warfare, and biological and toxin research. We also approved the recommendations contained in the Annual Review. The most important are as follows: — That DOD make every effort to obtain a formal agreement by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that it will undertake the herbicide study requested by Public Law 91–441 and that a public announcement be made before commencement of hearings on the Geneva Protocol. We understand that the NAS has agreed to this study. — That greater attention and priority be given to collection and analysis of CBW intelligence. In this regard, available evidence is not sufficient to make a confident estimate of the size or composition of the Soviet stockpile of CBW agents. Our information on Chinese capabilities is negligible. Desirable types of additional intelligence data and the associated costs of collection should be identified. That the US continue efforts to have the UK draft convention on BW adopted by the CCD in Geneva and that the US continue to cooperate in efforts to achieve effective control of CW through international agreement. — That military deficiencies in US defensive capabilities be remedied as rapidly as feasible. Desirable additional programs to counter identified threats should be developed and considered within the Defense review process. — That an Ad Hoc Interagency Committee be formed to define more precisely the biological and toxin research program and determine which areas require classification. Several issues were raised as a result of the Annual Review. They have been resolved as follows: Issue 1: Should the US provide the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) with capabilities to use RCAs in other than normal riot control activities? The Under Secretaries Committee endorsed the position of the Secretary of Defense to continue US support for the Republic of Vietnam with RCAs after withdrawal of US combat forces from Vietnam at a reasonable and appropriate level. The present DOD guidelines are: 1) That support continue at a level to be determined by relevant military and economic considerations; 2) That riot control agents be carefully controlled and employed with discrimination by our Allies as by ourselves; and 3) That the JCS and subordinate military commands carefully monitor their use. The Under Secretaries Committee agreed that US support for any substantial increase in usage would first have to be authorized through specific action in Washington in consultation with interested Departments and Agencies. In addition, this support will be reexamined during the next Annual Review. Issue 2: Should the US provide the RVNAF with capabilities to utilize chemical herbicides militarily on a large scale? This issue was rendered moot by the White House Memorandum of December 28, 1970, which in effect withdraws COMUSMACV authority to use all chemical herbicides when their present phase-out program, presently anticipated for May 1971, is completed. Both US programs and US support for Vietnamese programs are covered by this memorandum. Any extension or expansion of the current program and any plans regarding Vietnamization of chemical herbicide capabilities will require your approval. Issue 3: Should a broad reassessment of the use of RCAs and herbicides in the Vietnam conflict be initiated at this time so that necessary data can be obtained for a later examination of the implications and consequences for US policy of their future use in war? The Under Secretaries Committee approved the conduct of this reassessment by the Department of Defense with other interested agencies participating. This will supplement the study on the physiological and ecological effects of herbicides which the National Academy of Sciences has been requested to undertake and complete by January 1972. However, these studies will now be incorporated into the response to NSSM 112 which requests a study of the full range of United States policy options with regard to the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war after Vietnam. Issue 4: Should the temporary ban on the use of herbicide Orange (2,4,D and 2,4,5,T) in the Republic of Vietnam be lifted? The Secretary of Defense Memorandum of December 22 to you and the White House press release of December 26, 1970 which state that the ban on herbicide Orange remains in effect make this issue moot. The Department of Defense is preparing disposition plans for review by this Committee. Issue 5: Should the US terminate the use of herbicides for crop destruction in South Vietnam? The Under Secretaries Committee agreed to the termination of crop destruction operations now. Under review is the desirability of making a public announcement of this decision concerning crop destruction operations in Vietnam prior to the commencement of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Geneva Protocol, presently anticipated for late February or early March. The Department of State is considering including this announcement, as well as some of the decisions mentioned above, in Secretary Rogers’ opening statement at the Senate hearings. Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird are expected to be the first two witnesses before the Committee. The actions required above together with the entire chemical warfare, and biological and toxin research program will continue to be monitored by the Under Secretaries Committee and results will be reported to you during November 1971 as part of the next Annual Review. John N. Irwin II Chairman 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, ACDA Central Depository of Top Secret Documents Covering the Period of July 1955–April 1983: FRC 383–98–162, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Annual Review of U.S. Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs, February 1971. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published. 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 11, 1971 Subject: The Geneva Protocol Shortly Secretary Laird and I will be leading off the Administration’s testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I want to report to you now that I think we are in a good position to obtain the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification, if we can resolve one outstanding policy question. I believe that we should decide immediately to discontinue all use of chemical herbicides in defoliation and other operations in Vietnam. Our position that riot control agents (tear gas) and chemical herbicides are not covered by the prohibitions of the Protocol will be a central issue in the hearings and floor debate. Your decisions of November 25, 1969, on these questions, including that which permits the continued use of riot control agents in Vietnam, have recently been reaffirmed as part of an Annual Review, which concluded that no change was now required or justified in our policy on riot control agents. There will be some Senators who will oppose our use of riot control agents in Vietnam and our position that the Protocol does not prohibit their use in war, but a number of others will strongly support us. A third group will find it difficult to vote against the use of riot control agents in war when they are available to, and are used by, local police departments in their home states in crowd control. On chemical herbicides we face a similarly difficult and serious issue; one that has developed largely since your initial decisions of November 25, 1969. As you know, recent reports have called into question the domestic use of all herbicides in proximity to any food supply or water sources. The Department of Defense has concurred in the immediate cessation of all crop destruction by chemical herbicides in Vietnam. Secretary Laird has also recommended, and you have approved, a phase-out of the chemical herbicide programs in Vietnam for defoliation operations. This phase-out, I understand, will be completed by about May 1971 when we use up existing stocks of herbicide agents “Blue” and “White”. In my statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I plan to make clear that we have stopped crop destruction by chemical herbicides in Vietnam; and also to state that we regularly review all chemical warfare and biological research programs, policies and activities; and finally that we will be carrying out a full-scale study of the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in Vietnam together with the implications this use may carry for the use of these weapons in any future conflict. The herbicide issue has raised serious problems on the Hill and among influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In a vote last August on the question of denying Defense appropriations for the use of chemical herbicides to destroy food crops in Vietnam, three important Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee—Senators Case, Cooper and Javits—and a number of Democrats, voted in favor. Senator Case also supported the “Goodell/Nelson Amendment” to ban the use of herbicide chemicals for any purpose in Vietnam. While an exact analysis of the implications of all voting is subject to some interpretative problems, the crop destruction amendment received 33 votes which is just one short of the number required absolutely to block advice and consent to a treaty. Similarly, the attempt to ban the use of herbicides absolutely in Vietnam received 22 votes. A positive decision to phase-out immediately the use of chemical herbicides for defoliation in Vietnam would do much to help reduce opposition in the Senate to advice and consent to the Protocol. We could expect that a number of Senators concerned by the use of herbicides in Vietnam and about the environment would find it easier to support the Administration’s interpretation of the Protocol if they saw the chemical herbicide question was no longer a live issue. I am recommending that we not change our position that the Protocol does not cover the use of chemical herbicides within its prohibitions, My draft statement on the Protocol makes clear that we reaffirm our position, but indicates we are not inflexible in seeking to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties to the Protocol. To give up now all use of herbicides for all time by changing our view on the Protocol without adequate study would not in my view be wise or prudent, would raise serious questions of treaty interpretation, and might well alienate a number of Senators who favor keeping a “free hand” for the future on this question. I therefore recommend that you order an immediate cessation of the use of chemical herbicides, in any form for any military purpose in Vietnam, the decision to be announced prior to, or if you should desire, in the course of my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Mel Laird has seen this memorandum and has differing views which he may express to you separately. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, Top Secret, POL 27–10. Top Secret; Exdis. In a February 11 memorandum, Eliot informed Rogers that DOD did not concur with an immediate phase-out of defoliants in Vietnam and Rogers’ memorandum to the President had been revised to reflect that fact. (Ibid.) 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 19, 1971 SUBJECT: The Geneva Protocol I refer to Secretary Rogers’ memorandum concerning the future Congressional hearings on the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I share Secretary Rogers’ view that we reaffirm our position that riot control agents and chemical herbicides are not covered by the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol. However, because of the safety of our forces, I cannot concur in his recommendation for “an immediate cessation of the use of chemical herbicides, in any form for any military purpose in Vietnam.” During the past two months, the policy regarding the use of herbicides in Vietnam has undergone intensive reviews by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, by my Department, and by your Office. As you know, all uses of herbicides in Vietnam are governed by the same restrictions for their use in the U.S., and have been further restricted to use in remote, unpopulated areas or around firebases and U.S. installations. On 16 January 1971, it was ordered that the use of chemical herbicides for crop destruction be terminated. Consequently, Vietnam and its people are not being subjected to any greater risks than our own country and population through the use of herbicides. I consider that these actions have made our current herbicide operations in Vietnam completely justifiable in light of current domestic practices. The above actions were taken with full awareness of the temporary risks to our forces and the detrimental effects on our military operations. I have concluded that any additional actions to speed up the phaseout of the herbicide operations prior to 1 May 1971 should be determined by General Abrams in reaction to the military situation in the field rather than dictated solely by the political situation in Washington. Retention of the option to employ herbicides around fire support bases and installations, and along certain important lines of communication is considered essential for the protection of U.S. and allied forces - especially as the VC/NVA forces revert to greater reliance on sapper and ambush tactics, and as we continue to withdraw more American troops. In accordance with your directions, as indicated by Dr. Kissinger on 28 December 1970, we will seek your approval should we require an expansion of herbicide operations in Vietnam prior to 1 May 1971 or should it become necessary to extend herbicide operations beyond that date. We anticipate submitting a plan for an appropriate RVNAF herbicide capability for your consideration at a future date. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret. 216. Message From President Nixon to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 216. Message From President Nixon to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 1 Washington, February 23, 1971 Message From President Nixon to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, February 23, 1971 1 Today the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament begins a new session of work in the vital fields of Arms Control and Disarmament. On this occasion, once again I want to convey my thoughts to you directly because of my conviction that few areas of endeavour go so deeply to the heart of the concerns and the aspirations of all nations as the search for restraints on armaments. Sound limitations on armaments can enhance international stability and increase the security of all countries; they can reduce the economic burden of armaments; and they can lay the ground-work for productive international cooperation in other areas. The achievements of this Committee during the past decade have been significant, including, notably, the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2 and most recently a Seabed Arms Control Treaty 3 which was overwhelmingly commended by the UN General Assembly 4 and signed earlier this month by a substantial number of States. The tasks before the Committee are very important to world security. As in the past, genuine progress can best be made through patient and careful work toward mutually beneficial measures. Opportunities for such progress can and must be realized. I believe that an opportunity for progress exists in the field of chemical and biological weapons. Despite differences of approach, there appears to be a fundamental area of agreement and common interest in the CCD regarding this problem. All members desire the greatest possible advance in achieving effective restraints on these weapons. All members are aware that such progress will enhance their own security and international security in general. An agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons should serve these objectives. Because of the rapid transmission of contagious diseases, particularly with modern means of communications, any use of biological weapons—by any State in any conflict anywhere in the world—could endanger the people of every country. Additional restraints on biological weapons would thus contribute to the security of all peoples. A prohibition against the possession of biological weapons could also have far-reaching benefits of another character. It could encourage international cooperation in the peaceful application of biological research, a field which may lead to immeasurable advances in the health and well-being of peoples everywhere. With respect to chemical weapons the objective situation is different. Unless countries can have assurance that other parties to an agreement will no longer possess chemical weapons, there will not be a basis for a sound and reliable arms control measure. It is this basic fact that determines the approach of the United States. The common task with respect to chemical weapons now is to find solutions to the difficult problems of verification. We are determined to pursue this task. And, in any biological weapons convention, we will support an unambiguous commitment engaging all parties to undertake further negotiations regarding limitations on chemical weapons. Important efforts are being made to move ahead in other areas of arms limitation. The need for restraints on nuclear arms is universally recognized. Negotiations to achieve limitations are continuing through the bilateral strategic arms talks. It is our earnest hope that these crucial talks will result in positive and substantial arms limitations. The General Assembly has requested this Committee to continue as a matter of urgency its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. It also called attention to the need to improve worldwide seismological capabilities in order to facilitate such a ban. 5 The United States will continue to support these efforts, particularly those designed to achieve a greater understanding of the verification issue. At the same time, I hope that increasing attention will be given to the question of arms limitation with respect to conventional weapons. When such a vast proportion of all expenditures on armaments is being devoted to these weapons, all States, in all stages of development, share a common interest in exploring the possible paths toward sound agreements consistent with their security interests. The Seabed Treaty demonstrated, as have other arms control agreements negotiated during the past decade, that steadfastness in the pursuit of common goals can lead to tangible results. When we have worked toward measures in the interests of all, we have succeeded in resolving differences and overcoming obstacles that seemed great. Let us continue to do so. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 19–21. No classification marking. 1 CCD/319, Feb. 23, 1971. 2 Documents on Disarmament , 1968, pp. 461–465. 3 Ante , pp. 7–11. 4 Documents on Disarmament , 1970, pp. 680–681. 5 Ibid. , p. 82 217. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 217. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 4, 1971 SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers’ Recommendation to Cease All Use of Herbicides in Vietnam and His Testimony on the Geneva Protocol You will recall that Secretary Rogers recently recommended that the President “order an immediate cessation of the use of chemical herbicides in any form for any military purpose in Vietnam” and that this decision be announced to ease the passage of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by making our controversial herbicide operations a dead issue. However, we would not change our position concerning our understanding that herbicides are outside the prohibitions of the Protocol. Secretary Laird disagreed with Secretary Rogers’ recommendation. We understand you have forwarded the memorandum for decision to the President. Mr. Eliot has called Mrs. Davis to inform her that, as a result of the Secretary’s briefing on the subject preparatory to his testimony on the Geneva Protocol tomorrow (March 5), he has decided to withdraw his recommendation from consideration . The memorandum has been withdrawn. (attached) In addition, State has just now sent us a copy of Secretary Rogers proposed testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have no substantive problems with the proposed testimony. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Sent through Behr. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “OBE” (Overtaken By Events) and “(Put into personal file).” Attached is Document 214 . 218. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Senator J. William Fulbright 218. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Senator J. William Fulbright 1 Washington, March 19, 1971 Dear Mr. Chairman: I am concerned over the misunderstanding that apparently developed in connection with the rescheduling of my appearance in the hearings of your Committee on the Geneva Protocol. I should therefore like to clarify the circumstances of the rescheduling. Approximately one hour before my scheduled appearance on Thursday at 10:30 a.m., I was informed for the first time that the Committee would meet only in morning session and that two other witnesses were to precede me. As a result of discussions between members of our respective staffs, it seemed most likely that there would not be sufficient time remaining for me to complete my testimony that day. It was then mutually agreed to be preferable for my appearance to be rescheduled for a later day in a session that would provide more adequate time for my testimony. There was no suggestion that this arrangement would inconvenience the Committee. The fact that the testimony of the other two witnesses lasted until about 12:30 p.m., Thursday, reinforces the belief that there would not have been sufficient time remaining for me to be heard that day. This is the sole reason for the rescheduling. In particular, I wish to have dispel any impression that I would have considered a luncheon engagement more important than my appearance. Because of the interest of a number of individual members of the Committee in this unfortunate misunderstanding, I am taking the liberty of sending each of them a copy of this letter Sincerely, G. Warren Nutter 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Feb–Mar). No classification marking. Written at the bottom is, “Dick, “Capen has talked to Sen. Sparkman and Sen Aiken. They were not upset in the first place. This is a ‘non-issue’ contrived by Sen. Fulbright’s staff. REP [Robert E. Pursley].” A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the Secretary of Defense saw it March 22. 219. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 219. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 19, 1971 HAK: Secretary Rogers (Tab A) suggested to you that we ought to have a higher level representative than Nutter to testify from Defense on the Geneva Protocol. You agreed and said that you would call Defense on this. Rogers said “Nutter would kill it.” The Secretary seems to have known whereof he spoke (See NYT item this morning at Tab B). Nutter could not make the appearance because of a luncheon date and the Times notes that the “snub” (even though he is now scheduled to testify on Monday) “combined with the unwillingness of the JCS to testify is inclined to create reluctance within the Committee to support ratification.” If the Administration really wants to pursue this there will have to be some push put behind it. The tear gas and herbicides question has arisen, of course, and there is some sentiment in the Senate to let the treaty lie. The Defense performance adds weight to that school. We have to decide, therefore, whether the President really wants to push this to ratification or just let it take its own course. RTK 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 1]. No classification marking. The attachments are not published. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Talk to Pursley—that we want higher level representative.” In a March 20 note, Kennedy wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “Dave—Adm Murphy advised that both Secretary Laird & Mr. Packard were already committed to appearances with the Hill on the 22nd. I informed Ted Curran that DOD had been urged to provide higher level representation but was unable to do so—for the delay in appearing would affront the Committee. Curran noted that he would make a note for the file to this effect and assume the matter was put to rest.” A note adjacent to “(Tab A)” in line one of the memorandum reads, “—destroyed—telcon of 3/17/71, jlj.” 220. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 58A 220. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 58A 1 Washington, March 23, 1971 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, Mr. James Schlesinger The Director, Office of Science and Technology The Director, United States Information Agency The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs The President has noted the report of the Under Secretaries Committee’s annual review of U.S. chemical, warfare and biological research programs as directed by National Security Decision Memoranda 35, 44, and 78. The President has directed that the Department of Defense request the study by the National Academy of Sciences, regarding the ecological and physiological effects of the use of herbicides in Vietnam, give due consideration to the questions of restoration and future use of the sprayed areas and possible steps to minimize further deterioration. In addition, the President has requested that the Under Secretaries Committee’s report on the defensive biological programs be forwarded to him by August 15, 1971. Arthur A. Hartman Staff Director 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Secret. 221. Draft Convention Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Representative 221. Draft Convention Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Representative 1 Geneva, March 30, 1971 Communist Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on Their Destruction, March 30, 1971 1 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament and, above all, with a view to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear, chemical, bacteriological (biological) and all other types of weapons of mass destruction, Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament, 2 Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes, Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 3 and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Guided by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 as well as the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and any biological means of warfare, 4 Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, 5 Convinced that an agreement on bacteriological (biological) weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued, Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire: (1) microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not designed for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes; (2) auxiliary equipment or means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents or toxins for hostile purposes. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the Convention—observing all the necessary precautions—or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated weapons in its possession as well as the equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention. Article III Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations to take action contrary to the provisions of this Convention. Article IV Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal or physical persons of that State. Article V Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention, and for destroying them. Article VI The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention. Article VII 1. Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation. 6 2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. Article VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law. Article IX Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.” 7 Article X 1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. 2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. Article XI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XII 1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, so as to be sure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention. Article XIII 1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ……… which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by…. Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and shall transmit other notices to them. 6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XIV This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. Done in ……. copies at ………, this ……… day of ……., 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament , 1971, pp. 190–194. No classification marking. 1 CCD/325/Rev. 1, Apr. 15, 1971. The draft Convention was submitted to the CCD by the Soviet representative on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR. The Apr. 15 edition incorporated several minor changes described below. 2 In the original version (CCD/325, Mar. 30, 1971), there were commas after the words “toxins” and “elimination.” 3 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 764–765. 4 Ibid ., 1968, pp. 793–795; ibid., 1969, pp. 716–717. 5 Ibid ., pp. 297–298. 6 In the original version the last sentence of this par. began, “The Security Council shall inform…” 7 In the original version this article read as follows: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for carrying out any use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.” 222. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 222. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 30, 1971 SUBJECT: Shift in Soviet CBW Arms Control Position at Geneva Today (March 30), the Soviets submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva a draft convention (Tab A) to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins and to destroy existing stocks. On first reading, the Soviet draft appears very similar to the UK draft convention which the US supports. You will recall that the Soviet position last year and at the opening session this year was that the problems of chemical and biological weapons were inseparable and should be treated in a single convention: namely, the 1969 draft convention of the socialist states. Many of the “non-aligned” members of the CCD have tended to favor the idea of a single CBW convention. The Soviet draft convention on BW and toxins is a substantial shift toward our position that (1) BW and CW are separable problems and (2) we should move now toward a separate BW ban such as the proposed UK draft convention. Ambassador Roshchin had earlier hinted that a shift toward the US position would be possible when the US ratifies the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of both CW and BW. The Soviet move toward a separate BW ban, combined with a commitment to negotiations in good faith on CW, is apparently predicated inter alia on the assumption that the US will be ratifying the Geneva Protocol in the not too distant future. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV [Part 1]. Confidential. Sent for information. Sent through Behr (NSC). Kissinger initialed the memorandum. The attachment is not published; the text of the draft convention contained in the telegram is Document 231 . 223. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 223. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 31, 1971 Subject: Geneva Protocol On March 30 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered the Geneva Protocol in executive session. Following the session Senator Fulbright met the press and told them he personally favored advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol with the understanding that riot control agents and herbicides are covered by the Protocol’s prohibitions. We understand the Committee generally shared this view. This is of course contrary to the position taken by the Administration. We were confidentially informed that Senator Fulbright plans to write the President about the Protocol. We do not know what Senator Fulbright will say, but presume that he will at least convey on behalf of the Committee that the Administration’s position on the Protocol should be reconsidered. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. 224. Telegram 1259 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 224. Telegram 1259 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, April 5, 1971, 1845Z. Subject: CCD—Socialist BW Draft Convention—Meeting With SovDel 1. Summary: In informal meeting with SovDel April 5 Leonard and US Del welcomed Socialist BW convention as serious basis for negotiations. Questioned on text of Socialist draft, Roshchin said prohibitions in Art I and provisions for destruction in Art II were meant to apply both to weapons and to agents and toxins. Soviets said Art IV, which had been included to give greater guarantees against violations, was similar to line US had taken in statement on NPT (though not in treaty text see Foster speech ENDC/PV370). Provision for review conference in Art XII would assure that problem of CW not being shelved. This Article was “juridically and politically” important. On procedural question, Leonard indicated US and allies would attempt to have comments on Sov text by end April. US hoped Sovs would respond ASAP so by beginning July we could table agreed draft treaty. End summary. 2. Leonard and US deloffs called on SovDel April 5 to request clarification of points in text of Socialist BW draft convention. Leonard told Roshchin USDel had not yet received instructions from Washington but noted State Dep Spokesman had welcomed Socialist text as “serious document” that should facilitate negotiations. Turning to text of Socialist draft, Leonard raised several questions: — Preambular paras 1 and 2. Leonard questioned references to GCD and to “prohibiting and eliminating nuclear, chemical, bacteriological” weapons of mass destruction. Roshchin said points had been included to make scope of convention as wide as possible. — Preambular para 3. Leonard asked if intent of Soviet draft here and elsewhere was to ban agents and toxins as well as “weapons”. Roshchin replied intent was to eliminate agents and toxins as well as weapons, both in Preamble and in Articles I and II. Day (US) suggested draft could be improved by using same terms throughout to leave no doubt both weapons and agents included in prohibitions. — Preambular para 10. Leonard said this could pose problem for USG in view of fact we had voted against 2603A at Twenty-Fourth UNGA, though fact that 2603A not listed, as it had been in Socialist CBW draft, was some improvement. SovDel simply took note. 3. Before taking up operative articles of Socialist draft convention, Leonard pointed out Article I of UK convention included useful definition of “microbial or other biological agents or toxins causing death, damage or disease to man, other animals, or crops” (US would prefer plants to crops), and said USSR might give consideration to such a definition. 4. USDel received following clarification of operative articles of Socialist convention: — Article I. Asked if word development in Socialist text included concept of research. Roshchin replied “yes, absolutely”. SovDel took note of Leonard’s explanation word microbial in UK text had a broader and slightly different meaning than microbiological. Soviets said term for means of delivery and vector same in Russian and appeared not to care which word used in English. — Article II. Leonard thanked Roshchin for clarifying that agents and toxins were also to be destroyed. It was US experience that it took longer than three months to destroy stockpiles of BW. Roshchin responded this no problem since between signature and ratification any state would have time to arrange for destruction of stockpiles. — Article IV. Roshchin said Art IV intended to strengthen obligations of parties to BW convention and thus give greater assurance to all. Although NPT text did not contain analogous article, an understanding along its lines was, according to Roshchin, accepted in US speech (subsequently identified by SovDel as Foster speech February 27, 1968 (ENDC/PV.370). — Article VIII. Leonard pointed out that last part (“…an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law.”) was drawn from UNGA Res 2603A (XXIV) which US opposed. It also raised legal question of what are generally recognized rules. Roshchin replied that intention was to strengthen Geneva Protocol and that this concept had been cited “many times” besides in 2603A. — Article IX. Leonard noted President’s “unambiguous commitment” on CW negotiations in Feb 23 message to CCD and said US will be studying language. Non-aligned will likely try to secure strongest possible CW commitment in a BW convention and Co-Chairman should guard against any attempt to include commitment, unacceptable to US, along lines of Moroccan proposal. Soviets reserved comment, noting only that English text of Art IX should be corrected so that final sentence reads “… specifically designed for production or use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.” — Art XII. Re review conference, Roshchin said this article was “juridically and politically” important in offering additional assurances on CW. 5. Leonard remarked upon omission of prohibition on use in the Socialist draft and the absence of a complaints procedure for case of use. He also noted in this connection that Sov draft was not accompanied by Security Council resolution as had been Socialist CBW draft and UK BW draft. SovDel took note of US comments. 6. On procedural question, Roshchin expressed hope for prompt US official reaction to Socialist draft. Leonard commented that if, as Soviets wished, BW treaty to be ready by next UNGA, prompt action also necessary from Socialists and Non-aligned.US and allied reactions would hopefully be available by end of current session (late April). Socialist response then needed ASAP for negotiation of US–USSR draft by early July. This timing necessary to give time for comment by Non-aligned, who will likely not have concrete suggestions until given Co-Chairmen draft, and for preparation of final draft. Comment: We had clear impression Soviet delegation was not able to respond substantively to US points. We suspect treaty draft was sprung on the delegation by Moscow without much preparation, and delegation now has inadequate guidance to carry the ball on its own. We should not assume that relatively passive response is indicative of give on Soviet part. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to London, Moscow, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT. 225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 28, 1971 SUBJECT: Negotiation of a Convention Banning Biological Weapons Secretary Rogers has written you (Tab B) regarding our proposed response to the USSR’s draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, tabled at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) on March 30, 1971. The Soviets had previously insisted that both chemical and biological weapons must be prohibited by one instrument, an approach widely supported by the non-aligned countries. (In this regard, both the USSR and the UK biological draft treaties commit parties to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures to prohibit chemical weapons.) In accordance with your policy decisions, we have supported negotiation of a prohibition on biological weapons and toxins along the lines of the 1969 UK draft convention. The Soviet draft incorporates most of the important concepts of the earlier UK draft. The other main points of the Secretary’s memorandum are: — The Soviets have shifted from propaganda tactics to serious negotiations in this area. — Successful negotiation of an agreement banning biological and toxin weapons would bind other countries to the position we have already adopted unilaterally. — Detailed instructions (Tab C) for Ambassador Leonard at the CCD have been worked out by ACDA, State, and Defense. Discussions with the Soviets will begin after coordination with the British and consultation with our other NATO allies and Japan. — Since the Soviets have moved so far in our direction, our response is designed to be forthcoming. (We will negotiate on the basis of the Soviet draft.) However , we plan to reject firmly a number of clauses of the Soviet draft which by implication support the USSR’s view that the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of tear gas and herbicides in war. — The most significant difference between the USSR draft and the UK draft is that the former does not include an operative article prohibiting the use of biological weapons in any circumstances. Since a prohibition of possession or production of these weapons would accomplish the purpose of prohibiting use, an operative provision banning use is not considered necessary. We will, however, seek a preambular clause reflecting the intention that the convention should preclude use. — We should know later this summer whether it will be possible to achieve an agreed text in time to seek UN General Assembly approval this fall. If this proves possible, the treaty could be open for signature early in 1972. Besides several proposed drafting changes, the detailed instructions (Tab C) note that we will propose a standard withdrawal provision to be included in the convention. Neither the UK draft convention nor the USSR draft provides for on-site verification. Both rely on procedures for complaint and investigation of treaty violations by agencies under UN auspices. Because on-site verification could not possibly be effective without also being extraordinarily intrusive, to us as well as to the USSR, and since biological weapons have questionable utility, all agencies consider the complaint procedures the only attainable system and hence adequate for these particular weapons. Moreover, it is in our interest to have other countries bound to a policy which we have already adopted unilaterally. In view of this favorable Soviet shift toward our position, and the fact that their draft convention contains most of the important concepts included in the UK draft which we have been supporting, I have approved (Tab A) our moving ahead to negotiations along the lines discussed by Secretary Rogers. After coordination with the UK and other allies, we may be able to begin discussions with the Soviets before the current session of the CCD closes in early May. Tab A Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, April 28, 1971 SUBJECT: Negotiation of a Convention Banning Biological and Toxin Weapons The President has reviewed your memorandum of April 23, 1971, regarding negotiation of a convention banning biological and toxin weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, and approves moving ahead promptly. A status report on developments in these negotiations should be forwarded to the President periodically. If the need for changes in the U.S. position should arise, hey must be approved by the President. Henry A. Kissinger Tab B Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, April 23, 1971 Subject: Negotiation of a Convention Banning Biological Weapons On March 30 the Soviet Union tabled at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva a draft convention prohibiting the production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins. By taking this step, the Soviets made an important move toward a basic U.S. position and opened the prospect of achieving a U.S. objective—the negotiation of a widely accepted agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins that would bind other countries to the position we have already adopted unilaterally. In accordance with your policy decisions in this field and your February 1971 letter to the CCD, we have supported the negotiation at Geneva of a prohibition on biological weapons and toxins along the lines of a draft convention first proposed by the United Kingdom. The USSR had previously insisted that all chemical and biological weapons must be prohibited together by one instrument, an approach which won wide support among the nonaligned countries. It is therefore particularly noteworthy that the Soviets have shifted from a long standing position with propaganda appeal to serious negotiations with the U.S. We have prepared instructions, worked out by ACDA, State, OSD and JCS, for Ambassador Leonard, our representative at the CCD, to be used after coordination with the British and consultation with our other NATO allies and Japan. Since the Soviets have moved so far in our direction, our response is designed to be forthcoming—to encourage achievement of our basic objective, negotiation of a ban on production or possession of biological weapons and toxins. However, we plan to reject firmly a number of clauses of the Soviet draft which appear designed to support by implication the USSR’s views that the Geneva Protocol prohibits riot control agents and herbicides. We are not certain now whether this issue will pose an obstacle to early progress. The most significant, substantive difference between the Soviet proposed draft and the earlier UK draft convention is that the Soviet draft does not include an operative article prohibiting use of biological weapons in any circumstances. We feel we need not insist on such a provision since the main purpose of the convention would be achieved by prohibition of possession or production of these weapons. We will seek to include a preambular clause reflecting the parties’ intention that the convention should have the effect of precluding use of these weapons in any circumstances. Our main objective will be to develop a treaty text commanding broad international support. We will not be able to judge until later this summer whether it will be possible to achieve such a text in time to seek UNGA approval this fall. If this proves possible, then signature of the treaty would be expected early in 1972. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. The instructions at Tab C were transmitted in Document 226 . 226. Telegram 72644 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 226. Telegram 72644 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, April 28, 1971, 1647Z. Subject: CCD: Negotiation of Biological Weapons Convention 1. Set forth in paras 3 to 21 below is the response that we propose to make to the Soviets (after consultations, first with the UK, and then with other NATO Allies and Japan) regarding the draft convention banning production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins that the USSR and its allies tabled at the CCD on March 30. We are sending by septel the text of our revised draft convention to which these comments are keyed. We plan to consult NATO Allies and Japan at the NAC and CCD as soon as discussions with the UK have been completed. We will send additional instructions regarding those consultations. 2. Ambassador Leonard should present paras 3 to 21 below and revised draft convention (septel) to del ASAP and urge UK to join with us in proceeding with Sovs on this basis. We are talking parallel in Washington with UK Embassy and will send septel reporting that conversation. 3. The USG is gratified that the USSR has made a concrete proposal regarding the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins and their destruction. We recognize that the draft convention tabled by the USSR on March 30 represents a serious approach to this problem and we hope that it will open the way for successful negotiation of a widely accepted international agreement. Since a number of the most important concepts in the UK draft have been included in the Soviet proposal, we are prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Soviet text. 4. As to procedure, we believe we should seek to achieve expeditiously a draft agreed upon by the USSR, UK and US which can be presented to the CCD for comments by other delegations. We would be prepared to table a tripartite USSR–UK–US draft, or two identical parallel texts, one a USSR draft (together with its allies, if it wishes) and a UK–US draft. We would hope to achieve an agreed text early in the summer session of the CCD so that the broadest possible consensus can subsequently be reached in the committee regarding a text for submission to the 26th UN General Assembly along with the CCD report. 5. In reviewing the Soviet draft convention we have sought wherever possible to accept provisions along the lines of that text. We are prepared to accept many articles of the draft in whole or in part. In order to expedite achievement of an agreed draft, we are limiting our proposals to the following points: 6. Although we have supported the inclusion in the UK draft convention of an operative article preventing use of biological weapons under any circumstances, we are prepared not to insist on such an article in the interests of achieving the main purpose of this convention—elimination of biological weapons. We believe it very important, however, that the convention contain a clear expression of the desire of the parties that elimination of these weapons preclude their use under any circumstances. Accordingly, we are proposing a new third preambular paragraph which expresses this idea. All potential parties of this convention must surely share the objective expressed in this paragraph and we strongly urge the Soviet Government to accept it.FYI: In our view, a provision prohibiting any use of BW, while desirable, is not a prerequisite to our agreement to a draft convention banning BW production and stockpiling. It is difficult to imagine a use of BW that would not be accompanied by a violation of Article I, and that article thus would seem to operate as a prohibition on BW use. We also recognize that some Nonaligned, as evidenced by the Swedish plenary statement on March 9, would oppose such a provision. By urging the Soviet Union from the outset to accept a preambular clause, we hope to maximize the possibility of achieving appropriate recognition of the idea that BW should not be used in any circumstances. End FYI. 7. We note that the UK Proposal for a complaints procedure involving the UN SYG has not been included in the USSR draft. In light of the Soviet position in previous multilateral arms control negotiations, we understand, although we do not support, the USSR’s views regarding the participation of the SYG in implementing treaty procedures. Although we believe such a provision could be useful in determining the facts in dispute, we are prepared to join in tabling a new draft without it because it is not essential to our security interests. We anticipate, however that other delegations may strongly urge that a provision involving the UN SYG be included in a final text. We may later wish to consult on how we might accommodate such proposals if this should be necessary to win broad support for the convention. 8. We are prepared to accept the Soviet proposal for an article on further negotiations. (A stylistic change in the last phrase is indicated in the text.) 9. We are also prepared to accept the Soviet proposal that this convention contain a review clause and we find the language of the Soviet draft acceptable. 10. We appreciate with respect to references to the Geneva Protocol in the Soviet draft that one of the USSR’s main concerns is to protect the Protocol. We also wish to do this, but will, of course, not agree to do so in a way that is in conflict with our basic position regarding that instrument. We therefore believe it essential, as well as possible, that this convention not prejudice any country’s position regarding the Protocol and that it in no way undermine the significance of that important agreement. 11. We thus consider it essential to delete the tenth preambular paragraph of the Soviet draft since it is not possible for us to be guided by a UN resolution against which we voted and with which we disagree. Moreover, since 36 countries abstained from this resolution, we are convinced that the reference to it would prejudice broad support for the treaty. 12. We strongly urge that the eleventh preambular paragraph be deleted. The Secretary General’s report on chemical and biological weapons is only one of a number of studies in this area that have been noted in UNGA resolutions. For example, UNGA Resolution 2662 (XXV) also referred to the World Health Organization report on this subject. We do not believe it necessary or appropriate for the preamble of an important treaty between states to recite a list of references which have contributed in varying degrees to knowledge regarding this subject. Specifically, opinions in a report drafted by private experts for the United Nations should not be given formal notice in a treaty between states. 13. We are prepared to accept the first part of the Soviet Article VIII but we cannot accept the formulation of the last phrase of this article. We do not think it is appropriate to attempt to resolve or define in this convention the complex relationship of the Protocol and international law. We therefore strongly urge slightly altered language to make clear that this convention will in no way limit or detract from any of the obligations of the Protocol or from any of the rules of international law. Such a provision should be acceptable to all potential parties because it would at the same time protect both the Protocol and international law. 14. We understand the objectives of the provisions contained in Articles IV and V of the Soviet draft. We share these objectives. We also wish to preclude any possibility that this agreement could be circumvented in the manner that the Soviet Articles IV and V appear designed to prevent. However, our past experience in arms control negotiations, particularly in connection with the NPT, has shown that is extremely difficult to formulate provisions in this area which take adequately into account the great diversity of legal systems of potential parties. We believe that it would greatly simplify negotiations, and be of substantive value, to utilize legal formulations from prior treaties that have been acceptable to a great many countries. We therefore propose utilization, in a new Article IV, of key phrases contained in paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT and paragraph I of Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty to accomplish the purposes of Articles IV and V, respectively, of the Soviet draft. 15. We believe that the nonproliferation provisions of this convention should be based on the language of the NPT. Such language should pose no difficulty for any countries since there would be no distinction in this agreement between parties that possess these weapons and those that do not. All parties would agree not to acquire or retain biological weapons, and, therefore, it would be in each party’s interest that all other parties be precluded by unambiguously clear provisions from helping any recipient whatsoever, whether a party or a non-party, to manufacture or acquire biological weapons. 16. We agree that a time limit for destruction should be specified in this convention. However, in our own experience more than three months is required to destroy stocks of B weapons while observing the strictest possible safety precautions. We therefore propose that Article II call for destruction of stocks “as soon as possible, but not later than (blank) months after the entry into force of the convention.” We would foresee filling in this blank after further discussion in the committee. We suggest adding a phrase at the end of this article to clarify the meaning of “safety precautions.” FYI. We do not wish to see any agreement reached that could require the United States to complete its destruction prior to January 1973. At a later stage we may wish to suggest or support incorporating in Article II a clause to the effect that parties would inform each other through notices to the depositary governments of any actions taken in implementation of this article. End FYI. 17. We propose that, following the precedent of other arms limitation agreements, a standard withdrawal provision be included in this convention. 18. We note that the Soviet convention does not include a draft Security Council resolution, although one attached to the UK draft and such a resolution was proposed earlier by Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland. Since this convention would call for the Security Council to be prepared to follow certain procedures, we believe it will be necessary to develop such a resolution at a later stage. 19. We are prepared to table a draft convention without designating the number of parties required to bring the convention into force. Our view, however, is that this agreement should enter into effect as soon as possible and that twenty-two parties should be designated. We can, of course, return to this point later after we have received the views of other CCD members. 20. With respect to the Preamble, we urge the deletion of the first paragraph. In our view, the second preambular paragraph, with minor changes, would be a more appropriate opening for this convention. It does not raise problems regarding different philosophies of arms limitation and disarmament and covers fully the concept of general and complete disarmament. We would add the phrase “under strict and effective international control” which has been included in previous treaties. In the next to the last preambular paragraph we propose a change, that we consider important, so that the language on further negotiations in the Preamble conforms to that used in the operative article on further negotiations. 21. We are proposing a number of drafting changes designed mainly to strengthen the convention. (A) In Article I we have added the words “or to retain” after the word “acquire” in order to strengthen the undertaking and to tie this article in more closely with the provisions of Articles II through IV. In paragraph 1 of Article I we have used the language of the UK draft which we believe conforms to the Russian text and seems preferable to us in English. At the beginning of paragraph 2 we have added the word “weapons” in order to make clear that the prohibition applies also to weapons and in order to relate this prohibition more closely to the mention of “weapons” in the title, the Preamble, and other articles of the convention. We have deleted the word “auxiliary” (or “ancillary”) which we believe is unnecessary and possibly confusing in light of the other changes we propose. We believe the phrase “designed to use” is more precise than the formula “designed to facilitate” (or “the purpose of which is to facilitate“) since it makes clear that the prohibition would not apply to gas masks or inoculation instruments which could “facilitate” the use of B agents or toxins for hostile purposes. We have added the phrase “or in armed conflict” in order to guard against any circumvention of the prohibition on the grounds that potential “use” could be alleged not to be “hostile”. (B) We have reworded Article II in a way that seems clearer to us in English. We have added the phrase “which are in its possession or under its jurisd1ction or control” in order to connect more closely the concepts of Article IV to this provision on destruction. (C) In the title and preambular paragraph 10 we have placed the word “toxin” before the word “weapons” since this more clearly conveys the intent of the convention to eliminate toxins as weapons rather than toxins used for peaceful purposes. Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT, and London. Drafted by McCormack (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), DE PALMA (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 227. Telegram 72645 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 227. Telegram 72645 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, April 28, 1971, 1648Z. Subj: CCD: Negotiation of Biological Weapons Convention Following is revised text of draft convention on the prohibition of the development production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. This text, to which comments septel are keyed, includes changes we are proposing in draft tabled by Soviets at CCD on March 30. Begin text Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The States Parties to this Convention, (1) Convinced that the prohibition of the development production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for weapons, and their elimination, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, (2) Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, (3) Seeking thereby to preclude, for the benefit of all mankind, the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons in any circumstances, (4) Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, (5) Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes, (6) Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, (7) Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, (8) Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, (9) Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, (10) Convinced that an agreement on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued, (11) Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic or other peaceful purposes: (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in arms conflict. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than (___) months after the entry into force of the convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect the population and the environment. Article III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any agent, toxin, weapon, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with, its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention. Article VI (1) Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation. (2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. Article VII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, or from generally recognized rules of international law. Article VIII Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning the equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons for warfare. Article IX (1) The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use of production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. Article X Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XI Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention. Article XII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Convention have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events in regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIII (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 or this article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of (blank) which are hereby designated the depositary governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by (blank) governments, including the governments designated as depositaries of the convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and shall transmit other notices to them. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XIV This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding States. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this convention. Done in (blank) Copies at (blank), This (blank) date of (blank). Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part I]. Confidential. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT IV, and London. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by Farley (ACDA), Pickering (PM), Anderson (DOD/ISA), De Palma (IO), Rhinelander (L), and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. 228. Telegram 78171 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 228. Telegram 78171 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, May 6, 1971, 0149Z. Subj: CCD Consultations With UK on Convention Ref: State 76399 1. On May 4, UK Minister Millard and UK Emb Off Hiddleton called on ACDA Deputy Director Farley to discuss proposed US response to Soviet March 30 draft BW convention. 2. Millard said London appreciated US offer to add additional para (reftel) to our instructions in order to accommodate UK viewpoint. However, London continued to think that BW convention should include complaints procedure in case of BW use. In response to question from Farley, Millard said that British did not now have specific language which they were prepared to put forward to cover point. Millard noted that Article III, para 1, from earlier UK draft was what British had in mind but he did not disagree when it was pointed out to him that UK Rep Lord Lothian in Geneva had stated in CCD plenary speech that original UK Article III language might not be negotiable because of role assigned to SYG and that UK Del would not insist on this feature of article. Middleton explained that London had been working on an alternative formula but none had been approved. 3. Farley pointed out that a complaints procedure provision about use of BW would involve important substantive issues which would warrant careful study, e.g., relationship to Geneva Protocol. He suggested that we continue work on this problem with the UK to see whether we could devise a mutually acceptable formula for possible use with Sovs at later stage of negotiations. He pointed out that additional para to US instruction reftel would make clear to Sovs that we might wish to return to this point, but it did not press Sovs for yes or no answer at first stage of negotiations. We saw clear advantage to this approach in light of Soviet hostility to any references to BW use or to complaints procedure involving any entity except UN Security Council. We thought only chance of achieving some provision would be at later stage if Non-aligned dels pressed for it. 4. Millard said London had also wondered whether we might simply provide Sovs with comments on their March 30 draft without giving Sovs proposed draft text to which ourcomments were keyed. Farley said we thought such approach to Sovs would not move negotiations forward. He believed that a draft text was highly desirable in that it would clearly indicate language we would be prepared to accept in first agreed draft. It would also give us much firmer control over subsequent course of negotiations. ACDA Off added that UK would in no sense be “abandoning” its position in favor of complaints procedure on use through such an approach since new para (reftel) would allow us both to return to subject at later stage. 5. Farley said we believed that tabling of Soviet March 30 draft, which accepted basic UK and US approach to CW and BW negotiations should be recognized as a important new development. He felt it was in interest of all of us who want to make a success of UK proposal for a convention prohibiting production of BW to nail down major Soviet concession through prompt negotiation of a first agreed draft with the USSR. 6. Millard said he would of course report our views to London. He thought it might be helpful if he could report in addition that US would be prepared to strengthen the new para (reftel) that we proposed to add to our instructions, so that US would appear more in support of UK objective. After further discussion, Millard and Farley agreed ad referendum to modified version of this paragraph set forth below. 7. Begin text. We believe there may also be support in the CCD for including in the convention a complaints procedure in case of use of BW similar to that contained in the UK draft convention. We supported Article III, paragraph 1 of that convention on this point. The UK Delegation may, we understand, wish to provide the soviet delegation with illustrative clauses. We would urge the USSR to give serous thought to these ideas, so that at a subsequent stage we can be in a position to consider this matter further. We would hope that generally acceptable provisions could be worked out. End text. 8. On morning of May 5, after clearance with other interested US officials, ACDA Off confirmed to Middleton that new text of additional para was acceptable. 9. Afternoon May 5, Middleton called ACDA Off to convey following instructions from London. London had completed consideration of points discussed during our consultations of past week. UK appreciated closeness of these consultations. In view of importance London attached to inclusion of complaints procedure in case of use in BW convention, London believed it would be best, at present stage, for US and UK to give up idea of joint approach to Sovs and instead pursue separate, but mutually reinforcing, approaches. UK would support points in US guidance and hoped that we would retain new para (above) regarding UK desire for complaints procedure. London anticipated that UK Del would wish to give Sovs number of comments on USSR March 30 text, drawing attention to points in early UK draft that London considered worthwhile, but would not provide Sovs with new alternative text. 10. Middleton concluded that US is now clear to go ahead and circulate US proposed response to Sovs to our other allies. UK Del at Geneva will be preparing comments for presentation to Sovs which UK may also wish to provide to NATO dels. 11. ACDA Off expressed our appreciation for prompt UK response. He said he believed US would include strengthened para covering UK point. Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]. Confidential. It was repeated to London, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT IV. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); paragraphs 7 and 8 were cleared in OSD/ISA, ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, IO/UNP, and L/PM, and, in substance, in the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA). The proposed text in paragraph 7 was added to the text of Document 226 [4/28 telegram 72644] and sent as telegram 71873 to all NATO capitals on May 6, 1971. (Ibid., Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]) 229. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 229. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 13, 1971. SUBJECT: Policy Regarding the Use of Herbicides in Vietnam (U) Reference is made to Dr. Kissinger’s memorandum of 28 December 1970, which stipulated that any extension of the current herbicide program in South Vietnam be submitted for your approval. As you know, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams indicated in December 1970 that US herbicide operations would be phased out in South Vietnam while preserving the option to reinstitute the program, if necessary. Since then, herbicide operations in Vietnam have continued to decline. During January, February and March 1971, only one fixed wing and approximately 25 helicopter missions were flown. The anticipated phase out date was 1 May 1971. In our memorandum of 19 February 1971, we indicated to you that we would seek your approval should it become necessary to extend herbicide operations beyond that date. The JCS have requested retaining the option to use herbicides around fire support bases and installations using helicopter and ground spray equipment. We support their request. Since the enemy is placing greater reliance on sapper and ambush tactics as we continue our redeployments, the option to use herbicides in this manner is deemed vital for the protection of US and allied forces. The perimeters of fire support bases and their surrounding fields of fire are the most critical areas requiring the use of herbicides. The presence of vegetation within and adjacent to their perimeter defenses compromises their security to an unacceptable degree. Most fire support base perimeters contain barbed wire entanglements, mines, booby traps, claymores and flame munitions. Burning or manually cleaning unwanted vegetation would require physical removal of these devices, a procedure which not only constitutes an unwarranted personnel hazard, but also degrades the perimeter defense while the ordnance is inactive. Alternate non-mechanical means of clearing vegetation, such as using petroleum products are relatively inefficient, are more expensive to use than herbicides, and are known to cause permanent soil damage. We are currently evaluating a JCS plan for a limited herbicide capability for the RVNAF. This plan will be forwarded for your consideration. However, until the RVNAF possess a herbicide capability (or until 1 December 1971, whichever is earlier), we request authority for US forces to continue to use herbicides as needed around fire support bases and installations. Our current military objectives do not call for more extensive use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam at this time. Furthermore, there are no restraints under international law nor under the Geneva Protocol, should the United States become a party to that agreement, regarding their use in Vietnam. If this request is approved, the existing stocks of herbicides BLUE and WHITE in RVN will be used for such operations. The USDA restrictions governing the use of these herbicides in the US will still be applicable in RVN during this extension. The Secretary of State will provide his comments concerning this request in a separate memorandum. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: Gerald Ford Library, Melvin Laird Papers, Box 39, Chemical Warfare & Biological Research, Vol. III Jan. 1971–July 1972, Calendar (5). Secret; Sensitive. 230. Note From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 230. Note From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 21, 1971. SUBJECT: Attached After reading the attached memorandum on tear gas-herbicides and the Geneva Protocol deadlock in the Senate, you may ask what meaningful analysis can we get this summer if the NSSM 112 study is not due until October or later. The reason State requested an extension of the NSSM 112 due date was for further Vietnam data analysis which, by definition, involves one type of situation. There is already a substantial amount of material on agreed areas of military utility in Vietnam (NSSM 59 study on CBW, the Under Secretaries Committee’s 1970 annual review of CBW programs, and the 1969 PSAC report, not to mention outside materials). The applicability of Vietnam conclusions to other types of situations will remain questionable now as later and will require “knocking heads” interagency wise. Further data analysis will add more detail, but no one suspects that the process will alter the basic conclusions of the study or the options, arguments (military utility versus political costs) and agency positions, Also, I understand from Admiral Welander that Joint Staff believes it will have enough to support its case by August were decisions desired. Attachment Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 17, 1971 SUBJECT: Tear Gas and Herbicides Use in War and the 1925 Geneva Protocol After the Geneva Protocol hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee decided to take no action except to communicate its views to the President. On May 5 we received Senator Fulbright’s April 5 (which was erroneously dated March 5) letter to the President (Tab B) requesting that the Administration reconsider its understanding that the Protocol does not prohibit the first use of tear gas and herbicides in war. Senator Fulbright’s other main points are: — Many members believe we should ratify the Protocol without restrictive understandings on tear gas and herbicides or postpone action until that is possible. They seriously question the military utility of these agents. — The President’s study (NSSM 112, Tab G) on these agents should be available before final Senate action. — It is doubtful that the Protocol could pass on Secretary Rogers’ terms (Mr. Rogers said the President might not ratify if the Senate modified the understanding); but he (Fulbright) sees no serious opposition if the President proposed ratification without the interpretation. Ken BeLieu acknowledged (Tab C) the letter and sent it to you for appropriate action. In mid-May, we asked Ken for his judgment on this issue. He does not yet know when he can sound out Senator Mansfield. (Mansfield has reportedly said the Protocol is in trouble since a Senate majority is against herbicides and probably against tear gas.) Other related developments are: — Senator Humphrey wrote Secretary Rogers (Tab D/State Reply Tab E) that we should not reserve a first use option for warfare uses of tear gas and herbicides. — Senator Brooke recently said (Tab F) that he will propose the Protocol be referred to the International Court (ICJ) for interpretation. — We are negotiating a BW ban at Geneva (CCD) perforce on the basis that it should rely on and not duplicate the Protocol’s ban on use . Our remaining outside the Protocol might complicate this matter. Also, the Protocol’s scope will be discussed as the Soviets and many others disagree with us and may push their view at least for tactical purposes. — Secretary Laird has requested that the President approve extending herbicide operations for base perimeter purposes until December, when he will recommend “Vietnamizing” some herbicide capability. We are awaiting Secretary Rogers’ comments. [You will recall that we announced Mr. Laird’s earlier report that herbicide operations would be phased out by May. They have, we understand, stopped.] — We understand State PM and Legal will soon ask Secretary Rogers to review Protocol options including (1) reaffirming our position with no change; or (2) reaffirming it while saying we will seek an agreed interpretation either by offering to extend our undertaking vis-à-vis states which officially agree or by seeking an ICJ opinion. Before we can handle the tactics, we need to know the substantive options and arguments on tear gas and herbicides. NSSM 112, issued on January 7, deals with our policy on these agents. On April 23, you extended (Tab H) the due date at the request of State from May 15 to October 15 and said DOD’s inputs should be expedited. (These inputs are still not expected until September, and DDR&E will have only a progress report on its herbicide study by then.) The study as scheduled would likely be considered in late fall or early 1972 and have the same basic options, arguments and agency positions later as now. At most more time may tell us whether current military utility estimates are understated, accurate or overstated. The main question will remain constant in spite of Vietnam complications: Does the military utility of a “first use” policy outweigh our agreeing to a “no first use” policy vis-á-vis states that agree? Also, we owe a response to the Foreign Relations Committee. We see three options: (1) sit tight and continue on course till late fall or next year and take whatever flak occurs on the subject; (2) speed up the NSSM 112 response; or (3) send Fulbright’s letter to State requesting an interagency review of options, arguments and agency positions. We question simply sitting tight because there is today no surety that this issue is worth placing the President’s prestige on the line and, like it or not, the Protocol is basic to his CBW policy decisions internationally speaking. Admiral Welander does not believe that the DOD study effort for NSSM 112 could be accelerated to the August time frame. At best an interim report could be requested but it would probably be heavily caveated and inadequate to serve as the basis for any decisions were such desired. On balance, to give the President the best analysis of the situation, options and arguments before late fall, we favor sending the Senator’s letter to State for an interagency review of the situation, alternative responses, arguments and agency positions. At Tab A is a proposed memorandum for Secretaries Rogers and Laird requesting a review by August 1. At Tab 1 is an information memorandum for the President outlining the Senator’s letter and your action. Admiral Welander and John Lehman have concurred. Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A requesting a review of our Protocol options, and initial the memorandum for the President at Tab 1. Ken BeLieu has informed Senator Fulbright that his letter will be brought to the President’s attention. We see no need for further reply at this time and, unless you believe we should tell him more, we will merely inform Ken BeLieu of the action being taken. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 1–248, NSSM 112. Confidential: Secret; Eyes Only. The attached memorandum of June 17 from Guhin is published but not the attachments to the June 17 memorandum, other than the letter from Fulbright to the President, which is an attachment to Document 226 . 231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 24, 1971. Subject: DOD Request for Authority to Continue Use of Herbicides in Viet-Nam In his memorandum of May 13, 1971, Secretary Laird requested your approval for the Department of Defense to continue to use herbicides in Viet-Nam on a restricted basis until the RVNAF possess a herbicide capability or until December 1, 1971, whichever is earlier. Secretary Laird’s request would extend the use of herbicides by U.S. forces in Viet-Nam up to a maximum of seven months beyond the anticipated phase-out date of May 1, 1971. The Department of State on political grounds would prefer no extension of herbicide use in Viet-Nam. While Secretary Laird bases his recommendation solely on a military justification, there are certain basic political factors which should be weighed in considering his request. A public expectation has developed that herbicides would be phased-out in Viet-Nam during the first half of this year as a result of public statements, Congressional testimony, and the White House press release of December 26, 1970 stating, “Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams are initiating a program for an orderly yet rapid phase-out of the herbicide operations. “During the phase-out, the use of herbicides in Viet-Nam will be restricted to perimeter of fire bases and U.S. installations or remote, unpopulated areas.” Senator Fulbright reflected this view in his April 15 letter to you (which he released to the public on June 8) when he said “we note that the use of herbicides in Viet-Nam is now being discontinued.” Any decision to extend the use of herbicides in South Viet-Nam might well, therefore, give rise to charges that the Administration has misled the American public and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and could conceivably result in further attempts to legislate a prohibition of herbicide use in Southeast Asia. Moreover, in view of the language of the December 26 press release, any extension of such authority which went beyond “perimeters of fire bases and U.S. installations” to include “fields of fire” (as Secretary Laird appears to propose) could generate criticism not only as a reversal of the phase-out process but as a decision to increase the scope of herbicide use. Finally, the herbicide question has a direct bearing on our efforts to achieve ratification of the Geneva Protocol, although the Senate seems unlikely to move the Protocol forward in its present form during this session. Given our public and Congressional vulnerability because of prior announcements on “phase-out” of herbicides, a decision now to reverse the phasing-out process and to continue and broaden the use of herbicides in Viet-Nam should clearly be based on important military requirements. If in your judgment these requirements outweigh the possible political costs involved, we suggest a limited extension not beyond December 1, 1971 at a maximum for the use of herbicides in Viet-Nam under the definitive and restricted conditions outlined by Secretary Laird except that such use be restricted to “perimeter of fire bases and U.S. installations” as stated, in part, by the December 26, 1970 White House press release rather than to “fields of fire.” In this event it is also suggested that we take a positive approach with regard to both the public and the Congress by issuing a statement along the following lines: — In December we announced a phase-out of herbicide operations in Viet-Nam. - -In February we terminated crop destruction operations and the use of fixed-wing aircraft for defoliation missions. — The military situation is now such that me are using herbicides only for vegetation control in and around bases and installations where U.S. forces are stationed. The USDA restrictions governing the use of herbicides in the U.S. will still be applicable in Viet-Nam during this extension. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, TS Files, POL 27–10 VIETS. Top Secret; Exdis. 232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird 232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, June 28, 1971. SUBJECT: 1925 Geneva Protocol The 1925 Geneva Protocol is deadlocked in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has requested that the Administration reconsider its position on the question of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. (See Senator Fulbright’s attached letter to the President.) Before forwarding this matter to the President for reply, I believe we should have a careful review of the situation, alternative responses including their full advantages and disadvantages and agency positions for his consideration. This review should be submitted by August 1, 1971. Attachment Letter From Senator Fulbright to President Nixon Washington, March 5, 1971 Dear Mr. President: The Committee on Foreign Relations has recently completed hearings on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which you submitted to the Senate on August 19, 1970. At its last business meeting the Committee discussed the testimony which had been heard and reviewed the possible courses of action open to it. The Members decided that before the Committee gave further consideration to the Protocol I should privately communicate to you certain views which many of us now hold concerning United States adherence to the Protocol. At the outset let me express the Committee’s strong approval of the initiatives which you have already taken in revising U.S. policy with regard to chemical and biological weapons. Your decisions to renounce altogether biological and toxin warfare, as well as the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, were a major contribution toward a more secure future for mankind. All of us appreciate the difficulties which confronted you in taking these steps and in deciding to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate. There is no question of the Committee’s strong support for the objectives of the Geneva Protocol. Indeed it is because we attach such great importance to the Protocol that many of us are reluctant to proceed further toward its ratification on the basis of the understandings and interpretations which have been attached to it by the Secretary of State. I believe it accurate to say that when our hearings began few of the Members had firm views on the question of tear gas and herbicides. Having heard a number of expert witnesses on all aspects of the Protocol many Members now consider that it would be in the interest of the United States to ratify the Protocol without restrictive understandings, or, if that is not possible at this time, to postpone further action on the Protocol until it is. The Secretary of State’s position on tear gas and herbicides appears to rest primarily on the grounds that the Protocol was not intended to prohibit their use. Having heard the legal testimony on both sides of this issue, many Committee Members conclude that an adequate legal argument can be made either for or against that interpretation. Given the Protocol’s acknowledged ambiguity, we tend to agree with the view expressed in testimony by Mr. George Bunn, former General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who said that “any future interpretation of the Protocol should depend less on the negotiating history than on a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons—military, diplomatic and arms control—of the use of these agents in the future.” In this connection, we note that the use of herbicides in Vietnam is now being discontinued. It would appear that their actual utility in Vietnam has been marginal and that the crop destruction program may well have been counterproductive. Furthermore, the more we learn about the impact of the herbicide warfare on the ecology of Vietnam, the more disturbing are its implications for the future. As Dr. Arthur W. Galston, an eminent biologist from Yale, reminded the Committee, “If man makes conditions unsuitable for vegetation on this earth, he thereby makes conditions unsuitable for his own existence.” Testimony on the question of tear gas also raised considerable doubt in the minds of many Members as to the desirability of its future use in war by the United States. Dr. Matthew Meselson of Harvard, who testified before the Committee and who has made a careful study of the military use of tear gas, presented the following conclusions: 1. The military value of riot gas is very low. 2. Our overriding security interest in the area of chemical and biological weapons is to prevent the proliferation and use of biological and lethal chemical weapons. 3. Our use of riot gas in war runs directly counter to this fundamental interest. Dr. Meselson’s view coincides closely with that expressed by another highly qualified witness, Dr. Donald.G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute, a military strategist who last testified before the Committee in support of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System. After a skeptical critique of many of the familiar arguments against tear gas and herbicides, Dr. Bennan concluded that the military cost of giving up tear gas and herbicides appeared relatively low and that the United States position could therefore properly “be dominated by ‘decent respect for the opinions of mankind’ and accept the interpretation that the Protocol embraces harrassing agents and herbicides.” The latter point leads to another consideration which troubles many Members of the Committee. This is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world already agree, as evidenced by an 80–3 vote in the U.N. General Assembly, that tear gas and herbicides should be prohibited under the Geneva Protocol. If, at this late date the United States adheres to the Protocol but in so doing places its weight behind a restrictive interpretation, this cannot help but weaken the effect of the Protocol. The Committee finds it difficult to believe there would be any positive moral force to our becoming a party to the protocol only on condition that we reserve the right to keep on doing as we wish despite the fact that most other nations believe it undesirable. Furthermore, I sense a reluctance on the part of Committee members to give advice and consent to an international agreement in the face of a virtual certainty that our interpretation will be challenged or rejected. It will not suffice, as the Secretary of State suggested, to ratify now, and work out the problems later. We believe that these arguments are, of themselves, sufficiently compelling to warrant the Committee’s request that you give further consideration to the tear gas and herbicide question. In addition, as you know, there are now several studies in progress on the use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam, including one requested by you as a basis for examining the implications and consequences for U.S. policy of their future use in war. It seems to us that all of these studies, but in particular the latter, should be available before any final action is taken with regard to ratification of the Protocol. Although we would agree that the Protocol should long ago have been ratified by the United States, it is perhaps unfortunate that it comes before the Senate at a time when the United States is at war and actively employing chemical weapons which most nations consider to be prohibited by the Protocol. Possibly by the time the results of these additional studies are available the war in Indochina will be ended, or at least the level of conflict there will have been reduced to a point where our further use of either tear gas or herbicides will be unnecessary. This alone would make it easier for all concerned to make a dispassionate assessment of the issues involved. As a practical matter I have considerable doubt that the Protocol could low receive the advice and consent of the Senate on the terms laid down by the Secretary of State, i.e., that you might not ratify the Protocol if the proposed understandings are modified by action of the Senate. At present the prospects for the Protocol are clouded by strongly held views on both sides and I personally would not wish to see it risked a second time under such circumstances. The Committee asks therefore that the question of the interpretation of the Protocol be reexamined considering whether the need to hold open the option to use tear gas and herbicides is indeed so great that it outweighs the long-term advantages to the United States of strengthening existing barriers against chemical warfare by means of ratification of the Protocol with out restrictive interpretations. If the Administration were to take the longer and broader view of our own interests, I cannot imagine any serious opposition to that decision, either here at home or abroad. On the contrary, I personally believe that were you to take this initiative your action would be regarded as truly courageous and possessed of real moral force. Sincerely yours, J.W. Fulbright Chairman 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.) Vol. IV. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Helms, Smith, Moorer, and David. Regarding the proper date of Fulbright’s letter, see the attachment to Document 230 . According to an undated, unsigned note attached to Document 272 , a secretary in Fulbright’s office erroneously typed March 5 prior to sending the letter to the White House. 233. Telegram 137470 From the Department of State to All NATO Capitals 233. Telegram 137470 From the Department of State to All NATO Capitals 1 Washington, July 29, 1971 SUBJECT: CCD: Allied Consultations on Biological Weapons Convention REF: State 137394 1. We have reached point in CCD negotiations in Geneva where we are prepared to table draft BW convention text jointly agreed with Soviets. Before doing so, we wish consult our allies. 2. FOR USMISSION NATO: You should circulate ASAP to other delegations letter contained paras 3–10 below: 3. BEGIN TEXT: Last week the Soviet government conveyed its response to the most recent proposals by the US for a treaty banning biological weapons, and I am writing to you about the steps we would propose to take next in this regard. 4. As you will recall, the Council last discussed this subject on May 11. At the end of that discussion, the Chairman noted that the Council as a whole appeared to favor the US plan to present to the Soviet Co-Chairman in Geneva its comments to the draft BW Convention submitted by the Soviets at the CCD on March 30. The Council also agreed that further consultations on the subject would be desirable at an appropriate time. 5. On July 21, Ambassador Roshchin conveyed to Ambassador Leonard the Soviet response to our comments. The response was forthcoming and accepted the US text given in the annex to my letter of May 6, 1971, to the Secretary General, with the exception of the following five points: a. The first preambular paragraph would be revised to read: “Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins intended for use as weapons and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” b. The third preambular paragraph would be revised to read as follows: “Desiring thereby, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,” and become the second preambular paragraph; the text second preambular paragraph in the US text would become the third preambular paragraph. c. After the ninth US preambular paragraph the following paragraph would be inserted: “Recalling the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,” d. In Article VII of the US text the phrase “or from generally recognized rules of international law” would be deleted. e. Article XI of the US draft would be revised as follows: “Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier, if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the Provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.” 6. These modifications are in our view minor and do not adversely affect alliance interests. With respect to the first change, the US had two purposes in its redraft: to avoid independent reference to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons (previous such references had been in the context of general and complete disarmament); and to insert the phrase “under strict and effective international control” in connection with general and complete disarmament. Both of these points are met by the Soviet redraft. With respect to the second change, the US paragraph was intended to express our view, and that of some other delegations, that the Convention should in some way affirm the principle of non-use of BW. The Soviet formulation meets this purpose. With respect to the third change, you will recall that the US rejected as unacceptable the idea, contained in the original Soviet draft, of being guided by a General Assembly resolution which we had voted against and with which we disagree. It is our view that the present Soviet suggestion does not affect our position on the Geneva Protocol and is unacceptable. We plan, however, to suggest the deletion of the article “the” before the word “resolutions”. We regard the fourth proposed change as an improvement. The phrase proposed to be deleted was originally designed merely to get around an unacceptable attempt at definition, in the March 30 Soviet draft, of the relationship of the Protocol and international law. With respect to the last change, we see no objection to insertion in the text of the possibility of having a review conference earlier than five years after the entry into force. This clause is likely to satisfy the desire of many non-aligned delegations. 7. We are ready to inform the Soviets that we are prepared, with the one slight exception noted above, to accept the Soviet suggestions. This will make possible the tabling of an agreed draft BW convention to the CCD. We hope to be able to communicate our position formally to the Soviets on Wednesday, August 4, and to table such an agreed draft convention at the CCD on Thursday, August 5. We expect to proceed in the same way as that followed in the NPT negotiations, i.e., there would be two identical texts on the table. In this case, the Soviets and their allies would co-sponsor one text and the US would sponsor another, identical, text. 8. You will note that the text to be tabled would, with the exception of the five changes referred to above, be the same as that circulated by us on May 6. The substance is therefore not new and, indeed, a number of our allies have made oral and written comments on it. The draft we foresee tabling meets a number of these comments. 9. Once the text has been tabled at the CCD, negotiations in Geneva can proceed more intensively. We expect that in the course of these negotiations amendments will be suggested in an effort to make the BW convention generally acceptable. Our allies are, of course, free at any time to raise points of interest to them in Geneva or Brussels. We are hopeful that it will be possible in the time remaining to reach agreement on a BW convention during the summer session of the CCD in Geneva. We hope that our allies will not pose any objection to going ahead with the Soviets on this basis. 10. In the interest of facilitating allied consultations we are also transmitting this text to foreign offices in NATO capitals. END TEXT 11. FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS Embassies should transmit ASAP to Fonoffs text paras 3–10, making clear this material is being circulated to NAC. We are presenting this information to NATO Fonoffs in order to expedite allied consultations. You should express hope that Fonoffs will instruct their NATO dels not to pose any objection to our going ahead with Sovs on this basis. 12. FOR LONDON: You should say we assume UK considering Soviet response as it related to British position. Question may well arise in NATO whether UK prepared to go along with draft jointly agreed between US and Soviets. We would of course be pleased to have British do so. 13. FOR TOKYO: Embassy should convey text of letter to Fonoff and note US CCD del in close touch with Japanese del with whom we will continue to consult regarding Tokyo’s views. You should express hope Japanese will have no objection to our proceeding on foregoing basis. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Tokyo. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USDel SALT V, USUN, and Moscow. Drafted by Van Heuven (ACDA/IR); cleared by Day (ACDA/IR), Martin (PM/DCA), Breer (EA/J), and Nolan (OSD/ISA); and approved by Goodby (EUR/RPM). 234. Telegram 3312 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 234. Telegram 3312 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, August 4, 1971, 1545Z Subj: CCD Co-Chairmen Meeting re Tabling of Draft BW Convention Ref: (A) State 137470; (B) USNATO 3217 1. Begin summary: US and Soviet Co-Chairmen reached agreement August 4 on text of draft convention prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons (BW) and on procedures for tabling this draft at CCD plenary August 5. End summary. 2. At Co-Chairmen meeting Aug 4, requested by US Del after receipt reftel B, Leonard (US) informed Roshchin (USSR) that we were prepared to accept five changes in text of draft BW convention proposed by Sovs July 21 with deletion of article “the” before the word “resolutions” in preambular para 10 of English text (see para 6 reftel a). Roshchin agreed to this modification. 3. Leonard told Roshchin that while US allies did not object to our tabling draft on which we had agreed with Sovs, our allies might wish to suggest some amendments or changes in this draft during discussions of it in the CCD. 4. Roshchin pointed out several minor, non-substantive discrepancies in US and Russian text which Leonard agreed, at Roshchin’s request, to correct (these are identified in septel containing full text). Co-Chairmen agreed that during next stage in negotiations US and Sovs would further review English and Russian texts in order achieve best possible accord in languages. 5. On procedure, Co-Chairmen agreed to table identical but separate texts of draft BW convention at CCD plenary meeting morning Aug 5. Sovs and their allies will co-sponsor one text (CCD/337) with original in Russian. US will sponsor separate text (CCD/338) with original in English. Co-Chairmen also agreed to provide Non-aligned dels with advance copies afternoon Aug 1 (we have provided US allies morning Aug 4 with advance copy of text that will be tabled). Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, Moscow, USUN, USDel SALT V, London, The Hague, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 235. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 235. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 1 Geneva, August 5, 1971. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, August 5, 1971 1 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins intended for use as weapons and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Desiring thereby, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of states such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes, Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 2 and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the honors of war, Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, Convinced that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued, Anxiou s to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I Each State Party to this Convention Undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. ARTICLE II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than months after the entry into force of the Convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect the population and the environment. ARTICLE III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any agent, toxin, weapon, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. ARTICLE IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. ARTICLE V The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult One another and to co-operate solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention. ARTICLE VI (1) Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation. (2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. ARTICLE VII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. ARTICLE VIII Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning the equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons for warfare. ARTICLE IX (1) The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. ARTICLE X Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. ARTICLE XI Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention. ARTICLE XII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE XIII (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force-in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of —- which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by —- Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE XIV This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. Done in—- copies at —-, this —- day of —-. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 456–460. No classification marking. The text of the draft convention was transmitted to Washington in telegram 3312. 1 This draft convention was submitted to the CCD on Aug. 5, 1971, by the United Sates as CCD/338 and Corr. 1 and by the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania as CCD/337. The documents are identical, except that the seven-nation version is entitled “Revised draft Convention.” 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 764–765. 236. Report on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 236. Report on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 Prepared by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 1 Washington, undated THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL A. INTRODUCTION In response to Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum dated June 28, this memorandum reviews pertinent background information (Sections B and C) and discusses the underlying question of whether or not at this time we should continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war (Section D). The answer to this question will depend upon whether or not the military utility in retaining a first-use option for RCAs and herbicides outweighs the political costs of preserving this option. One of the major elements to be considered in arriving at a final decision—the alternative methods that are available for implementing a decision—is discussed in Section E. B. BACKGROUND 1. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s (SFRC) hearings on the 1925 Geneva Protocol were completed on March 26. The focus of the debate was on the Administration’s position that the Protocol should be interpreted as not covering riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides and, therefore, as not prohibiting the first use of these agents in war. 2. A substantial majority of the SFRC favors U.S. adherence to the Protocol, but disagrees with the Administration’s position on RCAs and herbicides. A majority of the Senate may also disagree. 3. Senator Fulbright has written the President requesting him to reconsider the Administration’s position, indicating that unless there were some change no further action would be taken by the SFRC at least until the Administration’s announced study of the post-Vietnam military utility of RCAs and herbicides (NSSM 112) was completed and made available (Tab A). 4. On April 15, a nonsubstantive reply was made to Senator Fulbright’s letter, indicating that this matter would be brought to the attention of the President (Tab B). 5. By memorandum dated June 28, Mr. Kissinger requested a careful review of the situation, alternative responses (including advantages and disadvantages), and agency positions for the President’s consideration by August 1 (Tab C). 6. The NSSM 112 study is expected to be completed in mid-October, 1971. This will include a progress report on DOD’s internal study on military utility of herbicides.DOD’s study on the ecological and physiological aspects of herbicide use, conducted by the National Academy of Science (NAS), will not be fully completed before the spring of 1972, at the earliest. Unless these DOD studies were to lead to a substantial change in the conclusions and analyses concerning military utility in this report, which is not expected, the basis for making the decision on the RCA and herbicide issue and the issue itself will not be changed from the present. DOD has indicated that its studies to date will augment and substantiate the military utility of RCAs and herbicides reflected in the NSSM 59 response and in this report. 7. Senators Nelson, Humphrey and Brooke have introduced resolutions in the Senate on this subject. The Nelson resolution (Tab D) proposes that our ratification be accompanied by a formal understanding to the effect that the Protocol covers chemical herbicides. The Humphrey resolution (Tab E), which is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that could be voted on before the resolution of ratification, proposes that the Senate support a broad interpretation of the Geneva Protocol. In so doing it recommends that the U.S. be willing, on the basis of reciprocity, to refrain from the use in war of all toxic chemical weapons whether directed against man, animals, or plants. The Brooke resolution (Tab F) would also be a separate sense-of-the-Senate resolution to the effect that the dispute over RCAs and herbicides should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); that we should be bound by its decision with respect to other parties accepting it; but that if the ICJ finds that the agents are not covered by the Protocol, we should seek an international agreement banning their use in war. Chairman Fulbright of the SFRC asked the Department of State on July 27 and August 3 for coordinated Executive Branch comments on the Brooke and Humphrey Resolutions respectively. His letters were acknowledged on July 30 and August 5. 8. On July 16, Senator Fulbright noted on the Senate floor the absence of a substantive reply to his letter and commented on indications that continued use of herbicides in Vietnam is being considered by the Administration (Tab G). On August 6 Senator Fulbright notified the Senate that the Foreign Relations Committee would hold hearings following the August recess to discuss the draft Convention on Biological Weapons. These hearings would include the consideration of the Humphrey and Brooke resolutions relating to the Administration’s restrictive interpretation of the Geneva Protocol on the use of tear gas and herbicides (Tab H). 9. On December 26, 1970, the White House announced Secretary Laird’s report that an orderly yet rapid phase-out of the herbicide operations in Vietnam had been initiated. In February 1971, MACV announced the termination of the use of herbicides for anti-crop operations and of the use of fixed-wing aircraft for defoliation missions. 10. During this phase-out period, herbicide use was restricted to perimeters of fire bases and U.S. installations or remote, unpopulated areas. There have been no U.S. herbicide operations since May 1, 1971, though authority to extend the phase-out period until December 1, 1971 (for use of herbicides by helicopters and ground-based spray equipment as needed around fire bases and installations) has been requested and subsequently approved for base perimeter clearing in cases where other means are not available or possible. C. CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION 1. It is forecast by the Congressional Relations Bureau of the Department of State that: — The Protocol would fail to receive a two-thirds majority of the Senate with the Administration’s interpretation excluding RCAs and herbicides. — The Protocol would probably fail to receive the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification with an understanding including RCAs and herbicides as long as the Administration remained opposed to including these agents. — If the Administration endorsed an interpretation of the Protocol to include RCAs and herbicides, the Senate would almost undoubtedly vote by a majority of two thirds for ratification. 2. Rather than risk U.S. failure to ratify the Protocol a second time, it is unlikely that the Protocol will be reported out in the near future unless there were to be a change in the Administration’s position. If, however, there were a prolonged delay without a change in the Administration’s position (e.g., beyond January of 1972), the Protocol might be reported out by the SFRC with some understanding contrary to that of the Administration, or the Senate may make its views known in a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. Even if it were reported out with an understanding contrary to the Administration’s, it is unlikely that it would be brought to a vote by the Senate leadership unless there were a sufficient change in the Administration’s position on RCAs and herbicides to ensure the support of two thirds of the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. D. THE UNDERLYING QUESTION 1. Several alternatives for responding to the letter from Senator Fulbright are discussed below in Section E. The choice among them requires a fundamental decision on the underlying question of whether or not at this time we wish to continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war. 2. Substantively speaking, the question turns on whether or not the military utility, in retaining a first-use option for RCAs and herbicides outweighs the political costs of preserving this option. 3. Military Utility a. Herbicides The utility of herbicides in Vietnam to increase vertical visibility and enhance aerial observation for the detection of base areas, infiltration routes, firing positions, and ambush sites is well documented. This is a unique capability to assist in reducing concealment over large areas without the presence of friendly troops on the ground. It is the considered judgment of the JCS, based on many field intelligence reports and command evaluations that selective anti-crop operations have resulted in significant logistic problems to the enemy and have required the diversion of substantial numbers of combat troops to food production. There have also been reports by a number of U.S. CORDS officials that crop destruction has had a net adverse effect on pacification in South Vietnam. This problem indicates that, as we extrapolate our Vietnam experience to other possible areas of conflict, the military applications of herbicides, while very useful in certain tactical situations may in the long run prove detrimental to our overall military objective should they work against such major efforts as our Vietnam pacification program. * The JCS also believes that casualties to friendly forces from ambush have been greatly reduced as a result of marked reductions in frequency and size of ambushes following defoliation. Herbicides have also proven effective in the removal of foliage in the vicinity of installations and base camps to deny concealed routes of approach to sappers or infiltrators and to provide open fields of fire for defense. In this regard herbicides are the most efficient where minefields or other explosive devices prohibit clearing by hand (Tab I). Finally, it should be noted that in wide area application, effective dissemination of herbicides requires air superiority and sufficient lack of enemy mobility or a sufficiently stabilized military situation to allow the time for herbicides to become effective. b. Riot Control Agents RCAs have been widely used in combat operations in Southeast Asia since 1965. * In this environment, against an enemy with little protective equipment or retaliatory capability, the military utility is unquestioned. Their use there has resulted in increased ability to accomplish military goals without excessive civilian casualties when civilians are intermixed with the enemy, and an enhanced capability to counter an enemy concealed in fortifications, caves, or tunnels. In this role, RCAs saved U.S., allied and enemy lives and forced the enemy to make a decision between surrender or continuing to fight under adverse conditions by driving him from his fortified position. RCAs also provide effective area denial. ** The use of RCAS to assist in the recovery of downed airmen has frequently been the decisive factor when the downed crew was under direct enemy attack. RCAs have sometimes resulted in significant reduction in U.S. and allied casualties when the enemy was entrenched or in bunkers. The use of RCAs in South Vietnam has been unique in specific operations, where there was no other weapons system which would accomplish the mission. * RCAs serve as a unique alternative to other munitions in that they provide a non-lethal “search” capability to the commander in the field. Even screening smoke cannot offer this flexibility in that it is often lethal in enclosed areas and does not necessarily force the occupant from his position as do RCAs. The Working Group was unable to quantify the frequency with which the various types of uses have occurred. ** RCA effectiveness is substantially decreased when the enemy has respiratory protection. However, masking in itself tends to limit mobility and, additionally, RCAs can cause discomfort in closed areas. In combat actions against an enemy which has a comparable capability to use RCAs or defend against them (e.g., the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and PRC), RCAs may not confer an advantage to U.S. forces. Any advantage gained by either side would depend, among other things, upon the tactical environment. * The military advantages of RCAs against a guerrilla-type operation (and of herbicides in geographic areas similar to Vietnam) may be comparable to those experienced in Vietnam although these will be substantially decreased if other nations elect to treat their use as the initiation of chemical warfare and retaliate with chemical agents (either lethal or incapacitating) or develop an effective defense (e.g., masks). In Vietnam use of RCAs and herbicides has not led to escalation to lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons. 4. Political Costs The Vietnam experience suggests that extensive use of herbicides may carry high political costs in terms of impact on public opinion at home and abroad and some political costs in terms of impact on civilians in combat areas. The environmental effects of herbicide usage can range from insignificant to widespread depending on the terrain, the type used, the extent and type of usage, and the precautionary and reparative measures taken. The environmental and physiological effects of herbicide usage in general and specifically in Vietnam are currently being studied by the National Academy of Sciences at the request of Congress, with the concurrence of the Administration. Though a progress report is expected in March, 1972, the full study is not expected to be completed until much later. To continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in armed conflicts would probably result in continuation of the impasse with the SFRC over ratification of the Protocol, but might even lead at some point to their reporting it out in a form directly contrary to the Administration’s position. In the event the Senate leadership then brought it to a vote, it might fail to obtain the requisite action by the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. On the other hand, Senate approval would make it impossible for the Administration to complete the ratification process without reversing its position. Failure of the U.S. to ratify the Geneva Protocol would (a) deflate domestic and international expectations aroused by the President’s decisions of November, 1969, and could undercut the net political impact of these decisions since the Protocol is basic to these policy decisions; (b) leave the U.S. (which originally sponsored the Protocol) the only important country that has not become a party to it (there are presently 98 parties); (c) continue to deprive the U.S. of a treaty undertaking by others not to use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S.; and (d) be used by some countries for political or propaganda purposes to cast doubt on U.S. policy in this area. The U.S. is negotiating at the Geneva Disarmament Conference a BW convention that would commit others to follow a policy on BW and toxins similar to that which the U.S. adopted in 1969. As currently being negotiated, this BW convention would rely on and not duplicate or affect the Protocol’s prohibitions on use. The negotiations with the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries are moving forward, and U.S. delay in ratification of the Protocol has not complicated this process to date. We have no positive indications as to what positions the non-aligned nations will take on the BW convention with or without U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Should it become possible to ratify the Protocol with the Administration’s interpretation that it does not prohibit the use of RCAs and herbicides in war, the U.S. interpretation would still be contrary to that of a majority of the present parties to the Protocol * and, therefore, could draw wide criticism by such countries though possibly less than continued failure to ratify the Protocol at all. Ratification on this basis might also lead to a request from the UNGA or UNSC for an advisory opinion of the ICJ, which would probably be adverse at least to our position on RCAs, and would in any event highlight our dispute with other parties on this matter. (While such an advisory opinion would not be legally binding on the U.S., we could not ignore it without undermining our general efforts to strengthen international law and encourage use of the ICJ.) Ratification in a manner preserving a first-use option for RCAs and herbicides would not make the Protocol as good a legal and psychological barrier against chemical warfare as would ratification on the basis that it provided a flat “no gas in armed conflict” firebreak. Under reservations taken by a number of parties (including members of the Warsaw Pact), our use of RCAs or herbicides against them could relieve them of their responsibilities under the Protocol toward the U.S. and our allies and could provide them a justification for escalation to chemical or biological warfare if they so desired. While many countries would welcome a modification of our views on the use of RCAs and herbicides, a change in the U.S. position could cause some difficulty with those countries which have taken more or less similar positions to that of the U.S. (i.e., Australia, Japan, Portugal and the United Kingdom), depending on how the U.S. actually modified its position. * Consultations with these governments before any modification of our views is made public could of course minimize these difficulties. 5. In summary, the general arguments favoring preservation at this time of the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war are as follows: — The military use of RCAs and herbicides has demonstrated military utility and saved U.S. and allied lives in Vietnam in purely military operations. This utility might be extrapolated to analogous conflicts in the future. — RCAs are useful in situations where the adversary is intermingled with the civilian population and the battlefield is undefined. — A change in our present position, while it may not legally prohibit continued use of RCAs and herbicides in Vietnam, would pave the way for increased domestic and international pressure to stop the use of these agents in Southeast Asia. — It can be considered incongruous to allow the controlled use of RCAs and herbicides domestically while prohibiting similar and different uses in war for the purposes of conserving U.S. lives. * (The Protocol would not prohibit the use by U.S. armed forces in wartime on U.S. bases of RCAs for riot control purposes or of herbicides for vegetation clearance.) — Though no substantial change in our current assessments is expected, deferring a definitive choice on this question would enable the Administration to take advantage of whatever additional light might be cast on this subject by the studies referred to in the background section. 6. The general arguments favoring relinquishing the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war can be summarized as follows: — It could result in securing Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol, which would a) fulfill domestic and international expectations, and b) provide the U.S. with a treaty undertaking by others not to use chemical or biological weapons against us. — It would eliminate the international and domestic political costs of maintaining a position inconsistent with the majority of the parties to the Protocol as to how the Protocol should be interpreted. — It could help reduce the chances that any form of chemical weapons would be used in future conflicts while not depriving us either of the right of retaliation or of maintaining the capability to retaliate with chemical weapons. — Continued use of RCAs or herbicides by the U.S. could be claimed by many possible adversaries as a violation of the Geneva Protocol, freeing them from the obligations of the Protocol and providing them a justification for using any form of chemical or bacteriological agent in war against the U.S. D. OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 1. Option A. Preserve the Option to Initiate the Use of RCAs and Herbicides in Armed Conflict without Restriction If the decision is to continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war, the alternative at this stage would be to inform Senator Fulbright that the issues raised in his letter will be carefully considered in our current studies, of which the SFRC is informed, and that the Administration’s conclusions will be forwarded upon completion of this review. The advantage of this course of action is that it would keep our understanding intact, pending further decision, without heightening the issue and precluding flexibility in the future. DOD believes that the completion of their studies now in progress, barring unforeseen changes, will afford another opportunity to attempt to make a persuasive case for the Administration’s position to the Senate. (On the other hand, the NSSM 112 study, which encompasses the DOD studies and other considerations, when completed, may not provide an opportunity to make any persuasive case for the Administration’s position.) The disadvantage of this option is that the Administration is in effect deferring action on the Protocol until it supplies the conclusions of the studies under way (expected in late 1971 at the earliest). * 2. Option B. Relinquish the Option to Initiate the Use of RCAs and Herbicides in Armed Conflict If the decision is to express our willingness to relinquish the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides under the circumstances indicated below, there are four ways in which this might be accomplished, each with distinct advantages and disadvantages. ** However, all these alternatives involve the following common denominators: — All of them are contemplated as prospective only, and need not imply that our past interpretations and conduct have been contrary to the Protocol. — We would retain the right to retaliate in kind. — The prohibitions of the Protocol would not cover the use of RCAs within our own bases for maintaining order, or the use of chemical herbicides for control of vegetation within our bases under the same restrictions imposed domestically in the United States. — Should this option be accepted it is assumed that a final choice among the alternatives would be preceded by appropriate consultation with the Congress. Alternative 1: Reaffirm our current understanding of the Protocol, but agree not to make first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides against states officially confirm they are bound on the same basis. * Other states could offer confirmation either by notice to the depositary of the Protocol (France) that they so understand the scope of their obligations, or by an exchange of diplomatic notes with us at our initiation, ** or possibly by other means. Pros: a. It would insure that we would not end up with a legal obligation to extend the Protocol in this manner to any party that did not have a comparable obligation to us. b. It would not, as a legal matter, undercut the position of those allies who have shared more or less similar interpretations, although it could he politically awkward for some of them if they did not plan to follow suit. Cons: a. While our legal obligation to refrain from using RCAs and herbicides in war would be limited to states who confirmed their corresponding obligation to us, this initiative would make it more politically difficult than it now is to justify either initiating use against others with whom we have no agreement or continuing their use in Southeast Asia. b. Some states would object to providing any official confirmation in view of their established positions that the Protocol prohibits first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides and others might object to confirming on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis. Alternative 2: Reaffirm our current understanding, but accompany United States ratification with a proposal calling for an Annex to the Protocol, providing that first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides is prohibited, which would come into force upon adherence by specified number of parties to the Protocol. Pros: a. The United States could assure that a certain number of states and their allies were similarly bound before being obligated not to initiate use of RCAs and chemical herbicides. b. The Annex would enable the contracting parties to share precisely identical restraints worked out in negotiation, having the full binding force of a treaty, and avoiding any ambiguity regarding scope and applicability to allies. Cons: a. This Annex would constitute a new treaty requiring submission by the President to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. b. Some states would object to becoming parties to a new Annex in view of their established positions that the Protocol prohibits first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides, especially since this procedure would require other states to go through their constitutionally required internal mechanisms requisite to ratification of a new treaty. C. The scope of the legal obligation between parties to the Annex and nonparties would be left unresolved. d. Since a significant amount of time might be required for the parties to the Protocol to adopt an Annex and thereafter for a sufficient number of them to ratify it before it came into force, other states and domestic and international public opinion (including the SFRC) might view this tactic merely as a position taken in order to delay and possibly totally to prevent the United States from ever being obligated to give up RCAs and herbicides. e. While our legal obligation to refrain from using RCAs and herbicides in war would be limited by the terms of the Annex, this initiative would make it more politically difficult than it now is to justify the initial use against others with whom we have no agreement. Moreover, though we would consider there were no prohibitions on use until the Annex came into force, it would be politically difficult to justify using these agents while supporting a ban on their use. Alternative 3: Reaffirm our current understanding but state that we would agree to abide by an advisory opinion of the ICJ, to be requested by the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council. * As an advisory opinion cannot be sought by individual countries, a request would have to come in the form of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council. We could persuade a group of friendly states to sponsor such a resolution and declare that we would be bound by an advisory opinion if such a resolution were adopted. Pros: a. It would provide the clearest legal basis of any of the alternatives for continuing to use RCAs or herbicides, and for defending our past positions and practices, until such time as an opinion was rendered. b. it would highlight the President’s support for international law and use of the ICJ. Cons: a. The discussion in the UNGA or SC of whether to ask for an advisory opinion could be the occasion for attacks on our past and present use of these agents. (In 1969, the UNGA voted 80–3–36 to the effect that international law as embodied in the Protocol prohibits the use of any chemical and biological agents in war.) b. Defending our present position in written and oral statements during the ICJ proceedings might aggravate domestic and international criticism of our present position and make potential defeat on the substance, which is very likely, more embarrassing. c. It would seem the least likely of the alternatives to break the impasse in the Senate, since it could lose both the votes of those who might object to our maintaining our present position pending the ICJ decision and of those who might object to leaving the decision to the ICJ. d. It might be considered inconsistent with the indications given in Secretary Rogers’ testimony that he did not at that time favor submitting the question to the ICJ. Alternative 4: Announce that while we continue to believe that our understandings are legally and substantively correct, we will hereafter treat the Protocol as the first use of RCAs and herbicides. * Pros: a. The SFRC would undoubtedly send the Protocol to the Senate for a vote recommending advice and consent for ratification. b. If the Administration openly endorses this interpretation, the Senate in all probability would muster the necessary two-third vote for ratification. c. It would avoid the complexity of the other alternatives, and the difficulties of getting other states to accept them, while still preserving our right to use these agents against any other party that used them in war against us or our allies. Cons: a. It would be the most vulnerable of the four alternatives to being interpreted as an admission that our past statements and conduct have been wrong, and that the use of these agents in Southeast Asia by the U.S. and Australia was contrary to a widely accepted international standard. b. It could antagonize those allies and those Senators who have supported the Administration’s interpretations. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC— Miscellaneous, Memos, October & November 1971. Secret. Under cover of a September 8 memorandum, Davis forwarded the report to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Moorer, Farley, and Edward David with a request that their views on the report’s options and alternatives be submitted to NSC by September 16 for incorporation in a memorandum to the President. Document 232 and its attachment are at Tabs A and C. The other attachments are not published. * Regarding the military utility of herbicides, ACDA calls attention to the views of the Embassy in Saigon, as expressed in the cable at Tab J., i.e., that the military value of area spraying of herbicides has not been clearly established. DOD notes that the Embassy views on military utility were submitted without coordination with any military authorities in Vietnam. Current studies are documenting military utility so the current absence of formal documentation must not he the basis for conclusions as to military utility. State and Defense agree that the views expressed in Embassy Saigon’s telegram are not determinative of the issue of military utility. * While no precise data on past or present usage is available, the figures on procurement and issuance to Southeast Asia are at Tab K. ** During operation DURHAM PEAK, Marines rendered an entire tunnel complex unusable for at least four months through the use of micropulverized CS, dusting and scattering CS crystals with C–4. Other tunnels and caves denied with CS were found effectively contaminated after 3 months. Contaminated in this case means untenable for unmasked personnel. In warm climates, a mask was not total protection since the agent produced discomfort on exposed, damp skin which made the contamination marginally effective even on masked personnel and at least made comfortable long-term use of the area unlikely. * For example, a North Vietnamese Army regiment resisted conventional assaults for two days resulting in heavy casualties to two companies in spite of air, artillery, and even B–52 attacks. Two helicopter loads of CS grenades effectively dislodged the enemy and his position was taken in two hours with only two casualties. ** OST notes that without some such quantification it is very difficult to assess objectively both the net contribution of RCA use in Southeast Asia to our objectives there, and the importance of this contribution in view of other national objectives. The JCS recognize the OST note but caution that a lack of data by which usage could be quantified should not contribute to a deprecation of the utility of RCAs. * As a result of its technical studies, OST believes that if the initiation of RCAs (or herbicides) resulted in widespread use of lethal or incapacitating agents in conflicts with the USSR or Warsaw Pact nations (who consider RCAs and herbicides as elements of chemical warfare, and hence banned by the Geneva Protocol, and whose combined offensive and defensive capabilities and the ability to operate in a toxic environment probably significantly exceeds that of U.S. forces and undoubtedly greatly exceeds that of our allies), U.S. and allied forces would he placed at a serious military disadvantage. Thus OST believes that the situations in which herbicides or RCAs could be initiated in the confident expectation of obtaining a military advantage are sharply limited both by this risk of escalation and by the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact nations to operate in a toxic environment. DOD believes that initiation of the use of lethal or incapacitating chemicals involves a fundamental political decision, especially for any party to the Protocol, and would not be based on U.S. use of RCAs or herbicides. * As evidenced by the 1969 UNGA vote (80–3–36) on a resolution stating that international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of all chemical and biological agents in war: — 51 countries party to the Protocol voted contrary to the view of the U.S. [including Spain, Pakistan, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, most of the Latin American countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and most of the other non-aligned countries (e.g., the Arab countries, Finland, India, Indonesia and Sweden]; — 2 parties voted with the U.S. (Australia and Portugal); — 30 parties abstained (e.g., almost all of the Western European countries, Japan and several other Asian nations, and Israel); — 5 parties were absent; and — 10 parties are not members of the UN. Among the abstaining parties to the Protocol, France clearly indicated a view contrary to the U.S. position; Japan later indicated a view similar to the U.S. and the U.K. has taken the position that one type of RCA is not prohibited. Italy and Turkey had expressed the view, in 1930, that lachrymatory agents were prohibited and are not known to have changed this view. Among the UN members not party to the Protocol, 27 voted contrary to the U.S. view, 6 abstained and 2 were absent. * Australia and Portugal joined us in voting against the 1969 UNGA resolution interpreting the Protocol to cover RCAs and herbicides. Ratification proceedings in the Japanese Diet made clear the Japanese position that the Protocol did not cover RCAs. While the Japanese agree with us on herbicides, they have not taken this position publicly. The former Labor Government of the U.K. took the position that CS (as distinguished from earlier types of RCAs) was not covered by the Protocol; the U.K. has taken no public position on herbicides. * ACDA and State assert that military uses can be readily distinguished from controlled domestic uses of similar agents as the latter uses are far more limited in their objectives, subject to the inherent limitation of what governments believe their own citizens will tolerate, and do not involve the risks of escalation to other forms of CBW. * Since Option A represents a “no change in current policy” option, there is only one alternative to be listed. The number of alternatives to Option B is not to be considered as indicating the relative merit of either Option. The basic decision is between Option A and Option II. Everything following is concerned with techniques of implementing that basic decision. ** The Working Group examined alternatives which treated RCAs and herbicides separately but considered that such alternatives would be less legally and politically viable than the alternatives presented herein and would have far less chance in overcoming the impasse on the Protocol. For example, USIA considers that of the two agents, only herbicides pose a significant overseas public opinion problem, and offers two alternatives which retain RCAs and drop herbicides. These alternatives, which could be worth serious consideration if RCAs are deemed too valuable militarily to give up, are: 1) The President could unilaterally renounce herbicides as he did biological weapons. (Favorable public impact could make it easier to defend our interpretation on RCAs, using our previous arguments excluding them from the Protocol.) 2) The U.S. could take the position that herbicides are covered by the Protocol, but RCAs are not covered. This alternative would be very difficult legally and less striking psychologically. * Both Alternatives I and 2 would be consistent with the testimony of Secretary Rogers on the Protocol, that our position on both RCAs and chemical herbicides is without prejudice to the position the U.S. might take in any future international agreements dealing with chemical agents. ** The first method offers the advantage of making clear that the understanding of the scope of the obligation is multilateral in context and applies to all other parties to the Protocol. However, some other states may object to notifying the depositary now of an interpretation they have maintained for a long period of time. The second method offers the advantage of not requiring that other states notify the depositary; since it could be accomplished by the United States, as a new party to the Protocol, inquiring of other parties whether they consider the Protocol to include non first-use of RCAs and chemical herbicides. The responses would clarify our obligation with respect to each state party, but this method might leave some ambiguity as to the obligations of other states inter se . * This does not include the qualification in the Brooke resolution that we should consider the opinion binding only “with regard to any other states adhering to the Protocol and accepting the Court’s interpretation.” However, the Brooke resolution urges the President to take the initiative in obtaining an early opinion and recommends that in the event that the ICJ finds that either RCAs or herbicides are not covered by the Protocol, the United States should initiate international negotiations to prohibit their use in warfare. While the adoption of this resolution would not present a legal obstacle to our continued use of these agents in war pending such an advisory opinion, it would seem to present a serious political obstacle to our doing so. * This differs from the solution suggested in the Nelson resolution, which (1) only applies to herbicides, and (2) would require our instrument of ratification to include a formal “understanding” that herbicides are covered. No other party has taken the latter step. If Alternative 4 were chosen, it might be desirable to take the initial precaution of seeking a vote on the Humphrey resolution so that we could tell whether or not we could be sure of obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority. (This would, however, also suggest that the reason for the Administration’s change in position was the Senate’s opposition. The Humphrey resolution as currently worded, however, would make it difficult to defend past United States positions and practices with respect to the use of RCAs and herbicides in war. 237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) 237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) 1 Washington, September 13, 1971. SUBJECT: Negotiation of BW Convention I would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the attached draft message of instruction to the United States delegation at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva concerning the draft Bacteriological Warfare Convention. A reply is requested by 17 September, if possible. G. Warren Nutter Attachment Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, undated SUBJECT: CCD: Negotiation of BW Convention REF: A. Geneva 3844 B. Geneva 3849 C. Geneva 3850 D. Geneva 3851 E. Geneva 3852 1. We are prepared to accept changes in text of August 5 draft convention as reported reftels. 2. Text of BW convention as sent reftel B represents achievement of main US objective: development, production and stockpiling of BW, already renounced unilaterally by USG, would be prohibited by treaty. Moreover, the two major US concerns in negotiating the treaty are met: 1) draft does not affect US position on Geneva Protocol and 2) commitment to further negotiations on chemical weapons prohibitions does not prejudge outcome of such negotiations. 3. We appreciate efforts of Del to arrive at draft which would appear generally acceptable at CCD and at UNGA. We believe some additions will be particularly acceptable to our allies (e.g., additions to Articles I and V) while new language proposed by non-aligned for preamble and operative Articles VIII and IX should increase support for Convention. 4. a. We favor inclusion of optional article on BW assistance (para 13, reftel D) if, in light of further consultations with Sovs and other dels, US del believe this would enhance overall support for treaty. b. We consider preambular para 4 of proposed text an improvement, but we continue to be able to accept August 5 version. C. If in Del’s judgment it would significantly increase non-aligned backing for BW convention you authorized insert “comprehensive” in preambular para of proposed text (para 7, reftel C). 5. FOR USNATO, ALL NATO CAPITALS AND EMBASSY TOKYO: Consultations with our NATO allies and Japan on new language should begin soonest. Instructions follow septel. END 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan–1971. Secret. For text of the August 5 draft convention, see Document 235 . 238. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 238. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 16, 1971. Subject: Geneva Protocol of 1925 1. This is in response to the memorandum, subject as above, from the NSC Secretariat requesting my views on the options and alternatives presented in the IPMG report of September 16, 1971, subject also as above. 2. Whereas I accept the judgment that there has been some net utility arising from the use of riot control agents and herbicides in South Vietnam, the technical support for assertions that such utility has been great is weak and is likely to remain so. In any case, such utility appears to be confined to situations like Southeast Asia in which the enemy has inadequate protection against RCA’s (no effective masks) and limited capabilities to retaliate in kind or with other chemical or biological weapons against the use of either RCA’s or herbicides. (Advantages in the use of lethal chemicals appear to be with guerrillas.) The situation with respect to nations with greater military capabilities who might be bound to us by mutually acceptable agreements is substantially different. In the extreme case of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, actual utilization could have a negative utility since it could provide a legal and political excuse for the escalation to higher levels of chemical activity for which we are relatively quite poorly prepared. Studies done by the CBW Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee indicate that the widespread introduction of lethal chemicals by the Soviet Union into a NATO conflict would be disastrous for us and would force us to consider nuclear retaliation or to sustain a substantial defeat. It is generally agreed that our defenses are weak and those of other NATO allies even weaker relative to those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Furthermore, it is believed by my office that the offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact substantially exceeds our own. Thus we have much to gain by strengthening the political constraints against the possible introduction of chemicals into conflicts with more advanced countries. We should clearly do this in the most advantageous way politically. This leads me to believe that in the absence of additional and contrary evidence which I do not expect the ongoing studies to produce, the interest of the nation would be best served by implementing Alternative 1 of Option 13. (“Reaffirm our current understanding of the Protocol, but agree not to make first use of RCAs and chemical herbicides against states that officially confirm they are bound on the same basis.”) 3. It is the judgment of my office that the ongoing studies will contribute little to the basis for decision on the issues involved in the Geneva Protocol, particularly those scheduled for completion after NSSM–112. However, since the Congress is aware of the fact that the NSSM–112 study is in progress, it might be awkward to change position without awaiting its results. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has asked that we reconsider our position in light of this study, thus we could easily delay making a further substantive response to Senator Fulbright’s proposals until the studies are complete, though a communication of our intent to him seems desirable. The NSSM–112 study could be presented to the President by the end of October, I understand. Accordingly, I see little merit in supporting publicly any change of position prior to that time. At this time, it would appear to be useful to take such steps as are necessary: 1. to assure that the NSSM–112 study is not delayed; and 2. to confirm the IPMG judgment that if the Administration were to support Alternative I of Option B, it would lead to the ratification of the Geneva Protocol by the Senate. About the end of October, the President could then possibly be prepared to support publicly an option (presumably Alternative 1 of Option B) that would be expected to lead to ratification during this Administration, should that be his desire. Edward E. David, Jr. Science Adviser 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Secret. 239. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Laird 239. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, September 17, 1971. Subject: Negotiation of Bacteriological Warfare Convention (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), I–11893/71, dated 13 September 1971, subject: “Negotiation of BW Convention.” 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed both the changes proposed by the US Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the 5 August 1971 US draft Biological Warfare (BW) convention and the proposed US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) response contained in the reference. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with all the proposed changes to the draft BW convention as authorized in the proposed ACDA response. The following comments respond to the reference: a. First Preambular Paragraph . The added words “chemical and” should be dropped from the first preambular paragraph and the phrase “and toxins” reinserted. This convention is concerned primarily with a prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. The addition of the words “chemical and” in front of “biological weapons” in this opening paragraph is inappropriate and tends to change the entire thrust of the BW convention. There is adequate reference both in other preambular paragraphs and one operative article to a commitment by the parties to this convention to further negotiations of chemical weapons. Further, National Security Decision Memorandum 35 states that BW and chemical warfare (CW) are to be treated differently and separately. b. Eighth Preambular Paragraph . The US delegation should not be authorized to insert the word “comprehensive” before “prohibition” in the eighth preambular paragraph. The commitment in this paragraph to US future negotiations on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons should satisfy those nonaligned nations desiring a linkage of the two subjects. Adding the word “comprehensive,” as authorized in subparagraph 4c of ACDA’s response, would prejudge the outcome of those future negotiations as they relate to chemical weapons. c. Article VIII . The US delegation should not be authorized to substitute the words “as soon as possible” in operative Article VIII. This article commits the United States to further negotiations for effective prohibition of chemical weapons. “As soon as possible” would seem to be more compulsive for quick follow-on CW negotiations than the “reaching early agreement” phrase. d. The ACDA draft response should be redrafted to reflect the foregoing comments. 4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that support was not obtained for an operative article that would ban the use of biological weapons as had been provided for in the UK BW convention. 5. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objections to the revised text of the US draft BW convention provided ACDA’s response is redrafted to incorporate the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, the foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are based on the understanding that the revised text of the US draft BW convention does not: a. Affect the US position on the Geneva Protocol, specifically concerning the use of riot control agents and herbicides. b. Prejudge the outcome of the commitment to further negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. c. Commit the United States to any specific date or time For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Mason Freeman Rear Admiral, USN Vice Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 384 Jan–1971. Secret. 240. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 240. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 17, 1971. SUBJECT: Convention Banning Biological Weapons and Toxins We are on the verge of completing an agreement at Geneva on a convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons (BW) and toxins. You will recall that the convention relies on complaint procedures rather than verification per se . After negotiations with allies and non-aligned, our delegation and the Soviets are seeking clearance on a package of amendments (Tab B). Our delegation believes that if we and the Soviets approve the package, the prospects are good for broad acceptance at the impending UN General Assembly and signature in 1972. The amendments are consistent with the instructions you approved on April 28 (Tab C). However, there is one political “hooker” worthy of attention: i.e., there are more references and a closer tie into chemical weapons (CW) generally. (The added references to CW are marked at Tab B.) For example, where the draft preamble (non-operative) before referred to the importance of eliminating BW and toxin weapons it now refers to the importance of eliminating chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Where this has occurred, our delegation has added “through effective measures” to protect our position that any CW agreement would require more effective verification. Also, earlier drafts of operative Article VIII contained only an obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting CW. This article has been expanded to include (1) affirming “the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons” and (2) aiming at “reaching early agreement”. I agree with State, ACDA and DOD that this does not, in real terms, alter or enlarge our obligations. The non-aligned have generally favored a single ban for CW and BW. The references to CW have been the price for general support of a BW ban and do not bother the Soviets who, you will recall, previously supported a single CW/BW ban. Though we would, of course, prefer to do without the added references to CW, the options are either (1) to go along with the amendments now with the aim of getting UNGA approval this fall and signature in 1972, or (2) to carry negotiations over into next year after having pushed a BW ban this year and with no assurance that we will be in a better position next year. The ACDA draft cable at Tab A in effect accepts the amendments and two minor changes by the Soviets (see below) and authorizes NATO consultations this Wednesday or Thursday (September 22 or 23). It has been cleared by ACDA (Farley), State/PM, and OSD (Eagleburger). JCS concerns have been met except on one main point. The JCS consider that the addition of the words “chemical and” in preambular paragraph 1 tends to change the entire thrust of the BW convention and may not be entirely consistent with NSDM 35’s statement that BW and CW are to be treated separately: “…. convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and their elimination through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” We also prefer the earlier draft’s references to only “bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons” in this paragraph, but believe the ACDA/State/ OSD position should be approved, particularly when the platitudinous preambular paragraph does not alter our real obligations. The cable at Tab A states that we prefer the earlier language, but not at the price of holding up agreement on a treaty this year. This should be decided upon as soon as possible since we should notify our NATO allies on Monday (September 20) for consultations on Wednesday or Thursday before responding at Geneva. Geneva is getting ready to pack up this session and the Soviet delegation has informed us that the USSR accepts the amendments with only two minor changes. The UK has also responded that it is ready to co-sponsor the treaty, as may Canada and the Dutch. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Dick Kennedy concur. Recommendation: That you approve my clearing the attached instructions (Tab A) approving the amendments. APPROVE [HK initialed] DISAPPROVE 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote “Approved H” on page one and initialed the “Approve” option on page two. At Tab A are the instructions transmitted in Document 241 . At Tab B is Document 225 . The attachment at Tab B is not published. 241. Telegram 175047 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 241. Telegram 175047 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, September 23, 1971 SUBJECT: CCD: Negotiation of BW Convention REF: A. Geneva 3844 B. Geneva 3849 C. Geneva 3850 D. Geneva 3851 E. Geneva 3852 F. Geneva 4036 1. We are prepared to accept changes in text of August 5 draft convention as reported reftels, subject to comments in para 3 below. 2. We appreciate efforts of Del to arrive at draft which would appear generally acceptable at CCD and at UNGA. We believe some additions will be particularly acceptable to our allies (e.g., additions to Articles I and V) while new language proposed by non-aligned for preamble and operative Articles VIII and IX should increase support for Convention. 3. a. We prefer maintain August 5 version preambular para 1. If, however, in judgment of Del, it would not be possible to achieve agreement on BW treaty at this CCD session without suggested changes—and we highly value Del efforts in inserting reference to “effective measures”—Del is authorized to agree to proposed changes. b. We favor inclusion of optional article on BW assistance (para 13, reftel D) if, in light of further consultations with Sovs and other dels, US Del believes this would enhance overall support for treaty. If article included US Del should make clear our understanding that it refers to humanitarian assistance. c. We consider preambular para 4 of proposed text an improvement, but we continue to be able to accept August 5 version. d. Del should not raise question of insertion word “comprehensive” in preambular para 8 of proposed text (para 7, reftel C), particularly in light of latest Soviet change in this para (see 3e below.) e. We can also accept the two additional changes pip proposed by Soviets (reftel F): that is, (1) deletion of word, “appropriate” in optional article on assistance; and (2) deletion of words “and bacteriological (biological)” together with the insertion word “also” in preambular paragraph 8 of proposed text, so that revised para would read: “Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end.” 4. FOR USNATO, ALL NATO CAPITALS AND AMEMBASSY TOKYO: Consultations with our NATO allies and Japan on new language should begin soonest following receipt instructions which being sent septel. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to All NATO Capitals, USUN, Moscow, Tokyo, and USDel SALT V. Drafted by Rodes (ACDA/IR); cleared in PM/DCA, DOD/ISA, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP, L, the White House, ACDA/IR, and ACDA/GC; and approved by Farley. 242. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 242. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 23, 1971. Subject: Geneva Protocol of 1925 This is in reply to the memorandum of the NSC Staff Secretary, dated September 8, 1971. The following views of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be included in the proposed memorandum for the President. The United States should preserve the option to use RCAs and herbicides in armed conflict (Option A). Department of Defense studies have clearly established that use of these agents in Vietnam has made it possible to accomplish military missions with fewer U.S. and allied casualties, military and civilian, than would otherwise have been incurred. RCAs proved to be of unique value in special circumstances where other types of conventional ordnance were ineffective, as against heavily armed troops in bunkers, or where lethal weapons could not be used, as when enemy troops mingled with civilians. Herbicides have been especially vital for keeping open important lines of communication such as the ship channel to Saigon and defoliating defensive fields of fire around firebases and other military installations. Commanders reported increased casualties when perimeter defoliation was temporarily suspended. These judgments are based on our review of data collected in connection with comprehensive studies on the military utility of RCAs and herbicides being conducted pursuant to National Security Study Memorandum 112. Detailed reports will be submitted by October 15. As to the possible political costs of retaining the option to use RCAs and herbicides, we note the following. The policies announced unilaterally by the President in November 1969 renouncing any use of biological warfare and first use of chemical warfare extend far beyond the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol and are applicable in our relations with all nations, whether or not they are parties to the Protocol. Our policies are in no way inconsistent with accepted rules and principles of international law. We should be under no compulsion, therefore, to revise our position with respect to RCAs and herbicides, which have proven their utility in reducing injuries and deaths in armed conflict. If there are governments which might look upon use of these agents as justification for introduction of lethal or incapacitating chemicals, we must rely on such political or military means as may be available to dissuade or deter them. We should not abandon our sound and basically humane policy because of the extremely remote possibility that a use by us of RCAs or herbicides would be the trigger for a lethal chemical response. It is our view that any decision to use lethal chemicals would be based on profound political judgments totally unrelated to any earlier use by the United States of RCAs or herbicides. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol remains a desirable objective but we continue to believe strongly that the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification should be sought on the basis of the understanding that the prohibitions of the Protocol do not extend to RCAs and herbicides. David Packard 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 40 NSC (September 1971). Secret. 243. Telegram 4163 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 243. Telegram 4163 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, September 27, 1971, 0845Z. Subject: CCD: Negotiation of BW Convention: First Preambular Para. Ref: State 175047 1. Summary. Since receipt of instructions contained in reftel, we have discussed possibility of utilizing Aug 5 version of first preambular para with SovDel and with key Non-aligned dels. Reactions have been so unanimously negative that US Del is convinced it would seriously jeopardize, and probably make impossible any chance of achieving consensus in favor of BW convention. In accordance with instructions in para 3 of reftel that del is authorized to agree to proposed changes, we have informed key dels that we will not insist on Aug 5 version and will table treaty with version recommended by Co-Chairmen. End summary 2. We informed SovDel and dels of Sweden, Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco that US would strongly prefer to utilize Aug 5 version of para 1. In each case we explained that present convention was about BW and toxins and that, therefore, it would be more accurate and clearer to use Aug 5 version which referred specifically to B weapons and toxins. Dels we chose for consultations have all played key role in committee work on BW convention. They included several, e.g., Sweden, Morocco, and Ethiopia, that have recently been particularly helpful to US in committee’s corridor work, and whose support will be important in developing a consensus. Comments of various dels are summarized in following paras of this cable. 3. Soviet Union. Roshchin said that he could not use different preambular para from that most recently authorized in his instructions without new guidance from Moscow. Leonard asked specifically if Roshchin could not agree to accept para which had already been accepted in Aug 5 version. Roshchin said he could not do this on his own authority and was certain that issue would have to be considered in Moscow since latest version of treaty had been reviewed by FonMin Gromyko. Roshchin believed this could involve considerable delay. As to substance, Roshchin said that he could not share our view that Aug 5 version was better. He argued that this preambular para had no juridical effect but was merely of a hortatory character, stating something that was a truism. He thought use of Aug 5 language would have very negative impact on Non-aligned dels and would even be viewed negatively by his own authorities. He hoped US Del would not insist on this change. 4. Swedish delegation. Amb Eckerberg said that he now had some hope of making a positive statement about treaty after it was tabled. He was sure that if Aug 5 version of first preambular para were inserted he would not get authorization to say anything good about treaty. He commented that first preambular para had been particularly important one for Non-aligned group as a whole and many dels would not be able to understand why new language could not be accepted by US. New language seemed so reasonable to Eckerberg, that he believed, if it were changed, this would raise question for many dels whether US was sincere in saying it was willing to work earnestly on problem of chemical weapons. He urged that these views be reported to Washington and that matter be reconsidered. 5. Yugoslavia. Vukovic (Acting Head of Yugoslav disarmament delegation) commented that proposed change would be viewed by Non-aligned as contrary to basic concept and approach of Non-aligned. Despite our explanation, he could not see how there could be any objection to saving that elimination of C and B weapons through effective measures would facilitate the achievement of GCD. Most Non-aligned dels had been willing to go along only reluctantly with separate treaty on B weapons and toxins and, therefore, US refusal to accept clause that was very important for Non-aligned would be “very difficult to swallow” and would do “real damage” to any prospect of consensus. He “begged of us” to make an effort with Washington to be able to accept language as recommended. 6. India. Jain (Deputy of Indian del) said that he was certain that use of Aug 5 version for first preambular para would be viewed extremely negatively by Non-aligned dels, including his own. Non-aligned had worked particularly hard to have broad language in first para, and therefore refusal by US to accommodate this view would be very harmful in reaching a consensus. 7. Egypt. Amb Khallaf said first para was of particular importance in view of his delegation and, he thought, of other Non-aligned in establishing broad framework for treaty. If chemical weapons not mentioned this would have extremely negative effect on developing consensus in favor of treaty. he pleaded with leonard to intervene with Washington to avoid this particular change. 8. Ethiopia. Amb Imru also underlined particular importance of first preambular para. He thought that if US was unwilling to refer to elimination of chemical weapons, even in context of elimination of all mass destruction weapons and GCD, then serious questions would be raised about implications of this position. 9. Morocco. Khattabi (Head of Moroccan del) called Leonard back after reflecting on proposal and expressed serious concern about its effect within Non-aligned group. He recalled that first preambular para had been subject of particularly intense discussions within group in preparation of CCD 341 and reversion to Aug 5 text would have significant consequences within group. He strongly hoped it would not be necessary to insist on this change. 10. Conclusion. In view of reactions reported above, and in view of US Del’s judgment that our insistence on Aug 5 language would seriously jeopardize achievement of consensus agreement at this CCD session, we have utilized the authority granted us in para E of reftel to agree to version of para 1 as recommended by both Co-Chairmen. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3 Switz (GE). Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to USNATO and USUN. 244. Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 244. Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 1 Geneva, September 28, 1971. Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, September 28, 1971 1 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 2 and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war. Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of states, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end, Determined , for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, this Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI (1) Any State Party to the Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article VII Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of this convention. Article VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Article IX Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article X (1) The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. Article XI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XII Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention. Article XIII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIV (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ——-which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. Done in—— copies at ——, this ——day of——, ——. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 568–573. No classification marking. The final text of the convention is in Documents on Disarmament, 1972 , pp. 133–138, but is essentially the same as the revised draft convention dated September 28, 1971. 1 CCD/353, Sept. 28, 1971. The revised draft convention was submitted by Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, USSR, U.K., and U.S. 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 764–765. 245. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon 245. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 5, 1971. Subject: 1925 Geneva Protocol As you know, the Geneva Protocol has not been reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee due to disagreement over this Administration’s interpretation that the Protocol does not cover riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides. I believe we can select a course of action that would achieve our major objective of obtaining advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol while maintaining key elements of the Administration’s position. To secure favorable action on the Protocol, I therefore recommend that you decide now publicly to reaffirm the U.S. understanding that the Protocol does not cover riot control agents and herbicides, but agree not to initiate first use of these agents against states which officially confirm their adherence to the same (no-first-use) principle. I recommend this approach for the following reasons: a. We would retain our current interpretation and thus avoid any possible implication that we have even tacitly acknowledged previous error in employing these agents in Vietnam contrary to the presently widely accepted international interpretation of the Protocol. b. We would significantly improve the prospects of overcoming the present impasse with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by demonstrating the Administration’s willingness to modify its position in order to accommodate the views of the Committee and thereby to obtain the Senate’s consent to ratification. c. We would eliminate the likelihood of independent Congressional action which might be in conflict with our current interpretation. At present three such resolutions have been introduced in the Senate. The Administration should continue to take the lead in this question, following your previous significant decisions in the area of chemical and biological weapons arms control. d. We would not be disavowing our past positions on the military utility of RCAs and chemical herbicides nor would we be discarding our right to employ these weapons without a clear reciprocal commitment from others to do the same. e. We would not prohibit their continued employment in Vietnam, within the restrictive guidelines which you have prescribed, since it is most unlikely that North Vietnam would become a party to the Protocol, confirm reciprocal application of the U.S. no-first-use offer, and admit officially that its forces are fighting in South Vietnam. f. We would minimize any possible political embarrassment in our relations with those allies who have shared our interpretation of the Protocol since we are not changing our interpretation of the Protocol. We can further reduce any adverse reactions if we can consult in advance of any public announcement. g. We would be taking another visible step toward your announced goal of the control of armaments through negotiation by providing the basis for a clear “no gas in armed conflict” policy for those nations which are parties to the Protocol and reciprocally acknowledge non-first-use of these agents. h. It would be consistent with our efforts in the current U.S./U.S.S.R. Biological Weapons Convention negotiations. If you should decide to accept this recommendation, I believe it would be desirable to make a simple, forthright statement to the effect: “It is the view of the United States and certain other states that the Geneva Protocol does not prohibit the first use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides, but the United States will apply the Protocol with the understanding that it will be obligated not to initiate the use of riot control agents and officially confirms that it is bound on the same basis.” We would anticipate that these confirmations can be secured on an informal basis from other signatory nations, e.g., through exchange of notes, through acceptance of prior or subsequent pronouncements on their interpretation of the Protocol including their vote on relevant General Assembly resolutions, or by other forms of commitment. I believe you should not further delay action on the Protocol which is an important aspect of your November 25, 1969 decisions on chemical and biological warfare. I do so in the full knowledge that there are numerous studies now under way to examine the military utility and environmental effects of RCAs and herbicides. No doubt these studies, to include one which is not due for completion until 1973, will some day be helpful in determining more precisely the utility of these weapons and their environmental effects. I am convinced, however, that there will always remain a wide range of disagreement, both within Government and the public at large, as to the relative importance of RCAs and herbicides in comparison to other military tools. Differences will also continue to exist over the political costs in employing these weapons in direct conflict with majority international opinion. Therefore, I believe, with the winding down of U.S. participation in the Vietnam war, we can and should move now to ratify the Protocol on a basis acceptable to the Administration. Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 8, NSC Miscellaneous Memos, October & November 1971. Secret. 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (Spiers) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 1, 1971. Subject: NSSM 112, US Post-Vietnam Policy on Use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War On January 7, 1971, NSSM 112 directed a study of US policy options with regard to the future use of riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical herbicides in war, including the position which the US would take concerning its understanding as to the 1925 Geneva Protocol under each policy option. Shortly after the issuance of NSSM 112, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the President to reconsider the Administration’s position that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not prohibit the first use in war of RCAs and herbicides, indicating that unless there were some change no further action would be taken by the SFRC at least until the Administration’s announced study on the post-Vietnam military utility of RCAs and herbicides (NSSM 112) was completed and its results made available. In response to your memorandum of June 28, the IPMG prepared and, on August 26, 1971, forwarded for the President’s consideration its review of the Geneva Protocol situation and alternative responses with their advantages and disadvantages. Agency views were subsequently forwarded under separate cover. Although this review was directed specifically at an examination of the US interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, the basic issue—that is, whether or not at this time we wish to continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war—and the options, evaluations and judgments are substantially the same as in NSSM 112. The Geneva Protocol study recognized the military utility of RCAs and herbicides in various types of military situations. However, the IPMG did not at that time have the benefit of DOD’s more detailed analyses which were in preparation for the NSSM 112 study. DOD has now provided their analyses of the military utility of these agents which document more fully the types of uses based on experience in Southeast Asia and a projection of possible uses in the future. DOD’s analyses substantiate the judgments on military utility as contained in the Protocol study. Although the Geneva Protocol study indicated possible political costs within Vietnam, the Saigon Embassy was unable to either confirm or deny any non-military effects of the use of these agents, stating that this question has not been the subject of any systematic study. The DOD studies do not purport to reflect the views of other agencies but all agencies do concur with the statement of military utility as contained in the Geneva Protocol study and approved by the IPMG. Most important, all agencies agree that DOD’s current analyses do not generate a need to modify the judgments and evaluations contained in the Protocol study. DOD’s continuing study of the military utility of herbicides in Vietnam is expected to be completed in December. The study on the ecological and physiological aspects of military herbicide use in Vietnam, conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, will not be completed before mid-1973. The National Academy plans to forward a preliminary report to DOD in January of 1972. All these studies will be unclassified and will be presented to the Congress. It is expected that these studies will not lead to any changes in the judgments and evaluations contained in the Protocol study. Thus, the basis for making a decision on the RCA and herbicide issue will not be changed from the present. (DOD has requested that should the decision be to retain the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war, a follow-or, longer-range study be undertaken concerning whether or not current restrictions on their use should be continued.) The IPMG concludes that the Protocol study, along with the respective agency views, and the attached DOD studies (summaries enclosed), fulfill the requirements of NSSM 112. Ronald I. Spiers, Chairman NSC Interdepartmental Political-Military Group Enclosure 1 Report Washington, undated DOD STUDY ON MILITARY UTILITY OF HERBICIDES Summary The military utility of herbicides has been conclusively established. Use of herbicides exposed enemy supply, storage, training and staging sites. This deprivation of concealment facilitated defense of fixed US and allied installations, reduced the number and effectiveness of enemy ambushes, and generally made it more difficult for the enemy to accomplish his tactical mission. Use of herbicides has saved many US and allied lives. 1. A study of the military utility of herbicides in Southeast Asia is currently being conducted by the Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG). Although the study will not be completed until December, 1971, ESSG has provided an interim report covering their field study conducted in Vietnam during June/July 1971. The study discusses the chronology of herbicide use in Vietnam, the controls imposed on its use, and the military utility of such use. 2. The preliminary study recognized the difficulty in defining an appropriate index for measuring military utility and limits itself to data reported and collected in the data files of the National Military Command System Support Center. 3. The study identified the following broad range of purposes served by the use of herbicides: a. Observe enemy activity, including movement of troops and supplies, storage and staging areas. b. Expose interdiction targets. c. Expose enemy to close air support (by removing cover in areas where contact with enemy troops is likely). d. Reduce enemy capability to ambush. e. Mark targets (create readily visible reference points in otherwise uniform jungle terrain). f. Canalizing enemy movement. g. Route an enemy force from long-established base areas. h. Controlling regrowth in Rome-plowed areas. i. Clear fields of fire for defense of friendly installations. j. Clear river banks to inhibit attacks on shipping and patrol boats. k. Control vegetation in depot areas. l. Clear areas around isolated inhabited areas. 4. Conclusions of DOD Study: Use of herbicides facilitates movement to engage the enemy and enhances the effectiveness of direct fire weapons. Defensively, the security of a force or installation is aided by improving visibility around its perimeter. Enclosure 2 Report Washington, undated DOD STUDY ON RIOT CONTROL AGENTS Summary The option to employ RCAs provides the United States an alternative of graduated application of force, permitting mission accomplishment while significantly limiting loss of life and property. 1. The utility of RCAs in the conflict in Southeast Asia has been thoroughly demonstrated. It has been clearly established that use of these agents in Vietnam made it possible to accomplish military missions with fewer US and allied casualties, military and civilian, than would otherwise have been incurred. RCAs proved to be of unique value in special circumstances where other types of conventional ordnance were ineffective. In neutralizing enemy fortified positions, for example, RCA munitions have proven to be far more humane than the alternative major expenditure of conventional munitions. 2. The Services were required to evaluate the utility of RCAs in furtherance of their missions in Southeast Asia. All Services noted that since the use of RCAs was not specifically documented, quantitative evaluation was difficult. Without exception, however, the Services stated that use of RCAs contributed to the accomplishment of their missions and in several individual cases it was stated that use of RCAs was decisive. (Selected examples in Enclosure 3.) 3. Most uses of RCAs can be categorized as follows: a. Use involving area denial to unprotected personnel. 1. Denying use of section of trail or roadnet. 2. Denying use of base or firing area. 3. Denying subsequent enemy use of fortifications, tunnels, or caves (after initial clearing). 4. Denying use of potential ambush site. 5. Denying use of food cache or food growing area. 6. Disrupt repair of lines of communication. b. Use for fire suppression or to cause confusion. 1. In defensive fires around fixed installation. 2. In counter-ambush or counter-sniper role. 3. To break contact with an enemy. 4. In timely counter-battery fire. 5. In extractions of individuals or small units. (a) Downed aircrew members in SAR operations. (b) Reconnaissance teams or long range patrols. (c) Casualties, (assistance in medical evacuation). 6. To suppress anti-aircraft fire. 7. To capture prisoners for intelligence purposes. 8. In preparation of landing zones. c. Use to reduce damage or casualties. 1. When noncombatants are intermixed in the area of operations. 2. In cities or built-up areas. d. Use to increase effectiveness of US operations. 1. In conjunction with conventional weapons. 2. To replace combat units in blocking operations. e. Use as a search weapon. 1. To detect concealed personnel. 2. To clear fortifications, tunnel complexes and caves. 3. To assist in the assault of a fortified position. 4. A DOD study projecting the Southeast Asia experience to other theatres of operation and intensities of conflict indicates that RCAs can have significant utility in many military situations. The situations investigated in the DOD study were these: (1) Combat in the Middle East against a sophisticated force in a warm environment. (2) Combat against a semi-sophisticated force in Korea in both cold and warm environments. (3) Counterinsurgent operations in Latin America. (4) Urban combat in Western Europe involving both cold and warm environments. The conclusions of this study have been summarized in the following matrix showing the degree of utility (or disutility) of RCA use in each situation and in each geographic area. Conclusions : 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after analyzing the study of RCA use in Southeast Asia and the possibilities for use in other areas and in different levels of conflict, have concluded that: (1) RCA use in Southeast Asia was effective and significantly augmented the US military capability. (2) RCA use in Southeast Asia frequently prevented undue friendly casualties and provided an entrenched enemy the option of surrender. (3) RCA use in Southeast Asia was often the decisive factor in the recovery of downed aircrews which were under enemy attack. (4) In many situations, use of RCAs uniquely provides the commander with non-lethal options unavailable through any other weapon system. (5) RCAs provide an excellent non-lethal alternative to reconnaissance by fire. (6) RCA would be useful in many types of tactical situations in most of the land areas of the world. (7) RCA use is most effective when employed with surprise against an unprotected enemy. (8) RCA use provides an effective military option which permits the saving of noncombat, friendly, and enemy lives. Enclosure 3 Report Washington, undated SELECTED EXAMPLES OF RCA USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA a. “An NVA regiment resisted conventional assaults for two days resulting in heavy casualties to two companies in spite of air, artillery, and even B–52 attacks. Two helicopter loads of grenades effectively dislodged the enemy and his position was taken in two hours with only two casualties.” b. “Riot control agent CS was used extensively and effectively against an estimated 1000 troops in the vicinity of a survivor. Employment of CS was invaluable to the successful rescue.” c. “CS, combined with smoke, effectively screened an area concentrated with small arms and automatic weapons and allowed the helicopter rescue of two survivors without aircraft damage.” d. “Riot Control Agent in the form of CBU–19, combined with other ordnance, contributed to the successful rescue of a downed pilot in an extremely hostile environment. In such an area, employment of CBU–19 is an automatic requirement just prior to the rescue attempt. In addition to causing temporary incapacitation, the screening properties of CS, along with smoke, are considered very effective.” e. “One example of the use of RCA to clear tunnels and caves took place when 44 enemy who had been pursued in a lively fire fight for nearly a kilometer were finally driven into a cave. Ten CS grenades were thrown into the cave by a pursuing US platoon. All 44 enemy departed, with no firing. Only one VC was even wounded; he refused to follow directions. All VC weapons were captured. The entire platoon was therefore available for interrogation.” f. “A trooper related that he could recall vividly jumping off a helicopter which had put him down within 20 meters of an NVA soldier armed with an AK–47 but who fortunately had been completely incapacitated by CS.” g. “During a 17-day period, 13 helicopters received hits by enemy ground fire while flying over the Hobo Woods in III CTZ. Following each incident airstrikes and artillery were placed on suspected enemy positions. The enemy was firing from well-concealed attacks were ineffective. In order to flush the enemy out-of these-positions, CS was employed. Subsequent flights over the same area during the next three weeks were made without a single incident of enemy ground-to-air fire.” h. “Helicopters had been receiving sporadic ground fire from a village. Leaflets were dropped over the village telling inhabitants to stop firing at aircraft or suffer the consequences. Fire continued from the village and new leaflets were dropped telling the people that they were warned and must be dealt with unless they left the village. Many villagers heeded the advice and left. Nonpersistent CS was then dropped on the village and followed by a ground sweep without a shot being fired. Since this employment, no ground fire has been received from this village.” i. “An armored cavalry troop securing an engineer platoon had been ambushed twice a day for two days in a row. The engineers were removing a Bailey bridge located about five kilometers from the NDP, reached by a single, restricted access route. E158R2 CS canisters were dropped immediately in front of the troops as they proceeded down the road. All ground personnel were masked and the column was driven through the dense agent cloud. Using this technique, not one round was fired at the column in the remaining three days of the operation.” j. “With the increasing frequency of indirect fire attacks, a means was sought whereby rapid counter-battery fire could be delivered with minimum effect on noncombatants in the launch area. Within the capital military district, 105mm CS was employed in a counter rocket/mortar role as a method for rapid neutralization of actual or suspected rocket or mortar locations in short enough time to prevent a second volley of rockets or prolonged attacks by mortar. In one period, CS rounds were expended during 17 rocket attacks and not once in any of those attacks was a second volley of rockets fired. Agent CS thus allows rapid reaction to enemy initiatives when the launch site is in close proximity to friendly troops or in densely populated areas. It has precluded sustained attack by stand-off means and has made the introduction of standard 122mm or 107mm rocket launchers tactically unsound because of the inability to fire successive volleys and because the rapid response permitted by CS use increases the difficulty in evacuating the launcher before retaliatory measures are taken. Although obviously not quantifiable, CS use in this role saves innumerable civilian lives.” k. “In the period immediately after TET 1968 the Commanding General of an ARVN Unit, in an attempt to curtail the VC resupply effort, decreed that villagers in his area would not be allowed to transport large amounts of foodstuffs at any one time. He received US support in the form of gunship surveillance. Within a few days bicycle and scooter riders with large bags of rice slung across the backs of their bikes were observed. At first a few warning gunship rounds ’across the bow’ succeeded in turning them around; but in very short order, the riders were back again, this time in addition to the rice they also carried women, and children; knowing the Americans would not shoot to kill, they did not respond to the warning shots. However, one of the gunners had some CS grenades on board; he dropped them in front of bicycles, which when they reached the edge of the cloud, promptly turned around. Word of this new effective technique apparently was rapidly circulated since the traffic of the food transporters immediately declined.” l. “One unit had received heavy fire from a village and the ground commander requested artillery fire. The Division Commander was reluctant to use HE in attacking the village. The enemy was located within a small area in the village and accuracy and time were important. The decision was made to use CS mortar rounds while HE fires were authorized only as a last resort and only on small targets. The mortars were required to register outside the village with HE prior to shifting to the village with CS; four tubes delivered 80 rounds of CS on the village within two and one-half minutes, ground troops then swept the area encountering only minor resistance. The village was taken without casualties or major damage.” m. “Damage to property as well as civilian and military casualties during combat in urban areas can be reduced by the use of RCA. While not the sole means of achieving these goals, CS was employed effectively to drive enemy personnel from buildings and fortified positions. This has lessened the requirement to engage in sustained combat in urban areas. The use of CS from helicopters permits rapid clearance of villages. Because of the haste with which personnel leave the buildings, little time is available for hiding or caching weapons and munitions. Single munitions such as grenades can save lives in reconnoitering caves, tunnels and houses within a village. The number of casualties both to the attacking force and to noncombatants are greatly reduced. In one case, a company attempted to clear a village and in the course of the day sustained 12 casualties. When RCA was employed the village was swept within one hour with no casualties “to either side.” n. Many troops have used single CS grenades in reconnaissance of villages. One grenade very effectively assures that no personnel remain in a house. This has lessened friendly casualties and reduced the danger to noncombatants who are merely hiding. A similar technique has proved effective in tunnels and bunkers in heavily populated areas where civilians may be hiding.” 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, 370.64 CBR (Jul–). Secret. Davis circulated the memorandum and its attachments to Laird and other officials, under cover of a memorandum in which she requested comments before December 28. (Ibid.) 247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 247. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 23, 1971. Subject: Signing Ceremony for the Convention on Biological Weapons We should begin planning for the signature ceremony for the Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction) which was negotiated this year at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. On December 16 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved, by a vote of 110–0–1, a resolution commending the Convention and requesting the depositary government (US, UK, USSR) to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. Following the procedure used last year in the case of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department would plan to have the Convention signed by the chief negotiator of the Convention, Ambassador James F. Leonard, and me. The ambassadors of the UK, the Soviet Union and other ambassadors accredited to the United States would sign for their respective countries. Also following last year’s procedure, we propose to arrange, in consultation with the UK and the Soviet Union, for signing ceremonies to be held on the same date in Washington, London and Moscow. The ceremonies could be held sometime in early February, prior to the reconvening of the CCD on February 29. The Soviets also suggest this timing. This would provide time in January for other countries to get ready and lay the basis for a good turnout at the signing ceremony. It would be useful to propose to the UK and the Soviet Union a choice of specific dates, such as February 1, February 3 or February 8. Early this year you participated in the signing of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty at the Department of State on February 11. The BW Convention stems from your decision to renounce all biological weapons and to work for a treaty prohibiting such weapons. Your participation at the signing ceremony in Washington would therefore be highly appropriate and would provide the opportunity for you to make a brief statement. The ceremony would not last more than about half an hour. The ceremony might be held in the White House. This was done in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Alternatively, the ceremony could be held in the international conference room of the Department of State, as was the case when the Seabed Arms Control Treaty was signed. While the BW Convention is unquestionably a noteworthy achievement, it does not rank in importance with the NPT and a ceremony in the State Department would therefore seem to be the most appropriate. As soon as we know whether you are planning to participate and have an indication which dates would be convenient, we will coordinate with the British and Soviets to reach firm agreement on a date. If you plan to attend, we will at a later time provide further information and suggestions about the ceremony, as well as suggested speaking points for your remarks. Recommendations 1. That, particularly given your identification with this issue, you participate in the signing ceremony of the BW Convention. 2. That the White House indicate alternative dates for the ceremony so that we can work out an agreed date with the British and Soviet governments. 3. That the signing ceremony be held in the Department of State. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Van Novena (ACDA/IR). 248. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 248. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 28, 1971. Subject: NSSM 112 In response to the request from your Office for Agency comments on the IPMG memorandum on NSSM 112, and on the DoD studies enclosed therewith: 1. ACDA agrees that the basic issue presented by NSSM 112 - whether the US should at this time continue to preserve the option to initiate the use of RCAs and herbicides in war - is the same as that in the Geneva Protocol study. We also believe that the new DoD studies do not generate a need to modify the judgments and evaluations contained in the Geneva Protocol study. 2. While the DoD studies illustrate the undisputed fact that in certain special circumstances the unilateral use of RCAs and herbicides against an unprotected enemy can be helpful in achieving tactical objectives, they do not purport to deal with the political costs of preserving the option to make first use of such agents in war, and they do not adequately analyze the net military utility of that option. Specifically: (a) They do not provide sufficient quantitative information to form a judgment on how often the advantages claimed for these agents in Vietnam were in fact realized, or how often they would be likely to be realized in future conflicts. Without some quantification and an evaluation of alternative methods it is difficult to assess objectively the net contribution of tear gas and herbicide use in Southeast Asia to our objectives there, and the importance of this contribution in view of other national objectives. (b) They do not give sufficient emphasis to the marginal utility of RCAs against forces equipped with protective masks. (Army technical manual TM 3–215, states that tear agents “have little more than nuisance value in war in view of the effectiveness of the modern protective mask.”) (c) The projection by the Deseret Test Center of possible utility of RCAs in hypothetical future conflicts does not give adequate attention to the limitations on such utility in a conflict where the other side has such protective masks or a good capability to retaliate with these or other chemical weapons. Three of the four hypothetical cases considered (combat in Europe, against sophisticated forces in the Middle East, or against semi-sophisticated forces in Korea) would involve just such limitations. In the fourth (against insurgents in Latin America) such agents would seem to have limited utility at best under the stated premise that “the U.S. ground combat role is limited to securing major logistical bases and providing necessary advisory and technical assistance.” Although RCAs might have utility in individual tactical situations in the four cases cited, first use of RCAs would appear to offer at most a marginal net advantage and could work to our disadvantage if the enemy also used RCAs or other chemical weapons in retaliation. (d) Similar shortcomings are evident in the DoD analysis of the military effectiveness of herbicides. The most extensive use of herbicides in Vietnam has involved application over wide areas. Effective dissemination for this purpose requires air superiority and sufficient lack of enemy mobility or a sufficiently stabilized military situation to allow time for the herbicides to become effective. Consequently, effective wide area application of herbicides would not be feasible in a conflict with a sophisticated enemy. In assessing the contribution of herbicides to our efforts in Vietnam and future counterinsurgency situations, inadequate attention is given to the negative effect of such uses on vitally important pacification programs and on attempts to maintain the confidence and support of the local population. The adverse effects of herbicide use on the pacification program in Vietnam indicates that military applications of herbicides, while useful in certain tactical situations, may in the long run prove detrimental to our overall objectives. (e) None of the DoD studies addresses the possibility that, in the case of countries (such as the Soviet Union) which ratified the Geneva Protocol with a no-first use reservation and consider that it covers RCAs and herbicides, our use of such agents against them could relieve them of their legal obligations under the Protocol to our allies. This has potential military significance in view of the chemical weapon capability of the Soviet Union and the poor state of CW defenses in Western Europe. 4. A political consideration supplementing those discussed in the Geneva Protocol study is the possibility that the BW Convention will be opened for signature early in 1972. U.S. ratification is a prerequisite to its coming into force. If the President wishes to round out his initiative on BW by bringing this Convention into force this year, and thus secure binding obligations by other states to follow the U.S. example, there are strong indications that the Foreign Relations Committee will seek, as a condition to acting on this Convention, modification of the Administration’s position on RCAs and herbicides. 5. We share the view of the IPMG that the essential factors required for a decision on this matter are presented in the Geneva Protocol study, and consider it unlikely that further studies will materially affect the analysis of such factors made therein. We reconfirm the recommendations made in our memorandum of September 17, in which our first choice was Option B, Alternative 4 (i.e., to announce that, while we continue to believe that our understandings are legally and substantively correct, we will hereafter treat the Protocol as prohibiting the first use of RCAs and herbicides). Philip J. Farley Acting Director 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, DD/ACDA, P. Farley Subject Files, March 1969–June 1973: FRC 383–98–96, Chron Files: Deputy Director, ACDA, J. Philip Farley, September–December 1971. Secret. 249. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 249. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 14, 1971. Subject: NSSM 112 With regard to the December 1 memorandum of the NSC Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in response to NSSM 112, the Department agrees that the DOD analyses reflected in the NSSM 112 study do not require modification of the judgments and evaluations contained in the IPMG study on the Geneva Protocol, forwarded to the President on August 26, 1971, and reaffirms its recommendation thereon dated October 5, 1971. The Protocol study reflected in a general way the uncertainties which exist as to the overall utility of riot control agents and chemical herbicides as weapon systems for use in furthering U.S. national security interests. Many of these uncertainties, which the Department believes are underscored rather than reduced by the NSSM 112 study, are highlighted in paragraph 2 of the ACDA memorandum of December 28, 1971. In addition, we would emphasize that the DOD study on herbicides makes no claim for the military utility of these agents for crop destruction. Other studies by the U.S. Mission in Vietnam, such as the 1968 Herbicide Policy Review and the 1970 Interagency 203 Committee Study on Crop Destruction, cast serious doubt on the military utility of herbicides for this purpose, while pointing to substantial non-military effects. These effects would have been greater except for the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Mission on use of herbicides, but another country in a future war might choose to use herbicides for massive crop destruction without imposing such restrictions upon itself, resulting in long-term hardships beyond the scope of the conflict. We should make special efforts to prohibit their use in the future for crop destruction. In the light of the doubts which continue to exist as to the overall utility of RCAs and herbicides, and for the other reasons set forth in its memorandum of October 5, 1971, relating to the Geneva Protocol study, the Department of State adheres to its recommendation that the Administration reaffirm the previous U.S. contention that the Protocol does not cover RCAs or chemical herbicides, but state that we are willing to renounce the first use of these agents against states which officially confirm that they are bound on the same basis. In the Department’s view, the immediate question is that of timing of a decision on the Protocol. In this regard, there are essentially three options open to the Administration: — First, we can reaffirm our present contention that the Protocol does not cover RCAs and herbicides and take no further initiative. This probably would result in an indefinite delay in ratification of the Protocol. — Second, we can make reference to current ongoing studies and postpone temporarily any decision vis-à-vis the Protocol, pending their completion. — Third, we can take a new initiative at the beginning of this next session of Congress aimed at overcoming the present impasse with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and at obtaining the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification. We do not believe that considerations affecting the timing of any action to be taken on the Geneva Protocol are crucial; nevertheless we see some advantage in moving ahead at this time. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol commands widespread popular support over and above the related question of riot control agents and herbicides. The primary argument against moving now would be raised by the selection of an option which would rule out continuing use of herbicides or RCAs in Vietnam, or which would have a broader and less well-defined adverse impact on our future use of RCAs or herbicides in possible conflict areas outside of Vietnam. We have considered this argument carefully and, in our view, the recommended option on the Protocol would be consistent with any foreseeable future military needs. We therefore recommend that the President move now to seek advice and consent to ratification in the next session of the Congress, along the lines suggested in our October 5 recommendation, for the following reasons: (1) Ratification will fulfill a pledge made by this Administration in November of 1969 when the President set forth his far-reaching decisions on chemical and biological warfare, including his decision to seek ratification of the Geneva Protocol; (2) An initiative to break the deadlock on ratification would receive wide, favorable support at home, both in Congress and with the general public. It would indicate as well the Administration’s willingness to compromise with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee without diluting its own basic position; (3) While the Geneva Protocol study of August 26 raised the possibility that the NSSM 112 study might provide an additional, persuasive public justification for our present understanding of the Protocol, we believe the NSSM 112 study will not have that effect. In fact, rather than reinforcing our present position, the NSSM 112 study, if made public or introduced in executive session in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would be more likely to undercut that position by highlighting the uncertainties which remain as to overall utility of RCAs and herbicides; (4) Ratification would contribute to U.S. international stature on the verge of the President’s visits to Peking and MOSCOW and could contribute to the arms control negotiating process soon to resume in Geneva in the CCD; and (5) Finally, assuming the option recommended by the Department of State is accepted, no unacceptable military liabilities would be imposed because of the requirement for reciprocity both in undertaking the initial obligation and in refraining from use of these agents in time of war; furthermore, considerable time and negotiation would be required before any military programs of the United States would be affected. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary 1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Secret. 250. Telegram 37639 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 250. Telegram 37639 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, March 4, 1972 SUBJECT: Signing of BW Convention 1. Amb. Dobrynin (USSR) called on Assistant Secretary DePalma in order to propose, on instructions, that biological weapons convention be signed in Moscow, Washington and London during the week of March 20 to 24. Dobrynin explained that UNGA resolution called for signature of BWC at early date and accordingly Sov government had proposed signature in February. However, since that had not been possible, Sov government would now like to see signature in March. 2. Dobrynin said that Sov government also proposed that the signing be accomplished at the foreign minister level in the presence of heads of government. DePalma asked if Soviets therefore expected Kosygin to be present at signing in Moscow and Dobrynin replied “certainly”. Dobrynin explained that both seabed treaty and NPT treaty had been signed in presence of heads of government and Soviets believe there should be no appearance of downgrading of BW treaty. 3. DePalma said that US government also regarded BW treaty as of great importance and hoped that signing could be accomplished in the near future. He said that entire matter was now under consideration at high levels in the US government and we hoped to have response for the Soviets fairly soon. DePalma also commented that the US was making considerable efforts with other governments to encourage greatest possible number of signatures at opening signing and it now looked as though more than 60 countries might sign on opening day. 4. Just prior to meeting with Dobrynin, UK emboff called ACDA official to report on similar demarche that Soviets had made to British in London. UK official in London told Russians that if signing took place 20 to 24 March, Douglas-Home would be out of town and not able to attend. However, senior foreign office minister could sign in presence of Prime Minister. Foreign office has just ascertained, according to British emboff, that signing on this basis could take place anytime on 22 March or late in the afternoon of March 23. British emboff expressed hope that US government could take this information into account. End. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27–10. Confidential. Also sent to London. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, and USUN. Drafted on March 3 by Neidle (ACDA/IR); cleared by De Palma (IO) and Shaw (PM); and approved by Leonard (ACDA/IR). 251. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 251. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington March 9, 1972 SUBJECT: Signing Ceremony for Biological Weapons Treaty Dave Parker has (1) informed us that the President has decided not to participate in the signing ceremony for the biological weapons treaty, but (2) indicated that an appeal of this decision would be considered if it spelled out what the President’s and Secretary Rogers’ roles would be in the ceremony. Secretary Rogers has requested that the President reconsider and agree to attend (Tab A). The Secretary notes inter alia that: (1) In a demarche on March 3, Ambassador Dobrynin proposed that the ceremony for the biological weapons treaty be like the NPT and Seabeds ceremonies with Foreign Ministers signing in the presence of their Heads of State and urged that there be no appearance of downgrading this treaty. (2) The British seem prepared and even anxious to have Prime Minister Heath attend the ceremony in London. (3) A decision by the President not to participate would appear to the Soviets as a specific rejection of Dobrynin’s demarche , and would puzzle if not seriously disappoint the British. In view of the above, I think the President’s decision should be appealed. The revised schedule proposal at Tab 1 recommends that he reconsider and attend the ceremony to be arranged for late March or possibly early April. Recommendation: That you forward the revised schedule proposal to the President (Tab 1). Tab A Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 9, 1972 Subject: Signing Ceremony for the Convention on Biological Weapons I understand that you are not certain of the advisability of your attending the ceremony for the signing of the recently negotiated convention to prohibit manufacture and possession of biological weapons. The ceremony could be in late March as proposed by the Soviets and the British, or possibly in April. I believe that there are important considerations in favor of your attendance, including the following: 1. You attended the signing ceremony for the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. President Johnson attended the signing ceremony for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which took place at the White House. Thus, both recent multilateral arms control treaties were signed in the presence of the President. (The SALT Accidents agreement was a bi-lateral executive agreement.) 2. In a recent demarche of March 3, on instruction of the Soviet government, Ambassador Dobrynin proposed that the Biological Weapons Treaty be signed in Washington, London and Moscow in the presence of heads of government. He urged that there should be no appearance of downgrading the Biological Weapons Treaty in comparison with the Seabed and Non-Proliferation Treaties. 3. A decision conveyed now to the Soviets that you will not participate would appear to them as a specific rejection of Dobrynin’s demarche. Since the Soviets might well take a decision by you not to participate as a “snub” in an area where their willingness to reverse their own policy in multilateral negotiations had made international agreement possible, there could be negative ramifications affecting cooperation with the Soviets in future disarmament negotiations. 4. The British seem prepared and even anxious to have their Prime Minister attend the signing ceremony in London. The British correctly claim credit for having initiated the idea of a separate Biological Weapons Treaty even before you announced our renunciation of biological weapons. The British would therefore be at least puzzled, and probably seriously disappointed, if you decided not to attend the ceremony. 5. The Biological Weapons Treaty has been closely associated with your decisions and initiatives in the field of controlling chemical and biological weapons. The United States took the leading role in urging the Soviets to adopt a position parallel to our own (i.e. separate treatment for chemical weapons and for biological weapons), and when the Soviets finally shifted their position towards our own, a treaty was possible. Your participation therefore seems especially appropriate. 6. In view of presidential participation in prior comparable ceremonies and the importance of your earlier decision in renouncing biological warfare for the United States, the Soviets might believe that a decision by you not to participate results from some special consideration in our relations with the People’s Republic of China. (The People’s Republic has not supported the Biological Weapons Treaty.) The Soviets will, of course, be particularly sensitive at this time to any possible indications of United States “cooling” towards projects or activities in which we and they have played leading and cooperative roles. Recommendation That you agree to attend the ceremony for the signing of the Biological Weapons Treaty to be held at the State Department, on a date convenient for you which will be coordinated with the British and the Soviets to permit parallel ceremonies in their capitals. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent through Walsh. Below the “Recommendation” line Sonnenfeldt wrote, “I reluctantly concur in view of Sec Rogers’ appeal. HS.” Below that, Kissinger wrote, “Add that Dobrynin has appealed because Kosygin will participate,” presumably meaning that Guhin should add the information to the schedule proposal for the President. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. At the top of the memorandum is written “Rush,” with a line linking “Rush” to Kissinger’s note at the bottom. The schedule proposal is not published. 252. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 252. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 10, 1971. Subject: Biological Weapons Convention, the President’s Attendance at Signing Ceremony As I said to you on the phone yesterday, I think it would be important for the President to be present at the signing ceremony, which might be late this month or next month. I think that his absence would be taken by the Soviets as a sign that the President is for some reason less interested in lending his prestige to this latest instance of US-Soviet agreement than was the case when he attended the signing of the Seabed Treaty. The Soviets will almost certainly wonder whether the China trip is the intervening factor, and once they speculate about this, it is doubtful that any amount of explanation would make them feel certain that it was not. The question comes in a particularly sharp manner now because the Soviets, through Ambassador Dobrynin, formally suggested on March 3 that the signing should take place with heads of government present. Dobrynin cited the President’s presence when the NPT and the Seabed Treaty were signed. As you know, the Soviets made the main “concessions” during the negotiations. In effect, they switched from an all-or-nothing C and B ban to adopt the position put forth by the President, as well as the UK, that B weapons should be prohibited first. The Soviets and we, as Co-Chairmen at the Geneva Conference, then worked together effectively to obtain broad support for our approach. If the Soviets now come to feel that the President was less interested in being associated with such a success, suspecting that the China trip was a factor, the impact on future efforts with the Soviets could not help but be negative. On the positive side, I think the BW Treaty is a particularly solid arms control achievement. It was overwhelmingly approved at the UN and universally praised in the US press. More than 60 countries, including most of our allies, will probably sign it at the opening. Gerard Smith P.S. You will recall that the Peoples’ Republic has criticized the BW Convention. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V. Confidential. 253. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) 253. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) 1 Washington, March 17, 1971. (Picked up in middle of conversation) D: You have the paper in front of you? K: No, I have it of course but I don’t have it in front of me - my staff assistant is not here - but you go ahead and read it to me. D: First, the United States and the USSR will proceed on the premise that it would be impossible to improve mutual relations. K: No - that is a typing error. Of course it is possible not impossible. It is a typing error. D: I don’t know … K: Well, let me check it. That word should be “possible” and I will call you right back. D: Secondly, what about the … biological … K: On a personal basis I have very strong recommended it to the President and it is inconceivable that he …. D: Moscow is asking me for a reply K: There will be a reply. D: Officially you are not going to do it. K: No we will get a positive reply by Monday night. D: It is soon the 20th already - between the 20th and the 24th. K: They are now thinking of the 28th. D: … British proposal … K: I don’t care just as long as we get them to do it. D: In the middle of March … Moscow … K: Are you talking about in the middle of April? D: No, I am talking about March - we discussed between the 20th and 24th. The British said the 28 of March. … D: Let me first get the President’s agreement and then State will work out a mutual reply no later than Monday. D: Is it right to presume it will be March. K: It is possible. D: Will you be here on Monday. K: Look I have the paper now - the word should be “possible” - it is a typing error… D: … 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 395, Telephone Conversations, Dobrynin, September 1971–April 1972. No classification marking. 254. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Chief of Staff (Haldeman) 254. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Chief of Staff (Haldeman) 1 Washington, March 17, 1972, 3:05–4:37 p.m. [The tape begins in mid-sentence.] Haldeman: …biological weapons signing, which we turned down. Henry and Bill both ask that you reconsider and that you go, because Dobrynin has urged that you attend because Kosygin will attend the ceremony in Moscow and the British want Heath to attend the ceremony in London. The concern is that if you do not participate it will look like a rejection of Dobrynin’s demarche on [unclear.] Nixon: All right, I’ll do it. Haldeman: And also that you might have [unclear] the China thing— Nixon: Do I have to say anything? Haldeman: Yeah, you’d have to say that it’s a great thing [unclear.] Now we can move it to the [White] House if you want to instead of doing it at the State Department. Nixon: Could we do that for a change? Haldeman: We can, but it’s about 70 Ambassadors for that little [unclear] so it’s - Nixon: So we should do it at the State Department? Haldeman: It’s a big thing. We could do it in the East Room with all of them sitting in chairs if you want them to. It’s a little [unclear.] Nixon: Do it up at State. Haldeman: I think somebody——somebody will say you’re downgrading the State Department again. Nixon: Go ahead [unclear.] [Omitted here is discussion of another topic.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 323–33. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 255. Draft Convention on Chemical Weapons 255. Draft Convention on Chemical Weapons 1 Geneva, March 28, 1972 Communist Draft Convention On the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, March 28, 1972 1 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including first of all the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological, Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical agents, Recalling that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons, 2 Recognizing the important Significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 3 and also the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly, and particularly in resolution 2827A(XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 4 condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of chemical agents being used as weapons, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Chemical agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or m armed conflict. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than …. months after the entry into force of the Convention, all chemical agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article 1 of the Convention which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary, measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, this Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI (1) Any State Party to the Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article VII Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of this Convention. Article VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Article IX The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemical agents for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the international exchange of chemical agents and equipment for the processing, use or production of chemical agents for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. Article X Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it of the amendments. Article XI Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention. Article XII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other, States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIII (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ——- which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit Of the instruments of ratification by ——- Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XIV This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States, In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. Done in ———- copies at ———- this ———- day of ———-, ———- 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 120–124. No classification marking. For text of the U.S. Work Program regarding negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted to the CCD on March 20, and the statement of the U.S. Representative on chemical weapons, made March 21, see ibid., pp. 98—113. 1 CCD/361, Mar. 28, 1971. The draft convention was submitted to the CCD on Mar. 28 by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR. 2 Post, pp. 133–138. 3 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 764–765. 4 Ibid., 1971, pp. 890–892. 256. Editorial Note. 256. Editorial Note. 1 On April 10, 1972, in a ceremony in the Main Conference Room of the U.S. Department of State, representatives from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, more commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention. President Nixon spoke at the ceremony. In several conversations in the Oval Office on April 10 and 11 the President and members of his administration discussed the Convention, the President’s speech, and the importance of arms control in general. In addition, National Security Advisor to the President Kissinger and President Nixon discussed ways to use the occasion of the ceremony to publicly, but indirectly, rebuke the Soviet Union for what they believed was its support of a recent Democratic Republic of Vietnam offensive against the Republic of Vietnam. Excerpts from those conversations are published below. For the text of Nixon’s speech at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972 , pages 525–526. For text of Secretary Rogers’ June 21 report to the President on the negotiation and terms of the Convention, made in anticipation of its transmittal to the Senate for its advice consent to ratification, see Document 257 . In a conversation on April 10 with Kissinger and Ambassador William Porter after the signing ceremony, the President made the following comments on his decision to make a less effusive statement about the agreement and the state of U.S.-Soviet relations than the Department of State had recommended: The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recordings published here specifically for this volume. “Let me say, it doesn’t do any good, Bill, to follow up a lie. Now, I don’t mean that you get out there and are a belligerent son-of-a-bitch. [unclear]. I’ve heard all the crap about, you know, that science-that we’ll work in peace. We all want that. Everybody believes in that. But goddamn, why talk about it too much? That’s all the remarks were about, you know…But, for an opportunity like this to be missed. For the Soviet Ambassador sitting there, having just supported the Indians against Pakistan, and then having over the past two years supported the UAR and increasing the danger of war in the Mideast, and now at the present time with Soviet tanks and Soviet guns rumbling through South Vietnam and for me to sit there and sign it say, “Isn’t it great that we’ve now had three agreements and we hope to have a SALT agreement.” I couldn’t do it. So I just said, “By God.” Don’t you agree? We’ve got to say these things.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, April 10, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:23 p.m., Conversation No. 705–9) Later that afternoon, while reviewing a transcript of his presentation with Kissinger, the President commented on the speech and asked Kissinger for his opinion. Nixon: Just scan it quickly. See all the gobbledy-gook about all the people who have worked their asses off. I said that for the benefit of Gerry Smith and all that bunch. Kissinger: It’s a disgrace that you should do so much better with no preparation then [unclear] have done. Nixon: Go ahead and read the last of it. Kissinger: Excellent. Nixon: You get the point? Now if any smart guy in the press [unclear]. Kissinger: They’ll pick it up. Nixon: Huh? The press? That’s all right. But we really warned them there, haven’t we? Now that really is the way that, you know, surprise [unclear]. Kissinger: Yeah, but what is so - Nixon: A year’s worth [unclear]. Kissinger: What is so remarkable here, Mr. President, is that this is full of nuance, beautifully put, and I know that you had practically no time to prepare it, if any time. It shows you how limited that these guys are. At this point, Kissinger raised the topic of Vietnam and CIA Director Helms, and the tape cut out abruptly. When it picked up again the two had returned to the subject of the President’s speech. Nixon: This isn’t too badly put. Kissinger: It’s superbly put. Nixon: “But as we look at these various agreements, we must understand how much they mean, and also what we still need”-this is wrong, it says, “they say”- “What we still need if we are to achieve our ultimate goal. As far as these agreements are concerned, they are basically not an end in themselves.” See that sticks to the son-of-a-bitches in arms control. “They limit arms but they do not mean the end of war. They are means to an end and that end is peace.” And then I put in this crap about the university community of scientists. That’s for [unclear]. It’s not bad. That’ll bring them around to China. “[unclear] against the enemy of all mankind-disease.” Let’s not have that. “For that reason, this agreement [unclear].” But you really get to the guts of it, what you prepared. “Insofar as that goal is concerned, we begin with one proposition. That is that each nation of the world must renounce the use of force, the use of aggression against other nations.” Kissinger: I didn’t put that in. That you put in. Nixon: “We must also recognize”-see that goes back to China. Kissinger: That’s right. After reading a few more lines from the transcript, the two began discussing a proposed meeting between Mrs. Nixon and Mrs. Dobrynin. The President’s Press Secretary, Ron Ziegler, entered the room and presumably handed Kissinger a press release or wire report about the speech. Kissinger read some of the copy aloud. After briefly returning to the subject of Vietnam, the President again raised the subject of his presentation at the convention signing ceremony. “I’ll bet ya’ that the disarmament boys at ACDA are probably just shitting their pants because of this thing…because we should have kept the emphasis on peace and all that. The hell with them. That was senseless to make us sit there with the Soviet Ambassador at a time when they’re raping South Vietnam and say that they have made a great contribution to peace by signing this silly biological warfare thing which doesn’t mean anything. Now you know it and I know it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, April 10, 1972, 12:44–1:06 p.m., Conversation No. 705–13.) Similarly, during a conversation with Haldeman that afternoon, Nixon made the following comments about the convention and the role of arms control in general in international affairs: “But the main thrust of my remarks is far more fundamental than “arms control doesn’t mean peace.” It’s not an end in itself. You see, that’s directly contrary to what the Gerry Smiths and the others and the Bill Fosters, they all look upon arms control as an end in itself. That’s the Soviet line. It is not an end in itself. The purpose of arms control is the means to the end and the control of war. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, April 10, 1972, 4:00–4:41 p.m., Conversation No. 705–15) The next day, Nixon referred to the speech again during a discussion with Treasury Secretary Connally on the North Vietnamese offensive: “That’s why I gave them a little shot across the bow yesterday where I-at that-went over to sign that jackass treaty on biological warfare. And I said, “Well.” I said, “It isn’t just arms limitation, as an end in itself.” We’ve had the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Warfare, that Seabeds [sic] because with all the arms limitation in the world there’s still enough arms left to blow up the world many times over. What we need is restraint on the part of the great powers. And as you may have noted, I said that that means that, ‘Every great power must not only exercise restraint in the use of force as an instrument of aggression. But it must not encourage, directly or indirectly, any other power to use force,’ which was a direct shot at the Russians.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, April 11, 1972, 3:06–5:05 p.m., Conversation No. 706–5) 1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, April 11, 1972, 3:06–5:05 p.m., Conversation No. 706–5 257. Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 257. Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 21, 1972 Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and on Their Destruction, June 21, 1972 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., June 21, 1972 . THE PRESIDENT, The White House. The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a certified copy of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and on their Destruction. The Convention was opened for signature at Washington, London and Moscow on April 10, 1972. Seventy-four States, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed the Convention in Washington on that date. 2 A number of other States have also signed the Convention in one or more of the three capitals. In January 1969, immediately after this Administration took office, the Secretary of Defense initiated a review of all chemical and biological programs within his Department. In April you directed that the National Security Council conduct a comprehensive study of United States policies and programs relating to chemical and biological warfare. This was the first such review ever undertaken on this subject at the Presidential level. On November 25, 1969, you announced that the study had been completed and that you had made several decisions on the basis of that review. At that time you announced that the United States was unilaterally renouncing biological methods of warfare and would destroy its existing stocks of these weapons. 3 On February 14, 1970, a further, closely related step was taken. As a result of a study of our policy and programs concerning toxins subsequent to your November announcement, the United States also renounced the use of toxins as a method of warfare. 4 In May 1971, the Department of Defense announced that plans to destroy the United States inventory of bacteriological and toxin weapons at Pine Bluff, 5 Arkansas had been cleared by interested agencies and would proceed forthwith. Similar announcements with respect to other facilities were made in July 1971. 6 All anti-personnel agents have now been destroyed. Destruction of anti-crop material is continuing and will be completed before the end of 1972. With respect to Fort Detrick, Maryland, it was announced on October 18, 1971, that this facility would be converted into a cancer research center. Included in your November 25 announcement was the positive association of the United States with the principles and objectives of the draft Convention on Biological Weapons that had been submitted by the United Kingdom at the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, now the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), in July 1969. 7 Important provisions of the present Convention are derived from that United Kingdom draft, which was revised in 1970 after extensive discussion at the CCD. 8 At our suggestion, the coverage of the United Kingdom draft was expanded to include toxins. 9 Other provisions of the Convention are based on a draft convention presented at the Geneva conference in March 1971 by the Soviet Union and a number of its allies. 10 Following the tabling by the United States and by the Soviet Union and its allies of identical drafts of a convention prohibiting biological and toxin weapons at Geneva on August 5, 1970, [1971] 11 the representatives of Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia presented a paper containing specific suggestions which are reflected in the present text. 12 Other recommendations reflected in the language of this Convention and in statements regarding its interpretation were put forward at Geneva by representatives of Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. On September 28, 1971, a final revised draft text was cosponsored in Geneva by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, together with Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania. 13 This text was forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly for its consideration. On December 16, 1971, by a vote of 110–0, with one abstention, the General Assembly commended this draft text and requested that the Convention be opened for signature and ratification at an early date. 14 The Convention consists of a Preamble and 15 Articles. The Preamble contains ten paragraphs expressing the consensus of the Parties. The first expresses the belief that an agreement eliminating biological weapons will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament: the second recognizes the significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; 15 the third reaffirms the adherence of the Parties to the principles and objectives of the Protocol; the fourth recalls condemnations by the United Nations of all actions contrary to those principles and objectives; the fifth and sixth express the desire to contribute to the improvement of the international atmosphere and to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; the seventh notes the importance of eliminating chemical and biological weapons; the eighth expresses the determination to continue negotiations on effective measures for prohibiting chemical weapons; the ninth expresses the determination to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons; and the final preambular paragraphs expresses the conviction that the use of such weapons would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. In Article I, the Parties undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment and means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Many Parties to the Geneva Protocol have, in their ratification of that Agreement, entered reservations regarding the right to use weapons covered by the Protocol (including biological and toxin weapons) in retaliation against States Parties which themselves use such weapons in violation of the Protocol. The phrase “never in any circumstances” in Article I of this Convention makes it clear that, as a practical matter, these reservations would not result in any exception to the total prohibition of biological and toxin weapons achieved by the Convention. Moreover, since war would obviously be one of the “circumstances” referred to, the phrase “never in any circumstances” emphasizes the intention of the Parties that this Convention remain in full force and effect in time of war. The inclusion of this phrase does not, of course, prejudice the rights of Parties under the withdrawal clause in Article XIII. While this Convention does not explicitly ban the use of biological weapons, no Party to the Convention would be permitted to possess such weapons even in wartime. There is no possibility that a Party could use biological or toxin weapons without being in violation of Articles I and II of this Convention. The phrase “whatever their origin or method of production” after the word “toxins” in Article I is intended to ensure that the concept of toxins will be interpreted broadly and that toxins produced synthetically, as well as those produced naturally by bacteriological or other biological organisms, would be covered by the prohibition. Toxins are poisonous chemical substances which are naturally produced by living organisms and which, if present in the body, produce effects comparable to those of infection by hostile organisms. The provisions of Article I would not permit any quantities of the agents or toxins covered to be developed, produced, stockpiled, acquired or retained for hostile purposes or for use in armed conflict. Nor would they permit the stockpiling or retention for non-peaceful purposes of agents or toxins that, when acquired, had a justification for a peaceful purpose, such as meeting hospital requirements. Article I provides that biological agents or toxins justified for purposes covered by the terms “prophylactic” and “protective” are not prohibited by this Convention. The word “prophylactic” refers to activities related to the protection of the human body from the effects of organisms or substances to which an individual might be directly exposed. It encompasses medical activities such as diagnosis, therapy and immunization, and related research. The term “protective” applies to the development of such equipment as decontamination systems, protective masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems, and detection and warning devices. Laboratory quantities of certain agents and toxins might well be required for research and testing in these areas. In order to avoid any possible ambiguity, it was made clear during the negotiation of this Convention that the terms “prophylactic” and “protective” are not intended to convey any broader meaning which would in any way permit possession of biological agents or toxins for weapons purposes on the theory that such weapons were for “defensive” warfare, retaliation or deterrence. Article II sets forth a requirement for destruction of the agents, toxins, weapons and equipment prohibited by Article I within nine months after the entry into force of this Convention. It is expected that the United States program of destruction will be completed before the expiration of this period. Article II specifies that, in carrying out such destruction, all necessary safety precautions should be observed to protect the populations of all States and the environment. We believe, as we and a number of other participants in the negotiation of this Convention have already made clear, that it would be appropriate and desirable for each Party to inform other Parties, through notices to the Depositary Governments, of actions taken in the implementation of the provisions of this Article. The United States intends to do so when its program has been completed. Article III provides that no Party shall transfer to any recipient, directly or indirectly, or assist any other State or States to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I. This Article is designed to prevent indirect participation by States Parties in the development, production or stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Article IV provides that each Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent those activities prohibited by Article I, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The question of what measures are necessary at a given time must, of course, be assessed in the light of the factual circumstances facing a State Party at that time. The governmental policies with respect to biological and toxin weapons announced on November 25, 1969 and February 14, 1970 assure compliance with the Convention by the United States Government. Article IV also contemplates the adoption by legislative or administrative action of any measures which may be necessary to prohibit and prevent private activity which would defeat the central objectives of the Convention. Existing United States statutes relevant to this obligation include the Munitions Control provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. $ 1934 (1970)) and the Export Administration Act of 1969 (50 U.S.C. App. $ 2401 et. seq. (1970)). However, additional legislation for more effective implementation of Article IV is being prepared for early submission to the Congress. Articles V, VI, and VII strengthen this Convention by establishing a framework for consideration of any problems arising under the Convention and for possible assistance to any Party endangered as a result of a violation. Article V provides for consultations and cooperation in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of the Convention or the application of its provisions. Such consultations and cooperation need not be limited to narrow questions of a possible technical violation of any particular article but may encompass as well any problems concerning the achievement of the overall objective of this Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article may be undertaken directly among Parties or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI provides that any Party to the Convention which finds that any other Party is acting in breach of its obligations under this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. In the second paragraph of Article VI each Party undertakes to cooperate with any investigation that the Security Council may initiate on the basis of such a complaint. Article VII concerns providing or supporting assistance, “in accordance with the United Nations Charter,” to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of this Convention. This Article does not, of course, alter the obligations or the rights of Parties under the United Nations Charter but reaffirms those rights and obligations in the specific context of a possible violation of this Convention. While this Article does not create any new international commitment, it stresses the importance of strict observance of the Convention by placing the question of a possible violation, resulting in danger to any State which has agreed to abide by its prohibition, on the highest plane of international concern. It was made clear during the negotiations that under this provision assistance would be provided only following a request by the endangered Party and each Party would decide for itself whether it was in a position to provide or support the form of assistance requested. In the course of the negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union expressed their view that medical or other humanitarian relief assistance would be suitable. While this Article, by its terms, would not apply until a decision by the Security Council had been made that a Party had been exposed to danger as a result of a violation, Parties would remain free to provide assistance that they deemed appropriate in the interim. Article VIII provides that nothing in this Convention shall in any way limit or detract from obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. Article IX reaffirms the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons, and contains an undertaking to continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures to eliminate such weapons. Article X is designed to encourage international cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins. It contains a general undertaking by the Parties to cooperate in efforts to facilitate the widest possible application of discoveries in the field of biology for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes. In addition, it provides for implementation of this Convention in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of Parties in this area. The Article is based on similar provisions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article XI sets forth the procedure for amendment. Any Party may propose amendments. An amendment would enter into force for each Party accepting it upon acceptance by a majority of the Parties, and for any other Party on the date it accepts the amendment. This Article is similar to a provision found in the Outer Space Treaty. Article XII provides for a review conference to be held five years after entry into force of the Convention, or earlier if requested by a majority of the Parties. The provision for a review conference was included to assure that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized, taking into account any relevant technological developments. This Article is similar to a provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 16 Article XIII provides in its first paragraph that the Convention shall be of unlimited duration and contains in its second paragraph the withdrawal clause that has been standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that a Party may withdraw from the Convention upon notice if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention have jeopardized its supreme interests. The notice period required is three months. Article XIV designates the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Depositary Governments, and provides that the Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two signatory States including the Depositary Governments. It specifies how other States may become Parties and contains provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession and registration with the United Nations. The final Article provides for official languages and other formal matters. The provisions for signature and accession have been designed to permit the widest possible application of the Convention. At the same time adherence to the Convention will in no way imply recognition or change in status of regimes the United States does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other Party. I believe that this Convention represents a major advance in arms control. Its broad acceptance will enhance the security of all countries. It will help to eliminate biological and toxin weapons from the arsenals of States, and help to ensure that advances in the field of biology, now being made at an impressive pace, will be devoted to the benefit and not to the destruction of mankind. I hope that the United States, whose ratification is required to bring the Convention into force, will become a Party in the near future. Respectfully submitted. William P. Rogers 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 380–386. No classification marking. Nixon submitted the convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on August 10, 1972, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held up the vote along with the vote on the Geneva Protocol because of its disagreement with the administration over whether the Protocol prohibited the use of herbicides and riot control agents. In December 1974, after a concerted lobbying effort by the Ford administration, the Senate gave its consent to both treaties, and President Ford ratified them on January 22, 1975. 1 S.Ex. Q, 92d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1–6. 2 Ante , pp. 133–138. 3 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 592–593. 4 Ibid ., 1970, pp. 5–6. 5 New York Times , May 8, 1971, 11; ibid., June 10, 1971, p. 47. 6 Ibid ., July 14, 1971, p. 8. 7 Documents on Disarmament, 1969 , pp. 324 ff. 8 Ibid ., 1970 pp. 428 ff. 9 Ibid ., pp. 272–273. 10 Ibid ., 1971, pp. 190–194. 11 Ibid ., pp. 456–460. 12 Ibid ., pp. 500–501. 13 Ibid ., pp. 568–573. 14 Ibid ., pp. 890 ff. 15 Ibid ., 1969, pp. 764–765. 16 Ibid., 1968 , pp. 461–465. 258. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 258. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, June 29, 1972 SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Policy The attached package is in response to your request for a review of our current chemical warfare policy. The views of the JCS, SA, and ISA are summarized in the memorandum at Tab I. You will note therein that while JCS and ISA have reached general agreement on a possible CCD initiative early this fall, SA is opposed to such a move. Gardiner Tucker’s views are explained in greater detail in a memo from him at Tab II. Since Gardiner raises a number of issues not covered in the joint ISA, SA, JCS study itself, I should like to address myself briefly to them here. In the basic study we set forth three alternatives: 1) offer no new chemical warfare arms control proposal now; 2) offer a limited proposal for a prohibition on the production of lethal agents; 3) offer a comprehensive chemical warfare disarmament proposal. Systems Analysis recommends no new proposal, with continued study of three issues now before the CCD: 1. Identification of chemical agents. 2. Techniques of verification. 3. Administration of verification procedures. SA also recommends that, within DOD, we undertake a further study of alternative chemical arms limitation proposals and a study of our current chemical posture, aimed at developing recommendations for improving our retaliatory capability. I strongly disagree with this approach for the following reasons : 1) To delay further while we again study possible chemical arm limitation proposals would mean that we would lose any chance of tabling a proposal this year at the CCD. 2) A study of our chemical posture and what we should do to correct it will only reveal what we already know: Our current posture is, at best, only barely consistent with our stated “retaliatory” policy (NSDM-35). But , no matter what recommendations the study might produce regarding the augmentation or refinement of our present CW arsenal, there would be no way to get money from Congress for any such additional apparent offensive capability. 3) I doubt Gardiner’s claim that we can ride out this session of the CCD without some new proposal of our own. Just prior to the commencement of the session of the CCD talks now in progress, we received from ACDA (and from direct British Embassy sources) confirmation of the intention of the British CCD delegation to consider seriously a comprehensive and unverifiable chemical weapons control proposal which they would table unless the United States indicated it had a new initiative ready for this session. The Soviets, who have already tabled a rather simplistic general disarmament proposal, approached the U.S. delegation last week to say that they would be very receptive to any initiative on a partial chemical weapons limitation. The Swedes have told our negotiators in Geneva that they may shift from their willingness to support a partial limitation to a sweeping Soviet-type proposal, and, generally, the non-aligned have reaffirmed their support for the concept of a comprehensive prohibition. In short, the assessment of our negotiators is that we have about one month before the bottom falls out of our present position. We could probably ride out the storm, but at the cost—which I believe to be unnecessary—of the appearance of great recalcitrance and negativism on our part. 4) If DOD does not move now to initiate a limited proposal, other departments of the government are likely to react to present Soviet feelers by putting forward proposals far less acceptable than ours. 5) Finally, and perhaps most important, the initiative I have recommended (to prohibit the further production of lethal agents) would begin the reform of our chemical posture, which I believe to be essential; but it would not do so by a frontal attack, which, in my view, would be politically unworkable. Our capability today is extremely limited, and I see no sign that the Congress is—or will soon be—in a mood to correct those limitations. Thus, we should be prepared to make a virtue of necessity by proposing an initiative that would be a logical folow on to your earlier imaginative BW success, gain us some domestic and international recognition, and head off sweeping and ill-conceived proposals from others, while at the same time suspending the production of a weapon of dubious tactical or strategic value. This is an opportunity we should not miss. G. Warren Nutter Tab I Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, undated SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Policy We are attaching the study on chemical warfare (Tab A) directed by your memorandum of 2 June. The study was prepared by representatives of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), and the Joint Staff. It presents three basic alternatives: offer no arms control initiative, offer a limited initiative, or offer a proposal for complete elimination of offensive and defensive capabilities. The ASD(SA) recommends the first alternative of offering no new arms control initiatives as our position at the CCD. Both alternatives two and three could result in unverifiable chemical arms limitations agreements which would impede rectification of shortcomings in the current U.S. chemical posture. Both would leave us unsure, however, of the extent of compliance of other countries, especially the U.S.S.R. He supports the current U.S. proposal in the CCD to study seriously the three major issues of (1) identification of chemical agents, (2) techniques of verification, and (3) administration of verification procedures, as he feels answers on these questions must be obtained before details of alternative approaches, such as proposed in alternatives two and three can be worked out. He points out that only this first alternative, through the work already proposed at the CCD, has been well thought out. He would also support study in the U.S. Government aimed at defining arms control proposals along the lines of alternatives two and three and along other lines suggested by the study (Tab A). He would, in the interim, move to rectify the most serious shortcomings of our current retaliatory posture, especially reduction of the vulnerability of our chemical capabilities to conventional and chemical attack. The ASD (ISA) recommends the second alternative, a limited initiative to ban further production of lethal chemical weapons. He believes our current CCD program is not sufficiently attractive to prevent other far more restrictive proposals from being tabled, and perhaps adopted, at Geneva. Further, he believes alternative 2 is in keeping with the thrust of the Moscow Communique, and would gain general support from the agencies in Washington, thus forestalling the possibility that more far-reaching proposals might be suggested to the President. Finally, ISA believes no issue of precedent is raised by proposing an agreement that does not require verification, since the recently concluded BW convention is not verifiable. Verification is an issue which must be decided on the merits of the particular case—a point we have often before made in international fora. We have provided for adequate verification in SALT; we must insist on it for MBFR. But, in ISA’s view, insistence on verification of a ban on the production of lethal chemical weapons would not only be substantively unnecessary, but would largely negate the political effects of tabling an otherwise forthcoming proposal in Geneva. An imaginative proposal now could provide a reduction in the chemical warfare capability directed against us while reducing the likelihood of proliferation, all at no cost in terms of current or planned U.S. programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose views are attached at Tab B, concur in the desirability of a proposal to ban production of lethal chemical weapons. They recommend, however, that the proposal include a verification provision, with the U.S. delegation at the CCD being directed to request further instructions from Washington before dropping that provision. All recommend that our basic chemical warfare policy should be reflected in a “retaliation only” posture. A CCD initiative to limit stockpiles to levels consistent with this posture would therefore be appropriate under any circumstances. Depending upon your decision as to which of the several possible initiatives you prefer, we will prepare appropriate letters from you to Secretary Rogers and ACDA Director Smith forwarding your proposal. Gardiner Tucker Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Approve current CCD program Approve limited initiative without verification (ISA recommends) Approve limited initiative with verification (JCS recommends) Approve stockpile limitation initiative ã recommends Tab A Study Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, undated National Policy United States policy with respect to chemical warfare is to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. NSDM 35 is very explicit in saying that, whereas we renounce biological warfare in all circumstances, we will maintain a capability to retaliate in kind against a chemical attack. An important aspect of United States policy is our position that use of riot control agents (RCA’s—i.e., tear gases) and herbicides does not involve waging chemical warfare. The Threat of Chemical Warfare We have no reliable estimate of the size of the Soviet chemical stockpile, but we know they are capable of producing lethal chemical agents quite similar to our G and V- agents. Evidence is lacking of any significant forward area storage of chemical weapons. Nevertheless, the Soviets are believed to possess a complete array of chemical delivery systems, including tube artillery, rockets, tactical missiles, and aerial bombs. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces possess large quantities of a wide range of protective equipment, much of which is of recent design. Extensive training in the use of this protective gear is integrated into regular military training and maneuvers. Military Effectiveness of Chemical Weapons The history of chemical warfare in World War I suggests that these kinds of weapons can, under certain circumstances, be effective. Between World Wars I and II developmental work on chemical weapons continued and Germany produced the nerve agents which are the primary chemical weapons today. Chemical weapons were not used in World War II although they were available. In conflict between forces equally well prepared offensively and defensively for chemical war, chemical weapons may offer no advantage to either side. On the other hand, it seems undeniable that if a nation were significantly inferior in either offensive or defensive chemical capability, it might find itself at a disadvantage as to an important means of waging war, albeit one of limited scope. United States Antipersonnel Chemical Agents Almost any chemical agent taken in sufficient concentration can be lethal, but it is nevertheless true that agents are designed to kill, while others are designed only to incapacitate their victims. [ 3 lines not declassified ] Our actual chemical stockpiles include only these agents, all lethal: nerve agent VX, nerve agent GB, and mustard. Nerve Agent VX . This agent causes casualties primarily by absorption of the liquid agent through the skin, but it can also cause casualties quickly when it is inhaled as a vapor or an aerosol. Nerve Agent GB . This agent is employed to cause casualties by inhalation of vapor. Like VX, it produces tension, tremors, confusion, weakness, convulsions and, finally, death. Mustard (BD and HT) . These agents will burn and blister any part of the body they touch, external or internal. They are generally useful only in tropical climates or highly restricted to seasonal use in non-tropical climates. [ 3 lines not declassified ] Logistical Support for Chemical Operations The projected consumption rate for chemical munitions will vary according to the scenario, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff use a planning figure of [ 1 line not declassified ] Because of the weight of containers, pallets, and explosives for dispersal, the shipment tonnage required [ 4 lines not declassified ]. Protective Equipment . Over-all, the defensive posture of U.S. forces with regard to chemical warfare is marginal. There is a serious shortage of protective clothing, detection and warning devices, decontamination gear and collective protection shelters. Chemical Munitions Develoment/Procurement The FY 70 and 71 Military Procurement Acts specifically prohibited procurement of delivery systems for lethal chemicals unless the President certified to Congress that such procurement was essential to the security of the United States. Even without legislative constraints, it is unlikely that any lethal chemical agents would be produced for several years because problems associated with maintaining stocks of these agents have led to work on binary munitions, which will not be available until at least 1975. Alternative Negotiating Positions There are a great many uncertainties about chemical warfare, but it is very clear that our current military posture in this regard is not consistent with our declared national policy. We would not be prepared to retaliate in kind if Soviet forces were to launch an offensive in Europe using chemical weapons. This state of affairs was recognized by the Under Secretaries Committee at the time they concluded their first annual review of chemical warfare and biological research programs. In that review, it was determined that a study was required “to determine what constitutes an adequate and effective retaliatory capability and deterrent against CB attack.” In conducting the study the working group attempted to take a broader look at the problem, and the effort was directed toward prevention as well as deterrence. Consequently a broader range of options were developed than originally anticipated. Coupling the options developed in the deterrent study with analysis done since then, there are basically three paths which can be followed with respect to negotiating initiatives at the CCD: (1) make no immediate offers to limit chemical weapons (2) offer a limited initiative or (3) propose total disarmament initiative covering both offensive and defensive chemical warfare capabilities. Alternative 1: The first alternative (make no immediate offers to limit chemical weapons) is essentially a continuation of our current posture at the CCD. This involves an invitation to explore the complex issues involved seriously. On March 21, 1972, we tabled a U.S. working paper concerned with three problems: identification of chemical agents, techniques of verification, and the administration of verification procedures. The paper has been favorably received; however, the CCD has not yet come to grips with the issues raised by this paper. Even so, it has not been received as an effort to delay progress in placing limitations on CW. (This is in contrast to the rather simplistic Soviet draft treaty which ignores most of the serious problems associated with the complex and difficult question of verifying a possible CW treaty.) Alternative 2. The second alternative, which is to offer a limited arms control initiative, is based on converting current constraints on U.S. chemical programs into negotiating initiatives. For a variety of reasons, including Congressional prohibition against expenditure of funds for lethal chemical weapons we have no plans now to produce additional nerve agents. Therefore. we can propose a ban on production of lethal agents without effect on U.S. programs, while preserving some elements of a deterrent capability. Further, we plan certain reductions and restructuring in our current stockpile as weapons become obsolete. We might also propose a reduction in capability to a “retaliation only” level. Although it would be preferable to obtain agreement to on-site inspection of compliance, an agreement without such a clause would limit potential opponents to varying degrees while it would not affect any current or prospective U.S. plans or programs. Alternative 3. The third negotiating alternative, to offer a comprehensive ban on all offensive and defensive chemical warfare capability, seeks to make chemical warfare impossible by eliminating chemical weapons from arsenals. To be comprehensive, and to permit verification by national means alone, such a ban would have to include defensive capabilities, since training with full protective gear would be a prerequisite to effective use of chemical weapons and would be relatively easy to detect. In such a case, it would be necessary also to include incapacitants and RCA’s, since differentiation between training in use of these agents and lethal agents would not be possible. Choice of a negotiating alternative at the CCD should be coupled with steps to rectify deficiencies in current U.S. CW posture. We have very limited defensive capability; our troops and stockpiles are relatively vulnerable; and we do not have a viable retaliatory capability. Options for such rectification would include the following (which were identified in the deterrent study). Option A. Develop a chemical warfare capability sufficient to deter a chemical attack. Sub-Option i. Chemical warfare capability for continued offensive and defensive operations. Sub-Option ii. Retaliation only, i.e., set aside warfare considerations and develop a capability for purely retaliatiory use of chemicals. Option B. Continue the NATO policy of relying principally upon our conventional and nuclear force for deterrence. Sub-Option i. Retain present limited chemical offensive capability; continue improving defenses against chemical weapons. Sub-Option ii. Destruction of existing chemical munitions, thus accentuating reliance on conventional and nuclear weapons. This option is available under all negotiating alternatives. Comment on the Negotiating Alternatives Alternative 1 is an offer to join others in studying key problems associated with chemical warfare arms control. Relative to the other alternatives, it has the following advantages and disadvantages: Advantage 1. It retains U.S. flexibility to retain or procure any offensive and defensive chemical warfare items required to give U.S. forces the desired warfighting capability. Advantage 2. It precludes dependence on unverified arms limitation agreements. Advantage 3. It does not require the U.S. to alter any actions, and leaves the U.S. free to change its chemical posture should it decide to do so. Disadvantage 1. Unless coupled with steps to improve our chemical warfare posture, this alternative leaves U.S. and allied forces relatively vulnerable to chemical attack and relatively unprepared to counterattack with chemical weapons. Disadvantage 2. Because this alternative does not include an arms control proposal now, it may well be viewed as inconsistent with the U.S. commitment, made at the Moscow summit, to continue efforts to reach an agreement on chemical weapons. Alternative 2 is a limited proposal that all production of lethal nerve agents be banned. It might also include a stockpile limitation to the “retaliation only” level. This is a middle course under which we could attempt to begin the process of arms control for chemical weapons while preserving a considerable amount of U.S. flexibility. The advantages and disadvantages of this alternative are: Advantage 1. It is consistent with our commitment at the Moscow summit. Advantage 2. It may pre-empt more restrictive proposals. Advantage 3. By being limited, and being defensible in terms of its intended limitations, it may avoid debates over whether riot control agents and herbicides are or are not included in chemical warfare. Advantage 4. It does not require the U.S. to alter any actions. Since we have no plans to produce lethal chemicals, and since the sense of Congress seems likely to continue to be opposed to such production, we are giving up nothing. With respect to stockpiles, any agreement would clearly be compatible with current U.S. stockpile adjustment plans. Advantage 5. By limiting, or at least increasing the likelihood of limiting lethal agent production in other countries, this alternative would serve to avoid a widening gap in U.S.S.R./Warsaw Pact and U.S./NATO chemical warfare capabilities. Advantage 6. Because most small countries would find it difficult to refuse to become parties to this agreement, there would be an inhibition on the proliferation of chemical weapons, notwithstanding their attractiveness to such countries as an inexpensive means of inflicting mass casualties. However, it may be that those countries we would most want to see become parties to the agreement [ less than 1 line not declassified ] are least likely to join. Disadvantage 1. Unless coupled with steps to improve our chemical warfare posture, this alternative leaves U.S. and allied forces relatively vulnerable to chemical attack and relatively unprepared to counterattack with chemical weapons. Disadvantage 2. The agreement would not be subject to unilateral verification of complete compliance. Disadvantage 3. Some believe that there would be a precedent in proposing a chemical warfare arms control agreement without verification, which would weaken our position in other settings such as MBFR and SAL follow-on. Others point out that the recently concluded BW convention has no provision for verification, that each arms control agreement must be viewed on its own merits in this regard, and that we would in any case retain a retaliatory capability under the agreement being proposed. Alternative 3 is a total chemical warfare disarmament proposal, which, to be effective, must be accepted by all parties to potential conflict. It would prohibit possession of either an offensive/defensive chemical warfare capability. Its advantages and disadvantages are: Advantages: 1. Adherence to this alternative virtually eliminates the possibility of chemical warfare. 2. National means alone are relatively likely to detect violations of this alternative. This is so because of the difficulty of concealing the defensive training which is a prerequisite for effective offensive use of chemical weapons. 3. If signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this alternative would eliminate an advantage currently possessed by the U.S.S.R. Disadvantages: 1. Abstention (or contravention) by any competent country could jeoparidze the security of all adherents. 2. Compliance with the provisions of this alternative would require the U.S. to forsake the use of riot control agents by military forces, either in warfare or civil emergency. Riot control agents cannot be exploited without use of a gas mask and gas masks would be prohibited. 3. A number of significant countries are most unlikely to sign Conclusions Alternative 1 (press for serious consideration of the U.S. working paper tabled in March) will not lead to immediate agreements, but it is constructive and it does avoid reliance on unverifiable stipulations. Alternative 2 (offer a limited arms control proposal) builds an initiative on domestic political constraints against production and practical trends toward reduction in stockpile. It may appear to be very forthcoming in terms of achieving some sort of agreement. It is responsive to the President’s summit commitment. It would offer some reduction in the stockpile available for use against us and discourage proliferation, all at no cost in terms of current or planned U.S. programs. It does require the U.S. to offer an essentially unverifiable proposition. Alternative 3 would require the U.S. to give up the military use of riot control agents and herbicides and it might still entail some verification risks. Tab B Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, June 19, 1972 JCSM-276-72 Subiect: Chemical Warfare Policy (U) 1. (TS) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 2 June 1972, subject as above, which requested a study of US current chemical warfare (CW) posture vis-à-vis the USSR and possibilities for a negotiating initiative for the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. 2. (TS/NF) The study in Appendix A hereto of the CW initiatives which might be appropriate for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was prepared by the Joint Staff and the staffs of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (International Security Affairs) and (Systems Analysis). This study concludes that US military posture would not be adversely affected should the United States: a. Propose a ban on production of lethal agents without effect on US programs, while preserving some elements of a deterrent capability. b. Propose a reduction in capability to a “retaliation only” stockpile level. c. Accept an agreement to subparagraph a and/or b above, without obtaining agreement to onsite inspection of compliance even though such an onsite agreement would be preferable. 3. (TS/NF) In assessing the possible alternative negotiating positions, certain factors should be expanded upon: a. US CW Capabilities and Limitations . The US CW stockpile is relatively small and poorly distributed and provides a retaliatory options. [ 3 lines not declassified ] Further deployment of present stocks is prohibited by Congress. Current plans of the Department of the Army will provide for the modernization of the US stookpile through the the acquisition of approximately [ 2 lines not declassified ] would not adversely affect the US posture. USSR acceptance of these levels, however, would probably require significant reductions in its stockpile and thus could be to US advantage. b. USSR CW Capablities and Limitations . A summary of the latest CW intelligence on the USSR provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency is contained in Appendix B hereto. Particularly germane to the issues at hand are the following: (1) The USSR stockpile is believed to be large, its doctrine and trailing accept CW as an integral part of its overall weapon systems, and it has chemical troop units organic to tactical regiments and larger units. (2) Firm intelligence supports the assessment that the USSR could initiate and sustain sustain large scale CW. (3) The current agreed US intelligence position is that chemical agents constitute at least one-third of the USSR tactical rocket and missile warheads. (4) The USSR is reported to have used live high explosive rounds and CW and biological warfare (BW) agents in maneuvers (One such maneuver was held in May 1971, during serious negotiations on BW disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament.) c. Verification Problems (1) Strict adherence by all parties to a treaty banning CW would be to the US advantage, whereas a treaty honored by the United States but not by the USSR could give the USSR an overwhelming advantage. In the case of a CW treaty similar to the existing BW treaty, which would ban all CW activity and result in stockpile destruction, adequate verification would be absolutely essential. It appears that any effective form of CW verification must entail onsite inspection; considering the past USSR positions on the subject of onsite inspection, it is highly doubtful that it would agree, but the United States should seek it nonetheless. (2) It should be borne in mind that, as the USSR, under the Limited Test Ban Treaty, is apparently willing to take greater risks than the United States of venting debris to the atmosphere which might be detected beyond its borders, it may be willing to take similar risks with regard to the production, testing, or training with CW. Of the 124 underground nuclear tests conducted by the USSR since the Limited Test Ban Treaty went into effect, possibly 57 vented into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. Current intelligence indicates 14 “certain” instances, 10 more in which there is “high confidence” of a violation, and 33 other “possible” violations. 4. (TS) It appears that: a. The US CW posture vis-à-vis the USSR is poor, and there would be some advantage to be gained by a mutual chemical stockpile limitation. b. The recommended initiatives must be carefully negotiated to insure that any ban on production of lethal agents does not prohibit the production of nonlethal binary intermediates which are planned to modernize the US retaliation stockpile. c. Any level decided upon for the “retaliation only” stockpile capability should be consistent with the US current stockpile level until the United States has some real assurance of USSR compliance with treaty provisions. 5. (TS) Based on the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that the relative military posture of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR would not be adversely affected should the United States proceed as indicated in the conclusions in paragraph 2 above. They would add that US initiatives should be restricted to lethal chemical agents only. (Note: Inclusion of incapacitants could soon involve tear gas/riot control agents and thus hopelessly confuse the issues. Riot control agents should continue to be considered as apart from CW in accordance with US national policy.) 6. (TS) Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would interpose no objection if the United States were to: a. Develop a detailed proposal for a CW arms control measure consistent with the conclusions of subparagraphs 2a and 2b above, including provisions for onsite verification, for review and clearance within the US Government prior to the conclusion of the July 1972 discussions of the technical experts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. b. Develop the requirements for varying degrees of verification for the proposals in subparagraph 6a above. As a matter of principle, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that verification is an essential ingredient of any arms limitation agreement. However, in this case, because of the large disparity in military posture, it seems prudent to develop plans for review and clearance within the US Government. c. Pursue the present US negotiating position on CW at the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament until such time as in the discretion of the US delegation it would be appropriate to introduce the US initiative developed in accordance with subparagraph 6a above. If, after pursuing this initiative, it is apparent that an agreement can only be concluded by modifying the requirement for onsite verification, the delegation should request further instructions. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: T.H. Moorer Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff [Omitted here are Appendices A and B to JCSM–276–72.] Tab II Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, June 28, 1972 SUBJECT: Our Chemical Warfare Posture (U) The accompanying document offers you a range of chemical arms limitation proposals for use at the CCD. I believe that commitment now to either the second or third alternative in this paper would be a mistake, because neither of these proposals has been defined in sufficient detail for us to understand the military, technical and political ramifications; we are in no position to make an informed decision to offer either of them at the CCD at this time. The U.S. has rejected “first use” of chemical weapons. This rejection has been incorporated into publicly stated U.S. policy to the effect that our goal is to deter the use of chemical weapons and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. NSDM–35 further expands on this policy by stating that the U.S. will maintain a capability to retaliate in kind against a chemical attack. The paper enclosed offers three alternatives for chemical weapons limitations. Only the first alternative is sufficiently well thought out to permit commitment to it at this time. This alternative is a continuation of a course of action already undertaken by the U.S. at the CCD. In particular, we have tabled a working paper which undertakes to develop a fuller understanding of the exceedingly complex problems of definition and verification presented by chemical weapons. This paper has been received favorably and as a positive contribution to the solution of chemical arms limitation problems. Work in the next session of the CCD will be centered around the issues presented in the paper. The second approach would commit us now to table a proposal at the CCD for a production ban on lethal chemicals. This proposal, however, is not defined beyond this general concept. It does not define leathal chemicals; it does not come to grips with the non-lethal ingredients of modern binary chemical agents; it does not deal with problems of transfer of chemicals across international boundaries; and it does not include any plan for verification. A careful examination of this alternative will undoubtedly reveal that this is only a partial list of problems. One final criticism which can be made of this alternative is that it would complicate and impede, if not prohibit, correction of shortcomings in our current chemical retaliatory posture which in the judgment of all concerned does not meet the intent of NSDM–35. In particular, we would probably want to produce modern binary chemical agents in the creation of a secure chemical retaliatory capability; Alternative 2 would prohibit the production of these agents. Alternative 3, a proposal for complete chemical disarmament, is equally undefined. Such disarmament is probably more verifiable than the production ban of Alternative 2. However, Alternative 3 also presents verification problems. The technical problems cited above would also exist in Alternative 3 and they would be accentuated by the possibility that a signatory, having completely disarmed, could be seriously disadvantaged by sudden abrogation of the agreement by a hostile neighbor. Finally, I would like to observe that the most verifiable component of an agreement to disarm completely is the ban on chemical defenses against persistent percutaneous (long lasting, skin penetrating) chemical agents. This circumstance may contain the seed of progress in chemical arms control. If we could get agreement to ban chemical defenses for troops, such a ban, if verifiable, would make impractical first use of chemicals by anyone. Such a ban on chemical defenses, if carefully formulated, need not interfere with continued production and use of riot control agents, since only gas masks are required for such use, while full protective over-garments and associated decontamination equipment is required for a force to engage in hostilities with lethal, percutaneous chemical agents. In conclusion, I recommend that you take the following actions: 1. Accept Alternative 1, continuance of the current U.S. position in the CCD on chemical warfare at this time. 2. Initiate a study in the Department of Defense of a range of chemical arms limitation proposals, including at least Alternatives 2 and 3, and one proposal built around the notion of banning chemical defenses against lethal persistent percutaneous agents. 3. Initiate study of ways to improve our chemical posture to satisfy the policies of NSDM–35. 4. Ask Warren Nutter and me to return to you by September 1st of this year with an analysis of alternative proposals for chemical arms limitations and for the U.S. chemical posture for your review and decision. John D. Christie for Gardiner L. Tucker Assistant Secretary of Defense 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Appendices A and B to JCSM–276–72 are not published. 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, July 12, 1972 Dear Bill: As you know, we have maintained a continuing review within the Department of Defense of S.S. programs and policies regarding chemical weapons, as well as the present capabilities and potential of other countries in this field. I have, as a result of that review, now concluded that it would be in the security interests of the United States to achieve broad international acceptance of an arms control treaty focusing on the prohibition of the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. The following are the central considerations that have led me to this view: - An agreement such as I propose, which would permit us to retain our existing CW stockpiles, would not in any major way affect present U.S. capabilities. - Existing fiscal constraints and attitudes in this country make it unrealistic for us to plan any substantial expansion of our CW program. These constraints and attitudes are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. - An international agreement prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes would place similar constraints on other countries. It would also help limit the proliferation of significant chemical weapons capabilities. I am concerned that, in the absence of a U.S. initiative, international discussion of prohibitions on chemical weapons will generate increasing pressures for far more comprehensive prohibitions—extending to stockpiles and research—than would be in the U.S. interest. Early United States support for an agreement prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals would, I believe, satisfy legitimate demands for concrete chemical arms control steps, while deflecting pressures for broader, harmful proposals. Therefore, it seems to me to be in the U.S. interest to put forward as soon as possible a concrete proposal establishing a basis for negotiating a sound arms control step that would enhance the security of the United States. I believe that such an initiative, like the other important decisions regarding chemical and biological weapons taken by this Administration, would be welcome both at home and abroad. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the views that I have set forth above. In view of ACM’s experience with the discussions of chemical weapons control now under way at Geneva, and the various ideas and proposals have already been suggested, I think it would be best for ACDA to take the lead in following up the ideas I have put forward. Specifically, I am proposing to Gerry Smith that ACDA develop for the President’s consideration an arms control proposal focusing on the prohibition of the production of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. I trust that you will agree with this course of action. The Department of Defense, of course, wishes to work closely with the Department of State and ACDA on this matter at all stages, as we did in working out U.S. proposals for the Biological Weapons Convention and the Seabeds Treaty. Sincerely, Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. Laird sent a similar letter to ACDA Director Smith. (Ibid.) 260. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 260. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 14, 1972 SUBJECT: Status of Chemical Weapons Discussions Since the conclusion of the biological weapons treaty last year, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has concentrated on two issues: test ban and chemical weapons problems. In March we submitted a working paper raising chemical weapons arms control problems requiring further expert analysis. Our position is to avoid negotiating a treaty because there are many unanswered questions regarding verification. Also in March the Soviets submitted a draft chemical weapons treaty almost identical to the recently signed biological weapons treaty. The draft had no verification system other than the Security Council complaint procedure in the biological weapons treaty. Many CCD delegations considered the Soviet approach too simplified. The Soviets have continued to show interest in a chemical weapons treaty. In June the Soviet delegation asked about US counter-proposals. On July 5, contrary to the long-standing Soviet principle of boycotting and opposing CCD experts meetings, Soviet chemical warfare expert Melnikov attended such a meeting. He mentioned, inter alia , international procedures for information exchange and consultative mechanisms for monitoring any prohibitions. No mandatory international inspections were envisaged. Our CCD delegation notes that this Soviet move may provide an impetus toward treaty negotiations. Because of unanswered questions regarding the effectiveness and importance of various verification measures, our best course may be to continue to avoid negotiations. On the other hand, there may be other acceptable tactical or substantive courses of action. I understand Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined some of these questions intensively and are consulting with ACDA prior to requesting that there be an NSC review. I think a review is in order, but believe we should wait to see what Defense and the Chiefs have in mind. Dick Kennedy, Hal Sonnenfeldt, and Jack Merritt concur. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. V, 1972-. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Walsh. 261. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird 261. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, July 19, 1972 Dear Mel: Your thoughtful letter of July 12 dealing with US programs and policies regarding chemical weapons contains useful ideas, which are most timely. I agree with your conclusion that it is very much in our interest to take an early initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva to meet legitimate demands for concrete steps on chemical arms control consistent with US and Allied security. Your suggestion that we develop a draft treaty focusing on prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes is particularly constructive. I agree that ACDA should take the lead in drafting a specific proposal of this sort, working closely with our staffs, for the President’s consideration. We shall want to be particularly sensitive to the need for full Allied consultation during the development of our views. This is very much in our interest, I am sure you agree, not only in general terms, but it also should put us in a stronger position to avoid harmful proposals and to achieve broader international acceptance for our approach. We look forward to a close working relationship with ACDA and the Department of Defense on this subject. With best personal regards, Sincerely, William P. Rogers 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 384. Top Secret. 262. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 262. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 19, 1972 Dear Henry: I am writing to you about Secretary Laird’s recommendation, set forth in his letters to the Secretary of State and to me, that the United States put forward this summer at the Geneva Disarmament Committee a proposal aimed at prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. I believe that an initiative along the lines proposed by Secretary Laird deserves urgent consideration. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is prepared to develop a draft CW proposal with other interested agencies. I assume that this work would be carried on under the aegis of the National Security Council machinery with a view to providing a possible initiative for the President’s consideration in the near future. In order to move ahead rapidly we would hope it would be possible to concentrate our attention on the specific elements of a draft CW proposal. In my view an early US initiative to promote the working out of a broadly acceptable international agreement focusing on the production and transfer of lethal chemicals would be a constructive step in the arms control field. Such an initiative would provide evidence of our intention to carry forward through negotiations the commitment in the Moscow communique that the US and USSR “will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons.” As Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the US and USSR would play the leading role in negotiating a chemical weapons agreement. This activity would serve to demonstrate continuing US-Soviet cooperation on a significant arms control issue, where, we believe, mutual interests scan be identified. This spring the Soviet Union put forward at Geneva a draft convention calling for the total elimination of chemical weapons, an approach with considerable international appeal. Recently, however, the Soviet representative has publicly stated that the USSR would be prepared to consider other more limited proposals and has privately urged the US Delegation to put forward a proposal that would make clear the basis on which the US would like to proceed. On timing, I believe it would be highly advantageous to the United States to put forward a proposal regarding CW at Geneva this summer. Intensive discussions of approaches to CW prohibitions are underway but many countries have not yet taken firm positions. The United States therefore has an opportunity to help establish through an early concrete proposal the basis on which negotiations regarding chemical weapons will move forward. I think we should make every effort to take advantage of this opportunity and to press ahead with our work on an urgent basis. Sincerely, Gerard Smith Director 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-155, 384. Top Secret. Drafted on July 18 by McCormack (ACDA) and cleared by Leonard and Keeny . The letter is a copy that bears an indication Smith signed the original. 263. National Security Study Memorandum 157 263. National Security Study Memorandum 157 1 Washington, July 28, 1972 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The President’s Science Adviser SUBJECT: Review of United States Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions The President has directed a prompt review of the United States position on negotiations regarding chemical weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. This review should focus on the advantages and disadvantages of the present U.S. position and of possible alternatives, with specific analysis of proposals aimed at achieving broad international restraints on the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. In addition to defining the basic and collateral provisions of such proposals, the study should specifically assess methods of verification, related procedures and necessary constraints in terms of their effectiveness, their acceptability to the United States, and their negotiability. This review should also include analysis of related courses of action, such as calling for a moratorium in lieu of or in conjunction with treaty negotiations. This review should be conducted by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and comprised of representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The study should be ready for consideration by the Senior Review Group by August 8, 1972. Both the fact and nature of this review should be closely held, and distribution of this memorandum should be restricted to those persons essential to the completion of the study. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. 264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 264. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, August 12, 1972 SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Study—NSSM 157 In response to your chemical weapons negotiating initiative, Henry Kissinger issued NSSM 157, requesting a review of the United States position on chemical weapons prohibitions. An ad hoc group composed of representatives of State, Defense, CIA, ACDA, and NSC have now prepared the required study, drawing, in part, on a study we earlier prepared for you. The new study (Tab B), which has received approval of the participating agencies at the working level, discusses the pros and cons of proceeding with a new initiative and then presents seven negotiating options: 1. Treaty which would limit stockpiles and prohibit transfer. 2. Treaty prohibiting production and transfer. 3. Treaty prohibiting stockpiles as well as production and transfer. 4. Comprehensive treaty. 5. Treaty prohibiting defensive equipment. 6. Unilateral statement announcing substantial U.S. stockpile reductions. 7. Unilateral moratorium on certain U.S. CW activities. Since the study covers about the same ground that you considered before deciding on the position expressed in your 12 July letter (Tab C) to the Secretary of State, we believe that there is no need for further coordination and that you should reaffirm your support of option 2. In doing so, you should, however, be aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have shifted their position away from option 2 to option 1, on the grounds that it offers a better opportunity to maintain a deterrent capability. The arguments against this and other options remain as those you addressed earlier. Recommendation: I understand that Henry Kissinger will soon ask for your views; therefore, recommend that you anticipate request by sending the attached memorandum (Tab A). Tab B Study Prepared in Response to NSSM 157 Washington, August 11, 1972 August 11, 1972 RESPONSE TO NSSM 157 REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POSITION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROHIBITIONS I. Summary and Options A. Background Considerations 1 B. Basic Question 4 C. Treaty Options 6 1. Treaty Limiting Stockpiles 6 2. Treaty Prohibiting Production 7 3. Treaty Prohibiting Stockpiles as well as Production 9 4. Comprehensive Treaty 10 5. Treaty Prohibiting Defensive CW Equipment 11 D. Related Unilateral Options 13 1. Statement Regarding Substantial US Stockpile Reduction 13 2. Moratorium on Production 14 E. Verification and Assurance Options 15 1. Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation 15 2. Non-Obligatory On-Site Inspection 15 3. Obligatory On-Site Inspection of Declared Facilities 16 II. Current Situation A. Military Situation and Constraints 17 1. US 17 2. NATO 21 3. France 22 4. USSR/Warsaw Pact 23 5. Other Countries 25 B. Negotiating Situation 27 1. Use of CW - The Geneva Protocol 27 2. Additional Arms Control Measures Recent Discussions 27 3. US Approach 28 4. Approach of Other Countries 28 III. Possible International Restraints A. Verification and Assurances 30 1. National Means 30 2. International Means 30 (a) Existing International Organizations 31 (b) Consultative Committee 32 3. On-Site Inspection 33 4. Provision of Data 37 (a) Data on Facilities and Stockpiles 37 (b) Economic Data 38 B. Activities and Facilities 39 1. Production and Stockpiles 39 (a) Agents Covered 40 (1) Single Purpose Agents 40 (2) Dual Purpose Agents 40 (3) Precursors 40 (b) Stockpiles 41 (1) Shelf-life and Obsolescence 41 (2) Stockpile Reduction 42 (3) Stockpile Modernization 42 2. Munitions and Other Means of Delivery 43 3. Weapons Loading 44 4. Production Facilities 445 5. Research, Development, Testing 46 6. Defensive Measures 47 7. International Transfer 47 RESPONSE TO NSSM 157 REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POSITION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROHIBITIONS I. SUMMARY AND OPTIONS A. Background Considerations During the past four years there has been considerable international discussion about possible arms control measures for chemical weapons. This has been the principal subject of debate this year at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The United States is now being asked by the Soviets, some of our allies, and other countries what steps if any we are prepared to take in this area. This spring the Soviets put forward a draft convention calling for the total elimination of chemical weapons—an approach that has broad appeal, particularly to non-aligned countries. The Soviets have made clear, however, that they desire to enter into concrete negotiations and hope to have counter-proposals from the US. Our allies have as yet taken no firm positions on possible chemical weapons limitations. The British have suggested a phased approach to CW arms control starting either with a prohibition on the production of CW agents or alternatively with the destruction of stockpiles; the scope of a treaty would be related to practical and negotiable possibilities for verification. Our position has been that the best way to make progress is through study of the complex issues involved. Others now want to go beyond this study stage to treaty negotiations. Our response or lack of response will shape future debate and negotiation on CW controls. The basic question we must ask ourselves is whether—in light of the overall military situation, political constraints, and the specific possibilities and problems of limiting chemical weapons—any arms control steps in this field would be in our overall national interest. We must also consider how to handle the negotiating situation in the light of what makes sense for us on security grounds. A number of facts and considerations are immediately relevant to an assessment of these questions and of the options discussed in this summary: — There is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons. We could have no confidence of detecting a change in the USSR’s CW posture through national means. Even on-site inspection—which would be acceptable to the US only if limited to declared military facilities and which would probably not be acceptable at all to the Soviets—would add very little technical assurance in spite of its possible additional deterrent effect. International procedures for exchanging relevant data would provide only a modest political restraint against non-compliance. — In contrast to biological weapons, chemical weapons have been used; they can be effective in tactical situations; and the USSR is known to have a CW capability. — Our knowledge of USSR/Warsaw Pact capabilities is fragmentary at best. The USSR has the technological capability to produce modern nerve agents, but no actual production facility has been positively identified. We know that the USSR has chemical weapons stockpiles, but we do not know their size or composition even within very broad limits. There is no evidence that chemical munitions are stored with troops in Eastern Europe. We do know that USSR/Pact programs for defense against chemical attack, and thus their capability to conduct operations in a toxic environment, are considerably more extensive than those of NATO or the US. — The evidence indicates that a decision by the Soviets to use chemical weapons would be made at the highest political levels as would a decision to use nuclear weapons. Although the Soviets could decide to use chemical weapons without using nuclear weapons, no evidence indicates that they visualize a purely chemical war apart from the use of nuclear weapons. — The objective of our CW program is to deter the use of chemical weapons and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. The current US chemical posture, while functioning as one deterrent against chemical attack, does not provide an adequate capability either for sufficient retaliation in kind against a large-scale attack or for extended war-fighting using chemicals on a large scale. The United States has [ 2 lines not declassified ]. A 5 to 10 day capability for US ground forces is located at one vulnerable site in Germany. — The US is improving its defensive CW posture, but funding is substantially lower than JCS recommendations. The US is developing binary munitions which permit separate storage and transportation of two relatively safe components which, when combined, form a standard toxic chemical agent. Plans to produce binaries (starting in 1976) depend on further successful research and adequate production funding. We are not planning to produce chemical weapons pending the availability of binaries. Also, present plans call for considerably lower stockpile levels. Destruction of excess or obsolete stocks will take many years. — There is no significant CW threat to the continental United States. Our principal area of concern is Europe where there is felt to be a Soviet CW threat to US and allied forces. NATO strategy, while relying principally on conventional and nuclear capabilities for deterrence of chemical attack, envisions limited employment of chemical agents in retaliation and passive defense measures. NATO defensive capabilities are relatively meager. Other NATO countries (with the exception of France -which has a small CW program) have very limited CW programs and no weapons stocks. It is unlikely that any other NATO country will develop a retaliatory chemical weapons capability. — The US has renounced the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals. The USSR is a party to the Geneva Protocol and has renounced the first use of all chemical weapons including riot control or harrassing agents. — There are virtually no public opinion constraints on USSR/Warsaw Pact programs. We are not aware that the Soviets have ever admitted even to their own public the existence of CW stockpiles or production facilities. — In contrast, some of the most important constraints on US and allied CW capabilities are political, resulting in large measure from acute public sensitivities about possible risks in the movement, testing, and storage of chemicalweapon and from opposition to such weapons generally. Congress has enacted legislation which imposes a number of procedural requirements in connection with the transportation, storage, testing, and disposal of lethal chemical weapons. These requirements significantly impinge on our ability to deploy lethal chemical weapons. Similar sensitivities in Europe make it politically very difficult for the US to introduce new or relocate existing chemical weapons. Present constraints on deployment of chemical weapons might be substantially reduced if we had binaries. — For at least the next few years, prospects for con gressional funding of US CW programs are expected to be poor. * — An active research, development and testing program would provide the necessary continuity of technical competence in the general areas of CW offense and defense. An active R, D&T program is usually easier to sustain if it is in combination with a weapons development and production option. — None of the constraints discussed in the options below would apply to riot control agents or herbicides. Nevertheless, US proposals regarding chemical weapons might lead to questions about our failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol and about our position that RCAs and herbicides are not covered by the Protocol. (This position is the subject of a separate study and decision.) B. Basic question. The basic question at this stage is whether to maintain our position that possible limitations on chemical weapons require further study before we adopt a specific approach to treaty negotiations, or whether we wish at this time to enter into negotiations with a view to achieving additional international treaty restraints on chemical weapons. If the decision is to enter into treaty negotiations there are basically five options regarding the scope of a treaty. These options, and related options regarding unilateral actions and verification, are discussed following the advantages and disadvantages relevant to the basic question. (Regardless of the decision on the basic question, we could make a unilateral statement on the reduction in US stocks to underscore our willingness to take some steps in this area.) The advantages of our present course are: —limitations on chemical weapons would be inherently unverifiable and negotiations leading to treaty restraints would limit our programs without our being able to assure that others were complying with such limitations. — It would clearly keep our options open for further developing and improving our CW capabilities to the extent that political conditions permit. Chemical weapons provide a useful military option for retaliation against possible use of chemical weapons by others, since their use would place the same restraints on the tactical mobility and combat effectiveness of the opposing force. — We would gain time for further study of alternative courses of action and related technical issues. The disadvantages of continuing our present course are: — Present prospects for Congressional funding to improve our chemical weapons program substantially are poor and we may find ourselves, in fact, with a very limited program while others would not be similarly constrained. — We might lose the opportunity to establish on our terms the basis for negotiations leading to international restraints on chemical weapons which could in principle equalize the presently better Soviet operational capability. — In the absence of a clear indication of the direction we want to move, positions of others may harden and the UNGA may endorse an approach which we might find to our disadvantage. There would be efforts to bring international and domestic pressure on the US to negotiate on the basis of such an approach. — US sincerity toward its commitment in the Biological Weapons Convention to continue negotiations on chemical weapons in good faith might increasingly be called into question. We might also appear unwilling to respond to apparent Soviet eagerness to move forward on an arms control issue mentioned in the Moscow summit communique. If the decsision is to enter into treaty negotiations, there are five proposals that we could make regarding the scope of a possible agreement. There are also two related unilateral actions the US could take. All have their own distinct advantages and disadvantages which are discussed below. Verification options which could be used with any of the five treaty proposals are discussed separately. C. Treaty Options 1. Propose a Treat Reducing Stockpiles and Prohibiting Transfer of Lethal and other Highly Toxic Agents or Weapons Purposes. (R&D and defensive measures would not be affected; modernization and replenishment within agreed stockpile levels would not be affected; countries with a CW capability would reduce to agreed levels; transfer of single and dual-purpose chemicals, precursors, and chemical munitions would be covered; countries without chemical weapons would be encouraged to become parties.provided they agreed not to acquire stockpiles.) Advantages — This would allow binary production and modernization and improvement of CW stockpiles to provide a better retaliatory capability. Binary development, production, and stockpiling would provide a far better retaliatory capability if political constraints on transport and storage were alleviated. — Since we are planning to reduce stockpiles generally, and because some of the munitions are obsolete, we would have considerable freedom in selecting the actual level and methods of reduction. — Such an agreement would place international treaty constraints on the total quantity of lethal agents that could be stockpiled by the USSR and other parties and establish in principle a balance between US and USSR stocks. — It would be easier politically to justify a continuing level or increased level of R&D. — Maintenance of a sufficient retaliatory capability would serve as a deterrent and decrease the importance of verification. — If generally accepted, it would inhibit proliferation of CW capabilities. Disadvantages — Unless Congress funds new chemical weapons production programs (in particular binaries), we would face a situation in which the Soviets were free to modernize their agreed level of stocks, while the US was not able to do so. — There could be some Congressional, public and international criticism of the proposal as designed to justify continuation of chemical weapons production by the US. — It might be difficult to reach agreement on the stockpile reductions, — Such a proposal might not mitigate pressures by many countries for further CW restraints. — Some US allies, in particular the FRG, and many non-aligned would criticize this approach as discriminatory, because it allows chemical weapons states to stockpile, produce and modernize, while it asks others to forego chemical weapons completely. — This proposal might be more difficult to negotiate than the ensuing option. 2. Propose a Treaty Prohibiting Production and Transfer of Lethal and Other Highly Toxic Agents for Weapons Purposes. (Existing stockpiles, R&D, and defensive measures would not be covered; production and transfer of single and dual-purpose chemicals and precursors would be covered, weapons loading and CW munitions production could also be covered.) Advantages. — Retention of stockpiles would assure preservation of a deterrent and some retaliatory capability (though limited) and thus decrease the importance of verification — Such an agreement would place international treaty constraints on the production of chemical warfare agents by the USSR and other parties similiar in effect to present fiscal and Congressional constraints on the US. — Resulting constraints would not significantly affect present US chemical weapons stockpiles before the 1980’s—and perhaps not until-substantially later. — We would have a better framework for justifying R&D than with the ensuing options. — The proposal could channel international pressures for CW prohibitions toward achievement of treaty proposed by US. — The political and monetary costs of producing chemical weapons would be avoided. — If generally accepted, it would inhibit proliferation of CW capabilities. Disadvantages — The US CW capability might begin to diminish during the 1980’s due to possible deterioration of stockpiles and to obsolescence of munitions. (In principle, the Soviet capability might also deteriorate under a production ban depending on the nature of their stocks and how they are stored.) — To the extent our CW retaliatory/deterrent capability deteriorated under a production ban, we would be in a less favorable position to respond in kind to an attack by a non-party or treaty violator. — The agreement would prohibit our producing binary weapons, the manufacture of which could begin by 1976 if present Congressional attitudes change and funding becomes available. — Achievement of such an agreement, though it could mitigate pressures, would not eliminate interest by many countries in further CW restraints. — An agreement might lead to a progressive deterioration of our R&D effort. — Some US allies and many non-aligned might criticize this approach as discriminatory since we could retain stockpiles while asking non-chemical states not to acquire stockpiles. (However, this would be less discriminator than the first option because a prohibition on production would apply to all parties. The FRG is already prohibited from producing CW agents or munitions and therefore might regard this option as helping to equalize its position with respect to other countries.) 3. Propose a Treaty Prohibiting Stockpiles as Well as Production and transfer of Lethal and other Highly Toxic Agents. (R&D and defensive measures would not be covered; stockpiles, production and transfer of single and dual-purpose chemicals and precursors, as well as munitions loading and weapons production would be covered; a time limit of 10 to 15 years for destruction of stockpiles would be established.) Advantages. — This would place the maximum possible legal and political constraints on any stockpiling of chemical weapons and therefore could correct imbalances between ourselves and the USSR arising from the constraints on our deployment of stocks. — It would constitute a political deterrent to any Soviet stockpiling in Eastern Europe. — It would probably be the most readily negotiable in terms of scope (although some countries might want intrusive non-negotiable verification procedures for an agreement) — The political and monetary costs of producing chemical weapons and of maintaining chemical weapons stockpiles would be avoided. (There would, of course, be an initial cost for stockpile destruction.) — If generally accepted, it would inhibit proliferation of CW capabilities. Disadvantages. — Upon completion of stockpile destruction, we would have no CW retaliatory capability to respond in kind to an attack by a non-party of a treaty violator. (Our current capability would of course progressively diminish as stocks were destroyed.) — We would lose the deterrent effect of a retaliatory capability vis-à-vis non-parties or treaty violators. — US R&D capability and perhaps even defensive capability could eventually become difficult to maintain. 4. Propose a Comprehensive Treaty Abolishing CW Research, Development, Production, Stockpiles, Training and Defensive Measures. (Riot control agents and herbicides would be excluded from the treaty proposal.) Advantages. — This would place the maximum possible legal and political constraints on all aspects of a CW capability and might correct imbalances between ourselves and the USSR. — Prohibiting such a wide range of activities would increase the likelihood of detecting a violation since national means alone would have a reasonable probability of detecting gross violations of the prohibition on defensive measures. (However, while some defensive measures are unique to CW, most are the same as radiological or biological defense measures and could be justified accordingly.) — The political and monetary costs of producing chemical weapons, of maintaining chemical weapons stockpiles, of research; and of building an adequate CW defensive capability would be avoided. (There would, of course, be an initial cost for stockpile destruction.) — If generally accepted, it would inhibit proliferation of CW capabilities. Disadvantages — Parties complying with the prohibition would have neither chemical warfare capability nor protective equipment to deter or deal with possible use of chemical weapons by a non-party or treaty violator. — It would be politically difficult to justify depriving troops and population of all CW defenses in the absence of nearly total certainty that other parties were abiding by their prohibitions and unless all relevant countries were parties. — Absence of R&D programs would impair US and allied technical competence in the general area of chemical weapons. — The comprehensiveness of the treaty might deprive the US of the flexibility to use riot control agents (and perhaps herbicides) in time of armed conflict. — It would be very difficult to make a meaningful distinction between chemical defenses and biological or radiological defenses. 5. Propose a Treaty Prohibiting CW Defensive Equipment Only. (R&D, modernization and replenishment of stockpiles, production and transfer to chemical warfare agents would not be affected.) Advantages — This would place legal and political constraints on defensive capabilities, an area where the Soviets now have a distinct and obvious advantage. — Since eliminating large-scale defensive preparations makes waging a chemical war very unattractive to both sides, this option might establish a mutual foundation for subsequent offensive limitations. — National means alone might have a reasonable probability of detecting gross violations of the prohibition on defensive measures even though many of these measures could be justified for radiological defense. — This option would allow maintenance and modernization (e.g., binary production) of our CW stockpiles, and provide a framework for justifying R&D. — The monetary costs of building an adequate CW defensive capability would be avoided. — If generally accepted, it would inhibit proliferation of CW capabilities. — Maintenance of a retaliatory capablity by US would continue the deterrent effect of the stockpile and decrease the importance of verification. Disadvantages. — Parties complying with the prohibition would have no protective equipment in case of possible use of CW by a non-party of a treaty violator. Though the agreement would permit parties to have retaliatory capabilities a defensive capability is necessary to an adequate offensive capability. — It would be difficult to justify depriving troops and population of all defenses in the absence of nearly total certainty that other parties were abiding by their prohibitions and unless all relevant countries were parties. — Prohibition of defensive equipment might deprive the US flexibility to use riot control agents (and perhaps herbicides) in time of armed conflict. — Such an agreement, though it might mitigate pressures, would not eliminate interest by many countries in further CW restraints. — It would be very difficult to make a meaningful distinction between chemical defenses and biological or radiological defenses. — This agreement would probably be difficult to negotiate. D. Related Unilateral Options. 1. Make a Unilateral Statement Regarding Substantial Reduction of US stockpiles. (The statement could be independent of all other options or coupled with any. It would announce our decision to reduce stocks by a significant amount and could also promise destruction of some moth-balled production facilities. It might foreshadow a treaty proposal and even the general outlines of a proposal.) Advantages. — Such a statement could capitalize on reductions we are planning to make in any event by underscoring US readiness to take concrete steps toward CW limitations. — It would gain time for further study of alternative courses of action and relevant technical issues. — If coupled with a statement that we were studying specific arms control proposals, it might inhibit crystallization of positions on CW arms control at the CCD, in the UNGA, and in Moscow thereby leaving future negotiating options more open for the US. Disadvantages. — In the absence of a clearer indication of the direction we want to move regarding CW negotiations, positions of others may still harden and the UNGA may endorse an approach which we find to our disadvantage. — If there is no indication that we are studying further arms control measures, such a statement could be criticized as designed to avoid negotiations and as giving up nothing we had not already planned to give up. 2. Moratorium (with Options 2, 3, 4, or 5) Declare a Moratorium on Certain US CW Activities in Conjunction with a Specific Treaty Proposal. (Any moratorium, to secure the advantages listed below, would have to be accompanied or followed shortly by the treaty proposal itself and would have to be at least as far-reaching as a ban on production of CW agents. It might also include renunciation of weapons loading and/or production of munitions.) Advantages. — A moratorium could serve to underscore a desire for progress on CW controls. — It could give us more time to work out treaty details, particularly with our allies. — It might inhibit crystallization of positions on CW arms control at the CCD, UNGA, and in Moscow. (Such hardening could make successful negotiation of our treaty proposal more difficult.) Disadvantages. — The US, but not the Soviets and others, would be additionally constrained until the treaty we proposed entered into force or until the moratorium ran out—an outcome we could not expect for at least a year or two and could not predict with complete certainty. — There might well be some erosion of our bargaining position if we were going for a limited measure. The Soviets and other could take our moratorium as a floor and press for this and other CW prohibitions. E. Verification and Assurance Options. (Since national means and on-site inspections cannot provide effective verification, the choice is among methods aimed at achieving marginal political constraints or additional deterrents against violating treaty provisions.) 1. Propose International Procedures Providing for a Consultative Committee o CW Experts Agreed Exchange of Relevant Data Periodic Declarations of Compliance with Treaty Prohibitions, and the Handling of Complaints of Possible Violations Through Consultations. Advantages — Provisions for international cooperation in implementing a CW agreement would offer a marginal, basically political, element of assurance to potential parties against both violations and irresponsible charges. They would also promote compliance with the treaty’s provisions through regular technical consultations. — Such provisions would be readily negotiable. Disadvantages — These arrangements are more vulnerable than ensueing options to the criticism that they provide an inadequate mechanism for verification. — These alone would provide fewer political assurances and deterrents than with the ensueing options. 2. Propose Procedures as Above Adding Voluntar On-Site Inspection to Clarify Doubts or Challenges Regarding Compliance. (Parties could permit or invite inspection of any facility they controlled if they were challenged by another party regarding possible infractions of treaty provisions.) Advantages — Parties could use provisions to resolve possible misunderstandings regarding compliance with treaty obligations. — Refusal by USSR to permit inspection might provide acceptable grounds for US to withdraw if we believed there had been a significant violation. —This might be negotiable. Disadvantages — US might be embarrassed by request to permit inspection of facilities to which it would not wish to allow access by inspectors. — This procedure would provide little, if any, additional assurance that the USSR was not circumventing treaty provisions. 3. Propose Procedures as in 1 and/or 2, Plus an Obligation to Accept Inspection of certain Declared Facilities. Advantages — US could declare our three mothballed CW facilities and accept such inspection. There would be pressure on USSR to declare one or more of its facilities. On-site inspection could go far toward determining whether these facilities were producing agents. — Soviet agreement to this provision and concomitant declaration of facilities would constitute added political assurance of their seriousness in entering this agreement. Disadvantages — This procedure would provide little, if any, additional assurance that the USSR was not circumventing treaty provisions. — In view of past Soviet positions it would probably not be negotiable with the USSR and might appear to some as designed to prevent reaching agreement. — Since we have not been able to identify any Soviet CW production facilities, we would have difficulty establishing the basis for a public challenge of any Soviet declaration. II. CURRENT SITUATION A. Military Situation and Constraints. 1. United States. The United States has renounced the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals and has stated that the objective of the US chemical warfare program is to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. The current US chemical posture, while functioning as one deterrent against chemical attack, does not provide a sufficient capability either for adequate retaliation in kind against a large-scale attack or for extended war-fighting using chemicals on a large scale. (a) Military Factors. Tactical use of chemical weapons can greatly reduce the mobility and combat effectiveness of ground forces and increase their vulnerability. This restriction in mobility is a more critical factor than the casualty producing effects of chemical weapons. There is no significant chemical warfare threat tot he continental United States. Our principal area of concern is Europe where there is felt to be a Soviet CW threat to US and allied forces. A review of the current US chemical posture indicates the following: [ text not declassified ] US chemical munitions already in the FRG [ 1 line not declassified ] for 5 to 10 days, depending on the tactics employed. [ text not declassified ] Since the existing chemical stockpile in Europe is located at one site in Germany that would be a logical target for the Soviets, it is vulnerable to attack. In theory, the vulnerability of the stockpile could be reduced by dispersing it to locations nearer the delivery systems, but because of lack of storage facilities and the political problems of movement and storage of lethal chemicals in a foreign country, it is not possible to disperse the munitions during peacetime unless the outbreak of hostilities seems a real possibility. Overall, the chemical defensive posture of the US armed forces is inadequate and significantly weaker than that of the USSR. The primary deficiencies are: (a) a lack of automatic detection and warning systems; (b) inadequate stocks of individual protective clothing; (c) limited supplies of decontamination equipment; (d) limited capability for suitable positive pressure protection for elements normally housed in mobile vans and shelters, (e) lack of adequate capability for decontaminating air fields and first-line military aircraft; and (f) very limited ability of US naval combat vessels to operate in a toxic chemical environment. The masks, protective clothing, alarms and shelters being procured would significantly improve US defensive capabilities if they were available in sufficient quantities. The FY 1973 budget calls for expenditure of $11.4 million on defensive equipment. This is 20% of the expenditure proposed by the JCS for defensive equipment procurement in FY 1973. The JCS considers that an expenditure of $576 million over an 8-year period is needed to remedy our chemical warfare defensive deficiencies. Public concern over the potential toxic hazard associated with present lethal chemical munitions has resulted in severe restrictions being placed on the US CW program. A research program has been initiated to develop binoary munitions which permit separate storage and transportation of two relatively safe components which, when combined, form a standard toxic chemical agent. These ingredients are combined in the chemical projectile while it is in flight to the target. Such a system will not increase the effectiveness of the munitions but it will reduce hazards during manufacture, storage, transportation, and handling. Thus, it should be a more politically acceptable munition than those currently available. Present plans call for production of binary 155 mm and 8-inch shells using both VX and GB. Plans to procure binary munitions, beginning with 155 mm GB rounds in FY 1976 and 8-inch VX rounds in FY 1978, are contingent on successful completion of current research and adequate production funding. Estimated costs are as follows: 155 mm (FY 73–76) 8” (FY 73–78) completion of development $2.8 million $11.1 million production base establishment 6.8 million 2.9 million first year procurement 17.4 million (FY 76) 8.5 million (FY 78) Total stockpile objective cost (FY 76 through FY 1980) $183 million [ less than 1 line not declassified ] No technical factors preclude the development of binary bombs or spray tanks. To complete development and to begin production of a spray system would require 4 years lead-time. A binary massive-fill bomb would take 5 years. Estimated R&D funds needed are $1.5 million for a spray system, $3.5 million for a bomb. Current defensive R&D efforts are directed toward development of a chemical area-scanning alarm to supplement the M8 point-source alarm now in production and of protective masks and clothing that will afford improved protection against known agents. (b) Non-Military Factors. Some of the most important constraints on our chemical warfare capability are political constraints both abroad and in the US. These constraints arise from the acute sensitivities of local population concerning what they consider to be the risks inherent in the movement or storage of chemical weapons. In 1969 leakage from a chemical munition at a US installation on Okinawa created serious political problems for us which resulted not only in the removal from Okinawa of US chemical weapons stockpiles but also in political pressures which complicated our negotiations with Japan on the reversion of Okinawa. The domestic political constraints in this area are at least as great. In one case, involving a plan to relocate the Okinawa chemical munitions to Umatilla, Oregon, the political pressures were so strong that the plan had to be dropped. It seems doubtful that Congress will be prepared to support commitment of substantial resources to chemical weapons procurement in the next few years. Military procurement acts for FY 1970 and FY 1971 contained provisions prohibiting use of appropriated funds for procurement of devices for disseminating lethal chemical warfare agents, unless the President certifies to Congress that such procurement is “essential to the safety and security of the United States” (50 U.S.C. 1516). Although such provisions are absent from the FY 1972 and thus far from the FY 1973 procurement act, this is not an indication that Congressional attitudes have changed. Congress has also enacted legislation which seriously restricts our ability to deploy the chemical agents and munitions already produced. Legislation enacted in 1969 and 1970 (50 U.S.C. 1511–1518) imposes a number of procedural requirements in connection with the transportation, storage, testing and disposal of lethal chemical weapons. With respect to actions taking place in whole or in part in the United States, these include submission of plans to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, implementation of any safety precautions he recommends, and notification to Congress (and the Governor of any State involved) in advance. There are also special requirements for prior notification of any foreign government in whose territory such actions are to take place and for certain determinations by the Secretary of State which are to be reported to leaders of the Congress. (In practice, the determinations may be classified.) These provisions may be suspended by the President, but only in time of war declared by Congress or of national emergency declared by Congress or the President. The transporation, storage, testing and disposal of lethal chemical weapons also create political problems relating to presumed potential environmental effects and in many instances involve compliance with the Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321–4374), including the filing of environmental impact statements. All of the foregoing constraints significantly impinge on our ability to deploy lethal chemical weapons rapidly and without publicity. These political problems could be substantially reduced through the development of binary weapons, which would eliminate any serious safety hazard. In any event, it can be expected that public sensitivities concerning chemical weapons would continue to be materially greater than those concerning other types of weapons. 2. NATO. NATO strategy, while relying principally on conventional and nuclear capabilities for deterrence of chemical attack, envisions employment of chemical agents in retaliation on limited basis as well as passive defense measures against chemical agents. In practical terms all NATO countries rely on the US to provide the capability to retaliate-in-kind to a CW attack. (France is in some respects a special case and is discussed separately below.) NATO defensive capabilities are relatively meager. Some, but not all, nations have sufficient quantities of protective masks for all troops. Protective clothing and detection devices are in short supply. In addition, none of the NATO countries would be able to provide significant defense against chemical attack to their civilian populations. [ 1 paragraph not declassified ] Concentrated chemical attacks could seriously disrupt NATO tactical operations. Because of the relatively weaker protective posture of US and NATO forces, chemicals used on the battlefield and in rear areas would be effective in creating high casualty rates. This would be advantageous to the Soviets during the early stages of hostilities before mobilization and reinforcement of NATO forces had been completed. Chemicals could be used to create barriers against NATO reinforcements as well as against withdrawing NATO units. Another use of chemicals would be to attack forward air bases in NATO possibly neutralizing a portion of the air strike capability. Chemicals could also be used to contaminate port, rail, and logistical complexes, thereby degrading the reinforcement and resupply system. One NATO country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is subject to international legal constraints on CW production. Under the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954, the FRG is forbidden to produce chemical warfare agents or munitions on its territory. [ 1 paragraph not declassified ] From the poor defensive capability of NATO forces, it is clear that in general low priority is given to chemical warfare defensive preparedness. Because of this low priority and the high cost of providing adequate military and civilian protection, it is unlikely that NATO defensive capabilities will be substantially improved in the near future. 3. [ text not declassified ] 4. USSR/Warsaw Pact Capabilities. Most of the available intelligence on Soviet policy and doctrine regarding chemical weapons dates from the early Sixties. This information is in the form of theoretical discourses on military strategy and doctrine. No official policy or planning documents are available. The information dating from later in the Sixties is mostly from East European sources, and reflects no apparent significant changes. The evidence indicates that the Soviets consider chemical weapons subject to the same restrictions and controls as nuclear weapons, both classified as “weapons of mass destruction”. Although the Soviets could decide to use chemical weapons without using nuclear weapons, there has been no evidence that they visualize a chemical war which does not involve the use of nuclear weapons. Once the nuclear threshold has been crossed, however, the Soviets would not be inhibited from using chemical weapons in battlefield actions. The decision to initiate the use of nuclear and chemical weapons would be made at the highest level of government. Once authorized, the front commanders would plan operations and leave execution to the lower echelons. Chemical weapons are viewed as complementary to nuclear weapons -not as substitutes for them—and as having their own peculiar attributes and advantages. Chemical weapons are seen primarily as weapons for tactical rather than strategic use, and the Pact possesses systems capable of delivering chemical weapons up to the “operational” depth—about 300 miles inside the battle area. There is no evidence that a chemical option has ever been considered for weapons of intercontinetal range. Chemicals would be delivered by conventional tactical weapons systems, and chemical munitions are believed to be available for tube artillery, tactical rockets and missiles, multiple-launched rockets, and ground-attack aircraft. There is no information regarding the quantities of such munitions available, or how they would be delivered from their storage sites to the combat units. The USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries are known to be conducting research and development related to chemical agents, including what is believed to be a major program directed at prophylaxis and therapy against nerve agents. The extent of offensively directed research and development is impossible to determine. The Soviet Union has the technological capability to develop and produce any of the modern nerve agents, and its CW stockpile probably contains both the G- and V-type agents. Older agents, such as mustard and hydrogen cyanide, are also planned for use against certain types of targets, and are most likely stockpiled. There is no evidence of the actual production of chemical agents—other than in limited quantities for experimental or training purposes—though the existence of chemical munitions implies such production. Despite continued observation and analysis of the several production facilities in the USSR which we have at one time or another suspected of chemical warfare activitiy, no actual production has been identified. It is possible that an agent production facility could be integrated into one of the large chemical complexes, and such a plant would probably not be too difficult to conceal. The conversion of related types of plants—such as organophosphorous insecticide producers—to chemical agent production in times of crisis is unlikely. Studies have shown that such conversion would be so technically complex that the construction of an entirely separate, new facility would be more feasible. There is only one site in the USSR where there is convincing evidence and several others where there are good indications of the storage of chemical agent or munitions. We have no evidence that chemical munitions are stored with troops in Eastern Europe. There are reports that field units have been instructed that chemical munitions will be supplied from unspecified locations. There is no information on what quantities of the various agents or munitions might be in the stockpile or the storage practices involved. Although it is known that there are chemical munitions in the stockpile, the proportion of chemical agent in munitions to that in bulk storage is not known. Thus no estimate of the size of the total stockpile, even within very broad limits, is possible. On the basis of Soviet exercises and documents, it is estimated that Soviet toxic chemical requirements for 30 days’ military operations would be on the order of 30,000 tons. Pact organization and military programs for defense against chemical attack are considerably more extensive than NATO’s. The Pact places great emphasis on training for chemical defense, and Pact forces possess large quantities of equipment intended to permit operations in a toxic environment. Much of the equipment which would be employed for defense against chemical attack is also designed to be used for protection against the radiological effects of nuclear attack, and against biological agents. While this equipment and training provides them with a limited ability to operate in a toxic environment, the physical limitations imposed by protective equipment would greatly limit the tempo and duration of offensive action. There are virtually no public opinion constraints on USSR/Warsaw Pact programs. The highly developed USSR/Warsaw Pact defensive chemical warfare capabilities indicates that their chemical warfare programs are not inhibited by financial constraints to the same degree as US/NATO programs. 5. Other Countries. [ text not declassified ] it is likely that a limited capability to engage in offensive chemical warfare operations does exist. China. The Chinese chemical warfare program has emphasized defense against chemical attack; their offensive capability is believed to be handicapped by the undeveloped nature of the Chinese chemical industry. The Chinese have a small CW research and development program. The Chinese are knowledgeable of both the conventional World War I type agents, such as mustard, and the G- and V-type nerve agents, and have the technological capability to produce them in militarily significant quantities if required. Current production, if any, is unknown; there is no-evidence of any production of nerve agents. The size and composition of the current stock-pile of chemical warfare agents are also unknown. Chinese tactics for the employment of CW, largely copied from the Soviets, are quite conventional. They regard tube artillery as the primary means of delivering an initial CW attack; there is little information concerning the tactical use of aerial chemical munitions. Chinese chemical warfare protective equipment, mostly Soviet in origin or design, is good, but is not available in quantities sufficient to provide regular units of the PLA with more than a limited capability to protect against and recover from a CW attack. Elite troops, however, are fully equipped and receivespecialize training in all phases of offensive and defensive chemical warfare. Army-wide training, as well as that in the Navy, emphasizes defense against CW and can best be described as fair. B. The Negotiating Situation. 1, Use of CW - The Geneva Protocol. The basic international agreement in this field is the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and bacteriological methods of warfare. Many states have ratified or acceded with reservations that have the effect of making the Protocol binding on the reserving states only with respect to other parties and of limiting the prohibitions to “no first use”. At present there are 98 parties to the Protocol. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, as well as the PRC, are parties. The United States is the only major military power that is not yet a party. The US has repeatedly affirmed its adherence to the principles and objectives of the Protocol, but has considered that RCAs and herbicides do not come under the Protocol’s prohibitions. President Nixon resubmitted the Protocol to the Senate in August 1970. Following hearings in March 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the President to reconsider the Administration’s position that first use of RCAs and herbicides is not prohibited by the Protocol. The principles of the Protocol have been observed in almost all armed conflicts since 1925 by parties and nonparties alike. * (Chemical weapons were used by Italy against Ethiopia in 1936, reportedly by Japan in a few instances against China early in World War II, and in 1963–67 by the UAR in the Yemen.) In 1966, the US sponsored and voted for a UNGA Resolution that called for “strict observance by all states of the principles and objectives of the Protocol” and condemned. “all actions contrary to these objectives”. In 1968, 1969, and 1970 the US supported similar resolutions that were adopted with virtual unanimity by the UNGA. 2. Additional Arms Control Measures - Recent Discussion. The question of possible controls on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been actively discussed at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and at the UN General Assembly since 1968. In September 1969, the USSR and its allies proposed complete abolition of both chemical and biological weapons -an approach which these countries and many non-aligned advocated throughout 1970. In March 1971 the USSR agreed to negotiate a separate biological weapons (BW) convention as proposed by the United Kingdom and supported by the United States. Work on this convention was completed in 1971 and it was opened for signature in April 1972. This year CW has been the most intensively discussed issue at the CCD. 3. US Approach. Since early 1969 the President has affirmed US willingness to explore proposals and ideas that could contribute to sound and effective arms control relating to chemical weapons and to seek solutions to the difficult problem of verification. In the BW Convention the US undertook a specific commitment to continue negotiations in good faith regarding limitations on CW. At the CCD this year, we have taken the position that the most promising path toward sound progress in the CW field through serious study and analysis of the complex issues involved. To this end the US delegation submitted to the CCD in March a detailed “Work Program” on CW negotiations and in early July a number of additional working papers on CW definitions and other issues for a special meeting of CW experts. While US working papers and statements regarding CW issues have been regarded as useful contributions, many delegations that were willing to go along with this approach through the July experts meeting now feel that further study should be in the context of solving specific treaty issues. 4. Approach of Other Countries. In March 1972, the USSR and its allies tabled at Geneva a draft convention, based closely on the text of the BW agreement, calling for total elimination of chemical weapons. The Soviets have, however, indicated that they are flexible. They have placed on record their willingness “to consider and todiscuss other proposals aimed at a constructive solution of the problem”; they have privately made clear their desire to enter into concrete negotiations and have invited counterproposals from the US. Our allies have as yet taken no firm position on the parameters of possible CW limitations. Recently, however, some have indicated a desire to move forward in this area. [ text not declassified ] The non-aligned generally favor comprehensive prohibitions and recently have been pressing hard for concrete negotiations. While many participated in earlier technical discussions, most now insist that further study will only be useful if focused on specific treaty provisions. A non-aligned group has begun work on a paper dealing with scope and verification. Sweden and the UAR have proposed that the Soviet draft be accepted as a basis for negotiations while Yugoslavia, Morocco, and others have called on the US to submit counter-proposals. III. POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINTS A. Verification and Assurances. The desirability of specific international restraints on CW should be considered in light of the following points: — There are no dependable means of verifying compliance with most possible types of prohibition or limitation on chemical warfare activities. — Nerve agents could present a major threat to the military forces of the major powers as, to a lesser extent, could mustard. The potential threat is tactical, not strategic. — The requirement for verification of a CW agreement is influenced by the military significance of chemical weapons relative to other weapons at a nation’s disposal. — A government considering the decision to violate a CW treaty must take into account the consequences if a violation were detected. Other countries might undertake corresponding CW activities. Public knowledge or the violation might alienate support in neutral, friendly and allied countries. Since violation of international law would be involved, it would raise questions as to the reliability of the country’s signature on other international agreements. 1. National Means. To date we have not been able, through national means, to quantify current levels of CW activity in the USSR and other countries, or, in many aspects of CW activity, even to tell with confidence if there are any programs underway. It would appear very doubtful that we could have any confidence of detecting through national means a change in the USSR’s CW posture. We would not be able to determine sites or quantities of production, types of agents, stockpile levels and locations, R&D, or international transfers. We would probably be able to determine if a known or declared mothballed facilityhad been put back into production. 2. International Means. A CW arms control proposal could prescribe specific international procedures with regard to verification and enforcement in order to provide: — procedures for updating relevant standards; — a mechanism or at least agreed channels for an orderly exchange of relevant data; — a modest incremental.restraint on a prospective violator through participation of its CW experts in international activities designed to promote observance of treaty prohibitions; — agreement on steps to be taken to resolve any misunderstandings or disputes and to clarify whether suspected violations had taken place; — procedures for possible inspections; — a framework for focusing international attention on alleged violations; — a framework for considering sanctions against a violator. The US interest in promoting any such arrangements would depend on their effectiveness, cost, general acceptability, and the degree of control that we would have over their implementation. (a) Existing International Organization. UN procedures and organizations could be used to carry out some of the above functions. Smaller countries would welcome the assigning of the tasks of gathering and transmitting data and investigations to the UN Secretary-General, which in essence means to the Secretariat. The Soviets, however, would almost certainly not go along with such an arrangement. While the US has been prepared to have the UN Secretariat perform some limited implementation functions with regard to arms control agreements, we often possess only limited control over its actions. No organization is as readily qualified to take on responsibilities with respect to a CW agreement as the IAEA was for the NPT. The UN Security Council could also be charged, as it was in the BW Convention, with considering and investigating complaints regarding violations of an agreement. SC decision to consider such a complaint is procedural and determined by majority vote; decision to investigated is, however, subject to veto. This obviously has both advantages and disadvantages for the US. However, a specific drawback to such an arrangement is that the PRC might reject the assumption of this role by the Security Council and veto any investigation, in part because of its sensitivity to ROC status as a party to an agreement. In addition, some countries would resist a provision which permits use of the veto to block an investigation. The threat of having possible charges of violation aired before the Security Council might exert some constraint on a potential violator. It should be recognized, however, that treaty provisions regarding such procedures would not significantly enhance the already existing possibilities for using UN Charter provisions to focus attention on a violator. (b) Consultative Committee. The US Work program submitted to the CCD discussed the possiblity of establishing a standing consultative body, to perform certain functions in connection with a possible CW agreement. These functions could include: — Technical tasks such as reviewing determinations about classification with regard to agreed prohibitions and definitions. — Consultative and information tasks to help assure parties that the provisions of any agreement were being carried out. It could receive and transmit relevant economic data and information such as the intended use of organophosphorus chemicals. It would perhaps serve as the forum for arranging inspection visits to clarify ambiguous situations. While recent multilateral arms control agreements have not established or defined special roles for such a body, a special consultative group might be able to perform constructive functions in connection with a CW agreement. Given the complexities of CW verification, a consultative body might offer some additional element of assurance to potential parties against both violations and irresponsible charges. Participation of appropriate governmental, military and scientific representatives might in itself contribute to international confidence, understanding, and cooperation in dealing with problems inherent in implementing restraints on CW. Some organizational questions regarding such a body could be settled in advance; others would have to be worked out by the participants. There could be a requirement that certain parties to an agreement, such as the depositories, take part in such a body, while participation might be optional for other parties. There would, of course, be some financial restraints on the size, regularity of meetings, and administrative support for such a body. Establishment of such a body might well be negotiable. A number of our allies and some non-aligned have shown considerable interest in an expert body in connection with any CW agreement. In July a Soviet expert spoke to the CCD about the possibility of annual conferences of experts to exchange information concerning chemical products that could be used for producing chemical weapons. The Soviet expert also suggested the creation of national committees to implement CW controls. They would conduct their activities on the basis of a single international program containing the necessary norms and rules. The Soviets did not make clear, however, whether such standards should be described in a verification article or whether the entire development of standards would be left to meetings of experts after an agreement was in force. 3. On-Site Inspection. “Inspection” means an actual visit to a facility by technically qualified personnel. The goals of inspection are to deter illegal activities by making exposure probable, to obtain information on suspected violations, and to supply conclusive evidence in the event a treaty violation is uncovered. Provisions for on-site inspection could specify: — scope of inspection - facilities and activities depending on the scope of the prohibitions. — triggering mechanism - ranging from periodic inspection of a few designated facilities to challenge or even a right to inspect anything anywhere at any time. — auspices - on a bilateral basis or under the aegis of an international organization. — inspectors - full-time experts or an ad hoc group. — access - observation from the perimeter of a facility; unrestricted access to any area within a facility; the right to examine records and sample material being processed. Effectiveness: The extent of inspection that could be carried out in connection with a CW agreement would be severely limited by both political and financial constraints, regardless of the exact system established. The principal technical problem, which severely limits the utility of on-site inspection, is the extreme difficulty in obtaining reliable, comprehensive intelligence information about the location of possible CW-related facilities. It would be very difficult to have any high degree of assurance that an on-site inspection program was covering all a nation’s chemical weapons production facilities unless a very large number of inspections were undertaken—and even then we could not be sure. Inspection of a small number of facilities, particularly if confined to facilities designated by the host government, would provide little assurance that clandestine chemical weapons production was not taking place in the country in question. Intelligence data, derived from all sources, would be the principal basis for site selection even if all chemical weapons-related facilities had been ostensibly declared. On-site inspection of production facilities would be more effective in detecting a treaty violation than inspection of transportation, storage, or testing facilities. Conclusive proof of illegal activities, however, could only be obtained if samples were taken for chemical analysis. On-site inspection within an industrial chemical plant could probably verify that it was not producing chemical weapons. Observation from the perimeter of a plant would not be effective. At declared chemical weapons facilities that had been shut down inspectors could detect prohibited activities (or absence of any activity) with little difficulty. Acceptability to the US . Provisions for on-site inspection of US facilities in connection with international limitations on chemical weapons might be acceptable provided: Regular inspection was limited to certain sites designated by the US. International inspectors could not be guaranteed unlimited access to either US military CW facilities or to commercial chemical plants. It might be possible to designate certain mothballed military CW production facilities where regular inspection could be permitted with no detriment to US security. It would be more difficult to assure access for such inspections to civilian facilities. The US could veto any challenge inspection (except of certain designated facilities) that might be requested by another party or by an international organization. Again, the US could not guarantee access to any facility or installation where others might claim prohibited activities were or could be taking place. Negotiability. Any obligatory inspection would not be broadly negotiable. Voluntary inspection might be broadly negotiable, even with the Soviets, provided all partici- pants naa equal opportunity both to request inspection others and to veto or refuse inspection of their territory. Most Western countries would probably be prepared to accept some inspections - but only with the same restrictions as the US would require on any such provisions. The Soviets are highly unlikely to accept on-site inspection within the USSR even of certain declared military facilities. They would argue, inter alia, that comprehensive on-site inspection is unacceptable to them, is not feasible, and would not really be acceptable to the West. As for inspecting certain specified facilities, they would insist that this would add little additional assurance since treaty violations could take place at numerous other locations. Even if they accepted the concept of inspection of certain declared CW production facilities they might declare none. They have never admitted the existence of CW production plants in the USSR. While a few non-aligned countries might be prepared to grant broad access for inspection in connection with a CW agreement, most would be unwilling to permit access to military or to commercial installations. Many would press for complete equality among all parties in the application of inspection provisions. A related consideration with respect to CW negotiations is that, in light of the limited effectiveness of inspecting only certain designated facilities and the known unacceptability to the Soviets of any obligatory international inspection on Soviet territory, a US proposal calling for this would be viewed by many as aimed at blocking progress toward an agreement. 4. Provision of Data (a) Data on Facilities and Stockpiles An agreement prohibiting CW production could contain provisions calling on parties to make declarations regarding: — production facilities - Such declarations could provide positive identification of facilities that are producing or have produced chemical warfare agents or munitions, their location, and possibly their capabilities. Alternatively, declarations could simply be negative, affirming that the party either had no facilities for chemical weapons production or that it was not producing chemical weapons. — stockpiles - Parties might agree to provide declarations positively identifying the size, location, and/or composition of their CW stockpiles or stating that they had no stockpiles. Alternatively, parties could agree to declare quantities of stocks destroyed and/or replenished without declaring the actual size, location, or composition of their stockpiles. Effectiveness . Declarations regarding production, facilities in the USSR would, if accurate, provide significant additional assurance regarding Soviet compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons production. This would be particularly true if facilities declared appeared to be sufficient for estimated Soviet chemical weapons needs. However, without on-site inspection it would be difficult to determine whether declared facilities were in fact capable of CW production. It would, of course, not be possible to determine whether all such facilities had been declared. Periodic declarations regarding non-production of prohibited substances would provide a modest additional political constraint against violations. Declarations regarding stockpiles would provide little assurance regarding compliance with prohibitions on CW production - except in countries with no chemical weapons capabilities where any detection of stocks would reveal a violation. On the other hand delcarations concerning stockpiles would provide a modest poitical constraint against prohibited increases in stockpiles. Acceptability to the US . The US would be prepared to provide quite detailed information concerning the location and perhaps capabilities of its military CW production facilities. We might be prepared to make some statement concerning overall quantity of our stockpiles, but we would certainly not want to provide detailed information on the size, composition, or location or our stockpiles. Negotiability . Most Western countries would, like the US, probably be prepared to provide information on production facilities. With the possible exception [ less than 1 line not declassified ] no Western countries are believed to have CW stockpiles. The Soviet Union has never admitted possessing chemical weapons production capability, and it is most unlikely that it would agree to provide information on production facilities in connection with a CW arms control agreement. It would almost certainly refuse to divulge any information on stockpiles. It is quite possible, however, that the USSR and its allies would be prepared to make declarations on a periodic basis that they were not producing any CW, the manufacture of which was proscribed or controlled by a treaty. Many countries that have no capabilities would be prepared to make voluntary statements to this effect, though they would probably not accept a treaty obligation to do so which did not cover all parties. (b) Economic Data Organophosphorus nerve agents are the only nerve agents known or suspected to be in national stockpiles. Since elemental phosphorus is an essential ingredient in the manufacture of these agents, it is conceivable that a detailed data-reporting and monitoring system might be proposed for verification of a ban on nerve agent production. Data monitoring for non-phosphorous agents and dual-purpose chemicals (industrial chemicals that can also be used for weapons) would be much more massive and intrusive than phosphorus monitoring, Effectiveness. There are currently no effctive methods for discovering clandestine phosphorus production facilities or phosphorus stockpiles. Consequently, data monitoring of phosphorus production and consumption would not provide assurance of compliance with a production ban, since it is impressible, even with extensive inspection, to ensure that the data reported are comprehensive. Nevertheless, provisions for data exchange might provide a measure of additional political constraint, since a nation wishing to violate a production ban would have to submit deliberately false data. In addition, provisions for data exchange might provide some slight benefit by increasing our meager knowledge of the Soviet chemical industry. Acceptability to the US. Most of the data which would be reported in the US is already available in the form of industrial records. Although not all of this information is collected by the US Government, this could be accomplished if necessary. Adequate procedures already exist within the US Government for safeguarding commercial secrets. The submission to other countries or to international organizations of aggregated data would probably be acceptable to the US chemical industry. However, reports on individual US companies or plants using the monitored materials is likely to be unacceptable to US industry. Negotiability. Since the Soviet Union and several non-aligned delegations have suggested use of economic data as a method of verification, it is likely that treaty provisions for this type of exchange could be negotiated if this were acceptable to the US and its allies. However, provisions for extensive on-site inspections by an international authority needed to ensure any degree of reliability would be unacceptable to most countries. B. Activities and Facilities 1. Production and Stockpiles A key element in any CW proposal would be its treatment of production. This would affect many other features or a CW program, inlcuding stockpiles, weapons-loading, and R&D. (a) Agents Covered (1) Single-Purpose Agents. These agents have no large-scale uses except in chemical warfare. Modern agents in this category, such as organophosphorous compounds, are extremely toxic. Some older agents, which caused a number of deaths in World War I, also fall into the “single-purpose” category. Single-purpose agents form the core of current DS chemical warfare capability (and probably the Soviet capability), and would logically be covered in any CW proposal. (2) Dual-Purpose Agents. Dual-purpose agents are chemicals which are used for non-military purposes, but which can also be used as chemical warfare agents. Phosgene, chlorine, and hydrogen cyanide are well-known examples which were utilized in the First World War. The US does not produce such agents for weapons purposes. Dual purpose agents might be of more relevance than single-purpose agents to chemical warfare among less highly industrialized states and to avoiding the proliferation of chemical weapons, even though the military value of the older dual-purpose agents is marginal for the VS. Some insecticides are sufficiently toxic that they could, in fact, be considered dual-purpose agents. In the event that peaceful applications are found for single-purpose agents, we would have a problem of how to maintain restrictions on their military use without hampering such peaceful applications. Coverage of dual-purpose agents should provide a framework for dealing with this proplem. Thus to be broadly acceptable any proposal proscribing production should place restrictions on dual-purpose agents produced for hostile purposes. To allow a country to produce military stocks of dual-purpose chemicals would undermine the significance of restrictions on single-purpose agents. (3) Precursors. Precursors are used in the production of modern agents and may or may not have civilian applications. Phosphorus trichioride, for example, a key precursor of organophosphorus nerve agents, is widely used in the manufacture of pesticides and plasticizers. On the other, hand some precursors of nerve agents have no current civilian applications. Under present conditions, agent precursors do not assume immediate military significance until processed further into an agent, but binary devices, by using intermediates as weapon components, could blur this distinction. A party should not he permitted to accumulate stores of precursors for rapid conversion for weapons purposes. For a proposal to be taken seriously, the same restrictions would have to be put on precursors intended for military purposes as are put on single-purpose agents. We could not expect to get agreement to a proposal which banned production of current agents but exempted from its provisions our planned follow-on chemical weapons—binaries. (b) Stockpiles (1) Shelf-life and Obsolescence. Restraints on stockpiles may operate either directly, as a consequence of restrictions on the stockpiles themselves, or indirectly, as a result of restraints on production of agents and munitions. If production of chemical warfare agents and munitions were prohibited, the US and other parties which already had stockpiles would not be allowed to replace agent or munitions which were no longer usable because of deterioration or obsolescence. These two processes would eventually—perhaps after quite a long period—reduce stockpiles to zero. It is important to note that the length of time a stockpile is usable (the shelf-life) is not determined by its size. Agent stored in bulk containers [ less than 1 line not declassified ] will probably retain its potency longer than agent in filled munitions. Technical means are available to maintain bulk agent at high potency for an extended period, if adequate funds are provided. For example, storage of bulk agent in a moderate, controlled environment could extend its shelf-life. At present US bulk agent is stored in containers, most of which are in the open and often exposed to relatively high temperatures at which agent tends to deteriorate to some degree. If agent were redistilled to maintain its potency, some decrease in total quantity would occur. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] The shelf-life of filled munitions [ less than 1 line not declassified ] is at least 15–20 years. Artillery rounds filled [ less than 1 line not declassified ] show no signs of serious deterioration, nor do artillery rounds filled [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. The average age of [ 2 lines not declassified ]. The rest of the munitions are filled with [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. Measured in tons of agent, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] filled munitions make up [ less than 1 line not declassified ] of US chemical munitions stocks, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] filled [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. The bulk of the munitions containing [ less than 1 line not declassified ]are 6–10 years old; those filled with [ less than 1 line not declassified ] have been in storage 5–9 years. No significant deterioration has been observed in either case. At the present time obsolescence of the delivery system is the limiting factor in determing the useful life of filled munitions. Present stocks of 155 mm and 8-inch artillery rounds, as well as 4.2-inch mortar rounds are expected to remain usable well into the 1980’s. Current aerial-delivered CW munitions (bombs and spray tanks) and chemical land mines are also expected to remain in the stockpile. Together these items compose [ less than 1 line not declassified ] of current filled munitions stocks. Chemical rockets and 105 mm howitzer rounds ([ less than 1 line not declassified ] of filled munitions) are expected to remain in usable condition into the 1980’s but may not in fact be usable if their delivery systems are phased out. Sufficient rocket launchers and howitzers could easily be made available if given funding priority. If adequate funds for maintenance and for replacement of obsolete delivery systems were available, the US, relying on current chemical munitions, would retain a deterrent about as satisfactory (or unsatisfactory) as at present for an extended period, even under a total ban on production of chemical agents and munitions; however, according to JCS reports replacing delivery systems for current munitions would be more expensive than replacing munitions with binaries. (2) Stockpile Reduction. Reduction of stockpiles by an agreed amount or to an agreed level would permit nations with stockpiles to retain a capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack. The agreed level of retained stockpiles could provide a retaliation-only capability as opposed to a long-term warfighting capability. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] of the US stockpile is made up of [ less than 1 line not declassified ] much of which is considered excess and planned for disposal during the mid1970’s. The remainder is to be retained pending procurement of binary munitions. Thus a substantial reduction of stockpiles, particularly if phased over a period of time, would have little impact on current or projected US retaliatory capability. (3) Stockpile Modernization. Stockpiles could be reduced without prohibiting modernization and replenishment. This is an important military consideration. Although the deterrent effects of our current stockpile could continue for some time to come, its composition, age, condition and disposition do not now provide an adequate capability for sufficient retaliation in kind against a large-scale attack or for extended warfighting using chemicals on a large scale. Additionally, political and public constraints seriously impede the movement, storage and development of current chemical weapons. Acquisition of binary chemical weapons, which could alleviate these constraints, appears to be the only practical course for improving the US retaliatory capability. 2. Munitions and Other Means of Delivery (a) Current Munitions While current chemical munitions and other means of delivery are very similar to conventional weapons, some of them must be specially designed and manufactured for CW purposes. A ban on production of chemical munitions and other delivery means could be a logical ancillary measure in the context of an agreement to destroy all existing agent stockpiles. It would, of course, not be possible to prohibit the production of dual-purpose munitions, i.e., munitions such as artillery shells that could be used for both high explosives and the dissemination of chemical agents. However, as an adjunct to a ban on new agent production, a prohibition on the production of munitions specifically intended for using chemical agents would, if implemented, also contribute to restraints on CW capabilities by preventing parties from using already existing bulk stocks to increase their stocks of filled munitions. In this case, the US would be prevented from using bulk stocks we already possess ([ less than 1 line not declassified ] of our total stocks) for replacement of deteriorating filled munitions. A proposal to prohibit production of chemical warfare agents which did not prohibit production of chemical munitions could be criticized as containing an obvious loophole. (b) Binary Munitions Since binary munitions contain two agent precursors, a ban on production of precursors for weapons purposes would prevent production of binary munitions as well. Thiswould be true even production of the required shell casingswere allowed, as precursor stocks are not now available for loading into the casings. 3. Weapons Loading Given a stockpile of chemical agents and available weapons or other means of delivery, the time required for weapons-loading could be relatively short. If the weapons (for example, artillery shells) were not available, the time required for their procurement and loading would be one year or more. Existing loading lines for chemical weapons are likely to be located at agent production facilities. If agent production were prohibited but loading at production plants from existing bulk stocks allowed, serious ambiguity could result regarding the compliance with a production ban. A ban on loading would not appear to be logical if munitions production were permitted. If both chemical munitions production and weapons loading were prohibited, the US would not be able to use bulk stocks to replace deteriorating munitions. On the other hand, our lack of unfilled munitions would make a ban on weapons-loading a logical accompaniment to any ban on production of munitions. A proposal to prohibit production of chemical warfare agents which did not prohibit weapons loading be criticized as containing an obvious loophole. 4. Production Facilities If chemical warfare agent production were totally prohibited, parties might be required to dismantle or moth-ball certain facilities (which in most countries, including the US, would be military) for production of single-purpose agents or to convert them to peaceful purposes. Such provisions, if lived up to, would make it more difficult to resume chemical weapons production at a later date. A requirement that chemical weapons production facilities be moth-balled or dismantled, if implemented, would place the Soviet Union under constraints comparable to those which already affect US nerve agent production facilities. If the US decided at some future date to resume production of chemical agents several courses of action might be considered: — produce “conventional” chemical weapons a. reactivate old plants b. build new plants — produce binary chemical weapons by building new facilities US facilities for GB production have been mothballed since 1957 and the VX plant since 1968. Maintenance of all plants has been minimal, resulting in extensive deterioration. To bring the VX plant back into production would require considerable rebuilding. Reactivation of the GB plant at Rocky Mountain Arsenal would require dismantling facilities currently being used for demilitarization of obsolete munitions and reinstalling certain filling equipment. Data on the lead-time and costs for resuming chemical warfare agent production are given in the table below: lead-time cost-millions 1. “conventional” reactivation GB 2 yr. $35–40 VX 2 yr. $26 new construction GB 20 mo. $120 VX 16 mo. $82 2. binary new construction GB 12 mo. $10 The lead-time and costs for reactivating the current plants will probably increase appreciably with time due to deterioration. The course of action that would allow resumption of CW agent production most rapidly appears to be construction of facilities for manufacturing binaries (assuming that R&D is already completed at the time). During the 1970’s, however, only GB binaries are likely to be available. Resumption of production of VX chemical munitions would be accomplished most rapidly by constructing a new plant. It should also be noted that unless production of munitions hardware (shell casings, etc.) were given high priority, the hardware production process, rather than the agent production process, might determine how fast chemical munitions production would be resumed. 5. Research, Development and Testing Maintenance of a research, development and testing program under a CW agreement would serve to guard against technological surprise, but more importantly to provide a continuity of technical competence in the general area of CW. Since this is a fairly mature technology we do not anticipate technological improvements that would alter in a major way the overall effectiveness of chemical weapons. Maintaining an RD&T program would also ensure that production of binary munitions would be possible if the US decided, for compelling security reasons, to resume production of chemical munitions’. On the other hand, an effective ban on research, development and testing would prevent the Sovie Union or any other potential adversary from improving its CW capability. It would be extremely difficult to determine and to specify clearly what research, development and testing could be useful militarily. As an example, the discovery of chemical warfare agents would be an accidental by-product of academic or industrial research. Nerve agents are an off-shoot of industrial research on insecticides. It would also be extremely difficult in practice to separate R&D for offensive purposes from defense-oriented R&D. The testing that might be limited for treaty purposes would also be difficult to specify. Some testing is required to obtain knowledge of a stockpile, particularly as the stockpile grows older. Development of defensive equipment also involves testing. We should have in mind, in shaping and presenting any CW proposal, the problem of possible erosion of public and Congressional support for a research, development and testing program under a CW agreement. 6. Defensive Measures A ban on chemical defense would have some inhibiting effect on use of chemical weapons, as a nation contemplating first use would have to take into consideration that its own troops and population would be undefended against whatever retaliation could be carried out. It would appear likely that a number of countries would hesitate to subscribe to an agreement leaving them so vulnerable to a chemical attack from a non-party or a treaty violator. Masks suitable for use against RCA would presumably be omitted from the ban, as would decontamination equipment justified as intended to cope with radiation or BW hazards. 7. International Transfer Parties to an agreement should be prohibited from evading it by dealing with non-narties. A ban on international transfer would enhance the security of all parties by inhibiting the proliferation of offensive CW capability through transfer of stocks or of production technology and facilities. There are strong precedents for such provisions in previous arms control agreements. The US currently has no plans for transfer of operational quantities of lethal chemical munitions or of technology or facilities for their production. However, there is almost total exchange of R&D information with [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. Laboratory and test quantities of agent are exchanged as needed for cooperative R&D programs. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] also participates in the exchange arrangements, but to a esser extent. These activities would not be affected by a transfer ban. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–155, 40 NSC. Top Secret. The attachment at Tab A is not published. At Tab C is Document 259 . * The JCS maintain that CW negotiations attempted by the United States would be from a position of weakness considering its present posture vis-à-vis the USSR. * The JCS note that many historians believe the primary reason that chemical weapons were not used in WWII was not the existence of the Geneva Protocol but rather the adversaries’ belief that their opponents had an extensive, in kind retaliatory capability. 265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\ 265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\ 1 Washington, August 15, 1972 SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Study—NSSM 157 In response to your 13 August memorandum, I have read with care the recent CW study coordinated by ACDA, which brought forth all the different options available to us in proposing a U.S. initiative at the CCD negotiations currently underway in Geneva. I am pleased to see that the study presents a comprehensive range of options, several of which can be useful in moving beyond our present CW negotiating position. As I explained in my 12 July letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of State, my decision is in favor of option 2 which proposes a production ban on all lethal agents, including binaries, and no limitation on present stockpiles. As I see this option, it is a realistic proposal that has a good chance for acceptance at Geneva. At the same time, the proposal would not now nor in the near future affect present U.S. capabilities. To permit formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, I have requested their comments to be submitted by 1000 hours, 16 August. On receipt, I will forward the Chairman’s memorandum to you. It appears that the JCS position will favor option 1. This option would allow binary production, modernization and improvement of CW stockpiles, and a continuing R&D program, all considered important to JCS. However, it offers very little that could help effect realistic CW restraints. In the event that there is no production, JCS appear to be concerned primarily over the deterioration of the stockpile and the R&D program. I, too, am concerned about these matters but I believe that they can be taken care of in a treaty that has a provision for review after five or ten years as well as another provision that would serve as an escape clause. Technical measures can be undertaken within DOD to prolong the shelf life of chemical agents, protect our present stockpile, and modify plans for phasing out certain delivery systems employed at present. Control measures could insure a continuing R&D program. Let me say in closing that prompt action is essential in order to table something at the CCD by early September before the possibility vanishes of doing anything meaningful in chemical warfare this year. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. The memorandum at Tab A is not published. 266. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 266. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 15, 1972 Subject: NSSM 157 In your memorandum of August 13, 1972, you requested the views of ACDA on the options set forth in the NSSM 157 review of the United States position on chemical weapons prohibitions. On the basic question of whether the US should enter into negotiations or continue to maintain the position that further study is needed, we urge that the US seize the opportunity it now has to establish the basis on which negotiations regarding chemical weapons will move forward. We therefore believe it would be to our advantage to put forward a specific treaty proposal at Geneva this summer. ACDA believes that both our national security and our political interests would be served by a broad ban on chemical weapons, covering at least a prohibition on production and the eventual elimination of stockpiles (Option 3 of the NSSM 157 review). If it is not judged desirable to put forward at this time a proposal as far-reaching as Option 3, then a treaty prohibiting production but allowing the retention of stockpiles (Option 2) should, in our view, be tabled without delay. We believe it would be contrary to our interests to put forward a proposal along the lines of Option 1. The following considerations underlie our support for Option 3. — We doubt that the US or NATO needs chemical weapons to deter, through the threat of retaliation in kind, the possible first use of chemical weapons by the Soviets. We believe it would be in our interest to work toward the elimination of both US and Soviet CW and to rely ultimately on our conventional and nuclear capabilities for both deterrence and retaliation against any residual threat of chemical attack. — There is no realistic prospect that the United States or our NATO allies would make the substantial commitment of resources to the CW field needed to provide the military basis for a credible strategy of retaliation-in-kind. Nor do we believe that CW should be given that priority. — We would expect political opposition from European governments to any movement of additional US chemical weapons to Europe whether or not binaries were available. — If we attempt to build up our CW capabilities through the introduction of binaries and other steps, we must expect that the Soviets will increase their CW capabilities. Both countries would clearly be moving in a direction that was in the interest of neither; but the problems for the US in attaining a credible CW posture in Europe would be particularly difficult. On the other hand, the US would gain an advantage to the extent that Soviet CW capabilities are constrained by international treaty commitments. For these reasons, I believe that our goal with respect to chemical weapons should be the most comprehensive feasible controls. In our view, Option 2, a prohibition on the production of lethal and other highly toxic agents for weapons purposes, would be a sound and appropriate step toward this goal. It would enable us to move ahead now to develop international cooperation and confidence in achieving controls on chemical weapons. If we decide to put forward a specific arms control proposal regarding chemical weapons, we believe it essential that this proposal appear sound and meaningful. Therefore, if Option 2 is chosen, I urge that our proposal prohibit the production of chemical munitions and the loading of agents into munitions as well as the production of agents. If the proposal were limited only to agents, I believe it would be viewed as leaving open broad possibilities for activities relating to chemical weapons production and it might well not have the desired impact in Geneva and elsewhere. We cannot, of course, be certain of the international reaction to a proposal like Option 2 until we put it forward. It is noteworthy, however, that the Soviets at Geneva have clearly indicated their willingness to consider a partial measure in the CW field. Some of our allies have spoken of the desirability of prohibiting stockpiles as well as production, but they are also interested in taking practical steps that might be possible at this time. We expect that a number of non-aligned will continue to support a comprehensive approach regardless of what we propose. However, as in the seabed and biological weapon negotiations, they are likely to welcome whatever concrete steps can be agreed upon by the US and USSR. I believe that Option 1, which suggests a treaty limiting stockpiles but allowing new production, is not negotiable, nor could it be a basis for negotiations. It would be viewed as a chemical weapons modernization proposal and would be criticized accordingly, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, as one of the two major nuclear powers, it is not in our interest to undertake programs aimed at achieving general acceptance of the deployment of substantial quantities of chemical weapons. With respect to the merits of an announcement of unilateral action by the US rather than a proposal for a treaty, I strongly recommend that we propose a treaty. A unilateral US statement in lieu of a treaty would not deal with pressures for negotiations nor serve to channel the efforts of others in this field toward the constraints we think desirable. It would involve restraints on the US without securing the comparable restraints on others that a treaty would provide. Unilateral action, if we request that others emulate it, would result at best in a variety of differing responses by other countries and a confusing situation in which the stated policies of governments regarding their chemical weapons programs were at variance and were subject to unilateral changes. Treaty negotiations will lead to clearly defined and compatible positions on the part of all parties. Finally, unilateral action would not provide a basis for the international cooperation, in particular between us and the Soviets, which could serve to make less likely a chemical arms race and tensions in general. A unilateral statement joined to a treaty proposal could, however, be quite useful in connection with the problem of stockpiles. Since we plan to reduce our stockpiles in any case, there would seem to be no reason not to make this fact public. Such an announcement could be quite helpful in gaining acceptance for a treaty proposal which placed no legal constraint on stockpiles. It would also be important for us to acknowledge as a valid objective - not yet attainable - the eventual elimination of stockpiles. On timing, I would emphasize that as the CCD moves to the end of its present session and the UNGA approaches, it is in our interest to begin to discuss with others a specific treaty proposal. If we can in the immediate future begin to consult with our allies regarding a specific proposal, the Geneva Conference would be prepared to remain in session for some time in order to await the outcome of these consultations. ACDA has devoted considerable study to the legal and technical aspects of a possible treaty. We believe that we are now in a position to deal effectively with the issues involved and that we could put forward at an early date a practical and workable proposal for constraints on chemical weapons. Philip J. Farley Acting Director 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 267. Memorandum From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird 267. Memorandum From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, August 16, 1972 JCSM–372–72 Subject: Response to NSSM 157 (U) 1. U) Reference is made to: a. JCSM–351–72, dated 28 July 1972, subject: “Chemical Warfare Policy (U),” which forwarded the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a US draft treaty on chemical warfare (CW). b. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), I–26439/72, dated 14 August 1972, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the response to NSSM 157 and, particularly, the options therein. 2. (U) As requested in reference 1b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the study and recognize it as a reasonably balanced presentation of the major available alternatives, their relative merits, and other relevant considerations. 3. (S) In assessing the proposed negotiating alternatives, certain factors have a major bearing on the selection of a proper option. a. There is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons. Even onsite inspections (OSI) cannot provide effective verification regarding CW activities. Therefore, in the absence of any effective means of insuring that other nations would comply with CW prohibitions, it is imperative that the United States maintain an effective CW retaliatory capability in order to provide an effective CW deterrent and to preclude being placed at a significant disadvantage should CW hostilities occur. b. In terms of negotiating goals, the United States should seek an agreement that would limit the USSR to a retaliatory capability in CW. c. A production ban, which is a significant factor in several proposals in the study, would effectively eliminate the capability to maintain a viable retaliatory CW capability. Reliance on the chemical stocks of the vintage and composition of the current US stockpile to provide a continuing deterrent is unacceptable due to uncertainties concerning their remaining shelf life/employment life. The modernization of the current stockpile with binary type weapons, the most efficient and cost effective of the feasible courses of action, is essential to a credible retaliatory/deterrent CW capability. d. While no truly effective and acceptable means of verifying a stockpile limit or a production ban exist, the principle of OSI should be advocated by the United States. An obligation to accept inspection of certain declared facilities would appear to have merit in the international arena. e. A unilateral statement by the United States regarding a substantial reduction of US stockpiles independent of, or coupled with, any other option is not in the US security interest. The same applies to a unilateral declaration of a moratorium on production. Such measures would result in immediate limitations on US CW capabilities without similar restraints on other nations. They would probably remain as permanent constraints even if international agreement on such measures never materializes. 4. (TS) Based on the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a treaty limiting stockpiles to retaliatory levels and prohibiting the transfer of lethal agents for weapons purposes would not adversely affect the national security. This combination of proposals more nearly reflects the approach of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a new US CW treaty initiative forwarded in reference 1a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can support a proposal for a retaliatory/deterrent stockpile limit at approximately the current US level, with provision for modernization (binary production), accompanied, at least in initial negotiations, by a limited OSI requirement at military production centers by an international team. 5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you support these views and forward them to the National Security Council. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: T.H. Moorer Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. Laird forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of an August 18 memorandum in which he noted that the JCS position was essentially that described in his August 15 memorandum ( Document 265 ). (Ibid.) 268. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 268. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 17, 1972 I have reviewed the study prepared in response to NSSM 157 by the ad hoc group and wish first of all to emphasize three points: 1. in contrast to BW agents, lethal CW agents can be very effective weapons against an unprotected, unprepared, or unwarned force, even more effective than modern conventional ordnance; 2. relative to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations, US troops are very poorly prepared to engage in chemical warfare (the troops of our NATO allies are even less well prepared) and the prospects for improving their capability to do so are poor; 3. although we are well aware of the excellent Soviet CW defensive program, our detailed knowledge of their offensive program (what agents, where and how produced, where stored, etc.) is so limited and the diversity of available methods of production so great, that verification in the technical sense can by no means be relied upon to assure that limitations on stockpile or production are being observed. (Even very intrusive on-site inspection will not significantly increase the very low level assurance that seems possible without it.) It follows from the first two of these generally accepted points that it is in our overall interest to strengthen political restraints against the introduction of chemical agents into war, and that agreements which tend to restrain national capabilities equally are likely to favor the US rather than the USSR. Even though such agreements may not be fully honored, the present disparity between the capabilities of the US and the Soviet Union are so great that we could tolerate a great deal of uncertainty in the honoring of properly chosen agreements without a net detriment to our national security. Hence, in some cases, we could readily accept the limitations on verifications indicated in item 3 preceding. However, since these weapons are effective weapons that can be produced without great difficulty, it seems unwise to rely on political constraints alone to inhibit their actual use. Thus, I would urge that the US retain a CW retaliatory capability. Since options 3, 4 and 5 do not permit retention of an in-kind retaliatory capability, I would recommend rejecting these. A treaty limiting stockpiles, Option 1, should meet the requirement for retention of an in-kind retaliatory capability and also permit us to modernize our stocks through the introduction of weapons that are absolutely safe in storage and transit. Furthermore, the working group pointed out that we have a great deal of flexibility in determining how stockpiles might be limited and to what level they might be limited since we are in the process of reducing our stockpiles anyhow. Thus there is much to commend this option. Regarding Option 2, I am concerned that a ban on production would ultimately reduce our assurance of a capability to retaliate in kind, without effectively limiting the capability of others. Our present capability to retaliate is inadequate because of a lack of appropriate weapon systems, difficulties in storage and handling, and deployment limitations imposed out of concern for safety by the Congress. The Navy, for example, will not handle available weapons on its ships. The Air Force is quite concerned about the transportation of these weapons by air. Movement of these weapons in foreign countries is highly restricted. Consequently, we have great difficulty in having these weapons available at the places where retaliation might be called for. Most of these problems are solved by the introduction of “binary” weapons now in development and which would be prohibited under a production ban. There remains also some uncertainty as to the viability of our stockpile under a production ban because of the possible decomposition of the lethal agents themselves. Recent progress in the development of inhibitors appears to have gone a long way towards easing what was a difficult problem. However, most of our filled munitions contain an older inhibitor and we do not have enough experience with the new inhibitors to say with certainty that our stockpile could be maintained for a decade or two. This problem, of course, must present itself to other nations as well. Furthermore, I find it impossible to define a production ban in a meaningful way. A production ban would certainly limit the production of finished lethal agents. However, in the so-called binary weapons which are now under development, two non-toxic compounds are mixed during the flight of an artillery shell, missile, or aircraft, and react to form the final highly toxic agent. A general production ban would presumably also limit synthesis of these agent precursors. However, production involves a series of chemical reactions starting with commonly available initial reactants. Many of the possible starting materials are produced in very large quantities for use in the production of insecticides, fuel additive, flameproofing compounds, etc. Since most of the possible reactions leading to the final precursors of the active agent are in themselves straightforward and can be carried out rapidly with simple equipment and minimal risk, it is not clear how far back restraints must be placed in the synthetic sequence in order to have some assurance that we have at least delayed the fielding of a lethal chemical agent capability by countries actually observing the ban. The number of G and V agents which might be produced is so large, and the methods of production so numerous that we would find it difficult if not impossible to specify all of the precursors which would have to be searched out in order to verify that a violation was in fact occurring. Since so many of the starting materials have other uses, it is not clear that a production ban, no matter how defined or verified, would in fact effectively limit the lethal chemical capability of another country. Therefore, I favor Option 1 with no production ban, or possibly a stockpile limitation with a ban on the production of finished agents only. The latter would permit all nations to modernize their stockpiles through the introduction of binary weapons while retaining a fixed total agreed stockpile level. Edward E. David, Jr. Science Adviser 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting,NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 17, 1972 Subject: Department of State Comments on NSSM–157 The Department of State concludes that it is in the U.S. interest to take a limited CW arms control initiative, involving a prohibition of the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. This position is in accordance with Secretary Rogers’ letter to Secretary Laird July 19, in which the Secretary supported Mr. Laird’s judgment that the U.S. should undertake such an initiative as soon as possible. The Department of State would thus support the second of the treaty options developed in the NSSM–157 study, which calls for proposing a treaty prohibiting production and transfer of the lethal and other highly toxic agents for weapons purposes. In reaching this conclusion we have considered the very real arguments that can be made against Mr. Laird’s approach, specifically: such a ban would be unverifiable, and thus establish a further precedent in an undesirable direction; we would freeze ourselves into our existing posture, which may or may not be sufficient for deterrence; it may be difficult to avoid extension of the ban to RCAs, herbicides and non-lethal agents; and the assumption that we could not get Congressional support for stockpile modernization may be incorrect. While recognizing that a proposal such as Mr. Laird has suggested would extend the precedent with respect to unverifiable arms control agreements which already exists, we do not find this a reason for not proceeding. The general approach of the U.S. is to tailor verification to provide whatever assurance we feel is necessary for the arms control agreement in question. All CW limits are inherently unverifiable. We have to decide, therefore, whether a prohibition on the production and transfer of lethal chemicals (or any other CW limit) is—on balance—more in the U.S. interest than no limit. On balance the Department of State supports an early initiative, preferably during the current CCD session, calling for a ban on the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. The principal reasons that lead the Department of State to support such a proposal as being in the U.S. interest are similar to those which Mr. Laird finds compelling. They are as follows: — Existing fiscal constraints and public and Congressional attitudes in this country make it unrealistic for us to plan, or expect approval for, expansion of our CW program in the near future; — An agreement of this type would place similar constraints on other countries. If generally accepted, such an agreement would also help limit the proliferation of CW capabilities; — This option would permit the U.S. to retain our existing CW stockpiles; — A production and transfer ban is not, of course, a comprehensive ban and will be resisted by some because of that, but it is defensible as a serious, forthcoming and realistic proposal whose constraints would apply equally to all parties. Just the opposite is true of a stockpile limit, which—permitting modernization—would apply differently to those with CW as opposed to those not possessing it. Some will argue that this involves have/have not discrimination similar to the NPT. The FRG has already made clear that such an approach would cause it serious domestic political problems. Thus, a stockpile limit in our view would not help us channel international pressures towards support for a U.S. proposal, but would almost certainly lead to increased support for proposals which we would likely view as contrary to our interest; — There is increasing pressure at the CCD to get on with negotiating a CW treaty. With no U.S. counter to the sweeping, simplistic USSR draft comprehensive ban, positions are beginning to harden in support of that approach. However, the Soviets—both privately and publicly—have indicated they are flexible, and have strongly urged us to provide concrete views. — If we decide to make a limited CW proposal it is clearly in our interest to do so sooner rather than later. Our ability to have a limited proposal accepted will be greatly diminished if we do not act at this time. At the CCD even some of our Allies tend to favor a comprehensive solution; the non-aligned clearly do. With no U.S. initiative before the CCD recesses about the end of August, we can expect the non-aligned to agree on the paper they are drafting supporting a comprehensive ban, perhaps including endorsement of the Soviet draft treaty as a basis for negotiations. If that occurs the Soviets will find it much more difficult to abandon their comprehensive approach. Indeed, this will be true regardless of whether the non-aligned take specific action in the next few weeks at the CCD, since we anticipate strong and broad pressures this autumn at the UN in favor of a comprehensive CW ban. Reference was made in the Joint US-Soviet Communique to the significant arms control successes achieved as a result of parallel U.S. and USSR efforts, and to the fact that we would continue working to reach a CW agreement. A U.S. initiative in the current discussions aimed at a meaningful international limitation on CW would represent a further contribution to the developing era of negotiation. These are the considerations upon which the Department of State bases the judgment that a CW production and transfer ban would be in the U.S. interest. In developing, an initiative in this area we will want to have full and close consultation with our Allies. John N. Irwin II Deputy Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting,NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Secret. 270. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 270. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 23, 1972 SUBJECT: US Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions Pressures at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for treaty negotiations on CW prohibitions are increasing. In February, the Soviets introduced a draft treaty calling for the total elimination of chemical weapons (similar to that for biological weapons). This approach appeals particularly to the non-aligned. In June, a Soviet CW expert participated for the first time in a CCD experts meeting. The UK recently stated at the CCD that we should work toward a comprehensive CW ban but perhaps proceed toward that goal by more limited measures (e.g., prohibitions on stocks or production) with appropriate verification. Our position for the past year has been that further study and resolution of verification problems are needed before meaningful negotiations can be undertaken. We have presented working papers on verification problems for CCD discussion. Both the Moscow Joint Communique and the Biological Weapons Convention indicate we will work toward further CW prohibitions. The CCD is scheduled to wind up its current session this month and report to the UNGA in September. The Soviets have asked us for counter-proposals. If we are prepared to make a proposal in September, the CCD can hold off until then. If we stand with our present position, the UNGA will probably endorse a resolution calling for more intensive efforts to get a comprehensive CW ban. This would have no immediate effect, but it could increase the pressure when the CCD reconvenes in February and others may rally behind the Soviet draft as a basis for negotiations. This would make negotiation of a limited measure more difficult. In July, Secretary Laird recommended that we develop a proposal to ban the production of chemical weapons. All issues relevant to CW limitations have been thoroughly considered in the NSSM 157 study. (The study is being held in your outer office; agency positions and my analytical summary are at marked tabs.) Are Restraints in Our Interest ? All agencies agree that some treaty restraints would be in our interest, even though any limitations would be unverifiable . Basic considerations include: — The Soviet CW capability exceeds ours. Their defenses are considerably better; we do not know the size or location of their stocks or production facilities. — Our programs are limited. We are making only modest improvements in defensive measures. Only very limited stocks are forward deployed at one site in Germany. The negligible capabilities of our NATO allies are not likely to improve; nor are their sensitivities to our introducing or relocating stocks there. — The most promising development is binary weapons (two relatively safe, separable components which combine to form a nerve agent). But these will not be ready for even limited production earlier than 1976 and only then if Congress were to authorize substantially higher funding. — Prospects for congressional support for any increase in our programs (except for defensive measures), even to replace existing stocks, are generally agreed to be slim; and Congress and public opinion have limited our ability to move stocks and thus to deploy them. Options for Treaty Restraints . There are agency differences, however, as to the scope of a proposal we might make. There are three basic options for the scope of a proposal: — Limit stocks to agreed retaliatory levels. — Prohibit production of agents and weapons. — Prohibit both stocks and production. Prohibition on proliferation of chemical weapons would be included with each of these options. (Options to limit R&D or defensive measures, detailed in the summary, are unacceptable. No agency would recommend accepting risks of such limitations because reliable verification of any limitation is not possible.) Option 1 . Limit Stocks to Agreed Levels . This would allow binary production to provide a better retaliatory capability; affect none of our planned programs; and provide the best basis for continuing and increasing R&D. But , it would leave the USSR free to modernize while we could not unless Congress funds new chemical weapons programs; open us to internal and international criticisms that we are only justifying weapons production; is not likely to mitigate pressures for broader limitations; and would open us to criticism, even by some allies, who in fact would be limited more than we. The JCS and Dr. David support this option because they believe our current capability is inadequate, could deteriorate with time, and should be replaced by binary weapons. Option 2 . Prohibit Production . This would impose limits on the Soviet Union in the area where our own programs are already most constrained by Congress and budget priorities; would retain a retaliatory capability because our stocks would not be affected significantly before the 1980’s—and perhaps not until substantially later; provide some framework for justifying R&D; and help channel pressures away from broader limitations. But , it would risk a diminution of our CW capability during the 1980’s due to possible deterioration and obsolescence (the Soviet capability might also deteriorate); and prohibit the production of binaries which could ease existing constraints on storage and movement and thus improve our capability to deploy. Defense and State support this option since it would leave us a retaliatory capability, put constraints on the USSR and others similar to already existing constraints on us, and be an initiative which could channel pressures away from broader limitations. ACDA considers this option sound (but prefers Option 3 below). Option 3 . Prohibit Stocks and Production . This would place maximum legal and political constraints against chemical warfare where we would be at a disadvantage unless nuclear weapons were used; be the most negotiable in terms of scope since most CCD members favor a comprehensive ban; and avoid costs for weapons and stocks. But, this ultimately eliminates any deterrent effect of a retaliatory capability and the option to respond in kind vis-à-vis treaty violators or non-parties; and might risk our R&D and defensive efforts. ACDA supports this option on the grounds that (1) our nuclear and conventional capabilities provide adequate deterrence against chemical attack, and (2) we should put maximum political constraints on the Soviets since it is unlikely we will develop a real retaliatory capability. Although reliable verification of compliance is impossible under any of the foregoing options, some efforts could and should be made. These could include (1) consultative committee arrangements for review of developments, compliance, and complaints, (2) voluntary agreement to on-site inspection on challenge (mandatory on-site on challenge was considered unacceptable to the US), and (3) mandatory on-site inspection of certain declared facilities. Our objective should be to seek whatever verification steps can be agreed which will increase the constraints on the Soviets. The JCS believe that we should adhere to an on-site principle by trying to get agreement to mandatory international on-site inspection of a few declared military production centers. State, Defense, and ACDA have not stated preferences for any particular measures. Since no verification procedure would be reliable, they view specific measures to be essentially a matter of negotiating tactics. My Views . A ban on stocks and production (Option 3) would be in our interest were reliable verification possible. But it is not. Retention of a retaliatory capability provides insurance and decreases the importance of verification. Therefore, the choice boils down to a limit on stocks (Option 1) or a prohibition on production (Option 2). A limit on production clearly freezes stocks to their present levels. But, as the study indicates, our present stocks exceed future stockpile objectives by a substantial margin. Our plans for production would therefore be limited to replacing stocks with new binary weapons. The loss of binaries under a production ban could be worrisome in principle. Indeed, it is the heart of the JCS objection to such a prohibition. But to achieve a significant capability in binaries would require highly visible CW budget increases (at least double)-production of binary artillery shells would add over $200M in FY 73-FY 80; spray tanks, bombs, and missiles would cost at least that much more. Given current fiscal constraints and congressional attitudes, there is real question whether a program of this magnitude would go forward. Thus, a ban on production would in effect restrain us from doing what we cannot or will not do in any event; at the same time, it would place restraints on whatever production program the Soviets have or plan. With a limit on stocks, we would still be limited to whatever we now have unless Congress could be persuaded to fund major new programs, while the Soviets would not be restrained from producing newer or better weapons within agreed levels. Therefore, if we are to make a proposal, I believe that it should be a prohibition on production and transfer (Option 2) as recommended by Secretaries Laird and Irwin (but perhaps limited to ten years to protect our future options should stocks deteriorate or the environment change). Timing of a Proposal . Should we make a proposal now or wait until next February when the CCD meets again? The arguments for making a proposal now are that it could ease pressures at the UNGA this fall and lessen the chances of others rallying behind the Soviet approach, which would make negotiation of a limited measure (which is in our interest) more difficult next year. We would have time for complete allied consultations if a decision were made soon. State, Defense , and ACDA recommend that we move now. The arguments against making a proposal now are that we would have more time for allied consultations and private approaches to the Soviets, as well as an opportunity for the NSC to consider the options and related considerations (e.g., a moratorium). Moreover, if we had a decision in September or early October, even a statement that we intend to make a proposal in February could ease any pressures at the UNGA this fall. This is a major step involving an unverifiable treaty obligation, which has both favorable and unfavorable domestic implications. We need not move now at the CCD. Given the JCS dissent and, to a lesser degree, ACDA’s long-run preference for a more comprehensive proposal than Defense and State, I recommend that the issues be aired in the NSC before a decision is made and that we inform the CCD that we are studying the various proposals. The memorandum for the interested agencies at Tab A reflects this recommendation. Dick Kennedy [RK initialed], Hal Sonnenfeldt [HS initialed] and Phil Odeen [PO initialed] concur. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192 and Box H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote in the margin on page 3 near “Option 2,” How could we monitor?” The attachment at Tab A is not published, however for additional information see Document 273 . 271. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 271. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 5, 1972 SUBJECT: More on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions In response to your query, penned in the margin of the attached, as to how we could monitor limitations on stocks or production of lethal chemical agents and weapons, you will note that any chemical weapons limitations would be unverifiable. National means provide us very little information (e.g., we do not know the size or location of any Soviet stocks or production facilities), and we could not have any confidence of being able to detect a change in the Soviet CW posture through national means. Voluntary on-site inspection on challenge and, particularly, mandatory inspections at declared facilities could serve as deterrents, and we would probably be able to detect violations at a declared facility. Also, national means could probably tell us if a declared mothballed facility went back into production. However, we would not know if there were undeclared, clandestine facilities and would have little likelihood of detecting such. Mandatory on-site inspection on challenge could provide a better deterrent against violations (as we do not know that the Russians know we know so little); but mandatory on-site inspection on challenge is considered unacceptable to us because there are military facilities to which we would not wish to permit unlimited access. Also, mandatory on-site on challenge would not change our inability to monitor compliance. Even if the Russians were to accept what the bureaucracy considers the maximum verification procedures for CW acceptable to us - consultative committee arrangements for review of developments, compliance and complaints; voluntary on-site inspection on challenge; and mandatory on-site inspection of certain declared facilities - any treaty limitations would remain basically unverifiable. (A treaty proposal which included mandatory on-site inspection of declared facilities would probably prove unacceptable to the Russians and, therefore, not likely result in international agreement.) Therefore, as mentioned previously, one of the questions is whether or not we wish to pursue another essentially unverifiable treaty (that is, in addition to the outer space, seabeds, and biological weapons treaties). Another side of the question is whether we wish to place some treaty restraints on the Russians since our CW programs are restrained by congressional and public attitudes and budget priorities. If not, and if we wished still to attempt to ease international pressures for CW negotiations and to place some restraints on the Russians, we could consider declaring a unilateral or bilateral moratorium for “x” number of years and invite others to subscribe. However, all agencies prefer placing treaty restraints on the Russians over the unilateral moratorium approach unless the latter were accompanied or followed by a treaty proposal. I still recommend that the issues concerning our position on chemical weapons prohibitions be aired in the NSC before a decision is made. The memorandum for the interested agencies at Tab A reflects this recommendation. Dick Kennedy, Hal Sonnenfeldt and Phil Odeen have concurred. Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who initialed it. Attached is Document 270 and, at Tab A, presumably Document 273 . 272. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 272. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 7, 1972 SUBJECT: Tear Gas-Herbicides and the Geneva Protocol Per your request, the memorandum from you to the President at Tab 1 expresses your recommendation that we should not be willing to relinquish the option to initiate use of tear gas and herbicides in war and that the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol should be sought only on that basis. The memorandum also notes that we would so notify the Foreign Relations Committee of the President’s decision after the election. (Since this option is expected to lead to continued deadlock between the Committee and the Administration, there is no advantage in pushing it now.) As stated in my previous memorandum, the major implication of this position is that there will probably be no favorable Senate action on the Protocol and the US (the country which initiated and signed the Protocol in 1925) will remain the only important country not a party to it (there are 98 parties to the Protocol). Our failure to become a party could be used for political or propaganda purposes against us. In addition, the Foreign Relations Committee may hold up action on the Biological Weapons Convention pending a resolution to its liking of the Protocol issue. (The Convention expressly recognizes the significance of the Protocol, reaffirms its objectives, and does not repeat its ban against use since many nations thought this would detract from the Protocol.) At some future time, Senate forces might muster enough votes against our position for a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to embarrass the Administration-but there is little likelihood that the Protocol would be brought to a vote until there were some agreement between the White House and the Foreign Relations Committee. I still strongly believe that (1) ratification of the Protocol is a basic part of the President’s initiatives in this area, (2) we should become a party to it, and (3), to this end, we should be willing to relinquish the first-use option on a reciprocal basis by agreeing to consider first use of tear gas and herbicides in war prohibited by the Protocol if and when a substantial majority (e.g., three-quarters) of the parties officially confirm a reciprocal obligation. This would keep our present position on these two agents clearly intact for several months at the very least and not require any change unless a required majority officially agreed to a no-first-use policy. There is no guarantee that the Foreign Relations Committee would agree to this formula; but there appears no chance of their accepting our present position. Dick Kennedy concurs. Recommendation: If you still believe that we should stand firm in preserving the first-use option for tear gas and herbicides in war, that you forward the memorandum for the President at Tab 1. Approve ________ (Have signed attached memorandum) Alternatively, if you believe we should agree to relinquish the first-use option if a substantial majority of the parties officially confirm a reciprocal obligation, I will promptly prepare an appropriate memorandum for the President. Approve ________ Tab 1 Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated SUBJECT: Tear Gas-Herbicides and the Geneva Protocol In August 1970, you submitted the Protocol to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons to the Senate for its consent to ratification with the understanding that it does not prohibit first use of tear gas and herbicides in war. The Foreign Relations Committee favors the Protocol but disagrees with our position on these two agents. In April 1971, Chairman Fulbright asked you to reconsider this position (letter at marked tab). There appears no prospect of favorable Senate action without some change in our stance. We have now forwarded the Biological Weapons Convention to the Senate for its consent to ratification, and this may result in further questions regarding our position on the Protocol. (The Convention expressly recognizes the significance and reaffirms the objectives of the Protocol.) There are two aspects of the problem. Militarily, do we wish to retain the first use option? Politically, how important is US ratification of the Protocol internationally and domestically? My summary of the completed interagency studies and agency positions on these questions is at marked tab. Military Utility. Tear gas and herbicides have been militarily useful in Vietnam and have saved US and allied lives. Herbicides have been used to enhance aerial observation in forest areas and to clear vegetation along lines of communication and around bases. Tear gas is useful in many types of operations against an enemy with little protection (masks) or retaliatory capability. Tear gas is also a useful tool if the adversary is intermixed with civilians. The utility of these agents can be expected in analogous conflict situations with lesser powers. The main military limitations on these agents are: Wide use of herbicides (except for base perimeters) requires aerial delivery, control of the air, minimal enemy anti-aircraft defenses and sufficient lack of enemy mobility. Tear gas effectiveness is significantly decreased if the enemy has adequate masks or a comparable retaliatory capability (e.g., all major powers). Political Factors. Failure to ratify the Protocol would deflate international and domestic expectations and could be used for political or propaganda purposes against us. We are the only important country not a party (there are 98 parties) to the Protocol. In addition, fifty-two parties (e.g., France, Spain, Pakistan, USSR and its allies) expressly disagree with our view on these agents. Japan, Australia, and Portugal side with us, and the UK sides with us on one type of tear gas (the type used in Vietnam). About thirty parties (e.g., other West Europeans) have not set forth positions. Alternatives. Four alternatives are worth consideration. None would prohibit our right of retaliation in kind or the use in war of tear gas for riot control purposes and of herbicides in and around our bases (the extent of US operations in Vietnam today). 1. Preserve the First Use Option . This would allow us to use these agents in any future conflicts and in Vietnam, at the probable cost of no Senate consent to ratification of the Protocol and some international and domestic adverse criticism. Defense and the JCS strongly recommend this choice on grounds that use of these agents has saved lives and lessened casualties (military and civilian); tear gas has proved unique in special circumstances where other weapons proved ineffective; and herbicides have been vital for clearing vegetation along lines of communication. 2. Agree to a No First Use Policy toward States which Confirm a Reciprocal Commitment . This would give us the lead; significantly improve chances of getting Senate consent to ratify the Protocol; avoid any implication of previous error; and legally permit continued use in Vietnam unless Hanoi became a party, confirmed a reciprocal obligation and admitted its forces are in the South. On the other hand , this choice would preclude using these agents first against states which agree not to use them; make it difficult to justify initiating use against others; and, although most unlikely, Hanoi could take the above steps to stop US use. State and Dr. David recommend this choice. 3. Agree to a No First Use Policy If and When a Substantial Majority of the Parties (e.g. Three-Quarters) Confirms a Reciprocal Obligation . This would have essentially the same advantages as the preceding choice but would also avoid our having differing obligations toward different parties, and keep our present position clearly intact and permit continued use in Vietnam unless and until a substantial majority of the parties disagreed with us (which would take several months at the very least) and Hanoi became a party. On the other hand , if the above conditions were met, this would preclude our initiating use against parties to the Protocol and, if Hanoi became a party, US forces in Vietnam would lose the use of tear gas (except for riot control purposes) were we still in military operations. Although not included in the interagency review, this choice would be as acceptable to State, Dr. David and ACDA as the preceding alternative. 4. Consider First Use to be Prohibited by the Protocol . This would best ensure Senate consent to ratification, and bring us into line with most of the parties to the Protocol. On the other hand , it would imply past improper conduct; could cause some difficulties for those allies and perhaps Senators who have sided with us; and would make it very difficult to justify continued use in or supply to Vietnam (except for the base herbicide operations). ACDA recommends this choice. ACDA takes State’s view as a fallback position. My Views . Tear gas and herbicides have proved useful in saving lives and lessening casualties in Vietnam in a variety of situations. Although their utility would be significantly decreased in conflicts with major or well-equipped powers, the military utility of these agents could be expected in conflicts similar to that in Vietnam. Moreover, I do not believe we should in any way risk our option to continue using tear gas in Vietnam even if that risk seems very small or several months away. Therefore, I believe that we should preserve the first-use option by sticking to our position that the Protocol should be interpreted as not prohibiting first-use of these agents in war and, after November, we should so inform the Foreign Relations Committee. This would put the ball back in the Senate court. It is most unlikely that the Senate will act favorably on the Protocol with our interpretation and, therefore, the matter will probably remain deadlocked for the foreseeable future. If you approve the recommendation, I will issue the appropriate instructions to State after November. Recommendation: That you approve our remaining firm on the position that we will not relinquish the option to initiate use of tear gas and herbicides in war and that Senate consent to our ratification of the Protocol should be sought on that basis only. APPROVE DISAPPROVE 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig. At the top of page one Kissinger wrote, “Hold for next session of Congress.” Neither of Guhin’s recommendations is marked as approved, and the attached memorandum is not signed nor its recommendation marked as approved or disapproved. Kissinger’s note on page one and a covering note in the file indicate that Kissinger did not forward the memorandum to the President. 273. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 273. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 25, 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence The President’s Science Adviser SUBJECT: Review of United States Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions: NSSM 157 The President desires that the issues concerning possible United States positions on chemical weapons limitations be discussed in an early meeting of the National Security Council. In the interim, the President desires that the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and other countries, as appropriate, be informed that the United States is studying in detail all proposals set forth this year and plans to respond at the next meeting of the CCD in February, 1973. There should be no implication at this time that the United States plans to make a specific new proposal. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. 274. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 274. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 20, 1972 SUBJECT: Updating the NSSM 157 Study, US Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions The NSSM 157 study, US position on chemical weapons prohibitions, was forwarded for consideration in August 1972. On September 25 you informed the interested agencies that the President wishes to have the issues aired at an early NSC meeting. It would be preferable to have a decision prior to the February 20 session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. However, before meeting on this subject, I believe three aspects of the study should be updated: 1. The verification section should be updated to include analysis of subsequent Soviet proposals and any others deemed appropriate. 2. The shelf-life question should be examined further (e.g., how long can we maintain a capability with current stocks and what measures would be necessary to ensure such a capability?). 3. The section on our binary weapons program should include recent developments or problems and schedules. The memorandum for the addressees of NSSM 157 at Tab A would request these three updates by the appropriate agencies. Dick Kennedy concurs. Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A requesting these three supplementary reports. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Elliot. A handwritten notation that was crossed out indicates it was also sent through Scowcroft. At Tab A is Document 275 . 275. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 275. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 5 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The President’s Science Adviser SUBJECT: US Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions: Updating of NSSM 157 Study My memorandum of September 25 noted that the President wishes to have the issues related to the NSSM 157 study, United States Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions, aired at an NSC meeting. In preparation for such a meeting and for a decision which will form the basis of the U.S. position at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), certain aspects of the study noted below should be updated by the following study groups: 1. The Ad Hoc Working Group, established by NSSM 157 and chaired by a representative of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, should review the verification aspects of the study and submit an analysis of any further verification measures deemed appropriate. 2. The President’s Science Adviser, in coordination with Defense and NSC Staffs and in consultation with other agencies as appropriate, should provide: — An updating of the shelf-life question. (For example, will there be any serious deterioration or obsolescence problems in the next few decades? Approximately how long can a capability be maintained with current stocks and what measures would be necessary to ensure this capability?) — An update regarding the binary weapons program. (For example, what are recent developments or problems and current plans for meeting such?) Recognizing that a decision prior to the February 20 session of the CCD is preferable, these reports should be submitted as supplements to the NSSM 157 study by January 21, 1973. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–192 and H–193, NSSM 157. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Helms, Smith, and David. 276. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon 276. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 25, 1973 Subject: Annual Review of U.S. Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Program Pursuant to NSDM 35, the Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed and approved the attached second annual review of the U.S. chemical warfare and biological research program, including riot control agents and herbicides. The report covers the period from November 1, 1970 through June 30, 1972. Developments during this period include the following: — No procurement or production of offensive weapons was undertaken during the period under review. Within the framework of applicable environmental legislation, disposal or demilitarization of unneeded stocks of chemical weapons has continued. This will be facilitated by a transportable disposal system which is being developed. Current offensive research and development efforts include development of binary munitions (discussed further below) and improved incapacitating agents. — All research and development on biological weapons has been terminated. Programs for disposing of stocks of these weapons are now virtually complete. Laboratory quantities of agents (not weapons) will be retained to support defensive research. The conversion of facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal and Fort Detrick to emphasize civil use has been accomplished. The Army is contemplating some defensive tests of prototype biological alarms to determine their efficiency. Because the results of these tests may be classified, public affairs problems could arise; a forthright approach may resolve or contain such problems. — Our chemical and biological defensive posture is marginal. Only limited procurement of defensive equipment is being undertaken. Research and development looking toward improved techniques continues. — Procurement of riot control agents was undertaken during this period largely to replace stocks issued in Vietnam. No procurement of herbicides was undertaken for U.S. forces, and only limited use was made of herbicides by U.S. forces in Vietnam. Remaining stocks of herbicide Orange, the use of which was suspended in 1970 will be disposed of when a final environmental impact statement has been prepared. — Limited support in riot control agents and herbicides is being given to the Republic of Vietnam. U.S. ground and helicopter herbicide spray equipment has been turned over to the Government of Vietnam. No fixed wing capability has been provided or is contemplated. The National Academy of Sciences study of the use of herbicides in Vietnam is to be completed this year. — Developments in the arms control field include completion of the biological weapons convention and intensified interest on the part of a number of countries in placing additional restraints on chemical weapons. — The report does not provide a comprehensive estimate but summarizes available information concerning foreign chemical and biological capabilities (pages 3–7 and pages 16–17 respectively). Difficulties in obtaining intelligence are noted at pages 36–37. In forwarding this report, the Committee notes that two major policy issues affecting this program have been the subject of separate studies: — The first concerns whether or not the U.S. wishes to preserve the option to initiate the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war (Geneva Protocol Study). It should be noted that this issue is likely to be raised during Senate consideration of the Biological Weapons Convention. — The second concerns whether the U.S. wishes to make a proposal at the upcoming CCD session with a view to achieving additional treaty restraints on chemical weapons prohibitions. In connection with the second of these studies, the Committee wishes, in particular, to call your attention to the following recommendations which appear at pages 42–43 of the attached report: — Following a decision on the NSSM 157 study on chemical weapons prohibitions, an interagency study should be initiated to examine options for a U.S. deterrent and retaliatory posture, drawing on previous studies as appropriate. — Also following a decision on the NSSM 157 study, guidelines for the public information program on U.S. chemical warfare and biological and toxin research should be reviewed. You may wish to consider these recommendations in conjunction with a decision on the NSSM 157 study. In addition, I wish to call your attention to those sections of the report concerned with binary munitions (pages 13 and 39–40). Binary artillery munitions would permit separate storage and transportation of nerve agent precursors which are no more toxic than many ordinary industrial chemicals. The components would be assembled in forward areas, and the agent would be formed in the projectile while in-flight to the target. Such a system should circumvent current technical difficulties encountered in the movement and storage of CW weapons. The expected study and discussion centering around the need for open-air tests of the 155 mm binary GB projectile will focus attention on current U.S. plans to move in the direction of binary munitions. Your approval of these tests will be requested by the Department of Defense prior to presenting the plan to Congress. Some believe that the provision of extensive information on this activity and its environmental aspects, coupled with advance public affairs planning, will reduce criticism to a minimum. Others believe that open-air testing will prove controversial and draw substantial criticism in any case. All agree that careful handling of public affairs aspects will be needed and that the chance of controversy should not be discounted. The Department of Defense will pursue public affairs aspects of these activities in cooperation with other interested agencies. Although not included specifically in the issues or recommendations, the joint OSD/JCS position is that there is a need to maintain current priority efforts in the collection and analysis of intelligence, and to continue an adequate research and development program in chemical warfare and biological defensive measures. In addition, JCS believe that CB defensive posture should be improved. The Under Secretaries Committee is prepared to be of assistance in connection with the foregoing or other matters covered in the attached report if you so desire. U. Alexis Johnson Acting Chairman 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H–212 and H–213, NSDM 35. Top Secret. The attached Annual Review is not published. 4. Nuclear Test Ban Issues; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 4. Nuclear Test Ban Issues; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 277. Telegram 9903 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, January 22, 1969 Soviet Chargé Chernyakov delivered an aide-mémoire protesting the fallout from a December 8, 1968, U.S. underground nuclear test (Schooner). Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 6 US. Secret. It was repeated to Ottawa. Drafted by MacCracken (EUR/SOV); cleared by Toon and Springsteen (EUR), Dubs (EUR/SOV), Scott (EUR/CAN), and Lehman (G/PM); and approved by Bohlen. 278. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 28, 1969 Kissinger briefed Nixon on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, control of nuclear weapons, deployment of ABMs, underground testing of large yield nuclear weapons, and nuclear excavation for his meeting that afternoon with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 202, Agency Files, Atomic Energy Commission-1969, General, volume I. Secret. 279. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, January 28, 1969 Seaborg summarized the substance of his January 28 meeting with Nixon. He focused specifically on his discussion with the President about the peaceful nuclear explosive projects (Plowshare). Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 18, pp. 35–39. No classification marking. 280. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Nixon Washington, February 5, 1969 Seaborg addressed the various Plowshare projects and the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. He recommended allocating funding for AEC’s excavation and explosive development program, but noted that doing so potentially violated the LTBT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Tests. Secret. 281. Editorial Note. 282. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 17, 1969 Citing Senate interest in nuclear excavation, Kissinger proposed the preparation of an options paper on the relationship of the Australian excavation project to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. He then attached an issues paper, titled Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project in Australia and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, outlining possible objectives. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Tests. Secret. The attachments at Tabs A and B are published. The NSSM at Tab C is Document 283. Written in hand at the top of the memorandum is, “copy sent Ellsworth as attachment to top memo,” a reference to the copy of the February 17 memorandum from Kissinger to Ellsworth to which Kissinger’s memorandum to the President is attached. 283. National Security Study Memorandum 25 Washington, February 20, 1969 Per Kissinger’s suggestion (Document 282), the President directed a study be prepared on the relationship of the Australian excavation project to the LTBT. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1–42). Secret. 284. Telegram 30638 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, February 27, 1969 The Department reported that on February 26 an aide-mémoire was given to Soviet Embassy Counselor Vorontsov in response to the Soviets’ January 21 aide-mémoire on the December 8, 1968 Schooner explosion. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 6 US. Secret. It was repeated to Ottawa. Drafted by MacCracken (EUR/SOV); cleared by Dubs (EUR/SOV) and Scott (EUR/CAN) and in substance in J/PM and ACDA; and approved by Toon. Secret. 285. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 28, 1969 In a meeting with Under Secretary of State Richardson, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin delivered a verbal statement requesting a formal explanation how the U.S. joint nuclear cratering experiment with Australia would comply with the terms of the LTBT and the reason for the lack of U.S. response to the Soviet proposal to hold PNE technical talks. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Confidential. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV) on March 3, 1969. 286. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 22, 1969 Pollock forwarded the report prepared in response to NSSM 25 and highlighted the need for a more refined definition between the peaceful nuclear explosions program and the LTBT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC–U/Sec Committee Misc. Memos. Secret. The appendices to the attached report are not published. 287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Kissinger’s forwarded Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg’s March 26 memorandum notifying the President that the Cape Keraudren PNE project had been canceled. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Testing. Confidential. “Approve press release” is checked. The letter at Tab A is published but not the press release at Tab B. 288. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson Washington, May 19, 1969 Kissinger noted that the President had directed that a study be conducted of the available options for reconciling the U.S. Plowshare program with the LTBT. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos-UN Secretary’s Committee. Secret. At Tab A was the attachment to Document 286. In a May 23 memorandum, Richardson replied that even before the NSSM 25 exercise began Rogers had approved just such a study and that an interagency group under Pollock’s direction was working on the project. (Ibid.) 289. National Security Decision Memorandum 18 Washington, June 27, 1969 The President directed that henceforth the Under Secretaries Committee review the annual underground nuclear test program and quarterly requests for authorization of specific scheduled tests. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50.) Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer (JCS). Laurence Lynn drafted the NSDM and, under cover of a June 23 memorandum, forwarded it to Kissinger together with a draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President explaining that “to extend bureaucratic arrangements directed by NSAMs 269 and 307 would not be consistent with the new NSC organization because the previous directives designate me as chairman of a group whose membership includes the Secretaries of State and Defense.” (Ibid., Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos) 290. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Department of State (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) Washington, August 22, 1969 Pollack forwarded the report requested by Richardson on the implications of the LTBT for the Plowshare program, which included both long-term and interim measures for the U.S. to adopt. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC–U/SEC, Committee Misc., Memos. Secret; Restricted Data. The summary and conclusions at Tabs A and B are published but not the report at Tab C. 291. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 14, 1969 The memorandum is a record of the discussion on relationship between the PNEs and the LTBT at the October 14 meeting of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, A–400.112 (Sep–Dec) 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by M.C. Demler on October 15. 292. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, October 14, 1969 Seaborg kept his own record of the discussion concerning the PNE and LTBT at the October 14 NSC Under Secretaries meeting. This entry also includes a record of his discussion with Under Secretary of State Richardson following the meeting. Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 20, pp. 304, 307, 309. No classification marking. 293. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 22 Washington, November 5, 1969 The memorandum is a record of the decisions reached at the October 14 NSC Under Secretaries Committee meeting, noting that, if the United States intended to continue with the Plowshare program, the LTBT needed to be modified. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, A–400.112 (Sep–Dec) 1969. Confidential. Prepared by Arthur Hartman. 294. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, December 10, 1970 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Soviet Venting from Nuclear Testing, Nov.–Dec. 1970. Secret. The attachments at Tabs C and D are published but not the attachments at Tabs A, B, and E. 295. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, December 15, 1970 At a December 15 meeting, Seaborg, Under Secretary of State Irwin, and other officials discussed the proposed aide mémoire to the Soviets protesting the venting of their October 14 nuclear test. Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 23, pp. 621–622. No classification marking. 296. Telegram 2322 From the Department of State to Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, January 7, 1971 This telegram transmitted Dobrynin’s verbal statement criticizing the U.S. for the venting from recent underground nuclear explosions. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8 US. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to AEC. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV); cleared by Davies (EUR) and in PM, SCI, ACDA, and AEC; and approved by Hillenbrand. 297. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Washington, January 11, 1971 Seaborg highlighted an interim status report on the December 18, 1970, Baneberry underground nuclear test, which vented radioactivity into the atmosphere. The report indicated no large scale public health hazard resulting from the explosion and designated an investigation into the possibilities for the radioactive release. Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 24, pp. 42–43. No classification marking. The status report is not included in Seaborg’s journal. 298. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, January 21, 1971 Keeny discussed the Canadian reports of radioactive material detected in the atmosphere resulting from U.S. venting following the December 18, 1970 Baneberry underground nuclear test. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, January–December 1971: FRC 383–98–5, Underground Nuclear Testing–Venting December 1970–December 1971. Drafted by P.J. Long (ACDA/ST). The attached memorandum of conversation is not published. The Canadian minister stated that their readings did not indicate conclusively that the increase in radioactivity was a result of venting from the Nevada tests, but they considered it probable because the radioactivity resulted from “fresh venting.” 299. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, April 13, 1971 Irwin reported on the underground nuclear test program for the third and fourth quarters of fiscal year 1971, focusing specifically on the venting of radioactive material into the atmosphere following the December 18, 1968 test at Baneberry. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 334 NSC–U (March–April). Secret; Restricted Data. The attachments to the Under Secretaries Committee’s report are not published. The President approved the test program in a May 5 letter to Seaborg. (Ibid., May 1971) 300. Telegram 85171 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, May 15, 1971 The Department reported on Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Springsteen’s May 14 meeting with Soviet Acting DCM Vorontsov. At this meeting the two men discussed the Soviet demarche over the venting of radioactive material from the December 18, 1970, Baneberry underground nuclear test. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8 US. Confidential. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, Vienna, and AEC. Drafted on May 14 by Okun (EUR/SOV); cleared by Van Doren (ACDA); and approved by Springsteen (EUR). 301. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 15, 1971 In light of the growing domestic and international opposition to nuclear testing, Smith recommended an interagency review of U.S. nuclear test ban policy and attached a draft NSSM detailing various viable proposals. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–184, NSSM 128. Secret; Noforn. Under cover of a May 24 memorandum, Behr, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt forwarded Smith’s memorandum and draft NSSM to Kissinger together with their own draft NSSM, noting that they had changed Smith’s “approach of looking at alternative ways to have a ban and adopted the approach used for SALT: that is, studying verification and strategic implications alone.” (Ibid.) 302. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated Citing international, domestic, and Congressional opposition to nuclear testing and the connection between SALT and test ban options, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve instituting a review of U.S. nuclear test ban policy. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was drafted by Behr, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a May 24 memorandum in which they proposed that Kissinger either initial it and forward it to the President for his approval or approve it for the President himself. Kissinger initialed the memorandum and approved it for the President, writing “HK for RN” next to “Approve.” For Tab A, NSSM 128, see Document 303. 303. National Security Study Memorandum 128 Washington, June 4, 1971 The President directed a review of U.S. policy with respect to underground nuclear testing and requested separate analyses for verification possibilities, effect on U.S. and Soviet nuclear development, and potentially influential political factors. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. A copy was sent to the David, Seaborg, and Moorer. 304. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 12, 1971 Smith recommended that the White House clear all U.S. delegation public statements and instructions involving nuclear test ban policy until the issuance of the NSSM 128 study on U.S. nuclear test ban policy. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 229, Agency Files, Department of Defense, volume 14–Nov–Dec 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. At Tab A was the November 17 memorandum issued by Kissinger (Document 305). 305. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, November 17, 1971 The President issued directions for clearance of statements and instructions concerning nuclear test ban policy. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 229, Agency Files, Department of Defense, volume 14, Nov–Dec 1971. Confidential. A copy was sent to Laird, Schlesinger, and Moorer. 306. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 2, 1971 Odeen reviewed and evaluated three resolutions before the UN General Assembly urging all nuclear powers to halt nuclear weapons testing. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1328, NSC Unfiled, 1971. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. The attachments are not published. None of the options on page 5 are marked. Haig forwarded Odeen’s memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a note in which he observed that State and ACDA wanted the U.S. to agree with the Canadian resolution while Odeen and Merrit thought the U.S. should abstain. Haig recommended voting no on the Mexican and Saudi resolutions but abstaining on the Canadian resolution “to reflect a degree of difference in our attitude.” Kissinger wrote “Agree” at the bottom of Haig’s note. (Ibid.) 307. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 3, 1971 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig informed the Department of State that the White House had no objection to it abstaining on all three test ban resolutions before the UN. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–4. Confidential. Prepared by Robert H. Miller. 308. Telegram 226692 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, December 17, 1971 Springsteen gave Soviet Chargé Vorontsov an aide mémoire on the venting of radioactive material from a Soviet underground explosion on September 27, 1971. 309. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, February 16, 1972 Odeen indicated his concern over AEC Chairman Schlesinger’s recent interview with U.S. News and World Report in which he commented unfavorably on U.S. test ban policy. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 203, Agency Files, Atomic Energy Commission 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attachment is not published. Haig checked “I will call Schlesinger.” Written on the memorandum is “OBE” (overtaken by events). 310. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 17, 1972 The President directed that all official statements on nuclear test ban policy be cleared through the White House. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan. 1972–Aug 1974, volume IV. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Seaborg, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Moorer. 311. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 29, 1972 Under the cover of this memorandum, Odeen transmitted the March 14 JCS memorandum expressing its “highly-charged” opposition to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and recommended Kissinger forward it to the President. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 245, Agency Files, JCS volume II. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Sent for action. Kennedy and Sonnenfeldt concurred in the memorandum. A handwritten notation at the top indicated that Kissinger saw it, but he did not sign or forward the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President (Tab A is not published). In a March 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy said he doubted Kissinger would want to send the JCS memorandum to the President since the Verification Panel was studying the issue and an upcoming meeting would provide an opportunity to explore all views, including those of the JCS, before putting them before the President. He concluded the memorandum was “too cryptic” to give the President a full exposition of the arguments both pro and con. Kissinger wrote on Kennedy’s note, “It is a brief not an analysis.”(Ibid.) 312. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 5, 1972 The President’s Science Adviser recommended against making any further moves toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and forwarded a paper on the subject. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meeting Folders, 6/14/72 NSSM 128. Secret. 313. Executive Summary Prepared by Interagency Group Washington, undated This executive summary of the study on U.S. nuclear test ban policy examines the arguments for and against a possible ban, assesses the strategic impact of the ban and of the verification issues, and analyzes those policy options set forth in NSSM 128. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings,NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Annex A, Strategic Analysis, and Annex B, Verification Analysis, are not published. 314. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated This summary analyzes the strategic and verification issues outlined in the study on U.S. nuclear test ban policy prepared in response to NSSM 128. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings, NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for a Verification Panel meeting scheduled for June 14 but not held. 315. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 9, 1972 In anticipation of the Verification Panel meeting scheduled for June 14, Odeen provided Kissinger with a 10–page briefing memorandum examining possible problems and options with the NSSM 128 study and the potential issues with verification. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 829, Phil Odeen. Top Secret. As part of the meeting book for the June 14 meeting, Odeen forwarded the memorandum and its tabs to Kissinger on July 3. In his covering memorandum, Odeen noted that although Kissinger had decided the previous week not to hold the June 14 meeting, Odeen wanted him to see the meeting book. The tabs are not published as attachments to Odeen’s June 9 memorandum; however, the JCS memorandum referred to on page one is the attachment to Document 311, the David memorandum referred to on page one is Document 312, and the Analytical Summary referred to on page 4 is Document 313. 277. Telegram 9903 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 277. Telegram 9903 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, January 22, 1969 SUBJ: Soviet Protest on SCHOONER 1. Soviet Charge Chernyakov called on Acting Secretary Bohlen on January 21 to deliver aide mémoire concerning US nuclear explosion of December 8, 1968. Bohlen replied that he had no basis for considering that there was a violation of the agreement. We have had no representations from the Government of Canada, our nearest neighbor. Moreover, as Bohlen told Dobrynin last April (in response to Dobrynin’s inquiry about BUGGY), there have been a number of Soviet nuclear events which resulted in detectable radioactivity outside the USSR’s borders. Although aware of this radioactivity, we have not complained about it because we did not consider the amounts involved to be large. Bohlen said we would, of course, be replying in writing to the Soviet communication. 2. Chernyakov indicated Soviets do not rpt not plan to publish their aide mémoire. Full text follows. 3. BEGIN TEXT According to a communication of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, on December 8, 1968 in the State of Nevada an underground nuclear explosion was carried out, as a result of which a crater was formed, with a diameter of about 220 meters and a depth of 60 meters. This explosion was also registered by Soviet seismological means. The coordinates of the explosion corresponded to the U.S. nuclear test site in the State of Nevada. According to data of competent agencies of the Soviet Union, a radioactive cloud from this explosion reached Soviet territory in the Baltic region on December 15, 1968, spread over the European part of the country at different levels, and on December 19 went outside the limits of the USSR. Radiochemical analysis of control samples gathered showed that radioactive products of the nuclear explosion conducted in the USA on December 8, 1968 were present in the cloud, which caused a two-to-five-fold increase in their fallout in the regions along the Baltic, the Volga, the Northern Caucasus and Crimea. As is well known, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibits the States parties to the Treaty from carrying out nuclear explosions “if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State.” Since, as a result of the nuclear explosion of December 8, 1968, radioactive debris went outside the national territory of the USA, this constituted a violation of this Treaty. The Soviet side expects that the Government of the USA will present the necessary explanations and will take appropriate measures for the purpose of complying with the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Washington, January 21, 1969. END TEXT 4. FOR OTTAWA We plan Inform Canadian Embassy here in confidence of substance of Soviet aide mémoire and of fact Bohlen told Chernyakov we have received no representations re SCHOONER from GOC. We plan tell Canadians that nature of our written reply is under study. END Acting Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 6 US. Secret. It was repeated to Ottawa. Drafted by MacCracken (EUR/SOV); cleared by Toon and Springsteen (EUR), Dubs (EUR/SOV), Scott (EUR/CAN), and Lehman (G/PM); and approved by Bohlen. 278. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 278. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 28, 1969 Subject: Dr. Glenn Seaborg’s Appointment, 3:30 pm, Today Dr. Seaborg has indicated that the purpose of his meeting with you at 3:30 today is to call to your attention certain recent developments in the field of nuclear weapons that you should know about before you take action on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other questions involving security affairs. I have been unable to find out anything about the nature of the developments he has in mind. In view of the subject matter, I believe that Dr. Seaborg might bring up some of the following subjects which are currently of concern to the AEC: 1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty. The AEC supports the NPT and has been involved in the negotiations, particularly with regard to the safeguard provisions. Dr. Seaborg may believe, therefore, that he should be involved in the NSC review of this question on Wednesday. 2. Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons. Procedures for the release of nuclear weapons and other sensitive questions of command and control have been handled directly between the President and the Department of Defense. The AEC, which has been specifically excluded in the past, would like to be advised of and be involved in these procedures. (I see no need for this.) 3. ABM Deployment. Strong local opposition is developing to the deployment of SENTINEL ABM sites in the immediate vicinity of large cities—specifically Chicago and Boston. This has raised questions concerning the requirement for such close-in deployments and the need to reassure the public as to the safety of the weapons. 4, Large-Yield Underground Tests. There is considerable public concern over the safety of large-yield (megaton) underground nuclear tests. Moreover, an ad hoc panel of the Office of Science and Technology under the chairmanship of Dr. Kenneth Pitzer, new president of Stanford, concluded in a report to President Johnson last November that, on the basis of new evidence, there is a possibility that a megaton-size underground nuclear explosion might induce earthquakes of sufficiently large magnitude to cause serious damage beyond the limits of the test site. The panel recommended that the need for each future large-yield test be given new consideration in the light of this information. 5. Nuclear Excavation. The Australians want to construct a new harbor in northwestern Australia using US nuclear explosives as a pilot project in the development of nuclear excavation technology. This subject is of great interest to the AEC in connection with the development of nuclear excavation technology which might lead to construction of a sea-level Atlantic-Pacific canal with nuclear explosives. However, there is a serious complication, since this project could presumably not be undertaken without an amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In this connection, the Soviets, on January 21, gave us an aide mémoire reporting that they had detected radioactivity in the USSR from the US excavation shot, SCHOONER, conducted in Nevada in December, 1968, and stating that this constituted a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 6. Chairmanship of the AEC. Dr. Seaborg may also wish to discuss your wishes with regard to the future chairmanship of the AEC. (All members of the Commission serve for fixed terms. However, the President has the right to name the Chairman. Unless one of the present members of the Commission resigns, you must name the Chairman from those already on the Commission.) 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 202, Agency Files, Atomic Energy Commission-1969, General, volume I. Secret. 279. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 279. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, January 28, 1969 [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Seaborg’s visit to the White House.] From 3:40 to 4:15 p.m. I had my first appointment with President Nixon with Lee A. DuBridge, Henry A. Kissinger, Robert F. Ellsworth, and H. R. Haldeman present. The President handed me a letter asking me to stay on as the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. We discussed the TROLL study, the AEC peaceful uses of atomic energy program, the problem of high yield underground nuclear testing, and the shutdown of two reactors at Hanford. The President asked us to enter his office before his preceding appointment had ended, consisting of a group which included Senator Scoop Jackson, Henry Kissinger, General Andrew Goodpaster, and Bryce Harlow. The President introduced us to these people, and as Senator Jackson was leaving, asked him in a semi-joking way what his recommendation on the SST would be. Jackson replied lightly that he had sort of a conflict of interest there and didn’t reply directly, but the President reiterated his interest in the SST. We sat down on the two couches facing each other, in front of the fireplace which had a crackling fire. I sat on the couch next to the President, while DuBridge, Ellsworth and Kissinger sat on the opposite couch, and Haldeman sat on a chair in between the couches. The President began by handing me a letter, with an accompanying envelope, saying it was self-explanatory. (This was the letter asking me to stay on as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.) He jokingly said it was a close decision, but that he had the final say. I began by saying I had a very sensitive matter to discuss with the President and then went on to describe the TROLL study. I discussed its implications, which the President clearly understood, and cautioned all present to treat the information in the highest confidence, which all agreed to do. I said I was asking three people in the Livermore Laboratory to check the conclusions of this study, and that I would let the President know these results when they were forthcoming. The President then raised the question of Plowshare in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and said that this is a subject in which he is very interested. He said he wants this to have a high priority in his Administration; in fact, he said he has a special prejudice for this program—the way all people have special quirks and prejudices—and hopes it can go forward expeditiously. He said he has heard of the Australian project and asked whether I could describe this to him. The President had a two-page memorandum before him, which he glanced at occasionally as we spoke. (I wouldn’t be surprised if this might not have been a memorandum written by Ellsworth covering the conversation I had with Ellsworth, Whitehead and Hofgren last Wednesday, January 22nd.) I described the project proposed for Keraudren Bay in Northwest Australia, including the fact that it would consist of five nuclear explosives buried a couple hundred feet below the ocean bottom in that region. The purpose would be to build a narrow harbor for ships to enter to receive iron ore from the interior for transport to other ports. The President asked what would be required to get on with this project, and I said that two things would be required: (1) we would need additional funding for this and related aspects of the Plowshare program, and (2) we would need to adopt a more realistic interpretation of the test ban treaty from the standpoint of radioactive debris than had been adopted in the previous Administration by the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The interpretation adopted by the previous Administration had been that any amount of radioactivity, no matter how small, might be a violation of the test ban treaty if it were detectable beyond the borders of the country where the excavation experiment had been performed. I said I had disputed this interpretation, which I referred to as absurd, rather continuously during the last four or five years. I said that I had advocated a more sensible or de minimis interpretation that had something to do with reality and levels that might have some meaning from a health standpoint. I said there were international committees that set standards from the health standpoint which, if we adhered to, would make it possible to carry out the Plowshare program, including the Australian experiment. I also mentioned that when I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (testimony which was critical to the ratification of the test ban treaty from the standpoint of a number of Senators like Scoop Jackson and Clint Anderson), I indicated it would be possible to carry out excavation experiments, having in mind a reasonable interpretation and not the atom-by-atom interpretation. I also mentioned that there was a great deal of interest in other countries in Plowshare and, in fact, we promise in article 5 of the Nonproliferation Treaty that we will make Plowshare services available to them; if we had not agreed to do this, there would be a number of countries that would not be interested in adhering to the NPT. I indicated that the Soviets, without announcing it as policy in so many words, are conducting a program which is more consistent with such a realistic interpretation of the test ban treaty. They had conducted at least ten underground weapons tests or excavation experiments, and possibly as many as 15, 20 or 25, in which debris was readily detectable outside their borders. Apparently the Soviets do not take the trouble to bury their underground shots as deeply or as carefully as we do. The President said he was interested in the entire Plowshare program and wanted to know what the prospects were for using the Isthmus of Panama. I indicated that the prospects were good. I pointed out that there is an Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission, headed by Robert Anderson (Milton Eisenhower and Kenneth Fields are also members), that was studying this with the view of coming up with a recommendation before December, 1970, as to the best method for building such a canal, nuclear or conventional. I said that the Australian experiment would be one step among the many that would be required in order to obtain the information within the time frame required by the Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission. I said that it was only within the last year that we had succeeded in getting approval for three important Plowshare excavation experiments, and that these, together with the Australian experiment—or its equivalent—as well as some others, would be needed in order to get the information that the Commission required. I pointed out that, due to the need for the harbor in Australia, it would be necessary to complete the experiment by 1970. The President asked whether it could be done sooner, and I said it probably could, provided funding and approvals were given in quick order. The President asked that I send him as soon as possible a memorandum indicating the additional funding that would be required for the Plowshare program, including the Australian experiment. The memorandum should contain a description of the Australian experiment and the Plowshare program as related to the Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission, including the problems concerning the interpretation of the test ban treaty and our suggestion of how to overcome these. The President reiterated his interest in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and said he thought this was something that should be accelerated. As he was speaking in broad terms beyond the Plowshare aspect, I asked whether he had in mind power reactor development, and especially breeder development, and he said he did. He thus expanded his request for information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy on a rather broader scale than just the Plowshare program. The President said he would like to set up some kind of a briefing session in which he and others might be briefed on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He recalled in this connection the talk I had given at the Bohemian Grove at the breakfast which he attended (this was the talk at the Owls Nest in July, 1967) and how impressed he was by my description of the great potential in this field. I immediately suggested that he come to our Headquarters in Germantown and meet some of the key staff and be briefed on our program. He said he would like to do this and that the briefing might cover the weapons and national security aspects as well as the peaceful uses aspects of atomic energy. At first he said he might come out in about two months, but then as the conversation continued, he suggested it might be March. When I hinted it might be useful to come even earlier, he said he could possibly do it in February. He asked Haldeman to include the Atomic Energy Commission among the departments and agencies that he was scheduling for visits. He also suggested to Haldeman that Secretary of State Rogers should be included in the briefing at Germantown. I then said there was another area that I would like to call to his attention, and that was underground testing of high yield weapons. He immediately recognized this as a problem area and glanced at his memorandum, which appeared to treat this subject as well. I described the problem briefly, indicating that I thought the AEC had the safety considerations well in hand. I said we have adopted the posture of being very forthright. I said we are briefing the interested people and keeping them informed, and the President immediately said this was the right thing to do and that he was glad we were handling it this way. He asked what I thought we should do, and I replied I thought we should continue our forthright public posture and also continue to carry out the tests that are needed and not lose our nerve. I said these tests were necessary in order to develop the ABM. It was as simple as that. I told him we were developing another test site in central Nevada and also one in Amchitka in the Aleutian Islands. He smiled and indicated by a gesture that that didn’t seem to be the best place in the world for testing, but I indicated we had made a real search for sites and this was the best we could find, and if anyone in the room could come up with a better suggestion, we would be very surprised. I then went on to describe the situation with respect to the proposed shutdown of two reactors at Hanford. I said that this was contemplated in the Johnson budget; as a result of the interjections of Senator Jackson, however, President Johnson had agreed that the AEC might defer action in starting the shutdowns until President Nixon had an opportunity to review the situation. The President indicated in a somewhat light way that this meant it has been thrown into his lap, which, I conceded, is the case. I said there is a genuine difference of opinion about how much plutonium is needed, that there are some who think that the continued production of these two Hanford reactors is required. I said that, in any case, due to the economic impact on the Hanford area, it might be better to have a more orderly slowdown in production and not shut down these two reactors until we have found some compensating factors. I mentioned that five out of nine reactors have been shut down at Hanford in the past four years. Somebody raised the question whether I should see the press; although I indicated it would probably be best if I left in low key without doing this, the President immediately suggested that he would prefer that I meet with the press—that he was making such meetings a part of his mode of operation. He suggested I might indicate that he had asked me to stay on as Chairman, that we had discussed a number of items, especially the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He suggested I indicate his interest in this field, mentioning especially the Plowshare program and the Australian harbor experiment and the power program, such as the breeder reactors. He also suggested I mention that he was going to visit the AEC at Germantown soon in order to be briefed further about the AEC’s program. As the meeting broke up, the President suggested that a photographer come in to take some pictures for the historical record, which was done (see picture below). The President and I recalled our meeting long ago—in January, 1948—at Chattanooga, when we were both in the group of the Ten Outstanding Young Men of 1947, chosen by the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce. I said I had a photograph of us in that context and asked whether he would autograph it, and he said he would be glad to do so. I also said I had a picture of him with my kids, taken in June, 1960, and he indicated very cordially that he would be glad to autograph this also. After my appointment with the President, Ellsworth took me to the Press Room, where we met Ron Ziegler. We waited for a few minutes outside while Interior Secretary Walter Hickel was finishing his press conference; when he came out, I met him. Ziegler then took me to the packed Press Room to a microphone. I began by saying that I had just finished meeting with the President and that the President has asked me to tell the press about our conversation. I said we had talked about some national security matters and then had gone on to discuss the AEC’s program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I said the President had expressed a great interest in this program and that he had especially singled out Plowshare and the power reactor breeder program. I said he has asked that these programs receive adequate attention and be accelerated by the AEC. I said he had mentioned a special interest in the use of nuclear explosives for the building of a harbor in Australia. I also said that the President indicated he intended to visit the AEC in its Germantown [Omitted here is a photograph.] Headquarters sometime in February to receive a more thorough briefing on the AEC’s program (transcript attached). My initial statement was followed by questions. A number of these concerned the Australian project. I described the nature of the project. I said that the cost might be, very roughly, $10 million, although this is rather vague and could be interpreted as being in the broader context of a larger program. I did indicate that the U.S. share might be that of furnishing the explosives and their emplacement, and perhaps something more, roughly equivalent to the cost of an experiment that would otherwise be conducted in the U.S. I said that the Australian experiment would be the equivalent of such an other experiment and would be part of the program required in order to get the necessary information for the Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission for their report, which is due in 1970. Continuing answering questions, I said I thought the Australian experiment could be conducted within the requirements of the test ban treaty. This question was asked twice. In answer to a question 1 was asked, whether the President had asked me to continue as Chairman of the AEC, I indicated that he had. I was asked how long my term is, and I indicated that I voluntarily accepted a short term, which expires in June, 1970. I indicated that my term as Commissioner was determined by law, and that my designation as Chairman was a separate matter, done by the President. Upon returning to the office, I presided at 4:45 p.m. at Information Meeting 811 (notes attached), where I reported on my meeting with President Nixon. [Omitted here is Seaborg’s diary entry for January 29.] 1 Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, volume 18, pp. 35–39. No classification marking. 280. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Nixon 280. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 5, 1969 Dear Mr. President: I am writing in response to your request for a recommendation of means to accelerate the further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I shall focus first on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives - the Plowshare program - and then on some other areas of great potential importance. Of the numerous possible Plowshare excavation projects throughout the world, by far the most ambitious and best known is the sea-level transisthmian canal. To develop nuclear excavation technology and to permit the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, established by P.L. 88-609, to determine its feasibility, the AEC needs to complete a minimum program of cratering experiments before December 1, 1970. Three such experiments were conducted in 1963, but additional experiments are required. One new exciting project that could provide essential experimental data, thereby replacing a planned U.S. experiment (GALLEY) and furthermore serving a useful purpose, is the proposed Australian harbor project (Cape Keraudren in Western Australia). We are prepared to proceed expeditiously with the joint feasibility study of that project. In the Plowshare underground engineering area, we are working in close cooperation with industry, and several U.S. companies are prepared to contribute a major part of the cost required to carry out joint experiments in natural gas production and storage and in copper and shale oil recovery. Industry is urging AEC to accelerate its development of the special nuclear explosives for such applications. To accomplish the excavation and explosive development program, the AEC will need additional new obligational authority of about $20 million in its Fiscal Year 1970 budget, corresponding to additional expenditures of about $15 million. In fact, we will not be able to meet the schedule of the Canal Study Commission or undertake the Australian harbor project if these funds are not provided. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater permits all underground nuclear explosions, except those which cause “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits” of the nation concerned. Accordingly, the treaty presents no obstacle to underground engineering projects since they are designed to fully contain the radioactivity. It does present a potential obstacle to underground nuclear explosions for excavation experiments and projects such as the Australian harbor and the sealevel canal where a very small amount of radioactivity must be released to the atmosphere. An overly restrictive interpretation of the treaty would foreclose these excavation experiments and projects. There has been a tendency on the part of some in the United States Government to interpret “radioactive debris to be present” if it is detectable with the most sensitive means available to modern science—a moving target since we are steadily increasing our sensitivity of detection to a fantastic degree. Literally, on a “one-atom-at-a-time basis, we now have reached the point where from nuclear explosions we can detect a concentration of radioactivity as small as one atom in a room full of air. The USSR has not followed a narrow interpretation of the treaty in the conduct of its underground nuclear explosion programs. Narrowly interpreted, the Soviets could be said to have caused “radioactive debris to be present” outside Soviet territory about 25 times since the treaty came into effect. The Commission consistently has maintained that there is room and precedent for reasonable and defensible interpretations of the treaty that would permit future excavation experiments. For example, most radiation protection guides, including those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Commission on Radiation Protection, the USSR, and the U.S., contain definitions of concentrations of radioactivity below which the radioactivity is considered to be “not present” insofar as such guides are concerned. This phrase, “not present,” is the inverse of the phrase “to be present” in the treaty. Significantly, the health guide definition of “not present” has been applied by the U.S. to reactor operation under the Antarctic Treaty without objection by the other parties, including the Soviets. We believe that the adoption of such a reasonable standard would permit the Australian harbor project to go forward; however, confirmation of this judgment should await the results of the joint U.S.-Australian feasibility study. In the long term, amendment or other formal arrangement under the treaty, by agreement with a majority of the treaty parties, including the Soviets, will be needed for projects such as the sea-level canal; however, this will be a time-consuming and difficult undertaking. We recommend proceeding with excavation experiments and projects, including those mentioned above, to develop nuclear excavation technology on the basis of a suitable and reasonable treaty interpretation. In parallel, and looking ahead to the long-range question of an amendment or other formal arrangement, we endorse, as a first step, having, technical talks on Plowshare with the Soviets - talks in which they have expressed a willingness to engage. Our information on Soviet activities indicates a strong and continuing program in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. There also are a number of other exciting developments in our programs for peaceful applications of nuclear energy which in our judgment will merit your attention in the coming months. These include the development and demonstration of nuclear electric power stations which breed more fuel than they consume (the breeder reactors); the prospects of vast nuclear electric agricultural and industrial complexes, including the large-scale desalting of sea water (for example, a Mid-east project proposed by General Eisenhower); and the development of reliable, long-lived artificial hearts powered by radioisotopes. We believe that additional progress in these programs can be made by the adjustments in the revised FY 1970 budget we shortly shall submit in response to Budget Director Mayo’s request of January 23, 1969; however, to realize fully the promise of these programs, it will be necessary to provide for further acceleration in future budgets. Respectfully, Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Tests. Secret. 281. Editorial Note. 281. Editorial Note. In preparation for spring 1969 session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, a number of documents were generated by key government agencies during February and March that deal with the issue of a comprehensive test ban but appear in the chapter on the “Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Spring Session,1969.” 282. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 282. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 17, 1969 SUBJECT: Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project in Australia and the Limited Test Ban Treaty In response to your earlier request, Dr. DuBridge and I have prepared for your consideration the attached Issues Paper (Tab A) on the relationship of the proposed Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the various options by which we might proceed with the project. I think that it is clear from the attached paper that this is a very complex issue that will have to be dealt with carefully to avoid serious complications. While it will not be possible to make a final judgment on the magnitude of this problem until the joint US-Australia technical feasibility study has been completed, I think that we should develop a better understanding of the options available to us as soon as possible. In view of the Senate’s interest in this problem, the Administration will probably have to lay the groundwork for its approach to the problem very soon. In this connection, Senator Fulbright has sent the attached letter (Tab B) to Secretary Rogers requesting a formal Administration statement on whether or not the SCHOONER event, a nuclear excavation shot in Nevada last December, violated the provisions of the LTBT. The answer to Senator Fulbright’s question will present problems since the amount of radioactive debris that left US territorial limits was considerably in excess of the maximum that had been predicted. I therefore recommend that you direct that a formal study be prepared on the relationship of the Cape Keraudren project to the LTBT and the options by which we might proceed with the Australian project. If you approve, I will sign the attached NSSM (Tab C) setting up an ad hoc NSC group under the Secretary of State with appropriate representatives of other agencies, including the AEC, to prepare the study for NSC consideration. Approve Disapprove Other Tab A Issues Paper Washington, February 11, 1969 CAPE KERAUDREN NUCLEAR EXCAVATION PROJECT and the LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY We have now agreed to a joint technical feasibility study with the Australians on the nuclear excavation of a harbor at Cape Keraudren on the northwestern coast of Western Australia. The issue must now be examined as to the relationship of this project to the provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) (copy attached). Consideration should then be given to the relative merits of the various options under which we might carry out the project. The following questions should be answered in developing the U.S. position on this project in the light of the provisions of the LTBT. 1. Would the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project in Australia constitute a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty? 2. Would a unilateral U.S. interpretation of the LTBT to permit the Cape Keraudren project provide an acceptable basis for the project? 3. Would an agreed bilateral (or trilateral) US–USSR–(UK) interpretation of the LTBT to permit the Cape Keraudren project provide an acceptable basis for the project? 4. Would an effort to amend the LTBT to permit nuclear excavation activities such as the Cape Keraudren project be in the overall U.S. interests at this time? The pros and cons on each of these questions can be summarized along the following lines: 1. Would the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project in Australia constitute a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty? a. Pro: (1) The LTBT prohibits any nuclear explosion “(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.” The Cape Keraudren project, which will involve underwater excavation will inject radioactive debris into both the atmosphere and the ocean. Since the proposed harbor is on the coast of Australia, it will be extremely difficult to find weather conditions that will assure that debris vented to the atmosphere will not go past the three-mile territorial limits. In addition, the fact that the excavation will take place underwater might be construed to constitute a separate violation of the provisions of the treaty against underwater tests even in territorial waters. In any event, even if it is argued that this underwater test is in fact underground, there appears to be little possibility that the radioactivity injected into the water could be prevented from going beyond the territorial waters of Australia which would also be a violation of the treaty. (2) Although both we and the Soviets have conducted a number of tests that clearly put radioactive debris beyond our respective territories, neither the Soviet Union, nor any other signatory, has accepted a de minimis or any other interpretation of the meaning of the treaty language. In fact, on January 21, 1969, the Soviet Union informed us privately that they had detected debris from the SCHOONER nuclear excavation event in Nevada and that they considered this to be a violation of the LTBT. (3) The fact that the project will be subject to close public scrutiny, as a consequence of its international nature and strong Congressional interest, will make it impossible to obscure the treaty implications and therefore will establish any violation as a premeditated act. b. Con: (1) The treaty does not define “radioactive debris” nor establish quantitatively how much must be present outside the territorial limits in order to constitute a violation. The language clearly was not intended to cover the presence of a single radioactive atom. This is, therefore, clearly a case where a de minimis interpretation is required to make the treaty operationally meaningful. In these circumstances, a reasonable interpretation could vary anywhere from the level of detectability to the normal international safety standards. By carefully choosing the site and meteorological condition, it should be possible to design this test so that levels of radioactivity outside of Australian territorial waters, both in the atmosphere and in the ocean, would be kept within normal safety standards. (2) There is, in fact, an implicit international acceptance of a de minimis interpretation of the treaty. Our nuclear excavation program to date has been conducted on this basis since we knew that some of the tests would put radioactivity outside our boundaries and that there was a reasonable probability that they would be detected in Canada and possibly elsewhere. The Soviets have also conducted nuclear excavation and other underground tests in a manner in which they obviously knew that some radioactivity would go beyond their territory, and we detected these tests in a number of instances. In these circumstances, it is significant that neither country has chosen to protest publicly that these tests have violated the LTBT, nor has any other country chosen to charge formally that these tests have violated the treaty. (3) The location of the Australian event makes it very unlikely that the debris would be detected by any other country and makes it extremely unlikely that detectable amounts would enter into the territory of other countries. Moreover, there is no possibility that amounts approaching international safety standards will enter the territory of other countries. There would, therefore, almost certainly not be an injured party to claim a treaty violation. 2. Would a unilateral U.S. interpretation of the LTBT to permit the Cape Keraudren project provide an acceptable basis for the project? a. Pro: (1) A unilateral U.S. interpretation of the LTBT would provide an adequate basis for the conduct of this test since there is strong worldwide support, including the Soviet Union, for such peaceful applications of nuclear explosives. Other countries, which in general see potential benefits from nuclear excavation, would welcome our getting on with the job. (2) The public would in fact be reassured by a U.S. interpretation that kept debris levels outside of national territories below internationally accepted safety levels. b. Con: (1) This would present the Soviet Union, and others, with a unilateral U.S. reinterpretation of a formal multilateral treaty and would thereby force them to challenge the position even if they had some sympathy with the objective. (2) There would be substantial foreign and domestic public criticism that the U.S. was attempting to undercut the LTBT and contaminate the atmosphere. (3) This could have a major long-term effect in undercutting confidence in international treaties by creating the impression that they could be unilaterally interpreted by individual major powers to suit their immediate purposes. (4) This action might even start a chain reaction of treaty interpretations by other countries that could have the effect of destroying the LTBT. 3. Would an agreed bilateral (or trilateral) US–USSR–(UK) interpretation of the LTBT to permit the Cape Keraudren project provide an acceptable basis for the project ? a. Pro: (1) This procedure would be generally acceptable internationally for the reasons given in 2a(1)&(2) above. (2) There would be additional support for this procedure among nations and individuals that would look with favor on a joint US–USSR–(UK) undertaking in an activity involving the extension of the peaceful uses of the atom on a worldwide basis. b. Con: (1) Some countries would deeply resent this as a dictate by the nuclear powers to arbitrarily reinterpret the LTBT for their own purposes. (2) Although possibly somewhat muted by the joint US–USSR–(UK) character of the interpretation, there would still be considerable public disapproval on the grounds that this would undercut the LTBT. (3) This could also have a long-term effect in undercutting confidence in international treaties by indicating that the key nuclear powers could arbitrarily reinterpret the treaties to suit their immediate purposes. 4. Would an effort to amend the LTBT to permit nuclear excavation activities such as the Cape Keraudren project be in the overall U.S. interests at this time? a. Pro: (1) An amendment to the LTBT would give us a clear-cut legal basis to go forward with nuclear excavation projects and would avoid any possibility that we would be charged with violations of the treaty. (2) An amendment would in any case almost certainly have to be made before we could undertake really large-scale projects such as the sea-level Atlantic-Pacific canal or projects less favorably located geographically. b. Con: (1) It is extremely unlikely that an amendment to the LTBT could be brought into force on a time-scale consistent with the Cape Keraudren project. The form of the amendment will probably in practice prove to be quite complex, both with regard to the establishment of levels of radioactivity and with the definition of inspection procedures to insure that venting tests are in fact intended for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the formal procedures for amending the treaty would undoubtedly prove quite time-consuming since the treaty provides that amendments must be considered at a conference called for by at least one-third of the parties to the treaty and that the amendments would only enter into force if ratified by a majority of the parties, including the US, the USSR, and the UK. (2) An amendment would weaken the force of the LTBT, an agreement to prevent contamination of the atmosphere. (3) It is not certain that the Senate would in fact ratify an amendment. In addition to concern about endorsing increased radioactivity in the atmosphere, questions may well be raised concerning the security implications of the amendment. Specifically, if the procedures do not include inspection in the Soviet Union, which seems unlikely, the charge will be made that special weapons effects tests could be conducted by the Soviets in the atmosphere under the provisions of the amendment. (4) An effort to reopen the LTBT for amendment will result in counter proposals from other countries to amend the LTBT to make it a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with or without provisions for PLOWSHARE activities. Tab B Letter From Senator Fulbright to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, January 22, 1969 Dear Mr. Secretary: Over the past few years the United States has conducted a number of Plowshare cratering experiments. These tests have increased in frequency and size. The test in January of 1968, for example was somewhat less than the equivalent of 3,000 tons of TNT, while the most recent December 1968 test was equivalent to 35,000 tons of TNT. It is the pattern of these tests and the implications of this pattern for the United States responsibilities under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 that concern me. According to press reports, the cratering experiment in December of 1968 may have resulted in a violation of the 1963 Test Ban agreement. A few days after this experiment reports indicate that radiation levels in Canada rose from 10 to 20 times what they are normally. I understand from the press that the United States is investigating these reports. Inasmuch as this Committee approved the Test Ban Treaty with its restricting provisions, I would appreciate a complete report from the Department of State on what actually happened as a result of the December experiment. My primary concern at this time is not with the question of whether the radioactive debris that may have gone into Canada was of a dangerous level of radiation. Nor do I find the question of whether Canada has officially noted any violation of the treaty that may have occurred as particularly relevant to my interest. What concerns me is the integrity of United States adherence to Article I (b) of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. That Article explicitly bans any nuclear explosion which “causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.” There is no exception to this provision. Adherence to, or violation of, this article is not modified by the circumstances of the experiment, the radiation level outside the United States as a result of an incident, or whether or not the incident is officially noticed by the country where the radioactive debris lands. On behalf of the Committee I would appreciate it if you would provide us with a full report on the alleged radioactive fallout over Canada and its relationship to the December 1968 cratering experiment. In particular I should like to have a clear and unequivocal statement from the Department of State whether the United States, for whatever reason, violated the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It would be very helpful if the Committee could have this information at the earliest possible date. Sincerely yours, J.W. Fulbright Chairman 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Tests. Secret. The attachments at Tabs A and B are published. The NSSM at Tab C is Document 283 . Written in hand at the top of the memorandum is, “copy sent Ellsworth as attachment to top memo,” a reference to the copy of the February 17 memorandum from Kissinger to Ellsworth to which Kissinger’s memorandum to the President is attached. 283. National Security Study Memorandum 25 283. National Security Study Memorandum 25 1 Washington, February 20, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director of Central Intelligence The President’s Science Adviser SUBJECT: Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and the Limited Test Ban Treaty The President has directed that a study be prepared on the relationship of the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the various options by which we might proceed with the project. The study should be prepared by an ad hoc NSC group under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary of State, with representatives of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the President’s Science Adviser. The study should be forwarded to the National Security Council Review Group by March 17, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1–42). Secret. 284. Telegram 30638 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 284. Telegram 30638 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, February 27, 1969 REF: STATE 9903 SUBJ.: US Reply to Soviet Protest on SCHOONER 1. Acting Country Director for USSR called in Soviet Embassy Counselor Vorontsov Feb. 26 and handed him US reply to Soviet aide-mémoire of January 21, 1969, concerning US nuclear explosion of December 8, 1968 (SCHOONER). Vorontsov made no substantive comment but said he would transmit US aide-mémoire to his government. Full text follows. 2. BEGIN TEXT…Reference is made to the Soviet aide-mémoire of January 21, 1969, concerning the United States nuclear explosion of December 8, 1968, at the Nevada Test Site of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. As the Soviet Government is aware, this experiment was part of the Atomic Energy Commission’s program to develop information on the possible use of nuclear explosions for peaceful excavations and other engineering purposes. The intention to conduct the experiment was publicly announced in advance, and the significant results achieved were announced after the test. Extensive precautions were taken to ensure that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The test was not conducted until very precise meteorological conditions were present that were selected to assure dilution, dispersion and decay within the United States of the small quantities of radioactivity released at the test site. The United States refers to and reaffirms its earlier statement in an aide-mémoire to the Soviet Government dated May 14, 1965, that “the United States Government will continue to take the greatest care in the conduct of nuclear detonations including its program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. The United States Government affirms its commitment to the preservation of the Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) with unimpaired authority.”…END TEXT 3. FOR OTTAWA: Since we informed Canadian Embassy here in confidence of substance of Soviet aide-mémoire and Bohlen-Chernyakov conversation of January 21, we plan likewise to inform them of nature of our reply. END Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 6 US. Secret. It was repeated to Ottawa. Drafted by MacCracken (EUR/SOV); cleared by Dubs (EUR/SOV) and Scott (EUR/CAN) and in substance in J/PM and ACDA; and approved by Toon. Secret. 285. Memorandum of Conversation 285. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 28, 1969 PART V of VI SUBJECT: (1) U.S. Participation in Study Related to Use of Nuclear Explosions to Develop Harbor in Australia; (2) U.S.-Soviet Technical Discussions on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador The Acting Secretary Morton Abramowitz, Special Assistant, U Adolph Dubs, Acting Country Director, SOV Ambassador Dobrynin said that just prior to coming to the Department to pay his courtesy visit he had received an instruction from his Government which he said he would like to take the liberty to read: “Referring to the statement of the Department of State of February 6, 1969, that the Government of the United States agreed to participate in a study on the technical and economic feasibility of employing nuclear explosions to develop a harbor at Cape Keraudren on the northwest coast of Australia, I am instructed to state the following. “The decision of the Government of the United States to assist Australia in research work on the creation of a harbor with the help of underground nuclear explosions attracted attention in the Soviet Union. “In this connection the Soviet side would like to get from the Government of the United States explanations and additional information as to whether the planned actions of the United States in conducting nuclear explosions in Australia will be consistent with the Moscow Treaty on a limited nuclear weapons test ban. This Treaty prohibits the conducting of any nuclear explosion under water, including territorial waters and open sea, and of any explosion, which causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions are conducted.” The Acting Secretary said he would look into the matter. He noted that he was aware of questions which had arisen in connection with our PLOWSHARE program involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The legal questions involved were being explored by the Department of State and other appropriate U.S. agencies. He understood that one of the central problems involved the quantity of nuclear debris which might be released by underground explosions and vent into the atmosphere. It was important for both countries to clarify their views on matters such as this. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. are proponents of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and both evidently propose, as he understands it, to make nuclear devices available for peaceful purposes. The Acting Secretary added that both countries obviously wish to observe the limitations which treaties impose upon the signatories. Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had indicated its preparedness to hold technical talks on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (PNEs). No specific answer has yet been received from the U.S. Government. He conjectured that this was perhaps due to the fact that the U.S. Government is going through a transition period. In any event, the Soviet Government is looking forward to receiving the views of the U.S. Government on this subject. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Confidential. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV) on March 3, 1969. 286. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 286. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 22, 1969 Subject: NSSM 25: Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water As Chairman of the Ad Hoc NSC Study Group, I submit the enclosed report in response to National Security Study Memorandum 25 of February 20, 1969. I should emphasize that there exists among the agencies and offices involved significant differences in viewpoint regarding the restrictions of the Treaty and acceptable courses of action for carrying out peaceful nuclear cratering explosions under the Treaty. Accordingly, many statements in this report do not have the specific concurrence of all agencies and offices involved in its preparation. The report endeavors to present the differing views without prejudice. The Cape Keraudren project is but one segment of a larger problem of the need for a more clearly defined relationship between the peaceful nuclear explosions program and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The fundamental differences that exist within the Executive Branch will arise again, as they have in the past, in essentially the same form when the next Atomic Energy Commission nuclear excavation experiment is considered. Herman Pollack, Director International Scientific and Technological Affairs Enclosure Subject Report Washington, March 22, 1969 Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water I. Problem: To review the relationship of the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the various options by which we might proceed with the project. (Review requested by NSSM 25, February 20, 1969.) II. Background: A. Description and History of the Harbor Project The Commonwealth of Australia on January 22, 1969, asked the US Government to authorize USAEC participation in a study of the economic and technical feasibility, including safety, of using nuclear explosions to create a harbor on the northwest coast of Australia, stated by the Sentinel Mining Company to be required by mid-1971. The US Government responded affirmatively on February 3, 1969. Both Governments have stated that subsequent steps will be subject to later decision. The concept for the project calls for the simultaneous detonation of five 200-kiloton thermonuclear explosives. The explosions would occur 800 feet beneath the ocean floor and would create a channel about 6,000 feet long, 1,500 feet wide and 350 feet deep, with 200-foot high side lips. (See Appendix A - The Australian Harbor Project .) B. Relevant Limited Test Ban Treaty History The Treaty’s primary purpose is to inhibit the arms race by banning any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. In addition, an important purpose of the Treaty, as expressed in its preamble, is “to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances.” The Treaty also prohibits carrying out underground “any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other explosion… if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.” The Treaty was extended to include “any other nuclear explosions” because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapons test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls, e.g., on-site inspection. 1 Thus, explosions for peaceful purposes are subject to the same restrictions as nuclear weapon tests; i.e., they are permissible only if carried out underground and if they do not cause radioactive debris to be present beyond territorial limits. This criterion is imprecise and has given rise to questions of interpretation. Since the Treaty was signed, both the US and the USSR have made representations to the other concerning their conduct under the Treaty. (See Appendix B - US and USSR Conduct Since the Treaty .) III. Discussion : It is assumed that, should the US and Australia decide to proceed with the execution of the Keraudren project, they would do so in a manner consistent with their obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty (in its present form or as amended). The Treaty is regarded throughout the world as the single most important agreement, to date, in limiting the nuclear arms race. The Parties to the Treaty can be expected to study any proposals for changes in the Treaty or for interpretations with utmost seriousness. We would, accordingly, wish to be especially careful to avoid any situation in which reasonable charges or widespread suspicions might arise that the US seeks to circumvent the Treaty. Such a situation would be contrary to our interests, not only because it would cast doubt on the integrity of US commitments, but because it would seriously prejudice our ability to elicit cooperation from key countries whose help we want in important activities (e.g., making the NPT work) in the IAEA, the UN and the ENDC. On the other hand, both the Executive and Legislative Branches have indicated their desire to further the progress in the important field of nuclear excavation if such progress can be reconciled in a responsible way with our obligations under the Treaty. Relevant to the ongoing program, but not directly pertinent to the Cape Keraudren project, are the interests of many key developing countries in the economic significance of Plowshare technology, the potential benefits of which are assured to them under Article V of the NPT. Until the Feasibility Study is completed, it will not be possible to determine the precise dimensions of the problem which execution of the project would pose with respect to our obligations under the Treaty. The joint Feasibility Study will, among other things, include estimates of the amounts and kinds of radioactive debris, including induced activity, that may be expected to escape into the water and the atmosphere, and how much of it is likely to pass beyond the territorial limits of Australia, and in what form. Until we have the results of the Feasibility Study no international commitment on any course of action with respect to the Treaty should be taken. In the meantime, we can obtain a better understanding of international attitudes—for example in our planned technical talks with the Soviet Union on Plowshare as well as on the role of the IAEA as the appropriate international body to make the benefits of Plowshare available to third countries pursuant to Article V of the NPT. IV. Courses of Action Considered: The courses of action set forth below should be considered in light of the fact that, if we decide to proceed with the project, we will be called upon at some time to justify publicly the project as being consistent with our obligations under the Treaty. A. Amendment If, on the basis of the Feasibility Study estimates, it is concluded that the project cannot be carried out without an unacceptable risk of violation or reasonable charges of violation of the Treaty, an amendment could be sought. The Treaty permits amendment by a majority of the Parties (which now total 97), including the concurrence of the US, the USSR and the UK. Two types of amendment could be considered. First, a general amendment permitting, under specified conditions and procedures, Plowshare projects that would otherwise be prohibited by the Treaty. Second, an amendment limited just to authorizing the Cape Keraudren explosions. It is doubtful that either of these types of amendment could be accomplished in time to meet the deadline (mid-1970) contemplated for the detonation of the nuclear explosives. This deadline is consistent with the understanding by the Australian Government of the need by the Sentinel Mining Company to have an operating harbor by mid-1971. However, considerations may arise which may slip this completion date. Although the political complexities of negotiating and bringing into force an amendment are considerable and should not be underestimated, we should examine the deadline carefully from all aspects when the Feasibility Study is completed before determining that the amendment route is incompatible with the project schedule. Pros and cons of seeking each kind of amendment are set forth in Annex I. B. Interpretation Another possible approach could be based on an interpretation of the Treaty, as for example when radioactive debris would be considered to be present outside of a country’s territory. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1963 hearings on the Treaty, Dr. Seaborg said: “The intent of the test ban treaty is to prohibit tests in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater, but to permit underground nuclear explosions. “It is recognized that there may be venting to the atmosphere from some of these underground explosions, and a limitation has been set upon the delivery of radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. “In those cases where venting does take place, no problems are presented if the effects are noticed solely within the United States. The treaty would prohibit a test which resulted in a quantity of radioactive debris delivered outside of the country’s territorial limits in amounts sufficient to establish that such contamination resulted from a recent test within that country.” This concept has a limited subjective quality since the technical ability of various nations to detect radioactivity varies widely and depends upon the extremes to which detection techniques are employed, where collections are attempted, and environmental factors. In addition, the sensitivity of detection has markedly increased in the last six years. For example, under the most favorable conditions and utilizing the most sensitive means, almost any amount of radioactivity, however miniscule, can be detected. Nevertheless, in view of the record any change from the interpretation stated during the Treaty hearings may be difficult to justify both to the Congress and to other countries. It probably would be conceded that the Treaty would not be violated if some minimal amount of radioactive debris passed across the border of a country in which an underground nuclear explosion took place. This leaves room for an approach involving an interpretation of the Treaty, and there are several possibilities. By way of illustration one could adopt an interpretation of the Treaty that would suggest that radioactivity is “not present”, as that term is employed in health and safety guides, and therefore does not constitute “contamination”. Another approach, which is not necessarily incompatible with the foregoing, would be to base the interpretation on the practices which have occurred under the Treaty to date. The pros and cons of these approaches to interpretation are summarized in Annex II. Quite apart from the type of interpretation employed, one is confronted with the tactical question of the techniques that might be used to establish agreement or acquiescence in an interpretation. In the event the data developed by the Feasibility Study and the prevailing political climate suggest that the project could not be conducted without incurring serious allegations of a Treaty violation, broad international acceptance of an interpretation could be explicitly sought. This approach would have the difficulty of being very time consuming and there would be political complexities similar to the amendment process. On the other hand, if the data and the political climate suggest that the political risks were not likely to be very acute, it might be feasible for the US to gain acceptance or acquiescence to an interpretation short of having to canvass all of the Treaty adherents. Selective consultation would stand the risk of challenge from those not consulted. There is a divergence of viewpoint as to the effectiveness of this technique. These factors would suggest the necessity for preserving some flexibility until the results of the Feasibility Study are known. C. Other Courses Considered Consideration was also given to several other possible courses of action. There exists a wide range of viewpoints as to their acceptability. These other courses include: 1. International Resolution We might seek to have the IAEA General Conference or the UN General Assembly pass a resolution authorizing States to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions under designated observation and control procedures and providing implicitly or explicitly that the Treaty does not apply to explosions conducted under the authority of the resolution. 2. Project Approval Specific approval of this project might be sought from one of a wide spectrum of groups ranging from those most affected (i.e., neighboring States, the UK and the USSR), to the IAEA, UN or the Treaty signatories. 3. Tacit International Consent to Keraudren The United States or Australia could inform the other Treaty signatories, the UN, the IAEA, or the countries neighboring Australia that we plan to proceed with the project, convincing as many as possible of the value and peaceful nature of the project without necessarily providing specific rationale of its consistency with the Treaty. We would, as necessary, invite the informed group to observe, to co-sponsor, or to participate. 4. International Consent to Peaceful Nuclear Excavation. Consent might be sought, particularly of the Original Parties, that underground nuclear explosions that can be established through inspection as being for a peaceful purpose and not weapons tests as well as not contaminating man’s environment, may be conducted. Secretary Rusk said in NPT Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 10, 1968, in reply to a question concerning Plowshare under the Limited Test Ban Treaty: “…Now, it is also contemplated that in an excavation situation where there might be extraterritorial fallout there would be discussions in a suitable international body such as the IAEA in Vienna and conceivably the Security Council. And one can imagine that there would be consent and agreement that a particular type of explosion for peaceful purposes might occur, despite the limitations of the Test Ban Treaty, with the consent of everybody who would be ready to acknowledge that it is in fact a genuine Plowshare operation with a legitimate civilian purpose.” These possible courses of action would avoid the procedural delays of amendment, and, in that sense, have a greater chance of being accomplishable on a time scale compatible with the harbor project. As a legal matter, none of these, in and of itself, would alter our obligation to conduct the Keraudren project in compliance with the Test Ban Treaty and, consequently, each would entail the political risks associated with suspicions that the US seeks to circumvent the Treaty. Those who consider these courses therefore unacceptable suggest that favorable resolutions, if obtainable, and development of a consensus on acceptable inspection and control procedures should not be regarded as an alternative to amendment or general acceptance interpretation, but might be helpful in building support either for an amendment or a favorable interpretation. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC–U/Sec Committee Misc. Memos. Secret. The appendices to the attached report are not published. 1 The State Department Legal Adviser points out that this formulation is incomplete if intended to be used to lay the basis for interpreting the Treaty to permit peaceful explosions if on-site inspection is provided. The Treaty’s preamble as well as statements of President Kennedy and other Executive Branch spokesmen made clear that the concern about radioactive contamination from testing was just as important an impetus to the Treaty as arms control considerations. (In fact, the testimony of Administration spokesmen in support of the Treaty pointed out again and again that it would not significantly inhibit US nuclear arms development.) These considerations cannot be left out of any accurate estimate of the scope available for interpretation of the Treaty. 287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 287. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Cape Keraudren In the attached letter (Tab A), Glenn Seaborg reports that the U.S. and Australian Atomic Energy Commissions believe that continuation of the joint study on a nuclear harbor at Cape Keraudren in Western Australia is no longer warranted. The reason for this decision is that the industrial participant, the Sentinel Mining Company, has decided, after re-evaluation of the economics of the iron ore located there, not to participate. The Australian government requested clearance this afternoon to release the attached press statement (Tab B) at 9:00 am tomorrow, Saturday, Washington time, announcing the termination of the project. State would like to advise the Australian Embassy by 5:00 pm today of our decision. The press release has been cleared by State and the AEC. There is clearly no basis for continuing the project in the absence of interest by both the Australian government and the Sentinel Mining Company. The prompt release of the decision and the reasons for it at the request of the Australian government should prevent it from becoming an issue in connection with Prime Minister Gorton’s possible visit next week. The press release makes the general future commitment that: “However, the United States and the Australian Atomic Energy Commissions continue to be interested in the possible use of nuclear explosions for harbour construction and will therefore continue their review of the practicability of applying this technology to other possible harbour sites in the area.” I recommend that you approve the press release. Approve press release [Nixon checked] Disapprove press release Other Tab A Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Nixon Washington, March 26, 1969 Dear Mr. President: In light of your interest in the USAEC’s Plowshare program, in particular the proposed harbor project at Cape Keraudren in Western Australia, and the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Gorton, I would like to advise you that the industrial participant, the Sentinel Mining Company, has decided not to participate in the Feasibility Study as originally contemplated. The reason cited by the Sentinel Mining Company for their new position is a reevaluation of the opportunities in the mining and marketing of iron ore (the principal product to be shipped through the harbor) which indicates they are markedly reduced as compared with those a few months ago. The USAEC and the Australian AEC believe that continuation of the study under these conditions is unwarranted. In the course of your discussions with Prime Minister Gorton, during his visit next week, the USAEC believes you should express regret at Sentinel Mining’s unwillingness to participate as expected and reiterate the United States willingness to participate in a similar alternate Feasibility Study. A more encouraging note in the Plowshare program is the signing today of a contract between the U.S. Government represented by the USAEC and the Department of the Interior and the Austral Oil Company of Houston, Texas for Project Rulison. Rulison will be the second deep, underground nuclear explosion to investigate the use of nuclear explosions in “stimulating” unproductive natural gas fields. Respectfully yours, Glenn T. Seaborg 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 200, Agency Files, Nuclear Testing, Joint Nuclear Testing. Confidential. “Approve press release” is checked. The letter at Tab A is published but not the press release at Tab B. 288. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 288. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 1 Washington, May 19, 1969 SUBJECT: Relationship of Plowshare to Limited Test Ban Treaty The President has directed that a study be conducted of all options, together with their respective advantages and disadvantages, for reconciling a US program of peaceful nuclear explosions with our obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I believe a study of this nature might best be conducted under the auspices of the Under Secretaries Committee. A basic discussion of this subject was contained in the response to NSSM 25 concerning the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation project in Australia (Tab A). This study was completed on March 22, but never was considered by the NSC Review Group or the NSC because the Cape Keraudren Project was abandoned. The NSSM 25 response therefore will be of considerable assistance to the Under Secretaries Committee in preparing its study, should you agree that the Under Secretaries Committee undertake this task. I would be grateful if you could provide me with your views on this project at an early date so that I can inform the President of the expected date of completion of the study and the forum in which it will be conducted. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos-UN Secretary’s Committee. Secret. At Tab A was the attachment to Document 286 . In a May 23 memorandum, Richardson replied that even before the NSSM 25 exercise began Rogers had approved just such a study and that an interagency group under Pollock’s direction was working on the project. (Ibid.) 289. National Security Decision Memorandum 18 289. National Security Decision Memorandum 18 1 Washington, June 27, 1969 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission The Director of Central Intelligence< The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT: Review of Underground Nuclear Tests The President has directed that the NSC Under Secretaries’ Committee will review the annual underground nuclear test program and quarterly requests for authorization of specific scheduled tests. The Committee will consider the policy and technical justifications for the proposed tests to determine if they are consistent with the requirements of national security and foreign policy. When considering the subject of underground nuclear tests, the Under Secretaries’ Committee will include, in addition to its regular membership, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The following guidelines will apply to the review and approval of nuclear tests that might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test that is intended to be fully contained underground will be included in this category if there is a significant possibility that the test will place measurable amounts of radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the United States under circumstances in which the debris could be credibly related to the test. Any other nuclear test which by its nature could reasonably give rise to domestic or foreign charges of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency believes that the charges would prove to be unfounded. The guidelines are: — In planning the nuclear test program, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense will make every effort to avoid tests that might be regarded as being a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is recognized that this will be a matter of judgment since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria as to the nature of prohibited tests. — If the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary of Defense believes after careful study that a particular test should remain in the program despite the possibility that it might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sponsoring agency will submit the test for review by the Under Secretaries’ Committee. — In support of the proposals for each nuclear test of this type, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the reviewing committee a detailed study of the importance of the proposed test and the possible direct or indirect effects associated with the test that might be regarded as evidence of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The study of effects associated with the test will include an analysis of (a) the anticipated distribution of particulate and gaseous radioactive debris under the full range of possible meteorological conditions; (b) the extent to which blast, electromagnetic, and other direct radiation phenomena associated with the test will occur in the atmosphere; (c) the possibility that various foreign countries would be able to detect the anticipated level of radioactive debris and other phenomena associated with the tests with their detection instrumentation; (d) visible phenomena in the vicinity of the test site; and (e) planned or expected publicity. The results of the Committee’s review of the underground nuclear test programs and its recommendations should be transmitted to the President in time to allow him to give them full consideration before the scheduled events are to take place. NSAM 269 and NSAM 307 are hereby rescinded. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs (1–50.) Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer (JCS). Laurence Lynn drafted the NSDM and, under cover of a June 23 memorandum, forwarded it to Kissinger together with a draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President explaining that “to extend bureaucratic arrangements directed by NSAMs 269 and 307 would not be consistent with the new NSC organization because the previous directives designate me as chairman of a group whose membership includes the Secretaries of State and Defense.” (Ibid., Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos) 290. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Department of State (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 290. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Department of State (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 1 Washington, August 22, 1969 Subject: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the Limited Test Ban Treaty Your memorandum of June 12, 1969 requested a study of the implications of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on the “Plowshare” program for peaceful application of nuclear explosives. Representatives of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense have participated in this study. Within the Department, contributions have been made by the Legal Adviser’s office, the Political/Military staff in Under Secretary Johnson’s office, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and the Bureau of European Affairs, as well as the staff of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Our report is attached at Tab C. SCI, with the participation of ACDA and AEC, has also prepared a Summary (Tab A) and Conclusions (Tab B) for your convenience in reviewing the report. For the sake of brevity we have not repeated in this report the full recital of potential advantages and disadvantages for all aspects of the problem, since this would have involved covering much of the same ground which was treated in our March 22, 1969 report on the proposed Cape Keraudren nuclear harbor excavation in Australia (NSSM 25), The present report addresses itself to the most realistic options available for consideration as well as new factors which have emerged since the Cape Keraudren study. In this study we have borne in mind not only the limitations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but also the desirability of proceeding with the development of this technology in order to meet the expectations under Article V of the Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty. While some differences in viewpoint still exist regarding the’ restrictions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the attached report endeavors to present the significant considerations without prejudice. The participants in this study are in general agreement on the Conclusions expressed in Tab B, although divergent views regarding presentation and emphasis still remain- Even in the absence of unanimity, it has been gratifying to observe the extent to which the agencies and offices concerned have been willing to accomodate their different views on this traditionally controversial subject. Annex II, an illustrative draft Protocol, will be transmitted as soon as the various Agencies have completed their review of the draft text. Tab A Summary One of the principal objectives of the United States in its Plowshare program is to develop the technology necessary to establish the feasibility and utility of underground nuclear explosions for excavation purposes. The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) permits nuclear explosions underground, but only if such explosions do not “cause radioactive debris to be present” beyond the territorial limits of the country under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted. The Treaty does not differentiate between weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. Nuclear excavation explosions release some radioactive debris into the atmosphere. Some of this may be carried beyond territorial limits. For the past six years there has been disagreement within the US Government as to the exact effect of the Treaty insofar as peaceful nuclear excavation explosions are concerned. An understanding of why this disagreement persists is necessary to an appreciation of how the development and utilization of peaceful nuclear excavation explosions might be pursued in a manner consistent with the LTBT. Absence of Agreed Criteria. The Treaty sets forth no criteria or objective standards for determining when radioactive debris is “present” beyond national borders. This imprecision of the Treaty has given rise to basic differences regarding the extent of the problem. One View . One view holds that, since the Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions that cause radioactive debris to be present beyond territorial limits, an explosion from which radioactive debris is actually detected outside such limits in amounts and kinds sufficient to identify its origin would violate the Treaty. Moreover, since the Treaty clearly applies the same restriction to peaceful nuclear explosions as to weapons tests, those who hold this view maintain that peaceful nuclear excavation explosions which present a high probability of such extra-territorial detection and identification pose an unacceptable risk of supportable charges that we have deliberately violated this Treaty obligation. This position leads to an assertion of the most restrictive interpretation of the phrase “causes radioactive debris to be present”, which is held to be consistent with the presumed reluctance of some States to let anyone else judge for them how much additional radioactivity they should be willing to accept. Other View . The other view maintains that the primary purpose of the Treaty was to limit weapons testing and therefore excavation explosions are not contrary to the purpose of the Treaty if their conduct does not impair the objective of limiting weapons tests. Only because of the inability to reach agreement with the Soviets on a mutually acceptable means for differentiating weapons tests from peaceful explosions were all peaceful explosions subjected to the same restrictions as weapons tests. Proponents of this view hold that the principle of de minimis should be applied to the Treaty’s prohibition on radioactive debris being “present” across national boundaries, since this can be related to the effort to put an end to contamination, and thus to elimination of the risk to health and safety caused by radioactive debris, rather than to the total abolition of such debris beyond territorial limits. This position then leads to a less restrictive interpretation of what constitutes radioactive debris being “present.” Issue . The issue then focuses on what standard will be used to determine when radioactivity is present. 1/ While those supporting a restrictive interpretation would admit to some minimal amount of radioactivity transiting a border without constituting a violation, they maintain that the standard should be based on detectability. Under that view, an explosion is prohibited if it causes radioactive debris to be “present” which can be detected and identified with that explosion. Those supporting a less restrictive interpretation argue that a de minimis standard could be used for determining when radioactive debris is “present”, based on an analogy to internationally accepted health guides for radioactivity exposure in industry, medicine, etc. These guides often establish levels of concentration which are so far below those having any health and safety significance as to be considered “not present.” Experience . While neither view has been expressly adopted, the US has made ad hoc decisions to conduct five excavation experiments since the Treaty came into force in 1963—several in the knowledge that there was a finite probability that debris would cross the borders in such concentrations that it could be detected and identified with the test by routine monitoring. The predicted concentrations involved, however, were very small and well below the levels of reasonable concern about health and safety. After the last of these five experiments, the Soviet Union transmitted an aide-memoire on January 21, 1969 which claimed a violation of the Treaty on the basis that they had detected radioactive debris attributable to that experiment. (Because of special circumstances involved in that experiment, such as the announced presence of unusual isotopes, it is conceivable that debris could have been detected by the Soviets and reasonably attributed to our experiment.) We have also privately reported to the USSR, on several occasions, that we had collected radioactive debris, outside their territory, from specific Soviet explosions and have requested explanations. Neither Party has ever admitted to a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor explained in an international forum its conduct under the Treaty, Thus, there has not evolved an agreed interpretation as to what concentration of radioactive debris constitutes a violation. Within the United States there are divergent views. We do not know how the phrase is understood by other governments. It is against this background that any study of the question of reconciling the development and utilization of peaceful nuclear excavation explosions with the Limited Test Ban Treaty begins. Questions . A study of the problem of reconciling the US nuclear excavation program with the Limited Test Ban Treaty requires the answer to several questions: 1. When will it be necessary or desirable to obtain relief from the restrictions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on peaceful nuclear excavation explosions? 2. What form of relief from these restrictions is necessary? 3. How should the US seek to obtain such relief? The resolution of these questions involves complicated international negotiation and extensive, delicate diplomatic preparation. When ? The question of timing can more logically be addressed in terms of the stages of development and application of the technology than by chronological dates. The stage at which the US will require relief from the restrictions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty can be considered in two phases. First, there is the relief, if any, that may be necessary to complete the developmental program, which is designed to establish the feasibility of nuclear excavation in general and for a sea-level, transisthmian Atlantic-Pacific canal in particular. Four additional experiments, the minimal program for the latter purpose, are required over the next two years or so. Second, there is the relief that would be required to utilize fully the nuclear excavation technology developed, as in the construction of a transisthmian canal. The extent of relief required in either case is not known. It will depend upon a) agreement as to what concentrations at national borders can be accepted as consistent with the LTBT and b) forecasts as to the concentrations that will probably be produced by contemplated excavation explosions. Current AEC studies of the technical aspects of this problem should provide a basis for judgment as to optimum timing. What ? Any possible course of action to obtain relief must be judged against three basic criteria. What is its effect on the objectives and the integrity of the Limited Test Ban Treaty? How does it take into account international attitudes toward the Limited Test Ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions? And, how does it affect the ability to develop and exploit peaceful nuclear excavation technology? Any solution must provide assurance that the opportunities for weapons development and weapons effects experiments will not be increased beyond those now permitted. Since the operation of the Treaty to date has prevented some substantial additions to the worldwide burden of radioactive debris, any solution to the peaceful nuclear excavation problem will be examined closely by many in light of its effect on the environmental contamination objective of the Treaty. How ? In working out an internationally accepted accommodation, the US can expect to encounter several important international attitudes: a reluctance to amend the Limited Test Ban Treaty; a desire to link this issue with progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB); and, the likelihood that an effort will be made to link any resolution of the issue with an elaboration of the procedures for implementing peaceful nuclear explosion services foreseen under Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is the strong likelihood that these issues will all interact, with the CTB issue being foremost. Sweden, India and others can be expected to make achievement of a CTB or other new obligations the price of agreement. The attitudes of the USSR and the UK as the two other Original Parties are important, but unclear. In a Vienna meeting of technical experts earlier this year the Soviets indicated reservations about the wisdom of seeking to amend the Limited Test Ban Treaty and informally suggested another approach. The UK is not interested in performing nuclear excavations and has manifested some concern about opening up the LTBT. Their ultimate attitude is difficult to forecast. The accomplishments of the US Plowshare program and the extensive information available have increased international knowledge of and interest in the potential of peaceful nuclear explosions including nuclear excavation. A number of foreign projects have been suggested. Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides that non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the Treaty will be able to obtain the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. This has highlighted the potential of peaceful nuclear explosions and has heightened the expectations of the non-nuclear weapons States for these benefits. The considerable international interest in peaceful nuclear explosions should help provide a favorable climate for efforts to resolve the problems associated with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Fundamental to most interim and long-term means of handling nuclear excavations under the LTBT is a need for objective criteria against which the proposed experiment or project could be evaluated. The AEC is currently studying: (1) Criteria that may be used in applying the de minimis principle to the phrase “causes radioactive debris to be present”; and (2) the possible adaptations of existing radiological health and safety guides to develop relevant operating guides for nuclear excavation. These studies will take from three to six months. It will not be known until the completion of the current studies whether objective criteria can be established; and, if so, what effect such criteria would have on the problems identified in this study. Possible Courses of Action . While we lack sufficient technical data and political information at this point to make a conclusive assessment of the most advisable courses of action which the US should follow to reconcile the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the development and utilization of nuclear excavation technology, some general observations can be made. Amendment of the Treaty, if attainable, would be the ideal long-term solution to permit full development and utilization of peaceful nuclear excavation technology. An examination of the substantive features of the amendment the US would prefer highlights the complex negotiations that would be entailed in achieving an amendment. Many elements and permutations of elements must be considered in formulating an amendment dealing with peaceful nuclear excavation explosions. The principal elements include: the explosions to which the amendment would apply; the procedures which would be followed with respect to the international community; and the functions and authority of the international body through which certain of the procedures might be implemented. Interpretation of the Treaty was found to be less comprehensive and definitive than an amendment, but might be useful as an interim or evolutionary step in attaining a long-range solution. It is recognized that interpretations of the Treaty run the risk of not being accepted by some Parties and of legal challenge. Interpretation would, however, have the advantage of not opening up the Treaty to amendment and thus would reduce some of the political obstacles foreseen in attaining an amendment and a number of the negotiating complexities involved in formulating an amendment. It could probably not provide sufficient latitude to conduct projects such as nuclear excavation of a sea-level Atlantic-Pacific transisthmian canal or harbors near national borders, and thus would not provide a general solution of the problem. Various forms of interpretation were considered, as well as a number of techniques that might be used to achieve their acceptance. For example, the phrase, “causes radioactive debris to be present” outside territorial limits, could be interpreted on the basis of criteria for de minimis quantities of radioactive debris. Consideration was also given to obtaining some indication of international consent by obtaining a favorable resolution by an appropriate international organization endorsing the conduct of peaceful nuclear excavation explosions. Interin Measures . In the absence of a general long-term reconciliation Of full development and utilization of nuclear excavation explosions with the Limited Test Ban Treaty or during the period when such an objective is being pursued, it was recognized that the US would wish to continue to develop and, if feasible, to exploit nuclear excavation technology without appearing to disregard its Treaty obligations. A spectrum of alternative courses can be considered for this purpose, beginning with the current practice under NSDM 18’ of an ad hoc subjective review of each proposed underground nuclear explosion. Additionally, objective criteria could be developed and adopted within the Government to determine in the light of the LTBT whether a proposed nuclear excavation explosion should or should not be carried out. Depending upon the criteria established, it might be possible to conduct a substantial portion of the experiments necessary for the development of nuclear excavation technology. A factor to be considered in adopting an interim course of action is its relationship to possible approaches to achieve a general long-term reconciliation. A possible enhancement of or interference with success in achieving general long-term reconciliation through various courses of action will require examination. Once a long-term approach is selected, it ntciy be possible to design a specific interim approach which will enhance the success of the long-term solution. Tab C Conclusions Washington, undated A. Long Term Solution 1. Modification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty will be required to permit the full development and utilization of peaceful nuclear excavation explosions. An amendment of the Treaty appears to be the best long-term solution of the problem if attainable. 2. A long-term solution is likely to require several years of considerable effott to achieve. If an appropriate course of action is followed in the interim there need be no compelling programmatic or political reasons for the United States to propose any long-term solution for some time. 3. Nevertheless the US should proceed to develop its preferred long-term solution, and its technical rationale, into as concrete a form as possible. This would allow pursuit of such a course when necessary, and would also permit the long-term solution to be taken into account in determining appropriate interim action and conduct under the Treaty. 4. Before forming a definitive decision on the long-term solution, we shall need to: a. Reach agreement within the US Government as to what levels of radioactivity at national borders can be accepted as consistent with our undertaking in the Limited Test Ban Treaty not to carry out underground nuclear explosions that cause radioactive debris to be present beyond such borders. In this connection, AEC should complete its study of criteria that might be used in applying the de minimis principle to the phrase “causes radioactive debris to be present.” b. Consider the results of the current AEC study on the possible adaptation of existing radiological health and safety guides to develop relevant operating guides for nuclear excavation. If such guides are found useful, they will need to be developed in detail and to be considered by an appropriate international technical forum. c. Attain an adequate understanding of Soviet attitudes on two key points: the concept of a worldwide ceiling on radioactivity in the atmosphere which they suggested in April 1969? and their attitude towards various possible modifications of the LTBT, especially in view of an indicated reluctance to amend the Treaty. It would be desirable at an appropriate time to hold further exploratory talks on these points following appropriate allied consultations, although no effort should be made to reach agreement with the USSR at this time on LTBT issues. d. Obtain more precise information than is now available concerning the views of other countries in order to assess the prospects of attaining international acceptance of a modification of the LTBT. Continuing international pressures for a comprehensive test ban are likely to complicate the process. The complex of political attitudes likely to attend an effort to amend the Treaty, and the complicated negotiations that can be foreseen, suggest that it would be prudent for the US to take international interest into account in the timing and tactics of negotiation. The question of restrictions of the LTBT will undoubtedly be brought to the fore in connection with the formulation of procedures for Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We should exploit the interest of other countries in obtaining the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosion services to help achieve international recognition and acceptance of the need to modify the Treaty. B. Interim Measures 5. Until a long-term solution is available, the US should adopt an interim course of action for continuing the development of excavation technology. This can be considered in several stages: a. Because of the present lack of objective criteria, peaceful nuclear excavation experiments during FY 1970 should continue to be handled on an ad hoc basis pursuant to NSDM 18. (Preliminary analysis indicates that the first of the two explosions being planned for the period November, 1969–March,1970 may involve somewhat higher concentrations of radioactive debris at ground level near our borders than those experienced in the last test, Project SCHOONER. However, the maximum concentrations which might occur are estimated to be about the same as the maximum predictions for SCHOONER at the time it was approved.) b. Once the necessary data become available from current AEC studies it should be possible to determine if they provide a suitable and acceptable basis for a de minimis interpretation of the Treaty for the remainder of the developmental stages of the program. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC–U/SEC, Committee Misc., Memos. Secret; Restricted Data. The summary and conclusions at Tabs A and B are published but not the report at Tab C. 1/ Ever-present but variable background radioactivity at any given location, unrelated to current excavation explosions, complicates the problem of measuring the radioactive debris attributable to a particular explosion. It should also be noted that increasingly sensitive techniques make it possible for a number of countries to detect and identify the presence of minimal amounts of radioactive debris—far below the levels which could be considered significant from a health standpoint. 291. Memorandum for the Record 291. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, October 14, 1969 Subject: Eighteenth Meeting of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on Tuesday, 14 October 1969 1. Attending: STATE: Mr. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, Under Secretary of State MR. ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, Staff Director, USC MR. HERMAN POLLACK, Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs MR. NELSON S. SIEVERING, JR., Office of International Scientific and Technologic Affairs MR. JOHN R. STEVENSON, Legal Advisor CIA: GENERAL ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, Deputy Director, CIA MR. PETER JESSUP, Special Group Officer, CIA DOD: MR. DAVID PACKARD, Deputy Secretary of Defense JCS: GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER, Chairman, JCS MAJOR GENERAL M. C. DEMLER, Special Assistant to the JCS for Arms Control AEC: DR. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman,AEC DR. THEOS J. THOMPSON, Member, AEC BOB: DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, Assistant Director, BOB NSC: COLONEL ROBERT M. BEHR, Staff of NSC WHITE HOUSE: DR. HUBERT HEFFNER, Office of Science and Technology MR. DAVID FREEMAN, Office of Science and Technology ACDA: MR. GERARD Smith, Director, ACDA 2. Agenda Item: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the Limited Test Ban Treaty MR. RICHARDSON opened the meeting by stating that the subject of today’s meeting was very complex. He asked Dr. Seaborg to describe the problems of (1) tests and information needed for nuclear explosions to excavate a proposed interoceanic canal, and (2) constraints of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). DR. SEABORG stated that he was pleased with the report of the study by the interagency group and the draft memorandum for the President on this subject. He explained that in the PLOWSHARE program there have been five cratering nuclear explosions which contributed information and only two more of a program of four tests were essential to determine feasibility of constructing the (transisthmian) canal. [ text not declassified ] MR. RICHARDSON asked if these tests require amendment of the LTBT and if so is it realistic to proceed concurrently with tests and negotiations for an amendment. DR. SEABORG responded that there is no question that we need the amendment, but it would take years to negotiate. From his talks with the Soviets, it was not clear that they would agree because they can perform nuclear explosive excavations without an amendment. However, small central American countries present a fall-out problem for us. GENERAL WHEELER stated he understood that the AEC had studies going to determine standards for health and safety in order to proceed with LTBT amendment. MR. RICHARDSON felt that the concurrent route of tests and negotiation of amendment would not get anywhere. He then asked for discussion to justify the two new tests proposed in PLOWSHARE with a comparison of detectable amounts of fall-out from the previous SCHOONER test at [ less than 1 line not declassified ] yield. What did we say to Soviets about the results? DR. SEABORG responded that the Soviet Union charge of a US violation was answered by our explanation that it was a negligible amount. Also, the United States queried the Soviet Union on three of their explosions detected by the United States and asked for explanations. MR. PACKARD asked if Canada had any official question on radioactive detection of US tests. DR. SEABORG explained that Canada had not questioned the United States and their Foreign Secretary reported to Parliament that their Public Health Stations could not attribute radioactive debris to our SCHOONER test. However, our AFTAC did detect and verify the SCHOONER test radioactivity at 1-to-2 picocuries per cubic meter of air near the US border. (1 picocurie = one millionth of one millionth of a curie.) MR. RICHARDSON inquired as to the range of radioactivity level in the atmosphere from nuclear weapons tests before the LTBT (1963) and after. DR. SEABORG and AEC staff indicated that this level was 10 picocuries one year after the LTBT and is now down to 1 picocurie. MR. RICHARDSON proposed several approaches to the problem (radioactivity detection of PLOWSHARE tests at our borders): 1. It may be a technical violation but does not amount to anything. 2. It is not a violation although detectable in the context of atmospheric tests banned by the LTBT. MR. SMITH of ACDA stated there was more concern over the public image of the United States than in the technical facts related to the problem; therefore, AEC should get the data from studies and tests. MR. RICHARDSON asked what level of radioactivity after a nuclear explosion is tolerable under the LTBT. (There followed a discussion between lawyers present covering international law, relief provisions in treaties, rules for interpreting treaties, and legislative history including AEC testimony to the US Senate on the LTBT.) DR. SEABORG stated that he tried hard in his Senate testimony on the LTBT to prove that we could conduct PLOWSHARE tests under the treaty. MR. PACKARD asked what was our resolution capability for radioactivity in the atmosphere at our borders. DR. SEABORG responded that with laboratory equipment we now could detect “one atom in a room this size” or one ten-thousandth of a picocurie whereas in 1963 we could detect only 100 times that amount of radioactivity. MR. SMITH stated that the problem is political, the LTBT prohibition (“radioactive debris present outside the territorial limits of the State”) is clearly “detectable,” we should avoid any legal argument, and go ahead with AEC tests. MR. PACKARD inquired as to the status of Soviet Union tests. DR. SEABORG stated that the Soviet Union program of future tests has already been accomplished. High levels of radioactivity have been detected in Japan with Public Health Stations reporting up to 70 picocuries. MR. PACKARD proposed that if levels (of radioactivity) are kept low AEC should proceed with studies and test program for canal excavation and then assess the next step (LTBT amendment) with adequate data. MR. HEFFNER asked why are we doing the canal excavation, why amend the LTBT with the rising public concern in the area of nuclear tests and the budgetary bind, and why are not these PLOWSHARE tests postponable? DR. SEABORG explained that the STURTEVANT test has already been paid for and two tests are required for the canal study commission next year. MR. SMITH observed that if an LTBT amendment is needed it would take a decade and if time is urgent, AEC tests should proceed DR. SEABORG added that under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) the United States is expected to assist nonnuclear countries with nuclear explosion excavations based on PLOWSHARE program. If we do not help them, this gives countries an excuse to develop their own nuclear explosives for excavation. Also, the Soviet Union may give their services to other countries, notably Latin-American. MR. SMITH and AEC staff members then discussed relative cost of nuclear explosions versus conventional means for excavating an interoceanic canal with an indication that at present the nuclear explosion method was cheaper by a half-billion dollars. MR. PACKARD felt that the government should not let dissident hold up scientific and technical progress, we should get on with testing, and find out what can be done. MR. RICHARDSON asked about the political issues involved, and a true public concern over recent tests (RULISON and MILROW) plus other tests in prospect. He observed that these tests may tend to draw down public tolerance of weapons tests (underground), wouldn’t they? Dr. Seaborg responded simply by saying “yes.” MR. PACKARD asked and was informed by AEC that the STURTEVANT test was planned for next month and the next MILROW test in one year. MR. SMITH was informed by AEC staff that the column of debris from the SCHOONER test was visible to 16,000 feet in heighth. MR. RICHARDSON referred to the White House memorandum (19 May 1969) requesting the views of the Committee and to the draft memorandum for the President (prepared by the Department of state). He discussed the importance of the STURTEVANT test for entire PLOWSHARE program, as well as canal excavation, bilateral technical meetings with the Soviet Union and the need for AEC laboratory tests to LTBT interpretation or amendment. Interagency agreement was reached on the following course of action: a. The AEC will promptly complete the development of the data necessary to establish objective criteria for acceptable levels of radioactivity; b. The Interagency Study Group will 1) examine the AEC study with a view of determining whether the data can be used as the basis of establishing acceptable objective criteria and 2) prepare further detailed recommendations for consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee regarding the amendment approach to modification of the LTBT and interim procedures. (Tentative deadline established of March 1, 1970); and c. Resumption of bilateral technical talks with the USSR at an early date after appropriate consultation with our Allies. Consideration will be given to having another round of technical talks this year as a basis for preparing for subsequent exploratory talks, perhaps as early as Spring of next year, about possible approaches to reconciling nuclear excavations with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. DR. SEABORG explained that the AEC data to establish criteria for acceptable levels of radioactivity must be followed by much broader studies for government-wide understanding of criteria for use in amendment of the LTBT. MR. RICHARDSON , referring to a previous question by Mr. Packard, stated that more information was needed on the importance of the excavation tests, the political risks involved, and the impetus of this on a total test ban. GENERAL WHEELER expressed concern, as did Mr. Smith, that efforts to obtain an amendment to the LTBT would lead to opening the question of a complete test ban treaty with a clause for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. This would be anathema to the Joint Chiefs of staff. MR. RICHARDSON observed that other similar PLOWSHARE projects of other countries also require amendment of the LTBT although, as Dr. Seaborg stated, the Soviet Union does not worry about it in their large (land-mass) country. He posed the question for further study; do we want to start amending the treaty and get pressures to go to a complete test ban treaty? DR. SEABORG suggested that the further study also include the effect of Article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty on the LTBT with many small countries looking to the United States for assistance in PLOWSHARE-type projects (Brazil, Japan, Australia, Israel, etc). MR. RICHARDSON indicated that a memorandum of the sense of this meeting would be sent to members of the Committee. M.C. Demler Major General, USAF Special Assistant to the JCS for Arms Control Attachment AEC Table GROUND LEVEL CONCENTRATIONS (pCi/m3) AT EXIT [1 page not declassified] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, A–400.112 (Sep–Dec) 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by M.C. Demler on October 15. 292. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 292. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, October 14, 1969 [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the October 14 Under Secretaries Meeting] At 4:10 p.m. I attended a meeting at the State Department of the Under Secretaries Committee. Present were: Chairman Elliot L. Richardson, Jack Stevenson, Herman Pollack, Nelson Sievering, Arthur A. Hartman, Biltchik, and Wolfgang Lehmann of the State Department; General Robert E. Cushman and Peter Jessup of the CIA; Colonel Robert M. Behr of the NSC staff; General Earle Wheeler and Major General Demler of the JCS; Henry Loomis of the USIA: David Packard of the DOD; Commissioner Theos Thompson, John Kelly, and Allan Labowitz of the AEC; Gerard C. Smith of the ACDA; James Schlesinger of the BOB; and Hubert Heffner and David Freeman of the Office of Science and Technology. The meeting opened with Richardson asking me to summarize the excavation shots that are required before the decision can be made as to whether nuclear methods can be applied to the digging of a second canal across the Isthmus. I said that only two shots, the STURTEVANT and the YAWL would be required. The STURTEVANT shot is ready for execution next month, whereas the YAWL shot could be executed next spring. In addition, the excavation program contemplates two other experiments, the GALLEY experiment, which would be some seven shots about a year from now, and the GONDOLA experiment to be conducted in a different medium—a wet clay shale medium—scheduled for the spring of 1971. I emphasized, however, that only the first two shots are required in order to give information for a decision on the canal across the Isthmus. The discussion then turned to the question of the interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the matter of detectable amounts as opposed to a de minimis interpretation. In order to compare the impending STURTEVANT shot with the SCHOONER experiment I handed out and explained the attached sheet. I emphasized the low level of the radioactivity involved and pointed out that even the background in our meeting room amounted to some 100 picocuries per cubic meter, much greater than the levels we expect at the Canadian border from the STURTEVANT shot. I also pointed out how much larger the maximum permissible concentration of tungsten-187 (the main isotope that will be released in the STURTEVANT experiment) is than the expected level to be released is. There was a great deal of discussion as to the interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty that equates a violation with the ability to detect any radioactivity at all at the border. I emphasized that I didn’t think this is a reasonable interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and suggested that the phrase, “radioactive debris,” or the Russian translation of this phrase, “radioactive fallout,” implied more than an insignificant detectable amount at the border. Richardson asked one of the State Department lawyers present, Jack Stevenson, if my interpretation is viable, and he indicated that this is probably the best connotation that could be put on any concept that allows higher levels at the extremely small detectable levels. I said that I believe that the Limited Test Ban Treaty would never have been passed by the Senate (due to opposition by people like Senators Anderson and Jackson) if I hadn’t testified that I thought excavation shots (larger than STURTEVANT) could be carried out under a reasonable interpretation of its provisions. Packard argued for an immediate approval of the STURTEVANT event on the basis that we shouldn’t give in to the unreasonable attitudes and the public clamor against testing and Wheeler supported him in this. Heffner and others raised the issue of increasing public pressures against activities that are thought to create environmental hazards. He expressed the view that this pressure would become extremely great in the case of STURTEVANT. I agreed with him that this is a serious problem and said that I consider it more serious in the case of STURTEVANT than the question of the interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Smith expressed doubt that we should go ahead with the STURTEVANT shot and recalled that the study group had suggested that it be handled separately and that we limit the present recommendation in the suggested draft report to the President, which is concerned primarily with the derivation of an interpretation to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I expressed agreement with that position and suggested that there are some recommendations in the draft memorandum, such as the recommendation that we resume our bilateral technical talks with the U.S.S.R. at an early date, which the AEC would like to see implemented as soon as possible. Richardson indicated that he thought it would be possible to go ahead with the bilateral technical talks with the U.S.S.R. without further approval from the President and there seemed to be general agreement on this. Richardson also expressed the view that since the draft memorandum to the President (copy attached) doesn’t recommend any particular position, it is doubtful that it should be sent to the President. He suggested instead that staff might restructure the memo so that the main courses of action recommended could be authorized without involvement of the President. These courses of action are: (1) that the AEC will promptly complete the development of the data necessary to establish objective criteria for acceptable levels of radioactivity, (2) on the basis of this, an attempt will be made to find an agreed upon interagency position that will allow a determination of what levels of radioactivity are consistent with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and (3) resumption of the bilateral technical talks with the U.S.S.R. will be undertaken at an early date. At 5:45 p.m. I had a conversation with Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson in his office. I told him that I thought the matter of domestic public acceptance of the STURTEVANT shot is more important than the interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I thought that a smaller group should discuss this and then perhaps discuss it with the President. I pointed out that in the case of the MILROW and RULISON shots it had been touch and go up to the very end and that the President had been involved in the final decision to go ahead at the very last moment in the case of the MILROW shot. I said that I thought this would also be the case with the STURTEVANT shot and that if the pressure became so great that it became necessary for the President to cancel the shot at the last moment, this would do great harm to both the President and the Plowshare program. I said I thought, therefore, that these hazards should be frankly discussed with the President so that, if he decides to go forward despite the tremendous public pressures that will build up, we would be in a position of not being subject to a last minute cancellation, which would do so much harm to all concerned. I said that I had particularly in mind protecting the President on this matter, and that I certainly wouldn’t push for carrying out the STURTEVANT experiment if an examination of these questions of public pressures should make it seem unwise. I pointed out that it could still be conducted as a completely contained device development test as was originally planned if we wanted to go ahead on this basis. Richardson seemed quite impressed by these arguments and suggested that a paper might be drawn up summarizing this situation by a small group, including a representative of his office, the AEC, the ACDA, and the DOD. He will take steps to have this done. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the October 14 Under Secretaries Meeting] 1 Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 20, pp. 304, 307, 309. No classification marking. 293. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 22 293. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 22 1 Washington, November 5, 1969 TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency The Science Advisor to the President The Director, United States Information Agency Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Schlesinger SUBJECT: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the Limited Test Ban Treaty REFERENCE: NSC–U/SM 43 The Committee discussed at length the basic issues and underlying differences of view reflected in the Interagency Study Group report. The Committee endorsed the conclusion reached by the Study Group that if the United States wished to fully develop and utilize peaceful nuclear excavation explosions, the Limited Test Ban Treaty would have to be modified. The Committee further agreed that amendment of the Treaty would probably be the best long-term solution. Leaving the timing question open, the Committee agreed that the United States should develop as fully as possible its preferred long-term solution, and its technical rationale. The Committee thereupon decided that: a. The AEC will continue the development of the data necessary to evaluate the utility of various objective radioactivity criteria in interim and long-term approaches. (Initial results of the AEC studies to be available by January 15, 1970.) b. The Interagency Study Group will: (1) examine the initial results of the AEC studies with a view to determining whether acceptable objective criteria are feasible in interim or long-term approaches, and (2) prepare further recommendations for consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee regarding the amendment approach and interim measures (Tentative deadline established of March 1, 1970.) c. Bilateral technical talks with the USSR on the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions should be resumed at an early date after appropriate consultation with our Allies. The next round of technical talks should take place within the coming months. It was noted that an early establishment of the “de minimis” criterion for radioactive debris would be useful, despite the essentially political nature of such standards. The “de minimis” criterion could be used as an interim, internal government-wide understanding of what would be permissible under the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and might find utility in interim public interpretation of the LTBT by the U.S. It was further argued by the Legal Adviser that it would be most difficult to sustain a “de minimis” legal case, in view of the Limited Test Ban Treaty’s nature, explicit language and negotiating history, although a rational for a “de minimis” interpretation was also described. With regard to pending excavation shots related to the new sea-level Atlantic-Pacific Canal, the AEC stated that by conducting only two more key experiments, one of which would be Project Sturtevant, it could resolve the major technical uncertainties relating to Route 25, the only potentially viable route outside of Panama. It was noted that in an atmosphere of heightened public concern over activities that affect the environment, even these two PLOWSHARE shots might draw down the already limited level of public tolerance for the entire testing program—both weapons and peaceful. Seeking a Treaty amendment at this time would undoubtedly encounter strong pressure to link this issue with a comprehensive test ban treaty, and with progress by the nuclear powers in other disarmament areas such as SALT and the NPT. The Committee therefore agreed to ask the Interagency Study Group to address promptly the question of the relative importance of the excavation part of the development of peaceful nuclear explosions, against this background of political risks, both domestic and international. The Committee agreed to defer action on the AEC’s proposed project Sturtevant. Arthur A. Hartman Staff Director 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, A–400.112 (Sep–Dec) 1969. Confidential. Prepared by Arthur Hartman. 294. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 294. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, December 10, 1970 [11 pages not declassified in time for publication] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Soviet Venting from Nuclear Testing, Nov.–Dec. 1970. Secret. The attachments at Tabs C and D are published but not the attachments at Tabs A, B, and E. 295. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 295. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, December 15, 1970 [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the October 14 Under Secretaries Meeting] After the Under Secretaries meeting I met in Irwin’s office with Irwin, Spiers, Kendrick, Custer, Pollack, Keeny and Myron Kratzer to discuss the Department of State’s aide mémoire to the Soviets protesting the venting from their large nuclear test on October 14th. Kratzer and I suggested that this is a poor time to protest to the Soviets on this because we are in the process of discussing with them the interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty from the standpoint of conducting Plowshare experiments and projects and we want to keep our relationships in the best possible shape for these discussions. We also indicated that the October 14th test vented only gaseous fission products, indicating that the Soviets had taken reasonable precautions to keep it contained. We also said we hadn’t been protesting all ventings with the Soviets and they would wonder why we decided to emphasize this particular occasion. Irwin and those with him felt that we should establish a good record of indicating to the Soviets our concern and particularly so that the Department of State could respond to queries that come up in the future from the Senate on the subject of the venting of Soviet tests. Irwin indicated that he wants to go ahead with the aide mémoire to the Soviet Union, but that it would be kept low key. He also indicated an interest in going ahead in our discussions with the Soviets in order to come to an agreement on the interpretation of the provision of the limited nuclear test ban treaty prohibiting the venting of radioactive debris beyond the borders of the country conducting the test. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the October 14 Under Secretaries Meeting] 1 Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 23, pp. 621–622. No classification marking. 296. Telegram 2322 From the Department of State to Embassy in the Soviet Union 296. Telegram 2322 From the Department of State to Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, January 7, 1971 SUBJECT: Soviet Statement re U.S. Underground Explosions 1. Ambassador Dobrynin, at his initiative, called on Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand on January 6 to present the following oral statement: BEGIN QUOTE On December 16, 17 and 18, 1970, the United States carried out four underground nuclear explosions as a result of which there was a release of radioactive products into the atmosphere. According to reports, a noticeable increase in radiation occurred in the area of the explosion and at considerable distance from it. The Soviet side could not but pay attention to the lack of an official evaluation of the possibility of the radioactive cloud going outside the national borders of the United States. As is known, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water prohibits a signatory from carrying out a nuclear test, “if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State.” Drawing attention to the fact of release into the atmosphere of a large quantity of radioactive products as a result of a nuclear explosion on December 18, the Soviet side expects that necessary explanations will be given in the light of the Treaty which banned nuclear explosions causing radioactive debris to be present outside territorial limits. Competent Soviet authorities will naturally watch the radioactive cloud that has developed and, if the analyses of the debris of this cloud reveal the presence of radioactive products, then the Soviet side reserves the right to return to this question. END QUOTE 2. Hillenbrand said that he had not received a full report of the tests to which Dobrynin referred. Any pertinent information relating to the matter raised in the Soviet statement would be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government. 3. Hillenbrand then said that he would like to call the Ambassador’s attention to Soviet nuclear explosions of October 14 and December 17, 1970 from which we had collected radioactive material outside the borders of the USSR. In this connection he handed Dobrynin a piece of paper containing the following statement: BEGIN QUOTE The United States collected outside of the Soviet Union radioactive material directly associated with the Soviet nuclear explosions of October 14 and December 17, 1970. In view of Paragraph 1(b) of Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, the Government of the United States wishes to draw the attention of the Government of the Soviet Union to this matter, and to the importance of due precautions to insure compliance with that Treaty. The United States Government would welcome any pertinent information the Soviet Government could make available about these events. END QUOTE Hillenbrand added that both sides no doubt agree that it is in their interests to observe the Limited Test Ban Treaty as rigorously as possible. In this light, it is useful to exchange information when questions arise from either side. To the degree possible, of course, both should seek to avoid explosions which may raise questions, although it is recognized that these sometimes inadvertently and regrettably occur. 4. Dobrynin said he would pass the U.S. statement to his government and convey any information given to him in response to the U.S. request for any pertinent information. 5. FYI. As has been practice in past we do not intend to publicize nature of this exchange. END Irwin 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8 US. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to AEC. Drafted by Dubs (EUR/SOV); cleared by Davies (EUR) and in PM, SCI, ACDA, and AEC; and approved by Hillenbrand. 297. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee 297. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee 1 Washington, January 11, 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE Honorable John N. Irwin II, Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Honorable David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense Honorable Richard N. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Honorable George P. Shultz, Director, Office of Management and Budget Honorable Gerard C. Smith, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Honorable Eduard E. David, Jr., President’s Science Adviser Honorable Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality Honorable Frank Shakespeare, Director, United States Information Agency BANEBERRY INTERIM STATUS REPORT Enclosed for your information is an interim status report on the BANEBERRY underground nuclear test which was conducted at the Nevada Test Site on December 18, 1970, and which released radioactivity to the atmosphere. While I commend the entire report to your attention, I would like to emphasize the following points with respect to this release of radioactivity: a. No public health hazard resulted from the radioactivity which was detected at any location off the Nevada Test Site. Radiological survey results to date have not indicated sufficient levels of radioactivity to justify special field studies or the need for instituting protective actions. b. As a result of the radioactive release, Area 12, which is on the Nevada Test Site, had to be evacuated. While contingency plans for such an evacuation were initiated promptly, some personnel exposures and equipment contamination did occur. About 145 personnel required decontamination with the highest contamination level observed being about 200 mR/hr in the hair of one individual. The highest exposure to a worker was approximately 6 Rem to thyroid and approximately 1 Rem to whole body. No worker exceeded the quarterly occupational standard for the thyroid, which is 10 Rem, or for the whole body, which is 3 Rem. c. Although it is too early to determine the cause of the radioactive release, two possibilities which are being investigated quite closely are an anomalous geologic situation or the induction of a failure as a result of an unexpectedly high yield. Either possibility might account for the observed surface fissure through which the radioactive products were released. Preshot containment reviews which were quite thorough indicated no geological fault in this area. The Commission does not intend to authorize the conduct of any further tests at the Nevada Test Site until it has reviewed the BANEBERRY test in detail and is convinced every reasonable precaution has been initiated to reduce the probability of a similar future occurrence. You will be kept advised of our progress in this matter. It is currently planned to complete our detailed review by the end of January 1971. This schedule is subject to change, however, since the yield determination in BANEBERRY may not be available until February 1971. Cordially, Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman 1 Source: Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, vol. 24, pp. 42–43. No classification marking. The status report is not included in Seaborg’s journal. 298. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 298. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Keeny) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, January 21, 1971 SUBJECT: Venting from AEC Nuclear Test of December 18, 1970 (BANEBERRY) As detailed in the attached memcon, the Canadians reported having detected radioactive debris attributable to venting from the U.S. nuclear test BANEBERRY of December 18, 1970. The Canadian representation was oral and in low key, and they affirmed that the Canadian government had no intention to make a formal protest or to conceive of the event as a violation of the LTBT. Nevertheless, the representation is noteworthy in that it marks the first time a foreign government, other than the USSR, has officially approached the U.S. government concerning the detection beyond U.S. borders of radioactivity debris from a U.S. nuclear test. In the meantime, the AEC has suspended further testing at the Nevada Test Site until it has reviewed the BANEBERRY test in detail and is convinced that every reasonable precaution has been initiated to reduce the probability of a similar future occurrence. Chairman Seaborg’s memorandum for members of the NSC Undersecretaries Committee, dated January 11, 1971, stated that the AEC hopes to complete this review by the end of January 1971, however, discussions with the AEC staff this morning indicated that testing will be suspended until at least 1 March 1971. The release of radioactivity from BANEBERRY began at approximately H+3.5 minutes, from a crack in the earth, opening up after detonation in a southwesternly direction from the emplacement hole. Although it is too early to determine the cause of radioactive release, two possibilities which are being investigated are (1) an anomalous geologic situation or (2) unexpectedly high yield from the device. The venting was rather widely publicized. The Environmental Protection Agency stated that radioactivity was traced to the Canadian border at International Falls, Minnesota, but presented no health effects. The Soviets, on January 6, 1971, made an oral representation on this venting, but did not claim to have detected radioactive debris from it. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, January–December 1971: FRC 383–98–5, Underground Nuclear Testing–Venting December 1970–December 1971. Drafted by P.J. Long (ACDA/ST). The attached memorandum of conversation is not published. The Canadian minister stated that their readings did not indicate conclusively that the increase in radioactivity was a result of venting from the Nevada tests, but they considered it probable because the radioactivity resulted from “fresh venting.” 299. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 299. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 13, 1971 Subject: Underground Nuclear Test Program for the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1971 (EMERY III/IV) An uneventful and successful half-year of nuclear weapons testing suddenly, with the venting of radioactive material in Nevada on December 18, 1970, turned into a period of intensive self-examination by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Under Secretaries Committee thus delayed until now its recommendation to you on the testing program proposed by AEC for the next six months, waiting for the results of AEC’s technical/managerial review of its testing procedures. On the basis of the AEC investigation and of careful study of the issues involved, the Committee recommends your approval of the test program contained in Chairman Seaborg’s original request of November 25, 1970. While recommending approval, the Committee, in its Report to you, does draw your attention to a number of factors which may give ammunition to critics of the test program. On balance, however, we found these factors, as well as the psychological impact of the Los Angeles earthquake, containable for this testing cycle. I should point out that while public health, safety, and Test Ban Treaty obligations are well understood by all involved, the possibility of the minor release of radioactivity from future underground tests remains. A release, however small, could stimulate negative publicity. We are preparing an analysis of public/Congressional attitudes toward testing in connection with our report on the high yield underground test—CANNIKIN—now scheduled for September of this year in the Aleutians. Our recommendations on CANNIKIN will be forthcoming shortly. We have established, at the suggestion of the AEC, a USC Technical Working Group which will provide this Committee with inter-agency staffing on all forthcoming underground nuclear tests. John N. Irwin II Chairman Enclosure Report Prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee for President Nixon Washington, undated Subject: Underground Nuclear Test Program for the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1971 (EMERY III/IV) The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission submitted to the Under Secretaries Committee on November 25, 1970 the projected Underground Nuclear Test Program for the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1971 (EMERY III/IV) for the review required by NSDM 18. However, on December 18, an underground test conducted at the Nevada Test Site (BANEBERRY) vented into the atmosphere. The Commission immediately suspended all further tests, and launched a thorough investigation of the accident. Subsequently, the Commission decided to continue the suspension of the test program until the causes of the BANEBERRY venting accident had been clearly identified and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated to reduce substantially the probability of a recurrence of such an incident. BANEBERRY INVESTIGATION: The Atomic Energy Commission has now determined the causes of the December 18 venting: 1. The unrecognized high water content of the geologic environment surrounding the BANEBERRY device caused the detonation to act as if it were of higher effective yield and therefore emplaced at too shallow a depth. 2. The emplacement geometry and other geologic characteristics of the surrounding media played a contributing, although somewhat lesser, role in the venting. (The enclosure on BANEBERRY contains a more detailed technical explanation of the accident.) After careful study of the results of the BANEBERRY investigation, the Commission has imposed (a) a number of additional scientific and technical requirements on the test program and procedures, and (b) a series of additional managerial controls over test operations. New or more stringent requirements have been or are being imposed to insure a more thorough knowledge of the geology of each test site. Specialized consultants are being retained in certain technical areas to supplement or to verify the investigations and assessments of AEC scientists and engineers. Test review procedures are being expanded and strengthened. The functions of the Advisory Panels, particularly the panel of consultants on safety, are being enlarged. An investigation of the BANEBERRY incident in more detail will continue. A major effort is being undertaken to produce a better understanding of the complex problems, both scientific and engineering, that are involved in the containment of low yield tests, with special emphasis on more conservative burial depth. In view of the corrective measures that have been and are being taken, the Commission believes that testing can now be resumed with the expectation of enhanced safety. The Under Secretaries Committee has discussed the findings of the Commission on BANEBERRY in detail with Dr. Seaborg and members of his staff. We are satisfied that the remedial measures already taken and planned by AEC will permit the resumption of testing with reasonable assurance of minimum risk. PROPOSED TEST PROGRAM: The Commission has reviewed the EMERY III/IV test program initially proposed in November and has determined that the program as originally designed is still valid and required. Because the test program will not begin until early in the fourth quarter of FY 1971, it will not be possible to complete the program before the end of the fiscal year. It will therefore be necessary to carry a number of tests over into the following quarter. All of the tests included in the EMERY III/IV program will be subject to the tighter technical and managerial controls now being imposed. [ text not declassified ] POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTION: Although the tests included in the EMERY III/IV program do not of themselves raise any particular domestic or international issues, the resumption of underground testing, whatever the specifics of a particular test program, may very well, in the wake of BANEBERRY and the renewed international pressure for a Comprehensive Test Ban, be met with a sharp negative reaction. Given the events of the past few months and the increased public sensitivity both here and abroad to continued nuclear testing, the Committee wishes to draw your attention to three aspects of the proposed test program which may stimulate press, public, and/or Congressional opposition. First: Although the level of activity proposed in EMERY III/IV is in the same range as that of earlier years, the proposed program calls for an increase (from 26 to 31) in the number of tests as well as in the number of devices detonated (from 41 to 49) when compared to the corresponding period of FY 1970 (see enclosure 4). Second: During calendar year 1969, the US detected 18 Soviet underground tests and only 13 in calendar year 1970 (see enclosure 5), a significantly fewer number than we carried out. (It should, however, be kept in mind that the Soviets may have carried out additional low yield tests which we did not identify.) Third: The concern already expressed by some members of the scientific community and Congress about CANNIKIN, the test of the large yield ABM SPARTAN warhead slated for September, may be reinforced by the concern generated by the BANEBERRY accident with the end result being increased public opposition to both the Nevada Test Program and the Amchitka experiment. On the other hand, the apparent increase in the proposed Nevada Test Program stems from the fact that the comparable test period last fiscal year (Third and Fourth Quarters) was shortened from six to five months by the strike of AEC contractor personnel. In fact, if all the tests contained in the proposed test program are carried out as planned over a six month period, the AEC will be maintaining roughly the same monthly level of test activity in the EMERY III/IV program as was maintained in the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1970, that is, five tests per month. However, because of the uncertainties on timing introduced by the current suspension of testing, what the actual monthly rate of test activity will be for EMERY III/IV cannot be precisely determined at this time. Since a significant change in the rate of testing could have public repercussions, we intend to keep the monthly level of test activity under continuing review. For the mid-term, the Committee understands that the decisions taken on the AEC budget will result in a decrease in weapons testing in FY 1972. The cost figures for the Nevada Test Program reveal a drop from $143.7 million in FY 1970 to $133.6 million (estimated) in FY 1971 The downward trend is made even clearer by the still smaller amount ($119 million) requested for FY 1972. As for CANNIKIN, the Committee is well along in its review of this major event, and will be submitting its report to you in the near future. CARRY-OVER AUTHORITY: You will note that the test program proposed under EMERY III/IV covers two quarters rather than the single quarter covered in previous requests. It is as such the first semi-annual program request to be forwarded to you under the new procedure authorized by you in September. While the test program proposals will now cover a period of six months, we believe that the carry-over authority granted the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out approved tests during the quarter following the end of the original approved period if their execution has been unavoidably delayed, should remain unchanged. Thus tests approved in July could be carried out as late as the following March without further approval. (In the case of EMERY III/IV, this would mean that tests approved now could be carried out as late as September 30 without further authorization.) While the extension of the program period coupled with the existing carry-over authority lengthens significantly the possible elapsed time between the approval and the execution of a particular test, it is believed that this stretch-out poses no serious problems. We will in any event continue to follow the test program closely as it proceeds. The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve EMERY III/IV and reaffirm the existing carry-over authority procedure. To implement this recommendation, we have enclosed the text of a Memorandum to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission which you may wish to send. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–83, 334 NSC–U (March–April). Secret; Restricted Data. The attachments to the Under Secretaries Committee’s report are not published. The President approved the test program in a May 5 letter to Seaborg. (Ibid., May 1971) 300. Telegram 85171 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 300. Telegram 85171 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, May 15, 1971 SUBJECT: Venting of Underground Explosions REF: State 2322 1. Acting Assistant Secretary Springsteen on May 14 called in Soviet DCM Vorontsov (in absence Ambassador) to reply to previous Soviet demarche on a U.S. nuclear test venting in December (reftel) and gave him a copy of the AEC report on the incident being released this afternoon. 2. In handing over AEC report, Springsteen noted: A. Ambassador Dobrynin had raised the Nevada venting with Hillenbrand in January, at which time latter noted that a thorough investigation was being carried out and that any pertinent information would be brought to attention of Soviet Government. B. U.S. had immediately suspended all underground testing after December incident. Intensive investigation has now been completed, and measures have been taken to reduce possibility of recurrence. C. Our suspension of testing demonstrated seriousness with which USG views its obligations under Limited Test Ban Treaty and its determination to observe these obligations fully. D. AEC is announcing decision to resume underground testing this afternoon and is releasing report on December incident to public. Fulfilling Hillenbrand’s assurance we now providing Soviet Government with copy of documents summarizing results of our investigation of December incident. 3. Springsteen also delivered following Aide-Memoire to Vorontsov, noting he was sure that our two governments agree that it is in interest of both to maintain integrity of Limited Test Ban Treaty and to take all necessary precautions to comply with it. BEGIN QUOTE: The United States collected outside of the Soviet Union radioactive material directly associated with the Soviet nuclear explosions of November 4, 1970 and March 22 and 23, 1971. In view of Paragraph 1 (B) of Article 1 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, the Government of the United States wishes to draw the attention of the Government of the Soviet Union to this matter, and to the importance of due precautions to insure compliances with that treaty. The United States Government would welcome any pertinent information the Soviet Government could make available about these events. END QUOTE 4. Vorontsov said he would pass Aide-Memoire to Moscow and inquired what caused venting in U.S. test. Springsteen replied that primary cause of venting in December test was an unexpected and abnormally high water content surrounding the detonation point. Springsteen concluded by reiterating that USG would welcome receiving any information which Soviet Government could make available on the three recent venting incidents referred to in Aide-Memoire. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8 US. Confidential. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, Vienna, and AEC. Drafted on May 14 by Okun (EUR/SOV); cleared by Van Doren (ACDA); and approved by Springsteen (EUR). 301. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 301. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 15, 1971 SUBJECT: Request for Review of Nuclear Test Ban Policy There have been a number of recent developments that indicate that there should be an overall review of our policy on an underground test ban. In particular, believe that we should consider whether there are initiatives that we could take in this field. There has been a build-up of domestic and international pressure against nuclear testing and in support of movement on the test ban issue. There will be extensive Congressional debate and hearings on this subject. We can expect initiatives from the non-aligned countries and possibly the Soviet Union. Public concern with environmental issues is focusing on growing opposition to the CANNIKIN test in Alaska. Over the past few years, there have been significant changes in the technical aspects of this problem. There has been a slow but steady improvement in our capability to verify a ban on underground nuclear tests. At the same time, the nuclear warhead requirements picture has also undergone substantial changes both for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which may affect the overall assessment of the net security implications of various types of underground test ban. There have also been changes in the priorities for the Plowshare program, which has been a complicating factor in our assessment of the desirability of further limits on nuclear testing. Finally, while the outcome of SALT is far from clear, I believe we understand the range of possible outcomes well enough to evaluate the relationship of SALT to various possible forms that further limitations on testing might take. In view of the above, I recommend that the Administration undertake a detailed review of this subject, examining in particular specific initiatives that the United States might take. I believe the study could best be conducted by a steering group made up of all interested agencies. This steering group would most appropriately report to the Verification Panel since many of the problems will closely interact with questions we are considering relative to SALT. I have attached for your consideration a draft NSSM which details the principal proposals which I believe should be considered and the terms in which the proposals should be examined and evaluated. Gerard Smith Attachment Draft National Security Study Memorandum Washington, undated TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency The Director, Office of Science & Technology SUBJECT: Review of Nuclear Test Ban Policy The President has directed a review of U.S. policy with respect to limitation of nuclear testing in order to determine the desirability of a new initiative in this field. The study should review current policy and examine a broad range of possible specific new proposals, including the following: — continue the present position of supporting an underground test ban with guaranteed annual on-site inspections, either with or without provision for automatic seismic stations; — an underground test ban without guaranteed on-site inspections, but with provision for inspections by challenge, provision for automatic seismic stations, and provision for international seismic data exchange, — an underground test ban without guaranteed on-site inspections and without automatic seismic stations, but with provision for inspections by challenge and for international seismic data exchange; — an underground test ban verified only by national means and some form of international seismic data exchange; — an underground threshold test ban verified by national means supplemented by an international seismic data exchange; — an underground quota test ban. Each proposal should be examined and evaluated in the following terms: 1. Verification, taking into account: present, currently planned, and possible seismic capabilities; other national means, and, as appropriate, on-site inspection or automatic seismic stations. 2. Effects on Strategic Balance, including value in controlling strategic arms; consideration should be given to the case of no SALT agreement and to the case of a variety of possible outcomes to SALT. 3. Effects on Weapons Development, including impact on current and anticipated US and USSR weapons requirements; the possibilities and implications of clandestine testing; impact on nuclear weapons laboratories, taking into account possible conversion programs; savings, if any, taking into account verification requirements. 4. Impact on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, including the consequences of restricting or prohibiting such explosions; consideration should be given to possible ways of dealing with Plowshare and the possibilities of PNE’s for potential evasion of a test ban. 5. Responsiveness to Environmental Concerns. 6. Value in Controlling the Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This study should be coordinated by a steering committee under the chairmanship of the National Security Council staff, including representatives of State, Defense, ACDA, CIA, AEC, JCS, Council on Environmental Quality and the Office of Science and Technology. As the first phase of this review, a series of basic papers on the following topics should be prepared by working groups of the participating agencies with the indicated agencies as Chairmen: 1. Verification (CIA) 2. Effects on the Strategic Balance (OSD/ACDA) 3. Effects on Weapons Development (AEC) 4. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (State) 5. Environmental Concerns (CEQ) 6. Contribution to Controlling Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ACDA) 7. Foreign Policy Implications (State/ACDA) The first phase basic papers should be submitted to the steering committee by September 1, 1971. As the second phase of this review, the steering committee should analyze the options under consideration in terms of the criteria listed above and in the light of the first phase studies and other relevant material such as the negotiability of the options. This analysis should be submitted by the steering committee to the Verification Panel by October 15, 1971. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–184, NSSM 128. Secret; Noforn. Under cover of a May 24 memorandum, Behr, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt forwarded Smith’s memorandum and draft NSSM to Kissinger together with their own draft NSSM, noting that they had changed Smith’s “approach of looking at alternative ways to have a ban and adopted the approach used for SALT: that is, studying verification and strategic implications alone.” (Ibid.) 302. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 302. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Review of Nuclear Test Ban Policy ACDA Director Smith recommended to me that we conduct a review of our policy and possible initiatives on an underground nuclear test ban for, inter alia , the following reasons: — There has been a build-up of domestic and international pressures against nuclear testing and for a test ban. — There will be extensive Congressional debate and hearings on the subject. — Improvements over the past few years in our capability to verify an underground nuclear test ban merit review. — We are capable of evaluating the relationship of SALT to various test ban options. Pressures and expectations for a policy change might increase were it to become known that we are reviewing this subject. On the other hand, the increasing interest in the subject, magnified by well-published (and somewhat exaggerated) progress in seismographic technology, suggests that the issue will not disappear and that now is the time to establish White House control. Moreover, technological improvements may be such that they foreshadow substantive developments in the nuclear test ban area. Therefore, I believe we should inaugurate a study and have prepared a study directive (Tab A) taking the approach we used for SALT. Recommendation: That you approve inaugurating this review of our nuclear test ban policy. APPROVE [HK initialed for RN] DISAPPROVE SEE ME 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was drafted by Behr, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a May 24 memorandum in which they proposed that Kissinger either initial it and forward it to the President for his approval or approve it for the President himself. Kissinger initialed the memorandum and approved it for the President, writing “HK for RN” next to “Approve.” For Tab A, NSSM 128, see Document 303 . 303. National Security Study Memorandum 128 303. National Security Study Memorandum 128 1 Washington, June 4, 1971 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Review of Nuclear Test Ban Policy The President has directed a review of United States policy with respect to underground nuclear testing. This review should include separate analyses in the areas listed below. In each case an evaluation should be made of comprehensive test ban, threshold test ban, quota test ban and moratorium options. 1. Verification possibilities: taking into account estimated capabilities of present, currently planned and possible future seismic systems; history of past system performance versus expectations; probable capabilities of other national means alone and, as appropriate, the added capabilities provided by on-site inspection or on-site automatic seismic stations. 2. The effects on U.S. nuclear weapons development: including impact on meeting current and anticipated weapons needs and requirements; impact on nuclear weapons laboratories and possible conversion programs; and savings, if any, taking into account verification requirements. 3. Estimated effects on Soviet weapons development: including potential gains from clandestine testing. 4. Political and other factors: including value in controlling further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and effects on both U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. relations with allied nuclear powers. 5. Impact on U.S. and Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosion programs: including domestic and international consequences of restricting or prohibiting such explosions; possible ways of accommodating Plowshare applications; and the possibilities of utilizing PNE’s for evasion of a test ban. This study should be prepared under the direction of the Verification Panel which, for the purpose of this study, will include a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. The study should be ready for consideration by the NSC by August 15, 1971. In view of the sensitivity of this memorandum, distribution should be restricted to those persons essential to the completion of the study. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Top Secret. A copy was sent to the David, Seaborg, and Moorer. 304. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 304. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 12, 1971 SUBJECT: Clearance of Public Statements on Nuclear Test Ban Policy Our nuclear test ban policy is currently under review in the NSSM 128 study. This subject is also getting increasing attention in the Congress, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly. Our declaratory policy is that the U.S. continues to support an adequately verified comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. “Adequate verification” repeatedly has been linked with a requirement for on-site inspection. The Soviets also publicly endorse a comprehensive test ban, but have maintained that national means are sufficient for verification. The U.S. position on on-site inspections has been weakened by advances in seismic discrimination technology to the point that domestic and international pressures are mounting to challenge the necessity and efficacy of on-site inspections and supporting national means of verification of a comprehensive test ban. As the verification problem is perceived to recede in significance, pressures will increase for the U.S. to change its position and get on with negotiations of a test ban. Therefore, it becomes important that official public statements and instructions to delegations concerning nuclear test ban policy avoid prejudicing the U.S. position until the NSSM 128 study is completed and appropriate policy decisions are made. The President directed that government agency testimony on seismic technology advances before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee be cleared at the White House. It is now timely and appropriate that we bring U.S. delegation statements and instructions concerning nuclear test ban policy at the UN and the forthcoming session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament under the same review. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency directing that delegation statements and instructions concerning this subject be cleared at the White House (Tab A). Marshall Wright concurs. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 229, Agency Files, Department of Defense, volume 14–Nov–Dec 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. At Tab A was the November 17 memorandum issued by Kissinger ( Document 305 ). 305. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 305. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, November 17, 1971 SUBJECT: Clearance of Statements and Instructions Concerning Nuclear Test Ban Policy The President has directed that official statements and instructions to delegations at the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning U.S. nuclear test ban policy will be cleared at the White House. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 229, Agency Files, Department of Defense, volume 14, Nov–Dec 1971. Confidential. A copy was sent to Laird, Schlesinger, and Moorer. 306. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 306. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 2, 1971 SUBJECT: U.S. Vote on UN Nuclear Test Ban Resolution There are now three resolutions before the UN General Assembly urging all the nuclear powers to halt nuclear weapons testing, both underground and in the atmosphere, and to reach an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests as a matter of urgency. These resolutions vary principally in the degree to which nuclear testing is deplored or condemned and the stridency with which the nuclear powers are urged to take action to cease testing. These resolutions are briefly summarized below: — Saudi Arabian (Baroody) Resolution condemns nuclear testing and urges the nuclear powers to cease further nuclear testing and to reach an agreement on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) “without delay” and no later than ( date to be filled in ). (Tab A) — Mexican Resolution condemns the arms race and environmental dangers of nuclear testing, asserts that the differences on verification are no longer a valid reason for delaying a CTB, condemns all nuclear weapons tests, and urges nuclear weapons states to halt all nuclear testing no later than ( date to be filled in ). (Tab B) — The Canadian Resolution entirely avoids condemning nuclear testing. It urges all states that have not done so to adhere to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (i.e., France and China). It calls upon the nuclear powers, particularly the U.S. and USSR “immediately” to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures to suspend or limit or reduce nuclear weapon testing pending a CTB applicable to all states . It urges greater effort to develop further seismological capabilities to facilitate monitoring a CTB. It urges the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to continue deliberations on a CTB “as a matter of highest priority” and particularly requests the U.S. and USSR “to take an active and constructive part in developing in the CCD specific proposals for a CTB.” (Tab C) Our UN delegation expects that all three resolutions will pass easily if brought to a vote. Voting could begin as early as Friday, though probably not until early next week. Background Facts — In both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty the U.S.—and USSR—is committed to work toward an agreement to cease all nuclear weapon testing, a CTB. — Since 1957 the UN has passed 18 resolutions calling for an end to nuclear weapons testing. The U.S. has voted for 17 of these resolutions. Their primary thrust was that a CTB was a desirable objective, in principle, which we have supported. — In 1962 we (and the Soviets) abstained, since the resolution passed condemned nuclear testing. We have never voted against a resolution calling for a test ban. — Since 1963 we have annually voted for a UN resolution calling for a halt in nuclear weapon testing and negotiation of a CTB. — In voting for these UN resolutions since 1963, we have explained our position that a halt in nuclear weapons testing should be pursuant to an “ adequately verified treaty. ” Moreover, in 1970 we accepted language calling on the CCD to continue its deliberations on a CTB “as a matter of urgency.” — We are reviewing our test ban policy in NSSM 128. Agency divergencies are many and sharp, with OSD–JCS-AEC opposing a test ban versus ACDA and State in favor. The fundamental issues are bound up in deep-seated disputes over several genuine uncertainties and opposing views of the attendant risks. At this point, however, we have no basis for changing U.S. position on CTB. Issues for Decision — How should the U.S. vote on the three UN resolutions? — How will we explain our votes? The Saudi and Mexican resolutions pose no real problems for voting. We cannot vote to condemn ourselves for underground nuclear testing which is not in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. State/ACDA recommend we abstain. I concur. Reportedly, the Soviets will abstain also. Our proposed explanation of these abstentions is that strident denunciations and the imposition of early deadlines are harmful to the creation of the atmosphere of accommodation which is essential for progress in meaningful arms control measures. We would reaffirm our long-standing policy commitment to a CTB pursuant to an adequately verified treaty, and pledge to continue our active and constructive participation in the CCD deliberations concerning a CTB with emphasis on further necessary exploration of the verification issue. The real problems are posed by the Canadian Resolution. The Canadian Resolution has some novel features different from the previous UN resolutions we have supported that are the sources of our difficulty. These pointedly call on the U.S. and USSR to: — Take immediate unilateral or negotiated action to (1) suspend or (2) limit or (3) reduce nuclear testing; — Develop specific proposals for a CTB , with the hope that a treaty can be signed “in the near future.” Our real choices are to: (1) vote for the Canadian Resolution or (2) abstain . My analysis follows. Option 1. Vote for the Canadian Resolution — Maintains consistency with our previous support of a CTB in the UN, but adds new momentum toward a CTB. — Avoids isolating the U.S. and putting us in opposition to our friends and Allies on this issue. Seven smaller allies and eight neutrals co-sponsor this resolution. Japan, UK and Italy have also indicated their support. — Avoids antagonizing the disarmament and environmentalist constituencies domestically and internationally. Denies Muskie a potential political issue, too —he supports a CTB. — If the Soviets abstain, as they say they will, we may get one up on them since they would have to explain away their abstention and could not point to us as being in the same position. Option 2. Abstain on the Canadian Resolution — Avoids the appearance of a new U.S. initiative toward a CTB. Being on record favoring immediate action to halt or limit testing and to submit specific proposals for a CTB, plus other language conveying a sense of urgency, could create a new sense of expectation for movement toward a CTB in the near future. We have not yet determined that such a policy commitment is in our national security interests. — Avoids raising a potential domestic political issue with the right-wing “hawks.” Do we want to take further disarmament initiatives—or be so perceived—during the 1972 political campaign? The left would cheer and the right would jeer. — While the SALT outcome is uncertain and the NSSM 128 study is still underway, it is not prudent to commit ourselves to cease or restrict testing and to add momentum toward a CTB. (Our study tentatively indicates that SALT has a significant impact on some aspects of a CTB.) — A unilateral or negotiated halt of testing now could undermine our current public position that on-site inspections are essential to test ban verification. Regardless of how we vote, we will have to explain how we interpret the immediate action and specific proposals provisions. — State/ACDA assert that we could slough off the immediate action provision by pointing out that (1) meaningful limitations on testing can come only in the context of negotiation; (2) negotiations take time and must not be precipitous; (3) therefore, “immediately” is not really a meaningful term. (The Canadians have already indicated that they understand and accept this interpretation. Indeed, they say their resolution gives us considerable flexibility—and time—by offering unilateral or negotiated options to suspend or limit or reduce testing.) — We would finesse the provision to submit specific proposals for a CTB by reaffirming our constructive participation in the CCD deliberations and assuring that we would submit proposals when appropriate. (The Canadians admit that one of their—and the nonaligned nations’—key objectives is to gain acceptance of the idea that the U.S. and USSR should submit specific proposals for a CTB. State/ACDA believe that these explanations will stick if we vote for the Canadian Resolution. It appears to me that they could also serve to explain an abstention. My Views Regardless of how we vote, it will be publicized and we will get plaudits and lumps either way. My concern is that we not create an image of having a new test ban policy until we decide whether we want one. Marshall Wright concurs that we should abstain on the Mexican and Saudi resolutions. However, he believes we should vote for the Canadian resolution as “a politically useful gesture which in fact binds us to nothing.” RECOMMENDATIONS Abstain on Mexican and Saudi resolutions. Approved Disapproved, vote against Abstain on Canadian Resolution. Approved Disapproved, vote for Based upon your decisions, I will inform State/ACDA to prepare the appropriate instructions to our delegation. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1328, NSC Unfiled, 1971. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. The attachments are not published. None of the options on page 5 are marked. Haig forwarded Odeen’s memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a note in which he observed that State and ACDA wanted the U.S. to agree with the Canadian resolution while Odeen and Merrit thought the U.S. should abstain. Haig recommended voting no on the Mexican and Saudi resolutions but abstaining on the Canadian resolution “to reflect a degree of difference in our attitude.” Kissinger wrote “Agree” at the bottom of Haig’s note. (Ibid.) 307. Memorandum for the Record 307. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 3, 1971 General Haig has informed us that there is no objection in the White House to our abstaining on all three test ban resolutions at the UN. General Haig said that the NSC staff people concerned would be in touch with IO on the matter. Robert H. Miller Deputy Executive Secretary 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–4. Confidential. Prepared by Robert H. Miller. 308. Telegram 226692 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 308. Telegram 226692 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, December 17, 1971 SUBJECT: Venting of Underground Explosions 1. Acting Assistant Secretary Springsteen called in Soviet Charge Vorontsov on December 16 to give him the following Aide Memoire, drawing on its substance for his accompanying remarks. BEGIN QUOTE: The United States collected outside the Soviet Union radioactive material directly associated with the Soviet nuclear explosion of September 27, 1971. In view of Paragraph 1(b) of Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, the United States wishes to draw the attention of the Soviet Union to this matter, and to the importance of due precautions to insure compliance with that treaty. The United States considers this incident to be most regrettable because of the relativity large quantity of radioactive material collected and the fact that this was the sixth Soviet nuclear explosion within one year from which radioactive material has been collected outside the Soviet Union. The United States Government would welcome any pertinent information the Soviet Government could make available about this incident and the increasing frequency of occurrences of this nature. END QUOTE 2. Springsteen added that he hoped the Soviet Government will respond to our request for information regarding this event. He noted that the Soviets had made a statement regarding their test of March 23, 1971, in response to our previous approach. 3. Vorontsov replied that he would bring the matter to the attention of his authorities, and that he hoped he would get a response to our request for information. END Rogers 1 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–8. Confidential. It was repeated to USUN, USMission IAEA Vienna, USDelegation to SALT, and AEC. Drafted by Kadilis (EUR/SOV); cleared by Matlock (EUR/SOV) and Davies (EUR) and in substance by Handyside (PM/AE) and Long (ACDA/ST); and approved by Davies. 309. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 309. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, February 16, 1972 SUBJECT: Test ban Statements Attached is an interview with Jim Schlesinger in U.S. News and World Report. In several places he argues the strategic need for continued nuclear testing. On the final page he takes on directly the fundamental issue of whether a test ban is desirable even if verifiable . I have some sympathy for Jim’s view on this issue but I think it is political dynamite for us to begin changing our position on CTB in the middle of an election year. Agreed that the verification position is eroding—but even ACDA agrees that we can still get a lot of mileage out of it. I think we are much better off this year to endure hostile suspicion of our verification position than to debate the merits of a test ban. Accordingly, I think you should talk to Jim, or should approve my doing so, asking him to “soft pedal” lest us drift into open debate with Muskie, Kennedy, et al, on this issue. Nuclear test ban can only become an important issue if we make it one. Your Decision I will call Schlesinger [Haig checked] You call Schlesinger See me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 203, Agency Files, Atomic Energy Commission 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attachment is not published. Haig checked “I will call Schlesinger.” Written on the memorandum is “OBE” (overtaken by events). 310. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 310. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 17, 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Clearance of Statements Concerning Nuclear Test Ban Policy The President has consistently affirmed United States support for the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing within the context of an adequately verified agreement. This is our current policy position. The President has directed that official statements concerning our nuclear test ban policy conform to his position. All statements must be approved by the White House prior to release. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan. 1972–Aug 1974, volume IV. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Laird, Seaborg, and Gerard Smith. A copy was sent to Moorer. 311. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 311. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 29, 1972 SUBJECT: JCS Opposition to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Secretary Laird has forwarded to the President—without comment—the JCS views opposing a comprehensive nuclear test ban (Tab B). The JCS paper is a highly charged, emotional document. It mixes genuine implications and uncertainties concerning a nuclear test ban with unsubstantiated assertions, irrelevancies and debatable assumptions. As you know, the NSSM 128 study is trying to cut through the emotion and rigidly-held opinions that characterize the views both of proponents and opponents of CTB. A summary paper is currently being completed and the tentative meeting schedule has a Verification Panel meeting on the CTB study just prior to the Canada trip. Attached at Tab A is a self explanatory memorandum to the President that presents the relevant points of the JCS position with some tempering comments derived from the ongoing NSSM 128 analysis. If you wish to send the JCS views to the President, I believe it is important to his understanding of the issues that they be presented objectively. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum at Tab A forwarding the JCS paper to the President. Tab B Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, March 14, 1972 JCSM–109–72 Subject: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (U) 1. (TS) The current policy of the United States regarding support for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing within the context of an adequately verified agreement has recently been reiterated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that official statements regarding a comprehensive test ban must conform to the US position. However, as directed by National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 128, a review of US nuclear test ban policy continues. It is, therefore, appropriate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views and military advice on this subject as this time. 2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that continued international and domestic demands, plus recently publicized but misleading information regarding the capability of the United States to detect low-yield underground nuclear tests, may create considerable pressure for early US acceptance of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the absence of an adequate verification. 3. (TS) While recognizing that preambular treaty commitments to seek the achievement of a comprehensive test ban have existed since signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that these commmitments were made at a time when the United States was in a position of strategic superiority. Today, US strategic missile superiority has disappeared, and the erosion of US technological superiority has been constrained only through the intensive efforts of its nuclear weapon designers and laboratories and through underground test programs. 4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently emphasized the essentiality of testing all weapon systems. The US Armed Forces are committed to maintain a deterrent and warfighting capability across the spectrum of warfare, ranging from strategic nuclear offensive and defensive operations through tactical nuclear, conventional, and unconventional operations. Although it is highly preferred to test a system in its anticipated operational environment, the retention of the underground testing capability of the LTBT has provided the US Armed Forces with weapon systems upon which they can realistically rely. Although this effort has alarmed some elements of US society, there have been no significant adverse ecological effects to life or property resulting from the testing allowed under the LTBT. By retaining a strong technological capability and maintaining a viable underground test program, the United States has continued the development of sophisticated, cost-effective, and reliable nuclear weapon systems. Additionally, testing can assure the reliability of nuclear weapons which have been stockpiled over prolonged periods of time. Without the present underground testing capability, the US Armed Forces could not confidently exploit advanced nuclear weapons technology which offers many design improvements, such as tailored outputs, selectable yields, reduced size, reduced cost and more efficient use of nuclear material, reduced maintenance, increased safety and reliability, and improved command and control devices. For the foreseeable future, underground nuclear testing will continue to be mandatory, as weapon systems dependability can be confirmed only through such testing. Untested weaponry would erode confidence in US deterrent forces, thereby seriously jeopardizing national survival. 5. [ text not declassified ] These weapon systems and programs are required to meet current and forecast military threats. Testing programs have permitted in the past—and will permit in the future—verification of theoretical analysis. [ text not declassified ] 6. (S) Lacking the challenge of advanced design and testing opportunities, serious consequences can be anticipated in the field of nuclear technology. The highly talented scientists who have contributed so much to the advanced weapons technology of the United States would displace to more attractive and stimulating endeavors, and qualified replacements could not be enticed to replace them in a stagnant field; the nuclear research laboratories, such as Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Sandia Corporation, and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, would atrophy; and the US underground nuclear test facilities would lose their capabilities even in caretaker status. Remobilization of this expertise and materiel would be time-consuming, expensive, and ineffective in a crisis situation. 7. (TS) It has been argued that a comprehensive test ban serves the national security interests by placing equal constraints upon weapons development by all parties. These constraints are real only as long as all parties adhere to the treaty. The opportunity exists under a CTBT for potential enemies to gain significant and unpredictable advantages (particularly by clandestine testing) which would be impossible to assess if the United States were not permitted to test. a. Should potential enemies pursue a policy of clandestine testing, current and foreseeable technology does not provide a positive means of detecting low-yield nuclear detonations. The principal detection system of the United States is dependent upon seismic disturbance. Currently, seismic discrimination between nuclear detonation and natural earth disturbance phenomena cannot be achieved with high confidence below 4.0 to 4.5 seismic magnitude. Even this verification capability is vulnerable because most of the Atomic Energy Detection Stations are located in foreign countries and are subject to foreign expulsion. The loss of a key station at any time could, at least temporarily, reduce already limited confidence levels significantly. Valuable military gains, especially in the areas of weapons effects test, hardness assurance, and warhead/device development, can be achieved by tests conducted below the seismic detection threshold. b. An assessment of the potential impact of a CTBT must include the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Program, granted by the Nonproliferation Treaty and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Program obviates the usual clandestine testing scenarios involving complex subterfuges as well as sophisticated seismic detection schemes. For example, a current Soviet PLOWSHARE project will require 250 nuclear detonations totaling 36 megatons, with a single maximum yield of 500 kilotons. The problems involved in policing such a mammoth project to insure that none of the devices being tested represents weapons development, e.g., the development of a “clean” atomic demolition munition, are of staggering proportion. There seems to be no reasonable way that the United States, by national means, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, by onsite inspections, could assure that a peaceful nuclear explosion was not masking or, in some way, serving weapons development. c. If the United States agreed to cease all nuclear testing, public opinion and national priorities would ultimately dictate a decrease in both funds available for and level of effort in nuclear research and development. On the other hand, the Soviet Union or the PRC could sign a CTBT without making concomitant reductions in nuclear research and development efforts. Continuation of nuclear research and testing, even if not for the purpose of weapon development, would provide the Soviets or the PRC continuity in training of personnel, handling of devices, weapons effects, development of technical literature and professional interest, and other collateral benefits which would certainly enhance their nuclear weapon development capabilities. This would be facilitated by the closed, regimented nature of their societies. The logical result of this situation would be a disadvantageous imbalance of nuclear capabilities which would undoubtedly be prejudicial to the security of the United States. 8. (TS) Consideration must also be given to the collateral relationship of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Any strategic arms limitation agreement will reduce US strategic flexibility and increase the importance of qualitative improvements to weapon systems. Of particular consequence is the Soviet advantage in missile throw-weight, which may permit the Soviets more flexibility than the United States in further improving their systems without requiring nuclear testing. Also, in view of possible Soviet abrogation of proposed strategic arms limitation agreements, ongoing weapons research and development programs, as well as testing, would become increasingly important. These programs are also of added significance in light of the consistent refusal of France and the PRC to participate in any test ban negotiations. 9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the strategic situation today is significantly different from that which existed when US current policy on a comprehensive test ban was formulated and that fundamental US national security interests would be compromised by such a ban on nuclear testing in view of the fact that adequate verification behind the Iron Curtain is not achievable. Uncertainty inherent in future military threats also dictates that the United States should not surrender the freedom to conduct nuclear testing. In summary, the United States will be able to meet military threats only if it continues to test and develop the weapon systems deemed essential to its national survival. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous views that a CTBT is not in the national security interests of the United States. 10. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their position against initiatives to negotiate a CTBT and that you express these views to the President, preferably as an agreed DOD position. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: T.H. Moorer Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 245, Agency Files, JCS volume II. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Sent for action. Kennedy and Sonnenfeldt concurred in the memorandum. A handwritten notation at the top indicated that Kissinger saw it, but he did not sign or forward the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President (Tab A is not published). In a March 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy said he doubted Kissinger would want to send the JCS memorandum to the President since the Verification Panel was studying the issue and an upcoming meeting would provide an opportunity to explore all views, including those of the JCS, before putting them before the President. He concluded the memorandum was “too cryptic” to give the President a full exposition of the arguments both pro and con. Kissinger wrote on Kennedy’s note, “It is a brief not an analysis.”(Ibid.) 312. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 312. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 5, 1972 SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Enclosed for your review is a paper outlining my general position towards U.S. policy on a comprehensive test ban. I have arrived at this view largely as a result of a closely held but thorough technical study of the topic by an ad hoc OST panel of experts, but also from close interaction with the NSSM 128 review and others throughout the government. The panel’s study has been provided to your staff for their use, and views expressed in the paper have also been discussed at some length between our staffs. Briefly, the essence of my position is: - Make no further moves toward CTB. I conclude that the benefits do not outweigh the penalties at this time, and that plausible SALT or tactical nuclear review outcomes will not alter this conclusion. - Consider replacing the OSI requirement with unattended seismic observatories as an alternative means of ensuring adequate verification. - Require PRC and French participation in a CTB. - Proceed towards upgrading our seismic verification capability and spaceborne verification capability by developing and deploying prototypes of the important elements. - If a decision to proceed towards a CTB is made, take specific steps to ensure that research on pure fusion technology can continue under the CTB. While my position remains open to some modification following the Verification Panel review of the subject, I believe it is sound and appropriate. I will be prepared to discuss my views at the Verification Panel review and will be happy to discuss them in more detail with you and your staff if that would be helpful. Edward E. David, Jr. Enclosure Paper Prepared by the President’s Science Adviser (David) Washington, April 5, 1972 U.S. POLICY ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN Current or potential performance of the U.S. verification system is not really a key issue in a review of policy towards CTB negotiations. It is agreed that for about $20M we could establish in a few years a capability to identify all but about five events per year above Mb= 4.0 with 90 percent confidence. More importantly, it is generally agreed that under the current or future U.S. verification system, the Soviets could, with some small risk of discovery, clandestinely conduct numerous tests below 2 or 3 kt, and with increasing risk, a few tests from 10–50 kt per year by decoupling, and perhaps a test every year or so in the 50–100 kt range by masking in or simulating earthquakes. Properly conducted, these techniques would not be detectable by other national means either. Decoupling and masking appear feasible even though they have not been demonstrated at high yields. The central issue is whether this amount of clandestine testing, coupled with the impact of our being unable to test, poses risks or penalties sufficiently significant to outweigh the perceived benefits of agreeing to a CTB. The need for on-site inspection (OSI) is tangentially relevant; but only because it has been a publicly stated position and the focal point of past US/USSR disagreements. While OSI would increase the costs and risks of clandestine testing somewhat, its effectiveness could clearly be negated by a determined evader. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) are also a side issue because special verification arrangements would be required to permit them under a CTB, and because the USSR may wish to continue its PNE program strongly enough to insist on such accommodations. Regarding the significance of USSR evasion, coupled with complete preclusion of U.S. testing under a CTB, it is unlikely that a CTB would result in catastrophic deterioration of our strategic deterrent. The consequences of a CTB would be felt most severely in the event of a major Soviet ABM expansion or an ASW breakthrough. In either event, however, there are non-nuclear response options we could exercise which, although more expensive (and perhaps very much so), would be adequate. Moreover, we would probably notice the Soviet trend prior to major deployment, leaving some time for response, and if the threat were grave enough to require it, we could withdraw from the CTB treaty (although time would be required to justify withdrawal and to reestablish our design and test capability). Clear penalties which would accompany a CTB that we respected and the Soviets chose to evade, consist of the following: a. Our nuclear design capability would slowly but surely deteriorate while, via a minimum of clandestine testing, the USSR could maintain hers. This would reduce our ability to remain abreast of the technology, to maintain nuclear options for response to changing threats (such as ABM expansions or Soviet or PRC tactical nuclear expansions), and to guard against technological surprises. It is particularly important, for example, that we be able to determine experimentally the feasibility and probable impacts of pure fusion technology so as to better perceive future threats. This technology also has important implications for weapon effects simulation and advanced U.S weapons, as well as for future clean energy sources. b. We would not be able to conduct a nuclear test to evaluate or prove a fix for any fault found in our strategic stockpile, while the USSR could. Non-nuclear fixes might be possible, but we might also be faced with to need to rebuild large segments of the stockpile, which would be expensive and, more seriously, time consuming. c. We would not be able to modernize our low yield tactical stockpile, should that be desired, while the Soviets (and the PRC) could. The relevance of maintaining this option is uncertain, since the Soviets may not wish to modernize, but it is related to potential developments in European and Asian nuclear forces, each of which are under study. d. We would be unable to develop and deploy new nuclear warheads for new weapon systems. This would require that any necessary improvement or expansion of our nuclear forces be accomplished by improving only the non-nuclear portions of our systems, using existing warhead designs. This can be done, but frequently at greater expense (e.g., an additional submarine or improved guidance instead of smaller warheads for a specific damage level). The USSR would be similarly restricted in the case of high yield warheads because of the high risks of detection associated with the numerous tests needed for weapon development, so this penalty is, in fact, one of the anticipated benefits of a CTB, e.g., slowing the arms race. Because of the Soviets’ larger boosters, etc., however, the added cost of non-nuclear improvements may not be as great for them. Also, current intelligence provides no reliable indication of the actual status of their nuclear developments, so the net slowing of the arms race we could count on seems small. Against these penalties must be weighed the perceived benefits of a CTB. Environmental concerns are just not the issue that they were when the LTBT was under consideration—no serious harmful effects have been experienced from the underground test program nor are any likely to be. As discussed above, there would be little significant technical contribution to slowing the arms race because deployment of additional or non-nuclearly improved forces is as great an element in maintaining the race, perhaps greater, than advances in nuclear technology, and a CTB would not restrain deployment or non-nuclear improvements. We would realize the political advantage of reaching a publicly stated objective, but a major increase in progress towards NPT objectives would be unlikely without PRC and French participation. At this time it is my judgment that the penalties to the U.S. are not justified by the benefits . I doubt that plausible SALT or Tactical Nuclear Weapons review outcomes would reverse this judgment, since neither is likely to produce a compelling basis for foreclosure of nuclear options for the long-term future. The contribution of OSI to our verification capability is so minimal except perhaps as a negotiating position, that it could be abandoned. If we want to negotiate a CTB at this time, we could negotiate away the OSI requirement for some other quid pro quo. If we do not wish to move towards a CTB at this time, we should (a) say so on the basis of a reassessment of penalties, (b) insist on numerous unattended stations in the USSR as an alternative (and more credible) delaying tactic than OSI, or (c) require PRC and French inclusion. I would favor a combination of (b) and (c). PNE technology can be an important contributor to future energy resources and should be maintained as a permissible option. Possible PNE accommodations should be addressed separately from CTB negotiations to determine whether an acceptable international monitoring procedure could be established. I believe we should proceed immediately to upgrade seismic verification systems by developing and deploying prototypes of the important elements in any event, because it takes time to do so and it would be useful to have acquired some technical and operational experience with the improved systems should we decide to move towards a CTB later. To maintain our verification capability against tests in space, our spaceborne verification systems should be similarly upgraded. There is one additional matter of detail which may lead to adverse consequences through inadvertence. This is the definition of a “nuclear test” or “nuclear explosion.” Those terms were not defined in the Limited Test Ban Treaty because it was written in an era when nuclear technology supported only substantial explosions. However, recent work in high explosive driven pure fusion devices as well as laser initiated devices permits “explosive” (i.e., short interval) release of small amounts of nuclear energy, even within laboratories. This work is related to the understanding of controlled fusion as an energy source as well as to weapon technology. Under no circumstances should this work be truncated. In addition, it presents impossible verification problems. To summarize: - Make no further moves toward CTB. I conclude that benefits do not outweigh the penalties at this time, and that plausible SALT or Tactical Nuclear review outcomes will not alter this conclusion. - Consider replacing the OSI requirement with unattended seismic observatories as an alternative means of ensuring adequate verification. - Require PRC and French participation in a CTB. - Proceed towards upgrading our seismic verification capability and spaceborne verification capability by developing and deploying prototypes of the important elements. - If a decision to proceed towards a CTB is made, take specific steps to ensure that research on pure fusion technology can continue under the CTB. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meeting Folders, 6/14/72 NSSM 128. Secret. 313. Executive Summary Prepared by Interagency Group 313. Executive Summary Prepared by Interagency Group 1 Washington, undated NSSM 128 NUCLEAR TEST BAN POLICY REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INDEX Pages Introduction 1–7 Arguments For a Test Ban 7–11 Arguments Against a Test Ban 11–21 Net Assessment of Strategic Impact of a Test Ban 21–32 Tactical Nuclear Weapon Modernization 32a–34 Net Assessment of Verification Issues 35–41 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) 41–42 Policy Options 43–50 Annex A: Strategic Analysis 51–81 Annex B: Verification Analysis 82–106 NSSM 128 NUCLEAR TEST BAN POLICY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The United States has maintained the public position that we would be willing to negotiate a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing if such an agreement could be adequately verified. This policy is manifested in our endorsement of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in our general support of UN resolutions 1 commending a comprehensive test ban (CTB) as a desirable arms control objective. It has been our position that on-site inspection (OSI) would be a necessary supplement to national means to adequately verify a CTB. The Soviets also have consistently endorsed a CTB, but have maintained that national means of verification are adequate and have in recent years rejected on-site inspections. Thus, while the U.S. and Soviets publicly agree on the desirability of a CTB. the US Soviet impasse on verification has served to prevent the negotiation of a treaty. Recently, there has been an increase in domestic and international pressure to negotiate a CTB, particularly since advances in the technology of seismic (and other) means of detection and identification raise challenges to our insistence upon the need for on-site inspection. Many have declared that these advances in seismology permit us to rely on national means only for test ban verification. —A CTB has become an increasingly important item of discussion in the CCD. Many countries at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) maintain that a CTB is long overdue and should now be negotiated. Nine non-aligned states have submitted a memorandum stating that the verification problem could be resolved by national means alone, but “supplemented by international means”, and calling for the nuclear weapon states to submit proposals in order to initiate negotiations. Japan, Canada and Sweden are leading proponents of further limitations on nuclear testing, and Sweden has tabled a draft CTB treaty. Canada has proposed that the U.S. and USSR table their own draft CTB treaties, but has suggested that signature could be contingent upon French and Chinese adherence. Japan has tabled a proposal for a gradually descending seismic threshold test ban, beginning with an immediate magnitude 5.75 moratorium pending the establishment of an international machinery to supervise observance of a magnitude 5.25 test ban agreement. Under this proposal the threshold would be lowered to at least 4.25 as seismic and other means of verification improve. —Some non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have asserted that prompt conclusion of a CTB will be necessary to preserve the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These states claim that a CTB is necessary to balance the non-proliferation obligations assumed by the NNWS under the NPT. There are also states signatory to the NPT but which have not ratified it that might attempt to use the NPT rationale as a lever to pressure for CTB negotiations. The NPT is due for review in 1975 at which time it is possible that the lack of a CTB might provide ostensible justification for some states to withdraw from the NPT. There are differing views as to how valid these threats are. More likely, the NNWS will continue to criticize the nuclear weapons states for failure to conclude a CTB and urge action to do so with increasing stridency. Ratification or withdrawal from the NPT is likely to depend more on other national policy considerations than on a CTB. —It is highly probable that the UN General Assembly will continue to pass strongly worded annual resolutions urging negotiation of a CTB. —Some scientists and vocal disarmament and environmental groups are likely to continue their pressure for a CTB. There is increasing pressure from some senators for prompt negotiation of a CTB on the grounds that advances in seismic discrimination technology have made verification of an agreement feasible by national means alone. Among the sponsors of resolutions calling for a test ban are several potential presidential candidates (Muskie, Kennedy, McGovern and Humphrey). A CTB may become a 1972 political issue. —Our Delegation to the CCD speculated late in 1971 that the Soviets might be considering a new test ban initiative, although it is almost certain that any such initiative would not include a right to mandatory on-site inspection. However, there has been no specific Soviet initiative to date. —If a nuclear test is blamed for environmental mishaps, further domestic and international pressure could arise urging a halt in nuclear testing and perhaps negotiation of a CTB. However, our underground nuclear test program has had an outstanding safety record and has not been generally the focus of severe public criticism. But the high yield CANNIKIN test did raise a public outcry before its detonation. This test also spurred Japanese and Canadian demands for a test ban. Another reason for examining our current nuclear test ban policy is to determine whether this policy is any longer consistent with our national security interests in light of its interaction with likely SALT agreements and possible future threats. There are those who believe that a test ban would be detrimental to our national security interests and that we should not accept any further restraints on our testing capability at this time. Others believe that a test ban would be in the best interests of our national security and international political relationships. In view of these considerations, the NSSM 128 study has examined our current policy, alternative test ban proposals and verification means, political aspects and the national security implications of further limitations on nuclear testing for both the US and USSR. The overriding issue in assessing our nuclear test ban policy is whether or not the mutual cessation of nuclear testing—or an intermediate restraint on such testing—will be more—or less—advantageous to our national security interests than the continuation of underground testing without new restraints. Since the proper objective of a test ban is to enhance our national security, an assessment of the salient advantages and disadvantages in terms of their impact upon our security should be determinative of our test ban policy. (While recognizing its importance, verification can be treated to some extent as a separate and subordinate issue since it relates mostly to the confidence with which a test ban can be enforced and is relevant only if a decision is made that a test ban is in our national interest.) However, our position on verification-related issues is important in the public domain for justifying decisions either to maintain the status quo or undertake new policies. Analysis in the NSSM 128 study has focused on two sets of questions: — What are the net effects of a CTB on U.S. national security interests relative to the USSR? What are the political and military benefits and disadvantages of a CTB? What risks and uncertainties will we incur as a result of a CTB and will they be greater than if the U.S. and USSR continue nuclear testing? How effectively can we, and the Soviets, attain improved nuclear weapon capabilities and maintain system reliability by alternative means without testing? What would be the military and political effects of less than comprehensive test limitations (e.g., seismic threshold test ban, quota testing limits)? Are there asymmetries favoring either side that affect the desirability of a CTB? What are the interactions of a CTB with likely SALT agreements? — To what extent and confidence can a CTB be verified by national means alone? Additionally—or alternatively—what are the efficacy and desirability of various international means of verification? 1 What are the limits on our current and potential national capabilities for detection and identification of nuclear detonations? What are the risks and strategic value of clandestine testing to evade a test ban? Decisions on the issues above should lead to answers to the following policy questions: — Should the U.S. seek a comprehensive nuclear test ban? — Should the U.S. maintain or modify its public policy concerning a CTB? Particularly, should wecontinue to insist upon obligatory on-site inspections as a precondition of a test ban, rely upon national means only, or accept some form of cooperative international verification? On the other hand, do we want to advance reasons against negotiating a test ban? Or, should we advance new pre-conditions for a test ban, such as requiring French and Chinese participation? — Alternatively, should the US. pursue some form of intermediate limitation on nuclear testing short of a CTB? (e.g. threshold, quota)? Arguments for Comprehensive Test Ban 1 — A CTB would contribute to the stability of the political and strategic relationship between the US and the USSR by promoting detente . We do not know whether the Soviets really want a test ban or not. However, a successful test ban negotiation, in which a bilateral US-Soviet negotiation would be central, would have a positive impact on US-Soviet relations. A CTB could contribute to US national security through further involving the Soviets in the process of detente. However, it does not necessarily follow that a more durable peace will be achieved thereby, that U.S.-Soviet tensions will diminish, or that the nuclear arms race will be significantly curbed—at least in the near future. Nevertheless, many would believe that an important step forward had been taken toward detente, that the momentum for arms control agreements was being maintained, and that progress had been made toward a more stable and peaceful world order. A U.S. initiative toward a test ban might strengthen the hand of those within the Soviet power structure who favor accommodations with the U.S. and might lead to greater stability and less antagonism in U.S.-Soviet relations. If the Soviets failed to respond positively to such an initiative, tensions probably would not worsen, although the fears of those who distrust the Soviets would be strengthened. — A CTB would prevent the development of new nuclear weapons systems requiring new warheads and thereby would restrain the arms race . If it is perceived that such weapons developments are destabilizing, then a test ban would be a positive step in removing a source of instability. However, other technical means exist to upgrade nuclear weapons systems capabilities—even within a SALT limit—without nuclear testing (egs., guidance improvements, booster throw-weight increases, increases in numbers of some existing types of weapons, adaptation of existing warhead designs to new delivery systems). These measures could be destablizing whether or not there is a test ban. — A CTB would enhance U.S. security by reinforcing the effect of the NPT in reducing the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation . Further proliferation of nuclear weapons could lower the present barrier to the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict, make nuclear war “thinkable”, and increase the risk of U.S. involvement in a nuclear engagement. Those states joining a CTB would be barred from using nuclear tests to develop nuclear weapons, and even those not adhering to a CTB would face an additional deterrent to testing imposed by the existence of a widely and strongly supported treaty. Without testing, non-nuclear weapon states would be limited to developing simple fission weapons of uncertain performance. A test ban could be a factor in facilitating adherence to the NPT by near-nuclear states that have not yet ratified the NPT. However, it is questionable that those states (e g. India and Israel) that have sought to retain their prerogative to develop nuclear devices would be dissuaded by a CTB and the political climate it would create against nuclear testing, but it would raise the political penalty of a decision to initiate nuclear testing. There is disagreement as to the extent a CTB would increase the inhibitions against nuclear proliferation. A CTB would satisfy the claim of some non-nuclear weapon states that such a treaty is necessary to preserve the NPT, which they view as discriminatory. A CTB would be seen by many countries as a fulfillment of the LTBT and of Article VI of the NPT which pledges the nuclear powers to negotiate further nuclear arms limitations. — The stronger and more codified international political sentiment opposed to nuclear testing created by a CTB might be of some political restraint on nuclear testing by France and China . However, it is not expected that France and China would join a CTB in the near future. — Would respond to domestic and international concern about the effects on the environment of underground tests , even though these effects have, thus far, been negligible. However questionable the scientific basis may be for some of the environmental concerns, public anxiety is a real factor in determining the political cost of continued testing. — Could preserve any Soviet qualitiative disadvantages in nuclear weapon technology that may exist , particularly in low yield weapons where US testing experience is much greater, although our knowledge of current Soviet nuclear weapons development is very limited. À CTB could prevent the Soviets from developing future optimized MIRVs for the SS–9, any MIRVing of SS–11 and SLBMs, or optimum warheads for SAM-upgrade or new ABMs. The Soviets may already have warheads suitable to MIRV their ICBMs and SLBMs, for new ABM interceptors and to give some ABM capabilities to their SAMs without more nuclear testing. There is disagreement as to whether the Soviets might encounter nuclear material constraints on extensive MIRVing and ABM capable SAM deployments, if they are forced by a CTB to use existing warheads. It is unlikely that national means of verification could preclude some clandestine Soviet development of new very low yield warheads. — Could reinforce SALT to the extent that a CTB would inhibit the Soviets’ attaining a viable first-strike counterforce capability and SAM upgrade . — Might over the longer term diminish Soviet confidence in the reliability of their nuclear weapons so as to diminish the possibility of their employing a first strike . However, we would not be likely to know if this situation arose. — Further restraints on nuclear testing would improve the international political atmosphere . It would remove an irritant in U.S. bilateral relations with Canada and Japan. —It would remove one source of fear and discontent believed by many to arise from the postulated dangers of nuclear testing (egs., adverse environmental impact, arms race threats to a stable peace; and contributing to the risks of nuclear war). Arguments Against a Comprehensive Test Ban 1 — We would be denied the capability to identify or develop new nuclear warhead options and thereby constrain our capability to develop or modernize systems in response to future threat s. Advanced nuclear weapons technology is currently directed toward attaining such capabilities as improved tactical weapons (e.g. less collateral damage, improved safety and control) [ text not declassified ]. Some believe that we have adequate responses using current warhead technology to counter plausible future threats. Moreover, against any serious potential threats adequate US responses involve much more than deployment of improved warhead technology. These non-nuclear technology measures include improvements in accuracy, booster throw-weight, penaids, survivability, tactics, larger numbers of certain existing weapons, replacing MINUTEMAN II by MINUTEMAN III with MIRVs, better ASW, and adaptation of existing warheads to new delivery systems. Of these, only the deployment of more strategic missiles would be prevented by our SALT proposal. Others believe that only in the absence of a SALT agreement could the U.S. deploy a sufficient number of options which in combination could overcome all impacts of a CTB on development of needed responses to potential future threats. Without SALT, the U.S. could deploy increased numbers of missiles, some of which could be in mobile basing modes, defend to a significant level the existing silo force and also deploy qualitiative improvements such as accuracy and penaids. However, the extent effectiveness could be improved by these non-nuclear technology measures as compared to the optimum alternatives postulated through further nuclear testing is uncertain. Moreover, several of these non-nuclear technology measures are likely to be more costly to develop than options possible with new nuclear warheads. Some believe that these non-nuclear alternatives also may be less reliable than the counters that would continue to be available through testing. They emphasize that it is simply not feasible to predict the nature and character of all possible Soviet threats, and that retrospectively the U.S. test program has proven to be highly effective not only in identifying some possible Soviet advances but in developing suitable counters. Others believe that the combined restrictiom of SALT and a CTB would constrain the Soviet threat and thereby reduce the need for these countries. — The interaction of a CTB with the probable provisions and exemptions of SALT agreements raise additional concerns over our future security posture : 1. A CTB must be assumed to be of unlimited duration. SALT will constrain our ability to deploy new strategic weapon systems in response to possible future threats. A CTB will add further constraints on our flexibility to respond to these threats. Others note that both SALT and CTB would constrain Soviet threat development while permitting a wide variety of other U.S. responses to unforeseen threats. Moreover, both SALT and CTB would contain clauses permitting withdrawal if supreme national interests are seen to be jeopardized. Others believe that such withdrawal clauses, if invoked, would not permit timely responses to Soviet threats—if perceived. 2. A need could arise to develop maneuvering RVs (MaRV), to [ 1 line not declassified ] RVs as a hedge against the ability of SALT to effectively restrict potential Soviet ABM capability such as ABM-capable radars and SAM-upgrade systems. A CTB would reduce our confidence in [ 1 line not declassified ] and could increase the weight of MaRV such that the U.S. SLBM forces independent retaliatory capability would be diminished in the face of deployments of these ABM systems in numbers comparable to present SAMs. Some question whether deployments of such numbers of ABM capable SAMs would go undetected or that the Soviets would elect to forego bomber defense to achieve this ABM capability. They also believe that SALT, especially if reinforced by a CTB, would reduce or eliminate the need for MaRVs, and that in any case an adequate MaRV can be built under a CTB. 3. SALT follow-on negotiations may allow the Soviets a slight numerical superiority in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Some believe that this asymmetry will require U.S. strategic systems to depend more heavily upon qualitiative improvements in the future, and that these improvements will be more difficult to achieve without a nuclear testing capability. Others believe that these numerical differences would not be strategically significant in the context of the large forces possessed by both sides. 4. To the extent that a CTB could, in conjunction with SALT, restrict the U.S. options to effectively respond to a Soviet first-strike counterforce development, it could increase the incentive for the Soviets to proceed in such à direction because the feasibility of such an option may appear open to them. However, a CTB could constrain Soviet ability to develop a first strike capability and might diminish their confidence in a first strike strategy. 5. Under a CTB, in conjunction with anticipated SALT restrictions, some potential future Soviet threats (e.g., ICBM bomber negation, severe ASW, ABM-capable SAM)—insofar as these threats are not prevented by SALT or could not be countered by responses not restrained by a CTB—could severely penalize the U.S. ability to maintain strategic objectives [ 1 line not declassified ]. Our current policy is to target [ less than 1 line not declassified ] targets on a priority basis. Some believe that even if U.S. targeting were to be revised, assured destruction under a CTB would remain adequate unless virtually all U.S. ICBMs and bombers did not survive a Soviet first strike and SLBM attrition exceeds 30%. The issue is the selection of a revised strategic policy, to continue to maintain forces to cover [ less than 1 line not declassified ] targets, and to hedge these capabilities against future threats. These alternatives are being considered, among others, in the DPRC strategic Objectives Study. — There are several prospective asymmetries that could favor the USSR under a CTB. 1. The Soviet advantage in SS–9 throw-weight would permit some flexibity to MIRV that missile without requiring nuclear testing. While suitable RV/warhead combinations for MIRVing of the SS–11 and SS-NX–8 have not been seen, the warheads may exist or may be available by the time a CTB went into effect. [ text not declassified ] 2. It might be possible for the Soviets to evade a CTB or plan for abrogation clandestinely on a large-scale basis. The closed nature of Soviet society could allow them to continue very low yield tests even though the U.S. could not. Even the current estimate of the feasible seismic identification threshold is still high enough to allow the Soviets to develop a number of types of very low yield tactical nuclear weapons [ less than 1 line not declassified ] and probably to conduct some types of weapons effects tests. — Vulnerabilities to nuclear effects may exist in current and future systems which are not known or anticipated, and which can only be discovered or evaluated by nuclear tests. During the past decade several hidden vulnerabilities have been explored and evaluated through nuclear testing, which, if not corrected, would have caused serious problems with performance of delivery systems, warheads, launch facilities and command control systems in a nuclear environment. [ text not declassified ] Under a CTB it would be impossible to search for further vulnerabilities using nuclear effects tests, and U.S. confidence in our systems could be reduced. Moreover, verification of the hardness of any new system designs could require nuclear testing. Simulation techniques are not able to reproduce all of the effects of nuclear explosions nor are they expected to be able to do so in the future. While conceding this point, some believe that such techniques should provide us with sufficient confidence in systems using existing warheads, and note that the Soviets would also suffer any diminished confidence in their systems that might stem from relying solely on simulation. Others believe that the contribution of our nuclear effects tests to assure the reliability of our systems is extremely important and that simulation will be inadequate to discover such complicated and subtle effects. — Confidence in some weapons in our nuclear stockpile could erode over time if defects are discovered which cannot be investigated or their fixes proven except by nuvlear testing. Several hundred stockpiled nuclear warheads are inspected annually. [ text not declassified ] Some believe that experience has yet to demonstrate that nuclear testing of stockpile weapons for reliability verification is essential . Others believe that we should initiate periodic testing of weapons in the stockpile to maintain confidence as the stockpile ages. Much of the real basis for the very high confidence in our stockpile is due in large measure to our development and test program. Some believe that it is important that we not lose the constant measure of confidence provided by our nuclear test program which has continuously demonstrated the high reliability of the materials and design concepts reflected in the stockpile. Others believe that our stockpile inspection program will remain adequate for maintianing stockpile confidence if testing is prohibited. They also believe that the U.S. strategic force is sufficiently large and diversified that any modest reduction in stockpile confidence would be of no overall strategic consequence. (Under a CTB the Soviets would face a similar confidence problem.) [ text not declassified ] — Our nuclear weapons laboratories would be severely curtailed in their capacity to advance nuclear weapons technology, and the competence of weapons design teams would soon deteriorate . * If it ever becomes necessary to resume testing and new weapons development after a CTB had been in effect for an extended period, it is estimated by the AEC that it could take 3 to 5 years to reestablish our currently exentsive and mature nuclear weapons design competence, although any available experimental devices and stockpile weapons could be tested quite soon after testing resumed and some new weapons development could be undertaken. While there would be some work available for our laboratories relevant to nuclear weapons, such as improvements in non-nuclear technology, and components, simulation research, and warhead adaptation, which would require the skills of some weapons designers and researchers, nevertheless, nuclear testing is a necessary ingredient for the advancement of nuclear weapons science. Soviet nuclear weapon scientists may be subject to different incentives to continue their research, but without nuclear testing the advancement of their technology eventually would reach its limit and thereafter their competence would also deteriorate from stagnation, They could, however, prolong the creative activity of their laboratories by risking some clandestine testing or by planning that, through treaty abrogation, these opportunities would be provided in the not distant future. —[ text not declassified ] Some believe that this lead currently acts as a deterrent to third country aggression and proliferation (e.g., India [ less than 1 line not declassified ], and that it is militarily unsound to consider a CTB which is not truly comprehensive, that is, one which does not eliminate nuclear testing by all countries. Moreover, they believe that even without a CTB, continued advances in atmospheric nuclear testing by China could eventually create sufficient pressure on the Soviets to cause them to resume atmospheric testing. The ability to test underground has to date prevented this pressure from growing to such a point. It seems certain that under a CTB there would be justifiable pressures in the U.S. as well as in the USSR to resume testing if other countries were actively testing and building large nuclear arsenals to the point that our national security postures might be imperiled. However, others believe that a CTB without Chinese adherence would not be detrimental to our national security, and that a widely-adhered-to CTB is expected to isolate China and France as the only testing countries, thereby increasing political pressure on them to stop testing eventually. It is noted that the current U.S. and Soviet lead over China in nuclear weaponry is great, and that it would take many years and a massive effort for China to attain an equal posture, regardless of a CTB some believe that nuclear “superiority” is not attainable in any meaningful sense, and that this concept ignores the fact that a capability to inflict massive destruction sufficient for deterrence can be achieved with low levels of nuclear forces and technology. NET ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC IMPACT The impact that a CTB would have on the national security posture of the U.S. is affected by four major considerations: (1) How would a CTB affect attainment of U.S. strategic objectives? (2) To what degree would a CTB affect our capability to respond to future threats? (3) To what degree will SALT and a CTB constrain development of threats against U.S. forces? (4) Are there adequate responses to future threats that can be provided without nuclear testing. There are sharp disagreements between agencies over the four major considerations above. These disagreements hinge over the uncertainties inherent in these issues. Our current strategic objectives are stated in NSDM 16: 1. Maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces. 2. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis. 3. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer. 4. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level. The President, in his foreign policy report to Congress on 9 February this year, reaffirmed the broad scope of U.S. strategic objectives when he stated: “A simple assured destruction doctrine does not meet our present requirements for a flexible range of strategic options. No President should be left with only one strategic course of action, particularly that of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians and facilities. Given the range of possible political-military situations which could conceivably confront us, our strategic policy should not be based solely on a capability of inflicting urban and industrial damage presumed to be beyond the level on adversary would accept.” These objectives and alternatives are under review by the DPRC. Some believe that assured destruction remains the most essential component of strategic deterrence. They note that in a letter to Senator Brooke, on December 29, 1969, President Nixon stated that “the purpose of our strategic program is to maintain our deterrent, not to threaten any nation with a first strike…” Similarly, Secretary Laird in a November 5, 1970 letter to Senator Brooke stated that “we have not developed, and are not seeking to develop, a weapons system having, or which could reasonably be construed as having, a first strike potential.” [ text not declassified ] The following discussion considers the effect of a CTB insofar as it denies certain new strategic warhead options for [ text not declassified ] The detailed analysis upon which this assessment is based is at pages 51–81. Assured Destruction Under current NIE projected threats and force levels for this decade, analyses of strategic force exchange models indicate a CTB would make no appreciable difference to our—or Soviet—strategic retaliatory assured destruction deterrent capabilities compared to what could be achieved without test ban constraints. Moreover, the independent retaliatory capabilities of our SLBMS and ICBM-bomber forces would remain quite sufficient for assured destruction capabilities. [text not declassified] These conclusions are based on current threat estimates for this decade. The effect of new threats possible in the future is addressed below. Future Threats There is little doubt that under a CTB the Soviets probably could still install 3 to 6 MIRVs on the SS–9 class missile, using existing warheads. The possibilities for higher MIRV loadings under CTB constraints are questioned by some. While we have not seen Soviet warhead/RV combinations that would be suitable to MIRV the SS–11 and SS–NX–8, these may exist or may be available by the time a CTB went into effect. If not, a CTB could prevent MIRVing these missiles. The yields of warheads the Soviets could employ for MIRVing under a CTB would depend upon the extent of their experience prior to the conclusion of a CTB in developing high yield warheads in relatively low weights, on their willingness after a CTB is in effect to deploy warheads that have not been tested in their final weaponized configuration, [ text not declassified ]. Although we are unable to specity which of the capabilities assumed for Soviet forces would be the more difficult to achieve under a CTB, it seems likely that an early CTB would constrain at least some Soviet strategic nuclear warhead capabilities to less than the maximums they could achieve with continued freedom to test. Analysis suggests that even if all this MIRVing were accomplished, it would not make any difference to our—or the Soviets—overall assured destruction capability with or without a CTB. [ text not declassified ] 1 In this case, the whole weight of our retaliatory responses would fall on our SLBMs and bombers. If a test ban constrained the Soviets from extensive MIRVing, there would be some increase in U.S. ICBM survivability. [ text not declassified ] Some believe that the time when MINUTEMAN could become highly vulnerable would be delayed by a CTB. [ text not declassified ] A maneuvering RV (MaRV) for our SLBMs is postulated to overcome large scale deployments of ABM-capab1e SAMs that could negate an all-ballistic U.S. strategic deterrent. [ text not declassified ] 1 2 Endo-atmospheric intercept ABM-capable SAMs are possible, as are exo-atmospheric interceptors. It appears that exo-atmospheric interceptors may be more likely to be inhibited by CTB constraints because of their very high yields, if suitable warheads are not already available. Development of endo-atmospheric interceptors may also be constrained by a CTB, if suitable lightweight warheads necessary for the high velocity and accereration required for endo-atmospheric intercept are not already available or would not be by the time a CTB went into effect. Our SALT proposal is intended to prevent SAM-upgrade by prohibiting (1) testing in an ABM mode, (2) no territorial defense, (3) and upgrading radars, interceptors, and launchers to ABM capability. However, some believe that SALT will not effectively prohibit ABM-capable SAM systems. The Soviets have continued their refusal to accept meaningful controls on SAM radars. It would be difficult to verify that large phased-array radars ostensibly deployed as SAM radars did not have an inherent or actual ABM capability, and we have only limited ability to establish participation of specific radars in ABM tests. Further, they believe that the SALT agreement will not establish meaningful limitations on the performance of SAM interceptors. [ text not declassified ] Attack of Other [less than 1 line not declassified] Targets [Pages 30–32 not declassified] Tactical Modernization Projected testing for new tactical nuclear weapons can be divided into three categories: (1) that necessary for warheads now in engineering development, (2) that which would apply to the development of further new warheads within the present state of the art, and (3) longer range investigations of advanced technology, [ 1 line not declassified ]. Currently three tactical warheads are in engineering development. The warhead for the LANCE missile system is completed insofar as nuclear testing is concerned. On the other hand, the two new nuclear artillery rounds for the 155 mm and 8 inch howitzers each require some additional nuclear testing. The present state of the art for nuclear weapons would permit some improvements in other tactical weapons Such possible improvements include: warheads for air-to-surface missiles, such as CONDOR; new atomic demolition munitions with improved field handling features; earth penetrating warheads on surface to surface missiles; a warhead for a possible new surface-to-air missile; and warheads for naval applications. To varying degrees these developments would profit from nuclear testing. Some fitting of current warheads to new and improved delivery systems could be done without nuclear testing. Optimization would generally require more nuclear testing. Such developments as discussed above will not give U.S. forces totally new capabilities on the battlefield or at sea. Their import, to those who support tactical nuclear weapons options, lies primarily in their giving clear evidence as to the U.S. belief in the utility of such options. In their view, some modernization would thereby enhance the value of our tactical nuclear weapons in deterring potential enemies. Beyond the present state of the art, nuclear testing might produce new types of weapons, [ text not declassified ]. It is conceivable that some new weapon type could be of advantage to the U.S. An issue of considerable uncertainty and controversy is the extent tactical nuclear stockpile modernization is essential to our national security. The support for tactical stockpile modernization is based on a conviction that constrained tactical nuclear warfare is an attractive option if the other alternatives are loss of a conventional war in Europe or mutual destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although success is not certain, limited and selective use of a few battlefield nuclear weapons would seem to offer a possibility of halting a penetration that otherwise would overrun our forces, and thereby might cause the opponent to reconsider the payoff from his attack and, in fact, to withdraw. [ text not declassified ] The size, composition, quality and rationale for the tactical nuclear weapon stockpile are unresolved issues, as yet. Other studies within the NSC system are addressing these issues. It is argued by some that we should not make a decision to negotiate a CTB until the results of these studies are known. However, others question whether the results of these studies would materially affect a test ban decision. A threshold test ban or quota limit would keep the tactical modernization option open. NET ASSESSMENT OF VERIFICATION ANALYSIS 1 — The public credibility of the U.S. case for insisting upon on-site inspection on verifying a CTB is under attack due to the advances in seismic and other national means technology. Moreover, there is decreasing confidence in the technical efficacy of on-site inspections in discovering clandestine testing by a determined evader, although they could—under some circumstances—provide the only incontrovertible evidence of a nuclear detonation. However, the political value of on-site inspections in achieving public acceptance of a CTB, for providing public confidence that violations are not occuring, and for possibly providing some measure of deterrence should be noted. How many and what type (invitational or mandatory) OSIs would be necessary for these purposes has not been determined. The modalities of conducting useful OSI present many problems that would require difficult negotiations to overcome. The contributions of OSIs to detection of possible test ban violations is likely to be modest when compared to the contribution of other verification means available to us. Invitational inspections, as recently proposed in Geneva, are of dubious utility, could contribute to international tension if refused, and are not likely to be granted except on terms calculated to exonerate the evader. — If the U.S. genuinely wants a CTB we will have to be prepared to rely upon national means of verification. These sources may be supplemented, if possible, by such OSIs, unmanned seismic observatories, an international seismic network or some form of “nuclear detection club” as might be obtained in negotiations. 1 — Improvements in the U.S. AEDS system are attainable and would increase U.S. internal confidence in verifying a CTB. These improvements would cost around $20 million. We should also consider deploying other sensors in space and under water. [ text not declassified ] (Magnitude 4.0 is about the lowest limit of feasible seismic discrimination with improved AEDs. The actual capability achieved would have to await [ text not declassified ]. — Some of our AEDS stations could become vulnerable to adverse shifts in U.S. political relations with the host countries . [ text not declassified ] This possible future vulnerability would be less likely if the host were a party to a CTB treaty and had an interest in treaty verification. — Some clandestine underground nuclear testing would still be possible that could evade identification by national means including improved AEDS. 1) [ text not declassified ] some tactical weapons development, and some nuclear effects testing could be conducted. It also may be possible to develop a SAM-upgrade warhead. 2) [ text not declassified ] It is not known whether the Soviets have perfected these techniques. If these techniques were used successfully, and depending on yields and rate of testing, a variety of nuclear tests could be conducted including probably all types of nuclear effects tests and the development of tactical weapons, warheads for ABM-capable SAMs and warheads for Poseidon-class MIRVs. There are no theoretical techniques known that would permit evasive underground testing [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. 3) None of these clandestine testing techniques is foolproof and all have risk of detection by the composite of our national means. This risk increases with yield, [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. 4) At the present time opportunities would exist for higher yield testing in environments prohibited by the LTBT (e.g., behind planets in outer space or low over Antarctica). The technology is available to detect such testing, but funding of the systems is required. — Seismic systems other than AEDS are possible which could provide high confidence identification [less than 1 line not declassified] 1) A high quality unclassified international seismic network could be deployed in 3–5 years at a cost of $60–$160 million, depending on coverage and sophistication desired. [ text not declassified ] 2) [ text not declassified ] Further work is required to develop satisfactory USOs. Even if the USOs were acceptable to the Soviets, negotiating the necessary modalities could be difficult and protracted. — International means of verification could strengthen our ability to present a charge of violation, if the internationally derived data supported such accusations. Moreover, international means could enhance deterrence of violations and provide public confidence in test ban enforcement. Nevertheless, these international means would not be essential to our diplomacy in bringing credible charges of test ban violation. — Some international means of CTB verification would be difficult to negotiate and administer. The modalities are complex, [ text not declassified ]. Furthermore, the U.S. probably cannot afford to place primary reliance upon such international schemes as a substitute for national capabilities. — Reliance upon seismic data alone to support public charges of test ban violation could be difficult due to the complexity of the data, the interpretation required and the fact that unresolvable ambiguities may occur. — If we undertake a CTB we shall have to consider how we will handle any suspected violations both diplomatically and publicly. There are two aspects to this problem. First, where confirmatory evidence of a violation depends on sources more highly classified that AEDs, means would have to be found to justify our public position that do not compromise important intelligence sources. Second, choices would have to be made among responses open to us ranging from protests, public or private, to treaty abrogation. Our response will have to depend on the political situation, the evidence available, the source of the data and our political objectives under the circumstances. — Any type of further test ban will necessarily require that Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) either be subjected to comprehensive safeguards to prevent clandestine nuclear weapons testing or be prohibited. These safeguards are all complex and highly intrusive, and thus may be very difficult to negotiate. Prohibiting PNEs may not be acceptable to the Soviets. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions present a formidable verification problem and possible political problems which are discussed in the section that follows. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions It is not known how much importance the Soviets attach to retaining their PNE capability under a CTB, but they have been pursuing their PNE program at a rate approximately three times that of the U.S. and have announced that they have refined four applications to practical use. In the U.S., PNEs have not yet attained commercial applications, though the technology is available for several uses of economic potential. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty the nuclear powers are committed to share the benefits of PNEs with non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) if and when PNEs become economically practical. So far, no such services have been provided. It is not known whether the NNWS would sacrifice PNEs to attain a CTB or insist that PNEs be accommodated under a CTB. If PNEs were prohibited, some near-nuclear states might refuse to join a CTB under this pretext (e.g., India). Others, however, might-favor banning PNEs if they prove to be a basic impediment to a test ban. Technically feasible means of accommodating PNEs have been postulated that would severely inhibit PNE use for clandestine nuclear weapon testing. Without these safeguards, it would be possible to conduct nuclear weapons related testing in the course of PNE detonations. However, these safeguards probably would be very difficult to negotiate since they involve comprehensive international controls and substantial access to national territory and the release of classified nuclear design information. Without effective safeguards, PNEs would have to be prohibited to achieve a CTB or TTB. Conversely, if the Soviets were adamant on continuing their PNE program, such safeguards would be essential to a CTB or TTB. Policy Options 1. Maintain the status quo commitment to eventually achieving a CTB, but continue to insist upon on-site inspections. —Our declaratory policy on verification will be construed as a measure of our desire to achieve a CTB. Any shift from the status quo position, including on-site inspection, is likely to be interpreted as a move toward or away from a CTB depending specifics. —As long as the U.S. maintains this position and the Soviets maintain that national means of verification alone are adequate, the net effect will be an impasse and underground nuclear testing can continue. However, we can expect to incur increasing criticism from domestic and international proponents of a CTB if the present U.S.-Soviet verification impasse continues to come under greater challenge. At present, the U.S. bears most of the political onus for lack of a CTB, since the Soviets have the advantage of advocating national means only for verification and this position is gathering public support. However, some states blame both the U.S. and USSR for failure to negotiate a CTB. Environmentalists may protest and possibly harass some future tests through court actions. Our non-proliferation objectives would not be reinforced. (Some believe that these objectives would be jeopardized. Others believe that the impact of continued testing would be marginal on NPT objectives.) The credibility of our position is likely to be attacked, especially as seismic discrimination technology advances. On the other hand, we have been able to successfully defend our verification position including on-site inspection for many years, and some believe that we can continue to do so for some time yet. —If the Soviets take new initiatives and advocate alternatives to OSIs for verification (egs., USOs or “nuclear detection club”), we would come under pressure to respond favorably. We have no firm evidence that the Soviets are planning new initiatives now. —If the Soviets unexpectedly agree to a few OSIs (e.g., 2–3), we will have to face squarely the question of the desirability of a CTB and decide either to negotiate or hold out for a larger number of OSIs. 2. We could attempt to shift the debate away from verification to national security without abandoning our commitment to a CTB by advancing reasons to contend that a CTB is not desirable, at this time, if credible reasons can be devised. We could raise new considerations such as awaiting long-term SALT outcomes, evaluation of future threats, MBFR, and thereby prolong and complicate the status quo . There is disagreement about the political feasibility of this approach. 3. Propose a pre-condition that all nuclear weapon states participate in a CTB. This proposal would be viewed as aimed at China even though applicable to France, too. This option could be advanced with or without a change in our position on verification. There is a high likelihood that China (and perhaps France) would not join a CTB. Thus, this pre-condition would preclude a CTB in the foreseeable future. It could shift the grounds of public debate away from verification to the issue of the necessity of participation by all the nuclear weapon states. There is disagreement as to whether this option could be publicly defended. 4. Accept national means only for verification of a CTB and offer to negotiate an agreement. This would put the choice and political pressure for proceeding with negotiations directly on the Soviets. We do not know if the Soviets really want a CTB agreement. If the Soviets did not want to negotiate, they would have to find a reason to defer or obstruct negotiations and persuade the international test ban constituency that they still favor a CTB as a goal. However, many would interpret such a Soviet response as a renunciation of their commitment to a CTB. 5. Drop mandatory OSIs and propose other sources of data to supplement our basic reliance on national means of verification (egs., USOs, international seismic networks). Such internationally derived data could also give public confidence in test ban enforcement as well as provide a public basis for any charges of violation. It would represent a new U.S. initiative that would broaden the verification issue, but release the U.S. from being confined to a simple OSI versus national-means-only confrontation with the Soviets. If the proposal is acceptable to the Soviets, then we would be expected to enter negotiations. However, negotiations of the modalities could be protracted and difficult. 6. Propose a seismic threshold test ban of [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. The threshold selected would depend upon the level of testing we deem it in our interest to prevent—and permit. We have the national means to verify the levels indicated adequately. Our requirement for on-site inspections would have to be dropped or else reduced to a very low number. Failure to drop OSI could lead to the continuation of the current impasse over verification. National verification capabilities are very good for the level indicated and anomalous seismic events above this threshold are so rare that clandestine testing would be very risky. However, a TTB is likely to be viewed as an interim measure and the expectation would remain that a CTB is the eventual goal, although some states would accept a TTB as progress toward a CTB. It probably would be difficult to abandon a CTB as our ultimate objective, although a TTB would likely defer a CTB to a distant future. However, a TTB offers a means to approach a CTB gradually over time by providing for periodic lowering of the threshold or periodic reviews for this purpose, as operational seismic verification capability improves. (The Japanese have tabled just such a proposal, beginning at magnitude 5.75 and eventually descending to magnitude 4.25—using an international seismic network for verification.) In this way we could maintain our commitment to a CTB yet continue testing in the lower yields probably for some years. But the pressures to reduce the threshold over time and move toward, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] or a CTB would be strong. A TTB would keep open the option to develop new nuclear weapons. The types of weapons would depend upon the threshold limit. For the thresholds indicated, we could continue to develop some strategic and many types of tactical warheads, continue technology advancement, investigate nuclear effects and provide a means for stockpile surveillance. The general political response to a TTB would be favorable, but substantially less than to a CTB. The potential for realizing the possible political benefits postulated under a CTB probably would be substantially less under a TTB. Some would perceive a TTB as a step toward a CTB, but others would view it as a tactic to delay a CTB. The Japanese, Canadians, those concerned with environmental effects, and others with an interest in preventing high yield tests have expressed interest in such a TTB. A TTB would not reinforce our non-proliferation objectives as much as a CTB, although there is disagreement over the extent a test ban reinforces non-proliferation. Under a [ less than 1 line not declassified ] TTB, economic applications of PNEs would be precluded unless accommodations and safeguards were provided. The modalities of negotiating the technical definition of the threshold could be difficult, and implementation could become a source of political controversy concerning alleged violations since disputes could arise over the interpretation of seismic data. Indeed, perhaps unintentional violations could occur since the yields of nuclear tests are not precisely predictable. Moreover, siesmic data does vary somewhat from station to station due to variation in station quality, location, geology, etc. These possible violations and disputes probably could be avoided if testing states confined themselves to testing at predicted yields some 30% or more below the theoretical maximum permitted by the threshold. Geological asymmetries might permit the U.S. to test at somewhat higher yields than the Soviets under the seismic threshold. In the past, the Soviets have rejected the idea of a TTB. 7. Propose a 4.0 seismic threshold test ban. This threshold would have most of the effects of a CTB. However, it would permit the Soviets—and U.S.—to test at those very low yields [ text not declassified ]. However, this threshold would still be vulnerable to violation by such clandestine testing techniques as earthquake masking or simulation. The other difficulties of a TTB cited above would also apply. 8. Propose some form of quota test limit. There are several variants: numerical quota, annual yield quota, cumulative seismic magnitude quota, a combination of threshold and quota. These options would retain the opportunity to continue nuclear testing for those purposes a state would choose within the limits of the quota. There would remain pressures to reduce the quota in order to achieve an eventual CTB. All of these variants have the common defect of being essentially unverifiable, except within broad limits of great elasticity and uncertainty (egs. multiple devices detonated simultaneously probably would be detected as only one test event; translating detected seismic magnitude into nuclear yields requires accurate knowledge of geological coupling media and closely corrobative seismic data—magnitude [ less than 1 line not declassified ] and could be a subject of controversy). This option would be only a loosely constraining and strictly unenforceable limitation. 9. Propose a moratorium. Variants include a unilateral undertaking to cease testing as long as the Soviets do not test, or else as a measure to preclude testing while negotiating a test ban agreement. There has been some recent Congressional interest in a moratorium. The longer a moratorium lasts, the more like a CTB it becomes. A moratorium could help create a favorable political atmosphere for test ban negotiations. On the other hand, a moratorium might remove a sense of urgency to negotiate a test ban. It could prejudice the possibility of negotiating other conditions for verification than national means only. A moratorium would be an uneasy respite, and a cause for political tension if broken or terminated. It would create an expectation for a CTB. [ text not declassified ] [Omitted here are Annex A and Annex B.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings,NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Annex A, Strategic Analysis, and Annex B, Verification Analysis, are not published. 1 We abstained on all three test ban resolutions in the 1971 UNGA due to what we considered to be unacceptable language. 1 International means are those which involve cooperative pooling and use of selected verification resources such as unmanned seismic observatories, international data sharing, worldwide seismic networks, and on-site inspections. 1 A less than comprehensive test ban generally would not attain these possible advantage but would demonstrate some U.S.-Soviet willingness to further restrain themselves with regard to nuclear weapons. 1 A threshold test ban would not be subject to these disadvantages, except for those tests at yield levels that would be prohibited by a threshold limit. * The AEC, JCS, and OSD representatives believe that the U.S. should not give up, through a CTB the freedom to continue nuclear testing because we would thereby lose a unique and important technical resource that has proven to be highly useful in continuously preserving the effectiveness and reliability of our deterrent. 1 [ text not declassified ] 1 [ text not declassified ] 2 [ text not declassified ] 1 The supporting analysis is on page 82–106. 1 [ text not declassified ] 314. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 314. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated RESULTS OF NSSM 128 A. STRATEGIC ISSUES — A CTB is not likely to make any significant difference to our —or to the Soviet’s— strategic deterrent capability, given currently projected forces and threats over the next decade. Whether or not there is further nuclear testing to develop new strategic warheads, both sides will retain substantial and well-hedged assured destruction capabilities. Moreover, under a CTB the U.S. would retain substantial capabilities to attack the Other Military Targets system while maintaining a sufficient assured destruction reserve. We could still meet the NSDM 16 criteria. — A CTB might prevent or at least constrain Soviet MIRVing of the SS–9 and SS–11 ICBMs and the SS–NX–8 SLBM and thus reinforce SALT . However, if warheads are already available for these purposes, our analysis indicates our assured destruction deterrent would be degraded only by about [ less than 1 line not declassified ]. Even if our ICBM and bomber forces could be destroyed, our SLBMs alone could inflict [ less than 1 line not declassified ] fatalities. However, the longer nuclear testing continues, the less likely is a CTB to prevent Soviet MIRVing, particularly MIRVing of the SS–9 to the level postulated in the severe threats which could jeopardize MINUTEMAN. A CTB could also inhibit Soviet development of SAM-upgrade or ABM-capable SAM and thereby reinforce SALT . — [ less than 1 line not declassified ] and for maneuvering RVs (MaRV), would preserve our capability [ text not declassified ]. However, survivability improvements appear to be equally promising countermeasures, but possibly more costly. These unforeseen threats are highly discounted by intelligence estimates for the next decade. SALT also bans the postulated ABM threat . — Increased nuclear force capabilities would not be prevented by a CTB . Improved strategic capabilities could be obtained through advances in non-nuclear technology (egs., better guidance accuracy, increased booster throw weight, MIRVing the entire MINUTEMAN force, adapting existing warheads to new delivery systems, improved ASW, better survivability measures for nuclear delivery systems—silo hardening, SSBN quietening, penaids, aircraft sheltering and dispersal, etc.). — New higher yield warheads are of marginal value for strategic rataliatory attack, unless extensive hard target kill is sought. The driving factors are force survivability, Damage Expectancy desired and number of very hard targets attacked, if a damage limiting counterforce capability is sought. For ASW/ABM attrition of RVs below 25% (the maximum estimated threat for the next decade), with these new warheads our Triad could inflict [ text not declassified ]. — A CTB would constrain or prevent our development of several types of new nuclear weapons now under consideration . The real issues are whether these new warheads are essential to develop. Analysis suggests their value is marginal at most. 1) ULMS . Using current warheads, we could deploy ULMS at 4000–5000 mile ranges in 6–9 million square miles ocean area. With a new nuclear warhead, ULMs range could be extended another 1000 miles. The marginal value of another 1000 miles range to SSBN survivability is likely to be very small. Moreover, given about 2 years of further testing we could develop the longer range ULMs warhead. This could be done during test ban negotiations, if there were no moratorium—but the Soviets could develop MIRVs, too. 2) MaRV aboard our SLBMs to elude thousands of postulated Soviet SAMs (despite SALT prohibitions and possible prevention of ABM warhead development by a CTB). SLBMs with a MaRV developed through more nuclear testing would provide [ text not declassified ]. 3) [ text not declassified ] quite likely to MIRV their ICBMs and SLBMs with similar or larger yield warheads which would cancel any U.S. gains in damage limiting capability. Moreover, these [ less than 1 line not declassified ] warheads would not provide us with an improved assured destruction retaliatory capability due to off setting gains in Soviet counterforce capability. 4) Hard Site Defense . We already have the SPRINT warhead for this purpose. Moreover, our SALT objective is to prevent ABM proliferation. 5) Tactical Modernization . The real issue is whether we need such modernization, and whether it would really provide better deterrence or war fighting capabilities than we already have. NSSM 128 did not take this issue on directly. However, the study did indicate that other improvements to tactical nuclear warfighting capabilities were more important than new warheads, e.g., command-control, survivability, viable plans. Moreover, it is difficult to argue an imperative for new tactical warheads given the Soviet force and doctrine as we know it and our expectations for tactical nuclear war. — We (and the Soviets) would be denied the rarely used option to test stockpile weapons to investigate and correct suspected or known deficiencies . Such testing is not now a normal stockpile reliability verification procedure, but it has been used on occasion as a quick, economical and sure means to correct a deficiency. To date, the deficiencies found in our weapons could have been corrected without nuclear testing, but at much greater expense of time and money. — A CTB would prevent us (and the Soviets)from further testing to discover possible hidden vulnerabilities in stockpile weapons to the radiation effects of enemy nuclear bursts . [ text not declassified ] — The nuclear weapon design and technology advancement capabilities of our laboratories are likely to atrophy from stagnation without the incentive of nuclear testing . Restoring these capabilities after a hiatus of several years could take up to three years. By occasional very low yield clandestine testing, the Soviets could keep some design teams active, and thereby might get a head start on us in developing new weapons if open testing were resumed. However, we should be able to keep some nuclear scientists active through non-weapons research and work on peaceful uses of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons improvements not requiring testing. If Peaceful Nuclear Explosions were permitted under international safeguards, we could keep nuclear explosive research active. — A seismic threshold test ban (TTB) offers a temporary halfway house between a CTB and no test ban, and a graduated phased approach to a CTB that could defer a CTB indefinitely . [ text not declassified ] B. VERIFICATION — Verification of a CTB by national means alone is technically feasible with high confidence . By investing around $20 million, we could improve our Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) to the point that about 98% of Soviet seismic events of magnitude [ less than 1 line not declassified ] could be identified as of nuclear or natural origin. [ text not declassified ] — There are evasive testing techniques which might reduce the effectiveness of AEDS . [ text not declassified ] There are no known underground testing techniques capable of hiding yields over 100 KT. — The strategic significance of possible successful clandestine testing depends upon yield levels and the number of tests . [ text not declassified ] Thus, the least risky forms of clandestine to testing create no significant threat to our strategic posture. The high risk and technically questionable techniques are required to produce the type of warheads that might affect the strategic balance—ABM-capable SAMs and Poseidon-type MIRVs. The real issue is whether the Soviets would accept the technical risks of clandestine testing and the political consequences of being caught . — On-site inspections (OSI) . Conceptually OSIs could be the last resort in resolving the cause of a detected but ambiguous seismic event. However, they probably could be defeated by a determined evader. The more defensible grounds for retaining some right to OSIs is that they could enhance public confidence in CTB enforcement and possibly contribute somewhat toward deterrence of violations. However, the more the technology of national means of verification improve, the weaker becomes the case for insisting upon OSIs. [ text not declassified ] The merits of such a system would be to give public confidence in test ban verification, deter cheating, and provide internationally credible data to support any public charge of violation. We would not want to rely solely on such a system and should improve our AEDS system for our own confidence in verification. — [ text not declassified ] verification , in conjunction with our current AEDS, and would be somewhat more effective against some of the more difficult—and theoretical—clandestine testing techniques. However, it is unknown whether the Soviet would submit to such intrusion of their territory. — Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) would have to be prohibited or else subjected to highly intrusive and complex internationally administered safeguards —which are technically feasible but probably of very difficult negotiability. We do not know whether the Soviets would be willing to ban PNEs or would accept the safeguards necessary to continue PNEs. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–8, Verification Panel Meetings, NSSM 128, 6/14/72. Top Secret. The summary was prepared for a Verification Panel meeting scheduled for June 14 but not held. 315. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 315. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 9, 1972 SUBJECT: Verification Panel Meeting on NSSM 128 A meeting of the Verification Panel on NSSM 128 (Nuclear Test Ban Policy Review) is tentatively scheduled for June 14, 1972. Your Talking Points are at Tab. The reasons for holding this meeting are essentially political and bureaucratic. The U.S. has a commitment to seek a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing (CTB). We have maintained that on-site inspection is a necessary supplement to national means for adequate verification. Our current position is eroding in that insistence on on-site inspections (OSIs) is losing credibility in the face of improved seismic detection capabilities. NSSM 128 has analyzed our nuclear test ban policy and developed alternatives. There are sharp divisions, however, in the conclusions as to what should be done: (1) OSD, JCS, and AEC tend to want to move to an explicit rejection of CTB (a la Laird and Schlesinger) on strategic grounds (reinforced by arguments that the Soviets in any case could do some clandestine testing). (The views of the JCS are at Tab.) (2) State and ACDA urge that we honor our commitment and take the initiative to move toward an eventual CTB. They argue that CTB would buttress SALT by constraining sophisticated Soviet MIRV and SAM upgrade, and that CTB is politically desirable in terms of reinforcing our non-proliferation objectives and lessening the tensions and instabilities alleged to arise from the arms race effects of nuclear testing. (3) Ed David has sent you a memo concluding that our strategic pasture would not be jeopardized by a CTB and that OSIs should be dropped; however, he would defer undertaking a CTB because of the penalties imposed on advancing our nuclear technology. (His views are detailed in a memorandurn to you at Tab.) NSSM 128 Study Given these sharply differing and often emotional views, the NSSM 128 study tried to address the question rationally and analytically. The analysis strips away much of the dogma underlying opposition to a test ban as well as the assertions advocating a CTB as the sine qua non of world peace. As a result, the study generated sharp reaction from both proponents and opponents; neither side is satisfied with the analysis because it fails to support preconceived institutional conclusions. The broad conclusions of the analysis are: — The effects of a CTB on our strategic capabilities are insignificant unless unforeseen threats materialize in extreme form, and even these unlikely threats could be countered by means not requiring further nuclear testing. — Attainable national means appear adequate for verification, and the risks to the evader of clandestine testing are high. — The very low yields associated with the most plausible clandestine testing techniques that might escape seismic identification—[ less than 1 line not declassified ]—are not likely to permit development of nuclear warheads that could upset the strategic balance. — A CTB could constrain Soviet MIRV development as well as high yield U.S. counterforce RVs. — Development of low field “clean” tactical weapons would be inhibited. — The political and arms control benefits are likely to be marginal. — In sum, the disadvantages of CTB have been overstated but there are few compelling reasons for the U.S. to make a major move toward a CTB. The Immediate Problem I doubt that any agency would advocate making a change in our position at this time. But, there is a risk that election-year polemics could engender efforts by either advocates or opponents to begin laying the public groundwork for their desired end result. This could make CTB a prominent and difficult political issue where there is not one now. The signing of the SALT agreement will also be used by Kennedy and others to argue for a test ban, and by DOD/JCS to argue against a test ban. Thus, the principal outcome of the meeting should be to recognize the uncertainties, emphasize the need to maintain the President’s flexibility, and to reaffirm that the current U.S. position should not be undermined. It is important for now that we show no sign of moving one way or the other. — If we decide that CTB is in our interest, it could be imprudent to act on that decision now in view of the problems it might create among the President’s principal supporters and the JCS during the SALT hearings. — If we concluded that a CTB was not in U.S. long-term interests, we would not want to abandon our current commitment to an adequately verifiable test ban and thereby provoke a critical international reaction and provide a political issue for the Democratic candidates. (Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey and Kennedy all favor a CTB). Conduct of the Verification Panel Meeting while the basic reason for the meeting is bureaucratic, I think you should start with a substantive discussion of the issues arising from the NSSM 128 study. In this manner you will be able to get first-hand the varying views and the intensity of the debate. I would start first with the verification issue where there is a modicum of agreement that seismic detection is getting better. The arguments will be as follows: — AEC, OSD, JCS will argue the deterrent effect of on-site inspection and the possibilities for cheating. ACDA and State will dismiss the more exotic cheating scenarios and downplay the importance of lower-yield clandestine testing. There is some validity to the arguments on both sides. — AEC, in particular, will argue that we must have peaceful explosions (PNEs) which make verification either impossible or highly intrusive. ACDA will argue that PNEs are not important to the U.S. The real question is the Soviet’s attitude. Secondly, you might take up the strategic issues: — ACDA, State will support the NSSM 128 study analysis arguing that: (1) a CTB would probably constrain Soviet threats and reinforce SALT; (2) we don’t need new RVs to do most things, e.g., accuracy improvements are more important than yield increases; (3) we can adapt existing warheads to new delivery systems. — AEC, OSD, JCS will argue that there are major uncertainties as to our long-term future needs: (1) We might need new warheads for better flexible options; (2) we might want more MIRVs on MINUTEMAN to give it a greater capability for each surviving missile; and (3) tactical modernization is needed. Thirdly, you should discuss the political issues, cautioning people not to get into public debate and to leave the issue for the President to decide. Your Talking Points are written in this fashion. Following is a more detailed discussion of NSSM 128 issues and the Analytical Summary is at Tab. The Strategic Analysis Rather than merely accepting assertions that the outcome of a test ban would be disasterous, we ran a series of “war outcome” games using the standard computer models used by OSD,JCS and other DOD agencies involved in strategic force planning. A wide range of scenarios regarding Soviet cheating, state of knowledge, etc., were used. The results were that: — The strategic deterrent capability of the U.S. [ less than 1 line not declassified ] is quite insensitive to a CTB through the 1970s. The analysis also indicates that the Soviet retaliatory capability would not be changed by a CTB. — The damage limiting capability of an all-out counterforce first strike by either the U.S. or the Soviets was not affected by a CTB—[ text not declassified ]. We did not just consider this “assured destruction” case. We also looked at the impact of CTB on flexible response options and counter-force capability. — For most flexible response options, CTB made no appreciable difference. [ text not declassified ] The impact of CTB on the Soviets would be much greater. For this reason it seems most unlikely they would actually agree to a ban if we dropped our on-site inspection demand. The reasons are: — Soviet technology is almost certainly significantly inferior to ours, especially in the area of small, high yield weapons. We were ahead of the Soviets in 1963 when atmospheric testing was ended. Since then we have conducted about 40 tests per year compared to about 14 for the Soviets. — The key to Soviet counterforce capability is deploying large numbers of relatively high yield MIRVs on the large missiles. A CTB might limit the Soviets to 3 to 6 warheads per SS–9 and make MIRVs for the SS–11 unlikely. Even if MIRVs were deployed, the number would be limited because of Soviet inability to produce efficient warheads. [ text not declassified ] thus hedge our flexible response capability against the very high threats. It can be argued that a test ban would reinforce our SALT agreements in other ways such as: (1) making SAM upgrade difficult because of the difficulty for the Soviets in developing small, high yield warheads, and (2) generally preventing the Soviets from catching up with our technology because they would have less efficient warheads. A CTB would also limit us in weapons advances and make our SALT hedges more difficult. But we could proceed with ULMs using the current POSEIDON warhead for the ULMs missile and SPRINT for the Hard Site interceptor. The above analyses are not accepted with enthusiasm by the bureaucracy, even though they have few specific objections. — OSD–AEC–JCS essentially disassociate themselves from the analysis on the grounds that we cannot afford to lose the incremental value of the nuclear technology option to respond to these unforeseen extreme threats. They are also likely to argue that continued nuclear testing is required to hedge against SALT failure and enable us to develop new warheads [ text not declassified ]. — State-ACDA are unhappy with the implication that nuclear warhead development is not a major component of the arms race, but rejoice in the insensitivity indicated for the strategic balance. Tactical Weapons Modernization One area where a test ban would clearly have an impact is tactical weapons modernization. Testing is important because of the small size of weapons and the numerous improvements that have been proposed by weapons designers. — Considerable progress can be made without testing as new designs such as the LANCE and 155 mm artillery round have already been developed. — However, a strategy that relied on small, very clean weapons would be seriously inhibited. Whether this brake on tactical nuclear modernization would really affect our forces and their employment is a different and more important question. We still lack a viable tac nuc warfighting strategy. Until someone makes the case that smaller and cleaner weapons are essential to a rational strategy, our inability to develop them will have little adverse impact. For deterrence purposes, current weapons seem fully adequate. Verification The U.S. stand on CTB has long been that we favor a test ban but must have on-site inspection to provide adequate verification. The seismic technology that is key to verification has improved markedly in recent years, thus our insistence on on-site inspection is becoming less and less credible. [ text not declassified ] This available capability prompts many advocates of a CTB to conclude that national means of verification are adequate, and leads to increasing pressures for a CTB. Nevertheless, the possibility of successful clandestine testing remains real, particularly at very low yields. [ text not declassified ] There are no foolproof means of clandestine testing. The risks rise sharply with yield, [ less than 1 line not declassified ] regardless of the means used. [ text not declassified ] The real uncertainty is whether Soviet leaders would take the risks of attempting clandestine testing. Assessing CTB Given the marginal nature of the verification and strategic risks (and the potential gain to us of limits on the Soviets), the issue is whether there is a net advantage to offset any potential risk. The virtues of a CTB are equally marginal: — We can’t argue that it saves the environment since there is no discernable environmental impact fromunderground testing. — Limiting Soviet MIRVing is not certain, and the longer a test ban is delayed the less likely these limits become. Moreover, the Soviets may already have suitable warheads for some SS–9 MIRVing (3–6 RVs), but probably not for 9–12 MIRVs nor MIRVs for SS–11 and SS–NX–8. — The argument that it “slows” the “arms race” is subverted by the fact that most weapons advances are more significant than improved warheads or can be done in spite of CTB—e.g., submarine quieting, adaptation of existing nuclear devices to new delivery systems, accuracy improvements, bigger boosters, survivability measures, more MIRVs. — A CTB is unlikely to save money since it will likely force development activity into less cost-effective areas without optimized warheads. In short, the whole matter becomes a very speculative political issue which is subject to uncertainties that are not resolved by the study. A central unknown is whether the Soviets really want a CTB, despite their persistent claims that they do. — Would agreement to “national means” of verification produce negotiations towards a test ban? — If the Soviets did not agree, would we come under pressure to make more concessions in order to obtain a CTB? (Our SALT experience, as well as our historical record in negotiations, would indicate that once we overcome our aversion to negotiating an issue, we are driven to continue to negotiate even under adverse circumstances.) What might these concessions be and how would they affect our security posture? — Would the negotiations be interminable with Soviet testing increasing at a substantial rate? Would we increase our own testing, how much, for what purpose, and at what political cost? Would we want a moratorium during negotiations? We need to examine such issues more carefully before we can make any net judgment on a CTB. However, the results are likely to be inconclusive, subjective and highly contentious. Future Decisions What this means to me is that the CTB issue is very much in the balance with the weight of uncertainty (and election year political sensitivities from the right concerning arms control) arguing against moving forward on a CTB in the hear future. However, the uncertainties and risks are not so great as to preclude the President from considering a CTB if he wants a new initiative in his second term. If we continue to decide against a CTB we will eventually face the problem that insistence on OSI lacks credibility—but we can get through election without facing this issue and by standing on our traditional position. After the election we will have to consider (probably in sequence): — Whether we really want a CTB or not? If so, under what conditions? If not, do we renounce our commitment, for what rationale and at what political cost? Or , by what means can we defensibly continue to defer a CTB indefinitely while maintaining credible our commitment? — Ways to extract more mileage from verification by introducing new complicating conditions, e.g., unmanned seismic stations in the USSR; insisting that peaceful nuclear explosions not be banned and insisting on elaborate controls; insisting on an international seismic network for verification. Even if the Soviets accepted these conditions, as they might, negotiations on the modalities would likely be long and difficult. Moreover, we would have to face the sticky problem of whether to continue testing during negotiations or seek a moratorium. If the Soviets rejected these conditions, will we be any better off in terms of the credibility of our commitment? — Whether to insist upon Chinese (and French) participation in a CTB, another difficult choice fraught with political problems either way we decide. — A Threshold Test Ban (TTB) which bans tests above a certain seismic magnitude which permits yields adequate to most purposes (e.g., 100–200 KT). A TTB leads inevitably to greater pressures for a CTB but only over a long period of time. If we really do not want a full test ban now but feel it desirable to make a forward move for political reasons, this could be an attractive option. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 829, Phil Odeen. Top Secret. As part of the meeting book for the June 14 meeting, Odeen forwarded the memorandum and its tabs to Kissinger on July 3. In his covering memorandum, Odeen noted that although Kissinger had decided the previous week not to hold the June 14 meeting, Odeen wanted him to see the meeting book. The tabs are not published as attachments to Odeen’s June 9 memorandum; however, the JCS memorandum referred to on page one is the attachment to Document 311 , the David memorandum referred to on page one is Document 312 , and the Analytical Summary referred to on page 4 is Document 313 . 5. Conferences on Nuclear and World Disarmament and Soviet UN Initative on Non-Use of Force 5. Conferences on Nuclear and World Disarmament and Soviet UN Initative on Non-Use of Force 316. Telegram 54503 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, April 1, 1971 In this telegram, Secretary of State Rogers examined those sections of Secretary Brezhnev’s March 30 address to the 24 Congress of the CPSU which dealt with disarmament. Rogers noted that Brezhnev revived the idea of holding a five-power nuclear disarmament conference. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF–18. Secret. It was repeated to all NATO Capitals and USDel SALT IV. Drafted on March 31 by Baroz (INR/RSE); cleared in EUR/RPM, PM, and ACDA; and approved by McGuire (EUR/RPM). 317. Telegram 2686 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, June 2, 1971, 1825Z. The telegram reported that the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference was a topic of considerable corridor discussion at the CCD. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF–18. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Hong Kong, USUN, and USNATO. 318. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 14, 1971 At a meeting with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presented the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers on disarmament. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6, Pt. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to Nixon under cover of a June 21 memorandum. (Ibid.) 319. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 14, 1971, 6:11–6:12 p.m. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the President’s upcoming meeting that afternoon with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 520–8. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 320. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 15, 1971, 12:45–12:54 p.m. Kissinger informed Nixon that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin wanted to hand Nixon a Soviet note proposing a meeting of the five nuclear powers on disarmament. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 519–15. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 321. Memorandum for the President’s Files Washington, June 15, 1971 The memorandum provides a record of President Nixon’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Attached is a copy of the Soviet note. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6, Pt. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at 2:30 p.m. 322. Conversation Between President Nixon, the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 15, 1971, 2:39–2:58 p.m. Nixon and Dobrynin engaged in a detailed discussion of the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Specifically, the conversation focused on the scope of the conference, the level of preparation involved, and the level of participants required for success. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 521–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 323. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) Washington, June 16, 1971, 10:35 a.m. Kissinger and Smith briefly discussed Ambassador Dobrynin’s visit to the President the day before and the Soviet proposal for five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 14–18 June 1971. No classification marking. 324. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 18, 1971 Sonnenfeldt forwarded, with his commentary, a memorandum for the President from ACDA Director Smith on the Soviet proposal for a five-per nuclear conference. Smith concluded the proposal was worth serious consideration and wanted a more thorough analysis before making any commitment. Sonnenfeldt attached a draft memorandum and a draft NSSM on the issue for Kissinger to forward to the President. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6 (Pt. 1) Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. A note at the end of the memorandum indicates that Wayne Smith concurred. Kissinger wrote the following on the top of the first page: “See my redo of NSSM-Issue (after conv. with Eliot) [illegible] waiting for [comeback ?].” Kissinger’s memorandum to the President and the revised NSSM are Documents 325 and 326. 325. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 25, 1971 Kissinger forwarded Gerard Smith’s June 16 memorandum and briefed the President on the pros and cons of the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–186, NSSM 132. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. At Tab A is the attachment to Document 324. 326. National Security Study Memorandum 132 (Revised) Washington, June 28, 1971 The President directed that a preliminary analysis be made of the issues involved in a five-power conference as proposed by the Soviets and provided guidelines regarding the U.S. position on the conference to be used in diplomatic contacts and press statements. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Moorer. 327. Telegram 119361 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 2, 1971, 1555Z. The telegram transmitted guidance on the position the U.S. intended to take concerning the Soviet proposed five-power nuclear disarmament conference, to be used in consultations with the UK and French embassies. The U.S. was cautiously optimistic, but intended to investigate into Soviet motivations before making any substantial response. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Secret. Also sent to Paris. It was repeated to Moscow, USMission Geneva, Hong Kong, and USNATO. Drafted by Spiers (PM), Shaw (PM/DCA) and Goodby (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hillenbrand (EUR), Garthoff (PM), Brown (EA), McGuire (EUR/RPM), Farley (ACDA), and Sonnenfeldt (White House); and approved by Richardson. 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 14, 1971 Kissinger briefed the President on his discussion with Chou En-Lai regarding the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President, China Materials, Polo I Record, HAK Visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. 329. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group Washington, July 15, 1971 Prepared in response to NSSM 132, the study examined background information, the national positions, advantages and disadvantages, possible topics for discussion, and six alternative approaches to the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. 330. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated This analytical summary of the study done in response to NSSM 132 was prepared in anticipation of the Verification Panel meeting on July 30. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for a 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. 331. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 30, 1971 Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger for an upcoming Verification Panel meeting on the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear conference. The NSSM study is Document 329. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for a 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. 332. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting Washington, July 30, 1971, 3:05–3:15 p.m. The meeting decided it was premature to discuss an agenda for the proposed five-power nuclear conference and agreed, if the allies responded favorably to U.S. soundings, to make a verbal reply indicating consideration of the Soviet proposal. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel Minutes, 1969 to 3–8–72. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Later that afternoon Kissinger told the President: “We’ve decided not to answer that [the Soviet proposal]…just let it drop.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 267–22) 333. Telegram 139501 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, August 1, 1971, 0152Z. The telegram transmitted a statement by the People’s Republic of China that it would not participate in the five-power conference proposed by the Soviets. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to USNATO, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Hong Kong. Drafted and approved by Martin (PM/DCA); and cleared by Farley (ACDA). 334. Telegram 141330 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, August 4, 1971, 1456Z. The U.S. Government responded to the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference. This response noted that, even though the Chinese refused to take part in the proposed conference, the U.S. Government considered the proposal worthy of continued interest. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XV. Secret; Priority. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USMission Geneva, and U.S. Delegation to SALT. Drafted by Spiers (PM); cleared by Brown of EA, Farley (ACDA), Sonnenfeldt (White House), and Richardson; and approved by Hillenbrand. 335. Message for the Government of the People’s Republic of China Beijing, undated The President called the PRC’s attention to the U.S. Government’s message to the Soviet Government transmitted in Telegram 14133 to Moscow (Document 334). Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, Files for the President, China, Lord-China, China Exchanges July–Oct 20, 1971. No classification marking. The message was transmitted by Haig to Major General Vernon Walters, Senior Military Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Paris, under cover of an August 5 letter instructing Walters to hand the message to the PRC ambassador. (Ibid.) 336. Telegram 166298 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, September 10, 1971 The telegram reported on the Soviet UN initiative to expand their proposed five power conference to encompass multiple nations in a World Disarmament Conference. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, New Delhi, Wellington, Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, U.S. Delegation to SALT, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Shinn (ACDA/IR); cleared in ACDA/D, ACDA/IR, PM/DCA (draft), IO/UNP (draft), EUR/SOV (draft), EUR/RPM (draft), and EA/ACA(draft); and approved by DE PALMA (IO). For a copy of Gromyko’s September 6 letter, see Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 544–545. 337. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 28, 1971 Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on the Soviet UN Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, noting that Under Secretary Irwin authorized the U.S. delegate to the UN to work with the Soviet UN delegation. He then attached a memorandum from Gerard Smith supporting the collaboration. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Oct–Nov 1971, Vol. VIII, Pt. 4. Confidential. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. The attached draft resolution with amendments is not published. In the left hand margin of page one, Kissinger wrote, “Don’t want to minimize-wish to include,” and indicated that the phrase, “special responsibility,” in paragraph two, “should be deleted.” None of the options on page 2 is checked. An attached routing slip indicates that Sonnenfeldt “handled by phone,” and a handwritten note at the bottom of page one, initialed by Sonnenfeldt, states, “Leonard informed Nov. 1,” presumably a reference to James F. Leonard of ACDA. 338. Telegram 199601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 28, 1971 The telegram provided instructions to the U.S. delegation to the UN recommending that delegates investigate Soviet reaction to amending the Soviet draft resolution on a world disarmament conference. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, Bonn, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Drafted by McCormack (ACDA/IR) and McIntyre and Armitage (IO/UNP); cleared by Leonard (ACDA/IR) and Garthoff (PM) and in substance in EUR/SOV (substance), EA/ACA (substance), and OSD/ISA (substance); and approved by De Palma of IO. 339. Telegram 226160 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 16, 1971 The telegram provided instructions to the U.S. delegation to the UN to vote affirmatively to the Soviet draft resolution for a world disarmament conference. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to Bonn, Moscow, USMission Geneva, U.S. Delegation to SALT, and USNATO. Drafted by Neidle (IO/UNP); cleared by Day (ACDA), McNutt (LM/DMS), Armitage and McIntyre (UNP), Martin (PM), and Skoug (EUR/GER); and approved by Herz (IO). 340. General Assembly Resolution 2833 (XXVI) New York, December 16, 1971 The text of the Resolution on World Disarmament Conference. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 909–910. No classification marking. 341. Telegram 171873 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, September 20, 1972, 2129Z. The telegram transmitted a Soviet verbal statement urging U.S. support for the Soviet proposal for a UN resolution rejecting of the use of force in international relations and forever prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Moscow. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared by Kadilis (EUR/SOV); and approved by Armitage (UNP). 342. Telegram 172239 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, September 20, 1972, 2317Z. The telegram reported on Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov’s discussion with Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs De Palma of the Soviet proposal for a UN resolution on the non-use of force and prohibition of nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Moscow. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared by Armitage (UNP), Kadilis (EUR/SOV), and in substance by Martin (PM/DCA); and approved by De Palma (IO). 343. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 26, 1972 Sonnenfeldt discussed options for responding to the Soviet proposal for a UN resolution on the non-use of force and asked Kissinger how he preferred to proceed. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXV. Secret. Sent for action. Rondon concurred with the memorandum. Option #2, “Ask for SRG paper,” is checked. The attached telegram at Tab A is published. It was repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, and Geneva. 344. Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the United Nations General Assembly New York, September 26, 1972 Text of Soviet draft resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972, p. 672. No classification marking. For the text of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s discussion of the proposal during his September 26 address to the UN, see ibid., pp. 662–672. 345. National Security Study Memorandum 162 Washington, October 3, 1972 The NSSM directed that a study be prepared on U.S. options for addressing the Soviet proposed UN resolution on the non-use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104-206). Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. 346. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group Washington, undated Prepared in response to NSSM 162, the study examined the Soviet proposal for a UN resolution on the non-use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The study outlined U.S. options in responding to the proposal and recommended a course of action. Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 2, NSC/Miscellaneous Memos, January-February 1972. Secret. Annexes A, B, and C are not published. The study was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an October 17 Department of State memorandum in anticipation of discussion of the Soviet proposal at an October 18 Senior Review Group meeting. (Ibid.) 347. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 24, 1972 The memorandum discussed the study prepared in response to NSSM 162 and briefed Kissinger in preparation for the upcoming Senior Review Group on the Soviet proposed UN resolution to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, SRG Meeting, NSSM 162, 10/27/72. Secret. Sent for action. None of the options on page 6 is marked. At Tab A was Document 345. 348. Telegram 195162 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 26, 1972, 2317Z. The telegram provided guidance to U.S. delegation at the UN on the ways to respond to the Soviet proposed UN resolution on non-use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, and USNATO. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); and cleared in IO, L, EUR/RPM, INR, UNP, L/UNA, ACDA, and EUR/SOV. 349. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, undated The memorandum advised the U.S. delegation to the UN to take an inactive stance on the Soviet proposed UN resolution and to inform other delegations that it would continue to “consider” amendments. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, SRG Meeting, NSSM 162 10/27/72. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum, unsigned, is dated October 27. (Ibid., NSSM 162) 350. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting Washington, October 27, 1972, 4:46–4:58 p.m. The group discussed the NSSM 162 study and concluded that the U.S. delegation to the UN should indicate that the U.S. favored the renunciation of the use of force, but ultimately considered it unnecessary. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes 1972–1973. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The attachment is not published. 351. Telegram 207841 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 15, 1972, 1742Z. The telegram instructed the U.S. delegation how to vote on draft resolutions on the non-use of force and what explanations to provide if questioned on the U.S. position. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Priority. It was repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Semler (ACDA/IR) and McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared in DOD/ISA, PM/DCA, ACDA/IR, the White House, IO/UNP, EUR/SOV, and IO; and approved by De Palma (IO). 352. Telegram 215438 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 28, 1972, 2251Z. The telegram instructed the U.S. delegation to consult WEOs in the event that non-aligned nations table the non-use of force resolution and to inform the Soviet delegation of this decision. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Armitage (IO/UNP); cleared in NEA, ACDA, L/UNA, EUR/SOV, NEA/RA, DOD/ISA, and PM/DCA; and approved by De Palma (IO). 353. Telegram 216018 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, November 29, 1972, 1812Z. The telegram instructed the U.S. delegation to abstain from voting on a revised non-use of force resolution. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Black (IO/UNP); cleared in UNP, NEA/RA, L/UNA, EUR/SOV, NEA, UNP, PM/DCA, and ACDA/IR; and approved by De Palma of IO. 354. Telegram 5164 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 30, 1972, 0330Z. The telegram reported on the General Assembly vote on the non-use of force resolution and provided the text of Ambassador PHILLIPS’ explanation of the U.S. vote. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, Hong Kong, and the U.S. Delegation to SALT. 316. Telegram 54503 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 316. Telegram 54503 From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, April 1, 1971 SUBJ: Brezhnev Speech to Soviet Party Congress: Disarmament REF: Baker-Goodby Telecon March 31 1. Following is our assessment based on excerpts available so far of disarmament portions of Brezhnev speech, which you may draw upon as appropriate in consultations with Allies. We will supply material for your use on other subjects covered in speech when available. 2. The disarmament portions of Brezhnev’s keynote speech to the Soviet Party Congress March 30 projected an image of Soviet initiative in the field. None of the items he mentioned was entirely new, but two were particularly eye-catching—a hint of Soviet interest in force reductions in Europe and a call for Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament. 3. Brezhnev spoke approvingly of the goals of the strategic arms limitation talks with the US. He cautioned that such complex talks could not succeed unless the security interests of both sides were considered equally—by implication a rebuke to the US for not really doing so. His treatment of SALT was brief, and Brezhnev was careful to respect the privacy of the talks. 4. Brezhnev had nothing new to say about the reiterated Soviet call for a CES. His mention of Soviet willingness to abolish the Warsaw Pact was, of course, old hat. The Pact’s duration clause provides for it to lapse upon conclusion of a general European security treaty, and the wrinkle about abolition of the NATO and Pact military organizations as a first stage dates from the Bucharest summit meeting of 1966. 5. What was unusual was Brezhnev’s reference to the desirability of reducing armed forces and armaments in areas of confrontation, especially in Central Europe. Since the June 22, 1970 Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers’ communique (which indicated that reductions of foreign forces in Europe might be discussed by an organ to be established at the European security conference or in some other mutually agreed forum), there had been no major Soviet or Pact policy statement on the subject. Brezhnev’s indication of Soviet interest in force reductions, and his use this time of a formulation which is not necessarily limited to foreign troops, seem calculated to convey a hint of Soviet flexibility to West Europeans. 6. In reviving the idea of a five-power nuclear disarmament conference, Brezhnev returned to an idea which the Soviets have played with, on and off, for some time. It first had currency after the initial Chinese nuclear weapon test occurred, just after Khrushchev’s ouster, in a period when the Soviets sought to tone down their strident polemics with Peking. It was also a period of Soviet wooing of De Gaulle, and the notion served to make a point of Soviet respect for France as a nuclear power. The reiteration of the ideas of prohibiting nuclear weapons and of a world disarmament conference also seems to be a Soviet effort to favor what were once Peking’s proposals in the disarmament field. Brezhnev’s treatment of disarmament themes thus appeared to be in keeping with his treatment of normalization of state relations with Peking earlier in his speech. But, as has so often been the case, such an olive branch to Peking seems to have its own polemical purpose. Brezhnev was by implication highlighting Chinese recalcitrance on disarmament issues. 7. Brezhnev’s other disarmament items seemed to add to the bulk of the package and to underscore the theme of Soviet initiative in the disarmament field: — the separability of biological warfare from chemical warfare as a possible topic for agreement at Geneva was indicated by the use of the plural “treaties” in a sentence listing them, but Brezhnev did not make a point of the shift in the Soviet position in recent days. — Brezhnev indicated a willingness to extend the idea of non-use-of-force agreements to other countries, either bilaterally or on a regional basis. He did not elaborate on what countries might be candidates for such agreements. — Brezhnev advocated a comprehensive test ban and agreement on military budgets, but added nothing to earlier Soviet proposals on either topic. END. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF–18. Secret. It was repeated to all NATO Capitals and USDel SALT IV. Drafted on March 31 by Baroz (INR/RSE); cleared in EUR/RPM, PM, and ACDA; and approved by McGuire (EUR/RPM). 317. Telegram 2686 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 317. Telegram 2686 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, June 2, 1971, 1825Z. Subject: CCD - Five-Power Nuclear Conference (FPNC): Soviet Views 1. SOV FPNC proposal has been subject of considerable corridor discussion during first week of resumed CCD session. Remarks in US opening statement about participation of all nuclear powers in disarmament efforts have been commented on favorably by a number of reps. CCD reps have taken these remarks as general expression of constructive US approach, and not as endorsement or rejection of Sov FPNC initiative, which reps understand is still under study in Washington. Following points of interest have emerged thus far regarding Sov views on FPNC: 2. SALT: In conversation with Neidle (Deputy US rep), Tcheprov (Deputy Sov rep and head of MFA disarmament section) took initiative to say he hoped US officials understood that Sov proposal of FPNC was in no way intended to detract from SALT. He emphasized that Sovs continue to regard SALT as talks of “extremely great value and highest importance”. 3. Non-Nuclears: Tcheprov said Sovs are seriously concerned about possible negative effects of FPNC on important non-nuclear countries that would be left out, particularly those not yet party to NPT. He said that this was reason Soviet Union would be willing to see a worldwide conference on disarmament take place. In separate conversation with UK and US Deputies, when UK Deputy asked about Sov assessment of reactions of non-nuclears to FPNC proposal, Tcheprov again stated that Sovs also support idea of worldwide conference. 4. CCD: Initial Sov comments on CCD appear designed to reassure non-nuclears, in light of FPNC proposal, about their continued participation in significant arms control talks. USSR Amb. Roshchin has been at pains in his various contacts to underline point made in his opening statement about continuing role of CCD. He told Mexican Amb at recent luncheon that China, Chile and Iran might well be added to CCD. At same luncheon, attended by most CCD reps, Roshchin made toast to “this important committee” which, he said, “has many applicants for membership”. (Comment: This is most unusual note for Sov rep to strike since there has been no discussion of enlargement of committee for some time.) Tcheprov also emphasized in talk with US Deputy that Sovs’ continue to value CCD which should be strengthened and maintained. He commented that arrangements for eventual participation of China and France in CCD would be “essential”. 5. FPNC agenda: Tcheprov noted that Sovs have some ideas in mind about what could be discussed at a FPNC, but might keep these ideas “up his sleeve” for time being. He indicated, however, that non-use of nuclear weapons and test ban question might be discussed. After stating that USSR does not rpt not have policy of requiring participation of all nuclear powers as condition for CTB, Tcheprov said that he personally thought test ban question could be discussed at FPNC in sense of urging China to adhere to Limited Test Ban Treaty. Rimestad 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF–18. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Hong Kong, USUN, and USNATO. 318. Memorandum of Conversation 318. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 14, 1971 PARTICIPANTS: Henry A. Kissinger Ambassador Dobrynin I met with Dobrynin at his request. He began the conversation by saying the recent alleviation of trade restrictions had been noted in Moscow as a very positive development. He wondered, however, whether one could not reinforce those measures by easing some of the harassment of Soviet ships in American ports. He could assure me that the Soviet Union would reciprocate immediately if we eased our restrictions on Soviet ships in American ports. I told him I would look into the matter and let him know within two weeks. Dobrynin then handed me a note which he had been instructed to give to the U.S. Government on the convening of a Five-Power conference with respect to nuclear disarmament. He asked me whether I could take official delivery of the note. I told him that since it would require a formal reply, I suggested that it be taken to the State Department. Dobrynin then added that it would make a very good impression in Moscow if he could deliver it personally to the President. It would not require a long meeting, and the fact that he was received by the President would be taken as a positive interest at the highest level. I told him I didn’t know what I could do on such short notice, but I would do my best. Dobrynin then said that in view of the upcoming conversations with Brandt and Bahr, he wanted to let me have some formulations on Berlin (Tab I) which the Soviet side would find acceptable, and he hoped that I would use my influence with the Germans. I said I would have to study them. I also said I would talk to Bahr and Rush in great detail and have a brief meeting of Rush, Dobrynin and myself set up for Monday. As Dobrynin left, he said he could not understand the motive behind the publication of the documents in the New York Times . As far as he could tell, it would hurt the Democrats a lot more than the Republicans except insofar as it might influence the McGovern/Hatfield vote. Dobrynin said that he continued to hold to his belief that the President’s domestic position was growing stronger. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6, Pt. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to Nixon under cover of a June 21 memorandum. (Ibid.) 319. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 319. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 14, 1971, 6:11–6:12 p.m. Kissinger: Dobrynin has a message for us that State can handle in which they are asking for a 5-power conference on nuclear matters, but which they are addressing to all heads of State. He asked if he could come in for five minutes to hand it to you tomorrow. It would make a good impression in Moscow. All you have to do is say you’ll study it. Nixon: A five-power conference on nuclear matters? Kissinger: It was in Breshnev’s 24th Party Congress speech. I would make very sure not to discuss anything else with him. But…5 or 10 minutes and then we can ship it right over to State. It’s not something we want to handle here. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: [Interrupting] That it’s addressed to every head of State. Nixon: [unclear] Well, tell Rogers that we’re having him deliver it here. Kissinger: Well, we’ll tell Rogers that he has to see me and since you were free we had him deliver it here. Also, it means if something comes off, it’s your channel. Something may come out of it. Nixon: What do we want to come out of it? Why do we want them to have a five-power conference? Kissinger: Well, they’re delivering it anyway. Nixon: What I meant is, do we want to have a 5-power conference on nuclear issues? Kissinger: Not particularly, but we can handle—That’s another subject we can discuss with the Chinese when we see them. It will take two to three weeks to prepare a reply for—and it won’t require preparing. It’s not a summit meeting. Nixon: Oh. Kissinger: We can’t refuse it really. [Omitted here is discussion of the upcoming meeting with Ambassador Rush.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 520–8. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 320. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 320. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 15, 1971, 12:45–12:54 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of European issues.] Kissinger: Well, now we’ve set Dobrynin for 2:30 this afternoon. It’s just part of the game Mr. President. Nixon: So I’ll see him here? Kissinger: Yah, for 10 minutes. We can bring him right in here, don’t you think? Nixon: Mhh? Bring him in here? Kissinger: Yah, he has a note of his to show you. Nixon: Oh sure! Bring him right in the main office. Kissinger: Just 10 minutes, really—but it shows him that we have high-level concerns. We’re building a record. If they kick us in the teeth after all of this we’ll tell them, look, we did everything we could. [momentary tape malfuntion.] The bad thing about their proposal…we can’t stop their proposal…for a 5-power nuclear conference…is that State will want to play it into a foreign ministers meeting. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Yah. I don’t think the Chinese will play it until they hear from us. Nixon: Yah, I guess they would. Sure. Kissinger: State…Rogers…wants a—wants a 5-power…wants a foreign ministers— Nixon: Well we can certainly put the brakes on this, can’t we? Kissinger: Oh sure. Nixon: [unclear] Well, I should hope so for Christ’s sake. Kissinger: Well when I see Heath next week I’m going to tell him we don’t want it, and— Nixon: It’s premature. It’s premature. Kissinger: And when I see the Chinese— Nixon: And you can tell Home that. Kissinger: And when I see Heath and the Chinese, I’m going to tell them to deal with this— Nixon: Yah. Kissinger: The Chinese, one has to say, have played the game on the visitors. Nixon: Very remarkably, so far. Kissinger: Yah, so far. Nixon: Yah, you never know. Well anyway— Kissinger: They’ve not only played the game with the visitors, they haven’t really told the press anything that could be inimical to you. And they could tell it. If they told [unclear] or any of these guys that are in there how you handle US-Chinese relations they would love to print it. Nixon: They’re a very cautious group, aye? Kissinger: They’re playing above all a big game. They’re not horsing around with little stuff. Nixon: Yah. [Omitted here is discussion of the war in Vietnam.] Nixon: This 5-power foreign ministers thing…Jesus Christ! Kissinger: Well, we can slow it down. I’ll tell him—I’ll tell Dobryn—I’ll tell Dobrynin you don’t want a foreign ministers meeting. Nixon: Yah, but— Kissinger: We can screw it up in the preparations. This will be months— Nixon: Yah, will you do that? Tell Dobrynin, I don’t want any foreign ministers meeting—that this isn’t the way to do it. It’s the way [unclear.] Kissinger: Yah. Well why don’t…you might tell him, uh, that you’ll study it but that you think it requires a lot of preparation. Nixon: Yah. Kissinger: Then that already puts it in— Nixon: Well, “a lot of preparation,” might mean a foreign ministers meeting. See? [Sigh] I don’t want them to think that we want the foreign ministers together to prepare a meeting. It’s ridiculous to continue this goddamn facade to the effect that the foreign ministries in dealing with the Soviets can do anything. They can’t do a goddamn thing. Kissinger: In fact, in many ways, it’s the worst level. It’s high enough to be very visible and yet Gromyko doesn’t have the authority. And, as it happens, now in no modern government does the foreign minister…in France, Pompidou really conducts foreign policy. In Britain, good as Home is, Heath conducts it. Nixon: And in Germany, its Scheel. Kissinger: And in Germany, Scheel doesn’t even know most of the things that are going on. [Omitted here is discussion of the character of contemporary foreign policy management.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 519–15. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 321. Memorandum for the President’s Files 321. Memorandum for the President’s Files 1 Washington, June 15, 1971 PARTICIPANTS: The President Ambassador Dobrynin Henry A. Kissinger The meeting was arranged by Dr. Kissinger in response to the request by Ambassador Dobrynin that he personally deliver the message of the Soviet Government for a Five-Power nuclear conference. Ambassador Dobrynin opened the conversation by handing to the President the official Soviet text and a translation. He said, “As is obvious, the Soviet Union is asking for a conference of nuclear powers to discuss the question of general and complete nuclear disarmament. The place can be wherever is convenient and the agenda is open. A preparatory meeting is acceptable. The Soviet Government hopes that your reply will be positive. Of course, Soviet/US talks will continue bilaterally outside the conference as part of the SALT talks. The note is being delivered today in Paris, London, Peking and Washington.” (Copy of note is attached) The President asked what preparatory work Ambassador Dobrynin had in mind. Was he thinking of Foreign Ministers? The Ambassador said, no, they were thinking of Foreign Ministry officials and Ambassadors. The time, place and modalities could be handled either through diplomatic channels or otherwise. The President then said, “Let’s be realistic. The key to this sort of thing is what the two major nuclear powers will do. It is a question of leadership at the top—I don’t mean at the top of the governments, but at the top of this group of five.” Ambassador Dobrynin asked, “Do you have anything in mind, Mr. President?“ The President replied, “We will consider your proposal seriously. The way our two governments can make the most progress is through the talks that you and Kissinger have been having. They are completely confidential with nobody leaking. Your government has confidence in you; Kissinger has a special relationship with me. Apart from the cosmetics of a Five-Power discussion, the real issue is the Two-Power relationship.” Ambassador Dobrynin said, “Well, how shall we do it?“ The President answered, “We will make a formal reply. Then you have a little talk with Henry Kissinger.” The Ambassador said, “What do you think of US/Soviet relations in general?“ The President said, “We can make a breakthrough on SALT and Berlin, and then our whole post-war relations will be on a new basis. The whole relationship can, indeed, be on a new basis. The press last week spoke of the failure of Berlin. You know better. We are at a point where we should make some agreement. If we culminate one, it will have a massive effect.” Ambassador Dobrynin said, “Are there any other areas of discussion?“ Dr. Kissinger said, “Mr. President, he is trying to lead you into the Middle East,” and the Ambassador laughed. The President said, “As for the Middle East, there is, of course, a fear of a US/Soviet condominium. Of course, Soviet and U.S. interests are quite different. We both have constituents we may not be able to control, and this makes the situation very explosive. The Middle East is very much on our mind and, at some point, discussions between us will be possible.” The meeting then ended with an exchange of pleasantries. Attachment Statement Prepared by the Soviet Government undated STATEMENT OF THE USSR GOVERMENT It is already for over a quarter of a century that mankind has been free from a world war. Yet, peace still remains unstable. Military conflicts flare up in different regions of the globe, hotbeds of armed tensions appear in various areas, the danger of global military confrontation still remains. Armaments drive is one of the factors that makes a particularly negative impact on the entire international life. It breeds an increasing threat to peace, let alone that it consumes tremendous material and intellectual resources that otherwise could be used for an accelerated economic and social progress, to the benefit of peoples. It is clear that nuclear armaments drive is fraught with particular danger. It is the nuclear armaments drive that first of all arouses the concern of peoples, that causes their anxiety for their future. Addressing this Statement to the Governments of the powers possessing nuclear weapons the USSR Government does not feel it necessary to make a special reference to the exceptional destructive power of such weapons, to the lethal consequences of their use to the sufferings and hardships that a nuclear war, if it ever occurs, would bring to all the peoples of the world. At the same time, the USSR Government deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Governments of all the nuclear powers to the fact that although the struggle for limiting nuclear arms drive has brought about certain positive results, it has not yet become possible to turn back the process of stockpiling increasingly destructive means of mass annihilation in the arsenals of nuclear powers. Consequently, ever more persistent efforts towards taking effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament are in order. The USSR Government believes that to be the duty and responsibility of all the nuclear powers. They, and only they, can and must work out and put into effect a practical program of nuclear disarmament. This task, of course, cannot be fulfilled if the efforts towards its implementation are made only by one or some of the nuclear powers. Joint actions of all the states possessing nuclear weapons are needed to arrive at the prohibition and destruction. As is known, the nuclear powers do not yet have a common approach to the solution of the questions of nuclear disarmament and their views on those questions differ in many respects. But this should not be an obstacle to the nuclear powers starting to work jointly to bring their views closer and, by joint effort to pave the way to nuclear disarmament. That is in the interests of people, the interests of all states, nuclear powers themselves included, since their own safety as well will be much more securely guaranteed by the liquidation of nuclear weapons, than by a further competition in the nuclear arms drive. With all these considerations in mind the Soviet Government proposes to convene at the earliest time a conference of the five powers possessing nuclear weapons— the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, France and Great Britain. Such a conference should examine the questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole. As regards an agreement that would result from the negotiations, it could encompass both the entire complex of meats area in nuclear disarmament and partial measures gradually leading to that goal. Progress in nuclear disarmament would undoubtedly facilitate the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, would make a favorable impact on the entire international situation and would contribute to the strengthening of trust in the relations among states. The USSR Government proposes to begin through diplomatic channels an exchange of opinion on questions pertaining to the time of convening the conference, the place of holding it, its agenda as well as its procedure. As to the view of the USSR Government, it believes that the sooner the conference of the five nuclear powers is convened, the better. With regard to the place of holding the conference, its position is open. Any place convenient to other participants is acceptable to us. The Soviet Government would not object to the establishment of a preparatory committee for convening the conference, if such is the common view. The USSR Government will await with interest the considerations that each of the nuclear powers might have on all these questions. It expresses the hope that this Statement will be given all the attention that the problem of nuclear disarmament deserves, and that through joint efforts of the nuclear powers progress will be ensured in the solution of this problem. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6, Pt. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at 2:30 p.m. 322. Conversation Between President Nixon, the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 322. Conversation Between President Nixon, the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 15, 1971, 2:39–2:58 p.m. [Omitted here are brief introductory remarks.] Dobrynin: We’re talking about convening of a five nuclear power conference dealing with nuclear disarmament. We are proposing to begin to schedule [unclear] diplomatic channel, about…[unclear]. We would like to discuss nuclear disarmament as well as partial measures [unclear]. We are open-minded, but if you [unclear]. We accept [unclear]. We feel…we won’t object if there is not a majority of all participate…you, China [unclear]. We shall deal with the question of [unclear]…. We think that this proposal [unclear]France. [unclear] Nixon: Is this statement a proposal for a conference on limitation or disarmament? Dobrynin: Disarmament, yes. It is a conference of five powers on nuclear disarmament. Nixon: Disarmament, partial or otherwise. Dobrynin: Yes. Nixon: What…would the…preparatory [sic] that would be required? Dobrynin: Well it is [unclear]the agenda. Nixon: At the ambassador level? Dobrynin: Agenda [unclear]foreign ministry to organize, establish and prepare the note. [unclear.]and Ambassadorial level. One way would be to establish a [unclear] and they will discuss. Or the diplomatic chancelleries can discuss. Nixon: It seems to me that the key is the leadership at the top. What I mean is…I’m not referring here to the tops of governments. That, too, is important. But, I really think that the…two major nuclear powers…the Soviet Union and the United States,…they would have to provide the leadership…role. The, uh,…other nuclear powers…they are still so far behind that they would…would look to both the Soviet Union and the United States for a leadership role. Dobrynin: [unclear]. Nixon: Well I [unclear.] Let me suggest this: I think a proposal like this is something we all here, of course, would consider very seriously. Anything your government suggests would get serious consideration. Second…I feel the way our two governments can make the most progress is to have, frankly, the kind of talks you and Henry have been having on various subjects. Basically a [unclear] where we’re not really trying to hide it, but where you can talk freely knowing that either side can accept or reject at anytime. Dobrynin: You mean [unclear]. Nixon: Exactly. In my opinion … in my opinion…and I haven’t talked to Kissinger about this…but in my opinion with all the other things you’re talking about which are very important…Berlin and SALT…some other subjects that might come up…I trust [unclear]. If we use these various channels [unclear]. The way that it’s done is through a relationship that is, first, completely confidential and not scattered throughout the bureaucracy where everybody is leaking to the press and all that sort of thing. And then, from there, we iron out our disagreements. Dot the I’s and cross the T’s. And then the two of you get together at the highest levels and agree. Obviously [unclear]. Dobrynin: [unclear]. Nixon: Well you’re in a different position than the average ambassador. Dobrynin: I don’t think so. Nixon: Well I think so. It is quite obvious that Kissinger and you, of course, have a special relationship. My feeling is that apart from the…basically, let’s face it…cosmetics of a five-power meeting, the session should go forward, should be presented, and we…of course…will have a decision. But apart from that, I would like to suggest…and I would like both Henry and you to give me your views on it…that possibly in your other discussions you might discuss this problem to see whether or not the two…the two powers…can play a role to, eh— Dobrynin: To play a role as the two powers? Nixon: Yes, let me put it this way: If the Soviet Union goes one way and we go another way on an subject of this magnitude…a conference…who do we agree with? How does that sound to you Henry? Kissinger: I think that’s a very good decision. Nixon: In other words, this is apart from other things that have happened. In the meantime, too, I would hope that we not…the only other thing I would suggest…is that [unclear]. If we talk about disarmament…if we have, for instance…if we have as much problems on…limitation of arms is difficult, but when you talk about disarmament, that is, of course…that is more difficult. And…so, uh, we’re talking about a set of two and having five…that’s even more difficult. But…so this means…and I’m glad you emphasized a very orderly procedure…uh. I would not think, for example, that it would be helpful that’s why I asked you two. It wouldn’t be helpful to, say, have the foreign ministers all meet— Dobrynin: No— Nixon: All grandstanding…until you’ve worked out a working level agreement. Dobrynin: But, specifically, on what levels would we respond? [unclear] Kissinger: I would have to study this text sufficiently, but right now— Dobrynin: [unclear] It’s a matter open for discussion…on what levels. Nixon: Now that’s the way it will have to proceed. We’ll have to send this to the [unclear] and that you and the Ambassador, at the appropriate time…along with the other things your discussing… perhaps…chat about this. Except that…let’s also keep the…let’s keep our discussions going on these other matters right now. Dobrynin: Now how do we fit this in when we have Berlin? Nixon: Well you have Berlin, SALT. Those two, it seems to me, those are the ones that are on fire, and we ought to…give each equal importance. Kissinger: We will make a formal reply to this, Mr. President. [unclear] Nixon: And I think this matter…what I’m suggesting is that after we’ve had a chance to read it, so that you’ve had a chance to consider it, we’ll get together and talk and then go from there. Dobrynin: [unclear] Nixon: My feeling is this: We are in a testing period. You know, some people tend to, tend to read speeches…like the one made last week by the Secretary to Congress and the same with the Russian [unclear, but it sounds as though he says “national assembly“] and say, “Well this is hard-line and this is soft-line”…and none of those things mean anything. Dobrynin: [unclear] Nixon: My view is what really counts is what we’re doing, but we should all be careful about what we say. But it seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, is that we’re at that point, if we play a constructive role, that we can make a breakthrough on Berlin and on SALT. If we do that, then the whole post-World War II relationship changes. If we don’t do that then it’s going to be the same. I think that’s what this really gets down to. If we can move in those two areas, then we open up the way…we open up the way to other areas of discussion. I’m not suggesting that if we don’t move in these other areas we will not discuss these other things, but what I am suggesting is that we have moved so far in these that we ought to do…in both Berlin and SALT…those are the ones I prefer very much. Now I think, frankly, if you follow our press and the world press, they’re watching both very closely. Dobrynin: Yes they do. Nixon: Because they know we are talking. Before our initial announcement on SALT, they said nothing is happening; and something happened. And with Berlin, if you noticed, some of the press last week said nothing’s happening…no progress. They don’t know what’s happening. The point is that…we now have an opportunity, it seems to me, on the basis where each serves their own interest…we serve ours and you serve yours. [One short sentence unclear.] Like SALT, you’ve got to make a deal that protects your interest and we’ve got to make one that protects ours. But it can be done. And the same with Berlin. And the same with other…such subjects further down the line like MBFR, like that. That…what I think…I think we have established here a method of discussion that, to me, is quite satisfactory. I’d like to have it pursued…and, in fact, we will pursue it. And the main point is…that you’ve got to remember, too…we must…want to make progress. And while we don’t want to hurry anything…you don’t, we don’t…we now are at a point…the…where we really should…be able to make some agreement of some sort. I mean, we’re at that point…with as many subjects as are before us…where we should culminate something. And if you culminate one of some importance, that is going to have a massive effect on world opinion. Now the Seabeds [sic] was good, but everybody knows that that was just a start. Dobrynin: Well, what do you think we should concentrate on now? Nixon: For the future? [Omitted here is brief discussion of the Middle East.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 521–5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. 323. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 323. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) 1 Washington, June 16, 1971, 10:35 a.m. K: Gerry? S: Henry, on this piece of paper Dobrynin passed yesterday, is there anything else one can know about it? K: I have told you everything I know. We deliberately didn’t go into any discussion. He said we should look at it favorably. The President said we would study it and reply through normal channels. S: Is this why he is seeing the Secretary today? K: He is seeing the Secretary as far as I know from Dobrynin—given the great communication within our bureaucracy—on MBFR. S: I thought I would make some suggestions to the Secretary in case this comes up. K: Would you send me a copy? We did not arrange this. We are not dying for a five-power conference, and the President’s instinct is to treat it in the most dilatory way. S: Something constructive might be squeezed out of it. K: Could you do a memo for the President of what your view is on the matter. S: I will get it over today. K: It literally took five minutes. There was no substantive discussion partly you will be pleased to know, because I didn’t know how the hell to play it. S: It’s a difficult one to react to quickly. If Rogers is asked anything about it, he should say we will study the paper. Okay, Henry, I will send you something today. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 14–18 June 1971. No classification marking. 324. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 324. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 18, 1971 SUBJECT: Memo to the President on Soviet-Five Power Conference You asked Gerard Smith for a memorandum commenting on the Soviet proposal for a Five Power Conference. He finds it “serious” and worth taking seriously. He wants to consult with the British and French and suggests we thoroughly explore the issues before making a definitive reply. Obviously, we should think about the best way to handle the Soviet proposal since, whatever else its purpose, it is patently designed to put us in a bind. — On the one hand, we cannot oppose “disarmament,” no matter how unrealistic and absurd the Soviet proposals may be. — On the other hand, the Soviets are presumably banking on a Chinese rejection, which they will use to isolate Peking as much as possible on the “Peace” issue. — We can end up in the role of “colluding” with the Soviets to put pressure on China. Your memorandum to the President (1) points out this aspect, (2) requests authorization for a preliminary analysis of different ways of handling the Soviet proposal and the issues it raises, and (3) includes interim guidance, taking a positive stand on the idea of a conference, if all other powers agree. RECOMMENDATION 1. That you forward the memorandum to the President (Tab A). 2. That you sign the NSSM (Tab A of the President’s memo). It seems fairly obvious that we are undergoing a barrage of disarmament proposals, as outlined by Brezhnev on March 30. Some of his list, reduction of budgets, worldwide disarmament conferences, nuclear free zones, are yet to come. The point is that we should give some thought to organizing (presumably under the Verification Panel?) whatever work will need to be done. For example, Brezhnev’s naval limitations proposal should be studied not only in the Indian Ocean but for the Mediterranean, Cuba, etc. While the Soviet list is for the most part window dressing, it should be recalled that in previous periods the Soviets have usually wound up claiming credit for their shopping list, and, at some point, prosecuting us for our failure to reply or take them seriously. In any case, it might be worth having the entire Soviet list reviewed in order to select those which we might respond to, or originate. Tab A Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to President Nixon Washington, June 16, 1971 Subject: Soviet Note of June 15th re Five-Power Nuclear Conference The Soviet proposal to convene at the earliest time a conference of the five nuclear weapons nations is a follow up on the Brezhnev March 30th speech statement: “We are for nuclear disarmament by all states which have nuclear weapons and for convening to this end a conference of the five nuclear powers.” The tenor of the Soviet note is serious and I think it should be taken seriously. At least the USSR should not be left with an exclusive role as “organizer” of disarmament negotiations. It is probably safe to assume that there is an element of anti-Chinese content in the Soviet initiative and this should be kept in mind in any examination of the five-power conference idea. It presents opportunities as well as difficulties for us. Because of the complexities of the problems involved, comprehensive questions of nuclear disarmament do not seem ripe for solution and it should not be expected that a conference would result in a comprehensive disarmament agreement. The proposed conference would be aimed at nuclear disarmament measures, comprehensive as well as partial. You will recall that declared Soviet policy favors on-site inspection for measures of actual disarmament. A conference would afford opportunity to explore the degree of present Soviet willingness to submit to such inspection. The asymmetries of the nuclear positions of the five parties, especially those of China and France vis-à-vis the United States and the USSR, do not bode well for any major disarmament agreement emerging from such a conference—but some progress on arms control measures might be possible. As long as progress is being made on a bilateral basis in SALT and possibly a multilateral basis in Geneva, we should be extremely careful about setting up what might be a competing forum which could prejudice existing efforts. On this score, after the Brezhnev speech I was advised in Vienna that the five-power conference would be in no way inconsistent with SALT, and Amb. Leonard was advised in Geneva that it would not prejudice CCD efforts. The concept of engaging the Chinese People’s Republic in disarmament negotiations is a significant part of current thinking about possible evolution of Chinese-American relations. This Soviet initiative could be the occasion for a US inquiry at Warsaw as to any Chinese interest in such a conference. A five-power conference could have some positive effect on efforts to implement non-proliferation policy. A comprehensive nuclear test ban, on which you recently directed that a policy review be carried out, is a likely topic. Brezhnev has referred more than once, in recent weeks, to elimination of nuclear testing as a Soviet objective, but the prospect is not bright for much French or Chinese interest in a test ban at this time. At SALT in the discussion of a subsidiary agreement to control risks of accidental war, the Soviets proposed a clause looking to the accession by other nuclear powers to a Soviet-American accident agreement. A five-power conference might usefully get into this range of problems (including communication link question). The Soviet note says: ”… it has not yet become possible to turn back the process of stockpiling increasingly destructive means of mass annihilation …” On this score the existing US Geneva proposal for a cut-off on fissionable material production for weapons purposes is directly pertinent. It is almost certain that at such a conference the question of non-use of nuclear weapons would arise. It should not be ruled out that some “non-use” formula could be in our interest. At several times in the past we have proposed qualified “non-use” formulas, e.g.: in 195.7 “Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or-collective self-defense.” The above is a sampling of the type of considerations that I think should be thoroughly explored before any definitive reaction is given to the Soviet initiative. In the interim, I think the United States position should be one of willingness to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposal. Early consultation with the UK and France is needed, regardless of what the eventual US position maybe. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Secretary of State. Gerard Smith 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6 (Pt. 1) Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. A note at the end of the memorandum indicates that Wayne Smith concurred. Kissinger wrote the following on the top of the first page: “See my redo of NSSM-Issue (after conv. with Eliot) [illegible] waiting for [comeback ?].” Kissinger’s memorandum to the President and the revised NSSM are Documents 325 and 326 . 325. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 325. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 25, 1971 SUBJECT: Soviet Proposal for Conference of Nuclear Powers In their Government statement given to us on June 15 and also to the other nuclear powers, the Soviet Union proposed the convening of a Five-Power nuclear disarmament conference, or the establishment of a preparatory committee. The Soviet statement indicated they would continue to pursue the question through diplomatic channels, and Ambassador Dobrynin told Secretary Rogers that the USSR would shortly publish its statement. Thus far only the French have agreed. (De Gaulle supported the idea which Khrushchev at one time promoted.) Ambassador Smith has written you a preliminary analysis (Tab A), pointing out that there are no realistic prospects for comprehensive nuclear disarmament, or even agreement of the French and Chinese to end nuclear testing, but that limited measures might be considered. He feels we should take the Soviet proposal seriously, and study some of its ramifications. For example, he points out that in SALT we have virtually negotiated an agreement with the USSF on certain measures to reduce the risk of accidental war. The Soviets have suggested that other nuclear powers be asked to accede to such an agreement, and this might be a starter for a Five-Power conference. While there may be a serious aspect to the Soviet proposal (especially since it originated at the Party Congress in Brezhnev’s speech), there is also a self-serving political aspect: — Moscow can be fairly certain that the Chinese will not cooperate in a conference organized by the USSR—especially on this subject. — It is difficult for the other nuclear powers, including us, to come out against “disarmament.” — Thus the Soviets gain a propaganda point to belabor the Chinese, and Peking in turn becomes even more suspicious of Soviet-American collusion. — In this proposal, as in Brezhnev’s “equal bargain” limiting the deployment of navies, the Soviets achieve some credit for their “initiative.” Ultimately, however, we do have an interest in drawing China (and France) into a disarmament dialogue. In short, we will have to steer a rather careful course between rejecting all of the recent Soviet disarmament proposals and accepting them without qualification. I will have asked that some preliminary evaluation be made of what kind of issues would be realistic to consider at such a conference. I have given some interim guidance so that we can speak with one voice on this matter. The guidance makes the following points: — We believe the idea of a conference of nuclear powers is worth serious consideration. — Such meetings would have to be carefully prepared, and this could best be done by discussing substantive issues and isolating realistic measures that might be discussed. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–186, NSSM 132. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated the President saw it. At Tab A is the attachment to Document 324 . 326. National Security Study Memorandum 132 (Revised) 326. National Security Study Memorandum 132 (Revised) 1 Washington, June 28, 1971 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Soviet Proposal for Five-Power Nuclear Conference The President wishes that a preliminary analysis be made of the issues involved in a conference or preparatory meeting of the five nuclear powers as proposed in the Soviet Union’s statement of June 15. As part of this analysis there should be some indication of those measures that could realistically be discussed with the other powers, in light of what is known of their positions. This study should include alternative ways to deal with the Soviet proposal and be submitted to the Verification Panel by July 16. The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Director, Central Intelligence, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC staff chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Until a more definitive U.S. position has been worked out, the following points will be used in diplomatic contacts and press statements: — The United States considers the subject raised by the USSR as worthy of serious consideration. — Such a conference would require careful preparation and a consensus on what measures were feasible for discussion. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104–206). Secret. A copy was sent to Helms and Moorer. 327. Telegram 119361 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 327. Telegram 119361 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, July 2, 1971, 1555Z. Subj: Soviet Statement on Five-Power Nuclear Disarmament Conference Ref: (A) State 110111 (B) State 111581 (C) State 115687 1. Following is line we intend to take in consultations with the UK and French Embassies in presenting initial US comments on Soviet proposal for Five-Power Nuclear Conference. You should be guided accordingly in any conversations you may have with Foreign Office officials. 2. We are still studying Soviet proposal and may be some time before study is complete. Final US response will depend upon exchange of views with UK and France, and indications of Chinese views. Furthermore, we will wish to develop our eventual response to the Soviet statement in consultation with all NATO Allies, since we believe it is important for the solidarity of the Alliance that we take into account the views of the non-nuclear powers in NATO. Following should therefore be regarded as preliminary input into process of consultation and study. 3. Our tentative view is that our reaction to Soviet proposal should be cautiously positive, though conditioned on response of other nuclear states. We do not know for certain what the mix of motivations behind Soviet proposal is. We are not prepared to dismiss it as simply propagandistic, though this is undoubtedly an important element. 4. In view this assessment and taking into account factors cited paragraph two, we are considering giving to Soviets an initial oral reply along following lines: Quote The US Government is studying the proposal of June 15 of the Soviet Government to convene a Five-Power conference on nuclear disarmament and will be prepared at a later date to give its formal reply to the proposal. At this time it can be stated that the United States considers the subject raised by the USSR as worthy of serious consideration. Such a conference would require careful preparation and a consensus among all Five Powers on what measures were feasible for discussion. Such a conference, if it were held, should in no way prejudice the current bilateral negotiations between the US and USSR on limiting the strategic arms of two countries. The United States Government presupposes that all Five Powers would be willing to attend such a conference. Unquote. It should be noted that this proposed initial reply does not commit us to any given course of action, but does indicate essential preconditions: the need for careful preparation, and participation of all Five Powers in any eventual conference. 5. In making this proposed reply we would not offer agenda suggestions of our own, nor would we offer comments on the venue and preliminary conference as requested in the Soviet statement. 6. While our analysis of Soviet proposal is not yet complete, following are our preliiminary views on pros and cons of Soviet proposal. Soviets may anticipate that Chinese will be negative towards it and have advanced it for that reason. They may see in suggestion a way to manuever Chinese into isolated position which latter would interpret as collusion between US and USSR. We believe best way to handle this at this time would be to make low-key conditional response along lines indicated. 7. Another disadvantage of proposal is that some of our major allies (e.g., Italy, Germany, Japan) may be suspicious of proposal and feel that although they are not nuclear powers, they have deep security interests in matters of nuclear disarmament. This is one reason we attach particular importance to consultations in NAC (Though consultations in NAC on proposed initial, conditional, reply need not be in depth). 8. Furthermore, Soviet proposal is vague about what it is intended that forum should take up or accomplish. For a variety of reasons it may be difficult to find common ground among all Five Powers. British and French views on what might usefully be discussed would be welcomed. We are still studying this matter, but hope to crystallize our views before too long. 9. Nevertheless, in our preliminary analysis we see some virtues in Soviet proposal if all Powers agree to it and something resembling a reasonable agenda could be worked out: (A) It would be helpful to have a forum in which all nuclear powers are participants. SALT cannot deal with third-country nuclear interests, and CCD has too many members to be useful for consideration of matters relating to central nuclear arms control, particularly in view of French and Chinese non-participation. (B) It is in our long-term interests to engage communist China, to the extent this is possible, in serious discussion of arms control. At some point China will have to be brought into process and there may well be merit in attempting to begin this earlier rather than later. Chinese have said that they would not be party to any agreement in which they did not participate in drafting. 10. Key element is, of course, attitude of PRC towards Soviet proposal. There could be no Five-Power conference if one of five refuses to participate. While there have been informal indications of negative Chinese reaction, PRC has yet to take a formal position. 11. Balancing out these negative and positive considerations has led us to believe that we should give an initial, conditional response along lines set forth in paragraph four above, but we would welcome views of French and British on this as well as on how consultations in NAC should be handled. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Secret. Also sent to Paris. It was repeated to Moscow, USMission Geneva, Hong Kong, and USNATO. Drafted by Spiers (PM), Shaw (PM/DCA) and Goodby (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hillenbrand (EUR), Garthoff (PM), Brown (EA), McGuire (EUR/RPM), Farley (ACDA), and Sonnenfeldt (White House); and approved by Richardson. 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 14, 1971 SUBJECT: My Talks with Chou En-Lai Introduction My two-day visit to Peking resulted in the most searching, sweeping and significant discussions I have ever had in government. I spent seventeen hours in meetings and informal conversation with Chou En-Lai, flanked by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, member of the Politburo, and of the Military Commission; Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the West European and American Department in the Foreign Ministry. Another four hours was spent with Huang and Chang, mostly on drafting a communique. These meetings brought about a summit meeting between you and Mao Tse-Tung, covered all major issues between our two countries at considerable length and with great candor, and may well have marked a major new departure in international relations. It is extremely difficult to capture in a memorandum the essence of this experience. Simply giving you a straightforward account of the highlights of our talks, potentially momentous as they were, would do violence to an event so shaped by the atmosphere and the ebb and flow of our encounter, or to the Chinese behavior, so dependent on nuances and style. Thus, this memorandum will sketch the overall sequence of events and philosophic framework, as well as the substance of our exchanges. For the intangibles are crucial and we must understand them if we are to take advantage of the opportunities we now have, deal effectively with these tough, idealistic, fanatical, single-minded and remarkable people, and thus transform-the very framework of global relationships. [Omitted here is material not pertinent to the proposed five-power conference.] Arms Control I asked for their views on the Soviet proposal on a five power nuclear conference, reminding him that you had held up our response so as to get Chinese views. They flatly rejected the idea as a Soviet attempt to lasso them. I said we would be slow in our response; that other countries’ pressures might force us to go along; and that if such a conference were held we would seek to make sure that China was not put at a disadvantage. On SALT I assured them we would conclude no agreement directed against them, and that we recognized that limiting their embryonic strategic program at this time would be discriminatory. I said we were willing to discuss accidental war agreements with them such as we were discussing with the Russians; Chou replied that we could raise this with them whenever we wished. I added that we were prepared to consider a renunciation of force agreement such as Chou had proposed in 1955. He responded in low key that Taiwan was linked to this issue and immediately went on to say he hoped my Paris Talks with the North Vietnamese would bear fruit. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President, China Materials, Polo I Record, HAK Visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. 329. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 329. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 1 Washington, July 15, 1971 NSSM–132 - Soviet Proposal for Nuclear Conference SCOPE The following is an analysis of the issues involved in a conference or a preparatory meeting of the five nuclear powers as proposed in the USSR statement of June 15, 1971. The study: (1) gives background information on the subject; (2) discusses existing positions of the five powers in this regard, to the extent that they are known; (3) examines in general the possible advantages and disadvantages in accepting the Soviet proposal; (4) outlines possible subjects for discussion at a conference; and (5) sets forth alternative ways to deal with the Soviet proposal. BACKGROUND Against the background of French refusal to participate in the Geneva disarmament talks, DeGaulle initiated the idea of a disarmament conference of the (then 4) world nuclear powers at a press conference in May 1962. DeGaulle said, “if there should one day be a meeting of states that truly want to organize disarmament—and such a meeting should, in our mind, be composed of the four atomic powers—France would participate in it wholeheartedly.” This position remains, in effect, French policy under President Pompidou, except that China is now included as the fifth nuclear power. Moscow advocacy of a five-power forum began with the April 30, 1965, joint Soviet-French communique marking Gromyko’s visit to Paris. This indicated a Soviet effort to find common ground with Paris in the nuclear disarmament field. The Soviets may also have had in mind the first successful Chinese atomic test on October 16, 1964 and the statement issued by the PRC in this connection. In this statement, the PRC proposed that “a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; as a first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers, and those countries which will soon become nuclear powers, undertake not to use nuclear weapons, either against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones or against each other.” Moscow’s advocacy of a conference of the five nuclear powers received fresh impetus from Brezhnev’s CPSU Congress speech of March 30, 1971, which opened a period of increased activity in Soviet disarmament policy. The proposal was one among several vehicles in Brezhnev’s program for Moscow to play the role of champion in the disarmament field, and author of new initiatives in that field. It is, at the same time, consistent with previous Soviet support for a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament and with the position, stated by Gromyko in July 1969 in connection with a discussion on negotiations for limiting US and Soviet strategic weapons, that nuclear disarmament could only be achieved through negotiations and agreement of the five powers. POSITIONS OF THE FIVE POWERS USSR . The position enunciated by Gromyko is explicitly acknowledged in the Soviet statement of June 15. With this in mind, the Soviet Government “proposes to convene at the earliest time” a conference of the five nuclear powers. The Soviet statement asserted that such a conference should examine “the questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole”. An agreement resulting from negotiations “could encompass both the entire complex of measures in nuclear disarmament and partial measures gradually leading to that goal”. Thus, to the extent that the Soviet proposal is a serious proposition for negotiations, the USSR would seem to have in mind the possibility of both proposals of a sweeping propagandistic nature and partial measures which might be realizable, despite divergencies among the five powers. The Soviet statement further proposed the beginning, through diplomatic channels, of an exchange of views on questions pertaining to the timing of the conference, its venue, and its agenda and procedure. Regarding timing, the Soviets stated the sooner the better, but did not attempt to set any date. The statement took no position in regard to venue. The statement also said that the Soviet Government did not object to establishment of a preparatory committee for the convening of the conference. In informal conversations, the Soviets have indicated that they do not believe that the conference would impinge on SALT and that there should be no connection between the two. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Roshchin, in his opening statement to the resumed CCD June 29 said the USSR five-power proposal is premised on the fact that efforts to limit nuclear arms and on disarmament “will, to be sure, continue through the available channels, in particular, in the CCD.” US. The US response to date has been cautious and conditional, but not negative. In an initial statement to the press on June 18, in response to press questions, the Department of State spokesman stated that “we will study this Soviet statement and consult with our allies about it”; meanwhile, “we continue to regard progress in SALT as the most immediate means to make meaningful progress in the area of arms control.” In his statement at the opening of the summer session of the CCD on June 29, in regard to the statement by U Thant concerning ways of associating all nuclear powers, including France and the PRC, with arms control and disarmament negotiations, Ambassador Leonard said that a number of possible approaches have been raised including the recent proposal by the Soviet Government. He further said that the US would welcome the participation of all nuclear weapons states in nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner acceptable to all of those states and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns of non-nuclear weapon states as well. Finally, the US is now considering an initial, conditional, oral reply to the USSR, which would be sent after consultations with the UK, France and other allies and would state that: (1) the US Government is studying the Soviet proposal and will be prepared later to give a formal reply; (2) the US considers the subject raised by the USSR as worthy of serious consideration; (3) such a conference would require careful preparation and the consensus of all five powers on what measures were feasible for discussion; (4) there should be no prejudice to SALT; (5) the US presupposes that all five powers would be willing to attend such a conference; and (6) * we understand as implicit in the proposal that the interests and concerns of non-nuclear states should be taken into account in considering ways to make progress on arms control measures. China : As noted above, the standing Chinese position is that nuclear disarmament should be considered by a world summit conference of nuclear and non-nuclear states. In that regard, the French have a report that in putting the proposal to Peking the USSR asserted that any five-power agreement would have to be submitted to a broader conference. Because of their general stance against the “super-powers”, and their aim of cultivating the lesser-developed countries, the Chinese have shown no interest in playing up the fact of PRC membership in the nuclear club. Also, they have not been willing to participate in arms control efforts. They presumably believe that participation in disarmament negotiations could lead to pressure on China to agree to a nuclear test ban or other measures which would inhibit its efforts to achieve eventually a credible nuclear deterrent against both Moscow and Washington. In a more general sense, the Chinese are suspicious of any proposals emanating from the USSR. Presumably, also, the Chinese would feel that they would be entering into such a conference in a position of marked inferiority vis-à-vis at least the US and the USSR. These considerations have no doubt conditioned the limited Chinese reactions to the Soviet proposal to date. The Chinese have not turned down the Soviet proposal, and are likely to be cautious before reaching a final decision in regard to it. On the basis of recent statements by PRC officials, the odds seem likely that they will reject it, if indeed they respond at all. They may, however, just continue to make generally negative comments without specifically and directly rejecting the proposal, thus hoping to avoid the onus of shooting it down. UK. The UK response to date has been cautious but not negative. Initially, the UK Government responded to a parliamentary question by saying that it was studying the Soviet statement and that the UK would wish to be present should such a conference be convened. The UK now has under consideration an interim reply which would indicate interest in the Soviet proposal, refer to the statement in parliament, and state that the conference, if held, would need careful preparation and in this context would elicit Soviet views, i.e., possible agenda. The British have been coordinating closely with us. They want to avoid appearing negative toward the proposal. UK interests seem to be quite close to ours.UK officials have described British views on a reply to the Soviet proposal as “in line with” and “very similar” to US thinking. France. The French Government has publicly accepted the Soviet proposal. Indeed, the French take the position that it is the Soviet Government which has accepted a long-standing French proposal. However, the GOF is still studying the proposal, and has not decided whether to send a written reply. The French note the Soviets are not pressing since they like the June 16 French oral response. The French view appears to be that the main Soviet aim for the proposal is to embarrass and isolate the PRC. The French believe the Soviets also have in mind underscoring a detente posture. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES Before examining the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the two broad choices of accepting or rejecting the Soviet proposal, it is useful to consider possible Soviet motives in advancing it. These Soviet motives are probably mixed. Even if such a conference is never held, the Soviets probably believe that they can score a propaganda gain by advancing the idea so as to enhance the peaceful image which they seek to portray. Second, the Soviets may count on the Chinese rejecting it. If so, this could serve their purpose of isolating the Chinese, particularly if the other nuclear powers were to accept the Soviet proposal. The Soviets might see this to be of particular utility at this time in view of the upcoming UNGA debate on Chinese representation, and the recent signs pointing in the direction of a gradual US-Chinese rapprochement. On the other hand, should a conference be held, the Soviets might view it as a device for bringing pressure to bear on Chinese nuclear programs, and perhaps those of France and the UK. They might also see some advantage in bringing the Chinese out of their shell by engaging them in a discussion of nuclear issues. It is possible that the Soviets might foresee some practical partial measures eventually emerging from such a conference. The superficial propagandistic element of the Soviet proposal represents an obvious potential disadvantage for us. However, we can neutralize this to some extent at least by taking a cautiously positive attitude toward it, which has characterized our approach to date. Another possible disadvantage for us could be the possible adverse impact of the proposal on US efforts gradually to improve relations with the PRC. We should therefore bear in mind when we have the chance to cooperate with the Soviets on practical matters where our interests coincide, that the Chinese may view and publicly condemn such steps as big power collusion. We would thus want to avoid the impression of colluding with the Soviet Union to embarrass or isolate the Chinese by a premature acceptance of the Soviet proposal, particularly, in view of its insubstantial nature and unforeseeable results. A possible way to try to handle this potential pitfall would be to make clear the prior condition that such a conference would require the participation of all nuclear powers. However, the USSR would probably still try to exploit our position to the detriment of the PRC, and the PRC might well regard our position as part of a joint US-Soviet effort to pressure the PRC. It is possible, though, that high-level private assurances from us would be of some help in allaying Chinese suspicions. Another disadvantage of the proposal, which the Soviets may have in mind, is that some of our allies (for example, Germany and Japan) may be suspicious of the proposal and may feel that, although they are not nuclear powers, they have deep security interests in matters of nuclear disarmament. Such suspicions could be harmful to alliance solidarity, and conceivably could have implications for non-proliferation over the longer run. This is also a factor with respect to non-aligned near-nuclears. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Delegation in Geneva at the CCD has shown itself to be sensitive to this problem. An implication of a nuclear power condominium is neither helpful nor healthy, but may be difficult to avoid—to some degree—especially, in any conference which is held. By accepting the Soviet proposal, we might also arouse the concern of the non-nuclear members of the CCD who might feel that a five-power conference would degrade the importance of this established disarmament body. These considerations call for close consultations with key non-nuclear countries, primarily within NATO and the CCD. Whether we eventually decide to accept or reject the Soviet proposal, frank consultations would go far toward relieving their concerns. A further disadvantage would be the propaganda use the PRC might make of the proposal by putting forward broad nuclear disarmament or no-first-use suggestions. Finally, and perhaps most important, it is not at all certain that a satisfactory agenda acceptable to all parties could be worked out. The Soviet proposal is vague about what is intended that this conference should take up or accomplish. Even if we are able to clarify Soviet views prior to a conference, this is no guarantee that these would be acceptable to us or to the other nuclear powers, and serve a useful purpose, or that other proposals would meet these criteria, given the wide disparity in the nuclear weapon arsenals of the nuclear states and other disparate interests. No conference would be better than one with ill-defined or unclear purposes which could arouse acrimony and lock us in to an activity which might not serve our interests. As against these potential disadvantages, there are some potential virtues in the Soviet proposal if all powers could agree to a reasonable agenda. It could be helpful to have a forum in which all nuclear powers are participants. SALT cannot deal with third-country nuclear interests, and the COD would seem to have too many members for useful consideration of matters relating to central nuclear arms control, particularly in view of French and Chinese non-participation, which is guaranteed so long as the institution of the US-Soviet Co-Chairmanship is maintained. This does not mean that a Comprehensive Test Ban might not be negotiated under the aegis of the CCD; it does mean that France and the PRC would not be parties to it if that occurred. Secondly, it appears to be in our long-term interest to engage the PRC, to the extent possible, in serious discussion of arms control. At some point, China will have to be brought into this process and it may well be best to begin this earlier rather than later. The Chinese have said on a number of occasions that they would not feel bound by nor undertake any obligation with respect to any disarmament agreement in the discussion of which China did not take part and which China has not signed. The key element in this consideration is, of course, whether or not the Chinese would accept the Soviet proposal. POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE The Soviets have not indicated what subjects might be addressed at such a conference, apart from suggesting that partial measures could be considered along with programs for general nuclear disarmament. To the extent the Soviets have considered possible topics, these could include pressing for adherence to past agreements (the LTBT, the NPT and the Seabeds Treaty) in order to isolate the PRC, but pursuit of this line would also impact adversely on Soviet-French relations. The Soviets might also wish to urge a Comprehensive Test Ban—particularly if they do not want one. Putting the CTB on the agenda of a five-power conference could be a way of avoiding the issue at the CCD while running little risk of real progress given the likely attitude of the PRC and France. It would also put the onus for delay on China and France. It is also possible that the Soviets would be interested in proposing some kind of freeze on strategic systems once a reasonably comprehensive agreement had been reached in SALT. Because of the inequities they would see as involved, a freeze proposal would meet firm opposition from the PRC and France. While the Soviets may have no real interest in a proposal on no-first-use of nuclear weapons involving the PRC, they might feel compelled to put this idea on the table because of their traditional support for such a measure. They might count on the long-standing opposition of the United States to non-use undertakings to block any real chance of such an agreement involving the PRC. If the PRC accepts the idea of a five-power conference, it would be likely to advance broad and sweeping proposals, at least in part designed to enhance its image with non-nuclear and non-aligned countries. They would probably press their past suggestions for a no-first-use undertaking and for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Although the French claim parentage for the five-power conference and have accepted the Brezhnev proposal, they have given no indication of topics they wish to be discussed at such a conference. They have traditionally argued that genuine disarmament required cutbacks in the strategic arsenals of the nuclear powers, particularly of delivery vehicles. The French might well argue—for propaganda purposes if for no other—that the two super-powers should do most or all of the cutting since the three smaller nuclear powers are already so far behind. In any case, France might welcome the prestige advantages to itself of the establishment of what looked like a five-power world nuclear “directorate.” We might wish to consider the following items as potential agenda topics for any five-power nuclear conference: Measures to avoid and reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war . Presumably all the nuclear powers have an interest in avoiding such a war. It might be possible to reach an agreement on this subject along the lines of, and supplementing, the bilateral US-USSR agreement being considered in SALT. The Soviets have expressed interest in accession of other nuclear powers to the bilateral agreement being worked out in SALT; however, they have not indicated an interest in opening this particular draft to multilateral negotiations. This topic would have to be managed carefully so as not to conflict with the on-going SALT negotiations; one way would be to use an agreement which had already been concluded between the US and USSR in SALT as a rough model for a multilateral agreement, tailored to meet the circumstances of five powers. Expanded “hot line” communications between nuclear powers. This subject might also be of interest to all five nuclear powers. It does, however, have political connotations both in regard to official contacts between the PRC and the US, and in giving a further impression of a nuclear power directorate. A proposal in the field of security assurances. * Such a proposal might draw upon the proposals the US advanced in connection with the NPT, or be cast in terms of more generalized non-use of force declarations. Such a proposal could provide a way of coping with Soviet or PRC non-use proposals. If negotiable, it might serve to reassure non-Communist Asian countries and act as disincentive to proliferation. On the other hand, it might merely get us into a war of words over non-use and in an awkward position regarding the use of nuclear weapons. This we will want to continue to avoid. The language of a proposal on security assurances, were we to decide to advance one, would be critical in protecting our interest in maintaining deterrence against aggression and blackmail by the conventional forces of the USSR, the PRC and their allies. It would also be in our interest to have it made clear in some appropriate way that under a generalized non-use of force agreement we would not be prepared to acquiesce in aggression falling short of the overt use of force. A five-power declaration to support the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons . This would be a more tactful way of trying to get France and the PRC to act in accordance with the NPT, without insisting that they sign an agreement they had not negotiated. The French have already stated that this is their policy, and it is conceivable that the PRC might be willing to do so as well. A proposal not to deploy further ABM systems. * If such a proposal were to be advanced, it should, of course, be handled in a way that would not prejudice discussions in SALT. The effect of implementing such a proposal would be to prevent the UK, France and the PRC of acquiring any ABMs, while the US and USSR would deploy limited ABMs in accordance with whatever agreement is reached in SALT. It might be resisted by the former countries for this reason. However, if the US and USSR were prepared to accept zero ABM, it might have wider appeal. It would have the advantage of codifying acceptance of a deterrent strategy by all the nuclear powers. Limitation on strategic offensive forces . ** For completeness this topic is included, even though it is highly unlikely that the five powers could agree on a common basis for considering offensive force limitations in the near term. One important reason for this is the great disparity in level of forces as between the US and the USSR on the one hand, and the UK, France and the PRC on the other. As this disparity lessens, of course, by whatever means, offensive force limitations on all nuclear powers will become a more timely topic—of increasing interest for the US and the USSR particularly. On the other hand, if at the outset one of the other powers were to suggest an agenda item like “prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons”, we might, for tactical purposes essentially, wish to put forward an agenda item couched in these terms. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES There are a number of possible approaches we might take in deciding upon a final US position regarding the Soviet proposal. The alternatives have here been narrowed down to a handful of broad possibilities in order to reduce the problem to its essentials. All the approaches presuppose that we have had thorough consultations with the UK and France, as well as with other NATO allies, other interested allies such as Japan, and possibly with the non-nuclear members of the CCD. This is no guarantee, however, that such consultations would have produced a consensus in support of a given alternative. For example, France is apparently prepared to participate in a five-power conference without preconditions. Nonetheless, a proposal which directly involves the security interests of our allies must be approached on the basis of full and frank consultations with them. All this being said, we should bear in mind that in practical terms we may have less than full freedom of action, For example, the US would be hard put to reject a disarmament conference which all the other nuclear powers have agreed to. Thus, the PRC, in one sense, would have an impact on how the US responds to the Soviet proposal. However, the PRC might choose to delay its response or not to respond at all, or to propose, perhaps, a specific alternative. For instance, the PRC might suggest a wider meeting, including the five nuclear powers. In that event, we might face quite a different problem. A number of important states might at least want to explore the idea. It is hard to imagine, however, a wider meeting—including the five nuclear powers—that would not come into conflict with the CCD, at least in terms of membership. It would seem contrary to US interests to undercut the CCD, both as a general proposition, and specifically with respect to the Co-Chairmanship institution. Another point to bear in mind is that regardless of the amount of true consultation and exchange we have with non-nuclear states (allied and otherwise), we may still face serious reservations about a five-power conference. SALT, it can be argued, is an outgrowth of the fact that two states possess large nuclear arsenals. A five-power conference, however, contrary to the concept of SALT, would tend to show that simply becoming a nuclear power, no matter how insignificant, entitled a country to a special status. This could be viewed as sanctioning the establishment of a “nuclear club”. Membership in the club would almost certainly look attractive to a number of states with the capability to meet the membership requirement, and who might well, under the circumstances, believe membership important enough to move to join—regardless of other considerations, including, where it might be relevant, obligations under the NPT. Alternative 1. We could reject the Soviet proposal, regardless of acceptance by all other powers and the possible views they might have regarding items for discussion. This approach would have the advantage of avoiding what might be a fruitless conference if we conclude that no useful agenda could be arrived at. It would also avoid whatever concerns non-nuclear states, including principally our allies, might have regarding the nuclear “directorate” implications of the proposal. It would have several drawbacks: (1) it would hand the Soviets a propaganda victory and would be contrary to the preliminary line we and the British have taken to date in an effort to avoid such an eventuality; (2) it would deny us one possibility for establishing initial contacts with the PRC in the field of arms limitation, as well as the possibility of eventually achieving some worthwhile agreement whatever our initial estimates, and (3) it would probably be viewed with misgivings by at least some of our non-nuclear allies and by neutrals. France would oppose. Alternative 2. We could accept the Soviet proposal on the condition that all other nuclear powers agreed to it and that something resembling a reasonable agenda could be agreed to; if either condition were not met, the proposal would be turned down. This approach would have the twin advantages of avoiding, to the extent possible, playing the Soviet game of isolating China in the event the Chinese reject the Soviet invitation, and of seeking some assurances before agreeing to a conference that it might produce concrete results. This alternative would be in line with the preliminary approach we have taken to date and the tentative views of the UK. On the other hand, if the Chinese accept, rigid insistence on a reasonable agenda as a precondition could deprive us of useful initial contacts in this field with the PRC and might incur charges of US obstructionism from the USSR, neutrals, and perhaps, even from some of our allies, in particular France. The preferred manner of reaching some degree of agreement on an agenda would be through diplomatic channels; this would avoid being locked in to an open-ended conference by agreeing to a preliminary conference on agenda. However, this latter approach could be considered in the light of initial diplomatic exchanges. Alternative 3. We could accept the Soviet proposal with the only precondition that all other nuclear powers agreed to it, even if no prior agreement could be reached on a useful agenda, whether through diplomatic channels or at a preliminary conference. This approach would have the advantage of maximizing the possibility of a dialogue with the Chinese and by demonstrating flexibility in regard to the terms for a five-power conference. On the other hand, it would run the greatest risk of participating in a conference which had little likelihood of producing fruitful results, and which could degenerate into an acrimonious propaganda debate whose result might be a hardening, or even widening, of national positions (or both), and a delay in the possibility of engaging in a useful dialogue. It is likely, however, that we will have to face some propaganda slings and arrows as a function of getting the PRC—and even the French—through the initial educational process and into a useful arms control dialogue. In this sense it is arguably to our advantage to accept the Soviet proposal if all the other nuclear powers do, even without agreement on a useful agenda. Alternative 4. We could accept the Soviet proposal even if the Chinese did not accept (i.e., agree to a Four-Power Conference). This would be contrary to the line which we and the UK plan to take on a preliminary basis. The position would expose us to PRC charges and renewed suspicion of US-Soviet collusion in attempting to isolate the PRC. Such a conference, if held, could direct Soviet efforts against the UK and French nuclear program. Alternative 5. Without accepting or rejecting the Soviet proposal, we could propose an initial conference of the five nuclear powers at the expert level devoted solely to exploration of one question, for example, measures to guard against accidental nuclear war, including “Hot Line” communication arrangements, provided all five powers agreed to such a meeting. At the same time, we could indicate that we would continue to consider a five power conference at a higher level. Although the subject of measures to guard against accidental nuclear war has significant political content, a proposal for an “experts” meeting would underline its exploratory and ad referendum character. It would also underline our intent to rule out extraneous political issues. The five nuclear powers are more likely to have a common interest in this subject than in any other nuclear arms control subject. There might be a fair chance of a useful outcome. The Chinese might be more receptive to such an idea than to the Soviet idea of a conference with a wider agenda. They may correctly believe the Soviets are designing the latter to put them on the spot. Also, major non-nuclear powers, such as Japan and Germany, might find this alternative more acceptable than a conference of the nuclear powers with an agenda which included matters of nuclear disarmament about which they feel they have deep security interests. On the other hand, introduction of this proposal prior to the successful conclusion of bilateral US-Soviet talks on this subject in SALT might affect these negotiations in exchange for what might be ephemeral prospects in the five-power context. The risk of affecting SALT might be minimized or avoided through preliminary soundings of the Soviets. Alternatively, introduction of this proposal could await successful conclusion of the accidents question in SALT. In addition, other powers (e.g., France, the USSR) might oppose an experts meeting with a narrow agenda, particularly if they thought we were attempting in this way to preclude a meeting on major nuclear disarmament issues. Further the Soviets might feel it would not accomplish the political purposes they may have in mind vis-à-vis China. Alternative 6. We could avoid so long as feasible accepting or rejecting the Soviet proposal, and stand on the initial oral reply that we are considering, * which does not commit us to any particular course of action. It does, however, indicate that careful preparation and participation of all five powers would be preconditions to any eventual conference. This approach is attractive on several counts. It would not involve offering agenda suggestions of our own, nor comments on the possible venue and a preliminary conference as requested in the Soviet statement. It has been characterized by the British Embassy as being “very similar” to the views of the UK. It would not be inconsistent with—although different from—the French June 16 oral response to the USSR. It would provide greater protection than a US conditional acceptance against Soviet exploitation to the detriment of the PRC, including the possibility that the Chinese would view our conditional acceptance as part of a joint US-Soviet pressure tactic. Further, this approach would leave us free to take no action if the PRC does not reject the proposal, but without appearing, for our part, too negative. Although the Soviets might want us “to fish or cut bait,” it would probably be difficult for them to object to the fence straddling that would be involved in this alternative. What it says is cautious, but in general terms positive; however, the Soviet problem would arise from what is not said. It does not say that the US accepts the Soviet proposal. Having made such an oral statement, however, we would be in a good position further to probe Soviet views to see what in specific terms the USSR may have in mind. A possible pitfall with this approach relates to further probing of the USSR. The problem is shared with Alternatives 2 through 5, and relates to the fact that the Soviets will wish to put us in a position in which it would be difficult for us eventually to refuse to accept their proposal. They would certainly attempt to narrow our flexibility (to their advantage) on that central point, as well as on other issues such as venue or possible discussion topics. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. * Point (6) would be an addition to the text of the initial oral reply (STATE 119361, paragraph 4 - see footnote on page 23, infra) which has been used in discussing a possible response to the Soviet proposal with the UK and France, prior to consulting on such a response with other US allies. * The OSD Representative believes that on balance a proposal in the field of security assurances is not a promising subject for a five-power conference, and recommends it be deleted. The JCS Representative objects to the inclusion of this subject as a possible discussion topic in a five-power conference. A non-use commitment could encourage increased adventurism on the part of US enemies or potential enemies who view themselves as free from the threat of nuclear attack and relatively safe from a significant conventional response because of a stated security assurance. * The OSD Representative believes that the disparity among the levels of forces of the nuclear powers makes it impossible to consider serious discussion of this topic, and recommends it be deleted. The JCS Representative believes that this is not an appropriate agenda item to be considered at an initial five-power nuclear conference. Only the United States and USSR have deployed ABM systems, and their limitation is being discussed at SALT. Proposals for zero ABM hinge, inter alia, on US ability to verify such a proposal for all countries. Since there has not been an assessment of the complexities associated with this problem, it would be most premature to put such a proposal forward. ** The OSD Representative believes that the disparity among the levels of forces of the nuclear powers makes it impossible to consider serious discussion of this topic, and recommends it be deleted. The JCS Representative believes that this is not an appropriate agenda item to be considered at an initial five-power nuclear conference. The limitation of strategic offensive forces is currently a subject under discussion at SALT, and proposals in the five-power arena could undermine the US position in those talks. Furthermore, there has neither been an assessment of the types of limitations possible or desirable, nor the verification and security implications involved. It would be premature, therefore, to put such proposals forward. * Text of initial oral reply from State 119361: “The US Government is studying the proposal of June 15 of the Soviet Government to convene a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament and will be prepared at a later date to give its formal reply to the proposal. At this time, it can be stated that the United States considers the subject raised by the USSR as worthy of serious consideration. Such a conference would require careful preparation and a consensus among all five powers on what measures were feasible for discussion. Such a conference, if it were held, should in no way prejudice the current bilateral negotiations between the US and USSR on limiting the strategic arms of the two countries. The United States Government presupposes that all five powers would be willing to attend such a conference.” An additional point is to be added, to the effect that the US understands as implicit in the Soviet proposal that the interests and concerns of non-nuclear states should be taken into account in considering ways to make progress on arms control measures. 330. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 330. Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated NSSM 132 - Soviet Proposal for Five-Power Nuclear Conference I. BACKGROUND Moscow’s advocacy of a conference of the five nuclear powers received fresh impetus from Brezhnev’s CPSU Congress speech of March 30, 1971, which opened a period of increased activity in Soviet disarmament policy. The proposal was one among several vehicles in Brezhnev’s program for Moscow to play the role of champion in the disarmament field, and author of new initiatives in that field. II. POSITIONS OF THE FIVE POWERS USSR. — The Soviet statement asserted that such a conference should examine “the questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole”. An agreement resulting from negotiations “could encompass both the entire complex of measures in nuclear disarmament and partial measures gradually leading to that goal”. — The Soviet statement further proposed the beginning, through diplomatic channels, of an exchange of views on questions pertaining to the timing of the conference, its venue, and its agenda and procedure. — The statement also said that the Soviet Government did not object to establishment of a preparatory committee for the convening of the conference. US. The US response to date has been cautious and conditional, but not negative. In his statement at the opening of the summer session of the CCD on June 29, Ambassador Leonard said that the US would welcome the participation of all nuclear weapons states in nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner acceptable to all of those states and in a manner reflecting the interest and concerns of non-nuclear weapon states as well. Finally, the US is now considering an initial, conditional, oral reply to the USSR, already discussed with the UK, France and other allies. It would state that: (a) US is studying the Soviet proposal and will be prepared later to give a formal reply; (b) The US considers the subject raised by the USSR as worthy of serious consideration; (c) Conference would require careful preparation of the consensus of all five powers on what measures were feasible for discussion; (d) There should be no prejudice to SALT; (e) The US presupposes that all five powers would be willing to attend such a conference; and (f) We understand as implicit in the proposal that the interest and concerns of non-nuclear states should be taken into account in considering ways to make progress on arms control measures. China Chinese have shown no interest in playing up the fact of PRC membership in the nuclear club. Also, they have not been willing to participate in arms control efforts. Presumably they believe that participation in disarmament negotiations could lead to pressure on China to agree to a nuclear test ban or other measures which would inhibit its efforts to achieve eventually a credible nuclear deterrent against both Moscow and Washington. In a more general sense, the Chinese are suspicious of any proposals emanating from the USSR. The Chinese have not turned down the Soviet proposal, the odds seem likely that they will reject it, if indeed they respond at all. UK The UK now has under consideration an interim reply which would indicate interest in Soviet proposal, in this context would elicit Soviet views, i.e. possible agenda. In line with or very similar to our proposed oral reply. France The French Government has publicly accepted the Soviet proposal. The French view, however, appears to be that the main Soviet aim for the proposal is to embarrass and isolate the Chinese. III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES Soviet motives. Soviet motives are probably mixed. — They can score a propaganda gain by advancing the idea so as to enhance the peaceful image which they seek to portray. — Second, the Soviets may count on the Chinese rejecting it. If so, this could serve their purpose of isolating the Chinese. — On the other hand, should a conference be held, the Soviets might view it as a device for bringing pressure on Chinese nuclear programs, and perhaps those of France and the UK. Disadvantages The superficial propagandistic element is an obvious potential disadvantage for us. However, we can neutralize this to some extent at least by taking a cautiously positive attitude toward it, which has characterized our approach to date. Possible disadvantage for us could be the possible adverse impact of the proposal on US efforts gradually to improve relations with the PRC. We should, therefore, bear in mind when we have the chance to cooperate with the Soviets on practical matters where our interests coincide, that the Chinese may view and publicly condemn such steps as big power collusion. We would thus want to avoid the impression of colluding with the Soviet Union to embarrass or isolate the Chinese by a premature acceptance of the Soviet proposal, particularly, in view of its insubstantial nature and unforeseeable results. Another way to handle proposal would be to make clear the prior condition that such a conference would require participation of all five powers. It is possible that high-level private assurances from us would be of some help in allaying Chinese suspicions. Another disadvantage is that some of the allies (for example, Germany and Japan) may be suspicious of the proposal and feel that, although they are not nuclear powers, they have deep security interest in matters of nuclear disarmament. An implication of a nuclear power condominium is neither helpful nor healthy, but may be difficult to avoid—to some degree—especially, in any conference which is held. By accepting the Soviet proposal, we might also arouse the concern of the non-nuclear members of the CCD who might feel that a five power conference would degrade the importance of this established disarmament body. Frank consultations would go far toward relieving their concerns. Perhaps most important , it is not at all certain that a satisfactory agenda acceptable to all parties could be worked out. Even if we are able to clarify Soviet views prior to a conference, this is no guarantee that these would be acceptable to us or to the other nuclear powers, and serve a useful purpose, or that other proposals would meet these criteria, given the wide disparity in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the nuclear states and other disparate interests. No conference would be better than one with ill-defined or unclear purposes which could arouse acrimony and lock us into an activity which might not serve our interests. There are some potential virtues in the Soviet proposal if all powers could agree to a reasonable agenda. (1) SALT cannot deal with third-country nuclear interests, and the CCD would seem to have too many members for useful consideration of matters relating to central nuclear arms control. (2) It appears to be in our long-term interest to engage the PRC, to the extent possible, in serious discussion of arms control. (Comment: If, as the study indicates, Soviet motives are largely propagandistic or anti-Chinese, then it is a fair question what interest the US could have in pursuing this Soviet initiative. As the section listing advantages and disadvantages also indicates, perhaps the only virtue for the US is to establish a formal or semi-permanent “channel” for the Chinese to participate in “disarmament.”) This, however, raises a more fundamental question of whether disarmament/arms control is, in fact, a starting point for broader, multilateral negotiations with the Chinese. It is almost an article of faith in arms control theology that all nuclear powers must perforce share common interests. Maybe they do, historically, but the disparities in actual power suggest that the immediate interests of each nuclear power are not parallel. The study suggests that the Chinese can only regard a nuclear club with suspicion, not only because of their patent inferiority in the nuclear field, but also because, politically, Peking finds it more profitable to remain aligned with the “have-nots” as a bloc. In other words, until the Chinese have some more direct interest in either establishing their Nuclear Power Credentials or, perhaps, advancing their own particular arms control proposals, then using arms control as a vehicle for a dialogue with the Chinese may in fact be self defeating (and playing the Soviet game). Another complicating aspect of this general idea of five power interests is that we have an adversary relationship with the USSR and China, and an alliance relationship with France and the UK. If and when five power forums, proposals, etc., gather momentum, they inject the Soviets into these alliance relationships, perhaps only indirectly at first. Since the Soviets no longer have a similar alliance relationship with China to concern them, this gives them a rather free hand to meddle in a wide variety of affairs that affect nuclear powers. At the same time, it restricts our freedom of action, especially because of our special relationship to the UK. Thus one can foresee that however desirable it may appear to explore the five power approach as one convenient way of drawing in China, we may pay a price in terms of our allies. In sum, the disparities between the US and USSR, on the one hand, and the other three on the other hand, seem to militate against preserving the nuclear status quo through arms control. But to the extent we try to do this, perhaps as Chinese capabilities grow to a point where they are interested, we may have to sacrifice some aspects of cooperation with the UK and France. And this point might be reached at some point in this decade when our interests in a European Defense arrangement will be growing. IV. POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE The Soviets have not indicated what subjects might be addressed at such a conference. To the extent the Soviets have considered possible topics, these could include pressing for adherence to past agreements (the LTBT, the NPT and the Seabeds Treaty) in order to isolate the PRC, but pursuit of this line would also impact adversely on Soviet-French relations. The Soviets might also wish to urge a Comprehensive Test Ban—particularly if they do not want one. It is also possible that the Soviets would be interested in proposing some kind of freeze on strategic systems once a reasonably comprehensive agreement had been reached in SALT. Because of the inequities they would see as involved, a freeze proposal would meet firm opposition from the PRC and France. While the Soviets may have no real interest in a proposal on no-first-use of nuclear weapons involving the PRC, they might feel compelled to put this idea on the table because of their traditional support for such a measure. If the PRC accepts the idea of a five-power conference, it would be likely to advance broad and sweeping proposals, at least in part designed to enhance its image with non-nuclear and non-aligned countries: for a no-first-use undertaking and for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. The French have given no indication of topics they wish to be discussed at such a conference. We might wish to consider the following items as potential: 1. Measures to avoid and reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. It might be possible to reach an agreement on this subject along the lines of, and supplementing, the bilateral US-USSR agreement being considered in SALT. So as not to conflict with the on-going SALT negotiations, one way would be to use an agreement which had already been concluded between the US and USSR in SALT as a rough model for a multilateral agreement, tailored to meet the circumstances of five powers. 2. Expanded “hot line” communications between nuclear powers. This subject of interest to all five nuclear powers. It does, however, have political connotations both in regard to official contacts between the PRC and the US, and in giving a further impression of a nuclear power directorate. 3. A proposal in the field of security assurances. Such a proposal might draw upon the proposals the US advanced in connection with the NPT, or be cast in terms of more generalized non-use of force declarations. — Might serve to reassure non-Communist Asian countries and act as disincentive to proliferation. — The language of a proposal on security assurances, were we to advance one, would be critical in protecting our interest in maintaining deterrence against aggression and blackmail by the conventional forces of the USSR, the PRC and their allies. OSD and JCS oppose this as potential agenda item. 4. A five-power declaration to support the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A more tactful way of trying to get France and the PRC to act in accordance with the NPT, without insisting that they sign an agreement they had not negotiated. The French have already stated that this is their policy, and it is conceivable that the PRC might be willing to do so as well. 5. A proposal not to deploy further ABM systems. Such a proposal would prevent the UK, France and the PRC from acquiring any ABMs, while the US and USSR would deploy limited ABMs in accordance with whatever agreement is reached in SALT. If the US and USSR were prepared to accept zero ABMs, it might have wider appeal. It would have the advantage of codifying acceptance of a deterrent strategy by all the nuclear powers. (OSD and JCS believe this is not serious or appropriate.) 6. Limitation on strategic offensive forces. For completeness this topic is included, even though it is highly unlikely that the five powers could agree on a common basis for considering offensive force limitations in the near term. (OSD and JCS would oppose this.) ( Comment: This is a rather unimpressive shopping list, which merely points up that there is little that is likely to be appealing to all of the nuclear powers.) Of the six subjects, limits on strategic offensive is a non-starter, obviously. No first use is violently opposed within this government because it undercuts the basic thesis of “flexible response” and, some would argue, weakens deterrence. A generalized non-first-use in the guise of a security assurance runs into the same opposition; moreover, it is difficult to see what we would gain by it. This leaves as semi-serious possibilities: (1) accidental war measures, (2) hot line, (3) ABMs and (4) non-proliferation. — ABMs is a remote question for the lesser nuclear powers. Nevertheless, as the study points out, it could have the effect of codifying assured destruction strategies—and therefore could have some interest to China, France and the UK. It is only workable if we have a complete ABM ban in SALT. — Non-proliferation runs directly against current Chinese ideological claims; realistically, however, it is highly unlikely that any of the nuclear powers will assist non-nuclear states to create capability. Codifying this, however, is a political matter that turns on the Chinese willingness to be aligned with the nuclear powers against the non-nuclears. — As practical matters the hot line and accidental war are probably the only two items that might survive preliminary negotiation. The prevention of accidental war is sufficiently anodyne that a five power agreement might emerge. It has the disadvantage for China and France of originating out of US-Soviet dialogue. If we conclude that this could be a vehicle for a five power conversation, then the agreement as currently written (“other situations”, etc.) will be anathema to China, since Peking would quite rightly see an invitation for Soviet meddling and interference in the omnibus clause we have now in SALT. One area of nuclear arms control not considered, but likely to arise might be limits on operational areas of nuclear forces, withdrawal of bases, or denuclearization of specific areas—all of these at one time part of the Chinese or Soviet arms control litany. Another contingency, not discussed, but worth remembering is that China could propose that the five powers join in urging a world wide disarmament conference. This also happens to be on the Brezhnev peace program, and some Soviets have hinted that if the Chinese move this way the Soviets would go along. In any case, since the conference is a Soviet initiative, the burden for devising an agenda might be best left to Moscow to suggest, at least initially. This review, however, suggests that most proposals either are outrageously unfair or are mere propaganda. There does not seem to be much in the way of common ground. V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES The alternatives have here been narrowed down to a handful of broad possibilities in order to reduce the problem to its essentials. All the approaches presuppose that we have had thorough consultations with the UK and France, as well as with other NATO allies, other interested allies such as Japan, and possibly with the non-nuclear members of the CCD. We should bear in mind that in practical terms we may have less than full freedom of action. — The US would be hard put to reject a disarmament conference which all the other nuclear powers have agreed to. Thus, the PRC, in one sense, would have an impact on how the US responds to the Soviet proposal. The PRC might choose to delay its response or not to respond at all, or to propose, perhaps, a wider meeting. In that event, we might face quite a different problem. A number of important states might at least want to explore the idea. It would seem contrary to US interests to undercut the CCD, both as a general proposition, and specifically with respect to the Co-Chairmanship institution. Another point to bear in mind is that regardless of the amount of true consultation and exchange we have with non-nuclear states (allied and otherwise), we may still face serious reservations about a five-power conference. A five-power conference, contrary to the concept of SALT, would tend to show that simply becoming a nuclear power, no matter how insignificant, entitled a country to a special status. The Study deals with six alternatives. 1. Reject the proposal, regardless of acceptance by others; 2. Accept on condition that all other nuclear powers agree and reasonable agenda could be agreed; 3. Accept with only precondition that all others agree; 4. Accept even if Chinese do not accept (i.e., 4-power conference); 5. Make counterproposal for initial conference of experts to exploration of one question, e.g., measures to guard against accidental nuclear war, including Hot Line; 6. Avoid so long a feasible accepting or rejecting and stand on initial reply (as proposed by State in first section of study, above). ( Comment: Alternatives I (reject) and 4 (accept) are presumably beyond the pale. The only difference between 2 and 3 is whether precondition of an acceptable agenda should be posed. Alternative 5 is a variant, in which we take an active role, preempting agenda, and press for a conference ourselves (essentially an anti-Chinese move, if Peking in fact opposes concept of five power conference). Alternative 6 would be a decision to make no decision, but at the same time, not precluding alternatives 2, 3, or even 4.) Following are the principal arguments presented in the study concerning 2 and 3 : — Posing preconditions of agreement by all nuclear powers and agreement to a reasonable agenda avoids onus for rejection, avoids playing game of isolating China, and provides some assurance that conference might lead to tangible results. — Insisting on “reasonable” agenda, however, might put it in position of obstructionists; if all agreed to conference would we want to hold out for agreement to agenda? — Starting with both preconditions and falling off the condition of agreed agenda would be a middle ground. Alternative (5) of proposing an “experts meeting” on single subject (accidental war). — Attempts to rule out extraneous political gambits, might appeal more to Chinese, might have a fair chance of a useful outcome, and non-nuclear powers might find this approach more reassuring. — However, introduction of this approach prior to SALT might undermine real prospects for agreement on accidental war, for ephemeral prospects in five power meeting (this approach could await successful conclusion of SALT.) ( Comment : Even these narrower approaches, however, might raise Chinese suspicions, particularly since our single agenda item would be already defined to large extent by US-Soviet negotiations in SALT.) Alternative 6 — avoiding definitive response, standing on interim reply. — Avoids burden of trying to define agenda at this time and is in line with UK and not inconsistent with French. — Provides greater protection than conditional acceptance against USSR maneuvers against Peking. — The pitfall is that in further probing by USSR, Soviets can put us in position from which it would be difficult eventually to refuse conference. — Soviets would try to narrow our freedom of action on agenda, venue, timing, etc. ( Comment: If we do not want to reject the conference out of hand, or accept unconditionally, and if we do not want to take an initiative (for an experts meeting), then essentially we have only two choices: 1. Accept conditionally , beginning with most desirable conditions of agreement to a conference by all concerned and prior agreement on agenda, but be prepared to give up haggling over agenda if we are the only holdout; 2. Stall , by giving the Soviets a mildly positive response but without commitments. Main criteria for choosing is what nuance in our relations with China and the USSR we want to convey. — If we want to seem more encouraging to the USSR, a conditional acceptance would be the route to follow. — If we want to allow for the Chinese to reject, or avoid seeming to put them under any pressures, then logical choice would be to provide interim reply and stall. Presumably we would want to inform the Chinese of our interim reply and your intention not to pursue the matter in any active way. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for a 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. 331. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 331. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 30, 1971 SUBJECT: Verification Panel Meeting, Friday, July 30; NSSM-132, Soviet Proposals for Five Power Nuclear Conference. At this meeting there are two aspects (decisions) you want to cover: 1. What approach do we take in next weeks toward the Soviet proposals; how do we respond initially, and beyond? — The issue here is not really one of disarmament or arms control, but a political decision to lean slightly toward the USSR or remain as neutral as possible, and in this way avoid seeming to bring pressure on Peking. 2. Do we want or need to study further, some of the substantive issues that might conceivably be the subject of a conference in the unlikely event that all parties agree. I. The US Approach The study presents six alternatives ranging from unqualified acceptance to straightforward rejection. Assuming we want to do neither, our essential choices are: — Conditional acceptance: conditions could be that all powers agree to a conference and agree on a reasonable agenda, or only that all powers agree to a conference. — No Definitive Response, but a mildly positive “interim” reply and no further action. If we want to show some sign of encouragement to the USSR then the “conditional acceptance” would be the way to do so; at the same time the conditions would mitigate suspicions in China that we were colluding with the USSR against known Chinese objections to entire project. On the other hand, if we prefer to remain noncommittal, then the stalling tactic with an “interim” reply is preferable. (In this case you might want to convey our reply through private channels to China.) Another approach, canvassed in the study is to take the initiative and propose a meeting of “experts” to discuss only one proposal, namely a five-power agreement to guard against accidental nuclear war. — given the origin of this subject—in the US-Soviet SALT context—the Chinese, at least, and possibly France, would balk; on the other hand, it would rule out extraneous political or propagandistic approaches. Since this approach would go a long way toward involving the US as co-sponsor of the five-power conference, it has a distinct anti-Chinese overtone, even if the Chinese saw some merit in the idea of agreement on measures to prevent accidental war. Next Steps—US Reply If you wish to adopt the stalling tactic, what needs to be done is approve an interim reply. A tentative reply has already been discussed with the French and UK and discussed in NATO. The current version which you have approved includes the following main points: (1) US is still studying, but considers subject worthy of serious consideration; (2) Such a conference would require careful preparation and a consensus among all five powers on what measures were feasible for discussion; (3) The interest of the non-nuclear states must be taken into account; (4) Conference should not prejudice SALT or detract from the CCD; and (5) The US presupposes all five powers would be willing to attend. If you wish to accept the conference, but attach conditions, we could either amend this “interim reply” to state the conditions of our acceptance, or proceed with an interim reply and then draft a more definitive acceptance and statement of conditions. (NOTE: Even the interim as formulated by State tends to foreshadow conditions of unanimous consent of all powers and consensus on agenda.) Agency Views We know of no great disputes over the middle-ground alternatives, though there was little attempt to stimulate agency differences. State could live with the stalling tactic, but probably has a slight preference for a conditional acceptance. ACDA, as expected, would go for a conditional acceptance, but both State and ACDA are somewhat intrigued with the idea of a five power conference on preventing accidental war and establishing a hot line. II. Substantive Issues for a Conference The study includes six possibilities , some included for intellectual neatness, and not because they are realistic or even attractive for US interest. (There are, nevertheless, JCS and Defense objections included in the study to some of these measures.) The issues are which, if any, of these possibilities are both feasible from what we know of the positions of the other powers, and in the interest of the US. There is little exploration in the study of what, exactly, our interests are in a five power conference, other than bringing China into a disarmament forum. This latter objective, while presumably a long term aim, in the short run may actually complicate relations with China depending on the forum, sponsorship and timing. The doubtful proposition that all nuclear powers must necessarily share a common interest runs throughout the study. 1. Measures to avoid and reduce the risk of accidental war: — the US-Soviet agreement could serve as a rough model; — the net practical effect, if accepted, would be that all the nuclear powers would exchange information on missile launches outside national territory. — the clause (not yet settled in HELSINKI) requiring data exchange in “other situations” would almost certainly raise problems for China vis a vis Moscow. The issue for further consideration is how the prospective SALT agreement on this subject would have to be modified to include all nuclear powers, and what obligations and gains would be involved for us. 2. Expanded hot line communication between nuclear powers: — the main problem is the political one; does China want to join the “nuclear club” in this way, or to remain aligned with the non-nuclear world. The latter has been Peking’s policy and as SALT has progressed, Peking has become more vociferous in denouncing “superpowerism.” — It is possible we would reserve this as a bilateral subject with China. The technical issue for further study would be the feasibility of a five way circuit, perhaps via Intelsat and Molniya, or a simple land line link. — This might be reserved for Sino-US bilaterals. 3. A proposal in the field of security assurances: — While not well defined in the study, the idea is to come up with a counter to the old idea of non first use of nuclear weapons, which inevitably would be surfaced by the Soviets or perhaps the Chinese. — Non first use in any variant is violently opposed in the Pentagon on the grounds it destroys the theory and effectiveness of flexible response and weakens deterrence. — Further study of this issue seems warranted only as a defense against Soviet proposals. Treating this seriously, however, leads inexorably into issues of withdrawal of foreign bases, de-nuclearization of regions, or limits on operational areas, etc. Defense believes this is not a promising subject for five power consideration and JCS objects to inclusion of it for further consideration. 4. Five Declaration to support the principle of Non-Proliferation: — The main problem, again, is political: does China want to associate with the non-proliferation principle. For years it has opposed the concept, though in practice it supports it. — Pressing this approach could force the Chinese into a rejection, which, of course, is what the Soviets want. 5. A proposal not to deploy further ABMs. 6. Limitation of Strategic Offensive Forces: — These two might be intellectually laudable from an arms control point of view, but almost totally unrealistic, politically. — Nevertheless, on the outside chance of a zero ABM in SALT, the prerequisite to a five power ban—it might be worth a short survey of what would be involved in defining and verifying a ABM ban in China, UK, France, etc. In sum, there are no real five-power arms control prospects, given the disparity among the powers, other than those that are related to arrangements such as hot lines, accidents, non first use, non-proliferation. The central issue is whether China wishes to join the nuclear club in some formal way, and, for us, whether we want to begin, now, the gradual process of drawing Peking in this direction. If we do have such an interest, then we also face the delicate issue of conciliating our main non-nuclear allies, who would undoubtedly see the emergence of a worldwide nuclear directorate as an incentive to create their own nuclear capability. It is no accident that the four and five power nuclear conference originated with De Gaulle. Next Steps Assuming we might become involved in explorations of an agenda, you may want to ask for “position papers” on the following to be submitted to you. (This could be done in a follow on directive): — More detailed examination of a five power accidents treaty. — Technical examination of feasibility of five power hot lines. — (optional) Study of problem in generalized non first use security assurance agreement. — (optional) Problems of defining, verifying five-power ABM ban. Your book includes: — Talking points for the meeting, along the lines of this memorandum; — Analytical summary of NSSM 132 Study; — NSSM 132 Study; and — Text of US Position, used in NATO consultation (including interim reply). 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–11, Verification Panel Meeting 7/30/72, Soviet Proposal for a 5-Power Nuclear Conference. Secret. 332. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting 332. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting 1 Washington, July 30, 1971, 3:05–3:15 p.m. Subject: Soviet Proposal for Five-Power Nuclear Conference Participants: Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger State - John N. Irwin, II Ronald Spiers Martin J. Hillenbrand Robert A. Martin Defense - Robert J. Pranger Col. John Nolan JCS - Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Col. James McCarthy CIA - Richard Helms [ name not declassified ] Justice - Attorney General John Mitchell ACDA - Philip J. Farley David Linebaugh OST - Dr. Edward David NSC Staff - R/Adm. Robert O. Welander Helmut Sonnenfeldt William Hyland John Holdridge Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS It was agreed that: — it was premature to try to discuss an agenda for any five-power nuclear conference; — assuming our allies react favorably to our soundings, we would make our initial oral reply that we are considering the Soviet proposal. Mr. Kissinger: We have two problems today: (1) how to respond to the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear conference, and (2) what the agenda should be for such a conference. As I understand the present positions, we have said we are still studying the proposal; the French are willing to go; the UK is mildly interested; and the Chinese have said no. Mr. Irwin: The French have said they would not attend unless the Chinese also come. Adm. Zumwalt: And the Chinese have told the French they wouldn’t go. Mr. Kissinger: They have given the impression that they wouldn’t go, but they haven’t rejected it offically, have they? Mr. Helms: Chou En-Lai has been completely negative. Mr. Hillenbrand: Chou also told the French Ambassador in Peking that they would not attend. Mr. Kissinger: Would we consider going to a four-power meeting? Of course, there wouldn’t be a four-power meeting, since if China doesn’t go, France won’t go. Would the UK go if China or China and France don’t go? Adm. Zumwalt: We already have a two-power conference going. Mr. Kissinger: Realistically, how can we reply to something we know won’t come off in such a way as not to create complications for China? We could reject the proposal outright. We could accept on the condition that all the other powers accept, as France did. Or we could accept on the two conditions that all the other countries accept and that the agenda is satisfactory. What are the views as to what we should do? Mr. Irwin: We’ve actually been operating along the lines of Option 6—temporizing on giving a reply. Mr. Spiers: We think it best to leave it withour oral reply until something happens. Mr. Irwin: Option 2 might appear as though we were needling China to attend. Mr. Kissinger: Making our attendance contingent on a satisfactory agenda doesn’t cure that problem. Mr. Mitchell: Are the Russians putting any pressure on us for a more definitive answer? Mr. Kissinger: Not yet, but I don’t doubt that Dobrynin will start needling us in a low-key way. Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Spiers) To whom did our interim message go? Mr. Spiers: It was an oral statement to be made in NATO and will then go to Japan, Australia and New Zealand. We don’t anticipate any objections from them on our position. Mr. Kissinger: Then we can just stand on that. Dick (Helms), what do you think? Mr. Helms: I think it would be wise. Mr. Irwin: Once we hear back from our allies, we can make the statement to the Russians. Mr. Mitchell: What is the purpose behind the Russian proposal? Mr. Kissinger: To isolate the Chinese. Mr. Helms: Yes, and the new Russian statement today is obviously pointed to the Chinese. Mr. Mitchell: Which is even further justification for our standing pat. Mr. Kissinger: Does our oral message say we are studying the proposal? Mr. Farley: It identifies some of the things that would have to be dealt with if the conference should come alive. Mr. Kissinger: It also said we shouldn’t do anything to prejudice SALT and assumes all five countries are willing to accept. Mr. Farley: This seemed as far as it made sense to go at this point. Mr. Kissinger: Then it is really premature to try to discuss what we would discuss at any such conference. Mr. Farley: I agree. Mr. Kissinger: I find the list of possible agenda items most unpromising. Dr. David : There is one far-out thing that might be discussed, and that is the question of uranium enrichment techniques involving the use of plutonium of which the U.S. is the main supplier. The Soviets might have something in mind on that. Mr. Farley: I think the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva has a pretty good understanding with the Soviets on that. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel Minutes, 1969 to 3–8–72. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Later that afternoon Kissinger told the President: “We’ve decided not to answer that [the Soviet proposal]…just let it drop.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 267–22) 333. Telegram 139501 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 333. Telegram 139501 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, August 1, 1971, 0152Z. Following sent Action SecState from Warsaw Jul 31: Quote Warsaw 2405 Subj: PRC Statement on Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Proposal Ref: State 139453 Full text PRC statement delivered Embassy July 31 follows: “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (translation) “July 30, 1971 A. “On June 15, 1971, the Soviet Government delivered a statement to the Government of the People’s Republic of China, proposing to ‘convene a conference of the Five Powers possessing nuclear weapons—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, France and Great Britain’, at which ‘the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole should be considered’. In this connection, the Chinese Government hereby makes the following statement: B. “All countries in the world, big or small, should be equal. Matters affecting various countries in the world should be jointly discussed and settled by all of them and permit of no monopoly by a few big powers. This is a principle guiding international relations which all countries must abide by. The prevention of nuclear war, the elimination of nuclear threats and the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are matters affecting the peace and security of all countries of the world, and a few nuclear countries have no right to push aside the majority of countries in the world and arbitrarily hold a conference and decide upon matters of such great importance. C. “The history following World War II shows that it is absolutely impossible to settle questions of nuclear disarmament by relying on negotiations only between a few big powers possessing nuclear weapons. In July 1963, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union concluded the ‘Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’. Subsequently, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly concocted a series of treaties on the so-called nuclear arms ‘limitation,’ including the treaty on the ‘non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.’ In November 1969, the Soviet Union and the United States started their ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’. But none of them have restricted in any way the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union have continued their nuclear weapon tests without let-up. Their production of nuclear weapons is becoming ever more developed. Their stockpiles of nuclear weapons are becoming greater and greater and they are stationing in many other countries their troops armed with nuclear weapons; this seriously threatens world peace and the security of the people of all countries. The peoples of the world have long lost their confidence in the disarmament talks between the nuclear powers. They rightly hold that it is impossible to settle the question of nuclear disarmament as a whole depending on two nuclear superpowers, nor can it be settled by the addition of some more nuclear powers. D. “China develops nuclear weapons because she is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclear threats, and she does so entirely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and at present she is not yet a nuclear power, nor will she ever be a ‘nuclear superpower’ practising the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. At no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries. E. “Therefore, the Chinese Government cannot accept the Soviet Government’s proposal on the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers. F. The Chinese Government’s stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. Firstly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; secondly, the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at no time and in no cicumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government hereby once again solemnly reaffirms its above stand. G. The Chinese Government holds that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons should issue statements separately or jointly to openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances; and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories. Whether this is carried out or not will be a test as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament. H. “The Chinese people will, as always, continue to make joint efforts with the peoples of the world, persevere in the struggle and strive for the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” Stoessel Unquote Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to USNATO, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Hong Kong. Drafted and approved by Martin (PM/DCA); and cleared by Farley (ACDA). 334. Telegram 141330 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 334. Telegram 141330 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, August 4, 1971, 1456Z. Subj: Response to Soviet Five-Power Nuclear Conference Proposal 1. Ambassador requested when he next sees Gromyko to raise Soviet June 15 proposal for five-power nuclear disarmament conference (State 108820), and advise him that US Government had not commented to USSR previously since we were still engaged in study of Soviet proposal at time we received word over weekend of formal Chinese rejection. Despite this rejection, which was not altogether unexpected, US considered subject raised by Soviets as worthy of serious consideration. Our view had been that such a conference would require careful preparation and consensus among all Five Powers on what measures were feasible for discussion, and that, if held, such a conference should in no way prejudice current bilateral negotiations between US and USSR on limiting strategic arms of the two countries, nor detract from multilateral consideration of arms control measures in the CCD. US also believed it important in considering ways to make progress on arms control measures that interests and concerns of non-nuclear states be taken into account. 2. We presupposed, of course, that all Five Powers would be willing to attend such a conference. Chinese reply now makes this question academic for time being. 3. US NATO: Mission may inform Allies of US oral comments to USSR on Soviet proposal following confirmation that Ambassador Beam has conveyed them to Gromyko. 4. Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington: We will be informing host government Embassies here of US comments to USSR after they have been conveyed to Gromyko. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XV. Secret; Priority. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USMission Geneva, and U.S. Delegation to SALT. Drafted by Spiers (PM); cleared by Brown of EA, Farley (ACDA), Sonnenfeldt (White House), and Richardson; and approved by Hillenbrand. 335. Message for the Government of the People’s Republic of China 335. Message for the Government of the People’s Republic of China 1 Beijing, undated The President wishes to call the attention of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to the following matters: The U.S. Government has not replied formally to the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. It is transmitting an oral comment to the Soviet Foreign Ministry through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow along these lines: The subject of nuclear disarmament is worthy of serious consideration. A conference would require careful preparation and agreement among the five powers as to what subjects were feasible for discussion. The views of non-nuclear states should be considered. All five powers must be willing to attend. It is not anticipated that a formal reply will be made. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Five-Power Conference] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, Files for the President, China, Lord-China, China Exchanges July–Oct 20, 1971. No classification marking. The message was transmitted by Haig to Major General Vernon Walters, Senior Military Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Paris, under cover of an August 5 letter instructing Walters to hand the message to the PRC ambassador. (Ibid.) 336. Telegram 166298 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 336. Telegram 166298 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, September 10, 1971 SUBJECT: Soviet UN Initiative on World Disarmament Conference 1. Gromyko letter to SYG September 6 requests inclusion of item entitled World Disarmament Conference (WDC) on UNGA agenda as important and urgent item. Letter takes account of arms control agreements achieved and under negotiation, but argues that fundamental progress toward controlling stockpiling and improvement of armaments has yet to be made. We are pouching full text of letter. 2. Letter reiterates Soviet proposal for conference of five nuclear powers, noting that it most realistic way to success in nuclear arms control, which possible if all five powers willing to work toward agreement. At same time letter states desirability of encouraging efforts of all countries to solve disarmament problems through world conference. All countries of the world would be represented on basis of universality and equality. In reference which it seems obvious to us includes PRC, and probably GDR, North Vietnam and North Korea, letter notes special importance of participation of all states which possess significant armed forces and armaments. 3. Letter suggests that whole complex of disarmament problems be considered by conference but that, depending on desire of participants, primary attention could be devoted to prohibition of nuclear weapons. 4. Our preliminary reaction is that this Soviet initiative has been taken largely for propaganda and political effect. Among Soviet motives may be desire to avoid being outflanked by PRC world conference proposal and to counter suspicions and charges re US-Soviet collusion in nuclear arms matters. Vague and general nature of Soviet proposal recalls past attempts to use broad schemes such as GCD for propaganda advantage in broad UN forum where simplistic disarmament panaceas can have certain appeal. It is interesting to note that although letter strongly suggests desirability and possibility of WDC, it carefully avoids actually calling for such a conference, asking only for discussion of question. 5. Focus of discussion will, of course, be in New York. We will not resist USSR effort to have its proposed item be included as important and urgent item on GA agenda. Soviet proposal will undoubtedly evoke broad interest elsewhere. In response to queries re our attitude, you might refer to President’s speech at UNGA on September 18, 1969. In declaring our readiness to enter SALT talks, he stated then that we were prepared to deal with the complex issues involved seriously, concretely and purposefully and that we would conduct negotiations soberly and seriously seeking to reach agreement rather than to make propaganda. You might also cite Section on Era of Negotiations in President’s 1970 Report to Congress which stresses need for realism, concluding with promise that “we shall always be ready to talk seriously and purposefully about the building of a stable peace.” 6. You should stress that a realistic approach (which we note USSR specifically recognizes in its letter as most fruitful way of seeking arms control accords) has resulted in a number of solid achievements, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the NPT and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Progress has been made on other issues such as BW at CCD in Geneva, and SALT has for the first time tackled fundamental questions of nuclear war in atmosphere devoid of propaganda posturing, and these fora continue to offer most realistic prospect for progress on difficult, complex arms control issues. 7. You may wish to note that we will of course give the Soviet proposal careful study. Exempt from decontrol. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Geneva. It was repeated to Canberra, Moscow, New Delhi, Wellington, Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, U.S. Delegation to SALT, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Shinn (ACDA/IR); cleared in ACDA/D, ACDA/IR, PM/DCA (draft), IO/UNP (draft), EUR/SOV (draft), EUR/RPM (draft), and EA/ACA(draft); and approved by DE PALMA (IO). For a copy of Gromyko’s September 6 letter, see Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 544–545. 337. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 337. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 28, 1971 SUBJECT: Soviet UN Resolution on World Disarmament Conference Under Secretary Irwin has authorized our UN delegation to work with the Soviet UN delegation on the amended version of the Soviet resolution calling for a World Disarmament Conference in 1972. The Soviets have inquired whether we might co-sponsor the resolution, but the Under Secretary’s instructions rule out co-sponsoring. Rather, we would make a number of changes to show that we were “cooperative and flexible” in our approach to the Soviet proposal and to participation by the PRC in future disarmament discussion. The proposed State/ACDA approach would “minimize” any appearance that the US was aligning itself in a tactical ploy against China, and keep open maximum range of options by obscuring questions of timing nature, etc. Nevertheless, there can be some problems with this approach. First of all, the item is meaningless if judged on its merits. More serious, however, the obvious anti-Chinese bent of the Soviet move (even though it originated before your first Peking trip). As it now stands the resolution would refer to the “special responsibility” of all nuclear weapons powers for the solution of nuclear disarmament (this, of course, the Chinese reject) and set up a Conference without allowing the Chinese any say in the matter. On the other hand, a resolution in some form along Soviet lines, is bound to carry with a large vote, as these items always do. It will be turned over to the CCD. If we remain totally aloof, we may be confronted with a more serious problem than if we try to soften the language and commitments. At the same time, refusing to have anything to do with this project is a signal to the Soviets of our concern not to offend Peking. Thus, we will end up leaning one way or the other toward Moscow or Peking. Secretary Rogers is on record at the UN to the effect that we are skeptical of the project and prefer not to create new machinery. John Holdridge feels that the China implications indicate we should not cooperate on the resolution and should abstain. Marshall Wright and I see no advantage in simply sitting idle, and thus permitting the passage of a resolution that is likely to be totally unacceptable to us. Thus, we are not attracted to the idea of abstaining (and even less to voting against a disarmament resolution sure to command a large majority). We, therefore, think we should make the effort to insure a final version that we can live with and vote for. In addition to the Irwin proposals, we should also amend the clause on the “special responsibility” of “all nuclear powers,” thus making the resolution more palatable, or at least less objectionable, to China. RECOMMENDATION That you concur in Irwin’s instructions , plus the further amendment noted above.(Tab A). Approve Irwin’s instructions (Sonnenfeldt will notify ACDA) Disapprove Other Tab A Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affaris (Kissinger) Washington, October 26, 1971 Subject: Soviet Draft United Nations General Assembly Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference The Under Secretary has authorized our delegation to the United Nations General Assembly to propose amendments to a resolution introduced by the Soviets which “deems desirable that agreement should be reached among States before the end of 1972 on an actual date for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and on its agenda.” We would offer to support this resolution provided it is amended to avoid a specific commitment by the General Assembly to such a conference and to avoid any implication of agreement to still more disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework. The enclosed paper sets forth in more detail the rationale for this course of action and the amendments we desire in the Soviet resolution. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Attachment Paper regarding the Soviet Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference Soviet Draft United Nations General Assembly Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference The Soviet draft resolution regarding a World Disarmament Conference, which Gromyko presented to the General Assembly on September 28, could come up for debate in the Assembly as early as November 1. The Soviets appear to be more interested in getting credit for their World Disarmament Conference proposal than in pressing for early convening of a conference. However, their draft resolution, if adopted, would place the General Assembly on record in favor of a World Disarmament Conference and would provide that agreement to convene the Conference should be reached before the end of 1972. The Soviet proposal is designed in some measure to take the play away from the Peoples Republic of China. At the same time, it leaves open an avenue for participation by the Peoples Republic of China in disarmament talks. The Peoples Republic flatly refused the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference of nuclear powers. The position of the Peoples Republic was that nuclear disarmament should only be discussed at a world conference of all countries at the summit level. The Soviet draft resolution would counter the position of the Peoples Republic by making less explicit the suggestion for a World Disarmament Conference and avoiding the implication that the conference would be an alternative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Our western allies have doubts about the Soviet proposal but most could probably be expected to vote in its favor. Non-aligned countries have so far indicated little interest in a World Disarmament Conference but will almost certainly be prepared to vote for the resolution. As a practical matter we have a choice between abstaining on the resolution, knowing it will pass with an overwhelming majority, or seeking to get it amended into a more acceptable form which we could support. The Soviets have asked if we could co-sponsor the resolution and have indicated some willingness to consider our suggestions for amendment. In view of our skepticism regarding the value of a World Disarmament Conference in terms of producing specific accomplishments, we would not co-sponsor the resolution. But if we can get changes which avoid a specific commitment by the General Assembly to a conference and do not imply our moving toward still more disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework, we would have a resolution we should be able to support. Our proposed amendments would show that we were prepared to be cooperative and flexible in our approach to the Soviet proposal and to participation by the Peoples Republic of China in future disarmament discussions. They would also minimize any appearance that the United States is aligning itself in a tactical ploy against the Peoples Republic of China and they would keep open the maximum range of options for future decision by obscuring the questions of the timing, nature, and venue of any future world conference. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, U.S.U.N., Oct–Nov 1971, Vol. VIII, Pt. 4. Confidential. Sent for action. Sent through Haig. The attached draft resolution with amendments is not published. In the left hand margin of page one, Kissinger wrote, “Don’t want to minimize-wish to include,” and indicated that the phrase, “special responsibility,” in paragraph two, “should be deleted.” None of the options on page 2 is checked. An attached routing slip indicates that Sonnenfeldt “handled by phone,” and a handwritten note at the bottom of page one, initialed by Sonnenfeldt, states, “Leonard informed Nov. 1,” presumably a reference to James F. Leonard of ACDA. 338. Telegram 199601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 338. Telegram 199601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 28, 1971 SUBJECT: Soviet Draft UNGA Res on a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) REF: USUN 2957, 3899 1. SUMMARY. In view of the likelihood that the General Assembly will adopt a WDC resolution by a substantial majority, USUN should sound out other dels on possibility of amending the Soviet draft resolution to make clear that the WDC idea is to remain simply a matter for UNGA “discussion” and that no commitment is being made regarding need to set a specific date or to begin concrete preparations for a WDC. Our views on the Soviet resolution and the type of amendments we desire are as follows: END SUMMARY 2. The Soviet proposal for WDC, which Gromyko presented to the GA on September 28, is expected to come up for debate in the Assembly during the first week of November. While the Soviets appear to be more interested in gaining credit for their WDC proposal than in pressing for early convening of such a conference, their resolution would, if adopted in its present form, place the GA on record as favoring a WDC and would provide that agreement on an actual date and on an agenda for a WDC should be reached before the end of 1972. 3. The Soviet proposal seems designed in some measure to take the play on the WDC idea away from the PRC. On July 30 the PRC flatly refused the Soviet proposal for a conference of five nuclear powers and repeated its longstanding position in favor of a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. 4. Although our allies are skeptical about the value of the WDC, a number of them have indicated that they would probably vote in favor of the Soviet resolution. Non-aligned countries have so far indicated little interest in a WDC but they would probably also support the Soviet resolution. 5. As the Secretary made clear in his October 4 GA speech (USUN 3116), we are skeptical about the value of a WDC. However, since the Soviet resolution is likely to be adopted, we have decided as a practical matter to seek to have it amended in a way which will avoid any specific commitment by the GA to a WDC or any implication of movement toward still more disarmament machinery outside the UN framework. While showing that we are prepared to be cooperative and flexible in dealing with this matter, this approach would minimize any appearance that the US was aligning itself in a tactical ploy against the PRC and would leave open the maximum range of options for future decision by obscuring the questions of the timing, nature, and venue of a possible WDC. 6. Accordingly USUN should sound out allied, important non-aligned and Sov dels on possibility of amending the Soviet resolution along lines described above. (Specific changes we desire being sent only to USUN, by separate message.) You should say we could go along with a WDC res along lines of our amended version of the Soviet resolution. If asked, you should say we will not co-sponsor. You should indicate that if the Soviet resolution were pressed to a vote in its present form you would very likely be unable to support it. (Our final decision regarding our vote would be made at a later stage in light of situation which develops during debate and consultations on this issue. Whatever our vote, we will probably wish to make a statement of explanation setting forth our general reservations regarding a WDC along the lines of the comments in the Secretary’s October 4 GA speech). END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USMission Geneva, USNATO, Bonn, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Drafted by McCormack (ACDA/IR) and McIntyre and Armitage (IO/UNP); cleared by Leonard (ACDA/IR) and Garthoff (PM) and in substance in EUR/SOV (substance), EA/ACA (substance), and OSD/ISA (substance); and approved by De Palma of IO. 339. Telegram 226160 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 339. Telegram 226160 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 16, 1971 SUBJECT: World Disarmament Conference Resolution: Voting Instructions REF: USUN 5087 1. Appreciate USDel’s success in obtaining change in title of 27th GA agenda item in of para 4 to “World Disarmament Conference.” In our view this satisfactorily concludes our effort to avoid commitment in res to hold WDC. 2. Despite our continued misgivings about “all States” references in res, we feel balance of considerations involved indicates affirmative US vote. USDel is so instructed. 3. If Soviet or other key del asserts that res represents commitment to hold WDC, you may, at your discretion, draw on following in explaining US vote: QTE Mr. President, the US Delegation is able to support the present draft resolution because in our view it is consistent with the criteria set out by Ambassador PHILLIPS last month. The resolution leaves the question of a possible world disarmament conference open for consideration and does not prejudge the outcome of that consideration. It does not attempt to prescribe when or in what circumstances such a conference might be held. As the Assembly is aware, we have expressed doubt regarding the prospective usefulness of a WDC. Our doubts remain. However, we are of course prepared to take part in the further consideration called for in the resolution before us, on which the United States is casting (has cast) an affirmative vote. UNQTE 4. We share FRG concern to avoid floor argument over participation question and therefore we would not wish to stimulate possible Soviet rejoinder to any US statement on subject. However, if Soviets or others take initiative in asserting specifically that res has disposed of question of participation in WDC or that “open to all states” means that the GDR or other unrecognized authorities would attend a WDC, you should make brief statement in reply along following lines: BEGIN QTE I would like to state that in our view operative paragraph 2 of the resolution does not set forth an exhaustive list of the topics which might be addressed in further consideration of a WDC; we, for example, may wish to comment on additional aspects of the matter. Specifically, the question of the scope of such a conference and of participation are complex having many aspects on which different states might wish to express various views about a variety of situations. They will be able to do so under the present resolution. UNQTE 5. In unlikely event Soviets or others asset assert specifically that “all states” formula means Vienna Formula states plus GDR, North Korea and NVN, US Del should say that in his view resolution makes no such determination. END Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to Bonn, Moscow, USMission Geneva, U.S. Delegation to SALT, and USNATO. Drafted by Neidle (IO/UNP); cleared by Day (ACDA), McNutt (LM/DMS), Armitage and McIntyre (UNP), Martin (PM), and Skoug (EUR/GER); and approved by Herz (IO). 340. General Assembly Resolution 2833 (XXVI) 340. General Assembly Resolution 2833 (XXVI) 1 New York, December 16, 1971 General Assembly Resolution 2833 (XXVI): World Disarmament Conference, December 16, 1971 1 The General Assembly, Conscious of the responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter for disarmament and the consolidation of peace, Convinced that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations, Believing that it is imperative that all States exert further efforts for the adoption of effective measures of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament, Believing also that a world disarmament conference could promote and facilitate the realization of such aims, 1. Expresses the conviction that it is most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States; 2. Invites all States to communicate to the Secretary-General, before 31 August 1972, their views and suggestions on any relevant questions relating to a world disarmament conference, in particular the following: ( a ) Main objectives; ( b ) Provisional agenda; ( c ) Site favoured; ( d ) Date and contemplated duration; ( e ) Procedures to be adopted for carrying out the preparatory work; ( f ) Relationship to the United Nations; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session a report containing the views and suggestions communicated to him; 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled “World Disarmament Conference”. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 909–910. No classification marking. 1 A/RES/2833 (XXVI), Jan. 18, 1972. The resolution was adopted by acclamation. 341. Telegram 171873 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 341. Telegram 171873 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, September 20, 1972, 2129Z. Subj: Soviet Proposed Item for UNGA on Non-use of Force and Non-use of Nuclear Weapons 1. Septel reports call by Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov on Assistant Secretary De Palma in which Vorontsov asked USG support for subject item. Following is Dept’s unofficial translation of oral statement left by Vorontsov. 2. Begin text: For examination by the 27th session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Union has raised the important and urgent question of “the non-use of force in international relations and the prohibition forever of the use of nuclear weapons.” (The text of the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Secretary General of the UN on this question is attached). Under present conditions, the task of the United Nations is to consolidate achievements in the reduction of international tension and to carry out measures which would further the elimination of existing conflicts and the creation of conditions which would eliminate the outbreak of wars and armed conflicts between states. An effective means of achieving this goal is the consistant application by all states of the principle of the rejection of the use of force, which embraces all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, which are the most destructive weapons of mass destruction. The rejection of the use of force and the prohibition forever of the use of all kinds of weapons, both conventional, as well as nuclear, is the main idea of the new Soviet proposal. In the past, the General Assembly repeatedly took up the question on the non-use of force in international relations. The question on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was placed separately before the UN. But it is quite obvious that the rejection of the use of force must include the prohibition of the use of all kinds of weapons—both conventional, as well as nuclear. Such an approach is dictated by the entire course of the development of post-war international relations. Our proposal that the prohibition of the use of nuclear and conventional weapons would constitute a single whole, meets the principle of equal security of states and the prevention of military advantages. Putting the question in this way, we think, meets the interests of all nations. The Soviet Government intends to strive for the General Assembly, in the name of member states of the organization, to declare solemnly, in accordance with the UN Charter, their rejection of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations, and the prohibition forever of the use of nuclear weapons, and also to recommend that the Security Council adopt an appropriate resolution as soon as possible, which will give this declaration of the General Assembly a binding force in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter. The Soviet Government hopes that the Government of United States will give this information its serious consideration and will make its contribution to the resolution of the question on the rejection of the use of force and on the prohibition forever of the use of nuclear weapons. End text 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Moscow. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared by Kadilis (EUR/SOV); and approved by Armitage (UNP). 342. Telegram 172239 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 342. Telegram 172239 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, September 20, 1972, 2317Z. Subj: Soviet Proposed Item for UNGA on Non-use of Force and Non-use of Nuclear Weapons 1. Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov called on Assistant Secretary De Palma 19 September to draw Department’s attention to Sov proposed item for UNGA on non-use of force and non-use of nuclear weapons. He left text of oral statement urging USG support. We will transmit memo following translation. Vorontsov said Sov Govt leaving similar memoranda with a number of other govts. 2. Vorontsov said that adoption by UNGA of a res on non use of force and permanent prohibition of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the strengthening of international security and prevention of armed conflicts. Renunciation must include prohibition of use of all types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. Vorontsov added that while Sovs have not yet stated so publicly they do intend to seek to make renunciation of use of force binding through SC action under Article XXV of the UN Charter. 3. De Palma responded that we would want to study Soviet proposal in detail but offered personal observation that proposal added nothing to UN Charter or to a number of UN reses involving renunciation of use of force. Cited declarations on friendly relations and strengthening international security as most recent examples containing such provisions. Said he saw serious drawbacks in efforts to restate Charter language in reses. Although he could see some possible advantages to reminding members of Charter obligations from time to time, if the wording varies at all from Charter language then it tends to detract from Charter. 4. De Palma expressed particular concern about the exception introduced by Gromyko in his explanation of the new item for the UNGA to effect that people of “oppressed colonial countries”, among others, can legitimately carry on a struggle against “aggression for the elimination of its consequences, for their freedom and independence and for their legitimate interests, using all available means in that struggle”. Said this created enormous loophole which would be dangerous and subject to misuse. He noted also that by failing to mention threat of use of force, Soviet proposal does not even go so far as UN Charter in renouncing force and this was also dangerous. De Palma said he would be particularly concerned if Sovs were to press for SC action in relation to their item, since this would likely result in acrimonious dispute in SC and could in fact thereby harm effectiveness of SC. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Moscow. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared by Armitage (UNP), Kadilis (EUR/SOV), and in substance by Martin (PM/DCA); and approved by De Palma (IO). 343. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 343. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 26, 1972 SUBJECT: Handling of Soviet Non-Use of Force Resolution in the UN The Soviets have now completed the preliminaries for introducing a General Assembly Resolution on the renunciation of the use or force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They have made oral demarches to us and other UN members seeking support and have left the usual aide memoire. Under normal circumstances, the Soviet item would go to the First Committee, where the debate will occur, as it did last year on their World Disarmament Conference item. Given the nature and intent of the Soviet proposal we can expect certain fireworks between the Chinese and the Soviets in the debate. The question is what position the United Sates should take. Thus far the Department of State, without White House clearance, has, as expected, issued totally negative instructions with the following points (Tab A): — the proposed Soviet resolution will not add anything to the UN Charter; — restating Charter language tends to detract from the Charter, if the language varies; — we have strong reservations about calling on the Security Council to make GA Resolutions binding; — injection of this issue into the Security Council is likely to result in an acrimonious debate and harm the Council’s effectiveness (sic); — we are “concerned” about Gromyko’s proposed exception to the effect that people of “oppressed colonial countries” could legitimately use all available means; — we think the way to make recourse to force less likely is to pursue genuine and constructive negotiations. These are standard debating points, but clearly negative. Presumably, this is the line we will take in any debates, but how we might vote is another matter. We would probably abstain, if there is no further guidance from the White House, and might support it if there is wide support in the GA. The problem is that by taking a negative line we tend to range ourselves on the side of the opponents who, in addition to the Chinese, may be quite small in number and oppose a proposition that is certain to pass, at least in the GA. On the other hand, it would be too cynical to support the Soviet proposal, which, though probably harmless as a UN resolution, accomplishes little and has some anti-Chinese overtones. One way out may be to use the constitutional argument that the Security Council not be involved, and in the debate take the position that we support the idea and principle but see no need for further reiteration by the General Assembly. We could indicate that we will abstain, if the item proves contentious in debate. In any case, we need guidance on how you want to handle it: 1. By requesting cables for clearance: — this runs certain risks and is tiresome, but the most direct way of controlling the tactics. 2. By asking for a position paper and holding an SRG: — this allows the establishment of control, through post SRG NSDM, etc., but takes some time and will probably yield no new ideas. 3. Issuing instructions now on how to deal with it along the lines described above (i.e., relative neutralism with the intention of abstaining). RECOMMENDATION That you indicate how you prefer to proceed: 1. Clear cables 2. Ask for SRG paper 3. Issue directive no Tab A Telegram 173183 From the Department of State to the Missions to the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, September 22, 1972, 1413Z Subj: Soviet UN Initiative on Non-use of Force 1. USSR has requested addition to UNGA agenda of item “non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons”. In call on Assistant Secretary De Palma, Soviet Embassy Minister Counselor Vorontsov said USSR wants UNGA to adopt res banning use of force and all types of weapons—conventional as well as nuclear. Moreover, according to Voronsov, Sovs envisage request for SC decision making UNGA res binding on all UN member states. 2. For USUN: In discussing USSR initiative with other UNGA dels, you should draw on guidance para 4 below as appropriate. 3. For USNATO: Septels reporting Vorontsov-De Palma conversation and text of Sov aide memoire on non-use of force initiative being repeated to you. Should subject be raised by NATO colleagues you may draw on both tels as well as guidelines in explaining US position. 4. Guidelines follow: (A) We do not see how proposed Sov res can add anything useful to what is already contained in UN Charter which draws distinction between use of force for individual and collective defense, which is legitimate, and for aggression, which, is not. (B) We see drawbacks in effort to restate Charter language in UN reses. If wording departs at all from Charter language, then it tends to detract from Charter. If it does not depart, then it adds nothing. (C) We have particularly strong reservations about calling on Security Council to make such UNGA declaration binding on all member states. This would pose serious constitutional problems under Charter. Under relevant Charter articles, Security Council has power to make binding decisions to maintain peace and security with respect to specific situations of threat or breach of peace; Council does not have the power to establish general rules of conduct binding on all members, much less to purport to revise Charter treaty obligations for all members. (D) Also, injection of this project into Security Council would likely result in acrimonious dispute and could thereby harm Council’s effectiveness. (E) We are particularly concerned about exception made by Gromyko in his explanation of proposed agenda item to effect that people of “oppressed colonial countries”, among others, could legitimately use all available means to carry on their struggle. This creates enormous loophole which would be dangerous and subject to misuse, for example by terrorist organizations. (F) We think way to make recourse to force less likely is to pursue genuine and constructive negotiations to concrete arms limitation measures. Efforts toward broad reformulation of existing Charter provisions would not help to solve specific problems. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXV. Secret. Sent for action. Rondon concurred with the memorandum. Option #2, “Ask for SRG paper,” is checked. The attached telegram at Tab A is published. It was repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, and Geneva. 344. Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the United Nations General Assembly 344. Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the United Nations General Assembly 1 New York, September 26, 1972 Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the General Assembly: Non-use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, September 26, 1972 13 The General Assembly, Noting that renunciation of the use or threat of force as proclaimed in the United Nations Charter and a number of other international instruments is gaining ever wider international recognition, Bearing in mind at the same time that the use of force is still occurring in violation of the United Nations Charter and that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons continues to exist, Guided by the growing desire of all peoples to eliminate war from the life of human society and to prevent a nuclear disaster, Believing that renunciation of the use of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should become a law of international life, 1. Solemnly declares on behalf of the States Members of the Organization, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, their renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; 2. Recommends the Security Council to take, as soon as possible, an appropriate decision whereby the present declaration of the General Assembly will acquire binding force under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1972 , p. 672. No classification marking. For the text of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s discussion of the proposal during his September 26 address to the UN, see ibid., pp. 662–672. 13 A/L. 676, Sept. 26, 1972. This draft res. was not voted on. It was replaced on Nov. 27, 1972, by a revised draft res. (A/L. 676/Rev. 1 and Adds. 1–2), cosponsored by Afghanistan, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Iran, Liberia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Ukrainian SSR, and USSR. The revised res. was approved as G.A. res. 2936 (XXVII), post, pp. 848–849. 345. National Security Study Memorandum 162 345. National Security Study Memorandum 162 1 Washington, October 3, 1972 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: US Position on the Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons The President has directed that a study be prepared on US approaches in dealing with the Soviet proposal for a General Assembly Resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The study should include a brief review of the background to this issue, including previous Soviet proposals on this issue in the UN or otherwise, proposals by other countries, pertinent UN Resolutions, and past US positions. In addition, the study should set forth the current US positions for handling this item, the attitude of UN members, and options that the US might addpt for dealing with the issue in the UN. The study should include a brief analysis of Soviet motives and objectives in submitting their proposal and the consequences of its adoption. This study should be developed by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Department of State, and comprised of representatives of the addresses of this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council Staff. The study should be forwarded to the Senior Review Group by October 11. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (104-206). Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. 346. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 346. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group 1 Washington, undated U.S. Position on the Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. The Soviet Proposal and How They Explain It 1 2. Positions of the U.S., USSR and Others on Non-Use of Force during Postwar Period 4 3. Military Implications 5 4. Likely Soviet Objectives and Implications 6 A. In relation to the U.S. 6 B. In Relation to China 6 C. In relation to Europe (CSCE/MBFR) 7 D. In relation to the United Nations 8 E. In relation to Future Disarmament Negotiations 8 5. Attitude of the PRC 9 6. Initial U.S. Response 10 7. Tactical Situati9n in the UN 12 A. Timing B. Positions 8. Options 14 A. Support Resolution in Present Form 16 B. Support Resolution if Amended to make it Innocuous 17 C. Support if Amended as in Preceding Option, but with Addition of an Assurance by Nuclear States regarding Non-Nuclear States 18 D. Opposition to Resolution 19 9. Recommendations 21 Annexes A. Postwar History of Positions of the U.S., USSR and Others, re Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons B. Military Implications of Soviet Proposal C. Chinese Attitude on Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 1. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND HOW THEY EXPLAIN IT On September 26, 1972, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko tabled at the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution, the operative paragraphs of which read: “The General Assembly… 1. Solemnly declares on behalf of the States Members of the Organization, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, their renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. 2. Recommends the Security Council take, as soon as possible, an appropriate decision whereby the present declaration of the General Assembly will acquire binding force under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. In presenting this draft resolution, Gromyko said publicly it was fully consistent with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter (“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). He explained that the danger of conflict could be removed, or at least drastically reduced, if the renunciation of force in international relations were elevated to the level of international law and a ban simultaneously imposed on nuclear weapons. Gromyko added that conventional weapons have caused numerous tragedies since the, end of World War II and that the danger of their use in military conflicts has also grown many times. Gromyko claimed publicly the traditional separation between banning the use of force and prohibiting nuclear arms had introduced an element of “uncertainty and suspicion” in the past. He noted, moreover, that the United Nations resolutions on these issues had been in the form of recommendations or, at best, declarations of intent, without the force of law that would be provided by the current Soviet proposal if it were made the subject of a mandatory “decision” of the Security Council. Gromyko mentioned in his speech that the obligation of States to renounce the use of force, including nuclear weapons, would in no way affect their right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This point does not expressly appear in the Soviet draft resolution. In his speech Gromyko also stated that “No one can challenge the inalienable right of States and peoples subjected to aggression to repel it by employing all possible means so long as the aggressor continues to use force and to encroach upon their freedom and sovereignty, so long as he tries to retain control over the forcibly seized territories.” Although this carries the clear inference that the Soviet Union could use nuclear weapons to defend itself from a Chinese conventional attack (“all possible means” presumably includes nuclear weapons), Gromyko chose to cite the Middle East and Indochina as places where “crude force” is now being encountered. Although the first operative paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution could be read to mean that the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons was something additional to and separate from renunciation of use of force, the Soviets told us privately this was not their intention. Soviet Ambassador Roshchin told Ambassador Martin (U.S.) in New York on October 12 that the non-use of nuclear weapons and non-use of force are “inseparable and integral parts of the same prohibition. One part does not exist without the other. If one is violated the whole agreement does not exist.” During the same conversation, another Soviet official privately made clear that when the use of force (in self-defense) is justified, the use of nuclear weapons is also justified. The Soviet diplomat said “if country ‘x’ uses conventional weapons, country ‘y’ is free from obligation under the resolution and could use nuclear weapons. If there is any use of force, the whole thing falls.” The Soviets have not yet given this exegesis in public. Beyond the exception for self-defense, Gromyko publicly made another apparent exception to the coverage of the draft resolution when he stated that it in no way limited the right of the “peoples of colonial countries” to fight for their freedom. He explained that “violence was used against those peoples, which are the victims of colonialism and aggression, and that in resorting to force to make themselves free they are only restoring justice and restituting their trampled rights”. The exception for victims of colonialism does not appear in the Soviet draft resolution. It is possible that it was excluded as a result of an earlier conversation between Assistant Secretary De Palma and Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov in which we pointed out serious problems this and certain other elements would cause us. 2. POSITIONS OF U.S., USSR, AND OTHERS ON NON-USE OF FORCE DURING POST-WAR PERIOD The US has consistently maintained that UN Charter provisions should govern the use of force. It has generally opposed efforts to single out nuclear weapons for special limitation, explaining that the Charter bans all use of force, nuclear and conventional, for aggression, while permitting individual and collective self-defense. The USSR has generally pressed for sweeping prohibitions against the use of nuclear weapons, either by submitting draft conventions and calling for negotiations on them, or by supporting condemnatory UN resolutions. There have been a number of indications in the last four years that the Soviets have been considering a shift in position which would permit them to support or even advocate formulations forbidding a state to “launch an attack” or commit aggression with nuclear weapons, thus implicitly recognizing that even first-use of nuclear weapons would be legitimate if in the exercise of self-defense. Soviet diplomats have said that such a position would be similar to the position of the US. It is possible, although we cannot be certain, that the Soviets are adopting a new approach to a restricted limitation—tying the nuclear ban to the non-use of force undertaking—that would have the same effect as that described above. During the post-war period the UN has adopted essentially three types of resolutions concerning non-use of force. First, the Ethiopian resolution of 1961, which was approved by a large majority but opposed by the US, bans all use of nuclear weapons. Second, there have been a number of procedural resolutions referring negotiations on non-use of nuclear weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The US has either opposed or abstained in the vote on these resolutions. Third, the UN has adopted a lengthy commentary on the non-use of force principle, in the form of a declaration of principles regarding friendly relations and cooperation among states. The US joined in adoption of this document because it included an unqualified statement on non-use of force and called on states not to support insurgent activities. Although the US has generally opposed establishing separate rules on use of nuclear weapons and discouraged unnecessary reiteration or elaboration of existing Charter principles, on a limited number of occasions it has departed from this approach. In 1968 we undertook a carefully conditioned non-use of nuclear weapons obligation in connection with the establishment of the nuclear free zone in Latin America. During non-proliferation treaty negotiations in 1968, the US proposed to the USSR a limited non-use of nuclear weapons undertaking for the benefit of potential non-nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (See Annex A, p. 7) Negotiations were not successful. President Johnson later withdrew authorization to use this formulation. Regarding non-use of force, in May 1972 the US adopted with the Soviet Union a declaration which includes renunciation of the use or threat of force as one of the basic principles of relations between the two countries. The US-Chinese Joint Communique of February 1972 also contained a statement against resort to use or threat of force. A detailed account of the post-war history of the positions of the US, the USSR and others on renunciation of force and non-use of nuclear weapons is contained in Annex A. 3. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS As we have seen, it is far from certain that the Soviets themselves intend the “permanent prohibition” of nuclear weapons to apply to actions taken in defense against aggression. Were the prohibition to be really categoric, there would of course be the most serious objections of a military nature to the Soviet proposal, some of which are set forth briefly in Annex B. On October 2 and 10, the Soviet proposal was discussed by NATO experts. None of the allies indicated they would support the draft proposal, and most seemed to feel it is essentially propagandistic in nature and might fall of its own weight. There appears to be a desire to stay out of the cross-fire between the Soviets and the PRC. 4. LIKELY SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS A. In Relation to the U.S. Like Moscow’s earlier proposals for a disarmament conference of the five nuclear powers and for a world disarmament conference, the latest Soviet initiative was probably not formulated primarily with the U.S. in mind. Nevertheless, the Soviets would obviously like U.S. support if they could get it. They may have been encouraged by the fact that we were ready to include a clause on renunciation of force in the Moscow communique, and they clearly are going to some pains to make their position seem close to that which we have traditionally held, that nuclear weapons must not he treated differently from conventional weapons. Obviously, if they could get us to go along with their resolution they would consider that we were aligning ourselves with them against the PRC. They would also derive comfort from the effect on our European allies if we now suddenly discovered merit in the kind of resolution that we have in the past regarded as spurious or unnecessary. B. In Relation to China There are strong grounds for assessing the Soviet initiative as aimed primarily at Peking, even though the proposal has other implications as well—e.g., for the forthcoming CSCE and MBFR negotiations in Europe. For over a decade, the desire to undercut Chinese propaganda positions has played an important role in the formulation of Soviet disarmament proposals. Moreover, in recent years Peking has consistently held to a no-first-use posture on nuclear weapons (as it did in rejecting Moscow’s proposals for five power and world disarmament conferences) and has stressed the priority and importance of reaching agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. In view of Brezhnev’s revelation in his speech to the Trade Union Congress last March 20 that the Soviet Union had made non-use of force proposals to the Chinese in the Peking border talks, the Soviets may also see their initiative as an effort to increase pressure on Peking in this context. The Soviets will probably accuse the Chinese of resorting to tactical maneuvers in the UN to disguise their intransigence in opposing all practical arms control measures which would hinder their aspirations to first class military power including nuclear superpower status. In any case, from the standpoint of USSR–PRC relations, the Soviet proposal should not be viewed purely as a propaganda maneuver. Moscow has obvious grounds for concern over Peking’s use of the “threat from the north” theme to stir anti-Soviet feelings in the Chinese people and to spur domestic military preparations. The Soviets may wish to signal to the PRC that their may have to use nuclear weapons if the PRC were to attack them with conventional weapons. Moscow may be genuinely interested, therefore, in exploring the possibility of engaging the Chinese in arms control efforts in the hope of ultimately restricting Peking’s ability to engage in unfettered weapons development. C. In Relation to Europe (CSCE/MBFR) We have no indication thus far that the Soviets intend to carry over the language in their draft UNGA declaration into CSCE negotiations. However, this should be regarded as a significant possibility, particularly in view of the stress placed by the Soviets on non-use of force in connection with a CSCE declaration. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have consistently argued, in calling for an all-European conference on security and cooperation, that the centerpiece of such a conference should be a declaration, with maximum legal force, renouncing the threat or use of force and recognizing existing European frontiers. Besides non-use of force, the Soviets possess a well-stocked arsenal of suggestions related to arms control and collateral measures. Although they have thus far not gone beyond non-use of force or the threat of force in prescribing for a CSCE, they could well raise other proposals such as non-use of conventional or nuclear weapons or restrictions on military budgets. Depending on the reception given their UNGA proposal in New York—or even regardless of it—the Soviets might also invite consideration of the text by a CSCE, perhaps as a counter to Allied proposals in the field of confidence-building measures or to efforts by some CSCE participants to build a bridge between CSCE and MBFR, to which the Soviets strongly object. They may reason that the lumping together of conventional and nuclear warfare and the reference to the UN Charter which includes the right of individual and collective self-defense would make these proposals more difficult for the NATO Allies to handle in a CSCE. UN approval of the resolution could enhance a trend toward relaxing military readiness in Western Europe, a relaxation based on a perception of new levels of detente and peaceful relations, but in a situation still lacking in such genuinely reassuring ingredients as broad and verified reductions in arms. D. In Relation to the United Nations With Peking now seated in the UN the Soviets may consider it doubly important to keep the initiative on detente items of this sort—both to enhance Moscow’s image as a peace-maker, particularly in the less-developed world, and to “expose” the Chinese as opposed to the relaxation of international tensions. The new “Non-Use of Force” (NUF) item could be pushed in several successive General Assemblies, as the Soviets have done with “Strengthening International Security” (SIS), thus creating the impression among uninformed people that they are busily promoting peace. E. In Relation to Future Disarmament Negotiations It is difficult to foresee to what extent the Soviets may wish to pursue their new non-use initiative following UN consideration of the item this year. If Soviet motivations are principally in the propaganda field, and if the item is not successful at the GA, then it would seem likely that they would not be particularly interested in urging serious negotiations on the basis of their proposal in forums such as SALT and the CCD where propaganda elements are less prominent. If, on the other hand, a substantial part of the Soviet motivation includes establishment of a principle which implies that use of nuclear weapons may be initiated if an enemy attacks with conventional force, then the Soviets may wish to pursue the matter with the US privately at subsequent negotiations, arguing that agreement on the Soviet formulation would represent consolidation of a traditional US position. Whether, in connection with SALT, CSCE/MBFR or CCD negotiations the U.S. would wish to treat the proposal as a serious proposition would depend upon consideration of the context of the discussions as well as on more far-reaching policy studies than are being undertaken in this paper. 5. ATTITUDE OF THE PRC The Chinese interpret the new Soviet initiative as directed against them. By including nuclear weapons in the non-use of force concept, the Soviet Union is no doubt seen as seeking worldwide approval of its right to use such weapons against China in the event it is attacked with conventional weapons. Furthermore, the PRC must sense that the Soviets are also undercutting its propaganda position on the nonuse of nuclear weapons and that by appearing to be even more sweepingly against the use of force, the Soviets can hold themselves out to the Third World as being more peaceful than the Chinese. In his October 3 address to the UNGA, the Chinese representative, Chiao Kuan-hua, emphasized that the Soviet Government is still unwilling to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Specifically, the Chinese representative stated that the consequence of linking renunciation of the use of force and non-use of nuclear weapons would he to permit use of nuclear weapons if a country engaged “in armed struggle against aggression.” Chiao added that the Soviet Government does not believe in its own theory of non-use of force, as witnessed by the undisguised Soviet support to the Indian Government against Pakistan. The PRC sees the Soviet non-use of force initiative as an attempt to undermine Chinese efforts to place the greatest responsibility for disarmament on the two nuclear superpowers. Although the Chinese charge both the US and USSR with hypocrisy in their disarmament efforts, the principal object of PRC hostility is the Soviet Union. The perceived Soviet threat against China and the long-standing competition of the two countries to lead the world Communist movement are doubtless key elements in the Chinese position. It is, therefore, unlikely that the Chinese will mute their sharp condemnation of any disarmament proposal which the Soviets may introduce. While professing neutrality on the question of inscription of the Soviet “non-use of force” item on the UNGA agenda, the PRC delegation declared that, far from being afraid of a debate, it was actually anticipating the opportunity to make things uncomfortable for the Soviet Union. Once the item was inscribed, the PRC lost no time in trying to do so. In his address to the General Assembly Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua dismissed the Soviet initiative as a “sheer hoax” and “shabby stuff.” The PRC representative asserted that the real intent of the Soviet proposal was to perpetuate the division of the world between the two nuclear superpowers, who would keep their nuclear arsenal intact, and the “oppressed peoples” who would be forced to submit to the nuclear threat of the superpowers. In Chiao’s words, “the proposal of the Soviet Government, no matter how much it is couched in diplomatic language, has the real intent of making all oppressed nations and peoples tamely submit to the nuclear threat of the one or two superpowers.” Chiao asserted that only the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons could do away with the nuclear threat, saying: “At present, a mere cessation of all nuclear tests without complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons can only hinder countries with few or no nuclear weapons from developing their nuclear capabilities for self-defense, hut will not affect in the least the nuclear hegemony of the superpowers.” An examination of the background of the PRC position on non-use of force and nuclear weapons is contained in Annex C. 6. INITIAL U.S. RESPONSE On September 19, Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov called on Assistant Secretary De Palma to urge the U.S. Government to support the USSR’s new UNGA item on non-use of force. In our initial comments to Vorontsov and in subsequent preliminary guidance to the field, we drew on long-established U.S. positions. Pending a detailed study of the Soviet proposal, we have neither supported nor opposed the initiative. At the same time we have pointed out privately to the Soviets and others the following reservations: (1) The proposed Soviet resolution does not seem to add anything useful to what is already in the UN Charter which draws a distinction between use of force for individual and collective defense, which is legitimate, and for aggression, which is not. (2) An effort to restate Charter language in UN resolutions has drawbacks. If the wording of the proposed resolution departs at all from the language of the Charter, then it tends to—detract from the Charter. If it does not depart, then it adds nothing. (3) Calling on the Security Council to make such a UNGA declaration binding on all member states would pose serious constitutional problems under the Charter. Under relevant Charter articles, the Security Council has the power to make binding decisions to maintain peace and security with respect to specific situations of a threat or breach of the peace. The Council does not have the power to establish general rules of conduct binding on all members, much less to purport to revise Charter treaty obligations for all members. Moreover, injection of the non-use proposal into the Security Council would likely result in acrimonious dispute and could thereby harm the Council’s effectiveness. (4) The exception made by Mr. Gromyko in his letter of September 15 to the Secretary-General, and in his speech of September 26 to the UNGA, that “the peoples of oppressed colonial countries” among others could legitimately use all available means to carry on their struggle, creates an enormous loophole which would be dangerous and subject to misuse, for example by terrorist organizations. (5) The general U.S. position on such matters is that the way to make recourse to force less likely is to pursue genuine and constructive negotiations to resolve outstanding and specific disputes and to achieve concrete arms limitation measures. Efforts toward broad reformulation of existing Charter provisions would not help to solve specific problems. 7. TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE UN Timing UNGA plenary debate on the Soviet draft resolution on nonuse of force is scheduled to begin November 2. Four full days have been set aside for the item. If the resolution is pressed to a vote, we would expect voting to take place considerably later in the UNGA session, perhaps as late as mid-December. Delay could be expected in particular if, as is quite possible, Sino-Soviet polemics erupt during debate. Any significant effort to modify the USSR draft text would also be likely to delay a vote. Positions Soundings by the US Mission in New York indicate that most delegations have so far paid little attention to the non-use of force item, and that those which have largely tend to regard it as a propaganda initiative analogous to earlier Soviet efforts on Strengthening International Security and the World Disarmament Conference. A review of some 45 speeches in UNGA general debate indicates that no UN member apart from the Soviet Bloc, PRC and Chile has ever mentioned the USSR proposal. Nor are we aware of favorable non-Bloc comments outside the Assembly forum. As noted, the PRC has taken a very negative public stand, labeling the Soviet proposal “a sheer hoax” which is ideologically faulty for not distinguishing between just and unjust wars. Moreover, PRC representatives in New York have several times sought to sound out US Mission officials on our position, with the clear implication that they were soliciting US opposition to the Soviet resolution. Our allies are generally negative although most do not yet appear to have arrived at final positions. Both the UK and France have privately dismissed the initiative as a transparent Soviet attempt to convince the Third World that the USSR is more “peace-loving” than other major powers. A Dutch official was particularly critical of the feature of the resolution that singles out nuclear weapons as the subject of a non-use undertaking. Several West European countries, notably the FRG, are worried about the implications of the resolution for the US nuclear deterrent and European security. A UK Mission officer indicated that the British were considering a totally passive role in the UN, abstaining in any vote on the resolution with a brief explanation of vote. The UK, he said, was especially reluctant to interject itself into what it foresaw as a potentially heated Sino-Soviet dispute. The Japanese also regard the Soviet initiative as a propaganda vehicle, but note that domestic public opinion practically precludes Japan’s overt opposition to such a disarmament item. Third World countries thus far have been generally skeptical or indifferent regarding the USSR initiative; some have indicated sensitivity to the Sino-Soviet problem and a distaste for taking sides. 8. Options The evaluation of various options which follows is intended to facilitate a decision on the posture which the United States should adopt now toward the Soviet draft resolution. That posture must be subject to further review as the Assembly debate unfolds for a number of reasons. The Soviets are probably not willing to accommodate the Chinese but might perhaps he willing to amend their resolution to gain the support of the U.S. and others. They might, for example, be willing to make clear that the use of nuclear weapons is included in the prohibition of the use of force and delete the language regarding a “decision” by the Security Council. On the other hand, they might be pressed by some LDC’s to include objectionable language reflecting the position that assistance to national liberation groups is not covered by the resolution. Also, it is not yet clear what positions other countries will be adopting toward the resolution, i.e., whether the resolution is seriously or lightly regarded, whether it is seen as involving essentially a USSR-PRC confrontation and, if so, whether there is a general disposition to stand back from it. It is not even clear at this stage that the Soviets will press their resolution to a vote if it receives scanty support. The unfolding of these variables could not only redefine the language and interpretation of the resolution but will also determine whether it is a matter of greater or lesser political significance. The Ad Hoc Group has considered and discarded a completely “neutral” posture. Although it may be possible for the U.S. to hide behind others to some extent in relation to the proposal, it will not be possible to remain completely non-committal because of past U.S. positions on non-use of force and because a complete failure to express U.S. reservations would be immediately misunderstood by others as leaning in the Soviet direction. The delegation could, however, regardless of what final position the U.S. might take on the substance of the matter, adopt a position of relative inactivity. This could govern our initial posture in deciding whether to speak in the debate, whether to seek amendments either directly or through others, and whether to seek or encourage the introduction of competing resolutions. Whatever position is adopted by the U.S., close consultation with our Allies is essential. A. Support Resolution in its Present Form In seeking our support the Soviets have sought to interpret their resolution as ruling out all use of force, conventional and nuclear, but as permitting use of all means (including nuclear) by a country that is attacked. This, of course, is essentially our position with regard to the defense of Western Europe, and the Soviets may have some hope that we will associate ourselves with their initiative or at least go along with it. Conceivably we could do so, explaining to the PRC that this is our traditional position and that our support of it in the UNGA is not intended to have any special significance relative to USSR–PRC relations. It seems highly unlikely that the PRC would accept any such explanation. The Chinese would almost certainly treat our position as a deliberate and direct association with the USSR on the most sensitive and important security issue between it and the USSR. As for our European allies, we could also attempt to persuade them that we were only reiterating the fundamental position which validated our nuclear deterrent in Europe, but they would almost certainly be dismayed at what they would regard as a radical change in the U.S. position. They would point out that the interpretation we were attributing to the Soviet resolution could hardly be derived from a direct reading of its text. They would undoubtedly see our position as a departure from our traditional insistence on the invalidity of unenforceable “prohibitions of the use of nuclear weapons” and would regard that reversal as casting new and fundamental doubts on our political will to make the nuclear deterrent effective. Pro — Would contribute to possibility that Soviets might be willing to be more forthcoming toward us in other contexts. — Puts US on affirmative side of so-called “peace initiative”. Con — Would raise serious doubts among our Allies about the reliability of the US nuclear deterrent. — Would clearly be regarded by the PRC as U.S. taking sides with the Soviets against them. — Would attribute a more serious nature to Soviet proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it. — Would acquiesce in a most undesirable precedent affirming Security Council competence to revise Charter treaty obligations and-establish general rules of conduct binding on members. — Would be inconsistent with our traditional position that reiteration of UN Charter principles is unnecessary and can detract from the Charter. B. Support or Accept Resolution if Suitably Amended Within this option we could seek amendments which would make the resolution acceptable to us, either submitting these ourselves or urging friendly countries to do so. Alternatively, we could be prepared only when asked to tell the Soviets and others what changes would permit us reluctantly to go along with the resolution if it were then generally acceptable in the GA. For the resolution to be acceptable to us, it would have to make clear that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is not a separate matter but is included in the general prohibition of the use of force, the language regarding the Security Council would have to be removed, and the resolution would have to be entirely consistent with the UN Charter. The Ad Hoc Group believes the U.S. should not accept any exceptions to the prohibition on non-use of force for national liberation groups. If the Soviet Union were prepared to move to a resolution acceptable to us, the PRC might find itself isolated. In this situation, the PRC could either support directly, abstain, oppose, or suggest a procedure such as acceptance of the resolution by the UNGA by acclamation (thus avoiding a vote). This latter procedure was used, for example, in relation to last year’s World Disarmament Conference resolution when the PRC apparently wanted to avoid having to have its vote recorded. Pro — Might afford better chance of resolution ultimately acceptable to our friends, especially in NATO. — Might possibly reduce friction between PRC and Soviets on this issue and reduce the possibility of the US being caught in the middle. — Would still put the U.S. in a relatively affirmative posture toward so-called “peace initiative”. — Would be consistent with US view that prohibition of nuclear force is included within and subject to Charter’s general rule on non-use of force. — Would appear consistent with US willingness in other contexts (e.g.,US/USSR Declaration of Principles) to support adoption of non-use of force principles if properly formulated. — Might be regarded by the Soviets as helpful if they are otherwise faced with defeat of their resolution. Con — Might still carry negative implications, particularly for some of our allies, regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent—unless the amendments were to result in a text completely acceptable to us and all our allies. — Collaboration with Soviets would have political overtones for our allies regardless of substance of our consultations. — Might still be considered by the PRC as favoring a Soviet initiative at their expense, especially because of the implication that nuclear weapons would be treated as any other weapons. — Might be viewed by the Soviets as vitiating their initiative and hence contrary to our obligation to work with them toward detente. — Could lend credence in the eyes of LDCs to the PRC charge of “superpower collusion”. — Would be inconsistent with our traditional position that reiteration of UN Charter Principles is not necessary and can detract from the Charter. — Would attribute a more serious nature to Soviet’ proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it. C. Support If Amended as in Preceding Option But With Addition of an Assurance by Nuclear States Regarding Non-Nuclear States This Option would add a provision that nuclear states intend to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is not engaged in an aggress ion assisted by a nuclear weapons state. This formula is very close to one advanced privately to the USSR in February 1968 (described at page 5 above.) The statement of intention by the nuclear weapons states would be included in the resolution itself or could be requested by the GA for action in the Security Council. In 1968, the Soviets found the US proposal “completely unacceptable” since the USSR was unwilling to give the same guarantee to countries with nuclear weapons on their territory as to those without such weapons. President Johnson withdrew authorization to use the earlier formula in April 1968. It is unlikely that the Soviets are now willing to consider such a provision. The US delegation could either advance the proposal itself or get it advanced by a friendly country. It could be put up as a trial balloon or, alternatively, be promoted vigorously. Full advance consultation with our allies would be necessary. Pro — Could advance our policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons by reassuring non-nuclear weapon states that in certain types of conflicts nuclear weapons would not be used against them, thus creating a disincentive to obtaining nuclear weapons for themselves or seeking the assistance of an armed conflict. — Could give the U.S. a measure of credit for leadership on a significant arms control matter. — Would move nonuse of force discussions to a more serious plane. Con — Would likely to be unacceptable to the Soviets, as it was in 1968. — Might be interpreted by Soviets as an effort to destroy their initiative and, hence, contrary to our obligation to work together toward detente. — Might not receive appreciable support because it would not apply to certain types of conflicts. — Might lead the Soviets to issue a competing proposal protecting non-nuclear states. Such a proposal would be more attractive than our own. — Could stimulate reopening of the issue of whether non-nuclear signatories of the NPT should receive increased security compensation for their adherence to the NPT. — Might not be sufficient time available to consult adequately with our allies regarding a US initiative of this importance. — Might be prejudicial to careful consideration of a later initiative in subsequent arms control negotiations where it might contribute more substantially to general arms control. D. Opposition to Resolution Within this option there is a wide range of possible activity, from vigorous opposition in urging other governments to adopt the same position to a quiet restraint in which the delegation would indicate its difficulty with resolution only if others asked. In the voting the delegation could under this option oppose or abstain, depending upon the developing situation in New York. The U.S. delegation would refuse to suggest any amendments, saying that the resolution is so defective that it does not warrant an effort to try to improve it. It would be possible to begin with a negative position and then, move to a somewhat more affirmative one if the resolution were being changed to take into consideration our objections. Pro — Would reassure some NATO allies. — Would suggest to the PRC that we are not facilitating a formula which they would view as condoning a Soviet nuclear attack or pressure against them. — Would be consistent with our earlier position on attempts to restate Charter Principles and with our opposition to granting the Security Council power to establish genuine and binding rules of conduct. — Would keep us detached from troublesome amendment process where solutions satisfactory to all major participants may be unattainable. Con (All these liabilities would be greatly reduced if our opposition were of a quiet or restrained character rather than more obvious and active) — Would be resented by the Soviets, particularly as we would appear to he aligning ourselves with the PRC against them. — If pursued actively, our position would probably not be supported by certain NATO allies, including some of our close friends, on the grounds that less aggressive tactics could be adequate to protect alliance interests. — Could be misunderstood as opposition to a peace initiative. — Could be distorted as an inconsistency in view of our past willingness to support non-use declarations, e.g. in the Moscow Declaration of Principles. — Could be interpreted as attributing a more serious nature to the Soviet proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it. — Might lose some opportunities to promote favorable changes in the resolution by failing to hold out the prospect of possible U.S. support if the resolution is acceptably amended. 9. Recommendations: The Ad Hoc Group, in view of the considerations expressed above reached the following consensus: Our initial stance should be a relatively inactive one. We do not think it would be reasonable to support the resolution as it is. Nor should we promote amendments initially because the Soviet initiative may fail to attract much support or even interest. We should privately and quietly point out to the delegates the problems we see in the draft, especially the role contemplated for the Security Council, the explicit and separate prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and in general the doubtful utility of trying to refine Charter language. We would tell others that we could not support the resolution in its present form. (One possibility is that no resolution may be voted upon as a result of Chinese-Soviet conflict on the item.) While we would not ourselves propose amendments, if the Soviets (or others) propose some to us we would say that we would consider them. We would not give any undertaking to press such amendments with others. We will, of course, keep in constant and close touch with our Allies regarding the resolution. Depending on the nature of amendments offered by the Soviets and by others, and depending on the degree of interest generated by their draft resolution and by amendments to cure its deficiencies, we would then consider whether to take a more active posture and whether to move from “relatively inactive opposition” to acceptance of a suitably amended resolution. [Omitted here are Annexes A, B, and C.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 2, NSC/Miscellaneous Memos, January-February 1972. Secret. Annexes A, B, and C are not published. The study was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an October 17 Department of State memorandum in anticipation of discussion of the Soviet proposal at an October 18 Senior Review Group meeting. (Ibid.) 347. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 347. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 24, 1972 SUBJECT: NSSM 162: Soviet UN Resolution: None-Use of Force, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons This is a rather straightforward issue: What posture should we adopt in the UN discussion on the Soviet proposal for renunciation of force and a permanent prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons? The debate starts on November 2 and will last about 4 days; voting may be delayed until mid-December. This memorandum is for your use at the SRG, but if there is not time for an SRG meeting, we will need to provide some guidance well before the debate starts. The conclusions of the NSSM, my recommendations, and some questions for your decision are at the end of this memorandum. The full study is at Tab A. 1. The Soviet Resolution The operative paragraphs are: “The General Assembly… 1. Solemnly declares on behalf of the State Members of the Organization, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, their renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. 2. Recommends the Security Council take, as soon as possible, an appropriate decision whereby the present declaration of the General Assembly will acquire binding force under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. ” What does it mean? As explained privately in New York by Ambassador Roshchin, the Soviet delegate to the CCD, the non-use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons are “inseparable.”If force is used by one country against another country, then the latter is freed from any obligation under the Soviet scheme and could use nuclear weapons, i.e., the whole agreement “does not exist.” Under this interpretation the Soviet resolution is as much a prescription for the use of nuclear weapons as a permanent prohibition. Moreover, there is a veiled implication that use of conventional weapons is slightly more legitimate than use of nuclear weapons. 2. The Major Factors A. Whatever the Soviets may have in mind in advancing this in the UN, one aspect stands out clearly: it is directed against China. This item is the latest in a series of anti-Chinese initiatives. The Soviets have very deliberately taken the old Chinese disarmament position and have advanced it piece by piece in the UN and elsewhere, with the aim no doubt of creating a record of Chinese obstreperousness in opposing their own ideas. First, there was Brezhnev’s Asian collective security scheme, which included a renunciation of the use of force; then a Five Power Conference of Nuclear States; a World Disarmament Conference; and a renunciation of force and prohibition of nuclear use. The Chinese have seen this aspect but have counterattacked. Thus in New York, Chiao denounced the latest Soviet proposal as a “hoax,” invalidated by Soviet support of India and designed to perpetuate the nuclear domination of the US and USSR. He characterized the proposal as one intended to make other countries submit to the Soviet nuclear (by legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons). Thus, a Sino-Soviet clash is likely in New York. Whatever positionwe adopt will be read in light of this Sino-Soviet dispute. B. A second factor is our long record of opposition to this type of item in the UN and in other forums (Annex A to the Study). We have consistently opposed reiterating the Charter provision on the renunciation of force, on the grounds that this tends to undermine the Charter by casting doubt on its validity. Moreover, we have opposed special treatment of nuclear weapons because (a) it casts doubt on our willingness to use nuclear weapons in self-defense, and (b) it undermines “flexible response” in Europe. A broad prohibition on nuclear use but organically linked to non-use of force is different from the older idea of no-first-use, which tends to sanction conventional attack and defense. The difference between a “permanent prohibition” and no-first-use, however, is too Talmudic to cause a change in our position. C. Third , there is the problem of Allied reaction . Our Allies assume that the Soviet initiative is largely propaganda and not to be taken seriously. They assume we will be passive or oppose the item. They argue that singling out a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons impugns tactical use in self-defense, which could shake the credibility of our deterrent. D. Finally, there is the factor of UN opinion. The Soviets can generate some support for their proposal. There is a record of UN resolutions banning force and nuclear use. They may be able to muster a majority, especially if they entertain amendments. Our opposition—especially in light of the Soviet-American Principles—may be a more difficult problem than in past years. After all, we have renounced force in bilateral relations in a 1970 UN resolution and will probably do so in the CSCE. In sum , the degree of opposition or support we provide the USSR must take account of the following: — our record of previous opposition to this sort of initiative, and the implications and consequences of shifting toward the Soviets; — the probability of a sharp Sino-Soviet exchange and how our stand will be interpreted by Moscow and Peking in terms of whether we seem to be siding with one or the other; — the possibility (or probability) of passage of an amended resolution which we might find difficult to oppose; — the dilemma that amending the Soviet text in the direction of legitimizing nuclear self-defense satisfies the Allies, but alarms the Chinese. 3. OPTIONS Our options are not very wide ranging. (1) Straightforward support for the resolution in its present form would range us squarely against China, and raise apprehensions in Allied capitals about our eagerness to accommodate Moscow. (2) Vigorous (active) opposition on the other hand is probably not tenable since (a) we do not oppose the concept of non-use of force; (b) we cannot afford to align ourselves actively with China against Moscow. (3) Pure neutralism is not viable in practice: we cannot really be mute, since we have to inform some of our Allies where we stand; and, more significant adopting strict neutrality means we will not work against, and, therefore, the chances for passing the resolution automatically improve. This would probably be read as pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese. Thus our Basic Options seem to be: (1) Modest support for a suitably amended resolution: — We would either submit amendments, or encourage others to do so, with the aim of subsuming the nuclear prohibition within the renunciation of force. — In addition, we would seek the removal, on UN constitutional grounds, of the second paragraph, thus stripping the resolution of any unique, binding character. — In an altered form we would either vote for or abstain and submit an interpretation of our abstention. (2) Passive opposition: — Under this option we would not actively oppose the resolution; if asked we would criticize its features in a fairly low key; we would abstain or oppose the resolution perhaps explaining our vote. — We would not encourage or offer amendments to make the resolution more palatable, but would not necessarily oppose them. — We could hold open a shift to a more affirmative position if the resolution were amended to our satisfaction. (3) Seek Amendment with Special Clause of Non-Use Against Non-Nuclear Powers: — Under this variant we would resurrect some of the NPT language as an amendment: a pledge by the nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not engaged in aggression assisted by a nuclear power. This is close to the position advanced privately to the USSR in 1969, but subsequently withdrawn. — The Soviets opposed it in 1968 on the grounds that they differentiated between a state with nuclear weapons on its territory and other non-nuclear powers. — This is probably a non-starter, and opens an ugly mess of issues that had better remain closed. CONCLUSIONS The NSSM ends with the following recommendations: — initially we should be relatively inactive; we would not support the resolution or promote amendments; — privately and “quietly” we would point out the problems in the Soviet draft, especially the binding nature of paragraph 2 (a SC resolution) and the unacceptability of an explicit and separate prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons; — we would inform other delegations that we would not support the resolution in its present form; — we would consider, in light of developments, a more active posture and whether to move from relative inactive opposition to acceptance of a suitably amended re solution. RECOMMENDATIONS I have no major problems with this suggested tactical line. It is, however, rather general and loose, so that one does not know exactly what our position is going to be as the debate progresses. Moreover, given the disposition of our UN Desk in State to oppose this item, our negativism may be less restrained than suggested. The main problem, however, is how far we can go in attacking the substance ofa non-use of force/nuclear prohibition. I recommend that we play down this aspect and take the position that if there is wide support for the resolution, minus its binding SC provisions, we could support it. But, if there is major contention, the issues should not be pressed to a conclusion. In short, our position is mildly favorable to the substance, but opposition to forcing a clear split among the members. Next Steps Time has about run out. Assuming there is no SRG and in view of the fact that corridor talk on the Soviet item is already starting in New York, State is preparing an instruction, for White House clearance, to implement the recommendations in the NSSM study. I will forward this to you, with my comments as soon as possible, but in the interim I need to have your view on the following: 1. Do we start with an initial, passive position of low-keyed criticism? Approve Disapprove. 2. Do we refrain from trying to amend the Soviet text? Approve Disapprove, amend to make more acceptable 3. Do we avoid a clear-cut stand by announcing our intention to abstain on the grounds that the issue has become divisive and too contentious? Approve Disapprove 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, SRG Meeting, NSSM 162, 10/27/72. Secret. Sent for action. None of the options on page 6 is marked. At Tab A was Document 345 . 348. Telegram 195162 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 348. Telegram 195162 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 26, 1972, 2317Z. Subj: Non-use of Force (NUF) 1. In discussing with other delegations the Sov draft res on non-use of force and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, USDel should be guided by the following: (A) USDel should adopt a relatively inactive stance. We do not support the res as it is. USDel should not encourage or promote amendments at this time because the Sov initiative may fail to attract much support or even interest. (B) USDel should privately and quietly point out to other delegations the problems we see in the Sov draft, especially the role contemplated for the SC, and in the doubtful utility of trying to refine Charter language. Re latter, Sov res apparently attempts in second operative para to make something binding which is already binding under the Charter. (C) USDel should tell other dels that USG could not support the res in its present form. USDel should not propose amendments, but if the Sovs or others propose amendments to us USDel should say that we would consider them. USDel should say we could not give any undertaking to press such amendments with others. (D) USDel should keep in constant and close touch with our allies regarding the res. 2. USDel is requested to keep Dept promptly informed of any moves by others to amend or otherwise alter Sov text. Depending upon developments, we will consider whether to move from relatively inactive opposition to acceptance of a suitably amended resolution. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, and USNATO. Drafted by McIntyre (IO/UNP); and cleared in IO, L, EUR/RPM, INR, UNP, L/UNA, ACDA, and EUR/SOV. 349. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 349. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, undated SUBJECT: Supplementary Memo: NSSM 162 Soviet Non-Use of Force, etc./SRG Meeting The current instructions for our UN delegation are a modified version of the conclusions of the NSSM study. They include the following points: — The US should adopt a relatively inactive stance, but not support the Soviet resolution as it now stands, nor encourage or promote amendments. — The US will criticize the constitutional features (para. 2 of Soviet resolution) and the doubtful value of trying to restate or redefine Charter language. — NOTE : for now we will not attack the substance of a “permanent prohibition” on use of nuclear weapons. — We will tell other delegations that we will “consider” amendments, but give no commitment to support them. — Pending “developments” we will consider whether to move from relatively inactive opposition to acceptance of a suitably amended resolution. COMMENT : This instruction should keep us out of the Sino-Soviet fight, and without having to attack the substance of the non-use of force provisions. There are two further points that are not made that you may want to consider after or during the meeting. — Rather than become engaged in a debate on the substance of the proposal, we could take the position that the key issue is for all the nuclear powers to support any resolution (as Gromyko indicated in his speech), and that failing such a unanimity, it would be better to lay the matter aside for this GA session. — In addition, however, we could go further and suggest that the ambiguity of the Soviet resolution be clarified so that it is clearly established that renunciation of force includes renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. In this case, we could abstain on the procedural grounds that nuclear power unanimity was required, but that the substance was acceptable. — This position would placate the Soviets but would almost certainly antagonize the Chinese, and perhaps dismay our Allies. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, SRG Meeting, NSSM 162 10/27/72. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum, unsigned, is dated October 27. (Ibid., NSSM 162) 350. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 350. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting 1 Washington, October 27, 1972, 4:46–4:58 p.m. Subject: Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: NSSM 162 Participants: Chairman Henry A. Kissinger State: U. Alexis Johnson Samuel DePalma Robert Martin Col. Harry Johnson Defense Kenneth Rush Armistead Selden Dwayne Anderson JCS Vice Adm. John P. Weinel R/Adm. James H. Doyle, Jr. CIA Richard Helms [ name not declassified ] ACDA James Leonard Alan Neidle NSC Helmet Sonnendeldt William Hyland Fernando Rondon Jeanne W. Davis SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS It was agreed that: — the U.S. Delegation to the UN General Assembly will take the position that we favor reaffirmation of the renunciation of the use of force, but consider it unnecessary, and that we object to any distinction between categories of weapons. Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might have a brief meeting on this Soviet resolution on non-use of force (copy attached), primarily because of the way it positions us with the Chinese and the Soviets and the pressures we will be under from both sides, particularly the Chinese. We have already had some messages from them indicating that they consider it an anti-Chinese resolution and they hope we won’t be taken in by it. Mr. Johnson: They’re right, it is an anti-Chinese resolution. That’s what it’s designed for and the Soviets hope to bring us into it. Our position is very simple—we think we should stay as far away from it as possible. We have nothing to gain by working with the Soviets on this. We can take the line that, if the prohibition of the use of force is already in the UN Charter, why say it? If this resolution is different, how is it different? This is a Peking-Moscow fight. We have instructed our delegation not to discuss it, not to take any initiative, and not to talk about any defects in it or we will be asked how we would correct the defects. We do expect the Soviets to get a majority for it. Mr. Kissinger: When does it come up? Mr. DePalma: The debate begins November and is expected to last four days. Mr. Johnson: And when the vote comes, we will abstain. Mr. Kissinger: This is not the time to get either the Soviets or the Chinese mad at us. Mr. DePalma: The Soviets are leaning hard on us. They are saying that they have bought our position. That we told them our position was to stand by the Charter prohibition on the use of force and that that’s what they’re doing. They are linking it to Article 51 of the Charter. They say they have come around to our point of view. Mr. Johnson: They’re not that naive. Mr. DePalma they’re not. They know full well what they’re doing and the probable effect on the Allies. They have come around 180 degrees and they think it would be nice to have the UN and the world community endorse their position against the Chinese. Mr. Johnson: This says that if they are attacked by the Chinese, the Soviets can use nuclear weapons. The Soviets interpret this as UN sanction for them to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese. Mr. DePalma: And the Chinese made this point right away. Mr. Kissinger: Will the resolution pass? Mr. DePalma: The General Assembly has a long record of passing resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, a cutback of the position they have taken in the past. I can’t believe the Assembly won’t pass it. Mr. Kissinger: Can we separate the prohibition on the recourse to force from the use of nuclear weapons? Mr. DePalma: We have always taken that position. The Soviets specifically want the reference to nuclear weapons. Mr. Kissinger: I’m concerned with saying something that leans a little their way but, in fact, stops any operational procedures. The Chinese wouldn’t be bothered by a resolution against the use of force. Mr. Johnson: But if it’s only that, how is it different from the Charter? And if it is different, how is it different? Mr. Kissinger: What would we say in the debate ? Would we have to speak at all? Mr. DePalma: It depends on how the debate goes. It’s hard to believe that we wouldn’t have to speak. We could make our traditional speech on the non-use of force—we could refer to the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations which was one of the best of these statements. Mr. Kissinger: Can we postpone the debate next week? Next week is a bad time—we don’t want either of these countries mad at us. Mr. Johnson: The Russians have made this a priority item. Mr. Belden: Can we get someone else to amend it? Mr. Johnson: What attitude would the Chinese take to that? Mr. Kissinger: The Chinese won’t object to reaffirming the objection to the use of force. They will object to linking this with the use of nuclear weapons since this, in effect, legitimizes the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Johnson: If someone else wants to try to amend it, we could take a look at the amendment. Mr. Kissinger: So we can take the position that we favor the reaffirmation of the objection to the recourse to force, but consider it unnecessary, and that we oppose any distinction between categories of weapons. Mr. Leonard: We may end up in a very small group. The French have told the Russians they will go along. Mr. Johnson: I agree, we may end in a small group, but we always have been on this issue. Mr. Kissinger: How about the British? Mr. DePalma: They’re okay as of now. But the French have said they would agree if the resolution contained a reference to Article 51. Mr. Johnson: What about an amendment to the referral to the security Council in the second paragraph? Mr. DePalma: This is very troublesome. We can’t accept the idea of the Security Council adopting this as a binding declaration. Mr. Kissinger: The Chinese would veto it. Mr. DePalma: The Soviets have indicated they would drop this if necessary. Mr. Kissinger: (to Helms) How do you feel about it? Mr. Helms: I agree that we should stay as far away from it as possible and then make a statement against sin and reaffirming the Charter objection to the use of force. Mr. Kissinger: Okay, but can we make sure we won’t infuriate the Chinese. I’d rather pay a little price with the Russians if we absolutely have to, but we shouldn’t get in the middle of their fight. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes 1972–1973. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The attachment is not published. 351. Telegram 207841 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 351. Telegram 207841 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 15, 1972, 1742Z. Subject: Non-use of Force (NUF) Ref: A. State 1951122 B. USUN 4572 1. It is clear from USUN 4572 that Sovs know of nonaligned efforts to produce their own draft NUF res and Sovs are unhappy about this development, fearing non-aligned will take initiative away from Sovs on NUF as they did on WDC. 2. We believe it also magnifies our problem. Whereas Sov effort appeared to be facing a massive abstention which could have deterred them from pressing their res to a vote, the non-aligned res (which appears to have most of same problems as Soviet res from our standpoint) may well be brought to a vote; and because of non-aligned loyalties it can be expected to pick up more affirmative votes than the Sov draft. 3. If Soviet NUF resolution is brought to vote, you should abstain. 4. If a draft along lines described in USUN 4572 is tabled, you should also abstain. We are concerned, inter alia, that draft appears to place Charter, SIS Declaration and Declaration on Friendly Relations on a par; that paraphrase of Art 51 is incomplete; that it is unclear as to what the right of states to eliminate “consequences of aggression” might mean: that implications of the phrase “legitimacy of struggle of national liberation movements to assert self-determination by all necessary means” are uncertain; that draft recalls declaration on prohibition of nuclear weapons which we opposed for well-known reasons of basic policy; and that operative paras which are similar to those contained in Sov draft contain other difficulties (single out nuclear weapons, inappropriate use of Security Council, etc.). 5. If the operative paras are voted separately in the two draft NUF reses, USDel should abstain on both operative paras in the non-aligned draft, abstain on first operative para in the Sov draft but vote against operative para two in the Sov draft. We share UK view that we will be in a stronger position in possible SC consultations if we have opposed adoption of that para. Non-aligned draft operative para two does not raise as strong objections since it refers only to “appropriate measures”. 6. Del should continue to point out privately and quietly to other dels problems we see in the drafts, especially the role contemplated for the SC and the doubtful utility of trying to refine Charter language. 7. If several of our NATO allies explain their vote, you should explain ours as well. If none of our major allies does, you should not make a statement. A. To explain absention on resolutions as a whole: While the non-use of force is a laudable objective, the US believes the Charter of the United Nations remains the basic guideline covering the conduct of nations. We are skeptical about the utility of restating principles of the UN Charter through General Assembly resolutions because we feel that such resolutions tend to detract from the Charter itself. We also believe that the distinction drawn in the Charter between the threat of or use of force for individual or collective self-defense, which is legitimate, and the threat of or use of force for aggression, which is not, is the key principle governing the use of force in international relations, and we regret that the two resolutions before us do not explicitly draw that distinction. We will therefore abstain on both resolutions. B. To explain a negative vote on second operative paragraph of Soviet draft: Although we are abstaining on entirety of Soviet draft resolution, as well as on the first operative paragraph of that resolution, we are voting against the second operative paragraph of that resolution. We do not believe that the Charter confers on the Security Council the power to establish general rules of conduct binding upon members, much less the power to add to or detract from or otherwise modify Charter obligations for all members. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Priority. It was repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Semler (ACDA/IR) and McIntyre (IO/UNP); cleared in DOD/ISA, PM/DCA, ACDA/IR, the White House, IO/UNP, EUR/SOV, and IO; and approved by De Palma (IO). 352. Telegram 215438 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 352. Telegram 215438 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 28, 1972, 2251Z. Subj: Non-aligned Non-use of Force Resolution Ref: USUN 4880 1. Preambular para reading “mindful of the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force and the inherent right of states to recover such territories by all the means at their disposal” is unacceptable. No UN document to Department’s knowledge affirms right to use force in these circumstances and we could not accept implicit interpretation of Charter to that effect. 2. We understand PRC is attempting to dissuade non-aligned from tabling this draft, in which event this problem would not arise. If it appears that there is reasonable probability draft will be tabled, Mission should consult soonest with WEOS to set forth our position. We would not wish to suggest suitable wording ourselves, but would hope some of WEOS would take our point that this para articulates right to use of force outside terms of charter and hence insupportable. You should make point that wording change which removes presumption of valid use of force will be required if US is to abstain (instead of casting negative vote) and we believe that WEOS as group should find merit in this position. 3. In view of Sov efforts to consult US on this res, Dept believes it would be appropriate to inform Sovs also of position stated above. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Armitage (IO/UNP); cleared in NEA, ACDA, L/UNA, EUR/SOV, NEA/RA, DOD/ISA, and PM/DCA; and approved by De Palma (IO). 353. Telegram 216018 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 353. Telegram 216018 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, November 29, 1972, 1812Z. Subj: Non-use of Force (NUF) Res Refs: (A) USUN 4880; (B) State 207841; (C) State 215438 1. USDel instructed to abstain in plenary vote on revised non-aligned NUF res (reftel A). 2. USDel should ask for separate vote on sixth preambular para and vote against. 3. In explanation of vote on res you should include statement that US considers that nothing in sixth or seventh preambular paras can change Charter provisions regarding legitimate use of force. 4. USDel should also add statement to effect that preambular para 8 recalls res which US opposed. Our opposition to that res remains unchanged notwithstanding our abstention on NUF res as whole. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Black (IO/UNP); cleared in UNP, NEA/RA, L/UNA, EUR/SOV, NEA, UNP, PM/DCA, and ACDA/IR; and approved by De Palma of IO. 354. Telegram 5164 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 354. Telegram 5164 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 30, 1972, 0330Z. Subj: Non-use of Force (NUF) Res Ref: (A) State 216018 (B) Phillips-De Palma Telcon of Nov 29 1. Confirming Phillips-De Palma telcon, we ascertained midday Nov 29 co-sponsors of non-aligned NUF res, would firmly oppose any attempt to vote on separate paras of res. As per telcon, we therefore registered our opposition to preambular para six in explanation of vote after vote and did not request separate vote on the para. Text of our explanation given below. 2. Outcome of vote was 73–4 PRC, Albania, South Africa, Portugal)–46(US). Most WEO’s abstained, as did several LA and AF dels. 3. In explanation of vote before vote, PRC was sharply critical of Sov NUF initiative. Revised NUF res and use in general. Text of Chinese statement reported septel. 4. We understand Malik was furious over Chinese statement and immediately inscribed to make right of reply. He later deinscribed, apparently at urging of cooler heads on his staff. Malik did, however, make brief summary statement after vote, ostensibly on behalf of co-sponsors, in which he called attention to PRC isolation from Third World on this issue and in calm tone hoped PRC would learn to cooperate with other dels in maintaining international peace and security. Malik also lamely claimed vote was great victory for USSR and peace-loving countries. Begin unclassified. 5. Text of US explanation of vote, delivered by Amb Phillips, follows: Quote Mr. President, while the non-use of force is a laudable objective, the United States believes the Charter of the United Nations remains the basic guideline covering the conduct of nations. We are skeptical about the utility of restating principles of the UN Charter through General Assembly resolutions because we feel that such resolutions tend to detract from the Charter itself. It is for these reasons my delegation has abstained on draft res 676/rev. 1. We also believe that the distinction drawn in the Charter between the threat of, or use of force in accordance with the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, which is legitimate, and non-legitimate uses such as acts of aggression, is the key principle governing the use of force in international relations, and we regret that the resolution before us does not explicitly draw that distinction. I also wish to point out that the United States and many other members voted against General Assembly Res. 1659 (XVI), the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We continue to regard that resolution, which asserts that the use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances is ipso facto a violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity, as without any legal basis. The draft resolution before us today refers to this earlier resolution and appears to assert that nuclear weapons have been prohibited. However laudable the goals of the proponents of this resolution, we are, of course, unable to support such a proposition which so clearly flies in the face of reality and law. Finally, I wish to make clear that the United States considers that nothing in the sixth or seventh preambular paragraphs of the resolution we have just voted upon can change the provisions of the Charter regarding the legitimate use of force. Let me emphasize that in our view paragraph six would establish a right to use force which is beyond the provision of the United Nations Charter. To our knowledge, no United Nations document affirms a right to use force in the circumstances described in this paragraph, and my delegation could not accept an implicit interpretation of the Charter to that effect. Article 2, para 4, of the Charter states “all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” We must not in the name of the “non-use of force” convey to anyone the suggestion that we are creating loopholes to this cardinal Charter principle. End quote. Bush 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, Hong Kong, and the U.S. Delegation to SALT. 6. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 6. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 355. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) Washington, June 10, 1970 Richardson asked DOD to review the issue of ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and enclosed two papers on the protocol. Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Latin America Free Zone, February–December 1970. Confidential. The letter is an unsigned copy but bears an indication Richardson signed the original. Tabs D–H of the enclosed Background Memorandum are published but not Tabs A–C. For documentation on the decision to sign Protocol II in 1968, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XI, Document 226 356. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 24, 1970 Rogers recommended that the President submit Additional Protocol II to the Senate for ratification. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Secret. In a June 26, 1970, memorandum, Jeanne Davis, Director of the NSC Secretariat, notified Eliot that Rogers was authorized to announce to the OAS Assembly on June 26 that the President would submit Protocol II for Senate ratification. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6) 357. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 16, 1970 Eliot forwarded Rogers’ report on Additional Protocol II for the purpose of submitting the protocol for Senate ratification. Included was a proposal for a statement of understanding to be made an integral part of U.S. ratification. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–9 LA. No classification marking. Drafted by McDowell. Enclosures 2 and 3 are not published. 358. Proclamation by President Nixon Washington, July 16, 1970 In his proclamation upon the ratification of Additional Protocol II, the President made note of the “understandings and declarations” with which the Senate gave its consent. Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971, pp. 311–313. No classification marking. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report on Additional Protocol II, April 5, 1971, see ibid., pp. 197–201. 355. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 355. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) 1 Washington, June 10, 1970 Dear Dave: You are doubtless aware that 13 of our Latin American allies have brought into force a regional Treaty for the Prohibition Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which in many ways complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On April 1, 1968, Vice President Humphrey signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the United States. This is a Protocol designed for adherence by nuclear weapon states, which are not eligible to sign the treaty itself. It has been signed and ratified by the United Kingdom. Prior to the U.S. signature, the issues involved in U.S. adherence to the Protocol were carefully reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All such departments and agencies concurred in the decision to sign the Protocol with a statement which was designed to clarify our understanding of several points under the Treaty on which our review indicated that clarification was needed. The Department of Defense requested, however, an opportunity to review the matter again prior to the submission of the Protocol to the Senate, to assure that any relevant experience under the Treaty following our signature would be taken into account. It is the purpose of this letter to afford that opportunity, as well as to seek concurrence in the updating of that portion of the statement dealing with peaceful nuclear explosion services. If you agree that early ratification would be desirable, we would then plan to propose to the President that he submit the Protocol to the Senate at this session. To facilitate consideration of this matter, I enclose (1) a brief summary of the significant interests that would be served by ratification of Additional Protocol II in the near future with a statement similar to that made on signature; and (2) a more detailed paper describing the Protocol and the underlying Treaty, including their status, the issues that were considered by the Executive Branch in connection with the decision to sign the Protocol, and relevant developments since such signature. I personally believe it would be advantageous for the Administration to act on this matter now. Announcement of a decision by the President to seek the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of Additional Protocol II would have a favorable impact at home and abroad, and would reinforce our position on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we should delay action unduly, questions might be raised both here and in Latin America concerning the failure to follow up the U.S. signature of Additional Protocol II. I understand that the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has periodically inquired about when this Protocol be submitted to the Senate and indicated the expectation that it would be favorably received. If additional information on this matter is desired, please contact the Acting Director of ACDA, Mr. Philip Farley. Sincerely, Elliot L. Richardson Enclosure 1 Paper Washington, undated SUMMARY STATEMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS IN RATIFYING ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America would materially improve the prospects for the Treaty’s success. This is believed to be in our national security interest since: 1. The Treaty includes an undertaking by the Latin American parties to prevent the type of deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America that occurred in the Cuban missile crisis and provides for verification of compliance with this undertaking not only by the parties themselves, but by a regional organization that has now been established. It is to our advantage to reduce the chances of such deployment, which could upset stability in this hemisphere and add to the number of locations and directions, and in some cases decrease the distance, from which nuclear attacks could be launched against us. 2. The Treaty complements our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the following respects: (a) The Treaty is already in force for eight states that have not yet ratified the NPT * and has been signed by (but has not entered into force for) three states which have not yet signed the NPT. ** (b) The Treaty requires all nuclear materials and facilities under the jurisdiction of the parties to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (unlike the NPT, which does not prohibit non-explosive military uses of nuclear material), and calls for IAEA safeguards on all such materials and facilities (unlike NPT safeguards, which do not attempt to detect the diversion to nuclear weapons of nuclear material furnished or used for other military purposes). Moreover,IAEA safeguards will be supplemented by the verification activities of the regional organization mentioned above. 3. The U.S. statement proposed as an integral part of our ratification will preserve our rights with regard to territorial claims of others and the freedom of action of the U.S., as well as the parties to the Treaty, to negotiate transit and transport privileges. Our political interests in ratifying Additional Protocol II seem equally clear: 1. It would be a widely welcomed positive step in our relations with our Latin American allies, especially Mexico, which has been its chief promoter. (Our Ambassador to Mexico has strongly urged us to proceed promptly with this matter and Secretary Rogers has assured the Foreign Minister of Mexico that we would consider it expeditiously. We are on notice that our failure to ratify the Protocol this year, now that the United Kingdom has ratified it, will result in the introduction by the Parties of a resolution criticizing such failure at the next session of the UN General Assembly. If we do proceed with ratification, the onus of this criticism will fall on the Soviet Union.) 2. It would improve our posture in international forums dealing with arms control, giving substance to the support which we have consistently expressed for this initiative in Presidential and Vice Presidential speeches in the last Administration, in statements and votes at the UN General Assembly and at disarmament conferences, and during the negotiation of the NPT. (Resolutions supported by the United States and approved with no opposing votes were adopted at the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Sessions of the UN General Assembly, inviting the nuclear-weapon states to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to this treaty as soon as possible.) Such action would be particularly auspicious in this UN anniversary year, in which arms control is expected to be stressed. 3. It should have a timely, beneficial effect on public opinion here and abroad, as a demonstration of the Administration’s interest in promoting arms control. 4. It would put us in a better position to exploit the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to enter into a commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons in Latin America and would help emphasize to our Latin American allies the potential danger of Soviet Cuban ties. Enclosure 2 Paper Washington, undated BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (hereinafter called the Treaty, the full text of which is set forth at Tab B ) is the first successful attempt to create a nuclear free-zone in a populated region of the world. It was created at the initiative of a number of states in Central and South America, a region in which nuclear weapons do not form a part of existing security arrangements. The Parties to the Treaty itself are limited to states located in this region. The basic undertaking of the Parties, contained in Article 1, is to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: “(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and “(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.” The Parties have also undertaken to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon. The Treaty excludes from the definition of nuclear weapon “an instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device… if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.” (Art. 5) Compliance with the Treaty is to be verified by the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear activities in the states covered by the Treaty, and by a regional implementing organization which was established in September, 1969. The Treaty is already in force for the fifteen states listed below (shown on the map at Tab A ): Barbados Honduras Bolivia Jamaica Costa Rica Mexico Dominican Republic Nicaragua Ecuador Paraguay El Salvador Peru Guatemala Uruguay Haiti All other Latin American states have signed the Treaty except Cuba (whose present government has indicated that it will not sign) and Guyana (whose eligibility to sign is in dispute). Brazil has ratified the Treaty in a manner that seems likely to defer indefinitely its entry into force for Brazil. * The Treaty itself is not open for signature by states that are located outside Latin America, and such states are not eligible for membership in, or bound by the decisions of, the implementing organization. The Protocols to the Treaty, on the other hand, are designed for adherence by States outside the region. Protocol ( Tab C ) is designed to enable such States which have territories within Latin America (i.e. the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Netherlands) to subject such territories to the provisions of the Treaty. Protocol II ( Tab D ) is designed for adherence by nuclear weapon states. It contains undertakings to respect the aims and provisions of the Treaty, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American states for which the Treaty is in force. The statement made by the United States in connection with signature of Protocol II clarifies our understanding of these undertakings. Protocol I has been signed and ratified by the United Kingdom and signed by the Netherlands. It has not been signed by the United States or France. Protocol II has been signed and ratified by the United Kingdom and signed by the United States. It has not been signed by the Soviet Union, France or the Chinese Communists. Before the U.S. signed Protocol II, a careful study of the implications and consequences of adhering to it was made by the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission and ACDA. As a result of this study, it was recommended that our signature be accompanied by a statement clarifying our understanding of certain aspects of our undertaking. That statement (the full text of which appears at Tab E ) is discussed below. It is recommended that the same statement be made an integral part of the U.S. ratification of Protocol 11. (In that connection it should be noted that the United Kingdom incorporated the statement at Tab F in its instrument of ratification of Protocol II.) The U.S. Statement on Signing Protocol II The statement is divided into three sections. Section I of the statement has three paragraphs. 1. Territory The first paragraph of Section I provides: “The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims.” Article 3 of the Treaty (which is incorporated by reference in Article 4 of Protocol II), provides that, for the purposes of the Treaty, the term “territory” shall include all space “over which the state exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation.” When the Treaty was being negotiated, the U.S. had suggested the deletion of the language “in accordance with its own legislation,” noting that “this language raises serious problems of territorial sovereignty which cannot realistically be resolved in the context of a nuclear free zone treaty.” Several Latin American states claim extended territorial seas. Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, and Peru, for example, claim 200 mile territorial seas. The United States has never accepted such claims and holds them contrary to the rules of international law. The United States statement assures that United States ratification of Protocol II cannot be construed as an acceptance by the United States of the unilaterally asserted territorial boundary claims of the parties to the Treaty. 2. Transit The second paragraph of Section 1 of the United States statement deals with the question of the transit through the Treaty’s zone of application of airplanes or ships of states that are not Parties while carrying nuclear weapons. It cites the negotiating history of the Treaty, which makes it clear that such rights and privileges of transit are not affected by the Treaty. One of the alternative drafts of Article 1 of the Treaty submitted at the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission would have prohibited the Parties from permitting “transport” of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Mexico’s alternative text did not include any reference to “transport”. In his letter of August 29, 1966, to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, U.S. Ambassador Freeman stated that “the United States assumes that the proposed treaty would impose no prohibition that would restrict the freedom of transit within the Western Hemisphere. The United States policy on freedom of transit is based on our national security needs and the vital security interests of the Hemisphere.… We therefore assume that the language of Article 1 as finally agreed will not in any way impair the freedom of transit.” At the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission, Argentina advised that it wished a prohibition against transit and transport to be included in the Treaty. However, the Commission refused to adopt the Argentine position and the Final Act of the Fourth Session contained a specific statement regarding transit and transport. This statement notes that the parties to the Treaty itself may not engage in the “transport” of nuclear weapons, whether in transit or not, because of the prohibition in Article 1 against “any form of possession of nuclear weapons.” But in the case of other states, including Parties to Protocol II, the transport of nuclear weapons is seen as “identical with ’transit”, which, in the absence of any provision of the Treaty, must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law.” In the light of this background, the statement made by the United States on signing Protocol II read: “The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges.” Both the statement in the Final Act and the United States statement preserve for the United States the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea (this being one effect of the phrase “governed by the principles and rules of international law”). The statement in the Final Act and the United States statement also preserve for the United States the privilege, if granted by the relevant Party, of port visits and overflights incidental to transit. The Final Act statement provides assurance that the continuation of present U.S. policies and practices with respect to the transport or transit of nuclear weapons will not be inconsistent with our undertakings under Protocol II to “fully respect the statute of denuclearization” and not to contribute to violations of Article 1 of the Treaty. Our experience since the Treaty’s entry into force provides further assurance on this question. As shown below, the Treaty has now been in force for most of its present parties for an appreciable period of time: Date of Ratification Country 1967 September 20 Mexico 1968 April 22 El Salvador June 14 Dominican Republic August 20 Uruguay September 23 Honduras October 23 Nicaragua 1969 February 11 Ecuador February 18 Bolivia March 4 Peru March 19 Paraguay April 25 Barbados May 23 Haiti June 26 Jamaica August 25 Costa Rica 1970 February 6 Guatemala We have had no difficulties under the Treaty with respect to transit and transport privileges. The only relevant diplomatic exchanges have been those described below with Mexico, to which our naval vessels make some 60 port visits per year. In April, 1969, the Mexican Government presented us with a note which did not refer to the Treaty but asked us for assurances that we would not request port visits of ships or overflights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. After several diplomatic exchanges, the matter was resolved as follows to the apparent satisfaction of all concerned: it was agreed that we would not reply to the note, but that we would continue to request clearances for port visits and overflights in the same manner as in the past; and the Mexican Government indicated that such requests would be granted. At the time this way of handling the matter was worked out, the Foreign Minister of Mexico cleared up a misunderstanding (based on an earlier remark he had made) by stating that the Mexican Government’s request had been independent of and unrelated to the Treaty, and expressed agreement with the U.S. interpretation of the Treaty with respect to transit rights (Cable No. 4903 from Mexico City, 6 September 1969). We understand that no difficulties have been experienced since that time. It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom received a similar note from Mexico, which was handled in the same general way prior to U.K. ratification of Protocol II. 3. Non-Use As shown at page 1 of this memorandum, one of the undertakings by the Latin American parties to the Treaty is to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Protocol II, which is basically an undertaking by nuclear-weapon states to respect the Treaty and not to contribute to its violation, contains an undertaking “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties” to the Treaty, which are defined to include only those Latin American states with respect to which the Treaty is actually in force. This undertaking does not extend to other nuclear powers, nor to non-parties to the Treaty (such as Cuba), nor to states outside the zone which have territories or possessions within it. It is made in reciprocity for the undertakings of the Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Treaty which not only are designed to keep the area wholly free from nuclear weapons but also include an undertaking to refrain from “encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the use…possession or control of any nuclear weapon.” Actions incompatible with those basic obligations would constitute a failure of the consideration for our non-use undertaking, and thus a material breach of the Treaty that would enable us to treat our non-use undertaking as no longer binding. To make clear our understanding that this principle would extend to an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, the third paragraph of Section I of the U.S. statement reads as follows: “As regards the undertaking in article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under article 1 of the treaty.” Assessment of the non-use undertaking at the time the Treaty was signed by the United States resulted in agreement within the government that it was acceptable in this particular case in view of (a) the special historic relationship which the United States has maintained with its hemispheric neighbors, and (b) the difficulty of conceiving of circumstances in which the United States would find it in its interest to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a Latin American party to the Treaty which was abiding by its obligations there under, as understood by the United States and clarified in the foregoing statement. 4. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions The Treaty does not preclude the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes within the territories of the parties, provided such explosions are carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 (which establishes certain procedural requirements) “and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5” (Article 1 includes the basic undertakings, quoted at-page 1 above, not to acquire, use, or possess nuclear weapons, and Article 5 defines “nuclear weapon” in a manner which covers the nuclear explosive devices that could be used in an explosion for peaceful purposes). During negotiation of the Treaty, Brazil took the position that the parties should be left free to manufacture their own nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. The United States, which was then facing the same problem in the NPT negotiations, pointed out that to carve out this exception from the undertakings under Article 1 would be to nullify the latter. In response to our suggestions, a new paragraph 4 was added to Article 18 of the Treaty, permitting the Parties to accept the collaboration of third parties, such as the United States, in carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions. It is our position, which is shared by Mexico and (to the best of our knowledge and belief) by most of the other parties, that the final text of the treaty must be construed, like the NPT, to prohibit the manufacture or other acquisition of nuclear explosive devices even for peaceful purposes, and hence not to enable the parties to explode such devices by themselves. The only present party to the Treaty which has indicated a different view is Nicaragua (see Tab H ). Brazil and Argentina, which are the only other countries that have indicated such disagreement, are not yet parties to the Treaty. None of the three is yet a party to the NPT. To make clear our understanding of the Treaty on this point, the United States included the following paragraphs as Part II of its statement on signature: “The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of article 18. “The United States further notes that paragraph-4 of article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear weapon States in a commitment to do so.” The last sentence of this statement was written before negotiation of the NPT was completed, and accordingly neither reflects the fact that in that Treaty we did join other nuclear weapon states in such a commitment, nor indicates the terms and conditions of such commitment. Thus it appears desirable to revise this sentence in the statement we make upon ratification of Protocol II. A suggested revision follows: “In this connection, the United States calls attention to Article V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear weapon states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive devices.” This revision assumes that the United States is willing to make nuclear explosion services available to parties to this treaty even if they are not also parties to the NPT. Failure to do so would seem clearly inconsistent with assurances we gave during negotiation of the treaty (see Tab G ) and in our statement on signature. Such failure would also strengthen the hand of those who believe the Treaty should not be read to preclude the development, acquisition or use by the parties themselves of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes—a position which would destroy the efficacy of the Treaty as a non-proliferation measure. On the other hand, the extension of this commitment to non-NPT parties could reduce the incentive to join the NPT, and might be criticized in the Senate as an uncalled-for extension of our undertaking under Article V of that Treaty, which was itself subjected to criticism as constituting “nuclear largesse.” The particular wording suggested is designed to: (1) update our statement on signature by making clear that we have already joined others in a commitment to ensure that nuclear explosion services are made available on a non-discriminatory basis; (2) make clear that the basis on which we would be willing to make the explosion services available is the same as that under the NPT: * (3) limit ourselves to an expression of willingness to extend NPT benefits to parties to this treaty, thus implying that some further step may be necessary to create a legally binding commitment to do so. (This could reduce the basis for Congressional criticism and would leave some of the incentive for joining the NPT provided by Article V thereof, which is more clearly a commitment not only by us but by other parties.); and (4) limit our expression of willingness to extend the NPT undertaking to those parties to the Latin American Treaty who consider themselves bound by our interpretation of Article 18 of that Treaty. Regardless of the form of the U.S. statement, it is clear that neither the Treaty, nor our ratification of Protocol II, would prevent the United States from conducting the nuclear explosions that would be involved in the nuclear excavation of an Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal. If such excavation were conducted in the territory of a party to the Treaty, however, the procedural requirements set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 18 would of course have to be met. (Neither Panama nor Colombia is yet a party to the Treaty, although both have signed it. * ) In this connection, it should be noted that the provisions in paragraph 3 of Article 18 regarding observation of preparations and “unrestricted access in the vicinity of the site of the explosion” for the International Atomic Energy Commission and the personnel from the regional implementing organization would have to be read in the light of the basic purpose of the Treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. Access could not be such as to disclose the technology involved in the manufacture of the nuclear explosive devices used by a nuclear weapon state in providing the explosion service. That the United States understands paragraph 3 of Article 18 in this fashion is demonstrated by the reference in Part II of the United States statement to our goal of carrying out any such explosions in a manner consistent with the policy of “not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.” * 5. Protocol I Territories As noted in the section above on the “non-use” undertaking in Protocol II, that undertaking applies only to the “Contracting Parties” to the Treaty itself, a term that does not include territories or possessions in the area that are brought under the Treaty by ratification of Protocol I. Thus territories such as Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles and British Honduras could be subjected to all of the obligations of a party to the Treaty without getting the benefit of the “non-use” undertaking under Protocol II. In signing Protocol II, both the United States and the United Kingdom indicated their desire to correct this inequity (which was probably a drafting oversight) by extending their “non-use” undertakings to such territories. Thus Section III of the U.S. statement on signature reads as follows: “The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties.” Other Matters While it is believed that the preceding discussions covers the principal matters that must be considered in connection with U.S. ratification of Protocol II, several others should be noted: (a) Zone of Application Although the Treaty includes provisions for the eventual creation of a very extensive zone of application, excluding the continental United States but covering substantial portions of the high seas, these provisions can be ignored in considering our ratification of Protocol II. This is so because, even after ratification of Protocol II, we will retain full power to prevent this broad zone of application from ever coming into effect. The Treaty provides that one of the preconditions for this extension of the zone of application is U.S. signature and ratification of Protocol I to the Treaty. We have not signed Protocol I, and do not contemplate doing so in the foreseeable future. Moreover, it seems extremely unlikely that ail the other preconditions—which include ratification of the Treaty by Cuba and ratification of Protocol II by the Chinese Communists—will ever be met. (b) The Canal Zone Panama has signed, but not yet ratified the Treaty. During negotiation of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission was officially advised by the United States that “From the U.S. point of view, we would be agreeable to inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone” under the Treaty, “although of course the well-established transit rights would-not be affected.” * to achieve this result by signing and ratifying Protocol I to the Treaty, however, would present problems, because (1) we would have to specify in our ratification of Protocol I that it did not apply to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which we do not wish included in a nuclear free zone; (2) we might lose our ability to prevent the entry into force of the extended zone of application of the Treaty; and (3) Panama takes the position that it has the power to commit the Canal Zone to the Treaty by virtue of its sovereignty over the Zone. The United States position is that only the U.S. has the power to enter into treaty obligations covering the Zone (since it exercises all powers as if it were sovereign) and that Panama cannot do so without the consent of the United States. When Panama ratifies the Treaty, the United States could assert that our ratification of Protocol II, coupled with our earlier expressions of intent with respect to the Canal Zone, constituted consent to inclusion of the Canal Zone under the Treaty, subject to established transit rights. That, together with Panamanian ratification of the Treaty, would leave no doubt (under either the U.S. or Panamanian legal positions) that the Treaty was applicable to the Canal Zone. (c) Duration and Denunciation Protocol II makes the provisions in Article 29 of the Treaty, on duration and denunciation, applicable to that Protocol. Article 29 provides that the Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but that any Party may denounce it by giving three months’ advance notice that, in its opinion, “there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of the Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests and the peace and security of one or more of the Contracting Parties.” (The three months’ notice requirement would not apply to-an exercise of our right under international law, discussed under “Non-Use” above, to consider ourselves relieved of our undertakings under Protocol II as against a party responsible for a material breach of its own obligations under the Treaty.) (d) The Soviet Position The Soviets have not signed Protocol II, and have indicated considerable hesitancy to do so. The reasons for this hesitancy appear to include the following: (1) Support for the position of Cuba, which has refused to join the treaty, asserting that U.S. nuclear weapons remain in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and “and other Latin American areas”; (2) The fact that the Treaty contains no ban on the transportation of nuclear weapons and that the United States has refused to stop sending nuclear-armed vessels through the Panama Canal; (3) The position taken by Brazil, with which the Soviet Union disagrees as we do, with respect to the Treaty’s provisions on peaceful nuclear explosions; (4) Concern that the Treaty may deflect some Latin American states from joining the NPT, which the Soviets prefer; and (5) The fact that their ratification of Protocol II, unlike ours, would end their ability to control whether the extended zone of application—covering substantial areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans—ever comes into effect. While we would consider Soviet adherence to Protocol II highly desirable, we do not believe it should be considered a sine qua non of our own adherence to that Protocol. This is so because: (1) The principal benefit of the Treaty to us lies in the undertaking of the Latin American. parties to forswear nuclear weapons, to prohibit and prevent their introduction into the area, and not to authorize or encourage their use by others. Participation by the Soviets is irrelevant to the first, and the second and third should serve to inhibit the Soviet Union even if it does not adhere to Protocol II. (2) The Treaty will supplement our national efforts to detect any introduction of nuclear weapons into the region by the Soviet Union; and (3) The non-use undertaking in Protocol II, as clarified by our statement on signature, would not apply to any state which permitted the Soviet Union to introduce nuclear weapons into the area or to a situation in which the Soviet Union assisted a Contracting Party in connection with an armed attack by such Party. CONCLUSION Except for the proposed revision of our statement on peaceful nuclear explosions, all of the problems discussed above were carefully considered in connection with the U.S. decision to sign Protocol II to the. Treaty. It is believed that the review of these problems in this memorandum indicates that none of them is so serious or unmanageable as to offset the clear advantages to the United States of proceeding with ratification of Protocol II and incorporating in the instrument of ratification the statement described above. Tab D Additional Protocol II undated The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments, Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendation 3 of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States, Have agreed as follows: Article 1. The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions. Article 2. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof. Article 3. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 4. The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty. Article 5. This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments. Tab E Statement Accompanying Signature by the States of Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America undated In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States Government makes the following statement: I The United States understands that the treaty and its protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims. The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. As regards the undertaking in article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under article 1 of the treaty. II The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of article 18. The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devises for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear weapon States in a commitment to do so. III The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties. Tab F U.K. Statement on Ratification of Protocol II undated “On depositing these instruments of ratification, I have the honour to declare that it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom that: (a) The reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to “its own legislation” relates only to such legislation as is compatible with-the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as implying recognition of any legislation which did not, in their view, comply with the relevant, rules of international law; (b) Article 18 of the Treaty, when read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 thereof, would not permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in technology have made possible the development of devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes; (c) Signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as affecting in any way the legal status of any territory for the international relations of which they are responsible lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by the Treaty; and (d) The Government of the United Kingdom would, in the event of any act of aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty in which that Party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State, be free to reconsider the extent to which they could be regarded as committed by the provisions of Additional Protocol II. I have the honour further to declare that the Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to regard their undertaking under Article 3 of Additional Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearization, in accordance with Article I of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective. The Government of the United Kingdom have always believed that the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America would be a most useful step towards non-proliferation and the building up of international confidence. While warmly welcoming the achievement of the States concerned in setting up the organs of the Treaty, Her Majesty’s Government note with regret that the Treaty is not yet in force in a number of important States in the area. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore hope that the deposit of their instruments of ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty will serve as an encouragement both to other nuclear weapon States to recognize the Treaty and to those Latin American States which have not yet done so, to bring the Treaty into force in their territory.” Tab G Excerpt from Note Addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission by the United States Ambassador to Mexico August 29, 1966 Article 13 [Later became Article 18] We agree that Article 13 should permit the contracting parties to arrange with nuclear powers for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but believe that it should not provide for the acquisition or development by the contracting parties of their own nuclear devices for such purposes. We recommend that Article 13 specifically prohibit the testing, manufacture, or other acquisition of all nuclear explosives by the contracting parties. The development of any nuclear explosive device by such a partes even if intended for a non-military purpose, would be essentially indistinguishable from a weapons development program, and would necessarily provide information directly pertinent for such a program. The effect on triggering further nuclear proliferation by neighbors and potential adversaries would be virtually the same as from building a bomb. This is particularly so, since any nuclear explosive intended for peaceful applications could be used as a weapon, or could be readily adapted for such use. If a Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, therefore, permitted the manufacture or acquisition without appropriate controls of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, the treaty would be rendered virtually meaningless. The United States believes, however, that possible future benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be made available to all states, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, but in a manner which would not contribute in any way to nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, the United States believes that if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives that are permissible under test ban treaty limitations prove technically and economically feasible, states that possess nuclear explosive devices should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful uses, Such a service would consist of performing the desired detonation under appropriate international observation, with the-nuclear device remaining under the control., and custody of the state that performs the service. This procedure would make available any possible future benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions at a, cost far below that at which other countries could develop and produce such devices for themselves, especially in the case of excavation projects where only highly sophisticated thermonuclear explosives are really useful. Paragraph 3 of Article 13 provides that appropriate officials shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the explosion site, Since this could result in the compromise and divulging of sensitive design data of the nuclear device and of other techniques, we suggest that the officials only be given such access as is necessary to ensure compliance with paragraph 2 of this article. Tab H Statements of Minority View With Respect to Article 18 undated BRAZIL : Statement on signature (which was repeated on ratification): “The Brazilian Government, in affixing its signature to the Treaty… desires to reaffirm its interpretation of the meaning of Article 18 of that instrument. It is the understanding of the Government of Brazil that said Article 18 permits signatory states to carry out, through their own means or in asspciation with third parties, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including those which might presuppose devices similar to those used in military armament. I ask that your excellency transmit the tenor of the present note to all the signatories of the treaty.” (Emphasis added) [Note: Article 18 does provide that “The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose” but adds, “provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5.”] Statement by Ambassador Silveira at INDC, August 31, 1967: “Brazil is a signatory of the only international agreement which prohibits nuclear weapons in an inhabited region of the world. The LatinAmerican Treaty, the purposes of which we have always supported, encourages peaceful nuclearization and fully allows its parties to conduct research and to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the manufacture of explosive devices for uses other than military . In Latin America—within a homogeneous international community where special favorable conditions prevail—we have made it clear that the renunciation of nuclear armament does not entail the abandonment of our inalienable right to economic and social development through the preservation of our freedom of scientific research and technological advancement. There can certainly be no reason, in a broader context, to adhere to a treaty the NPT imposing greater restrictions and restrictions which, in our view are both unjust and unnecessary,” (Emphasis added) ARGENTINA : Statement on signature: “In signing the treaty … the Government of the Argentine Republic wishes to express its satisfaction over the inclusion in the instrument of clauses safeguarding the peaceful development of nuclear energy, among them Article 18 , which recognizes the right of the Contracting Parties, by their own means or in association with third parties, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, including explosions that presuppose devices similar to those used in nuclear armaments . The Government of the Argentine Republic understands that the aforesaid provisions insure the use of nuclear energy as an essential aid in the development of Latin America and that consequently they constitute a fundamental prior condition on which to base an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for the nuclear and non-nuclear powers with respect to nonproliferation.” (Emphasis added) [Note: Embassy Caracas indicated that this statement had been coordinated with the Brazilian government.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Director, Subject Files of the Former Executive Director Office, December 1969–December 1970: FRC 383–98–4, Latin America Free Zone, February–December 1970. Confidential. The letter is an unsigned copy but bears an indication Richardson signed the original. Tabs D–H of the enclosed Background Memorandum are published but not Tabs A–C. For documentation on the decision to sign Protocol II in 1968, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XI, Document 226 * Barbados, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay. (For Nicaragua’s statement on peaceful nuclear explosions, see pp. 8-9 of Background Memorandum.) ** Argentina, Brazil and Chile. (For statements of the first two on peaceful nuclear explosions, see pp. 8–9 of Background Memorandum.) * Unlike the other states which have ratified the Treaty, Brazil did not waive the numerous preconditions set forth in Article 28 for its entry into force. * Which provides (1) that “Each party to the treaty undertakes -to take appropriate means to ensure” that “the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions” will be made available “in accordance with this Treaty” (thus precluding any transfer of nuclear explosive devices or access to information that would be of assistance in their manufacture); (2) that they will be made available “under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures…on a non-discriminatory basis;” (3) that “the charge for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development;” and (4) that such benefits shall be obtainable either pursuant to bilateral agreements or “pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements/negotiations on which are to commence as soon as possible after the entry into force of the NPT/ through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon states.” * They have both also signed the NPT. * Also by the earlier U.S. Note at Tab G . * Letter dated December 10, 1965 from ACDA Director Foster to Chairman Garcia Robles. 356. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 356. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 24, 1970 Subject: Proposal to Submit Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the Senate for Advice and Consent to Ratification Recommendations: 1. That you agree to submit to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Approve Disapprove 2. That you authorize me to announce, during my speech before the OAS General Assembly on June 26, that you intend to submit the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification during the current session of Congress, Approve Disapprove Discussion: Sixteen of our Latin American allies have brought into force a regional. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Which in many ways complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On April 1, 1968, Vice President Humphrey signed Additional Protocol II to that Treaty for the United States. This is a Protocol designed for adherence by nuclear weapon states, which are not eligible to sign the Treaty itself. Adherents to the Protocol undertake to respect the aims and provisions of the. Treaty, not to contribute to its violation in the territories to which it applies, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. Protocol II has been signed and ratified by, the United Kingdom. Prior to the U.S. signature, the issues involved in U.S. adherence to the Protocol were carefully reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. These departments and agencies concurred in the decision that the U.S. should sign the Protocol with a statement designed to clarify our understanding of several points under the Treaty, which our review indicated needed clarification. Such a statement was made at the time of signing. The Department of Defense requested, however, an opportunity to review the matter again prior to the submission of the Protocol to the Senate, to assure that any relevant experience under the Treaty following our signature would be taken into account. This review has now been completed, and the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission are agreed with me that it would be advantageous for the Administration to proceed with ratification. I understand that the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has periodically inquired when this Protocol will be submitted to the Senate, and has indicated the expectation that it would be favorably received. To facilitate consideration, I enclose a brief summary of the significant U.S. interests that would be served by ratification of Additional Protocol II in the near future with a statement similar to that made on signature, and a more detailed paper describing and containing the text of the Protocol and the underlying Treaty, including their status, the issues that were considered by the Executive Branch in connection with the decision to sign the Protocol, and relevant developments since such signature. As you know, I am scheduled to address the General Assembly of the OAS on June 26. I believe it would make a favorable impression on that body and on Latin American opinion in general if I could announce on your behalf in that speech that the United States Executive Branch has completed its review of Protocol II of the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and that you intend to submit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification this summer. While I am aware that this allows little time for a decision of this nature, the obvious advantage of making such an announcement at an important gathering of representatives of our Latin American allies prompts me to recommend your expeditious consideration of an issue on which would shortly have sent you a recommendation in any event. If you agree to the procedure I have outlined, we shall complete the preparation of the necessary documents to accompany the formal submission of the Protocol to the Senate. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6. Secret. In a June 26, 1970, memorandum, Jeanne Davis, Director of the NSC Secretariat, notified Eliot that Rogers was authorized to announce to the OAS Assembly on June 26 that the President would submit Protocol II for Senate ratification. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–6) 357. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 357. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 16, 1970 Subject: Transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed for the United States on April 1, 1968. On June 26, 1970 the Secretary announced before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States that the President would submit the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification in the very near future. The enclosed report of the Secretary of State and message from the President to the Senate are for the purpose of making that submission. Additional Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon States, not eligible to sign the Treaty itself, to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America as provided for in the Treaty, not to contribute to violation of the Treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Treaty parties. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified the Protocol. The Secretary’s report proposes a statement of understandings to be made an integral part of United States ratification of the Protocol, similar to the statement made by the United States at the time of signing the Protocol. It expresses our understanding concerning territories and territorial claims, transit and transport privileges, nonuse of nuclear weapons, and the definition of “nuclear weapon”. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the proposed submission to the Senate. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary Enclosure 1 Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, July 16, 1970 The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, Additional Protocol II, signed on April 1, 1968 on behalf of the United States of America, to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Treaty itself is not open for signature to states that are located outside Latin America, and such states are not eligible for membership in, or bound by the decisions of, the regional organization established to implement the Treaty. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty is specifically designed for adherence by nuclear-weapon states that are willing to undertake to respect the express aims and provisions of the Treaty, not to contribute to its violation in the territories to which it applies, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states parties to the Treaty. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified the Protocol. The obligations which states assume upon ratification of the Protocol derive from both the provisions of the Protocol and the provisions of the Treaty itself. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is the culmination of a regional effort to keep Latin America free of nuclear weapons. A Joint Declaration on the subject was issued by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico on April 29, 1963. This effort was welcomed and encouraged by a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 27, 1963. After several years of international negotiation, including consideration of comments by the United States, the Treaty was opened for signature on February 14, 1967. The United States has expressed its support for the Treaty not only by signing Additional Protocol II, but also in public statements made by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, by our representatives in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee and the. United Nations General Assembly, and by United States votes for resolutions of the General Assembly in 1967 and 1968 commending the Treaty and calling upon those eligible to sign and ratify Protocol II to do so. The Treaty has been signed by all Latin American states except Cuba (whose present government has indicated that it does not intend to sign) and Guyana (whose eligibility to sign is in dispute). It is currently in force for 16 of these states, and a new regional organization has been established to implement it. The basic undertakings of the Contracting Parties (defined in Article 2 as the states for which the Treaty is in force) are set forth in Article 1. They are (a) to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction; (b) to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons; (c) to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons by the Contracting Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf, or in any other way; and (d) to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon. The negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that these prohibitions do not affect transit and transport privileges of non-Contracting Parties. This fact is reflected in the statement which accompanied United States signature of Protocol II and which, it is proposed, should accompany our ratification thereof. In that statement the United States “takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant, or deny non-Contracting Parties, transit and transport privileges.” The United States statement makes clear also that, as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Treaty parties, this country would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party to the Treaty, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with that Party’s corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty. Article 3 of the Treaty defines “territory” to include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the state exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation. The statement of the United States makes clear our understanding that the Treaty and its protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims. Article 4 of the Treaty defines the zone of application of the Treaty as “the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force”. The article also makes provision for a broader zone of application within the Western Hemisphere, including international waters, upon the fulfillment of all of a number of conditions, one of which is United States ratification of Protocol I to the Treaty. Protocol I calls upon states to apply the status of denuclearization in territories for which they are internationally responsible within the Treaty zone. The United States has not signed Protocol I, and the United Kingdom is the only nuclear-weapon state that has to date become a party to this Protocol. Article 5 of the Treaty defines nuclear weapons. It excludes an instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of a nuclear explosive device if it is separable from the device itself and not an indivisible part thereof. But it includes any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. This definition is particularly significant in connection with Article 18 of the Treaty, which deals with peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Paragraph 1 of that article provides that the Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided they do so in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly Articles 1 and 5. Paragraph 4 of Article 18 specifically permits the Contracting Parties to accept the collaboration of third parties for such purposes. The statement which accompanied signature by the United States of Additional Protocol II, made the following comments on the definition of “nuclear weapon” in Article 5: “The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18; “The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear weapon States in a commitment to do so.” Subsequent to the making of this statement, the United States in fact joined in such a commitment in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force on March 5, 1970. Accordingly, it is proposed that when used in connection with our ratification of Additional Protocol II the last sentence of this statement be Updated to read as follows: “In this connection, the United States calls attention to Article V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive devices.” Neither the Treaty nor our adherence to Additional Protocol II would present any bar to the use by the United States of nuclear explosions for excavation of a new Atlantic-Pacific interoceanic canal with the consent of the party in whose territory such excavation took place, although it would have to be consistent with other treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty. But, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America would require certain procedures to be followed in connection with such a project. These include (a) advance notification to the International Atomic Energy Agency, containing the information specified in paragraph 2 of Article 18, and (b) observation as provided in paragraph 3 of that article, by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of the new regional organization established to implement the Treaty. Articles 6–11 of the Treaty are not of direct interest to the United States, since they relate to meetings of the signatories and the organization and procedures of the regional “Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America” (the Spanish acronym for which is OPANAL). The first meeting of this organization was held in Mexico City September 2–9, 1969, and was attended by a United States observer. Article 7 of the Treaty provides that “Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions.” Articles 12–16 of the Treaty establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 1. Article 13 requires the Contracting Parties to enter into agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to their nuclear activities.’ I enclose a copy of the Treaty and Additional Protocol I, which I suggest be transmitted to the Senate for its information in connection with consideration of Protocol II. Also enclosed is a copy of the statement which I propose be made an integral part of United States ratification of Protocol II, I believe that ratification of Additional Protocol Il to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty would complement our other efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Respectfully submitted, William P. Rogers Enclosure 2 Proposed Statement on U.S. Ratification of Additional Protocol II undated PROPOSED STATEMENT ON RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA I The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims. The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty. II The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States calls attention to Article V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device. III The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, DEF 18–9 LA. No classification marking. Drafted by McDowell. Enclosures 2 and 3 are not published. 358. Proclamation by President Nixon 358. Proclamation by President Nixon 1 Washington, July 16, 1970 Proclamation by President Nixon on Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, June 11, 1971 1 The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of 19 April 1971, two thirds of the Senators present concurring, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of Additional Protocol II, with the following understandings and declarations: I That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the treaty to “its own legislation” to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of this treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law. That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article I of the treaty. II That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device. 2 III That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties. The President ratified Additional Protocol II on 8 May 1971, with the above-recited understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate. It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II that the Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was deposited on 11 December 1969, with understandings and a declaration, and the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12, 1971 with the above-recited understandings and declarations. In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol entered into force for the United States of America on 12 May 1971, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations. Now, Therefore , I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations, on and after 12 May 1971, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. In testimony whereof, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fifth. [SEAL] Richard Nixon By the President: William P. Rogers Secretary of State 1 Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1971 , pp. 311–313. No classification marking. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report on Additional Protocol II, April 5, 1971, see ibid., pp. 197–201. 1 A/8560, Dec. 8, 1971. The treaty appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 69 ff. For Additional Protocol II, see ibid ., p. 83. 2 Ibid., 1968 , pp. 461–465.